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Conclave

Conclave
Conclave
A committee is choosing from two alternatives. If required supermajority is not reached, voting is repeated indefinitely, although there is a cost of delay. Under suitable assumptions the equilibrium analysis provides a sharp prediction. The result can be interpreted as a generalization of the seminal median voter theorem known from the simple majority case. If supermajority is required instead, then the power to select the outcome moves from the median voter to the more extreme voters. Normative analysis indicates that the simple majority is strictly inferior to some supermajority. Even if unanimity is a bad voting rule, voting rules close to unanimity may be efficient. The more likely it is to have a very many almost indifferent voters and some very opinionated ones, the more stringent supermajority is required for efficiency.
supermajority, qualified majority, repeated voting, conclave, war of attrition
0966-4246
1308
University of Southampton
Kwiek, Maksymilian
84ba7dab-b54b-4d22-8cf3-817b2a2077cf
Kwiek, Maksymilian
84ba7dab-b54b-4d22-8cf3-817b2a2077cf

Kwiek, Maksymilian (2013) Conclave (Discussion Papers in Economics and Econometrics, 1308) Southampton, GB. University of Southampton 37pp.

Record type: Monograph (Working Paper)

Abstract

A committee is choosing from two alternatives. If required supermajority is not reached, voting is repeated indefinitely, although there is a cost of delay. Under suitable assumptions the equilibrium analysis provides a sharp prediction. The result can be interpreted as a generalization of the seminal median voter theorem known from the simple majority case. If supermajority is required instead, then the power to select the outcome moves from the median voter to the more extreme voters. Normative analysis indicates that the simple majority is strictly inferior to some supermajority. Even if unanimity is a bad voting rule, voting rules close to unanimity may be efficient. The more likely it is to have a very many almost indifferent voters and some very opinionated ones, the more stringent supermajority is required for efficiency.

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More information

Published date: October 2013
Keywords: supermajority, qualified majority, repeated voting, conclave, war of attrition
Organisations: Economics

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 359850
URI: https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/359850
ISSN: 0966-4246
PURE UUID: 8dd58b89-fd1f-40fa-aa85-989474267b6f

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Date deposited: 14 Nov 2013 14:53
Last modified: 18 Oct 2018 16:32

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