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The coevolution of costly heterogeneities and cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game

The coevolution of costly heterogeneities and cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game
The coevolution of costly heterogeneities and cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game
This paper discusses the co-evolution of social strategies and an efficiency trait in spatial evolutionary games. The continuous efficiency trait determines how well a player can convert gains from a prisoner's dilemma game into evolutionary fitness. It is assumed to come at a cost proportional to its magnitude and this cost is deducted from payoff. We demonstrate that cost ranges exist such that the regime in which cooperation can persist is strongly extended by the co-evolution of efficiencies and strategies. We find that cooperation typically associates with large efficiencies while defection tends to pair with lower efficiencies. The simulations highlight that social dilemma situations in structured populations can be resolved in a natural way: the nature of the dilemma itself leads to differential pressures for efficiency improvement in cooperator and defector populations. Cooperators benefit by larger improvements which allow them to survive even in the face of inferior performance in the social dilemma. Importantly, the mechanism is possible with and without the presence of noise in the evolutionary replication process.
159-166
Brede, M.
bbd03865-8e0b-4372-b9d7-cd549631f3f7
Noble, J.
440f07ba-dbb8-4d66-b969-36cde4e3b764
Brede, M.
bbd03865-8e0b-4372-b9d7-cd549631f3f7
Noble, J.
440f07ba-dbb8-4d66-b969-36cde4e3b764

Brede, M. and Noble, J. (2013) The coevolution of costly heterogeneities and cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game. ECAL 2013, Italy. pp. 159-166 .

Record type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)

Abstract

This paper discusses the co-evolution of social strategies and an efficiency trait in spatial evolutionary games. The continuous efficiency trait determines how well a player can convert gains from a prisoner's dilemma game into evolutionary fitness. It is assumed to come at a cost proportional to its magnitude and this cost is deducted from payoff. We demonstrate that cost ranges exist such that the regime in which cooperation can persist is strongly extended by the co-evolution of efficiencies and strategies. We find that cooperation typically associates with large efficiencies while defection tends to pair with lower efficiencies. The simulations highlight that social dilemma situations in structured populations can be resolved in a natural way: the nature of the dilemma itself leads to differential pressures for efficiency improvement in cooperator and defector populations. Cooperators benefit by larger improvements which allow them to survive even in the face of inferior performance in the social dilemma. Importantly, the mechanism is possible with and without the presence of noise in the evolutionary replication process.

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More information

Published date: August 2013
Venue - Dates: ECAL 2013, Italy, 2013-08-01
Organisations: Agents, Interactions & Complexity

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Local EPrints ID: 357201
URI: https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/357201
PURE UUID: f86317fd-40b9-4310-bb42-06b66132556c

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Date deposited: 23 Sep 2013 10:23
Last modified: 18 Jul 2017 03:35

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