Pension scheme asset allocation with taxation arbitrage, risk sharing and default insurance
Pension scheme asset allocation with taxation arbitrage, risk sharing and default insurance
The asset allocation is a crucial decision for pension funds, and this paper analyses the economic factors which determine this choice. The analysis proceeds on the basis that, in the absence of taxation, risk sharing and default insurance, the asset allocation between equities and bonds is indeterminate and governed by the risk-return preferences of the trustees and the employer. If the employing company and its shareholders are subject to taxation, there is a tax advantage in a largely bond allocation. Risk sharing between the employer and the employees often means that one group favours a high equity allocation, while the other favours a low equity allocation. Underpriced default insurance creates an incentive for a high equity allocation. When taxation, risk sharing and underpriced default insurance are all present it is concluded that the appropriate asset allocation varies with the circumstances of the scheme; but that a high equity allocation is probably inappropriate for many private sector pension schemes.
pension fund, asset allocation, tax arbitrage, risk sharing, default insurance, embedded options
University of Southampton
Sutcliffe, Charles
1a8ec184-d880-492f-8714-7312c6884105
2004
Sutcliffe, Charles
1a8ec184-d880-492f-8714-7312c6884105
Sutcliffe, Charles
(2004)
Pension scheme asset allocation with taxation arbitrage, risk sharing and default insurance
(Discussion Papers in Accounting & Finance, AF04-16)
Southampton, UK.
University of Southampton
25pp.
Record type:
Monograph
(Discussion Paper)
Abstract
The asset allocation is a crucial decision for pension funds, and this paper analyses the economic factors which determine this choice. The analysis proceeds on the basis that, in the absence of taxation, risk sharing and default insurance, the asset allocation between equities and bonds is indeterminate and governed by the risk-return preferences of the trustees and the employer. If the employing company and its shareholders are subject to taxation, there is a tax advantage in a largely bond allocation. Risk sharing between the employer and the employees often means that one group favours a high equity allocation, while the other favours a low equity allocation. Underpriced default insurance creates an incentive for a high equity allocation. When taxation, risk sharing and underpriced default insurance are all present it is concluded that the appropriate asset allocation varies with the circumstances of the scheme; but that a high equity allocation is probably inappropriate for many private sector pension schemes.
More information
Published date: 2004
Additional Information:
ISSN 1356-3548
Keywords:
pension fund, asset allocation, tax arbitrage, risk sharing, default insurance, embedded options
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 35977
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/35977
PURE UUID: 18cce49c-f489-46e5-bb6c-c797e14ac9bf
Catalogue record
Date deposited: 24 May 2006
Last modified: 15 Mar 2024 07:55
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Contributors
Author:
Charles Sutcliffe
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