The University of Southampton
University of Southampton Institutional Repository

An argument for conjunction conditionalization

An argument for conjunction conditionalization
An argument for conjunction conditionalization
Are counterfactuals with true antecedents and consequents automatically true? That is, is Conjunction Conditionalization: (X ? Y) ? (X > Y) valid? Stalnaker and Lewis think so, but many others disagree. We note here that the extant arguments for Conjunction Conditionalization are unpersuasive, before presenting a family of more compelling arguments. These arguments rely on some standard theorems of the logic of counterfactuals as well as a plausible and popular semantic claim about certain semifactuals. Denying Conjunction Conditionalization, then, requires rejecting other aspects of the standard logic of counterfactuals or else our intuitive picture of semifactuals
1755-0203
573-588
Walters, Lee
6588848d-16fa-41f1-a94b-c339c3428c13
Williams, J.R.G.
7c7eb68f-6f5b-4f39-9e00-e17494ed5647
Walters, Lee
6588848d-16fa-41f1-a94b-c339c3428c13
Williams, J.R.G.
7c7eb68f-6f5b-4f39-9e00-e17494ed5647

Walters, Lee and Williams, J.R.G. (2013) An argument for conjunction conditionalization. The Review of Symbolic Logic, 6, 573-588. (doi:10.1017/S1755020313000191).

Record type: Article

Abstract

Are counterfactuals with true antecedents and consequents automatically true? That is, is Conjunction Conditionalization: (X ? Y) ? (X > Y) valid? Stalnaker and Lewis think so, but many others disagree. We note here that the extant arguments for Conjunction Conditionalization are unpersuasive, before presenting a family of more compelling arguments. These arguments rely on some standard theorems of the logic of counterfactuals as well as a plausible and popular semantic claim about certain semifactuals. Denying Conjunction Conditionalization, then, requires rejecting other aspects of the standard logic of counterfactuals or else our intuitive picture of semifactuals

Text
An Argument for Conjunction Conditionalization.docx - Accepted Manuscript
Download (75kB)

More information

Published date: 25 November 2013
Organisations: Philosophy

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 355645
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/355645
ISSN: 1755-0203
PURE UUID: d3456274-c8f2-4729-9801-714b01c370ca
ORCID for Lee Walters: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0003-3899-3522

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 03 Sep 2013 10:54
Last modified: 15 Mar 2024 03:48

Export record

Altmetrics

Contributors

Author: Lee Walters ORCID iD
Author: J.R.G. Williams

Download statistics

Downloads from ePrints over the past year. Other digital versions may also be available to download e.g. from the publisher's website.

View more statistics

Atom RSS 1.0 RSS 2.0

Contact ePrints Soton: eprints@soton.ac.uk

ePrints Soton supports OAI 2.0 with a base URL of http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/cgi/oai2

This repository has been built using EPrints software, developed at the University of Southampton, but available to everyone to use.

We use cookies to ensure that we give you the best experience on our website. If you continue without changing your settings, we will assume that you are happy to receive cookies on the University of Southampton website.

×