Concern for relative standing and deception
Concern for relative standing and deception
We report results from a sender-receiver cheap talk game, which explores whether an individual's decision to deceive is influenced by a concern for relative standing in a reference group. We show theoretically that positively biased senders, who think they are higher in the deception distribution than they actually are, will correct their beliefs and increase their cheating, when presented with information on the actual deception distribution. Hence, a predominantly positively biased group of senders will increase its average deception. Moreover, within a group, being more positively biased implies cheating less. The experimental data confirm both of these hypotheses
deception, lying, sender-receiver game, concern for rank
University of Southampton
Galanis, Spyros
66c2b7af-6f28-4319-be60-787796b4054c
Vlassopoulos, Michael
2d557227-958c-4855-92a8-b74b398f95c7
14 January 2014
Galanis, Spyros
66c2b7af-6f28-4319-be60-787796b4054c
Vlassopoulos, Michael
2d557227-958c-4855-92a8-b74b398f95c7
Galanis, Spyros and Vlassopoulos, Michael
(2014)
Concern for relative standing and deception
(Discussion Papers in Economics and Econometrics, 1403)
Southampton, GB.
University of Southampton
25pp.
Record type:
Monograph
(Discussion Paper)
Abstract
We report results from a sender-receiver cheap talk game, which explores whether an individual's decision to deceive is influenced by a concern for relative standing in a reference group. We show theoretically that positively biased senders, who think they are higher in the deception distribution than they actually are, will correct their beliefs and increase their cheating, when presented with information on the actual deception distribution. Hence, a predominantly positively biased group of senders will increase its average deception. Moreover, within a group, being more positively biased implies cheating less. The experimental data confirm both of these hypotheses
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Published date: 14 January 2014
Keywords:
deception, lying, sender-receiver game, concern for rank
Organisations:
Economics
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 363573
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/363573
ISSN: 0966-4246
PURE UUID: ba581049-2c4a-4823-ba56-b53fc005e729
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Date deposited: 27 Mar 2014 11:48
Last modified: 15 Mar 2024 03:28
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Contributors
Author:
Spyros Galanis
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