The University of Southampton
University of Southampton Institutional Repository

New results on equilibria in strategic candidacy

New results on equilibria in strategic candidacy
New results on equilibria in strategic candidacy
We consider a voting setting where candidates have preferences about the outcome of the election and are free to join or leave the election. The corresponding candidacy game, where candidates choose strategically to participate or not, has been studied in very few papers, mainly by Dutta et al. [5,6], who showed that no non-dictatorial voting procedure satisfying unanimity is candidacy-strategyproof, or equivalently, is such that the joint action where all candidates enter the election is always a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. They also showed that for voting trees, there are candidacy games with no pure strategy equilibria. However, no results were known about other voting rules. Here we prove several such results. Some are positive (a pure strategy Nash equilibrium is guaranteed for Copeland and the uncovered set, whichever is the number of candidates, and for all Condorcet-consistent rules, for 4 candidates). Some are negative, namely for plurality and maximin
978-3-642-41391-9
13-25
Lang, Je ́rome
5df775f3-8691-4cc0-9393-f4f78484fedc
Maudet, Nicolas
529133f6-53b9-45f1-aef1-8b7ff2555674
Polukarov, Maria
bd2f0623-9e8a-465f-8b29-851387a64740
Lang, Je ́rome
5df775f3-8691-4cc0-9393-f4f78484fedc
Maudet, Nicolas
529133f6-53b9-45f1-aef1-8b7ff2555674
Polukarov, Maria
bd2f0623-9e8a-465f-8b29-851387a64740

Lang, Je ́rome, Maudet, Nicolas and Polukarov, Maria (2013) New results on equilibria in strategic candidacy. 6th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT). pp. 13-25 . (doi:10.1007/978-3-642-41392-6_2).

Record type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)

Abstract

We consider a voting setting where candidates have preferences about the outcome of the election and are free to join or leave the election. The corresponding candidacy game, where candidates choose strategically to participate or not, has been studied in very few papers, mainly by Dutta et al. [5,6], who showed that no non-dictatorial voting procedure satisfying unanimity is candidacy-strategyproof, or equivalently, is such that the joint action where all candidates enter the election is always a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. They also showed that for voting trees, there are candidacy games with no pure strategy equilibria. However, no results were known about other voting rules. Here we prove several such results. Some are positive (a pure strategy Nash equilibrium is guaranteed for Copeland and the uncovered set, whichever is the number of candidates, and for all Condorcet-consistent rules, for 4 candidates). Some are negative, namely for plurality and maximin

Text
stratcand-all-1208.pdf - Other
Download (264kB)

More information

e-pub ahead of print date: 2013
Venue - Dates: 6th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), 2013-01-01
Organisations: Agents, Interactions & Complexity

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 364853
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/364853
ISBN: 978-3-642-41391-9
PURE UUID: 75030e26-5b8f-4f2c-bd0e-da9979072fe7

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 19 May 2014 07:50
Last modified: 28 Oct 2019 20:58

Export record

Altmetrics

Contributors

Author: Je ́rome Lang
Author: Nicolas Maudet
Author: Maria Polukarov

University divisions

Download statistics

Downloads from ePrints over the past year. Other digital versions may also be available to download e.g. from the publisher's website.

View more statistics

Atom RSS 1.0 RSS 2.0

Contact ePrints Soton: eprints@soton.ac.uk

ePrints Soton supports OAI 2.0 with a base URL of http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/cgi/oai2

This repository has been built using EPrints software, developed at the University of Southampton, but available to everyone to use.

We use cookies to ensure that we give you the best experience on our website. If you continue without changing your settings, we will assume that you are happy to receive cookies on the University of Southampton website.

×