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Microfinance Institutions and Efficiency

Begoña Gutiérrez Nieto Departamento de Contabilidad y Finanzas Universidad de Zaragoza

Carlos Serrano Cinca Departamento de Contabilidad y Finanzas Universidad de Zaragoza

and

Cecilio Mar Molinero
IOC
Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya
and
School of Management
University of Southampton

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By

Begoña Gutiérrez Nieto
Departamento de Contabilidad y Finanzas
Universidad de Zaragoza
bgn@unizar.es

Carlos Serrano Cinca
Departamento de Contabilidad y Finanzas
Universidad de Zaragoza
serrano@unizar.es

Cecilio Mar Molinero
IOC
Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya
and
School of Management
University of Southampton
Cecilio.mar@upc.es
camm@soton.ac.uk

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Abstract

Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) are special financial institutions. They have both a

social nature and a for-profit nature. Their performance has been traditionally measured

by means of financial ratios. The paper uses a Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)

approach to efficiency to show that ratio analysis does not capture DEA efficiency.

Special care is taken in the specification of the DEA model. We take a methodological

approach based on multivariate analysis. We rank DEA efficiencies under different

models and specifications; e.g., particular sets of inputs and outputs. This serves to

explore what is behind a DEA score.

The results show that we can explain MFIs efficiency by means of four principal

components of efficiency, and this way we are able to understand differences between

DEA scores. It is shown that there are country effects on efficiency; and effects that

depend on Non-governmental Organization (NGO)/non-NGO status of the MFI.

Keywords: Microfinance, microcredit, DEA, multivariate analysis, efficiency.

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Introduction

Microcredit is the provision of small loans to very poor people for self-employment projects that generate income. It is a new approach to fight poverty. In its heart are new financial institutions, often non-profit organisations, whose aim is to serve those people who would not have access to a loan from a traditional trading bank.

The fact that Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) tend not to operate in the same way as traditional banks does not mean that they are not interested in profitability and efficiency issues. However, existing tools to assess the performance of traditional banking institutions may not be appropriate within this new context.

How can we assess if a MFI is efficient? How should we compare MFIs? How far is existing knowledge on traditional financial institutions appropriate in order to understand the behaviour of MFIs? These are the issues that are addressed in the current paper.

The paper starts with a discussion of microcredit and its role in the fight of financial exclusion. Existing tools for the assessment of performance in MFIs are next reviewed and some lessons are drawn from this review. It is suggested that Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is an appropriate tool for the assessment of MFI performance. There is, however, an issue to be resolved: how should the DEA model be specified? Which inputs and which outputs should it contain? A methodological approach based on multivariate analysis is applied in order to select appropriate model specifications, understand the way in which the relative efficiency of a MFI is determined by the choice of model, and to produce a ranking of MFIs in terms of efficiency. The methodology is applied to the analysis of 30 Latin American microcredit institutions. This is followed by a comparison between the procedure here described and traditional methods based on ratio analysis. The paper ends with a concluding section that lists and discusses the findings.

Microcredit and Microfinance Institutions

It has long been argued that commercial banks have not provided for the credit needs of relatively poor people who are not in a condition to offer loan guarantees but who have feasible and promising investment ideas that can result in profitable ventures; Hollis and Sweetman (1998). Meeting this need is of interest to governments, charitable institutions, and socially responsible investors. New financial institutions have arisen that are in touch with the local community, that can obtain information about the loan taker at low cost, and that often are not only interested in profit but also on the creation of jobs, women' employment, development, and green issues. These new financial intermediaries, the MFIs, provide small loans to poor people who can offer little or no collateral assets. But the provision of such microcredit is not limited to not-for-profit organisations. Traditional financial institutions can, and often do, make loans to the deprived as part of a socially responsible investment policy.

The best known innovation arising from microfinance programs is peer group loan methodology, in which members accept joint liability for the individual loans made. This joint responsibility approach results in low levels of default, but there are other reasons for successful repayment rates: dynamic incentives, regular repayment schedules and collateral substitutes; Morduch (1999).

Microcredit institutions have mushroomed in countries with less developed financial systems. The Microcredit Summit Campaign formed by donors, policymakers and more than 2500 MFIs, claimed to have helped 41.6 million of the poorest people around the world by 31 December 2002 (Daley-Harris, 2003). Their goal is to reach 100 million of the world poorest families by 2005. Moreover, the United Nations declared 2005 as the Year of Microcredit.

According to Von Pischke (2002), modern microcredit evolved from its origins in the mid 1970s to the present day from some organisations that offered loans and savings to individuals at the margins of the financial markets. Some examples of microcredit initiatives are: FINCA and ACCION International, two US organisations whose area of activity is Latin America; the rural units of Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI), one of the few

institutions that receive no subsidies; and Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, now acting in more than 50 countries.

Assessing microcredit institutions

Microcredit emerges as a new approach to fight poverty. But, is the money lent by MFIs efficiently managed? There is much literature on bank efficiency, but very little on microfinance efficiency. Should we assess microfinance institutions efficiency the way banks do, taking into account financial inputs and outputs? This tends not to be the case: Morduch (1999) observes that discussions on microcredit performance almost ignore financial matters.

Yaron (1994) suggested a framework, based on the dual concepts of outreach and sustainability, that has became popular in the assessment of MFIs performance; Navajas *et al.* (2000), Schreiner and Yaron (2001). Outreach accounts for the number of clients serviced and the quality of the products provided. Sustainability implies that the institution generates enough income to at least repay the opportunity cost of all inputs and assets; Chaves and González-Vega (1996). It is difficult to think of a sustainable MFI with poor financial management; Johnson and Rogaly (1997). Sustainability has two levels: operational and financial (see, for example CGAP, 2003).

Microfinance industry evolution stresses more and more the importance of financial viability. A set of performance indicators has arisen, and many of them have become standardized, but there is by no means general agreement on how to define and calculate them. A consensus group composed of microfinance rating agencies, donors, multilateral banks and private voluntary organizations agreed in 2003 some guidelines on definitions of financial terms, ratios and adjustments for microfinance (CGAP, 2003). The ratios fall into four categories: sustainability/profitability, asset/liability management, portfolio quality, and efficiency/productivity. These measures derive from the financial ratio analysis implemented in conventional financial institutions. In what follows, we will concentrate on efficiency ratios. Table 1 shows a list of 21 ratios issued by Microrate, used to assess the performance of MFIs and their definitions.

These are grouped in terms of portfolio quality, efficiency and productivity, financial management, profitability, productivity and others. Table 2 shows the values of these ratios in 30 Latin American MFIs.

Table 1 and Table 2 about here

The efficiency/productivity ratios reflect "how efficiently an MFI is using its resources, particularly its assets and personnel" (CGAP, 2003). Thus, efficiency ratios compare a measure of personnel employed with a measure of assets. Institutions can choose as assets either average gross loan portfolio, or average total assets, or average performing assets. CGAP describes as performing assets "loans, investments, and other assets expected to produce income". Personnel may be defined as the total number of staff employed or the number of loan officers. In this paper we are going to use a different definition of efficiency, based on DEA, and we will compare traditional ratio based measures with DEA efficiencies. It will be shown that they are not the same thing, and that ratio analysis is no substitute for efficiency analysis as defined by the micro economic theory of production functions.

DEA efficiency and financial institutions

The efficiency with which financial institutions conduct their business has long been studied. Efficiency assessment is based on the theory of production functions. The standard definition of efficiency is due to Pareto-Koopman; see Thanassoulis (2001). There are two main approaches to efficiency assessment: parametric frontiers and Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Berger and Humphrey (1997) provide a comprehensive review of methods and models up to 1997. This subject has continued to interest researchers up to the present date; some recent papers on efficiency and financial institutions are Athanassopoulos (1997), Bala and Cook (2003), Brockett *et al.* (2004), Dekker and Post (2001), Hartman *et al.* (2001), Kuosmanen and Post (2001), Luo (2003), Pille and Paradi (2002), Paradi and Schaffnit (2003), Pastor *et al.* (1997), Saha

and Ravisankar (2000), Seiford and Zhu (1999), and Worthington (2004). The literature continues to grow all the time.

One advantage of DEA (nonparametric) over parametric approaches to measure efficiency is that this technique can be used when the conventional cost and profit functions cannot be justified; Berger and Humphrey (1997). DEA performs multiple comparisons between a set of homogeneous units. For an introduction to the theory of DEA see Thanassoulis (2001), Charnes *et al.* (1994), or Cooper *et al.* (2000).

For the purposes of this paper, it will be useful to make a distinction between model and specification in a DEA context. Different philosophical approaches as to what a financial institution does, and what is meant by efficiency lead to different models; see Berger and Mester (1997) for a full discussion. Two basic models are prevalent in the literature: intermediation and production; Athanassoupoulos (1997). Specification will refer to a more restricted concept: the particular set of inputs and outputs that enter into model definition.

Under the intermediation model, financial institutions collect deposits and make loans in order to make a profit. Deposits and acquired loans are considered to be inputs. Institutions are interested in placing loans, which are traditional outputs in studies of this kind; see, for example Berger and Humphrey (1991). Under the production model, a financial institution uses physical resources such as labour and plant in order to process transactions, take deposits, lend funds, and so on. In the production model manpower and assets are treated as inputs and transactions dealt with -such as deposits and loans- are treated as outputs. See, for example, Vassiloglou and Giokas (1990), Schaffnit *et al.* (1997), Soteriou and Zenios (1999).

We notice that the selection of inputs and outputs is determined by our understanding of what a financial institution does. Deposits provide an extreme example: they are inputs from an intermediation point of view, and outputs from a production point of view. The specification of what is an input and what is an output is crucial in the modelling process. In our particular case we do not need to ponder about the way in which deposits should be treated, since microfinance institutions do not always collect them,

and had to be excluded as a possible variable in the data set since the technique to be applied, DEA, requires homogeneous data for all the MFIs. Many MFIs obtain funds from the market (loans) or receive grants. Other issues become relevant in the selection of inputs and outputs. For example, some MFI receive subsidised loans at an interest rate that is below the market.

It follows that the selection of inputs and outputs is crucial in the financial institution modelling. Berger and Humphrey (1997) suggest that one could assess efficiency under a variety of output/input specifications, and see the way in which calculated efficiencies change as the specification changes. This is sensible, but they do not provide guidelines on how to choose between specifications. In fact, specification searches are common in the modelling of financial institutions; examples are Oral and Yolalan (1990), Vassiloglou and Giokas (1990), and Pastor and Lovell (1997).

A major problem with the selection of inputs and outputs in a DEA model is that there is no statistical framework on which significance tests can be based. The neat approach of variable selection that is used in regression, based on t statistic values, has no parallel in DEA. One may be tempted to use as many inputs and outputs as one may think to be relevant, but some of them will be correlated, perhaps highly so. Parkin and Hollingsworth (1997) review the problems that variable selection creates in DEA. Jenkins and Anderson (2003) warn against the use of correlated inputs and outputs in a DEA model. An important issue is that the number of 100% efficient units increases with the number of inputs and outputs in the model, and adding irrelevant variables may change the results obtained; Dyson *et al.* (2001), Pedraja Chaparro *et al.* (1999). Specification search methods in DEA have been proposed by Norman and Stocker (1991), Pastor *et al.* (2002), and Serrano Cinca and Mar Molinero (2004).

Here we will use the model specification methodology suggested by Serrano Cinca and Mar Molinero (2004). This, in essence, consists in calculating efficiencies for every possible combination of inputs and outputs. A two way table is obtained in which the columns are output/input specifications and the rows are decision units (MFIs). The entries in the table are the efficiencies obtained under each different model for each MFI. The rows of this table are treated as cases and the columns as variables in a

bivariate statistical analysis which throws light on the similarity between models, extreme observations, and the reasons why a particular MFI achieves a particular level of efficiency with a particular specification. This will be discussed in detail in the empirical example presented below.

Microfinance in Latin America

Most of the research on banking efficiency has concentrated on US and developed countries. So far, neither DEA nor other parametric or non-parametric frontier techniques have been used to evaluate the efficiency of microfinance institutions. Here we depart from this trend, and analyse thirty Latin American MFIs from Bolivia, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru and Salvador. Some of them are for profit institutions and others are not profit oriented. Some MFIs are just specialised banking institutions, while others are Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). The question arises of whether this difference influences efficiency, or the way in which efficiency is achieved.

According to Miller (2003), some of the most experienced, developed, and diverse MFIs around the world can be found in Latin America. Using 2001 and 2002 data from 124 worldwide MFIs (provided by the MicroBanking Bulletin), almost half of them from Latin America, the author draws several conclusions: MFIs from this region have more assets, are more leveraged, and make use of an increasingly growing share of commercial funds than institutions from other regions. Lapenu and Zeller (2002) complete this vision: comparing African, Asian and Latin America MFIs, they find that the number of institutions and the number of clients remain small in Latin American MFIs compared to Asian. However, Latin American MFIs mobilise a good amount of savings and loans in comparison to Asian MFIs. Finally, Latin America records the largest volume per transaction although rural outreach remains low.

For the purposes of this paper, data was obtained from Microrate web page for the year 2003, and completed with the Technical Guide prepared by Jansson *et al.* (2003). All

the data is measured in monetary units (thousand of dollars), except the number of credit officers and the number of loans outstanding.

Selection of inputs and outputs

The selection of inputs and outputs in the model was based on Yaron's (1994) outreach and sustainability framework. The number of loans outstanding (output) and the gross loan portfolio (output) were selected as measures of outreach. The two aspects of sustainability, operational and financial, guided the selection of a further input and output. Interest and fee income (output) was taken as an indicator of operational sustainability, as a MFI that fails to collect enough income is not viable in the long term. Financial sustainability was captured through operating expenses. In essence, the collection of fee and interest income is necessary for survival, but such survival cannot be long lasting if this income is collected at high cost. In common with other similar studies, the number of credit officers was also used as an input.

The inputs selected in this study are credit officers and operating expenses. A production model would suggest the inclusion of the first input, while the second input is consistent with an intermediation model. Jansson *et al.* (2003) define loan officers as "personnel whose main activity is direct management of a portion of the loan portfolio". Our choice of input could have been total staff, but this would have included people whose activity is unrelated to the MFI activity. The number of employees has been proposed as an input by Berger and Humphrey (1997), Dekker and Post (2001), Desrochers and Lamberte (2003), Leon (1999), and Tortosa-Ausina (2001) among others. Operating expenses –or similar inputs have been suggested by Berger and Humphrey (1997), Cuadras-Morató *et al.* (2001), Laeven (1999), Pastor (1999) and Worthington (1998). Operating expenses are "expenses related to the operation of the institution, including all the administrative and salary expenses, depreciation and board fees"; Jansson *et al.* (2003).

The selection of outputs is also consistent with the production and intermediation models. Interest and fee income and the gross loan portfolio are associated with an

intermediation orientation, whereas the number of loans outstanding is associated with a production orientation. We wish to emphasize that the gross loan portfolio and the number of loans outstanding appeared as components of MFI efficiency ratios in Table 1. Interest and fee incomes are used by Pastor (1999). Gross loan portfolio or similar measures are often mentioned: Berger and Humphrey (1997), Desrochers and Lamberte (2003), Laeven (1999), Lozano-Vivas (1998), Leon (1999), Tortosa-Ausina (2001), and Worthington (1998). Finally, the number of loans outstanding is mentioned by Berger and Humphrey (1997), Budnevich *et al.* (2001) and Tortosa-Ausina (2001). As there is some difficulty in getting data for the number of loans processed in a given period, we use instead the stock of loans. Table 4 gives the values of inputs and outputs for the MFIs in the sample¹.

| Table 3 about here | | |
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| | | |
| Table 4 about here | | |

Specifications and DEA efficiencies

Notation is needed to simplify the discussion of the various specifications. Inputs are referred to by means of capital letters, in such a way that the first input (credit officers) is represented by the letter A, and the second input (operating expenses) by the letter B. Outputs are referred to by means of numbers. The first output (interest and fee income) is associated with number 1, the second output (gross loan portfolio) with number 2, and the third output (number of loans outstanding) with number 3. In this way a specification that treats a MFI as an institution whose credit officers (input A) take interest and fee income (output 1) and place a number of loans in the market (output 3) would be labeled A13. If this specification is augmented with operating expenses (input B) and gross loan portfolio (output 2), the specification becomes AB123. An intermediation model would be described by a specification such as B2. Under the specification B2, a MFI is an institution that spends money to build a loan portfolio. Of course, this is just a performance indicator, EP1 in Table 1, relating operating expenses

to gross loan portfolio, contained in the list recommended by the consensus group of rating agencies, donors, banks, and voluntary organizations.

Other views of the way in which a MFI operates can be generated by using different combinations of inputs and outputs. Efficiency ratios are a particular case obtained when only one input and only one output enter into the specification. It is, of course, possible to think of all possible combinations of inputs and outputs. The total number of possible specifications with two inputs and three outputs is 21. The complete list of specifications can be seen in Table 5.

DEA efficiencies for each MFI were calculated using the CCR model of constant returns to scale; Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978). The results are given in Table 5.

Table 5 about here

Visual examination of Table 5 reveals some important features. Two MFIs (W-Popayan, an NGO and Findesa, a non-bank financial institution) are 100% efficient under many specifications. On the other side, some MFI achieve low scores under most specifications. No MFI is efficient under all specifications, highlighting the fact that the selection of inputs and outputs and, therefore, the view of what constitutes efficiency in this sector is a matter of importance. If we take, for example, W-Popayan, we find that it is 100% efficient under 18 specifications, meaning that it is an excellent institution, but its efficiency drops below 30% under A1, A2 and A12. We conclude that W-Popayan is good in any specification that contains either input B or output 3, indicating that this MFI is good at generating lots of loans with low operating expenses. A counter example is Fie, a non-bank financial institution, whose scores tend to be low, but becomes 100% efficient under 4 specifications: AB12, AB123, AB2, AB23. This indicates that, although Fie can take action to improve its efficiency, it has some strong points that deserve further attention.

In summary, the level of efficiency achieved by a particular MFI depends on the specification chosen, indicating that specification search is delicate and important. In

addition, if two MFIs achieve the same efficiency score under a given specification they may do so following very different patterns of behaviour: there is no single path to efficiency in MFI. Exploring what is behind a DEA score is the objective of the next sections.

Multivariate analysis of DEA efficiency results

Serrano Cinca and Mar Molinero (2004) propose a specification search methodology based on treating the data in Table 5 as a multivariate data set. Other examples of the use of this approach are Serrano Cinca *et al.* (2004a), and Serrano Cinca *et al.* (2004b). This involves treating specifications as variables and MFIs as cases in a Principal Components Analysis (PCA). For an account of PCA see, for example, Chatfield and Collins (1980).

The first principal component, accounting for 57% of the variance, has an associated eigenvalue of 12.1; the second component accounts for a further 18% of the variance with an associated eigenvalue of 3.8; the third component, in turn accounts for 15% of the variance with an eigenvalue of 3.1; finally, there is only one more eigenvalue greater than 1, at 1.3, accounting for 6.4% of the variance. In total, the first four principal components account for 97% of the variance. This suggests that only four numbers (components) are required to explain why a particular MFI achieves a certain level of efficiency under all specifications.

Component correlations are shown in Table 6. It can be seen that the first principal component (PC1) is positively and highly correlated with efficiency under all specifications, suggesting that it provides an overall measure of efficiency that could be seen as an average over all specifications. The meaning of the remaining components could be assessed in the same way, just looking at the values in the columns in Table 6, but we prefer a more graphical approach to interpretation based on component scores. Each MFI is associated with four components, and this forces us to work with projections on to pairs of components. Component scores for each MFI in principal

components 1 and 2 can be seen in Figure 1, and component loadings in principal components 2 and 3 can be seen in Figure 2.

Table 6 about here

Figure 1 about here

Figure 2 about here

If we look at Figure 1 while taking into account the numbers in Table 5, some interesting W-Popayan, Findesa, C-Cusco, that are efficient under many features appear. specifications, appear at the right hand side of the figure. At the other extreme of the figure we find MFIs such as Cr-Arequipa and Fincomun, that achieve low levels of efficiency under most specifications. This is in line with our observation that the first principal component provides an overall rating in terms of efficiency. We could approach the understanding of the remaining components in a similar vein. For example, the second component appears to be associated with Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) status, as all the MFIs with a positive score in this component are NGOs, and all the MFIs with a negative value of the component, with the exception of Nieborowski, are non-NGOs. Towards the top of Figure 2 we find MFIs whose efficiency is higher under specifications that contain input A (credit officers) than under specifications that contain input B (operating expenses). The most extreme example is Findesa. Findesa is 100% efficient under all models that contain input A, but its efficiency drops considerably when this input is excluded. This would suggest that the third principal component is associated with the efficient use of input A versus the efficient use of input B. However, it is dangerous to perform this type of labelling exercise without the help of a formal tool. In order to interpret the meaning of the components and in order to highlight the information contained in the figures, we resort to the technique of Property Fitting (Pro-Fit).

Pro-Fit is a regression-based technique that draws lines in the figures in much the same way in which North-South directions are drawn in order to orient a geographical map. A

particular characteristic of a MFI is taken as a property. A line is drawn pointing in the direction towards the value of the property increases. For example, in Figure 1, if we calculate the efficiency of the various MFIs under specification B3, we find that W-Popayan is associated with the highest value, while Fincomun and Bancosol show the lowest values. B3 efficiency takes intermediate values in the remaining MFIs, increasing as we approach W-Popayan and decreasing as we approach Bancosol. Thus, a line from the origin towards W-Popayan, and away from Bancosol, would provide an indication of how B3 efficiency changes within Figure 1. A good introduction to Pro-Fit can be found in Schiffman *et al.* (1981). For some examples of the use of Pro-Fit within a management science context see Mar Molinero and Serrano Cinca (2001) and Serrano Cinca *et al* (2004a).

Pro-Fit lines have been calculated for all the specifications and displayed in Figures 1 and 2. Goodness of fit statistics associated with the Pro-Fit lines is given in Table 7. Figures 1 and 2 will now be interpreted in the light of the information contained in the directional vectors.

Table 7 about here

The first principal component has already been identified as an overall measure of efficiency that summarises all the models. This can be clearly seen in Figure 1, where all the lines associated with the different specifications are at acute angles with the horizontal axis, indicating positive correlation between the value of the first component score for each MFI and efficiency, in whatever specification efficiency is measured. In Figure 1, the label "global efficiency" has been attached to the first component.

The second principal component has been already interpreted as being related to NGO status, and this is clear in Figure 2 where the shaded area contains all the MFIs with NGO status.

We observe in Figure 2 that specifications that contain input A in their definitions are associated with directional vectors that point upwards, while specifications that contain

input B in their definition are associated with downward pointing directional vectors. The third principal component clearly reflects the different strategies followed by MFIs in their search for efficiency, opposing those that follow a policy of being efficient in the use of credit officers- positive values of the third principal component- and those that follow a policy of being efficient in their operating expenses – negative values of the third principal component. In Figure 2 we also see that Findesa can be considered to be a discordant observation. Indeed, Findesa is an extreme case of performance related pay, since 99% of credit officers' salary is due to incentive pay, and this is reflected in our results.

Principal Component 4 was found to be associated with input 2- gross loan portfolio. Specifications that contain output 2 in their definition produce vectors that point towards the negative end of the fourth principal component, while specifications that exclude this output produce vectors that point towards the positive side. This is sending the message that the inclusion or exclusion of this output affects efficiency values.

In summary, when describing a MFI from the point of view of efficiency, we need to refer to at least four characteristics, or principal components of efficiency. The first principal component refers to an overall assessment of efficiency under all possible models, and gives a ranking of MFIs. The second component refers to the NGO status. The third principal component is associated with inputs and reveals which MFIs have an approach to efficiency based on credit officers, and which ones approach efficiency by concentrating on operating expenses. The fourth principal component is associated with the inclusion or exclusion of an output in the model: gross loan portfolio.

Returning to the difference between W-Popayan and Findesa, that was earlier mentioned, we are now in a position to see in which way these two institutions are different. In Figure 1 we see that both W-Popayan and Findesa are at the extreme right hand side of the first principal component, indicating that both are fully efficient in an overall assessment. W-Popayan, is towards the top of this figure, at the extreme of vector A3, indicating that W-Popayan places a high number of loans per credit officer, while Findesa is at the extreme of vector B1, indicating that with little operating expenses obtains a great deal of interest and fee income. But is in Principal Component

3 where the difference appears most clearly. W-Popayan is at the bottom of Figure 2 indicating efficient use of credit officers, while Findesa is located towards the top of the same figure, indicating efficient use of operating expenses. Both W-Popayan and Findesa achieve similar scores with respect to Principal Component 4.

Non-governmental organisations and country effect

Two aspects of MFIs will now be examined: their country of operation, and their non-governmental (NGO) status. We will start with the NGO status.

Given the aims and objectives of MFIs - the fight against poverty, self-help, and the promotion of women's status -, it is not surprising to discover that many of them are NGOs. In fact, very often an organisation starts as an NGO, and when it becomes well established in the microfinance world, changes into a non-banking financial institution. But are NGOs more or less efficient than non-NGOs MFIs? Is there anything in the way they achieve efficiency that distinguishes them?

A region has been highlighted in Figure 2. This region contains only NGO institutions and does not contain any institution that is not NGO. MFIs outside this region are all non-NGOs. It is clear that, from the point of view of efficiency there is something that distinguishes a NGO MFI. Looking further into Figure 2, we see that the profit line B3 points directly towards the cluster of NGO MFIs and away from the rest of the MFIs. This suggests that NGOs try to make a large number of loans and operate as cheaply as possible. This is very much in tune with this type of organisation, since they tend to be operated by volunteers to keep costs down, and aim at supporting as many individuals as possible. The specifications that are most in tune with non-NGO institutions are A1, A12, and A2. Non-NGOs, therefore, rely on their specialised staff to build a profitable portfolio of loans, very much like commercial banks would do. The difference is not in the way they view the financial business but in their attitude towards obtaining guarantees for their loans and, indeed, in the average size of loans. It is to be noticed that the most extreme point in the non-NGO region of Figure 2 is Bancosol, a commercial bank that is involved in the microfinance business.

We now turn our attention to the country effect. There is a country effect, best seen in Principal Component 4. Figure 3 plots component scores in principal component 1 versus principal component 4. The names of the MFIs have been replaced with the names of the countries in which MFIs operate. We can see that there is very little overlap between the countries. From top to bottom, all Nicaraguan MFIs appear together; all but one Peruvian MFIs appear together; all but one Colombian MFIs appear together; and all Bolivian MFIs appear together. Nothing can be said about Salvador, Ecuador, and the Dominican Republic, since these countries are represented by just one MFI each. There is no right to left grouping of countries in Figure 3, indicating that country of origin and overall efficiency are unrelated. Remembering that Principal Component 4 is associated with output 2 (gross loan portfolio), one would conclude that efficiency of MFIs in Bolivia is associated with building large portfolios, while efficiency of MFIs in Nicaragua has to be assessed in terms of the number of loans or the amount of interests and fees collected by the MFI. In fact, Bolivia has one of the more developed microfinance markets, where margins are narrowing and this is resulting in mergers and acquisitions within the MFI industry, Silva (2003).

Figure 3 about here

DEA efficiency and ratio analysis

Up to now we have been working with DEA efficiency. We have been able to rate MFIs in terms of overall DEA efficiency; we have seen that there are effects associated with NGO status; and we have observed country effects. The question remains of what the DEA analysis adds to our knowledge of microfinance institutions? Have we observed effects that would have remained hidden if we had used traditional ratio analysis? This will be the object of the current section.

Traditional ratios used to assess a MFI institution have been discussed in a previous section, their definitions given in Table 1, and their values are shown in Table 2.

It is clear that there is redundancy in a set of 21 ratios, and that it should be possible to use a smaller number of factors in order to describe what is special about a given MFI. For this reason, ratios have been treated as variables and MFIs as observations and principal component analysis has been performed. Seven principal components were found to be associated with eigenvalues greater than one, accounting for 79% of the total variance in the data.

We have now reasoned as follows. Seven factors are needed to describe a MFI from the point of view of ratio analysis. Some of these factors are probably related to efficiency, in whatever form this is defined. Indeed, ratios EP1 to EP4 are known in the trade as "efficiency and productivity ratios". If efficiency is captured by the ratios, there will be at least one principal component that reflects efficiency. Of course, this definition of efficiency does not have to coincide with DEA efficiency, but one expects that if a MFI is efficient from the point of view of ratio analysis, it will also be efficient from the DEA point of view. The fact that some DEA specifications coincide with ratio definitions make us think that the two approaches will be related. But in this paper we have shown how to define a measure of overall efficiency taking into account all possible specifications. Does ratio analysis capture in any way such measure of overall efficiency?

To answer this question we have computed Pearson correlation coefficients between component scores obtained from the ratios in Table 2, and principal components obtained from efficiency scores in Table 5. These are summarised in Table 8.

Table 8 about here

We can see in Table 8 that the first DEA principal component, the measure of overall efficiency, is significantly correlated with the second and the third principal components of the ratios. The second DEA principal component, NGO status, is associated with the first principal component of the ratios. The third DEA principal component, which in our case is related to efficient use of inputs, is not reflected in the principal components of the ratios. Finally, the fourth DEA principal component, which is associated with the

country effect, is correlated with the second and the third principal components of the ratios. If we look at component correlations, not shown here, we find that the first principal component of the ratios is correlated with EP3 (number of borrowers per staff), EP4 (number of borrowers per credit officer), FM3 (debt/equity ratio), O1 (average loan balance per client) and O3 (equity/assets ratio); the second principal component of the ratios is correlated with EP1 (operating expense ratio), FM1 (funding expense ratio), FM2 (cost of funds ratio), and Prd1(Personnel expense/average gross portfolio). Of all efficiency ratios, only EP1 appears to be associated with the overall measure of DEA efficiency, and its effect is relatively low, as the correlation of EP1 with the first principal component of the ratios is 0.75, and the correlation of the second principal component of the ratios with the first principal component of DEA efficiencies is -0.53. We have to conclude that efficiency and productivity ratios are only vaguely related to efficiency from the DEA point of view. What are we to conclude? DEA efficiency is well based on Economic Theory, while ratios are only consensus indicators. Everyone can make up his/her own mind, but we lean towards DEA efficiency.

Conclusions

DEA has long been applied to the measurement of financial institutions efficiency. Here we have used it to assess efficiency of MFIs, which have a banking side and a social side. We have suggested a methodological approach that goes behind a DEA measure and explains the scores obtained under different choices of models and specifications.

We have obtained DEA efficiencies for every combination of inputs and outputs of 30 Latin American MFIs. This way, we can see that the level of efficiency achieved by a MFI depends on the specification chosen. So the choice of a particular model or specification is relevant for efficiency assessment.

We have then followed a multivariate approach on efficiencies obtained through DEA: we have combined Principal Component Analysis with Property Fitting. We have obtained four principal components of efficiency, each one related to a different issue: overall efficiency, NGO status, input choice and output choice. This way we can

understand why a MFI achieves a level of efficiency under a given specification, or which are the paths to efficiency followed by a group of MFIs.

Finally, there is no reason why we should be fanatic believers in a DEA efficiency world, but the converse is also true. Efficiency and productivity ratios that have emerged from the deliberations of a committee need not be associated with efficiency nor with productivity. We have shown that our approach to efficiency analysis not only produces an overall ranking of MFIs in terms of the use they make of inputs and outputs, but also reveals features that distinguish NGOs from non-NGO institutions, that we can explain the reasons why some MFIs are or are not efficient, and that there are country effects in the data.

We finish by encouraging analysts, rating agencies, and users to go beyond ratio analysis in MFIs and incorporate measures of efficiency based on Data Envelopment Analysis.

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PQ1 portfolio at risk = portfolio at risk / gross loan portfolio

PQ2 provision expense ratio = loan loss provision expense / average portfolio

PQ3 risk coverage ratio = loan loss reserves / portfolio at risk

PQ4 write-off ratio = write offs / average portfolio

EP1 operating expense ratio = operating expenses / gross loan portfolio

EP2 cost per client = operating expenses / average number of clients

EP3 personnel productivity = number of borrowers per staff

EP4 credit officer productivity = number of active borrowers / number of credit officers

FM1 funding expense ratio = interest and fee expense / average gross portfolio

FM2 cost of funds ratio = interest and fee expenses on funding liabilities / average funding liabilities

FM3 debt/equity ratio = total liabilities / total equity

P1 return on equity = net income / average equity

P2 return on assets = net income/ average assets

P3 portfolio yield = cash financial revenue / average gross portfolio

Prd1 personnel expense/average gross portfolio

Prd2 credit officers/total personnel

Prd3 incentive pay as % of base salary

Prd4 percent of staff with <12 months

O1 average loan balance per client

O2 current assets/current liabilities

O3 equity/assets

Table 1. The 21 ratios and their definitions

PQ: Portfolio Quality; EP: Efficiency and Productivity; FM: Financial Management; P: Profitability; Prd: Productivity; O: Other

| DMU | PQ1 | PQ2 | PQ3 | PQ4 | EP1 | EP2 | EP3 | EP4 | FM1 | FM2 | FM3 | P1 | P2 | P3 | Prd1 | Prd2 | Prd3 | Pr4 | O1 | O2 | O3 |
|-------------------|-------|-------|--------|-------|-------|----------|-----|-----|-------|-------|-----|--------|--------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|------|------|-------|
| Adopem | 0.037 | 0.02 | 1.025 | 0.002 | 0.155 | 387.789 | 226 | 431 | 0.047 | 0.136 | 0.8 | 0.007 | 0.003 | 35.7 | 0.076 | 0.526 | 8.0 | 0.229 | 191 | 4.7 | 0.509 |
| Andes | 0.06 | 0.035 | 1.161 | 0.014 | 0.137 | 189.492 | 69 | 248 | 0.026 | 0.054 | 10 | 0.33 | 0.03 | 0.258 | 0.087 | 0.276 | 0.237 | 0.162 | 1451 | 1.9 | 0.086 |
| Bancosol | 0.12 | 0.045 | 0.726 | 0.013 | 0.132 | 210.876 | 74 | 239 | 0.028 | 0.054 | 5.6 | 0.049 | 0.007 | 0.223 | 0.068 | 0.311 | 0.389 | 0.222 | 2008 | 2.1 | 0.148 |
| Calpia | 0.031 | 0.034 | 1.393 | 0.003 | 0.19 | 205.556 | 136 | 360 | 0.018 | 0.04 | 5 | 0.17 | 0.028 | 0.276 | 0.091 | 0.377 | 0.41 | 0.27 | 1122 | 1.9 | 0.143 |
| C-Arequipa | 0.061 | 0.032 | 1.122 | 0.005 | 0.135 | 148.869 | 129 | 336 | 0.037 | 0.064 | 5.2 | 0.547 | 0.08 | 0.393 | 0.073 | 0.384 | 0.11 | 0.231 | 1122 | 1.2 | 0.148 |
| Cr-Arequipa | 0.057 | 0.034 | 0.99 | 0.011 | 0.248 | 203.063 | 48 | 91 | 0.058 | 0.127 | 4.2 | 0.264 | 0.054 | 0.487 | 0.134 | 0.526 | 0.5 | 0.447 | 825 | 5.7 | 0.187 |
| C-Cusco | 0.048 | 0.015 | 1.173 | 0.001 | 0.123 | 1560.900 | 129 | 400 | 0.031 | 0.054 | 5.2 | 0.593 | 0.085 | 0.356 | 0.073 | 0.323 | 0.11 | 0.157 | 1333 | 1.2 | 0.155 |
| C-lca | 0.169 | 0.001 | 0.876 | 0 | 0.173 | 1500.884 | 91 | 237 | 0.041 | 0.077 | 3.9 | 0.325 | 0.058 | 0.349 | 0.091 | 0.385 | 0 | 0.291 | 761 | 1.3 | 0.193 |
| Compartamos | 0.01 | 0.028 | 5.128 | 0 | 0.391 | 113.787 | 182 | 317 | 0.064 | 0.155 | 1.7 | 0.61 | 0.21 | 1.016 | 0.262 | 0.573 | 0.5 | 0.421 | 292 | 2.8 | 0.341 |
| Confia | 0.017 | 0.054 | 1.644 | 0 | 0.217 | 1909.873 | 99 | 256 | 0.075 | 0.132 | 6.3 | 0.498 | 0.059 | 0.49 | 0.125 | 0.385 | 0.65 | 0.296 | 890 | 1.3 | 0.13 |
| Confianza | 0.048 | 0.053 | 0.863 | 0.018 | 0.235 | 2090.002 | 133 | 287 | 0.06 | 0.108 | 4.2 | 0.181 | 0.036 | 0.513 | 0.113 | 0.463 | 0.12 | 0.244 | 894 | 3.5 | 0.182 |
| C-Sullana | 0.87 | 0.022 | 0.993 | 0.017 | 0.182 | 99.262 | 83 | 253 | 0.061 | 0.111 | 5.2 | 0.352 | 0.055 | 0.42 | 0.083 | 0.328 | 0.12 | 0.308 | 565 | 1.4 | 0.154 |
| C-Tacna | 0.061 | 0.012 | 0.883 | 0.001 | 0.167 | 169.844 | 61 | 166 | 0.062 | 0.092 | 5.2 | 0.316 | 0.052 | 0.398 | 0.079 | 0.366 | 0.123 | 0.26 | 1004 | 1.3 | 0.154 |
| Cr-Tacna | 0.094 | 0.007 | 0.941 | 0.01 | 0.223 | 2026.796 | 74 | 166 | 0.039 | 0.091 | 2.9 | 0.216 | 0.051 | 0.39 | 0.13 | 0.444 | 0 | 0.244 | 904 | 3.2 | 0.241 |
| C-Trujillo | 0.052 | 0.028 | 0.94 | 0 | 0.159 | 134.940 | 68 | 192 | 0.038 | 0.074 | 5.8 | 0.441 | 0.067 | 0.367 | 0.079 | 0.354 | 0.054 | 0.326 | 885 | 1.3 | 0.141 |
| Diaconia-Frif | 0.155 | 0.059 | 0.38 | 0.001 | 0.142 | 65.232 | 194 | 408 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.062 | 0.06 | 0.297 | 0.086 | 0.475 | 0 | 0.288 | 465 | 48.8 | 0.982 |
| D-Miro | 0.009 | 0.016 | 1.885 | 0 | 0.322 | 97.713 | 157 | 421 | 0.019 | 0.062 | 0.6 | 0.171 | 0.119 | 0.607 | 0.186 | 0.374 | 0.64 | 0.505 | 310 | 2.3 | 0.581 |
| Edyficar | 0.075 | 0.022 | 0.851 | 0.051 | 0.226 | 214.961 | 92 | 274 | 0.037 | 0.097 | 3 | 0.205 | 0.047 | 0.399 | 0.137 | 0.335 | 0.076 | 0.36 | 961 | 1.8 | 0.233 |
| Fie | 0.069 | 0.058 | 1.263 | 0.015 | 0.114 | 149.430 | 98 | 242 | 0.027 | 0.063 | 6.3 | 0.156 | 0.021 | 0.24 | 0.065 | 0.405 | 0.515 | 0.3 | 1318 | 2.5 | 0.13 |
| Finamerica | 0.113 | 0.02 | 0.29 | 0.004 | 0.198 | 165.682 | 90 | 257 | 0.046 | 0.083 | 5.9 | -0.36 | -0.049 | 0.271 | 0.103 | 0.350 | 0.144 | 0.228 | 833 | 1.3 | 0.136 |
| Fincomun | 0.036 | 0.023 | 1.004 | 0.016 | 0.849 | 502.138 | 54 | 134 | 0.074 | 0.073 | 3.7 | -0.019 | -0.003 | 0.934 | 0.565 | 0.398 | 0.67 | 0.301 | 573 | 1.4 | 0.196 |
| Findesa | 0.02 | 0.034 | 0.87 | 0.005 | 0.224 | 265.590 | 114 | 489 | 0.094 | 0.203 | 4.2 | 0.152 | 0.032 | 0.506 | 0.139 | 0.232 | 0.99 | 0.242 | 1147 | 14.5 | 0.187 |
| Nieborowski | 0.036 | 0.039 | 0.729 | 0.005 | 0.151 | 1011.806 | 97 | 239 | 0.038 | 80.0 | 2.7 | 0.803 | 0.215 | 0.571 | 0.081 | 0.407 | 8.0 | 0.267 | 670 | 4.6 | 0.258 |
| Proempresa | 0.105 | 0.07 | 0.794 | 0.012 | 0.269 | 238.407 | 107 | 292 | 0.053 | 0.108 | 3.6 | 0.05 | 0.011 | 0.498 | 0.129 | 0.368 | 0.032 | 0.338 | 889 | 2.8 | 0.208 |
| Pro-mujer | 0.002 | 0.008 | 13.995 | 0.002 | 0.364 | 47.629 | 173 | 538 | 0.017 | 0.082 | 0.6 | 0.046 | 0.034 | 42.2 | 0.186 | 0.322 | 0 | 0.302 | 134 | 20.3 | 0.612 |
| W-Bogota | 0.021 | 0.022 | 0.866 | 0.006 | 0.248 | 79.032 | 210 | 479 | 0.058 | 0.142 | 2.9 | 0.035 | 0.01 | 0.41 | 0.128 | 0.438 | 0.414 | 0.348 | 327 | 2.4 | 0.252 |
| W- Bucaramanga | 0.008 | 0.012 | 1.008 | 0.002 | 0.241 | 510.437 | 296 | 629 | 0.067 | 0.143 | 2.9 | 0.039 | 0.011 | 0.449 | 0.114 | 0.471 | 0.509 | 0.388 | 218 | 2.2 | 0.249 |
| W-Cali | 0.012 | 0.014 | 2.576 | 0.002 | 0.126 | 57.969 | 260 | 497 | 0.047 | 0.144 | 1.7 | 0.184 | 0.071 | 0.346 | 0.07 | 0.524 | 0.3 | 0.311 | 468 | 2.6 | 0.356 |
| W-Medellin | 0.024 | 0.015 | 0.929 | 0.006 | 0.196 | 55.545 | 187 | 451 | 0.047 | 0.123 | 1.6 | 0.098 | 0.037 | 0.383 | 0.115 | 0.415 | 0.433 | 0.298 | 283 | 3.4 | 0.378 |
| W-Popayan | 0.01 | 0.006 | 1 | 0 | 0.115 | 274.482 | 354 | 724 | 0.03 | 0.16 | 0.6 | 0.247 | 0.16 | 0.433 | 0.062 | 0.489 | 0.78 | 0.038 | 233 | 5.5 | 0.629 |

Table 2. Values of the 21 ratios in 30 Latin American MFIs

| Inputs | Outputs |
|--------------------------------------|---|
| A. Credit officers (number) | 1. Interest and fee income (\$ thousands) |
| B. Operating expenses (\$ thousands) | 2. Gross loan portfolio (\$ thousands) |
| | 3. Number of loans outstanding (number) |

Table 3. Inputs and outputs included in the DEA model, together with their units of measurement.

| DMU | Input A | Input B | Output 1 | Output 2 | Output 3 |
|---------------|----------|------------|--------------|------------|-------------|
| 20 | Credit | Operating | Interest and | Gross Ioan | Number of |
| | officers | expenses | fee income | portfolio | loans |
| | | · | | <u> </u> | outstanding |
| Adopem | 92 | 1,483.273 | 3,341 | 7,597 | 39,717 |
| Andes | 195 | 9,098.855 | 16,238 | 70,058 | 52,954 |
| Bancosol | 173 | 10,816.344 | 18,082 | 82,984 | 41,317 |
| Calpia | 130 | 9,190.205 | 12,038 | 52,550 | 46,856 |
| C-Arequipa | 211 | 10,017.945 | 26,015 | 78,985 | 85,929 |
| Cr-Arequipa | 67 | 1,157.664 | 2,045 | 5,035 | 7,053 |
| C-Cusco | 66 | 3,910.601 | 10,020 | 34,954 | 28,506 |
| C-lca | 78 | 2,322.093 | 4,470 | 14,102 | 18,534 |
| Compartamos | 525 | 17,726.376 | 40,115 | 48,605 | 166,580 |
| Confia | 82 | 3,667.626 | 8,042 | 18,723 | 24,320 |
| Confianza | 23 | 1,201.438 | 2,217 | 5,890 | 7,233 |
| C-Sullana | 223 | 5,293.925 | 11,300 | 31,843 | 56,343 |
| C-Tacna | 111 | 3,012.012 | 6,191 | 18,464 | 21,327 |
| Cr-Tacna | 27 | 818.522 | 1,366 | 3,892 | 4,756 |
| C-Trujillo | 347 | 8,436.381 | 16,838 | 59,047 | 81,571 |
| Diaconia-Frif | 38 | 957.577 | 1,908 | 7,206 | 15,495 |
| D-Miro | 20 | 751.709 | 1,099 | 2,607 | 8,415 |
| Edyficar | 92 | 5,254.613 | 8,862 | 24,216 | 25,201 |
| Fie | 114 | 3,955.857 | 7,967 | 36,317 | 28,910 |
| Finamerica | 72 | 3,040.092 | 4,555 | 15,414 | 20,287 |
| Fincomun | 82 | 5,113.527 | 4,754 | 6,317 | 11,027 |
| Findesa | 23 | 2,627.744 | 5,371 | 12,894 | 11,243 |
| Nieborowski | 40 | 896.714 | 2,792 | 6,449 | 9,619 |
| Proempresa | 25 | 1,680.174 | 2,931 | 6,491 | 8,031 |
| Pro-Mujer | 65 | 1,676.766 | 1,762 | 4,682 | 34,973 |
| W-Bogota | 39 | 1,355.444 | 2,055 | 6,095 | 19,466 |
| W-Bucaramanga | 60 | 1,737.249 | 3,101 | 8,201 | 37,789 |
| W-Cali | 118 | 3,121.965 | 8,229 | 27,423 | 63,463 |
| W-Medellin | 39 | 922.768 | 1,792 | 4,971 | 17,979 |
| W-Popayan | 85 | 1,505.178 | 5,454 | 14,270 | 61,341 |

Table 4. List of MFIs and the value of inputs and outputs

| | | | | | | | , | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----------------------|------------|-----|------|-----|------------|-----|-----|-----|------|-------|------|-----|------|-----|----------|-----|------|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| DMU | A 1 | A12 | A123 | A13 | A 2 | A23 | A3 | AB1 | AB12 | AB123 | AB13 | AB2 | AB23 | AB3 | B | B12 | B123 | B13 | B2 | B23 | B3 |
| Adopem | 16 | 16 | 60 | 60 | 15 | 60 | 60 | 62 | 62 | 66 | 66 | 54 | 66 | 66 | 62 | 62 | 66 | 66 | 54 | 66 | 66 |
| Andes | 36 | 64 | 64 | 48 | 64 | 64 | 38 | 66 | 85 | 85 | 66 | 85 | 85 | 38 | 49 | 81 | 81 | 49 | 81 | 81 | 14 |
| Bancosol | 45 | 86 | 86 | 47 | 86 | 86 | 33 | 67 | 90 | 90 | 67 | 90 | 90 | 33 | 46 | 81 | 81 | 46 | 81 | 81 | 9 |
| Calpia | 40 | 72 | 73 | 60 | 72 | 73 | 50 | 55 | 75 | 78 | 60 | 75 | 78 | 50 | 36 | 60 | 60 | 36 | 60 | 60 | 13 |
| C-Arequipa | 53 | 67 | 76 | 71 | 67 | 76 | 56 | 97 | 97 | 97 | 97 | 87 | 88 | 56 | 72 | 83 | 83 | 72 | 83 | 83 | 21 |
| Cr-Arequipa | 13 | 13 | 18 | 18 | 13 | 18 | 15 | 49 | 49 | 49 | 49 | 46 | 46 | 15 | 49 | 49 | 49 | 49 | 46 | 46 | 15 |
| C-Cusco | 65 | 95 | 95 | 80 | 95 | 95 | 60 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 60 | 71 | 94 | 94 | 71 | 94 | 94 | 18 |
| C-lca | 24 | 32 | 42 | 39 | 32 | 42 | 33 | 64 | 66 | 66 | 64 | 66 | 66 | 33 | 53 | 64 | 64 | 53 | 64 | 64 | 20 |
| Compartamos | 33 | 33 | 52 | 52 | 16 | 45 | 44 | 78 | 78 | 78 | 78 | 30 | 45 | 44 | 62 | 62 | 62 | 62 | 29 | 29 | 23 |
| Confia | 42 | 42 | 53 | 53 | 41 | 52 | 41 | 81 | 81 | 81 | 81 | 56 | 57 | 41 | 61 | 61 | 61 | 61 | 54 | 54 | 16 |
| Confianza | 41 | 46 | 57 | 55 | 46 | 57 | 44 | 70 | 70 | 70 | 70 | 55 | 60 | 44 | 51 | 52 | 52 | 51 | 52 | 52 | 15 |
| C-Sullana | 22 | 26 | 41 | 40 | 26 | 41 | 35 | 66 | 66 | 66 | 66 | 65 | 65 | 35 | 59 | 63 | 63 | 59 | 63 | 63 | 26 |
| C-Tacna | 24 | 30 | 35 | 33 | 30 | 35 | 27 | 66 | 67 | 67 | 66 | 66 | 66 | 27 | 57 | 65 | 65 | 57 | 65 | 65 | 17 |
| Cr-Tacna | 22 | 26 | 32 | 31 | 26 | 32 | 25 | 56 | 56 | 56 | 56 | 52 | 52 | 25 | 46 | 50 | 50 | 46 | 50 | 50 | 14 |
| C-Trujillo | 21 | 30 | 41 | 37 | 30 | 41 | 32 | 62 | 75 | 75 | 62 | 75 | 75 | 32 | 55 | 74 | 74 | 55 | 74 | 74 | 24 |
| Diaconia-Frif | 22 | 34 | 63 | 59 | 34 | 63 | 56 | 63 | 81 | 81 | 63 | 81 | 81 | 56 | 55 | 79 | 79 | 55 | 79 | 79 | 40 |
| D-Miro | 24 | 24 | 61 | 61 | 23 | 61 | 58 | 52 | 52 | 61 | 61 | 38 | 61 | 58 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 37 | 37 | 27 |
| Edyficar | 41 | 47 | 52 | 50 | 47 | 52 | 38 | 65 | 65 | 65 | 65 | 51 | 56 | 38 | 47 | 49 | 49 | 47 | 49 | 49 | 12 |
| Fie | 30 | 57 | 57 | 43 | 57 | 57 | 35 | 70 | 100 | 100 | 70 | 100 | 100 | 35 | 56 | 97 | 97 | 56 | 97 | 97 | 18 |
| Finamerica | 27 | 38 | 50 | 45 | 38 | 50 | 39 | 55 | 56 | 56 | 55 | 56 | 56 | 39 | 41 | 53 | 53 | 41 | 53 | 53 | 16 |
| Fincomun | 25 | 25 | 26 | 26 | 14 | 22 | 19 | 37 | 37 | 37 | 37 | 14 | 22 | 19 | 26 | 26 | 26 | 26 | 13 | 13 | 5 |
| Findesa ¹ | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 68 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 68 | 56 | 56 | 56 | 56 | 52 | 52 | 11 |
| Nieborowski | 30 | 30 | 41 | 41 | 29 | 41 | 33 | 94 | 94 | 94 | 94 | 77 | 77 | 33 | 86 | 86 | 86 | 86 | 76 | 76 | 26 |
| Proempresa | 50 | 50 | 59 | 59 | 46 | 58 | 44 | 71 | 71 | 72 | 72 | 48 | 60 | 44 | 48 | 48 | 48 | 48 | 41 | 41 | 12 |
| Pro-Mujer | 12 | 13 | 74 | 74 | 13 | 74 | 74 | 33 | 33 | 74 | 74 | 30 | 74 | 74 | 29 | 29 | 51 | 51 | 29 | 51 | 51 |
| W-Bogota | 23 | 28 | 72 | 70 | 28 | 72 | 69 | 53 | 53 | 72 | 70 | 49 | 72 | 69 | 42 | 47 | 47 | 42 | 47 | 47 | 35 |
| W-Bucaramanga | 22 | 24 | 87 | 87 | 24 | 87 | 87 | 59 | 59 | 87 | 87 | 51 | 87 | 87 | 49 | 50 | 53 | 53 | 50 | 53 | 53 |
| W-Cali | 30 | 41 | 82 | 78 | 41 | 82 | 74 | 84 | 95 | 95 | 84 | 95 | 95 | 74 | 73 | 93 | 93 | 73 | 93 | 93 | 50 |
| W-Medellin | 20 | 23 | 65 | 65 | 23 | 65 | 64 | 60 | 60 | 65 | 65 | 58 | 65 | 64 | 54 | 57 | 57 | 54 | 57 | 57 | 48 |
| W-Popayan | 28 | 30 | 100 | 100 | 30 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |

Table 5. The 30 MFIs Efficiency results under the 21 specifications. The column in bold is the specification containing all the inputs and all the outputs.

| Model | PC1 | PC2 | PC3 | PC4 | |
|------------|-------|--------|--------|--------|--|
| AB123 | 0.946 | -0.041 | 0.059 | 0.008 | |
| AB23 | 0.914 | 0.028 | 0.058 | -0.316 | |
| AB12 | 0.883 | -0.394 | -0.038 | 0.136 | |
| AB2 | 0.879 | -0.352 | -0.064 | -0.218 | |
| AB13 | 0.854 | 0.188 | 0.080 | 0.396 | |
| B123 | 0.843 | -0.245 | -0.415 | -0.163 | |
| AB1 | 0.832 | -0.216 | -0.031 | 0.497 | |
| B12 | 0.823 | -0.341 | -0.407 | -0.112 | |
| B23 | 0.818 | -0.206 | -0.377 | -0.349 | |
| B2 | 0.811 | -0.312 | -0.361 | -0.298 | |
| A23 | 0.796 | 0.387 | 0.413 | -0.178 | |
| A123 | 0.788 | 0.395 | 0.426 | -0.147 | |
| B13 | 0.738 | 0.134 | -0.521 | 0.380 | |
| B1 | 0.736 | -0.015 | -0.515 | 0.416 | |
| A13 | 0.696 | 0.609 | 0.361 | 0.065 | |
| A2 | 0.621 | -0.476 | 0.599 | -0.116 | |
| AB3 | 0.578 | 0.800 | 0.117 | -0.054 | |
| А3 | 0.584 | 0.793 | 0.129 | -0.055 | |
| В3 | 0.376 | 0.775 | -0.458 | -0.080 | |
| A 1 | 0.516 | -0.323 | 0.697 | 0.345 | |
| A12 | 0.589 | -0.490 | 0.626 | -0.048 | |

 Table 6. DEA component loadings matrix.

| Model | | Directio | onal cosines | | F | Adj R2 |
|-------|-----------|------------|--------------|------------|--------|--------|
| | γ1 | γ2 | γз | γ4 | | |
| A1 | 0.09 | -0.06 | 0.12 | 0.06 | 243.19 | 0.971 |
| | (16.30)** | | | (10.91)** | | |
| A12 | 0.14 | -0.11 | 0.15 | -0.01 | 330.95 | 0.978 |
| | (21.64)** | (-18.00)** | (22.99)** | (-1.76) | | |
| A123 | 0.17 | 0.08 | 0.09 | -0.03 | 307.00 | 0.977 |
| | (27.90)** | (13.98)** | (15.07)** | (-5.21)** | | |
| A13 | 0.14 | 0.12 | 0.07 | 0.01 | 691.59 | 0.990 |
| | (36.79)** | (32.20)** | (19.09)** | (3.46)* | | |
| A2 | 0.15 | -0.11 | 0.14 | -0.03 | 398.28 | 0.982 |
| | (24.98)** | (-19.15)** | (24.09)** | (-4.68)** | | |
| A23 | 0.17 | 0.08 | 0.09 | -0.04 | 432.07 | 0.983 |
| | (33.34)** | (16.20)** | (17.30)** | (-7.44)** | | |
| A3 | 0.12 | 0.16 | 0.03 | -0.01 | 620.98 | 0.988 |
| | (29.28)** | (39.71)** | (6.48)** | (-2.74) | | |
| AB1 | 0.15 | -0.04 | -0.01 | 0.09 | 466.47 | 0.987 |
| | (36.18)** | (-9.39)** | (-1.34) | (21.61)** | | |
| AB12 | 0.17 | -0.08 | -0.01 | 0.03 | 132.07 | 0.948 |
| | (20.77)** | (-9.26)** | (-0.89) | (3.20)* | | |
| AB123 | 0.16 | -0.01 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 55.93 | 0.883 |
| | (14.91)** | (-0.64) | (0.93) | (0.13) | | |
| AB13 | 0.13 | 0.03 | 0.01 | 0.06 | 80.48 | 0.916 |
| | (15.91)** | (3.50)* | (1.49) | (7.37)** | | |
| AB2 | 0.20 | -0.08 | -0.01 | -0.05 | 112.06 | 0.939 |
| | (19.11)** | (-7.65)** | (-1.39) | (-4.74)** | | |
| AB23 | 0.17 | 0.01 | 0.01 | -0.06 | 97.85 | 0.930 |
| | (18.65)** | (0.58) | (1.18) | (-6.46)** | | |
| AB3 | 0.12 | 0.16 | 0.02 | -0.01 | 690.00 | 0.990 |
| | (30.52)** | (42.22)** | (6.18)** | (-2.87)** | | |
| B1 | 0.11 | 0.00 | -0.08 | 0.06 | 307.43 | 0.977 |
| | (26.07)** | (-0.54) | (-18.24)** | (14.74)** | | |
| B12 | 0.16 | -0.07 | -0.08 | -0.02 | 211.64 | 0.967 |
| | (24.29)** | (-10.05)** | (-12.01)** | (-3.32)* | | |
| B123 | 0.15 | -0.04 | -0.08 | -0.03 | 193.16 | 0.964 |
| | (23.79)** | (-6.91)** | (-11.73)** | (-4.60)* | | |
| B13 | 0.11 | 0.02 | -0.08 | 0.06 | 264.74 | 0.973 |
| | (24.28)** | (4.40)* | (-17.14)** | (12.50)** | | |
| B2 | 0.17 | -0.07 | -0.08 | -0.06 | 244.50 | 0.971 |
| | (25.69)** | (-9.89)** | (-11.44)** | (-9.44)** | | |
| B23 | 0.17 | -0.04)** | -0.08 | -0.07 | 258.94 | 0.973 |
| | (26.65)** | (-6.72)** | (-12.28)** | (-11.38)** | | |
| В3 | 0.08 | 0.16 | -0.09 | -0.02 | 142.26 | 0.951 |
| | (9.15)** | (18.89)** | (-11.16)** | (-1.95) | | |

^{**} Significant at the 0.01 level. * Significant at the 0.05 level

 Table 7. Pro-Fit Analysis. Linear regression results

| | PC 1 ratios | PC 2 ratios | PC 3 ratios | PC 4 ratios | PC 5 ratios | PC 6 ratios | PC 7 ratios | PC 8 ratios |
|----------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| PC 1 DEA | 0.099 | -0.528** | 0.612** | -0.208 | -0.014 | 0.216 | 0.232 | 0.003 |
| PC 2 DEA | 0.876** | 0.125 | -0.044 | -0.292 | -0.101 | -0.103 | -0.044 | -0.035 |
| PC 3 DEA | -0.205 | 0.215 | -0.250 | -0.357 | -0.008 | 0.324 | 0.168 | 0.027 |
| PC 4 DEA | 0.057 | 0.507** | 0.446** | 0.359 | -0.053 | -0.004 | 0.087 | 0.344 |

^{**} Significant at the 0.01 level (bilateral)

Table 8. Pearson correlation coefficients between PC from ratios and PC from DEA




Figure 1. PC1 versus PC2. Profit lines.




Figure 2. PC2 versus PC3. Profit lines. NGOs are shadowed




Figure 3. PC 1 versus PC 4. Country effect

A: Credit officers

Credit officers=Number of clients outstanding/Number of clients per credit officer

B: Operating expense

Operating expense= (Total operating expense/average gross portfolio)*average gross portfolio To obtain the average gross portfolio, we take the gross portfolio data from adjusted comparison table 2002 and 2003.

Outputs data was directly taken from the adjusted comparison table

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¹ Some of the data had to be deduced from the Microrate source as follows: