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Social networks and interactions in cities

Social networks and interactions in cities
Social networks and interactions in cities
We examine how interaction choices depend on the interplay of social and physical distance, and show that agents who are more central in the social network, or are located closer to the geographic center of interaction, choose higher levels of interactions in equilibrium. As a result, the level of interactivity in the economy as a whole will rise with the density of links in the social network and with the degree to which agents are clustered in physical space. When agents can choose geographic locations, there is a tendency for those who are more central in the social network to locate closer to the interaction center, leading to a form of endogenous geographic separation based on social distance. We also show that the market equilibrium is not optimal because of social externalities. We determine the value of the subsidy to interactions that could support the first-best allocation as an equilibrium. Finally, we interpret our model in terms of labor-market networks and show that the lack of good job contacts would be here a structural consequence of the social isolation of inner-city neighborhoods.
social networks, urban-land use, spatial mismatch, network centrality
0022-0531
n/a
Helsley, Robert W.
8c51c459-69df-4dad-96c7-47c1b25a7529
Zenou, Yves
38bf0c72-462b-4c08-8fd1-ce365b0296dc
Helsley, Robert W.
8c51c459-69df-4dad-96c7-47c1b25a7529
Zenou, Yves
38bf0c72-462b-4c08-8fd1-ce365b0296dc

Helsley, Robert W. and Zenou, Yves (2013) Social networks and interactions in cities. Journal of Economic Theory, n/a, n/a. (doi:10.1016/j.jet.2013.09.009).

Record type: Article

Abstract

We examine how interaction choices depend on the interplay of social and physical distance, and show that agents who are more central in the social network, or are located closer to the geographic center of interaction, choose higher levels of interactions in equilibrium. As a result, the level of interactivity in the economy as a whole will rise with the density of links in the social network and with the degree to which agents are clustered in physical space. When agents can choose geographic locations, there is a tendency for those who are more central in the social network to locate closer to the interaction center, leading to a form of endogenous geographic separation based on social distance. We also show that the market equilibrium is not optimal because of social externalities. We determine the value of the subsidy to interactions that could support the first-best allocation as an equilibrium. Finally, we interpret our model in terms of labor-market networks and show that the lack of good job contacts would be here a structural consequence of the social isolation of inner-city neighborhoods.

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More information

e-pub ahead of print date: 10 September 2013
Keywords: social networks, urban-land use, spatial mismatch, network centrality
Organisations: Economics

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 358358
URI: https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/358358
ISSN: 0022-0531
PURE UUID: 9ad17030-beb3-4697-b6f6-26ded96c6cad
ORCID for Yves Zenou: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0001-6516-0812

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 07 Oct 2013 15:08
Last modified: 03 Dec 2019 01:38

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