What apparent reasons appear to be

Abstract

Many meta-ethicists think that rationality only requires us to heed apparent normative reasons, not objective normative reasons. But what are apparent reasons? One hears two kinds of answers. On de dicto views, p is an apparent reason for S to A when it appears to S that p is an objective reason to A. On de re views, p is an apparent reason for S to A when (i) p's truth would provide an objective reason to A and (ii) it appears to S that p. De re views are currently more popular because they avoid overintellectualizing rationality. But they face problems owing to the way in which they do so. Some assume we can escape the problems by requiring more descriptive facts to be apparent or by appealing to defeat. But these strategies fail. So I defend a new view that is closer in spirit to de dicto views but less demanding (at least granting the assumptions needed to support overintellectualization worries). On this view, apparent reasons are apparent facts that agents are competently attracted to treating like objective reasons, where competence is indirectly defined in terms of objective reasons and a competence/performance distinction is drawn

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