Demand uncertainty and manufacturer returns policies for style-good retailing competition

Yao, Z., Wu, Y. and Lai, K.K. (2007) Demand uncertainty and manufacturer returns policies for style-good retailing competition. Production Planning & Control, 16 (7), 691-700. (doi:10.1080/09537280500274148).

Abstract

This paper investigates the role of the returns policy in the co-ordination of supply chain: A manufacturer provides a return policy for unsold goods to two competing retailers who face uncertain demand. The problem is described with a game theory structure: The manufacturer, as the Stackelberg leader, first commits a returns price to the retailers under a given wholesale price. Upon receiving this information, two competing retailers, as followers, make decisions for their retail price and order size, in which the process of pricing and ordering is played as Nash equilibrium. Anticipated the retailers’ responses, the manufacturer designs his returns policy. Adopting the classic newsboy problem model framework and using numerical study methods, the study finds that the provision of a returns policy is dependent on the market conditions faced by the retailers. The paper also analyses the impact of demand variability on the decisions of optimal retail price and order quantity and profit reallocation between the manufacturer and the retailers. Finally, it investigates how the competing factor influences the decision-making of supply chain members in response to uncertain demand and profit variability.

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Contributors

Author: Y. Wu

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