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Party system nationalization, presidential coalitions, and government spending

Party system nationalization, presidential coalitions, and government spending
Party system nationalization, presidential coalitions, and government spending
This paper argues that there is a strong relationship between geographical patterns of political parties' electoral performance and the composition of central government expenditures. When party system nationalization is high, the composition of spending will focus more on non-targetable expenditures, while targetable expenditures increase as the party system distribution of votes across different districts becomes less homogenous. However, the effect of party nationalization on spending type is conditioned by the size of the presidential coalition; targeted transfers will increase if the coalition size decreases, even if party nationalization is high. I find support for these hypotheses with an empirical analysis of district-level electoral and government expenditure data for several countries in Latin America between 1990 and 2006.
0261-3794
1-12
Castaneda-Angarita, Nestor
6e791426-3da3-4ba9-baaf-83f0b564a681
Castaneda-Angarita, Nestor
6e791426-3da3-4ba9-baaf-83f0b564a681

Castaneda-Angarita, Nestor (2013) Party system nationalization, presidential coalitions, and government spending. Electoral Studies, 32 (4), 1-12. (doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2013.03.005).

Record type: Article

Abstract

This paper argues that there is a strong relationship between geographical patterns of political parties' electoral performance and the composition of central government expenditures. When party system nationalization is high, the composition of spending will focus more on non-targetable expenditures, while targetable expenditures increase as the party system distribution of votes across different districts becomes less homogenous. However, the effect of party nationalization on spending type is conditioned by the size of the presidential coalition; targeted transfers will increase if the coalition size decreases, even if party nationalization is high. I find support for these hypotheses with an empirical analysis of district-level electoral and government expenditure data for several countries in Latin America between 1990 and 2006.

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Published date: December 2013
Organisations: Politics & International Relations

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Local EPrints ID: 357420
URI: https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/357420
ISSN: 0261-3794
PURE UUID: 6ab3bcf9-286c-4772-9231-cf8c3d10de5c

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Date deposited: 10 Oct 2013 13:39
Last modified: 18 Jul 2017 03:32

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