CHRISTIAN RESPONSES IN BRITAIN TO JEWISH REFUGEES FROM EUROPE: 1933-1939

CHANA REVELL KOTZIN

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
FACULTY OF ARTS
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This thesis was submitted for examination in March 2000. It does not necessarily represent the final form of the thesis as deposited in the University after examination.
This thesis examines the responses of Christians in Britain at both organizational and individual levels to German speaking Jewish refugees from the standpoint of five protestant bodies: Quakers, Unitarians, Methodists, Christadelphians and the Church of England, during the years 1933 to 1939. Exploring the development of each group’s response to the plight of Jews under Nazism, it highlights Christian sympathy for Jews as victims of Nazi brutality and Christian condemnation of Nazi antisemitism as illiberal and immoral. Simultaneously, Christian action for the practical needs of Jewish refugees is presented as complex and variable from one group to group. In this respect, the responses of each denomination reveal how theological and organizational differences influenced policies for refugees. Using a comparative framework, a central contention of this thesis is that for the most part Christians saw the refugee issue as a ‘Jewish problem’, one that would be solved by the actions of Jews who it was believed had the necessary resources and infrastructures to deal with the situation at least prior to 1938. As such, Christian refugee organizations were slow to emerge and generally poorly received by Christians and the wider British public. It is also shown that Christians were only slightly more generous to Christian refugees.

This thesis also examines the way in which Nazi racial thinking penetrated Christian thinking and affected British Christian responses to the refugee crisis. In this regard, the confusion surrounding the identity of the so-called ‘non-Aryan’ Christian, variably seen as Christian or Jew, is explored in depth. Moreover, the extent to which the construction of the Jew as ‘other’, in both Christian and liberal discourse, inhibited practical action by Christians is considered. It is shown that many Christians in Britain were ambivalent to Jews as Jews, and instead viewed Jews as potential converts and ‘future’ Christians. In the final chapter, the way in which Jews and Christians came together on behalf of child refugees is examined in the context of differing views on rescue priorities, as well as varying attitudes to assimilation and acculturation.
To my husband
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Finally, I have dedicated my thesis to my husband, Daniel. Daniel finished his own thesis as I was mid-way through mine and was a constant and continual source of encouragement throughout. While working in different fields of history, I was extremely lucky to have a friendly ‘colleague’ permanently on hand, to break with his own work, to listen to my ideas and read through my rough drafts. In addition I had an immediate role model – an example of someone who had stayed the course and finished! For his unfailing support and love throughout, I thank him.
# LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

## ORGANIZATIONS

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAC</td>
<td>Academic Assistance Council (Non-sectarian)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFSC</td>
<td>American Friends Service Committee (Quaker)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BDEP</td>
<td>Board of Deputies of British Jews (Jewish)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BFUA</td>
<td>British and Foreign Unitarian Association (Unitarian)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBF</td>
<td>Central British Fund for the Relief of German Jewry (Jewish)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCJR</td>
<td>Central Council for Jewish Refugees (Jewish)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCR</td>
<td>Christian Council for Refugees from Germany and Central Europe (Christian)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CENAC</td>
<td>Church of England Committee for &quot;non-Aryan&quot; Christians (Anglican)</td>
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<td>CFR</td>
<td>Church of England Council on Foreign Relations with the Churches (Anglican)</td>
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<td>CGJ</td>
<td>Council for German Jewry (Jewish)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Council for International Service (Quaker)</td>
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<td>CQ</td>
<td>Committee on the Jewish Question (Quaker)</td>
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<td>CSC</td>
<td>Christian Social Council (Anglican/Ecumenical)</td>
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<td>EICA</td>
<td>European Central Bureau for Inter-Church Aid (Ecumenical)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FFMA</td>
<td>Friends Foreign Mission Association (Quaker)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FSC</td>
<td>Friends Service Council (Quaker)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAC</td>
<td>German Appeal Committee (Non-sectarian)</td>
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<td>GAFC</td>
<td>General Assembly of Unitarians and Free Christian Churches in Britain (Unitarian)</td>
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<td>GCVC</td>
<td>German Child Victims Committee (SCF affiliate/Inter-confessional)</td>
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<td>GEC</td>
<td>Germany Emergency Committee (Quaker)</td>
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<td>GJAC</td>
<td>German Jewish Aid Committee (Jewish)</td>
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<td>GRAF</td>
<td>German Refugee Assistance Fund (Non-sectarian)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GRHC</td>
<td>German Refugee Hospitality Committee (Jewish)</td>
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<td>IAC</td>
<td>Inter-Aid Committee for Children (Interconfessional)</td>
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<td>IACG</td>
<td>Save the Children Fund: Inter-Aid Committee for Children from Germany (Interconfessional)</td>
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<td>IARF</td>
<td>International Association for Liberal Christians and Religious Freedom (Unitarian)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICCGR</td>
<td>International Christian Committee for German Refugees (Ecumenical)</td>
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<td>IHCA</td>
<td>International Hebrew Christian Alliance (‘Hebrew-Christian’)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IISC</td>
<td>Standing Committee on International and Industrial Relations (Methodist)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMC</td>
<td>International Missionary Council (Ecumenical)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMCCAJ</td>
<td>International Missionary Council Committee on the Christian Approach to the Jews (Ecumenical)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISS</td>
<td>International Student Service (Ecumenical)</td>
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<tr>
<td>JRC</td>
<td>Jewish Refugees Committee (Jewish)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LYM</td>
<td>London Yearly Meeting (Quaker Annual General Meeting)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCCG</td>
<td>Movement for the Care of Children coming from Germany (Interconfessional)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFS</td>
<td>Meetings for Sufferings (Quaker Executive Council)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCLC</td>
<td>National Council of Unitarian, Liberal Christian, Presbyterian and other Non-subscribing or Kindred Congregations (Unitarian)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCM</td>
<td>Refugee Children’s Movement (Interconfessional)</td>
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SCF  Save the Children Fund (Non-sectarian)
SPSL  Society for the Protection of Science and Learning (Non-sectarian)
TSWD  Temperance and Social Welfare Department (Methodist)
UCLW  Universal Christian Council for Life and Work (Ecumenical)
WAIFC  World Alliance for Promoting Friendship through the Churches (Ecumenical)

ARCHIVES/REFERENCES

BOD MSS  Bodleian Library, Oxford, Modern Manuscripts
CERC  Church of England Record Centre, Bermondsey, London (Anglican Archives)
DSR  Division of Social Responsibility Papers (Methodist)
DWL  Dr. Williams Library, London (holds some Unitarian papers)
FCRA  File reference for GEC Quaker material
FHL  Friends House, London
OPR  Overton Papers, Rugby (Christadelphian private collection)
JRULM  John Rylands University Library, Manchester (Methodist Archives)
LMA  London Metropolitan Archives, London
LPL  Lambeth Palace Library, London (Anglican Archives)
LSF  Library of the Society of Friends, London (Quaker Archives)
MCO  (Harris) Manchester College, Oxford (Unitarian Archives)
SCFA  Save the Children Fund Archives, London.
SUA  Southampton University Archives, Southampton.
INTRODUCTION

British responses to the plight of European Jewish refugees in the 1930s is an expanding area of research, stretching across the ‘high politics’ of international diplomacy and national immigration policies to the more populist responses of voluntary relief organizations and the reactions of ‘ordinary people’. This segment of British history is part of a larger historiography on Allied reactions to Jewish refugees and the fate of Jews more generally during the entire Nazi era, illustrating Tony Kushner’s analysis that the study of the this period “is not simply German, Jewish or Continental history”, but is also a significant part of the histories of countries away from Nazi occupation or dominion. Within this sub-field of “bystander” and ‘free-world’ responses (and straddling Holocaust research more generally) are studies of Christian responses to refugees, to the rise of Nazism, and to the Holocaust. A further related area is that of the Christian or gentile activist and


“rescuer”, which are more usually part of studies of countries under Nazism but extended by some researchers to rescue activists in democracies.4

This thesis is a social history of Christian responses in Britain to German speaking Jewish refugees from the standpoint of five protestant churches and sects: Quakers, Unitarians, Methodists, Christadelphians and the Church of England.5 It is a study of ‘free-world’ Christian reactions within a ‘bystander’ nation and follows an interdisciplinary approach, combining cultural and religious histories with exile and immigration studies. It is the first detailed analysis of British Christian responses and will utilize many new source materials.

In the first instance, this is a study of policy making and implementation devised by religious individuals and institutions within denominational structures and loosely associated with religious bodies (not necessarily constrained by denominational boundaries). This study examines the development of each body’s specific policy towards Jewish refugees, and refugees of the Third Reich more generally, to identify whether policies towards different refugee sub-groups varied and whether practices varied between confessions. Group responses are studied within the context of their own internal and external confessional concerns as well as from the wider perspective of interdenominational responses, where present, set against the growth of ecumenism. Assessments of what factors promoted, shaped and constrained the work of both individuals and groups is determined. The thesis also

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5 It is regretted that Catholic responses could not be included in this study through lack of space, however, this author applies the proviso of researchers (working on Canadian history) that in England “Protestantism was the dominant religious force in shaping the moral ethos of the nation”. See Davies and Nefsky, How silent were the Churches?, xi.
examines the extent to which refugee policy changed over time. Where flexibility existed, the factors which determined that elasticity are outlined. The relationship between individual activists, their leaders and their relief committees (or ad hoc groupings) is investigated. There is an appraisal of the influence of activists on members and affiliates of each church or sect. An evaluation as to whether responses were 'corporate' and movement wide, or more fragmentary, is further investigated as is an assessment as to whether a unified interdenominational 'Christian' voice arose in respect of Jewish refugees. Lastly, cross-confessional relations between Christian and Jewish organizations are examined, as well as the relationships within organizations with cross-confessional membership, to discern their effects on Christian refugee policies.

Having established actual responses from group to group and across groups, other issues are considered. The relationship between the 'ecclesiastical' and 'political' provinces, and the role of the church and religion in public life, is investigated in the context of intervention and influence on the political sphere and society. Attitudes to Christian involvement in politics and what constitutes political persuasion and intervention from varying Christian points of views are discussed in this light, as are the tensions between differing viewpoints. Christian attitudes to peace and war in a declining international situation are discussed in this connection.

The incorporation of specific Judaic precepts (such as going to the aid of those in need and love for one's neighbour) into the Christian tradition is also considered, as are Christian debates about the practical implementation of these values in refugee policies.

Finally, the influence of historical Christian attitudes to Jews are of particular relevance to this study as is the construction of the Jew as 'other' in both Christian and liberal discourse. It is suggested that the responses of Christians to the issue of the so-called 'non-Aryan' Christian is particularly instructive in this regard, illustrating Christian understandings of mission and universalism as well as 'race', 'Jewishness' and 'otherness'. Integration of Jewish refugees into British society and the toleration of 'difference' is also discussed under this rubric.\(^6\)

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\(^6\) For this I will be drawing heavily on the work of Tony Kushner, Bill Williams, Bryan Cheyette, and Brian Klug: Bryan Cheyette, *Constructions of 'the Jew' in English Literature and Society: Racial representations, 1875-1945* (Cambridge: CUP, 1993); Tony Kushner, *The Holocaust and Liberal Imagination*; Bill Williams, 'The Antisemitism of Tolerance: Middle-class Manchester
Religious and cultural context in Britain

The recrudescence of antisemitism and the ‘Jewish problem’ during the 1930s was viewed by Christians in Britain in a number of ways. Most were initially horrified at its excessive violent and unmeasured nature. As the persecutory policies waxed and waned, however, so did Christian interest and attention. In addition, from the purely Christian perspective, the resurgence of antisemitism provided a prime opportunity to make new converts as Christians remembered past historical examples of Jews converting to evade persecution. Christians believed that Jews might flee Judaism ‘whole-sale’ given the intensity and ferocity of antisemitism in Germany, coupled with similar rumblings further east. Given this interpretation, it was essential for many Christians that Christian missions demonstrate their compassion for Jews by redoubling their efforts. It was hard for Christians to understand Jewish protestations over such proselytizing activities. Jews would reason that they did not need spiritual ‘salvation’, what they required was practical and physical aid. That Jews did not see missions as solicitous but offensive was completely misunderstood by most Christians, and the animosity that special missions to Jews generated between Jews and Christians was consistently misconstrued by Christians throughout this period as confirmation of Jewish ‘stubbornness’ and “tribalism”.

Many such protestant missions glossed over the fact that the distinctly ‘racial’ basis of Nazi antisemitism, founded on notions of ‘purity’ of blood and the ‘Aryan’ myth, meant that conversion was irrelevant. Religious adherence might change but, in the Nazi mind, ‘blood’ could not be altered and ‘origins’ could never be commuted.


Edwyn Bevan, “Considerations on a complaint regarding Christian propaganda among Jews,” International Review of Missions, 22 (1933): 481-499. One researcher has noted that while civil disabilities had been removed, theological attitudes remained unaltered up to WWII: “Jews and Christians engaged not in dialogue but in double monologue. Christians wanted to prove the superiority of their faith: Jews were primarily concerned with bettering their lot in society. Christians wanted converts; Jews, civil rights. Jews were forced to talk religion when they meant social betterment”. See, Geoffrey Wigoder, Jewish-Christian relations since the Second World War (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988), 51.
if one was a Jew. Conversion would not provide an escape for the rigours of Nazi anti-Jewish legislation and any ‘relief’ would be temporary at best as the gradual extension of antisemitic laws included professing Christians as well as Jews.8

While some missionizing Christians underestimated the ‘racial’ basis of Nazi antisemitism and what this meant for Jewish ‘escape’, other proselytizing Christians believed that Jews would distinguish between the racial persecution of Nazism and acknowledged historic wrongs committed by the Church against Jews, the memory of which, was believed to be a stumbling block in efforts to convert Jews.9 For this group, the phenomena of racial antisemitism provided the opportunity to make ‘reparations’ for past religious persecutions of Jews through the welcoming of Jews to Christ, thus demonstrating their lack of antisemitism and ‘racialism’. Even so, it was acknowledged with some trepidation that these attempts might be undermined by the fact that this new wave of hostility had emanated from a ‘Christian’ country, indeed from the cradle of the protestant Reformation itself.10

That both sides of this missionary impulse should see conversion as a ‘solution’ - in the first instance as a way of (incorrectly) avoiding further persecution, and in the second as an expression of Christian atonement and friendship - is instructive of the way in which the Christian-Jewish relationship was understood by

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8 The inclusion of many Christians under this legislation is discussed throughout the course of this thesis. For works that distinguish Christian religious anti-Judaism and racial antisemitism see, Uriel Tal, “Religious and anti-religious roots of modern Antisemitism,” Leo Baeck Memorial Lecture (New York: Leo Baeck Institute, 1971); William Nicholls, Christian Antisemitism: A History of Hate (New Jersey: Jason Aronson Inc., 1993). For more general studies on antisemitism, see Shmuel Almog, Nationalism and Antisemitism in Modern Europe, 1815-1945 (Oxford: Pergamon, 1990).

9 Missionary material during the 1930s lists general persecution, forced conversion, ghettoization, civil and political disabilities as some of the wrongs committed by the Church against Jews. See footnotes 8 and 13 for references.

10 For a chance to make amends see, Letter from Bishop of Fulham [Basil Staunton Batty] to Archbishop Lang, L. P. L. Lang Papers, 12 March 1933, v. 38, fo. 1; “News and Notes: The Church and the Jew,” Guardian, 11 February 1938, p. 95. Note that the Guardian was a weekly Anglican newspaper and not the daily newspaper The Guardian which was known as the Manchester Guardian during this period. As a threat to conversionary work see “The Jews,” International Review of Missions 28 (1939): 84. The very use of the term ‘Jewish problem’ is in itself problematic for writers were actually referring to antisemitism. The designation suggests that this issue is one that is created and sustained by Jews when it is more accurately a non-Jewish hostility to Jews, constructed and perpetuated by non-Jews. It is a Jewish ‘problem’ in that Jews are affected by it.
British Christians in this period. Most Christians still viewed their relationship with Jews in very traditional terms throughout the 1930s. Christians believed that Christianity represented the New Israel, Judaism the Old. Jews were seen as mistaken in their continuing belief and thus, their ‘blindness’ and ‘stubbornness’ in regard to Christ explained much of their misfortune. Were Jews to accept the validity of the new covenant and acknowledge their error, it was believed that they would be saved from the ‘legalism’ of Judaism and find new life in the ‘spiritualism’ of Christianity. On conversion, the “backward” stage of development in which Judaism stood as an “ethnic - national and religious community” would be erased by a religion which made a universal claim and that required a genuine act of individual determination, something the ‘particularistic’ and “tribal” nature of Judaism could never allow. Through Christianity, Christians believed Jews would find fulfillment and freedom (and Christianity would be vindicated). That Jews continued to ‘defy’ attempts to bring them to the ‘truth’ was a source of both bewilderment and resentment to most Christians and churches.  

Given this attitude to Judaism and Jews as Jews it was perfectly reasonable for Christians to believe that church missions to Jews were the “best antidote to the cruel oppression of Judaism”. British Christians were regularly reminded of the “age long witness” to God by the Jews and their gift of the scriptures, for which Christians were in their debt. To discharge this duty, Christians needed to divest themselves of their “inherited dislike of the Jew, socially and nationally” and commit themselves to the conversion of Jews at home and abroad. Only the Church of Christ had the “key” to deal with this “age long problem”: the “strange and awkward problem” of the continuing “existence and persistence” of Jews.  

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something inherently unlikable about ‘Jewishness’ that Christians might ‘naturally’ feel was significant, as was the suggestion that the only way to mitigate this aversion was to remove the ‘reason’: make Jews into Christians and thereby rid society of the Jewish ‘difference’. By conversion of the Jew, the negative response of Christians towards Jews would be dissipated. This argument, however, demonstrates that antipathy and hostility towards Jews was viewed by some British Christians as partially induced in some way by Jews themselves, through their actions or behaviour and their ‘particularism’: that antisemitism was more ‘of’ the Jews themselves, rather than a hostility of non-Jews to Jews. Such views impacted on the way Nazi actions were viewed and acted as a inhibitor to sympathy and action. So that while Christians in Britain were horrified at the level of brutality and the commitment of Nazis to anti-Jewish hatred, it could also be reasoned at some unconscious level that actions of Nazis towards Jews were partially understandable.

James Parkes was one of the few contemporary British Christian thinkers and scholars to reflect on the influence of negative Christian attitudes towards Jews and the effects of scurrilous depictions of Jews perpetuated by Church teachings, many of which he found to be flawed or in error. In his study of the conflict between the early church and Judaism, Parkes saw a link between the ideological construction of the Jew in the Christian mind and the scurrilous characterization of Jews in Nazi

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13 As we will see, the case of the so called ‘non-Aryan’ Christians undermines this notion. See especially, chapter 5.

14 The existence of an unwritten ‘emancipation contract’ in liberal and tolerant Britain held that Jews would be accepted into British society if they “would cease to be Jewish and move closer to British society”. Colin Holmes, Antisemitism in British Society: 1876-1939 (London: Edward Arnold, 1979), 104. Tony Kushner has termed this ‘liberal’ or ‘assimilationist antisemitism’. For the idea that Jews by retaining their ‘Jewishness’ are responsible for their own persecution, see Tony Kushner, “Beyond the Pale? British reactions to Nazi persecution of the Jews, 1933-1939,” in The Politics of Marginality, eds. Tony Kushner and Kenneth Lunn (London: Frank Cass, 1990), 143-60.

ideology. That there might be a connection in the long continuum of anti-Judaism and the more recent radicalized and ‘racial’ disease of antisemitism active in Germany, meant that Parkes’ “epoch making book” was seen as highly controversial and made little impact on attitudes at the time it was published. Many of the ideas Parkes mooted then and subsequently, however, still inform academic inquiry and debate today. In addition, his research laid the basis for subsequent post-war work on the history of Christian anti-Judaism and the “teachings of contempt”. While little of Parkes’ writings seems to have dented contemporary Christian attitudes, Parkes emerges as a significant figure during this time, working as an intermediary behind the scenes, building informal contacts across the spectrum of Protestantism. Particularly adept at utilizing his reputation as a specialist on the ‘Jewish problem’, he fostered greater understanding amongst Christians of Nazi antisemitism and charges made against Jews more generally, as well as connecting Jews and Christians across confessional lines in the furtherance of refugee activism.

That said, most lay Christians and Christian leaders, as well as Christian representatives and educators, in addition to their historical attitudes informed by religious historical ‘folk’ memories, biblical and liturgical sources, also had a cultural context from which to access views about Jews and Judaism which had non-religious roots. Alan Davies acknowledges the part played by anti-Jewish Christian formulations which “watered the cultural soil of the West throughout the centuries” expounding the “negative myth of Jewish existence”, but, he argues that this was not


the “only force” at work for ill. Modernity, alienation and the rise of a “religion” of racism were new and distinct influences that enabled anti-Judaism to become modern antisemitism. The pre-existence of Christian anti-Jewish prejudice was a significant factor in the success of Nazi propaganda in Germany and many of the newer antisemitic constructions drew strength from inherited religious formulations, but there were crucial additions, which hardened old prejudices and produced newer ones. The conflict between Christian ideas of mission and universalism, on the one hand, and perceptions of ‘race’ and ‘difference’ on the other, was not limited to the sphere of Christianity in Germany. These ideas impacted on British Christians in the context of Christian action on behalf of Christian and Jewish refugees during this period. In particular, the case of Christian refugees ‘classified’ in Germany as ‘Jewish-Christians’ - converts from Judaism either generations previously or more recently - were known throughout the period as ‘non-Aryan’ Christians. Taken from its Nazi context, and used by Christians outside of Germany, is illustrative of the penetration of racial thinking in Britain during the 1930s in church circles and beyond. While it was used on the one hand to ‘explain’ why Christians should suffer, it also distinguished one Christian from another on racial grounds. The use of this terminology, even under these circumstances, used indiscriminately and uncritically, also gave racial categorizations and distinctions a degree of acceptability.

The belief in a separate Jewish ‘race’ and the notion of the Jew as ‘other’, as distinct and separate, were potent cultural ideas during the 1930s, not least because of the central role played by such thought in Germany. In Britain there were a wide range of views on the subject which ran the gamut of fervent conviction that Jews were ‘racially’ distinct to those who decried it as an outright fallacy. While these

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Refuting the idea that there is an unbroken continuum between Christian anti-Judaism and racial antisemitism, Alan Davies has observed, “The dominant religious tradition was aided by the depraved children of modernity, who were not the bastard offspring of Christianity alone”. He agrees, however, that “because of its grip on the popular as well as the ecclesiastical mind” Christian anti-Jewish representations were particularly powerful. See Alan Davies, “On Religious Myths and Their Secular Translation,” 203.

For those in Britain who saw Jews as a separate ‘race’ see Kushner, “Beyond the Pale?” 150. Bishop Hensley Henson publicly decried the folly of racialism in consistently strong terms: see
stances appeared to reflect minority and individual positions at opposite ends of the spectrum with little knowledge of the attitudes in between, antisemitism in Britain was more widespread than has been generally admitted, but it was different in form to its European models. As A. J. P. Taylor remarked, "there was a good deal of quiet antisemitism in England". It might be said that its very 'quiteness' meant that antisemitism in Britain was seen by many as something 'benign' and incomparable to 'true' antisemitism – that seen in action in Germany. Any examples approaching the Nazi typology in Britain were therefore regarded as the province of extremists on the right and could be discredited as such. That there might be antisemitism within a liberal matrix was inconceivable. The antipathy and ambivalence to Jews in British culture and the pressure on Jews – British or foreign – to conform to the English (Christian) way of life was not seen as a form of intolerance or hostility of the majority to a minority, but more of a reasonable demand held by a host society to its 'guests'. The 'antisemitism of tolerance' asked little more of its tolerated group than the shedding of their heritage, their culture, their communal bonds and their religion: in other words, everything that made them Jewish.

Indeed, in the context of both analyzing admission policies and formulating a general response to Jews and Jewish refugees under Nazism, one historian argues that greater attention be given to the role of ideological and cultural influences. This does not negate the importance of economic considerations; rather it is proposed that only through the complex interplay of economics, politics, religion, culture and ideology


one is able to understand more fully the complexity of responses. As this thesis looks at Christian responses, the interaction of religious and cultural ideas are particularly relevant, but not always easy to ascertain. Indeed, in some cases these intricacies are "impossible to disentangle". Nonetheless, when a rich picture is assembled, one that allows for consistencies and inconsistencies, patterns and exceptions; greater comprehension of the period emerges. This is particularly the case when one examines the dominant cultural setting of liberalism, whose study in connection with British antisemitism has been adjudged as either too weak or unsystematic to be studied more closely. To this one might add that the cultural context was one shaped by Christian religious values as well as Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment ideals. Even with the effects of secularization, the decline in church attendance, and the decrease in memberships of all the religious bodies studied in the course of this thesis, it does not necessarily follow that the wider public were less interested in religious issues or less influenced by religious ideas and appeals.

Regarding the examination of British responses to the Nazi persecution of Jews, there is evidence that while English men and women were repelled by the brutality of Nazi treatment of Jews, they harboured ambivalent feelings towards Jews relating to their continuing ‘difference’ and group identity. Nazi actions reinforced the belief that antisemitism in England was incomparable, more acceptable, a fringe activity at best. Moreover, most were truly perturbed by the vehemence of German actions against Jews, believing it to be indecent and unfair.

In trying to find the reason for the ferocity of German antisemitism, distinctions were made between legitimate antisemitism and unjustifiable antisemitism, particularly after Kristallnacht. "Social ostracism and ‘polite’ discrimination were acceptable but mass murder could not be rationalized". The underlying assumptions of the liberal response voiced in these terms was that violence towards an ‘irritant’ was unwarranted, even if that irritant had behaved ‘badly’. Nazi

For a historiography of British antisemitism, see: Kushner, “Beyond the Pale,” 144-145.
actions were wrong not because they were unfounded, for it was held that there was some foundation – perhaps ‘well earned’. Instead, Nazi actions were decried because their extreme response was irrational and illiberal. Thus an implicit charge in the liberal discourse was brutal action against a minority is a direct response to the behaviour of that minority, and that was responsible for its own persecution, rather than the perpetrator of that intolerance. “The ambiguities of liberalism” then “were of crucial importance in determining popular and state reactions to the crisis of European Jewry in the 1930s”.

The fear of ‘importing’ a similar situation meant that when it came to aiding this persecuted minority group, the response was to treat each case on ‘individual’ merits. In this way, it could be said that traditions of asylum were being honoured, and Britain was able to control the numbers of immigrants it admitted. Moreover, it could avoid treating Jews as a “collective entity”, select cases on their “ability” to “assimilate into the national culture” and circumvent acknowledging the specificity of Nazi anti-Jewish actions and Jewish suffering by suggesting that to see Jews as a special grouping was a Nazi approach, not a British one.

In short, the ideology of racism was generally seen as unacceptable by the majority and Nazi actions were seen as a return to the religious medieval hatreds of earlier times - irrational in a post-Enlightenment age. This characterization of Nazi antisemitism, as obscurantist, reactionary and outside of British culture, meant that many of the deeply rooted Christian religious and cultural characterizations of Jews and the nature of the Christian-Jewish relationship in Britain remained unquestioned and unconnected with European counterparts. The mixed messages of placing Nazi antisemitism “beyond the pale”, as something un-English and ‘illiberal’, while accommodating unconsciously the convergence of both liberal and Christian anti-Judaism and antisemitism made it difficult for Christians to regard Jews as anything

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24 Kushner, Liberal Imagination, 32-40.
25 Ibid.
but an ‘other’. That these cultural and religious attitudes influenced Christian responses to Jewish refugees forms the underlying motif of this thesis.

**Historiography**

British academics have observed that during the 1930s church leaders across the confessional spectrum criticized and denounced Nazi antisemitism. One historian, however, noting the paucity of research in this area, suggests that only after more thorough investigation will a “critical” picture emerge that reveals both “the strengths and limitations of the Christian response”. In writing this thesis, I attempt to fill this lacunae in the current historiography.

Each chapter of this thesis discusses a separate Christian sect or church, with the exception of the last section which studies interdenominational and cross-confessional organizations formed specially for the aid of refugees. In each profile, a section which highlights confessional specific histories is included. The responses of Christians to Jews under Nazism and Jewish refugees is usually discussed by historians as parts of other discussions, for example, as part of the *Kirchenkampf* (German Church Struggle) or more generally, Christian responses to the rise of Nazism in Germany and the declining international situation. Some of the works that deal with an array of Christian groups are discussed below. Histories of non-British church responses are also discussed, for their findings raise useful ideas applicable to the British setting. There is also a discussion of those works that touch on Christian responses, with a bias towards Anglican reactions to Jewish and non-Jewish refugees in the 1930s, within the wider context of Christian responses.

Much of the historiography is apologist, seeking to either excuse Christian inaction or focus almost entirely on what Christians did do. Richard Gutteridge concluded that there was “by and large . . . [a] good record of the Churches in

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26 Ibid.
England during the Nazi period”. Similarly, Alan Wilkinson highlights the positive performance of the Churches rather than their limitations. A monograph on the Established Church’s responses to Nazi Germany is usefully included here, for the conclusion Andrew Chandler reaches: “If the English Church failed to give to the victims of Nazism, it did not lack the humanity to be moved, nor the vision to judge and the voice to protest on their behalf”. Here, Chandler hints at an alternative view of Anglican – and perhaps Christian responses more generally: that Christians were vocal critics of Nazi antisemitism, and this needs to be fully acknowledged, but they did not ‘follow through’ with aid for Jewish refugees. Peter Ludlow, in his study on international protestant relief organizations (the leadership and driving force of which was dominated by the Bishop of Chichester and therefore relevant to a study of British responses) writes on this undertone and observes that while Christian “expressions of dismay and concern” were public and vocal, nothing was achieved in the way of a practical response for Jews, “but in fairness it was never the intention”. Only Adrian Hastings confronts the fact that while Christians did speak out at certain points, for the most part, they refrained from criticism while simultaneously and studiously avoiding any involvement in the practical aid of Jewish refugees.

American and Canadian studies on their respective Christian community reactions to this subject also make the distinction between words and deeds. Alan Davies and Marilyn Nefsky in their research of Canadian Protestantism state candidly that “Making the right noises is a good device for doing nothing because words are cheap and actions are expensive”. Echoing Kushner’s comments in the Christian context, Davies and Nefsky note that “Protestant Christianity possess a divided mind on Jews and Judaism . . . [and] an essentially ambivalent view of the Jew and Judaism haunted the [British] imagination”. William Nawyn, in his monograph on American Protestantism, remarks as frankly on the apathy of Christians in America: “American Protestants had difficulty identifying with the problems and needs of the Jews”,

30 Wilkinson, Dissent or Conform, 160-65.
34 Davies and Nefsky, How silent were the Churches?,” xii, 123.
recalling the essence of Hastings' comments. Moreover, Nawyn notes that “Seldom were appeals for money or help presented to assist Jews. The refugee programs that were developed proffered assistance almost exclusively for German Christian refugees”. Significantly, Nawyn argues that the poor practical response of Christians to Christian refugees indicates that their lack of response to Jewish refugees was not driven by antisemitism. For this author, the fact that these same Christian refugees were consistently defined in racial terms and cast alternatively as Jews or Christians, I would argue, questions this finding.

Extending on much of the existing historiography, this thesis shows that Christians generally did not identify Jews as their ‘neighbour’ in practical terms, though they were moved by their situation, particularly at specific crisis points in 1933 and 1938. The inability to relate to Jews as Jews and as fellows can be explained by their incapacity to see beyond historical Christian and liberal constructions of Jews to identify Jews as ‘ordinary people’. Christians believed that the refugee issue was predominantly a ‘Jewish problem’, one that would be solved by the actions of Jews who it was believed had the necessary resources and infrastructures to deal effectively with the situation, at least prior to 1938. Christians therefore underestimated the universal nature of suffering and failed to act accordingly.

We will see throughout this thesis that British Christians often through their own reporting, were aware of the situation facing Jews in Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia. What follows, is a brief description of the chronology of events affecting Jews, almost all of which was public knowledge.

Refugees: Nazi actions, Jewish responses and British immigration controls

Between 1933 and 1939, approximately 400,000 refugees fled Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia. In the six years before WWII, nearly 60,000 refugees were admitted to Britain, four-fifths of whom entered in the period between October

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35 Nawyn, American Protestantism’s Response to Germany’s Jews and Refugees, 183. Nawyn’s observations in regard to Christian responses to Christian refugees is the focus of much of the useful work of Haim Genizi, American Apathy: The Plight of Christian Refugees from Nazism (Ramat Gan, Israel: University of Bar Ilan, 1983).

1938 and September 1939; many, if not most, were fleeing state sponsored antisemitism. Often violent and with the support of the legislature, persecution aimed to exclude Jews from the body-politic. Most refugees (or would-be refugees) were also systematically despoiled of property, possessions, and income prior to their flight.\(^{37}\)

The Nazi party-directed boycott launched on 1 April 1933 against Jewish business and Jewish professionals was accompanied by violence, intimidation and destruction of property, marked a very public beginning to the policy of oppression. This approach was quickly abandoned following international criticism, and a slower ‘legal’ strategy of excluding Jews from public life through the promulgation of various decrees was inaugurated. The *Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service* on 7 April 1933 ejected all Jews from the civil service and affected a diverse range of occupations from professors in academia to members of the clergy. Further edicts removed employment rights from Jews in other areas: the legal and medical professions, armed forces, cultural organisations and publishing. Jews were also restricted from joining professional associations or leisure clubs. Attacks on employment were followed by restriction on educational opportunities. Jewish student numbers were limited by the *Law against the Overcrowding of German Schools and Universities* issued in April 1933.

Nor were confessing Jews the only target of Nazi legislation. On 11 April 1933, a supplement to the Civil Service Law was issued defining a ‘non-Aryan’. This extended the scope of discrimination to anyone who had one Jewish grandparent, whether or not they identified with the Jewish community, and as a result, practising

\(^{37}\) Sherman, *Island Refuge*, 264-5; Herbert Strauss, “Jewish Emigration from Germany: Nazi policies and Jewish Responses (I),” *Leo Baeck Institute Year Book*, XXV (1980), 354-5. Louise London has noted that the term ‘refugee’ in international law applies to persons who have already left the country in which they fear persecution. In both her study and my own, this term is applied to those who were seeking to leave not always as refugees in the ‘technical sense’, but certainly not as ‘emigrants’ either, as many “would-be refugees” or “potential” refugees did not leave ‘voluntarily’. They left because their civil and political rights as well as their livelihoods had been stripped away and because many were in fear for their lives and that of their families. This was particularly the case from 1938 onwards. See London, Louise, “British Immigration Control Procedures and Jewish Refugees, 1933-1942,” (University of London PhD, 1992), 13.
Christians were also included under this legislation. By the end of 1934, over 60,000 émigrés fled Germany for other European countries and just under 4000 exiles came to Britain.\(^{38}\)

More Jews left Germany following the enactment of the Nuremberg Laws on 15 September 1935. The *Reich Citizenship Law* defined citizenship on the basis of ‘German or kindred blood’. Jews were excluded from this definition and classified as subjects, stripping them of the rights and privileges of citizenship. The *Law for the Protection of German Blood and German Honour* outlawed marriages between Jewish subjects and German citizens. In addition, it forbade extra-marital sexual relations between Jews and Germans and provided penalties for those who broke these prohibitions. By 1937 the policy of expropriation was introduced with the institution of ‘Aryanization’; this process gave Jewish businesses and property to ‘Aryan’ Germans without compensation. A further 68,000 Jewish refugees left Germany between 1935 and 1937, and nearly 20,000 came to Britain, aided in the main by Jewish and non-sectarian refugee organizations.\(^{39}\) At least half this figure left for other countries of refuge, including Palestine and America. A small number of children also migrated during this period.

In 1938 the process of intimidation and exclusion had intensified and extended beyond the boundaries of Germany. *Anschluß* with Austria brought a further 191,000 Jews under Nazi dominion, and all laws generated against German Jews over the years were effected immediately in Austria.\(^{40}\) The Munich agreement in September 1938 led to the occupation of the Sudetenland by German Forces and the creation of

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\(^{39}\) Ibid.

the 'double refugee' - German and Austrian refugees who had fled their homelands and settled in Sudetenland and who began a second exodus. Czech Jews also began to reassess their future in Czechoslovakia. In late October, 17,000 Polish Jews – many of whom had lived in Germany for a generation - were forcibly repatriated to Poland, but as Poland refused to allow their entry they were compelled to live on the border in makeshift camps. In protest at this action, Hershel Grynzpan, a young Jewish student in France, assassinated a diplomatic official Ernst vom Rath at the German Embassy in Paris on 7 November 1938. This action formed the pretext for an organised pogrom, Kristallnacht, lasting two days beginning on 9 November 1938. Ninety-one Jews were killed and a further 26,000 Jews were sent to concentration camps. In addition, two hundred synagogues were burnt and over 7,000 Jewish businesses and homes were destroyed. Furthermore, Jewish businesses were held responsible for the devastation of property and forced to cover the 25 million Reich Mark (RM) insurance costs. A community ‘fine’ of 1 billion RM was imposed on Reich Jews. Between March 1938 and September 1939, a further 100,000 refugees fled Germany alone despite the earlier introduction of visas. Nearly 50,000 refugees entered Britain as immigrants, of whom almost 10,000 were children on a special programme known as the Kindertransporte.

As has been noted by one historian, on the passage of the Aliens Restriction (Amendment) Act of 1919, the distinction between ‘refugee’ and ‘alien’ was lost, therefore Britain did not possess a specific refugee policy. Rights of entry, grants of asylum and matters relating to refugees came under “alien immigration”. A ‘right’ of asylum was restricted to the grant of asylum under certain conditions or situations which was at the discretion of government.

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Structure and organization

The material used in this thesis encompasses a wide variety of documentation. Official church documents such as conferences, convocational debates and assembly proceedings are used to see how the reactions of the various Christian groups were presented publicly beyond their own congregational audience. Papers of archbishops, bishops, clergy and ministers, and denominational administrators, their correspondence, reports and minutes of meetings give the more private side of deliberations. These source areas taken together generally give more of a 'top-down' impression of denominational reactions, but do not necessarily exclude other voices. For broader views of confessional reactions, church or sectarian journals and confessional newspapers have been mined for articles and letters to obtain a section of lay opinion as well as the various viewpoints of leaders or those holding office in some capacity. Private journals and diaries, as well as personal papers and oral recollections, complement and extend these sources still further.

The organization of the chapters are split along denominational lines, with each religious group studied in a separate chapter. The chapters following the first one each have a comparative element to them. Chapter 1 takes the response of the Quakers, also known as the Friends, as its subject of enquiry. The chapter looks at the interaction of denominational specific themes such as the concern of Friends to remain true to their values of universalism and non-partisanship, as much as a study of Quaker responses in Britain and Germany to antisemitism and refugees per se. Their practice of action over public debate and historical practice as 'behind the scenes' lobbyists is also considered. The absolutist pacifist stance of Quakers is also studied in terms of its relationship to their refugee policy.

Chapter 2 looks at a similar sized movement, the Unitarians, and the relationship between general Unitarian concerns to their reaction to Jewish refugees. The declining world situation, the German Church Struggle, the persecution of Christians, and the nature of Judaism feature prominently as themes of this chapter.
Chapter 3 investigates the work of the Christadelphian sect in England. This group is studied to see the way in which a highly ideological group fused its religious fundamentalist beliefs into action in support of their values.

The responses of the Methodist Church forms the subject of Chapter 4. Having just undergone reunion in 1932 (with the exception of the Independent Methodists) the Connexion (Church) was concerned with how to successfully integrate its new Methodist partners in a broader framework, sapping much of its attention and energies. It was also a movement deeply divided by the issue of pacifism, and this subject will be discussed in relation to its response to Germany, antisemitism, and refugees.

The last denominational group of this study, the Church of England, is the subject of Chapter 5. Once again the way in which specifically denominational concerns affected and shaped reaction to the growth of violent antisemitism and the concomitant flow of refugees is considered. The nature of mission and universalism, as well as the issue of ‘racializing’ refugees, is discussed in this particular context. The reaction of the Church of England to the German Church Struggle and the way in which this response interacts with other issues is also a significant theme of this long chapter.

Chapter 6 breaks with the approach of denominational profiling seen in the previous chapters to look at cross-communal and interdenominational structures created specifically in response to the refugee crisis. Competition, parity, favouritism, conversionism, assimilation and acculturation form the main themes of this section.

The scope of this study is restricted in a number of ways. It does not consider responses of Christian denominations to Jewish refugees settled in Britain once at war with Germany or Christian wartime reactions to the fate of Jews in Europe. Nor can this study, in the space allotted, consider the effects of secularization. This study focuses on the responses of a section of British Christians to non-British, non-Christian ‘others’ in crisis from the context of each groups’ religious persuasion and
organizational structure. In this respect, my study works from the point of view of Holocaust studies, refugee studies, religious, social and organizational history. This study of the British Christian response to Jewish refugees in the 1930s highlights the complex array of issues that consumed Christians in Britain as Nazi Germany gradually stripped its own Jewish civilians of civil and political rights using both legal and violent persecutory means.
CHAPTER 1
QUAKERS

Introduction

The Quakers began as a mystical movement under George Fox, developing out of the political and religious turmoil of the mid-seventeenth century as “a logical outcome of the Puritan impulse”. Quakers wanted to recover “primitive” Christianity which, they argued, had been corrupted by the apostasy of the Church. Quakerism sought to address this ‘spiritual crisis’ with a personal faith which dispensed with episcopacy, outward sacraments, and dogmas, as well as consecrated buildings and an ordained clergy. They developed instead the concept of simple ‘meeting houses’ and a “priesthood of every member”.

Quakerism further contended that Friends should look to the direct, unmediated personal experience of God, known as the ‘Inner light’, rather than relying on the word of the Bible, or intermediaries. Through facing ‘the light’ (which was accessible to everyone, not only Quakers) the individual was released from sin and able to fulfill man’s purpose: co-operation with God to “combat evil . . . [and to] reconstruct the world on the basis of love and on the conviction that all are capable of good”. Moreover, as “that of God [is] in every man” Friends saw worth in all people,

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1 The Quakers were also known as the ‘Children of the Light’, ‘The Friends’, ‘The Friends in Truth’, and ‘The First Publishers of the Truth’. Collectively Quakers are known as the ‘Society of Friends’ (abb. ‘The Society’). The name Quaker was first used in 1650 as a derisive term which George Fox (founder of the movement) attributed to Judge Gervase Bennett who had used this to describe Friends’ ‘trembling at the word of God’. The term is no longer depreciative and is used interchangeably with ‘Friends’. See John Punshon, Portrait in Grey: A short history of the Quakers (London: Quaker Home Service, 1991), 10, 71-72; D. Elton Trueblood, The People called Quakers (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), 4; Harold Loukes, The Quaker Contribution (New York: Macmillan, 1965), 15.

2 Trueblood, ibid., 4; Punshon, ibid., 35, 46.

3 Trueblood, ibid., 117-119; Punshon, ibid., 141, 143. There are however positions with responsibilities including overseers (pastoral care of congregation) and elders (conduct of meetings).

4 Punshon, ibid., 36-37, 48-52; Trueblood, ibid., 67.

5 London Yearly Meeting, Christian Discipline in the Religious Society of Friends in Great Britain Part II: Christian Practice (London: Central Offices of the Religious Society of Friends, 1925), 103; Trueblood, ibid., 77; Punshon, ibid., 46. This three volume work reproduced statements issued by the Society of Friends at various times on matters of conviction, purpose and procedure. In addition, there were summaries from individual Friends (generally leading lights in the Quaker movement) which charted their own religious experience and development to provide inspiration to other Friends. Since 1900 this text has been revised almost every decade. More recently it has been compiled into one volume and renamed Quaker Faith and Practice.
regardless of differences in age, class, sex, ability, religion and politics.\textsuperscript{6} The ‘divine within’ intrinsically meant respect and equality for all mankind.

A Quaker concept of ‘unity of fate’ where mankind is ‘inextricably interrelated’ meant that the condition of all mankind was a source of concern and relevance to all.\textsuperscript{7} Involvement in social issues and a commitment to society through service were a practical expression of this inter-relatedness and interdependence of man.\textsuperscript{8} This is “the secret of Quakerism . . . the close and constant marriage between religious experience and social concern”.\textsuperscript{9} Even so, service to the community is merely a way to promote “the God within” and benefit to society remains incidental; it is merely the mechanism that displays to others ‘the Quaker way’.\textsuperscript{10} Small scale ‘pilot projects’ are favoured because they illustrate Quaker values more successfully, and in this way raise the profile of Quakerism in the public arena.\textsuperscript{11} The ultimate Quaker goal is the remaking of the world along spiritual lines in harmony with others and with God.\textsuperscript{12}

Pacifism has been a central tenet of Quakerism since the Society’s declaration to Charles II in 1660 which avowed that war under any circumstance was wrong. This statement coupled with George Fox’s earlier testimony of 1650, established pacifism as an essential component of Quakerism. War with “its abrogation of moral restraint, its denial of discriminating justice, its responsibility for atrocities [and] its destruction of

\textsuperscript{6} Robert Oakes Byrd, Quaker Ways in Foreign Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1960), 4; Punshon, ibid., 48.

\textsuperscript{7} Byrd, ibid., 17; Trueblood, The People called Quakers, 10.

\textsuperscript{8} London Yearly Meeting (LYM), Christian Discipline: Christian Practice, Part II, xiv;

\textsuperscript{9} Byrd, ibid., 19, 30.

\textsuperscript{10} Trueblood, ibid., 256. See also Punshon, Portrait in Grey, 165.

\textsuperscript{11} Byrd, Quaker Ways in Foreign Policy, 22-23. Quakers are often regarded as non-missionary because they do not approach mission in the way traditionally understood as missionary, that is ‘door-stopping’ or producing explicit missionary literature. Yet their commitment to social action is implicitly missionary. This is clearly stated in a section on international service and its aims: LYM, Christian Discipline: Christian Practice, Part II, 100. Byrd’s study of Quaker Foreign Policy attitudes also recognizes missionary activity by some Quakers by referring to a section of Friends who do not support this practice within the Society. Byrd, Quaker Ways in Foreign Policy., 18-19. I would identify two types of mission within Quakerism, the more ‘globally’ directed type discussed above, where Quaker projects illicit support for Quaker values; I would term this ‘mission by example’ and the second type, ‘mission by experience’, conducted at a more immediate and personal level, akin to a common understanding of mission (though more subtle), where individuals experience Quaker meetings and by ‘experience’ are sensitized to Quakerism. My research on the Quaker school in Ommen, Holland clearly demonstrates this second type of mission in practice.

\textsuperscript{12} Byrd, ibid., 49-50. Quaker commitment to small scale projects would be of significance to approaching the problem of Jewish refugees in the 1930s.

the divine possibilities of human life” was deemed thoroughly incompatible with Quakerism.13

While the main interest of the Quakers in the nineteenth century had been philanthropy, it was the inter-related issues of pacifism and international relations that dominated British Quaker thoughts and actions throughout the first half of the twentieth century. Quakers were not alone in these concerns. Fears of increasing militarism and memories of the Great War encouraged the growth of peace movements and a significant non-Quaker pacifist lobby developed in Britain during the inter-war period.14 Nor were the predicaments of a pacifist stance lost on Quakers. It could appear to others that by refusing to fight ‘evil’ aggressors, they were appeasing or aiding oppression and injustice. Within ‘mainstream’ Christianity, the concept of ‘just war’ enabled war on certain terms, but Friends rejected this theological justification.15 Quakers held onto the pacifist stance despite its difficulties. Quaker writer Elton Trueblood summarized the Quaker pacifist position as a long-term strategy, one that aimed to “overcome evil with good, not in isolated cases, but as a consistent and enduring policy”.16 He acknowledged that the moral demands of the Quaker position were apparent but inescapable if one was to “witness” for man’s future peace.17

Quakers believe that politics and religion are indivisible.18 Yet, despite this belief, Quakers have adopted starkly opposing views about their relationship with politics at various times in their history.19 While previously refraining from endorsing

13 Fox’s testimony appeared in successive reprints of the Quaker handbook until and beyond the 1930s. This appeared along side Quaker peace testimonies from 1651 until the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. See LYM, Christian Discipline: Christian Practice, Part II, 137-143.
14 Martin Ceadle has divided the peace movements into two; Pacifists took a less absolutist position and were willing to consider that war was “sometimes necessary [though] prevention should be an overriding political priority”. Conversely, pacifists opposed military force unconditionally, believing that war was “always wrong” and should never be resorted to, whatever the consequences”. Pacifism was a position of faith, “to witness to the values of peace while waiting for the rest of humanity to be converted to the same way of thinking”. Quakers were pacifists. See Martin Ceadle, “Christian Pacifism in the Era of Two World Wars,” in The Church and War, ed. W. J. Sheils (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers for the Ecclesiastical History Society, 1983), 393.
15 Christian ‘just war’ theory aims to establish an endurable peace until God’s purposes for the world are satisfied.
17 Ibid., 22.
18 Byrd, Quaker Ways in Foreign Policy, 30.
19 At the start of the movement, Friends were politically active as dissenters, refusing to pay taxes and swear oaths. By virtue of their exclusion from public office as non-conformists, they concentrated on their own organization and interests. This lead to a period of ‘Quietism’ where

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political activity, this became whole heartedly advocated in the twentieth century. Friends entered the public arena as politicians, local government officials and pressure group lobbyists with gusto, but recognised that involvement in party politics came at a price. This cost seemed worthwhile, as withdrawing from politics would mean the loss of an opportunity to influence political and social issues.\(^{20}\)

Despite individual involvement in party politics of varying hues, the Society maintained a strict non-partisan stance, precluding alignment with any one political party. This meant that as a movement it was free to raise Quaker issues onto national and international agendas. Petitioning politicians, participating in deputations, giving public lectures, publishing pamphlets and initiating fund-raising campaigns, rapidly became legitimate methods for highlighting issues relating to Friends interests or attitudes.\(^{21}\) It is as such ‘divine’ lobbyists, rather than as politicians, Quakers have found their niche.\(^{22}\)

As with most dynamic organizations, religious or secular, there are periods in the history of the corporate body when one philosophy dominates, though elements of other outlooks prevail to a greater or lesser degree. Within the ‘broad church’ of Quakerism this has meant that internationalist, idealist and pragmatist positions have been accommodated. The paramount objective of Friends in the 1930s was the need to prevent war and to establish good international relations in the light of resurfacing militarism in Japan, Germany, Italy and Spain. Whilst differences of approach to political matters existed, certain core tenets remained timeless and enduring. These included a belief in the interdependence of mankind, the necessity of social action and commitment to pacifism. Quaker historian John Punshon has crystallized the way in which Quaker bonds are maintained despite varying positions, characterizing Friends as holding an ‘attitude’ rather than firmly held doctrines.\(^{23}\)

Despite their small size, Quakers (and Quakerism) have achieved a degree of

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\(^{20}\) Tolles, *Quakerism and Politics*, 14-22.


\(^{22}\) Tolles, *Quakerism and Politics*, 21-22. ‘Divine Lobbyists’ is a term coined by Frederick Tolles.

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social prominence and respect, as well as a modicum of influence which its mere
numbers would belie. It is clear, then, that the Friends have been much more than a
small religious and philanthropic organization. They were a highly activist body which
used well honed lobbying skills both at national and international levels in support of
Quaker ideals and goals, an approach continued until the present day.

Quaker Organization and Administration

Quakers have a unique organization and administration whose terminology and
structure need explanation in order to understand the context of aid policies. On the
spiritual side, Quakers hold Christian meetings for worship (abbreviated to ‘Meetings’) rather than services. These are generally conducted in silence with opportunities to
speak out, pray, preach or give testimonies. This is radically different to other
Christian worship and thereby distinctively Quaker. During the 1930s, Friends were
guided in their faith, practice and polity by a three part work of which the first section
was composed of testimonies of the founding men and women of the movement on
issues of faith. A second part, used by clerks, elders and overseers, outlined church
government, giving guidelines about how to run meetings. The last section, guiding
Quakers daily faith, was Christian Practice, which addressed issues such as war,
peace, slavery, mission and other subjects from the Quaker perspective, representing
‘normative’ thinking of each issue. During the 1930s the current version of Christian
Practice was the 1925 edition.

Monthly meetings and Quarterly meetings formed the organizational basis of
the Society. During the 1930s, the final constitutional body of the Society of Friends
was known as the London Yearly Meeting (LYM), of which the Meetings for

23 Punshon, Portrait in Grey, 1.
24 The Society of Friends was a small movement which never consisted of more than 60,000
members at its zenith. In 1933, British Friends numbered 19,215 in contrast to approximately
23,800,000 confirmed Anglicans supported by a clergy of 21,039, a Catholic community of
1,915,475 and a Jewish community of 335,000. This has to be set against a total population of
44.8 million in the United Kingdom (1931). The Anglican information is for the year 1931,
Catholic figure (1921), Jewish figure (1935) and general population figure (1931). See London
Yearly Meeting, Tabular Statement (London: LYM, 1933); David Butler and Gareth Butler,
and John Stevenson, The Longman Handbook of Modern British History, 1714-1980 (London:
25 Punshon remarked that individuals seeking to understand Quakers and Quakerism “by
worshipping with them, tend to end up by becoming Quakers”. See Punshon, Portrait in Grey, 1.
26 LYM, Christian Discipline: Christian Practice, Part II.
Sufferings (MFS) was its Standing Executive Council. The executive function of the Meetings for Sufferings was both deliberative and executive, and it operated through a number of committees and councils. The LYM also had a series of committees and a council, the Friends Service Council (FSC) whose role in the 1930s was to coordinate overseas relief work.\(^{27}\) The Germany Emergency Committee (GEC), the main committee to address the refugee issue, was a joint committee of the FSC and the MFS, and was formed in 1933 to aid victims of the Nazi regime. The Recording Clerk was the principal permanent administrator of the London Yearly Meeting and the Meetings for Sufferings.\(^{28}\)

**Historiography**

The British Quakers are often remembered as having played a significant part in the rescue of Jewish refugees from Germany in the 1930s. This memory of Quaker action is promoted by scholars writing about Jewish refugees who mention the Germany Emergency Committee (GEC).\(^{29}\) Norman Bentwich (1883-1971), a Jewish academic and worker for the refugee cause, applauded the efforts of Quakers as “outstanding amongst the Christian bodies in their philanthropic effort”.\(^{30}\) As recently

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\(^{27}\) This Council has since been renamed and reorganized many times and is currently known as Quaker Peace and Service.

\(^{28}\) The term London Yearly Meeting (LYM) also refers to the Annual General Meeting held each year in May, though not necessarily (and somewhat confusing) in London. The link with London is historical as the AGM was always held there until the twentieth century when other metropolitan sites were used. Today the name has changed to reflect this reality and is now termed the Britain Yearly Meeting. The Meetings for Suffering is a historical term coined at a time of Quaker persecution. See Hugh Doncaster, *Quaker Organization and Business Meetings* (London: Friends Home Service Committee, 1958) 41-52.

\(^{29}\) The Germany Emergency Committee was initially formed in April 1933. The title ‘Friends Committee for Refugees and Aliens’ (FCRA) was adopted in 1941, to reflect its wider remit which by the late 1930s included aid to Austrian and Czech refugees as well as German refugees. File references to GEC documents use the abbreviation of this later name. Note that the GEC is often incorrectly referred to as the ‘German’ Emergency Committee, while it was in fact the Germany Emergency Committee.

\(^{30}\) Norman Bentwich, *Wanderer between Two Worlds* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Trubner, 1941), 239. See also, Norman Bentwich, *My 77 Years* (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1961), 134. Norman Bentwich was a significant figure during the 1930s and will figure throughout this thesis; see especially, Chapter 5. Norman de Mattos Bentwich was a communal activist, barrister, scholar and author. In 1913 he was appointed commissioner of courts in Egypt while also a lecturer at Cairo Law School, 1912-15. He served at the Palestine front from 1917-18 during WWI attaining the rank of major. He became Legal Secretary to the British Military Administration in Palestine from 1918 to 1920 and subsequently Attorney-General of Palestine, 1921-31. Appointed Professor of International Relations at Hebrew University of Jerusalem in 1932, he retired from this post in 1951. In 1933 he became Director of League of Nations High Commission for Refugees from Germany and held this post until 1936.
as 1991, the historian Gerhard Hirschfeld praised the work of the Friends as “impressive” and as “an act of selfless humanity”.31

These sources, however, once read more closely, outline Quaker aid to denominationally undefined ‘refugees’ or describe Quaker work for political opponents of the regime (‘politics’) and Christian ‘non-Aryans’.32 Moreover, the minutes of the Germany Emergency Committee, its publications and the official account of its history make no claim to aiding European Jewry.33 Likewise, contemporary pamphlets by non-Quaker organizations list Quaker aid to ‘politicals’ and Christian ‘non-Aryans’, but make no reference to Jews as group recipients of Quaker aid.34

In contrast, memoirs which cover the same period extol British Quaker aid to Jews from Germany and other European countries. Most of these memoirs deal with the Kindertransporte, a joint Jewish-Christian movement which brought over nearly 10,000 unaccompanied (mainly Jewish) children during the late 1930s.35 Supporting

During WWII, he was Vice President of the Jewish Committee for Relief Abroad, continuing in post until 1947, transferring to the United Restitution Office from 1948. Bentwich was a prolific writer over several areas including Zionism, Hellenism and International Relations. He was also author of many articles on the position of Jewish refugees during the 1930s.

Biographical and organizational information listed throughout this thesis are compiled from Reference Works listed in the Bibliography (Printed Sources) augmented by the author’s own researches.


32 According to Bentwich, Quakers “helped thousands of stricken families and individuals”. See Norman Bentwich, Wanderer, 240. This same sentence is repeated in Bentwich, 77 years, 134. A further book by Bentwich identifies Quaker aid more clearly with ‘non-Aryans’ (defined under Nazi legislation as Jews by race rather than religion). See Norman Bentwich, They Found Refuge (London: The Cresset Press, 1956), 19-20. Hirschfeld is equally unclear as to the identity of the refugees he writes about, referring to them as ‘German refugees’. See Hirschfeld, ibid., 606. The various meanings of the term ‘non-Aryan’ will be discussed throughout this thesis.

33 Lawrence Darnton states that: “Friends’ work was based on the Christian conception of the brotherhood of all men, and the Society was concerned to help . . . any who were in need . . . In practice, however, because Jews were looked after by their own community, the GEC’s relief work was chiefly for non-Jews, including Christian non-Aryans and political refugees”. See Lawrence Darnton, An Account of the Friends Committee for Refugees and Aliens, first known as the Germany Emergency Committee of the Society of Friends, 1933-1950 (London: FCRA, 1954) 38. Darnton’s account represents the GEC official history.


these testimonies is a ‘folk memory’ of Quaker aid to Jewish refugees, sustaining the wider historical reputation Friends have for ‘good works’.36

Yet the anomaly between archive records, scholarly accounts and ‘collective memory’ remains, and given the existence of these seemingly conflicting accounts, one is forced to conclude that a more complex pattern of Quaker response operated. The aim of this chapter will be to distinguish between the memory of Quaker action and the contemporary policies and practices of Friends towards Jewish refugees during the 1930s.

The existing historiography relating to this subject is roughly divided into two groups. The first set of sources are those by Quaker writers who touch on the subject in a general way, with some dealing more directly with the subject.37 They are generally non-academic, largely celebratory accounts, although by no means always, which give descriptive narratives with little critical analysis or assessment of Friends work. Of these works, three shed light on Quaker views of their own work in this period. John Punshon argues that Quakers did not protest publicly in order that they might continue their relief work in Germany unimpeded. “Silence” was, he states,


36 Some examples of Quaker reform projects include prison reform, Elizabeth Fry (1780-1845), and William Tuke, (1732-1822); anti-slavery campaigns, John Woolman (1720-72), Anthony Benezet (1732-84) and Lucretia Mott (1793-1880); elementary education, Joseph Lancaster (1778-1838).

37 Quakers are extensive chroniclers of their history. Unlike the other groups of this study, there exists a significant literature relevant to this topic, mainly written by Quakers themselves. See Alistair Heron, Quakers in Britain, a century of change 1896-1995 (Kelso: Curlew Graphics, 1995). Heron has supplied the most recent popular history of the Friends in Britain during the twentieth century. He devotes less than one page to record GEC work during the Nazi period and concludes, with little stated evidence, that British and German Quakers were pro-active in their aid efforts towards Jews and others, even when it was obvious that the Gestapo would not tolerate such activity. Also see Alex Bryan, Corder Catchpool (London: Quaker Home Service, 1982). This biographical account details the work of Catchpool, head of the Berlin International Centre and briefly makes mention of the controversy surrounding Catchpool’s decision to aid Nazi prisoners in Lithuania. William Hughes similarly touches lightly on this issue in his biography of Catchpool in, William Hughes, ‘Indomitable Friend’, Corder Catchpool, 1883-1952 (London: Housemans, 1964). Also see Brenda Bailey, A Quaker Couple in Nazi Germany (York: William Sessions, 1994). Bailey’s personal account of the Rest Home in Bad Pyrmont (a GEC venture within Germany) champions the work of her parents, the Quaker couple of the title. Other articles and pamphlets give information about relief work generally or highlight roles of specific individuals. These works provide ‘atmosphere’ but lack critical analysis. See Edward Milligan, The Past is Prologue: 100 years of Quaker overseas work, 1868-1968 (London: Friends Service Council, 1969); Alex Bryan, “Bertha L. Bracey: Friend of the Oppressed,” Friends Quarterly Journal 26, no. 5 (1991): 233-241.
Roger Carter’s study of the International Centre in Berlin, its relationships with the GEC in Britain and German Friends, touches on the sensitivity and complexity of this situation. He acknowledges German Friends’ ambivalence to providing aid to Jewish refugees, but is circumspect when it comes to analyzing British Quaker policy decisions. John Ormerod Greenwood, in his larger work on Quaker rescue and relief work over three centuries, provides an overview of GEC aid activities, surveying relief work before, during and after the war. He also mentions the public “silence” of Friends, one which he links to British Quaker concerns for their German co-religionists, rather than one related to the continuation of aid work.

The weighty work of Lawrence Darnton sits between these two groups of writings. His monograph on the GEC outlines the committee’s origins, evolution, policies and efforts to help refugees, both before, during and after the war. This narrative history, written in precise and careful language, supported by reference to reports and minutes clearly states that the GEC aided ‘Non-Aryan’ Christians and ‘politicals’ as opposed to Jews. His account lacks an assessment of the committee’s work, but remains an invaluable starting source for anyone undertaking research in this area.

Works written by non-Quaker historians form the second group of studies. They summarize Quaker actions as part of their wider studies on social, political or religious history. Church historian Richard Gutteridge discussed the role of British Friends in a study on more general Christian responses to Nazism, antisemitism and Jewish refugees. Discussing Quaker prewar and wartime activity, he comments on the absence of Quaker public criticism, suggesting that their work was achieved at the price of “an appreciable measure of Quaker silence as to what was being perpetrated”. Conversely, another article by Gerhard Hirschfeld highlights the record of GEC relief work far more favourably. In his dual study of two relief

38 John Punshon, Portrait in Grey, 242.
40 John Ormerod Greenwood, Quaker Encounters; Friends and Relief, 1 (York: William Sessions, 1975), 259-269.
41 Lawrence Darnton, An Account of, 4, 34, 38.
42 Richard Gutteridge noted that Quaker aid was for ‘Non-Aryan’ Christians rather than Jews, see Richard Gutteridge, ‘The Churches and the Jews in England, 1933-1945’, in Judaism and
organizations: the GEC and the Academic Assistance Council (AAC - a secular refugee aid organization) he establishes AAC aid to Jews, but is less lucid about GEC policy towards Jewish refugees. He acknowledges though, that much more detailed research is required.\textsuperscript{43}

A recent and rigorous work on the Quaker "encounter" with Nazism provides a thoughtful study of this subject. Using German, American and limited British Quaker archives, Hans Schmitt offers "no consoling maxims" for their descent "into a dark place", a place they hoped "to illuminate with the light of divine mercy". Schmitt notes that in Quaker attempts to mitigate Nazi inflicted sufferings, it became necessary to intercede on behalf of Nazis as well as socialists, communists, Jews and Christians, in order that friends remain true to their principle of non-sectarianism. Moreover, these activities were achieved at the price of appeasement and silence. Information on the conditions under which Jews lived was suppressed to enable Quakers to remain in Germany and continue their work. Lastly, the commitment of Quakers to put the absolutist pacifist position in Britain and elsewhere, aided German expansion on the continent. He concludes that Quakers were able to continue their "healing course" because others had "refused to conciliate an intolerant and intolerable adversary".\textsuperscript{44}

Most of these works have concentrated on the public 'silence' of Quakers and the dilemma raised by an absolutist pacifist stance, a theme that will be revisited and reexamined in this chapter. Given the range of work that has been completed on this area, however, it is perplexing that little attention has been paid to the actual policies Quakers utilized. This is in part because Friends' policy is assumed to be 'a given' - established on cherished Quaker notions of non-partisanship and non-sectarianism. Most of this chapter will be spent analyzing whether such policies were formulated in line with these values, with the aim of gaining a more nuanced understanding of

\textsuperscript{43} Towards the end of his article, Hirschfeld states that Quaker aid concentrated on Christian 'non-Aryans'. Confusingly though, he opens the GEC section of his article, with the statement that the committee was formed in response to the Nazi boycott of Jewish businesses which suggests it developed to aid Jews. He follows on with a description of the GEC work for 'German refugees'. See Hirschfeld, "A high tradition", 606-607. Also see A. J. Sherman, \textit{Island Refuge} 2nd ed. (Essex: Frank Cass, 1994) 4, 53, 54, 184, 245-6. Using Foreign Office and Cabinet documents, Sherman discusses the ability of Friends to lobby government bodies on behalf of refugees. He does not discuss whether this influenced government policy on refugee issues.

Quaker responses to Jewish refugees in this period. Particular attention is paid to investigating the conflict between stated and unstated procedures, teasing out intricacies and complexities, mapping varying and even conflicting decisions, as well as the inherent difficulties posed when applying policy in the practical sphere under difficult political and emotional conditions.

I: FRIENDS ABROAD: RELIEF WORK AND QUAKER ‘EMBASSIES’

Quakers and Overseas Aid

British Quakers were able to respond quickly to the German refugee crisis because of their pre-existing network of contacts through Quaker ‘centres’ or ‘embassies’ and local Friends’ groups, occasionally augmented by individual Friends outside these organizations as well as ‘friends of Friends’. In addition to this geographical advantage, there was a significant historical experience of relief work which Quakers could call upon. In many places in Europe and specifically Germany, there was a legacy of goodwill within local populations who had benefited from previous Quaker aid as well as a positive disposition towards Friends in general. No other Christian organization had this remarkable combination of geographical spread, indigenous support and historical experience of relief work.

Quaker overseas relief work began in the nineteenth century with the development of the Friends Foreign Mission Association (FFMA) in 1868. The FFMA was initially an independent organization, separate from the LYM and the MFS, supported instead by individual Friends. The Association worked outside of Europe in the so called ‘non-Christian World’ in India, Madagascar, Syria, China, Pemba and Turkey. These Missions were religious settlements which provided vocational training, schools and orphanages with medical aid and famine relief. Although a significant part of the Mission’s work, aid formed a secondary function to its primary objective: promoting Quakerism.

45 The expression ‘friends of Friends’ denotes several types of relationship with non-Friends. It may include people who have an affinity with Friends’ ideas or actions. Alternatively, it can refer to individuals who join Quaker ventures in the field, serving alongside Friends. Those who contribute financially or support Quaker stances publicly are also known by this appellation. Lastly, it may include people known to Quakers personally or through recommendation.

46 Milligan, The Past is Prologue, 3-19; Greenwood, Quaker Encounters, Vol. 1, 259.

47 Milligan, Ibid., 3-5, 18-19, 60-61.
While Missions worked beyond Europe, within Europe relief committees and much later, ‘Embassies’ or ‘Centres’ proliferated. Service committees concentrated on direct humanitarian efforts whilst ‘Embassies’, the European equivalent of Missions, aimed at disseminating information about Quakerism. Rescue, relief and resettlement work in Britain and abroad defined the first decades of the twentieth century. This included work with Armenian refugees in Turkey and Corfu (1924-1938), and Belgian refugees in Holland and England (1914-1918). Nor was such aid limited to refugees, as the formation of the ‘Friends War Victims Relief Committee’ attested. Created to help non-combatant victims of war, it aided those in France and Holland during the Great War and beyond (1914-1923). Working in Britain, a further committee served ‘enemy aliens’ and was known by the cumbrous title of ‘Emergency Committee for the Assistance of German, Austrians and Hungarians in Distress’. This committee aided those who had settled in Britain but had not gained British nationality, and who fell foul of British alien legislation once Britain was at war. Friends also

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48 Armenians in Turkey were aided in both ways; by the Mission in Constantinople in the 1890s and by a committee from 1924-1938. See Akaby Nassiban, *Britain and the Armenian Question*, 1915-1923 (London: Croom Helm, 1985), 59-60, 63.

49 I have categorized Quaker relief in five ways: ‘Relief’: a general type of aid to those in distress at home, or in both friendly and belligerent countries; usually in the form of food, clothing or work projects. ‘Resettlement’: aided refugees to re-establish themselves elsewhere. ‘Reconstruction’: rebuilt communities after war or internal conflict. ‘Rescue’: removed persecuted individuals from oppressive and discriminatory regimes usually through help with emigration. ‘Reconciliation programmes’: aimed to restore friendship between previously opposing groups or nations. Examples of these committee relief efforts in the nineteenth century include their work in Germany (1805-1816), in Greece (1822-67) and aid during the Irish (1822-1900) and Russian famines (1891-93). They also participated in relief during and reconstruction after the Franco-Prussian war (1870-75), relief in Finland (1856-68) as well as relief in South African (1905-1908). See: Sydney Bailey, *Peace is a Process* (London: Quaker Home Service and Woodbrooke College for the Swarthmore Lecture Committee, 1993), 37-43.

50 For information on Armenian Refugees see Nassiban, *Britain and the Armenian Question*, 59-60, 63. For Belgian Refugees, see Peter Cahalan, *Belgium Refugee Relief in England During the Great War* (New York: Garland Publishing, 1982), 120-121. For contemporary views about Friends’ work for Belgian refugees (and others) see Francesca Wilson, *In the Margins of Chaos; Recollections of Relief Work in and Between Three Wars* (London: John Murray, 1944); Ruth A. Fry, *A Quaker Adventure: The story of nine years of relief and reconstruction* (London: Nisbet & Co., 1926). For an overview of all Quaker relief work see: John Ormerod Greenwood,* Quaker Encounters, Vol. 1.*

worked in reconstruction programmes after the war such as through the child feeding programmes in Germany (1919-24). Organized by American Quakers, British Quakers augmented these reconstruction efforts with a programme to clothe and feed university students and other needy adults.\textsuperscript{52}

These European committees were organized under the Continental Committee (equivalent umbrella of the Friends Foreign Mission Association). Relief committees proliferated in direct response to victims of distress under this central body, so that coordination of these groups became exceedingly problematic. By the conclusion of the First World War, the need to rearrange sprawling relief activities became paramount. In addition, there was a desire to create Quaker ‘Embassies’ or ‘Centres’ in every major European city to promote mission rather than relief. To coordinate relief and embassy work, the Council for International Service (CIS) was created in 1918 and it took over the Continental Committee’s commitments and the ‘centre’ idea. Both the CIS and the FFMA worked separately ‘side by side’ as “two streams” for nearly ten years. In 1927, the desire to formally acknowledge the FFMA and retain the work of CIS led to an amalgamation of these separate bodies and the formation of the Friends Service Council (FSC), which would eventually create the GEC for refugee relief.\textsuperscript{53} From the late 1920s onwards, Missions, aid committees and Centres were controlled by this Council.

\textit{British Quakers in Germany in the 1930s and the creation of the GEC}

A Quaker presence in Germany began in the late 1660s with a few small communities such as Friedrichstadt in the north of Germany, but this settlement and others like it disappeared by the 1750s. In the late 1770s and 1780s, a group of German expatriates returned with Quaker beliefs reintroducing Quakerism, establishing a meeting house at Pyrmont. Once financial support from American and British Quakers waned, however, these communities died out too.\textsuperscript{54}

\textsuperscript{52} Nearly two million German children were fed by the American Quakers. See also: Michael Seadle, \textit{Quakers in Nazi Germany} (Chicago: Progressive Publisher, 1978) 5. The feeding programme was such a significant re-constructive effort that a new verb was created (used mainly by the children), ‘quakern’. See Rosenfeld, \textit{Four Lives}, 40.
\textsuperscript{53} Milligan, \textit{The Past is Prologue}, 3.
\textsuperscript{54} Punshon, \textit{Portrait in Grey}, 69, 184.
The Society of Friends reestablished a lasting presence in Germany after the First World War as a by-product of the American and British Quaker reconstruction efforts in child feeding programmes mentioned above. By the early 1930s, British Friends had established themselves in Germany in two ways. Firstly, the bonds of spiritual and financial support for local Quaker groups, led to the declaration of the German Yearly Meeting in 1925. The second and main connection between Friends in London and Germany, however, was the ‘International Centre’ or ‘Quaker Embassy’, situated in Berlin (henceforth, Berlin Centre). As previously outlined, the aim of these Centres was to express ‘the Quaker way’, to interest local people in Quakerism and illustrate Quaker approaches to life; it was therefore fundamentally missionary. During the 1930s, these Centres retained their missionary function but extended their relief activities by becoming one of the routes through which the GEC channeled aid money for refugees and other victims of Nazi policies.

The German Yearly Meeting had been established for ten years and the Berlin Centre (staffed predominately by British Quakers) was approaching its thirteenth anniversary, when the Nazis came to power in 1933. The boycott of Jewish shops began on 1 April 1933 and the first ‘legal’ antisemitic measure followed on 7 April in the form of the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service. This excluded Jews from government service and a wave of Jewish refugees left Germany. In 1933, 37,000 Jews left Germany out of a total population of 525,000 German Jews.

Quaker representatives in Germany reported back to London that the period of

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55 Quaker ‘Centres’ or ‘Embassies’ were the brain child of Carl Heath who first suggested the idea in 1917. There was to be a Centre in every major European city whose function was to “carry the Quaker message of the direct inner light of Christ”. See Carl Heath, Quaker Embassies (Oxted, Surrey, 1917), 1. Other functions included support of local Friends and minor aid work. Quaker Centres were established in other European cities such as Vienna and Paris. These “embassies” were headed by a British or American Quaker Representative and staffed by British, American and local Friends. See Herbert Hadley, Quakers Worldwide (London: FWCC, 1991), 7.

56 “All the activities of our centres . . . have this double end in view, the redemption of the individual lives of men, and the establishment of the Kingdom of God on Earth . . . Prophecy, missionary effort, personal and social and international redemption and reconstruction, touching the whole process of human existence, belong of essence to the life of the whole church”. See LYM, Christian Discipline: Part II, Christian Practice, 100.

57 The International Centre also had a representative from the American wing of the Friends (American Friends Service Committee). The British staff reported back to London directly to the Germany and Holland Committee and the FSC. Once the Germany Emergency Committee (GEC) was formed, British Quakers at the centre also reported to this committee. Finance for the Centre was provided by the American FSC (AFSC) and the British FSC. Funds for refugees were provided by the GEC.
‘national revolution’ had resulted in uncontrolled street violence against Jews and Jewish property. Opponents of the regime were also attacked, arrested and incarcerated in concentration camps. The Berlin Centre staff were concerned for the future of German Friends, some of whom had socialist ties. At a Meetings for Sufferings on 3 March 1933, the recording clerk noted the “difficult” political climate in Germany and declared British Quaker support for their German co-religionists.\(^59\) On the 27 March 1933, a report compiled by Corder Catchpool (1883-1952) \(^60\) was read to an ‘Emergency Gathering’ of 26 Friends in London. The report detailed the violence in Germany and identified the antisemitic nature of the regime. Catchpool, however, wanted Quakers to pay particular attention to the political exclusionism of Nazism affecting other non-Jewish groups.

The persecution carried out by the National Socialists is directed not only against Jews, but against socialist, communists and members of the republican and democratic groups; including even prominent leaders of the Centre and People’s parties.\(^61\)

The meeting recorded a desire by Friends to witness “for a positive and practical Christian attitude towards antisemitism and its victims” and a hope that other members of the Church would join them.\(^62\) As appeals to the Berlin Centre increased daily it was felt a special committee should be created and on 7 April 1933, the MFS and the FSC created a temporary joint ‘Emergency Committee’ to be known as the Germany Emergency Committee (GEC). It was to be both a fund raising and case working committee to aid victims of Nazi discriminatory policies.\(^63\)

59 Seadle, Quakers in Nazi Germany, 15; Meeting for Sufferings, GEC Minutes, 2 March 1933, FCRA/1, LSF/FHL.
60 Catchpool was the British Representative and joint manager of the Berlin International Centre. Previously he was an inspector and superintendent on the Great Eastern Railway, 1905-11. He was architect, planner and Superintendent of Greenfield Garden Village, 1912-14. He served in Friends Ambulance Unit from 1914 to 1916, but resigned from this unit to join the campaign against compulsory conscription. For this he was imprisoned in 1917 with a sentence of hard labour for two years. Released in April 1919, he returned to Germany to work in reconstruction for a brief period, cut short by illness. From 1920 to 1931, he was ensconced in Greenfield Garden Village. Catchpool and his family moved to Berlin in 1931, where he became Joint Secretary of Quaker International Centre, a post he held until 1937. He was also active in National Peace Council, the Friends Peace Committee and the Fellowship of Reconciliation.
61 Friends Service Council, “Report of Gathering of Friends of the Situation in Germany”, GEC Minutes, 27 March 1933, FCRA/1, LSF/FHL.
62 Ibid. It is not clear whether any attempts were made to coordinate such action.
63 Committee members were co-opted from the FSC and the MFS. FSC members of the committee were: Helen W. Dixon, Maurice L. Rowntree, Edith M. Pye, Elizabeth Fox Howard, Joan M. Fry and Charles Weiss. MFS members were: Lucy Backhouse, Percy Bartlett, Eric Hayman, Mary
II: DEFINING A ROLE, APRIL 1933 TO SEPTEMBER 1935

Over the first two years of the committee’s existence, members were defining the groups function and remit as well as forming alliances with other refugee organizations, mainly non-sectarian agencies and Jewish refugee bodies. Quakers were also fundraising and lobbying under certain conditions and approaching the government on specific issues. Relief support was made mainly in Germany as aid to political prisoners, concentration camp internees and others. Later this help would extend to refugees who had fled to neighbouring countries, through agencies in France, Holland and Czechoslovakia, so that British Quaker aid was not restricted to aid in Germany. In addition, assistance in Britain was given to refugees who made their way to England and consisted mainly of support in gaining employment permits (in restricted areas), hospitality, maintenance grants, training and emigration.

Establishing first principles

The GEC quickly tied together the German political situation and the refugee issue as subjects of Quaker concern. Articles appeared in *The Friend* and the more contemplative *Wayfarer* outlining the problems experienced by Jews, Friends and others in Germany. Editorials and articles pressed Friends to action, not merely for humanitarian purposes, but also for political reasons: a continuing refugee problem might disrupt the increasingly unsteady peace and provoke war. Quakers were urged to put their support behind the League of Nations as the best tool for an international solution. While the plight of Jews was acknowledged, Quaker reporters and commentators consistently stressed non-Jewish victims of Nazi discrimination over their Jewish counterparts. In conjunction with this tendency to downplay the specificity of Nazi anti-Jewish policies, much time was spent connecting German actions with the country’s poor fiscal problems, which was subsequently blamed on the harsh post-war penalties imposed by the Allies. Criticism of Nazi policies themselves and the cost of their outcome was muted in this combination, an approach that became

O’Brien Harris and Marion E. Parmoor and George B. Jeffrey (Chairman). The Secretary, Bertha L. Bracey (also FSC), was appointed at the first meeting of the committee on 12 April 1933. Membership of this committee increased over time and, in 1938, numbered over 80.
characteristic of Quaker discussions on issues relating to Germany throughout much of this period.65

Contact with the Foreign Office was established at one of the earliest meetings of the newly constituted committee. George B. Jeffrey (1891-1957), professor of Mathematics at UCL and chairman of the GEC, wrote to the Foreign Secretary, Sir John Simon, in April 1933. Jeffrey urged the government to bring the plight of refugees “including a large numbers of Jews” now effectively stateless, before the Council of the League of Nations in May, so that they might be taken into the care of the League.66 Replying for Sir John Simon, a Foreign Office official noted that whilst the idea had been carefully considered, it was noted that such a proposal would not help German ‘nationals’. As Germans, the émigrés still possessed valid passports and technically were not stateless: they were therefore outside the remit of the Nansen office.67 Undaunted, the GEC chairman remarked that regardless of ‘valid’ passports, the problem remained: there were about 10,000 refugees in neighboring countries who did not want to return to Germany. In an emphatic rejoinder, Sargeant drew attention to the lack of finances in the Nansen Office and he noted that the Nansen Office was reducing its activities in line with its planned ‘liquidation’ at the end of 1938.68

While a first approach to Foreign Office had proved unsuccessful, these letters initiated a long series of exchanges between various government departments and the Committee, continuing a long established tradition of Friends as ‘behind the scenes’ lobbyists. As characteristic of Quaker approaches to the issue was the belief that the League of Nations provided the most suitable forum for any solution. With the advent of refugees, the domestic policies of one country (namely Germany) had moved from ‘simple’ internal politics to an issue beyond state boundaries and one that necessitated an international solution. Quakers looked to the League of Nations to provide such a

64 The Friend, 28 April 1933, p. 350; Wayfarer, 12, no. 9 (October 1933), 174; London Yearly Meeting, LYM Proceedings, Minute 18 and Minute 25 (London: LYM, 1933), 274, 276.
65 Greenwood has argued that “the first instinct of Friends was to work behind the scenes, to sympathize with Germany . . . to maintain every link with the country . . . and apply discrete pressure, and never foul the international atmosphere with hysterical calumny”. See Greenwood, Quaker Encounters, Vol. 1., 260.
67 Letter from Sargeant to G. Jeffrey, [F. O. Ref: C3653/319/18], 23 May 1933, GEC Minutes, FCRA/1, LSF/FHL.
68 Letter from Jeffreys to Simon, 24 May 1933, GEC minutes, FCRA/1, LSF/FHL; Letter from Simon to Jeffreys [Ref: C4712/319/18], 7 June 1933, GEC minutes, FCRA/1, LSF/FHL.
settlement and it was in this arena that the Society of Friends used their lobbying skills once again in their capacity as representatives on the Advisory Committee of the Nansen Office.\(^69\)

Yet, while willing to be active in 'back rooms', public statements were avoided, establishing another pattern of response that would become definitive of GEC work. One example in 1933 illustrates this style. Members of the Anglican Church and Jewish community leaders were planning a protest meeting at Queens Hall for June 1933 to express public concern about the plight of Jews in Germany.\(^70\) GEC representatives were invited to join the platform but declined on the grounds that “such a protest” would only be helpful “if it is positive and constructive, without animosity [that] shows real understanding of the international responsibility for the present political and economic state of Germany”. Fearing that the meeting was more likely to inflame feelings against Germany, members of the committee were told that if they attended, they did so as individuals and that no official representation would be sent. By mid-June, however, there was evidence of a ‘change of heart’ as Friends were encouraged to attend. While Quakers were not attending as a corporate body, individuals now received the blessing of the committee, albeit one which stopped short of a ringing endorsement.\(^71\) Ambivalence as to the efficacy of public protest was reiterated throughout the committee’s life span which related to Quaker concerns about appearing anti-German, coupled with a belief that Britain as an Allied partner was partly to blame for the present conditions. As a result, Quakers were anxious that critical commentary about Nazi actions against German Jewish nationals would not outweigh the message that, in Quaker eyes, these acts were a reaction to the imposition of the Versailles Treaty. Friends remained wedded to this belief and for this reason, public criticism of Nazi persecution was avoided, as we will see, in stark contrast to the critical stance taken by other Christian groups of this study.\(^72\)

\(^69\) The Advisory committee was made up of private organizations and attached to the Nansen Office. This Office was in turn attached to the League of Nations and was named after the Norwegian explorer Fridtjof Nansen who devised a system that enabled refugees without passports to gain travel papers which were accepted by certain governments. See: Michael Marrus, The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century (Oxford: OUP, 1985) 86-91.

\(^70\) This meeting is discussed in further detail in chapter 5.

\(^71\) Committee Meetings, GEC minutes, 24 April 1933, 8 June 1933, 14 June 1933, FCRA/1, LSF/FHL.

\(^72\) For sympathy with the situation in Germany and Allied culpability, see “An Impression of Germany Today,” Wayfarer 12, no. 9 (Oct 1933):174; Also see “The present German situation is
While unconvinced of the efficacy of critical public statements about German persecution of minorities and opponents, the initial parameters of GEC aid policy were defined in early May 1933.

So far as seems necessary, cases of distress among Jews, having no special claim upon Friends, are to be put in touch with Jewish Organizations, and our committee will deal with Friends and friends of Friends.73

On an initial reading, it appeared that Jewish refugee cases were to be excluded from Quaker relief on the basis that there were pre-existing aid sources available for refugee Jews. Rereading this pronouncement, however, its ambiguities become clearer. The statement did allow, at least theoretically, for aid to be distributed to Jewish claimants who were known to Friends, that is, ‘friends of Friends’. In addition, the proviso, ‘so far as seems necessary’ indicated an element of latitude and inferred the possibility of inclusion blurring policy parameters still further.

Indeed, vague definition of terms reappears as a constant theme throughout this study. The term ‘refugee’ was used as a generic designation to refer to various sub-groups of refugees: ‘politicals’ (socialist and communists), liberals, Jews, Christians and so called ‘non-Aryan’ Christians. Refugee Jews, however, were often separated out from this more general appellation and specifically referred to as ‘Jewish refugees’. (This related in part to a more general understanding of the growing refugee crisis, that is, that it was a ‘Jewish’ emergency, rather than a much larger humanitarian problem). In some cases, however, another term was applied, namely an Anglicized version of a Nazi term: nicht Arier - ‘non-Aryan’. The opacity of this designation was that it could equally be used in Nazi discourse to refer to Christians with Jewish relations – immediate or through marriage - and applied to Christian members of ‘mixed marriages’ (where one partner was Christian and the other, Jewish), in addition to its use in reference to Jews. During the 1930s, however, in practice the term ‘non-Aryan’ referred to so called Christian ‘non-Aryans’, even if used

73 Meeting of the Joint Committee on the German Situation, GEC Minutes, 3 May 1935, FCRA/1, LSF/FHL. Nor were committee members out of step with grass-root members: “We do not think there is any need for Friends to help Jews as the various Jewish organizations are quite able to do this”. See Letter from Winifred A. Garnett, Manchester, to Thomas Ellis, Manchester, 22 July 1933, Unsorted Papers, Friends House, Manchester.
without its religious identifier ‘Christian’. Thus, the expression ‘non-Aryan’ (Christian) distinguished the Christian refugee (linked to Jews in various ways) from his Jewish refugee counterpart. Ambiguous terminology, combined with vaguely worded statements, meant that policy positions were sometimes difficult to interpret. Generally, the terms ‘Jewish refugee’ and ‘non-Aryan’ Christian refugee were used, but in other situations, and not restricted to Quaker circles, the more ambiguous ‘non-Aryan’ was utilized, making policy seem ‘fudged’ or ‘played both ways’, to give an appearance of an inclusive policy, when in reality aid was targeted solely at Christians. Interpreted one way, however, this ambiguity of terms indicated a willingness to open out policy to include as many case variations as were possible. Moreover, policy was being created under pressure of events and defining such parameters was difficult to establish immediately. On the other hand, this ambiguity signified in certain situations a desire to make only the vaguest of statements on paper so that ultimate control of policy would be understood within the committee alone. This complicated style had consequences much later when the GEC committee was augmented by a much greater number of workers, who had not be privy to early policy discussions and who did not understand immediately how to proceed with certain cases so that confusion ensued.74

In the early weeks and months after the Nazis came to power, aid was distributed to German Friends and ‘friends of Friends’ as outlined above. This decision seemed to preclude Jews because Quakers determined that as Jewish relief organizations were already in place, they would handle their ‘own’ cases, as Friends were dealing with theirs (German Friends). Nevertheless, that initial statement was vague and ambiguous and it was not long before clarification was sought by the committee’s own Berlin representative, William Hughes (1880-1966).75 His request

74 See especially, an exchange of letters regarding policy about mixed marriages. Briefly, years later, at the height of the refugee crisis in 1938, when Quaker aid workers numbered over 80, GEC workers corresponded with their Jewish counterparts in the German Jewish Aid Committee (GJAC) to ascertain and confirm Quaker policy, one which previous members had been implementing for over five years. See correspondence between Fischel (GEC) and Fellner (GJAC): Letter from Fischel to Fellner, 8 January 1939 and Fellner’s reply, 13 February 1939, CGJ Folder, FCRA/25, LSF/FHL. As the term ‘non-Aryan’ is a Nazi racial construct based on pseudoscientific notions of Jewish ‘race’ it will always be used within quote marks so as to make clear that its use does not validate its Nazi meaning. During the 1930s this term became part of the common discourse and even liberal minded groups (such as the Quakers) used the term without discrimination, whether or not they credited the concept with any validity themselves.

75 William Ravenscroft Hughes was GEC representative in Germany from 1933 to 1935. He was Secretary of the Camps Committee of the Friends Emergency Committee, 1915-19. Over a two year period he allocated approximately £1,500 to various cases, mainly families of political
for clearer guidelines was met with a statement in November 1933 that pronounced whatever help Friends can give should go to those in distress who are not able to get relief from any other source, and that whatever relief is undertaken in the name of the Friends should be entirely without political discrimination.\textsuperscript{76}

This was a clarification of sorts. Policy expanded from the ‘confines’ of German Friends, ‘friends of Friends’ and, as alluded above, a grey area of discretion, to a policy which now included those unable to find help from other resources. If an existing aid source was available, the individual was to be redirected to that alternative, while other (ultimately more complex) cases, those which fell between established support systems might call on Quaker assistance. Indeed, Friends were to find their niche in cases that fell between organizations as a rapidly sectionalized refugee aid network emerged, one that by November 1933 was divided between group interests such as academics and professionals, Jews and politicals and others. The policy clarification for Hughes once again established needy Jews as excluded from Quaker relief policy on the basis that other sources were open to this group, but as before, an element of flexibility remained, one that allowed for individual anomalies.

Friends demonstrated their commitment to non-sectarianism following an approach by William Paton (1886-1943) of the International Missionary Council (IMC) in February 1934.\textsuperscript{77} Paton sought GEC support for a new organization to represent the interests of ‘Hebrew Christian’ refugees and suggested that the new group be composed of representatives of the GEC, the International Hebrew Christian Alliance (IHCA) and the International Missionary Council Committee on the Christian

\begin{footnotes}
\item[76] Committee Meeting, \textit{GEC Minutes}, 13 November 1933, FCRA/1, LSF/FHL.
\item[77] William Paton was a writer on missionary themes. He was secretary of the Student Christian Movement in 1911 and secretary of the International Missionary Council from 1928. See E. Jackson, \textit{Red Tape and the Gospel: a study of William Paton, 1886-1943} (Birmingham, Phlogiston, Selly Oak Colleges, 1980). The International Missionary Council (IMC) was founded in 1921 in New York. It was born out of the Continuation committee of the World Missionary Conference, Edinburgh in 1910 and the ‘Emergency Committee’ organized during the Great War. The Council sought to stimulate thinking and investigation on questions related to the mission and expansion of Christianity worldwide, to help coordinate the activities of the national missionary work of the churches and unite Christians in seeking justice in international and inter-racial relations. Representatives were drawn from Australia, Japan, India, Britain Latin America and North America. In the 1930s this body was led by the American missionary, John R. Mott (Chairman) in New York. J. H. Oldham and William Paton in London and Rev. A. L. Warnshuis in New York, all served as concurrent secretaries. The IMC produced the \textit{International Review of Missions} as well as intermittent reports bearing on missionary issues.
\end{footnotes}
Approach to the Jews (IMCCAJ). Believing that the refugee problem could not be treated "sectionally", GEC members declined to join the new group: "In our own work we make no distinction between various classes of refugees and do not feel that it would be wise for Friends to undertake to represent any one section". This was a glossing over of the finer details of GEC policy. Groups were distinguished one from another and excluded or included on certain terms. Moreover, in another variation of policy logic, while the committee opposed campaigning for the IHCA as a distinct grouping, the GEC would represent 'Hebrew-Christians' interests on the Advisory Council. On the grounds of non-sectarianism, the GEC also declined to take up the cause of 'Non-Aryan' Christian children, for "while we feel sympathy with this concern, we do not feel able to single it out for special attention". Later, this decision would alter under pressure of events and a change in focus.

GEC policy was taken to its logical, if somewhat perverse conclusion by the Quaker Representative in Berlin in his assistance to Nazi German prisoners in Memel, Lithuania. As part of the Treaty of Versailles between Germany and the Allies on 28 June 1919, Germany lost control of Memelland. After a period of instability, leading to a dictatorship, however, German nationalist activities led to a trial of German Nationalist Socialist leaders. The Memel Treason Trial (summer 1935) resulted in the imprisonment of 83 men and continuing tensions between the Lithuanian and German populations. Corder Catchpool interceded for these prisoners at the behest of their colleagues in Germany and was successful in gaining the release of most of the men. Catchpool argued that this aid was given on the basis of non-partisanship, rather then

78 Committee Meeting, GEC Minutes, 27 February 1934, FCRA/1, LSF/FHL. It should be noted that 'Hebrew-Christians' distinguished themselves from 'non-Aryan' Christians. While Christians 'non-Aryan' were Christians with some Jewish 'ancestry', 'Hebrew-Christians' were 'full' Jews, who while believing in Jesus as a Divine Messiah still regarded themselves to be Jews. The International Hebrew Christian Alliance (IHCA) was created to represent this group which mixed 'racial' concepts of Jewishness with messianic Christianity. National councils were present in Britain, throughout Europe, including Germany, Austria and Switzerland. Branches were also found in America and Australia. During the 1930s, the International Alliance and British section were run by Sir Leon Levison and Rev. Harcourt Samuel. The International Missionary Council's Committee on the Christian Approach to the Jews (IMCCAJ) was founded in 1930 to coordinate missionary work to Jews in order to prevent overlapping of effort. It produced literature which emphasized Christian responsibility for Jewish conversion. Conrad Hoffmann, an American churchman, was Chairman of this committee during the 1930s.

79 Committee Meeting, GEC Minutes, 11 July 1934, FCRA/1, LSF/FHL.

80 Committee Meeting, GEC Minutes, 30 July 1934, FCRA/1, LSF/FHL.
pressure from the prisoners’ Nazi friends in Germany.\textsuperscript{81}

A pattern of aid emerges over this period consistent with stated policy which was at once ambiguous and exclusionary while at the same time inclusive and internally consonant with Quaker philosophy. Jews as a group of refugees, as far as GEC members were concerned, were already served sufficiently by their own committees, and thus would not be aided by the GEC as such.\textsuperscript{82} It is possible, however, in their decision not to aid Jews, that Quakers over-estimated Jewish Refugee organizational funds and the ability of Jewish aid agencies to assist all Jewish refugees at all times. GEC assistance was given on non-sectarian guidelines and certain groups were rejected on the grounds of particularism, yet by adopting an ‘even-handed’ approach to all cases of ‘distress’, particularly in the case of Nazi prisoners and their families, Friends judged all cases as equally needy and as equally valid. By enacting a policy of ‘scrupulous equality’ and providing assistance to such cases, it must be suggested that while championing non-partisanship and non-sectarianism, Quakers sidelined their own cherished values of equality and freedom by ignoring the greater reality of Nazi persecution of minorities. Choosing a policy of total ‘evenhandedness’ without exception, meant that Quakers assisted Nazis to appease their critics and to demonstrate their evenhandedness.

\textit{Policy and Practice: A school in Holland and Rest Homes in Germany}

Members of the GEC kept themselves abreast of conditions in Germany through reports issued by the Berlin Centre and trips by committee members to Germany, the Berlin Centre and German Friends. In this way committee members were informed about local and political developments from the ‘grassroots’, a unique set of sources not possessed by other Christian groups of this study.\textsuperscript{83}

As the effects of the Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service were felt in the teaching professions, German and British Friends developed the idea of

\textsuperscript{81} Committee Meeting, \textit{GEC Minutes}, 3 September 1934, FCRA/1, LSF/FHL. See: William Hughes, \textit{Indomitable Friend}, 123-132. There is a suggestion that pressure was bought to bear on Quakers to ‘prove’ their credentials in this regard given the emphatic statement by Willis Hall that this aid was \textit{not} given for these reasons. Nazis accused Catchpool of helping opponents of the Nazis yet excluding them from assistance. See Willis Hall, \textit{Quaker International Work in Europe since 1914} (Savoie: Imprimeries Réunies de Chambéry, 1938), 149-152.

\textsuperscript{82} Darnton, \textit{Account of,} 36.

\textsuperscript{83} From the committees inception in March 1933 to May 1934, British Friends made nearly thirty trips to Germany. See, FSC Report: Germany, \textit{LYM Proceedings} (London: LYM, 1934), 34.
an ‘International School’ for teachers dismissed from State service and for children of parents affected by political or ‘racial’ discrimination. The school was to be an opportunity to demonstrate Quaker ideals of religious tolerance and non-sectarianism in practice. Relying mainly on GEC funding, it was to be run by an International Quaker Committee composed of German, Dutch and British Friends, of whom Bertha Bracey was appointed the British representative. A site in Ommen, Holland near the German border was found in 1933 and plans for the intake of children were developed, emphasizing the need for “children of all nationalities . . . non-Jewish children as well as Jewish pupils”. The fostering of an atmosphere of international understanding and reconciliation in line with Quaker values was an essential principle of the school’s foundation.

On the opening of the International School in February 1934, intake policy altered, emphasizing the specific desire to include Jewish children. The school was to be built on a “liberal basis” that would be accessible to both non-orthodox Jews and, adopting Nazi terminology, ‘non-Aryans’, defined as children of mixed marriages or Christians with Jewish heritage. Increasingly, Jewish applicants outstripped those from Christians, so that policy was reviewed again in June as competing views of universalism and sectarianism clashed with an ideology (Nazism) that was particularist in its attacks (Jews). The committee voiced its misgivings about advertising to the Jewish community as an influx “of purely Jewish children is likely to cause difficulties for a school which is trying to build up a Quaker atmosphere and tradition”. By

84 Committee Meeting, GEC Minutes, 3 May 1933, FCRA/1, LSF/FHL. It was also an opportunity to support constructive aid, rather than just relief, a preferred type of Quaker aid. The file of ‘The Quaker International School at Ommen’ (Friends Education Council) is missing, believed lost. Information is therefore derived from GEC minutes and reports as well as various Quaker publications.

85 “The educational work and the life of the school is based on the principles of Quakerism . . . complete toleration of belief and thought”. GEC Report, LYM Proceedings (London: LYM, May 1935), 51.

86 The International committee included: Bertha Bracey (Secretary of the GEC), Hans Albrecht (Clerk of the German Yearly Meeting), Piet Ariens Kappers (Dutch representative). Professor Katerina Petersen was appointed principle of the school. See Bertha Bracey, “The German Emergency,” Wayfarer 12, no. 12 (January 1934): 240; Katerina Petersen, “The New Quaker School in Holland,” The Friend, 13 July 1934, pp. 651-652. Darnton, An Account of, 29-32. The school started with 7 staff and three pupils. By 1939 there were 15 staff members and over 140 pupils.

87 Letter from Bertha Bracey to the Friends Service Council, 24 May 1933, FCRA/1, LSF/FHL.

88 Committee Meeting, GEC Minutes, 20 February 1934, FCRA/1, LSF/FHL. The term appears to have been adopted without reservation.

89 Committee Meeting, GEC Minutes, 25 June 1934, FCRA/1, LSF/FHL.
July an article by the schools' director appeared in *The Friend* which detailed the progress of the school and the curriculum, including Religious Instruction that traced "the development of the Christian religion". Later, classes dealt with "the practical implications of the Christian faith" with examples of Quaker individuals who have "put their religious convictions into practice". A Quaker visitor to the school noted that "Meetings for Worship" were held every Sunday morning. "Hardly any are actually Quakers, some are not of the Christian faith or, indeed, perhaps of any, but all gather in silence, broken only if anyone feels moved to speak". His observations, contradicted those of one refugee child, who recalled this experience differently. Instead of the customary silence, a sermon was generally given, usually delivered by the English master, Kurt Neuse.

Admission policy was in flux again in September 1934, following a number of applications from Orthodox Jewish parents. It was agreed that Orthodox Jewish children could be accepted, on the understanding that they attend the Meetings for Worship as all other pupils were required to do. Moreover any Jewish "instruction" was undertaken in their own time at their parents expense.

We feel the weight of the view expressed by Katerina Peterson, that such instruction may make the unity of the school, which is being built up on a Quaker basis, very difficult. If however the pupils can all still attend the school Meetings [for Worship] and the Jewish instruction does not become a substitute for these, and if arrangements can be undertaken for a visiting Jewish teacher by those who desire such instruction, we see no objection to allowing Jewish children to have such instruction as their parents desire.

The initial plan for an 'International school' run on the principle of religious freedom and egalitarianism was replaced with a 'Quaker school' suffused with Quaker religious values, that included Jews with the proviso that they attend Meetings and religious classes. Indeed, for some school staff and committee members there was a fear that practicing Jews would erode even, damage, the school's 'Quaker spirit'. Only through mandatory Christian religious instruction would this essence be preserved.

Once again the pull between Quaker values of non-sectarianism, tolerance and
egalitarianism were balanced finely between the need to maintain and expand a Quaker culture, one that was both Christian and anti-particularistic as well as including children who were non-Christian. Jewish parents had limited choices as to where to place their children during this period and the Ommen school provided their children with a haven free from Nazi influence and intolerance where children would be appreciated as individuals. Although the majority of the school population was Jewish, or were from families where one parent was Jewish, there was no individual or group observance of Jewish holidays. The school at Ommen was an institution that wished to include Jews under certain conditions, but was ambivalent about religious Jews or Jewish observance on any level, including religious instruction.

A parallel small scale project for adult respite care was underway at a similar time in Germany with comparable goals of providing a place of refuge, albeit for short periods. Elizabeth Fox Howard (1873-1957), a GEC member who made frequent trips to Germany, saw the problems faced by political prisoners (‘politicals’) and alerted the committee of their position in June 1933. The idea of a safe place where German Friends and “other in distress” could rest and recuperate had been raised earlier in April by another Friend, Herta Kraus. This idea was revived and brought to fruition in November 1933 as a GEC funded and staffed project. Situated in a hotel in Falkenstein, a few miles from Frankurt-am-Main, the home was run by visiting British Friends, members of the GEC and the Germany and Holland Committee members who acted as ‘hostesses’. In October 1934, the Rest Home transferred to Bad Pyrmont where there was an established group of German Friends with a Meeting House. The premises of a Franciscan convent were acquired and a pattern of alternating between the two Homes developed over a period of the next few years.

Visitors to the Rest Homes were recommended by Friends at the Berlin Centre. Most had been incarcerated in either concentration camps or prisons, others as opponents of the regime, were living under daily fear and stress of arrest and the home provided respite from these experiences. Over the next five years approximately 800 people stayed as guests, mainly German Friends and political dissidents, but a small

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94 Committee Meeting, GEC Minutes, 25 June 1934, FCRA/1, LSF/ FHL.
95 Committee Meeting, GEC Minutes, 22 June 1933, FCRA/1, LSF/ FHL. Committee Meeting, GEC Minutes, 4 September 1933, FCRA/1, LSF/FHL. See Elizabeth Fox Howard, Across Barriers (Essex: Chigwell Press, 1941).
number of Catholics and Jews also found relief. In this case, Jews were aided not as Jews per se, but the primary reason for their inclusion was because they were political opponents of the regime, defined by their ‘political’ colours as socialist, communists or liberal thinkers. Nor were they excluded because they were Jews. Friends had a tradition of helping political dissidents who were seen as a marginalized group in need of aid. In aiding ‘politicals’ therefore, Quakers followed established patterns of relief and in not distinguishing, in this case, between Jewish and non-Jewish ‘politicals’, nor automatically referring these individuals to Jewish aid sources, Friends could be seen to be maintaining their commitment to non-partisanship.

Nazi reactions to Quaker work in the Rest Home and more generally, to visiting British Friends attached to the Centre and contact with German Friends, were mixed. Quakers were generally free to operate unhindered for most of the time. Nevertheless, arrests did occur, the first in 1933, when the head of the Berlin Centre, Corder Catchpool was taken to Gestapo headquarters and accused of aiding opponents of the regime. The subsequent arrests of Elizabeth Fox led to the withdrawal of GEC representative, William Hughes, for fear of endangering the position of Hughes, the Berlin Centre and German Friends. It has been suggested that British Quakers, fearing for their co-religionists in Germany stayed their public voice because they were afraid of endangering their precarious position. Certainly, contemporary Quaker writers voiced concern for the position of their German brethren. There is evidence that British Quakers were sensitive to the predicament of German Friends and feared retribution for public criticism, for themselves and their German brethren. As a result, the position of German Friends presented British Quakers with both advantage and difficulty. German Friends provided local knowledge and language expertise (though many of the Quaker aid workers were German speakers) as well as a ‘home’ base, yet as a pacifist group, Quakers - German or British were unlikely to welcome Nazi totalitarianism. Nor were they likely to endorse Nazi territorial ambitions, in fact with their absolutist pacifist position they were likely to campaign against such actions.

97 Howard was arrested in August 1935 as she crossed the border with papers, letters and an address book. Committee Meeting, GEC Minutes, 2 September 1935, FCRA/1, LSF/FHL.
German Quakers trod a thin line between maintaining traditional Quaker values and not provoking German officials, so that lobbying German nationals against conscription was a task only British Friends could undertake.  

These concerns, however, were balanced by the advantage of a unique role Friends' had played for German nationals in Britain during the war and their reconstructive efforts after the Great War. Germans remembered Quaker aid for children and this legacy engendered respect and gratitude to Quakers. Quakers, as a group, rarely choose public reproach of a foreign nation as a lobbying strategy, favouring private 'behind the scenes' approaches. Albeit a way of giving indirect criticism, it was less overtly political, less threatening, and in the German government's case was one that was easy to dismiss. British Friends' bifurcate approach of public "silence" on persecution, coupled with high profile public criticism in Britain and in international forums and lobbying against the enforcement of Versailles Treaty obligations, aided, as one historian as noted, a German political agenda rather than defusing the violent and aggressive policies of Nazis against minorities, especially Jews. Quakers were able to continue to maintain a Quaker presence in Germany, to carry on their own interests such as 'message work', on the understanding they would not risk this work nor endanger their German brethren with public criticism. The withdrawal of Hughes, who had give aid to 'politicals' and possibly Jews, illustrates a tacit agreement to modify Quaker activity at a relief level too as well as the withdrawal from anti-conscription campaigning. Pragmatism, as well as religious idealism shaped British Quaker actions in Germany and Britain at least until 1935.

Withdrawal of the GEC workers in Germany and a change in Focus

From mid 1935, British Quakers and the GEC broke their public 'silence'. An open letter to Hitler, reprinted in The Friend and in other national papers, precipitated the exit of British GEC representatives from Germany. Addressed to the German Chancellor, the letter did not tackle the issue of Nazi antisemitism but chose to focus on another issue, the concentration camp. Quakers expressed an understanding of the "peculiar difficulties" Germany had faced because of onerous reparations and other

99 Catchpool was embroiled in anti-conscription campaigning; see Seadle, Quakers in Nazi Germany, 27. British Friends were in charge of aid for the same reason.

100 Schmitt, Quakers and Nazis, passim.
political factors. At the same time, the oppressive measures introduced by the regime and the discrimination experienced by some of its citizens (undefined) gave cause for concern. Generally so reticent about open criticism, this letter represented a significant change in GEC public policy which in the past spoke on behalf of Germany in the context of Versailles. Quakers, however, felt impelled to act publicly. They had studiously tried their traditional options, using discrete lobbying and personal letters to Hitler and Goering. This had been accompanied by a number of deputations to German officials in Germany and England but none of these strategies had produced any change in camp conditions. This was a brief break in public policy, one which while critical of the effects of Nazi ideology – concentration camps - also displayed an ambivalence to direct censure of a national exclusionary policy which made all German Jews the chief targets of Nazi persecution. At the same time, it was probable that whatever subject chosen for admonition by Friends, such criticism would have a deleterious effect on the future of Quaker-Nazi relations, either for German Friends or for British Quakers operating in Germany.

Indeed by 1935, Quaker relations with Germany were souring. In September 1935, Corder Catchpool and Elizabeth Fox Howard were arrested and asked to write “full statements” regarding their work in Germany. On 11 September 1935, the FSC called a meeting and ruled that all work in Germany must be handed over to the Germany and Holland Committee, including the school at Ommen. In addition, the FSC ruled that relief in Germany should no longer play more than a “very small part” of Quaker work in the future. Clearly circumscribing the future remit of the GEC, it declared that the committee could retain its fundraising function for refugee and relief work, but henceforth would no longer have any responsibility for fieldwork operations in Germany, though work outside of Germany, on the continent would still be under its control. The intervention of the FSC was indicative of diverging opinion within Friends House over approaches to the declining situation in Germany. The publication

102 The letter was published by the Meetings for Suffering at the request of the GEC. It was publicized in the national press and copies of the letter were sent to individuals in Germany. See Darnton, An Account of..., 12.
103 Letter from the GEC to Hitler [copy], GEC Minutes, 6 March 1935, FCRA/1, LSF/FHL.
104 Committee Meeting, GEC Minutes, 2 Sept 1935, FCRA/1, LSF/FHL.
of the letter and the arrest of two GEC representatives was viewed with alarm and as
devoid of the Quaker position of non-partisanship. FSC seizure of German-based
Quaker activities from the GEC heralded the beginning of a decline in the committee’s
fortunes. The FSC believed that if they as a body did not conduct their future
relief work “very quietly”, the continuation of their work was under threat. British
Friends might be expelled from Germany and the continued existence of the German
Friends’ as an independent body would be endangered. The balance between relief and
‘message’ work had become seriously biased towards aid work in the view of the FSC.
In order to retain the ‘delicate’ relationship with the German authorities, it was
determined that future field work should be controlled by a committee under full FSC
control rather than under both FSC and MFS direction.

The GEC, in FSC ‘eyes’, had taken assistance to far. The existence of an
independent GEC representative to administer aid had not prevented the Berlin Centre
from becoming involved in relief efforts; in fact, the Society was increasingly seen as a
relief agency rather than as a religious organization. The idea that such an
intermediary would be seen as distinct from the Berlin Centre and the German friends,
nor jeopardize either positions, was regarded as somewhat naïve. German authorities
would view all Quakers attached to the Centre, or ‘independent’ of it, as part of the
same organization regardless of a GEC imposed separation of functions. In practice,
on occasions, the GEC representative did meet prospective claimants at the Berlin
Centre and individuals were recommended by the Berlin Centre itself. As a result it
was not an unreasonable assumption for the German authorities to assume a link
existed between the Berlin Centre, the GEC representative, British and by extension
German Friends. Moreover, there was also a realization that Quakers in Germany wished
to be a solely pietistic organization, opposed to the more ‘politicized’ parent body in
Britain. It was recognized that indigenous or local Quaker groups in other countries
would develop differently away from England, so that if German Friends were called to
an alternative way of witness, this was to be respected.106 The GEC and British
Quakers more generally were pulled by their loyalty and commitment to the fledgling

105 FSC Report to the GEC and the German and Holland Committee, FSC Reports, 11 Sept. 1935,
LSF/FHL.
106 M. Catherine Albright, “The Spread of Quakerism in Other Lands,” Wayfarer, 13, no. 5 (June
1935): 87.
German Quaker community, their desire to give aid and a wish to maintain a Quaker interest in Germany beyond the current crisis. In looking to the future, the Berlin Centre would be a forum for reconciliation projects and the continuation of the German Yearly Meeting would provide local input. Friends reasoned that by moving to a low key approach to Quaker aid in Germany, they allowed for such a continuation. To retain a presence of this sort was essential to the FSC and Quakers, so that the GEC acquiesced and withdrew its field interest in Germany.

III: TRANSITION AND CRISIS, SEPTEMBER 1935 TO FEBRUARY 1938.

The removal of relief work in Germany from the GEC’s remit altered its focus. While it continued to fund projects it had initiated in Germany, such as the Rest Home in Bad Pyrmont and the Ommen School in Holland, the GEC began to concentrate on its assistance programmes in Britain and relationships with other organizations to improve its financial situation. By autumn of 1935, six hundred refugee cases (families and individuals) had been helped by the GEC since 1933. The committee provided various types of aid, from finding hospitality and school places in the early days, to providing maintenance grants, getting work permits in occupations allowed by the Ministry of Labour, as well as health welfare, training and emigration support from 1935 onwards. One historian has remarked that GEC negotiations with the Home Office and the Ministry of Labour was one of its most useful functions.

By 1936, however, the Friends in Britain began to concentrate on funding training projects, most with a goal of emigration in mind. Searching out emigration possibilities became increasingly necessary because of British immigration policy which granted ‘leave to remain’ for short periods on proof of funds for adequate support, or attendance on a training course. A further 184 permits and renewals were obtained via the committee in 1936, and in spring of that year the GEC supported a further 124 refugees for between five to nine months in training or until emigration. Training

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107 It is not clear whether adult German Jewish refugees were helped as the terminology of the report is ambiguous; it clearly mentions ‘Jewish children’ but more vaguely ‘German adults’. I would suggest that this meant non-Jewish adult refugees or ‘non-Aryan’ Christians. In a few cases Jewish children were educated at reduced fees in Quaker schools. See Darnton, An Account of, 34. GEC Report, LYM Proceedings (London, LYM, 1934), 86.

108 Darnton, An Account of, 34.
schemes included photography, midwifery, farming and hairdressing. The GEC spent approximately £4180 on maintenance, training and welfare from 1936 to 1937, and an estimated £3,000 on emigration for the 1936 to 1937 period, illustrating their commitment to emigration projects. During the period 1936 to 1937, the GEC aided a few hundred mainly non-Jewish refugees. This is set in the wider context of an estimated flow from Germany of 129,000 refugees between 1933 and 1937, of which several thousand had entered Britain.

Moving from the practical services given to various groups of refugees, at the international level, the GEC maintained its lobbyist role for the general refugee cause, redoubling its efforts with the High Commissioner's Office at the League of Nations. More notably, in this 'middle period' of the committee's inter-war years, 1935-1938, the committee became more clearly identified with the cause of a specific group of refugees, namely the 'non-Aryan' Christians, in contradiction to stated non-partisan and non-sectarian policy. Part of this alignment came from pressure from, from the High Commissioner, James Grover McDonald (1886-1964) and Deputy High Commissioner, Norman Bentwich, who wanted the GEC, as the only Christians in refugee aid, to coordinate aid for 'non-Aryan' Christians. As Friends identified that there was no existing structure for these Christians to call upon, there was a desire within Quakerism itself to be involved, as Friends saw themselves as giving aid to those who had no other source of aid. Increasingly, Jewish refugee organizations were taking care of these non-Jewish refugees and were struggling to keep up with an every burgeoning problem. So that while Friends aligned themselves with a group that had no designated source, they subsequently became sectionally identified with this group running counter to their belief that the problem be treated neither sectionally nor in a

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109 Ibid., 34-36.
110 Income and Expenditure Accounts submitted for end of years 1935, 1936 and 1937 in: GEC Reports to Meetings for Suffering, LYM Proceedings, (London, LYM, 1936, 1937 and 1938). The following are a list of exact figures. Emigration: £1, 579.8.2 (1936) and £1, 382.4.11 (1937); Hospitality: £2,096.14.1 (1936) and £2,083.19.6 (1937).
112 James Grover McDonald was an American diplomat, internationalist and author. His background was in history and international law and he held various teaching and research position at Harvard University and Indiana University between 1912 to 1918. He formed the Foreign Policy Association in 1921 and served as Chairman until 1933. McDonald was a frequent visitor to Europe and Germany and interviewed Hitler in 1933. Appointed High Commissioner for Refugees under the League of Nations in 1933, he made a very public resignation in December 1935 in which he condemned the treatment of Jews in Germany and criticized the democracies for evading their responsibilities to aid the refugees.
partisan way.

Wider issues of Christian response became increasingly significant from 1935 onwards. The lack of a general Christian reaction lay in the public perception of the problem as a Jewish issue, one that would be solved by the activities of Jewish refugee organizations alone. In this opinion, Quakers were in agreement: they too believed that Jewish bodies could take care of Jewish refugees and that they and other bodies would help non-Jewish refugees. At the same time Friends were committed to the notion that the refugee crisis should not be treated sectionally. It was a contradictory state of affairs not helped by the confusion in the public mind surrounding ‘non-Aryan’ Christians, who despite being Christians, were not necessarily perceived as Christian (rather they were seen as partly Jewish and therefore to be dealt with by Jews). Or, conversely, sometimes they were seen as Christian and, consequently, not regarded as needy as their Jewish refugee counterparts because it was understood that Nazis targeted Jews rather than Christians, an incorrect assumption given the ‘racialization’ of certain Christians. While Christian refugees were a very much smaller grouping, numbering less than a tenth of all refugees, their numbers were growing. Until 1936, Quakers were the sole provider amongst Christian denominational relief groups to provide aid to any refugee or ‘would be refugee’, Christian or Jewish, liberal or pacifist, communist or socialist. While there was much discussion within the international Protestant community (discussed in Chapter 5) from as early as 1933, relief structures did not follow. In the meanwhile, Jewish refugee bodies shouldered the increasing burden of refugee aid help by a small number of sectarian bodies such as the AAC and the Quakers.

The passing of the Nuremberg Laws of 15 September 1935 thrust the issue of ‘non-Aryan’ Christians to the forefront of Christian concerns. Overnight Jewish and certain Christian Germans were reduced from ‘citizens’ with rights to ‘subjects’ with duties. Requests from the High Commissioner to the GEC for the committee to coordinate this aid were declined as Quakers argued that this was beyond the financial scope of their body. At the same time, Corder Catchpool reported to the committee that little was being done for ‘non-Aryan’ Christians in Berlin. While it was

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113 Byrd, *Quaker Ways in Foreign Policy*, 22-23. The preference for small scale, personalized projects where Quakerism could be demonstrated may have also played a part in this decision.
rumoured that certain categories of ‘non-Aryans’ would be reabsorbed back into the German State, the problem remained that a proportion of these Christians might need to leave. The Berlin Centre was rapidly becoming a meeting place for individuals and organizations interested in the problems of ‘non-Aryan’ Christians, but there was a need for a coordinating body to direct this assortment of interested parties.

In fact, between September 1935 and September 1936, the number of cases which sought aid from the GEC increased “three fold”. This was joined by renewed pressure from the replacement High Commissioner, Sir Neill Malcolm, that the position of “non-Jewish” refugees continued to present difficulty as no organization “with sufficient funds” was prepared to come their assistance. The GEC had already taken on further obligations with its support of a new venture for ‘non-Aryan’ children. Helping the Inter-Aid Committee (IAC) with hospitality and school placements for non-Jewish children, the GEC joined the Council for German Jewry (CGJ) in this joint venture. Thus the GEC members felt pressure to aid more ‘non-Aryan’ Christians from within the Quaker body itself, the new High Commissioner, and from the applicants themselves at a time when GEC income was decreasing.

After many false starts and much discussion, an International Christian Committee for German Refugees (ICCGR) was formed to distribute money to pre-existing case-working committees as well as searching out emigration possibilities for the benefit of Christian refugees. Keen to get help from this body, the GEC send a representative to the inaugural ICCGR meeting in Geneva. Within weeks of this meeting, a conference of Christians and Churches met on 20 February 1936 to discuss a Churches Appeal for German ‘refugees’ which would concentrate on fundraising for

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114 Committee Meeting, GEC Minutes, 20 January 1936, FCRA/2, LSF/FHL.
115 Germany and Holland Committee Minutes, 15 April 1936, FCRA/2, LSF/FHL.
116 “Refugees, where will they find a resting place?”, Folder 8, FCRA/17-5, LSF/FHL.
117 The IAC was founded by Gladys Skelton and Francis Benedict with a grant from CGJ of £200 and £60 from SCF in March 1936. From March 1936 to 6 July 1937 the IAC brought in 124 children, split more or less evenly between Jewish and Christian children. There was also a grant of £400 from an anonymous source. See Baumel, ‘The Refugee Children’, 35; Mary Ford, “The Arrival of Jewish Refugee Children in England, 1938-1939,” Immigrants and Minorities 2, no. 2 (July 1983) : 137; Committee Meeting, GEC Minutes, 18 May 1936, FCRA/2, LSF/FHL. The IAC is discussed in Chapter 6.
118 Committee Meeting, GEC Minutes, 3 February 1936, FCRA/2, LSF/FHL.
Having gained funding from the ICCGR, the GEC created training initiatives which were geared towards ‘non-Aryan’ Christians. Gradually the GEC became associated with ‘non-Aryan’ Christian refugees, and subsequent Christian fundraising bodies channeled further money to the GEC for ‘non-Aryan’ Christian and Christian refugees cases. What had started out as a desire to take up cases that fell between established refugee groups, became an alignment with a group that formed the greater number of these marginalized cases. By 1936, the GEC was firmly established as a relief group which specialized in ‘non-Aryan’ Christians refugee aid. Force of political events, pressure from within and without, coupled with the slow response of Christian churches to the general issue of refugees and the decision by Christians to restrict their funds to Christian cases, meant that the sectional approach to the provision of refugee had triumphed. Friends, despite earlier qualms in this regard, joined the wider network of refugee aid as representatives of the ‘non-Aryan’ Christian cause.

Fundraising: Financial problems and reprieve

Prior to the creation of the ICCRG in 1936, the GEC was facing harsh financial realities as commitments soared and income dropped. In May 1935 the GEC needed £2,500 to meet the costs of emigration cases under its care, but had only £70 on reserve. Despite national appeals throughout June 1935 in various national weekly publications and quality broad sheets, the response was disappointing. A Christmas Appeal that year utilizing 4,500 appeal leaflets produced only £320 in return. The formation of the ICCRG seemed to provide a reprieve, although funds came with strict conditions and could only be used for Christian refugees. Very quickly, however, this source of funding proved to be less sustaining than first envisioned as the ICCGR

120 Such as the discussions for training schemes for ‘non-Aryan’ Christian German boys in England. Committee Meeting, GEC Minutes, 30 March 1936, FCRA/2, LSF/FHL.
121 Committee Meeting, GEC Minutes, 3 May 1935, FCRA/1, LSF/FHL.
122 Committee Meeting, GEC Minutes, 3 June 1935, FCRA/1, LSF/FHL.
123 Committee Meeting, GEC Minutes, 6 January 1936, FCRA/2, LSF/FHL.
failed to raise barely a tenth of its projected fund of £125,000.124

The running costs of the GEC and a substantial amount of its funding was provided by the FSC and the Meetings for Suffering. As the GEC began to raise funds outside of the Society through public appeals, the FSC noted a drop in its own external funding and suggested that donors were switching to GEC appeals in preference to FSC calls. It was believed that donors preferred to give to concrete projects or individual cases rather than general relief funds which the FSC sought for its work in Germany, Spain and China. Donations to the FSC continued to decrease throughout 1935 and remained low into the following year. As a result, the FSC requested a renegotiation of funds sent to the GEC so that it might regain funds to meet its own project commitments in China and Spain. Given poor returns from GEC appeals, coupled with increasing costs (the committee was now supporting projects in Germany, France and Czechoslovakia) the GEC executive argued that a retraction of funds would create severe problems. In addition, the Quaker representative in Vienna, Headley Horsnail, had applied for GEC money to deal with the increasing number of German refugees at the Viennese Centre.125 Finding no support from the FSC, the GEC appealed to the Meetings for Sufferings in successive November meetings for £400 a month to help maintain its commitments.126 At the beginning of 1937, finances were so dire, the officers began to discuss the dissolution of the committee as fundraising had become increasingly difficult, and the FSC had reduced its grant. A review of all work was an immediate priority and plans for the careful wind up of the committee’s operation was essential.127 Nor were finances the only problem facing the GEC. Absences, illness and resignations dogged the committee throughout this period and there were two deaths of members. Bertha Bracey, General Secretary of the committee, returned at the beginning of January 1936 after a year long illness, brought on by exhaustion because of overwork.128 During 1936 and 1937, a series of resignations were followed by the death of Charles Weiss, a funding committee member and Paula Kurgass. These resignations and deaths forced the earlier than

124 See chapter 5 for more about the problems associated with this appeal.
125 Request for money by the Austria Committee: Committee Meeting, GEC Minutes, 8 May 1936, FCRA/2, LSF/FHL. Horsnail requests for money: Committee Meeting, GEC Minutes, 18 May 1936, FCRA/2, LSF/FHL.
126 Committee Meeting, GEC Minutes, 2 and 6 November 1936, FCRA/2, LSF/FHL.
127 Committee Meeting, GEC Minutes, 1 February 1937, FCRA/2, LSF/FHL.
planned cessation of the GEC work in Paris.\textsuperscript{129}

On 8 February 1937, a date for the termination of the committee was set to coincide with the end of the High Commission for Refugees Coming from Germany on 31 December 1938. Priorities were assigned to each of the committee’s functions. The school at Ommen, political prisoners, the Home of Rest, training and emigration projects for ‘non-Aryan’ Christians were seen as core functions of the committee. Individual cases were to be reviewed and only the very chronic could be considered.\textsuperscript{130}

In March, the GEC discussed the design of new appeal leaflet in the hope that a public response would bring in more funds.\textsuperscript{131} During April and May, the GEC turned to the Meetings for Suffering and FSC with a demand that more of the administrative and other running costs be met by their parent committees.\textsuperscript{132} By June 1937 the committee began to make allocations to its existing commitments on the basis that the public appeal would be successful.\textsuperscript{133} At the beginning of November the committee brought forward the termination of its work to July 1938, as opposed to December.

Given the strength of committee feeling that the GEC should continue its role, committee members called for discussions with the FSC to see if the GEC could be made permanent ensuring its position within the Quaker body and thus guaranteeing its survival.\textsuperscript{134} At the end of November the committee reported that it would need £4800 to carry out its commitments “assuming termination”.\textsuperscript{135} Over the period 1933 to November 1937, the GEC had received a total of £29,809 and the committee’s December balance stood at £140. Bracey made a last appeal, declaring that without the GEC, the continued existence of aid work for non-Aryan Christians was imperiled and received a last minute reprieve.\textsuperscript{136}

Towards the end of 1937, the GEC was becoming part of a much larger

\textsuperscript{128} Committee Meeting, \textit{GEC Minutes}, 6 January 1936, FCRA/2, LSF/FHL.
\textsuperscript{129} Committee Meeting, \textit{GEC Minutes}, 5 October 1936, FCRA/2, LSF/FHL; Committee Meeting, \textit{GEC Minutes}, 2 July 1937, FCRA/2, LSF/FHL; Committee Meeting, \textit{GEC Minutes}, 30 August 1937, FCRA/2, LSF/FHL; Committee Meeting, \textit{GEC Minutes}, 27 September 1937, FCRA/2, LSF/FHL.
\textsuperscript{130} Committee Meeting, \textit{GEC Minutes}, 8 February 1937, FCRA/2, LSF/FHL.
\textsuperscript{131} Committee Meeting, \textit{GEC Minutes}, 12 March 1937, FCRA/2, LSF/FHL.
\textsuperscript{132} Committee Meeting, \textit{GEC Minutes}, 24 April and 4 May 1937, FCRA/2, LSF/FHL.
\textsuperscript{133} Committee Meeting, \textit{GEC Minutes}, 28 June 1937, FCRA/2, LSF/FHL.
\textsuperscript{134} Committee Meeting, \textit{GEC Minutes}, 1 November 1937, FCRA/2, LSF/FHL.
\textsuperscript{135} Committee Meeting, \textit{GEC Minutes}, 29 November 1937, FCRA/2, LSF/FHL.
\textsuperscript{136} FSC Meeting\[copy\], \textit{GEC Minutes}, 2 December 1937, FCRA/2, LSF/FHL.
network of Christian, Jewish and secular case working and fundraising committees and councils. A “systematic division of responsibility” was emerging and the GEC formed a small but well connected part of this wider system. Their refugee work was part of a growing ‘semi-professional’ relief network, to the extent that much of the work such as applying for visas, finding places for children in schools and adults in training programmes, hospitality and seeking out emigration possibilities, had become a “routine job of work”. Although this work was already pressurized by the lack of its resources, it was about to become even more so, through the force of political events in Germany. Following Kristallnacht, refugee work would be arduous and exhausting in the extreme as the number of applicants soared. Financial systems already approaching their limit (there never was much slack in any of the refugee organizations who were all self-supporting) would be stretched to unbearable lengths and the much vaunted ‘guarantee’ (that no refugee would become a charge on the public purse) would come under severe strain by the later half of 1938. Indeed, the GEC was losing its identity as a religious organisation, and was becoming a relief body engaged in work for refugees connected to the wider framework of refugee organisation through its links with the Christian Council for Refugees from Germany and Central Europe, The Church of England Committee for Non-Aryan Christians, the Catholic Committee for Refugees from Germany and the Inter-Aid Committee for Children Coming from Germany.

IV: ANSCHLUß, KRISTALLNACHT AND KINDERTRANSPORTE, 1938-39

By the beginning of 1938, only relatively few refugees, numbering about 15,000, had entered Britain, approximately one third of whom were transmigrants. Any refugee coming to Britain before May 1938 entered under the provisions of the 1919 Aliens Act. This allowed entry to friendly aliens for a limited period (which could be extended), provided the incomers could support themselves without recourse to

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138 Made by Anglo-Jewish leaders in 1933, the guarantee meant that no Jewish refugee admitted would become a ‘charge’ on public funds. See Louise London, “British Immigration Control Procedures and Jewish Refugees, 1933-1942,” (University of London, PhD, 1992) 22, 140.
139 Hansard, House of Commons, 21 November 1938, v. 314:1314
government funds and that any job they filled was granted on the basis that no suitable British applicant was found. Britain was a temporary refuge and refugees were admitted on the basis that they would re-emigrate elsewhere. This proviso also applied to children and young people on training programmes who were expected to leave on completion of their education or placements. Finding jobs, school places, training and emigration opportunities was undertaken by the refugee organizations funded through voluntary public donations. Refugee committees, indeed, were required to be self-supporting. This arrangement began to fail under the weight of refugee applicants from March 1938 and by the summer of 1939 it became unsustainabled.

On 12 March 1938 Germany annexed Austria and Hitler’s idea of a Greater Reich came a step closer. Antisemitic measures which had been introduced piecemeal over several years in Germany were applied overnight. After May 1938, visas were introduced at the instigation of the Home Office for German and Austrian nationals. British Passport Control Offices in Vienna and Berlin were besieged by desperate Jews trying to escape. Suicide numbers increased tenfold.

Until 1938, GEC minutes devoted remarkably little space to the way in which Nazi measures particularly discriminated against Jews. Direct references and discussions to the specific nature of Jewish suffering under the regime were dropped from committee meetings within a few months of its creation, replaced by discussions on the difficulties of all refugees, political prisoners and concentration camp inmates. Instead, the particular problems faced by the Christian ‘non-Aryan’ refugees became a growing concern. If Jews were mentioned, they were identified as one group of many that were persecuted by the new regime. GEC minutes were non attributive and there were no records of disagreement or discussion on issues of policy giving the impression that consensus ruled. Yet lively debate existed outside of the committee, such as the use of sanctions by the League of Nations. This was viewed by some as morally wrong and by others as absolutely necessary. Given that it was possible for Quakers to have different, even diverging opinions, it must be assumed that the

minutes represent only a skeletal, possibly censored record of the meetings.

The creation of a separate committee to consider antisemitism therefore broke with previous patterns of viewing all victims of Nazism under the same umbrella. The ‘Committee on the Jewish Question’ (CJQ) was formed following the publication of Minute 8 by the Meetings for Sufferings in October 1938.\(^{142}\) Identifying concerns over the relationships between Christians and Jews stressed the “sufferings of Jews in many countries” without reference to other refugees. Moreover, Quakers identified the discrimination and victimization of Jewry in Germany as a Christian concern, “one which strikes at the heart of all Christian communities”. Before any political action was taken it was decided that committee members consult with “prominent members” of the Jewish community.\(^{143}\)

Prior to the formation of the CJQ, the Eighth European Conference of Friends met in Vallekilde, Denmark in September 1938. Much of the proceedings were dominated by issues of refugees, ‘race’ and antisemitism. Deep concern was expressed about the growth of racial discrimination and “particularly at the treatment accorded to the Jews, and to those Christians and others with Jewish relationship”. Six suggestions were made to Friends:

1. Study and seek to understand the Jewish problem in all its bearings and especially the causes and effects of the recent forced migrations.
2. Seek out Jews in their neighbourhood in order to express their sympathy with them as members of a suffering community, and to consider with them the right way towards a solution of the Jewish problem.
3. Do everything in their power to combat anti-Jewish feeling.
4. Take the initiative in arranging periodical meetings between Jews and Christians.
5. Urge Christians of other communions to recognise their responsibility so that the problem may become a burden upon the whole Church.
6. Support the existing relief work for Jews and other non-Aryans.\(^{144}\)

The task of disseminating the Vallekilde suggestions to Quakers and the wider public fell to the CJQ. The committee drew its membership from those directly involved in the refugee issue either by association with the GEC or by previous association with relief work in Germany. These ‘old hands’ included Carl Heath (creator of the International

\(^{142}\) *Meetings for Sufferings*, Minutes 7 and 8, 7 October 1938.

\(^{143}\) *Meetings for Sufferings*, Minute 8, 7 October 1938.

\(^{144}\) FWCC: Minutes 8 of Meeting held at Vallekilde, Denmark; *Committee on the Jewish Question*, 13 September 1938, LSF/FHL. The Vallekilde Minute was published in full in *Wayfarer* 17, no. 11 (November 1938): 245. In the same volume a report of the Conference was printed: Hugh Doncaster, “The Christian Community in the Modern World,” *Wayfarer*, 17, no. 11 (November 1938): 253-254. Delegates from eight European countries as well as representatives from the US attended the conference.
Centre idea), Elizabeth Fox Howard (hostess at the Home of Rest and GEC member) and other GEC members: Joan Mary Fry, Edith Pye and Maurice Rowntree. At its first meeting, members met with Conrad Hoffmann, Director of the International Missionary Council’s Committee on the Christian Approach to the Jews (IMCCAJ). Hoffmann outlined a scheme to remove Jews and non-Aryan Christians out of Germany into large settlement camps in friendly countries, pending arrangements for permanent settlement, an idea viewed as impracticable by the committee given their own (futile) attempts to elicit interest at international governmental level. Instead the Vallekiilde statement was sent to Quaker publications and it was suggested that the Yearly Meeting discuss Jewish and ‘non-Aryan’ persecution.

On 9 November 1938, the group began to draft various statements defining the Quaker position on the matter of antisemitism and persecution.

The Executive Committee (Meetings for Sufferings) of the Society of Friends (Quakers) in Great Britain, taking note of the increasingly bitter persecution of the Jews and those related to Jews in so many countries at the present time... places on record its deep sense of shame at this evil return to the cruelties of the past; its recognition of the age-long neglect of its response in this matter by the Christian Church.

Our conviction is that the rights of the individual personality should be preserved in all human relationships. This persecution not only destroys these rights and injures its maltreated victims but also brutalises its perpetrators... We appeal to all Christian people to realise the cruelty and wickedness of this persecution, to pray that a new spirit may possess the nations, and to give expression to this feeling to all Jewish people.

The document was released in The Friend and mainstream newspapers and sent to the heads of the churches in Britain. Whilst more direct about the effects of Nazi actions on Jews, reference to Germany as ‘the perpetrator’ was notably absent. The date of the meeting was significant, for it was the first day of Kristallnacht, a pogrom which left over a 100 Jews dead and synagogues across the Greater Reich in flames. The minute’s release was delayed and released in December 1938 without revision.

In a letter to the Chief Rabbi several weeks later, following the Yearly Meeting

145 Carl Heath was Secretary of the Friends Service Council from 1927 to 1931 and then its General Secretary from 1932 to 1935. He was Chairman of the Committee on the Jewish Question from 1938 to 1939. Maurice Lotherington Rowntree was sentenced to 25 months imprisonment as a Conscientious Objector during WWI. He was involved in post WWI relief in Vienna and Budapest and was a leading member of the Peace Pledge Union. Joan Mary Fry was an author, writing on the subjects of Germany and Peace. Edith Pye was GEC Representative on Advisory Committee at the League of Nations. She was awarded the Chevalier of the Legion of Honour in 1919 for work in France during WWI.

146 Minutes, Committee on the Jewish Question (CJQ), 17 October 1938, LSF/FHL.
147 Minutes, CJQ, 9 November 1938, LSF/FHL.
148 Minutes, CJQ, 7 December 1938, LSF/FHL.
which discussed the situation of Jews in Germany on the recommendation of the CJQ, the clerk, Stephen J. Thorne, sent his concerns

as part of the Christian Community of Europe, the Society of Friends has seen the increasing bitter persecution of the Jewish race in certain countries... Friends... would at this juncture like to express to you a deeper note of fellowship in a spiritual suffering. 149

Although expressing concern at specific Jewish suffering, reference to German involvement was avoided. Nor was any opinion on Nazi actions appended. Quakers were understandably concerned for their fellow Friends in Germany and wary of the danger they might cause their German based workers should they be overtly critical of the regime. Determining that it was better to say less about the events publicly and continue to help victims of the Nazi regime behind the scenes, Quakers continued to avoid condemnatory comments about German actions in respect of Jews. Given the earlier exception made for comments regarding concentration camp conditions, British Quaker failure to damn these events casts a shadow on Friends approach to the anti-Jewish specificity of Nazi hatred.

In addition, it seemed that involvement with antisemitism and the issue of Jewish suffering and persecution was creating problems in other parts of the Quaker organization. Stephen J. Thorne, the clerk of Meetings for Sufferings, wrote to Carl Heath at the beginning of January to ask about the future work of the CJQ. In this abruptly worded letter, Thorne pointed out that the committee had been established to disseminate the Vallekilde minute, which it had done through circulation of the statement to Quaker, Jewish, Christian and national presses. Thorne concluded that political aspects of the refugee problem were the remit of the Peace Committee and relief work was the remit of the GEC; duplication of any of these functions was unnecessary and should be avoided. 150 A fortnight later, on 19 January 1939, the committee asked to be ‘laid down’ (wound up) by the Meetings for Sufferings on the grounds it was no longer needed. 151

The members of the committee clearly felt their remit should be greater than the proclamation of the Vallekilde minute. Their interest in practical (or even

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149. Letter from Wilfred Littleboy, (Chairman of the Yearly Meeting) [copy] to the Chief Rabbi, CJQ, 23 November 1938, LSF/FHL.

150. Letter from Stephen J. Thorne to Carl Heath, CJQ, 3 January 1939, LSF/FHL. Peace Committee minutes did not make reference to antisemitism and Jewish persecution as a special subject of the committee.

151. Minutes, CJQ, 19 January 1939, LSF/FHL.
impractical) 'resettlement' schemes and their desire to see the subject further discussed at a Yearly Meeting reveals the members' belief that there was a need for an increased remit of the Committee's work. The drafting of statements on behalf of Meetings for Sufferings which recognised the peculiar position of Jews in Germany was a forward move which, while failing to identify Nazi Germany as oppressor, followed an established Quaker pattern which sought to empathize with victims rather than identify or criticize persecutors. The abrupt termination of the committee, as it seemed poised for further work, begs the question about the CJQ's position within the wider Quaker structure. The rather terse letter to Carl Heath was a reflection of the success of CJQ public work which catapulted the words of Friends beyond the confines of the Society. It is likely that this more public role, speaking critically on events in Germany, would have made some members of the Society, who were used to conducting matters in less overt ways, uncomfortable.

Conversely, while the CJQ directed such public education work, its existence was not widely known of, nor was it mentioned in the minutes of the GEC, despite the fact that many of the CJQ members were also involved in the GEC.\(^{152}\) The CJQ acted as a GEC alter ego, saying more than the GEC was willing or able to do. The GEC rarely made overt public statements; indeed, it could not because anything 'political' would have to be agreed first by the Meetings for Suffering and the LYM. It was also wary about the position of its workers in Germany, the German Friends and the future of Quaker work in Germany. The public letter to Hitler published in 1935, issued by the Meetings for Suffering at the request of the GEC, referred to parts of the Nazi government machine and did not highlight directly Nazi anti-Jewish policies. Despite first-hand knowledge and experience of Nazi methods, the GEC and its principal members did not release this information.\(^{153}\) The CJQ seemed less concerned with those fears and was more unequivocal in its pronouncements on the situation. It too, however, stopped short of statements that criticized German actions directly. The CJQ was the first committee to publicly stress the need for sympathy with victimised Jews as opposed to 'refugees', acknowledging the particularism of Nazi anti-Jewish policies. GEC leaflets and information, in contrast, continually stressed the plight of 'non-

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\(^{152}\) Darnton makes no reference to this committee. Nor do the GEC Minutes.

\(^{153}\) Bracey argued that the committee had pursued the right course of action in a postwar article. See Bertha Bracey, "Were We Wrong?" *The Friend*, 25 May 1945, pp. 346, 348.
Aryan’ Christians and blamed the Allies for a harsh post-war settlement which, it was argued, had created the current conditions in Germany. In a postscript to the life and work of the CJQ, Carl Heath published an article on Christians and Jews, where he reiterated the need for Christians to fight antisemitism. Significantly, he broke Quaker convention and made mention of Jewish persecution “in Germany”. Even so, he did not refer to his committee’s role in the dissemination of the Vallekilde Minute nor to its attempts to spread those ideas throughout British Quakerism. The work of the CJQ demonstrates that differences in approach to public policy in regard to Jews and Germany existed between parts of the Quaker organisation.

Transformation: 1939

Friends House was transformed by Kristallnacht. Applicants overflowed into the stairwells of Friends House and interviews had to be conducted in corridors. A night shift was initiated to cope with the backlog of filing. Other Friends working in the building found the situation intolerable, and it was clear that the GEC needed more space than was available. In 1933 the administrative, fundraising and case working functions of the committee were carried out by the officers of the GEC with one part-time assistant. In practice this meant that the Secretary, Bertha Bracey, shouldered much of the burden. The number of clerical staff increased slowly and by the end of 1937 between nine and ten full-time workers (voluntary and paid) were working for the committee, some ‘on loan’ from other Quaker committees such as the FSC, the Meetings for Suffering and the Germany and Holland Committee.

The GEC relocated to Bloomsbury House in February 1939, joining ten other committees, including the Movement for the Care of Children from Germany, the Society for the Protection of Science and Learning (formerly the AAC) and the Christian Council for Refugees from Germany and Central Europe.

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154 Carl Heath, “Christians and Jews,” Wayfarer 13, no. 3 (March 1939) : 56-57. This article argues that historical Christian attitudes and antagonisms towards Jews have prepared the ground for antisemitism in Europe. Racial antagonism is described as ‘heathen’ and Jews are described as the same as any other people, having good and bad among them.

155 Darnton, An Account of, 37.

156 The other committees were: British Committee for Refugees from Czechoslovakia, Catholic Committee for Refugees from Germany, Church of England Committee for Non-Aryan Christians, International Student Service, Trades Union Congress and Labour Party and the International Hebrew Christian Alliance. The work of the Church of England Committee for ‘non-Aryan’ Christians as well as the Christian Council will be discussed in chapter 5 and 6.
In a detailed article in *The Friend* the following March, it became clear how much the GEC had been transformed from a small scale personalized committee to a much larger body, part of a greater network of refugee organizations. Over 14,000 files were transferred in the move to Bloomsbury House. With a staff of 87, the GEC occupied most of the third floor of the old Hotel. The work of the committee had become highly organised and hierarchical with four departments: Agricultural and Industrial Training, Employment, Emigration and Guarantees. Heads of Departments and assistants were there to “deal with the advanced stages of case work, making applications for visas to the Home Office, and finding openings for refugees in various directions”. Twelve preliminary case-workers interviewed relatives and friends of refugees, dealt with correspondence from them or refugee applicants, filled in necessary forms and prepared cases as far as they could. Due to the sheer number of applications they had to devise a uniform method of working. 157

It was noted that they were “conscious of the need to beware lest, in striving for efficiency, we loose the human touch, and forget the deeper purpose behind our work”. Moreover, despite the efficiencies and reorganization, it was “acutely” realized “that even with increased personnel and better organisation, we and the other refugee organizations are hardly touching the fringe of the problem”. 158 A pamphlet noted that since the GEC inception, between 8-9000 Christian Jews and other “non-Jewish refugees’ had been helped “to start a new life”. 159

*Kindertransporte and the GEC: Jewish or ‘Non-Aryan’ Christian Children?*

The *Kindertransporte* movement brought over nearly 10,000 unaccompanied, mainly Jewish children between December 1938 and May 1940. Children had entered Britain in various ways before the *Kindertransporte*, mainly as individuals or as part of the ‘whole-sale’ relocation of schools, such as the Herrlingen School which relocated at Bunce Court in Kent as early as 1933. 160 Additionally, a joint Jewish-Christian

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159 “How you can help the refugees,” (London, GEC pamphlet, 1939), FCRA/17-5, LSF/FHL.
initiative, the Inter-Aid Committee (discussed in an earlier section) bought over nearly five hundred children before November 1938. The size of the Kindertransporte, however, represented a new departure and signaled a period of large scale child refugee movement. The impetus for this movement was Kristallnacht as well as the ever escalating anti-Jewish legislation and persecution of Jews throughout the Greater Reich. Raging over two days in November 1938, the ‘Night of Broken Glass’ saw Jewish businesses smashed, synagogues burnt, roughly 100 Jews murdered and thousands of Jews arrested and interned in concentration camps. There followed a massive billion Reichmark ‘fine’ levied on the Jewish community. Thereafter, Foreign Embassies were besieged by Jews from Germany, Austria and Sudetenland desperate to leave.

Seeing that the situation was increasingly hopeless for many Jews, a deputation from the Council for German Jewry (CGJ) met the Prime Minister and asked him to consider the entry of a large number of children up to the age of 17 who could be educated or trained in Britain and then emigrated elsewhere. Chamberlain was noncommittal. The issue was raised, however, as part of discussions on the wider refugee ‘problem’ at a Cabinet meeting the following day. It was felt that a negative response to the proposal would have a deleterious effect on Anglo-American relations, particularly in the light of growing public concern for the refugees in both Britain and America.

Almost a week after the initial deputation, the CGJ subcommittee on children,

74. Gershon, We came as children, 77-78. Anna Essinger, Bunce Court School 1933-1943 (London: Headley Bros, 1944). Essinger, originally Jewish, converted to Quakerism. She ran a boarding school in Herrlingen, Germany on progressive, co-educational lines. The school was moved to England in 1933 and was supported by the GEC (Bertha Bracey was on the Board of Governors). September 1939 intake included 432 Jewish and 93 Christian children.

161 From the Nuremberg Laws (September 1935) to Kristallnacht (9-10 November 1938), Jews saw a steady erosion of their rights. Jews were not allowed to own pharmacies or act as pharmacists, not allowed to practice as vets, notaries, or give private tuition to ‘Aryans’. Jewish doctors could only treat other Jews. All Jewish assets over 5,000 RM had to be registered. Jews were issued with separate identity cards and later had to take the additional name Sara and Israel. In October 1938, passports belonging to Jews were stamped with the letter ‘J’. This list is not exhaustive. Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham, eds., Nazism 1919-1945, vol. 2 State, Economy and Society 1933-39 (Exeter: Exeter University Press, 1987).


163 Record of Meeting by Prime Minister's Private Secretary, 16 November 1938, FO 371/22536, W 15037/104/98 as cited in Sherman, Island Refuge, 171. The deputation consisted of Chaim Weizmann, The Chief Rabbi, Viscount Samuel, Viscount Bearsted, Neville Laski and Lionel de Rothschild. Also, see Shepherd, Wilfred Israel, 146-147.
the Movement for the Care of Children coming from Germany (MCCG), chaired by Viscount Samuel, approached Sir Wyndham Deedes, chairman of the Inter-Aid Committee. Together they formed a joint deputation with GEC delegates Bertha Bracey and Ben Greene. In a meeting with the Home Secretary, Sir Samuel Hoare, on 21 November 1938, they again suggested a large scale immigration effort for refugee children. During the course of a House of Commons debate on the refugee crisis that same evening, Hoare announced that entry permits for children would be granted (initially 5,000), on the understanding that these children would be supported either by the refugee organizations or by private sponsors. The two organizations, the IAC and the MCCG, joined forces to form the World Movement for the Care of Children coming from Germany: British Inter-Aid Committee, which was subsequently known as Movement for the Care of Children coming from Germany. In 1940 it became the Refugee Childrens’ Movement. On 23 November, the cumbersome visa system was dropped in favour of a simple travel document. Whereas prior to November 1938, refugee children arrived at a rate of 13 per month, this now rocketed to nearer 1000. The ‘selection’ of Jewish children and the organisation of the ‘transports’ was carried out by Jewish organizations in Berlin (Reichsvertretung für Juden in Deutschland) and Vienna (Kultusgemeinde). Two other organizations processed applications for ‘non-Aryan’ Christian children: the Paulusbund in Berlin and the Society of Friends in both Berlin and Vienna. A change in the rules in April 1939 slowed the number of

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164 Sherman, Island Refuge, 173.
165 London (1992) has argued that Hoare held the middle ground between ‘restrictionist critics and pro-refugee lobbyists’, appeasing the former (467). As a point of interest, Sir Samuel Hoare’s cousin Jean Hoare, also a Quaker, was intimately involved in refugee aid. She chartered a flight into Czechoslovakia taking out a plane load of children on her own initiative. She also opened her home to refugees. See Elaine Bond and Barry Turner, Marks of Distinction: The Memories of Elaine Blond (London: Vallentine and Mitchell, 1988) 74.
166 Hansard, House of Commons Debates, Sir Samuel Hoare, vol. 341: cols. 1473-1474. By mid December the figure of 10,000 appeared but it seems that no upper limit was set other than the speed at which the refugee organizations and the Home Office processed applications.
167 Ford, “The Arrival of Jewish Refugee Children,” 138. The (Jewish) Chairman was Lord Samuel and the Honorary Secretary was Helen Bentwich. See GEC Minutes, GEC Meeting 28 November 1938. The initial Christian chairman subsequently became Lord Hailey, who was then succeeded by Lord Gorell in 1939.
170 Presland, A Great Adventure, 4.
171 Ibid, 6; For other accounts which detail Quaker aid to ‘non-Aryan’ Christian children on Kindertransporte, see Ford, ‘The Arrival of Jewish Refugee Children’ 139; Turner, .. and the
applications as each child was required to have a bond of £50 to cover re-emigration costs (the average annual salary was under £500). In order to help the funding of the refugee organizations, Lord Baldwin gave a BBC broadcast appeal on behalf of refugees on 8 December 1938. When the appeal closed in April 1939, it had raised £500,000, of which the MCCG received £220,000. Baldwin money was also used to lease the Palace Hotel in Bloomsbury Square, the headquarters of eleven refugee agencies including the GEC. The first transport docked at Harwich on 2 December 1938 with 320 children and the last arrived on 14 May 1940 with children from an orphanage in Amsterdam. Overall the Kindertransporte brought over 9,354 children of which 7,482 were Jewish and the remainder Christian (most of whom were described as ‘non-Aryan’ Christians).

Above all else, British Quakers are remembered in the public sphere for their role in the Kindertransporte and, as a corollary, the rescue of Jewish children. Bertha Bracey, the most well known Quaker involved in relief work for refugees, is specifically identified with these transports, described in a collective biography of the Kinder (child of the transports), as a “friend for Jewish children”. Yet the above review confirms that whilst the GEC and Bracey were involved in petitioning for refugee children on a political level, at the organizational level they were responsible for ‘non-Aryan’ Christian children. Reading the minutes of the GEC, it is difficult to find any reference to the Kindertransporte, even as part of discussions on current events. The few sparing references in the Executive Committee minutes of the GEC (formed December 1938) give only the barest information, such as the name of a worker going out to help the Vienna Centre with Kindertransporte and the statement that the Society of Friends in Vienna were to take over the selection of ‘non-Aryan’

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Policeman smiled, 71; Darnton, An Account of... 51; Gershon, We came as children, 21; Carter, ‘Berlin International’, 25; Shepherd, Wilfred Israel, 146-148. Priority was given to orphaned and homeless children and children whose fathers were interned in concentration camps as well as older children who were in danger of internment themselves.

172 Turner, and the Policeman Smiled, 71.


175 Presland, A Great Adventure, 5.


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children. This absence could be explained by the existence of a separate committee whose records have been destroyed or lost; nevertheless, no reference to such a committee is found. More surprisingly and less explicable, is the absence of articles in Quaker publications, such as the weekly Friend or the monthly Wayfarer during the 1938-1940 period detailing these extraordinary events. The only substantial document on the issue is an unsigned retrospective report of the Vienna Centre for the period November 1938 to September 1939. Summarizing the policy of the Society of Friends, it stated that

They [Society of Friends] shared with the other already existing organizations... and undertook to deal only with the Non-Aryan Christians and people without denomination. This included not only full Jews according to the Nuremberg Laws, but also Mischlings. The majority of the baptised Jews and Mischlings belong to the Roman Catholic faith, a small part are without denomination and the smallest percentage are of Protestant and old Catholic faith.

Following these guidelines, 882 children were put onto transports to Britain in the period November 1938 to August 1939.

Another view of the Quaker work for this movement is recorded by the Kinder themselves. While it is clear that Quaker aid was directed at 'non-Aryan' children from Quaker sources above, it becomes apparent from these accounts that Quaker policy was also flexible. Examples of aid to Jewish children are demonstrated by the recollections of Shulamit Amir (now in Israel) who left Prague with the help of Quakers, as did Kurt Sachs who was placed with a family in Birmingham by a "Quaker committee" once in England. Kenneth Carey’s parents were told by a visiting Quaker to send Carey on a transport because of his age (he was then nearly 17 years

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177 GEC Executive Committee Minutes, Meetings, 17 January 1939 and 4 April 1939.
178 Baumel remarks that there are a lack of institutional records for the RCM due to the decision to destroy them in the 1950s because Kinder did not want others to find out about their past, having established lives in Britain. See Baumel, ‘The Jewish Refugee Children’, 16. Equally, no reference to the CIQ was alluded to in the minutes of the GEC. It may be that all aspects of the organisation were carried out in Vienna or Berlin, however this still does not explain why no discussions of their work were included in the minutes as were summaries of their other activities. The Kindertransporte was not a secret operation. The lack of any real references is perplexing.
180 Report of the Children’s Department, 1.
181 Ibid.
182 Testimonies in: Leveton, I came alone, 15, 281-283; Prague proved an exception to the rule. The Jewish refugee committees were completely swamped as were the other agencies. A number of rescue missions were arranged by individuals, such as Nicholas Winton, see Tony Kushner, “Britain’s Schindler,” BBC Radio 4, June 1999.
old and once 17 he would be in danger of internment). Likewise, once in England Jews were aided by Quakers in certain situations. Marion Marston's mother was helped by Quakers once Marion was in England. Ruth Michaelis, after being badly treated by a Rector's wife, was moved to a Quaker boarding school where staff were much more sympathetic. Gerta Grün stayed at a Quaker Children's Home in the East End of London and Harry Schramm was fostered by a Quaker family in Sussex. Quaker policy was therefore flexible in these cases. Yet, Quaker policy dictated that 'non-Aryan' children were to be aided. Bernhard Heikel's account demonstrates this, as he states that the Quakers arranged his transport from Berlin because he was a 'Mischlinge' and not Jewish. Francis Steiner recalled Quakers visiting the Pakefield Hall camp to assess how many 'non-Aryan' Christian children there were: the number was high and surprised them all (children and Quakers!). Angela Carpos relates that because she was half Jewish she was helped by the Quakers.

These recollections demonstrate several points. First, many of the children recall Quaker aid once they were in Britain, either through hospitality or school placements. Some children were assisted because they were not Jewish, but Christians and the (former) children make this link themselves. The Jewish children who were helped highlight the flexibility of Quaker policy in practice under certain circumstances. Two cases outlined above involved children from Czechoslovakia where there was minimal aid infrastructure and Quaker aid was essential. Some children were helped on the grounds that they or their parents were known to Quakers or that they were unable to get help from pre-existing aid organizations (even though they were Jewish). In the case of Kenneth Carey, living in a village with a very small Jewish community, links to the central Jewish community in Berlin were tenuous, but as Carey's case also illustrates, the element of 'chance' and luck were also involved in some children's inclusion on child transports. Other reasons why Jews did not seek aid from the Jewish community included the rejection of Jewish identity or greater identification with political ideology over faith. In specific circumstances, Quakers were willing and did aid Jewish children, but they did not aid Jewish children as part of a wider remit because they believed that this was the role of the Jewish organizations. On an

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organizational level, Quakers helped those who were defined as Jews by Nazi laws, but who were in fact, for the most part, of the Christian faith and identified themselves as Christians.

Conclusion

Quakers never set out to rescue Jewish refugees and Jews were excluded from relief policy when it was first formulated. GEC rescue and relief policies were complex, however, and based on a series of certain assumptions, one of which was the premise that Jews, as a group, were already being aided by Jewish refugee groups who were, in the assessment of Friends, sufficiently well established and funded for that purpose. Nor did Friends help Jewish children, except in rare cases as part of the Kindertransporte, for this part of the work fell to Jewish organizations. Quakers, however, were responsible for children sometimes viewed as Jewish, that is so called 'non-Aryan' Christians. The memory of Quaker rescue of Jews prior to 1939 has therefore been conflated with Quaker action for interned Jewish and other refugees during the war in Britain. GEC committee members did join with Jewish communal leaders and lobby at the highest level in support of the Kindertransporte and their role in this guise must be recognized.

The initial approach of the GEC (and the British Quakers in general) to the refugee situation was to lobby the government behind the scenes for an international solution. GEC members stressed the Jewish refugee case at a political level but on a practical level they devised broad policy statements to help German Friends, other Christians and political groups, the latter conceivably included individual Jews as 'friends of Friends'. The GEC aided individual Jews along established historical and religious lines by initiating projects that reflected their own interests such as the Ommen School and the Rest Home in Germany. These schemes illustrated Quakerism in practice, small scale projects in line with their favoured personalized approach to relief and reconstruction projects, rather than larger enterprises where aid would dominate and the message of Quakerism would be lost.

A question remains as to whether Quakers were willing to acknowledge the special circumstances of Jews in Germany under Nazi antisemitism and, given this,

185 Turner, the Policeman smiled, 82.
whether they saw these peculiar circumstances to be an issue to take upon themselves. For the most part, the GEC and the wider Quaker body did not see Jewish refugees as part of their rescue and relief remit. That said, it is difficult to assess a specific Quaker view of Jews. A central tenet of Quakerism was the belief that the divine is in everyone, and this universalistic and egalitarian view would, it is reasoned, make Quakers less susceptible to antisemitic views. Quakers approached antisemitism in two ways. Discussions about victims of the Nazi regime always reminded readers that other groups such as pacifists and ‘politicals’, in addition to Jews, were targets. This could be interpreted as an attempt to marginalize the true extent of the situation or, alternatively, an effort to ensure that the situation of other groups was also recognized as needing aid. The constant reiteration of this argument, however, downplays the particular position of Jews under Nazism, as did the refusal to criticize Nazi actions against Jews but at the same time to chastise the existence and conditions of concentration camps.

Friends also called for introspection because of the possibility of prejudice within. Articles in Quaker publications demonstrated an understanding of the situation in Nazi Germany and how Nazi policies affected Jews. They recommended that antisemitism be checked not only in the world but where it existed within themselves. While important, it is difficult to see how the power of a ‘legally’ constituted antisemitic regime and an antisemitic individual (however ‘bad’) compare and on this basis the Quakers seem unwilling to deal with political antisemitism. Quakers rarely criticized antisemitic systems of government publicly, indicating an ambivalence to tackling antisemitism beyond the confines of the individual or the Society of Friends.

As well as Quaker reticence for public outcry, GEC responses were tempered by other complicating factors, namely their own historical legacy in Germany and their desire to retain Quaker interests in Germany. Quakers benefited from the legacy of their involvement with the reconstruction efforts of Germany and their work in Britain with German descendants during the Great War. Many of the committee members had lived and worked in Germany on postwar reconstruction projects, and therefore

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already had personal links in Germany. The competing and sometimes contradictory pulls and interplays of the German Friends, the International Centre, its representatives, and the London based GEC created difficulties, such as the effects of British Quaker policy on German Friends. But there were also gains. A local network and information base proved extremely helpful to the GEC. In 1934, however, German Friends concerned for their future under Nazism, began to define themselves as a purely religious society in opposition to the more political style of their British counterparts. In recognition of the German Friends' position, field work was removed from the GEC. Quakers were acutely aware that their position in Germany, and the position of the German Friends in particular, would be damaged if they too closely identified with Jewish refugees. John Ormerod Greenwood explains the Quaker predicament stating that the Nazis "knew how to maintain Quaker silence". By arresting Corder Catchpool in 1933, the Nazis effectively warned Friends that in order to remain in Germany, they would have to maintain a low profile. In this way, Quakers argued that they could achieve more by remaining inside Germany, giving relief where possible and that this was justification enough for their silence. By appeasing Nazi officials and maintaining their silence, Quakers did not protest a discriminatory regime, despite the fact that Nazi actions contravened many cherished Quaker values.

If the Quakers and the work of the GEC is to be understood from its own perspective and by its contemporaries, it is clear that Friends aided non-Aryan Christians and 'politicals'. Quakers did help a small number of Jews directly, but Jews were rarely aided as Jews. They were rescued as outspoken opponents of the regime, as 'politicals', socialists or communists or as pacifists or liberals. They were also rescued as marginalized Jews; Jews married to Christians and identifying Christians, defined as 'Jews', formed the main target of Quaker aid, as well as those who while racially Jewish adhered to no special faith grouping.

Where Quakers broke with policy they did so on the grounds that without their intervention, relief or rescue would be lacking at a time of crisis. These occasions should not be dismissed as insignificant. Generally though, Quakers did not identify Jews as primary recipients of their aid. They argued that this was the role of Jewish organizations who, they felt, had sufficient funds and existing networks. With limited

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187 Greenwood, Quaker Encounters, Friends and Relief: Vol. 1, 261.
money Friends tried to target other groups of refugees, helping Jewish refugees only occasionally as individuals in specific circumstances already outlined. Such policies reflected the ambivalence and ambiguities of Quaker policies towards Jewish refugees, for while Friends were sympathetic, there were also elements of unease when dealing with Jews as Jews. Aspects of Quaker policy at the International School in Ommen illustrate this point.

Overall, a complex, flexible, yet partly contradictory pattern emerges. On the basis of rejectii^ particularism (aid to a favoured group) and supporting non-sectarianism (aid to all, regardless or religion or political opinion), Quakers paradoxically aided Nazi prisoners, but refused initial support for Christian children. Additionally, while holding liberal views on education and supporting freedom of worship, the Quaker International School in Holland required compulsory attendance at Quaker services. Lastly, Quakers were opposed to treating the refugee crisis sectionally, yet British Quakers become identified with the cause of ‘non-Aryan Christians’.

CHAPTER 2
UNITARIANS

Introduction

Unitarianism is a system of religious thought which rejects the doctrine of the Trinity and the divinity of Jesus in support of the unity of God. The Unitarian theological schema progressed from an original belief in the infallibility of scriptural authority to a faith founded on reason, conscience and personal experience. The doctrines of the Original Sin, the Fall and eternal damnation are all rejected in favour of a more optimistic view of life guided by a belief in the essential goodness of human nature. Unitarians are “non-subscribing”, having no formal creeds or statements of faith. Characteristic of this liberal approach to religious tradition is an understanding that different beliefs and practices may exist within an organisation, thus supporting a wide range of individual liberty and private judgment on spiritual matters. As such, Unitarianism is a ‘broad Church’, enabling a wide variety of faith positions, from religious humanism to views approaching orthodox Christianity. Furthermore, Unitarianism embraces the plurality of divine revelation, suggesting an openness to the teachings of non-Christian religions. At particular times, certain emphases have dominated Unitarian thought. In the twentieth century, the movement has shifted away from its former association with rational theism to pantheism and a more intuitive religious style. While Unitarianism is non-credal, certain values are central to a Unitarian outlook, particularly freedom of conscience, defence of civil and religious rights and a commitment to the betterment of society.¹

Formalized Unitarian thought began in Britain with the translation of the Racovian Catechism, an anti-Trinitarian statement, by John Biddle (1615-1662) in

1652 during a brief relaxation of the laws against heresy. Anti-Trinitarian thought had grown out of a number of disparate religious ideas unleashed by the seventeenth century split between the Established Church and the Puritans. Apart from a rejection of God as a trinity of co-equal, consubstantial and co-eternal persons, these ideas objected to the notion that some were favoured with salvation while others were condemned to perdition. The notion that men are permanently depraved was also rejected. The mid-1600s saw the rise of many dissenting ideas and groups such as the Quakers. Unitarian concepts, though they were not formalized into a specific movement at this time, were part of the religious ‘melting pot’ of ideas. Following the Act of Uniformity and the imposition of a new Prayer Book in 1662, those who could not submit to an oath swearing to its sole usage, left the church in droves. More than 2000 men deserted and formed (English) Presbyterian ministries. Over time many of these congregation became Unitarian in orientation and practice. A strong Unitarian strand of thought, however, remained within the Anglican fold, and the first organised Unitarian congregation in Britain was started by a former Anglican priest, Theophilus Lindsey (1723-1808) in 1774. He founded a congregation at Essex Hall in London, and the site was the headquarters of the General Assembly of Unitarians and Free Christian Churches in Britain during the 1930s.

Unitarianism was formally recognized in 1813 and in 1825 a central body, the British and Foreign Unitarian Association (BFUA), was founded as the representative body for Unitarians in Britain and British Unitarian interests abroad. A further organization formed in 1881, the National Council of Unitarian, Liberal Christian, Presbyterian and other Non-subscribing or Kindred Congregations (NCLC), was created to serve the diversity of ‘Unitarian’ association. In common with other non-conformists, a decline in income and a desire to prevent duplication of resources, led to the union of these two organisations in 1928, forming the General Assembly of Unitarians and Free Christian Churches in Britain (hereafter, GAFC or General Assembly).

In 1605, the Minor Reformed Church published an outline on its faith in Raków, a small Polish town north-east of Krakow. The town had become the principle centre for anti-trinitarian thinking in Poland and the statement was henceforth know as the Racovian catechism.

During the 1930s, the General Assembly was comprised of various types of representation from the individual to the collective including approved local Congregations, Societies, Ministers, Honorary Officers, members of the Council and Committees, associate members and Honorary Ministers. The Assembly met annually in the spring or summer. Local Unitarian congregations were self-governing and independent in polity. The country was divided into District Associations to which congregations belonged and these Associations were represented on the Council of the General Assembly. In the 1930s there were approximately 345 places of ‘Free Christian’ worship in Britain and Unitarians numbered approximately 35,000 individuals. Unitarians in Britain were linked to other Free Christian movements abroad by membership of the International Association for Liberal Christians and Religious Freedom (IARF), founded in 1900. During the thirties, Unitarians had particularly strong links with Czechoslovakia, growing out of their financial and spiritual support for the recently formed Czechoslovak Church (1920) and the Czechoslovak Unitarian Church in 1921. This connection contrasted with an absence of ties to German free religious groups. These bodies had their roots in secularist philosophical culture, as opposed to the liberal Christian background of British Unitarians, and thus had little in common with and no connection with Unitarians in Britain during this period.

_Historiography and Sources_

Little has been written about the history of Unitarians in the twentieth century, still less about their response to Nazism. Nor are there academic articles or books specifically about Unitarian work for refugees in the 1930s, barring a few pages within a larger published autobiographical work. Most existing accounts of Unitarianism

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4 Few statistics on membership numbers were maintained because of the decentralized nature of Unitarianism in Britain. In 1927 a poll of members in congregations was conducted by the Mens’ League. This produced figures for 273 of 345 congregations, identifying 38,000 individual Unitarians; however, this number is considered on the high side, and the lower figure given in the main text would be regarded as more accurate. See, _The Inquirer_, 3 Dec 1927, p. 704. I am grateful to Alan Ruston of the Unitarian Historical Society for his help in locating this information.

5 C. J. Bleeker, ed., _Handbook of the International Association for Liberal Christians and Religious Freedom_ (London: Lindsey Press, 1936). This provides useful notes on the history of the formation of these Czech churches amongst general information on the association.

6 John McLachlan, _The Wine of Life: A Testimony to a Vital Encounter_ (Chippewham: Anthony Rowe Ltd., 1991), 70-75 and 177-179. The lack of texts in this area, however, may reflect other
combine studies of the movement's historical development with its theological schema and orientation to orthodox Christianity. These works generally proceed chronologically, ending in 1928 with the creation of the General Assembly, the representative body of British Unitarians. Written in the 1920s and 1930s, these standard historical studies follow a traditional narrative approach and focus most of their attention on either the early history of the movement or the impact of nineteenth century Unitarian work on social conditions in Britain. More recent studies on Unitarianism, written in the last three decades, continue to concentrate on the eighteenth and nineteenth century, brushing only lightly on the early twentieth century, similarly ending their studies at union. Indeed, the most useful works and sources on the twentieth century are those of amateur historians whose published and unpublished works offer the most insights into this period of study.

Sources of Unitarian material for this period are varied but incomplete for a number of reasons. During the 1930s, the General Assembly rarely kept records beyond a decade so that central records form a limited resource. Furthermore, Essex Hall, the headquarters of the General Assembly, was gutted during an aerial bombing raid in 1944 and most of those central records which had been retained for the period 1933-1939 were destroyed. Much of the surviving documentation from central records is therefore distributed elsewhere in various repositories for which there are no search guides available to the researcher. The independent and self-governing nature of Unitarian congregations has further reduced the likelihood of surviving documents, as record keeping decisions were devolved to each Church or congregation. The main reservoir of topical information is found in the primary denominational weekly (now reasons, namely that Unitarians are loathe to publicize their work. This is partly from a desire to keep a low profile, learnt from historical persecution, but is also driven by a desire not to foister beliefs and practices on others. See Goring and Goring, The Unitarians, 8-9.


Record retention policies have changed since the 1950s, however, during the 1930s this was the dominant policy. Dr Williams Library, holds a few donated items, such as Minute Books of the committees of the General Assembly for the 1930s period. The content of these records are so generalized as to be of little use. It also retains copies of the General Assembly reports which are of much greater use.
Indeed, Unitarians during the 1930s stated that the paper provided the only means available to express varying communal views on political and religious issues of the day. Supplementing this paper is a monthly magazine, *The Unitarian and Free Christian Monthly*. Augmenting these sources still further, is *The Monthly Letter*, the organ of the British League of Unitarian and Other Liberal Christian Women, demonstrating how a particular segment of Unitarians responded to the crisis of Jewish refugees. Other sources include various material (letters, notes, diaries and memoirs) from two ministers involved in refugee aid work in Britain and Czechoslovakia.

It will be essential in this chapter to analyze the general issues that dominated Unitarian debates during the 1930s. Certain subjects may appear to be unrelated to the refugee issue initially; however, the purpose of this exploration is to show what was essential to Unitarians throughout this period and how these issues impinged and shaped Unitarian approaches and responses to the flight of Jewish refugees.

I: THE INITIAL IMPETUS: APRIL TO DECEMBER, 1933

The day after the Nazi boycott of Jewish businesses in Germany, Liverpool Unitarians heard harsh criticism of Hitler's leadership by their minister, Rev. Sidney Spencer (1888-1974). In his sermon on the first Sunday of April 1933, Spencer criticized Nazism on the grounds that it was based on "prejudice, hatred and hysteria". This new form of rule was "a challenge" to all progressive ideals and "to the principle of freedom of thought" essential to any democracy. Concentrating on the totalitarian nature of "Hitlerism", he found it at one with fascism and Bolshevism, rejecting both as

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11 *The Inquirer* was founded in 1842 and is the recognized organ of Unitarian Christianity and Free Religious Fellowship. It incorporates *The Christian Life* and *Unitarian Herald*. The editor of *The Inquirer* from 1932-1939 was Leslie Belton who was also a serving Unitarian minister in Golders Green until 1937 and Upper Chapel, Sheffield until 1946. He was also a co-opted member of General Assembly, 1933-39. See Alan Ruston, *Inquirer*, 16. Belton introduced the "Open Forum" letter page which demonstrated the diversity of Unitarian thinking on various issues. Apart from internationalism, pacifism and war, the 'other' consuming debate of the 1930s, was how Unitarianism should be defined and how the movement should relate to orthodox Christianity. This was partly in response to the rejection of Unitarianism from mainstream Christianity as well as internal debates on this issue.

12 For example, see *The Inquirer*, 10 November 1934, p. 520.

13 For example, see Correspondence within *Papers of the Board of Deputy of British Jews* at the London Metropolitan Archives (LMA) ACC/3121/C15/03/019; "Visit to Czechoslovakia", Unpublished Diary of John McLachlan, 1938-39, *McLachlan Private Papers*, Copy in the possession of the author.
imperiling the future of a Europe free from war.14

Rev. Frank Coleman (d. 1951), Unitarian minister of Blackpool, supported Spencer’s critique of the new German government, which he agreed attacked “fundamental human liberties”. He worried about the suppression of political opposition, but he was particularly concerned about the antisemitism which seemed to dominate Germany society. He saw it as a definitive feature of Nazism as evidenced by the boycott and previous anti-Jewish violence, and hoped “that Unitarians will give to the unfortunate Jews evidence of our sympathy in their great trial”.15 Furthermore, Coleman called upon the General Assembly to discuss this issue at its forthcoming Annual General Meeting as a “vital matter”.16

Coleman’s call provoked a number of articles in The Inquirer, each seeking to explain the nature of anti-Jewish “animus” and its brutal physical expression. One feature identified antisemitism as a form of exclusionary nationalism which debarred Jews from German society. Another article, by a Presbyterian minister, linked current antisemitism to historical Christian attitudes to Jews. Focusing on the charge that Jews were “usurers”, he reminded Christians to look at their history. The Jew today, he argued was a product of the Church, which had forced Jews into finance and had denied them other avenues for nearly 2,000 years. In contrast, Jews had given Christians their heritage, indeed the Canon of Holy Scripture was “almost entirely Jewish”. Jews were also creative beings who had spread their genius across the medical professions, the arts, music, science and politics. Given these gifts, the persecution of the Jews was a sign of national decadence and racial peril. “I protest against the persecution of this people today; and most of all against the outrages which the Nazi hordes of Germany are inflicting upon them”.17

14 “A critic of Hitler,” The Inquirer, 8 April 1933, p. 158. Spencer was a Unitarian Minister at Leicester Free Christian Church from 1914 to 1917; Rotherham, from 1918 to 1921; Edinburgh from 1921 to 1927; Hope Street, Liverpool, 1927-52; and lastly Bath and Trowbridge, 1959-73. As an ardent pacifist, he refused fire-watching duties and was jailed in 1942. He was principal of Manchester College, Oxford, from 1953 to 1958.

15 Frank Coleman, “Antisemitism in Germany,” The Inquirer, 15 April 1933, p. 173. Coleman was a Unitarian Minister at Leeds, Hunslet, 1913-1917; Burnley, 1918-1925; and Blackpool, Dickinson Road, from 1926 until his death.

16 Ibid.

17 William J. Piggott, “Christendom and the Jew,” The Inquirer, 22 April 1933, p. 182; S. L. Ricardo, “The Jews and Germany,” The Inquirer, 22 April 1933, p. 181-82. Ricardo is listed as “an English Jewess”. She was also Secretary of the London Society of Jews and Christians. This society developed out of several interdenominational conferences held between liberal Jews and Christians during the 1920s. It aimed to promote cooperation between the two faiths through
Coleman's earlier petition, that the situation be discussed at the General Assembly, was duly taken up at the May meeting by the President, Rev. Alfred Hall. Moving the resolution for the Meeting, he deplored "the continued failure on the part of the Governments of several countries to respect and ensure the rights of minorities in their respective territories". On behalf of the General Assembly, he particularly protested against the treatment of the Jews by the present Government of Germany and its agents, as an offence against common human nature for which no difference of race or religion affords any justification or excuse.

Copies of the resolution were sent to the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary, the German Ambassador and mainstream presses. As we will see in a following chapter, Unitarians contrasted with Methodists, in their willingness to criticize antisemitic policies unequivocally and identify Germany as the sponsoring agent of such acts. A further resolution was proposed by Coleman, namely, the creation of an International Service Committee of the Assembly. The aim of this body would be to educate Unitarians on the "international situation" and build contacts with peace organisations as part of a practical 'witness' for international peace. It would also act as the public voice of Unitarians on these concerns. This proposal failed to gain support beyond a seconder and was referred to the Council for a final decision where it was rejected, deemed too expensive to fund.

Towards the end of the year, Rev. Sidney Spencer delivered a sermon about the political and religious changes in Germany. Focusing directly on the 'racial' doctrines which governed much of Nazi thinking, he spoke of the "Jewishness of Jesus". He declared the perversion of the Gospels by 'German Christians' who sought to "aryanise" Jesus as an outrage, a folly to be rejected, for not only was Jesus a Jew,

discussion of educational, social and political questions from the religious point of view, and also to promote religious understanding and fellowship. During the 1930s, the society's chairman was Rabbi I. I. Mattock. The Advisory Council consisted of Viscount Bearstead, George Cadbury, the Bishop of Croydon, R. H. Tawney, Claude Montefiore, Herbert Loewe and others. The Society affiliated with the Council of Christians and Jews in 1947.

Alfred Hall was a Unitarian Minister who served at Norwich, 1900-8; Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 1908-18; Upper Chapel, Sheffield 1918-39; and Lincoln, 1939-49. He was President of the Unitarian and Free Christian Churches 1932-34 and President of the International Association for Liberal Christianity and Religious Freedom. He was President of Manchester College, Oxford, 1945-49.


The Inquirer, 6 May 1933, p. 212. Also see Sixth Annual Report, 10.
he "was not a Christian!". In the following year, and during successive years, he gave over his pulpit to his Liberal Jewish counterpart, Rabbi Raphael Levine on various occasions.\textsuperscript{21}

Thus, from the beginning of Hitler's regime, Unitarian ministers spoke out against Nazi antisemitism because they saw it as a challenge to the liberal ideals that they so cherished. Initial reactions from Unitarian laity were more difficult to assess. Clara Collett, a London based Unitarian, volunteered to act as an intermediary between fellow Unitarians wishing to give hospitality and German Jewish refugees seeking refuge in Britain. Individuals were asked to write in with offers of accommodation, hospitality or paying vacancies.\textsuperscript{22} A statement by the Stand Unitarian Young Men's Sunday School Class declared their "deepest and sincerest sympathy with the Jewish people of Germany in the terrible persecution under which they are at present suffering".\textsuperscript{23} Seeing the problem in religious rather than political terms, the class declared their hope for a future Germany that allowed liberty and freedom to any and all faiths.\textsuperscript{24} These reactions were both heartfelt, reflecting an engagement with the problems faced by Jews in Germany and, in the first case, a willingness to personally intervene at an individual level for the benefit of Jewish refugees fleeing Nazism. Underreporting of such responses is probable, but given this caveat, it remains that Collett's response for refugees was exceptional rather than commonplace.

**II: FEAR OF WAR: UNITARIANS AND PACIFISM, 1933-36**

Just as the debate about Hitler's internal policies in respect of religious and political minorities seemed to be gaining momentum, the discussion halted and shifted to 'wider' international concerns. This change was part of a general movement in Britain after April 1933 which was duplicated across the denominations (with the notable exclusion of the Quakers who maintained a high level of interest on the position of minorities, religious and political in Germany, throughout the period). Increasingly, Unitarians were apprehensive about the nature of nationalisms worldwide. The aggressive internal policies of Germany were perceived as just one

\textsuperscript{21} "Jesus the Jew," *The Inquirer*, 16 December 1933, p. 595. This sermon was delivered on Sunday 26 November 1933 and was subsequently issued as a pamphlet in December that year.

\textsuperscript{22} "Open Forum: Jewish Refugees from Germany," *The Inquirer*, 17 June 1933, p. 293.

\textsuperscript{23} "News of the Churches: Jews in Germany," *The Inquirer*, 17 June 1933, p. 293.

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid.
such example. Japanese belligerence in the Far East, its occupation of Manchuria in 1931, and the creation of a satellite state, Manchukuo in 1932, also troubled Unitarians minds. At the same time, it was feared that Italy had designs on Abyssina. In this international context, Unitarians saw imperialistic ideologies and actions as part of a struggle, that if left unchecked would lead to the downfall of civilization. A "new spirit" was necessary, one that sanctified human relationships and inspired all citizens to love not only their own countries, but to be loyal to the world-wide "Kingdom of Man." Interconnectedness and interdependence, Unitarians believed, were the defining features of the modern world and the current examples of military 'muscle-flexing', induced fear for the future of that same world. The exit of Germany on 14 October 1933 from both the League and the World Disarmament Conference, following Japan's earlier withdrawal, merely confirmed the bleak outlook held by many Unitarians, and general public fears as well.

The thorny question of how one should react to the new political map in Germany divided Unitarians. The dominant concern was that Europe be spared another war. Developing a friendship with Germany, accepting the choice Germans had made in following and supporting Hitler, while at the same time expressing a more muted abhorrence of Nazi treatment of political minorities and Jews, increasingly replaced earlier forthright condemnation. Many Unitarians saw Britain and the Allies as partly to blame for the new government in Germany. The Allied powers, it was argued, had failed to support the previous democratic Weimar Republic and the enforcement of the Versailles Treaty had shamed Germany and crippled its economy. The rise of Nazism was seen by Free Christians as a reaction to past humiliations, as well as a genuine attempt to regain national unity and well-being, albeit at the cost of certain minorities.

In approaching the new German regime, Unitarians divided into pacifist or pacifist camps. Initial emphases of Liberal Christians discussion were not centred on defining a set stance, as much as articulating the variations of feeling on the matter. The Unitarian pacifist wing argued for non-intervention, stating it was not the right of

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26 See The Inquirer, passim. This was a view held by many Christians, see Chapter 5.
27 For the differences between these two stances as developed by historian Martin Ceadle, see earlier discussion in Chapter 1 and his work: Martin Ceadle, Pacifism in Britain, 1914-45: The Defining of a Faith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980).
Britain (and Free Christians), to meddle in the internal affairs of a foreign country, for, "if Germany chooses the Mussolini way we must stand aside and watch, with our national good will unimpaired". In addition, the Versailles Treaty must be amended, especially the clause on 'war guilt'. Reparation payments should be modified or shelved, and international disarmament talks must begin with Britain leading the way. Alternatively, the Unitarian pacifist camp argued that the world was "witnessing . . . an uprising of the old prewar spirit of militaristic arrogance". This section of Liberal Christians, moreover, believed that if the world "shut" its eyes, the tragedy of 1914 "will be repeated in a decade or so". Supporting a revision of the Versailles Treaty did not mean that all conditions should be removed: the ‘war guilt’ clause was not without validity. The issue of reparations should be renegotiated and reduced, it was argued, against the pacifist desire to abandon these conditions altogether.

Giving voice to the pacifist view of Unitarian thinking, Rev. Kemshall of Scarborough, stressed that it was the duty of Unitarians to take a positive, even 'extreme' stance on German actions, "to form one’s own opinion, rather than drawing a mean line between all the divergent opinions". Criticism and action were valid and necessary. It was not enough to hope that if one cried ‘Peace! Peace!’, Germany would be ‘deafened’ into change. It was “the duty of the civilized world to boycott Germany in every way, financially, economically and culturally”.

Taking an opposing pacifist view, Rev. Stanley Mossop argued that this approach would “promote the very spirit that breeds war” and argued that the way “to combat the reactionary power of the Nazi Government’ was for the Allies to ‘fulfil their pledges [demonstrating] that there is no desire to crush their legitimate national aspirations”.

In similar pacifist vein, Rev. Leslie Hardman retorted that Kemshall was still under the influence of “anti-German propaganda” from the Great War. Hardman argued that “Hitler desires Peace. He has no wish whatever to plunge Europe into another war”. Kemshall could not agree with this rationale. As a minister, Kemshall stated that although he preached peace, he was also willing to use

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30 Ibid.
31 Stanley Mossop, “The menace of Germany,” The Inquirer, 5 August 1933, p. 375. The phrase ‘fulfill pledges’ meant that the Allied powers should also disarm.
“at least economic force to restrain the criminal element in human nature”. The “pure face of amiable good-will and non-resistance” was not enough.  

Drawing a middle line in the debate, Rev. Henry Gow (c. 1861-1938), declared that Germany could neither be excused its actions nor England blamed for them. Nor did he refrain from commenting on the internal policies against minorities in Germany. This was not the focus of the debate, however, and the issue of Jewish suffering was covered in *passim*. Gow continued that one could not explain “misdeeds as caused by previous misdeeds”. If one did, then “all sense of responsibility” would be undermined. There was ‘a definite evil spirit at work in Germany’ and ‘the outrageous persecution of Jews, pacifists, trade unions and communists’ could not be justified. Even so, in spite of this strong condemnation, Gow did not feel that an economic boycott was justified. Instead, he argued for an “internationalism” which did not despise “true patriotism”, one that possessed “indignation”, as well as the “sympathy and tenderness of Christ”.  

In tandem with the debate on the ‘international situation’, the question of how Churches should influence international political developments was fervently debated. Moving beyond their own denominational offerings, Unitarians discussed what the wider fellowship of Christians might say and what guidance Free Christians could offer. Lay member, Ernest Pickering M.P., urged that the Church must not “turn God into a khaki-clad Britisher and send the Prince of Peace packing”, as it had done in the Great War. The Churches’ duty was to pursue peace and “its function was to make men good”. Other Unitarians commented that the job of churches was “to make people Christians” and in this way they would make men love God and their

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34 Rev. H. Gow, “Meeting the Menace,” *The Inquirer*, 19 August 1933, p. 391. Henry Gow was a Unitarian Minister at Missionary, Liverpool, Renshaw St., from 1886 to 1889; then London, Mansford Street, 1889 to 1893; Leicester, Great Meeting, 1893-1902; Rosslyn Hill Chapel, Hampstead, 1902-21; Tutor, Manchester College, Oxford 1915-31; Warden 1922-1931; Vice Principle, 1924-31; Minister, Brighton, 1931-35. He served on the committees of the BFUA from 1903-06 and 1920-26. He was President of the BFUA, 1923-1934; member of the National Conference from 1900 onwards. President of the National Conference, 1926-28. *He helped form the General Assembly of Unitarian and Free Christian Churches from the amalgamation of the BFUA and the National Conference. Joint President of the newly formed General Assembly in 1928. He served continuously on the Council and its departmental Committees until his death.*
neighbours. To this end, it was suggested that the Churches should stand firmly
behind the League of Nations as the instrument of world peace turning people’s “desire
for peace” into a “will for peace”. Certain groups were “talking war” because it suited
their economic and political interests. The Churches, if they wished, could make the
difference argued one writer:

If from every pulpit and religious platform the world over there rang out ... the terrible need
for the ‘will to peace,’ if those who heard the call were to carry it amongst their fellow
workers, spread it in the home, the office, the factory, wherever they might go, with the same
spirit of vital urgency in which it came to them... I am convinced that the masses would
respond.  

Responding to criticisms leveled at the League for its lack lustre response to
Japanese aggression, Frank Coleman suggested Unitarians support the creation of an
international police force to implement a military force against aggressor nations. This
should be exercised through the authority of the League as a final resort. 

The Unitarian movements’ support for ‘collective security’ through the League
of Nations, its demands for a policy of disarmament by international agreement, and
calls for the abolition of military aircraft (or conversely, the creation of an International
Air Police) was not a view held by all Unitarians, clergy or laity. As we have seen, the
movement was split into pacifist and pacificist wings. Sidney Spencer came out
strongly against the policy of Collective Security, arguing it was merely a means of
keeping peace through the threat of war. He argued that peace could only be
achieved through the “Christianising” of the prevailing world order. A structure of life
based on the service of the common good was the key to universal brotherhood.

Spencer was by no means a lone voice, and was supported by other ministers who
argued that Unitarian churches should give a lead to international cooperation and
disarmament. At the meeting of the General Assembly in June 1935, declarations
from both the pacifist and pacificist wings vied for support from the meeting.

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36 W. P. Colfox, M. P., “The Churches must concentrate on individuals: The World’s Travail:
What can the Churches do? A Symposium,” The Inquirer, 7 October 1933, p. 466.
37 G. S. Whitby, “Saving Civilization: What the Churches can Do,” The Inquirer, 10 November
1934, p. 519-520.
39 Sidney Spencer, “The Problem of Peace: Shall we Fight for the League of Nations,” The
Inquirer, 16 March 1935, p. 121.
40 Ibid., p. 122.
41 For examples, see Rev. Walter M. Long and Mr. Harold Moore in The Inquirer, 16 March 1935,
p. 125.
Individuals like Spencer called for an all out declaration by the General Assembly against ‘collective security’ and opposition to war “on whatever occasion”. Debates were increasingly acrimonious and each side became more entrenched, dividing Unitarian unity and splintering the movements’ response (to some extent replicating the response of Methodists in 1933 and 1937). The issue remained ‘live’, and contending views continued to be aired through The Inquirer for the remainder of 1935.

Echoes of these concerns surfaced again at the following General Assembly of 1936. With the defeat of Abyssinia and the subsequent failure of the League to act resolutely against Italy, many of the debates focused on this issue. As expected, the President, George Armstrong (c.1865-1945) moved a resolution condemning Italian action in Ethiopia. A further resolution initiated by Frank Coleman was also passed, expressing the General Assembly’s “abhorrence of war”, its concern at increasing rearmament and its wish that the British government take a lead to prevent stock-piling of further arms.

Bringing the pacifist-pacifist argument to a head, Sidney Spencer argued for a strong pacifist resolution by the Assembly on “war as a crime against humanity” and an unequivocal declaration that Unitarians would both refuse to support and take part in any future war. In response to this call, Rev. Hurn begged the meeting “not to attach the stigma of pacifism to the Assembly”. Similar sentiments were expressed by Rev. Rattray who declared that if “we passively submitted to conquest by a dictator we should certainly have inflicted on us forms of spiritual degradation worse than war”. Rev. A. H. Lewis of Hull condemned “pacifism as undemocratic”. Indeed, Spencers’ resolution received so many objections that it was printed as a submission of the Peace Fellowship, rather than the as a resolution of the GAFC. As we will see in

42 Meetings of the General Assembly,” The Inquirer, 1 June 1935, p. 263.
43 Meetings of the General Assembly,” The Inquirer, 16 May 1936, p. 239. George Armstrong was a lay Unitarian leader and was an ex-editor of The Inquirer which he edited from 1928 to 1930. He served as President of General Assembly from 1935-36. Armstrong was a journalist and editor by trade and held editorships of the Bradford Observer and the northern edition of the Daily News.
44 Ibid.
45 Meetings of the General Assembly,” The Inquirer, 16 May 1936, p. 239.
a following chapter, this paralleled similar happenings in the Methodist Church which produced a strongly pacifist (though not solely) resolution in 1933 and was forced to issue two separate pacifist and pacificist resolutions in 1937.

The heated pacifist-pacifist debates about how Unitarians should approach the international situation and what stance they should take in respect of Germany, rumbled on into early 1937 and beyond, never fully receding. Between 1936 to 1937, however, Unitarians were increasingly drawn to an issue closer to their own historical concerns, namely the ability of churches to operate free from state control and intervention. The struggle of the Confessing Church in Germany to maintain its own control over spiritual matters proved of interest to Unitarians as they reflected on their own historical experience of persecution by states and their continuing marginalization from other Christian denominations who placed Unitarians outside of the larger Christian fellowship.

III: **KIRCHENKAMPF AND CHRISTIAN BROTHERHOOD: 1934-39**

Soliciting less interest initially, but running more or less parallel to debates about German belligerence and rearmament, was Unitarian concern for the position of Christians in Germany. Unitarians watched on anxiously as the Confessing Church strove to guard its own religious doctrine against the onslaught of Nazi legislation and influence. Unitarians argued that the wider Church in Germany “must strictly retain its moral and spiritual liberty, detached from compromise with, or privilege from, the State”. Concerned by the appointment of Dr. Ludwig Müller (1883-1945) and his application of the ‘Aryan Clause’, “with ruthless thoroughness”, Unitarians expressed their sympathy for fellow Christians in Germany, declaring “We dare not be indifferent to the fate of our German brothers in their travail”. Moreover, Unitarians felt that

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48 Editorial, “The German Church Crisis,” *The Inquirer*, 20 January 1934, p. 30. Ludwig Müller, was a German Lutheran Bishop and personal friend of Hitler. He was a naval chaplain from 1914 to 1926 and an army Chaplain from 1926 to 1933. He was known for his antisemitic and nationalistic sermons. Head of ‘German Faith Movement’ and leading figure of the ‘German Christians’, a neo-pagan movement which sought to equate the “blood and soil” ideology of Nazism with belief in Christ, in 1933 he was appointed Bishop of the Prussian Evangelical Church and then Bishop of the Reich Evangelical Church. He opposed the Confessing Church led by Martin Niemöller, and was replaced by Hans Kerrl, a Nazi functionary, following the establishment of the Ministry for Church Affairs in 1935. Müller committed suicide in Berlin in 1945.
the political situation in Germany raised the prospect of a ‘qualified’ Christianity, one that could no longer claim to be universal once ‘German’ was affixed. To the Unitarian eye, ‘German Christianity’ was “lopping off excrescencies that do not conform to an Aryan plan”. In short, the German Church was “becoming subservient to national ideals”. 49

Yet even this initial direct line soon softened, just as statements made in defense of Jews in 1933 had similarly yielded for more generalist, less politicized declarations. Instead, a more dilute expression of concern for the general state of affairs was issued by the GAFC, stating the Assembly’s “traditional regard for public order, personal liberty and freedom of thought” which it believed was best secured by a democratic form of government. 50 This was a statement against totalitarianism but hardly a searing attack on German internal policies. Furthermore, a message in support of the Confessing Church expressed its admiration for the courage of those who had chosen to suffer for their faith. This statement, however, was less emphatic than earlier declarations that had argued that these interventions should cease. 51

The *Kirchenkampfe*, however, raised two distinct issues for Unitarians, one of which weighed more heavily than the other. The first was the freedom of Christians to practice their faith unimpeded by government dictate. This concern was partly shaped by historical experience, one in which Unitarians remembered their own persecution by government. The second was an issue of ‘Church and State’ relations that related to a question of fundamental religious principles. If Christians submitted to an ‘aryanized’ Christianity, they would be giving way to political intrusion into the direction of Christian religious values and accepting the rewriting of Christian principles, including a fundamental value; universal Christian brotherhood. Christians excluded by ‘race’ would mean the end of universalism. This part of the issue related to Unitarian exclusion by mainstream Christianity: the lack of support by the Lutheran Church to a section of its witness, the Confessing Church, held parallels for Free Christians as they struggled to be accepted as Christians and discussions in *The Inquirer* throughout the 1930s attested to this. Unitarians did see beyond to the wider implications of a Christianity

'scrubbed' of its Jewish heritage, but Free Christians did not pursue the exclusion of 'racialized' Christians from the body politic under the 'Aryan' clause, beyond a recognition that it was occurring. It was, however, an underlying thread viewed uneasily by Liberal Christians. Unitarians mourned the 'Aryan' paragraph as part of a general loss of rights by the dissenting voices of the Churches, the clauses "epic significance" being the fight of Christians against State tyranny, rather than the persecution of Jews.

Overall, however, the movement of Liberal Christians away from critical commentary on internal policies in Germany to relations between nations was in line with general movements in the wider press. In common with Methodists, as we will see in chapter 4, Unitarians, were increasingly gripped by the possibility of another European war. To Liberal Christians, the antisemitic drives within Germany, the resultant refugees, as well as the Kirchenkampfe, seemed an expression of a much larger problem, that of rampant nationalism and totalitarian aggression. The desire to be seen as supportive of Anglo-German relations meant that Unitarian criticisms were increasingly muted on the topic of the Confessing Church and the effect of 'racial' legislation on Christians as well as Jews.


Introduction

Following harsh criticism against Germany's treatment of her Jewish nationals in 1933, the plight of Jews in Germany and the issue of Jewish refugees in flight, engendered little discussion in Unitarian circles until the beginning of 1938. On the occasions that anti-Jewish discrimination was reported, it generally appeared as excerpts from other non-Unitarian newspapers or books without additional commentary. A typical example was the reprinting of a product by British Jewry, The Jews in Germany: Facts and Figures. The section chosen outlined the way in which racial doctrine determined access to work and the requirement for individuals to prove their 'Aryan' heritage. No additional remarks were appended by the editor of The Inquirer.52 Other occasional lines and passages appeared, without assessment, generating little response from Unitarians, laity or leaders.

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This style of reporting differed markedly from bulging letter pages which discussed the role the Church should take in International Affairs, and to a lesser extent, how it should respond to the position of the German Churches. Indeed, towards the end of 1935, a concerned correspondent complained to the editor that *The Inquirer* was neither reporting sufficiently nor raising its voice against the persecution of Jews in Germany. The editor, Leslie Belton, responded to this criticism robustly in a leader column the following week. He had been highly critical of the “grip of racial doctrine” in Germany, identifying how this reflected poorly on German society. This admission illustrated the desire by many Unitarians to focus on the state of the German nation rather than to engage with the effects of persecution on the daily lives of Jews in Germany. Belton stated that he saw little value in treating Germany “like a pariah”. Criticism, however well intentioned, would merely lead Germany to isolate herself and turn inwards, merely worsening “the lot of those very people in Germany we wish to help”. Arguing for a policy of appeasement, one that avoided confrontation regarding the continuing internal problems in Germany, Belton asked that British men and women act “magnanimously” towards Germany, making her feel “big” rather than “small” and in this way not “poison the wells of friendship” between the two nations. This article, written to demonstrate a commitment to highlighting the plight of Jews in Germany, concluded with phraseology which recalled medieval Christian mythological imagery that blamed Jews for poisoning wells and bringing the Black Death.

**Hungarian ‘National’ Refugees**

A major discussion on the problems faced by a particular refugee group did occur in December 1934, but the refugees discussed were not part of the Jewish mass exodus from Germany. A political dispute between Yugoslavia and Hungary rapidly escalated when several hundred Hungarians were expelled from Yugoslavian territory. This was not an internal issue of Yugoslavian minorities forced to flee through the actions of their own Yugoslavian government, but rather a ‘left-over’ national problem of Hungarians living in an area that had been determined as Yugoslavian in the Peace settlement after the Great War. This incident was eventually contained by the

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concerted effort of the League, but the refugee problem remained unsolved. Fred Hankinson, a Unitarian Minister working in Hungary, explained in The Inquirer how Yugoslavians officials had rounded up “some 3,300 or more souls of Hungarian nationality” and escorted them to the border with Hungary. The crisis was a humanitarian tragedy, one which should “arouse public opinion as to the real state of many human beings today”. These Hungarian refugees had left everything behind, their homes and possessions, and had been moved “at the whim of the official minds to an unknown destination”. He called upon Unitarians, British men and women, to give “practical sympathy and material help during the approaching winter”. These refugees have “a claim on us at this time when we commemorate the season of Peace and Goodwill amongst men of every nation and creed”. This was especially the case when “British folks realise what a happy lot theirs has been and is since the War with no refugee problem in their midst”. Through churches and peace societies, public opinion should be mobilized, he continued, so that “thousands of innocent human beings” would never suffer expulsion from their homes and occupations again. Hankinson tied Unitarian religious imperatives unambiguously to moral and political action.

The call for practical and political action underscored by religious values marked a change in reportage style from descriptive (occasionally critical)commentary style to one that directed and called Unitarians to act. This approach contrasted with that adopted with respect to Jewish refugees prior to 1934 and subsequently until 1938. The reasons for this lay partly in the personal involvement of the reporter. It was also determined by the number of Hungarian refugees, which was small and containable, whereas figures for Jewish refugees were more overwhelming and set to continue rising and thus required more significant policies. The relationship of Jewish refugees to Germany, one of the ‘Great Powers’, made the international political and military situation more complex, immediate and threatening, whereas Hungary and Yugoslavia posed less danger. This comparison further highlights and explains the

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55 Frederick Hankinson, was a Unitarian Minister at Essex Hall, London from 1905 to 1922. He represented Friend’s Relief Emergency Committee in Hungary for a number of Years after WW1. Frederick Hankinson, “Refugees in Hungary: War averted but hundreds homeless,” The Inquirer, 29 December 1934, pp. 605-606.
56 Italics mine. Ibid., p. 606.
Unitarian response to Jewish refugees. While aware (and sympathetic) to the Jewish experience in Germany, they focused on initiatives to bring Germany back ‘into the fold’ rather than initiatives to help refugees in flight because Jewish refugees, unlike Hungarian refugees, were escaping a country that, in Unitarian eyes and others, needed to be appeased.

Christian Refugees from Germany

Lord Bessborough’s appeal for Christian Refugees from Germany was carried in *The Inquirer* on 16 May 1936. Bearing the caption, “this appeal is supported by the Council of the General Assembly of Unitarians and Free Christian Churches,” the paragraph explained that of the 80,000 refugees who had left Germany since 1933, “one fifth” were not Jews by religion, but Christian of which 2,500 were utterly “destitute”. Applauding Jewish action for their co-religionists (and others), Bessborough called on Christians to come to the aid of ‘non-Aryan’ Christian refugees. “Their only chance lies in the possibility that, as they are Christians, their plight may appeal to the generosity of their fellow Christians”. Explaining that these Christian refugees were victimized because of their ‘race’ rather than their religion, the appeal was written in apologetic language and did not assume that a response by Christians for Christian refugees was guaranteed.

Lending full newspaper support to the appeal, Belton published a leader on the plight of these refugees as part of a general discussion on the reasons why refugee movements occur. Noting that movements were often sparked by racial or religious oppression as well as economic factors, he spoke of many refugees in the twentieth century who were compelled to flee from dictators and some who believed that their only ‘refuge’ was suicide. Drawing readers attention to the ‘National Appeal’ for Christian refugees, he directed readers to contribute as Jews had given to refugees appeal and praised Jews for using contributions to benefit Jew and “non-Jew”.

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57 Ibid.
58 Lord Bessborough, “Christian Refugees from Germany,” *The Inquirer*, 16 May 1936, p. 247. Bessborough, was chairman of the National Christian Appeal for Refugees from Germany launched in 1936. It aimed to raise £50,000 in Britain and was part of an international appeal to raise £125,000. The appeal eventually raised a fifth of this amount and considered an embarrassing failure. See further discussion in Chapter 5 and Peter W. Ludlow, “The refugee problem in the 1930s: the failures and successes of Protestant relief programmes.” *English Historical Review*, 90 (July 1975): 564-603.
59 For more discussions of the varying perceptions on ‘non-Aryan’ Christians, see Chapter 5.
response from the Christian Churches was required and an address for contributions was given.\(^{60}\)

In stark contrast to Anglican approaches to Christians refugees, which will be discussed in chapter 5, little if any space was allotted to expanding on the point raised in the appeal notice: that the vast majority of Christian refugees were ‘classified’ under Nazi ‘racial’ theories as ‘non-Aryan’, expelled not on religion grounds but rather for reasons of ‘race’. This aspect of the refugee ‘problem’ proved central to other groups’ explanatory attempts, one which assumed that the vast body of Christians perceived of the issue as one affecting Jews and to a lesser extent, political opponents. It is significant that Unitarians did not separate out this body of ‘racialized’ Christians as did other Christian groups such as the Anglicans and Methodists. Indeed for the most part, Unitarians did not engage in a detailed analysis of the ramifications of Nazi ‘racial doctrines’, though they noted its presence. Whether this was ignored, underestimated or avoided at least until 1938, is difficult to ascertain from an incomplete record but made the Liberal Christian response unique. This approach, however, did not prevent Unitarians from holding illiberal or ambiguous attitudes and feelings to Jews as Jews as the next sections demonstrate.

Unitarian attitudes to Jews, antisemitism and Jewish refugees,

If, as Unitarians themselves have suggested, the pages of The Inquirer acted as a debating chamber for Unitarians, giving voice to their various concerns, the ‘Nuremberg Laws’ of September 1935, could not be regarded as one of them. This contrasted, as previously outlined, with the detailed analysis week after week devoted to the international situation and German Church Crisis.\(^{61}\) Nazi actions against Jews continued unabated and the Nuremberg Laws advanced oppression of Jews through legal measures removing the right of citizenship, as well as extending these policies to certain groups of Christians at varying intensity. The ‘racialization’ of German society was accelerating apace and identifying and practicing Christians with Jewish family relations were increasingly included within Nazism discriminatory net. Many Jews and Christians affected by this legislation fled to escape these further repressive measures.


\(^{61}\) There was also a major internal discussion on whether Unitarianism was a form of Christianity and what its relationship to orthodox Christianity should be.
Unitarians responded to the latest crisis in a number of ways, ranging across the spectrum. It is possible to categorize their opposing reactions within a unitary response.

A full page article in April 1936 written by Rev. Burton (1910-) seemed initially to represent 'a call to arms' on behalf of Jews in Germany. It was also the first reference to the Nuremberg Laws of September 1935. Using recently published material, Burton summarized the Jewish situation and the resultant refugee exodus. He identified the gradual exclusion of Jews from German society, the denial of work rights for Jewish adults and the treatment of Jewish children in schools still open to them. The destruction of ‘mixed’ marriages between German-Jews and German Christians under pressure from these same Nazi laws were also described. Outlining German Jewish reaction to these attacks, he wrote of 100,000 refugees on the move and the work of the League of Nations and European Jewish communities efforts to help these Jewish and non-Jewish escapees. Identifying the need for Christians to go to the aid of other Christians (as distinct from Jews), he contrasted the response of Christians with that of the Jewish community, declaring that “the Christian churches have not met with the challenge of the problem of the non-Jewish refugees”.

Considering his former comments, he did not call, as might have been expected, for Liberal Christians to help non-Jewish refugees. Instead, addressing members of the League, he spoke of their need to “recognise” that Jews were the victims of German resentment against their country’s loss of political prestige and economic position as the result of the Versailles Treaty.\(^2\) In one succinct sentence, Burton gave a ‘reasoned’ justification for Nazi behaviour, connecting its contemporary discriminatory policies with its post-war reparatory duties. He repeated a long held liberal assertion, that Versailles obligations needed revision because they were too onerous, but went further extending this argument to remove much of the responsibility for German actions from German hands. It is uncertain whether Burton believed that the removal of reparation duties would reduce German policy of antagonism and persecution.

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\(^2\) J. C. G. (Joseph Cyril George) Burton, “The Jewish Problem in Germany,” The Inquirer, 18 June 1936, p. 183. Burton was a minister at Church of Our Father, Rotherham, Yorkshire, 1934-38 and Ipswich Unitarian Church, 1938-40. He was Hon. Secretary of the Ipswich Committee for Refugees, 1938-40. He was then an English Master at Beverly Grammar School, Yorkshire from 1940 to 1942, then Northgate Grammar School, 1942-47. Burton was a Lecturer at the Department of Adult Education at the University of Bristol from 1947 until his retirement. Today, he and his wife live in retirement in Bath.
towards its own Jewish nationals. From Burton’s assessment, it is possible that he underestimated Nazi policy in this regard. This contrasted with Frank Coleman’s view in 1933, which identified the regime as essentially antisemitic in nature and practice. Conversely, three years on, Burton identified the German government as acting “mostly” in response to external forces, pushed to the limits by Allied intransigence and revenge for the Great War. This argument moved the focus away from the immediate consequences of German policies to more theoretical considerations of ‘higher diplomacy’. The focus was explaining, and almost justifying German actions, which reflected larger Unitarian international concerns, rather than on the need to help Jewish refugees. Given that thousands of refugees had fled and needed aid demonstrates how firmly this view was held.

Little else was published on the plight of refugees, Jewish or Christian until February 1938. At a time when reporting of the Jews in Germany in the quality broadsheets was at a low, The Inquirer deviated from its own previous style of low key accounting by publishing a special edition devoted almost entirely to “the Jewish Problem”. Printed as the ‘Jewish Number’, the issue tackled this subject and its wider ramifications over a range of articles, opening with a front page article by Albert Harding, “Who are the Jews?” Surveying Jewish history in biblical times and then jumping rapidly to the present day, skipping somewhat confusingly over the intervening years of Jewish history, the author identified Jews as “representatives of a world-wide racial strain”. A “race”, he argued, that could not be assimilated because Jews are “tenacious” and have “a survival value greater than any other people”. He did not believe, however, that Jews should be “obliterated”, for this was the “nation of whom Christ came”. The article continued that in the present climate, it was not surprising that Jewish nationalism was a growing part of Jewish self-expression; however, Jewish flight “to their spiritual homeland” should not be at the expense of Arabs already there. Arabs had “as much historic right in Palestine as the English have in England”. Concluding, the author stated that ‘The Jewish problem’ was certainly “most complex”. In Harding’s review, Jews were characterized as ‘racially’ separate from the non-Jewish world, a people that created problems wherever they went, either by refusing to assimilate or by settling in lands at the expense of others. The problem

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would probably be solved were Jews to disappear, but given that Jesus was a Jew, it would be ‘wrong’ for Christians to ‘obliterate’ them considering the ‘gift’ they had given. Combining classic Christian views of Jews with modern ‘racial’ concerns which deemed Jews as inassimilable and problematic, the author displayed little sympathy for Jews in their present situation, arguing that their present troubles were a product of their own ‘qualities’ and history.65

A “cure” for antisemitism was suggested by George Yates. Rejecting Zionism, as the previous author had, this author mooted a solution that outlined the regeneration of both faiths. The creation of a more “vital Judaism” would promote a more “virile Christianity” as the religions worked together for the betterment of the world. These two revived religions would create “a lust for good” and the “weakness of prejudice” would be defeated.66 Yates’ article presented an entirely different view of Judaism, one that identified a need for reform (also the case for Christianity) but one that could make a positive contribution to the world. Whereas Harding had identified Judaism as essentially redundant once Christianity was established, and their continuing separate existence a recompense, Yates identified roles for both Christianity and Judaism. Judaism was not moribund, obscurantist and ‘finished’, as Harding suggested.

Yates’ more positive view of Judaism was not shared by other contributors, and indeed, an issue devoted to the position of refugee Jews had become a Liberal Christian critique of Judaism. Given the general tenor of the number, it was not unexpected that Liberal Judaism was adjudged as somehow lacking and lagging when compared to Unitarianism. In the eyes of a Rotherham Unitarian minister, Joseph Burton, this was because, despite the fact that both movements were liberal and progressive, shared many similar attitudes such as a belief in ethical monotheism and support for biblical criticism, Liberal Judaism was still faithful to traditional practices. Unitarianism, however, unlike Liberal Judaism, was a “non-historic, non-authoritarian and non-ritualistic religion” and was the most likely basis of a future “World Religion”

64 Ibid., p. 102. ‘Zionism’ is not referred to directly, rather ‘Jewish national self-expression’.
which would provide the “essence of all religions”. Liberal Judaism had a considerable way to go until it reached the “Quaker simplicity of Unitarianism”.\footnote{J. C. G. Burton, “Liberal Judaism and Unitarianism: A Comparison,” The Inquirer, 26 February 1938, p. 103.} Burton’s clear ambivalence to continuing Judaism, both Orthodox and Liberal, was expressed through a critical analysis that found Liberal Judaism lacking not ‘spiritually’ (a common Christian criticism that characterized Judaism as legalistic and Christianity as spiritual) but ‘failing’ because of its outward ‘form’. That Liberal Jewish values paralleled Unitarian values in Burton’s assessment was ultimately irrelevant when its practices harked back to its orthodox counterparts. Unless Liberal Judaism stripped itself of its Jewish practices, it remained ‘lacking’ and incomplete. Yet Burton was also willing to state that Unitarianism had not achieved the final goal of becoming the World Religion he hoped for, the one that Burton envisioned it was moving towards; it was however, far closer. Burton’s views reflected traditional Christian ideas of Christian superiority over (any form of) Judaism, particularly his pronouncements that Judaism in its practice, as opposed to its philosophical form, was in error.

Sandwiched between these critiques of Judaism and Jewish historical experience was a summary of Rev. Lillian Preston’s previous Sunday sermon. Its tone was quite different and focused on the contemporary state of Jewry rather than assessing Judaism. Referring to antisemitism abroad and at home, the Birkenhead minister stated that Jews had been made “the scapegoat of humanity” suffering for things for which “they are not to blame”. Concluding her homily, she asked fellow Unitarians, “Should not Christians raise their voices in protest?\footnote{“Christians and Jews,” The Inquirer, 26 February 1938, p. 102.} Running with this synopsis was a brief piece on the London Society of Jews and Christians suggesting Unitarians become members.\footnote{J. C. G. Burton, “Liberal Judaism and Unitarianism: A Comparison,” The Inquirer, 26 February 1938, p. 103.}

Responses to this special issue ran the gamut of attitudes to Jews and Judaism, most of which displayed an ambivalence to Jews as Jews. They revealed a paradoxical position, especially when considering Unitarians demands for the tolerance of various Christian faith positions (i.e. recognition of Unitarianism by orthodox Christianity). This was joined by the Unitarian notion that Liberal Christianity held enlightened attitudes to non-Christian faiths and believed in world-wide brotherhood,
yet still held intolerant and even antisemitic attitudes towards Jews.\textsuperscript{70}

The terms of the ‘Open Forum’ debate were set by the first correspondent, Rev. Sharp, who asked why the “high qualities of moral, intellectual and social leadership claimed for the Jews forever rouse in the Gentile mind a murderous fury?”\textsuperscript{71}

To the author, a minister from London, this was the essence of the Jewish “problem”. A way should be found for Gentiles to “reconcile” themselves to Jews, and he implored his “fellow and well meaning contributors [to] tell us what can be done”.\textsuperscript{71}

Unitarians, it was acknowledged, despite their stated egalitarian position to other religions, needed help on the specific relationship that should prevail between Jew and Gentile. Moreover, this movement, Rev. Sharp judged, should come from non-Jews: An admission that the “Jewish problem” was, in point of fact, a Christian one.

Rejecting Sharp’s call, Woolmer-Pile of Wallington Surrey stated that one could not reconcile Gentiles to Jews until certain charges against “the Jews as a world power” had been aired and answered. In an attack which the editor described as “alien to the spirit of brotherhood and reasonableness [Unitarians] seek to promote”, Woolmer-Pile raised antisemitic accusations one after another. In the first place, Jews were the “murderers” of Christ and ‘Jew adulation’ was now in place of Christs’ teachings. Most of all, “Jews falsely claim credit” for the ethics of the ten commandments which Gentiles had already possessed “over a thousand years before the birth of Moses”. Furthermore, the League of Nations was a cover for a “Universal Republic” of Jews and that Bolshevism was out to destroy all Gentile institutions.\textsuperscript{72}

Refuting the contribution of Mr. Woolmer-Pile, A. W. Blundell replied that the charge that Jews murdered Jesus was inaccurate, for “Christ gave himself... for the redemption of the world”. Blundell concluded that

Jews have been made to bear the spite and the hatred of the Christians for many centuries and the prolonged agony is still going on in the... twentieth century... as things are, it would have been better for the persecuted Jews if Christ had never lived.\textsuperscript{73}

Woolmer-Pile’s antisemitic insinuations were rejected by Blundell and the

\textsuperscript{69} “A Society of Jews and Christians,” The Inquirer, 26 February 1938, p. 106-7. See earlier footnote #17 on the London Society. It was comprised of representatives from various faith groups including a Unitarian and Free Church representative, Rev. John Ballantyne.

\textsuperscript{70} Reactions to the content of the “Jewish Number” and the responses these engendered filled the letter pages for the following month until the editor ended discussions.

\textsuperscript{71} G. C. Sharp, “Our Open Forum: The Jewish Question,” The Inquirer, 5 March 1938, p. 116. Sharp was the minister in Acton (London) at Creffield Road.

editor, yet the assertions found in much of Rev. Burton’s correspondence went unchallenged. Drawing on both Christian and liberal ambivalence to Jews as Jews and antipathy to the continuing existence, validity and vitality of Judaism, Burton gave a seven-point plan for a solution to the “Jewish problem”. Jews should mix more, he argued, as ghetto walls no longer divided Jews and Gentiles. Gradual assimilation of Jews should happen, as it had in Denmark and as “it was proceeding in Germany” (bar the current unfortunate reversal). Jews should accept Christianity, “then clever Jewish businessmen will be no more hated than Quaker capitalists are”. In this blueprint, Burton gave voice to an underlying antagonism and double standard in attitudes regarding Jewish and Christian prosperity: if Jews were successful they were detested, if Christians became rich, however, this was admirable. At first glance, it seemed that the minister from Rotherham was arguing that only through whole-sale conversion and assimilation would such attitudes disappear: but this was not the case. Burton found limited value in orthodox Judaism; Jews “should” adhere to the great principles of Judaism. It was the “irreligious” Jews that were the problem and were so disliked by Gentiles. This argument, however, contradicted his earlier comments. Were not irreligious Jews, Jews who were deemed problematic by Gentiles, the very same assimilated Jews he had thought would provide the ‘solution’? His initial suggestion was in reality a partial voicing of the only ‘true’ solution: conversion to Christianity. It was from the “Christian experience” that freedom flowed and it was Christianity which would “remove all hatred”.

The Inquirer debates centred around Jews and Judaism in one form or another but were not direct commentaries about the plight of Jewish refugees. Instead these discussions reflected Unitarian views towards Jews, antisemitism and Zionism on a general level. Unitarians, by focusing on Judaism rather than Jews in Germany, were diverting their attention to the relationship between Christianity and Judaism rather than the role Unitarians should play in regards to Jewish refugees. The Inquirer debates also demonstrated the variation in attitudes and the depths with which these were held within the movement. Not every Unitarian was able to take this opportunity to express a view in these discussions. This publication, however, marked a change in the way future news about Jewish persecution was reported in both content and

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coverage. Reporting increased several fold, partly in response to external political events as well as a growing interest in the wider problems faced by refugees. Outside of this print medium, it might also be said more speculatively, that these discussions sensitized Free Christians to the situation Jews faced in Germany (and later Austria) as well as highlighted the different positions within Unitarianism.

Unitarians Abroad: From Czechoslovakian Relief to Refugee Aid

Unitarian relief for refugees abroad, Jewish and others, began gradually in the later half of the 1938 through Free Christian connections in Czechoslovakia with the Czechoslovakian Church and the Czechoslovakian Unitarian Church. Unitarianism began in Czechoslovakia in the Reformation period, but slowly faded out. In 1921, Dr. Norbert Capek returned to his native Czechoslovakia with the sponsorship of the American Unitarian Association to form societies of “Liberal Religious Fellowship”. By 1930 Unitarian Churches were established and the Church was recognized by the State, gaining some State aid. Capek continued to lead the Movement with the aid of Rev. K. Hapsl in this period and links with Britain were forged via the ministerial training colleges in England and visits by Unitarian ministers.

By Autumn 1938, Prague had become the temporary ‘home’ for many refugees from various areas inside and outside of Czechoslovakia. Jewish refugees, who had fled from Germany following anti-Jewish legislation, and who had made their home in Sudetenland, were joined by Austrian Jewish émigrés after the Anschluß. Once Sudetenland was occupied by German Forces, Prague and its environs became the destination of these same Austrian and German refugees. Joining this large group of ‘double refugee’ were anti-Heinleinists; largely Social Democrats, non-Jewish German and Czech Sudeten refugees (regarded as political refugees) who were also fleeing Nazi rule. In addition to these groups, large numbers of Czech Jews from Sudetenland and the area bordering this newly occupied zone, also sought refuge and aid in Prague. Lastly, small numbers of liberal Christians, who felt unable to live under German occupation, also made their way to the capital.

75 Bleecker, ed., Handbook of the International Association for Liberal Christians and Religious Freedom, 44-46. The Czechoslovakian Church grew out of the succession of a large number of Roman Catholics, led by Dr. C. Farsky. In 1921, a new Church was declared and was headed by
Following the Munich agreement, a correspondent to *The Inquirer* called for the establishment of a Czech Relief Fund “for those of her people who are now made homeless and destitute”. The following week, Rev. John McLachlan, agreeing with the proposal, stated that “we as Unitarians [have] close religious affiliations with people in Czechoslovakia and ought to be foremost amongst those in this country to give a helping hand”. In the same issue, the Secretary of the General Assembly, Mortimer Rowe, stated that a Czech Relief Fund was to be created because of denominational demands for such a body. The Fund would aid those “in the two religious movements which we ourselves are associated”. By the time *The Inquirer* published a full page editorial asking Unitarians to support the General Assembly Czech Relief Fund, Rev. Rosalind Lee was already en-route to Prague. Her remit, as the Assembly representative, was to see how the fund could be used “to relieve distress, chiefly among our own co-religionists”.

A small *ad hoc* committee was formed in October at Essex House, the home of the GAFC, to deal with matters arising from the work in Czechoslovakia. It solicited and collected donations from individual Unitarians, congregations, womens’ leagues, associations and other bodies linked to the movement by advertising in *The Inquirer* and *The Monthly Letter* (the organ of the British League of Unitarian and Other Liberal Christian Women). Margaret Stevenson was made Honorary Treasurer and the *ad hoc* group was ready to take direction from Rev. Lee. By the end of October, within a month of the funds’ launch, the account stood at over £400. No central money from the General Assembly itself, however, was forthcoming.

Working in conjunction with both the Czechoslovakian Unitarian Church and

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Note that the Organizing Secretary was Miss M Stevenson and the Field Secretary: Rev (ema) Rosalind Lee. I am grateful to Judy Hague for supplying me with copies of this publication. It should be noted that this newsletter was printed without page numbers.

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“The Czechoslovak Relief Fund,” *The Inquirer*, 29 October 1938, 526. These figures should be set against an average GAFC income of c. £6700 and assets of c. £104, 500. The total raised by the GEC in 1938 was £28, 872 of which £365 was given by the Yearly Meeting. The Quaker committee, however, was well established by this time and raised money from public donations as well as central funds. Between 1933-1937 the GEC raised £31,530. See Lawrence Darnton, *An Account of the Work of the Friends Committee for Refugees and Aliens, first known as the*
Czechoslovakian Church, Lee quickly identified projects to fund. Her first concern was for refugee children separated from their parents. The Church had a holiday home in Jilové which they hoped to expand in order to take a small group of approximately 20 refugee children. A second proposal, that of a work room, was planned in Prague to employ refugee men. Half the costs of both schemes were funded by Unitarian donations. The remaining costs and ongoing maintenance was met by Prague based representatives of the Save the Children Fund and the Lord Mayor Fund for Czech Refugees with whom Rev. Lee had forged working contacts. The discrete sums raised by Unitarians were only effective if conjoined with other funds and cooperative work with existing aid agencies became characteristic of Unitarian aid.

Further pressure on Unitarians to contribute to the Fund was maintained by a message from the President of the General Assembly in November 1938. Dr Rattray, appealed “to all our people to give as generously as they can . . . surely no words are needed to commend our consciences to our debt of honour”. Verbal support for the relief work was given by the Assembly, but it was not matched with central funds.

In December 1938, Margaret Stevenson, Honorary Treasurer of the Czech Relief Fund, appealed for donations from Unitarian women to cover the cost of wool. This was to be used by women in refugee camps so that they might knit clothes for their families. At the same time Rosalind Lee asked “for material and moral help” in a full page spread in The Inquirer. Stating that the refugee problem in Czechoslovakia was ‘gigantic’ and worsening daily, she revealed that nearly 92,000 refugees were registered with the state authorities, but it was believed that many more where afraid to report to officials in case they were returned to the ceded areas. “For the Jews the outlook is even more bleak”, continued Rev Lee,

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*Some of the children were orphans because their parents had committed suicide or were murdered. See: “How Americans Helped a Nation in Crisis,” Report on the Commission for Service in Czechoslovakia (n. p. :ACSC, 1939), 16. The Commission for Service in Czechoslovakia (ACSC) was a joint American Unitarian-Quaker venture. It liaised with respective British counterparts. I am grateful to Ghanda Di Figlia of the American Unitarian Universalist Service Committee for her location of this report.*

*“Miss Lee at work in Prague,” The Inquirer, 5 November 1938, 538. Lee was a minister but generally referred to as “Miss”.*


*Monthly Letter, December 1938 (no page numbers indicated in this publication).*
There are those who in recent years have fled to Czechoslovakia from the old Germany and Austria. Then there are the Sudeten German Jews, including many professional and business men, and in addition, in view of the political situation in the country, the Czech Jews are getting nervous and want to get out as soon as possible. Already they have been warned that their power to make a living will be restricted in the New Year.\textsuperscript{85}

Rev. Lee concluded that there was urgent need for refugee aid as “an essential part of our work for religious freedom and world brotherhood”.\textsuperscript{86} Her call was reminiscent of Fred Hankinsons’ appeal on behalf of Hungarian refugees four years earlier. Increasingly, her focus was moving from co-religionists to a consideration of Jewish refugees, sensitized by earlier coverage in The Inquirer and the experience of conditions in Prague.

In December, Rev. John McLachlan (1908-) offered to assist Rev. Lee in Czechoslovakia.\textsuperscript{87} McLachlan had studied at the University in Heidelberg during the Nazi takeover in 1932-1933 and was a German speaker, a skill which would prove useful for his work in Prague tending to mainly German speaking refugees. He was also well informed in ‘refugee issues’ having been in touch with the Jewish Refugee Committee in London through an old friend and neighbour, Miss Issacs. On a month’s leave of absence from his church in Halifax, he traveled to Prague to work in the Unitarian office over the winter of 1938 to 1939, recording his activities in a daily diary.\textsuperscript{88} This diary provides an illuminating eye into an individual Unitarian’s perspective on the problems facing Jewish refugees fleeing from Czechoslovakia.

The office for Unitarian relief was based at Krakovska just off Wenceslas Square in the center of Prague. It had been the home of the Jewish editor of the Prager Tageblatt who had fled to Paris. The accommodation comprised of three rooms, a waiting room, another room for interviewing and an “inner sanctuary” full of

\textsuperscript{86} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{87} Herbert John McLachlan is a retired Unitarian Minister and writer. He served at Attercliffe Unitarian Church, 1933-37; Fulwood Old Chapel, 1934-7 and was an Assistant Minister, Upper Chapel, Sheffield, 1933-7; Minister, Northgate End Chapel, Halifax 1937-44. Tutor and Librarian of Manchester College, Oxford 1944-49; Acting Principal Manchester College from 1949. Member of Refugee Committee; Channel Islands Evacuee’s Committee, Halifax Youth Committee; Council of Social Service; First Presbyterian Church, Belfast 1952-1967; Cambridge Memorial (Unitarian) Church, 1967-1975. Member of the Council of Overseas and Foreign Committee, General Assembly; active social service worker in Sheffield and Halifax. He has lived in Sheffield since retirement in 1976 to write on Unitarian history.
\textsuperscript{88} I am thankful to Rev. McLachlan for access to his diary and other private papers in connection with his work for refugees in Czechoslovakia. His diary vividly demonstrates the interconnected and interdependent nature of work for refugees and the problems faced by refugee workers.
files and a telephone. Most of the work consisted of providing information and advice about the emigration process and redirecting individuals to agencies where they were more likely to get help. Extra clothing, food vouchers and small amounts of money to cover rent and photographs for documents were also given.\textsuperscript{89}

On his first day, McLachlan interviewed a variety of refugees and would-be emigrants. A young non-Jewish woman engaged to a Jewish lawyer wanted help with an application for a domestic visa. The case was considered "straight forward" and was referred to the Domestic Bureau in London with the support of the Unitarian office, illustrating the role played by relief workers in the validation and support of applications. Another case proved more difficult and demonstrated the complexity of the ‘double refugee’, as well as the extension of aid for Liberal Christians to Jews. A Slovakian Jewish Social Democrat who had three of his four children (aged between 7 to 12) with various friends in Hungary and Slovakia, asked for help to get his children on a “transport” (Kindertransport) to Britain. In order to aid this family, it was first necessary to reunite the children in Prague and then arrange for them to be put on the list for the next transport. Finding homes in Britain would be organized later. Negotiating with Miss Warriner (the Save the Children’s Fund and News Chronicle representative), the Unitarian minister was eventually able to get the children from their respective places into a Prague Children’s Home by the end of December.\textsuperscript{90} He was also successful in placing them on a transport to England. The children were separated once in Britain and looked after by various people, including Rev. Lee and other Unitarians, as well as the local Jewish refugee committee.\textsuperscript{91}

Other cases of parents who wished to send their children to the safety of Britain followed, some of whom were Jewish, some Catholic (but Social Democrat and therefore refused aid from Caritas, the Catholic relief agency) and some Protestants. There were also cases of ‘mixed couples’ as well as single men and women seeking emigration aid. Over the month, McLachlan saw hundreds of men, women and children, all desperate to leave, some with ‘prices on their heads’ (i.e. wanted by the


\textsuperscript{91} Unpublished Diary of John McLachlan, 1938-39, “Visit to Czechoslovakia”, \textit{McLachlan Private Papers}, 14 and 19 December, pp., 5-6, 21. This diary consists of 101 handwritten pages measuring 7” by 4”. (Hereafter, McLachlan Diary). The fate of the father is not recorded.
Gestapo). Highlighting the everyday cost of the crisis, McLachlan recalled in his diary a particularly poignant case of a Jewish carpet shop owner (now a refugee in Prague) who was “moving about from place to place, like a hunted animal, in order to escape detection”. Nor was his position exceptional. Refugees Jews were in an increasingly perilous position, and roamed the city, unable to work legally and trying to maintain ‘appearances’ so that they would not be questioned by the police and returned to the Sudetenland, Germany or Austria. For McLachlan, despite his best impulses, they were an ‘alien presence’ and the minister was forced to confront his own ambivalent attitudes towards them.

Sitting in the cafés one thing is very striking, namely the large number of very obvious Jews there are about. They appear to be a very large percentage of the café population of this city, and I am told they are beginning to be rather anxious about the future. It is curious, however, that many of them arouse in me a feeling of instinctive dislike which I have never experienced before. Whether it has any rational ground I doubt, but it is there nonetheless.

Fighting his prejudices, he felt guilty for such attitudes and his sympathy for the predicament of refugee Jews overrode these feelings, so that he was also able to say of these same Jews, that they were “very kindly and are perfect gentlemen”. He prayed that the efforts to rescue “particularly the Jewish children” through the Kindertransporte would be “mighty and successful.”

Over the weeks it became increasingly clear that the work for refugees, Jewish and other, would be eventually curtailed. The threat of German invasion and the occupation of the rest of Czechoslovakia was ever present. From a contact at the Thomas Mann Committee (for writers and intellectuals), McLachlan learnt that all refugees, German, Austrian and Jews, would have to leave Czechoslovakia by the 15 January, thereafter “it would be impossible for the Czech government to resist German demand for the extradition of such refugees”. McLachlan became ill with a severe stomach ulcer caused by stress, long hours and sheer volume of work. In the meanwhile, people continued to seek aid and McLachlan was kept busy negotiating on

92 McLachlan Diary, 28 December 1938, p. 51.
93 A fictional account of the refugee situation is by Martha Gellhorn. Martha Gellhorn, A Stricken Field (London: Virago, 1986).
95 McLachlan Diary, 3 January 1939, p. 69-70.
96 Soon after his return from Prague with a severe ulcer, McLachlan could not stand upright and had to preach sitting down until it improved. Indeed, “it was a relief to be back in England and to take up my Yorkshire ministry once more”. See McLachlan, Wine of Life, 75.
their behalf with other aid organisations in Prague and refugee organisations back home. In the capital, he worked closely with representatives of the Lord Mayors’ Fund for Czech Refugees, ‘News Chronicle Fund’, Save the Children Fund, Thomas Mann Fund, Quaker Czech Refugee Committee, YMCA and Salvation Army personnel, revealing how complex and interconnected refugee work had become in a very short amount of time.

Nor was his work solely under Unitarian auspices. On one day he measured nearly 150 refugees at the Prague Salvation Army centre for clothes eventually provided by the Lord Mayors’ Fund for Czech Refugees. On another day he visited refugee camps outside Prague to gather further information for a report for the GAFC. In the course of these visits, one little girl of five years old stood out, and her father turned to McLachlan and told him that he “could take her away” with him, back to England and safety. The father's desperation and willingness to give up his daughter to a complete stranger convinced McLachlan that those who had no money stood little chance of escaping. Refugees were becoming increasingly pauperized and he was compelled to face the fact that the situation was now “so complex and terrifying” that even his best efforts were “puny”. The voluntary refugee aid network could not shoulder the burden alone, instead “Governments ought to be doing more - making visas and permits more easily obtainable and not insisting on money payments and sureties.” The relief fund of £400 raised in a quick burst continued to grow, reaching beyond £1000 by January 1939, however, these monies were quickly exhausted and the office was forced to close. British Unitarians handed over their work to their better funded American counterparts and returned to England.

Local Refugee Committees: Unitarians and Jewish Refugees in Britain

Lee and McLachlan both returned to England and set about recording their impressions of conditions to encourage their co-religionists to act on behalf of refugees. Describing the situation in The Monthly Letter, Rev. Lee stated that the “most urgent problem is that of refugee-emigration... [of which the] large majority are non-Aryan, but some are, for political reasons, on the danger list”. Furthermore, the numbers looked likely to increase as “Czech-born Jews are now anxious to leave”.

97 McLachlan Diary, 4 January 1939, p. 81. The author was unable to locate this internal report.
Something needed to be done at an international level Lee declared: “I want most earnestly to plead with League members to take a share in it”. Detailing the options her readers could take on a practical level, she highlighted the need for domestic posts for women and employment openings for men where there was a “shortage in English labour”. Offers of hospitality was also desperately needed. Addressing the consciences of her fellow Womens League members, Lee declared that “Individuals and groups in England are actually offering hospitality of this kind. ARE WE DOING OUR SHARE? Some are doing even more”. Nor was Lee ready to leave it there. As Unitarians, Lee insisted that her readers had an obligation to involve themselves.

Have we any right to sit by with folded hands and accept this as “history”? Our ancestors had a reputation for humanitarian ideals and interests in civil and religious liberty. When the “history” of this time is written, shall it be said that we looked on calmly and pointed out the economic and political difficulties involved in helping these people, or shall we be counted amongst those who put humanity first and practiced their principles of world brotherhood? It is for us to decide by our action here and now what will be the verdict of history.

Similar pleas were carried in an article in The Inquirer written by John McLachlan, and his voice was echoed by others. John Ballantyne a Unitarian minister in Kensington, London, in conjunction with Margaret Stevenson, posted a notice asking for offers of hospitality for refugees. This was followed by a petition, signed by a over 70 individuals, many of who were ministers, calling on the Government to drop the ‘guarantee’ required to maintain refugees. The petition declared that “private benevolence” was not enough, particularly when hamstrung by additional financial and administrative burdens. “If we as a Christian community sit idly by in acquiescence, we cannot escape a share in responsibility”. Neither was Ballantyne ready to end his crusade. A long article followed explaining the function of various refugee committees as well as the latest appeal by Lord Baldwin with a request for Unitarians to act with “Large hearts, clear minds, and speed!” The pressure on voluntary agencies struggling to keep up with ever increasing numbers was outlined

98 McLachlan Diary, 28 December 1938, p. 51.
99 Monthly Letter, (January 1939). No page numbers are indicated in this publication.
100 Monthly Letter, (February 1939).
with a further impassioned plea for government intervention. Other correspondents were in agreement, charging the government with a moral duty to lead the way: refugees would enrich Britain and the Empire and it was up to the government to stop hesitating and come to the aid of refugees.

At the time of Ballantyne’s piece in *The Inquirer*, the minister was still part of the Czech Relief Committee with Margaret Stevenson. In January, however, a separate committee was created, specifically for Refugees, again with General Assembly backing but no finances. Running parallel to his new role on this committee was his appointment as Honorary Secretary of the Kensington Council for Refugees. With the help of gifts of aid, a rent free flat and donated furniture, the Kensington Committee managed to found a small hostel for twenty refugees. Nor was the Kensington Local Committee alone in providing Unitarian ministerial support.

Rev. J. C. G. Burton, a contributor to *The Inquirer* for the “Jewish number” and issues thereafter, was well established as the Honorary Secretary of the Ipswich Refugee Committee by summer 1938, having moved from his post in Yorkshire to another position in Ipswich. In correspondence with the Secretary of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, he collected literature from the Board to use as material for the basis of talks given in the area and outside at meetings arranged by the League of Nations Union, the Peace Pledge Ballot and the Workers Education Association. The appeal for “justice for the Jew” was particularly important in East Anglia, Burton felt, because it was an area where few Jews lived, and “insidious propaganda” was making itself felt. There was a “latent antisemitism” that aggrieved him, in all “kinds” of person, “even in Churches of all denominations (including Unitarianism, although Unitarians officially tolerate all religions)”. The reception to a sermon on the “foulness of antisemitism” revealed how “few” people “admire the Jews” and how many were “gently antisemitic”. There needed to be day-to-day contacts to counteract the varied nature of antisemitism from the blatant comment to the more subtle remark

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106 Extract from Annual Report of Essex Church, Kensington, (London; n. p., 1939). I am grateful to John Ballantyne (Jnr.) for copies of these reports. No other material on the hostel was traced.
107 Letter from Rev. J. C. G. Burton to the Secretary of the BDEP, *Papers of the BDEP*, LMA, 11 November 1938, ACC/3121/C15/03/019.
and "You can be sure of some responsible speaking on my part".  

Aided by his wife, Nancy Burton, and her connections via a cousin working at Bloomsbury House as well as a close friendship with Lotte and Wolf Krebs (refugees already in Ipswich), the Ipswich Refugee committee managed to aid approximately 50 refugees, mainly young girls between the ages of 11 to 14 years. The family home became a Friday night haven for many of these children who often found the transition to their new environment, difficult and lonely. Nancy, a convert to Unitariansism, found that her Jewish background gave her an understanding of the childrens' former homelife. Their "essentially family centred" experience changed with their removal to England and many were unhappy in their new surrounding, expected to conform quickly to a new way of life with little appreciation of the lifestyles they had left behind.

The Burtons' work for refugees came to a halt in Summer 1940 when Joseph Burton was arrested on suspicion of 5th column activities, their committee papers were removed by the Special Branch and the minister was subsequently dismissed by the Church. Rev. Burton was released after questioning and returned to Yorkshire for a teaching post, leaving his wife behind in Ipswich with their young daughter. His numerous pacifist speeches and his association with non-British nationals were it was believed to have cast suspicion on the family.

Joseph Burton’s ambivalence, even intolerance of Judaism and also ‘some’ Jews (as outlined in his earlier pieces in the community’s paper), did not make him an obvious candidate for work with refugees. That said, ambivalence to Judaism and even antipathy to Jews did not preclude him, as in the case of John McLachlan, from acting for Jewish refugees, nor did it stop him from rejecting antisemitism and campaigning against its occurrence. Moreover, the personal and professional cost to the Burtons’ involvement was significant and changed their lives thereafter – Burton was never again a minister for the Unitarian Church and remained in education until his

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108 Letter from Rev. J. C. G. Burton to the Secretary of the BDEP, Papers of the BDEP, LMA, 18 November 1938, ACC/3121/C15/03/019.
As a groundswell of Free Christian interest was beginning to build in early 1939, the ad hoc GAFC Refugee Committee was merged into a larger General Committee for Distress, the new parameters of such was “to deal with the refugee question in general, chiefly as a liaison committee between the General Assembly and the various official refugee committees”. As before, it was not centrally funded, and more significantly, it abandoned its previous donations collection role. Rather, it hoped to collect information about congregational efforts locally and provide information about the existing non-Unitarian work. Monies specifically for the use of Refugees in the UK had amounted to a little over £590, compared to the £1480 collected by the earlier established Relief Committee during a similar time period. The change in direction of the Committee was unexplained, but Rev. Ballantyne continued in his post as Chairman. Local Unitarian work continued, as before, directed at the local level by the Minister of the Free Christian Church, or through the Unitarian involvement through Local Committees, but dedicated GAFC work at a committee level re-focused other wider concerns.

Conclusion

Unitarians were generally uninterested in refugees until 1938. This is not to say they were unmoved by the Jewish plight prior to this juncture. Indeed, in 1933 the movement’s leadership declared forcefully against Nazi persecution of Jews in Germany. They were, however, almost immediately diverted by other interests, a pattern of response that will be seen in other groups in the proceeding chapters. The pressing issues for Free Christians throughout most of the 1930s was the fear of war and the international situation. Like other Christian denominations at the time, Unitarians were divided between a strictly pacifist and a more broadly pacifist stance. Free Christian energies were channeled into debates over which stance should dominate. Other discussions centred on the need to revise the Versailles treaty, bring Germany back ‘into the fold’, and curtail the arms race. The fate of Christianity in

113 Nancy Burton, Interview with Author, 15 March 1998.
Germany and the treatment of German pastors within the Reich was also a Free Christian concern. A desire to promote and maintain Anglo-German friendship undercut much of the debates about peace and war, and from 1934 to 1938 appeasing statements were favored over criticism of German internal policies. Unitarian concern for Jewish suffering under Nazism was consequently muted for this period. Thus, prior to 1938, Jewish refugees though of interest to individual Unitarians, were not a concern of the Unitarian movement as a whole.

The response of Unitarians and Free Christians to the position of German speaking refugees followed neither patterns of a ‘top-down’ approach (GAFC) nor a ‘bottom up’ model (laity), but rather came from the ‘middle’ (clergy) to the grassroots and from the grassroots upwards. Jewish and Christian refugees became a concern of the Unitarian movement by the force of several Ministers who committed themselves to the cause of the refugees, producing a ground swell of interest in late 1938 and early 1939. They were, however, unable to move the GAFC, the central representative body of Liberal Christians, to fund this cause. General Assembly administrators were prepared to get involved on an administrative level, but GAFC presidents did not back this work with funds from the General Assembly. This was, in part, because budgets were extremely tight; the average GAFC income was less than £7000 per annum. Moreover, giving funds ran counter to its culture as a receiving rather than a donating body. The functions of the GAFC consisted mainly of clerical training, maintenance of Church buildings, and arranging the yearly conference. An organized response to the crisis of Jewish refugees would have required a shift in ethos not provided for at that time. There were, however, unexplained aspects to GAFC decisions, such as the abrupt conclusion of the Refugee Relief Fund as it was gaining momentum. By this act, a developing reservoir of Free Christian interest was lost.

At the clerical level impetus developed out of personal commitment to the cause from a core few, some of who had high profile positions within the wider Free Christian movement. The factors that promoted such interest were varied including such things as previous involvement with refugees, such as the Basque children, friendship or family links with British Jews, membership of pacifist organizations, as well as humanitarian and religious impulses. All of these elements contributed in

115 12th Annual Report of the General Assembly for Unitarians and Free Christians (n. p.: London, 1940), 54. This was less than a tenth of monies raised by Quakers in similar time periods.
varying ways to sensitizing ministers to the specific plight of refugee Jews. Nor did ambivalence and even antipathy to Judaism and Jews prevent such clergy from becoming involved. In addition, many Unitarian ministers were conscious of Jewish suffering, and preached about the evils of antisemitism and the suffering of Jews.

In regards to Unitarian laity, assessment is still more difficult. Letters to The Inquirer, contributions to the refugee fund, and involvement in local committees certainly suggests a commitment to engage with the issue. A minority were opposed to aid for Jews and were clearly antisemitic, but these individuals were deemed as unrepresentative of Unitarian values of fraternity and charity. Others were more circumspect, but critical of Jews generally and unsympathetic to Jewish refugees who fled oppression and persecution in Germany and entered Palestine.

Refugee aid developed out of relief aid for Czech Unitarians and other Liberal Christians of the Czechoslovak Church. The Czech Relief Committee, created in late 1938 by the GAFC at the bidding of popular interest, received contributions and funneled these monies for work in Czechoslovakia. Ostensibly for the use of co-religionists, it was used in an unrestricted way, on a case by case basis. Thus, while Unitarians and Free Christians did not plan to rescue Jewish refugees from abroad as part of a policy initiative, Unitarians did give occasional aid on an ad hoc basis. British based aid developed mainly after the arrival of unaccompanied children on the Kindertransporte, sensitized by Czech work. Funds for work in Britain were raised at local Church level or were given as part of broader local initiatives when part of a Local Committee. In Britain, Unitarian laity contributed to the refugee cause through the network of Local Committees as well as acting as guarantors for a small number of Jewish children.

In comparison to the Quakers, a similar (though smaller sized) non-conformist movement, Unitarians were less involved despite having a shared commitment to social action and support for ‘freedoms’, both in the civil and religious spheres. This comparison, however, is partly unfair. Specific Quaker factors made aid by Friends more likely to be successful. Friends by the 1930s had nearly a hundred years experience in international aid, whereas Unitarians had next to none. Quakers had links in Germany and a network throughout Europe which could be used to the benefit of any rescue or relief efforts. Unitarian infrastructure abroad was much less developed and though it existed in areas of Europe such as Czechoslovakia, it did not have a base
in Germany. This is where the crisis began and prior to 1938 Unitarians did not see, in the immediate way that British Quakers based in Germany saw, the everyday brutalities and experiences of Jews and others targeted by the Nazi regime.

Quaker success and experience in fund raising, and the fact that their refugee/relief committee was backed at all levels of their organisation, was a key factor in their prodigious efforts. Quakers had the benefit of a highly organised, strongly centralized ‘government’ at the heart of their movement. Their rescue and relief committees were also funded in part from the central organisation. The Friends’ organizational and administrative structure, both in Britain and abroad, helped towards its success. Unitarians were much more decentralized, and despite the existence of the General Assembly, did not have extensive, well established organizational structures to deal with overseas aid and relief in Britain. The existing Unitarian committees were much more inward looking, even parochial, dealing with issues such as ministers’ salaries and education.

Quakers set out to aid groups they believed were less likely to find support elsewhere. As a result, Jewish refugees were not their priority and they became the champions of a particular group of ‘racially’ defined Christians known as the ‘non-Aryan’ Christians. Unitarians did not approach refugee policy in this way and while refugee work developed out of relief work for co-religionists, it was not bound to that. Czech based Unitarian workers did refer Jewish cases to Jewish refugee committees, but also retained some of these cases. They also aided political refugees and other Protestants as well as Catholics. The separation of ‘non-Aryan’ Christians from other Christians spoke of ‘racial’ differentiation and questioned the notion of a Universal Church. Unitarians did not raise or engage in this issue in the way other denominations, including the Quakers, and it is appears that refugees (Jewish, Christian and political) were aided on the basis of their refugee status rather than as discrete subgroups.

Help to a very small number of Jewish refugees both in Britain and abroad was achieved. Given that funds were extremely limited, Unitarians were only able to function effectively when joining forces with other refugee organisations abroad and at home. This work of individuals received the ‘blessing’ of the General Assembly, but was not backed by funds. Indeed the GAFC conversion of the Refugee Fund into an advisory committee as opposed to its maintenance as a fundraising body suggested that the General Assembly was out of step with its own membership on this issue.
CHAPTER 3
CHRISTADELPHIANS

Introduction

The Christadelphians are a small anti-trinitarian Christian fellowship of associations, originally known as the ‘Thomasites’ after their founder John Thomas (1805-1871) who began organizing ‘ecclesias’ (congregations) in the early 1840s. A British emigrant doctor living in New York, Thomas was first associated with Alexander Campbell (1788-1866) and his ‘Christian Church’ as a gifted preacher for nearly a decade. He split with the Campbellites in the mid 1840s on a point of doctrine, believing that baptism should only be granted to those who had read and understand the bible. Through his periodical, Herald of the Future Age, launched in 1846, Thomas began to spread his thought, travelling back and forth between Britain and America, founding ‘ecclesias’ or congregations of which the largest was based in Birmingham. The name ‘Christadelphian’, meaning ‘Christ’s Brethren’, was adopted during the American Civil War in order to justify exemption from military service on religious grounds, but more significantly, the name served as an alternative appellation to ‘Christian’ and in this way disassociated Christadelphians from the teachings and beliefs of mainstream Christianity, which were viewed as a form of apostasy.

Thomas declared his ‘new’ way as a return to the old ‘true’ faith and practices

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2 Some of the ideas and practices of the Campbellites (also known as the ‘Disciples of Christ’ or the ‘Christian Church’) are also found in Christadelphianism. The Disciples taught of the imminent second coming of Christ, took the ‘Bible only’ as their uniting creed, were lay oriented, and practiced adult baptism by immersion rather than affusion (pouring over the head; presbyterial form). They formed associations of independent societies and had an ultra-congregational polity following the New Testament form. They did not develop a separate ministry or subgroups with special duties (such as missionary societies). See Melton, Encyclopedia of American Religions, 100-101; Cross, A Revised Oxford Dictionary, 227, 409.
of the earliest disciples in the New Testament, one free of all the unnecessary and erroneous accretions of contemporary Christianity. The Bible was taken as inspired and infallible, with any discrepancies or contradictions due to transcription and translation errors. An anti-trinitarian stance was declared with the belief in one personal God. Hebrew prophecy is seen in terms of current and future events. Critical to Christadelphian thinking both then and now is God’s promise of Return and Restoration of Abraham’s descendants in the holy land as essential to the fulfilment of the ‘End Time’. At this juncture, Christadelphians believe the Kingdom of Israel will be re-established, Christ will appear visibly and return to reign at which point Jews will accept him as the Messiah. Jerusalem will then become the centre of a worldwide theocracy for a thousand years. Believers will be resurrected and judged, whilst the wicked are annihilated. The unconverted, the ignorant and infants are excluded from those to be raised from the dead. Salvation for non-Jews is only possible through the acceptance of Christadelphian doctrines, baptism by immersion, and humble good works. In this schema, there were and are three groups of peoples, Jews, Christadelphians and “aliens” (whether pagan, Christian or otherwise).

As events are seen in current terms, Christadelphians watch for signs of the coming Advent, correlating their interpretation of Bible prophecies and promises with contemporary happenings. Significantly, Christadelphians believed that Britain had a role to play in the ‘Restoration of the Jewish Nation’ to the ancestral land, so that during the 1930s British political policy in Palestine was followed avidly for signs indicating that the ‘End Time’ was at hand.

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3 Christadelphians, however, recognise Jesus as a ‘divine’ Messiah. Christadelphian christology is therefore not wholly Unitarian, (i.e., one that refutes the deity, divinity and pre-existence of Jesus). Christadelphians stress that Jesus was a mortal man, but also God (not Son of God) in the flesh. This topic caused a number of schisms within the Christadelphian movement. See Wilson, Sects and Society, 222-223.

4 “Only the Christadelphian together with the Jews have any hope of Resurrection”. Wilson, Sects and Society, 227, 233.

5 Michael Pragai, Faith and Fulfilment: Christians and the Return to the Promised Land (London: Vallentine and Mitchell, 1985), 21. While having a special role for Britain in their schema, Christadelphians are not adherents of the British Israelite theory that claims that the Anglo-Saxon peoples were descended from one of the ten Israelite tribes taken captive into Assyria. This late eighteenth century movement found success as a religious and emotional expression of British imperialism, and at its height in the 1930s and 1940s, found support even among people who would not normally have associated with the movement itself. To quote one Christadelphian on this point: “Christadelphians were not part of the preposterous nonsense that claimed the British and English speaking nations of the world as the ten tribes of Israel”. Brother Yockney,
Christadelphian attitudes to Jews and Judaism are based on their understanding of the covenants made to Jews through Moses at Sinai (identifying the Hebrews as God’s chosen people) and Abraham (the promise of the land in perpetuity to his descendants) and their relation to these covenants. Christadelphians believe that through baptism they become equal heirs to the covenant and are able to share in the eternal possession of the land when the divine kingdom is established on earth. Indeed, Christadelphians see themselves as the ‘new Israelites’ because they are ‘faithful’ to the Gospel, whereas ‘the Jews’ have ‘failed’ to keep the law or recognise Jesus. Even so, God’s promises were made to Jews and apply to Christadelphians only through adoption; therefore they see their fate as intimately bound up with the destiny of Jews. The return to Palestine of Jews and the establishment of a modern Jewish state is a precondition of Christ’s return. Only when there is a Jewish State created by Jewish believers can Jesus return to rule over this eternal kingdom at which point Jews will finally recognise him as the Messiah and Christadelphians will share in the thousand years of ‘blessedness’. Christadelphians believe they can aid this process by helping in the return of Jews to the Holy Land through making contributions to Jewish resettlement costs. In the 1930s the pages of The Christadelphian attested to this support in the form of donations to the Jewish Colonization Trust.

It should be noted that the Christadelphians are a sect as opposed to a church or denomination. As a group they reject both the established Catholic and Protestant

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7 Wilson, *Sects and Society*, 227. The notion that Christians replace – supercede - Jews as ‘the chosen’ because of their acknowledgement of Jesus as Messiah (and Jewish rejection of this claim) is termed ‘supercessionalist’. Christadelphians may not be seen themselves as such, but their theological schema indicates adherence to supercessionalism.


10 The Jewish Colonization Trust was a Zionist banking organisation. It was founded in 1899 by a decision of the Zionist Congress and was renamed the Anglo-Palestine bank in 1902. It aimed to help with settlement costs of Jews in Palestine. Christadelphians sent quarterly contributions averaging £40 to £50 in the 1930s, see: section II for more detail.

11 A religious sect is defined by its relationship with the wider society from within which it develops. It usually arises as a protest against the prevailing religious orthodoxy or against secular culture
religious authorities and claim to follow the authentic elements of the apostolic Christian faith based on a special exegesis of the Hebrew and Christian scriptures developed by their founder. The 'Brothers of Christ' are exclusive and membership is conditional on an understanding and agreement with the group's teachings. Votaries are bound by strict rules of conduct and loyalty, departure from which brings 'disfellowship' or excommunication. Allegiances to the wider community are discouraged and members associate mainly with each other. Christadelphians view the civic culture with disdain and suspicion, they do not vote or take part in politics, nor do they hold civil office in national or local government. As declared conscientious objectors they do not serve in police forces nor enlist in armies.

The Christadelphian community has no ordained clergy or lay workers, nor does it have a central bureaucracy to raise its funds or generate policy; instead, it is a fellowship of loosely bound local groups known as ecclesias. Each assembly is independent and autonomous. The sect is strictly patriarchal; women do not serve in any capacity. Functions are divided among the baptized men of the ecclesia and it is not unknown for a brother to hold a post for life. These assemblies, open only to Christadelphians, meet weekly to study the Bible, break bread, and worship.

As need arises, local Christadelphian committees are formed in order to raise funds or provide assistance for a specific project. In addition to this, announcements are placed in magazines published within the community to inform the worldwide

and seeks to reject and separate itself from society. Christadelphians are defined as a revolutionist sect because of the emphasis they place on God's part in overcoming evil by total war. Jehovah's Witnesses are similarly classified. Both groups await the establishment of a theocratic kingdom in which they will play prominent (Christadelphians along side Jews) or the only (Jehovah's Witnesses) role(s); unbelievers and enemies of God all having been destroyed. For classifications of sects see: Bryan Wilson, "Sect," in A. Richardson and J. Bowden, eds. A New Dictionary of Christian Theology (London: SCM, 1983) 532.

Lippy, Christadelphians, 246-248.

Christadelphians are often compared to the Friends, but they are not pacifists nor conscientious objectors in the Quaker sense. Christadelphians ascribe a role for war in their thinking, that is, divinely imposed for sin whereas Quakers seek to rid the world of war, a manmade response to unresolved conflict. Christadelphians do not serve in the army because they cannot serve 'another' master, i.e. the State as they owe their primary allegiance to God. Peter Watkins, War and Politics: The Christian's Duty (Birmingham: Christadelphian Bible Mission, n.d).


There are three main sets of administrative posts within the ecclesia: "arranging brethren" (management of ecclesia), "presiding brethren" (religious life), "examining brethren" (overseeing conversions). The other positions are: "recording brother" (secretary) and "finance brother"
brotherhood that a committee requesting funds has been established. This notice will
detail the type of work the committee expects to carry out and an address where
donations can be sent. Contributions are generally financial but also take the form of
supplies or manpower. As ad hoc bodies develop for a particular purpose, these
committees are not official representatives of the entire body of Christadelphians.
Often they are the enterprise of a single individual or a small group of people who see
the necessity for action and initiate a committee to meet that purpose, disbanding once
the crisis has been met.¹⁶

*Birmingham Central Fellowship as an unofficial ‘centre’*

Since the start of the movement in Britain, Birmingham has played a dominant
role within the wider community and overseas. Historically, this city was the area
where the first ecclesias were established and it remained a focus for ecclesias in the
surrounding areas because of Birmingham’s role as a publishing centre for
Christadelphian works.¹⁷ Ecclesias throughout the world in fellowship with
Birmingham Central look to it for leadership and guidance, so that the opinions of the
ecclesia’s leading brothers are treated with consideration and even deference. In
theory, this community has no more power than any other ecclesia and cannot force
the adoption of its views nor sanction individual Christadelphians or ecclesias if they
deviate from its opinions. Even so, it acts as a kind of unofficial ‘final authority’
deferred to by those Christadelphians within (Amended) and even outside
(Unamended) of the fellowship.¹⁸

¹⁶ Leslie Morrell-Norwood, “The Christadelphian Response to Nazi anti-Jewish policy of WWII”
(Unpublished paper, Brandeis University, Waltham, Mass., USA, 15 May 1996), 1.
Christadelphians do not believe in working to ameliorate social injustice in the way that other
Christian groups such as the Quakers. Post-baptismal life on earth before the Advent, however, is a
testing time and ‘good works’ are essential to ensure a place at the End Time. This action is carried
out at a local level without publicity and does not involve political lobbying. See Lippy,
*Christadelphians*, 170.

¹⁷ As well as the publication of the *Christadelphian*, this office was responsible for the reprinting of
the founder’s many works and texts by other leading Christadelphians such as Robert Roberts. It
also printed a range of pamphlets on biblical figures and leaflets on Christadelphian views on
various issues such as war, suffering, and other issues.

Birmingham adopted an amendment to the Statement of Faith drawn up by Robert Roberts
defining who would be resurrected for final judgement more precisely. Those who accepted his
position (as did most) became the Amended Christadelphians and those that did not were known as
The Central Fellowship is also 'in charge' of producing the main 'official organ' of Amended Christadelphians, *The Christadelphian*. As editor, a brother could wield enormous influence by determining what was included or excluded from the journal. This religious periodical appeared monthly. It was and remains strongly scriptural, carrying articles on various biblical characters or events supplemented with commentary and links to Christadelphian interpretation. News from ecclesias in Britain and worldwide is carried alongside notices of meetings, lectures and other announcements and in this way members are kept in touch with their co-religionists. Historians argue that this journal has been crucial for maintaining Christadelphian cohesion and for informing adherents of news and ecclesial activities.

A significant part of the Christadelphian is devoted to monitoring world events, especially as they relate to the position of Jews throughout the world. Reports of Jewish persecution in Russia and Germany dominated reports in the journal's pages during the 1930s and drew heavily on accounts in the *Manchester Guardian, Jewish Chronicle* and *The Times*. Supplementing these reports were accounts relating to Palestine, focusing on Jewish settlement rates and the advancement of infrastructure; these were all interpreted as 'signs' indicating progress towards the development of a Jewish nation state.

*Historiography*

As committed Adventists who look to the immanent Second Coming, Christadelphians are less interested in recording their own history than other denominations and churches. Their standard books remain the exposition of the bible the Unamended. Rugby ecclesia, discussed in the course of this chapter, was 'in fellowship' with Birmingham and had accepted the Statement of Faith.

*The Christadelphian* describes itself as: "A monthly magazine dedicated wholly to the Hope of Israel arising out of covenants made by God with Abraham and David, renewed in promise to the prophets, and finally 'made known to all nations' in the faith of Christ preached by the Apostles which is herein illustrated in opposition to the dogmas of Papal and Protestant Christendom". During the 1930s it was edited by C. C. Walker from 1898 to 1937 and by John Carter from 1937. For *The Christadelphian* as an 'official organ'; see Wilson, *Sects and Society*, 247.

Indeed, Wilson argued that "Whoever controlled the magazine would virtually control the movement... In practice they [the various editors] were leaders of the movement". See, Wilson, *Sects and Society*, 276-277. From this one could argue that if the editor's support was forthcoming for a specific cause, his stamp of authority would encourage other Christadelphians throughout the fellowship to act accordingly. This idea will be developed further in the main chapter.

Wilson, *Sects and Society*, 247.
by their founder, John Thomas. This is supplemented by books authored by Robert Roberts (1839-1898) who worked with Thomas and became the unofficial but effective ‘leader’ of Christadelphians in Britain until the 1890s. Robert Roberts wrote *Christendom Astray from the Bible* in 1862, which became a classic monograph of Christadelphian doctrines. It remains in print to this day alongside Roberts’ biography of Dr. Thomas. Any ‘history’ of the movement, by the movement itself, is limited to these works complemented by reprints of ‘classical’ expositions of particular scriptural passages.

As the Christadelphians do not encourage outside scrutiny, there is also a limited material on the history of this community written by non-Christadelphians. Bryan Wilson’s groundbreaking sociological study of three sects including the Christadelphians has provided the most exhaustive study of this community to date. Carried out in the 1950s, it provides a wealth of information on the history, belief system, and organisation of Christadelphians in Britain. This study is essential reading for an understanding of the workings of the fellowship and their weltanschauung. Wilson’s study required lengthy immersion in the life of the sect and participation in the activities of the community, and is a considerable achievement bearing in mind the insular nature of this particular group. As a sociological study, Wilson looked at the doctrinal and philosophical basis of the sect in relation to the social groups from which the sect attracted its adherents to examine whether social practices reflected the “social and psychological desiderata” of the members. While Wilson’s conclusions in this respect lie outside the reach of this study, his approach to the group provides a solid historical background to the founding of the sect and its theological schema. His investigation concentrated on one particular fellowship (known as the Central Ecclesia Fellowship) based in Birmingham, the ‘focus’ and unacknowledged ‘centre’

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23 Bryan Wilson, *Sects and Society: A Sociological study of Three Religious Groups in Britain* (London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1961). The Christadelphians constitute part three of his study. Five chapters cover the teachings, history, organisation, social teachings and social composition of this sect, pp. 219-345. I am indebted to Wilson for my understanding of this group. The other groups included in this study are the Elim Foursquare Gospel Church and the Christian Scientists.

24 Wilson, *Sects and Society*, 5.
of Christadelphianism in Britain. In the 1930s most ecclesias were ‘in fellowship’ with Birmingham having agreed with its Statement of Faith. Thus, this ecclesia has relevance both to the movement as a whole and to other ecclesias in this study. Wilson also illustrated how the sect had successfully maintained its distinctive ethic over time changing little in mission or organisation from its inception.

Charles Lippy’s work traces the development of the Christadelphians in Britain and their spread to North America. The subsequent and continual interchanges between the two communities divided by the Atlantic up to the present (1980s) are also documented. His monograph traces the group’s early foundation and concludes that the sects unique ‘structure’ has sustained the group, enabling it to maintain its early beliefs and ‘organisation’ without the transition to denomination or church. Lippy spends some time detailing the early life of John Thomas, his journey from committed Calvinist to the founder of a new sect in America, his travels to Britain and the creation of ecclesias in and around Birmingham. The book also highlights the influence of the Birmingham Central fellowship throughout the wider Christadelphian community in Britain and beyond. The part it plays in the dissemination of Christadelphian material world wide has meant that Birmingham is seen by many within and outside of England as an unofficial ‘headquarters’. Thus, despite being a study of North American Christadelphianism, this book is a substantial source for the history of Christadelphians in Britain.

In common with Unitarians and Methodists, little is written about Christadelphian action for refugees in the twentieth century, with the few references to such activity appearing in passim. There are two sources that provide some important information. The first is a reproduction of an internal report summarizing Christadelphian work from 1938-1942 in a book on Kindertransporte recollections.

Lippy, Christadelphians in North America.

This demonstrated the enduring nature of this particular sect in the face of theories on sects which suggests that once the first generation had passed, in order to survive into the second, the sect is forced to developed centralized structures and positions of authority to sustain it.

This account outlines the work of R. Alan Overton, a Christadelphian based in Rugby, who coordinated the placement of refugee children in Christadelphian homes throughout Britain from late 1938. With the aid of the Rugby ecclesia and funds from Christadelphians around the country, he also opened the first Christadelphian hostel for Jewish boys in 1939. Another home opened a year later in Edgbaston organised through the efforts of the Birmingham and Coventry ecclesias. Written in the middle of 1942, Overton's summary gives an overview of Christadelphian involvement in the refugee crisis and the reactions of the fellowship to the emergency. The second source is a brief two-part BBC radio programme aired in 1996 providing further reminiscences of refugees and anecdotes by members of the Overton family connected with rescue and relief work in Rugby. This is a valuable source as it gives the perspective of both those aided as well as the experience of a family affected by the efforts of an aid worker. An estimate of the numbers assisted is also suggested.

Sources

Gaining access to Christadelphian material was more difficult than obtaining comparative information on other groups in this study for a number of reasons. Firstly, the structure and organisation of the congregations within the wider Christadelphian fellowship does not support a centralized record keeping system. Congregations are independent and records (if any) are kept on an entirely local basis. Religious outlook also affect the likelihood of preserved records. The sincere belief in the immanent coming of the millennia makes record keeping more or less unnecessary in the eyes of some Christadelphians. Moreover, as the only judge of actions on earth is God, earthly kudos or criticism have little interest or meaning when viewed in these terms. Lastly, as a sect, Christadelphians remain a closed group, extremely wary of outside interest in their activities. These considerations apart, it was possible to locate enough material to study the response of this group. Permission to look at a privately

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29 Liz Taylor, "Afternoon Shift," on BBC Radio 4, 6 and 7 November 1996. Taylor is a relation of Overton and the report is somewhat eulogic. Taylor estimates 250 individuals were aided.
30 Unitarian churches are also congregational in polity and independently maintain their own records. Information, however, is sent to Essex House, the official headquarters of the Unitarian movement.
held collection of papers relating to a Christadelphian refugee committee was central to this ability. This store of papers is not simply a record of the local committee’s work in Rugby, it is also a source of information on Christadelphian activity throughout Britain, the Movement for the Care of Children from Germany, and a record of the work of other local non-Christadelphian committees.  

Another essential source for this period is *The Christadelphian*. As was already highlighted, those ecclesias in fellowship with Birmingham (as were the majority included in this study) used this as a way of keeping in touch with other Christadelphian ecclesias. It was also through the section on “Jews and Zionism” that readers were alerted and informed of the treatment of Jews under Nazism in Germany as well as given news on the progression of state building in Palestine.

Wilson suggests that in the 1950s there were approximately 20,000 Christadelphians throughout Britain, split between 267 Amended ecclesias, with a geographical concentration mainly in the Midlands. Allowing for post-war decline which was suffered by most non-conformist groups, it is estimated that there were a slightly larger number than this in the 1930s. On this basis, Christadelphian membership figures lie between Quaker numbers of approximately 20,000 and Unitarian estimates of 25,000 adherents for that same period.

I: INITIAL REACTIONS TO JEWS IN GERMANY; 1933-1937

Introduction

When considering a Christian response to the deteriorating international situation in the early 1930s and Germany’s part in that decline, Unitarians, Methodists and Anglicans agonized over what that reaction should be: pacifist or pacificist, conciliatory or critical. Denominational papers ran consecutive editions debating

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31 Access to the archive is granted through the family of R. A. Overton, and material is consulted at the family home. The records are kept in over twenty boxes in varying condition. The collection, as a rare example of a specifically Christadelphian refugee committee, is unique, but its wider uses as a ‘local’ committee record makes the collection as valuable for this purpose. Many regional committees were created ‘overnight’ and dissolved just as quickly when the need passed and their records were lost or destroyed.

32 Wilson, *Sects and Society*, 296.
these points and assemblies and yearly conferences were dominated by these topics. These issues became so contentious within Methodism that there was a danger the movement might be split into two irreconcilable wings. Within the Quaker movement, the focus was slightly different but no less divisive. As avowed pacifists it was clear where Quakers stood in the debate. What divided Quakers was how vocal their criticism should be of the Nazi regime. Should it be public and outspoken, given in the ‘hand of friendship’, or should it be dispensed ‘behind the scenes’ in lobbying – a traditional Quaker modus operandi? Christadelphians had none of these concerns and for them the issue was almost irrelevant. They were conscientious objectors on the grounds that serving any structure created by temporal authorities was in contravention to their belief in being answerable to God, their sole master. Thus, in radical contrast to their fellow Christians, they did not debate issues of ‘War and Peace’ nor did they engage in impassioned arguments about the morality of a pacifist or a pacificist stance. Moreover, as the Nazi regime targeted Jews and other groups, the focus of the Christadelphians did not change. Whereas other denominations were concerned by the position of the German Confessing Church, it was only mentioned in passim amongst Christadelphians. The complicated position of ‘non-Aryan’ Christians, which generated little enough interest within the wider Christian community until late 1937, had no relevance to Christadelphians at any point. From the Christadelphian perspective, ‘non-Aryan’ Christians were Christian in the same way as other Christians, and therefore considered in this light; they were not regarded as Jews as they were in other parts of the Christian community, but nor were they seen as ‘fellow’ Christians, as Christians themselves were viewed as ‘suspect’. Only news on the situation as it affected Jews was of concern to Christadelphians and these developments were tracked closely.

Christadelphian responses to the plight of German Jews

In April 1933, as accounts of persecution began to amass, Brother C. A. Ladson (1871-1939) in the Christadelphian, pointed out to readers that there was enough antisemitic outrages to make “the 600,000 Jews of Germany go in terror of their lives.” Nazi actions were creating a mass refugee movement and many Jews
were “in flight and are homeless”. Using biblical references to stress the predicament of the German Jews, he compared present-day Germany to Moab, with Hitler as Balak. In the Hebrew scriptures, Balak, King of the Moabites, had invoked Balaam (an Aramean Prophet) to curse the Israelites as they encamped in Moab before entering the Promised Land. Balaam, instead, inspired by God, decided to bless them. Using the bible as reference to explain current and future events, Christadelphians saw the situation in Germany as essentially transitory, believing that God would eventually thwart the evil actions of Hitler’s Nazi Germany and ‘the Jews’ would then be saved. As circumstances progressed, different passages were identified as explaining the situation in Germany and foreseeing their outcome. Ladson wrote in June that,

> We read with disgust and horror, but not amazement, of the persecution of Jews, and see in it the fulfilment of the words of God spoken by Moses . . . [that] “The Lord shall scatter thee among all people from the one end of earth to the other . . . and among these nations shalt thou find no peace, and thy life shall hang in doubt before thee and thou shalt fear day and night and have none assurance of thy life.”

Thus, for Christadelphians, the current trials of ‘the Jews’ were prophesized, as was their fate as refugees.

Whereas other Christian denominations downplayed the experiences of Jews under the new German regime to a certain extent and continually required further (non-Jewish) corroborative evidence, Christadelphians were in no doubt that Jews were suffering. “There is no escape from the conviction of the truth of the atrocities associated with the anti-Jewish campaign of the Nazi government. The evidence is too detailed and circumstantial, its volume too great, to leave any doubt”. Brethren believed this destiny was revealed in the bible. The fate of Jews was to suffer and eventually to be redeemed.

The Jewish communal response in Britain was also watched with keen

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Ladson was born in Victoria, Australia and settled in Britain in 1904. He wrote the ‘Jews and Zionism’ section of the *Christadelphian* from 1907 until 1939. He was a prominent member of the Birmingham Central ecclesia. Ladson helped co-ordinate financial contributions for Jewish refugees received from readers of the journal.


interest. By August 1933, Ladson could report to readers that nearly £160,000 had been collected by the Central British Fund for German Jewry (CBF) for refugees. A protest meeting had also been staged in June at Queens Hall attended by the Archbishop of Canterbury and Lord Reading. While these actions would ameliorate the position of some Jewish refugees, it was believed that the general situation could not be radically altered by human intervention. Christadelphians believed that Jewish suffering at the hands of the Nazis was pre-ordained and would eventually encourage Jews to return to Palestine. With that movement the Advent would be nearer.

As winter came however, and the outrages continued, there was a move away from explanatory biblical references to reporting the cost of Nazi actions at an individual level. Recounting the experience of one particular individual, Ladson reported how a Jewish shopkeeper had been attacked for not selling Nazi badges, but also explained that it was illegal for him to sell them as he was a Jew. Following his beating, he managed to obtain a small stock and was set upon by a different set of Nazis on the grounds that he was breaking the law. Ladson remarked, "Space fails, apart from any other reasons, to give even a bald list of the outrages and murders suffered by the Jews of Germany". That said, he appended several pages of excerpts from the Jewish Chronicle and reputable dailies to illustrate more incidents.

Looking for news that this distress would eventually produce a more 'positive' outcome in line with Christadelphian thinking, Brother Bilton's report of his travels in America came as a welcome release. Attending a theatrical fundraising event for German Jewry in New York, Bilton declared that the political situation in Germany had created "A wonderful impetus to indifferent and liberal Jews in America towards Palestine". Proceeds from the event would be used by American Jews to encourage German Jewish refugees to settle in the Holy Land. Two main themes emerged from this report; the first is a leitmotif that appears in later articles, that of Jewish 'superiority' expressed in the authors' statement that "only the Jewish race" could have staged such a successful extravaganza. The second motif is a modification of this exceptional characterization whereby liberal Jews and by extension other non-

orthodox Jews, e.g., secular non-practicing Jews were seen as ‘lesser’ examples of Jewry. Bilton argued that the current treatment of Jews in Germany was a “punishment” for “unscrupulous Jews” and where, by accident, orthodox Jews—“those of the faithful”—bore the brunt of Nazi actions, it would be Germany who would be punished. Thus it seemed that liberal and secular non-practicing Jews were seen by Christadelphians as less deserving of God’s mercy and that the crisis would bring them back to orthodoxy.

Seeking to explain how German attacks on Jews had continued for two years, and had intensified over this period, Ladson reminded Christadelphians that while Germany “seemed mighty” as it crushed a minority of Jews, “it will be found that [it] is no match for the ‘sword of the Lord and of Gideon’.” Where Gideon had defeated the Midianites near Ein Harod, so too would Jews eventually win out at Armageddon. Nazi actions appeared unstoppable, but they would be an eventual reckoning in which the wicked would be punished: “It is no good Germania! . . . Did Amalek fare better than Egypt? Did Moab prevail over Israel? . . . What befell Hamman the Agagite?” To all these in the end there will be “the war of the great day of God Almighty” when Germany would be punished for her actions.

Reports about the Jewish experience under Nazism were either reported and interpreted in a way meaningful to Christadelphians, that is with corresponding biblical passages and how they related to the Advent, or as narrative whereby excerpts from the Jewish Chronicle or the Manchester Guardian were used to inform readers

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40 Percy Bilton refers to the fact that at one point there were 6,000 people on an indoor stage all at once. The author indicated that this ability was due to the fact that they were Jewish. While the phraseology ‘unscrupulous Jews’ has been generally used by antisemites to refer to ‘unethical’ trading activities by Jews, in this context, I believe that the writer is using it to refer to secular, non-practicing and Liberal Jews. Orthodox Jews are referred to as “those of the faithful” and will be punished. This is an example of ‘some Jews are better than others’, a theme will appear intermittently throughout. See: Percy Bilton, “The romance of a people,” The Christadelphian 70 (1 December 1933): 555-556.

41 From Judges vii, 14, 18, 20, King James Version.

42 C. A. Ladson, “Jews and Zionism,” The Christadelphian 72 (1 March 1935): 124. The biblical passages are in order: Exodus xvii, Numbers, xxii-xxiv and Revelations, xvi.14. In Exodus xvii, 8-16, Amalek (son of Eliphaz and a descendant of Esau), the leader of the Amalekites goes to war against the Israelites. Moses inspired by God, helps Joshua and his army prevail over the Amalekites. In Numbers xxii-xxiv, as discussed before, Balak intended to destroy the Israelites with the aid of Balaam. Balak’s plans were thwarted when Balaam decided to help them instead. Hamman the Agagite attempted to destroy Jews throughout Persia, but was himself destroyed instead. This defeat is celebrated in the Jewish festival of Purim. Revelations xvi,14 refers to the invasion of all the armies of the world in the Holy Land for a last great battle - Armageddon —
of events and occurrences. In these cases virtually no commentary was provided by the journal’s writers. This dual approach meant that Christadelphians received information about life in Germany as it affected Jews from both a religious and secular point of view, but it also made it difficult to discern, except through inference, what Christadelphian views were on a particular episode when biblical passages were omitted. As an example of this, Ladson briefly responded to the passage of the Nuremberg Laws with the comment that “the Jews of Germany are now legally declared to be a race of ‘untouchables’ and friendship with the Hebrew is styled ‘racial desecration’.” The passage suggests regret and disapproval of Germany’s action, but direct criticism of Germany is absent. This contrasted with Methodist, Unitarian and Quaker writers who invoked their brethren to rally against bigotry and antisemitism. Christadelphians approached this issue differently. Instead, they saw this situation as part of an inevitable and expected ‘outworking’ of God’s plan, following the prophecies as laid down in the bible. As time went on and there appeared no likely let up, the paper began to reduce its coverage following the trend of other denominational and dailies. In doing this, Ladson expressed sadly that “It is not for want of material that news of the treatment of the Jews in Germany grows less in these columns” but rather it was for fear that “Writers and readers alike would weary of the repetition.” Not all ‘out-workings’ of prophecies were immediately comfortable, even if it was understood by the faithful that in the end things would improve.

The situation altered in December 1936 when the journal’s annual review contrasted the wider community’s view of the world situation - bleak and preparing for war - with the Christadelphian outlook; “the watchman of Zion” were “yet full of cheer”. As Britain rebuilt her airforce as a defence against aggressors this proved that the prophecies indicating Armageddon and the Second Advent were closer to hand:

Aerial developments are a very prominent sign . . . They are connected with ‘the vials of the wrath of God’ the last of which is poured out ‘into the air’ . . . In these predictions we see the preparation for the fulfilment of the gathering of all nations to battle . . . and the news of the appearance of a NEW POWER in the earth will be quickly known by all the inhabitants on the earth.45

In regard to “the Jewish Nation” through which “the mightiest influence over the human family” had come, Christadelphians could be less concerned because despite his present trials, “the Jew has outlived all his conquerors and persecutors, and walks unscathed amid the general wreck”. In fact, one only had to recall Jewish history to be full of hope for the future of this people: “Dispersions has failed to disintegrate them; captivity has failed to denationalize them; persecution has failed to exterminate them... the Jew walks the earth to-day a living fulfilment of prophecies uttered thousands of years ago.” Yet, it was also clear that the ‘scornful rejection’ of the “prophet of Nazareth” left Jews in the Diaspora and Jerusalem unclaimed as the capital of a Jewish theocratic state ruled over by Jesus. In the eyes of Christadelphians, Jews were therefore partly responsible for their current predicament and only their ‘Return’ and ultimate ‘recognition’ of Jesus could help their situation.

**Proselytizing campaigns by Christadelphians**

For the Second Advent to come about, Christadelphians believed that Jews needed to return to the Promised Land. For the Kingdom of God on earth, Jews would also have to realise that Jesus was the Messiah. A report in the November issue of the *Christadelphian* provided a way for less observant Jews to ‘bypass’ the need for return. Jews could progress to eternal life by becoming Christadelphians. “A gesture of goodwill to the Jewish Community has been shown in the visit of the Christadelphians to Stepney” where Mr. W. E. English had organised three lectures on “The Divine Purpose of the Jews”. English together with other members of the Auxiliary Lecturing Society canvassed Jewish houses in the neighbourhood, with the result that of the 200 strong audience “a good proportion” were Jewish, the remainder

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554. John Carter was sub-editor of this journal until Sept 1937, and editor thereafter. The biblical references are stated as Joel, iii. 2; Zechariah, xiv. 2; Revelations, xvi. 14. Joel iii, talks of God’s purpose to judge the oppressors of Israel when he gathers all the nations in the valley of Jehoshaphat, i.e. ‘Final Judgement’. Zechariah, xiv, 2 is interpreted by Christians as signifying the coming of the Messiah in the form of Christ. Revelations, xvi, 14, as before; see footnote 42. H.L. Hastings, “The Jewish Nation,” *The Christadelphian* 74 (1 April 1937): 159. Jews are portrayed by Hastings as both ‘superhuman’ (mightiest intellectual forces) and flawed (have not accepted Jesus) echoing Bilton’s earlier characterizations. Christadelphians see God’s selection of Jews as his ‘chosen’ people as conferring superiority and favour. Jews understand chosen-ness in a completely different way; that is, in terms of terms of duty and responsibility to learn and live by the Torah.

46. Jews are portrayed by Hastings as both ‘superhuman’ (mightiest intellectual forces) and flawed (have not accepted Jesus) echoing Bilton’s earlier characterizations. Christadelphians see God’s selection of Jews as his ‘chosen’ people as conferring superiority and favour. Jews understand chosen-ness in a completely different way; that is, in terms of terms of duty and responsibility to learn and live by the Torah.
being Christadelphians from other London branches in Brixton, Ilford, Walthamstow and Tooting. The organizers of the lecture series stated in an interview with a *Jewish Chronicle* reporter that this was not part of a proselytizing campaign (despite the fact that only Jews were invited) nor were there any “overtures of a conversionist nature”; rather, Christadelphians simply wanted to alert Jews to the biblical prophecies: “the present world struggles, social, political, religious, have been indicated by the prophets as showing that the setting up of the Kingdom of God, under the Messiah, with the Jews as the premier nation”. Christadelphians wanted to assure their Jewish audience of their support for Return: “We think peace and prosperity can come to the world only through the return of the Jews to Palestine. Jerusalem and not Geneva will solve the world’s problems”.

Despite their assertion to the *Jewish Chronicle* reporter that there would be no attempt to proselytize, further information about the lecture series included in the December issue of the *Christadelphian* painted another perspective to Christadelphian intentions. Written by F. E. Mitchell, it gave the background to the lecturing initiative. It had arisen out of conversations between a Brother living next door to a Jew. The Jewish neighbour had been “delighted to find a people who were interested in the Jewish prophets and asked that an opportunity should be given to others of his race to hear these things”. In response a series of talks was arranged. At the first lecture in the series a good supply of literature was provided and was “almost all exhausted”. Having met with such success, other addresses were planned and it was hoped that they too would illicit a similar response. The only concern would be what would happen “when we begin to advocate the claims of Jesus of Nazareth as the Jewish Messiah”, but for the moment “interest has been aroused, and we pray that good may result from efforts through our Father’s blessing”. While the preceding lecturers had looked at the prophetic promise of the land to the Jews and had reviewed the

47 “Christadelphians Among the Jews,” *The Christadelphian* 74 (1 December 1937): 559. In many cases, articles in *The Christadelphian* are not attributed to a specific author. Where an author is given, this is stated. The Auxiliary Lecturing Society (ALS) was a special group of Brothers within each ecclesia dedicated to proselytizing activities. These lectures were reported neutrally in the *Jewish Chronicle*: “Faith in Israel’s Revival: The Christadelphians’ Belief,” *Jewish Chronicle*, 12 November 1937, p. 38. The unnamed reporter questioned ALS members on whether the programme sought conversion candidates; this was denied. Similarly, the following week “Christadelphians and Palestine Prophecy.” *Jewish Chronicle*, 12 November 1937, p. 28. “There was a large attendance of Christadelphians . . . [and] a sprinkling of local Jewish residents”. 132
current schemes for settlement of Jewish refugees, the last of the series would be on
“What Christadelphians believe and teach”. Indeed, as a result of the East End
“effort” by the Auxiliaries Lecturing Society, Bible classes were now being held in
Mile End Library with

an average attendance of ten interested friends, three of whom, of the Jewish faith,
attended regularly, some having given evidence that the seed sown had found root.
We pray it may find good soil and ‘spring up into everlasting life’.

Moreover, “a fresh series of lectures is being arranged in April which we trust will
arouse further interest among the Jews”. It was apparent that despite their
protestations to the contrary, members of the Auxiliary Lecturing Society were
engaged in proselytizing activities in the East End of London, actively pursuing Jews
in the hope they would become Christadelphians.

II: RESPONDING TO JEWISH REFUGEES, 1938-1939

Raising Funds

Since the 1870s the office of the Christadelphian had traditionally collected
funds which were donated to Jewish charities that aimed to help distressed or refugee
Jews establish themselves in Palestine. Following the Jewish communities
fundraising activities in Britain, Ladson informed readers that the Central British Fund
(CBF) had raised £155,720. Though this amount was considerable, the crisis
required more funds. After Anschluss with Austria, he notified Christadelphians that
between the incorporation of Austria into the Reich and 15 April 1938, a further
£94,592 had been raised by the CBF, yet Jewish refugee committees were struggling
to meet refugee needs. This information was carried with the further news that
desperate Jews were committing suicides at the rate of hundreds a day. In July

51 In the 1930s, annual contributions of £200 to £300 were sent to the Jewish Colonization Trust:
Wilson, Sects and Society, 261. There are references to regular donations made to the Trust in
intermittent issues, for example: Donation to Jewish Colonial Trust for £40. 15s., “being
contributions of readers for the relief of persecuted and distressed Jews, to help their resettlement
in Palestine”. Cheque for £49.10s. 5d. “for the relief of distressed Jews, particularly in Palestine”,
1938, Ladson reported that there had been round-ups of as many as 6000 Jews throughout the Reich and included further illustrations of the daily experiences of Jews under Nazism in both Germany and Austria. In response to these reports, contributions to the Anglo-Palestine Bank doubled and July’s remittance of £109 was recorded in the August edition.

Christadelphians were both appalled by and resigned to the position of European Jewry under Nazism. Though affected by the suffering of Jews, they saw these events through the perspective of a religious worldview. Each event was tracked in terms of an unfolding plan and analyzed along these lines. The deepening crisis in Europe and the Munich crisis in particular, was taken as another sign of the ‘end of days’. The lead up to the agreement was painstakingly followed in the Christadelphian, further illustrating that “The truth is that Armageddon is definitely nearer than a month ago”. Moreover, the commission of a new royal boat, the Queen Mary on 27 September 1938, was dubbed “Another ship of Tarshish”, recalling Jonah’s escape as a refugee in a ship bound for the port of that name. It was hoped that this new boat might “yet have the distinction of being put to noble use in the service of the King of Kings in bringing Zion’s sons from far to the name of the Lord of Hosts”. Signs were everywhere, Christadelphians needed to be alert to them, follow and wait.

The issue of Jewish suffering in the Reich increasingly returned to the forefront. In November 1938, Brother Cowlishaw, responding to the notices on behalf of “Jacob’s Trouble”, informed his fellow brethren that his ecclesia in Rugby had decided to give their quarterly offering to this purpose. He added his voice to the appeal

to all individuals and ecclesias to make a great effort to assist the poor Jews, who are homeless and have no certain dwelling place, and are in want of everything in thousands of cases, ‘a number which is increasing daily’. We who have reaped spiritual things through their unbelief and custodianship of God’s Word will desire to do all that we can to minister to their needs. This is good and acceptable in the sight of God.

58 “Intelligence section,” The Christadelphian 75 (1 November 1938): 518. The other groups of this study also reduced their reporting of antisemitism in Germany at this time. Christadelphians, however maintained a higher degree of interest and dissemination of information than other
Cowlishaw wished to assist, but his call to help Jewish refugees was tempered by comments that both recognised Jewish trusteeship of the Hebrew scriptures and, conversely, criticized Jewish adherence to Judaism.

Requests from brethren and sisters, as well as from Recording Brethren around the country, had reached such a pitch by December 1938 that Ladson announced the intention of the Christadelphian Office to forward contributions for German Jewish refugees, as well as the usual donations to the Anglo-Palestine Bank. In Ladson’s consideration, the solution to the current situation confirmed the need for universal government, but in the “meanwhile, the terrible lot of a persecuted race calls for what amelioration other peoples can give”. Alerting brethren and sisters to the appeal of Lord Baldwin, he announced that “this provides a channel in particular through which help can be given without hesitation”. Any money sent in would be allocated “to the Fund for Refugee Children and also to the Fund for the Relief of German Jewry, in such proportions as seem best”. Christadelphians as “Israel after the spirit” would be involved in this cause because “we are of ‘the commonwealth of Israel’ by our union with Jesus Christ, and sympathy with the ‘Jew natural’.” The decision of the Birmingham Central ecclesia to follow Rugby’s lead and take a specific collection for the Refugee Relief Fund was duly noted at the end of the article.59

By the beginning of March a collection of £1000 from 140 ecclesias as well as individual Christadelphians had been raised and forwarded to the Baldwin Fund to be divided “in equal proportions for the relief of German Jewry and Jewish Refugee Children”.60 In contrast to Anglicans, Unitarians, Methodists and Quakers, Christadelphians were the only Christian group to raise and donate funds to

Christian organisations because of the place of Jews in their theological schema. Again the reference to Jews as both ‘unbelieving’ and as ‘custodians’ characterizes Jews as ‘good’ and ‘bad’. ‘Jacob’ in the phrase ‘Jacob’s trouble’ is the term used by Christadelphians to refer to Jews. The scriptural allegory is based on Genesis xxxii, 22-32, when Jacob is renamed Israel after his struggle with an Angel and his descendants are called the Children of Israel. Brother Cowlishaw was Secretary of Rugby Christadelphian Ecclesia.

59 C. A. Ladson, “Relief for Jewish Refugees,” The Christadelphian 76 (1 January 1939): 33-34. The Lord Baldwin Fund was initiated on the 8 December 1938 with a BBC broadcast. The ‘Fund for Refugee Children’ was more correctly the Movement for the Care of Children from Germany later known as the Refugee Children’s Movement. Both the Fund and the Movement are discussed further in Chapter 6.
specifically aid Jewish refugees and solely Jewish refugees. From the start of their fundraising, it is clear that Christadelphians resolved to aid Jewish refugees as opposed to contributing to general refugee aid and they determined to do this on the basis of their belief in a special relationship with Jews. Subsequent donations were similarly earmarked and apportioned between the Movement for the Care of Children from Germany (MCCG) for Jewish children and the Central British Fund (for German Jewry).

*Rugby Refugee Committee: a ‘local’ committee with movement wide support*

Raising funds had fallen ‘naturally’ to Birmingham for several reasons. It was already forwarding donations to aid Jewish settlement in Palestine and seemed the most sensible conduit for such activity. It had the apparatus through which to appeal for funds via the *Christadelphian* and it had the backing of the editors for such activity. Case-working, that is, finding jobs for refugees, gaining domestic visas or work permits as well as obtaining hospitality for children and adults became the responsibility of a Christadelphian local committee formed in Rugby.

Founded in late 1938, the Rugby committee was supported by the local ecclesia and Christadelphians throughout the country. It effectively became the case-working wing of the ‘movement’ and a compliment to the Birmingham fundraising centre. The committee’s chief concern was the placement of children in homes and it officially associated with the Movement for the Care of Children from Germany (MCCG). The prime mover of the committee was Brother R. Alan Overton (1900-1974) who had become interested in refugee aid in 1938 through the arrival of the *Kindertransporte*. A prolific and gifted speaker, he was already well known in

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60 “Jewish Refugee Fund,” *The Christadelphian* 76 (1 March 1939): 132. Unitarians raised approximately half this amount over their entire collecting period and applied grants to Jews in exceptional cases only.

61 The *Kindertransporte* was the drive for the formation of many of the local committees. Robert Alan Overton was a shop keeper (Overton Drapers: Ladies and children’s outfitters, 47 and 52 Church Street, Rugby). He initiated the Rugby (Christadelphian) Refugee Committee, serving as Honorary Secretary; Overton was at various times; Presiding, arranging, examining brother in Rugby ecclesia. Secretary of various committees and bible classes. He was Rugby’s Ecclesial Representative for the Auxiliary Lecturing Society; initiated a fund in the early 1930’s for Christadelphians and non-Christadelphians to cover medical bills of the needy. Letter from Bruce Overton to author, 17 May 1999. Bruce M. Overton, “Recollections after 50 years, of the work of a Christadelphian with Jewish refugees who escaped the Holocaust” (Unpublished paper, Rugby, U. K. n.d. c. 1988), 1. In the possession of the author. Bruce Overton is the youngest son of R. A.
Christadelphians circles as a ‘Palestine specialist’, having a special interest in the British Mandate of Palestine and general British policy in the Middle East. Having given numerous lectures and slide presentations to Christadelphians about developments in Palestine at various tea-meetings throughout Britain, he was well placed to disseminate information on the refugee situation and mobilize support. As we will see, he worked tirelessly to help the Jewish refugees in a number of ways from placing children to the creation of a hostel for refugee boys.

By 1938, refugees were scrabbling to get out of Reich occupied territories. Local committees, generally responding to the *Kindertransporte* rather than the adult refugee plight, were formed (generally in late 1938 but more frequently from 1939) to aid these refugees. Most of these committees were initiated on a short term basis to help the initial crisis and then fold when circumstances had been met. As a result, committee infrastructure was in most cases minimal and caseworkers learnt on the job. Though committees were begun in this voluntaristic way, they very quickly assumed the role of quasi government agencies processing applications in line with rules on visas and permits. Delays in administration of the wider refugee network were a constant problem. A report of a meeting of the North London Committee for Refugee Children which appeared in *The Christadelphian* spoke of complaints of the long and apparently unnecessary delays that occurred in bringing the children over. Mr. O’Brien, head of the Guarantee department, replied for the Movement explaining the need to investigate each offer of hospitality with limited staff and resources.62

Issues associated with the work were constant and ever mounting. Lady Reading and Elaine Laski were made new executives of the MCCG in order to monitor the “well-being” of children because increasingly it had “not been sufficient”. Asking for co-operation to improve the situation they wanted input in a circular sent

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62 “Refugee Children,” *The Christadelphian* 76 (1 July 1939): 322. For more on the problems associated with the MCCG and local committee structure, see Movement for the Care of Children from Germany, *First Annual Report: November 1938-December 1939* (London, n. p., 1940). This contemporary publication addresses some of these issues on the first page of the reports. Also see, Barry Turner, ‘... And the Policeman Smiled’: 10,000 children escape from Nazi Europe (London: Bloomsbury, 1990), passim. See Chapter 6 for more regarding the work of the MCCG.
out to local committees. Increasingly, the MCCG offices received complaints about the number of children entering schools in certain places. There was also a large number of refugee children who were leaving school drifting and unattached to any network. Local committees were asked to oversee their wards, but as the numbers under the committee's responsibility grew this aspect of the work was more difficult, particularly as refugees moved in and out of various local committee jurisdictions. Reports on the situation of children under the committee's care were soon required every September, December, March and June as well as a list of names of children under the committee's control. These controls were instituted to safeguard children but, as is evident from Overton's correspondence, these procedures appeared to have placed further administrative burdens on his committee, reduced his time spent on visiting children, and thus, had the opposite effect that they were brought in to achieve. It is probable that other local committees were similarly affected.

The other work of the Rugby committee included getting domestic permits on behalf of women, generally the mothers of the refugee children placed by the committee. Delays were experienced here too. Tensions between Bloomsbury House and the Rugby committee over inefficiencies became apparent in the middle of July 1939. Expressing his frustration about a particular case, Overton remarked in a letter to Mr. Anker at the Domestic Bureau of Bloomsbury House that "My committee considered it a most serious matter that no letter from the Home Office has been received from you today, and are not prepared to devote their time and unsparing

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64 Letter from R. O'Brien [organizing secretary of MCCG, Bloomsbury House] to Overton, 6 June 1939, OPR. Bloomsbury House was the building used by the main refugee organizations from 1939. Letter from Olive Dyke [After Care Dept., MCCG] to Overton, 26 June 1939, OPR.
65 For example, a letter from Leicester Coordinating Committee for Refugees addressed to Rugby Committee illustrates this issue. A refugee who had moved from Cornwall where she had been under the Cornish County Committee for Refugees from Central Europe wanted help in finding other refugees in Rugby. Letter from N. Bonsor [Secretary of Leicester Coordinating Committee for Refugees] to Overton, 12 September 1939, OPR. Re: Eva G., now living in Rugby. In most cases it was not possible to trace the individual children concerned. Children's full names are given only where they are previously published or broadcast elsewhere.
66 Letter from Olive Dyke [After Care Dept., MCCG] to Overton, 10 July 1939, OPR. Overton apologized for the delay in making these lists. Letter [copy] from Overton to Elsie Sheldon [Employment Department], 18 July 1939, OPR. It is evident that Overton liked to control his work and did not delegate tasks to others, preferring to do them himself. Conversely, it is apparent that he had a limited number of people who were willing to get involved on a practical level.
efforts to this work when they are not supported by your Department”.68

Requests for help were also arriving from refugee children already in Britain and placed by Overton, for assistance in getting their parents out of Germany. Writing from Devon in July 1939, Hanne D., asked Overton if he could help get her father out of Germany as there was a rumour that he faced the concentration camp. Having had no reply by the end of the month, Hanne wrote again imploring Overton to help her, confirming that the possibility was now a probability. “Father must leave Germany by 27 August or face a concentration camp”.69 Another child, Leopold D., placed in a Christadelphian home in Ormskirk asked for similar help.70 Responding to Hanne towards the end of August, Overton asked whether she had managed to get permits for her parents and if not he promised to make further efforts.71 Adults from Germany also applied to the committee for help.72

In addition to handling the administration of the committee, Overton was also motoring between London and Rugby as transports came into Liverpool Street Station. Overton’s own children were often wakened in the middle of the night to give up their beds to new arrivals, often ill from the crossing, scared and homesick.73 The workload was increasingly burdensome and, while financial support was forthcoming from individuals and ecclesias, help to collect and drive children to their destinations was more difficult to find. Gladys Finch in Essex proved the exception in this respect. Writing to Overton in June 1939, she offered to drive refugee children to their destinations from London or help with Jewish relief work in anyway she could. Free every weekend and weekday evenings, she was willing to drive all-night if necessary. “I am at your service in this good cause.”74 Overton thanked her “very

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67 Letter [copy] from Overton to Mr. Leeper [Home Office Permits] 25 May 1939, OPR.
68 Letter [copy] from Overton to Mr. Anker [Bloomsbury House] 28 July 1939, OPR.
69 Letter from Hanne D., Egerton School, Exeter, Devon to Overton, 8 July 1939, OPR. Letter from Hanne D. to Overton, 31 July 1939, OPR.
70 Letter from Leopold D., Ormskirk to Overton, 13 August 1939, OPR.
71 Letter [copy] from Overton to Miss D., Exeter, Devon, 23 August 1939, OPR. His response seems to be at odds with his correspondence, indicating that he may not have had time to give full attention to all the requests he received. The outcome of this correspondence was not found.
72 For example: Letter [copy] from Overton to Herr Leonhard Dienstag, Berlin, 30 June 1939, OPR. Overton replies that there may be difficulty in arranging help for him because he is of retirement age. Outcome unknown.
73 As recalled by both Bruce Overton in his unpublished recollections and by Betty Overton, the elder daughter, on the “Afternoon Shift” on BBC Radio 4, 6 November 1996.
74 Letter to Overton from Gladys Finch in Essex, 4 June 1939, OPR
much for your offer to help in refugee work and especially in view of the fact that I have only received one other response!".\(^75\)

In the meantime, the pressure of work was affecting Overton’s health and he began to complain of chronic tiredness in his letters to brethren.\(^76\) Ordered to rest by his doctor, Overton continued his refugee work but cancelled his usual speaking assignments:

> Much as I would like to accept your invitation to speak at Swindon in 1940 I am afraid it is impossible. For the past six months when I am really supposed to be resting I have been concerned with the Refugee Problem and have been snowed under with work in this connection.

Never one to miss an opportunity, however, Overton concluded the letter with a request that if Brother Deardon knew of anyone interested in taking a child, he would be “very glad to hear from you.”\(^77\)

**Christadelphians, the Kindertransporte and a community wide response**

The BBC broadcast ‘Children in Flight’ aired in March 1939 recording a day in the life of a children’s refugee camp near Harwich. It was reported in the *Christadelphian* along with the information that brethren and sisters in different parts of the country were planning to adopt refugee children.\(^78\) This programme coupled with a growing number of reports on the refugee crisis in the news print media stirred steadily more Christadelphians into action.

Representations and donations to the Christadelphian office continued to arrive in such quantities that in April 1939 the Birmingham Central Ecclesia launched a community wide programme. Not only would the Christadelphian office continue to collect funds, to “mitigate as much as possible the heart-rending miseries occasioned by this cruel persecution”, Christadelphians would be asked to respond to a questionnaire so that the Arranging Brethren could “measure the assistance which

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\(^75\) Letter [copy] from Overton to Finch, 7 June 1939, OPR. [emphasis in original]. The other response came from George Pass, also the financial officer of the Committee. Pass eventually took in two refugee children and helped place others.

\(^76\) Letter [copy] from Overton to Brother and Sister Jones, 17 July 1939, OPR. Overton mentions how tired he has become with the weight of refugee work.

\(^77\) Letter [copy] from Overton to Brother Deardon, 4 July 1939, OPR. Overton took to recording the time of night he was writing the letter, illustrative of the workload and perhaps as a ploy to illicit help from other brethren.

we can render”. Brethren were asked whether they could look after a child in their own home and if they could do this with or without financial aid. If brethren were unable to home a child, they were asked whether they could contribute (on a regular or irregular basis) and the amount they could give so that a guaranteed amount might be sent to the Jewish refugee committee (CBF) on a customary basis. Fryer directed brethren stating that,

The unprecedented and merciless treatment of the people of Jewish blood in central Europe has aroused widespread anxiety and compassion... As Christadelphians, we feel deeply affected; for we recognise that the Creator has a purpose with the seed of Abraham who are destined to come again under the Divine favour. When this occurs, then will come the Kingdom of life from the dead.\(^{79}\)

To support a quick response a prepaid postcard, funded by the magazine, was enclosed for reply. Those requiring more information regarding the placement of children were referred to Brother Overton and two others.

For a movement with an ultra-congregational polity, this circular letter displayed a high degree of central planning and a significant desire to be involved on a practical level to complement the financial commitment already established through donations. Employing religious language, Fryer linked Christadelphian concern for refugee Jews with the attainment of a future religious life. At the same time another theme emerged: that the position occupied by Jews in Christadelphian thinking (although revered) carried a certain utilitarian element as well. For Christadelphians to realise the promise of everlasting life, they needed Jewish Return and Restoration. Christadelphians could not achieve this by themselves. Consequently, there was a willingness to act both financially and practically, so that Jewish refugees benefited from this religious worldview.

Named as the main contact for child placements, Overton was already working in conjunction with the Movement for the Care of Children from Germany through his local committee. He visited ecclesias around Britain giving impassioned speeches about the plight of Jews in Europe and the obligation of brethren to aid refugees on general humanitarian and Christian grounds as well as on specifically

\(^{79}\) Circular letter from G. T. Fryer [Recording Brother of Birmingham Central Christadelphians Ecclesia (Late Temperance Hall), Midland Institute, Paradise Street] to ‘Brethren and Sisters’, 4 April 1939, OPR.
Continuing a familiar religious theme, Overton argued that while Germany would “not escape the retribution in store” for its actions against Jews in Germany, “there arises a cry of human distress which cannot - must not be ignored”. While divine retribution would eventually take its course, the refugees were “knocking on the doors of Christian countries” and “the fate of nearly a million people” was at stake. He asked his audiences, “Will they be admitted or will they be abandoned to hunger and death? You can to some extent give the answer”. Meanwhile, The Christadelphian ran another announcement in May stating that the need of Jewish refugees was “as great as ever” and that the office was willing to receive further contributions “to ease a little the burden of Jacob’s trouble, while recognizing that only the Lord can save him out of it”. Christadelphians could help ameliorate individual circumstances but they could not change the course of events. Only God had that power.

Overton rapidly became the locus for practical Christadelphian activity for refugees and it is worthwhile discussing in detail some of the specific cases he handled. Nudged by The Christadelphian appeal as well as Overton’s own entreaty in May, Brother and Sister Futcher in Bournemouth, wrote requesting a child. The couple had been married for four years and were childless, “so naturally a child as young as possible would be appreciated, but owing to the urgency of the situation, we would gladly take one child irrespective of age”. Overton responded by sending details of a 2 year old, Louis Peter K., whose mother was in Berlin applying for a domestic visa. The child’s father was already in Britain in the Kitchener camp having come from a concentration camp. The Futchers’ responded by return post, pleased that the boy was “so young”. Having gained the agreement for the toddler, Overton

80 Bruce Overton stated that his father had a standard speech which he varied from Christadelphian meetings around the country depending on the international news at the time. Bruce Overton, interview with author. Rugby, 10 November 1997.
82 “Jewish Refugees.” The Christadelphian 76 (1 May 1939): 223.
83 Letter from Mr and Mrs Futcher, Bournemouth, to Overton, 7 May 1939, OPR.
84 Letter (copy) from Overton to Brother and Sister Futcher, 19 May 1939, OPR. The ‘Kitchener camp’ at Richborough between Ramsgate and Dover was an old army camp that housed several thousand men from the Greater Reich in danger of arrest or incarceration in concentration camps. It was opened in January 1939 and funded mainly by the Council for German Jewry. See: Norman Bentwich, They Found Refuge (London: Cresset Press, 1956) 102-114.
85 Letter from Brother and Sister Futcher to Overton, 22 May 1939, OPR.
wrote again, this time with the intent of keeping the little boy and his mother as close as possible. Stating that “it would be very nice if she could be near her little one”, he asked whether they knew of any work his mother could do in Bournemouth.86

Both the April letter to individual ecclesias, coupled with Overton’s speaking campaign in May, promoted responses from individuals and ecclesias throughout the fellowship. Taking guidance from Overton, Northampton ecclesia initiated a “Refugee Inquiry” and agreed to collect contributions to help local Brethren support two refugee children. It was also proposed that the ecclesia support five refugee adults.87 Bournemouth ecclesia, also in close contact with Rugby, got “promises of about 16 shillings per week from Brethren and Sisters”. But they were not able to support a refugee as a community effort “because we have so much ecclesial work to deal with which would be impossible if our far hands were tied”.88 The Recording Brother from Derby ecclesia sent a cheque to Overton for £10.89

The positive results from the May campaign however, suffered a setback within the month when withdrawals from the Northampton scheme took place. The plan was far more modest than initially proposed and consisted of a weekly contribution of £1 1s 3d augmented by occasional contributors which would form a reserve fund. At this time, it was decided it could only support Brother and Sister Richardson and Brother and Sister Craddock who had each agreed to take a refugee child.90 Having duly returned their guarantee forms for the two children, “the Brethren” were now anxious to have their respective girls as early as possible “from the camp”.91 By return mail, details and photos of the two girls, “Jewesses, aged 14

86 Letter [copy] from Overton to Brother and Sister Futcher, n.d. c. May 1939, OPR. Re: Peter K. Outcome unknown. Overton repeated this pattern of keeping families together, or close by, in other cases.
87 Letter to Brother Fowler from Overton, 9 May 1939, OPR.
88 Letter from A. V. Light [Assistant Secretary, Bournemouth Christadelphian Ecclesia] to Overton, 15 May 1939, OPR. Re: Overton’s appeal of 7 May. There appear to have been two opposing views in this ecclesia. One group wished to aid refugees as a community while other believed it should be the work of individuals.
89 Letter [copy] from Overton to Hinchcliffe, 11 May 1939 (1130 p.m.) OPR. Note inclusion of the time he wrote the letter indicating how all consuming the job had become.
90 Letter from Fowler to Overton, 26 May 1939, OPR. It was also stated that a section of the ecclesia would contribute direct to Lord Baldwin Fund, or “through Carter”. John Carter, editor of The Christadelphian, was coordinating donations to CBF.
91 Letter from David H. Fowler, Kingsley Road, Northampton, to Overton, 3 June 1939, OPR. Re: Jewish refugees. Fowler adds note that guarantees are from individual Christadelphians not the ecclesia. “Camp” probably refers to Dovercourt, a temporary camp used for housing children until
and 12 respectively” were sent. While the two Brethren and Sisters were disappointed at the ages of the children, wishing that they were younger so that they might fit in with the ages of their own children, they felt that “they dare not refuse them, coming fresh from Prague”.  

In the middle of May, Coventry ecclesia invited Neville Laski (1890-1969), President of the Board of Deputies of British Jews to give a lecture on “Britain and the Refugees”. Knowing how rarely Christadelphians allowed “outsiders” to speak to them, Laski was “very sensible of the honour you have done me in asking me to come to speak to you”. Explaining how the Baldwin Fund had been initiated because Christians could not look on, unmoved by Jewish suffering, he asked “‘Have we not one father? Hath not one God created us?'”94 Stating that the issue of the refugees was “not just a Jewish problem only” he explained how some of the refugees who sought assistance from the Jewish refugee committees were Christian. Help was “never denied them” but resources were thinly stretched, barely able to cover the refugees the Jewish community had legally guaranteed to support. These refugees needed help from their fellow Christians and while Laski had “no resentment”, he also believed that “the Christian Churches and their people do not fully realise that this is a Christian problem too.”95

Suggesting the possibility that Jewish children were the target of conversionist activity in certain Christian homes, Laski asked those present, “in the fullness of the Christian or Christadelphian spirit” to remember “that there will be others besides Jews, the non-Aryan Christians of Jewish origin and the political refugee” who needed help. Moreover, if they had a Jewish child in their households, they should be

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92 Letter [copy] from Overton to Fowler, 9 June 1939, OPR. Re: two girls for Brother and Sister Richardson and Brother and Sister Graddock of Northampton.
93 Letter from David H. Fowler to Overton, 12 June 1939, OPR.
94 Quoting from Hebrew Prophet Malachi, ii, 10. “Britain and the Refugees,” The Christadelphian 76, (1 September 1939): 398-399. Reprinted text of an address delivered by Neville Laski at Coventry ecclesia on 18 May 1939. This part of the reprint gave an overview of the development of antisemitism in Germany and the gradual exclusion of German Jews from economic and social life. The rest of the speech was given in the following October issue. Neville Jonas Laski, was a barrister and communal Anglo-Jewish leader. He served as president of the Board of British Jews from 1933 to 1939. Laski was chairman of Joint Foreign Committee, 1933 to 1940. He was also chairman of the administrative committee of the Jewish Agency for Palestine and vice-president of the Anglo-Jewish Association.
95 Ibid.
very kind to them and considerate in approaching this human problem... that is the religious future of the child." Laski concluded that he was thoroughly appreciated the effort Christadelphians had made already: "I am grateful to you not merely on behalf of the Jews but of others who are included in the refugee problem."

The speech gave expression to the fear present in some parts of the Jewish community of Christadelphian intentions in respect of Jewish child refugees. Cognisant of the proselytizing campaign in the East End conducted in 1937, Laski hoped that this address might encourage Christadelphians to transfer their adoptive campaigns to non-Jewish refugees. By collapsing Christian and Christadelphian "spirit" into one concept, Laski misunderstood Christadelphian understanding of themselves as separate from the Christian mainstream and the 'only' true Christians. He also underestimated the value to Christadelphians of the special relationship they believed they had with Jews. Christadelphians simply wanted to aid 'God's chosen people' and only Jews; they did not consider Christian or other non-Jewish refugees as part of their remit. This speech was not circulated in the Christadelphian until September, so that it is difficult to determine its wider impact until after this time. But within the context of the Birmingham hostel opened in April 1940, Laski's request was heeded. Run by orthodox Jews, it contrasted sharply with the hostel founded the year before in Rugby which was operated along different lines. These two approaches will be reviewed in the latter part of this section.

The desire of many Christadelphians to take Jewish children continued and Overton, the conduit through which requests of the movement now passed, continued to receive and 'process' applications for children. Sister Fawcett offered to take a Jewish girl around 11 years old to be a companion and friend to her daughter Hazel. Asking to choose from several girls she concluded that considering the situation she would also "take whatever he has". Overton replied by enclosing the particulars of one girl that he thought would be suitable. At the same time he employed a strategy he had used earlier and would repeat again, asking whether she knew of anyone who


97 In the following Christadelphian issue, a second contribution of £250 was sent to the LBF "for the relief of Jewish refugees" of which £150 was for the relief of Jewish refugee children and the remainder for the CJG. See John Carter, "Jews and Zionism," The Christadelphian 76 (1 June 1939): 277.
would be interested in a boy. “If there is no one you know likely, please let me have the enclosure back soon as the time is very short”. Fawcett, in turn, took up the issue of the boy Overton wanted to place. As the brother of the girl they had already agreed to take, Fawcett asked him to “send a form to us at once, we will fill it in and so not part brother and sister. They have enough parting to suffer without that and a little extra sacrifice will not kill us - when we work for Him that gave his life for us.” Moreover “the boys sad face haunts me . . . Of course at 14 years he is old enough to realise the terribleness of the parting and the uncertainty.” In this case Overton was successful in keeping siblings together.

In a very short time, the volume of work escalated from a handful of children to group loads of youngsters urgently needing placement. Appealing to Brother Fowler at the Northampton ecclesia again, Overton asked whether there would be any interest in giving hospitality to a refugee child as he needed to find homes for 40 boys and girls arriving in England from Czechoslovakia towards the later half of the month. Aiming to keep siblings together again, Overton asked Brother and Sister Jones who had agreed to take an 8 ½ year old Jewish non-orthodox child whether they could take his brother of 13 ½ years and if not, whether they knew of anyone who would be interested.

Using his network of contacts, Overton checked the suitability of a Christadelphian he did not know who offered hospitality to a child. In a confidential letter to Brother Light in Bournemouth, Overton asked whether Light could vouch for Ruth K. “I should like to know firstly, the character, temper, amenities, education and social position of Miss K., (2) type and size of home (3) cleanliness and comfort thereof.” Keeping the activities of more ardent Christadelphians in check, Overton displayed measured enthusiasm and caution when informed that a refugee mother of a child had expressed interest in Christadelphianism “I am interested to hear that the mother of a child has shown interest in the Truth and although I do not believe it is wise to try and force this upon the refugees, it is very pleasing to hear of such a case

98 Letter from Sister Fawcett to Overton, 5 July 1939, OPR. Letter [copy] from Overton to Sister Fawcett, 6 July 1939, OPR.
99 Letter from Greta F. Fawcett, Wickstead, to Overton, 7 July 1939. OPR.
100 Letter from Overton to Fowler, 13 July 1939, OPR.
101 Letter from Overton to Brother and Sister Jones, 17 July 1939, OPR. Outcome unknown.
102 Letter from Overton to Brother Light (private and confidential), 27 July 1939, OPR.
where the refugee of their own volition take that interest".  

As children were placed, still more needed help, as a small piece in the Christadelphian attested. Several hundred children had been dumped in no-man’s land near Zbonszyn (Poland) along with their families. Here was another group of children in desperate need and the hunt for homes had to be done as quickly as possible. In a letter to Sister Rosa Lomas, Overton remarked that unlike the other refugee children there was nothing “to pay as deposit for these children - only hospitality and love is urgently needed”. No let up in the volume and pace of work occurred, instead daily details of children in flight from Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia continued to arrive.

Hostels for refugee children

Refugee girls were much easier to place in private homes than boys who were perceived as more difficult and expensive. In Germany, however, Jewish boys between the ages of 15-17 years faced the possibility of incarceration in a concentration camp so that a solution to their placement was urgently required. For many months, Overton had hoped to open a refugee hostel for boys in Rugby to be financed by Christadelphians throughout Britain by weekly or monthly contributions, supplemented by funding from the MCCG. Overseen by a refugee matron, it would be a model to be adopted by Christadelphians across the country. This project began to take concrete shape in June 1939 and in July the hostel, named Little Thorn, opened in Bilton Road, Rugby. By the end of the month it housed nine boys from Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia.

To support the hostel, Overton needed funds to run the daily utilities and cover the children’s feeding and clothing costs. Eliciting sponsors from individuals and

103 Letter from Oliver Ball in Bristol to Overton, 12 December 1939, OPR. Letter from Overton to Ball, 18 December 1939, OPR. Contrast Overton’s advice to Ball and his own practice at the Rugby hostel where he took refugee children to Christadelphian Meetings.

104 “Refugee Items,” The Christadelphian 76 (1 August 1939): 371.

105 Letter from Overton to Sister Rosa, 28 August 1939, OPR

106 Letter from W. M. Loewinsonh [Czech section of MCCG, Bloomsbury House] to Overton, 3 October 1939, OPR.

107 R. A. Overton, ‘Report of the activities of the Rugby (Christadelphians) refugee committing the special reference to the two Jewish boys hostel at Rugby’, c. July 1942, reprinted in Leverton, I came alone, 408. There is no significance to the name of the hostel; it was the original name of the house.
ecclesias was essential and determined how many boys could be helped. Again Derby and Bournemouth ecclesias proved stalwart supporters. Sister Finch, who was already helping to ferry children across the South to foster homes, was also forthcoming. Help in kind proved essential too and offers of clothing, furniture and medical support were gratefully received.

Recalling his experience at the Hostel some fifty years later, Hans Snabel, one of the refugee boys, describes Little Thorn as a rather stark place but with a large garden. There were on average 9 to 11 boys at anytime and Overton was seen as “the warden”. Snabel, then 12 years old, remembers that Overton was very involved in the lives of the hostel boys, giving weekly “divinity lectures” and on some days taking them to Christadelphian meetings. Overton’s son recalled the importance his father placed on educating his charges in the Bible: “I remember the many happy and lively Sunday afternoons when he not only became their guardian and friend but a teacher, making their own scriptures come to life”. This action contradicted Overton’s earlier lukewarm response to another Christadelphian family who were encouraging a refugee mother to attend Christadelphian meetings. These gatherings were closed to non-Christadelphians, so it is significant that the children were admitted to meetings.

As Overton had hoped, hostel plans in other ecclesias arose. A long article in the July issue of The Christadelphian laid out the schemes of Birmingham and Coventry. The leading Brethren believed that the large number of donations which had be sent to the office of The Christadelphian meant that something more than fundraising could be achieved: a specifically Christadelphian response was warranted. As the need for refugee boys was most urgent, hostels dedicated to Jewish boys were to be opened and run with the aid of refugee house wardens, thereby providing a

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108 Letter from Dr. Daniels to Overton, 2 July 1939, OPR. Letter from Hinchcliffe to Overton, 21 July 1939, OPR. Re: Derby ecclesias collection: £8.10s. Letter [copy] from Overton to Brother Light, 24 July 1939, OPR. Re: contributions “making it possible to run this hostel in Rugby... The seven boys and the refugee lady”. Letter [copy] from Overton to Sister Finch, 24 July 1939, OPR. Re: her “magnificent contribution to hostel fund”.

109 Letter from Brother F. A. L. Kemp, Leicester to Overton, 22 August 1939, OPR. Re: Sending a wardrobe and checking for suitable blankets for hostel. Letter from Dr. M. Daniel to Overton, 29 August 1939, OPR. Re: finding a doctor for the refugee house mother at the hostel.

110 Liz Taylor, “Afternoon Shift” on BBC Radio 4, 7 November 1996. Snabel, also recalled his gratitude to Overton “if he hadn’t of found me a guarantor for me or if he hadn’t been himself my guarantor, I wouldn’t have come to Britain and I would have not survived, just as my family didn’t survive.” Note that meetings were closed to Christadelphians only.

111 Bruce Overton, “Recollections after 50 years,” 3. In author’s possession.
home and work for refugee adults in addition. In sharp contrast to the Rugby hostel, the role of the Birmingham and Coventry ecclesias would be more limited. The communities involvement would include the provision of the houses themselves, the running costs and the equipment. It would not be involved in the ‘day to day’ as this would be devolved to the Jewish wardens overseen by the Jewish community. The hostel in Edgbaston and Coventry would be places “where Refugee boys can be bought under the direct influence of the Jewish people, and bought up as Jews”. This action would augment the work of a “considerable number of brethren and sister” who were already “taking Jewish Refugee girls into their homes”.

It was explained that the hostel projects should be supported because of the Christadelphian “interest in Israel” which came from “our knowledge of God’s purpose with them”. While Christadelphians had now “taken their place” and been “grafted into the Abrahamic olive tree”, neither God’s gifts nor his promises were “subject to any change of mind”. Israel remained the “chosen nation” and since the past and the future of this people “touches our faith so closely, we are naturally sympathetic to their needs at the present time”.

By the time a follow-up report appeared in December the situation in Europe had changed dramatically and the paper reported that the “sufferings of Israel” were “truly appalling”. With the borders closed there was little more that could be done for the refugees outside of Britain. Christadelphians had tried to mitigate the sufferings of a few of God’s people but this had been “only a small fraction” of what was needed. Moreover, the proposed hostel in Coventry had foundered on insufficient funds, but there was still hope for the Birmingham plan. The failure “should not deter us from doing what we can. Rather should it spur us on to greater effort.” Once again, it was stressed that the Birmingham hostel was to be entirely supported from Christadelphian sources. “It is therefore our Hostel. Here, then, is an opportunity for collective effort”. By working in conjunction with the local Jewish community, the hostel plan was well received. Rev. Dr. A. Cohen of the Hebrew Congregation expressed his “profound thanks” for the regular fundraising work the fellowship had been engaged upon since January 1939 and for their Hostel

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112 “Jewish Refugee Problems: How can we help?” *The Christadelphian* 76 (1 July 1939): 318.
113 Ibid.
Progress however slowed, with intermittent reports in the Christadelphian well into the spring of the following year. The hostel, named Elphis Israel (Abode of Hope) was not ready until the eve of Passover. Opened by the ex-editor of The Christadelphian, Brother Walker on 21 April 1940, a service of dedication was conducted by Rev. Cohen. In an address that followed, the Rabbi spoke of the helpfulness of the Christadelphian community and their willingness to be “conspicuous in their sympathy” to Jewish refugees. Moreover, this was not the first time Christadelphians had aided Jewish projects. He noted that they were long standing supporters of Zionist efforts to re-establish the Jewish people in Palestine. With the gift of the hostel, to be managed by Orthodox Jewish wardens but funded by Christadelphians, he continued: “We of the Jewish Community feel that a sacred trust has been committed to us, a trust we shall endeavour to discharge faithfully to the utmost of our ability”.

Although the hostel in Birmingham was financed by local Christadelphians, it was run on orthodox Jewish lines from its inception. The orthodox Jewish community in Birmingham were involved in the planning of the home and celebrated with Christadelphians its establishment and eventual opening. Ecclesias in Britain, though bound by loose ties were still independent of each other and could devise different policies. The practice of Sunday bible study at Rugby was not adopted at the Birmingham hostel nor was the attendance of Christadelphian meetings instituted. The differences are attributed to several factors. The hostel at Rugby was the work of a very small group of individuals dominated by one man who stressed the Christadelphian message more than brethren within the Birmingham ecclesia chose to do. Significantly, the Jewish community in Rugby was almost certainly absent or very small and the children were not able to or were not encouraged to develop links with their co-religionists. Lastly, Little Thorn was an independent project that gained movement financial support, but was almost a single-handed endeavour. As such its

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114 “Jewish Refugee Problems,” The Christadelphian 76 (1 Dec 1939): 556.
character was more likely to be determined by its initiator that one overseen by a community.

**Conclusion**

The Christadelphian fellowship, through the joint ‘centres’ of Birmingham and Rugby, organised ecclesias and their brethren countrywide to aid Jewish refugees from the late 1930s. This response was determined by Christadelphian religious convictions; in particular the Christadelphian belief in a privileged relationship and special friendship with Jews. Reaction within the fellowship was neither singular nor uniform when it came to practical care and contrasting policies developed in hostel care and proselytizing activity. On fundraising, however, commitment was uniquely dedicated to Jewish refugees, either directly through donations to Jewish refugee organisations or via non-sectarian refugee committees where monies were specifically earmarked for Jewish refugees.

This comprehensively coordinated response was remarkable considering the ultra-congregational structure of the Christadelphian movement. Despite being a loosely bound community rather than a denomination, the brethren effectively developed a corporate (community-wide) response. Their breadth of response can be compared with the movement wide reaction of the Friends. Despite organizational differences and a markedly less public profile, Christadelphians engaged as Quakers did to aid refugees throughout their polity at both grassroots and at ‘leadership’ levels. The most significant difference between these two groups was one of policy direction: Christadelphians sought to aid solely Jewish refugees, whereas Quakers operated over a wider remit developing a much more complex and fluid policy which included the aid of Jewish refugees where no alternative source of aid existed or where Jews were part of other groups such as ‘politics’. In addition, the Quaker relief network was considerably larger in size and was therefore able to aid higher numbers of Christian, Jewish and non-sectarian refugees.

Neither Quakers nor Christadelphians looked to other Christian denominations for guidance on how to respond. Instead, they looked to their own history and practice. Quakers had been involved in refugee relief work for over two centuries and drew upon their historical experience. Similarly, for almost a century
Christadelphians had been engaged in raising funds to aid Jews settle in Palestine. In the 1930s they extended this activity to helping Jewish refugees who had entered Britain. The reaction of these two groups contrasted with the other larger Christian groups. Methodists and Unitarians as well as Anglicans looked to each other and especially the Quakers to provide guidance on this issue. Individuals within Methodism and Anglicanism consistently bemoaned denominational lack of action and praised Quaker and Jewish efforts. In contrast, Christadelphian work for refugees was virtually unknown outside of its own and Jewish circles.

There were also other differences of ‘style’; Quakers worked in close cooperation with other Jewish and non-Jewish committees; exchanging information and cases, gratified by non-Quaker support. Christadelphians also worked in conjunction with other refugee committees, but were more reticent about their relationships with outside organisations. Choosing instead to concentrate on their own projects, Christadelphians remained aloof from the main refugee committee network that developed by late 1938. Once Bloomsbury House was established as a centre for refugee organisations, they did not relocate as did other Christian relief committees because they had no separate or dedicated machinery developed for refugees. Their refugee relief ‘organisation’ consisted of a few dedicated workers who preferred to concentrate on their own ventures.

From Birmingham, central funds for both child and adult Jewish refugees were collected and sent on a regular basis to Jewish refugee organisations. Unlike other groups, whose funds fell in other areas as their adherents switched donations to the cause of Christian (and to a much lesser extent, Jewish refugees), Christadelphians managed to maintain their existing donations which they had traditionally made to Jewish projects in Palestine. Policy discussions about who to aid or how to react to German antisemitism did not appear in the pages of the main fellowship’s journal or within internal committees minutes as was the case for other Christian groups. Religious precepts determined that Jews would be the recipients of aid and the issue of ‘non-Aryan’ Christians was seen as irrelevant and ignored. As centralized administrative structures were absent within the fellowship, the forums from within which policy discussions would arise were lacking. Nevertheless, this did not prevent
the preparation of a community-wide plan of action, which was coordinated and successfully enacted.

Christadelphians effectively split the responsibilities of funds raising and case-working into two distinct centres. Birmingham raised funds and forwarded these to Jewish case-working committees (this distinction also applied to the hostel in Edgbaston as the day to day running of the home was under Jewish communal authority). Case-working was devolved to Rugby because of the initiative of an individual there already concerned with the plight of refugee children.

A pattern seen in other Christian groups serves as a contrast and comparison for the Christadelphian fellowship. Responses within Unitarianism, Methodism and Anglicanism were often initiated by fairly high-ranking or high profile individuals who raised the refugee cause, and through their efforts (as opposed to leadership directives) managed to elicit interest from the laity of their respective movements. This support was never truly widespread but it was significant. Within Christadelphianism it was traditional for an interested individual to initiate a programme of aid and gain support from other brethren within his own ecclesia and beyond through word of mouth and a notice in the main journal. At least half of the wider fellowship were at one time or another actively involved in fundraising efforts and a proportionately large number of children were given hospitality in Christadelphian homes. Thus, although initiated by 'low-ranking' individuals, the diffuse network of ecclesias and members took up the cause through their biding and this effectively became a movement wide programme.

Brother Alan Overton followed in the Christadelphian tradition of beginning a group which he dominated and continued until the need was met. Touring the British Isles, he became the movements’ roving spokesman on the issue, informing his co-religionists of the need to offer hospitality to refugee children, both as individual Christadelphians and as a community. The Rugby committee, through his almost single-handed efforts, rapidly became the case-working wing of the fellowships’ response to the refugee crisis. Supported by a small band of helpers, he vetted and processed applications by Christadelphians from Bournemouth to Ormskirk and tried as much as possible to keep siblings together as well as the mothers of child applicants nearby. When he was unable to place an increasing number of Jewish
boys, he opened a hostel, putting a refugee matron in charge of the day to day care of up to a dozen boys at a time. The hostel was funded by Christadelphians in various ways: by ecclesias and individuals who gave regular contributions, sponsored specific children, or sent items required by the hostel dwellers.

Overton went further than the majority of his fellow Christadelphians in his devotion to the refugee cause. Indeed, to some extent, he went beyond what some Christadelphians would have seen as appropriate action. By dropping his lay preaching commitments and concentrating on the refugee issue, an issue that some Christadelphians believed was solely the providence of God, Overton devoted his energies to refugees, to the detriment of his religious activities. Several sources indicate that he was involved in lobbying activity at government level – highly unusual actions for a devout Christadelphian. Some brethren held fast to the belief that God would eventually ‘avenge’ the anti-Jewish deeds of Germany and it almost certain that Overton believed this too. But he chose to be heavily involved even so.

To those more literalist Christadelphians, Overton, in his efforts to save children, came close to questioning the Divine order. This orthodox view does not appear to have been the outlook of the majority of Christadelphians as displayed by their willingness to be involved in one way or another. Overton managed to place approximately 250 children with an additional small number of parents of these children in Christadelphian homes throughout Britain or in the hostel he opened. In order to do this he had to have the active involvement of hundreds of his co-religionists. Methodists, a community over thirty times larger than the Christadelphians, struggled to find places for 70 boys in a hostel for ‘non-Aryan’ Christian children in 1939 and were only able to do this with donations from the Lord Baldwin Fund and the Christian Council. The numbers of children taken into Methodists homes is difficult to assess, but, in comparison to other Christian groups such as Anglicans, Unitarians and Quakers, few articles appeared to suggest that this was a widespread activity within the Connexion.


118 Figures from Liz Taylor, “Afternoon Shift” on BBC Radio 4, 7 November 1996. A list of names in the archives, puts this figure at about half this level. The list is untitled and undated. Unitarians and Quaker papers carried a number of testimonies of those who had taken Jewish and non-Jewish children into their care. It should be noted, however that children may have been placed in
From the actions and activities of the Christadelphians it is clear that Jewish refugees benefited from the special role Christadelphians ascribed to them. The respect for Hebrew Scriptures and Brethren belief in the Hebrew prophecies (albeit with their own interpretation) meant they had a relationship with Judaism which was less triumphalist and oppositionalist (but in reality no less supercessionalist) than other mainstream Christian groups. Christadelphians believed they were working alongside Jews for the same end - the Kingdom of God on Earth. Jews were misguided about Jesus, so brethren believed, and eventually they would recognise and acknowledge him as messiah.

In their understanding of the Bible, however, Christadelphians did not see that they displayed an ambiguity to the validity of Judaism as understood from within its own traditions. These attitudes allowed for proselytizing activities from various individuals and groups within the fellowship directed towards both British Jews and Jewish refugees. Many of the refugee children (and adults) that fled from Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia came from liberal or secular Jewish backgrounds. These Jews (unlike the orthodox children placed in the Birmingham hostel) were instructed in the scriptures and taken to services on the grounds that they were being educated in their own heritage. This was given through the lenses of a form of Christianity which, though heavily prophetic and ‘Old Testament’ based, was nevertheless Christian. Proselytizing activity was most clearly present in the Rugby hostel run by Brother Overton who, while dedicated to the cause of Jewish physical rescue, also determined the need for ‘spiritual saving’ as he led the children under his care to Christadelphian meetings and Sunday bible study. Conversions occurred.

Not all Christadelphians became involved to the extent of Overton, Carter, Ladson and Walker; however, many of this small sects’ adherents send funds, gave hospitality and support, in what appears to have been a community wide endeavour for refugees. For the most part, this aid was accompanied by a sincere desire to help ‘Jacobs’ children’ at their time of terrible need.

Methodist and other Christian denominational homes via ‘Local Committees’ which sprang up in late 1938 and early 1939. Many of these records have been lost so that this aspect of Christian action cannot be assessed accurately. A number of these local committees, however, were dominated by a specific denominations (e.g. Anglican or Quaker which consequently became cross-communal or remained denominational. The author was not able to trace any specifically Methodist local committees).
CHAPTER 4

METHODISTS

Introduction

Methodism was an eighteenth-century revivalist movement that attempted to reform and re-invigorate some of the practices and doctrines of the Church of England. Led by John Wesley (1703-91), an ordained Anglican minister, his sermons and teachings, coupled with the hymns of his brother Charles Wesley (1707-88) led to the development of a faith that advocated a more personal and emotional kind of religion that contrasted with the Established Church. Wesley stressed the doctrine of ‘justification by faith’, which he argued had been replaced in the Anglican Church as the doctrine of ‘justification by good works’. Man, Wesley believed, was saved by grace through faith alone rather than by works of repentance, which he believed had become the emphasis of the Established Church.¹ John Wesley never resigned his position in the Church, but put in place a system that would enable the continuation of his approach to religious Christian faith. A few years after his death, separation did occur when his followers formed a new denomination.

The history of Methodism has been characterized by divisions and splits from its earliest beginnings. Over the years many different ‘sub’ denominations were created. The first secession was relatively limited and led to the formation of the Methodist New Connexion (1797), but other splits followed, with separation by the Independent Methodists in 1805, Primitive Methodists (1807-10), Bible Christians (1815), Protestant Methodists (1827), Wesleyan Methodist Association (1835), Wesleyan Reformers (1849) and the United Methodist Free Church (1857). At the beginning of the twentieth century, this separatist trend was reversed as the various strands suffered declines in their membership and the original reasons for separation became less potent and divisive.

The United Methodist Free Church, Bible Christians, and the Methodist New

¹ Rupert Davies, A. Raymond George, Gordon Rupp, eds., A History of The Methodist Church in Great Britain, 4 vols., (London: Epworth Press, 1965-88). For an extensive list of works on John Wesley, see F. L. Cross and E. A. Livingstone, A Revised Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church (Oxford OUP, 1978), 1467. This list represents less than a tenth of what is published. The centrality of Wesley’s thought to Methodism is demonstrated by the inclusion of his sermons, as well as his ‘Notes on the New Testament’, in the Deed of the Union of 1932, alongside the doctrinal standard of the united Churches constitution.
Connexion led ‘reunion’ moves, forming the United Methodist Church in 1907. A further reunion in 1932 brought most of the remaining strands together when Primitive Methodists, the United Methodist Church and Wesleyan groups fused to form the Methodist Church. Independent Methodists stayed true to their name, remaining aloof from this merger. This chapter will look at the response of the newly re-formed and united Methodist Church as the dominant Methodist grouping in the UK.² It will not look at the responses of Independent Methodists.

Prior to 1932, Wesleyan, Primitive and United Methodists each had similar departments dealing with home and overseas concerns, such as Temperance and Mission. Reunion resulted in duplication of these structures and, in the initial aftermath of the reuniting conference of September 1932, much time and energy was expended on coordinating and merging these departments.³ The effects on the lower reaches of the church were no less significant, as ‘superfluous’ circuits and chapel were amalgamated or closed. Organizational and administrational changes were accompanied by the creation of a new Hymn book and service book, the Book of Offices for specific occasions such as High Communion, ordination of ministers, life cycle events and other services.⁴ Statements and declarations on various issues needed to be re-drafted to incorporate the three views. Despite the initial pain of reunion, it was argued that it would re-focus the denomination’s energies and consolidate financial resources, leaving Methodists free to concentrate “on the clear and effective proclamation of Gospel.”⁵

Structure and Organization of the Methodist Church

To gain an understanding of how the Methodist Church operated as a

² Numerically speaking, Methodists form the largest non-conformist group of this study, numbering over 830,000 members during the 1930s. This figure was more than twelve times the size of the combined numbers of Quakers, Unitarians and Christadelphians. Each of these groups had between 20-30,000 adherents. See “Table IV: Annual Schedule for the Year 1933,” Minutes of the Methodist Conference (London: Methodist Publishing House, 1933) 448.
³ Methodist historian, Rupert Davies has stated, “The greatest event in Methodism between the wars was its reunion”. See Rupert E. Davies, Methodism 3d ed. (London: Epworth Press, 1985), 159-161.
⁵ Rupert Davies, A. Raymond George, Gordon Rupp, eds., A History of The Methodist Church in Great Britain, vol. 3 (London: Epworth, 1986), 362. While this is one view, an alternative is that of Adrian Hastings who characterizes Methodism as a spent force, that had lost its “sense of daring”. See Adrian Hastings, A History of English Christianity 1922-1990 (London: SCM Press,
corporate body, it is necessary to describe in some detail its complicated power structure. The Methodist Church is (and was) organized through a series of chapels which are grouped into a Circuit. The Circuit is regarded as the fundamental unit of Methodism, and a minister is appointed to a particular Circuit rather than an individual chapel. Circuits are constantly being united or subdivided so that chapels do not necessarily remain in the same circuit year to year. Circuits are grouped into Districts and each district has a synod to determine policy for the district. This arrangement is called the ‘Connexion’, and links all chapels, circuits and districts with each other and with the central ‘connexionial’ administrative offices as well as with the Church’s governing body, the Conference.⁶

The ‘Conference’ meets every year at the end of June or July and is led by elected officials, the President (Minister), Vice President (layman) and Secretary (Minister). It is directed by an executive known as the General Purposes Committee which has the power to take action on all national occasions on behalf of the Methodist Church as well as acting in cases affecting the interests, duties, rights and privileges of the Methodist Church. The committee, however, must act in conformity with any resolution of the Conference. Two ‘sessions’ divide various subjects and tasks; the Representative session is the main part of the Annual Meeting and is open to all. The other part of the meeting is the Ministerial Session which discusses pastoral questions and is closed to laymen.

Once the Conference has ruled on a particular issue, the connexional administrative offices implement its rulings, though they may offer their input. Indeed, these departments often direct as much as implement policy making. During the 1930s, the most active department was the Temperance and Social Welfare Department (henceforth, TSWD), with its duty to give “the effective presentation of the Christian social witness”. The list of subjects within its “purview” were wide ranging. In addition to Temperance – a central part of Methodist work - it embraced “Social Questions, including Industrial Observance of Welfare, Gambling, Public

⁶“The organisation of Methodism is peculiar to the Methodist Church ... the Presbyterians church most nearly resembles it. The Methodist Church assumes the form of ‘a connection’ with a yearly conference as the ‘governing body’ of the whole ... as far as possible however the organisation is evenly balanced, as to power, between the laity of the church and its ministers”. Who's Who in Methodism: An Encyclopedia of the Personnel and Departments, Ministerial and Lay in the United
Health and Social Purity, the Christian Observance of Sunday, World Peace and International Relationships, the preparation for and practice of Christian Citizenship, and the maintenance of the Christian ideal in social life.”

Each aspect of the Department’s interests were devolved to special committees, one of which was the Standing Committee on International and Industrial Relations (henceforth, the ‘I and I’ committee). The ‘I and I’ committee was the main focus of Methodist responses to antisemitism and the refugee issue.

Membership of the committee included well known ministers of the movement such as S. E. Keeble, John T. Bell, and E. C. Urwin, as well as lesser known ministers, like W. W. Simpson. The committee met on a monthly basis, although there were significant unexplained gaps when it did not convene. As we will see, it was this committee that dealt with the refugee issue during the 1930s. Unlike Quakers and Unitarians, Methodists did not create a formal relief or refugee committee structure.

A short appeal notice written by Henry Carter appeared in the Methodist Recorder on behalf of ‘non-Aryan’ Christian refugees and this letter was subsequently given Conference approval.

**Historiography**

Compared to the plethora of texts written this century alone on Methodism’s founder, John Wesley, twentieth-century Methodist history has received scant attention. There are no works detailing the history of Methodists in the 1930s nor Methodist responses to the refugee crisis of that period. In addition to works on

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7. *Church of Methodism* (London: Methodist Publications Ltd., 1933) 11. From 1932, the Conference was composed of 450 ministers and 450 laymen from elections at Districts.

8. “TSWD Report,” *Minutes of the Uniting Conference* (London: Methodist Publishing House, September 1932) 25. From 1936 the TSWD produced a journal called *On Active Service*. The author was not able to locate copies of this publication in any of the Methodists holdings in Britain, the British Library, or through private Methodist resources. This is unfortunate because from 1937, the magazine published articles on Christian responsibility to Jewish refugees. The TSWD is known as the Division of Social Responsibility (DSR) today and its archival records are under this designation. They are lodged at John Rylands University Library, Deansgate Site, Manchester. From the 1950s to the 1970s it was called the Christian Citizenship Department.

Wesley, histories on the movement’s early years dominate the study of Methodist history, concentrating on denominational schisms and reunions as well as studies on the ‘age of non-conformity’ during the late nineteenth century. This focus has slowly begun to shift in the last few decades, resulting chiefly in works that concentrate on the latest reunion (Wesleyan, United and Primitive) in 1932 and more latterly Methodists relations with the Established Church.

A four volume series on the history of Methodism in Britain, the most exhaustive study on British Methodism to date, relegates the 1930s to a brief part of the last chapter which begins with the reunion in 1932 and concludes with an assessment of Methodism’s ‘modern’ day (1980s) concerns. In its discussion of the inter-war years, most attention is given to the uniting conference and the decline in Methodist members at the end of the decade. This coverage makes no mention of Methodist engagement with the refugee issue, nor Methodist reactions to Nazism in general, except in passing. The value of this series, however, is not in its treatment of the post 1932 age, but rather the detailed study of Methodist history and theology preceding this period, providing perspective and understanding up to the 1930s era.

The structure and more recent history of twentieth century Methodism are explained, however, in a detailed monograph by George Brake on the politics and policies of the Church over fifty years from 1932 to 1982. From the beginning of this period, the author demonstrates how the Methodist Church moved from social

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10 See John Kent, *The Age of Disunity* (London: Epworth Press, 1966); Robert Currie, *Methodism Divided: A study in the sociology of ecumenicalism* (London: Faber & Faber, 1968). This concentration is mirrored by the absence of navigable guides to twentieth century Methodist material which remains unlisted for the most part, in contrast to the wealth and detail of 17th to 19th century indexes and catalogues.


improvement in the national sphere, particularly exemplified by its Temperance work, to a wider internationalist witness as illustrated by the ratification of a Declaration on Peace and War in 1933. This progression was not without its stresses, and the debate surrounding this declaration caused deep divisions within the newly reunited movement. It also highlighted the tensions of two competing impulses within Methodism, one which wished to extend the brief of the Church and the other which sought to retain its traditional outlook. This work is of further interest because of a brief section entitled ‘Approved schools and Centres for Refugees’, which touches on the Methodist orphanage opened for (Christian) refugee children in 1938. This, however, is a strange combination of topics, as the refugee children were not deviant, but effectively stateless.¹³

The most revealing source is a biography of Rev. Henry Carter (1874-1951) the General Secretary of the Temperance and Social Welfare department throughout the 1930s. Written in 1955 (soon after Carter’s death) by his colleague and successor, Rev. E. C. Urwin, the account outlines Carter’s (and Urwin’s) work in the Standing Committee on International and Industrial Relationships. It was this committee which generated statements about antisemitism and refugees as well as a host of other social and industrial issues such as unemployment, gambling and Temperance.¹⁴ Urwin’s biography, contains a wealth of information about Carter’s career and how his involvement in the refugee issue began. Written not long after the events, it remains a valuable source because of Urwin’s ability to bring ‘insider’ insights into his assessment of Carter’s work, not just from the perspective of confidant and friend, but also as colleague and co-worker.¹⁵

¹³ Brake, Policy and Politics.

¹⁴ Henry Carter was an ex-Wesleyan Methodist Minister, a prominent temperance reformer and a committed pacifist. He was General Secretary of the Temperance and Social Welfare Department from 1911-42. Carter was a member of the Central Control Board (Liquor Traffic) 1916-21 and the Royal Commission on Licensing (England and Wales) 1929-1932. This work led to a CBE. He was Wesleyan Methodist representative at Stockholm Life and Work Conference in 1925 and a member of the World Alliance for Promoting International Friendship through the Churches. He formed the Methodist Peace Fellowship in 1931. He was also Chairman of the Board of Management of the Christian Council for Refugees from Germany and Central Europe and author of numerous as many articles in the Methodist Recorder. He created a post-war Methodist Refugee Relief Committee for the aid of European Methodists.

¹⁵ E. C. Urwin, Henry Carter CBE: A Memoir (London: Epworth Press, 1955). This work is, however, limited by its lack of annotated sources. Urwin was an (ex-Primitive) Methodist minister and administrator. He served in various circuits ranging from Preston, 1907-1910; London in Hackney, 1910-1916 and Brixton, 1916-1922; Bristol, 1922-1930 and Farsley, 1930-33. He was a Methodist representative at COPEC, Birmingham in 1924. Urwin was Joint Honorary Secretary of
As in previous chapters, some time will be spent in this chapter, analyzing topics that dominated Methodist concerns in Britain during the 1930s. These debates may appear initially to have only marginal relevance to the refugee movement from Europe. The purpose of this examination, however, is to show what was essential to Methodists throughout this period and how these interests determined Methodist thinking about and reaction to the flight of Jewish refugees from Nazism.

I: CONSUMED BY PEACE AND WAR; OBSERVING ANTISEMITISM, 1933

The international situation at the beginning of 1933 did not bode well for a future free of nationalistic aggression. The foundering World Disarmament Conference and the appointment of Hitler as Chancellor in January 1933 sent waves of concern throughout Europe. Ministers within the Methodist Church began to debate what the Christian response should be in the face of rising militarism in Europe and the Far East. In particular, many Methodists determined that a clear statement on the Methodist stance to peace and war was essential so that should Europe enter another war, it would be clear where Methodists stood on this issue. This task of creating a unanimous document fell to the Industrial and International Relationships Standing Committee. The tone and arguments used in the preparation of this document contrasted with the reaction of the Methodist Church to German antisemitism.

Methodists, during the rise and ultimate takeover of the Nazi party, voiced their criticism against Nazi antisemitism. Prior to Hitler's appointment as Chancellor,

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17 Minutes of the Standing Committee on International and Industrial Relationships, (MARC 8/ MA 4761), Papers of the Division of Social Responsibility (DSR Papers), Methodist Church in England, John Rylands University Library, Deansgate, Manchester (hereafter, IISC Minutes, DSR Papers, JRULM). These committee records are neither numbered, foliated, or paginated. Three groups were formed consisting of Revs. H. Carter (ex-Wesleyan), J. T. Bell (ex-Primitive) and E. C. Urwin (ex-United) to represent these views. Rev. J. T. Bell was the chairman of the Industrial and International Relationships Committee (hereafter 'I and I' Committee). IISC Minutes, DSR Papers, 14 December 1932, MARC 8/ MA 4761, JRULM.
the *Methodist Recorder* ran a short piece observing the antisemitic tendencies of
Nazism. Seeing the ever widening policy of terrorism against ‘opponents’ of the
regime, it noted that “the campaign” of imprisoning Communist leaders and “stifling”
Socialist propaganda has been extended “to disgraceful Jew baiting”. In common
with other denominational organs, response to the violent nature of antisemitism was
swift and critical.

Subsequent reports sought an explanation for the ‘unreasonableness’ of Nazi
antisemitism. One such example typified the style of reportage that was to reoccur
repeatedly throughout this period, one not merely confined to Methodist circles. This
reporting simultaneously rejected Nazi claims that reports of violence were
exaggerated and criticized their policies which removed Jews from office. At the
same time it gave credence to antisemitic myths, in this case, of world-wide Jewish
financial manipulation.

No doubt there have been quite unauthorised excesses, no doubt, also, accounts of
what has happened in Germany have, in some instances, been highly coloured. On
the other hand, there are plenty of Jewish refugees and other travellers whose stories
of dastardly ill-treatment are well authenticated; and there is no denying that Jewish
municipal and other officials have been displaced and professional men prevented
from practicing . . . German resentments against the Jews - or at least against certain
of their international financiers - has been particularly strong since the war, and it
certainly has found voice in Nazi propaganda.

In searching to understand German actions – particularly the level of violence- the
author effectively found ‘reason’ for this conduct in past Jewish actions and
behaviour. In this respect, the author was repeating Nazi arguments in another form.
This was by no means the only reaction of the editor or the newspaper’s various
correspondents. In a later edition, the editor, J. B. Watson, identified the absurdity of
German protestations regarding poor treatment of the German minority in Polish
Silesia. How could Germany ask for its claims of injustice to be taken seriously,
“when her own government has victimised outrageously the Jewish minority within

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18 “Notes of the Week: Hitlerite symbolism,” *Methodist Recorder*, 16 March 1933, p. 3. *The
Methodist Recorder* (incorporating the *Methodist Times and Leader* and the *United Methodist*) is
used as a representative of the mainstream voice of Methodism in print at the time of this study.
See E. A Rose, *A Checklist of British Methodist Periodicals (Methodist Study Guide no. 1)*
(Sussex: WMHS Publications, 1981). This guide lists over 140 publications, most of which had
ceased by 1932 for financial or Uniting reasons. Of the 17 still extant in the 1930s, many were
specialist journals or magazines directed at specific audiences, such as Methodist training colleges
and children. *Two men edited the paper over the period of this study: J. B. Watson, 1906-1934 and
F. D. Wiseman, 1934-1952.*

19 See especially the response of Anglican papers in Chapter 5.

20 “Notes of the week: Germany and the Jews,” *Methodist Recorder*, 30 March 1933, p. 3.

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its jurisdiction?"  

Nor was Watson prepared to soothe German Methodist protests of ‘unfair’ treatment of Germany in international newspapers. Otto Melle (1875-1947), then President of the Methodist Episcopal Church in Germany, and Bishop John L. Nuelsen, wrote to the Methodist Recorder several days after the 1 April 1933 boycott. Protesting energetically against reports of atrocities committed against Jews by the Nationalist movement in Germany, the co-authors called for British Methodists to counter these ‘distortions’.

With the exception of a few incidents, which were immediately checked by the new government, peace and order were never disturbed . . . the German Methodists, representing all sections of Germany, most urgently appeal to world-wide Methodism to assist in counteracting this pernicious propaganda of calumnies against Germany.

Rejecting their appeal, the editor stated that he understood the delicacy of the German Methodist position given the present government in Germany. He reaffirmed the desire of Methodists in Britain to foster international understanding and concurred that some of the press reports probably had been “too highly coloured”, but the suggestion that all such reports were exaggerated was irresponsible; “are we to understand Bishop Nuelsen and Dr Melle as affirming that these reports are, in part of fact, without foundation?”. Too many reports from “reliable agencies” as well as from Jews themselves made the German Bishop’s assertion untenable.

Given the commitment of the editor in highlighting the problems faced by Jews in Germany, albeit with some unfortunate reasoning, coupled with his willingness to cross swords publicly with leading German Methodists, it is significant that this elicited no response from the wider Methodist readers.

This was in stark contrast to that generated by the ‘Peace and War’ Statement. Rev. Henry Carter, General Secretary of the TSWD and a deeply committed pacifist, wrote a lengthy article for the Methodist Recorder in March 1933 in which he argued

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21 "Notes of the Week - Germany and the Jews," Methodist Recorder, 6 April 1933, p. 3.
22 Otto Melle was a German Methodist Bishop, the first Bishop to be elected by the Germany Central Conference, 1936-46. Prior to this he was a Dresden pastor, 1900-20, and then Missionary and Superintendent of (the then United) Austria and Hungary. He was elected President of Frankfurt Theological Seminar in 1920 and retired in 1946. British Methodist, Rev Dr. W. F. Lofthouse joined in the act of consecration for Bishop Melle. Melle said that he “felt proud and humbled to receive this acknowledgement from a representative of the Mother Methodist Church of Great Britain”. The author was not able to locate any biographical information on Bishop John L. Nuelsen.
23 "German Methodists and the anti-Jewish campaign," Methodist Recorder, 6 April 1933, p. 6.
24 "Editor’s reply," Methodist Recorder, 6 April 1933, p. 6. No response to the editor’s question was
for a strictly pacifist stance. He maintained that Christians should be prepared to
unite against war as it contravened Christian principles “of love towards his fellows of
every race” and that this principle was to be applied even in a defensive war.\footnote{25} Whereas reaction was now absent in regard to current international events (the
persecution of Jews), response was immediate on the future stance of the Church.
Robert Oldfield of Westminster asked Carter if he would “meekly” allow an invader
“to violate your own fireside, to assault your own kith and kin, without raising an arm
for their protection?” It was hard to believe that “in the name of Jesus Christ” we
should not help a friend “to withstand a maraud?”\footnote{26} Dr. A. W. Harrison (1882-1946)
continued the criticism of Carter’s pacifist (as opposed to pacificist) stance. This
“mistaken policy” would divide the Methodist Church and should not become the
policy of the Connexion. Nor could he agree with Carter’s suggestion that an invaded
state should be left “to the care of God”. This was the “piety of an earlier day, that
was content to leave the victims of typhoid or cholera without examining the
drains”.\footnote{27} Indeed the “Editorial Letterbox”, a forum for readers of the Methodist
Recorder, was overrun with responses from both detractors and supporters of Carter’s
position for the following three months. Week after week inches of column space
were consumed in the ‘battle’ to win the minds of Methodist readers. Donald Soper,
in support of Carter, stated that “pacifism had seemed always a direct and simple
implication of our Christian faith”. The Reverend George Burden congratulated
Carter on his “courageous statement”.\footnote{28} For Mr. George Cowie of Northwood there
was agreement with Carter “insofar as aggressive war is concerned”, but when it came
to a war of defence, he subscribed “to the views expressed by Mr. Oldfield”.\footnote{29} Mr. G.
Ely of Tooting, admonished Carter and his supporters, arguing that “pacifists are unwittingly making war more likely.”

In April 1933 the debate had become so consuming that any other internationally related news was virtually absent. News of Jewish persecution in Europe was relegated to a few lines in occasional issues. Two senior members of the Methodist hierarchy weighed into the fray in the hope of ending the now heated discussion. Dr. W. F. Lofthouse declared that the correspondence had caused “perturbation” to many readers and commented that “Mr. Carter is a skilled and effective controversialist, and no one who crosses swords with him is likely to come away easily”. Lofthouse maintained that Carter’s position, one based on “personal” conviction and should not become church policy because his reasoning was one with, “which other people, equally devoted to the cause of peace, cannot honestly subscribe.” Moreover, the influence of Carter and his supporters was increasingly “divisive” and the current debate was dividing “the partisans of peace . . . into two opposite camps”. It would be better, Lofthouse said that “Instead of dividing us as to our duty in some future crisis whose issues it is impossible to forecast, let them [the pacifists] devote their energies to supporting everything that can prevent war and make that crisis and impossibility”. Dr. H. B. Rattenbury maintained the criticism stating his opinion; “I think it would be more Christian to take my chance and go to hell if need be with my fighting countrymen than to go to heaven and Wormwood Scrubs with the pacifists.”

The statement on Peace and War was submitted to the July Conference by the ‘I & I’ committee. The document demonstrated that an accommodation with both sides of the argument could be achieved given compromise. Stating that war “should

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31 Italic mine. Correspondent, “The Churches and War. Dr Lofhouse and Dr Rattenbury join the discussion,” Methodist Recorder, 13 April 1933, 7. William Frederick Lofthouse was a (Wesleyan) Methodist minister. He was Assistant Tutor at Richmond College, 1896-98 and Handsworth College in 1899 where he was Tutor of Old Testament Languages, 1904-16 and 1919-25, and Principle and Tutor of Theology from 1925-40. He was also Temporary Chaplain 4th Class from 1916-19; He gave the Fernley Lecture in 1921. Lofthouse was a member of the Oversight Commission from 1920-28, President of the Wesleyan Conference in 1929 & 1932, Secretary of the Beckley Lecture Trust in 1931 and President of the Society for Old Testament Study in 1932. In addition, he worked for the Methodist Union for Social Service. Finally, he contributed to the Faith and Order movement as a keen ecumenist.

32 Ibid., pp. 17-18. Reverend Rattenbury was a Connexional Funds administrator during the 1930s.
be considered a crime against humanity” it repudiated such force as a method of settling international disputes.\textsuperscript{33} Fellowship with people of other races, culture and tradition was defined as true “Christian spirit” and the exercise of Christian grace and courtesy towards the stranger was regarded as the only way “to assuage the spirit from which come wars... and so contribute to the establishment of peace in the earth”.\textsuperscript{34} It was conceded, however, that Christians might be driven by their “inner convictions and loyalty to Christ” to either refuse to bear arms or alternatively choose to volunteer service in the army. In either case, the Methodist Church was committed to the Ministry of “all her sons and daughters, in whichever direction loyalty to inward conviction may carry them”.\textsuperscript{35}

Throughout the debate on Methodist responses to Peace and War, it was continually stressed that Methodists wanted to maintain friendly relations with Germany, and that any criticism was given in the spirit of friendship. Such a debate evidently had broader ramifications than the content of the Declaration itself. Methodist actions could be construed as a ‘meddling’ in politics and international relations, but the Church was prepared to override this concern in this case. They were also aware of the impact of a strictly pacifist stance on Church-State relations, yet determined that a Church’s function was to allow dissent as much as conformity on such issues as conscription and government policies. In contrast, discussions regarding the actions of a foreign state to its own minority within its borders was markedly more circumspect, despite the fact that the presence of refugees outside these boundaries indicated that Nazi policies were far reaching and international. From the Methodist perspective, the former issue was wholly a Methodist concern (despite its political and international ramifications) while the later was purely an international issue, one that might produce commentary but not involvement.

For these reasons, and given the fixation of Methodists on the Peace and War statement, a two line statement on “the Jews” was easy to miss under the impact of the massive ‘Declaration on Peace and War’. Drafted by the same group working on the Declaration, and headed by Henry Carter, this brief statement extended Conference’s “heartfelt sympathy to members of the Jewish race in the persecutions


\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., p. 21.

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., p. 22.
to which they are being subjected”. Reference to Germany was absent blunting the force of this statement still further. It also marked a difference between the approach of the editor of the *Methodist Recorder* and leaders within the Methodist Church. Ministers were willing to express sympathy publicly, but were loathe to criticize the initiators of these actions. In contrast, the editor was prepared to identify the perpetrators and condemn their acts. Given the controversy surrounding the Declaration, it was not unexpected that Carter, the TSWD, and the work of the ‘I and I’ Committee should come under attack by Church members. Many feared that Carter’s emphasis on peace was forcing other issues onto the background. These reproaches, however, were not directed at other (more concrete) international issues, such as the Jewish experience under Nazism, but the new Temperance campaign, since “the attention of the department seems to have been given to peace propaganda. We hope that the new campaign is not being conducted at the expense of the former”.

II: *KIRCHENKAMPF*, GERMAN METHODISTS, ANTISEMITISM, 1934-38

The resolution of the pacifist versus pacificist debate in July 1933 enabled the TSWD to focus energies on other international matters. Interest in antisemitism in Germany, however, continued at low levels in Methodist circles. In 1933 Methodists contrasted with most other Christian denominations who had responded far more vociferously. In 1934, however, as general interest waned in reaction to the reduced flow of refugees, Methodist response was in step with other groups (including the wider public). The hope was expressed, that once political accommodation with the new rule in Germany was achieved, then the ‘initial’ antisemitic ‘outbursts’ would subside as the new regime established itself. Somewhat later than other Christians denominations, Methodists turned their attentions to the *Kirchenkampf*.

In order to make a better assessment of the position of the Church in Germany in 1934, the ‘I and I’ committee invited Reverend H. L. Henrid of the World Alliance and the Universal Christian Council for Life and Work to give a summary of

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the current religious situation in Germany. His assessment was depressing for he regarded the position as exceedingly “grave”. Concerned by this information, the committee invited Dr Bonhoeffer (1906-45), a visiting German Lutheran pastor based in London, to address a future meeting. In this way they might learn directly from a German cleric exactly what the position was for the clergy and Christians in the Reich. Given these efforts, little came of such investigations for reasons that are difficult to discern, and no further reference to the difficulties faced by dissenting Christians was made within the ‘I and I’ committee until 1936. Unitarians and Anglicans were gripped by the changing fortunes of the Lutheran Church in Germany. Methodists, however, were less concerned - at least between 1933 to 1935. Indeed after these initial inquiries on behalf of Christians, Methodists withdrew and focussed greater attention on the position of Jews in Europe and especially in Germany.

Yet an ambivalent attitude towards the persecution of Jews was also discernible, echoing earlier reports which had provided explanations that found Jews partially responsible for their own persecution. Thus, it was reported that Hitler’s attempt to drive Jews from eminent positions, harass them with restrictive legislation, and even ruin them commercially was “deplorable,” but still “within the bounds of

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38 IISC Minutes, DSR Papers, 24 January 1934, MARC 8/ MA 4761, JRULM. The World Alliance for Promoting International Friendship through the Churches (WAIFC) was a non-political pacifist Christian educational organization formed to instruct public opinion in international affairs. It was founded in 1914 but inactive until after the war. It was re-launched in 1920 with a conference of 20 member nations held in Geneva which had expanded to 35 member countries by 1933. Characterized as the “spiritual counterpart” to the League of Nations Union, its main aim was to create international goodwill around the world through the Churches by promoting world peace on religious principles. It operated via an International Council of Anglican, Orthodox, Protestant, Reformed and Lutheran Church representatives. Each country, additionally formed its own National Council drawing membership from leaders of Christian life and thought across the Christian confessional divide. In Britain this meant the Council was represented by the Anglican, Baptist, Congregational, Methodist, Presbyterian and Unitarian churches and the Friends and Salvation Army societies.

The Universal Christian Council for Life and Work (UCLW) was an organization concerned with the relation of the Church and Christian Faith to society, politics and economics. It was part of the ecumenical movement and developed out on the Edinburgh International Missionary Council in 1910 (as did its sister strand, Faith and Order). It sponsored conferences in Stockholm (1925) and Oxford (1937). Henry Henriod was the General Secretary of Life and Work in Geneva. Both of these organizations are discussed further in Chapter 5.

39 IISC Minutes, DSR Papers, 21 February 1934, MARC 8/ MA 4761, JRULM. It is not clear if a meeting with Dietrich Bonhoeffer ever took place. Bonhoeffer was a German Protestant pastor and theologian. From 1933 to 1935 he worked as a pastor at the German Congregation in Sydenham, London. He opposed Nazification of the Protestant Church in Germany and was a signatory of the ‘Barmen Declaration’ (1934) of the Confessing Church (bekennende Kirche) in reaction to this politicization. From 1935 he was director of an illegal preacher’s seminary in Pomerania until its closure by the Nazis in 1937. In 1942 he was involved in secret talks with the military resistance.
decorum”. What was not ‘acceptable’, however, was the arousal of “the baser passions of the people against a section of their fellows”. Julius Streicher’s soapbox diatribes in August 1935 were perfect examples of these sort of actions, which would “sow seeds of hatred”. This sort of action demeaned the German State, was prejudicial to “the German cause” and damaged “Germany’s good name”. Jew-baiting had come as “a distressful disappointment” to Germany’s friends and removed Germany from her rightful place among the nations, and its actions were in “the highest degree repugnant”. The stress of these reports did not consider the cost of Nazi actions to Jews, and lacked sympathy for the Jews involved. Disquiet for the ‘moral health’ of the German nation was the focus of Methodist concern and it was greater than consideration for the victims of the regime. As seen in chapters discussing Quaker and Unitarians reactions, problems of refugee and would-be refugees were side lined for discussions that focused on the ‘bad’ actions of the regime as a reflection illiberal practice.

Throughout most of the mid-1930s, the “I & I” Committee focused efforts on evoking the Peace and War Declaration, such as when Italian troops invaded Abyssinia in 1935. Even this, however, as with comments regarding Jewish persecution, or concerns regarding dissenting Christians, was undermined by its content or delivery, in this case six months after the specific events which initiated the evocation. Similarly, Conference’s call for a statement on Christian suffering in 1937 was beset with directional and content problems. Contributors to discussions were divided between what the primary function of such a statement: was it to criticize persecutory actions and demand they cease or was it to empathize with the victims of such deeds. Sir Henry Lunn, a leading lay Methodist, spoke out against the sufferings of Christians in Spain, particularly in areas in the control of the “Valencia government”. He also drew readers’ attention to the sufferings of those “Lutheran, Roman Catholics and Jews” in Germany. Aware that his resolution might be seen as controversial because of its criticism of Republican policy, he argued that the statement was still required, as humanitarian considerations apart, this was an
attack “upon God” and a determined “endeavour to secularize life”. Moreover, “His [Christian] brothers in Spain, Germany and Russia” needed a champion to speak for them and he could not keep silent. Henry Carter concurred with Lunn for the most part but wanted him to remove political references in his statement. Dr Scott Lidgett (1854-1953) summed up the general feeling by concluding that “more good” would be done if a statement were issued expressing general sympathy “with those who were suffering for the cause of Christ”. Moreover an agreed statement would carry far more weight than several statements expressing different views. A declaration on “Religious persecution” was passed stating the united Methodist view on the German Church Struggle and the trials of Christians in other parts of Europe and elsewhere.

Also present at the debate was a representative of the German Episcopal Methodists. Bishop Dr. Melle had been an occasional visitor to ‘I & I’ meetings as well as attendee at previous Conferences. In an uncritically reported interview reprinted in the Methodist Recorder, Melle recounted his disappointment with the recent Oxford Conference on Church, Community and State, which he had also attended. Specifically, he felt “obliged” to protest against the Conference’s own official message to the German Evangelical Church. Believing the conference to have misrepresented the situation, he declared that “So far as Free Churches in Germany are concerned, we are grateful for the full liberty to proclaim the gospel of Jesus

42 IISC Minutes, DSR Papers, 22 April 1936, MARC 8/ MA 4761, JRULM.
43 “Religious persecution in Europe,” Methodist Recorder, 22 July 1937, pp. 4, 6. Sir Henry Lunn, was a leading lay Officer in Methodist movement. After training as a minister, he qualified as a doctor in order to serve overseas and served India from 1887. His service was interrupted in 1890 by controversy with the Mission House over missionary methods and this led to his resignation from the ministry in 1893 to pursued business career. He was knighted in 1910. Lunn was the lay representative at Conference, 1911-32, and British Chairman of the Open Session on the Eucharist at the Lausanne Conference of Faith and Order and Work, 1925. He was Editor of Review of the Churches from 1892-96 and 1920-30. John Scott Lidgett was a distinguished theologian and Methodist minister, regarded by some as “the greatest Methodist since Wesley”. He was appointed President of the Wesleyan Conference, 1908-9, and was first President of a reunited Methodist Conference in 1932. Lidgett was a member of London School Board, 1897-1904, and a member of the London County Council (LCC) Education Committee member from 1904. He was appointed National President of the Free Church Council (FCC) from 1906-7 and was Honorary Secretary of the FCC from 1914. Lidgett was the founder and warden of the Bermonsey Settlement, 1891-1949. He was editor of the Methodist Times, 1907-18 and joint editor of Contemporary Review, 1911, as well as Deputy Vice-chancellor of London University from 1929-30 and Vice Chancellor from 1931-32. He was created Companion of Honour in 1933.
45 This was not the first time that Melle had featured in the Methodist Recorder. Following a letter to the paper in April 1933 downplaying Nazi antisemitism, he was roundly rebuked by the editor. See section I.
Christ, and the opportunity to render constructive religious, educational and social service”. Furthermore he was surprised at how much attention was focused on the imminence of war in Britain in contrast to Germany: “Our people are not afraid of the possibility of war because Germany needs peace, and we are certain that Herr Hitler is working for peace”.

The editor of the Methodist Recorder criticized this view of the situation and reprimanded German intervention and direction of the German churches. Agreeing with Melle that Germany had the right to choose its own government and public policies, he declared that it was also the right of those outside Germany to state that some of these ideas were “false and pernicious,” their dissemination, a cause of concern. “For this reason we do not hesitate to affirm that the persecution of Pastor Niemöller is the intimate concern of Christians all over the world, as well as of Germans.”

Nor was his a lone voice. Rev E. C. Urwin, a member of the TSWD and close colleague of Henry Carter, had gone to Germany and met with a number of “persecuted pastors of the Confessional Church”. His visit, it was hoped, might strengthen the “hands of their courageous Christian testimony”. Aware that the situation was serious for particular Christians not just the Church, he also inquired about Methodist families of “partial Jewish descent whose removal from Germany we are anxious to arrange”. Earlier attempts to establish the position of dissenting churchman had dissipated as quickly as they had begun. More recently, however, the position of those German Methodists affected by the Aryan clause had reactivated British Methodist interest and had led to a deeper understanding of the personal effects of ‘racial’ legislation on German nationals (and subjects). At this stage, interest was restricted to collating information, expressing sympathy to those affected, and trying to aid German ‘non-Aryan’ Methodists.

Indeed making sense of German Methodist attitudes to Nazism and squaring these with reports of persecution which included ‘non-Aryan’ Methodists was perplexing for Methodists in Britain. Rev. George Richards of Barnstaple, on his

47 Editorial, “Dictators and God,” Methodist Recorder, 10 March 1938, p. 16.
48 Special correspondent, “The connexional departments at work,” Methodist Recorder, 1 June 1939, p. 3.
return from Germany, shed some light on the matter, recalling his observations of the situation. He contrasted the outlook of Methodist theological students in Germany with their British counterparts and was struck by the differences between the two: German Methodists "were literalistic almost in extreme". Moreover, they believed that "God was using Hitler for his own inscrutable purposes".49

Despite these movements, United Methodism withdrew into a more domestic and introspective phase from 1936 as the more traditionalist wing of the Methodist Church reasserted itself. At the July 1936 Conference, the Annual Address made only an oblique mention of world issues. Its main purpose, however, was to encourage Methodists to rally on developing the movement's internal health and wealth. The international situation was "perplexing", but Methodists must not ignore the need to make the Church the centre of worship and fellowship and in this way enable men and women to find "rest unto their souls".50 This was a call to the more parochial concerns of Methodism, yet also, indirectly, an acknowledgment that Methodism was changing, diverging and polarizing. Two strands were emerging; one of which wanted to engage Methodism in supra-denominational issues such as international concerns whilst the other pined for a return to its older and traditional interests.51

Despite Carter's high profile involvement in Temperance, he was demonstrably part of an outward looking Methodism. Unlike many of his Methodist contemporaries he was dedicated to extending the reach of Methodist social witness into others arenas. As already shown, Carter was particularly interested in peaceful international relations through his work on the Methodist Peace and War declaration.

49 D. J.C., "In Nazi Germany: English Ministers Experience," Methodist Recorder, 21 September 1939, p. 20. Another Methodist minister had earlier commented in a book review on an aspect of German Methodist history that "It is unfortunate English Methodists know so little their fellow Methodists in Germany, as they might help each other to remove national misunderstanding and serve the cause of world peace. Moreover in many respects the German Methodists are nearer to the original evangelical impulse of earlier Methodism, and the simplicity of their biblical faith and practice resembles that of the English Methodist of an earlier period rather than the present day. Since 1897... the connection of German Methodist has been with America rather than with this country". See A. W. Harrison, "Methodist origins in Germany; life of the first Methodist preacher," Methodist Recorder, 8 June 1933, p. 20.

50 C. Ensor Walters (President of the Conference) and Robert Bond (Secretary), "Annual Address of the conference to Methodist Societies," Minutes of Conference of the Methodist Church (London: Methodist Publishing House, July 1936), 327-330.

51 As Davies has surmised, "Temperance... has sometimes been seen as the main concern of Methodism." But he continues "the real social concern of Methodism... [is] the just ordering of society, national and international". See Davies, Methodism, 157.
Increasingly, he began to refocus his concerns on antisemitism. Even so, some of his articles written with the aim of alerting Methodists to the evil of antisemitic recrudescence, revealed a form of reasoning that found the victim partly responsible for his own persecution.

On a trip to Poland in September 1937 to support nascent Methodism in Warsaw, Carter saw the impact of European antisemitism first hand. In his article subtitled “The Jewish Problem”, Carter wrote that antisemitism was the “most deplorable form of race hatred”. Recounting its “trail through Europe” over the past centuries, he attributed the latest outbreak of antisemitism to economic pressures and suggested that as increasing numbers of young Poles sought careers in commerce and the professions, they were blocked because “it is in these strata of working life that Jews have hitherto held a large portion” of the available posts. “Such facts explain in part, though they cannot justify, the hostility now directed against Jews as Jews”. In order for the situation to improve in Poland, he argued, economic co-operation was required. “Thus employment could increase, and [then] the tension between Jew and non-Jew at the gates of commerce and the professions [would] be lessened”.

As a significant number of Polish Jews scrapped livings on small holdings or in marginal trades, these arguments effectively repeated Nazi arguments of ‘Jewish overcrowding’ of the professions and ‘control of trade’ uncritically. Such arguments were making headway in liberal and religious circles not just in Europe but also, as Carter exemplifies, in general discourse in Britain.

Another example of this type of liberal antipathy was strikingly demonstrated in an editorial in the *Methodist Recorder*. Entitled “Jews and Christians”, it opened with a stark statement that defined Jewishness in problematic terms and re-iterated the idea of Jewish ‘separateness’. It boldly stated that: “The Jews have always constituted a serious problem to the peoples among whom they have lived. They have always been a ‘peculiar people’ and have not been easily assimilated”. Yet the rest of the text

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52 In this I disagree with Michael Edwards who argues that Carter lost his wider social witness during the 1920s as he concentrated on Temperance and that thereafter his vision never returned. Though this may be the case in the 1920s, by the early 1930s he was one of the very few Methodists that saw beyond domestic issues. See Michael Edwards, *S. E. Keeble: The Rejected Prophet* (Chester: Wesley Historical Society, 1977) 16, 31.
displayed a quite different tone from its opening sentences. Recalling the historic relationship between Jew and Christian since biblical times, it noted that “At first the Jews persecuted the Christians, but as the latter increased in influence and numbers the roles were reversed ... since those days, wave after wave of persecution has broken upon this unhappy people”. The worst modern outbreak of anti-Jewish prejudice was that unleashed by Hitler’s government in Germany. Moreover, the situation was one “which constitutes a challenge to all Christian people”. Calling on Christians to reevaluate the relationship they had with Jews, he suggested that Christians should “make an intelligent and sympathetic effort to understand Judaism” and recognize that “there is a failure on the part of Christians to appreciate the noble religious witness which Judaism has borne throughout the centuries”. Indeed, Christians were obligated to show “their goodwill to Jews by playing the part of the good Samaritan to those who have been plunged into distress through the action of their governments”. Referring readers to a new book written by a Methodist minister, the editor suggested that this work, “shows clearly how historical causes have combined with ignorance and prejudice to produce a situation so repugnant to the enlightened Christian conscience”.

Methodist reactions to antisemitism at clerical and editorial levels were complex. On the one hand, Methodists were highly critical of Nazi anti-Jewish actions, sympathetic to Jewish suffering and unwilling to appease German Methodist assertions of Jewish ‘propaganda’. Additionally, there was a demand for a Christian religious response, one that recognized historical wrongs of the Church in its relations to Jews. Christian precepts were recalled, such as the actions of the Good Samaritan, which was identified as a pattern of good conduct, to be adopted by Methodists. Indeed those clerics who engaged with this issue within Methodism (and Unitarianism), stressed the need to express Christian principles in concrete action. These individuals were generally a minority, but usually a vocal one, one that was also prepared to lead by example. Yet underlying these (exceptional) responses, were lingering and unresolved attitudes to Jews, typified by the language of ‘race’ with suggestions of the problematic nature of Jewishness and alleged Jewish activities.

Methodists (and other Christians) were not alone in these views of 'problematic Jewishness', nor were these ideas restricted to Christians, but were part of liberal discourse in 1930s. Overcoming both Christian historical antipathy and liberal ambivalence to Jews proved difficult for many. This was the case even in the face of sustained oppressive measures and confirmed reports of persecution.

Increasingly the discussion on antisemitism became tied to the movement of refugees across Europe and the need for an international solution to the plight of these émigrés. “The position is one which will have to be confronted very seriously, and as a matter of urgency, by the conference which is to meet next month [at Evian]”. Nor was Britain and America exempt from criticism:

It is not enough for Britain and the US to pride themselves on providing asylum for a few hundred scientists, men of letters, and distinguished members of other professions. There are tens of thousands of undistinguished Jews whose plight can be relieved only by the common sympathy of millions of undistinguished people, who have the good fortune to live in tolerant lands.57

Antisemitism was spreading across Europe, expressed in discriminatory legislation in Italy and Danzig. There was also news of organized pogroms in the Ukraine. These developments were a concern to Christians because they were happening in Christian Europe; “Thus does the wave of anti-semitism, originating in Nazi Germany, spread outwards across Europe -- a sad reflection upon our Christian civilization”.58

Continuing the newspaper series on his European travels, Carter wrote on another "Jewish problem", this time in countries bordering the Danube. Focusing again on the ‘concentration’ of Jews in certain professions, he suggested that historic reasons explain why in Hungary, Romania and some other European countries, the proportion of Jews in the professions - particularly in law and medicine - is much larger than the proportion of Jews to the whole population; and why very few Jews are associated with agriculture but many are shopkeepers and middlemen.

Supporting numerous clausus legislation because it reduced the “reason” for antisemitism, Carter was quick to state how antisemitism itself could never be justified under any circumstance:

People moved by anti-semitism, regarded it as a slight concession to the propaganda; others who feel -- as I hope my readers do -- that racial hatred of the Jews is an offence against God and man, regard the legal limitation as depriving the anti-Semitic movement of a potent appeal to the city population beset with unemployment.59

57 “Notes of the Week: Europe’s persecuted Jews,” Methodist Recorder, 23 June 1938, p. 3.
58 “Notes of the Week: Wave of Anti-semitism,” Methodist Recorder, 3 September 1938, p. 3.
Carter frequently avowed that hatred of Jews as Jews was inherently wrong. More significantly, he urged a Christian response, invoking guiding principles from within the Christian tradition, such as help to the oppressed. In addition, both for Carter's and the staff writers on the Methodist Recorder, antisemitism in Europe was seen increasingly as a poor reflection on the state of Christian civilization, and a source of shame. Despite the fact that antisemitism was characterized as immoral and un-Christian by Carter and other Methodist writers, there remained a tendency among Methodists to talk in terms of a real Jewish problem. In this respect, their failure to come to terms with antisemitism tacitly supported antisemitic prejudices.

III: ANTISEMITISM IN BRITAIN AND RELATIONS WITH BRITISH JEWS

On 4 October 1936, the British Union of Fascists (BUF) marched through the East End of London - an area with a large Jewish population. A fierce battle developed between the police and anti-fascist protestors around Cable Street. Reverend Percy Ineson reported to the 'I and I' committee on the outbreak of antisemitic feeling in East London and the organised attempts to inflame public opinion against Jews. A representative of the London Mission Extension Fund, Reverend Robinson Whittaker, endorsed Ineson's description of the situation. Carter and Whittaker consulted the President, who gave permission "to take any steps jointly necessary with regard to London (but not Germany)", maintaining appeasement towards Germany as Methodist policy. The President agreed that "(a) the departments jointly convene a meeting of Methodist ministers whose work is directly or indirectly affected by the situation and (b) a letter expressing goodwill be send to leaders of the Jewish community in London". The resolution moved by Carter was unanimously adopted by the Executive of the Methodist Church on 26 October 1936 and widely circulated inside and outside the Methodist world. It expressed Methodist willingness to build better Christian-Jewish relations and the need for Christians to act according to Christian principles towards their neighbours and fellow citizens.

The executive committee of the Methodist Church Social Welfare Department regards the present organised attempts to inflame the public mind against members of


61 IISC Minutes, DSR Papers, 21 October 1936, MARC 8/ MA 4761, JRULM. It is likely that the missionary committee cooperated with the 'I and I' committee on this issue. Minutes of this committee were not found.
the Jewish race as an offence against the Christian teachings of the Fatherhood of God and the universal Brotherhood of Man. Further, the executive would emphasize the importance at the present time of a clear witness by Christians against all forms of racial enmity and of practical expressions of Christian neighbourliness towards our Jewish fellow citizens.62

Carter also met with the Chief Rabbi and Sidney Saloman of the Board of Deputies of British Jews (BDEP). These meetings resulted in the BDEP reprinting an article on antisemitism which had originally appeared in On Active Service, entitled “To all Christians” as part of a drive against antisemitism. Increasing antisemitic activity abroad, and outbreaks at home, also prompted a suggestion that the subject be covered in Methodist colleges as part of ministerial training. “Mr. Carter suggested that the department should communicate directly with the colleges... offering the services of the Reverend W. W. Simpson as a speaker on the subject.”63 The proposal was subsequently approved by the Executive. Simpson had already been active in the field of educating youth about antisemitism through his involvement as Secretary of the Youth Council on Christian-Jewish relations and was particularly drawn to the plight of ‘non-Aryan’ Christians.64 Over a number of years he produced several pamphlets and books on this subject, consulting with James Parkes on various proofs, and liaising with the Board of Deputies for up-to-date figures on Jewish relief efforts.65 Indeed, Methodist relations with Jews in Britain as well as Methodist reaction to antisemitism in Germany and other European countries became increasingly tied to Methodist responses to refugees. This marked a change from earlier discussions where refugees were rarely mentioned, except in passing.

For Carter, Christians would be exhibiting their religious principles were they to reach out to their Jewish neighbour in need. In July 1938 he asked Methodists to join with other Christians as well as Jews for “a unique act of religious fellowship” on behalf of those suffering in Germany. This was to be a form of penitence for the “cruelties” which church leaders and the Christian church had “heaped” upon Jewish communities in bygone centuries. It was up to Christians, to reject past practices and

62 IISC Minutes, DSR Papers, 25 November 1936, MARC 8/ MA 4761, JRULM.
63 IISC Minutes, DSR Papers, 23 March 1938, MARC 8/ MA 4761, JRULM.

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involve themselves in the current crisis. Only the rendering of practical help to those who suffer grievously in their own land or have been driven into exile would suffice. The plea had one caveat. This appeal should not be seen as an attack on Germany, for true Christians wanted peace between Britain and Germany. This intercession was for those,

against whom enmity is directed -- Jews, who as Jews are outlaws and treated with brutality; Jewish (i.e. 'non-Aryan') Christians, equally the victims of this racial hatred; and clergy and laity of the Protestant and Catholic Churches in peril and suffering in Germany because of their fidelity to spiritual freedom. All these are our brethren. Their distresses should be our distress; their deliverance the subject of our intercession.  

Nevertheless, at the Annual Conference two weeks later, the TSWD urged that Methodists, as Christians, should “especially” direct their practical relief efforts to the needs of ‘non-Aryan’ Christians who were victims of this policy of racial hatred. A division and polarization of refugees was slowly emerging in Methodist circles. Christian and Jewish refugees were divided into different categories and Methodists, as Christians, were called to aid their brethren – fellow Christian refugees.


By the latter half of 1938, a general understanding of the extent of the refugee crisis had grown in Methodist circles through Carter’s advocacy efforts and the educational work of Simpson. Identifying Methodist responses to Jewish refugees became increasingly difficult to discern as several issues were linked: criticism of antisemitism, sympathy to persecuted Jews and Jewish refugees, and the active fundraising and practical support of ‘non-Aryan’ Christian refugee programmes. All of these were conflated into one ‘response’. Terms were used in inconsistent and inaccurate ways. Boundaries became muddied and changeable, and it was argued that Methodists were engaged in efforts to help Jewish and non-Jewish refugees when this was only partly the case. Over time it became apparent that while advocacy for Jewish refugees was certainly impassioned and forthright by a committed few, practical Methodist fundraising efforts were directed towards Christian (‘non-Aryan’) refugees. By being imprecise with language, possibly intentionally, Methodists used

terms interchangeably to create a positive image of what they were doing.

From what has been previously outlined, Methodist responses to antisemitism in the 1930s can be categorized into four distinct themes. The first was the need for Christians to recognise that they had a duty of care for peoples in need; the second, that antisemitism in Europe was a stain on European civilization and history; thirdly and more specifically, that Methodists should resist antisemitism as un-Christian and should seek positive relations with British Jews around them. Lastly, Methodists must not use the poor treatment of Jews by Nazis as a reason to sever links with Germans: it was essential to maintain friendly relations with Germany despite the flaws of the present government.

Reactions to refugees were more difficult to untangle. Methodist writers, consistently upheld the communal response of British Jewry, highlighting it as an example to emulate. Moreover, it was clearly established that Jewish aid efforts did not stop at tending to their own co-religionists, Christians were helped too. The need for a Christian response was accentuated by contrasting Jewish efforts with lack lustre responses by Christian Churches in Britain. The themes of Christian charity, neighbourliness and aid to victims of oppression first developed in articles about antisemitism, were recalled, in new discussions about refugees. The need for Christian action in the face of the refugee crisis was reiterated, and this was to be regarded as part of a penance for the historical wrongs committed by Christians against Jews in previous centuries. In conclusion, however, it was noted that Jews were not alone in their persecution, there were also a large number of Christian refugees who needed help and this should be a special concern for Christians.

For so long, the refugee issue was seen by Methodists as a ‘Jewish problem’. The Nazi regime had excluded Jews from social and political life in 1933 through legislative means and physical harassment. Refugees who fled these measures were generally (although not solely) Jews. Refugees and Jews from Germany became an almost synonymous concept in the public mind. As Nazi ‘racial’ terminology crept into the language of everyday use, however, the term ‘non-Aryan’ also entered the discourse on refugees. As previously stated, under Nazi theory, a ‘non-Aryan’ was a Jew or a professing Christian with a Jewish relative or spouse. As these ‘non-Aryan’ Christians as well as Jews fled Germany, the issue of aid to ‘non-Aryan’ Christian refugees arose.
But since the refugee issue was perceived as a Jewish refugee ‘problem’ any attempt to raise the profile of Christian ‘non-Aryan’s’ would need to refer to the difficulty and situation of Jewish refugees as a reference point to the issue. It could be clarified that Christian non-Aryan’s suffered not because of a fidelity to Christ but because in Nazi terms they were ‘partly’ Jewish.

Reverend W. W. Simpson, at an I & I meeting, called the committee’s attention to the plight of ‘non-Aryan’ refugees, “especially those who were Christian”. Jewish refugee agencies, he stated, had given generous help to some Christian ‘non-Aryans’, but the “Christian churches were often apathetic in their attitude to the Christian ‘non-Aryans’.” There was a need to bring this information to the attention of Methodists, he argued, and the committee gave departmental endorsement for a statement on this subject in the Methodist Recorder. Referring to the plight of the Christian ‘non-Aryans’ as a ‘Forgotten minority’, Simpson stated “that even more Christians than Jews are suffering for no other reason than that in their veins may run the blood of the race which gave us Jesus Christ, his mother, his apostles.” Over several hundred thousand, perhaps millions of Christians were affected, he declared and “Jews throughout the world have given and given again to the point of sacrifice” for the relief of their brethren in Germany. Moreover, “many of the ‘non-Aryan’ Christians have been assisted by these funds, to the great credit of the Jews and the great shame of Christendom”. He concluded that there needed to be more Christian action, “for it is obvious that the Christians ought to be the responsibility of the Church” rather than being dependent on the generosity of Jews who “already have their hands more than full.”

Months later, Carter echoed Simpson’s criticism of Christian inaction, stating that “Jewish organisations on a world scale are helping their oppressed fellows, but the Christian churches have yet to realise their responsibility for those ‘non-Aryan’ Christians whose loss is as bitter.” At the Conference in July 1938, a minute, prepared by the ‘I and I’ committee, was passed stating that in the event of a joint appeal by the Churches being made for ‘non-Aryan’ Christian refugees, “the

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68 IISC Minutes, DSR Papers, 23 February 1938, MARC 8/ MA 4761, JRULM.
conference instructs the Social Welfare Department to act in this matter on behalf of the Methodist church.” In a clear policy statement, the Methodist Church had declared an official interest in refugee aid, on the understanding it would be part of a coordinated appeal by other denominations, devised for the benefit of Christian refugees.

Three months after this resolution was passed, an interdenominational fundraising body was launched in the Jerusalem chamber of Westminster Abbey on 6 October 1938. Moderators of the Free Church Federal Council, the Church of Scotland, the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster were all present. Together these religious leaders formed the Christian Council for Refugees from Germany and Central Europe (CCR) with the aim of helping ‘non-Aryan’ Christian refugees. The new body was to be a fund raising and campaigning organization. Case-working was to be handled by the Germany Emergency Committee (Quaker) and ‘Bishop Bell’s Committee’ (The Church of England Committee for ‘Non-Aryan’ Christians (CENAC). Two Methodists were appointed as the Council’s leading administrators: Henry Carter was named Chairman of the Board of Management and W. W. Simpson was nominated as General Secretary.

On the day of the CCR launch, the Methodist Recorder ran a letter from Henry Carter headed “Thanksgiving - and the refugees”. The brief paragraph, outlined an “emergency call” on behalf of refugees. Those wishing to make “gifts in token of thanksgiving for the preservation of peace” (in reference to Czechoslovakia) were urged to give to the CCR which was working to “aid ‘non-Aryan’ Christian refugees” from Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia. Donations would be passed onto the new Council in support of the appeal. The ‘I and I’ committee, inactive since March, now reconvened at the end of October. Carter’s appeal letter had produced an initial response of £565 subscribed by individuals, Methodist Churches and Methodist societies. This was viewed as disappointing and the committee were confounded by

72 The Free Church Federal Council (FCFC) was founded in 1892. The Council was a loose network of local councils. Hugh Price Hughes (Methodist) and John Clifford (Baptist) were the driving force behind the organization’s genesis. Annual assemblies dealt with public as well as theological and ecclesiastical issues. A declaratory statement of Faith and Practice issued in 1919 excluded Unitarians. See: E. K. H. Jordan, Free Church Unity, 1896-1941 (London: Butterworth, 1956). Urwin, Henry Carter, 90. The work of the CENAC is covered in Chapter 5 and the CCR in Chapter 6.
such a poor response.  

One explanation for the lack of response is that the ‘non-Aryan’ Christian issue was not always clearly understood within Methodist circles (and beyond). There were a number of confusing articles about the experience of Jews under Nazism, and their subsequent flight as refugees which simultaneously called for readers to help Christian refugees. Typical of such an approach was one article which included a picture of people queuing for visas and a byline “These are our neighbours; Jewish citizens of Vienna queuing up to obtain permission to leave the German Reich”. At the beginning of the article, Carter established that there was a Christian duty to care for Jews, Jews were to be counted as neighbours, as Christians were neighbours. Midway through the piece, however, he referred Methodist readers to another group of people who also suffered exclusion. These individuals were Christian by confession but discriminated under Nazi laws for their “partial Jewish descent”. As a result they suffered “as all Jews suffer in the Reich”. Moreover, Methodists aided Jews “best” by refraining from bitter speech against Germany and by being “active helpers of those in distress”.

Jewish organisations throughout the world are striving to mitigate the miseries of those who are full Jews, nor - to their honour be it said - have they hesitated to help many ‘non-Aryans’. But obligations of Christian faith and fellowship are directly involved; hence the formation of the Christian Council for Refugees from Germany, whose task is to care for some of these imperiled and impoverished Christians.  

Thus, Methodists on the one hand were asked to view Jews and Christians as equal neighbours both deserving of aid. At the same time, Methodists were told that the need to aid Christian refugees took greater precedence, because Christian were co-religionists while Jews were not. This was doubly confusing when it was stated that Jews were acting on behalf of ‘non-Aryan’ Christians. Rather than suggesting an international solution to the general refugee issue was necessary, Methodists were informed that the problem was beyond the capacities of Jewish organizational resources and, Christians, in their support of “partial” Jews (albeit practicing Christians) would be aiding this wider ‘Jewish problem’.

With the advent of Kristallnacht, however, Henry Carter, leading the way again, argued for British government intervention, removing the ‘problem’ from the

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73 Editorial Letterbox, “Thanksgiving and the refugees,” Methodist Recorder, 6 October 1938, p. 21
74 IISC Minutes, DSR Papers, 26 October 1938, MARC 8/ MA 4761, JRULM.
75 Henry Carter, “Relentless persecution of the Jews in Germany: the call for Christian help,”
voluntary sector to the national and international arena. As “one fourth of the earth is under British rule”, it was the duty of “our race to accept a commanding part in the common responsibility of mankind.” Methodists needed to play an active role in fashioning government policy in this regard. Christians in alliance with Jews should lobby the government until the right policy was enacted, “I would ask that Christians should join with Jews, wherever possible, in discussing this vast issue, and in continuous pressure on the government to act and keep on acting”.

Yet while ultimately a political solution was essential, this did not reduce the obligation of the catholic (universal) Church “to aid Jews”. Reflecting on the past and the way in which “rulers of the Church inspired and led persecution of the Jews, in the very name of the Christ whose message is love”, Carter suggested that this was a moment of unique opportunity “to lift from the Hebrew mind the bitter memory of the wrongs done to the Jew, in the name of the Christian faith in bygone centuries”. Cooperative help to Jewry at this time would make partial amends for the past and henceforth relations between Christians and Jews could be “marked by brotherly understanding and fellowship”.

Indeed contacts between Jews and Methodists had increased since the shock of Kristallnacht. In the wake of the pogrom, the ‘I and I’ had formulated a resolution for the Board of Deputies of British Jews which expressed ‘abhorrence of the brutal and relentless persecution of the Jews”. Members of the TSWD emphasized their “intense sympathy with the Jewish race throughout the world in this time of oppression, hostility and sorrow”. Renewing an earlier appeal to Methodists everywhere, the committee asked its brethren “to seek opportunities for neighbourly co-operation with the members of the Jewish community, and to withstand any attempt by whomsoever made to arouse feelings of antagonism against the Jewish people”.

Cooperative action between Jews and Methodists was in evidence at a service of intercession held in South Shields. Attended by “a representative of practically every Christian denomination in the borough”, the service also included the ex-Mayoress, the town clerk and the chief constable. The order of service was issued

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77 *Methodist Recorder*, 3 November 1938, p. 12.
by the Chief Rabbi mainly in English and devotions were led to by the Rabbi M. A. Landan and Reverend W. T. Anderson of Westoe Methodist Church. “Deep feeling, larger sympathy and religious earnestness characterized the service throughout . . [this was] a remarkable manifestation of the sympathy of South Shields Christians with persecuted Jewry”.

As relations between Methodists and Jews became more frequent, the pressure for Methodists to act on behalf of the ‘non-Aryan’ Christian refugees was continued. Using similar Christian language and imagery, the editor of the *Methodist Recorder*, followed comparable arguments aired previously by Carter, he also stated the limits of Christian duty as well as demonstrating an ambivalent to Jews as Jews. Initially he spoke of Christian action for those in need:

Christian men spring to the side of the weak and downtrodden, recognizing in them their “neighbour” in the Christian meaning of the word. This is why the sufferings of Jews, confessional Christians and Roman Catholics within the German Reich are our intimate concern, even though we dwell outside the Reich.

The primary duty of Christian people, however, was “not judgement” nor condemnation of the oppressor, “but the succour of the oppressed”. Christians were not to criticize the actions of Germany but were to tend to the effects of their policies and in this way mitigate suffering. Continuing Methodist commitment to the policy of appeasement, the editor argued that reprimanding Germany for its persecutory policies should play no part in Methodist considerations of the subject, even in the face of terrible oppression. Following previous patterns, he continued that while general aid was recommended to all, Methodists had a “special responsibility . . . in relation to Christian Jews” and expressing a missionary desire, exclaimed: “Would to God that this were the faith of all Israel!” Thus while on the one hand, Methodist relief was to be theoretically inclusive, in practice it was to favour Christian non-Aryans. Moreover, there was also a clear expression of underlying attitudes to Jews as Jews, one that found continuing Jewish adherence to Judaism, irritating and a source of frustration.

77 IISC Minutes, *DSR Papers*, 23 November 1938, MARC 8/ MA 4761, JRULM; Open letter from the TSWD Methodist Church to the Board of Deputies of British Jews, *Papers of the Board of Deputies of British Jews*, 24 November 1938, ACC 3121/E03/281, LMA.
Whereas prior to Autumn 1938, refugees had received little coverage in the Methodist press, successive issues now carried articles or notices about their plight along with practical suggestions for personal involvement. On 8 December 1938, the day of Lord Baldwin’s broadcast appeal to the nation on behalf of refugees, the Methodist Recorder drew readers’ attention to the programme, encouraging Methodists to listen.81 An open letter was reprinted, bearing the signatures of Lansdell Wardle, President of the Methodist Conference and Robert Bond, another Methodist leader in his capacity as Moderator of the Federal Council of the Free Churches as well as other Church leaders. Asking for practical efforts, the letter outlined the many areas in which Christians could help, such as hospitality to an adult refugee or care of a refugee child.82

Yet other articles also appeared, suggesting that despite all the admonitions to become involved in refugee aid on the grounds of Christian principles and as penance for past wrongs, aid was not forthcoming because of lingering prejudices towards Jews and a view that Jews should help themselves. In this understanding of the crisis, Christian refugees were forgotten in such considerations, revealing how polarized and sectionalized the issue of refugees and refugee aid had become. Responding to the explanation that Jews brought on antisemitism themselves, Henry Carter stated that “To hate and oppress Jews simply because they are Jews is sinful and shameful. Christian testimony against his evil ferment of race hatred must be outspoken, continuous, and born by all the churches.” Addressing comments suggesting that refugees should be aided only by Jewish communities, he stated “it is often heard that ‘the refugee problem is a Jewish problem, and it is incumbent upon Jewry to cope with it without seeking outside assistance’”. Declaring this statement to be inherently false, Carter drew Methodist Recorder readers attention to a recently published article in The Times on 5 January 1939 which could be regarded as “an official declaration by the Churches”. Signed by the Archbishop of Canterbury, Cardinal Hinsley, Dr Bond (again as Moderator of the Federal Council of Free Churches of England), and Dr Black (as Moderator of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland), the

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81 See Chapter 5 for more information.
82 “Free Churches and the persecution of the Jews,” Methodist Recorder, 8 December 1938, p. 3. This open letter was also signed by F. J. H. Humphrey, President of the Baptist Union of Great Britain and Ireland, R. W. Thompson, Chairman of the Congregational Union of England and Wales, James Fraser, Moderator of the General Assembly of the Presbyterians Church of England and J.
piece made several points. Firstly, it stated that the refugee problem “had never been a purely Jewish’ problem, as it included ‘Aryan’ and ‘non-Aryan’ Christians in the numbers of at least 100,000”. Secondly, that up to now the greatest part of the relief effort had been paid for “out of Jewish funds without regard for the race or religion of the recipients” and thirdly, that the Jewish community had never asked for the assistance of the Christian churches, but on the contrary, churches had “felt that the time had come for them to play their part in the relief of this great volume of human suffering”. Moreover the fact “that so many of the sufferers are Christian, though this by itself should be enough, the refugee problem, by its very nature, makes the most insistent demand upon the charity of all Christian people”. This letter from leaders of all denominations seemed to suggest growing resentment to the whole issue of refugee aid, one not restricted to Methodist circles.

Reflecting some of the resentments that Carter’s earlier riposte had alluded to was a full-page spread in the *Methodist Recorder* which linked the deficiency of funds for missionary work with Carter’s appeal letter for refugees the year before. Despite regular pronouncements that funds raised were for the benefit of Christian refugees and not Jews, Rev. Harold Rattenbury, a Connexional Funds administrator, suggested that the subscription by Methodists of “some £4,700 for Jewish refugees from Germany” had adversely affected the department's ability to solicit funds for missionary activities. Continuing these misrepresentations he stated that since the “Lord Baldwin’s appeal for the Jews”, there seemed no likelihood that the present situation would improve. He announced that, “We cannot begrudge any of these funds one penny of the sums are they have received, but we wish they could have been raised without any reduction of the giving for that work of the Church which through bright days and dark days, must be carried on”. Rattenbury concluded that “Refugee funds, were never intended to be a substitute for, so much as an addition to, the regular giving of the Church”. Methodist leaders then, or at least those concerned with Methodist finances, saw the Jewish refugees as responsible for the

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83 D. Jones President of the National Free Church Council.  
84 At the same time, this was also a period in which many people gave generously to the Lord Baldwin Fund which by the end of December had reached £200,000. See Chapter 6.  
85 Baldwin funds were never restricted to Jewish refugees. See Chapter 6.  
86 [Italics mine]Interview with Reverend H. B. Rattenbury, “Deficit on overseas Missionary budget.
shortfall of their resources. An implicit criticism of those who had given to refugees ran throughout the article, one that stressed that the financial needs of missionary activity rather than the succor of those in need should be paramount in any charitable decision making.

With Methodist contributions standing at just over £5800 for Christian refugees, Henry Carter was determined that there should be a “practical contribution” from Methodism to the refugee situation. As joint chairman of the CCR executive, Carter had seen the efforts of Quakers and Anglicans through the Church Assembly Fund for Christian refugees. Approaching Reverend John Litten, head of the Methodist National Children’s Homes and Orphanages, he mooted the idea of a hostel for Christian refugee boys. The Germany Emergency Committee would help with the selection of 70 non-Aryan’ Protestant boys from Berlin and Vienna. A disused home in Ribblesdale, Lancashire was identified as a suitable site and it was estimated that for four years the cost of such a project would be approximately £13,400. Instead of passing on the monies already raised by Methodists, an application to the Baldwin Fund and the Christian Council could be made to augment these funds. Gaining the consent of the General Committee of the TSWD in mid-June, the ‘Riversmead scheme’ as it was to be known proceeded, aided by a grant of £6000 from the Baldwin Fund and £3000 from the Christian Council for Refugees. The £5800 already raised by Methodists was applied as the Methodist contribution.

The way in which this scheme was reported within Methodism demonstrated the way in which advocacy for refugees (both Jewish and Christian) was conflated with fundraising and practical relief programmes for Christian refugees. A front page cover spread in the Methodist Recorder on 22 June 1939 announced:

The Methodist church, through its social welfare department and many of its societies, is doing much to help Jewish refugees from Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia. Seventy children are being accommodated by the National Children’s Home and Orphanage in Ribblesdale, Lancashire.

The impression gained was that Methodists had contributed to a fund for Jewish refugees and were now aiding Jewish refugee boys: in fact, neither was the case. This confusion of terms and actions was continued through to other contemporary

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Effect of refugee funds on home revenue,” Methodist Recorder, 9 February 1939, p. 3.

Temperance and Social Welfare Committee Minutes, DSR Papers, 15 June 1939, MARC 8/ MA 4761, JRULM.
publications. The Minutes of Conference (the published record of events) and the pre-conference form as it appears in the Conference Agenda each had their own view of the orphanage project. The former recorded “the establishment of a home for refugee boys” as part of work “on behalf of the Jewish and non-Aryan victims of persecution and civil strife” the latter more accurately described the scheme as devised for “seventy refugee non-Aryan Christian boys”, while the TSWD report characterized the Riversmead project as “active service for refugees of Jewish ancestry”.  

**Conclusion**

In his review of Methodism in the inter-war period, Davies suggested that Methodism had been reunited “to meet just such a time as this” and suggested that Methodism would meet the challenges of the 1930s through “witness” to God’s intention “to build a new society free from injustice and war.” The “turmoil of Germany” was one such challenge and while Davies identified the period as one preoccupied with international issues, his assessment of whether Methodism met the difficulties of the period was absent. This is contrasted with another historian’s view of these times, one that views Methodist approaches to the challenges of the 1930s far more critically, characterizing it as self-satisfied, ‘resting’ with “a sense of rather elderly achievements”. In Adrian Hastings’ view, Methodism had lost its “sense of daring” and “caution, retrenchment, moderation and good sense” became the “deciding qualities of Free Church polity”.

Hastings' assessments certainly find resonance in the response of Methodists to Germany and refugees. Caution and moderation was expressed by the majority, and was almost total in regard to criticism regarding German actions against minorities and political opponents. The desire to appease dictated the content of most Methodist interactions. It was determined that when it came to commenting on reports of antisemitic violence and exclusion as well as oppression of other groups including

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91 Davies et. al., History of the Methodist Church, 363.
Christians after 1933, that the emphasis should not be on criticism but on aid to those who were the victims of such actions. Yet the ‘sucouring’ of such casualties of Nazi policies was also beset with difficulties. Advocacy and practical aid for refugees was limited to the work of a committed few who were unable, despite their best efforts, to bring both the movement and the higher reaches of the Methodist Church behind them except perhaps retrospectively towards the end of 1939. It must be emphasized that this practical action was never directed at Jewish refugees though it was portrayed as such on occasion. Methodists devised schemes for refugees who were “partly-Jewish” by Nazi racial criteria but were Christian by confession. Even this tardy approval by the leaders of the Methodist Church did not inspire a detectable public upsurge in Methodist action. The reaction of a small number of Methodist ministers on a local level dealing with home grown antisemitism was more successful, particularly at specific moments such as in the aftermath of Cable Street. In fairness to ‘groundroots’ Methodism, it is hard to assess the actions of individual Methodist chapels, their ministers and laity as so little of this action was reported.

In 1933, Methodist interest was gripped by a debate on a response to war which divided the newly reunited Church into opposing sides. Their interest in this subject was typical of other Christian Churches of the time where similar splits between pacifist and pacificist sections created similar tensions. As with other groups in this study there was a desire to maintain friendly relations with Germany despite her ‘deplorable’ internal policies and actions. While there was the chance of reigning in the increasingly militaristic and aggressive behaviour of Nazi Germany by keeping open channels of communication there was a possibility that war would be less likely. Once the number of refugees increased after Kristallnacht it was harder to maintain this policy and an international solution was called for by Methodists as appeals to Germany ‘better nature’ had obviously failed.

Figures like Henry Carter, William Simpson and F. Wiseman, editor of the Methodist Recorder through most of this period, were willing to speak out on the injustices of antisemitism, but this was often coupled with unresolved attitudes to Jews as Jews and absorption of some anti-Jewish and missionary attitudes. For the most part, they argued for a Christian response that recognised a duty to Jews as neighbours, but one that also defined a special obligation of Methodists to other Christians.
Towards the end of 1939, articles in the *Methodist Recorder* suggested that action for refugees had been a corporate response, the movement of the Church behind the cause. This self-assessment is not supported by the record. ‘Methodist reaction’ was more accurately speaking a loose association of individuals who responded to the efforts of a few men, who dedicated themselves to the general cause of Jewish refugees and the specific cause of ‘non-Aryan’ Christian refugees. Henry Carter spoke out about against antisemitism with a regularity and force not evident in either Unitarianism or Quakerism. He consistently spoke of a Christian duty to Jews, the need for the corporate Church to right historic wrongs to Jews. Moreover he called on individual Christians to reject antisemitism, help refugees and cultivate friendships with British Jews. He was supported in these efforts ‘on the ground’ by his younger colleague, W. W. Simpson - their voices were heeded by only a small section of their co-religionists. Indeed, it is significant that both Carter and Simpson held leading positions in the refugee aid network *outside* of their movement, finding greater expression to develop and enact policy for refugees beyond their denomination’s boundaries.
CHAPTER 5
THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND

Introduction

A Christian presence in Britain can be traced back as far as the second century AD, but the start of an organized church is more difficult to date. The attendance of British bishops at the Council of Arles in 314 signified the development of a Church hierarchy but the Church of England is generally thought to have been established through the missionary efforts of St. Augustine in 597 who introduced Roman Catholicism into the British Isles. From 1066 Roman Catholicism in Britain was ascendant and the Church in England was subject to Papal authority until the Protestant Reformation of the 16th Century. In 1534, King Henry VIII (1509-47), declared himself head of the Church of England (under Christ), broke with Rome, and dissolved the monasteries. While these changes, however, Henry did not create a truly reformed church, for his split with Rome was political and personal rather than religious, thus, in spite of separation, much of Catholic doctrine prevailed. Successive monarchs tried to make the Church either more Protestant or conversely, restore Roman Catholicism. Queen Elizabeth I (1558-1603) brought uniformity in the Elizabethan Settlement through the Act of Uniformity in 1559 and the Act of Supremacy in 1559. Doctrine was reduced to a formula of Thirty-Nine Articles which achieved their final form in 1571. It is from this date that the Church of England in its present form can be dated. As a result of the Elizabethan compromise, the Church of England or Anglican Church included a range of belief and opinion ranging from 'High Church' (Catholic) to 'Low Church' (Protestant/Evangelical). The Church’s relationship with the State is one of mutual obligation. The Sovereign, as Supreme Governor of the Church of England has a duty to uphold the beliefs and of the Church, while the head of the Church is crowned by the Archbishop of Canterbury. Other duties and obligations include representation in the House of Lords by Archbishops and Bishops as well as Royal and State ceremonial duties.1

As has been shown in previous chapters, most Christian groups in Britain

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when observing events in Nazi Germany focused on two main issues: the deteriorating international situation with a prospect of war and the struggles of a small breakaway faction of the German Evangelical Church; the Confessing Church. Methodists and Unitarians were particularly immersed in these areas, and the way in which this engagement relegated other considerations, such as a corporate Christian response to refugees within these traditions, has also been discussed in the preceding pages.

Anglicans shared these same preoccupations, but their deliberations were given much greater public exposure in part because of the relationship between Church, State and society created by Establishment. As a national Church, the Church of England had privileged legal and historical links with monarchy and government. In addition to this special status, the Anglican Church possessed an unrivaled countrywide spread of churches so that an Anglican presence was arguably represented in every community. Beyond this, to many it was seen as a religious institution invested with a “distinctive moral purpose”. Some went as far to suggest that it acted as the “professional conscience” of the country.2

Speeches by the archbishops and bishops in the House of Lords on national and international topics received coverage in British presses and were also carried overseas. Discussions by Anglican clergy and laity in various church forums were regularly reported in the quality press, considered of public as well as of Church interest. As a result, Anglican discussions received significantly more attention and had a comparatively greater impact than similar debates within the dissenting churches and movements. Anglican churchmen were able to reach far beyond their own adherents to affiliated and nonaffiliated, practicing and ‘nominal’ Christian alike. In this way the Church of England disseminated ‘Christian’ opinion to a much larger constituency than that of the other smaller protestant groups. In the case of the Anglican Church’s attitudes to war and its concern for the Confessing Church, these two issues moved from the realm of mere denominational interest to something akin to a mainstream national concern.

The same might be said for other issues. Lay and prelatic concerns with Nazi

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antisemitism and refugees became a concern for some members of the Church albeit as a secondary one. Nazi oppression of Jews, liberals, pacifists, socialists and communists was severely condemned by most Anglicans in the first few months of Hitler's accession to power. Denunciation of antisemitism and the persecution of German Jews was generally church-wide. The same arenas in which the Church discussed matters of peace and war, German Church independence or acquiescence, also proved to be the forums through which Anglicans raised the profile of Nazi actions towards Jews and other minorities. The concomitant flow of refugees fleeing Germany in reaction to Nazi actions also gained a greater degree of coverage.

Given this greater degree of engagement and prominence, it might be expected that the Church's response to the plight of these refugees would be deemed 'corporate' in line with Quaker and Christadelphian responses, but this was not the case. Refugees did receive comparatively higher public exposure than that generated by the groups previously discussed, mainly because of the public position of the Church, but machinery to help refugees did not evolve until very late and was not intended for the specific benefit of Jewish refugees. Nor could it be said that there was a church-wide movement for the aid of refugees, Jewish or Christian, on the scale of that initiated by Quakers and Christadelphians. Moreover, the interest in Jewish refugees was secondary to the realization that there was a growing group of non-political Christian refugees – the so-called 'non-Aryan' Christians. Their plight came to the forefront through the corporate work of Quakers and the efforts of a committed Anglican Bishop who strove to highlight their situation. In this, Anglican responses followed Methodists and Unitarians patterns; committed individuals, some high ranking, striving to engender interest, hoping to make the issue corporate, but ultimately unable to elicit more than pockets of interest within their respective hierarchy and laity. The profile of refugees in general received much wider coverage by the Anglican Church, but practical relief efforts were directed at a small group of Christian refugees, though they were often perceived to be in some way 'Jewish'. These labours were consistently frustrated by lack of money and insufficient infrastructure. Ultimately, the Anglican response, despite its status and resources, was practically no different than some of the much smaller and non-Established Christian groups of this study.

Indeed, the way in which the Established Church approached the issue of
'non-Aryan' Christian refugees has relevance to an understanding of its response to Jewish refugees and some of their reactions could also be applied to the other groups of this study. The Anglican response demonstrates how Nazi ‘racial’ categories were transplanted from Germany to England, and found resonance with pre-existing ideas of ‘race’ present within British society already underpinned (as was the rest of western Europe) by historic Christian feelings of antipathy to Jews in general as well as ambivalence to Jews as Jews. By following the Nazi example of dividing refugees into ‘racial’ categories, and subsequently favouring one group over another, the Church conceivably ran the risk of abandoning its ethic of universalism. Equally, the employment of Nazi definitions of ‘Jewish’, ‘non-Aryan’, and ‘non-Aryan’ Christian (the latter as distinct from the non-racially defined Christian) and the terminological inconsistencies, mistakes and confusions that often arose with these applications (even amongst those close to the problem) shows how uncomfortably some of these concepts sat within Anglican circles and beyond.

**Historiography**

The secondary literature regarding Anglican Christian response to Jewish refugees is significantly higher than that of the previous groups studied, with the possible exception of the Quakers. For the purpose of this chapter it is important to separate out works which deal with reactions of the Anglican Church to Nazism from the perspective of solely protestant church issues - most clearly expressed in the German Church Struggle - with the Church of England's response to other issues such as antisemitism and refugees. These issues are, however, inter-linked, insofar as reactions to the first often determined or influenced responses to the second. Much of the current historiography has divided these two subject areas partly because of the sheer complexity of their interaction. Historians have focused their historical inquiry on the Church of England’s response and involvement in the *Kirchenkampf*, thus it is not necessary to revisit this subject again, except as it affects and interacts with the central enquiry of this chapter.³

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³ Studies cover a variety of perspectives on the *Kirchenkampf*. For the sake of completeness some of the major treatments are briefly summarized. Richard Gutteridge examines the reaction of the German Church to German Jews, finding them wanting. Richard Gutteridge, *Open Thy Mouth for the Dumb! The German Evangelical Church and the Jews, 1879-1950* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1976); Conway looks at the Nazi treatment of the Churches throughout the Nazi period. J. S.
Individual roles, as seen in previous chapters, were often decisive in proposing policy to refugees, Jewish and other. All of the prelates featured in this chapter have been subject to at least one written biographical account of their churchmanship and in some cases as many as four. Most of these accounts were written in the 1950s and 1960s, although some have been supplemented by more recent treatments in the 1980s. Usually written by fellow Anglicans and churchmen, they have an insider’s understanding of their subject matter. The majority follow a chronological narrative that extensively details the lives of each figure providing a wealth of information in this regard. Many of these earlier biographies were written by men who had personal knowledge of both the era and the bishop they were writing on. Later accounts have tended to move away from more traditional narrative accounts, to look at their subjects’ political leanings, relationship to Church and society, religious thought, writings and social contributions. Such approaches have provided more nuanced views of these figures.

Five works look directly at Anglican reactions to Jewish refugees in the 1930s, some in the context of other Christian responses. Peter Ludlow addressed the question as part of his study on international protestant relief organizations. He

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demonstrated how successive attempts to establish programmes for Christian refugees were undermined by the failure to establish well thought out strategies and policies and then thwarted by lack of machinery and funding. He also observed that while Christian "expressions of dismay and concern" were public and vocal, nothing was actually achieved in the way of practical response for Jews, "but in fairness it was never the intention." Alan Wilkinson’s study of churches in the twentieth century, magisterially condensed swathes of material, including Free Church, Anglican and Catholic responses. His work looked at the positive performance of the Anglican Church rather than its limitations. Owen Chadwick studied the specific record of English Bishops and noted that most spoke out against the regime, but little was achieved for refugees and “especially the Jews”. Similarly, Richard Gutteridge, who as a young Anglican ordinand studied in Germany during the 1930s, covered similar territory and concluded that there was “by and large . . . [a] good record of the Churches in England during the Nazi period”.

Conversely, Adrian Hastings, in a large work on the history of English Christianity, has viewed the record far more critically, concluding that “[m]ost English Christians, clerical and lay, maintained prior to 1939 a most unjudgmental respect for their political neighbour, while they looked decently the other way from their true neighbour in his desperate need”. Andrew Chandler, focusing solely on the Church of England, suggests that Hastings’ verdict is overly critical and informed by hindsight underestimating Anglican responses. Anglicans, he argued, were vociferous critics of Nazi antisemitism and this, he believes, is inadequately acknowledged: “If the English Church failed to give to the victims of Nazism, it did not lack the humanity to be moved, nor the vision to judge and the voice to protest on their

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8 Owen Chadwick, “The English Bishops and the Nazis,” *Annual Report of the Friends of Lambeth Palace Library* (1973): 27-28. It is also interesting to note that Chadwick was at university during the 1930s and witnessed the unfolding of events as did Richard Gutteridge who was initially less critical of the regime.
While Gutteridge and Chandler make some significant points, Hastings' conclusion resonates with much of the findings of this thesis. The purpose of this chapter is to extend Hastings' observations and assessments further, to ascertain why Anglicans in Britain were not energized to act for Jewish refugees. The difficulties encountered by Anglicans in their attempts to organize aid for a specific section of Christian refugees, known as 'non-Aryan' Christians, will shed light on this question. This 'racialized' labeling which continued Nazi ideas of separation and segregation, and which in the Anglican context split the greater grouping of Christian refugees in two separate groups, is significant. That this disparate group of refugees became refugees because of Nazi racial policies is not disputed. The retention of this racial dichotomy is crucial and the way in which this impacted on perceptions towards all refugees is analyzed in the light of Anglican arguments that saw Nazi racial doctrine as divisive and contradictory to Christian principles, yet maintained some of these same ideas despite this belief. How this conflicting and contradictory approach subsequently impacted on refugee aid is then assessed.

I: INITIAL RESPONSES TO NAZISM AND ANTISEMITISM: 1933-35

There was no one Anglican response to Nazism nor Nazi antisemitism. Broadly speaking, Anglican churchmen were opposed to Nazism and its antisemitism. Nevertheless, there were exceptions and a small number of clergymen went as far as supporting Nazi Germany and the ideology behind Nazism and antisemitism, believing that Nazism was consistent with Christianity. Rev. M. Allen Yate declared that Germany was “a joyous country” and that Nazis were “Christian throughout”. Jews were “unhappy”, but that was “their own fault”. Rev. Geoffrey Dymock suggested that “Bolshevik Jews’ were responsible for encouraging Armageddon. A number of clergy were regular contributors to fascist journals including Blackshirt and Action. Rev. Evan Thomas dubbed Jews “a parasitical people, a veritable

12 These included Revs M Yate Allen, A. Palmer, E. C. Opie, Ellis Roberts and H. E. B. Nye. As cited in Richard Griffiths, Fellow Travellers of the Right (Oxford: OUP, 1983), 175. Rev. Dymcock spent much of summer 1935 touring the west country in a propaganda van, the 'Black
cancer to be eradicated at all costs” and Rev. L. A. Ewart claimed that “unscrupulous Jews” were trying to destroy the Christian faith in Germany and that they should be grateful to Hitler for safeguarding their lives. Rev. K. L. Kempthorne was a long serving local officer for the British Fascists in Falmouth. Overall, however, these men could not be regarded as representative of Anglican clergymen. As one church historian has commented, for “most” clergymen, “Fascism held almost no appeal”.

That said, Bishop Headlam, severely tarnishes this “by and large . . . good record” and his “advocacy” of certain aspects of Nazism within the Church will be studied in the course of this chapter.

Lay Anglican responses are more difficult to establish, however, the letter pages of Anglican papers as well as the established dailies provide some insight. Speeches of public lay figures, particularly in the House of Lords, give further understanding. Broadly speaking, much of this commentary was critical of the illiberal aspects of the regime exemplified by the suppression of political dissent. Violent attacks against Jews as well as their gradual exclusion from economic and public life were also condemned. At the beginning of March, “a reign of terror” signaled the Nazis “war” on Jews and was noted with trepidation by the editor of the Church Times, Sidney Dark. Jews were “assaulted, robbed and driven from the country” by Nazis who had adopted “Tsarist” methods. Moreover, it was noted, with “much regret” that the archbishop of Canterbury had not “voiced the Church’s detestation of such “wickedness”, in contrast to American churchmen.

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17 Anglican papers include The Church Times - a weekly publication strongly influenced by Anglo-Catholic traditions edited by Sidney Dark during the 1930s and The Guardian (not to be confused with the Manchester Guardian) - a liberal leaning weekly paper.

18 Summary, The Church Times, 3 March 1933, p. 251; Summary, The Church Times, 17 March 1933, p. 315; Summary, The Church Times, 31 March 1933, p. 379. Even so the percentage of newspaper space in denominational and quality presses on the German Church Struggle outstripped the amount of coverage give to the Jewish plight. See, Hampson, The British Response, 4; Also see F. R. Gannon, The British Press and Germany, 1936 - 1939 (Oxford:
Anglican newspapers were quick to inform their readership of anti-Jewish actions in Germany and to declare these acts illiberal and criminal. In order for any public or private reproof to carry weight, however, it was believed by many that such criticisms needed to be accompanied by words from the Primate himself. A bishop and a popular writer were the first to approach the archbishop of Canterbury, Cosmo Lang (1864-1945) with a request that he respond to reports of assaults on Jews in Germany. In mid-March, the bishop of Fulham (and Anglican bishop for North and Central Europe), Basil Staunton Batty, wrote of his concerns regarding “the campaign against the Jewish nation in Germany.” Promising Lang he would send further information as he traveled around Europe, he urged that despite the need for “delicate handling” the Primate should “make some pronouncement in England” that would voice Christian concern for the victims of these attacks. Replying for the archbishop, Rev. A. Sargent side-stepped Batty’s request, remarking that His Grace had not as yet received any “authoritative information about the possibility of persecution of the Jews in Germany”.

Similarly, Sicily Andrews (1892-1983), better known by her pen name of Rebecca West, prodded Lang to act “immediately” either publicly or privately. Declaring forcibly that though she was “without Jewish blood” nor “given to political activities”, she was nevertheless appalled by newspaper reports in the daily presses. Imploring Lang to act so that “the stain of guilt” might be lifted “from us of Christian


Cosmo Gordon Lang was Archbishop of Canterbury during most of the 1930s. He initially studied for the Bar in his native Scotland, but then went on to be ordained in 1890. He was Dean of Divinity at Magdalen, Oxford from 1890-1893, then vicar at St. Mary’s (the University Church) from 1894 to 1896. Lang was vicar at Portsea from 1896 to 1900 and became Bishop of Stepney in 1901. He was spokesman for the East London Church Fund from 1901-1909 and became the Archbishop of York in 1908. Lang was a member of the Royal Commission on Divorce and Matrimonial Causes (presided over by Lord Gorell) from 1909-12, signing the minority report. He issued the “Appeal to All Christians” at the Lambeth Conference of 1920. Lang was translated to Canterbury in 1928 and retired in 1942. During this time he created the Council on Foreign Affairs appointing bishop Headlam as Chairman.

Copy of letter from Bishop of (Staunton) Fulham (Anglican Bishop for North and Central Europe) to Archbishop Lang, 12 March 1933, Lambeth Palace Library (hereafter, L. P. L.) Lang Papers, v. 38, fo. 1. Basil Staunton Batty was ordained in 1896. He was successively Bishop of Bolchover, 1906-11 and Rector of S. Hackney, 1914-18. From 1914-18 he was part of the Church Army and then vicar of St. Gabriel, Pimlico, from 1918 to 1924. Batty was the Vicar of Church Chapel, Mayfair, from 1924-26 and was made Bishop of Fulham in 1926 and Anglican Bishop for North and Central Europe. He became Assistant Bishop of London in 1946. Following recent convention, ‘bishop’ and ‘archbishop’ will not be capitalized.

Italics mine. Copy of letter from A. Sargent (Secretary to Lang) to the Bishop of Fulham, 13 March 1933, L. P. L. Lang Papers, v. 38, fo. 2.
blood”, she suggested he sign a letter she had drafted as the “value of your name as a religious leader . . . would be inestimable”. The letter, to be sent privately to the German Ambassador, though critical of acts of violence against Jews, stressed the goodwill with which the signatories approached their appeal to the German people. Downplaying the experience of German Jews, it stated that the “stories” of attacks were most likely “rumours”, spread and “distorted out of all correspondence with reality”. Friends of Germany in Britain were aware of German sufferings under the Treaty of the Versailles; but these same friends were none the less “alarmed and distressed” to hear of Nazi actions against German-Jewish nationals. They sought reassurances that these acts would cease.21

Seeking government advice on a course of action, Lang consulted the Foreign Office via his chaplain. Informing Sir Robert Vansittart of the Andrews letter, Sargent prefaced that the Archbishop would not be signing the letter. Employing similar language used in his reply to Batty, however, Sargent asked whether “representations have been made, or are likely to be made, through diplomatic channels about the alleged treatment of the Jews in Germany.”22 While the Chaplain continued to downplay events in Germany, thereby minimizing the necessity for any response, Sicily Andrews continued in her efforts to obtain signatories. Having gained the support of both William Temple (1881-1944) - the Archbishop of York and Dr. James Black - the Moderator of the Free Church of Scotland, she reported to Lang on her progress. Again she stressed that the letter was strictly private and would not be published.23 In reply, Lang’s chaplain regretted that His Grace could not sign the

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21 Letter from Sicily Andrews (Rebecca West) to Lang, 16 March 1933, L. P. L. Lang Papers, v. 38, fos. 3-4. Rebecca West, OBE [pseud. Cicily Andrews] was an English novelist and critic who began her career as a writer for feminist and suffragist publications. She served as a political writer and literary critic for American and British journals. Her writings ranged over wide areas and included studies of individuals as diverse as St. Augustine, Henry James and William Joyce (Lord Haw-Haw). Many of the sentiments expressed in this letter, excusing to a certain degree, German culpability because of the effects of the imposition of the Versailles Treaty,24 were echoed across the Christian denominations.

22 Italics mine. Letter from AS (Chaplain) [Rev. Sargent] to Sir Robert Vansittart, 22 March 1933, L. P. L. Lang Papers, v. 38, fo. 3-4. It was as a writer for American and British journals. Her writings ranged over wide areas and included studies of individuals as diverse as St. Augustine, Henry James and William Joyce (Lord Haw-Haw). Many of the sentiments expressed in this letter, excusing to a certain degree, German culpability because of the effects of the imposition of the Versailles Treaty,24 were echoed across the Christian denominations.

23 Letter from Rebecca West to Lang, 22 March 1933, L. P. L. Lang Papers, v. 38, fo. 6. Other signatories included John Buchanan MP and Victor Cazalet, MP. Surprisingly, given Temple’s interest in social questions and ethics and his ecumenical position as chairman of Faith and Order, he was not as involved in the refugee issue as the other churchmen of this study: “Temple was engaged on intellectual systematizing and social policy, and the matter of international relations were in no way the natural subject of his reflections”. Chadwick, “The English Bishops and the Nazis,” 11-13. This would change in the year before war. William Temple was an Anglican prelate and Archbishop of York (and from 1942 until his early death - Archbishop of Canterbury).
letter at the moment, but assured her that the archbishop was in contact with the Foreign Office and leading representatives of Anglo-Jewry. It is uncertain what weight Lang attached to reports in the public sphere at this stage. Articles covering anti-Jewish acts had been prevalent in both Anglican denominational papers and the quality broad sheets since January. By the end of March they were almost common place. The Primates’ bishop for North and Central Europe - Basil Batty, bishop of Fulham, by now a regular visitor to Germany, urged again for an immediate response. The archbishop, however, anxious not to offend German sensibilities, trod a cautious path until the end of March when a debate in the House of Lords elicited a short but public response.

The Foreign Affairs debate in the House of Lords (primarily on disarmament and the effectiveness of the League of Nations) occasioned the first public expressions of Anglican concerns, both religious and lay, to the situation of German Jewry. Widespread newspaper coverage of the impending Nazi boycott of German-Jewish businesses provoked suggestions that representations be made to the German government. Lord Cecil (1864-1958), a leading lay Anglican highlighted the compulsory dismissal of German-Jews from civil service positions, their vilification in newspapers and incidents of violent physical assaults. Invoking the Berlin Congress, he stated that “the treatment of racial, linguistic and religious minorities is a matter of consideration for other countries besides the countries in which those minorities live”. At this stage, he stated, he was not calling for government action, but asked that more information be collected. The Marquess of Reading suggested

Temple was a prominent ecumenist, church reformer and theologian, commonly regarded as England’s “greatest” twentieth-century churchman. He was involved in the Student Christian Movement (SCM) and President of the Workers’ Educational Association, 1908-24. Temple served as Bishop of Manchester from 1920 to 1929. He was Chairman of Conference on Christian Politics, Economics And Citizenship (COPEC) at Birmingham in 1924 and was later Archbishop of York from 1929-42. Temple was Vice-President of the Church of England Council on Foreign Relations from 1933 and the driving force behind Faith and Order. He was Chairman of the Edinburgh Faith and Order Conference in 1937 and worked to bring the two church movements of ‘Faith and Order’ and socially oriented ‘Life and Work’ together (which eventually became the Provisional Committee of the World Council of Churches).


"Foreign Affairs," Hansard Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, 5th Series, v. 87 (30 March 1933) cols. 193-196. Hastings’s makes a very point that the Church of England was run by Lang in conjunction with the extended Cecil family, including Robert and Hugh. Hastings, English
that His Majesty’s Government should “let Germany know what is the opinion of this
country and what is felt by the British people.” It was “quite impossible” to sit in the
house and not speak out about the discrimination made against Jews merely “because
they are Jews”. As the debate was set to return to its main brief, Lang briefly
interjected. In a short speech, given in convoluted language, the Archbishop stated,

I should feel that I had been somewhat lacking if I did not here publicly say,
representing as in some sense I may claim to do the Christian citizenship of the
country, that I associate myself entirely with what was said by the noble and learned
Marquess.

Moreover, the Primate expressed the hope that any comments made by the
government, be done in a manner “animated by sincere friendship for the Germans.”

Though indirect, Lang’s comments were described by Lord Reading as a “lead to the
Christian world”. The Marquess thanked Lang on behalf of the Jewish community
who were all “deeply touched”.

Basil Batty declared that the debate in the House of Lords had given
“dignified expression” to the feelings of Christians in Britain and its effects were
bound to “do good”. More than that, here was a role for the Church. Not only should
it issue public expressions of sympathy, the Anglican Church might also use its links
with the Churches in Germany to support protests. Even without the co-operation of
the German Church, Batty suggested that the Anglican Church could “express our
abhorrence of this persecution on the ground of racial origin”. Batty insisted on this
because, as his report documented, the recent press reports were accurate: Jews were
being expelled from office, sporadic violent attacks had happened and continued. In
consequence, many were leaving Germany in a small but growing refugee exodus.

*Christianity, 252-253. It is interesting to note that Robert Cecil was known to make disparaging
remarks about Jews in private, yet he was the first to raise the issue of antisemitism in the House.
Wilkinson, *Dissent*, 97. Robert Edward Algernon Gascoigne [Viscount Cecil of Chelwood] was a
politician and internationalist. He was architect of the League of Nations and chairman of the
executive committee of League of Nations Union from 1919-23 and president from 1923-38. Cecil
was Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from 1915-1918 and head of
League of Nations section in Foreign Office, 1918. He was British representative on Advisory
Council of the High Commissioner for Refugees (Jewish and Other) coming from Germany from
1934 onwards. Cecil was initiator of the ‘Peace Ballot’, held from November 1934 to June 1935.
He was chairman of 1936 Church State Commission and was awarded Nobel Peace Prize in 1937.
Foreign Affairs, *Hansard Parliamentary Debates*, House of Lords, 5th Series, v. 87 (30 March
1933) cols. 210-212.

28 Ibid., col. 225 (Lord Archbishop of Canterbury). Also see The Times, 30 March 1933, p. 7
29 Letter from Lord Reading to Lang, 1 April 1933, L. P. L. *Lang Papers*, v. 38, fos. 17-18.
fos., 14-16.
While Lang continued to tread carefully, refraining from further public comment, popular Anglican opinion was less cautious in expressing assessments. Calling the Nazi campaign against Jews "cruel", the Guardian commented that the exclusion from public life of figures like Bruno Walther was utterly ridiculous. Germany was set to rewrite its own history "so as to eliminate the men who have contributed to her glory [merely] because they were Jews". In the wake of the Nazi boycott of German-Jewish businesses, the same newspaper remained critical but with less consistency. Now it sought to find reasons for the continued attacks. Echoing Rebecca West's sentiments, the article suggested that the Treaty of Versailles was "indirectly" to blame for the "present hysterical conditions" in Germany: a charge often heard in Christian and liberal circles. Germans were reacting against this inequitable agreement so that though the acts against Jews were inexcusable in of themselves, the underlying reasons were comprehensible and understandable: it was an outworking of German reaction to their own situation. There was also another reason suggested, one that related to the identity of the victims themselves. "Nowhere is it easy to absorb the Jewish population, for the distinction of race cannot be obliterated and the Jews themselves do not seek absorption". Even so, the piece concluded with the observation that Europe owed the "best part" of its laws and literature and "all of its religion" to Jews.

Thus, while fiercely critical of Nazi actions, the article sought 'rational explanations', and in doing so revealed sentiments which reflected underlying ambivalence to Jews as evidenced in arguments of Jewish 'separateness' and 'superiority'. Similarly, suggestions that the victim must be in someway responsible for his oppressor's crimes, reappeared intermittently.

32 John Kent, William Temple, 150. This argument was exemplified by the sermon made by William Temple at the opening of the 1932 Disarmament Conference in Geneva. Temple highlighted the war guilt clause imposed on Germany under the Versailles Treaty and declared that it "offended the Christian conscience". F. A. Iremonger, William Temple, 375-76. Chadwick, "English Bishops and the Nazis," 16. Carpenter noted how Temple was often drawn to the plight of the 'underdog'. E. Carpenter, Cantuar: The Archbishops in their Office (London: Cassell, 1971), 477. This liberal approach came under increasing strain with the suffering of Jews under German oppression during the Nazi era.
33 "Germans and Jews," Guardian, 7 April 1933, p. 231. This paper was a liberal Anglican weekly.
In hand with the Anglican print media, local and regional clerical opinion was expressed through joint platforms at protest meetings held throughout April 1933. At a gathering in Whitechapel, Anglican and Catholic religious speakers spoke out against Nazi actions against Jews. "As human beings and as Christian men and women”, remarked Lord Mount Temple, it was impossible “to look on in silence”, as a part of Germany’s population, “namely the Jewish section, was gravely threatened in its very existence.” Though not wishing to intervene in the internal politics of another country, men and women in Britain through “their human understanding and Christian fellow-love” were distressed at how “severely the Jews in Germany were suffering”. The Rev. Spencer Carpenter, Chaplain to His Majesty, joined Mount Temple on the platform to voice his agreement. To loud applause he called out “in the name of God and humanity, these persecutions of the Jews of Germany shall cease.”

Bishop Batty had, however, reconsidered the value of mass public protest and thought private action the better option. Talks with ‘prominent’ Germans as well as with Jews in Britain had led him to conclude that protest meetings might result in the opposite goal and induce further reprisals. Yet he remained troubled by the thought of inaction. In a sermon to his parishioners at the church of St Anne and St Agnes he stated that “we as Christian people” can not be “impassive spectators of the trial the Jewish nation were passing through.” As Christians, he suggested, we should “give ourselves to prayer” in the hope that those “who controlled policy in Germany might come to a right judgement in this matter.”

While Batty rethought his earlier approach preferring prayer over protest, other Bishops and Anglican ministers continued in active censure, passing resolutions against Nazi actions the length and breadth of the country. In Middlesborough, hundreds had to be turned away from a protest meeting because the large hall was too small. Those inside heard clergy from the Anglican, Catholic and Methodist faith traditions speak out against Nazi atrocities. An Anglican canon and dean along with local Anglican vicars spoke to a “vast audience” of Jews and non-Jews in Hull. The

35 “Religious and Political Leaders Protest,” Jewish Chronicle, 7 April 1933, pp. 31-32. Lord Mount Temple later became chairman of the Anglo-German Fellowship, an organization which was set up to promote good relations between England and Germany but numbered a good number of Nazi ‘enthusiasts’ amongst its ranks including his Lordship. Equally in 1938, Mount Temple resigned his post following Kristallnacht, citing his disgust at the recrudescence of antisemitic violence. See, Griffiths, Fellow Travellers, 182-186, 338-339.

Lord Bishop of Barking presided over a “mass” public meeting held at Stratford Town Hall in Essex. Further protest meetings were planned in Edinburgh, Norwich, Southampton, South Shields and locations elsewhere. At a service of the British and Foreign Bible Society during the first week of May, Dean Inge condemned Hitler’s attitude towards Jews, particularly in the light of the many contributions “the Jewish Nation” had made to the world. Public pressure, led by MPs and members of the clergy often in cooperation with other Christian denominations, continued to rise throughout the months of spring. Many bishops and their lesser clergy were united in their criticism. Given in the ‘spirit of friendship’, the resolutions condemned Nazi antisemitism as an impediment to the maintenance of good relations with Germany.

In contrast, since his brief interjection in the Lords at the end of March, the Archbishop of Canterbury had remained aloof from these protests, choosing instead to pursue private contacts with German churchmen and government officials in order to get ‘the other side’. In May the Primate had meetings with the German Ambassador, as well as several talks with Adolf Diessmann, a theologian at the University of Berlin. Both Germans had discussed, in unfavourable terms, the “reasons” why Jews had become so “intensely disliked” in Germany. Lang met with ecumenist Dr. J. R. Mott, who in conversation confirmed the prevailing public attitude against Jews in Germany, a view which Mott was bound to admit that he could “have at least some understanding of”.

37 Jewish Chronicle, 5 May 1933, p. 33.
38 Jewish Chronicle, 5 May 1933, p. 31. Dean Inge was a modernist theologian, who enjoyed a large public following and was popular with Anglican laity. He was also an avid and lifelong supporter of the eugenics movement and agreed with enforced sterilization of those deemed ‘unfit’ for parenthood. He was a sometimes vitriolic critic of many aspects of Judaism yet consistently stated that antisemitism was anti-Christian. See Adam Fox, Dean Inge (London, J. Murray, 1960). Also: Paul Crook, “Dean Inge and Cultural Crisis, 1899-1920,” The Journal of Religious History, 16, no. 4 (December 1991): 410-17. Gratitude for the ethical/religious contribution of Judaism to western civilization is a long running thread in many arguments. There may be something to be said, albeit tenuously, for a connection between the contributory argument expressed by Inge and the general idea of “Jewish utilitarianism” in the desire to favour only useful and productive refugees over those who did not possess identifiable useful or contributory skill and abilities.

39 Memorandum by Archbishop Lang of a Conversation with Adolf Diessmann,” 25 May 1933, reprinted in Andrew Chandler, Brethren in Adversity: Bishop Bell, the Church of England and the Crisis of German Protestantism, 1933-39, Document # 3:1933 (Suffolk: Boydell Press, Church of England Record Society, 1997) 46. This is a document collection of material from Lambeth Palace Library. Diessmann has played a leading role at both the Faith and Order conference at Lausanne in 1927 (in company with Lang and Bishop Headlam) and the Life and Work conference at Stockholm in 1925 (which saw the rise of George Bell, then Dean of Canterbury). Diessmann was not overly sympathetic to the regime so his attitudes to Jews are significant.

Other sources of information came from Anglican ecumenical contacts. Canon Tissington Tatlow, Rector of All Hallows, Lombard Street in London, wrote to Lang about the German political situation towards the end of May. He had received a detailed report by an Austrian Christian well acquainted with Germany and he now passed this onto Lang. Dr. Walter M. Kotschnig, chief secretary of International Student Service (ISS), had written a long memorandum on the German church situation and had highlighted the use of violence as a tool of suppression against Jews and socialists. Lang’s reply was disconcerting. Thanking Tatlow for the report, he mentioned a predicament, “I am in considerable difficulty.” A while ago he had agreed “at the request of leading and reputable Jews in London” to take part in a meeting on “the treatment of Jews in Germany”. The initial gathering was postponed but had now been re-organised for the end of June at Queens Hall. Lang commented, “I know well how sensitive the new German nationalist spirit is and I do not want to offend it”. Inexplicably, he continued, knowing as he did, “so much about the real situation in Germany” it would be “impossible I fear, to speak with the vehemence which the Jews might expect.”

Perplexed by Lang’s misreading of the situation, Tatlow asked James Parkes (1896-1981) to speak to Lang’s chaplain to clear up misconceptions and clarify the position of German-Jewish nationals in Nazi Germany. Following his conversation with Alan Don, Parkes wrote a detailed letter covering the various topics raised and quashing various Nazi charges made against Jews, some of which Don had himself repeated unquestioningly. The meeting at Queen’s Hall, Parkes believed, was “a unique opportunity for a declaration of fundamental Christian principles”, it was utterly appropriate that “a great Primate of a great Christian community” speak out

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41 Letter from Rev Canon Tissington Tatlow to Lang, 26 May 1933, L. P. L. Lang Papers, v. 38, fo. 19; Dr. Walter M. Kotschnig, “Reflections on a visit to Germany, May 1933,” 15 May 1933. Tatlow was chairman of the Student Christian Movement and International Student Service.
42 Letter from Lang to Tatlow, 7 June 1933, L. P. L. Lang Papers, v. 38, fo. 31.
43 James William Parkes was an Anglican historian and theologian. He served in Ypres, WW1 and postwar was active in student politics, the League of Nations Union and the National Union of Students. Parkes was also involved in the Committee for European Student Relief (World’s Student Christian Federation). In 1923 he joined the Student Christian Movement as an administrator and was later ordained as a priest in 1926. He was an administrator at the International Student Service in Geneva from 1928-1935. During this period he published his groundbreaking thesis The Conflict of the Church and Synagogue in 1934. This paved the way for further scholarship on the links between anti-Judaism in Christianity and modern day antisemitism. He worked behind the scenes to raise consciousness to the plight of Jewish and Christian refugees. For more on Parkes, see: Robert Everett, Christianity without Antisemitism,
against the "lies" inherent in Nazism. The term 'Aryan', he explained was a linguistic
not an ethnological signifier and the Nazi theories of 'racial' superiority were
completely spurious. Moreover, Parkes believed that a Christian could not accept
racial antisemitism because it was inconsistent "with the idea of the Fatherhood of
God". The Church in Germany was presently silent about Nazi actions against Jews
and therefore the Church of England must intercede on behalf of them. This was
particularly necessary as "no condemnation" would come from the Vatican, since the
Roman Catholic Church in Germany had made "official peace with the National
Socialists". Parkes concluded that the archbishop of Canterbury had the "weight of
official authority possessed by no-one else."

The Queens Hall meeting was held on 27 June 1933. For over two hours, men
and women stood in line for a place in the Hall. To take account of reservations and
concerns Lang still held, he took charge of the written text of the resolution. It led
with a convoluted caveat:

That this meeting, while disclaiming any right or desire to interfere in the internal
affairs of another country, and desiring that the most friendly relations between Great
Britain and Germany should be preserved, feels it a duty to express its opinion that
the discrimination now being exercised against the Jews in Germany is contrary to
the basic principles of tolerance and equality which are accepted by the modern
world in relation to the treatment of religious and racial minorities."

Adding that as Archbishop he represented "what might be called the Christian
citizenship of this country", Lang remarked (in seeming contradiction to his earlier
comment to Tatlow) that "we all know how, at this moment, as we sit here in peace
and security, that members of the Jewish Community in Germany are being driven
from all the State services, from posts which they have acquired by right of their
capacity". Jewish children were separated from other children in schools, as if they
were "unclean". Nations of the world were one community, therefore if anything
occurred which offended the common instincts, "every member of that community is
concerned". Moreover, he continued, "if it be true that on this scale, injustice is
abroad violating these elementary instincts of our common humanity, then it is
impossible . . . to remain silent". Those present in the Hall, Lang suggested, were not

Letter from James Parkes to Rev. Alan C. Don, 9 June 1933, L. P. L. Lang Papers, v. 38, fo. 32-
35.
45 "Jews in Germany – The Primate’s Appeal," The Times, 28 June 1933, p. 16; "Queen’s Hall

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assembled because of hostility to the “great” German nation, nor had they been “pressed and prompted” by members of the Jewish community. They were here because “our hearts already go out to them in obedience to the same common principles of our humanity.” Furthermore “not only the Jewish community . . . was suffering”, increasingly “our fellow Christians” were too: Roman Catholic, Lutheran and Evangelical alike. What filled the minds of the audience, Lang suggested, was “not a feeling of indignation at what is happening to the Jewish community”, but rather, “a great hope” that before long the German people will understand the real basis of national strength, that is “self-respect.”

Lang’s presumption that protesters were more concerned for the moral welfare of Germany than the physical well-being of Jews in Germany is jarring. The language of earlier comments which carried elements of qualification was further extended by this speech, reducing the impact of Lang’s more astute observations such as the separation of children in schools. It has been suggested that many Anglicans operated from a position of “sympathetic protest’. That is, they criticized Nazi antisemitism but continued to offer a hand of friendship to Germany in the hope that this would mollify and modify actions. It is argued that Lang carried this concept further, adopting a position of ‘qualified protest’.

In a number of ways, the Queens Hall Protest Meeting represented a watershed. Platform participants included public figures, members of parliament, leading representatives of the legal and medical professions as well as academics, writers journalists, civic and religious leaders. Together with private individuals, they had collectively given clear expression to their feelings. The meeting was deemed a great success, and proved to be the acme of united public Anglican action for many years to come. Response from the Jewish community was effusive. The Jewish Chronicle ran a six page spread on the meeting, reprinting all the speeches in full and leading with the title “England Protests!” Chief Rabbi Hertz wrote to Lang with “warmest gratitude” and expressed the “deep felt appreciation” which the Jewish community had felt for his “stand for Right and Humanity”.

Yet, after the heights of Queens Hall, Anglican interest quickly dissipated and

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46 “Queen’s Hall Protest Meeting”, Jewish Chronicle, 30 June 1933, p.28-29.  
48 Letter from Chief Rabbi (J. H. Hertz) to Lang, 29 June 1933, L. P. L. Lang Papers, v. 38, fo. , 41.
continued to decline dramatically throughout the summer and well into 1935, mirroring patterns in the daily presses. Letters to the *Times* by Bishop Bell over the period from June 1933 to September 1935 drew attention to the ever worsening crisis within the German churches, but references to the position of Jews in Germany were essentially absent. The denominational presses, so vociferous in their earlier denunciations, now concentrated column inches to other news, in particular to the developing Church struggle in Germany. Only an occasional antisemitic occurrence would draw a remonstrance from the Palace “associating” the Primate with other protests, such as the revival of the ‘Ritual Murder’ accusation, but overall Lambeth Palace was silent too.

The Church turned its gaze from criticism of Nazi anti-Jewish violence and the emerging issue of Jewish refugees to the deepening crisis within the German Evangelical Churches for much of the period beyond October 1933. The fight for the independence of Churches to operate free of state control and to determine their own doctrine and membership enthralled churchmen in Britain. These concerns were spearheaded by Church of England prelates. Anglican deliberations were thus increasingly drawn to the anti-Christian as well as anti-Jewish nature of the Nazi regime. In speeches to Convocation, Lang suggested that churchmen, “as leaders of public opinion”, could not remain “unmindful” of “wider questions” in the international sphere. Indeed, they had a right to comment on “the internal matters of another Church of another nation” because many of the questions which involved the German Church had much wider implications: the very nature of Christianity. Whether statements made in Convocation would have any impact on the German government or the German Evangelical Church was not certain, but commentary was

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49 For example, *The Times*, 3 June 1935, p. 15.
still necessary. Some of these arguments might reasonably have been applied to German persecution of Jews, but by June 1934 Lang was expressing the new mood within the mainstays of the Church with a near total focus on the Church issue. Furthermore, believing that criticism was more effective if comments on Nazi influence and pressure within the German Churches was combined with plaudits, it was not unusual to hear compliments on the relative bloodlessness of the revolution. Lang, on more than one occasion expressed “great sympathy...with the remarkable revolution” of Herr Hitler. Strictures against the regime’s restrictive and aggressive actions to its minorities were avoided. The adoption of various Aryan resolutions and the general persecution of the Jews was therefore not criticized in terms of what these actions meant for its victims so much as what it meant to ‘Christian Europe’, ‘Christianity’ and the ‘Universal Church’. Thus the ascendant Deutsche-Christen wing of German Christianity, a pro-Nazi grouping, had adopted a ‘form’ of Christianity which repudiated “the very basis upon which Christianity stands”. It was a very direct charge. Similarly Lang’s Presidential address to Convocation in June 1935, called on Germany to liberate its dissenting pastors from concentration camps and prisons, and reiterated concerns at the “whole character” of Christianity in Germany under the State. Direct language like this, however, was rarely employed for the benefit of victims of the regime.

Striking deviation from this saturation interest in the German Church came from the Lower House of Convocation when Rev. W. R. Johnson proposed that the Church indicate sympathy for all who suffered “whatever their nomenclature” and not merely dissenters within the German Church. Another speaker, the Archdeacon of Dudley, asked the House whether they had ever expressed abhorrence of the treatment of the Jews? These comments were the exception and this debate and others quickly refocused on whether discussions about the German Church issue might be confused by critics as a ‘political’ rather than ecclesiastical. Some in the Church were uncertain whether it was wise to intervene because of the possibility of misconstruction on this score. Their fears were overridden by Bell, Lang and others.

53 Ibid., 294.
54 Ibid., 291-96. Deutsche Christen sought to equalize the “blood and soil” doctrines of Nazi ideology with tenants of Christian belief. They willingly enforced the “Aryan paragraph”.
55 Hampson, “British Responses,” 63.
who were convinced of the legitimacy they possessed, one which they did not extend to cover the treatment of minorities until very much later and under specific conditions.

II: ‘NON-ARYAN’ CHRISTIAN REFUGEES AS A ‘CHURCH’ ISSUE.

As noted, Anglicans were affronted by Nazi antisemitism because it ran contrary to liberal values of freedom and liberty, denied basic humanitarianism, and struck at core Judeo-Christian precepts such as love of one’s neighbour and aid to the oppressed. For the most part, Christian leaders, ministers and laity expressed their disapproval vocally. But did the situation necessitate more than the biblical injunction to speak out for those who were “appointed for destruction”? Did the Church of England believe it had a responsibility to actively aid these individuals? As raised in previous chapters, the phraseology surrounding the terms ‘non-Aryan’ and ‘non-Aryan’ Christian, often applied inconsistently, elastically and even mistakenly, created confusion within Church circles and beyond. The term ‘non-Aryan’, though it could mean ‘Jew’, generally meant ‘non-Aryan’ Christian. Thus, while Jews and Jewish refugees were mentioned in various mediums by Anglicans to introduce the subject of refugee aid, these appeals, nevertheless, concluded with announcements that the funds would be distributed to Christians, and in particular ‘non-Aryan’ Christians. For those who maintained an unthinking racial concept of Jews (part of a common public discourse — and not restricted to non-Jews) this meant that they were being asked to help a ‘type’ of Jew, which was doubly confusing when it was believed that Jewish refugees were being sufficiently aided by Jews. To others, including many bishops, it seemed strange that Christians were to be aided when they reasoned it was Jews who suffered under Nazi legislation and it was they who needed aid. The fact that both Jew and Christian suffered under the legislation, and both required aid, was consistently misunderstood, at least until 1938.

In order to understand the reasons why Anglicans did not develop committees for the aid of Jewish refugees, a study of the attempts made to aid a specific group of ‘racial’ Christian refugees is necessary. The differences between internal and external perceptions of who was being aided will be examined as well as the internal tensions between universalistic and targeted aid. What emerges is the notion that the ‘Church’
had a duty to aid Christian refugees because of its standing as a universal religious body. This preceded the ‘general’ (Judeo) Christian precept to succour the needy. Moreover, the consistent reference to the ‘non-Aryan’ origins of the greater part of the Christian refugees reveals that some Anglicans saw ‘Jewish-Christians’ as a group distinct from the main body of Christians, further suggesting an unchallenging adoption of Nazi racial thinking.

Within a month of the promulgation of the anti-Jewish laws it became clear that these edicts could be applied to a much wider group of people than initially supposed, thus it soon became apparent that the overriding public perception that this was solely a Jewish ‘problem’ was overly simplistic. Due to the nature of the Church-State relationship in Germany, Jews were not the only citizens to be affected by the racial legislation enshrined in the Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service. Church pastors (considered part of the civil service) with recent or distant Jewish relatives also fell foul of this legislation, defined as ‘non-Aryans’ – neither ‘full’ Jews nor ‘full’ Aryans. While the full force of the law did not fall immediately on these men, and when it did, was applied in an arbitrary way (determined by local circumstances and conditions), those likely to be affected by the legislation expressed their fears to church colleagues and friends in Britain.

Herbert Bate (1871-1941), Dean of York, was approached by a Lutheran pastor in April 1933 who feared for his livelihood. His mother “was of Jewish descent” and because of this it was likely he would lose his job. In desperation he turned to Bate to see whether a position might exist for him in Britain. The Dean quickly informed the Archbishop of this “new development”, stressing how “this anti-Jewish fever” was now “attacking Christians of even distantly Jewish antecedents.” Disgusted by the news, Lang castigated the Lutheran Church for bowing “to dictation as to the qualifications for its ministry.” Bate continued to fight the cause of the Lutheran pastor. In July he asked Lang if a fund could be established “in this country” for people in the pastors’ position. Bate realized that such a project might be

56 Letter from H. N. Bate to Lang, reprinted in Andrew Chandler, 27 April 1933, Brethren in Adversity, 1933: Document # 1, 45; Herbert Newell Bate was a church historian. He was Canon in Carlisle from 1920-28 and was made rector of Hadleigh, Suffolk and dean of Bocking in 1928. In 1932, he was appointed dean of York. Bate was an important figure in the Faith and Order movement.

57 Letter from Lang to H. N. Bate, 30 April 1933, reprinted in Andrew Chandler, Brethren in Adversity, 1933: Document # 2, 45.
fraught with difficulty, but wondered if something along these lines was intended, perhaps under the direction of the Bishop of Fulham. Replying for the Primate, Chaplain Alan Don confirmed Lang’s sympathy with the position of men like the pastor, but did not know of such a “public fund” in Britain, nor did he suggest the creation of one. Instead Bate was referred to Professor Keller, a Swiss ecumenist who was believed to be organizing an international fund somewhat like the one Bate was recommending.

Jews also began to appeal to Anglicans to help with aid to Christian refugees. Helen Bentwich, a Jewish refugee aid worker, raised “the awful predicament” of tens of thousands of “non political Christians” who could not work “because of Jewish ancestry or a Jewish marriage”. In a letter to the lay Anglican Wyndham Deedes, she identified a role for the Churches and in particular the Missionary societies for “here are Jews who have become Christians, and are suffering acute martyrdom for it.” Those groups currently working for refugees, particularly Quaker and Jewish committees, “already have their hands full” and were in need of help. Moved by Bentwich’s appeal, Deedes passed her letter onto George Bell (1881-1958), the Bishop of Chichester. Bell replied that the letter had given him “a great deal of food for thought” and he wanted to know more. Already establishing himself as an Anglican commentator on the German Church crisis through his writings in The Times, as President of the Universal Christian Council for Life and Work Movement

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59 Letter from A. C. Don to H. N. Bate, 26 July 1933, reprinted in Chandler, Brethren in Adversity, 1933: Document # 11, 52.
60 Letter from Helen Bentwich [German Refugee Hospitality Committee] to Wyndham Deedes, 2 August 1933, L. P. L., Bell Papers, v. 27, fo. 1; Letter from Wyndham Deedes to Bell, 4 August 1933, L. P. L., Bell Papers, v. 27, fo. 3.
61 Helen Bentwich to Wyndham Deedes, ibid.
62 George Kennedy Allen Bell was bishop of Chichester and a leading ecumenist from 1920s to 1950s. He was ordained in 1908 and was tutor and lecturer at Christ Church from 1910-1914. He was chaplain to the archbishop, Randall Davidson from 1914 and was Secretary of Lambeth Conference in 1920. Appointed Dean of Canterbury, serving from 1924 to 1929. Bell organized Anglo-German theological conference at Canterbury in 1927 and Eisenach in 1928. He was made Bishop of Chichester from 1929 until his retirement in 1957. Bell was a leading light in the Life and Work Movement, (President and Chairman of standing committee, 1932-1934 and member of administration committee, 1934-1938). For more about Bell see: Jasper, George Bell; Kenneth Slack, George Bell. London: SCM, 1971; Rusama, Unity and Compassion. Bell is found in studies on the Confessing Church and the German Church Struggle, Hampson, “The British response to the German Church Struggle”. He is also strongly featured in Wilkinson, Hastings and Chandlers’ work.
63 Bishop Bell to Wyndham Deedes, 21 August 1933, L. P. L., Bell Papers, v. 27, fo. 4.
Bishop Bell had Protestant contacts throughout Europe; perhaps he could elicit support from this source.\textsuperscript{64} Suggesting a meeting with the Bentwicks\textsuperscript{21} in order to get an idea of “numbers” for a forthcoming meeting of Life and Work, Bell concluded that he wanted to be in a position “of one not only well armed with information” but also of one “capable of making practical proposals.”\textsuperscript{65} Norman Bentwich, heavily involved in refugee affairs through his work at the League of Nations, supplied Bell with figures, but warned Bell that it was difficult to say “what numbers are Jews and what numbers are persons of partial Jewish blood or Aryan pacifist”; however, what was clear was that the vast majority “are non-Aryans and most of those are professing Jews.”\textsuperscript{66}

Helen Bentwich further explained to Bell that the increasing number of Christian refugees seeking help from her committee were “mostly members of the Protestant Church”. The German Refugee Hospitality Committee functioned as a referral agency, finding hospitality and work, but mainly putting refugees in touch with a variety of organisations and committees that dealt with “specialized aspects of the refugee problem”. Bentwich noted that unlike academics, professionals, political or socialist refugees, there was “no committee for non-political Christians who have had to leave Germany because of their Jewish ancestry”. Indeed, the only specifically Christian refugee aid organisation in existence at the time was a Quaker committee, but their group was already stretched to the limit. Helen Bentwich saw the position of the ‘non-Aryan’ Christian refugee as “almost more tragic” than that of her German co-religionists, for “Jews belong to a community and are assured of the practical help and sympathy of Jews all over the world”. The “non-Aryans”, most of whom were “orthodox and professing Christians”, on the other hand, “are veritable pariahs who belong to no corporate body”.\textsuperscript{67} It is not exactly clear what Bentwich

\textsuperscript{64} The Universal Christian Council for Life and Work (UCLW) was concerned with the relation of the Church and Christian faith to society, politics and economics. This organization was a part of the ecumenical movement and developed out on the Edinburgh International Missionary Council of 1910 (as did its sister strand, Faith and Order).

\textsuperscript{65} Letter from Bishop Bell to Wyndham Deedes, 21 August 1933, L. P. L., Bell Papers, v. 27, fo. 4.

\textsuperscript{66} Italicics mine.

\textsuperscript{67} Helen Bentwich to Bishop Bell, 19 September 1933, L. P. L., Bell Papers, v. 27, fos. 9-11. For example if they were academics they were directed to the Academic Assistance Council, a non-sectarian committee which aided Jewish and non-Jewish refugees.

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meant by her conclusion that ‘non-Aryan’ refugees had no constituency to call upon, especially having specified that they were dominantly “professing” Christians. As Christians, they were members of the Universal Church and as such could expect to appeal for aid from other Christians: her assumptions in this regard were therefore unfounded. But unlike other Christians refugees such as Christian pacifists, the Christian ‘non-Aryan’ had fled for reasons that were neither religious nor political. Herein lay Helen Bentwich’s distinction and supposition – she recognised that they had left because they fell foul of ‘racial’ laws and were targeted under Nazi legislation not because they professed Christianity but because they were seen as ‘partly’ Jewish.

Bell disagreed with Bentwich’s intimation that this specific group of Christian refugee had no “corporate body” to turn to for help. They were fellow Christians and members of the Universal Church. Following Bentwich’s suggestion that Bell help with the needs of Christian refugees, the Bishop of Chichester set aside the idea of general aid to refugees and determined to target his efforts. He did this for two reasons. Bell, in common with many, believed that Jewish exiles were well served by Jewish charities who appeared sufficiently funded and responsive. Indeed, following traditional patterns of communal aid, Jewish aid organizations had rapidly established departments to deal with refugees within existing organizations or had devised entirely new refugee agencies almost immediately. On this basis, it could be argued that the Jewish organizations were sufficiently coping with the problem as it stood. Even so, Bell reasoned, Jewish agencies could not nor should they do all the work. The number of ‘non-Aryan’ Christian refugees was comparably much smaller, numbering in the hundreds rather than tens of thousands. Here was a discrete problem which could be addressed fairly easily and quickly and possibly extended as necessary. The main reason, however, was the disquiet Bell felt at the issue raised by Helen Bentwich. Jews who had converted to Christianity could not be abandoned, Bell believed, otherwise the very concept of mission would be bankrupt. Bell saw a vital issue for the Church, one that required a corporate response. His work over the next few years hoped to demonstrate that the Church recognized this essential point and considered it a central brief.

68 See Bell’s later letter in The Times in which he opposes “the introduction of racial distinctions in the Universal fellowship of the Christian Church”. The Times, 2 May 1934, p. 17.
Conferring with the well known ecumenist and missionary, J. H. Oldham (1874-1969), Bell proposed that his organization get involved. Oldham, of the International Missionary Council (IMC), disagreed. Having received earlier correspondence from Wyndham Deedes on the same matter, Oldham had taken advice from colleagues more involved in “the Jewish side of the things”. William Paton (1886-1943), one of the advisors, had felt that “the question did not fall properly within the scope of the Jewish missionary societies”. Any action in the matter, he believed, was best undertaken by the churches, and suggested that “the Christian Social Council (CSC) may be able to do something”. Writing to P. T. R. Kirk of the CSC, Bell stated that “surely we, as Christians, ought to be taking steps to deal with the non-Aryan Christians expelled from posts or homes in Germany”. The CSC Bell suggested, “could organize an appeal” but the real need was an adequate structure, a “definite organization”. To Bell’s disappointment, no immediate response could be elicited from the CSC.

Having failed to secure support from either the CSC or the IMC, Bell turned to The Times. In a long letter to the editor he described the wide-ranging work of the Universal Christian Council for Life and Work and their “grave anxieties... with regard to the severe action taken against persons of Jewish origin”. Because of these fears, an organization “for the relief of Christians of Jewish origin” was planned and ‘Life and Work’ would be giving its backing to the venture. The letter concluded with a request that contributions be sent to the Bishop at the Palace in Chichester.

69 Letter from Bishop Bell to J. H. Oldham, 26 September 1933, L. P. L. Bell Papers, v. 27, fo.,16; Letter from J. H. Oldham to Bishop Bell, 27 September 1933, L. P. L. Bell Papers, v. 27, fo.,21. Edinburgh House was the London head office of the IMC at this time. J. H. Oldham was an well known ecumenist. In 1910 he was appointed Executive Secretary of the World Missionary Conference - held in Edinburgh. From 1911 he was Secretary of its Continuing Committee and then Secretary in 1921 of the organisation which replaced the committee, the International Missionary Council. In 1934 he became chairman of the research commission which prepared the Church, Community and State conference of 1937 held in Oxford. Oldham helped draught the constitution of the new World Council of Churches. William Paton was also an ecumenicist and a Presbyterian minister and writer on missionary subjects. He was Missionary Secretary of the Student Christian Movement from 1911 and General Secretary of the National Christian Council of India, Burma and Ceylon from 1922 to 1927. Paton was Secretary of the International Missionary Council in London and editor of the International Review of Missions.

70 Letter from Bishop Bell to P. T. R. Kirk, 26 September 1933, L. P. L. Bell Papers, v. 27, fo.,15. The Christian Social Council was the national representative body of Life and Work in the UK from September 1929. It coexisted alongside the more effective National Council of the World Alliance for Promoting Friendship through the Churches (see Chapter 2). These two bodies amalgamated in 1936 to form the British Christian Council for International Friendship of Life and Work. Bell and Dr. A. E. Garvie were joint presidents. Jasper, Bell, p. 225.

71 “Church and State in Europe: The Jewish Question,” The Times, 4 October 1933, p. 8.
Having seen Bell’s letter in *The Times*, Rev. H. W. Fox,72 Travelling Secretary of the British Council of the World Alliance for International Friendship through the Churches (WAIFC/ ‘Alliance’), drew Bell’s attention to an earlier resolution his own organization had passed on “The Persecution of Jews in Germany”. This statement had affirmed the “super-racial nature of the gospel” and deplored “the treatment inflicted in Germany” to its citizens “who are of Jewish origin or have Jews in their families.” It had protested at the ‘Aryan paragraph’ which disqualified pastors and church officers “who through a mere chance of their birth are non-Aryans”. It was the conviction of the Alliance “that this action is altogether in contradiction to the teaching and the spirit of the gospel of Jesus.”73 The statement on closer inspection was more a commentary on the place of ‘non-Aryan’ Christians in Germany than an analysis on the position of Jews *per se*, despite its title. Its particular concern was the jurisdiction of the church over its own matters, areas of interest that echoed those raised by Bell in ‘Life and Work’. Seemingly interested in the same areas, an alliance between the two men seem sensible. Fox further informed Bell of a meeting in Albert Hall the previous evening called by four relief bodies already active in refugee aid. He suggested that the projected committee for ‘non-Aryan’ Christians考虑 cooperating with this existing grouping. Fox concluded with a promise to raise the matter with the Alliance and at a forthcoming meeting of the Anglican Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) of which he was also a member.74 Cooperative work would pool resources, prevent duplication and strengthen lobbying powers, the outcome of which it was hoped would ultimately produce greater funds.

The letter pages of *The Times* were fast becoming unofficial Church information exchanges and campaign sheets for churchmen of all denominations.75

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72 Henry Watson Fox was an Anglican administrator and writer. He was Canon of St. Peters, Oxford from 1896 to 1899 and Holy Trinity, Tunbridge Wells, 1899-1901. He was vicar of Legbourne, from 1901 to 1905, then Rector of Lower Cawthorpe, 1902-05. Fox was incumbent of St Jaspers, District Chairman Streatham from 1905 to 1909 and rector of St. Peters Oxford from 1909 to 1913. He was temporary chaplain to the Forces, 1914-1919 and Honorary Secretary of the (British Council) of the WAIFC. He was member of the Church of England Council on Foreign Affairs.


74 Letter from Rev. H. W. Fox to Bishop Bell, 4 October 1933, L. P. L. Bell Papers, v. 27, fo., 30. Fox is referring to a meeting of 3 October 1933 at which Einstein spoke in support of the GRAF, a union of four organizations formed for fundraising purposes, see Chapter 1. The CFR is discussed in the next section of this chapter.

75 Daphne Hampson noted that the *Times* was “the most reliable way” to acquire Church news in Germany itself. Hampson, “The British Response,” 21.
A letter by James Lockhart and W. Lewis Robertson, both Free Churchmen, suggested as Bell had done the previous day, that an organization be formed to help those who are “Jews by race, but adhere to some form of Christianity.” It was hoped that the “excellent provision” made by the Jewish community in Britain might be matched by Christians and the funds dedicated to Christian ‘non-Aryans’. These letters indicate that clergy believed that Jewish organisations were active in the field addressing the needs of Jews and others and, though not stated explicitly suggest indirectly, that Jewish aid groups did not need additional help from Christians.

Following up Robertson’s suggestion, Bishop Bell informed him of his efforts to create a body for the ‘non-Aryan’ Christian refugees. The IMC had ruled out any involvement and the CSC were still considering their response.  

Concerned that the proposition for a committee might be overly delayed if he awaited decisions from WAIFC, CSC and the CFR, Bell turned to his international contacts such as Adolf Keller of the European Central Office for Inter-Church Aid (EICA) and Henry Henriod of the UCLW. It was apparent, however, that there was little interest for Bell’s ideas. Instead, an appeal for Christian refugees was determined as the better option at this stage as a committee seemed too ambitious.

Just as the situation appeared at an standstill, Rev. H.W. Fox of WAIFC informed Bell that the Alliance had agreed to “act as a clearing house for any relief that may [be] undertaken by the churches”, however the appeal “should be exclusively for refugees who are members of the Christian Church and not only for Jewish-Christians.” Once again Fox suggested that they might join forces with GRAF.

Bell did not agree. Under the (incorrect) impression that the composite body of non-sectarian committees funded only Jewish refugees, Bell felt that any appeal for funds for ‘non-Aryan’ Christians should be timed separately, stating abruptly that “Jews as a rule prefer to give the money to Jews only.” It was a disheartening

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76 Letter to the Editor, “Refugees from Germany,” The Times, 5 October 1933, p. 8; Hugh Cecil, ibid. James Lockhart was President of the National Free Church Council and W. Lewis Robertson, Moderator of the Federal Council of the Free Churches.
77 Letter from Bishop Bell to Robertson, 5 October 1933, L. P. L. Bell Papers, v. 27, fo. ,32.
78 Letter from Adolf Keller to Bishop Bell, 7 October 1933, L. P. L. Bell Papers, v. 27, fo. ,45. Also see Peter W. Ludlow, “The Refugee problem,” 564-603. Adolf Keller was an academic and Swiss author on European Protestantism. Letter from Bishop Bell to H. L. Henridt, 10 October 1933, L. P. L. Bell Papers, v. 27, fo. ,55. ‘Jewish-Christian’ (as distinct from ‘Hebrew-Christians’) is another term for ‘non-Aryan’ Christians.
80 Letter from Bell to Rev. Fox, 13 October 1933, L. P. L. Bell Papers, v. 27, fo. ,76
comment from one who would subsequently use the example of Jewish action for Christian refugees in subsequent appeals to Christians for aid to ‘non-Aryan’ Christian refugees. It was also at odds with information provided by Helen Bentwich in her correspondence to the Bishop.

There were those who pressed for an immediate appeal. Sir Leon Levison, President of the International Hebrew-Christian Alliance in Edinburgh, attested that there were as many as 1.5 million German people who could be traced back to “Jewish decent” in their second and third generations. Moreover, this figure excluded 20,000 Hebrew-Christians. Levison believed (like Bell) that a separate agency should be established, complaining that “the Jewish people absolutely refuse to assist the Hebrew-Christians from their funds”. After three months embroiled in attempts to establish a corporate Church response for a specific group of Christians, the language of ‘race’ was common place. Christian refugees were categorized according to their degree of Jewish ‘blood’ and appeals were likewise seen in terms, often incorrectly, of their likely recipients – either ‘Jewish’ or ‘non Aryan’ Christian. Indeed, when the bishop of Chichester reported to Lang of his progress, he characterized an up and coming GRAF appeal as just “for the Jews” (when it was not) whereas he believed that what was required was “a Christian appeal for Christians”.

By October 1933, Bell could see that separate machinery at this stage would be a non-starter. Existing organizations considered suitable for the task were for one reason or another unable to institute administrative structures for this purpose. Procrastination by the heads of the various Church bodies consulted by Bell dogged his attempts to move forward. Having settled for a relief appeal as opposed to an aid committee, and seeing growing support for this approach, he returned to the Christian Social Council to see if they would disseminate the funds. Malcolm Spencer reported that while the CSC was interested in aiding ‘non-Aryan’ Christians, it was not the

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81 Letter from Levison to Bell, 12 October 1933, L. P. L. Bell Papers, v. 27, fo. 69; Levison’s charges are refuted by Helen Bentwich’s letters. Bell later agreed with William Temple’s assessment of Levison as “ineffective”. Letter from William Temple to Bell, 30 October 1933, L. P. L. Bell Papers, v. 27, fo. 135.

82 Letter from Bell to Levison, 13 October 1933, L. P. L. Bell Papers, v. 27, fo. 79.
body to take the lead. Should the World Alliance get involved, however, it would be willing to lend a hand. The WAIFC, on the other hand, though agreeing in principle, thought it “premature” to mention the British Council of the World Alliance as a receiving office for offers of hospitality or financial assistance, thus reneging on its earlier offers. WAIFC had understood that an appeal to the Churches for refugees would be issued by the archbishop of Canterbury. Until the Primate made such an appeal, giving it “the support of his authority”, it would be precipitous to proceed. Otherwise, WAIFC were “of course completely in sympathy” with the efforts of the Bishop of Chichester.

In the meanwhile, James McDonald, newly appointed High Commissioner for Refugees, had met with Bishop Bell and other Church leaders around Europe throughout the autumn of 1933. He pressed for a coordinated European and American Christmas Appeal to be made through their respective national and independent Churches on behalf of all refugees. He wanted the entire refugee issue to “be recognised as a concern of all communities and not as a Jewish problem only”.

Seeing a joint Churches appeal as the only way forward for the needs of Christian refugees, Bell set about planning the Christmas appeal, but was thwarted yet again when he divided with the Archbishop on emphasis. His Grace “expressed a wish to appeal to all kinds of refugees without distinction of religion” in keeping with McDonald’s vision. Bell agreed, but felt it was necessary to safeguard “the interests of the non-Aryan Christians” in the allocation of funds. James Parkes, administrator for the International Student Service, did not support the idea of funding distinctions between refugees. He pointed out that until now the established organisations “have so little emphasized discrimination, it seems to me it would be a pity for Churches appeals to do so”. Stung by Parkes’ criticism, Bell replied that

There has never been any intention, as far as I know, of discriminating between the victims of the present regime on the part of the Church. What I hope is that the Churches may make a special appeal to their own constituencies at Christmas time and that this appeal will be for every kind of victim, and by mentioning the fact that the victims are both Jewish and non-Jewish, show that the responsibility of Christians is very wide.

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83 Letter from Bell to Lang, 13 October 1933, L. P. L. Lang Papers, v. 38, fo. 70.
85 Letter from Burlingham to Duncan-Jones, October 1933, L. P. L. Bell Papers, v. 27, fo. 128.
86 Letter from Bell to Henriod, 14 November 1933, L. P. L. Bell Papers, v. 27, fo. 148.
87 Letter from Bell to Lang, 20 November 1933, L. P. L., Bell Papers, v. 27, fo. 170.
89 Letter from Bell to Henriod, 20 November 1933, L. P. L., Bell Papers, v. 27, fo. 172.
Lang, meanwhile, wavered on the date for a collection. Don informed Bell that His Grace did not feel that “he has any right actually to appoint any particular day”. Instead the chaplain continued, “all he feels able to do is to suggest that on some particular Sunday, Church people should be invited to make offerings for the relief of German refugees”.  

Rather that combine efforts, it was decided that two separate appeals be issued, one in Britain and the another through the member Churches of Bell’s UCLW. The British appeal was drawn up by H. W. Fox and addressed to “All Christian men and women”. Published in all the daily and denominational newspapers in mid-December, it asked for help to aid “those who have fled to this and other lands from persecution in Germany”. It was estimated that there were 70,000 exiles “of all classes and all creeds”. It continued that Christmas was the season of ‘peace and goodwill’, and the needs of the oppressed and destitute, including young children, “make a very special claim upon our sympathy and generosity.” Churchmen from all denominations signed the appeal.  

The second appeal was written by Bishop Bell and sent in the capacity of his role of President of Life and Work. It appealed to “Christians this Christmas time”. A new call comes to Christians this Christmas time. It is a call for help from those who are suffering because there is no room for them in Germany... All Christians are of Jewish descent in the spirit, for the Christian religion has its roots in Palestine. All Jews suffering today have accordingly a claim upon the sympathy of Christians. And Christians of Jewish descent in the flesh, a special claim... In allocating the funds, special consideration will be given to the needs of Christians of Jewish origin.  

In closing his appeal, Bell suggested that the monies raised by the Churches, “will be a welcome proof of the true ecumenical and Christian spirit which beneath all differences of race and class sees in every man a brother.” Despite the considerable efforts of both Bell and Fox, extensive media coverage, the backing of the heads of the Anglican and Free Churches, the appeal raised approximately

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90 Letter from A. C. Don to Bell, 28 November 1933, L. P. L., Bell Papers, v. 27, fo., 207.
91 “Christmas Appeal for German Refugees” addressed to “All Christian men and women,” signed by William Ebor, Cosmo Cantuar, R. Rowntree Clifford, President of the Baptist Union of Great Britain and Ireland; H. Elvet Lewis, Chairman of the Congregational Union of England and Wales; Fredrick Luke Wiseman, President of the Methodist Conference; Charles C. Goodlet, Moderator of the Presbyterian Church of England; Peter Hughes Griffiths, Moderator of the Church of Wales, December 1933, L. P. L., Bell Papers, v. 27, fo., 253. Funds for GRAF were also elicited in the same appeal.
92 “German Refugees: an Appeal to the Constituent Churches from the President of the Universal Christian Council for Life and Work,” 8 December 1933, L. P. L., Bell Papers, v. 43, fo. 35-36.
£11,000. This total sum was considered so paltry to that raised by contemporary appeals of the Jewish community that it was agreed that the figure would not be published.  

Following the unfavorable outcome of the Christmas appeal, Bell returned to discussions with William Paton, J. H. Oldham and others. Reports were produced on the outlook for German Christian refugees now variously called “non-Jewish, non-Aryans”, “Jews”, “non-Aryan Christians”, “Jewish-Christians” and “non-Jews”: all were bound together by their common confession Christianity, but none were referred to simply as ‘Christians’. While none of the participants identified their target group in the same terms, they all felt it necessary to distinguish this grouping of Christian refugees in racial as well as religious language. Terminological considerations apart, discussions were limited to information collation rather than specific plans for policies and procedures. It was acknowledged that Christian refugees represented approximately 10-15% of refugee figures and the ‘non-Aryan’ sub-grouping constituted the greater part of this figure. Among the group of self-appointed individuals anxious to effect change, uncertainty lingered as to why most Christians were not reacting to the refugee issue. Despite their interest in the subject, developing practical machinery was beset with difficulty, producing confusion, embarrassment and a degree of inertia. James McDonald regretted “the failure of the Christian conscience to assume its share of responsibility to the refugees”. Moreover, he expressed his concern that Jewish refugee agencies were almost single-handedly shouldering the burden of financial aid to refugees, independent of religious adherence of the recipients. At the same meeting held in the summer of 1934, Rev. H. Livessy decried the differentiation made between Christian and Jew. “The question was persecution, whether religious or political. People in need should be helped, whether Jews, Turks, infidels or heretics”, he stated, echoing earlier comments of James Parkes and H. W. Fox. “The Jewish societies seemed to have taken care of

93 “Minutes of a Meeting to consider Christian Responsibility for the Refugees from Germany,” 5 July 1934, L. P. L., Bell Papers, v.34, pp., fo., 44. Ludlow, Protestant Relief Programmes, 573.

everybody” Livessy continued, “[I]t was lamentable that the Church had done nothing to help the Jews.” McDonald concurred with Livessy, contending that Christians had a responsibility for all refugees regardless of religion, but he concluded that an appeal to the Churches for help in refugee aid “would be more effective if confined to the relief of Christians”. 95

If the frustrations of commending Christians to respond to refugees was apparent within sections of the Anglican Church, at least amongst Bell and his fellows, it was also increasingly felt by leading advocates for refugee aid. The depth of these concerns were revealed in a debate in the Lords in February 1935 and private misgivings became a matter of public record. Lord Noel-Buxton (1869-1948), president of the Save the Children Fund, highlighted the differences in responses between the respective Jewish and Christian communities. Whereas 80% of the refugees were Jewish, less than 4% of the funds had come from non-Jewish sources. The Jewish community had demonstrated their responsibility to their co-religionists, it might equally be expected that “Christians should feel at equal responsibility for their fellow Christians”. 96 By 1935 this was a much repeated refrain.

Churchmen such as Bell, Fox and others were perplexed by the distinct lack of response within their own Church and kindred organizations such as UCLW, WAIFC, and the CSC. They were also struck by the paucity of lay Anglican responses to Church collection calls, most notably demonstrated during the Christmas appeal in 1933. Interested Anglicans within the Church and the laity, particularly those in the Lords, were uncomfortable with the discrepancy between the funds raised by the Jewish and Christian communities, particularly when the Jewish community was applying the funds to refugees without discrimination. The issue of ‘responsibility’ for non-Aryan Christian refugees highlighted the assumptions made about the refugee crisis throughout the 1930s. It was commonly held (and correctly so) that the refugees were predominantly Jewish and fled because of ‘racial’ persecution and

95 “Minutes of a Meeting to consider Christian Responsibility,” 5 July 1934, L. P. L., Bell Papers, v. 34, fols., 37, 46.
96 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, 5th Series, v. 95 (6 February 1935), cols. 820-844. Noel Edward Buxton was the 1st Baron Noel-Buxton of Aylsham and peace activist. Initially a brewer by trade from 1889 to 1904, he became Aide to Governor of South Australia in 1896. He was MP for Whitby, from 1905-6 and MP for Norfolk, 1910-18 and 1922-30. He was created Baron in 1930. In 1916 he established Armenian Relief Fund. He was Minister of Agriculture in 1924 and again 1929, but retired from office because of ill health. Buxton actively supported the
legislation which stripped them of their livelihoods and later their citizenry. There were also a small number of refugees who left for other reasons: because they were pacifists, held liberal opinions or opposing political view. Some of these exiles were identifying Christians. But as the greater number of the refugees were Jewish and leaving because they were Jewish, it was seen primarily as a “Jewish problem”: one to be solved by ‘other’ Jews rather than a common humanitarian concern to be addressed practically by both Christian and Jew alike. The realization that a large number of German Christians could become refugees was only dimly grasped from the outset and was a continually misunderstood throughout the 1930s. As it became evident that this understanding of a ‘Jewish problem’ was mistaken because of Nazi conceptions of ‘race’, the issue of ‘non-Aryan’ Christians came to the fore. Anglicans (and Methodists) understood that ‘non-Aryan’ Christians were not persecuted as Christians; but rather were oppressed because they were not ‘Aryans’. With this ‘racial’ rationale at play, ‘non-Aryan’ Christians were not “really” Christian in the ‘real Christian-Christian sense’, but remained something ‘other’ because of their Jewish links.\(^7\) This suggests that for many ‘race’ had more resonance than religious identity, thereby contradicting the basis of Christian mission and universalism: a Jew could never become a ‘Christian-Christian’ and always remained an ‘ex-Jew’.\(^8\) Thus ‘non-Aryan’ Christians were not ‘simply’ recognized and identified as ‘Christian’ refugees, they were still regarded as Jews by many and therefore the responsibility of Jewish organisations.

### III: BISHOP HEADLAM AND THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

In February 1933, the Church of England Council on Foreign Relations (CFR/‘Council’) met for the first time. It was established to “survey and advise upon all matters concerning the contacts and relations of the Church of England with Foreign

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\(^7\) Here I am applying Brian Klug’s musings about ‘white-ness’ and ‘Jewishness’. He suggests that historical experience has taught Jews to see themselves as ‘white’ but not in the “real white-white sense”. Brian Klug, “The Language of Race,” in *Patterns of Prejudice*, 33, no. 3 (1999): 5-18. In this vein, it is interesting to note that the Christian theologian, Ulrich Simon is continually referred to by Christian writers as having German-Jewish parentage. See Wilkinson, *Dissent or conform?*, 182 and Hastings, *English Christianity*, 349.

\(^8\) This would reject the basis of the verse: “There is neither Jew nor Greek . . . or ye are all one in Christ Jesus”. Galatians, iii, 28.
Churches. A separate forum for this type of communication had been resisted by Archbishop Lang, but in 1932 he bowed to Church Assembly wishes and agreed to set up a Council with the proviso that it “could not take the place of that personal action or advice on the part of the Archbishop which these overseas Churches particularly valued.” The inaugural meeting of the Council was held at Lambeth Palace on 2 February 1933 and its terms of reference were firmly set. The Archbishop held the presidency of the Council and William Temple, the archbishop of York, was appointed Vice-President. Day to day running of the committee was placed in the hands of another senior member of the episcopal bench, the bishop of Gloucester.

A close colleague of Lang's from joint ecumenical work in the 1920s, Arthur Cayley Headlam (1862-1947) was also a highly regarded theologian and ecumenist. Similar in age to the Primate, but more conservative in outlook, he was 71 when appointed to this influential position. Headlam’s guiding principles were defined in a letter to Lang. Care would be taken to ensure that the Council did not intervene in the disputes or difficulties of different religious bodies and aid would be purely eleemosynary. On these grounds, the role of the Council as the Church’s equivalent to the Foreign Office was rejected, at least in theory. Finally, the Council was constructed in order to draw on the knowledge of committee members and local correspondents in situ, mainly foreign mission chaplains, who would provide impressions from the ground.

In the case of the Continental Churches Committee which covered German Church affairs, the committee was able to draw on many individuals who were well

101 It was not concerned with other Churches in Britain, nor problems within the existing Anglican Communion, nor overseas missions already under the Archbishop, and finally, it did not take the place of the Primate and did not have the power to conduct negotiations. Four subcommittees were created: (1) the Roman Catholic communion (2) the Orthodox communion (3) The Assyrian Churches consisting of the Coptic, Syrian-Orthodox (Jacobite) and the Abyssian Churches and (4) the Protestant Evangelical Churches of the Continent. Each subcommittee was composed of about forty clerical and lay members who were appointed for a term of three years. “Announcement for the British Press on the formation of the Council,” 31 March 1933, L. P. L., Headlam Papers, MS2650, fo., 16-18.
102 Arthur Cayley Headlam was Bishop of Gloucester and considered a “formidable” theologian. He was ordained as a priest in 1889 and was made Rector at Welwyn, Herts., in 1896. Headlam was Professor of Dogmatic Theology at Kings College from 1903 and Regis Professor of Divinity at Oxford from 1918. He was editor of Church Quarterly Review from 1901-21 and in 1920 gave the Bampton Lectures, which when published as The doctrine of the church and Christian union, sold out almost immediately. He was Bishop of Gloucester from 1923-45. Headlam was leader of Anglican group at Faith and Work meeting at Lausanne in 1927 and chairman of the Church of England Council on Foreign Relations from 1933 until 1945.
103 Letter from Headlam to Lang, 25 April 1933, L. P. L., Headlam Papers, MS2615, fo., 197.

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Roland Cragg, a chaplain in Berlin, sent Headlam a report in July 1933. Chaos reigned. “Events are moving so fast that what one writes today is out of date tomorrow.” Concentrating his report on the coordination of the Church and the rising control of the Deutsche-Christer, he gave a bitter assessment of what freedom of the Church would mean if they won out, “a freedom which is better called slavery.”

To further investigate the situation, A. S. Duncan-Jones, Dean of Chichester, was sent to Germany at Headlam’s behest. As an official of the CFR he met with an array of Church leaders including Ludwig Müller of the Deutsche-Christer movement and also secured an interview with Hitler. Recounting his meeting with the Chancellor in an article in the Times on his return, Duncan-Jones wrote of Hitler’s wish to unify the Church with the aim of creating a stronger moral force in Germany. Repression and intimidation of dissenting elements within the Church was absent as was reference to the continuing exclusion and persecution of Jews. Assessments of the effects of the Aryan paragraph, a law of direct significance to doctrinal independence of the Church, or its consequence for members of the Church, such as pastors—and by extension to Jews—was also omitted. In his confidential report submitted to Lang via Headlam, Duncan-Jones was keen to assure the Primate of the “high regard” for the Church of England and “the potentialities of our Committee”. He was clear “that doors were opened” and access granted that might have been otherwise denied.

Here then might be the avenue through which to advance Anglican views on doctrinal independence and the duty of right conduct to religious minorities; the latter being a topic of so many of the early 1933 protest meetings in which Anglicans had played such a leading part.

Since April 1933, Anglicans had watched the ever declining fortunes of the German Churches. Deutsche Christen had called for a united German Church at their Congress at the beginning of April and had unanimously adopted the Aryan

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104 For example, Bishop Bell, Bishop Batty, Rev. H. W. Fox, Lord Hugh Cecil, A. S. Duncan-Jones, Dean Bate, Rev. Sir Edwyn Hoskyns, Lord Noel Buxton, Rev. Dr. Tissington Tatlow and others.


106 Subsequently, Duncan-Jones would alter this position becoming a vociferous critic of Hitler and Nazism. See: A. S. Duncan-Jones, The Struggle for Religious Freedom in Germany (London: Victor Gollancz, 1938); Alan Wilkinson, Dissent, 146.

107 “Memorandum by A. S. Duncan-Jones on his visit to Germany,” 26 July 1933, reprinted in Andrew Chandler, Brethren in Adversity, Document # 12, 58.
Paragraph. By month’s end the German Church Federation was working on a new Church constitution to fall in line with government directives. By summer 1933, German churches were increasingly under Nazi influence, not all of it enforced. Many high ranking clergy saw no reason to denounce Gleichschaltung, even when it meant a loss of independence on church matters, as many were sympathetic to the new regime. By the end of July, after the further elevation of Müller, a Deutsche Christen to the newly created position of Reichsbischof, Anglican observers realized that the German Church was as much a part of the ‘national revolution’ as were other parts of the country’s establishment. There was a minority who disapproved of parts of the Nazi programme, but they were poorly organized and ineffectual.

Trying to make sense of the ever changing religious situation in Germany led correspondents of the CFR to form divergent conclusions. In expending considerable efforts to understand the changing situation in the German Church itself, earlier hopes of pressing the German Church to renounce Nazi antisemitism were laid aside. It was increasingly apparent that Anglican concerns for Church independence or minorities was not mirrored in Germany itself, except by a few dissenting voices. Moreover, criticism was construed as ‘meddling’ in the life of another church and, by extension, in the political affairs of another country. Rev. A. J. Macdonald, a close confidant of Bishop Headlam, went so far as to suggest that “while no doubt the present Hitlerite programme and practice can be criticized on some points – perhaps on many – justice demands that it should be allowed a fair trial without hostile criticism from external quarters”. Moreover, Macdonald suggested that the new hope in Germany stemmed from Nazi policies and “may yet justify Hitler’s action and policy.” 108 Conversely, Ruth Rouse, another correspondent for the CFR, gave an opposing view. She informed Lang of the “dark” outlook the Church faced. There were many that feared the direction that the Church was headed. The ‘Aryan Clause’ was seen as “utterly un-Christian” and resisted. Equally, however, there was a “state of confusion” and a near constant feeling of crisis permeating the Church. Words from Anglican “authorities” were seen as of “great importance” to the German Church. Censorious public pronouncements from abroad were unhelpful, Rouse concluded. Private

108 “Memorandum by Dr. A. J. Macdonald on a recent visit to Germany,” 6 September 1933, reprinted in Andrew Chandler, Brethren in Adversity, 1933: Document # 13, 58-60.
contacts were the most effective. Thus throughout the 1930s, Anglicans were torn on how to support their fellow Christians in Germany. Most believed that vocal protest was necessary but this was by no means universal.

Bishop Headlam’s first pronouncement on the Jewish experience of National Socialism was unsympathetic. In his diocesan magazine in August 1933, the Bishop decried “the folly and violence” against Jews but, he continued, “to both Jews and socialists alike some word of warning are necessary”. The “Bolshevik” violence which had preceded the Nazi grasp of power had been mainly Jewish inspired. Nazism, on the other hand, had brought stability and stopped the advance of Communism – a Jewish ideology. While his ire was mainly directed against eastern-European Jews who had settled in Germany, German-Jews did not escape his criticism; their population was “not altogether a pleasant element in Germany and in particular Berlin.” Extracts from the diocesan letter appeared in the Guardian, the Western Mail, and the reactionary right wing newspaper, The Patriot.

Claude Montefiore (1858-1938), Secretary of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, replied to each of Headlam’s charges in a long letter. He remarked that the “extract has given pain and astonishment to all those of my co-religionists who have read it” and hoped that the section he had seen “gives a false impression of the whole.” He was outraged that, considering all the reports of physical violence against Jews and forced expulsions from almost all the professions, accepted as fact by everyone else, that the Bishop was unconcerned and “appears to have taken no heed.” He refuted the charge that many Russian Jews now in Germany were Communists: “the great mass of Jews abhor their views, quite as much as the great mass of


112 Letter from Claude Montefiore to Headlam, 9 August 1933, L. P. L., Headlam Papers, MS2643, fo. 1. Claude Joseph Goldsmid Montefiore was a community leader, British Jewish theologian and founder of Liberal Judaism as well as the founder of the Jewish Religious Union in 1902 and the Liberal Jewish Synagogue in London in 1911. Montefiore was President of the Anglo-Jewish Association from 1895 to 1921, Joint Chairman of the Joint Foreign Committee in 1917 and President of the World Union for Progressive Judaism from 1926-1938.
Christians do.” He asked “Had your Lordship very precise information about the Jews in Germany before launching this indictment against 500,000 souls?” While there may be “some Jews who are ‘not altogether a pleasant element in German and in particular in Berlin life’ . . . should a whole community be vilely and atrociously treated for the sins of the few?” Moreover, were there not also “Christians likewise who were not ‘a pleasant element’?” Jews were “not unhealthy elements of the population”, in fact the “overwhelming mass of German Jews are vigorous and earnest patriots and no less devoted to Germany and to its cause than the great and overwhelming mass of English Jews are to England.” He concluded “I venture to think that your Lordship’s support of the Nazi persecution, (which I feel sure will be most eagerly read and reproduced in Germany, and doubtless as a further basis for insult and repression if such be possible), is ill-founded and erroneous.”

Headlam’s response to Montefiore was anything but contrite. Refusing to reprint his letter in the diocesan gazette on the grounds that it did not contain “anything which was worth publishing”, Headlam proceeded to state

I do not think that the more leading members of your race sufficiently realise (1) the injury done to the reputation of your race by the action of a considerable section of the Jews in this and other countries and (2) the intense dislike which that arouses and which is more widespread I think than you realise.

The Bishop continued that the antisemitic feeling in Germany was “really the concern of you and your fellow countrymen” and that, as a minority in Britain, if Jewry wished to be “treated with courtesy and toleration” it should behave with humility and learn from the poor example set by Jews in Germany and especially Berlin. Headlam was effectively arguing that Jews were responsible for their own persecution. Dining with his friend and peer at this time, the Bishop of Durham, Herbert Hensley Henson, found the Bishop of Gloucester “curiously wrong headed about the Jews”. Headlam remained convinced of his own assessments, unwilling to see the contradictions and inconsistencies in his own arguments: convictions from

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113 Letter from Claude Montefiore to Headlam, 9 August 1933, L. P. L., Headlam Papers, MS2643, fo. 1. Bishop Bell wrote to a colleague that Headlam had said “some very unfortunate things”. Neither Bell nor Lang, privately or publicly suggested his words were offensive and that he retract them. See, Chandler, “A Question of Fundamental Principles,” 237.

114 Letter from Headlam to Montefiore, 6 September 1933, Papers of the Board of Deputies of British Jews (Papers of BDEP), LMA, ACC/3121/B4/GL/25.

115 Andrew Chandler, “The Church of England and Nazi Germany,” 105. Henson would later describe Headlam as the “pertinacious apologist” of the Nazi regime. Herbert Hensley Henson, Retrospect of Unimportant Life, II (Oxford: OUP, 1943), 413.
which he would not waver in the following years and which hardened at each confrontation.

Headlam’s minority view of events continued in his actions surrounding the appointment of Ludwig Müller as Reichbischof. Complementing this Deutsche Christen on the creation of a United Church ‘free of state control’, Headlam apologized for the false reporting in Britain which was, he believed, damaging the reputation of the Church and the German people. He concluded by tendering his own and the Council’s congratulations on Müller’s new role.116 Lang was incensed. “A letter written by you expressly as Chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations will naturally be regarded as involving the archbishop of Canterbury and indeed the Church of England”. Yet Lang had received a copy of the letter, “in precisely the same form in which it was sent to an ordinary member on the Council on Foreign Relations.” As the letter had come from an official Church body “it ought to have been previously submitted to me”. Lang was not altogether certain whether the CFR had even seen and approved it either. But the independent action of Headlam apart, his interpretation of the situation gave the Archbishop even greater cause for concern. To Lang, it was not clear that the Church in Germany was “free of state control”, indeed there were many “misgivings” about the situation. Nor was it valid to suggest that “rumours” came only from those who wished “to damage the reputation abroad of the German people and Church”. The ‘rumours’ were matters of “common knowledge”. Lang cautioned Bishop Headlam that if relations between His Grace and the new council were to remain “cordial”, it was essential that the Archbishop see “documents of this kind” written on behalf of the Council “before they are issued”.117

It is not certain how Headlam responded specifically to Lang’s comments, but


117 Letter from Lang to Headlam, 11 October 1933, L. P. L., Headlam Papers, MS2615, fo. , 207. Headlam had supplied CFR reports to Lang throughout the summer, most notably: They were written by Roland Cragg (5 July 1933), A. S. Duncan Jones (26 July 1933), A. J. Macdonald (6 September 1933), H. W. Fox (September 1933) and Ruth Rouse (31 October 1933). Reprints appear in Chandler, Brethren in Adversity, 48-67. It is of interest to note that the CFR report for 1934 carries the byline, “Presented to the Archbishop of Canterbury, and with his approval laid
within a fortnight he was expressing his forthright and idiosyncratic views in a letter to *The Times*. In the letter entitled, “In German Eyes”, Headlam ‘went to bat’ for Nazi Germany. The efforts Germany had made to regain its sense of pride should be lauded rather than criticized at every turn. “The great body of the young Nazis” represented “the best element in the country” and they were “anxious for self-discipline and self-sacrifice”. No doubt, Headlam conceded, “things have been done, perhaps are being done, which cannot be excused”, but “their whole standard of life is more wholesome and healthy than it has been”. Nazism had prevented the descent of Germany into Bolshevism and that should be acknowledged. Concluding with a long drawn out cricketing metaphor, the Bishop surmised the approach of the surrounding nations to the fledgling regime:

> The nations of Europe seem to me like a lot of schoolboys playing cricket who are angry with one of their number because he has been indulging in bodyline bowling. They have lectured him, they have told him what they think of him in no measured language, and they have tied both his hands behind his back. They then tell him to go on playing with them. Now the discipline may or may not have been merited or wholesome, but is it reasonable to expect him to go on playing under those conditions?  

The letter provoked a considerable response from various quarters. Rev. W. E. Woodham-Deholm of Chorleywood Vicarage in Hertfordshire thanked his Lordship for his “excellent letter” and agreed “with it entirely”. Mr. A. W. Cartwright, a German teacher at St. Lawrence’s College in Ramsgate praised Headlam not only “as a friend of Germany”, but still more “as an Englishman.” Nancy Fleetwood writing from Dresden, Germany, read a report about his letter “with great pleasure” and expressed her “hearty congratulations” on the “splendid example . . . your authoritative opinion in *The Times*” had given to the rest of the British Press.

Still more took the opposing view, charging Headlam with misusing his

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118 A. C. Headlam, “In German Eyes,” *The Times*, 24 October 1933, p.10. Bell remarked to Alan Don that body line bowling could hardly be compared to concentration camps. Moreover, Headlam’s comments were “just the sort of soft peddling and white washing which encouraged the extreme Nazis to persevere with extreme measures”. Hampson, “British response,” 35.


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position as a Bishop and bringing shame on the Church and Christianity. Lt. Commander A. S. Elwell-Sutton wrote as “one who knows Germany, pre-war and post-war, personally”. He had found that there was nothing with which to commend Nazism. “The new spirit which possesses so many Germans” which had so “impressed” the Bishop was “born of the hope that Hitler will lead them to the recovery of all that was lost in 1918, and the gaining of much more.” As for the position “of that great cultural community, the Jews”, he believed, “their position should win the sympathy of all real Christians”. He concluded that it was the duty of all men of goodwill “and especially Christian leaders, to denounce iniquity as Christ did and not to palliate it.” Were Christian leaders to follow the lead of the Bishop of Headlam, “I shall have to consider seriously whether I and my children can belong to such a Christian community.”

Monty P. Arnold, also a frequent traveller to Germany, hoped that Headlam “as a peer of the Church” did not approve “of the deliberate persecution of Jews, Socialists and others”, which was the impression given by his letter. A. Gilbert suggested Headlam “devoted less time to making mischief and stirring up hatreds in Europe” and more on the work of the Church. “From the high social position that a Bishopric gives you” Gilbert charged, “you undertake political activities against liberals, Socialists, Jews and racial minorities in Europe”. These actions were shameful and “it is hard on the Church that it should be responsible for the unfortunate activities that you are occupying your time with.”

Unmoved by the volume of critical responses he received, far outweighing those supporting him, the Bishop of Gloucester remained determined that Germany receive “fair play”. Writing to the editor of The Times, Headlam reminded Geoffrey Dawson that “the German revolution has stirred up against Germany a whole crop of enemies, who do anything they can to injure her and to disseminate false or one-sided news about her.” The Jews, “who are clever, malicious and untruthful” had an “excessive influence” on the press of Europe and hence only “derogatory” news about Germany was carried. This was dangerous and if continued unchecked would create ill-feeling and even war. If Germany was treated “not only justly, but generously”,

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123 Letter from Monty P. Arnold to Headlam, 26 October 1933, L. P. L., Headlam Papers, MS2643, fo., 55.
matters would improve. Sadly, neither newspapers nor statesmen had the wisdom to adopt such a policy.\textsuperscript{125} Reflecting bitterly in a letter to his correspondent Roland Cragg in Germany, Headlam maintained that Germany was unfairly maligned and that “everything that can be collected to the detriment of Germany is published, and often exaggerated, and the other side is practically ignored.”\textsuperscript{126}

Suggesting to William Temple that following a Faith and Order Meeting in Dusseldort, they might conclude their trip with a visit to Berlin to meet with German churchmen and others, Headlam asked Temple if he would join him. The Archbishop of York declined. Temple was not sure whether their visit would be welcomed and suggested that Headlam, were he to go, should go alone. “I think you [Headlam] probably have more sympathy with the general aims of Hitler and his followers” he stated, and as a result might be able to “exercise some influence”. More centrally, however, Temple stated “[m]y antipathy to the Nazi movement as a whole is so intense that I do not think I have the necessary bonds of sympathy which can alone make criticisms effective”.\textsuperscript{127}

Returning to the theme of ‘biased’ reporting in regard to the Germany and German Church affairs, Headlam extended his criticism to members of the Church Assembly at the meeting in June 1934. In stark contrast to Lang’s earlier comments in Convocation some weeks earlier, Headlam bemoaned “the tendency in some quarters” to interfere with the internal troubles of another Church. The desire to create a national church was entirely commendable he believed (how this was effected was not addressed). Taken as a whole, Headlam stated “the national movement represented a real desire for the restoration of national life” and that should be appreciated. Now and again there were lapses and “elements of badness” but these were in response to the criticism Germany received from abroad. They were not particular to Germany herself.\textsuperscript{128}

With the continual ‘misrepresentation’ Germany received, the idea of visiting

\textsuperscript{125} Letter from Headlam to Editor of the Times, 27 October 1933, L. P. L., Headlam Papers, MS2643, fo. 58.
\textsuperscript{126} Letter from Headlam to Cragg, 3 November 1933, L. P. L., Headlam Papers, MS2643, fo. 85.
the country reoccurred to Headlam some months later when he received an invitation from Alfred Rosenberg, Nazi ideologue and editor of the Nazi newspaper, *Völkische Beobachter*. As head of the Nazi Party Foreign Affairs department, Rosenberg had made an unsuccessful trip to England in May 1933 in order to improve Anglo-German relations. Writing to Roland Cragg, correspondent of the CFR in Berlin, Headlam suggested he might accept and bring along his nephew or niece as they were "half German, and they both speak German very well indeed, and it would be a great advantage to have my own private interpreter." Even so he was concerned that his visit might be used for "political purposes". Cragg cautioned him. In his opinion as well as the British Ambassador in Berlin, Headlam's acceptance of such an invitation would be "most unwise". For Rosenberg, chief protagonist of anti-Church policy, to be able to "exhibit an English Bishop in his company" Cragg believed would be dire. Breaking with his previous pattern of acting on his own volition (without regard for consequence or mindful of the appearance of his actions) Headlam accepted his correspondent's counsel and declined the offer.

The CFR was not the 'Foreign Affairs' department of the Anglican Church established to develop overseas policies, but in many ways it acted unofficially in this way, even if unintentionally. Representatives of the Council were sent abroad and met (albeit privately) with government officials as well as with Church officers. It was therefore hard not to view the Council in this way. In connection with the German situation, the imposition of the Aryan paragraph, the expulsion of 'non-Aryan' pastors and later the removal of Aryan pastors married to 'non-Aryan' women demonstrated an accommodation or compliance with Nazi political ideology. The line between Church and government blurred particularly with the ascent of the *Deutsche-Christen* and the appointment of Ludwig Müller. The Church-State relationship was increasingly more interdependent and the continuing relationship by the CFR increasingly ambiguous, particularly as no reassessment of connections between the Council's chairman and German representatives was made.

Some CFR members certainly saw the problem of maintaining contacts but believed that an open door policy was preferable. Increasingly, however, cracks appeared and divisions arose over Council members attitude in respect of Germany,

reflected in part by their own views of the nature of the regime. Headlam and Macdonald found much to admire in the bold and newly invigorated Germany. They argued that the remit of the Council was purely to report and collate information and decried the negative or critical ‘judgements’ made about Germany as politically motivated and outside of the Church’s function. That they themselves assessed the regime favourably, and argued the merits of Nazism, was not in their view a political act. By the middle of 1935, it was apparent that some members of the Council did not agree with Headlam’s direction of the Council. His efforts to impose a ‘non-judgmental’ yet positive approach was seen as hypocritical. It might have been expected that news about the position of minorities and refugees would flow through the CFR because some of the laws applied to Jews and dissenters fell similarly on fellow churchmen. This was not to be the case, even amongst members like George Bell. More seriously, by Headlam’s public pronouncements on Nazism, Jews and antisemitism, his friendly relations with Deutsche-Christen leaders and his willing association with Nazi ideologues as well as his direction of the Council’s work, he promoted increasing disquiet about his chairmanship and an element of notoriety. This would merely grow in the following years.

**IV: SEPTEMBER 1935 TO FEBRUARY 1938.**

On the eve of the annual Nazi Party rally, on 15 September 1935, in a hall usually reserved for concerts, three laws were announced in Nuremberg. The first decreed that the swastika was Germany’s new national emblem, the second stripped German Jews of citizenship, and the last outlawed marriage and sexual relations between Germans and Jews.

At the time of this promulgation, Bishop Bell was travelling around Germany meeting various Church and state officials. In conversations, Bell raised the concerns of Christians in Britain to the ‘co-ordination’ of the German Church within the Nazi State, its lack of independence and the suppression of the Confessing Church. The main thrust of his inquiries were whether Hitler intended to “give the Church a full place within its own frontiers”, or whether it was to be “right under the State”. Hitler’s statement at Nuremberg on the church question had reassuringly suggested the former, but Bell sought confirmation from Rudolf Hess and Reichminister Kerpl. In his private memoranda of the meetings, his notes speak of the Church question and
his concerns for ‘non-Aryan’ Christians. In common with other churchman of the CFR, he did not link the fate of Jewish victims of the regime with the deteriorating position of the ‘non-Aryan’ Christians with which he was concerned, nor Church independence, yet both were a part of the same issue of Nazism and its relations to society. Separating out the Jewish specificity of Nazi antagonism enabled Churchmen to ‘avoid’ the problem and focus on more discrete dilemmas.

The boycott of Jewish business in April 1933 had provoked substantial criticism in national and Church newspapers both ahead of the proposed action and after the event. In stark contrast, the Nuremberg Laws provoked little immediate attention. The Times was one of the few dailies to carry the news immediately; for most other papers, coverage came much later. The first reaction in a Church paper appeared in The Guardian on 15 November 1935, exactly a month after the decrees were announced. “European Christians”, the editorial suggested, were looking on with “shame and dread”. Since the decrees had been promulgated, “the life of half a million or more German citizens has become less and less tolerable”. It concluded that nothing less than the “extinction of Jewish life” was the aim of the Nazis and their supporters. In the meantime, news of the divisions between the main wing of the Church and its dissenting branch, the Confessing Church, remained in the forefront of church and national news.

This approach changed on 20 November 1935. Meeting for the third day, the Church Assembly pushed aside other church business in order that Bishop Bell could table a motion on behalf of all those persecuted in Germany. It was the first time that any official body of the Church of England had been called upon to express a direct statement on the matter. Bell’s proposal was first prefaced by Archbishop Lang on his way out to the christening of the King’s grandson. “Without a word of

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133 The Church Assembly was the national assembly of the Church of England established in 1919 and superseding the representative Church Council. The Assembly had powers of legislation in Church affairs, subject to the assent of Parliament and the reigning monarch. The body was superseded by the General Synod in 1970.
explanation", Lang interjected, his absence from the debate might be misunderstood. Hurriedly stating his position on the motion in a standard reprise, he stated that, "the present modes of persecution . . . seriously affect the good will which the people of Great Britain desired to regard the German nation". The new laws in Germany had failed to protect the Jewish community in Germany and indeed there seemed to be a new intensity to the persecution. Handing over the chairmanship of the meeting to Archbishop William Temple, he departed.\(^\text{134}\) The Bishop of Chichester then moved a motion, striking in its call to Christians to sympathize and exert influence:

That this Assembly desires to express its sympathy with the Jewish people and those of Jewish origin in the sufferings which are being endured by many of their number in Germany, and trusts that Christian people in this and other countries will exert their influence to make it plain to the rulers of Germany that the continuance of their present policy will arouse widespread indignation and prove a grave obstacle to the promotion of confidence and good-will between Germany and the other nations.\(^\text{135}\)

Bell's subsequent comments, however, bear analysis. The Bishop began the rest of his speech with (by now) standard references to criticism being given in the name of Anglo-German friendship. Bell stated that there was no need for invective or a long debate on his proposal, a simple vote was enough. Having "a profound admiration for Germany" and having made friends with many Germans "including several members of the National Socialist Party", he called for an immediate vote on the resolution which he had called with "great reluctance". He appreciated the "real creative work" under National Socialism after the country "had suffered so deeply and for so long". Having given assurances to German sensibilities that this was not a gratuitous attack, Bell stated that despite having these feelings, he was "compelled" to move the resolution "because as a Christian he saw a wrong offered". Giving the number of "full Jews" likely to be affected by the legislation, Bell singled out the hardships suffered by "baptized Jews, or baptized persons of Jewish origin", who he stated "made a particular claim on Christian sympathy and compassion".

His next comments seemed out of step with his previous and subsequent remarks as well as the motion itself. Strangely, Bell followed this appeal with several charges against Jews in Germany. It was known, the Bishop continued, that "Jews in great numbers filled ministerial offices and the medical and legal professions". It was quite probable that "many Jews in different ways had abused their new found

\(^{134}\) L. P. L. Church Assembly Proceedings XVI (20 November 1935), 466-467.
\(^{135}\) L. P. L. Church Assembly Proceedings XVI (20 November 1935), 467.
freedom”, moreover it was clear that “Jews of a low type exercised a subversive
influence and caused not unnatural ill-feeling”. Bell repeated these assertions as if
they were undisputed facts, demonstrating an accommodation with, if not an
acceptance of, certain parts of Nazi rhetoric. Yet Bell proceeded to change tack again,
stating that these reasons were not grounds enough for the mistreatment of Jews. It
had to be remembered that 12,000 “full Jews” had fallen for their country in the
European War and this was quite apart from all the Jews in Germany who had
enriched the life of their country in the professions, arts and sciences. The exclusion
of these men and women from public life and the relentless defamation of Jews
throughout Germany was an attack on Jewry as a whole. He concluded, “Who could
protect the Jews in Germany against slander except Christians – Christians in
England, Christians in Europe?”

The Bishop of Southwark, Dr. Richard Parsons seconded the motion and
echoed many of Bell’s sentiments. He too had been to Germany and had many
German friends. Neither could he dispute the fact that “there might have been
perhaps numerous cases when Jews had misused the liberties open to them”, but this
could not be an excuse to “degrade the members of a race merely because they
belonged to that race”. The new laws denied Jews rights of any sort and gave them no
protections. Pushed back into the ghettos, they were reduced to helotry. Nazis were
making it impossible for Jews to live in Germany, yet equally impossible to leave
because of the process of despoliation. Parsons concluded his remarks by echoing
some of the Primate’s sentiments of June 1933, “the future of the German race itself,
to whom humanity owed much, no less than for the sake of their Jewish fellow human
beings . . . the movers of the motion would plead with the rulers of Germany to come
to a wiser, humaner and a more truly noble mind”. Mr. S. Carlile Davis, consular
representative for Germany in Plymouth and lay member of the Assembly added a
note of objection. It was not the place of the Assembly to get involved. The question
was political, not religious to his mind. The issue was race and he found it difficult to
believe that Britain had a right to intervene in the race problems of another country.
Drawing support from the floor, he called for the motion to be withdrawn and gained

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136 L. P. L. Church Assembly Proceedings, XVI (20 November 1935), 468-470. Again, note the
reference to the contributions made by Jews to German life/Western civilization as a reason
against the morality of persecution.

Bell’s wish that the resolution be tabled and then put to an immediate vote was now clearly unrealistic. Far from the motion being universally agreed, there were many that suspected whether a church body was the appropriate setting for such an instruction. But if Bell’s resolution had caused some consternation, the comments of the bishop of Durham, Herbert Hensley Henson (1863-1947), stirred up many more. Henson thoroughly supported the bishop’s motion and believed that it required “a clear pronouncement” from the Assembly. It was not possible for any constituent member of the civilized world to ignore certain fundamental obligations. “The treatment of the Jews did violence to those fundamental conclusions which civilized humanity had reached”. Moving beyond the statements and arguments of Bell, Henson thundered that it was essential “to bring home to the Germans” that they were “hypnotized by a fiction when they emphasized that racial doctrine”. Jews, as much as Germans, were “just as mixed a race”. The nonsense of race which suggested that “there were some peculiar poison in the ancestry of Judaism” had to be guarded against for it was “sheer hallucination”. Quite apart from the fact that Christendom owed “almost everything they valued” spiritually, morally and religiously to Jews, he felt that the lives of many Jews “would gain many points on Christians” in good citizenship and “in the higher ethic which Jesus Christ himself required”. He felt a kind of blind rage within him “that they could not draw the sword and go to the help of the low against the mighty”. Henson sat down to “loud and continuous applause”, his speech was given a standing ovation by the assembled members. The bishop of Durham emphatically rejected the foundations of Nazi racialism and the whole notion that, as victims, Jews had played a part in their own

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139 Bishop Herbert Hensley was an Anglican prelate and Bishop of Durham. He was successively, vicar at Barking, 1888; Chaplain of St Mary’s Hospital, Ilford, 1895; Rector of St. Margaret’s Westminster, 1900; Proctor of Convocation, 1903-12; Dean of Durham, 1912; Bishop of Hereford, 1918; Bishop of Durham from 1920 to 1939 and Canon of Westminster, 1940 to 1941. Henson argued for the disestablishment of the Church in order to maintain the Church’s independence from government after the rejection of revised prayer books, 1927-1928. He delivered the 1935-6 Gifford Lectures on Christian Morality and spoke out regularly against the excesses of the Nazi regime and its ‘Jewish Policy’.

140 L. P. L. Church Assembly Proceedings, XVI (20 November 1935), 474-476. Owen Chadwick, Hensley Henson: A study in the friction between Church and State (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1938), 256. Henson read voraciously “on the subject and was always willing to tread where others feared to”. Chadwick, “English Bishops and Nazis,” 12. Henson was already aged 72 in 1935 and was rarely at Assembly preferring to fulfil diocesan obligations. Henson, Retrospect: Vol. II, 386.
victimhood. This made Henson distinct from all of the other speakers, including the bishop of Chichester.

The motion now stood no hope of going to a simple vote. Lay representative, Mr. G. F. LeFroy suggested the resolution should be shortened to express merely the concern of the Assembly for Jews in Germany, removing the direction that Christians should “exert their influence”. Sir Raymond Beazley, Professor Emeritus of History at Birmingham University, wondered whether the whole motion might do “more harm than good”. Lord Hugh Cecil thought it might have been better if the motion had never been moved, but equally certain that it must be passed. Bell remained adamant that the motion stand as it was and he forced the issue with a vote on LeFroy’s amendment. It failed. Bell entered his motion once more with success.141

The motion had stirred the assembly, accentuated differences of opinion within ruling elements of the Church and crystallized certain positions. Henson had emerged as entirely antipathetic to Nazism and particularly disdainful of Nazi antisemitism: his comments on the language of race were directed to his fellow churchman as much as to those outside of the Assembly. A significant number of lay members (and perhaps clergy) were convinced that the subject lay outside the provenance of the Assembly. Bell was not of this mind. He believed that this action was a vital religious imperative for Christians and in particular the Church. In this view he was supported by the bishop of Durham. Reactions to the Church Assembly debate were immediate, yet, it was the speech given by Henson which drew the most attention.142 From the Jewish community, the response was immediate. Lord Rothschild thanked the Primate, and particularly the Church Assembly, for their stand against German persecution of his co-religionists. He felt sure that it would “resound throughout the whole civilized world”.143

The bishop of Gloucester had not spoken during the debate, but Headlam’s views had been expressed earlier that day with his submission of the Fourth Report of the Church of England Council on Foreign Relations. He commended the survey on

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142 The Manchester Guardian, Daily Herald, Daily Telegraph and Yorkshire Post all carried pieces. The Jewish Chronicle also carried a short paragraph on the reception the speech received in Germany, “Dr Thost’s Successor: His views in the Bishop of Durham,” Jewish Chronicle, 6 December 1935, p. 14. The Volkscher Boebracht described Durham’s quote from the Book of Judges as a direct attack on Germany.
German Church, drawn up by Dr. A. J. Macdonald to the Assembly, with the understanding that “the Council did not commit any of its members to complete agreement” with it. He thoroughly supported Macdonald as “an historian of great ability” who had given a fair and reasoned account of the situation producing a historical document of “great value”. His report expressed the hope that the new ‘regulation’ of Church by State would bring about better times. Indeed, things had improved with the new constitution, Macdonald believed, and “with the exception of one short paragraph about race, blood and soil, there was nothing in it to offend religious sensibilities”. Its “positive” teaching represented a “quite definite new departure” for the Government. The raids on confessional Church members had ceased and Hans Kerrl, head of the new Reich Ministry for Church affairs, was working through various committees to “conciliate different sections of the Church”. The report was received by the Assembly, but its members and those outside were aware that its contents and conclusions were disputed by other Council members. This division was to increase over the following years.

If bishop Headlam and Dr. A. J. Macdonald were becoming isolated within their own camp, the bishop of Durham was enjoying a new renaissance as defender of the rights of minorities and the defenseless. Henson had made himself unpopular within the Church by his high profile involvement in sensitive issues, such as the revision of the Prayer Book in 1928, where he had emerged as an unstinting campaigner for disestablishment to the chagrin of the Archbishop.

His speech in the Assembly, however, had returned him to the centre once more and he was now being thanked at services for the words he had stirringly spoken. Wyndham Deedes returned from a trip to Germany and remarked that “all Jews and non-Aryans now look to you my Lord, to espouse their cause”.

Henson’s public utterances did not cease with the end of the Assembly debate. He agreed to write a preface for *The Yellow Spot* (1936), against the advice of his

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145 He had previously denounced exploitative traders who had used South American Indians in Putumayo and subsequently condemned the gassing and bombing of tribesmen in Abyssinia by the Italian army. Owen Chadwick, *Hensley Henson*, 257-58.
peers. The book was a collection of Nazi documents, detailing the various anti-
Jewish laws with English translations. Cartoons, notices and articles culled from Der
Stürmer, a notoriously antisemitic newspaper edited by Julius Streicher, also filled its
pages. The bishop recommended the book to the public despite its “painful reading”.
The contents attested to “the woeful spectacle of oppression – cold, cunning,
complete, covering every part of social life, closing every door of escape”. For
everyone “who desired to know the truth” about the position of Jewry, it was essential
reading. Germany had repudiated the “restraints of traditional Christianity”, but he
trusted that the persecution was a passing aberration and he prayed that the
publication would “hasten the return of sanity”.146

The forthcoming celebration of Heidelberg University’s 550th anniversary
proved another opportunity for Henson’s to further demonstrate his abhorrence of
Nazism. Universities throughout Britain were receiving invitations to attend the
festivities. The appearance of British representatives at these celebrations, Henson
believed, would effectively sanction the expulsions of Jewish academics from the
universities. With the encouragement of George Bell, the bishop of Durham fired off
“a rocket” to The Times

The racial fanaticism which has swept over Germany has not left the universities
unaffected, and in Heidelberg its influence has been especially great. The savage
persecution of the Jews, described with plenary knowledge and in poignant detail by
Mr. James G. McDonald on his letter of resignation, has borne severely on the
numerous Jewish professors and lecturers in the German universities. Large numbers
... have been expelled from office and driven into exile. In this evil process
Heidelberg stands to the fore-front.147

Independent academic life in Germany was gone. It would be wrong to send
representatives to celebrations to “openly fraternize” with the enemies of “sound
learning” and “intellectual freedom”. Indeed, any presence would “be understood
everywhere as a public and deliberate condonation” of the intolerance which had
emptied the German universities and had filled Europe “with victims of cynical and
heartless oppression”.148 In a letter to Claude Montefiore, days after The Times
article, the bishop of Durham remarked on the “real pleasure” he had experienced for

146 The Yellow Spot: The extermination of the Jews in Germany with an Introduction by H. H. Henson
147 Chadwick, Hensley Henson, 259. “Persecution of the Jews. The University of Heidelberg,” The
Times, 4 February 1936, p.13.
148 Ibid. For his interventions in Durham University’s attempt to attend the University of Göttingen
bicentenary celebrations “a Jew baiting university”, see Chadwick, Hensley Henson, 261.

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his association with the Jewish community “in its great efforts to mitigate the barbarous oppression that now proceeds in Germany”. He hoped that very soon the persecution would end.\(^{149}\)

Henson’s outrage about Nazi policies and insistence that the Anglican Church take a stand, set him apart from the majority of the Anglican leadership. Other sections of the Church, however sympathetic, viewed the current persecution of Jewry in Germany in more traditional missionary terms. Commenting on the number of Jews in Germany who “had cast off their Judaism” as they sought admission to the mainstream of German life, the author of a Missionary Council report suggested that here was a new call to the Church to re-think its method of approach to Jews. “The Jew the world over is watching to see what the Churches think and do on this race question”. The biggest problem encountered by missionaries was not so much the attitude of “the Jew concerning Christ” but rather “the Christian concerning the Jew”. If Christians were to win more converts to Christ from Jewry they would need to remove the “attitude of suspicion and dislike or at best, aloof tolerance towards the Jew” currently present among “the majority of Christians”. It had to be made evident that the rights of a Jew “as a man and as a child of God” should be regarded as the touchstone of “Christian theology, of Christian ethics and of Christian faith”.\(^{150}\) In the Council’s report the following year, Henry Southwell, lamented the “treatment of the Jew” in a Europe that purported to be Christian. In the East End of London, in Rumania and Poland, no less than in Germany, “disturbances centre around the question of the Jew”. Yet there were signs of “a miracle in progress” for Christianity was beginning to be seen amongst Jews “as the antidote to the poison of antisemitism” producing more candidates for baptism “after long and stringent tests of sincerity”.\(^{151}\) Basil Batty, the bishop of Fulham, similarly reported on the “immense possibilities” for expansion of the ministry among Jews. He appealed for increased support of the Church Mission to Jews during Lent in Holy Week. The Society was


“the best antidote to the cruel oppression of Judaism in many countries today”, the sympathetic approach made by agents of the Mission “has done much to convince the Jews that the Christian Church has no lot or part in the persecution they are undergoing”.152

The evangelical approach to Jews adopted by both the bishop of Fulham and the Missionary Council’s reports, particularly in the latter’s response to blackshirt violence in the East End of London, contrasted significantly with that taken by the Manchester and Salford District Council of Christian Congregations. The District Council stressed the need for increased general religiosity in society. Rabbi Abrahams read the statement of friendship and goodwill at a service from the Manchester Great Synagogue. “Political antisemitism which is now manifesting itself in this country is of foreign importation. It is completely alien to the British spirit, it is fundamentally un-Christian and irreligious. Where there is true religion there would be no antisemitism”. Abrahams suggested that in the words of the Christian Congregations, one could hear “the true voice of Britain” not the “cruel venomous voice” heard more recently in the East End of London.153

Aware that the archbishop of Canterbury was to make a Christmas broadcast and hoping to build on the Manchester and Salford example, Neville Laski (Board of the Deputies of the British Jews) approached the Primate’s chaplain. Would the chaplain ask if the Primate was willing “to introduce into his talk a word which would indicate the distaste which the Christian church feels for the miasma of antisemitism which has been so cruelly aroused in this country by Sir Oswald Mosley and his followers”? Replying for His Grace some weeks later, Alan Don demurred, “His Grace did not feel able to incorporate any reference to antisemitism into his broadcast address” however, he had included a short paragraph on antisemitism in his monthly diocesan magazine, subsequently reproduced in The Times at the beginning of January.154 The reasoning behind the inclusion of such a reference in the press and not the broadcast which might have had a greater audience was unexplained.

152 “News and Notes - The Church and the Jew,” Guardian, 11 February 1938, p. 95.
Similarly, Sidney Salomon (Press Secretary of the Board of Deputies of British Jews) attempt to elicit interest for a official Christian document on antisemitism were cautioned against by James Parkes. The Churches were “cumbrous organizations”, declared Parkes, and any call “from Woburn House” for them to produce an authoritative statement would meet with “silent resentment”. Any general action “should be the result of a Christian initiative”. There were signs of an “awakened conscience” within the leadership of the church. The problem was that the greater “mass of Christians folk” continued to think of Jews in “conventional terms”, believing their Christian responsibilities lay solely in conversionary efforts. For an official Christian body to develop a responsibility to Jews in non-missionary terms “requires slow and careful preparation”. Naming William Temple, George Bell and J. H. Oldham as the most likely individuals to lead the way, Parkes cautioned Salomon to wait a while until the preparations for two international Christian conferences the following year were over.\footnote{Letter from Parkes to Salomon, 12 December 1936, BDEP, ACC/3121/C15/03/17, LMA. Sidney Salomon was the secretary and press officer of the Coordinating Committee, an joint anti-defamation committee of the Law and Parliamentary and the Press and Information Committees, formed in July 1936. It was later renamed the Jewish Defence Committee in 1938. Salomon was previously chief sub-editor of the Yorkshire Post and was a barrister by training. See: V. D. Lipman, 
\textit{A History of the Jews in Britain since 1858} (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1990) pp. 187-188. The Oxford conference on Church, Community and State in July 1937 was prepared by Oldham and the Second World Conference on Faith and Order (Edinburgh) in August 1937 was chaired by Temple.}

\section*{V: ANGLICAN APPEAL AND COMMITTEE FOR CHRISTIANS REFUGEES}

As High Commissioner for Refugees, until his very public resignation, James McDonald had continually stressed that the refugee issue was a concern for everyone, as opposed to a ‘Jewish’ problem as it was commonly perceived. Christians, he believed, bore responsibilities to all refugees, and not only Christian refugees. Furthermore, the common Judeo-Christian principle of love of one’s neighbour spoke to Christians in a particular way at this time because of the place of persecution. Germany was a dominantly Christian country, yet in this ‘Christian’ country, Jews and others were persecuted and oppressed in contradiction to the ethical principles of Christianity. Christians outside Germany found it difficult to understand why members of the Churches were not moved to help their Jewish co-patriots, but this
was partly explained by the attacks on the autonomy of the Churches themselves and their preoccupation with their own troubles. Beyond Germany, however, Christians had a duty of aid, McDonald argued, using the words of Lord Cecil, because the issue touched on "the principles of our civilization". It was therefore regrettable that it had become necessary to distinguish between aid recipients. As Christians had not been moved in significant numbers through general appeals for aid, and because there was a need to establish the principle that the refugees were not only Jewish, targeted appeals were developed. This approach was not agreed by all Christians interested in aiding refugees, but it was the way deliberations eventually proceeded. Christians would, it was believed, more likely help other Christians, but as was demonstrated in previous sections, this was not necessarily the case. Lack of interest was due in part because of the language used to identify some of the Christian refugees: making it difficult to understand that these refugees were Christians, although characterized as 'partly Jewish', nor was it clear why they needed aid when it seemed that Jews were helping Jews.

Bishop Bell believed that Christian appeals for ('non-Aryan') Christian refugees were the best way to invoke a sense of responsibility in Christians to the plight of refugees in general. It was also a philosophical and pragmatic response. As discussed previously, Bell believed that the integrity of the Church was at stake. On a practical level, however, the number of Christian refugees was small, numbering less than a fifth of the sum total, but they were a significant and growing group. As the refugee aid network was increasingly fractured along interest lines (academics, professionals, trade unionists and eventually children), it was not surprising that within this framework Christians would also wish to establish relief committees. Unfortunately, as was also previously demonstrated, there was a singular lack of support for developing such machinery despite the best efforts of those initiating such moves. Towards the end of 1935, with continued extension of anti-Jewish and 'non-Aryan' policies, however, the time was ripe for a renewed effort on behalf of the Churches. Two years after the start of the refugee exodus, there was greater knowledge of the refugee plight. This would, it was hoped, produce a greater

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156 These themes reoccur in many of the reports written by McDonald as High Commissioner. See also; James G. McDonald, "Christian Responsibility toward German Refugees," Radio Broadcast on WEAF/NBC, 14 January 1934.
response. But the confusion engendered by the persistent segregation of refugees along racial lines continued.

Beginning in December 1935, plans to develop a non-Jewish equivalent of the Jewish Colonization Association for resettlement of ‘non-Aryan’ Christians had been circulating within the international protestant community with the support of the High Commissioner for Refugees. An International Christian Committee for German Refugees (ICCGR) was created to launch appeals in Europe through national appeals. Bishop Bell was appointed chairman. The organisation first met on the 31 January 1936. But, the new initiative was stillborn, for reasons difficult to determine. Relaunched by a letter to The Times by Archbishop Lang on 25 April 1936, the aim was to raise £25,000 as part of a larger appeal to raise £125,000 from American and European Church appeals over the next year. The appeal also had the support of the Free Churches. At a meeting of the committee in July, it was stressed that the need for “concerted action” was essential and that to date, as far as the British Appeal was concerned, Bell could report that less than one tenth of the target figure had been achieved, namely £2443 to July 1936. To boost the appeal Bell broadcast a heartfelt appeal in September 1936. He urged the need for emigration funds and stressed that while Jews had the chance of Palestine, the ‘non-Aryan’ Christian did not. His appeal to Christians for Christians was predicated on the ‘racial’ origins of the refugees. The “Christian outcasts” were branded because of the “Jewish blood” of their parents or grandparents. Conversely his appeal was predicated on the supra-racial nature of the Church.

Christianity is a bigger thing than race, a bigger thing than nation. And if the Christian Church of our generation is to be true to the spirit of Christ, then Christians of all countries, and of all denominations, must recognize their suffering fellow Christians as brethren - and come to their rescue, just because they are brethren.

Financial success did not follow in the wake of the radio address. Disheartened by the

157 Dr. Adolf Keller, “International committee of the Churches for non-Jewish refugees from Germany,” 22 January 1936, L. P. L., Bell Papers, v. 35, pt.1 fo. 1a-4. Jasper, George Bell, 138. In April, its offices were established in the Sentinel Building, London - the previous home of the High Commissioner. Andre Wurfbain, the Commissioner’s former Secretary General was appointed Secretary of the ICCGR in April only to resign a few months later. Between January and April, the ICCGR was more of an idea than a practical reality.


lack of response, the Bishop contacted the Foreign Office in November and asked for a grant of £5000 with a suggestion that a special issue of stamps with a surcharge for refugee organizations be considered. The proposal was declined: all funds for refugee settlement were to be raised privately by the voluntary aid committees. At the end of December it was dispiriting to realize that the total accumulated was less than £8,000. Compared to the £1,400,000 raised by British Jews it was humiliating for Christians in Britain to realize that from over 890 Churches and 910 individuals, the committee had failed to raise less than £10,000. Efforts were redoubled in January with the dispatch of 20,000 pamphlets to Church ministers and Councils for England, the Church of Wales, Congregational, Methodist, Unitarian and Presbyterian Churches of England. Members of the Church Assembly, Bishops and Deans were contacted again and a second letter was sent to all rural deans. Personal approaches were made to the Salvation Army, the Rotary Clubs, the BBC and the Mens’ Christian Association as well as selected names from Kelly’s Directory. Against the original aims to only petition a Christian constituency, the appeal was extended beyond these confines and “firms dealing in furs, garments etc., (Jewish interest)” were also approached, revealing the level of desperation some of the committee members had reached. At the 12th meeting of the British National Christian Appeal, Bell declared the response as “disappointing”, but pointed out that the “British collection of nearly £9000 was the largest so far”. In trying to explain the apathetic response, Bell remarked that the appeal had been “handicapped by the fact that inquiries showed that only a small proportion of the refugees to be non-Aryan Christians, the large majority being political refugees”. In 1937, appeals were still beset with confusion in the public mind over who was being aided, engendering apathy and poor results. The appeal closed in the middle of 1937 having raised approximately

166 12th meeting of the National Christian Appeal for Refugees from Germany, 25 February 1937, L. P. L., Bell Papers, v. 34, fo., 432-433.
Writing the forward to a pamphlet issued by Charles Singer on the Christian approach to Jews in July 1937, Bell used the opportunity to publicize his feelings in regard to Christian approaches to ‘non-Aryan’ Christians:

The plight of these so called ‘non-Aryan’ Christians is grievous in the extreme. The Jews have rendered them no small measure of help in spite of their difference in religion. But the Christian Churches in England and elsewhere have made the minutest response. There have been individual Christians who have been generous. But the Churches as a whole are silent and, it seems unconcerned”.

It was a frank admission. Ever persistent, Bell returned to colleagues declaring that there was a need for a new committee and he hoped that the Conference of Missions Societies might take responsibility. A combination of the International Committee on the Christian Approach to the Jews and the British Committee on Work among Jews of the British Conference was suggested. The ad hoc group demurred. Some days later in an article to the Church Times, perhaps in response to his repeated frustrations with both Christian organizations and lay responses in Church based appeals, he bleakly surmised, “Do Christians Care?”

Discouraged but undeterred, Bell founded his own committee for refugees - The Church of England Committee for ‘non-Aryan’ Christians. While it bore the name of the Anglican Church as part of its title, in reality it was a Bell creation, with inter-confessional support and expertise. It was composed of men and women already in the field of relief, namely Quakers, such as Bertha Bracey and Methodists, including Henry Carter and William Simpson, as well as those interested in the general refugee issue including ecumenist Ruth Rouse and Anglican, James Parkes. Bell’s problems with engaging his own religious body with (any part of the) refugee issue paralleled the experiences of Simpson and Carter who had also struggled to energize their leadership and lay constituency. The new committee, in discussing their approach, determined that Church collections were severely limited, general appeals to the wider Christian constituency were too “ambitious” and unreliable. The best

approach was the “personal” one, approaching particular parishes and individuals.\textsuperscript{170} This was a startling statement, that only those already interested would be receptive.


By the middle of 1935, members of the Continental Churches Committee of the Council on Foreign Affairs were internally divided on the ramifications of Church compliance with Nazi legislation and Nazi ideologies of ‘race, blood and soil’ and how they should respond as fellow protestant churchmen to this situation. This concern was particularly evident in Council members diverging view of the Confessing Church. Increasingly, a bipartite division arose between members like Bell and Duncan Jones who supported the Confessing Church’s right to censure aspects of Nazi Church policy and, conversely, members like Macdonald, Douglas and Headlam who believed this faction to be destructive to Church unity and unrepresentative of the wider German Church. This internal wrangling over approach and policy in connection with the Confessing Church exploded publicly in June 1937 during a Church Assembly debate on a report surveying the Continental Churches. Much of this dispute between Bell and Headlam rested on the relative merits of particular sources of information.

As seen previously, the Bishop of Gloucester was concerned that the new Germany was unfairly represented in the media and that many in Britain were quick to judge their continental friend in unfavourable terms. Headlam believed that it was essential to ‘balance’ these reports with less ‘partisan’ sources. In this vein he subscribed to an Anglo-German information service in July 1935. Dr. R. J. Rösel promised to provide news about Germany that was “more reliable and authentic” in order to counteract the existing reports which he believed deterred greater understanding between the two nations.\textsuperscript{171} His service subsequently sent the Bishop various selected articles from the \textit{Völkische Beobachter} translated into English (for in common with Bell, Headlam could not read German). These excerpts included topics on German internal and foreign policy from the Nazi perspective. In reality, the Anglo-German service was little more than a thinly disguised Nazi propaganda

\textsuperscript{170} Letter from Bell to James Parkes, 22 November 1937, \textit{Parkes Papers}, BZ 7051 15.018, SUA.
machine, yet Headlam seemed unaware or unworried about this possibility. Prior and during his subscription, Headlam maintained lengthy and frequent correspondence with several key figures within the Nazi Party (Alfred Rosenberg), the Deutsche Christen (Müller) as well as the exponent of ‘positive’ Christianity, Dr. Fabricus. In these contacts and his various public pronouncements from August 1933, he appeared to fellow churchmen as a defender of the regime. His criticism of commonly held concerns about aspects of Nazism, particularly in respect to the Churches, gave rise to this view. Furthermore, he countered Anglican criticism regarding antisemitic violence with assertions that Jewish behaviour was to blame for the situation.

Privately however, Headlam was less supportive and raised similar criticism to those current in the public domain, revealing an ambiguity and inconsistency with his public position. In a letter to Rosenberg in July 1936, the Bishop stated that certain aspects of the regime were disliked in Britain. Many “utterances of the Nazi party... irritate us excessively.” Contradicting his more infamous remarks about Jews, he remarked “we intensely dislike your treatment of the Jews”. Some months later, however, he returned to earlier form remarking that “he was not inclined to be too severe a judge” of anti-Jewish actions recognizing “the difficulties that have arisen through the excessive influence that they [Jews] have obtained in Berlin”. Conversely, he could state that the Aryan theory was unscientific and “baseless” and that European nations had actually benefited from their “non-Aryan element” through the “strain of Jewish blood”. Similarly, in correspondence with Joachim von Ribbentrop, the German Ambassador to Britain, he wrote that many in Britain sympathized with the “restoration” of nation life in Germany “but what has done so much harm, in just those circles that sympathize most with you, has been the treatment of the German Church... the Christian Church should be free from State interference”. A few weeks later in a letter to The Times, however, Headlam contradicted these private reproofs by caviling the Confessing Church for its failure to join the programme to unify the Churches under new measures from Hitler. “We

173 Letter from Headlam to Professor Rosenberg, 5 February 1937, L. P. L., Headlam Papers, MS2643, fo., 155. February 1937 and onwards. This series also holds series of correspondence between Muller and Dr. Fabricus.
have no reason for thinking that the Chancellor’s action is not a wise and honest attempt at a settlement". Headlam stressed that by putting the Nazi view on certain issues in a favourable light, he was not guilty of partisanship, an accusation he passed on others who assessed German actions unsympathetically. He was, he argued in counterfact, bringing balance to a highly factionalized debate. German correspondents must have drawn confusing signals from his contradictory private-public remarks.

In addition to his own efforts to build alternative contacts and sources, Headlam also drew on the expertise of his fellow committee men and Anglican correspondents in situ. Headlam has been criticized for relying too heavily on his researcher and librarian, Dr. A. J. Macdonald. It might also be said that he was willing to trust Macdonald’s assessments and judgements, partly because they shared similar attitudes to the Confessing Church and Nazi Germany. Macdonald who was also vice-chairman of the Anglo-German Brotherhood, a Christian grouping of those broadly sympathetic to Nazi Germany and in some cases Nazism itself, went so far as to contribute an article entitled “Why I believe in Hitler” in a book published in Frankfurt in 1936. In the lead up to the publication of the Fourth Survey on the Affairs of the Continental Churches Headlam noted in a confidential letter to Archbishop Lang that Macdonald’s report was “one-sided”. This apart, he defended the CFR librarian saying that “one ought to remember” that the Christian religion in Germany “is not confined, as some people seem to think, to the Confessional Church”. In a follow up letter on the same matter, Headlam further acknowledged Macdonald’s “partisan manner” and his lack of “discretion”, noting the opposition he engendered within the Council. “On the other hand, the opposition to him is just as bad. The partisanship of the Dean of Chichester ... is quite intolerable”. Headlam would do his best to “be reasonable” in a preface to the report, “I rather blame myself for not having gone through it with him [Macdonald] and suggested alterations”. Macdonald was not the only cause of internal discontent in the CFR. Canon Douglas, the Council’s Secretary and supporter of Headlam, had considered giving an official

177 Griffiths, Fellow Travellers, 252.
invitation some months earlier to a visit by Bishop Dietrich, a German-Christian of the most radical wing. Bell had intervened and warned him not to proceed with such an action, believing it would be a disaster if the CFR gave him such recognition. Bell reminded Douglas that,

[The Archbishop of Canterbury is President of the Council, and must therefore in no small degree be involved in such an invitation. I hope very much that no invitation of the kind contemplated will be issued without his approval... any invitation (even of a semi-official kind) to any German Bishop requires careful consideration... I do beg that nothing be done without the Archbishop.]

While Headlam was willing to let these incidents pass other Continental Churches committee members were not and the cumulative actions of Douglas, Macdonald and Headlam over the preceding years came to a head with the outright rejection of the Fourth Survey. Macdonald’s report was quashed and an account prepared by Duncan-Jones was written in its place. Yet despite the criticisms Bishop Headlam freely shared with Lang on Macdonald’s work, he made an “about face” with his preface to the Fourth Survey. John Bull, a patriotic weekly, mercilessly lampooned the Bishop in its June issue.

Dear Bishop of Gloucester, I am too charitable to accuse you of ignorance; I can only presume that you are deluding yourself that some things are not so terrible as they seem. Such things as mass persecution, murder, maiming, perversion of justice, militarism. For these brutalities are the results of the Nazism you defend... and I can only regret that an English prelate should shut his eyes to avoid admitting the existence of those crimes against humanity.

Most notably Headlam downplayed antisemitic actions, stating that antisemitic “propaganda” was the work of only the most extreme members of the Nazi party and it was wrong to judge National Socialism on the “foolish utterances” of a few. On reading the preface, Jacob Sarna concluded that Headlam “a Bishop of the Church of Christ” approved of the “ghastly and barbaric crimes” of Hitler. Dorothy Buxton,
a well known and respected commentator on the Kirchenkampf, also took issue with the foreword. Taking each piece apart, she contested Headlam’s assertion that the Church was ‘free’ and the severity of restrictions on Church press and public meetings had decreased since 1935. ‘Church’ figures such as Herr Kerrl and Dr. Fabricius could hardly have been said to represent Christianity for they openly advocated “the persecution of Jews”. Concluding, Buxton stated that “[y]our preface may now, I fear, have been taken to mean that the Church of England accepts the National Socialist meaning of ‘freedom’ as applied to Church affairs.”185 While Headlam received substantial criticism for his negation of the official CFR report, he also received a few letters of appreciation. An anonymous letter from “A patriotic British National Socialist” congratulated Headlam for incurring the ‘rebuke’ printed in John Bull. The German Ambassador also gave thanks for his Lordship’s preface.186

The reception which greeted Headlam at the Church Assembly was mostly negative. Presenting the report, the bishop of Gloucester complained of the “vituperative” and “very violent criticism” he had received for his foreword, which merely confirmed his view, that people were highly “partisan”.187 Bishop Bell “felt obliged to express disagreement” with the bishop of Gloucester, “and was very sorry that he had seen fit, on his own responsibility” to include a preface “which seemed to most misleading”.188 Had Headlam “not gone out of his way . . . in his preface and his speech”, to give such an “unjust account” of the situation, the bishop of Chichester would not have spoken. Systematically Bell refuted each statement made by the bishop of Gloucester. The position of the Churches and Christianity in Germany was far more serious than Headlam gave credit. “There has now arisen a new authority as to what Christ and Christianity really is. This new authority is Adolf Hitler”. This very moment, Bell declared was the time to make a personal appeal to Hitler, to avow our friendship to the German people, but to express our disapproval of “your treatment of the Jews, of the non-Aryan Christians, and of the Churches”.189

187 L. P. L., Church Assembly Proceedings, XVIII (22 June 1937), 270.
188 L. P. L., Church Assembly Proceedings, XVIII (22 June 1937), 274.
189 L. P. L., Church Assembly Proceedings, XVIII (22 June 1937), 280-81.
Raymond Beazley defended Headlam as “wise and statesmanlike”. The bishop of Chichester had made too much of the “individual cases of oppression”. Canon Douglas remarked forcefully that “there was not a trace of bias” in this chairman’s preface. Archbishop Temple strove for the middle line, agreeing that it was hard to make a judgement about what was truly happening. At the same time it was “impossible to be blind to the continued activity of Herr Streicher concerning the Jews” and indeed the actions of Herr Kerrl against the Churches. Equally, he regretted that the “Confessionals” had not joined in unity attempts, but also recognised that this was in part because of their regret at the present trend in Germany to “worship Germania” rather than “God or Jesus Christ”. Temple surmised that they heed the warnings given by the bishop of Gloucester on the danger of rash judgements about the situation, but on the other hand, they should pray for the Christians of Germany, as bishop Bell suggested they might, in what was surely testing times for Christians in Germany. The last words fell to the Chairman – archbishop Lang who tendered his thanks to both bishops for their respective speeches. “Lest there be any misapprehension abroad” he continued

it was important to point out that the Bishop’s preface must not be regarded as having the authority of the Council of Foreign Relations or of the Church Assembly, which by accepting the Report, did not give its approval to all its contents, and still less of the Church of England as a whole; it had only the authority – a very considerable authority – of the Bishop of Gloucester himself.

Even more critically, the archbishop of Canterbury decried the fact that the bishop had given his view in a preface rather than appended note because “a preface seemed to invest his views with a somewhat official character which he would be the first to admit they did not possess”.

At the end of June 1937, the bishop of Gloucester’s position was a minority view held by very few within his own Council and was not one supported by the Primate. Headlam’s isolation seemed to be complete in a meeting of Convocation in January 1938 when he failed to get a seconder for his motion to quash a resolution on the German Church proposed by Bishop Bell. In a long and unapologetic letter to Lang following the meeting, Headlam continued to argue his case in language and

193 Ibid.
content consistent with his remarks in the preceding public forums. Clearly out of kilter with his fellow churchmen, a call for his resignation was not far off. Obstinate, truculent and convinced of the righteousness of his position, Headlam remained in post. Nor was he silenced: he would continue to make inflammatory remarks in the proceeding few months.

Throughout the increasingly polarized Anglican debates, Headlam persistently criticized other churchmen for indulging in political and partisan commentary, excusing his own remarks as exempt from such a charge. Headlam’s defence, that he was merely lending balance to a prejudiced debate, is discredited when one considers his private admonitions to Rosenberg and others, as well as his reservations regarding Macdonald’s reliability to the Primate. He shared similar concerns for the Church in Germany and at times he was passingly critical of Jewish persecution (with caveats). Yet, he was willing to publicly excuse and even credit certain aspects of the Nazi regime - a regime which most of his contemporaries in the Church found distinctly and singularly reprehensible.

VI: ANSCHLUß AND BEYOND: MARCH 1938 - SEPTEMBER 1939

After the initial outcry for Jewish refugees in 1933, public Church interest on this issue had waned for the most part. The Nuremburg Laws revived interest briefly, but this was not sustained in spite of an impassioned Church Assembly debate which produced the first substantive Church pronouncement on the plight of Jews and so-called ‘non-Aryans’. A slow awakening to the breadth of the refugee issue, at least among clerics, prelates and leading laity was discernible, but did not produce effective structures or funds for refugees, Christian or otherwise. Two separate but ultimately linked occurrences bought the issue of refugees back into Church conscience. The first was the incarceration of a German pastor, a former WWI war hero, and the second was the annexation of Austria.

On the 2 March 1938, Martin Niemöller was found not guilty of offences against the Nazi Party and the State. He was ordered to pay a small fine and released. On the orders of Hitler, however, the pastor was taken to Sachsenhausen and from there to Dachau where he remained for the next seven years. Niemöller’s trial and

imprisonment produced an outcry in British Christian circles, particularly amongst Anglicans, who saw him as a courageous individual, willing to express freedom of conscience against a totalitarian society. Bishop Bell criticized his arrest in The Times, declaring that the pastor had merely preached the Gospel so “What is his crime?” The internal divisions within the CFR, revealed at the Church Assembly in June 1937, hardened with a rebuttal letter in which Macdonald contradicted Bishop Bell’s assessment of Niemöller asserting that he had disobeyed the law and was now suffering the consequences. “We in this country also have to obey police instructions”.  

Ten days after the trial verdict, Austria was ‘absorbed’ into the Greater Reich by Anschluss. All restrictive measures applied against Jews in Germany for the previous five successive years were immediately instituted overnight in Austria: 200 Jews committed suicide in March alone. Bishop Bell doubted whether these fantastic numbers of deaths could all be attributable to suicides and suggested that murder was a more apt explanation; but this was a private suspicion, not a public utterance. Another mass refugee exodus began and over 20,000 refugees left Austria in March and April 1938. In successive months a further 30,000 left the country.

These two issues brought up the question again of whether it was ‘legitimate’ for a foreign Church such as the Church of England to comment on what was considered by Germans to be internal political matters. To Anglicans, however, at least in the case of Niemöller, it was primarily a religious matter in a ‘branch’ of the Universal Church and one that concerned them as fellow Christians. Yet British churchman understood that because of the totalitarian nature of Germany’s government, it was also a very political matter involving the coercive uses of State powers against the Church, and by extension, the treatment of Jews (now subjects) and those related to Jews who might also be a part of the Church. Most Anglican

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196 Chadwick, Hensley Henson, 264.
197 See Wilkinson, Dissent or Conform?, 154-58; James Bentley, “British and German High Churchman in the Struggle against Hitler,” Journal of Ecclesiastical History, XXIII, no. 3 (July 1972): 233-249.
engagement was taken up with the former, for it was seen to be of ‘direct’ relevance and arguably less ‘political’. Nazi racial ideology, however, affected Christians and members of the clergy. Here the cross over between the two concerns came about. Increasingly, if one criticized the former, it was no longer credible to ignore the latter, and the subject of antisemitism moved from the periphery to centre stage.

*Niemöller, Anschluß and Jews: Changing and divergent approaches*

In the House of Commons Sir Samuel Hoare, the Home Secretary, reiterated government policy of treating each asylum case on its “individual” merits. This approach was to continue, despite the “special circumstances created by the present situation” as economic and social problems in Britain might result from “indiscriminate” admissions. On hearing of the desperate position of Viennese Jews, Archbishop Lang wrote to the Home Secretary that day asking about the relaxation of entry regulations in regard to Jews entering Britain from Austria. He felt “bound to write” because of “the miserable plight of the Jews . . . [their] apprehension and even terror”. In language which both elicited and deflected a positive response, Lang averred that “[N]o one knows better than I do the difficulties which might be created if any large number of Austrian Jews were permitted to enter this country” yet equally it was “lamentable” that there might no place “for these unhappy people”. A piece in the *Guardian* echoed similar oscillating sentiments: “Sympathy and tradition suggest that they should be admitted”, however, the present economic conditions in Britain made this difficult. The Austrians refugees did not bring new skills like the Huguenots, nor was their any chance that they might be returned to their native home land like the Belgians before them. Ultimately their care would fall to the tax-payer, and while it was certain that they should be admitted unconditionally, only “the concerted action of the democracies” would solve the wider problem.

Given Lang’s sensitivity to the Jewish situation in Austria, his speech in the Lords on 29 March 1938 was a surprise, and to many of his fellow members, a great

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disappointment. Ignoring petitions he had personally received and news of suicides, he focused on the popularity of Anschluss in Austria. Quoting a prominent Austrian artist who had spoken of his “salvation” and “joy without parallel” on news of the annexation, Lang then focused his ire on the Versailles Treaty which he stated had long been regarded as “vindictive” and “arbitrary”. Moreover, in reference to the present situation he stated that the “union of Austria and Germany” was “inevitable”. True, the way this had been achieved was “reprehensible”, but it had been done without “any bloodshed whatsoever” and now, finally, “stability” in Europe was at hand. As for Hitler’s critics, “It is wholly reasonable and merely quixotic to think that Herr Hitler, having now achieved the one great ambition of his life, may be disposed to embark on other adventures”. Lord Cecil, criticized his Primate’s view of the annexation. “If he happened to be a Liberal or a Jew or a Roman Catholic in Austria, I doubt very much whether he would talk about a bloodless operation”. The harshest indictment against Lang’s summation came from Lord Strabolgi, another lay Anglican, who linked the high incidents of suicides with Nazi sponsored actions, and who decried the justification of Anschluss by a Christian leader.

It has been suggested that there has been no bloodshed in Austria, but there have been 1,700 suicides. Suicides may be wrong, but I think it is even more wrong to drive people to suicide . . . The right reverend Primate is, however, silent on these matters today. I cannot help thinking of the thousands of clergy of our Church with whom I have had the honour of pleading for great causes in the country, and I must again express regret on behalf of my noble friends that that speech was made.

Significantly, the tone of articles in the Guardian was more sympathetic to the need for Christian action following Strabolgi’s speech. It spoke of the “orgy of Jew bating” and “appalling figures” of Jewish suicides. “Concerted action of Christian countries and of the democracies” was required, and the Church was bidden to respond practically “in this charitable cause, the Churches of Europe and America will find opportunity for common action”.

204 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, 5th Series, v. 108, 29 March 1938, cols. 448-449. There is much to be said for Hastings’ assessments of Lang’s lack of leadership. Hastings, English Christianity, 251. Certainly Henson believed that Lang was weak, a compromiser and a procrastinator and someone that could not be trusted. He also characterized Lang as a great actor, a politician, pompous and vain! Henson, Retrospect, Vol II, 244, 257, 332-33, 383. Conversely Chadwick argues that “Lang was a more momentous figure in the German affair than has sometimes been supposed”. Chadwick, “The English Bishops,” 9.
Having incurred the public disapproval of many for his lack of sympathy regarding the plight of Jews in Vienna, Lang retreated from public pronouncements on this issue for the time being. Significantly, within a month of his unpopular speech and with the aid of his chaplain Dr. Don, he made his first practical expression of private sympathy for Jews through a petition from the Jewish communities in Burgenland. This eastern Austrian community of approximately 3,200 orthodox Jews was desperate to leave Austria, following decrees to make the region ‘Judenrein’. Through Don, Lang asked the Home Secretary whether he could intercede on their behalf. This request was rejected. Between late December 1938 to September 1939, Lang received further petitions from Vienna, Hungary and Rumania. Letters were divided into groupings marked ‘Catholic’, ‘non-Aryan’ Christians and ‘Jewish’, of which the last grouping formed the greater number of requests. All Jewish cases were forwarded to the German Jewish Aid Committee.

The Archbishop of Canterbury’s omission of Jewish suffering from his speech in March had incurred criticism from leading lay co-religionists and the popular press because it was believed that a Christian leader should not stay silent on such a matter. Yet those committed to maintaining the refugee issue at the forefront of the public mind still considered the Primate’s involvement, as head of the Established Church, crucial to increasing public awareness and involvement. For this reason Lang continued to be approached by organizations hoping to elicit his support for public meetings. Perhaps bitten by the public reception following the Lords speech, or holding a genuine belief that public action increased persecution in Germany and Austria, Lang for the most part refused these types of invitations. Requests from the British section of the World Jewish Congress and a meeting under the auspices of the British section of the World Evangelical Alliance were both declined. To the latter,

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Guardian, 14 April 1938, p. 239. Italics mine.

Pauley, From Prejudice to Destruction, 211, 249-251.


Don replied that His Grace “has full sympathy with the motives of those who desire that some united and public protest should be made against the continuing persecution of the Jews”, but that the Archbishop was “not at all certain that public protest, however well justified or emphatic” was likely to bring about any “real improvement in the situation”. His Grace supposed that he could do more “by private efforts behind the scenes”.

On the other hand, for a distinctly religious stance against oppression, Lang was prepared to act and urged Christians to join with Jews in a Service of Intercession on 17 July 1938. In a letter to the Chief Rabbi several weeks before the proposed day, the Primate stated that it was “right that Christian people should join in these Intercessions...on behalf of all members of your race who are suffering oppression and persecution”. Moreover, he would insert this request into his diocesan gazette “which is often quoted in the Press generally” with the hope that it would be met with a good response in Churches throughout Britain. “I need not assure you of my own deep and real sympathy”. In his call to Christians, the Archbishop stated that the current plight of Jews in Germany and Austria “must give acute distress to all who believe in the principles of justice and of racial and religious tolerance”. In common with Bell, he used the language of race, in this case to invoke action for refugees in Britain, recalling the generosity of Jews throughout the world “in helping those who are Jews by religion as well as race”, further noting “they have often extended their help to Christians with Jewish blood”. It was now the duty of Christian people to take over this task by supporting the Church of England Committee for ‘non-Aryan’ Christians.

While Lang steered clear of public statements outside of a purely religious context, his fellow churchmen were increasingly assertive and publicly outspoken, reviving and extending their initial approach of mid-1933. In the Church Assembly

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meeting in June 1938, the date and subject of which was pre-advertised in The Times, Bishop Bell moved a resolution to record the “deep distress” felt by members “at the sufferings endured by ‘non-Aryan’ Christians, as well as those of the Jewish race”. Building on his earlier resolution of 1935, he also asked for individual action “Christians everywhere should express their fellowship with their suffering brethren by material gifts as well as by personal sympathy and prayer”. Unlike his address three years earlier, this speech omitted the customary preamble which recognized the ‘benefits’ and skirted the less savoury aspects of the Nazi regime. Nor were there any references to Jewish “abuses”. More significantly, however, was Bell’s change in language which was less exclusionist than before. Previously, in his desire to demonstrate the needs of Christian refugees, he had excluded references to the needs of Jewish refugees, believing because they had been met with a response, at least by Jews, they were sufficiently cared for and no longer in need. Several years on, Bell knew that Jewish organizations were struggling to meet obligations, despite the level of funds they had to draw on, as the sheer size of the problem continued to grow uncontrollably. Thus, while he continued to express the particular responsibilities of Christians to Christian refugees, he also stressed that Jewish refugees were in need of Christian charity too. The exclusionary approach had failed to engender any response for reasons that were not entirely clear but could be partly attributable to the misunderstanding surrounding the general refugee issue and the ‘racialised’ language employed. A more inclusivist approach might invoke a better response, particularly when the news of Jewish persecution was fresh in the public mind. While Bell had modified his approach in this regard, however, the language of ‘race and blood’ remained.

They must remember the needs of Jews and Christian alike. It was wrong to separate the Jews and leave the Jews to the Jews and the Christians to the Christians. They both made a deep appeal by their sufferings to all humanity and above all to the Christian Church. . . He pleaded for the Jews and also especially for the non-Aryan Christians, their fellow Christians in Germany of mixed German blood. He was asking for a response by British Christians to the need of German Christians. The bond of race was strong: was the bond of the Christian religion to be no bond at all? . . . He asked for their sympathy and help . . . and he asked for the awakening of conscience.  

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215 “Plight of ‘Non-Aryan’ Christians,” [cutting], The Times, 16 June 1938, Parkes Papers, BZ7051 15.018, SUA. The speech was not restricted solely to ‘non-Aryan’ Christians as the title might suggest.  

216 L. P. L. Church Assembly Proceedings, XIX, (23 June 1938), 389–395. Bell’s motion was upheld.

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Bell recounted the work of the refugee committee he had initiated which was supporting refugee children and pastors in his diocese on a small-scale, giving what relief it could. What was really required, however, was a network of representatives in “every diocese” working together to raise and distribute funds. The bishop called on Christians in Britain to support this endeavour and the forthcoming intergovernmental conference on refugees in Evian via their MPs.

A forthright letter to The Times signed by the archbishop of York, George Bell, Lord Lytton and others, drew on the sentiments of Bell’s Church Assembly address. Again its language was less reticent about the realities under which Jews and others suffered and more impatient at Germany’s attempts to elicit sympathy for ‘German minorities’ outside its borders when within them it behaved with “barbarous injustice”. It enlarged on the theme of the ‘conscience of Christendom’, suggesting that unless a stand was made, “history” would judge Britain detrimentally in terms of humanity and Christianity alike. The bishop of Durham, forthright as ever against German antisemitism, told a mass demonstration in Leeds that the persecuted Jews “stood at the bar of mankind asking for justice”. The Dean of Canterbury, Dr. Hewlett Johnson, remarked that the attack on Jews was only the beginning.

Christians had to unite with Jews knowing that “[t]heir cause is our cause”. Canon Guy Rogers at a united service of Christians and Jews in Birmingham spoke the feelings of the congregation when he expressed his outrage at the barbarity of the recent events. Building on his Assembly address, Bell’s maiden speech to the House of Lords spoke of the need for international cooperation particularly in the light of the addition of Austria to the ever growing refugee problem.

The bishop of Gloucester’s letters to The Times, however, brought a discordant note to the united front of public censure and concern of churchmen. Fresh from a visit to Berlin in June 1938 and ignoring the continuing persecution of Jews (in

217 For more on Bell’s aid to exile German pastors see: Ronald D. E. Webster, “German ‘Non-Aryan’ Clergymen and the Anguish of Exile after 1933,” Journal of Religious History, 22, no. 1 (February 1998): 83-103. The Church of England Committee for ‘non-Aryan’ Christians worked closely with the Friends and the Inter-Aid Committee for Children (see chapters 1 and 6).


public at least) Headlam contested the popular consensus regarding Niemöller and the German regime, criticizing members of his own church for ‘taking sides’ on the issue. Having met with Church leaders and the Foreign Minister, Headlam was convinced that the Churches were “free to carry on their work”. He was irritated by the attention the Anglican church gave to Niemöller and his ilk. The majority of German pastors were quite “happy” with the situation and the Bishop believed that “great harm” was done by the “habit of certain English divines” of confusing “the Confessional Church with the whole Evangelical Church”. British churchmen should be encouraging the Confessional grouping to unify with the rest of the Church rather than supporting its independent stance. While some may not approve of the present government, the “great majority” of Germans believed “it has brought them order and self-respect and good government”. It would be better to try and understand Germany rather than constantly “scolding” her. Any references to Jews were notably absent. Privately, Headlam was no more sympathetic to the condition of the Confessing Church nor the worsening position of the Jewish community in Germany. In an eight page report delivered to Archbishop Lang on his Berlin trip, Headlam studiously avoided more than the briefest engagement with “The Jewish Question”. In a very short paragraph he admitted that “we did not talk much about the Jews” for the reason that he always avoided “mixing up different subjects of investigation”. He felt it was important to note however, that a “Nazi” attempt to introduce a new drive against Jews had elicited “a good deal of indignation”. Most of all, he really believed that “It is not our business to keep every nation in order. We are no means immaculate ourselves”.221

Back in the public arena, the bishop of Durham felt that Headlam’s letter in The Times could not go unanswered. Old friends, on this topic they had become adversaries. Henson could not credit Headlam’s position and he put the plight of Jews and Christians at the heart of his criticism.

Does he think that the Church of Christ in England ought to regard the situation in Germany as a merely domestic affair with which none but Germans are concerned, when the victims of Nazi tyranny, Jews and the ‘non-Aryan’ Christians, are streaming out of Germany and Austria in crowds so great that the statesmanship of Europe is at a loss how to provide for them?222

Headlam’s rebuke was no less tart and avoided the subject of persecution of Jews and

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221 “The German Church,” The Times, 14 July 1938, p. 10; Jasper, Headlam, 299.
Unwilling to let the matter rest, Henson wrote to Headlam privately, remarking that “I think you are dangerously misinformed about the religious situation in Germany”. More critically, Henson was “impressed by your strange lack of sympathy with the Christian protest against the claims and procedures of the totalitarian State”. In his diary, he further remarked on the bishop of Gloucester’s lack of compassion for the victims of the Nazi government.  

A British naval officer on the active list, horrified at the Bishop of Gloucester’s article, wrote to Headlam to tell him he was completely mistaken. The Bishop should write to the Times again and tell the Germans to show “a spark of mercy to their persecuted individuals and minorities”. The officer had travelled in Germany and had “seen behind the scenes” and was distressed that the hand of friendship could be extended by a churchman while the Nazi leaders continued in their “refined cruelty”. Conversely, a German writer thanked Headlam for his letters, “You will conceive what a treat it is to us, to read lines like yours to The Times doing us justice, written by a man of so high an ecclesiastical rank”.

Rather than take note of the trenchant comments of colleagues and others, Headlam reiterated his assessment on the German Church crisis and the nature of government in Germany in a full page spread in the Guardian. In contradiction to the conclusions of most other Anglican bishops, who viewed Nazism as anti-religious if not anti-Christian, Headlam declared that “It is quite untrue to say that National Socialism is incompatible with Christianity”. And while certain “English bishops” suggested that there was State persecution of Christians in Germany, this was not the case “in any real sense”. Indeed it had to be understood that the representation of Germany in press reports, on the Church issue and life in Germany itself was “grossly

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224 “Christianity in Germany,” The Times, 20 July 1938, p. 15.
225 Letter from Henson to Headlam, 17 August 1938, L. P. L., Headlam Papers, MS2643, fo. 277.
226 Henson, Retrospect: Vol. II, 413.
distorted... grossly exaggerated”.

This letter and the previous letters in The Times led to a breach between Council members and efforts ensued to unseat the Bishop. Recounting his approaches to Headlam regarding the situation, the Archbishop of Canterbury told Bishop Bell that his representations to Gloucester had been quite “ineffective”. Headlam had refused to resign and had promised to “make as much disturbance as he could” if he were asked to go. Subsequently, Lord Cecil moved a censure resolution against Headlam at a meeting of the Council on Foreign Relations. In a failure of nerve, the motion was not passed and three resolutions were ratified instead. The first required that Headlam’s letters be declared the “personal judgments of the bishop of Gloucester based on his individual experience”, and were not issued from “any official body in the Church of England”. Further, that the overwhelming majority of Bishops, clergy and laity of the Church of England deplored the treatment meted out to ministers of the confessional church and sympathized with those who maintained “the fundamental principles of Christianity”. Lastly, the Council resolved that these points be communicated to the Press at the Archbishop’s discretion. Lang, however, declined to refer the resolutions for publication.

Given that the Council had the discretion to officially censure Headlam's activities, it is interesting to note that they did not exercise this option, particularly when considering their dissatisfaction with the bishop of Gloucester’s chairmanship and activities. The Primate also had ample opportunity to clarify to both the public and his own constituents, that the Bishop opinion’s were contrary to the Church’s view. He did not exercise this option either, for reasons difficult to comprehend. This is all the more perplexing when the Archbishop had been willing to act decisively before. It must be assumed that it was considered more preferential to allow others to make up their minds on the Bishop’s opinions, one way or other. At a time of virtual unanimity on the questions of Church coercion and Jewish persecution, the bishop of Gloucester continued to defy calls from within his own ranks to modify or retract his position or resign. Despite having suffered public admonitions from his friends,

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227 Letter from Dr. Nicoleth, Germany to Headlam, 18 August 1938, L. P. L., Headlam Papers, MS2643, fo., 279.

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colleagues and the Primate on occasion, Headlam continued to air his views without consideration for their detrimental impact and aware of their propaganda value. More critically, it is difficult to understand why the opportunity to unseat him from his chairmanship position was not taken and Lang’s ‘fear’ of publicity on this point seems unconvincing. As it was, Headlam’s continuance in position sent conflicting and contradictory messages. It was still acceptable in the Church of England, at such a high rank and in such a position, to excuse, to defend and to promote National Socialism and Nazi actions.

Reacting to Kristallnacht

The ‘Night of Broken Glass’, more euphemistically known as ‘Crystal Night’, induced a slew of protest and commentary from the general press expressing “genuine moral outrage”. Unusually for the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Primate rushed out a letter for The Times expressing his abhorrence at the preceding two day pogrom.

I believe that I speak for the Christian people of this country in giving immediate expression to the feelings of indignation with which we have read of the deeds of cruelty and destruction which were perpetrated last Thursday in Germany and Austria.

The actions of Herschel Grynzpan - “a single irresponsible Jewish youth” - did not justify the reprisals that followed Lang continued. The failure of the police to intervene was of “sinister significance”. Referring indirectly to the Munich agreement recently negotiated and the prevailing policy of appeasement, Lang regretted that this action should have come at a time when Britain was particularly disposed to “friendly terms” with its German neighbour. The “excesses of hatred and malice” unleashed now placed an “almost intolerable strain” on these relations. To “those” who had suffered Lang hoped that Christians in Britain might offer prayers in their remembrance in churches on Sunday and thereafter. Arguably unnecessary in view of other coverage, but strangely absent from the article, was any reference to Jews as the intended target of the violence. Only by reference to the title (and this was a different one to that penned by Lang) was it clear who were the victims.

Yet the letter was understood as showing sympathy to Jews. In a direct motion brought at a meeting of the Church Assembly on the plight of Jews, Canon Guy Rogers stated that it was “important” that the Minutes contain “some definite expression of sympathy with the Jewish people in the persecution through which they were passing”. He was grateful to the Primate for “his witness to Christian principles which transcended the spurious limitations of race and blood . . . for voicing what had been in their hearts, and for the courageous leadership which he had given”. Grasping for an explanation for the antisemitic fury unleashed during Kristallnacht, the Versailles Treaty was raised as an exculpatory reason. Rogers concluded that it was essential for Germany to disassociate themselves from the persecution and to repent of its “violence and cruelty to the Jews” as it was also necessary that British Christians and churchmen, that “repented of their injustices” and the agreements unjust imposition. Critical commentary on Kristallnacht appeared in the Guardian and other Anglican papers, with the issue of Jewish refugees tied to both the strain on Anglo-German friendship and settlement problems in Palestine under the British Mandate. A statement recording “our solemn protest before the conscience of civilization, against the persecution of the Jews in Germany” appeared in The Times signed by a number of churchmen, lay leaders and public figures, including the Archbishop Temple, Lord Cecil, Hugh Cecil, George Lansbury and Henry Carter. Conversely, an article in a modernist Anglican journal, deviated from the general tenor with a argument citing traditional Christian religious reasons for Jewish sufferings: failure to convert. The “execrable treatment of the Jews in Germany” was part of a historical pattern of persecution of Jews whose solution related to the wider settlement of the Jewish ‘problem’ itself.

Unless the Jew - and how impossible this must seem - is prepared to loose himself in the higher and fuller life of the community in which he finds himself, and he can only do this by becoming in the truest sense Christian – that is to say, much more Christian.

234 Letter from Lang to the Editor of the Times, 11 November 1938, L. P. L. Lang Papers, v. 38, fo., 217. Lang had entitled his piece as ‘A Black Day for Germany’ but it appeared under the by-line of ‘Germany and the Jews’.
235 L. P. L. Church Assembly Proceedings (16 November 1938) 543-546. This motion was supported by the House of Laity.
than most of those by whom he is surrounded – there is no prospect of any permanent and satisfactory solution of the Jewish problem.\textsuperscript{238} A long discussion on “Refugees in Germany” initiated by Bishop Bell, which preceded the Rogers resolution on Jewish persecution, sheds further light on the Anglican difficulty of translating words into deeds. Bell’s address focused on the plight of ‘non-Aryan’ Christians, but also announced the formation of a the Christian Council for Refugees from Germany was announced. This new Council was to be an inter-confessional body for the aid of Christian refugees and was to be composed of representatives of the Anglicans and the various Free Churches, including Methodists, Quakers and Unitarians. It was hoped that there might also be Catholic involvement. Bell argued forcibly for a concrete grant of £5000 to demonstrate the Assembly’s and the Church of England’s commitment to the continuing needs of ‘non-Aryan’ Christians.

The Jews had helped the Jews, and had helped the Jews in a most extraordinary generous way . . . In Britain the Jews made up less than 0.7% of the British population, yet in Britain alone the Jews had contributed a sum of £1,400,000 to the central fund for German Jewry . . . The Christians had raised only a few thousand pounds, or a few tens of thousands, in all that time.\textsuperscript{239}

He hoped that a way would be found for a grant to be made for the relief of “fellow Christians”.\textsuperscript{240}

The reception of Bell’s call, both publicly and administratively, was symptomatic of the Bishop’s previous calls and response: some interest and slower delivery. Long discussions ensued as to the ‘fitness’ of the request, the problems of how to practically institute such an suggestion, and whether the Central Board of Finance had the powers to act accordingly. The Archbishop of York, William Temple, however, acutely observed the special “value of a gift from the corporate funds of the Church”.\textsuperscript{241} It was, he further noted, “a source of continual bewilderment” to other denominations with which he cooperated, that the Church of England had such “great difficulty in making grants from corporate funds”. The bishop of Portsmouth cautioned against immediate action, reminding the Assembly of the “appeals ad misericordiam” over the last twenty years and the creation of the

\textsuperscript{239} L. P. L. \textit{Church Assembly Proceedings}, (16 November 1938) 503-505. The Christian Council for Refugees from Germany will be discussed in the next chapter. 16 November 1938.
\textsuperscript{240} L. P. L. \textit{Church Assembly Proceedings}, (16 November 1938) 503-505.
Assembly Appeals Board “to protect itself from its own feelings, so that it should not embark on special appeals without due consideration”. Perhaps a twenty-four hour delay, while such an application was made to the Board was in order? The Dean of Chichester argued that £5000 was not enough; the Assembly should inaugurate a fund for £50,000 and get every diocese to cooperate with a donation. Canon J. V. Bullard of Ripon suggested that a collection of £10 from the 500 members of the Assembly “over lunch” would solve the problem instantaneously. The bishop of Malmesbury in Bristol reminded members not to forget the outstanding claims of widows and orphans of their own clergy. Lay member, Mrs. Burnett of York, declared to the assembled that this debate would be reported and if the call was declined “it would go out all over the world and not only all over the country”. The man in the street already thought “the Church of England the richest and perhaps the meanest corporation in existence”, and while Canon Bullard’s suggestion for individual donation was one thing, she wanted the Assembly to give as a “body” to the cause.  

Lord Grey, chairman of the Central Board of Finance supported the idea of the Dean of Chichester, that the £5000 form the basis of an Assembly Appeal for £50,000 for the relief of Christian refugees. Lang also agreed with the Bishop of Chichester’s appeal and he too recognised the generosity of Jews particularly in Britain. Indeed by their act today,

> The Jews, would recognise ... that the Assembly was doing its utmost to deal with that part of the problem in which they themselves had already partially assisted, but to which the body of Christian people had not given the attention and thought that it deserved.  

While Christians would not aid Jewish refugees directly, they could help with the wider refugee problem by aiding Christian refugees, thus reducing the general burden for Jewish refugee organizations. That so much of the debate focused on the legalities and logistics ensuing from such a grant is perplexing, particularly as the grant was comparatively small and was for the benefit of fellow Christians, the very constituency Churchmen had determined their own brethren would be more predisposed to help. Although not everyone was convinced that the Assembly should act on Bell’s proposal, it is significant that when both Lang and Grey put their weight behind the proposal, it was carried without dissention. Yet what may have remained

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in the public mind from the debate itself were the contrasts between admonitions from Churchmen to its Christian constituency to help Christian refugees, and conversely the lengthy process of the Church as an institutional body acceding to such a request itself. Considering that this appeal was made in the light of Kristallnacht is also significant. Did the Assembly consider the appeal for Christian refugees unnecessary (though it was not) at this time and that efforts might be better directed at Jewish refugees? The general reluctance to grant small amounts of funds unconditionally and to dwell on administrative and legal problems must have induced further confusion and complacency amongst a generally apathetic public.

Logistical problems continued to plague the haphazardly launched appeal as Grey informed Lang some weeks later. A legal fix whereby members of the Board became members of a special committee was suggested by Grey and agreed by Lang. Together they agreed that the matter not receive any publicity.244

Nor was this the end of the difficulties with confusion over the title of the fund and the identity of the intended recipients. Canon Luckock, the Honorary Secretary of the Peterborough Diocesan Board of Finance noted “all our Diocesan efforts should be made under the same title for the avoidance of confusion in people’s mind” and so that people “may see that they are for the same purpose as the Central Fund inaugurated by the Church Assembly”. Noting that The Times had called the fund ‘The Church of England Refugee Fund’ and stating that it was for non-Aryan Christians, Luckock felt that the word Christian should be included before refugees in the title and ‘non-Aryan’ should be dropped. “The Church of England Christian Refugee Fund seems to me to represent the case best”.245 Nor was he alone in his confusion about the funds title. The Diocesan Board of Finance in Cambridge referred to the fund as the “non-Aryan Refugee Fund”, the Lincoln Diocesan Trust called it the ‘Central Board of Finance initiative’. The Diocese of St. Albans’ styled it more simply as the ‘Refugee Fund’ and Derby Diocese: ‘Jewish Refugee Fund’.246

244 Letter from Grey to Lang, 22 November 1938, Papers of the Central Board of Finance. CERC/CBF/Ref3; Letter from Lang to Grey, 22 November 1938, Papers of the Central Board of Finance. CERC/CBF/Ref3. The appeal was announced in the general press the day after the debate: “Refugees From Germany: Church Fund of £50,000,” The Times, 17 November 1938, p.19. The formation of the Christian Council was detailed in a separate article on the same day.
245 Letter from Canon Luckock to CBF, 25 November 1938, CERC/CBF/Ref2.
Nor was the Central Board of Finance, the body in charge of coordinating the appeal, free from this confusion itself, referring to the fund as the ‘Appeal for Refugee Jews’. The name of the fund was not a superficial concern. That the Central Board of Finance could style the appeal as one initiated for Jews was telling, as were further letters on the same subject. Rev. W. Priest wrote to Lang’s Chaplain to query the purpose of the ‘Archbishop’s Appeal’. “I understood the Archbishop’s Appeal was for the relief of Jews in distress by reason of persecution, and for that I made an appeal and not for any body of Christians!” The Bishop of Dover wrote requesting further information about the appeal: “What are we supposed to be doing about it in this dioceses?” Indeed, Arthur Luckock found it necessary to re-write to Churchwardens in his diocese that the appeal was ‘for the relief of Christian Refugees, most of whom will be little children’.

Linked to this confusion was the charge that German-speaking Jews were converting in order to obtain Christian funds designated for ‘non-Aryan’ Christians. By 1938, it was apparent that conversion was no guarantee of safety, for which the position of ‘non-Aryan’ Christians could attest. Yet some Jews did seek false baptismal papers and did convert to Christianity in the hope that they might escape or delay persecution. Whether this was successful, at least as a delaying tactic, is uncertain. It is unlikely, however, considering the consistent problems of Christian organizations to raise money and develop adequate structures, that Jews were converting in order to gain access to funds. Nevertheless, the accusation once made, persisted. In July 1938, rumours arose about the number of baptisms performed by the chaplain at the British Embassy in Vienna, the Rev C. H. D. Grimes and the fact that they were granted without preparation. Basil Batty, the bishop of Fulham with additional responsibility for chaplains in Central Europe investigated the charges made by a Scottish minister and Grimes was replaced by “an experienced priest”.

At the end of November 1938, the rumours resurfaced again, with stories of

248 Letter from Rev. W. Priest to Don, 5 January 1939, Priest’s own emphasis. CERC/CBF/REF/C/4.
249 Letter from Bishop of Dover to A. Sargent, 29 November 1938, L. P. L., Long Papers, v. 38, fo., 251. Chandler argues that this was the exception. Chandler, “The Church of England,” 251. It is this author’s contention that confusion existed in many areas.
baptisms at a rate of 50 a day. Bishop Bell interviewed the informant, Mrs Baker, who assured him that "the remarks that were made to her in conversation were rather strong" and she being a good Church woman was "more than specially troubled". Bell informed Alan Don of the meeting. In turn Don recalled Batty to explain the situation if the practice continue unchecked it was "likely to cause a good deal of scandal". Batty informed Don that this was a long running story, originally put out by a German paper. The situation had been rectified with the replacement of Grimes, the "scholar and a gentleman" identified at the centre of the gossip and Batty continued "I think it must be admitted that his intense sympathy with these poor people in their terrible suffering led him to a greater belief in their sincerity than an outsider would have had". Further, Batty asked the chaplain to realize the stresses under which Grimes had operated, "it is difficult for a priest to refuse to deal with a Jew who wishes to become a Christian", but because of the political circumstances "the greatest care is necessary" and "if there is the slightest grounds for believing that baptism is wanted on political grounds" it was refused. As far as he was concerned the matter had be greatly exaggerated and was now closed.

Similar stories were circulating in Prague too, with a complaint that an Anglican priest, Pastor Wallno, was using rooms in the Czech Unitarian headquarters for similar mass baptisms. In January 1939, Elsie Ludovici wrote to Lang recounting a story that mass conversions of Jews in Vienna were happening at the rate of as many as 900 a day.

You may imagine my confusion on being confronted with such allegations which amount to charging the refugees with being converted to the Anglican Communion merely for the purpose of benefiting from the charities organised for the help of Christians.

Lang’s reply was terse, countering that the charges of 900 converts a day as

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Entry for 25 December 1938, "Dr Leopold Kläger (alias Federmann) baptized July 1938, by the minister at the British Embassy in Vienna".


Letter from Batty to A. C. Don, 6 December 1938, L. P. L. Lang Papers, v. 38, fo., 264.


The Anglican hierarchy was concerned about the rumours of mass baptisms for both political and religious reasons. Mercy baptisms might be deemed ‘political’ as much as religious. Conversion for the sake of escape was not guaranteed, but it might extend the time period in which the relevant permits and visas could be obtained. Baptismal or conversion papers might also enable the ‘convert’ to stay, although in reduced circumstances, as the position of Jewish converts to Christianity was not much better. Mass conversions might be viewed as a political act rather than a religious one. It could lay the Church open to the accusation of ‘meddling in politics’ and might endanger its position and the safety of its clergy. From a strictly religious point of view, conversion was a sacred act: its grant on non-religious grounds would be gravely wrong on this basis. It was also regarded as a lengthy process requiring preparation and study.

Significantly, while these two concerns were addressed, the charge that Jews were converting merely to obtain funds was not discussed. Lang and Bell, as well as others, were only too aware of the paucity of Christian funds, and they had themselves acknowledged the Jewish contribution to the care of Christian refugees. Moreover, following the Lord Baldwin Appeal, a national call for the benefit of Christian and Jewish refugee alike made in December 1938, Lang publicly denounced the suggestion that the Baldwin Fund should be for the benefit of Christian refugees only.258 The Anglican leadership in Assembly and in print recognized that British Jews had given to the refugee cause and were prepared to debunk the suggestion that Jewish refugees were benefiting at the expense of Christian refugees. Subsequently, the issue of Kindertransporte, discussed in the next chapter, would upset this Christian view and promote competition and division amongst the Christian lobbyists, serving the needs of Christian refugees. Recognition of Jewish reactions in contrast to Christian responses was a constant throughout this period, held privately and later declared publicly. In 1939 at a lecture to the Jewish Historical Society, Bell remarked that he could not ‘conceal my admiration of the magnificent activities of the Jewish

257 Letter from Lang to Ludovici, 13 January 1939, L. P. L. Lang Papers, v. 38, fo. , 313
community for their co-religionists and some of my co-religionists too. Anglicans were horrified by the violent anti-Jewish outbreaks between Anschluss and Kristallnacht, which were accompanied by ever more desperate Jewish reaction, including suicides and burgeoning numbers of refugees. The voluntary aid organizations were in danger of collapse and the issue of refugees became a pressing one, more difficult to ignore or avoid. As more neighbouring countries shut their door to escape routes, the need to find an international solution became compelling. But following Evian, which failed to establish just such a solution, the need to raise voluntary funds to support the current refugee framework became even more necessary as did the need to maintain pressure on the government to continue to find places of refuge, if not in Britain, then elsewhere.

These considerations competed with other Anglican concerns, notably the need to maintain friendly relations following Munich, particularly as prior to the settlement Europe seemed on the brink of war. As in other periods, there was a near total focus on the German Church issue, generally excluding the consideration of other issues except in reaction to specific events, such as mass suicides following Anschluss, the disappointment of Evian, and the November pogrom. Criticism of internal Nazi policies which produced external international effects, however, was viewed within the context of appeasement and meant that outcries were tempered by the fear of ending the fragile peace. In many cases there was an unwillingness to identify Germany with the latest outrages, blaming extremists in the Nazi party for these occurrences as well as an insistence on the involvement of the Allies in their unfair and 'un-Christian' imposition of the Versailles Treaty, partly explaining (though not necessarily excusing) this conduct. The distinction between Nazi actions as separate from German ones, led Churchmen to characterize extremist Nazi behaviour as unrepresentative. These ideas were coupled with the notion that Britain

260 It should be noted that Hensley Henson was critical of this line and spoke out against the policy in contradiction of Lang in May 1938. This did not endear him to His Grace. Hastings, English Christianity, 327-28.
261 Archbishop Temple’s speech to a demonstration at Albert Hall in December 1938 is a classic summary of Christian thinking on this line. He went as far as stating that the Allies had a share in the sufferings of Jews and Christians in Germany because of the Allied imposition of the Versailles Treaty. Within the same speech, he also argued that it was still necessary to speak out against the attacks of Jews. See, “Racial and Religious Persecution: A London Protest Meeting,” The Guardian, 9 December 1938, p. 816.
had not always behaved as it might have in the colonies and elsewhere, and these arguments taken together avoided, perhaps unintentionally, direct engagement with the cost of German actions on Jewish lives. Anglican approaches were also confusing because they changed depending on situation and circumstance. Thus in debates, arguments were used to criticize the regime for its action to the German Evangelical Church but not applied to oppressed minorities.

Differences of approach to antisemitism and the Nazi regime amongst the leading lights of Anglicanism, as exemplified by three of the Bishops mentioned in this study, further demonstrates how varying, contradictory and multiple was the response of the Church of England. Henson consistently and uncompromisingly spoke out against Nazi antisemitism and the general illiberality of the Nazi regime at every opportunity, associating himself with the Jewish plight within the Greater Reich and as refugees. Bell was an impassioned champion for the Confessing Church and Christian refugees in particular as well as for the general refugee cause. At the same time he strove to maintain the hand of friendship at even the most difficult times, some might say at the most impossible. Headlam, conversely, believed Germany suffered from biased and unfavourable press and saw no real inherent problems with the regime – actually arguing its many benefits. Moreover, he decried the criticism of antisemitism as misplaced because Jews, in large part, had produced a situation where they were reaping the results of their own actions. These contrasting approaches meant that no one unified and clear voice emerged as the Anglican view. This contrasted with Anglican reactions to the fate of pastors within the Confessing Church, which while at times contested, emerged as a distinct and generally supportive stance.

Lastly, in regard to practical aid, it was determined within the first six months of the Nazi period that aid should be directed to the benefit of solely Christian refugees for two main reasons. The first was that it was the duty of the Church to help other Christians, particularly racially defined Christians who had converted from Judaism to Christianity. If not, the concept of mission would be meaningless. Another reason was the belief that Christians would prefer to give to other Christians. Yet, conversely, given this supposition, there was little reaction. Several reasons were

262 Bell was accused of being a Germanophile, however it must be noted that Bell did not make the concessions that Headlam did in his efforts to show ‘sympathy’. Chadwick, “English Bishop,” 19.
given for poor performance, one of which recognized that the racial terminology was alien, confusing and inconsistent. Most understood the problem in simplistic terms, that it was a Jewish problem to be solved by Jews. Even ‘Jewish-Christians’ or ‘non-Aryan’ Christians might fall under this category as they were oppressed for ‘racial’ and not religious reasons. As late as 1938, many believed they were giving to Jews rather than ‘Jewish-Christians’. Moreover, some believed that they should not be giving to Christians. Finally, it is questionable whether the assumption that Christians would prefer to give to Christian refugees actually underestimated a desire for Christians to contribute to those in need (including Jews), yet it is also unsettling that they may not have given because they perceived that these victims were indeed not Christian but Jewish.

Conclusion

There are broadly two schools of thought when interpreting the way in which the Anglican church responded to the fate of Jews in German speaking countries and Jewish refugees in the period 1933 to 1939. One school is highly critical and finds them (and Christians in Britain more generally) virtually absent, characterizing them as so consumed by the German church issue and the plight of a few German pastors that they were unable to see the ‘bigger picture’; the plight of Jews, their ‘true neighbour’ and that their response was sadly lacking. The other school is far less critical, even complimentary and argues that verbal protestations regarding the Jewish plight should not be underestimated, that they were significant in of themselves and their impact should be neither depreciated nor deemed inconsequential. It is striking to note that each of these works predicates their assessments on the type and quantity of response: characterized as vocal as opposed to practical and either ‘too little’, ‘good’ or ‘significant’. A distinction between whether or not verbal protest was a sufficient response or whether active deeds were also necessary is also drawn. So that it appears that both seem to be replying to an inferred but unstated question: why did the Church not act on behalf of German speaking Jews when they were prepared to act on behalf of the German Confessing Church, dissenting German pastors and Christian refugees?
As has been shown, this question is answered by a combined analysis of its varying approach to the German Church Crisis, its responses to Nazi antisemitism, Nazi racial ideology and totalitarianism, and its work for a specific group of Christian refugees. To all of these it is possible to track dominant trends, diverging and converging views relating to internal conflicts and debates as well as varying emphases over time in reaction to changing political events in Germany.

Underpinning the specific areas were general concerns for the deteriorating international situation in Europe with the prospect of another war so soon after 'the war to end all wars', the increasing nationalism of Germany, the support for the policy of appeasement, the rise of Christian and political pacifism as well as a near complete consensus that the Versailles Treaty was mistaken and unjust, and that the Allies bore moral responsibility for its imposition. Having borne in mind these factors, it is then necessary to set these components in the context of more fundamental Christian considerations, such as the nature of Christianity, the function of a national Church in its own society and as a part of the Universal Church in the wider world. Attitudes towards the Church-State relationship also impinge on considerations, as well as, the distinction between 'religious' and 'political' provinces. Lastly it is essential to bear in mind that parts or all of these aspects were also varied and contested.

A number of trends were discernible within archiepiscopal, prelatic, clerical and popular Anglicanism in regards to the plight of German-speaking Jews and Jewish refugees in the 1930s. These approaches ran the gamut from outrage, compassion, caution, minimizing, rejection and even repudiation. They were also by no means set and were apt to change with time and circumstances.

General lay voices were quick to join in public protests throughout the country, willing to assert that friendship with Germany could not be maintained at the loss of common humanity. Lacking strong, direct and sustained leadership, however, this groundswell quickly dissipated and was slow to return and rebuild. Yet there was an untapped resource amongst Anglicans and the general public as evidenced by the creation of local committees accompanying the Kindertransporte (discussed in the next chapter). Similarly, Anglican newspapers, another thermometer of lay opinion, were generally critical of Nazi antisemitism and sustained this view over longer periods. Equally, these papers were deflected by the German Church Struggle for much of the period. Lay opinion amongst public Anglican figures was similarly
critical of Nazi antisemitism and the trials of the Churches in Germany. Arguably, it was from this grouping of Anglican opinion in the early years rather than from the Lords Spiritual, that an Anglican view reached the public.

Another significant response was that exemplified by the Primate. Lang’s approach was cautious and inconsistent. Distinctly uncomfortable with setting the lead, except on specific terms, he was inclined to refer to others for advice and direction but was sometimes aroused to independent action by particular events. Thus while he was willing to speak out at certain times (usually when part of a joint platform with other church leaders from different faith groups), he was apt to predicate his remarks with convoluted preambles and caveats. He was typical of those in the Church who did not identify the Jewish plight as a specific Church or Christian interest.

An (initially) minority response was that exhibited by Bishop Bell and Rev. H. W. Fox. Both were unsatisfied with resolutions on the Kirchenkampf and Nazi racialism, identifying a need for a practical response to both. Between these two men there were differences of emphasis in regard to the approach to Nazi racialism. Fox illustrated elements within the Church that supported universal appeals and relief structures for the benefit of Christian and Jewish refugee alike. Bishop Bell, who was quickly known as an expert on German Church affairs within Church forums such as Assembly and through letters in The Times, favoured the alignment of the Church with the practical needs of Christian refugees. Bell’s approach ultimately won out not least because of his dedication to his position. Afraid of appearing critical and unsympathetic as opposed to political, Bell worked behind the scenes with others – initially avoiding public pronouncements and generally using ecumenical contacts to engender support. Yet this back-room approach yielded disappointing and unsatisfactory results. After 1935, when Bell became increasingly critical of the lack of Church support for the fate of fellow Christians, he modified his position. Thereafter he was willing to publicly reproach German actions, and find the Christian response severely wanting. Furthermore, by 1938 he began to see the issue as a concern of all ‘humanity’ as opposed to the separate problem of Christian or Jew. In the meanwhile, his consistent use of Nazi terminology in the case of the ‘non-Aryan’ Christians continued Nazi racial distinctions in contradiction to his stated belief that the Universal Church could not be predicated on racial distinctions. At times, his
unthinking adoption brought criticism from other churchmen, most notably the bishop of Durham. Nevertheless, Bell emerges as an early supporter of refugees in general and Christian refugees in particular. Indeed, he emerges as an unflagging and untiring champion for the ‘non-Aryan’ Christian, second only to being identified in Britain as one of the Chief proponents of the German Confessing Church and a supporter of Niemoller. His activities certainly sensitized internal Church opinion and lay Anglicans to the issue of Christian refugees, but this was not always to great practical effect. Nor is it certain that the ‘racial’ distinction was properly understood or helpful to the cause of either Jewish or Christian refugees.

A further approach was that ploughed by Bishop Headlam, chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations with Foreign Churches. His comments in respect of Jews were reprinted in fascist publications in Britain and his letters to *The Times* were appreciated by Nazi supporters in Germany. While he might have defended his most outrageous comments as directed against communism and socialism – his equation of socialism as ‘the creed of the German Jew’ and Bolshevism as a ‘Jewish ideology’ can hardly have suggested a positive appreciation of Jews. His theory that Jewish ‘behaviour’ was the reason for Jewish persecution was at one with Nazi beliefs. Ultimately, his comments gave aspects of Nazism and particularly its antisemitism an acceptable face. His direction of the Council on Foreign Relations, one of the more likely structures through which any pressure might be brought to bear on the Nazi regime through its many informal government contacts, was never pursued because of Headlam’s insistence that it act within strict terms of reference which declared commentary on Nazi antisemitism and totalitarianism as political meddling. Yet at the same time he indulged in these acts himself using his position to excuse Nazi and German actions. Sympathetic to various aspects of Nazism (its anti-Bolshevism, its conservatism and authoritarianism) the bishop of Gloucester was a vociferous defender of Germany against real and imagined critics. Determined to dismiss the worst aspects of the regime and to downplay Jewish sufferings, he was at best oblivious to the Jewish situation, and at worst, hostile to it. Moreover, the weak reaction of Church colleagues and the Primate himself to Headlam’s role as an outspoken and pugnacious defender of Nazism demonstrates a failure of nerve. In addition, it must be concluded that Headlam’s continuance in office demonstrated an
unwillingness to confront uncomfortable and antisemitic elements on the ‘home front’.

The reactions of Bishop Henson represent an even more isolated response. He emerged as an outspoken and uncompromising critic of Nazi antisemitism and racialism and was willing to denounce it at every turn. His own position on the periphery of Church life in the House of Lords and Assembly, and perhaps his strained relationship with the Prelate, meant that his voice was not well disseminated through the Church. This is regrettable.

As much as these approaches are illuminating, so too is the internal dynamics of criticism which was ambiguous and contradictory at times. Thus while parts of the church were offended by Nazi antisemitism, explanations that partly excused German actions most notably by reference to the Versailles Treaty were often employed. There was some agreement, even among churchmen like Bell, as much as Headlam, that Jewish actions might be partly to blame for Nazi actions. In addition, statements decrying violent antisemitic acts were generally coupled with concerns about the deleterious effects these actions would have on Anglo-German friendship rather than a recognition of the individual suffering caused to those directly affected by these acts.

Lastly, the issue of ‘non-Aryan’ Christian refugees illuminates assumptions made about ‘Christian’ duty on the one hand and likely Anglican responses to refugees made by Anglican hierarchies on the other. The most prevalent view was that the issue was primarily a “Jewish problem”, one to be solved by Jews rather than a common humanitarian concern to be addressed practically by both Christian and Jew alike. Another was that Christians would prefer to give to other Christians (quite a presumptuous and tendentious charge in itself). Applying Brian Klug’s proposition of being ‘white’ in a ‘white-white’ sense, there is resonance in his ideas when one considers the way in which ‘non-Aryan’ Christians were seen as both ‘Christian’ and ‘Jewish’ by different sections, and not necessarily seen as ‘Christian’ in the ‘real Christian-Christian sense’ by much of the Church and wider public. Thus a myriad of responses resulted from these viewpoints. The first was that Christians saw Jews as in need of aid rather than Christians so were less likely to give to Christian refugees and did not fully understand that Christians suffered under racial and political legislation too. The second is that they saw this grouping as ‘Jewish’ and believed that it was not
their concern. The third, that though this grouping was Christian, they were still 'racially' Jewish, oppressed because of their 'Jewishness', rather than their Christianity. Thus, they were a 'type' of Jew and again the problem of Jewry. Bell's downplaying of the needs of Jews and Jewish refugees in order to highlight the needs of 'non-Aryan' Christians may have backfired given these assumptions. Fourthly, the complexity of explaining the intricacies of Nazi racial divisions was too confusing, alien and ultimately unproductive. Bell himself began to wonder if the division of refugees into separate groupings had harmed the refugee cause more than it had aided it. In closing his lecture to the Jewish Historical Society in February 1939, Bishop Bell spoke to the audience as a churchman, "who feels the plight of the refugees upon his conscience" and one who believed in the necessity of action because the issue was a matter of all humanity.

If humanity means anything it is impossible to shut our eyes. It is equally impossible to refuse to take action... If humanity as a quantity, is to prevail, or if the interest of mankind are to be regarded as the dominant interests, such an exhibition of human brotherhood should not be ruled out as a sentimental dream.263

CHAPTER 6
CHRISTIAN-JEWISH REFUGEE AGENCIES

Introduction

Within a very short period of time of the initial crisis of 1933, a number of refugee aid groups were formed in Britain split along either confessional or interest lines. Most were ‘Jewish’, that is, initiated and funded by Jews, often from within preexisting Jewish aid structures or alternatively specifically developed to address the contemporary need. As has been shown, refugee bodies organized by British Christian groups to help Christian or other groups of refugees (including Jews), were slow to develop, were generally poorly organized and were severely under funded. The exception to this rule was the work of Quakers who initiated relief work under complex policy guidelines from 1933.1

An exception to these patterns of aid and the division between ‘Christian’ and ‘Jewish’ confessional refugee organizations, however, did occur in a specific area: child refugees. This unique response developed in reaction to the effects of Nazi laws on child welfare, safety and education. Within a few months of the April 1933 boycott, it was evident that children as well as adults suffered under Nazi legislation. Children, it was recognized, would therefore need aid both within Germany itself and overseas on various educational placement schemes or general aid as refugees accompanying their émigré parents. At first Jewish children were affected only indirectly, through their parents who fell foul of the Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service. The Law against the overcrowding of German Schools and Institutions of Higher Learning, also promulgated in April 1933, however, applied to schools, and marked the beginning of legal exclusion of Jewish children from state

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If the parents did not themselves leave immediately, they made provision to remove their children from Germany, often into private schools abroad. Much of the work of refugee organizations in Britain consisted of finding free or reduced school places at boarding schools and hospitality placements for the vacations, and in the case of day school places, finding long term hosts.

For many parents, removing their children from Germany either before they themselves left (if they left), or with them as they fled, was not just a matter of preference. While children did not lose their jobs or livelihoods, they were affected by the change in political atmosphere and social climate through education. Jewish teachers disappeared from their positions and Jewish secondary school pupils faced ostracism, hostility and even physical violence from former fellow non-Jewish students. Nor could non-Jewish teachers be relied on to prevent these actions, and in some cases they initiated or supported such practices. Many Jewish students left the state system and entered Jewish schools. Indeed, Jewish schools in Germany witnessed a renewal as Jewish students returned, first as they were driven out of state schools by harassment, and then eventually by law when a decree following Kristallnacht outlawed Jewish pupils from general schools.

A number of cooperative British Christian and Jewish committees and structures as well as a cross-denominational Christian organization arose in response to this situation during the 1930s. Early ad hoc groupings, the Inter-Aid Committee (in its three separate guises), the Christian Council, the Lord Baldwin Fund and the Movement for the Care of Children from Germany (later known as the Refugee Children’s Movement) are studied in the context of Christian responses to child refugees. From this study it emerges that aiding refugee children was both a cohesive and divisive dimension to Christian-Jewish relations. This chapter also draws the distinction between Christian rescue policies towards Jews as discussed in earlier chapters, with Christian organizational policies and individual Christian relief approaches towards Jewish children of the Kindertransporte.

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2 The ‘Law against the Overcrowding of German Schools and Institutions of Higher Learning’, restricted the number of Jewish students to a maximum of 1.5% of the total number of students attending schools and universities. See Michael Burleigh and Wolfgang Wippermann, The Racial State Germany 1933-1945 (Cambridge: CUP, 1993), 79.

Much of the current historiography concentrates on the Kindertransporte acknowledging only briefly the ‘fore-runners’ to venture. The most extensive work to date is a study by Judith Baumel. Her work gives a detailed organizational view of the Kindertransporte as well as a study of the aftercare children received once in Britain. She finds that many children were subject to conversionary activities directly or indirectly, ‘leaving’ Judaism as a way of acculturating to British society. Mary Ford covers similar ground to Baumel, but in a more condensed fashion. She highlights the complexity of a network formed rapidly, almost immediately under tremendous pressure of numbers staffed by committed, yet untrained volunteers.

This chapter will study the initial attempts to aid Jewish and Christian children in cooperative programmes as well as the Kindertransporte itself. There has been no research into the Christian view of the Kindertransporte or any detailed study of the previous ad hoc and smaller bodies. Little is known about the role of the Christian Council and the Lord Baldwin Fund in this context and this chapter will attempt to provide greater understanding of the interplay of these groups.

I: SMALL BEGINNINGS, JULY 1933 TO 1935

At the suggestion of Helen Bentwich, a Jewish refugee worker and secretary of the German Refugees Hospitality Committee (GRHC), the Council of the non-sectarian Save the Children Fund (SCF/Fund) agreed that the two organizations should cooperate for the benefit of German children coming from Germany. School placements were identified as a starting point for joint action. Through the public standing of the SCF as a nationally and internationally renowned child welfare agency, the Fund would seek places in boarding schools at free or reduced rates by advertising in various newspapers and through contacts with other organizations. It would also solicit offers of “adoptions” or hospitality for children placed in day schools that did not have boarding facilities.

6 SCF 131st Minutes of the Council, 20 July 1933, Save the Children Archives (hereafter, SCF Archives), M1/7, C.1718. The German Refugees Hospitality Committee was a sub committee of
Prior to Bentwich’s suggestion for collaboration, council members of SCF had been considering ways in which they might aid certain children in Germany following the country’s political upheavals. At a Council meeting in May, members had heard from their General Secretary, L. B. Golden and another member, Dorothy Buxton, about the need for relief work in Germany, possibly along the lines of a feeding centre or canteen in Berlin for the children of those affected by “non-Aryan” legislation. It was proposed at this stage that financial support for the Berlin project be elicited from organizations with which the SCF already had close contact, namely the Women’s International League and the International Women’s Alliance for Equal Citizenship.7 There were also suggestions to contact representatives of other organizations, including the World Alliance.8 Generally more used to working with women’s organizations or internationalist and advocacy groups, Bentwich’s sectarian committee marked a new departure for the Fund, but one that fulfilled committee

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7 The executive committee of the British Section of Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) included a number of Save the Children Fund Council members such as Mosa Anderson. In addition to this, a large number of WILF executive committee members were also members of the Quaker, Germany Emergency Committee, including, Mosa Anderson, Dr. Hilda Clark, Edith Pye and Mrs Paul Sturge. This link is likely to have helped maintain the issue of children and child refugees at the forefront of all of these groups. Lady Samuel provides a further link to WILF, refugee aid and children. Lord Samuel emerged as the head of the Movement for the Care of Children Coming from Germany from 1938 to 1939. For more on WILFP see Gertrude Carman Bussey, Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, 1915-1965, a record of fifty years’ work (London: Allen and Unwin, 1965).

8 SCF 129th Minutes of the Council, 18 May 1933, SCF Archives, M1/7, C.1689; SCF 130th Minutes of the Council, 15 June 1933, SCF Archives, M1/7, C.1700. Dorothy Buxton was a political observer and pamphleteer. She was foreign press editor, Cambridge Magazine, 1914-1918. Throughout the 1930s, Buxton published a number of letters, pamphlets and books on the Confessing Church and the refugee situation. Sympathetic to the cause of the Confessing Church in Germany and in close contact with Bishop Bell. While her husband, Charles Roden Buxton, supported the policy of appeasement and was a staunch pacifist, Buxton was more circumspect. For more on Buxton’s work, see Keith Robbins, “Dorothy Buxton and the German Church Struggle,” in Church, Society and Politics, ed. Derek Baker, (Oxford Blackwell for the Ecclesiastical History Society, 1975), 419-433. See chapter 5 for more on the World Alliance for Promoting International Friendship through the Churches.
members’ desire to become involved in aid to German children both in Germany and Britain.

Anxiously to make links with other organizations already working in the field of relief, Helen Bentwich made contact with British Quakers hoping that they might extend their remit of relief to include the needs of German children. At a meeting of the Joint Committee on the German Situation, forerunner to the Germany Emergency Committee, Friends discussed her letter regarding children “whose parents are either in prison or ‘on the run’ for political reasons”. Bentwich asked whether free places in Friends’ schools might be forthcoming for these children. The matter was referred to Francis Knight of the Friends’ Central Education Committee, who duly replied that such places would be available to a limited number of German boys or girls.9

In the meanwhile it was agreed that cooperation between the SCF and the German Refugees Hospitality Committee could be further fostered by a formal structure and in October, the German Child Victims Committee (GCVC) was created to succour the “sufferings of large numbers of German children”. The new committee of Jews and non-Jews fused the two quite disparate ideas of the SCF Council Berlin feeding plan and the GRHC proposal to find and disseminate information on free school placements. In addition to these projects, the committee agreed that funds be raised for a similar child feeding scheme in Paris, to be delivered through the Service International d’aide aux Réfugiés de la Société des Amis, or Paris Relief Committee, (coincidentally, funded by the Friends Service Council in Britain).10 School placement information would be circulated to refugee aid committees dealing with adult refugees who were parents. These bodies included the Academic Assistance Council, Germany Emergency Committee and Jewish Refugees Committee. An affiliate body of the SCF, rather than a sub-committee, the GCVC operated under SCF auspices with the Fund distributing monies as well as retaining the power to veto

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9 Minutes of a meeting of the Joint Committee on German Situation, Minute 130, “German Christians,” 24 July 1933, GEC Minutes, FCRA/1, LSF/FHL. As the minute is entitled ‘German Christians’, it is assumed that the children were Christian, possibly Christians discriminated under Nazi racial legislation: ‘non-Aryan’ Christians. See, Minutes of a meeting of the Joint Committee on German Situation, Minute 149, 8 August 1933, GEC Minutes, FCRA/1, LSF/FHL.

policy and actions. Thus, while the group was free to raise funds “in any way it may consider best”, control in every other sense was retained by the SCF Council.11

Having achieved success with approaches to the Quakers’ Germany Emergency Committee and keen to secure the widest range of involvement, Helen Bentwich contacted Bishop Bell of Chichester. Asking for his support for the new organization, she asked him if he would act as the committee’s Vice-President. His involvement would raise the committee’s profile and increase its ability to raise funds for overseas work. The GCVC, Bentwich outlined in her letter to the Bishop, was “in aid of all children, irrespective of race, creed or political atmosphere who are the victims of the German regime”.12 Bell accepted the post with the proviso that he see the committee’s statement of aims in order to judge its criticism, “explicit or implied”, of the Nazi regime. “I am ready to be critical but not outrageously or indiscriminately fierce against all things German”.13

Within six months of the April Boycott, a network of formal and informal contacts connected Jewish, Quaker and non-sectarian refugee aid committees through child welfare concerns. Individual Anglican involvement had been obtained through the figure of Bishop Bell. Yet no sooner had the committee announced its formation as the German Child Victims Committee, in an unexplained move, the committee changed its name to German Appeal Committee (GAC), dropping reference to its target recipients. In addition, “owing to changing circumstances”, the committee decided to join with German Refugee Assistance Fund (GRAF) in mid December 1933 in time for a special Christmas Appeal. This move was presumably made to prevent duplication of appeal notices and increase the committee’s profile.14 Between June and December 1933, the GAC raised a total of £277, spent mainly in Germany and some in France, yet from January to November the following year, funds were so low that the committee dissolved in December 1934.15

11 SCF 133rd Minutes of the Council, 19 October 1933, SCF Archives, M1/7, C.1743. The members of GCVC were Barbara Ayrton Gould, Mrs. Victor Gollancz, Helen Bentwich, Miss T. Malschinger, Mr. Bertram Henson, Miss M. Symons, Miss Nancy Samuel and Mrs. Robert Mayer.
12 Helen Bentwich to Bishop Bell, 18 October 1933, L. P. L. Bell Papers, v. 27, fo., 108-109. George Bell had earlier met with both Bentwich and her husband Norman (also intimately involved in the refugee issue as Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees) in August and discussed the role the Churches might play: see chapter 5.
13 Bishop Bell to Helen Bentwich, 21 October 1933 L. P. L. Bell Papers, v. 27, fo., 115.
14 SCF 134th Minutes of the Council, 16 November 1933, SCF Archives: M1/7, C.1561 [sic 1761].
15 SCF 135th Minutes of the Council, 21 December 1933, SCF Archives: M1/7, C.1777.
An attempt to form a cross-communal committee which included both Jewish and non-Jewish participation had failed for lack of funds. British Quakers had begun to pursue child educational schemes themselves with more success.16 Fatally, the GCVC/GAC was a committee with two quite divergent functions, spread thinly, unable to increase revenue despite its involvement in the composite fundraising GRAF group. Even so, while this specific committee disbanded, the needs of children remained, as did awareness of their continuing distress amongst those in the refugee aid network. Nevertheless, while this initial group had failed, most relief workers believed that aid for children would be better coordinated in a central committee which cut across sectarian and confessional lines of separation. Whatever its failings, the GCVC/GAC would prove to be a future model on which to build.


At the beginning of March 1936 the idea of a committee to coordinate aid to refugee children revived. Francis Bendit, joint secretary of a preexisting committee, the Inter-Aid Committee which aided children suffering under oppression, was collating information on work in progress by refugee organizations in Britain for child refugees and German children in general. A conference, which would report on these research findings, was planned for the end of March, and it was hoped that the organizations directly or indirectly affected by refugee children would attend.17 This investigation was carried out at the behest of Wyndham Deedes (1883-1956) and Lewis Namier (1888-1960) who were increasingly concerned about the position of children following the Nuremberg Laws.18

16 Quakers had helped with the resettlement of the New Herrlingen School known in Britain as Bunce Court and had been instrumental in the formation of the Anglo-German school at Stotely Rough for 'non' Aryan Christians. The GEC was further involved in several schools in Holland in Erde and Ommer. For Bunce Court, see Anna Essinger, Bunce Court, 1933-1943 (n.p., 1943); Karen Gershon, We Came as Children: A Collective Autobiography (London: Victor Gollancz, 1966); Zoe Josephs, Survivors: Jewish Refugees in Birmingham, 1933-1945 (Birmingham: Meridian Books, 1988), 71-74. For school in Holland, see Hans A. Schmitt, 'Quakers Efforts to Rescue Children from Nazi Education and Discrimination: The International Quaker School, Eerde', Quaker History, v. 85 (1996), 45-57.

17 Letter from F. E. Bendit to Walter Adams [AAC], 3 March 1936, Questionnaire entitled “Conference on Refugee Children from Germany” BOD MSS SPSL 114/2/249-251. It is regretted that the author was unable to locate any biographical information on Francis Bendit or Gladys Skelton, the other joint secretary.

18 Wyndham Deedes Soldier was a civil Servant, refugee and social worker. He was an Anglican and gentle Zionst. He served in the military in Near and Mid East until 1918 and was appointed to the mandatory government of Palestine during which he created and ran the civil service until 1923.
Some months earlier, in November 1935, Mary Ormerod of the Germany Emergency Committee (GEC) had consulted with various Church leaders and the main non-sectarian relief committee, the Academic Assistance Committee (AAC), on the need for coordinated action in regard to German ‘non-Aryan’ Christian children. Quaker schools were providing free or reduced places for some of these children, but there was a greater demand than could be met from Quaker resources alone. With this in mind, Walter Adams (1906-1975), General Secretary of the AAC/SPSL, readily agreed with Bendit on the need for an organization that would coordinate all child refugee work. Whilst the AAC aided refugee adults, many of the scholars were heads of families. Adams was therefore “deeply concerned with the problems of children”. The most urgent need was a centralized information system on free school places or scholarship opportunities at boarding schools. This work was currently divided between various subcommittees of the JRC at Woburn House and the GEC; time and resources would be saved if this was coordinated. Whatever solution was found, however, it was essential it was done under an existing charity, so as to prevent public confusion. Adams suggested either the SCF or the GEC.20

The “Conference on Refugee Children from Germany” was held on the 24 March 1936 and was attended by many representatives from across the refugee aid network, illustrating the necessity for some sort of coordinated action across committee boundaries. Seven representatives came as part of the Jewish Refugee Committee delegation, the largest number attending from one committee including Otto Schiff and Anna Schwab. The Save the Children Fund, West London Synagogue and the League of Nations Union sent two representatives each. The

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20 Letter from Walter Adams to Francis Bendit, 9 March 1936, BOD MSS SPSL 114/2/252-55. Walter Adams was an academic and university administrator. He was General Secretary of the Academic Assistance Council from 1933 to 1938 and General Secretary of German Refugees Assistance Fund. He was the Director of LSE, 1967-1974 and was knighted in 1970.
GEC, AAC, New Herrlingen School at Bunce Court, and the German-English School at St oatley Rough all sent a single representative as did the Zionist Organization, the Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Refugees and the Women’s Appeal Committee for German Women and Children. Viscount Duncannon represented the High Commissioner for Refugees and Sir William Deedes presided over the event. The conference participants determined that a new committee would be useful as an information and referral agency that would collate and distribute information on school places and hospitality offers. It would also take in applications and sort these accordingly, referring them on the relevant committee, handling case-work only indirectly. Its most important function would be the creation and maintenance of a central register of children recording personal, religious and educational details of each child. The guiding principles of the committee were to place children in similar religious and social environments. In this vein, the committee was constituted with cross communal representation, with Jewish and non-Jewish members in equal number and Deedes as chairman. Monies would be raised internally rather than by public appeal, with most coming from the three central committees involved namely, CBF, GEC and SCF by ‘subscription’. Several other bodies would be asked to contribute ‘affiliation’ fees including the ISS, SPSL, Zionist Organization and West London Synagogue Hospitality Committee. At the conference, the Inter-Aid Committee (IAC) was formerly launched on a budget of £450 p.a.

Two months after the launch of the Inter-Aid Committee, problems arose. While the registry was fulfilling a useful function, the referral of cases produced delays and case numbers were increasing all the time. Wyndham Deedes had been on a fact finding mission to Germany and believed that the scope of IAC work was too narrow. A new decree ruled that Jewish and “non” Aryan children were no longer eligible to enter state schools. The decree, while not yet universally enforced, placed the future education of these children in doubt. If the committee was to impact on the

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21 Minutes of the Conference on Refugee Children from Germany, 24 March 1936, MSS SPSL 114/2/258-261. Inter-Aid Committee was an inter-confessional Committee formed to bring young people from Germany for hospitality, schooling and training to this country. It was founded on 24 March 1936 under the aegis of Save the Children Fund and ran until July 1936 when it was replaced by Inter-Aid Committee for Children from Germany. Wyndham Deedes was Chairman, joint Honorary secretaries were Gladys Skelton and Francis E. Bendit. The Honorary Case Secretary was Miss d’Avigdor. The Committee members were Miss d’Avigdor, Mrs Edgar Dugdale, Mr. H. C. Myers, Mr. L. B. Namier and Lady Whyte.

22 Francis Bendit to Sir Osmond d’Avigdor Goldsmid, 5 April 1936, BOD, MSS SPSL 114/2/265-67.
situation in a real way, Deedes argued that case work needed to centralized under IAC control. Again it was stressed that all aspects of unified work would be carried out with “no distinction of race or creed”. It was also agreed that the IAC would remain a subsidiary of SCF and that an advisory committee formed of “influential people both Christians and Jews” might be formed in order to raise the committee’s profile.23

Through Deedes direction, the committee was reconstituted as the Save the Children Fund: Inter-Aid Committee for Children from Germany (IACG) in July 1936.24 In this new guise, Deedes urged participating aid organizations to “pool their resources and join in a concerted effort which would gain strength by unity”. The aims of the new committee were little changed but its approach would be far more pro-active. Headmasters’ and Headmistresses’ Associations were approached, and agreed to help locate school places. Places in summer camps were found for children who needed a short break from the pressure of exclusion they faced in German life. Offers of occupational and trade openings “which do not compete with local workers” were collected for children who had completed their schooling. Lastly, it was hoped that the Exchange Clearing System which enabled some Jewish parents to send their children abroad for education, could be extended to include ‘non-Aryan’ Christians.25

Even so, in a meeting of the newly convened committee some days later, it was determined without further enumeration, that “Jewish cases” were to stay “with Woburn House” for the meanwhile and only “Non-Aryan” cases would be assumed by the IACG.26 The meeting also determined that the IACG would be better situated in Woburn House, the site of the JRC (near to Friends House and the GEC offices).27 Thus, in principle functions were centralized, but the preparation of Jewish children remained separate, ‘subsumed’ only under IACG auspices by geographical proximity.

23 IAC Minutes, 12 June 1936, BOD. MSS SPSL 114/2/297-99; Summary of Meeting, c. June 1936, BOD. MSS SPSL 114/2/295-96. For previous discussions of extending the committee’s remit, see IAC circular from Gladys Skelton and Francis Bendit, 27 May 1936, BOD. MSS SPSL/114/2/289; 29 May 1936. Francis Bendit [IAC] to Walter Adams [SPSL]. BOD. MSS SPSL/114/2/290.
24 Terms of IACG and SCF relationship, SCF Council Minutes, 16 July 1936, SCF Archive, M1/8, C.2264. The Advisory Council (as distinct from the Executive) consisted of the Dowager Marchioness of Aberdeen and Temair, Sir Osmond d’Avigdor Goldsmid, Viscount Bearsted, Max Bonn, Hugh Cecil, Bishop of Chichester, Bishop of Durham, Mrs Hartree, George Lansbury, Simon Marks, Lady Reading, Herbert Samuel, Rebecca Sieff, Nina K. Woods. The Joint Secretaries were Mrs Gladys Skelton and Francis E. Bendit and Miss d’Avigdor as Honorary Case Secretary. Deedes was chairman.
26 Minutes of IACG Meeting, 10 July 1936, BOD MSS SPSL 114/2/307-309.
As casework continued on separate lines and the Exchange Clearing System for ‘non-Aryan’ Christian children failed to materialize, the IACG began to raise the profile of ‘non-Aryan’ Christian children in The Times to raise funds for these children. This broke with previous committee policy to gather funds from other refugee committees and interested groups rather than the general public. The letter emphasized the inclusive nature of the appeal by stressing that while work was formerly separated between the JRC and the Society of Friends, under the IACG it was now handled together by its commitment to aid “children of Non-Aryans’ whether Christian or Jewish”. This dire “humanitarian” problem transcended such distinctions of “creed or race” and for this reason “a number of people, Jewish and Christian, have come together to try, by a concerted effort, to lighten the burden of fear and hopelessness which lies upon so many children in Germany, innocent of all save their birth”.28

The pull between parity for and promotion of Christian and Jewish children was a continuing theme of policy discussions. At a meeting in October 1936, Leonard Montefiore, the committee’s treasurer, stated that he was “inclined to tip the scales in favour of the Christian children as there was more help available for Jewish children from other sources”. Committee members rejected this suggestion, arguing that the only factor to be considered when selecting cases for assistance should be the “suffering” of individual child for whom the application is made.29 In contrast, distinctions were made in campaign leaflets by the IACG, which laid stress on the peculiar position of Christian children targeted under the “racial ban” because of their Jewish familial links.30 A suggestion to fund an orthodox Jewish hostel was rejected on the grounds that a hostel of 36 children would slow down the acquisition of the English language and children would be denied the opportunity to “experience an English atmosphere” as they would if they were in “specifically English homes and boarding schools”.31 Clearly, the IACG’s commitment to rescuing children was
conditional on the grounds that the children were properly anglicized. Moreover, this policy on a religious level, contradicted other policies which supported the funding of the New Herrlingen School at Bunce Court and The German-English School at Stoatley Rough, both schools which were characterized as non-sectarian but were Quaker influenced and backed.\(^{32}\)

Montefiore’s assertion that there were greater funds within the Jewish refugee aid network was partly true. Jewish refugee organizations had been singularly more successful at raising money accruing nearly half a million pounds by 1936. In 1936, however, the only Christian body to be working in this area were Quakers. Thus, the suggestion that Jewish refugee organizations had greater funds was correct, but also open to misinterpretation. As the primary targets of Nazi policy, Jews continued to be proportionally more affected by these policies than ‘non-Aryan’ Christians, as they would throughout the period, and were thereby the greater proportion of applicants for relief.\(^{33}\)

Within the community of refugee aid workers, it was agreed that awareness of the breadth of Nazi policy was still only the provenance of a “limited section of the public”. The multiplicity of appeals by the various non-sectarian committees, the poor showing of the Christmas appeal in 1933, and the necessary re-launch of the National Christian Appeal, rather than promoting understanding, seemed to be confusing the public further. Moreover, ‘appeal fatigue’ seemed to be setting in and poor returns were projected. In a move to counteract the depressing outlook, appeals were scheduled in cooperation with each organization to prevent overlap, and a booklet was created to counteract the confusion of the breadth of Nazi policy.

Yet, even the text of the pamphlet produced problems over terminology and meaning, reflecting real differences of perspective between Jews and Christians.

\(^{32}\) IACG Minutes, 14 December 1936, BOD MSS SPSL 114/2/338-340. In the case of Bunce Court, there is evidence of ambivalence towards continuing Jewish traditions, for example the lack of support in preparation for a Bar mitzvah. See Josephs, Survivors, 71-74. Also see comments of Professor Leslie Brent in I came Alone, p. 47.

\(^{33}\) This is confirmed by the number of applicants for IACG aid. Between May 1936 and January 1937, there were 148 applications for aid from Jewish applicants and 97 for “Mixed Race” applicants [IACG term]. The IACG awarded 38 grants to Jewish children (of which 15 children were supported by the West London Synagogue funds) and 35 to “Mixed Race” children. See Report on work of Inter-Aid Committee from 11 May 1936, 11 January 1937, BOD MSS SPSL 114/2/345. In this context it is useful to note that five out of every six refugees from Germany were Jews. See Joseph Cohen, German Refugees: A guide to those who wish to help. (London: Reprinted from the Jewish Chronicle, 1939), 9.
Whilst Gladys Skelton felt that the use of ‘Jews’ and ‘non-Aryan’ Christians’ was more preferable, Lewis Namier argued alternatively for ‘Jew’ and ‘non-Jews’. He believed that the terms ‘Aryan’, ‘non-Aryan’ and ‘racial’ should be printed within inverted commas to identify the committee’s rejection of these ‘racial’ notions. Skelton, while agreeing in theory, believed it would make an “irritating” read, one which might tire the reader. Moreover, she was anxious to find an alternative word to the term “refugee”. This exchange highlights the confusion many refugee aid workers had with contemporary terminology. That anyone found the word ‘refugee’ problematic, however, suggests that the term was gathering negative associations.

These considerations apart, the central issue for the IACG continued to be the low number of children aided. By June 1937 the committee had arranged for placements and hospitality for 124 children of which 61 were Christian and 63 were Jewish. On face value, these figures suggest that neither Jewish nor Christian applicants were favoured over each other. On closer scrutiny, however, the number of Jewish applicants was 50% higher than those from Christians. In addition, the IACG was solely or partly responsible for 70 of the 124 children. The remaining children were supported by two other plans operated through IACG administration. Eleven Christian children were supported on the ‘Chichester scheme’, and two were helped privately, whereas 24 of the Jewish children were funded by a coalition of the West London Synagogue and the JRC. Thus, in reality Christian children were given proportionally greater funding from the IACG.

Statistics apart, the number of children aided was significantly lower that the number of adult refugees aided in a similar time frame. The influx of Basque Spanish children further reduced the ability of the committee to raise adequate funds, as

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34 Letter from Deedes [IAC] to Walter Adams [SPSL], 20 November 1936, BOD MSS SPSL 114/2/322; Minutes of an “informal meeting” between a number of voluntary organizations working on behalf of refugees from Germany called by the SCF: Inter Aid Committee for Children from Germany, 9 December 1936, BOD MSS SPSL 114/2/333-335; Those present included, Deedes (chairman), Walter Adams (AAC), Miss d’Avigdor, Gladys Skelton, Francis Bendit (IAC), Bertha Bracey and Mary Ormerod (GEC), Captain Guy Cassie (National Christian Appeal), Mrs. Gordon Morier (SCF), Rebeccia Sieff, Eva Reading and Mrs A. H. Railing of the Women’s and Children’s Appeal Committee. Letter from Gladys Skelton to Walter Adams, BOD MSS SPSL 114/2/384-385; Gladys Skelton to Walter Adams, 16 June 1937, BOD MSS SPSL 114/2/387.

35 IAC Minutes, 30 June 1937. BOD MSS SPSL 114/2/391. The ‘Chichester scheme’ was organized by Bishop Bell through schools in Sussex from his diocese and from diocesan contributions. This project inspired the Church of England Committee for ‘non-Aryan Christians formed in late 1937. Also see, SCF/Inter Aid Committee for Children from Germany, First Annual Report: 27 April 1936 to 31 August 1937 (London: n. p. 1937).
appeals on their behalf had cut across those of the IACG and donations had been applied to the Basque appeals in preference to those for German children. Nor did the situation improve when another attempt to raise funds through the formation of local committees failed. An attempt at increasing Christian funding for the committees' work further compounded a sense of general failure when the National Appeal in autumn 1937 foundered and closed with poor returns. It had been hoped that the IACG would benefit from the nationwide church appeals, but this proved illusory.

Targeted monies for the IACG, however, did come with the establishment of the Church of England Committee for ‘Non-Aryan’ Christians (CENAC) by Bishop Bell towards the end of 1937. As part of its remit, this new organization promised to fund ‘non-Aryan’ Christian children and young people in association with the GEC (who would select the children in Berlin) and the IACG (who would administer funds in Britain). Thus while Jewish funding continued to be used indiscriminately and could be applied to Christian children, Christian aid from this source was earmarked for the benefit of Christian children only. The committee accepted this because it had been earlier established that larger funds could be raised from Jewish sources. At a SCF Council meeting in January 1938, Mrs. Skelton reported that the Bishop had created the committee because of his concern for lack of Christian support for refugees and he highlighted the difficult situation of ‘non-Aryan’ Christians. With this earmarked funding from the CENAC, the IACG looked forward to aiding more Christian children from Christian funds: parity would thereby be sustained not only in case work but also in funding.

In unraveling the initial policies of the IACG and the committees developing practice, it is apparent that the desire to remain scrupulously ‘even handed’ set up certain constraints. On the one hand, the committee needed to abide by its founding principles, inspired by its SCF ‘patron’ of equally aiding children regardless of background, ‘racial’ or religious adherence. On the other hand, while the committee

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37 SCF/IACG Council Minutes, 17 June 1937, SCF Archives, M1/9, C. 2404.
39 SCF Council Minutes, 20 January 1938, SCF Archives, M1/9, C. 2507.
wanted to appear cross-denominational – to be a committee of Jews and Christians – it also wanted to be ‘non-sectarian’, giving equal favour to both groups. This meant that it was effectively downplaying the specificity of Nazi laws which targeted ‘full’ Jews preferentially. Thus its non-sectarianism meant it would aid more or less equal numbers of Jewish and Christian children (though at certain periods slightly more Christian children were aided and similarly at other times, slightly more Jewish children). As applications from Jewish children were significantly higher than those received for Christian children, however, this meant the committee was rejecting higher numbers of Jewish applicants and by default favouring Christian children in order to maintain parity levels. In addition, while Jewish funds were regarded as ‘general funds’, Christian funds were earmarked for the Christian children only. An inimical process of separating out funding and applying certain funds for certain groups arose, undermining its original humanitarian and egalitarian principles. This practice of separation, however, would reappear within other ‘non-sectarian’ funds such as the Lord Baldwin Fund, a special national appeal discussed in the later half of this chapter.

III: UNDER PRESSURE: ANSCHLUß TO KRISTALLNACHT, 1938.

The economic and social exclusion of the Jewish community in Germany had started in 1933 and progressively accelerated over five years, enabling a certain degree of ‘accommodation’ to the changes. Austrian Jewry had no such time to ‘adjust’, and were subjected to these laws and practices overnight. Closed by order on 18 March 1938, Jewish community organizations were in chaos, their leaders either arrested, in jail, or ‘on the run’. Despoiled, destitute and homeless, thousands of Viennese Jews were reduced to starvation levels, reliant on soup kitchens. Applications to the British Consulate in Vienna numbered into the thousands per day. Jewish suicides rose from less than 5 per month to nearly 80.40

Between April and May 1938, Sir Wyndham Deedes visited Germany and Austria on behalf of the Council for German Jewry (CGJ) in his capacity as joint honorary Directors of Emigration and Training and chairman of the IACG. The need for aid was critical, especially in Austria amongst the Jewish population. The IACG committee, however, had barely enough funds for the children already under its care and could not take on further commitments without substantial help. Nor was IACG the only refugee organization experiencing financial problems and increased demands. Otto Schiß, head of the JRC, informed the Home Office shortly after the Nazi occupation that the Jewish community guarantee, in place since 1933, could no longer be sustained. By 2 May 1938, the Home Office imposed visas requirements for Austrian nationals, and applied this same condition to German passport holders from 21 May 1938.\(^{41}\) Now swamped with applications from Vienna, the IACG needed extra staff merely to keep abreast of mounting paper work. Emergency grants from the CGJ, JRC and CENAC, were quickly spent. Between 1936 and 1938, the IACG had removed just over a hundred children from Germany. While this figure tripled by the end of 1938, it was still piteously low in consideration of the larger numbers who needed help.\(^{42}\) To those within the extended refugee aid network, Jewish and Christian, including the IACG, it was clear that only a concerted effort by the international community could avert the collapse of the voluntary aid networks and at the same time increase their ability to aid the ever escalating number of refugees. The international meeting at Evian in June 1938, however, produced no such tangible results.\(^{43}\)

In addition to the failure of the international community to effect a solution, the British government had placed additional burdens on the British voluntary aid network by requiring the creation of a Coordinating Council. The establishment of the Coordinating Committee at the direction of the Home Office in April 1938, rather than alleviating these pressures, had merely created further burdens of administration and costs which the representative committees had to cover via subventions. The


Home Office had directed that this central body be created to coordinate all refugee work and act as the main channel of communication between the refugee aid bodies and government. In order for a committee to have its status and applications recognised by government, each committee, including the IACG, needed to be represented on this consultative body. At the same time, represented committees were required to cover a percentage of this new body’s administrative costs, diverting precious funds, in the case of the IACG, away from child case work.

The November 1938 pogrom bought fresh urgency and added pressure to reform and extend the work of the IACG. Orphanages as well as business had been destroyed during Kristallnacht, and the children from many of these institutions were now homeless, wandering the cities and countryside on the verge on starvation. Added to this, Polish-born children raised and educated in Germany were under deportation notice to be sent ‘back’ to Poland. While the IACG had more than tripled the number of children it had brought over since February 1938, the 471 children under the IACG’s care by November represented a minute fraction of those now needing to leave, a situation that had been made so much more desperate with the introduction of visas in April which created average waits of three months for each visa. A radical approach was now essential in order to get a large number of children out of the Greater Reich in which it was calculated that some 60,000 remained.

Significantly, the push to change the system of aid to children did not come from within the IACG as it had in the past, but from members of the Jewish community loosely connected to Inter-Aid through the Council for Germany Jewry, one of the IACG main contributors.

Effectively bypassing the IACG, this new grouping was initiated as a subcommittee of the CGJ under the chairmanship of Lord Samuel within a matter of

44 The Coordinating Committee was composed of: Hospitality Committee, Domestic Bureau, Nurses Committee, Midwives Committee, and Medical and Dentists’ Committee. It was subsequently known as the Refugee Joint Consultative Committee.
days of Kristallnacht, and, coincidentally, while Wyndham Deedes was in South Africa on a fund-raising trip. It is not clear whether underlying tensions between Jewish refugee organizations and the SCF and IACG existed. What is certain is that in the aftermath of Kristallnacht, the individual case by case approach of the IACG was no longer considered appropriate. Within a week of the pogrom the whole approach to the rescue of children was rethought and removed from a cross-confessional environment that had stressed the principles of parity, non-sectarianism, and individual attention to a grouping directed by Jewish community workers and communal leaders to be organized on a mass transit scale.

Movement for the Care of Children coming from Germany, 1938-39.

In mid November 1938, Helen Bentwich submitted a proposal that the system of individual case work be jettisoned in favour of removing large groups of children from Germany and housing them in temporary shelters such as holiday camps until homes were found. Rescue was to be the priority: education and hospitality would be secondary, organized once the children had arrived in Britain. A deputation to the Prime Minister on 15 November led by Lord Samuel expressed the Jewish community’s general concern for the future of their German speaking brethren. Amongst a number of issues raised, the delegates reminded Neville Chamberlain that permission for 10,000 children to enter Palestine from Germany had been denied. There were now real fears for the future of young people in Germany, where 6000 young men were currently incarcerated in concentration camps. Representatives asked that the entry of children and young persons to the age of 17 be considered and a special guarantee was promised by the Jewish community towards this end.

The idea for the mass movement of children from Germany was further fleshed out in a plan drawn up by Helen Bentwich and Dennis Cohen, chairman of the Emigration department of the JRC. They envisaged the emigration of approximately 5,000 young children entering in groups of 200 to 500 who would be lodged

49 Circular letter from IAC, 19 September 1938, MSS SPSL 114/3/533. Also see Ford, “Jewish refugee children,” 137.
50 A. J. Sherman, Island Refugee: Britain and the Refugees from the Third Reich, 1933-1939. 2 ed. (London: Frank Cass, 1994), 171. It should be noted that young boys as young as twelve were incarcerated in concentration camps. See Stefan K. Schimanski, “Refugee Children in England,” Contemporary Jewish Record (July-August 1939), 22.
temporarily in summer holiday chalets vacant over the winter. On the 17 November a sub-committee of the GCJ was formed and a committee was founded, named the British Committee for the Care of Children from Germany. Samuel emerged as chairman and Helen Bentwich as Honorary secretary of the new body. Deedes returned from South Africa on 20 November to find that a ‘rival’ organization was in the process of formation. Even so, he joined a deputation of Quakers and Jewish refugee workers from England and Germany headed by Lord Samuel, to the Home Secretary, Sir Samuel Hoare, to request that passports and visas for child refugees be substituted for a simplified travel document in order to enable speedier evacuation from Germany. By the 23 November visa restrictions were removed and it was announced that refugee children would be brought to England “under the care of the Inter Aid Committee”.

Identified as responsible for the care of these mass transits, the IACG held an extraordinary meeting on 28 November. In principle the meeting agreed that the IACG should amalgamate with the British Committee and that this newly fused body (as yet unnamed) should take over responsibility “immediately and prospectively” all children under IACG care. This was on the understanding that the guiding principles of the IACG were maintained: that the religious environment of the child reflected the parents wishes and that the children be placed in a similar cultural environment from which they had come. The meeting gave Helen Bentwich the chance to outline the plans of the British Committee for the Care of Children from Germany to use camps and hostels as staging posts, and later foster homes overseen by a local guardian committee. She also announced that the first “batch” of children were to arrive within the week.

Principles may have been agreed, but prior to the meeting it was apparent that not all of the SCF and IACG committee members were completely satisfied with the

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54 SCF/IACG Extraordinary Meeting, 28 November 1938, BOD MSS SPSL 114/3/546-47. The first transport of 320 children arrived in Harwich on 2 December 1938 and was made up of orphans and Polish born children.
fait accompli that the British Committee had effectively served. Indeed, Deedes's private offer to replace Lord Grey's diffident acceptance of joint chairmanship of the British Committee was withdrawn until the matter was fully clarified. A merger was agreed with a certain degree of reluctance, particularly amongst SCF members. On severing its connection with the IAC to make way for its amalgamation with the British Committee, the SCF Council took the opportunity to express “its sincerest regret that the necessity for this merging has arisen”. The merger was put into effect by the beginning of December 1938 and the new body was given the rather cumbersome title of the Movement for the Care of Children from Germany: British Inter-Aid Committee (‘Movement’/MCCG). Viscount Samuel and Wyndham Deedes were designated the Movement’s joint chairmanship, and Helen Bentwich continued in her British Committee role of Honorary Secretary.

Given the desire to bring over large numbers of children from Germany and Austria, cooperation with existing aid groups was essential, as was securing adequate funding. The Reichsvertretung der Juden in Deutschland and the Kultusgemeinde in Berlin and Vienna respectively were entrusted with the selection of Jewish children for the transports, while the Society of Friends in Berlin and Vienna was responsible for Christian children. In Britain, the two administrations of the former separate committees relocated to a new address on 29 November 1938. Guardian Committees, later known as Local Committees, were developed out of church and synagogue hospitality committees, or interested individuals joining together; in one case an existing refugee committee in Cambridge created a special subcommittee for children. By mid-December, 26 Guardian committees were up and running and a further 41 were in the process of formation. Many were formed spontaneously, in

55 It must be noted that Deedes does not appear to have been consulted on the proposition to found the new committee, moreover, Lord Grey was chosen over Deedes because of Grey’s role as chairman of the Church of England Central Board of Finance and his lay membership of the Church Assembly. Lord Samuel, however, believed that the IACG and the British Movement should merge and Wyndham Deedes should be joint chairman. Earl Grey subsequently became a trustee to the Lord Baldwin Fund, Treasurer of the Church of England Committee for ‘non-Aryan’ Christians and a member of the Christian Council. See, Letter from Wyndham Deedes to A. C. Don, 25 November 1938, L. P. L. Lang Papers, v. 38, fo., 231; Letter from Wyndham Deedes to Dr. Don, 26 November 1938, L. P. L. Lang Papers, v. 38, fo., 239; SCF Council Minutes, 19 January 1939, SCF Archives, M1/9; C. 2556.
56 The very small operations of Paulusbund, Pastor Grüber and Father Spiero also forwarded Christian cases to the Friends. See Ford, “Jewish Refugee children,” 139.
57 Movement 1st Annual Report, 4. By autumn 1939 there were 175 such local committees. See Schimanski, “Refugee Children in England,” 27.
response to the press photographs of the first transport of children arriving on De Praag, or of children arriving on the second transports at Liverpool Street Station. Funding the transports, hostels, holiday camps, schooling and fostering (in the case of ‘unguaranteed’ cases) was helped by the earlier launch of the Christian Council for Refugees from Germany and Central Europe (CCR/Christian Council), and the creation of the Lord Baldwin Fund (LBF) following the broadcast of an appeal by the Earl Baldwin.

The Christian Council, originally titled the Council for Christian Refugees, was launched in October 1938 and was conceived as the Christian equivalent to the Council for German Jewry, the fundraising wing of Jewish communal efforts to aid refugees from Germany. Launched on 6 October 1938, it sought “to stimulate the interest of Christian Communions in the plight of ‘Non-Aryan’ Christian victims of the racial persecution of the Nazi government in Germany, and to raise funds for their relief”. It also aimed to coordinate the refugee work of Anglicans, Roman Catholics, the Free Churches and Quakers for Christian refugees, but was not a case working body itself. Sir John Hope Simpson was appointed Chairman. The leaders of the Anglican Catholic, Free Churches and Church of Scotland were named as Presidents. Bishop Bell and Rev Henry Carter were appointed as joint Chairmen of the Executive Committee and Rev. W. W. Simpson was named as one of the Honorary Secretaries.

Bruce Overton, then aged ten, recalls his father, R. Alan Overton, forming the Rugby (Christadelphian) Committee (discussed in chapter 4) in this way. Bruce Overton, Interview with author, 10 November 1997, Rugby.

See, Movement 1 Annual Report.

Interview with Bertha Bracey, Imperial War Museum Sound Archive, 4646/3 Reel 2. Bertha Bracey recalling the naming of the CCR, said: “It was suggested that they would call it the Council for Christian refugees but I said ‘Gentlemen surely we’re not wanting to help these people because they are Christians? We are wanting to help because we hope we are Christians’ and therefore they did call it the Christian Council for Refugees”. One assumes that the designation Christian Council for Christian Refugees would have been too unwieldy. Bracey was General Secretary of the GEC. For CCR as a CGJ equivalent, see Wyndham Deedes to A. C. Don, c. 22 September 1938 L. P. L. Lang Papers, v. 38, fo., 183. The idea for the CCR was first mooted publicly by Bishop Bell in his maiden speech to the Lords in July 1938. See Bishop of Chichester [George Bell], Speech to the House of Lords, 27 July 1938 Parliamentary Debates (Lords), 5th series, v. 110 (1938), 1206-1249. The incorporation of so many different denominations was not without problems. See Turner, And the Policeman Smiled, 71.

Presidents: Archbishop of Canterbury and the Archbishop of York, Cardinal Hinsley, James Black, Moderator of the Church of Scotland and Robert Bond, Moderator of the Federal Council of the Evangelical Free Churches of England. Vice-Chairman: Viscount Cranbourne. Organizing Secretary: Major A. A. Watts. The Executive committee included representatives from the GEC, CENAC and the various non-sectarian refugee committees such as the ISS and AAC/SPSL. There were also delegates from Christian denominations such including Quaker and Unitarian members. See, Christian Council for Refugees from Germany and Central Europe, Final Report and Survey.
The murders and violence of Kristallnacht produced shock waves across Europe and America. In the Anglican community, Bishop Bell led a call in the Church Assembly to donate £5000 for the aid of Christian refugees. This proposal was debated and a motion was passed to raise an appeal for £50,000 from the dioceses for the benefit of Christian refugees and the monies raised were transferred to the CCR. Though this represented the largest amount raised by any Christian denomination in Britain over the period 1933-38, it was regarded by Anglicans as incomparable to the amounts raised by the Jewish community in that same period - approaching close to £2,000,000. Earl Grey, chairman of the Central Board of Finance of the Church of England, approached Stanley Baldwin, the former Conservative Prime Minister, to ask him to make a 'Christian appeal' to raise these levels and also draw Christian support across the denominations. Significantly, Baldwin agreed to such an appeal on the basis that it be a national appeal to Christians. That Baldwin drew this distinction suggests that Grey's appeal was to be for the sole benefit of Christian refugees rather than one aimed at refugees in general. Baldwin would reason to a colleague when asked why he was getting involved in "a Jewish question" that he saw this undertaking as a Christian duty, one to which he was called "because I am a Christian". Baldwin’s comment demonstrates the differences held amongst Anglicans, if not Christians more generally, to targeted aid.

Indeed the theme of Christian duty and action to universal suffering echoed throughout the speech Baldwin made on 8 December 1938. The other main theme was "to rescue" some of the 55,000 or more Jewish children and the many thousands of Christian children with the "utmost speed". The number saved, Baldwin stated, "would depend upon the extent to which hospitality can be offered". He asked that


See Chapter 5.

Interview with Bertha Bracey, Imperial War Museum Sound Archive, 4646/3 Reel 3.

This conversation was recalled by the Chief Rabbi, Joseph Hertz, when introducing a talk by Bishop Bell to the Jewish Historical Society of England in February 1939. A friend asked why Baldwin was interested in the refugees. Said the friend, "It is almost altogether a Jewish question, why worry about it?". To which Lord Baldwin replied, "I worry about this Jewish question because I am a Christian." See, George Bell, "Humanity and the Refugees," The Fifth Lucien Wolf Memorial Lecture, (London: UCL, 1939), 6.

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Britain “not lag behind” other countries who “are coming forward with their offerings”. Christian charity was “challenged” by the refugee’s plight, and if Christians did not heed this plea then “somehow our Christianity is not worth much”.

With the timing of the appeal within the month of Christmas, Baldwin concluded,

How can we in sincerity wish each other a happy Christmas with this knowledge in our hearts? How can we expect a happy Christmas for ourselves until we have done what lies in our power to help alleviate such suffering as we have not be called to bear?65

In the course of the broadcast, Baldwin unfavourably compared the past response of the Christian majority as “insignificant” to that of the minority Jewish community described variously as “remarkable” and “magnificent”. The speech was stirring, but also typified a ‘tone’ found in a number of appeals issued made by Christians both before and after the broadcast which admonished Christians for their lack of interest in Christians or Jewish refugees. Most if not all of these appeals, from Methodists such as Henry Carter and Anglicans like George Bell, identified Jewish efforts for their co-religionists and others as the example for Christians to follow.66

The Baldwin broadcast appeal was extremely successful, and by the end of December had raised over £250,000. Part of the success lay in support from The Times which published daily subscription lists. Semi-official Post Office involvement was also secured, enabling donations to be made via post office 6d. saving booklets distributed by volunteers in factories, schools and workplaces. Donations could also be made at any branch of any bank throughout the country.67 In addition, bold adverts with headlines, “Before it is too late - get them out”, ran frequently in The Times. Appeals were also combined with specific events such as Stage and Screen Day on 11 January 1939 and a special Mothers’ Day Appeal.68

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65 Earl Baldwin of Bewdley, “The Plight of the Refugees,” Speech delivered on 8 December 1938 (Ottawa: Canadian National Committee on Refugees and Victims of Political Persecution., 1939) 7-12.

66 One such example is the 17 November 1938. Jewish refugee work is referenced and the article continued: “Most earnestly do we entreat our fellow Christians to help their Christian brethren in a like manner”. The article concludes, “Let Christians prove themselves to be Christians and give liberally and at once”. See ‘Help for Christian Refugees’, The Times, 17 November 1938, cutting, CERC/CBF/REF/4.

67 Phillip Williamson, Stanley Baldwin, Conservative Leadership and National Values (Cambridge: CUP, 1999),59; Cohen, German Refugees: A guide to those who wish to help, 8.

While the initial public response to the appeal was very positive, it was soon tempered by criticism that public funds were being elicited for "a Jewish problem". The Presidents of the Christian Council scotched this "misapprehension" in a letter to The Times at the beginning of January 1939. Church leaders respectively spoke for their constituents, stressing that the refugee problem "by its very nature" made demands of the charity of all Christian people. Significantly, less than a week after this letter was published, a press release from the Lord Baldwin Fund (LBF) named its four trustees. Three were drawn from the Christian community, in contrast to a single representative from the Jewish community. Conversely, the Movement for the Care of Children from Germany and the Coordinating Council had striven for parity of communal representation, drawing equal numbers of Jews and Christian for figurehead and leading executive and administrative roles, thus the 'weighted' configuration of the Lord Baldwin Fund indicated an accommodation to the criticisms received. Furthermore, amongst refugee organizations, there was some concern over the decision to apportion the LBF monies between Christian Council, the CGJ and the Scottish National Council. Effectively this forced a carving up of interests which went against the universalistic impulse behind the appeal. It had appealed to Christians with the aim that funds be used for the benefit of all the refugees. With the grant of money to the Christian Council which operated a policy of funding Christians only, many feared was that the CGJ might similarly target its funds solely to Jews. Jews would then look after Jews, Christians, would continue to succour solely Christians and the political refugee, the refugee of conscience, and any other refugees who could not be so neatly categorized would be left without funding representation. This concern would echo throughout the year.


70 Lord Baldwin Fund: Notes and News, 11 January 1939, CERC Archives, Papers of the CECBF, CBF/REF/6. The Trustees were: Lord Grey (Anglican), Lord Tyrrell of Avon (Roman Catholic), Lord Stamp (Free Churchmen) and Lord Bearstead (Jewish). Apportionment Committee: Lord Baldwin (Chairman), Maj. Gen. Sir Neill Malcolm (Vice-Chairman), Lord Grey, Lord Bearstead, Lord Rankeillor, Lord Rothschild, Sir Geoffrey Fry, Mr. Godfrey Nicolson, Rev. Henry Carter and Rev. R. C. Macanna. The Joint Honorary Secretaries were: Rev. W. W. Simpson and Philip Vos. Part of the fund was set aside to allow for relocation of most of the refugee organizations, Jewish and Christians into one central office, formerly the Palace Hotel on Bloomsbury Street, renamed ‘Bloomsbury House’. It was also later agreed that almost one half of the closing fund would be transferred to the Movement.

71 David Cleghorn Thompson [General Secretary of the SPSL] to Lord Hailey [Chairman of the Coordinating Committee], 6 January 1939, BOD MSS SPSL 104/4/369-370.
While the LBF faced both internal and external criticism, the Movement for the Care of Children from Germany faced severe problems. Its hastily assembled structure of central and local committees were initially overwhelmed by the number of applicants. Furthermore, its administrative staff were generally untrained volunteers, mostly working part-time for uncertain lengths of time. Under these constraints, processing applications quickly, correctly and efficiently was extremely difficult. Nor was the Movement helped with the delays caused by the police authorities in Germany who needed ‘to vet’ each travel document, rejecting a small number in each batch, offering no explanation. The biggest tensions, however, arose over the distribution of the Lord Baldwin funds in respect of Christian refugee children and the placement of Jewish children in Christian homes once in Britain.

Buoyed up by the response to the Baldwin Fund, members of the Christian Council were initially satisfied with the arrangement that the LBF would be apportioned between the CGJ, the Christian Council and the Scottish National Council (composed of Christian and Jewish refugee groups) in proportion to case loads. It was understood that Jewish relief work was significantly greater than that carried out by Christian organizations, and that apportioning was appropriate. Indeed Jewish relief work was a spur to the Christian denominational efforts, and the CCR agreed that “every effort should be made to strengthen the Christian organizations in view of the great need for a worthier effort to set over against the Jewish relief work”. At the same time, Bishop Bell felt that more needed to be done for ‘non-Aryan’ Christian refugees, especially the children, and he felt that the CCR needed to facilitate this with “bigger action”, and that the Churches should be “induced to pull their weight”. Offers for free schooling were plentiful, and many wished to give hospitality, but the need to lay down sufficient money for each child until the age of 18 made this difficult. Jewish funds were able to bring in blocks of children at a time and it was hoped that Christian monies might do the same. More privately, however, Bell was concerned that too much of the ‘Baldwin money’ was used for all the various categories of children. It had to be remembered that the Baldwin Fund was for “both Christians and Jews” and Bell did not believe

72 Minutes of the CCR Board of Management [hereafter CCR Minutes (Management Committee)], 17 January 1939, CBF/REF/CCR/1.
73 Minutes of the Church of England Committee for ‘Non-Aryan’ Christians (hereafter CENAC Minutes), 10 February 1939, Parkes Papers, BZ 7051 15.018, SUA,
that “the Christians have yet come strongly enough into the picture”. Bell concluded his letter with the caution that he was not forgetting “the Jews, who are Jews by race and religion”, but he felt that he needed to make a “special plea” to the Baldwin Fund to ensure that the ‘non-Aryan’ Christians refugees were not overlooked nor forgotten.74

In the meanwhile, the Movement made a formal application to the LBF Apportionment Committee for a subvention of £220,000 of the £440,000 received to date suggesting that £150,000 of the £220,000 be derived from CGJ ear-markings, £20,000 from the Scottish Council and £50,000 from the CCR eventual ‘share’. The CCR total receipts stood at just under £70,000, most of which derived from the Church Assembly Appeal made in November 1938. Applications to the CCR had been received from the GEC, CENAC and Viennese organizations dealing with aid to non-Aryan Christians, as well as an applications from the Church of England Committee for Empire Settlement seeking to place 100 Christian girls in Australia. There was also the continuing maintenance of a Methodist initiated school for Christian refugee children.75 The £70,000 within CCR hands would be quickly spent and it was uncertain how much more would be required for maintenance in an uncertain future. The probability that the Movement might acquire such a large chunk ‘automatically’ and that it was assessing how much of the grant from the LBF would be earmarked from the three distributing bodies (CCR, CGJ and Scottish Council) raised concerns amongst members of the CCR. The need to establish the CCR as the determining body for grants distributed in it name was therefore essential, particularly in the light of the Movement’s attempt to ascribe a CCR contribution without consultation.

The expansion of the refugee aid network to include organizations such as the Coordinating Committee, the CCR, the Movement and CENAC created the prospect of refugee organizations competing for funds. Thus, the situation arose whereby a policy making and advising body, the Coordinating Council, would make recommendations to the LBF fundraising committee who would then give money to the CCR, a distributing agency. The entire chain of decision making was uninformed by the experience of case-working and the difficulties behind them, despite the

74 Letter from Bishop Bell to Lord Grey, 9 February 1939, CERC/CBF/REF/CCR/1.
75 CCR Minutes (Management Committee), 16 February 1939, CERC/CBF/REF/CCR/1.
representation of case-workers in many cases. Case-working representatives had to decide which committee meetings to attend and balance this against their own heavy working loads. Smaller committees as much as larger committees had to make their ‘presence felt’ in order to protect their allocations. Many resignations and illnesses ensued in this pressured round of meetings, insufficient funds, overburden work loads and not least, because of fraught interaction between the refugee workers themselves.\(^6\)

By March 1939, the LBF had restricted allocations to emergency grants only, but had yet to make its main allocations. Even so, and in light of its own tardiness in distributing funds, LBF representatives criticized the “inefficiency and discourtesy” of “certain” refugee bodies. Meeting with leading members of the CCR and Jewish refugee organizations, LBF committee members demanded that the administrative side of the Children’s Movement be placed under the Coordinating Committee and its head, Lord Hailey. It was argued that the Movement was engendering “widespread dissatisfaction”, reflecting poorly on the wider refugee network and the LBF itself. The Movement needed reorganization, and the employment of contracted salaried workers as opposed to short-term volunteers was identified as a necessity to be implemented immediately.\(^7\)

The administrative and organizational concerns of LBF executives and others did bear consideration. Indeed, the Movement itself began internal reviews in February 1939, brought about by the continuing problem of finding hospitality for the older children “unguaranteed” cases, which until resolved prevented the bringing in of further children. Nearly 3000 children without prearranged sponsors (“unguaranteed”) were brought over to Britain between December 1938 and February 1939. A few small groups were housed in pre-organized or hastily assembled private hostels. Most however, were initially placed in make-shift accommodation at Dovercourt Holiday Camp, near Harwich and Pakefield Hall Holiday camp near Lowestoft. The holiday camps had been built to summer specifications and the winter

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\(^6\) Letter from F. G. Kenyon [chairman of the SPSL Executive] to Lord Baldwin, 23 February 1939, BOD MSS SPSL 116/7/626-627.

\(^7\) Minutes of the Baldwin Executive Committee, 1 March 1939, CERC/CBF/CCR/1; CCR Minutes (Executive Committee), 9 March 1939, CERC/CBF/REF/6. On the problems associated with voluntary aid workers including seasoned workers such as Helen (Mami) Bentwich, see Turner, *And the Policeman smiled*, 48. The tone of much of the Movement’s 1st Report is written not just as a record of work but also “to explain to the more critical why mistakes were made and why
of 1938-1939 was one of the coldest ever recorded there. The concrete chalets had no heating and conditions were bitterly cold. Eventually, the children were evacuated over part of the holiday period into private schools and later severe flooding made the Pakefield Hall Holiday huts uninhabitable for a period of time. The placement of children in these camps, however, reflected the primary goal of the Movement, that is to rescue children from Germany. Most of the “unguaranteed” children had been placed on the first sets of transports because they faced immediate or imminent danger; for example, the orphans made homeless during Kristallnacht or others, as in the case of boys aged 12 or over, because they were threatened with incarceration in concentration camps. The children could therefore be more accurately called teenagers, mostly 14 or over, and predominately boys. Prospective foster parents had been expecting younger children and were disappointed that the majority were older than anticipated; there was also a preference for girls. For these reasons many hosts either withdrew their earlier offers of hospitality, or failed to maintain them properly. The Movement was consequently faced with supporting a large number of children without proper accommodation and covering costs which included food, health, clothes and schooling. By January, out of necessity, a more formalized guarantee system was instituted and became the preferred policy direction of the Movement. Distant relatives, friends, acquaintances and volunteer hosts could specify a child which they would guarantee to maintain until the age of 18, or until emigration. The system favoured middle class host applicants and less urgent child cases, but it was a system that enabled a further 6000 children to enter Britain from January 1939 to the outbreak of war.

The Movement reorganized in the spring of 1939, changing its status and

delays occurred”, Movement, 1st Annual Report, 3.

Turner, And the Policeman smiled, 59.

As Kushner, notes, however, the distinction between urgent Jewish cases and non-urgent Jewish cases “was increasingly meaningless” as Jews in Germany were systematically despooled and excluded from civil society. See Kushner and Knox, Refugees, 155. Yet it is significant that in order to justify Movement ‘selection’ policies it was necessary to apply these categories for the situation to be understood more widely. Many of the Kinder (children of the transports) remember their experiences at the reception camps negatively. The weekly ‘selection process’ by prospective foster parents was considered particularly difficult, with those ‘unselected’ children left behind feeling further discouraged by their situation. For these problems, see Schimanski, “Refugee Children in England,” 26-27 “resembles the manner of selecting a pet in an animal store” and the “cattle-market” as described by Anna Essinger in Gillespie, “Working with the Kindertransports,” 128. On competition for younger children, see Bentwich, They Found Refuge, 66.

For more, see Movement, 1st Annual Report, 3.
personnel. Incorporating in April 1939, it became the Refugee Children’s Movement or RCM. The organizing Secretary, Major Geoffrey Langdon, was removed and Deedes resignation was followed by Lord Reading’s soon after. Helen Bentwich also left the organization at this time. Charles Stead, an Anglican and previously an administrator in India, was appointed at the direction of Lord Hailey, as full time Executive Director. Dorothy Hardisty was made Organizing Secretary. Lord Gorell joined Lord Reading as co-Chairman for a month and, after Reading resigned, became the sole director of the Movement. An executive committee was appointed to join Rabbi Maurice Swift, with W. W. Simpson represented Protestant interests and Canon George Craven serving Catholic ones. With these changes the Movement moved towards a more non-sectarian temper more in line with its IACG predecessor. This continued even as Lord Hailey and members of the Church of England Central Board of Finance acknowledged that as the Council for German Jewry was funding the greater part of the Movement, the chairman of the executive should be nominated by the Council. They also agreed that there should be a greater number of Jewish representatives on the Executive. At the same time the fear was that a voice for ‘non-Aryan’ Christians would be lost, so arguments about membership and representation levels rumbled on unresolved.  

The appointment of non-Jewish figureheads and executives was part of a change in emphasis amongst the wider refugee aid network reacting to growing antisemitism as well as a response to specific concerns regarding the number of Christian children included on the transports. The coordinating committee was balanced towards non-Jewish affairs. Undoubtedly resentments still existed following the ‘Jewish take-over’ of the IACG and there may have been a desire by non-Jewish members to reassert Christian representations. Christian protestations had been mounting for some time in regard to the low percentage of Christian refugee children

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81 Central Council for Jewish Refugees (formerly the CGJ), *Annual Report for 1939*, p. 12; 15 April 1939, J. D. Walker [CECBF] to W. W. Simpson [CCR], 15 April 1939, *Papers of the CECBF*, CERC/CFB/CCR/1. For criticism of Langdon, see Turner, *And the Policeman smiled*, 48. Gillespie, “Working with the Kindertransports,” 129-130. Charles Stead proved to be an unsuccessful appointment and retired in September 1939 at which point Hardisty took over. Lord Gorell was a soldier educationalist and former minister of the crown who continued in his post until 1948, becoming legal guardian for the Movement’s children. He was asked to take the position by Archbishop Lang who informed him that his duties were unlikely to be “very exacting”. Gorell later described the letter from Lang as “a monument of persuasive unreality”. See Lord Gorell, “Adventure and Opportunity,” in Bentwich, *They Found Refuge*, pp. 78-85.

included on transports, which represented less than 20%. Jewish children represented
79% of the total number of children. Of the Christian numbers, 14% were Protestant,
3% were Catholic, 1% were from the Free Churches, 0.7% were Quaker, and 0.1% were Greek Orthodox. Those without religious affiliation represented just over 2%. The IACG had operated a policy of parity, which in reality had weighted in favour of Christian children, as a greater number of Jewish applicants were refused in comparison to those from Christians. The Movement, in contrast, was bringing over high numbers of Jewish children and significantly lower numbers of Christian children.

The removal of children from Germany and Austria by the Movement in the first few months was done under the policy of rescuing those who faced immediate threat or were facing family or personal crisis: concentration camp, expulsion, orphans or suicide. After Kristallnacht, all Jewish children were expelled from state schools. At the very least, Jewish children faced a marginalized and even unsafe future. To the organizers of the transports, with the knowledge that not all 80,000 children could be saved, their concern was that if they maintained the parity policy of the IACG, they would be consigning disproportionately high numbers of Jewish children to this fate, one in which they had been specifically targeted. Christian children, even those ‘racially’ defined, were not in this position. Under these circumstances, Movement organizers were obligated to remove as many Jewish children as possible, and they were aided in this goal by structures within the German Jewish community which could be utilized to ‘select’ the most needy of these children for rescue.

By comparison, the bodies dealing with non-Jewish child emigration were far less experienced and much more hastily assembled. They were heavily reliant on the relief work of the Quakers who were engaged in many spheres, not least of all, their work as a small religious organization. In the general case of ‘non-Aryan’ Christians in Germany, prior to 1933 and more particularly after 1935, there had been no ‘separate’ identity for this group of Christians. Even as anti-Jewish laws began to encroach on this segment of the Christian communion, there were few attempts to

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83 Schimanski, “Refugee Children in England,” 26. The final count as reported in the Movements’ 1st Annual Report lists religious affiliation accordingly: there were 7482 Jews, 1123 Christians, 749 Undenominational. The total was 9354. See Movement, 1st Annual Report, 19.
organize them as a distinct body, and that which was achieved was limited. Moreover, the range of individuals which might fall within the scope of such a grouping was quite disparate, making it hard to find a unifying thread, for example: converts from three or four generations ago vs. recent converts, as well as another semi-related grouping: mixed marriages. The wide assortment of interests were poorly served by Christian refugee and relief organizations, (the Friends excepted) who, as has been demonstrated in the preceding chapters, were slow to develop over the period for a number of reasons. Given these factors and constraints, it was to be expected that the greater percentage of children were likely to be Jewish. Even so, a report carried out by Charles Stead, the Movement’s new Executive Director, did confirm complaints of an “undue proportion” of Jewish children being brought over. As a result of his findings, transports from mid-March were rescheduled to include extra Christian children, with the first transport including an additional 40 Christian children. An earlier decision to contribute CCR funds for children classified as Konfessionlos was reversed, and it was determined that only after attempts had been made to discover the religion of the children, such as the date of a child’s baptism, could help be given. This decision further established Christian desires that funds be attributed only to identifiably Christian children. Concerns over the percentage of Jewish to Christian child refugees impacted beyond the Movement, and non-sectarian committees such as the AAC/SPSL feared that “confessional” conditions might become standard practice through the decision of the LBF to divide funds along confessional lines. Writing to Lord Hailey of the Coordinating committee at the end of March, David Cleghorn Thompson stressed his committee’s concern for allocation procedure which the LBF had effectively inaugurated. The Council for German Jewry had “never asked the Society to use its block grants on Jewish cases only” and the Society itself “never made any discrimination on confessional grounds in its case-work”. The concern was that it was now being asked to estimate the proportion of its Jewish and non-Jewish work,

85 Memorandum on the Position with Regard to Christian Children, 13 March 1939, Parkes Papers, BZ7051 15. 018, SUA.
86 CCR Minutes (Executive Committee), 9 March 1939, CERC/CBF/REF/6.
something it was against doing. Furthermore, if the Baldwin allocation policy became the norm it would have to adhere to these policies too, and this would leave refugees who fell between the two camps without funds; for example political refugees or Konfessionlos without a constituency.

Adding to the problems of an intermittent cash flow from the LBF, which sought to control spending so as to retain sufficient money for future commitments, the Movement was also affected by relocation to Bloomsbury House and the extension of the guarantee requiring a further £50 towards emigration costs for each child. This latter demand effectively placed a temporary halt to transports until the LBF agreed to cover this extra cost where necessary.

Aside from financial concerns, the main problem the Movement faced, however, for which it was to receive increasing criticism from Orthodox Jewish quarters, was its policy of placing children in Christian foster homes, as opposed to Jewish homes or Jewish run hostels. Having determined that the children might be in Britain for two years, before training or emigration, the Movement placed high emphasis on acculturation, learning the language and adapting to life in Britain. Its critics, however, believed that it was an assimilationist body, allowing Jewish children to be homed by Christian 'befrienders' who did more than give their charges a new environment, but enforced Christianity and transforming Jewish children into Christians. Indeed there are a significant number of later testimonies that confirmed these charges and the religious and other pressures Jewish children faced in Christian homes. Milena Roth, arrived in Britain just before her seventh birthday from Prague. Her generally non-practising Jewish family observed Yom Kippur but little else. The Church of England family who took her made her feel like a 'charity case': “I became their good deed and had to be constantly grateful”. Sunday school attendance was

87 Letter from David Cleghorn Thompson [SPSL] to Lord Hailey, 30 March 1939, BOD MSS SPSL 104/4/476-479.
88 SCF Council Minutes, 20 April 1939, SCF Archives, M1/9: C. 2579. At the end of April 1939, the LBF had received £468,000 and had granted only £71,200. LBF - Financial Position, 29 April 1939, CERC/CFB/CCR/1. For more on the workings and problems with Bloomsbury House see Gillespie, ‘Working with the Kindertransports’, 126; Werner Rosenstock, ‘The Bloomsbury House Saga’, in AJR Information, (June 1987), 4.
89 ‘Befriender’ was the RCM’s preferred term for foster parents. Jewish Children were placed with Christian families after gaining consent from the child’s parent. Given the circumstances, it was unlikely for parents to withhold this. The charge of proselytizing was made by Rabbi Solomon Schonfeld and Harry Goodman in February 1939. Schonfeld founded the Chief Rabbi’s Religious
obligatory and she was a target of active missionary activity, not only on the part of
the family itself but also by the extended family. Lillyan Rosenberg’s fosterer’s
while “kindly” forbid the wearing of her Star of David, a gift of her parents, because
of its association with “her past”. They wanted to adopt her and end contact with her
relatives but her brother’s arrival just before the beginning of the war enabled them to
leave for America in 1946 to establish new lives.

Not all ‘conversions’, however, were carried out as intentionally or
systematically. Many happening out of confusion, ‘convenience’ and isolation. As
Ingrid Gassman recalled her stay with a Christian family, “for years I could not be
sure if I was German or English, Jew or Gentile”. At the same time, her foster home
gave her security in other ways for three important years, making her feel “accepted
as one of their own” while encouraging her to maintain contact with her family in
Germany.

Age was also a contributory factor, for while the average age of a Kind (child)
at the beginning of the transport movement was as old as 16, towards the end of the
transports children could be as young as two months old, with little or no memory of
their former culture and religion. Many children, particularly younger children from
liberal Jewish backgrounds, found that becoming a Christian, or in many cases, more
accurately ‘leaving’ Judaism, aided their integration into British society, a liberal
society which continued to see ‘Jewishness’ as ‘other’ and ‘foreign’ against a
background of growing hostility to refugees and Jews. Furthermore, many children
also felt there was little or no interest on the part of the foster parents to help support
the child in retaining their ‘former’ identities, belying a certain passive ambivalence
rather than outright hostility to Judaism. Children also spoke of a desire to please their
hosts, to make things ‘easier’ by losing their former religious identification. Gisela
Eisner’s experience demonstrates the complex interplay of Christian host desires and

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Emergency Council to aid orthodox children and established two hostels, one for boys, Avigdor

I am grateful to Julie Couttie for sending me this testimony in a first draft of her BA dissertation:
Julie Couttie, “The effect of the Kindertransport on the identity of Jewish children” (BA Diss.,
University College of Ripon and York, 2000), unpaginated.


Testimony of Ingrid Gassman, *I came alone*, 117; Marion Berghahn, *Continental Britons: German

of liberalism in British society see, Tony Kushner, *The Holocaust and the Liberal Imagination*
actions on the issue of conversion. “Certainly it was plain to me that my foster
parents, while scrupulously avoiding any attempts to influence me, would have been
delighted had I decided to do so”.94

Geography also compounded the sense of isolation and otherness, as not all
children were boarded in areas where there was an established or thriving Jewish
community. Thus it was hard to retain contact with Jewish communities, in some
cases made worse by a lack of interest from Jewish communities themselves.
Moreover, while the movement tried to place children in a similar economic and
social class, placing them in a similar religious environment was problematic because
not enough Jewish families came forward, particularly in the case of Orthodox Jews.
The RCM was faced with the inevitable task of deciding whether to halt transports for
lack of interest from Jewish homes or continue them and place children in Christian
homes and hope for the best. It decided on the later course of action. Finally, a
number of Christian fosterers and helpers were conscious of, and committed to their
charges’ heritage, and did not seek to make converts, likewise placement in a Jewish
home was by no means a passport to retaining a child’s Jewishness, nor a guarantee of
better treatment.95

Conclusion

Cooperative work for children, Jewish and non-Jewish, was initially very
much the work of a few individuals, working together in an ad hoc fashion. Over time
this work was formalized into a group structure, that of committees set up to deal
specifically with children. The GCVC failed after a short time for several reasons: it
was trying to fulfil two distinctly divergent functions, it was unable to raise money
and the contributing organizations with which it worked were better established and
more successful at functions they had hoped this committee would take over. As the
body was seen as failing, full control was not ceded by the related groups. As a result,
it failed because of lack of confidence and competence.

The IACG was a cross denominational organization of Jewish and Christian
members in equal numbers. It highlighted its membership profile to establish the fact

94 Julie Couttie, “The effect of the Kindertransport on the identity of Jewish children”.
95 Examples of a more positive experiences in Christian homes includes Testimony of Sonja Pach, I
came alone, 286; Testimony of Steffi Schwarcz, I came alone, 297-299.
that the refugee crisis was one that concerned the whole community, not simply ‘a Jewish problem’. Equally, it sought to highlight the fact that Christians suffered under Nazism too. While it claimed to be non-sectarian and stressed parity as a policy, it favoured Christian children over Jewish children. It received over double the number of Jewish applicants, yet aided the same amount of Jews and Christians. In its desire to be considered free of bias, it downplayed the specificity of Nazi antisemitism. It thus failed to acknowledge that Jews were more likely to apply for aid because they were more likely to be affected by policies as the primary target of Nazi ‘racial’ policies. Christian applicants were therefore received in higher numbers through this committee.

The Movement for the Care of Children from Germany and later RCM were beset with the problems encountered by a hastily assembled structure. Its founders were driven by the desire to remove and save as many children, mainly Jewish, from an uncertain and limited future. Mostly managed and run by volunteers, the functions of which would be difficult for seasoned aid workers or administration professions, the organization tried to accomplish several functions ranging from rescue to fostering. There was little time to research offers of homes sufficiently and many children were poorly matched with their British hosts, some suffering emotional, physical or sexual abuse at the hands of their ‘bendicers’. There were also a charge that the Movement allowed Jewish children to become Christian, by placing them in Christian homes. The Movement did not receive enough offers from Jewish homes, had not intended to operate a series of long term hostels (only short-term accommodation) and put priority of getting more children out than building infrastructure. Moreover, many within the general Christian public, rallied by the Lord Baldwin broadcast, wished to open their homes and these offers were taken up readily. In contrast, Christian fundraising bodies such as the CCR did not wish to aid Jews and forced a division of aid provision between Christian and Jewish refugee bodies.

In addition to the organizational perspective, the Kindertransporte should also be understood as it was experienced by the Kinder themselves. What emerges, even where stories were “happy”, is the tremendous sense of loss: loss of identity, loss of family in Germany and loss through the separation of siblings once in Britain. The loss of language and the loss of country and culture and finally the loss of religious
identity or that identity becoming problematic. The disruption and truncation these children felt at the time through their parting from parents, homes and the lives they had known, continues as adults. Their lives did not continue as planned but were interrupted with little or no explanation, beginning again in an alien and sometimes unwelcoming environment.

The wrench from Germany in many cases, was not accompanied by an outlet through which to express that loss because of language barriers and lack of family and friends. Some Kinder experiences in Britain with families compounded these losses. Host families were unable to relate to the children’s experience and were sometimes insensitive to their charges’ experiences. A section of fosterers imposed conditions that were highly problematic ranging from the prohibition against use of their former language and conversion. It is also true that children were not always homed for strictly humanitarian reasons but for their utility as unpaid child minders and housemaids. There were also pressures to “fit in”, to Anglicize in very short periods of time (which in many cases meant ‘Christianize’), in either direct missionary activity or in indirect ways.

Earlier chapters showed that Christian organizational rescue policies were geared in the main towards ‘non-Aryan’ Christian children. The Kindertransporte illustrates the work of Christians on an individual level, which was not led by policy from ‘on high’ directly. Some Christians, who sought to aid the integration of their Jewish child charges into British society, saw the fusion of ‘Englishness’ and Christianity as a conflated identity. It is here that we see that attitudes to Jews from Christian education and Christian scriptures intersected with ideas of ‘Englishness’ that excluded ‘Jewishness’ on both counts as an ‘other’.
CONCLUSION

A book review of the Chief Rabbi's sermons and addresses which appeared in The Guardian in 1938, revealed a contemporary summation on the responses of Christians in Britain to the persecution of Jews on the continent. It stated forcefully that "Christians have shown an unedifying indifference to the sufferings of the Jews" and ordered that the Church might break with this pattern and act accordingly. In addition it drew attention to evidence of "racial animosity" in Britain with deep regret. Given this conclusion it is significant that most historians have assessed the record far more favourably, with two historians recalling the responses of British churches as representative of their "finest hour". Significantly, their characterization is subsequently qualified, and they note (as other historians have) that little was achieved in practical terms for refugees. Thus, while they find that British Christian rallied together and spoke as one on the issue of Jewish persecution and Jewish refugees, dissenting from "the national stream", their witness did not possess the power to effect change. This demonstrates the limits of religious institutions rather than the power they possess in public life and society. It is certainly acknowledged that religious bodies and institutions form only one segment of many parts to a society, so that when viewing the reactions of Christians and churches, the limits as well as the strength of religious constituencies to effect action or change must be considered. Indeed, the dominant cultural setting, a western liberal tradition shaped and influenced by Christianity, is as significant to the question of conditioning responses as to are the way in which illiberal forces impacted on Christian reactions to Jews and Jewish refugees. The question remains, however, as to whether the British churches response was as Davies and Nefsky have suggested: clear united, and unambiguous; a record that demonstrated the sympathy of Christians with Jews and one that called for their aid. It is the findings of this thesis that British Christians did not speak with one voice, nor did they act as a single constituency for the aid of Jewish refugees. There were many and varied responses by Christians in Britain to the plight of Jewish

1 The Guardian, 22 April 1938, p. 258.
refugees from Nazism between the years 1933 to 1939. These approaches ran the gamut from outrage, compassion, caution, minimizing, rejection and even repudiation. Responses were by no means set, and were apt to change with time and circumstances. Within the various Christians groups at various times, however, there were also differences in stress and substance so that no one monolithic reaction could be discerned. Instead, several strands could be elicited from each group which at varying points overlapped with each other, and at times diverged from one another. What emerges more equivocally, is that Christians, with the exception of Christadelphians, did not make Jews the recipients of fundraising nor rescue policies until 1938, and thereafter only as part of a specific programme known as the Kindertransporte.

Prior to 1938, high ranking Anglican clergy and other church leaders, on an individual basis, joined in public protests and spoke out passionately on the general plight of refugees. For the most part, however, the leaders of the various denominations wanted to maintain friendly relations with Germany and prevent war in Europe at a time of growing political tensions. As a result, outspoken criticism against the anti-Jewish specificity of Nazi persecution was muted, except at certain key times, and was continually combined with overtures of friendliness. References to the part played by the Allies in bringing about the collapse of democracy in Germany through the imposition of the Versailles Treaty were continually made in this regard.

Christian concentration on war was understandable. The possibility and even probability of another war haunted many Christians, and particularly Christian leaders. In 1933, only fifteen years had elapsed since the end of the “Great War” and the generations who had lived through and survived those years were only just entering middle or old age. It has been argued by a number of authors that the legacy of the Established Church’s role in ‘the war to end all wars’ had left a sense of betrayal amongst many of the general populace. When it appeared that another war might be looming, a significant Christian (as well as non-sectarian) peace lobby emerged, led by those who had experienced the war themselves as army chaplains or

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2 Davies, Alan and Marilyn F. Nefsky, How silent were the Churches? Canadian Protestantism and the Jewish Plight during the Nazi Era. (Waterloo, Ontario, Canada: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1997) 130.
who had lived through the war at home, all of whom were eager not to repeat their earlier mistakes.

Even so, British Christians were willing to criticise forcibly Nazi pressure on the German Churches to adopt aspects of Nazi ideology and quash their dissident voices. They were more circumspect, however, on what the finer points of doctrine meant for ‘racialized’ Christians, also a part of the Universal Church. The majority of Christian leaders empathised more with those engaged in the unfolding German Church Struggle rather than with the larger number of Germans who already ‘lost the struggle’ to retain political and civil rights and this included Christians who fell foul of the Nazi ‘racial’ laws.

Those clergy and laity who championed the cause of refugees, Jewish and non-Jewish, as an example of Christian aid to a neighbour in need, found it difficult to engage the sympathies of their respective colleagues and co-religionists at either denominational or collective levels. Furthermore, as the various denominational leaders failed to develop an unambiguous theological stance on this issue, no refugee policy emerged and thus no corresponding organisational machinery was created to support relief and rescue. Whilst it became increasingly clear from September 1935 that Nazi ‘racial’ policies made professing Christians (many of whom had Jewish ancestry) as much a target for persecution as German-Jews, action for even these refugees remained limited.

General lay voices were quick to join in public protests organized by their clergy and civic leaders throughout the country. They willingly asserted that friendship with Germany could not be maintained at the loss of common humanity. Lacking strong, direct and sustained leadership, however, this groundswell quickly dissipated and was slow to return and rebuild. Yet an untapped resource amongst the general public was later evidenced by the creation of local committees accompanying the Kindertransporte. Similarly, many denominational newspapers, another thermometer of lay opinion, were generally critical of Nazi antisemitism and sustained this view over longer periods. Equally, these papers were generally preoccupied by the German Church Struggle for much of the period.

The reasons for the slow growth in Christian voluntary refugee aid was predicated on several assumptions. The first was determined by a common view held amongst Anglicans and Free Churchmen in Britain about British Jews and Jews more
generally: namely that the refugee crisis was a Jewish problem and the Jewish community in Britain (and worldwide) were financially and organizationally able to provide for their German-speaking brethren. The second concerned internal Christian assumptions about Christians in Britain; that Christians were more likely to respond to calls for aid to Christian as opposed to Jewish refugees and that Christians had a special duty to aid Christians refugees. It also the case that some of these assumptions were contested within Christian circles and that Christian attitudes were neither univocal nor uniform.

The issue of ‘non-Aryan’ Christian refugees illuminates assumptions made about ‘Christian’ duty, on the one hand, and likely Christian responses to refugees made by Christian leaders on the other. As previously noted, the most prevalent view held that the issue was primarily a “Jewish problem”, one to be solved by Jews, rather than a common humanitarian concern to be addressed practically by both Christian and Jew alike. Another was that Christians would prefer to give to other Christians. Confusingly, ‘non-Aryan’ Christians were seen as both ‘Christian’ and ‘Jewish’ by different sections, and not necessarily seen as ‘Christian’ in the ‘real Christian-Christian sense’ by much of the Church and wider public. Thus a multiple of responses resulted from these viewpoints. The first was that Christians saw Jews as in need of aid rather than Christians, so were less likely to give to Christian refugees because of the lack of clarity that Christians suffered under racial and political legislation too. The second is that they saw this grouping as ‘Jewish’ and believed that it was not their concern. The third, that although this grouping was Christian, they were still ‘racially’ Jewish, oppressed because of their ‘Jewishness’, rather than their Christianity, and hence they were a ‘type’ of Jew and again the problem of Jewry. When it was realized that the complexity of explaining the intricacies of Nazi racial divisions was too confusing and ultimately unproductive, Christian refugee activists downplayed the needs of Jews and Jewish refugees in order to highlight the needs of ‘non-Aryan’ Christians. In this way they created a hierarchy of suffering, which favoured Christian over Jewish refugees.

The creation of the Christian Council for Refugees from Germany and Central Europe in October 1938 sought to change this situation, but limited its remit to ‘non-Aryan’ Christian refugees rather than refugee per se. The reasons for excluding Jews from its remit was predicated on the assumption that the resources of the Jewish
community were sufficient to cope with Jewish refugees and that Christians would want to more interested in aiding their co-religionists. There was also the recognition by the Council’s founders that interest in any group of refugees (including Christian refugees) remained the province of a limited number of Christian clergy and laity.

Refugee bodies specifically organized by Christian groups to help Christian or other groups of refugees including Jews, did eventually emerge, but were generally poorly organized and severely under funded. The exception to this rule was the work of Quakers who initiated relief work under complex policy guidelines from 1933. Friends organizational structure both in Britain and abroad helped towards its success. Quakers benefited from a highly organised, strong centralized ‘government’ at the heart of their movement. Their rescue and relief committees derived backing from their central organisation. Quaker experience in fund raising and the fact that their refugee/relief committee was supported at all levels of their organisation, from the executive, the central administration, to the leadership and its members lent to their success.

It is important though, to separate out the mythology of Quaker action from the historical record. Friends are remembered as the pre-eminent group that helped Jewish refugees escape Nazism. This is only partially the case. Quakers had a complex and changing policy which focused on so called Christian ‘non-Aryans’ and differed little from later Christian groups who also concentrated on this group of Christian refugees. Friends also aided Christian partners (in complementary conjunction with Jewish refugee bodies) within mixed Christian-Jewish relationships or marriages, and children of such relationships, as well as others who were unable to find aid from other organisations. Thus, Quakers did not aid Jewish refugees as a priority, but had a policy that enabled their inclusion under specific conditions, unlike their Christian counterparts in Methodist and Anglican relief organizations. ‘Jewishness’, seen as particularism by Quakers as much as by other Christian groups, clashed with the concept of Quaker universalism, and came to a head over the children educated in Friends schools in Britain and the continent. Conversionary activity was as prevalent here as it was in other Christian settings, no less powerful because of its silence and bible education through appeals to Quaker history. As Davies and Nefsky so acutely noted, ‘silence’ is a subtle thing and the power of
Quakers was in their silence.3

As far as other Christian refugee bodies, committees and ad hoc groupings were concerned, aid work began much later in 1937 and 1938, and in the case of the Anglican and Methodist aid initiatives was targeted wholly at Christian refugees. As discussed throughout this thesis, however, this assistance was variously understood as aid for Jewish or Christian refugees depending on perspective and ‘racial’ attitudes.

The issue of Jewish refugees generally failed to grasp the attention of the Unitarian movement. Unitarians and Free Christians did not plan to rescue Jewish refugees abroad as part of a policy initiative, but did give occasional aid on an ad hoc basis. Refugee work grew out of relief work that was initially aimed at Czech Unitarians and other Czech Christians. In Britain Unitarian individuals contributed to the refugee cause through the network of Local Committees as well as acting as guarantors for a small number of Jewish children. Cases of conversionist activity existed as did cases where the retention of a Jewish identity was respected.

Methodist responses to Jewish refugees was limited to the work of a committed few who were unable, despite their best efforts, to bring both the movement and the higher reaches of their Church behind them, except perhaps retrospectively towards the end of 1939. Methodists interest were gripped by a debate on a response to war which divided the newly reunited Church into opposing sides. When the issue of refugees emerged as an interest for Methodists, practical action was not directed at Jewish refugees, though it was portrayed as such, on occasion. Methodists devised schemes for refugees who were “partly-Jewish” by Nazi racial criteria but were Christian by confession. Even this tardy approval by the leaders of the Methodist Church did not inspire a detectable public upsurge in Methodist action. The reaction of Methodist ministers on a local level dealing with home grown antisemitism was more successful, particularly at specific junctures such as in the aftermath of the Battle of Cable Street in 1936. In fairness to ‘grass-roots’ Methodism, it is hard to assess the actions of individual Methodist chapels, their ministers and laity, as so little of this action was reported. Methodist reaction was more accurately speaking a loose association of individuals who responded to the efforts of a few men, who dedicated themselves to the general cause of Jewish refugees and the specific cause of ‘non-Aryan’ refugees. It is significant that these

3 Davies and Nefsky, How silent. . . ?, p. 123.
refugee activists held leading positions in the refugee aid network outside of their movement, finding greater expression to develop and enact policy for refugees beyond their denomination’s boundaries.

Anglican reactions were extremely varied and ran the gamut of several positions exemplified by various bishops and the Primate. Archbishop Lang’s approach was cautious and inconsistent. He was typical of those in the Church who did not identify the Jewish plight as a specific denominational interest but was willing to speak out on occasion in the company of others. Conversely, Bishop Bell identified the need for a practical and church-wide response to the refugee issue, selecting the non-Aryan Christians as the Church’s contribution to the wider problem, and as an expression of the Church’s mission in action. His consistent use of Nazi terminology in the case the ‘non-Aryan’ Christians continued Nazi racial distinctions in contradiction to his stated belief that the Universal Church could not be predicated on racial distinctions. At times, his unthinking adoption brought criticism from other churchmen, most notably the bishop of Durham. Nevertheless, Bell emerges as an early supporter of refugees in general and Christian refugees in particular. Indeed, he emerges as an unfailing and untiring champion for the ‘non-Aryan’ Christian. The reactions of Bishop Henson represent a more isolated response. He was an outspoken and uncompromising critic of Nazi antisemitism and racialism and was willing to denounce it at every turn. Conversely, Bishop Headlam, emerges as a defender of Nazi Germany. His public comments gave aspects of Nazism and particularly its antisemitism an acceptable face. Determined to dismiss the worst aspects of the regime and to downplay Jewish sufferings, he was at best oblivious to the Jewish situation, and at worst, hostile to it. Moreover, the weak reaction of Church colleagues and the Primate himself to Headlam demonstrates a failure of nerve to confront uncomfortable and antisemitic elements on the ‘home front’.

The Christadelphian fellowship prove the exception to all the groups of this study despite an ultra-congregational structure they effectively developed a corporate (community-wide) response for Jews. Their breadth of response can be compared with the movement wide reaction of the Friends. Despite organisational differences and a markedly less public profile, Christadelphians engaged as Quakers did to aid refugees throughout their polity at both grassroots and at ‘leadership’ levels. The most significant difference between these two groups was one of policy direction:
Christadelphians sought to aid solely Jewish refugees, whereas Quakers operated over a wider remit, developing a much more complex and fluid policy. Reaction within the fellowship was neither singular nor uniform when it came to practical care and contrasting policies developed in hostel care, and proselytizing activity. On fundraising, however, commitment was uniquely dedicated to Jewish refugees, either directly through donations to Jewish refugee organisations or via non-sectarian refugee committees where monies were specifically earmarked for Jewish refugees.

Throughout this thesis, a leitmotif has been the influences of historical Christian attitudes to Jews in conjunction with the construction of the Jew as ‘other’ in both Christian and liberal discourse. Historical Christian attitudes to Jews and the liberal construction of Jew as ‘other’, acted as an inhibitor to empathy and practical action. Jews were viewed as ‘future’ Christians, awaiting conversion. Liberal society also viewed Jews in similar terms, an anachronistic group, retaining their ‘particularism’, failing to fulfill the ‘emancipation contract’. In this way, antisemitism was viewed by some Christians as induced by Jews themselves, through their actions or behaviour, hence Jews were partly responsible for their own persecution. Under this rubric, the integration of German speaking Jewish refugees into British society required the removal of ‘Jewishness’ undermining the notion that a liberal society can tolerate ‘difference’. For the most part, except for a few notable Christian individuals, Christians did not identify Jews as a ‘neighbour’, so they did not act practically as ‘good Samaritans’. This is not to say Christians were unmoved by the situation as the Kindertransporte demonstrates, but the inability to relate to Jews as Jews and to see beyond historical Christian and liberal constructions of Jews to identify Jews as ‘ordinary people’, meant that they were unable to see Jews as deserving of practical aid and positive reception.

In summary, Christian responses in Britain to Jewish and non-Jewish refugees before 1939 remained the work of individuals, clerical and lay, who tried hard to bring the weight of their respective denominational machinery into action, but without much success. The limitations of the wider Christian response to the refuge crisis are demonstrated by the constraints under which refugee activists worked. Dedication by individuals was not enough to provide a solution to such a complex problem. Rather, effective Church leadership was necessary to engender denominational support for all refugees and for Jews as Jews.
GLOSSARY

Anschluß (lit. connection). The unification of Austria with Germany on 12 March 1938 ending independent Austrian political sovereignty.

Arierparagraph (Aryan Paragraph/Clause). Law promulgated on 7 April 1933 to exclude Jews as ‘non-Aryans’ from civil service positions and cultural associations. Some parts of the Protestant church accepted this law and excluded pastors from their churches. The Confessing Church opposed this clause.

Bekennende Kirche (Confessing Church). A group of German Protestants led by Martin Niemöller who opposed the nazification of the German Evangelical Church as attempted by Hitler’s German Faith Movement (Deutsche Glaubensbewegung). The Bekennende Kirche refused to adopt the Aryan clause.

Deutsche Christen (lit. “German-Christians”). A neo-pagan church association which sought to equalize the “blood and soil” doctrines of Nazi ideology with tenants of Christian belief. “German-Christians” accepted and supported the application of the Aryan paragraph.

Deutsche Glaubensbewegung (German Faith Movement). A religious movement which incorporated Hitler’s racial theory into Church teachings. The Aryan paragraph was implemented within the Movements’ ministries, so that bishops and pastors who could not prove their ‘Aryan’ ancestry were expelled.

Kinderverschiffungen (lit. child transports). A joint Jewish-Christian effort to bring over approximately 10,000 unaccompanied German speaking children from the Greater Reich from 1938 to 1939.

Kirchenkampf (lit. Church struggle). Battle by parts of the German evangelical Church to remain independent of government control on matters of doctrine and church polity.

Konfessionlos (lit. confessionless). One who is not associated with any particular religious community.

Kristallnacht (‘Night of Broken Glass’). Pogrom throughout the Reich over 9-10 November 1938. Resulted in the wholesale destruction of synagogues and murder of Jews.

Kultusgemeinde Jewish communal organization recognized by the authorities to take charge of emigration matters in Vienna, Austria.

Mischlinge (lit. ‘Hybrids’/Mixed ‘race’). Nazi term for ‘part-Jews’ as defined under the Nuremberg laws. Mischlinge of the first degree (‘half’ Jews) were defined as those who had two Jewish grandparents, that did not practice Judaism and were not married to Jews as of 15 September 1935. Mischlinge of the second degree (‘quarter-Jews’) were those who had one Jewish grandparent. Mischlinge of the
first degree were generally treated like 'full' Jews, whereas Mischlinge of the second degree were regarded as 'absorbable'.

*nicht Arier* (lit. 'non' Aryan). Nazi term to describe any person who were not of 'Aryan' blood. This term applied to Jews and Mischlinge.

*Pfarrennotbund* (lit. Pastor's Emergency League). Organization founded in January 1934 in reaction to an attempt to suppress freedom of expression from the pulpit. Many members of the League were later leaders of the Confessing Church.

*Reich*. Empire

*Reichsfluchtsteuer* (lit. Reich flight tax). Instituted in 1931 to prevent the exit of capital from Germany. Used by Nazi government as a measure to seize assets of emigrating Jews.

*Reichsvereinigung der Juden in Deutschland* (lit. Reich Association of Jews in Germany). A compulsory organisation of all 'Jews by race' (as defined under Nuremberg Laws of September 1935). It replaced the *Reichsvertretung* in February 1939 and was 'supervised' by the Gestapo.

*Reichsvertretung der Juden in Deutschland* (lit. Reich Representative Council of Jews in Germany). Independent organisation of German Jews headed by Rabbi Leo Baeck. Formed in 1933, it was dissolved in February 1939 to be replaced with the Nazi controlled *Reichsvereinigung*.

*Volksgemeinschaft* (lit. folk community). 'Aryan' German society.
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