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Social Enterprise and the Environmental Mission: Orchards in the United Kingdom and Germany

by

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Abstract

This thesis explores how rural social enterprises (SEs) in England and Germany pursue their environmental objectives to conserve traditional orchards. Such valuable biospheres lose money, leading their owners to replace them with more profitable land uses. SEs in both countries strive to revive commercial incentives to maintain these cultural landscapes. Policy makers have invested high expectations in SE for tackling social exclusion and strengthening civic participation in the UK, and in relation to labour market reforms following German reunification. Academic interest in the social and commercial performance of SE is not matched by research into its environmental potentials.

In England semi-structured interviews with 33 people examined SEs linked to estates of the National Trust. In Germany 18 people were interviewed within six social enterprises with varied structures including associative, co-operative or unlimited/limited liability. In all cases orchard products are sold to generate money to fund orchard conservation.

Analysis was framed by the concepts of field theory and market co-ordination advocated by Jens Beckert. He argues that market actors must co-ordinate three ‘problems’ - value, competition and co-operation - to secure market stability. Observing reciprocal and dynamic relationships in the market ‘field’ between networks, institutions and cognition, reveals how markets are socially structured. The appropriation of Beckert’s theories aids SE study: firstly, the intervention of SEs clearly stimulates market dynamics; and secondly, SEs attempt to re-configure market stability in favour of improved environmental results.

Analysis revealed that the National Trust’s efforts to market juice increases public engagement, but fails clearly to link juice sales and orchard conservation. The German networked market is a low-risk, low-turnover model that incentivises farmers to maintain orchards without changing market structures, thereby creating an alliance between market actors. Lastly, German market-building SEs use complex, risky operations to compete with conventional firms. Both German models produce positive environmental outcomes.

Key challenges linked to using Beckert’s ideas are that market power is not sought by environmental SEs, which see profit as a means to an end, and that field theory is largely aspatial, and thus unable to fully explain local variations in the environmental performance of each model. Nevertheless, Beckert’s structure for observing market interventions offers potential for practitioners/policy makers concerned with multi-functional rural development.

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Author's Declaration

I, Michael Daniel Keech, declare that this thesis and the work presented in it are my own and have been generated by me as the result of my own original research.

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I confirm that:

1. This work was done wholly or mainly while in candidature for a research degree at this University;

2. Where any part of this thesis has previously been submitted for a degree or any other qualification at this University or any other institution, this has been clearly stated;

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Signed: 

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1. Introduction: The multiple goals of social enterprises

The central goal of this thesis is to study how social enterprise has been used as a strategy for achieving environmental objectives. Social enterprises are distinguished from conventional enterprises because they are 'businesses with primarily social objectives that reinvest their surplus in the community, rather than seeking to maximise profit for shareholders' (Zografos 2007). In other words, for social enterprises, business activity is a means to an end beyond profit (Peattie and Morley 2008 p.4). Because of this, social enterprises can be characterised by their attempts to meet, and balance, multiple goals. Management scholars refer to the outcome of this balancing act as 'blended value' (Emerson 2003; Hebb and Harji 2009, Hynes 2009).

Academic attention to social enterprise has been wide-ranging, emerging, for example, from business and management studies, sociology, geography and economics. High levels of political expectation are attached to social enterprise as a method to tackle urban inequalities and social exclusion, although with limited evidence of its effectiveness. However, it is clear from the literature that little attention has been paid to how social enterprise is brought to bear on pressing environmental concerns, such as natural resource depletion, sustainable development, or the protection of biodiversity. This seems surprising, given the mission-related objectives of the social enterprise concept.

This study, therefore, attempts to make an original contribution to the study of social enterprise in two main ways. Firstly, it explores how a range of social enterprises in England and Germany pursue their environmental mission of conserving ecologically rich traditional orchards, via interventions in rural markets. Secondly, the thesis applies sociological analysis concepts in order to illuminate the geographical contexts and environmental outcomes of the social enterprises in question.

This contribution to understanding environmentally-motivated social enterprises is framed by two connected research questions:

(i) *How do such rural social enterprises attempt to meet their multiple aims? and*
(ii) *Which factors influence their ability to do so?*

In the literature, analyses of social and economic activities far outweigh environmental factors, although there are a few exceptions, which consider, for example, furniture recycling, beekeeping, and community energy generation (Thompson and Doherty 2006,

Scott-Cato et al. 2007, Edwards et al. 2010). By choosing traditional orchards (which represent, simultaneously, the entrepreneurial mission and the place of production) a wider and distinctive examination of the environmental dimensions of selected social enterprises can be undertaken.

Orchards represent a predominantly rural land use where natural processes, social meanings and economic influences are combined with regionally different cultural identities and routines (Cloke and Jones 2001, Common Ground 2000). Biodiversity in orchards is evident in fruit variety - itself the result of human intervention in natural processes, and a long-practiced version of genetic modification - and the proliferation of wildlife. Wildlife habitats result from further co-productive practices, such as pruning, or seasonal grass cutting. English writers such as Oliver Rackham (2000) and Richard Mabey (1980) describe in detail the ancient and continuing partnership between nature and culture from which the landscape results. Applegate (1990) and Blackbourne and Retallack (2007) illustrate a reciprocal relationship between people and nature in the construction of place in Germany. Where orchards remain, they reinforce a familiar (or nostalgic) sense of place as cultural landscapes – *Kulturlandschaften* (Blümlein 2007). Social enterprise appears in this study as a new method for continuing the cultural relations between people and nature, specifically by reviving the economic blended value of orchards and their products. It is argued, furthermore, that the social dynamics which result from social enterprise interventions in local markets for apple juice and cider highlight the geographical contexts within which the enterprises operate, as well as their environmental effectiveness.

1.1 Structure of this study

Following this introductory section, which has outlined my research aims and questions, the paper now proceeds in seven further chapters.

The second chapter presents a literature review illustrating the cross-disciplinary nature of social enterprise and its broad division into business and social economy spheres. The case is made, however, that principal recent themes in the literature reveal, firstly, limited attention to environmental missions of social enterprises. Secondly, although a range of purpose-built social enterprise support structures exist in Britain and Germany, little use has been made of them by the environmental organisations. Therefore, alternative food network literature is introduced. From this, the environmental motivations and

accomplishments of entrepreneurial approaches to forging alternative food networks, values and marketable qualities are presented. This body of literature is substantial, and directly relevant to understanding how the marketing of food is employed as a technique for pursuing environmental change. The review concludes by noting that social enterprise seems to lack not just an environmental perspective of its own, but also that a unified theory of social enterprise remains elusive, due to the breadth of definitions associated with the practice, and because the body of scholarly interest in the subject can seem like a catalogue of case studies.

This difficulty is faced in Chapter 3, which discusses a number of potentially supportive theories from economic and rural geography. However, it is from economic sociology, particularly the concern for the social structures of markets, that analytical and conceptual help can be drawn, most especially from Jens Beckert's interpretation of field theory. With its origins in natural sciences, the theory has been appropriated by social scientists to explore the conflicts and inter-relationships of dynamic forces in a given field (or research arena). The contemporary German sociologist, Jens Beckert, uses the concept of fields to explain the reciprocal dynamism created by market actors who seek to co-ordinate their interests in relation to one another. Beckert's theoretical insights are conducive to studying the tensions which social enterprises experience in the balancing of their commercial, social and environmental goals, and offer ways to observe how social enterprise market interventions may serve practical purpose. In particular, Beckert's field framework offers geographers:

(i) A useable, pragmatic analytical framework for studying social enterprise interventions in rural food markets;
(ii) Potential transferability into practice, for example by illustrating advantages, weaknesses and consequences of market relationships, for which adjustments could be envisaged by policy makers and business networks to improve market stability;
(iii) A robust critique of the concept of rational action, helping to frame social enterprise contributions within a multi-functional European rural economy.

The fourth chapter outlines and rationalises the methodology of the thesis. It begins by explaining in greater detail why attempts to revitalise orchards offer a useful arena within which to study social enterprise. The chapter draws on political and administrative differences between Britain, where the Coalition government is championing local

enfranchisement, and federalist Germany, where this is a constitutional reality. Cultural and ecological perceptions attached to orchards are also explored in both countries, from the perspective of growers, conservation professionals and among consumers. Interviews with 51 individuals have revealed in-depth and subjective views on the current position of orchard enterprises, their history, motivations, structures, outputs and aims. The primary focus is on actively trading orchard social enterprises run, or led, in England by the National Trust, and in Germany by a small cohort of environmental non-government organisations (NGOs). The strengths and weaknesses of this approach are discussed. Deductive methods for data coding are introduced, having been influenced by a combination of two theoretical approaches, namely civic agriculture (Lyson 2004) and social enterprise dimensions (Borzaga and Defourny 2001). The former is a perspective devised by Thomas Lyson whose research in agriculture-dependent economies in the American Midwest concluded that farm size and diversity influence social structuration. Lyson also suggested that closer ties between local production and consumption generate social benefits. Secondly, cross-national comparative research on European social enterprises has been conducted by the EMES academic partnership (www.emes.net), resulting in a list of social and economic dimensions, which distinguish social enterprises from conventional business formats. These two approaches have been adapted and combined to develop a list of social enterprise dimensions, which have been used as data codes for interview transcripts.

Chapters 5, 6 and 7 each present data from interviews carried out in England, between October 2010 and January 2011; and in two rounds of interviews in Germany, carried out in July 2011 and in November/December 2011. Each chapter progressively introduces a different model of an environmental social enterprise. In this study these models are called the estate model, the networked market and the market-building model, respectively. Case study enterprises conforming to each model are discussed. Each has a different range of enterprise costs, structures, risks, marketing methods and effectiveness in achieving environmental outcomes. The chapters appear in specific sequence in order to facilitate, firstly, a gradual and cumulative application (and critique) of Beckert's concepts, and secondly, because each model appears as progressively more complex in the way it creates market interventions to pursue the environmental mission of conserving orchards.

For example, chapter 5 covers social enterprise activities operating from within five properties of the National Trust, based in south-west England. In each case a slightly different course is followed in protecting orchards and marketing juices and cider. A

common suite of institutional factors, including policy grants, and reliance on regularized volunteer labour distinguish British efforts from those in Germany.

Chapters 6 and 7 illustrate two different incarnations of a well-established German practice called *Aufpreis* (enhanced price) marketing. Here, farmers in southern provinces most associated with traditional orchards, find that social enterprises act as supply chain brokers to secure higher fruit supply returns. These enhanced prices are generally the result of (i) inducing customers to pay more for juice, and (ii) ensuring a considerable volume of sales. In the networked market model the social enterprise is a civil broker within an existing supply chain, and has a very limited trading turnover; in the market-building model the social enterprise acts like a conventional company to secure its own profits with which supply prices and product production are financed.

The concluding chapter, chapter 8, summarises the key contexts which influence the effectiveness of each social enterprise model in attaining its environmental aims. It evaluates the usefulness of Beckert's theories as a way of understanding the effects of social enterprises on rural markets, and the new contributions economic sociology brings to social enterprise scholarship. Finally, the chapter reflects on methodological limitations and makes suggestions for further research.

2. Literature Review

2.1 Introduction – The resurgence of social enterprise

In the introduction, social enterprises were presented as businesses that juggle multiple objectives, and use their commercial endeavours as a means to an end. Understanding social enterprise is complicated by attention from several scholarly disciplines, each with their own interests and priorities. A more detailed exploration of this body of work now follows, organised into three sub-sections, the first of which presents the wide range of understandings of social enterprise, in order to illustrate the diversity of meanings linked to the term.

Secondly, the role of social enterprise as a policy tool to solve problems of social isolation or joblessness is drawn from literature on the social economy. How these dynamics play out in England compared to Germany is reviewed. The subsection will show how scholars see social enterprises as emerging from (i) economic sector hybridity and (ii) structural failures within these sectors. This contradiction has led many business scholars and community development practitioners to regard social entrepreneurialism as a special gift to be wielded in the face of adversity by talented and determined individuals.

Thirdly, although the environmental aims and achievements of social enterprises are under-represented in the literature, many alternative food networks are highly entrepreneurial in attempting to create more sustainable food systems, and these have been extensively studied. Using insights from this body of work, therefore, social enterprise can be understood within an environmental perspective. Finally, the way in which such food networks approach pricing of foods paves the way for conceptual discussions about how social enterprises engage with market power and which actors benefit from their interventions.

Although the essential principles behind social enterprise are not new, it is striking that the bulk of published academic material on the subject has appeared in the last decade or so, and particularly between 2002 and 2005 (Steyart and Hjorth 2006, p.4), and also during

the period of the establishment of the Third Sector Research Centre[1], from 2009 to 2013. While scholarly and practice-based definitions of social enterprise are plentiful, the goal of defining a social enterprise has not been fully achieved. Some earlier commentators (Dees 1998) have questioned the desirability of devising a generalised definition, for fear of masking the rich individuality of each incarnation. Others, such as Etzioni (1973), suggest social enterprise emerges as a hybrid format, or Third Sector, from the failed attempts to solve social ills by the ever more similar state and market sectors. Billis (1993), however, suggests that social enterprises are one format of hybrid organisation to emerge from the intersections of all three economic sectors (see figure 2 below). He indicates a fundamental discord with which social enterprises grapple, namely that because many social enterprises provide social functions for disadvantaged people, there is a tension between the ability to stay solvent and the goal of creating social change. Billis, therefore, helpfully crystallises the idea that social enterprises need to manage potentially conflicting multiple goals, firstly because they emerge from hybrids between economic sectors, and secondly because they use commercial methods to meet non-commercial ends. Social enterprise, meanwhile, is an old idea enjoying a revival.

The first co-operative shop, established in 1844 by the Rochdale Pioneers, was a grocery store run by its customers. These were mill workers organising alternatives to the extortionate prices charged in the mill-owned shops. The current Co-operative Retail Association is a direct descendent of that Lancashire social enterprise. Prior to the establishment of the welfare state, social safety nets were provided via charity and philanthropy, which blended industrial profit with moral and religious conviction (Bradley 2007). Later, under the influence of Keynesian economics and a post-war European social order, welfare became, from 1948, the responsibility of the state, and was funded by redistributive taxation. During its last thirty years or so, the European welfare state has been reformed and substantially reduced, although social needs remain. Reform is partly due to the rising cost of caring for an ageing population living for longer; other factors such as altered working patterns have increased the breadth of demands made on the social budget. Globalisation has reduced the importance of national-scale industries and the interventionist, ‘external’ state (Storper and Salais 1997, p210).

[1] TSRC is a collaboration between Birmingham and Southampton Universities, with additional contributions from Middlesex University and funding from the Barrow Cabury Trust and the Cabinet Office for Civil Society. See www.tsrc.ac.uk

In response to such changes, national political ideology has significantly renewed and reconfigured structures for, and applications of, social enterprise. In Britain, these have related particularly to social inclusion under New Labour, and social cohesion ('The Big Society') under the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition (Mohan 2011). In Germany, social enterprise has been formally co-opted as a facet of building a reunited German state. Outside the state, but with clear and shared links to its social objectives, housing associations, development trusts and credit unions all represent revived, non-government incarnations of social enterprises, responding to enduring social challenges. In the private sector, with faintly Victorian echoes, new commercial services are being created by banks to manage social philanthropy, as a method for investment in social missions by rich individuals (Joy et al. 2011).

In the narratives that follow, social enterprise is positioned as morally superior to the profit-focused market; or, conversely, that the creativity and know-how of the private sector can improve the poor performance of the financially inefficient or structurally inhibited public sector. By scrutinising a representative range of understandings from the literature, it is possible to frame social enterprise as (i) a crowded and contested field of activities and ideologies trying to juggle objectives that may not easily co-exist; and (ii) as a vague and shifting concept invested by its champions and practitioners with unrealistically high expectations for achieving change.

2.2 Understandings of social enterprise

What is social enterprise? Far from being a unified theoretical or practical concept it is, as it were, something of a patchwork quilt, sewn together from business, social, political and even legal dimensions. The fundamental feature of social enterprise is that its social mission is achieved through the means of trading in goods or services. Such a simple concept masks a wide range of interpretations from recent academic interest. For some, despite its essential trading characteristics, social enterprise is a form of social function situated outside a business context altogether (Goerke 2003), or when executed by the Third Sector, it is outside the formal economy (CONCISE 2000, p12). On the other hand, others (Ridley-Duff 2007, Zafirovski 1999) argue, that businesses are social institutions *by their nature*, engendering fellowship, social interactions and non-material motivations. Private enterprises thus create social good, even when this is not a profitable activity,

because, for example, the pursuit of social good may reinforce employee morale. Firms, not least larger corporations, are social institutions (in the sense that people come together and interact within them) which facilitate the development of social and personal networks beyond the corporate aim.

Both these narratives – social enterprise as a special and separate part of the social sphere, and as a universal social characteristic of corporate operation – are undermined by the idea that social objectives within a company may be contrived: 'ethical' corporate activities and investments may be embraced as good promotional opportunities in a crowded, price-sensitive market-place patronised by sophisticated consumers – even if stated and actual influence on purchases differ, or in cases where ethical marketing messages are only loosely hinged to corporate practices (Carragan and Attalla 2001). On the contrary, Tencati and Zsolani (2008) assign the successful performance of private enterprises to the ability to perceive of 'multiple-bottom-line[s]' by collaborating and fitting into prevailing environmental and social contexts.

Austin et al. (2006) build on these overlaps in social-environmental and commercial concerns to identify commonalities between successful social and private enterprise. These include the ability to capture human talent and financial investments for ventures, harnessing knowledge of an industry and having a track record of successful handling. Yet private-social enterprise distinctions can equally be highlighted, including that private sector opportunities to provide high employee remuneration or stock incentives are rarely open to social enterprises. This is because one of the greatest challenges facing social enterprises is that they often operate in business areas in which purchasing power is low or limited (Birkhölzer et al. 2005, p. 201).

How can the long history of the concept be reconciled with the very recent proliferation of scholarship? And what marks social enterprise out from what are simply social outcomes of market activity? There are, it seems, few clear answers, not least because the essential defining characteristics of social enterprise - 'the primacy of social aims and that the primary activity involves trading goods and services' - (Peatty and Morley 2008, p.4) are 'hidden' in various business, non-profit or sociology literatures.

The description by Zofragos (2007) given in the introduction suggests that social enterprises tend to be *redistributive*, rather than financially accumulative, and this closely resembles the definition agreed by the British government a decade ago (DTI 2002). The role of government has been crucial in stimulating recent practice and scholarship on the subject. Steyaert and Hjorth's (2006, p.4) work on social entrepreneurship reflects that much recent scholarly interest has been concerned with policy-making to rebalance the roles of government, civil society and business, and with non-profit organisational development. In other words, social enterprise literature is concerned with social change via the social economy. Some further insights expand understandings of the concept in relation to the relationship with public policy and community development:

- 'Social enterprises stand out from the rest of the social economy as organisations that use trading activities to achieve social goals and financial self-sufficiency' (Shaw et al. 2001). Here social enterprise is regarded as a *funding strategy*.

- Social enterprises meet minority needs not fulfilled by government, which is concerned with the welfare of the majority. Such minorities are not served by the private sector either, if an adequate return cannot be realised from providing them (Arthur et al. 2003). In this respect social enterprise offers a *safety net* for marginalised people.

- Other understandings see equitable power balances and *local embeddedness* as key social enterprise attributes. For example 'we would suggest that … for an enterprise to be considered part of the social economy a significant degree of its value must be owned directly by its employees or by other members of the local community.' (Scott Cato et al. 2008); local operation, as a distinctive characteristic of social enterprise, is also claimed to promote lower emissions and reduced transport costs, as well as promoting the re-circulation money by creating markets (Co-operatives^{UK} et al. 2008).

- 'People who have seen social enterprise for themselves see the effect it can have on public services – how it can reshape services around the user, and find new solutions to old problems. People who have seen social enterprise realise how it challenges much of the private sector, putting ethics at the centre of a business,

> not just as an add-on… It sets a benchmark for what needs to be done, competing on the basis of ethical values.' Here Ed Miliband, writing in 2007 when he was Minister for the Third Sector[2], saw *ethics* as both the central distinction of social enterprise, and an ideal basis for competition. Both fair trade and some local food initiatives reflect this sense of moral value as a core competitive message (Debuisson-Quellier and Lamine 2008, see chapter 6).

Evidently, social enterprise means different, if vague but loosely-related things to different people. On the one hand it flows from the mainstream economy, as in the case of Grameen-Danone partnership for dairy products established in Bangladesh[3], where existing corporate structures were utilised for social enterprise development, because adequate infrastructure was lacking. On the other hand, social enterprise stands in opposition to what some regard as an unsustainable mainstream (Ehrlich and Lang 2011).

Social enterprise is quite unusual in that its 'sub-disciplines (e.g. fair-trade, co-operatives and mutuals) are significantly more mature and extensive than the overarching parent discipline' (Peattie and Morley 2008, p.4). The consequences of this for social scientists are that generalizable patterns are difficult to recognise (Scott et al. 2009) and social enterprise appears little in public administration journals (Teasdale 2010), despite its service delivery role. A way to try and capture and summarise the varied understandings of social enterprise is provided by Kim Alter (2007). She has united social enterprise activity within a spectrum of organisations (represented in figure 1 below), each of which hybridise philanthropic and commercial methods, accountability and motivations, to produce social outcomes. The extremes of the spectrum are populated, on the right, by private companies which may create social value but which are principally motivated by the generation of profit and its redistribution to *shareholders*; and on the left by non-profit organisations which are driven by their mission, as dictated by the mandate of their *stakeholders,* which may include some of the social beneficiaries of the enterprise (Low 2006).

[2] Social Enterprise Journal, March 2007, Volume 3, Issue 1. Social Enterprise London, London.
[3] http://www.grameen-info.org/dialogue/dialogue63/regularfl2.html)

Alter thus introduces two complementary notions of social enterprise, namely, while social enterprises may exist as non-profit *organisations* in their own right, social enterprise is also an *activity* undertaken by various organisations which hybridise profit and non-profit methods.

Figure 1: Alter's hybrid sprectrum

← **Hybrid Spectrum** →

Traditional Non-profit	Non-profit with income generating activities	Social enterprise	Socially responsible business	Corporation practicising social responsibility	Traditional for-profit

Mission motive	Profit-making motive
Stakeholder accountability	Shareholder accountability
Income reinvested in social programmes or operation costs	Profit re-distributed to shareholders

Alter's attention to hybridity rests on earlier foundations, as described. Reproduced below, in figure 2, is Billis's locus of social enterprise activity (Billis 1993). This places social enterprise activity within three organisational worlds, which have their own culture and rules for workplace organisation. Billis proposes that where they overlap, hybrid organisations, *including social enterprises*, can form to serve multiple interests (profit, public service, special interest etc.), a vision reflected by contemporary Third Sector views of social enterprise as achieving benefits including, but beyond, profit (Co-operatives[UK] et al. 2008).

Figure 2: The locus of social enterprise activity



Alter and Billis both reinforce the idea that social enterprise is not easy to define, whether in mission or method, nor is it always obvious when the term social enterprise is to be employed as a noun or a verb. Understanding any underlying *nature* of social enterprise is further complicated by national policy contexts, although common understandings emerge through trans-national research such that of EMES, John Hopkins University in the USA, where Salamon and Anheier's work (1997) was based, and the CONCISE[4] project on how social enterprises generate and use social capital. Table 1 below provides attributes drafted by EMES, drawn from predominantly European understandings.

[4] CONCISE: Contribution of Social Capital in the Social Economy to Local Economic Development in Western Europe. 1997-2000.

Table 1: Attributes of social enterprise

EMES criteria for the definition of SE (from Borzaga and Defourny 2001)
Economic and entrepreneurial dimensions 1. Continuous activity producing goods and/or selling services 2. High degree of autonomy 3. Significant level of economic risk (*is borne by the SE*) 4. A minimum amount of paid work (*ie. there are a minimum amount of paid employees*) Social dimensions 1. Explicit aim to benefit the community 2. An initiative launched by a group of citizens (*ie. collective endeavour by a geographical or interest community*) 3. Decision-making power not based on capital share 4. Participatory enterprise involving persons affected by the activity 5. Limited profit distribution

To summarise: understandings of social enterprise are many and sometimes contradictory. Despite Peattie and Morley's attempt to capture a succinct essence of the concept, several more attributes are reflected in the discussion above, including that social enterprise:

- Reinvests/redistributes profits to its operation or mission;
- Stabilises funding through earned income;
- Can be locally owned and embedded;
- Is ethically-driven and democratic;
- Seeks to create social change;
- Combines features from private, public and voluntary sectors;
- Balances multiple goals, of which profit is one.

This discussion of the understandings of social enterprise has exposed tensions which are *inherent* in generating the blended values that social enterprises seek to deliver. These tensions are likely to be exacerbated if environmental values are sought alongside financial and social ambitions. Two significant challenges thus emerge for social

enterprises in balancing their objectives. Firstly, evidence exists (revealed in the following section) to suggest that social enterprises, because of their multiple goals, need to be flexible about which of them they prioritise, and when, over others. Secondly, and as a consequence of the first challenge, priorities may vary among stakeholders. For example, policy objectives (such as innovation) set out in grant agreements, may not be as important to service users who appreciate consistency (Osborne et al. 2008, Chew and Lyon 2012). In short, it should not be assumed these tensions can be resolved by social enterprises without some difficulty.

As well as the difficulty of balancing multiple goals, the concept of economic sector hybridity (of governance forms, mission objectives, market positions) places social enterprise as a response to systemic failures in the market, state or voluntary sectors (Teasdale 2010, p7). Where these three spheres interact, as we have seen, social enterprises can emerge. Some social enterprises may even see their long-term viability as dependent on their hybrid nature, which allows them to 'draw from and balance market forces and non-market and non-monetary relations' (Phillips 2006). Yet social enterprises do not emerge *a priori* from these sectoral intersections. The following section, in comparing some of the different influences on social enterprise development in Germany and Britain, indicates the clear hand of government in encouraging the proliferation of social enterprises. In the comparison, social enterprise establishment is influenced by administrative and social policies (such as new managerialism (Nyssens (ed.) 2006) and social inclusion (Amin et al. 2002)) and by sociological theory (social capital (Puttnam 1995, 2000), the Third Way (Giddens 1998) communitarianism and mutualism (Etzioni (ed.) 1998). To complement this discussion, a brief exploration of social entrepreneurship as a form of individual heroism reflects the enormous excitement, prominent in the literature, which surrounds the individual entrepreneur as an effective and positive force for change. Evidence exists, on the contrary, to suggest that social enterprise is supported or impeded in the reaching of its goals by a constellation of contexts, networks and resources.

2.3 Social enterprise and social policy in the UK and Germany

Expectations of social enterprise run high, although with limited, isolated evidence of institutional change, or even 'adequate evidence from empirical research which could

verify, differentiate or falsify these expectations' (Birkhölzer 2005). The exact scale of the social enterprise sector, let alone its scope, is also unclear and exaggerated by survey data (Brown 2007, Lyon et al. 2010). While social enterprise is seen as a response to the combined failure of the private and public sectors to produce social welfare, provide employment or distribute wealth equitably (Bull 2008), social enterprise establishment may help relieve the symptoms (lack of local provision), rather than the causes (exclusion, absence of social capital) of need. In this respect, growth of social enterprise may simply signal worsening social circumstances. There has been a substantial shift in public funding for the voluntary sector from grant-aid to service contract (Pearce 2003) in recent years and public austerity is the 'new normal' (Correy 2013). In Britain, practical support for social enterprise development has been available, often freely, through groups such as Business Links, Co-operatives[UK] and the Plunkett Foundation. In Germany, where 6% of all employment is in the Third Sector, moves to regulate and professionalise it are advancing apace (Birkhölzer 2005). The following sections trace social enterprise development in both countries.

Britain

After 18 years in opposition, the Labour party under Tony Blair rejected left-right dichotomies in favour of the Third Way, inspired by Anthony Giddens. Labour embraced social mobility and '[began] from an assumption that adaptation to global economic forces is the only feasible policy option' (Amin et al. 2002 p.28). Influenced by social capital discourse (e.g. Robert Putnam 2000), social exclusion gained political credence as a localised barrier to civic participation in society. Where pockets of long-term unemployment or social deprivation remained, local charities and voluntary groups (where in the past unions and work-linked clubs may have existed) were enlisted to support individuals back into a participatory role in the economic and political life of their communities, through training, advocacy and preparation for new kinds of work. Amin and colleagues (*ibid.*) comprehensively trace the co-option of innovative and dynamic social and voluntary groups, at the local level, by the New Labour government, as gatekeepers to an economic method (ie. work) for addressing multi-faceted social deprivation. In the same vein, these mainly Third Sector advocates are expected to tackle exclusion through encouraging 'the community' to participate in local development initiatives. In reality this proved more difficult and, as Toner et al. (2008) suggest, social enterprise may be seen as 'part of a liberal paradigm which seeks to reduce the direct role of the state' (p. 10). Dart agrees, expressing concern that the institutionalisation of social enterprise is more

aligned to pro-market political and ideological values (Dart 2004, cited in Sonnino and Griggs-Trevarthen 2013). Furthermore, a problematic moral agenda emerges, as universal and non-spatial principles of social justice - ‘a society of commitments’ (Amin 2005) or ‘the politics of care’ (Morgan 2010) - give way to spatially-based expectations that local problems can be remedied through the mobilisation of local people, with only patchy evidence that these work (MacLeavy 2008, Teasdale 2009).

The goal of mixing entrepreneurialism and social objectives has also been encouraged within the public sector itself, where the introduction entrepreneurial and competitive operations were designed to transfer resource efficiency goals from the private sector. The New Labour government extended and adapted previous Conservative approaches to public managerialism. Direct state and council-run provision of social services including school meals, public transport and residential care was considered politically obsolete and inefficient and subjected to Compulsory Competitive Tendering under the Conservatives in the 1980s (Morgan and Sonnino 2009). Under CCT, private companies and non-profit organisations were invited to bid for council contracts at the most competitive market rates. In some areas, a fertile institutional seed-bed already existed, in the form of local co-operative development agencies (CDAs), especially in left-wing boroughs in the capital (Brown, undated) where many persist since their establishment in the 1970s and 80s. These agencies encouraged innovative applications of co-operative, employee-owned and social businesses. Social Enterprise London (SEL) was the first of the regional network of social enterprise development networks to emerge under New Labour, in 1998.

The appearance of the market in public services is an important milestone in social enterprise development. For many Third Sector organisations and social enterprises, the Third Way offered a more stable way, through the national compacts (Morison 2000), to secure funding for services they were used to providing, in areas that they knew well. By 2002, the British government had established the Social Enterprise Unit and the Department for Trade and Industry defined social enterprise as a business with primarily social objectives (cf. Peattie and Morley, above) that redistributes or reinvests its profits. The national compacts, while lacking detail, gave enormous symbolic support to the notion of partnership between the Third Sector and the state, opening expectations of regularised funding, improved working conditions and appropriate pay for innovative and dedicated professionals.

In 2005 the first social enterprise-specific business model, the Community Interest Company, was created. In 2006 the Social Enterprise Action Plan was launched and the Office for the Third Sector established (based within the Cabinet Office). Under New Labour, social enterprise moved from a fringe activity to a core policy tool to tackle deprivation. This reflects opinion that non-profit organisations specifically exist to address minority needs because, generally, public services serve the many, not the few, and the more varied the minority needs, the more varied should be the ways to provide for them, both through non- and for-profit structures (Leiter 2005, Arthur et al. 2003). Table 1 below summarises government-sponsored social enterprise/Third Sector support during the Blair/Brown years:

Table 2: Social enterprise policy and agency support under New Labour

Initiative	**Focus**
1998: Social Enterprise London	Innovation, jobs
1999: Policy Action Teams 3 and 9	Social exclusion, regeneration
2002: UnLtd (funding for the charity via Millennium Commission)	Social enterprise network, professional development
2003: Adventure Capital Fund	Community enterprise development
2004: Future Builders	Third sector development
2004-7: Regional SE networks (RISE, Social Enterprise West Midlands…)	Innovation, jobs
2005: CIC established	Governance regulation
2006: Social Enterprise Action Plan	Strategic support for social enterprise development
2006: Capacity Builders	Third sector development
2006: Office of the Third Sector	Third sector development
2009: Asset Transfer Unit	Transfer of public assets to community organisations.

Critiques of social enterprise as a policy tool, both under Labour and more recently under the Coalition, have suggested important social prerequisites are needed for social enterprise to flourish in any given place (Amin et al. 2002, Evans and Syrett 2007, Mohan 2011). For example, Amin and colleagues, following work in Glasgow, Middlesbrough, London and Bristol, suggest the following six:

(i) *Need* is recognized by

(ii) mobile *'movers and shakers'* – ie. social entrepreneurs who are

(iii) *well-linked externally* into

(iv) an environment characterized by *diversity and flourishing ethical, religious and community groups* who encourage

(v) *alternative solutions* ('political agonism') that are recognized, finally, by

(vi) a *responsive local authority and other supportive institutions.*

Mike Gordon's research (2008, in Buckingham et al. 2010) adds four further detailed factors which have supported social enterprise development in Yorkshire, and reveals the level of public funding and support required, namely:

(i) there needs to be a broader entrepreneurial culture in place

(ii) areas benefit from EU Objective 1 and 2 structural funds

(iii) local authorities have regeneration funds to support social enterprise (such as Single Regeneration budgets 4,5,6, Phoenix Development Fund, Neighbourhood Renewal Fund)

(iv) regions need to have proactive Regional Development Agencies (these were abolished in 2010)

The Coalition government has used the idea of the 'Big Society' to articulate policy objectives to stimulate the charitable sector (including through bureaucratic streamlining) and increase participation in volunteering (Cabinet Office 2011). Policies foresee the

localization of social provision and governance via the Third Sector as an alternative to direct state provision. In echoing some of the insights above, Mohan (2011) reveals, firstly, that many Third Sector organisations rely on state funding; secondly that the proportion of state funding received rises according to local levels of deprivation; and, thirdly, that deprivation is geographically uneven, implying that Big Society objectives may be easier to realize in the home counties than in areas of higher unemployment and poverty.

These assessments combine to suggest that although structures and continuing political interest to support social enterprise in Britain are unrivalled (Teasdale 2010), local efforts to tackle exclusion through enterprise are affected by an array of complex institutional and social contexts. In summary, the opportunities for developing social enterprise have been given a push by the political co-ordination of structures which encourage alternatives to state-led activities; a pull has been provided by external economic circumstances, the inspiration of examples from elsewhere, and by new ideas about tackling social need.

Germany

In Germany, the development of social enterprise has been on a different basis, neither through a co-ordinated policy in favour of social enterprise *per se*, nor its emergence as a true state alternative. The reasons for this, according to Karl Birkhölzer, one of a small group of German social enterprise specialists, is two-fold: firstly, that as an imported term from trans-national research, social enterprise meant little to the Germans; and secondly that enduring social problems were fully intended, after the establishment of the Federal Republic, to be solved by the distinctively German social market model (Defourney and Nyssens 2008). While the extent of social service provision is a matter of party-political judgement in Britain, it is much more a basic tenet of government in Germany.

For Germany, the prominent and long-standing position of the Third Sector should be underscored. The Third Sector, as understood by Billis (1993), Etzioni (1973), Spear (2007) and many others is comprised of the voluntary, charitable and domestic non-monetary part of the economy, appearing third in rank of importance behind the private and public sectors, due to its relative economic size. Social enterprise is cast, especially by the EMES Network (see Defourney and Nyssens 2008), as an activity happening within the Third Sector, and at the cross-roads between state, market and civil society, drawing a

hybrid of resources from all three. In other words, while social enterprise is not the same thing as the Third Sector, it is impossible in Germany to trace, in the way already done for Britain, the development of social enterprise as an institution, for historical reasons.

Throughout late 19th century Europe, the establishment of welfare and political movements associated with the consequences of rapid industrialisation, such as trade unions and social democratic parties, were accompanied by industrial philanthropy (Joll, 1976). Crucial contextual differences in Germany include the outlawing of the social democratic party, and government led predominantly by feudal landowners (Salamon and Anheier, 1997, p.130). Meanwhile, a plethora of Christian, self-help or youth associations sought to challenge the values of industrialisation in Germany. Without a legitimate outlet for social democratic values, many of the associations built on established traditions of militaristic or nationalistic fraternities. Where the rural feudal and the urban bourgeois realms overlapped, various forms of associative and state co-operation emerged, such as in educational provision and economic development (*ibid*., p.131). By the 1920s many of the social and charitable services provided by the associations were closely connected to and regulated by the state under the Governance model of *Deutscher Verein* (German Association), later adapted and legitimised within the Federal Republic (Birkhölzer et al. 2005 p.62). Thus, what we now consider to be the Third Sector was, in Germany, not at all rooted in antithetical or alternative positions to the state, but a legally framed collaboration with it in addressing the social challenges of the time (Salamon and Anheier, 1997, pp.131, 497). In fact, civil society does not operate independently from its political environment but is a co-operation between nation-state and its civil society (Zimmer 2007).

More recently, the Germans have been concerned with the way the Third Sector delivers services and is financed. Since the 1970s global economic slow-down and associated rises in unemployment have increased strains on the German welfare budget, based on high taxation in return for stable generosity in times of need. While governments of many western economies have had to reduce welfare expenditure, the distinctive attribute of German welfare is that the state is the first resort for compensation for loss of social security, not the last, as it is in the US or Britain (Jones 1993). Decentralisation and privatisation of public services, constitute continuing retrenchment strategies for state provision of welfare. They have been accompanied by unemployment in the state sector, as civil servants are laid off, and with job losses in the private sector linked to recessions in the early 1980s and 90s, and most recently since the banking crisis in 2008.

The social challenges arising from these economic developments, such as long-term unemployment, combine and multiply under the influence of demographic patterns including longer life-expectancy and changes in family structure. Thus pioneering social enterprises in Europe emerged to fill the gap left by the shrinking welfare state (Goerke 2003, Kerlin 2006). By the turn of the millennium, jobs created within the broadest definitions of the social economy were outstripping those created in the private sector in the EU (Hudson 2005 in Doherty et al. 2009, p7).

While this process of post-industrialisation has been experienced across the industrialised capitalist world, Germans have additionally experienced the need for a reform of the public sector specifically as a result of reunification. Through both contexts a significant emphasis of the role of social enterprises is concerned with supporting people into work. This focus bears the English title Work Integration Social Enterprise (WISE). In response to rates of unemployment reaching up to 20% in former GDR states, socially useful employment was created by the federal government for the long-term (1 year +) unemployed with very low wages as a welfare supplement, so-called one-Euro jobs (Deutsche Welle, 2004[5]). WISE organisations as well as trade unions and other welfare organisations, including those linked to churches, have provided structure and management of such programmes by themselves acting as employers of benefit recipients in work with environmental benefits or in social care settings, as well as brokering training and work placements (Nyssens 2006). Thus, the social need created by the restructuring of the labour system as a result of reunification firmly helped to institutionalise the modern Third Sector. Already, however, German empirical research has called into question whether the evidence of the effectiveness of Third Sector attempts at social integration and professional public service management match expectations (Stecker and Nährlich in Birkhölzer et al. 2005, p. 195).

Thus, in drawing together some cross-national historical developments from the social policy literature on social enterprise and the Third Sector, a number of points emerge, outlined in table 1 below:

[5] *Deutsche Welle* broadcasts internationally to present German and European perspectives on global issues to promote intercultural dialogue. http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,1416143,00.html

Table 3: Comparative understandings of social enterprise in Germany and Britain

Britain	Germany
High degree of academic interest and output	Limited academic expertise
High degree of on-going political interest, structural support and champions	No long-term development policies or legal frameworks
Conceived as a broad approach to trade in goods and services with a socially redistributive function	Limited social integration functions handed down from the state, and linked to reunification
Public, private and third sector all involved in social enterprise activity	Third sector activity
Wide expectation that social enterprise will achieve social change	Supplementary to state welfare, esp. where state/market failure exists
In theory, income generation can come exclusively from trade	Blended income streams – state, donations, grants, trade.

Clearly, national frameworks and institutions – cultural, legal, historical - all affect the way in which social enterprises operate. Institutions also affect social enterprise development internally, due to federal governance, and account for differing local regeneration resources and public sector enthusiasm, as we have seen through the experience of WISE in eastern Germany, and social enterprise development in the English regions. Salamon and Anheiser's (1998) cross-national comparison of the Third Sector between eight countries, including the two studied here, led to the conception of Social Origins Theory (SOT). SOT, as a framework for cross-national Third Sector comparison, accepts that a diversity of political, economic and social factors influence the way the Sector works and informs decision-making to organise its development.

In summary, this section has served to root British social enterprise development in successive waves of government policy since the early 1980s (new managerialism, social inclusion and latterly Big Society), but especially under New Labour where social enterprise formed a key priority for the Department of Trade and Industry. During that time,

the notion of social enterprise was left deliberately loose to enable the inclusion of many business forms, while the Conservative-Liberal Coalition's enthusiasm is markedly pro-cooperative and pro-volunteering. In other words, the meanings, objectives and narratives applied to social enterprise have shifted over time (Teasdale 2010). For Germany, origins of the Third Sector as a proxy-state have resulted in a much more limited role of social enterprise in that country, delivered mainly through the institution of *Vereine* - associations. In both countries, social enterprise development has been substantially pursued within the Third Sector because it is here that creative thinking, specialist knowledge, efficient operation and local embeddedness are perceived and valued by a reforming public sector.

In this sense, it is helpful to think of social enterprises as networks of knowledge and actors, in particular places. Such networks require local 'movers and shakers', as prescribed in England. In later chapters it will also become clear that motivators are needed to harness the support and actions of the membership of German associations. This coming together of creative know-how and personal drive is pursued in the literature within the person of the social entrepreneur, who is the subject of the following sub-section.

2.4 Social entrepreneurship and the hero

In relation to this study, there are three principal reasons for examining scholarship on social entrepreneurs. Firstly, attention is warranted because entrepreneurship comprises a notable proportion of the spectrum of social enterprise literature particularly concerned with organisational and management issues such as enterprise techniques and financial strategy (Kerlin 2006). Secondly, a review reveals a level of expectation for social change, to be achieved through personal drive and effort, which seems overwhelming. Arguments thus far have cast social enterprise as multi-objective, hybrid undertakings characterised by tensions and balances, and influenced by local, historical and institutional contexts. Thus, thirdly, the question arises as to what extent personal and heroic entrepreneurialism acts as a factor in balancing objectives within environmentally-motivated social enterprises.

The literature on social entrepreneurship has roots, as might be expected, in conventional entrepreneurship. It is also distinct from research on social enterprise, which, as a method for achieving a social mission, is particularly associated with mutual, co-operative or democratic governance and structural change (Grenier 2008, Turnbull 1994). Social entrepreneurialism, while also concerned with changing structures, emphasises the driven, personal nature of achieving social change and spreading knowledge of how enterprise can help achieve such change. Entrepreneurs themselves may be regarded as *socially* important because they create organisations (Low and Macmillan 1998, p 142), using evolutionary techniques (Aldrich 1999) to survive in changing and challenging circumstances.

Dees (1998) traces the theoretical development of entrepreneurship as means of improving productivity and yield, and overlays it on the centrality of the social mission, by which he feels social entrepreneurs are distinguished from conventional entrepreneurs. Skoll (see below) regards social enterprise techniques as more efficient than state-run services. Schumpeter's Theory of Economic Development (transl. 1934) introduced the notion of entrepreneurs as creative-destructive actors, always pursuing innovation and change. Dees (1998a) recognises these attributes in social entrepreneurs who are able to exploit opportunity without heeding of the limits presented by the availability of resources. He identifies personal traits in social entrepreneurs and combines them with social motivations to define social entrepreneurs as change agents who:

- adopt a mission to create social value;
- recognise and relentlessly pursue new opportunities to serve the mission;
- engage in a process of continuous innovation, adaptation, and learning;
- act boldly, without being limited by resources currently at hand;
- exhibit a heightened sense of accountability to the constituencies served and for the outcomes created.

Use of the term social entrepreneur appeared in the 1970s (Banks 1972), in the context of approaches to, and values of management. The suggestion was made that management techniques could be applied to address social problems as well as business challenges. Social entrepreneurship is thus generated by individuals who create or improve social benefits through commercial activity. For this, social entrepreneurs are presented in a

heroic light in contrast to others, notably state or Third Sector officials (e.g. by Mawson 2008). Jeff Skoll provides an illustration of this in his dramatic preface to Nicholl's book on social entrepreneurship (Nicholls, 2008):

> *'With real threats of environmental and economic collapse, terrible diseases, over-population, war, terrorism and menacing new forms of weaponry, we have much to overcome. Efforts by our governments and institutions have proven insufficient to reverse these destructive trends. Our best hope for the future of humanity lies in the power and effectiveness of socially motivated, highly empowered, individuals to fight for changes in the way we live.'*[6]

Skoll, echoing Etzioni, invests hope that social entrepreneurs can save humanity (no less), where governments and corporations have proved ineffectual. Similarly, Bill Drayton, the founder of Ashoka (www.ashoka.org) comments in the same volume:

> *'It is only the entrepreneurs who cannot stop until they have changed the whole society.'* (Drayton in Nicholls 2008, p.45) *'The new socially entrepreneurial/competitive citizen sector has matured to the point that it is the most hopeful force driving history.'* (*ibid*, p.54)

Social entrepreneurs are, in these descriptions, people with special attributes and commercial experiences who are able to create change by enacting flexible and innovative approaches to their mission. They stand as disrupters, although availing themselves of capitalist market mechanisms, which they may adapt to pervert the self-interested and profit-maximising goals of enterprise in favour of social ends. While capitalism may allow company behaviours very close to stakeholder approaches (outlined above by Austen and Alter) of social enterprise to flourish (Boyer 2005), it is the ability to combine degrees of innovation, mission and market orientation which exemplifies social entrepreneurs.

[6] Skoll World Forum - "Social Entrepreneurship: The 21st Century Revolution" - Delivered at Saïd Business School, Oxford University, by Jeff Skoll, 3rd March 2004.

Yet Peredo and McLean caution, for example, that 'there is no exact way of fixing the border below which the importance of social goals fails to qualify something as social entrepreneurship' (2005, p.64). In their critical review of the subject, social entrepreneurship is affirmed when people, *or groups*:

- Aim, exclusively or prominently, to create social value…
- …by recognizing and exploiting opportunities,
- being innovative,
- tolerating risk, and
- not accepting limits in available resources.

The definitional boundaries are as flexible for social entrepreneurship as they have been shown to be for enterprise. According to Hynes (2009), '*[T]he nebulous nature of the core offering of the social enterprise renders the traditional commercial business measures difficult to apply in a meaningful sense' (p.117).* Steinerowski et al. (2008) present a detailed comparison between commercial and social entrepreneurs. The comparison concludes that social entrepreneurs can be considered entrepreneurs, rather than just motivated individuals seeking social change, because they possess significant entrepreneurial characteristics. However, social and commercial entrepreneurs operate in different spheres and have different missions.

In the sections of this study which discuss different social enterprise cases (chapters 5-7), it will be shown that orchard social enterprises are sophisticated networks of actors, reflecting Young's critique (2008) that creative social entrepreneurship emerges from chemistry *between* people, and that entrepreneurial hero-worship sits uncomfortably with a consensus-based, participatory approach to identifying social problems and solutions (Nicholls and Cho 2008). A systematic deconstruction of the merits of individual over associative entrepreneurialism is presented by Scott Cato et al. (2008). Their analysis presents comparative performance (theoretical and actual) between mutual and private firms, with comparably positive results in the former. Energy generation, housing and recycling, for example, with their associated localised spatial requirements and benefits have provided some successful case studies of community ownership of social enterprises. One way or another, it seems that the debate on social entrepreneurs as heroes raises unreasonable expectations of the sector in addressing difficult problems.

This section has traced some of the debates around the importance of entrepreneurialism in social enterprise literatures. It is clear that individual drive and personal leadership ability exert a weight of expectation for change on social enterprises, and that this is grounded in classical entrepreneurial theory. Social entrepreneurship perhaps cannot be imagined without personal champions such as Muhammed Yunis, the founder of the Grameen Bank, just as conventional entrepreneurship is associated with particular businessmen and women. The personalities and competencies of actors are, therefore, likely to be influential factors on the ways in which social enterprise actors balance the attainment of their goals. However, personality is also one of several other framings, considered in the preceding section, and which included historical and institutional contexts, the ability to generate an income, the availability of local social capital and the role of the state. While individual dedication is a pre-requisite in tackling social challenges, it is unlikely to be successful in isolation. The need for a multi-dimensional pursuit of social enterprise goals is likely to be reinforced by the addition of environmental aims, by which the local initiatives featured in this study are distinguished.

Yet, so far, the environment has not featured in the literature, other than in terms of the socio-political or the economic environment, (Perrini and Vurro in Perrini 2006, pp. 43-44). To gain insights into efforts by social enterprises to integrate environmental objectives into their missions we must look beyond social enterprise literature and into research on alternative food networks.

2.5 Food: the missing environmental mission

Scholarship on social enterprise has emerged from a number of areas, most particularly as a sub-discipline of entrepreneurship and business studies, and as a growing body of work concerned with state collaboration and the Third Sector in the social economy (Evers and Laville 2004). My contention that, in addition to marrying social and financial considerations, environmental objectives can be met through social enterprise is not one that has been widely demonstrated in the literature so far. This seems surprising because social enterprise is a mission-focussed activity, and the environmental challenges which face humanity, and which are substantially of our own making, have starkly social

consequences (Adam 1994, pp. 93-94). In this section, a review of alternative food literature introduces, firstly, the oppositional origins of and civil, public and market motivations for an alternative to the mainstream food supply system; and secondly that the resultant formats of producing, distributing and trading food are indeed forms of environmental social enterprise, although they are not always given that name.

The limited scholarly attention to environmental social enterprise should come as no surprise, according to Vickers (2010), given that only a quarter of UK social enterprises see themselves as contributing to environmental aims and only 5% identify their main activity as environmental, usually linked to waste recovery/management. However, there has been substantial of social economy activity related to food production, which must be reviewed in some detail to understand the specific environmental challenges pertaining to food-related social enterprise. What such an examination reveals is that, like the rise of social enterprise, the growth of alternative food initiatives has been in response to multiple factors, including policy, the opportunities and challenges of a globalising economy, and a desire among some people to act collectively to try and improve social, economic and environmental outcomes of food production and consumption.

Food is inherently environmental because it requires land, soil and water, and its commercial production usually requires natural resources including mineral fertilisers and oil. Furthermore, the environmental mission pursued by the social enterprises in later chapters is the conservation of nature in habitats associated with food production, namely orchards. The proliferation of alternative food networks which seek to change power and resource flows thus contribute to an on-going environmental movement. Food production has been a driver in social reform and ideology for centuries, from the seventeenth-century Levellers to the 1960s communards (Pepper 1991). More recently, alternative food networks seem distinguished by their technical and entrepreneurial efforts to balance a variety of ends, of which environmental motivations are centrally positioned, but which are integrated with social, health and economic objectives. As such, alternative food literature adds a rich environmental dimension lacking in social enterprise scholarship.

Early pioneers of environmentally sustainable alternatives in food production include the founders of the Soil Association such as Balfour, Picton and Howard, who drew

connections between soil fertility, food quality and human health in the 1940s (for example Balfour 1943/2006). Two decades later Rachel Carson revealed the environmental costs of the so-called 'green revolution' in agriculture by linking pesticide applications with collapses in biodiversity (Carson 1963). Carson's vision of a denuded countryside, followed by the oil supply crises in the 1970s, generated further concern about the resource intensity of mechanisation and pesticide production, and challenged the wisdom of what are now called 'food miles' - the distance which food travels from farm to shop (e.g. Green 1978, Jones 2001).

Since then, a range of environmental, animal welfare and social justice concerns have continued to animate civil society, state regulation and consumer activism. For example, fears over the effects of pesticides on honeybees led, in April 2013, to a ban of neonicotinoids as a precautionary experiment. Improvements in EU animal welfare by state, consumer and producer groups have been prompted by ethical considerations, supply chain transparency and improved income for farmers (Veissier et al. 2008). Fair-trade, now a mainstream concept worth £194m in UK coffee sales alone (Fairtrade Foundation 2012) supports coffee, tea and cocoa producers by redistributing retail premia, while investing in social projects in producer communities dependent on export trade. Nearer to home, the working conditions of horticultural farm workers, commonly migrants, are now infamous (Lawrence 2011, Cross et al. 2009, Rogaly 2008), with evidence of inadequate accommodation, exploitative agency and transport fees, malnourishment and worse, in the case of the Morecambe Bay cockle pickers[7]. Meanwhile, stark rises in commodity prices between 2006 and 2008 resulted in food riots in more than 30 countries (Ambler-Edwards et al. 2009), and export restrictions in many others with production surpluses. The mainstream food industry, then, represents a plethora of perceived threats: to the environment, to human well-being and fairness, to food security and to animal and human health. In this guise, food becomes a rich arena of oppositional or market-based activism for many groups, which struggle to transform (with examples of success) the qualities, politics and profit-rationalities of food provisioning through new forms of knowledge, although these are embedded in market mechanisms (Goodman et al. 2011, pp.6-9).

[7] In 2004, 23 Chinese cockle pickers, working for a criminal gangmaster, died when they were overwhelmed by the incoming tide. See: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-lancashire-25166604 accessed 31st January 2014.

Many alternative food practices attempt to re-establish direct supply connections with producers, partly as a way of increasing farmer returns from retail sales, but also because the values of certain (small, local) farmers are seen as contributing to environmental sustainability (Pretty 2002, p.117). Community-led attempts to increase local control over food production and distribution have found a firm foothold (Kneafsey et al. 2008), not least in cities (Steel 2008 pp.320-4, Jarosz 2008), where environmental concerns complement health and lifestyle motives, and some romanticised views of agriculture among activists.

Public attitudes towards farmers have shifted, although subsidy remains a contentious issue. For example, consumers flexed their purchasing muscles in reaction to food hygiene scandals in the 1980s and 1990s – salmonella and BSE – which exposed some of the worst practices of an industrial agricultural system vastly subsidised by the Common Agricultural Policy (61% of EU budget in 1992[8]**)**. A decade later, in contrast, consumer sympathy for farmers, now on the losing side of low food retail prices, solidified during the foot and mouth catastrophe of 2001, which virtually closed down the countryside. In-between these food safety crises, the first farmers' market was started in 1997 in Bath with the aim of reconnecting farmers directly with their consumers thereby improving transparency and securing retail returns for farmers. By engaging directly with the farmer, customers were able to ask detailed questions about the circumstances of production less visible through pre-packed product labels in self-service supermarkets. For their part, farmers were able to promote their quality and territorial messages through face-to-face discussion with buyers. Other schemes followed, including social enterprises such as Community Supported Agriculture (see Vickers and Lyons 2013) and local food box schemes all of which shared the dual aims of improving direct connection between customer and producer – in the case of CSA often blurring the distinction between the two parties – and capturing an increased proportion of sales returns for the farm business by cutting out third parties. Enterprise growth patterns are often based on the sharing and replication of models rather than company expansions (Clark et al. 2008).

Forging an alternative outside the dominant retail formats, however, was not always the solution to food system problems which many had expected. Because of the dominance of mainstream operators in the industry, the 'quality turn' in food (DuPuis and Goodman

[8] Europa Press Releases: MEMO/07/350

2005) exemplified by increasingly discerning and educated consumers, has also been significantly facilitated by players including supermarkets. In the BSE years, for example, government steadfastly stuck to its scientific guns, denying any link between the frightening images of collapsing cows as a result of ingesting sheep derivatives in feed, with the emergence of Kreutzfeld-Jakob disease in humans. The unforgettable image of the agriculture minister urging his young daughter to eat a hamburger of British beef had the opposite to the desired effect: a UK consumer and EU import boycott followed. Supermarkets stood with their customers and cleared British beef from their shelves (Wales et al. 2006). This development reveals not just the changing relative influence over the food system enjoyed by the corporate sector compared to the scientific state, but also the ability of the market to respond to popular consumer opinion. This responsiveness is an important link between the corporate mainstream and the entrepreneurial alternative who have pioneered food concepts now in common currency and which share with supermarkets common principles and monitoring practices (Goodman et al. 2011 p.91), not least environmental standards, from which value is extracted.

The National Association of Farmers' Markets (NAFM) itself was formed as an alliance between the National Farmers' Union, the Soil Association, the Farm Retail Association and the Countryside Agency. This division, at the time of BSE, of state, agri-industry and consumer became, within NAFM, a publicly-funded alliance with the addition of the organic movement, whose claims to be the arbiters of healthy food were, for obvious reasons, gaining ground among consumers.

Nevertheless, many people continue to be motivated by food activism as a way of expressing their sense of citizenship, and connection with the environment (Henderson and Van Eyn 2007 pp. viii-ix, DuPuis and Gillon 2009, Connelly et al. 2011). Several such experiments have become common currency, and efforts by the Soil Association, Sustain and others, to promote direct sourcing local food projects, as well as to raise awareness of the environmental benefits of organic farming, reflect deep dissatisfaction (albeit among a limited number of people (e.g. Bellows et al. 2008)) with the trajectory of mainstream agriculture. Kneafsey at al. (2004) specifically regard *participation* in alternative food projects as a way of alleviating anxiety caused by knowledge or assumptions about the conventional system associated with loss of consumer connection to the means of food production, environmental degradation and engagement in unethical practices. Direct (re-) connection between groups of *organised consumers* and producers is seen as stimulating

not just more sustainable food consumption habits, but more sustainable food systems *per se* (Cox et al. 2008). Thus, the concepts of alterity, connection and opposition are peculiarly united within local food as a proxy for, and route towards, sustainability.

In the literature (see Goodman et al. 2011), concepts of Alternative Food Movements (AFMs) converge, echoing social enterprise divisions, around generalised North American and European approaches: the former is a radical movement standing in opposition to, and wresting control of food from, the complex, multi-actor, global conventional food system (Allen et al. 2003). In a European perspective, AFMs are regarded as marginal social and co-operative models of direct reconnection between producers and consumers, of which farmers' markets, community gardens and the valorisation of local foods are all expressions. However small-scale such schemes seem in terms of their potential for household food provision, they reflect important practical and conceptual developments in political economy, rural sociology and network and governance theories (Tregear 2011). Local food initiatives, despite their low policy impact as a mode of provisioning, are nevertheless regarded as environmentally and socially regenerative by government:

> '*Many community food projects exist, at least in part, for social reasons. Most seek to overcome isolation amongst people who are unemployed, ex-offenders, homeless, elderly etc. and to build confidence and community. It is clear that many local food projects and farmers' markets are making a significant contribution to community building/regeneration although they find it difficult to measure. City farms, community gardens and allotment projects have a particularly important role in urban areas.*' (DEFRA 2003 p.29)

At EU level, the CAP represents a dual system of agriculture with de-territorialised, competitive commodities, alongside regionally valorised quality foods. This has stimulated, firstly, a number of national and regional schemes in within member states which pin food value to landscape and environmental protection (e.g. Eat the View, Leader+ and MEKA). Secondly, regional valorisation illuminates the tensions between food products valued as much for their cultural and ecological identities as they are for their gastronomic qualities, and the difficulty of supporting producers through policy initiatives (Tregear et al 2007).

The policy picture of a globally competitive and, in parallel, a social and territorially embedded food system also encompasses traditional orchards. The Countryside Stewardship Scheme, a government agri-environment grant for non-protected areas was launched in 1991, and included payments to land managers for traditional orchard conservation. This underscored the importance of orchards as historic landscapes, especially for the archaeological and historic interest of their old trees and the underlying grassland. As it turned out, ecological importance of many funded orchards was limited (Carey et al. 2003) and it is here where the Anglo-German differences, shortly to follow, are striking.

In this section, the work of alternative food networks has been presented as an environmental movement engaged in revaluing foods with environmental credentials. This represents a political, spatial and entrepreneurial response to the limits of the state in dealing with the negative supply chain impacts generated in the corporate sector, affecting the sustainability of the food system. The alternative food sector itself remains marginal in terms of a proportion of the food industry, as well as highly heterogeneous, not least because it is concerned with a wide range of objectives, including the protection of the environment. It has, despite this, been highly influential as a social and consumer movement. Activists and informed shoppers have encouraged changes in corporate practices and have harnessed public funding to develop experimental supply chain, retail and financial infrastructures based on ideological and sometimes conflicting objectives, such as the need to balance higher farmer returns (environment) with national food security (economic) and accessible prices at the check-out (social) (Hinrichs 2000, Goodman and DuPuis 2005, Macmillan and Dowler 2012). In other words, because the market practices of alternative food projects involve trade-offs between goals, some of which are overtly environmental and place-specific, they offer useful insights into social enterprise.

In the following section, traditional orchards are finally introduced as an arena of environmental social enterprise practice. Such orchards are especially interesting because of the combination of environmental, human and economic dynamics they represent. They are, in other words, hybrid spaces of tension. One of the great challenges facing traditional orchards is the marginal economic value of their fruit. Other major conundrums facing those supporting their conservation include a lack of understanding of their ecological complexity - which hinges on continued economic exploitation – and their

heritage value both as historic landscapes and as gene banks of rare or unique fruit varieties. It is by reviving economic use that social enterprises in this study seek to retain and to replant orchards in the face of social, but especially economic challenges. To explore how enterprises pursue these aims, often in the light of competing land use pressures including rural building development, intensive agriculture and simple neglect, the following summary of literature will help to uncover the cultural meanings and geographical and ecological understandings of orchards. Different forms of orchard are presented, and their relative utilities are discussed. Traditional orchards are not well-represented in agricultural literature, but enjoy (or possibly suffer from) prominence in non-scientific publications because of their contribution to the beauty of landscapes.

2.6 Orchards: nature and the cultural landscape

Orchards constitute a distinctive arena within which to explore the ways that social enterprises negotiate environmental, social and financial aims, although national differences in the way they are viewed affect the juice and cider enterprises supporting their conservation. This is because orchards themselves represent a wide range of functions and meanings, including culture, agriculture, landscape, identity, leisure, biodiversity and heritage.

Academic interest in orchards as ecological and cultural spaces (rather than from the more prolifically researched agronomic perspective) is limited, yet rewarding. From New Zealand, for example, a framework for understanding the actions of kiwi orchard farmers by Lesley Hunt (2009) draws on Bordieu's notion of 'habitus', or the disposition to act. Unconscious and embedded practices among different types of farmers are revealed when drawing out subjective views on what good farming constitutes in relation to their orchards. Her qualitative work reveals a division between 'good' farmers who are oriented towards maximising their kiwi crop and keeping their orchard 'disciplined', and those 'reflexive' farmers who are organic and relish orcharding as a lifestyle challenge. Although Hunt is concerned with kiwi plantations, her narrative of practice, based around the development of social, cultural and financial capital immediately resonates here.

Closer to home, Collet and Mormont (2003) examine the strategies of apple and pear farmers in the Meuse, Belgium's main fruit-production area. Bulk production, export, highly technical pest control and industrial quality criteria mean that the 'story' of the apple or pear is lost. As a result, the modern consumer eats an anonymous fruit, firstly because transparent quality labelling messages introduce new entities, such as pesticides, into the abstracted understanding of the fruit, and secondly because the supply chain causes imbalances in time: between the seasonally-tied production cycle, instantaneous consumption, weekly wholesaling, or marketing strategies ranging over months. Farmers thus attempt direct communications with their consumers, not through alternative/direct sales, as outlined for farmers' markets above, but through visual communications with consumers at the point of sale, which industry quality labels cannot satisfy. It seems therefore that the symbolism of the fruit is an important connection between the producer and the consumer, despite the industrial processes under which the fruit comes to market. These two papers both imply that orchard fruit, even in intensive bush plantations – rows of densely spaced trees above a sprayed herbicide strip – have locked-in and distinctive qualities which producers strive and struggle to reveal.

An examination of the suitability of German *Streuobst* (traditional orchards) as a possible model for agro-forestry, is considered economically unsustainable by Herzog (1998) because of its low labour-productivity ratio. This is despite his claim that the majority of all German fruits harvested come from this land use. Traditional orchards are regarded as too dependent on the low-value European fruit market (for juice), to be worth expanding as a model. Seen in isolation, Herzog's labour-productivity analysis implies that orchards ought to be pulled out and replaced with something less labour-intensive. However, Herzog indicates the high socio-cultural and ecological value of *Streuobst*, insisting that agro-forestry provides environmental services which must be publicly evaluated, and that a high degree of public support for *Streuobst* and its products exists, partly due to the efforts of NGOs, and extensive data on the biodiversity value of the habitat. Herzog thus reveals the conundrum which face all the subject enterprises of this study – how to balance the financial, social and environmental strands of orchards.

Cloke and Jones (2001) present a study from Somerset, of an orchard indirectly featured in this thesis, as the location of a bottling plant used by the National Trust (see Chapter 5). The authors challenge the vision of orchards as static and romanticised fixtures of place, authenticity and localness, suggesting instead, with recourse to actor network theory, that

orchard landscapes are a co-development of non-human and dynamic human actants, and that landscapes have time. This suggestion seems less abstract in the light of National Trust plans to restore Tudor orchards, which would have taken a much more formal and manicured form than the extensive, semi-arboreal structures of traditional orchards. Orchards, as a reinforcement of 'dwelling', are too often associated with fixed perceptions of authenticity and rurality, especially in West Bradley, which, for the authors, becomes an intersection of rural idyll, ambivalence and, given the challenges of securing a land-based livelihood in rural Somerset, of social exclusion.

Outside the academy, the last two decades have seen a number of glossy books celebrating the apple, cider and orchards (for example: Morgan and Richards 1993, Crowden 1999, Foot 1999, Common Ground 2000, Russell 2007, Crowden 2008). These volumes may have been spurred on by the persistence and success of the tiny charity Common Ground[9], which campaigned for orchard conservation from 1988 until its closure in 2013; they also reflect the upsurge in interest in local food and drink. In them orchards are presented variously as: repositories of locally unique fruit, in contrast to the few varieties available in supermarkets; misty, ancient, regional (usually West Country) landscapes; and as arenas of popular political activism. Recent survey work by the People's Trust for Endangered Species[10] has vastly improved scientific ecological knowledge of English traditional orchards to reveal them as increasingly rare, and of high entomological value.

Traditional orchards are constituted of widely-spaced and tall-stemmed fruit trees which stand in grassland (Cordrey et al. 2008, Rösler 1996 p.11). The grass is an integral part of the orchard's productive potential, for example through grazing or hay production. The name for this type of orchard in German is *Streuobstwiese*. This word is built of three elements – *streu*, which means scatter, indicating the typically extensive, scattered position of the trees across the landscape, and also that the ripe fruit falls - is scattered - and harvested from the ground; *obst*, meaning fruit; and *wiese*, which means meadow. The construction of this word thus offers a concise definition of the space, which intrinsically includes grass. Grass may be cropped for hay, used as pasture, or contribute floral nectar for honeybees. Some traditional orchards in Kent, Herefordshire,

[9] Common Ground is an arts and environment charity which celebrates local distinctiveness and works to empower people to value their everyday places (from website). Common Ground has specifically campaigned to save orchards since 1988. www.commonground.org.uk
[10] www.ptes.org.uk

Worcestershire and the parts of the south west of England, contain parasitic mistletoe, which is proving a lucrative seasonal seller in some National Trust properties. In short, the traditional orchard may have multiple direct and indirect crops. In Germany, Markus Rösler (1996, pp.12-13) suggests additional characteristics which typify this biotope: substantial crowns and vigorous rootstocks; trees of mixed ages (including dead trees); scattered distribution across the landscape containing different types of and varieties between fruits; and negligible, if any, use of pesticides and mineral fertilisers.

Traditional orchards have been associated with biodiversity because they amalgamate a number of habitat types at once (JNCC 2008, Common Ground 1999), and because chemical pesticides and herbicides are not always necessary to enhance cropping, or are impractical to apply to tall trees. In fact an uneven harvest is a natural process and ought to be expected – some years' crops will be heavier than others (Rosleff Sörensen 2009). In Germany a correlation between orchard loss and the loss of characteristic farmland birds was noted in the 1970s (Ullrich 1975), while in Britain, orchards were more recently, in 2008, included in the national Biodiversity Action Plan. Here orchards contribute to 'official' character definitions of landscapes (Countryside Agency 2005 – e.g. 142 Somerset Levels and Moors; 143 Mid Somerset Hills). Bygone socio-cultural associations such as wassailing (Clifford and King 2006 p.430) have been reinvented, for example as Apple Day in England, with regional equivalents in Germany, such as the Saarland *Viezkönig/in*. Others, such as the part-payment of labourers with cider (Crowden 1999 p.15), perhaps thankfully, remain a relic.

One reason for choosing traditional orchards as an arena for research into social enterprise is that such orchards have, in recent decades, largely fallen out of *economic* use, due to changes in farming practice from mixed, to specialised production; and due to development pressures in rural areas (Cordrey et al. 2008). It costs more to husband orchards than they earn. Nevertheless, attempts to find ways to weave orchards back into the rural economy persist, and sometimes succeed, where networks of actors choose commercial methods to support social and environmental objectives. Furthermore, the interaction of market, state and Third Sector in efforts to protect orchards in particular, and to capture the broadest qualities of food in general, suggests that there is an opportunity to place food within an alternative economic space (Leyshon et al. 2003). In short, the wildlife value of orchards has emerged from, and depends on, the on-going combination of cultural and economic interventions.

Van Elsen (2000) divides European landscapes into natural and cultural incarnations. Natural landscapes are the products of ecological succession, culminating in forests as the final phase. European landscapes are, with few exceptions, not in this category, but are cultural landscapes of the first ecological phase of succession following human interventions (ie. forest clearance). It is suggested by biological historians that biodiversity increased under the cultural regime around 150 years ago (Frankel et al. 1995), compared to the natural phase of ecological succession. All things being equal, a revival of cultural intervention in the orchard landscape, and beyond the marketing semiotics of the Meuse, might be a way to reviving orchard biospheres. Yet German and British ecologists know about and, therefore, understand orchard habitats quite differently, to be discussed in Chapter 3.

In summary, traditional orchards represent multi-structured ecological spaces imbued with potent, if sometimes nostalgic, cultural meanings. This analysis of traditional orchards scholarship and popular literature suggests that such attributes may provide opportunities to valorize products, excite public interest and participation in orchard care and develop re-connections with orchard owners. Orchards' continued ecological value, however, relies on continuing economic use for the renewal of the habitat and it has been suggested that the combination of ecological expertise and enthusiasm for rarity and/or heritage interest can affect the entrepreneurial route towards conservation. Meanwhile orchard owners can expect low supply prices for their fruit from the conventional agricultural market channels.

To conclude, it is my suggestion, therefore, firstly, that studying and comparing the efforts of localised orchard social enterprises will reveal the tensions they face and try to manage; and secondly, that just as a range of pre-requisites (outlined in section 2.3 above) is needed if enterprise is to support social change, so will a range of comparable pre-conditions mark the ability of social enterprises to achieve environmental goals. In this respect the work of environmental social enterprises is further complicated only because the overt environmental mission is an additional factor against which social and commercial considerations are weighed. On the other hand, the economic context of husbanding traditional orchards is so disadvantageous, although orchards are economic spaces of rich biodiversity, that it remains an important scholarly and practical endeavor to explore, describe and explain the workings of social enterprises that try to juggle such apparently contradictory interests.

2.7 Summary

This review has sought to present social enterprise as a format of business which is defined by conflict between competing priorities. Tensions intrinsically associated with social enterprise are created by the co-existence of multiple goals: without a social mission, the restrictive contexts of stakeholder governance and a financially constrained demand-side mean that a more traditional business approach could prove more effective. Where the state is encumbered with administrative procedures, budget cuts and shifting policy objectives, the flexibility and local know-how of social entrepreneurs can be effective, as can the opportunities for risk management linked to the co-operative and mutual business structures favoured by alternative food networks.

The literature reflects the surprisingly scant integration of social enterprise with the pursuit of an environmental mission, although it becomes more obvious in the literature around alternative food, where creative food chain experiments with environmental ideologies have been transformed into mainstream consumer routines. Although marginal in scale, these constitute transformations from 'green niche' to socio-technical 'regime change' (Smith 2007) when they succeed in changing the institutional and commercial landscapes, of which rises in fair trade and organic food retail are examples. Recalling Billis (1993), alternative food has created a hybridised social economy segment of the food market through its simultaneous opposition to and alliance with the mainstream industry and the state, and by employing very similar commercial strategies (Ilbery and Maye 2005, Sonnino and Marsden 2006).

Essentially, however, social enterprises remain groups with little market power and scant financial resources, in relation to dominant market actors. Large firms are much more influential, for example, in negotiating food price stability (Fligstein 2001 cited in Benson and Kim 2008, Nevo 2001). Social enterprises can thus be understood as engaged in struggles to win market power in order to find leverage for their mission. This struggle comes into focus in chapter 3, where concepts of market co-ordination are introduced by Jens Beckert (Beckert 2010); and in chapters 5-7 which show how social enterprises mobilise 'soft', persuasive power, as well as 'hard', competitive power to try and enhance their own market positions, and especially the position of farmers (who have hitherto

represented the relative weakness of labour over capital (Fligstein 1996, p.660)) to achieve environmental improvements through exchange.

2.8 Towards a framework for understanding environmental social enterprise

The problem emerges, that social enterprise is both everything and nothing at once – an arm of the state, or a 'soft' outcome of corporatism, or a community food project format. Insights available from literature are frequently reliant on case studies, although this has not assisted understandings of how social enterprises can combine their multiple objectives to build a distinctive part of the economy, or how they affect markets to achieve their goals. This theoretical void is raised by Richard Swedberg:

'One of the difficulties with the notion of social entrepreneurship (which I shall use… to represent the general trend of analysing social change with the help of the economic theory of entrepreneurship) is that it is not connected to a general theory of entrepreneurship, but is usually used as a slogan or inspiring phrase. … The result is that the current literature on social entrepreneurship is richer on inspiring examples and anecdotes than it is on theoretical insights and analytical power.' (Swedberg in Steyaert and Hjorth 2006 p.21)

Which concepts, then, can strengthen social enterprise analysis, given its locally particular functions and multiple objectives? Earlier discussion of social policy drew out Social Origins Theory in exploring the factors that aid qualitative comparisons of phenomena which are influenced by national contexts. Inspiration might also be found within Marxian-influenced geographies - especially the notion of alternative economic space and the idea of plural and parallel economic realities, as expounded by Leyshon et al. (2003), Gibson-Graham (1996) and Pepper (1991) - which help legitimise alternative food projects as contributing to influential social movements and building political awareness of food security issues (Kirwan and Maye 2013).

Tom Lyson's sociological concept of *Civic Agriculture* is helpful as an analytical tool for geographical study of food production, because it suggests criteria for mapping the social

patterns related to certain place-bounded agricultural practices. Lyson and his colleagues' make two key claims from work in agricultural communities in the United States, which are of transferable interest to the study of the multiple outcomes of rural social enterprise. The first is that, within agriculturally dependent economies, the size of the dominant pattern of agricultural holdings directly influences social structuration of the community (Lyson et al. 2001). In other words, small and medium-scale agriculture results in a mixed social profile, including a middle class, which helps fuel an animated civil society. This is because the business of husbanding smaller and more mixed farms requires reciprocation in exchange of goods and services, as well creating opportunities for social exchange. The alternative, namely a small number of large-scale monoculture farms quite simply requires fewer people to run it, with the consequence that the local class system is polarised between (potentially absentee) landowner and a small cohort of highly specialised farm workers. Furthermore, because such farms produce standardised commodities for national and global food purveyors, overall agricultural sales matter more than individual farm incomes (Lyson et al. 2008, p166).

Lyson's second contribution is that by becoming active within local agricultural production, for example, through participation in shared-risk production activities such as Community Supported Agriculture, participating individuals multiply their local social connections and production-related interdependencies. Lyson suggests that Civic Agriculture constitutes a source of family income for the farmer and a contribution towards the vitality of communities (see also DeLind 2002), based partly on the way that interdependence between farmers and processors causes money to circulate within a rural community. This kind of calculation has been called the local multiplier effect. In mainstream economics, the fiscal multiplier effect measures how government stimulus generates private consumption (for example, see Ilzetzki et al. 2013). The local multiplier effect occurs when money spent in a place is re-spent there by the recipient. This form of spatial economics has been widely used as a tool by campaigners arguing for the benefits of a localised food system, following the publication of a guide to help community groups measure the multiplier in their areas (Sacks 2002). The arguments for local circulation are not the premise on which this thesis is built; some argue that a local food is a distraction from the real goal, which is a sustainable food system (Born and Purcell 2006, Sumberg 2009), or a pro-development food economy (Müller 2007). Lyson's ideas form a first systematic step in developing a data analysis method, to be outlined more fully in Chapter 4.

The theoretical contributions briefly outlined above are useful in helping to frame the nature of social enterprise in a food setting, especially by drawing out the particular socio-ecological values of food, which are internalised and masked in neo-classical economics. Even so, these theories do not fully capture or describe the relationships of the different tensions which are associated with social enterprise operation. For this, we turn, in the next chapter, economic sociology and specifically to field theory, which offers more potential to explore how the relationships and tensions between actors and institutional support marshal resources (Pinch and Sunley 2013). It is also very well suited to empirical analysis of comparative qualitative data, making an asset of the fluidity of social enterprise.

3. Conceptual framework

3.1 Introduction – potential contributions to knowledge and practice

In the following chapter, concepts from economic sociology are borrowed in order to structure a systematic analysis of the ways in which environmental social enterprises in rural areas juggle and prioritise their goals, within the framework of their operational choices and institutional contexts. The choice of economic sociology over the other useable theories discussed in chapter 2 is rooted in the discipline's emphasis on the link between the structures, contexts, relationships and decision-making processes inherent in markets. This offers doorways to new interpretations of the impacts of social enterprise, which themselves challenge the orthodoxy of economic self-interest.

The pursuit of individual self-interest within a 'free' market-place has long been upheld as the economic foundation through which to achieve market equilibrium (Beckert, 1997/2002, p.2), on the basis that if individuals behave as rational, self-interested buyers and sellers, the desirable allocation of economic goods can be achieved. Experiences since the financial crisis of 2008 reinforce all too well, how closely linked social and economic stability are. In the UK and beyond, stock market volatility, inflation, bank bail-outs and public spending cuts are all creating renewed hardship. There is renewed concern, for example, about European food poverty[11], and the rise of food social enterprise can be interpreted as addressing need created by market failures emerging from the recession (TSRC 2012[12], MacMillan and Dowler 2012).

Economic sociology offers critiques, both theoretically and empirically, of the concept of the rational-actor, and strives to explain why both rationality and self-interest are routinely abandoned by market actors and why social stability is an unlikely result of market activity alone. Durkheim, Weber, Parsons, Granovetter and Giddens are some of the famous sociologists who offer explanations about how economic change, ethical interests, social

[11] 'Household Food Security in the Global North: Challenges and Responsibilities'. One-day international conference held on 6th July 2012 at Warwick University.
[12] Professor Kevin Morgan speaking at the Third Sector Research Centre workshop on Food Social Enterprises, University of Southampton, 25th April 2012.

structures and market relationships, among other issues, lead people to act in ways which do not always follow the narrow path of Mills' *homo-oeconomicus* (for a review and further examples see Smelser and Swedberg 2005). It follows then that some ideas from economic sociology hold potential for empirical research of social enterprises which deliberately balance commercial and social or, in the case of my research, environmental goals. This is an important conceptual position within this study and complements the social economy theories set out in the earlier literature review and coming methodology chapters. While social economy literature (esp. Evers 2004, Defourney and Nyssens 2008) has informed data coding categories, a broader service offered by its authors is to cast the economy socially and geographically, and to reinforce the idea that private, public and voluntary sectors all have important, interdependent roles to play in achieving a resilient, plural economy (Ashby, Cox and McInroy 2009). Critiques were outlined in chapter 2 on the tensions between spatial social economy strategies and universalist, moral concerns for social need. Yet being able to solve the manifold contemporary environmental challenges will require the involvement of market, public and civil society players in what Morgan (2010) calls 'a politics of care'. The hybrid nature of economic activities between these three sectors shows their reciprocity, or interdependence. Economic sociology thus emphasises market and social stability through the interaction of both, which individual segments of the economy cannot achieve in isolation.

Because economic sociology allows the researcher to dwell empirically and pragmatically on the market relationships and structures within which social enterprises operate and seek influence, two forms of scholarly potential are created: firstly, by placing social enterprises in a relational context, it is possible to acknowledge but reframe discussions on, for example, the merits of enterprise scale, the exclusivity of local food or heroic individualism, as components of social, institutional or cognitive context. Secondly, field theory in particular, and associated concepts such as social skill, offer potential for conceptual transferability to help answer the research questions posed in this study. Advocates of field theory suggest that by observing reciprocal interactions within a market, certain resultant relations – social orders – can be discerned. The theoretical challenge of this thesis is to judge whether *environmental* orders (or outcomes) can be recognised from the interventions and reciprocal engagements of social enterprises within a local marketplace. Such a conceptual leap, if successful, could prove interesting to policy-makers and practitioners engaged with the development of the rural economy, or with measures to support biodiversity.

A task remains before a fuller engagement with field theory, namely the clarification, or conceptualisation, of the environmental mission of the social enterprises within this study. The literature review presented environmental discourses associated local food values, physical food miles, land use techniques or business governance structures. This range has the potential to mask the simplicity of the environmental social enterprise mission which is the subject of this study. For clarity, the environmental mission of the social enterprises studied is: the conservation of traditional orchard habitats for the sake of the biodiversity they contain. The meanings and ontologies attached to these orchards will be extensively explored in chapters 5-7.

3.2 Introducing field theory

Field theory is a set of concepts grounded in natural sciences, particularly physics which, until a century ago was dominated by classical mechanics in the Newtonian mould. Energy, as a motivating force, was principally understood as exerting either an attractive, pulling force (gravity), or directional, kinetic force resulting from impact. Advances in quantum physics, as purported most famously by Planck, Einstein and Heisenberg, introduced the relative effect of time on physical state, through calculations explaining the properties of sub-atomic particles. Field theory forms a main arm of physical understanding, endowing energy with invisible properties which exist separately in space from the source of generation. This notion was demonstrated by Faraday, who revealed the otherwise invisible physical existence and patterns of a magnetic force-field, using iron filings. The enormous significance of field theory to physics, was to relegate Newtonian mechanics from its earlier pre-eminent position, to a constituent branch of physical knowledge (Mey 1972, p.3). It also differentiated, through the notion of a field as a given arena of study, the constituent and whole parts of the field – in short: attention to the combination of overall context and internal connections within the field reveal its nature.

Harald Mey's comprehensive collation of social scientific applications of field theory draw on well-known examples from psychology, particularly in the work of Kurt Lewin (1951), who proposed that human behaviour is a function of both person and environment. For example, by diagrammatically plotting the role of personally experienced tension, Lewin shows how the boundary between the person and the environment can become more, or

less, pronounced. Put another way, when people are affected by their temporal environments they devise tactics for coping with this, for example when a guilty child hides itself for fear of retribution (ibid, pp.33, 39). Lewin's work challenged some of the tenets of Freudian analysis and its foundations in childhood experience. In terms of social enterprise, we can employ Lewin's thinking to discern that the actors in the social enterprise are subject to, and create, environmental conditions, such as, respectively, social inequality and market exchange, and from here it is a small step towards conventions theories which use personal relationships and the development of habitual practices as the building blocks of product qualities and market dealings (Storper and Salais 1997, Murdoch and Miele, 1999). Cloke and Jones' (2001) suggestion also resonates: that orchards are landscapes which have time, and the regeneration of orchards in the light of conventional agricultural economics might be one way in which the leaders of orchard social enterprises react to, in Lewin's (1951) terms environmental, or external pressure.

Field theory aids the understanding of the effects of conflict in a field (which is what Lewin calls 'life-space'). The field is internally dynamic and changes over time, because people behave differently at certain times of life and according to experience and external stimuli. Psychological study, based as it is on subjective and individual experiences, cannot always draw generalizable conclusions. To think about this in terms of social enterprise: the field of the social enterprise is populated by resources, relationships and actions, which change over time and are affected by the by macro-economic, policy and social environment.

3.3 Jens Beckert

In the journey from the conceptual abstraction of field theory in electro-magnetics towards a pragmatic analytical aid, Jens Beckert, the German sociologist and current Director of the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies in Cologne, plays a central role in this study. Beckert himself draws on the work of a distinguished cohort of economic sociologists in indicating the social nature of capitalist exchange. Advocates of such a view include, for example, Emile Durkheim (1893/1997), who was concerned with the social effects of nineteenth century industrialisation, while Max Weber identified protestant faith as a motivator in the accumulation of capital, and Talcott Parsons suggested that

norms and values – not simply the pursuit of self-interest – are needed to facilitate the integration of society and economy (1937/1967). Mark Granovetter (1985) is critical of the over-simplistic interpretation of market actors as rational, self-interested individuals, although he also warns against a solely sociological interpretation of trading because factors governing the methods, localised circumstances and nature of personal relations influence actors who are, nevertheless, trying to turn a profit. Instead, Granovetter (1985) insists that markets should be seen as social networks where relationships govern outcomes and where new institutional norms result from actions between people which eventually become taken for granted. Because of the small scale and hybrid construction of social enterprises, sociological perspectives on market activity offer more potential than purely economic ones in trying to understand how social enterprises negotiate the journeys towards their aims.

Economic geographers have also understood the importance of networks and agency in exchange. Michael Storper and Renee Salais, (1997) offer detailed models, which illustrate how producers build conventions of trade in a number of connected 'worlds of production' through which actors move, depending on their marketing messages, growth trajectories and values. These 'worlds' are constructed through shared understandings of the common good, transparency in action, relations with other firms (such as suppliers or competitors), labour regulations and the application of technology.

Beckert is interested in how social structures influence economic outcomes. He sees market activity as inherently fraught, in that market actors (producers, buyers, sellers, suppliers, regulators, researchers and innovators) are constantly confronted with problems (Beckert 2007). Specifically, these are three-fold: (i) how to form clear subjective values in the market (a normative challenge); (ii) how to realise a profit through competition, when competition relies on market disequilibrium, from which market actors wish to be shielded; and, finally, (iii) how to manage co-operation within the market when one cannot control issues of quality, reliability, or competence abrogated to a co-operation partner, thus requiring high levels of trust, confidence and both economic and social risk.

Beckert's point is, essentially, that there is no such thing as an ideally competitive market, and that markets are subject to ingrained and renewed political and social hierarchies

which reflect social (even religious) norms in their economic outcomes. This means, to put it another way, that market outcomes are dependent on relationships and social behaviours, institutional structures and rules, and understandings and interpretations of them. Thus, there is a *social* order within markets, which classical economics cannot explain simply through the 'natural propensity to truck, barter and exchange' (Smith, 1776/2007). Beckert posits that market actions are embedded in social and institutional contexts; and that studying the reciprocal relationships between networks of personal relations and other market structures is highly illuminating. He by no means rejects the importance of economic factors to society or the market, such as the balance of supply and demand, the pursuit of self-interest or the consolidation of corporate power. But, additionally, he identifies, like Bourdieu (see Beckert 2010, p. 613), social structures behind economic actions. Even though Beckert's writings do not, to my knowledge, focus on the social economy or social enterprise as such, his interest in how people, institutions and ideas affect the stability and social outcomes of market action, seems to offer new ways of studying social enterprise, especially, as social entrepreneurial scholarship is so often constrained in its insights by recourse to case study, structural typography and, sometimes, hyperbole. Surely, the words *social enterprise,* invite a sociological view of commercial dealings?

Beckert's point of departure from earlier sociological explorations of markets is that, previously, the factors influencing the social structure of markets have been regarded in isolation. Economic sociology has variously construed markets as networks (cf. Granovetter), as institutions (Fligstein 2001) and as cultures (Abolafia 1998). Beckert refines and combines social forces to explain economic outcomes of markets governed by interactions of cognition (ideas), networks and institutions. It is the application of field theory which allows these three forces to be juxtaposed within an irreducible framework, or field, for understanding market dynamics (Beckert 2010), as illustrated in figure 3, below. The understanding of the market as a field allows, therefore, markets to be *'constituted and demarcated from one another by the mutual orientation of actors towards each other'* (Beckert 2010, p. 609).

Figure 3: The reciprocal influence of the three social forces in market fields (Beckert 2010)



This illustration represents the reciprocal forces exercised by the three social structures within markets on each other and the possible tensions between them. Social networks are influenced by the way institutions regulate markets and provide policy space for networks to form or change. An example of this, to return to our earlier farmers' markets example, is that government (institutional) support financially solidified the establishment of the National Association of Farmers' Markets, which was a cognitive response to the loss of transparency and place-based qualities in retailing. In turn, NAFM successfully lobbied agencies and councils to offer trading spaces for farmers' markets, an innovation which led to their expansion throughout the local authority and NGO network, to over 700 markets (FARMA 2008). Thus, in summary, cognitive frames are closely associated with the formation of networks, which in their turn generate new ideas through collective action and discussion. Such ideas are afforded a socially applicable context through the influence of institutions, while institutions alone would remain static without the development of new understandings.

To summarise, fields are arenas in which cultures, laws and established practices (institutions) are influenced by interacting networks of actors, who use their knowledge to help them perceive and analyse what is happening in the market and devise strategies to either protect or challenge dominant social orders (power). Clearly, then, field theory opens a conceptual framework for the empirical study of social enterprises, which are, inherently, spaces of tension, by elucidating the *interaction* of cognition, network and institutional factors at work within the social enterprise field. Each of the following chapters sets out a cumulative application of field analysis and market problem co-ordination as a way to examine the market relations which influence social enterprise decision-making, but also how the interjection of social enterprises affect social and environmental market outcomes.

There are some challenges connected with the field concept, however, which need to be identified and reviewed as analysis proceeds. The principal and obvious limitation here is Beckert's pre-occupation with the field of the market. In the case of orchard social enterprises, some of the richest relationships happen, not only at the point of trade, but at the point of production and processing, depending at this point most heavily on social capital and often on untraded dependencies. A second crucial Beckertian interest lies in the way the institutional force of market power affects field dynamics. Most Anglo-German cases in this study are either new market entrants with no existing market leverage, or simply do not seek to win competitive power in local markets. The exceptions are those enterprises conforming to the market-building model (see chapter 7).

Consequently, additional economic sociology theories have been mobilised to supplement Beckert's ideas. In particular, Neil Fligstein's concept of social skill is useful (Fligstein 1999, 2001). Social skill refers to the ability of market actors to induce co-operation to reproduce or create rules of behaviour. By framing some social enterprises as generators and wielders of social skill, it becomes possible to scrutinise their influence on market behaviours, and on the development of collaborative supply chain processes with environmental ends, and in which power dynamics remain largely unchanged. The reason that social skill is brought to bear is because markets are inherently unstable (Beckert 2007) and market actors need to work together to create 'stable worlds' to help them make decisions about investment, trading, regulations, collaboration and so on. In other

words, without the social skill exercised by social enterprises, the market for products from traditional orchards remains so unstable as to cause the erosion of the basis of production.

A combination of Beckert ‘s and Fligstein’s ideas will be used to try and explain the way in which environmental social enterprises attempt to influence the social order of the local market; where pre-market relationships produce good will, this can fuel the construction of social skill to create new co-operative relationships. To what end these relationships are successful at achieving orchard conservation remains to be seen.

Although social enterprises may pursue maximum profit in the commercial sphere of their work, some factors, such as enterprise structures, may mean that this goal becomes compromised, as the coming chapters will show. Furthermore, the social enterprises scrutinsed in this research seek to reinvest sales income in favour of an environmental mission because, currently, the market alone does not offer a solution to the environmental problems of orchard biodiversity – quite the opposite: market-approaches to orcharding cause the loss of biodiversity. The equilibrium claimed by economic orthodoxy through market activity is an equilibrium of economic resources alone (Beckert 1997/2002), and may even be mythical given that the economy is marked by incessant change. In other words, the market which links traditional orchard habitats and their products is in disequilibrium. While we may accept that the state of market equilibrium has social and environmental consequences, it is evident that another interpretation of the results of economic activity is needed (not to mention of how nature is valued, for example through ecosystems services (Jetzkovitz 2011) and including, perhaps, more abstract ideas such as ‘ecological charisma’ (Lorimer 2010) in which humans ‘filter’ the ecological values of some species or habitats over others) to explain how social enterprises try to facilitate a different, pro-environmental, set of market outcomes.

It was suggested above that Beckert opens doors to the world of social enterprise which social enterprise scholarship doesn’t. Most specifically, Beckert’s various critiques of economic rationality lead him to suggest that neo-classical economic theory actually neglects the highly social market, being instead a theory of exchange (White 1990). Beckert does not accept that price flexibility, information supply and the corresponding rationality of economic actors alone combine to reflect the social dimensions of markets

populated by humans, who are in turn influenced by custom, structure, personal relationships, legal prescriptions and irrational impulses. Beckert suggests that the key role of economic sociology is to explain the order of markets. The order of markets is, he says, the ability to align production and distribution through exchange to achieve co-ordinated economic activity, even though the people involved in these economic activities are different and seek different ends (Beckert 2007). Markets are faced with the core problem of balancing co-operation, competition and value. By trying to address this problem (for example, with the help of regulations and non-statutory conventions) market dynamism is created, resulting in certain social effects. Inverting this process implies, theoretically, that improved social outcomes (and by extension environmental ones) may be striven for by predicting the outcomes of market dynamism. This is created by changes in reciprocal relationships between structures, actors and ideas (Beckert 2010).

To further clarify how economic sociology may help to explain the route through which third sector interventions in the market can achieve specifically environmental outcomes (which, after all, are never directly addressed by Beckert) a fuller discussion of valuation must now follow. Compiled with Patrik Aspers, one of Beckert's recent books introduces essays on the valuation of goods, building on some of the preoccupations he aired in an earlier Max Planck Institute discussion paper (Beckert 2010b). Values, Beckert suggests, can be socially constructed in three ways: firstly, on the basis of what difference goods make to the physical world; secondly, to the owner's social position; and thirdly through the perceived meanings the good presents to the owner. One or all of these value dimensions - physical, social and symbolic - can be embedded in a product and, clearly, the dimensions need not be entirely linked to objective utility value, especially in western economies where material needs are usually more than adequately satisfied. The owner or purchaser of the good needs some cognitive understanding of the uses and social values of the good in order to make decisions on the value dimensions of the object (Beckert and Aspers 2011 pp. 11-13).

I suggest it is possible to cast the environmental mission of a third sector group trying to conserve orchards in this Beckertian way; orchards and their products must transcend ordinary market values (both material and symbolic) if they are to survive. They currently struggle to survive because, for apple juice, the market is not stable - orchards are not commercially viable (reasons for this, as empirical data will convey, include localised over-

or undersupply of apples, labour-force capacity, or competition from imports with different value dimensions). In response, third sector groups create structural and operational interventions in the market which renegotiate its stability by introducing a different value system. Their dimensions are, following Beckert, symbolic (homeland/locality, biodiversity), functional (quality, taste, market access, ecosystem services) and social (shared environmental and civic cognitions and meanings) for orchard products.

Beckert links his discourse on value closely to the way in which Durkheim examines religious sociology (Beckert and Aspers 2011 p.107). Durkheim helps explain how the attraction to goods reaches beyond hedonistic urges, towards the realisation of shared values in social groups. Some goods which are valued for their age or authenticity can transcend utility value and help the purchaser imagine past or distant worlds. In the case of traditional orchards, these values bring past agricultural practices into the present, but, in doing so, suggest that commercial maintenance is the key to the biodiversity so uniquely represented within them. In other words, orchards, as landscapes which combine economic provisioning with biodiversity, somehow need to be commercially valuable to survive.

In short, economic sociology helps achieve two important theoretical progressions. Firstly, to challenge the simplistic idea of the rational actor by accepting that non-utilitarian or non-material factors (ie. socially-informed reasoning (cf. Giddens 1991)) is an integral element of weighing up market choices. By the same token, secondly, the Marxian view of nature as little more than the repository of commodities to be realised by labour (see Smith 1984) seems fragile in the light of the Durkheimian discussion on transcendental values or, more prosaically, the apparent willingness of individuals to pay more for apple juice produced by food social enterprises, and to work for free to make or market it. An analytical challenge in this study is to consider whether or not Beckert's insights help to explain how social enterprise interventions overcome the 'problem of co-ordination' within the market for traditional orchard products sufficiently to achieve an order in the market conducive to reproducing biodiversity.

To conclude, the alternative economics and comparative non-profit theories introduced in chapter 2 offer useful but only partial insights into the mechanics of juggling multiple aims, which distinguishes social enterprises from other business formats. Instead, field theory,

employing epistemological approaches from psychology and analytical applications from economic sociology, is used so that market relationships and structures can be analysed to understand the tensions involved and trade-offs required to meet multiple social enterprise goals. More detailed recourse to economic sociology and to field theory analysis will follow in the next three chapters, which discuss different social enterprises, and this will be used to support distinctions between three models of environmental social enterprise. Meanwhile, it has been argued that the environmental agenda is an important omission in social enterprise scholarship. Designing a structure for the presentation of empirical work which fills this gap, through a comparative, qualitative exploration of German and English fruit juice enterprises is the subject of the next chapter.

4. Methodology

4.1 Introduction

The following chapter presents the design chosen for gathering and analysing empirical research data. It begins by restating the research aims and questions, before describing the research process. The merits and potential weaknesses of choosing interviews as the preferred method for eliciting research data are weighed up. Sampling, data-coding and deductive thematic analysis are outlined.

Before proceeding a comment is needed on language. I am a fluent German speaker and excerpts from German interviews are given in English translation, in order to save space. Therefore, any mistakes in translating the excerpts are the responsibility of the author alone.

4.2 Research questions

It is useful to recall the unique contribution this research is aiming to make, as outlined in Chapter 1, namely: this study attempts to make an original contribution to the study of social enterprise in two main ways. First, it explores the under-researched work of environmentally motivated social enterprises, through analysis of social enterprises which aim to conserve wildlife-rich traditional orchards. Second, by undertaking a comparative analysis of social enterprises in Britain and Germany, it reveals the contested nature of social enterprise and the way in which the sector is affected by local institutional structures, networks of activists, ideologies and historical contingencies.

This contribution to social enterprise scholarship is framed by two connected research questions:

(i) Can rural social enterprises meet their multiple aims? and
(ii) Which factors influence their ability to do so?

It is important to underline the inter-connected nature of the questions: the first seeks to understand the results of a process, while the second seeks to examine the reasons which lead to the results.

4.3 Research approach

To answer the research questions, this study uses data from a combination of (i) local case studies and (ii) national or regional (sub-national) policy reports. Semi-structured (usually face-to-face) interviews were the method used to elicit data in the former, although many interviewees were also well informed about the latter.

Before describing the research method, Richard Swedberg's (2006) complaint, presented in section 2.8 above, is renewed: that scholarship of social entrepreneurship is problematic, because it may be construed as a long list of case studies, rather than an accumulation of knowledge. An immediate challenge, then, is how to avoid, through this study, simply adding to that list? A second is to justify the choice of interviews as a method for qualitative data collection in this instance.

Interviews can usefully generate very rich data, firstly and most simply, thanks to the time and space they allow the interviewee to devote to the questions. Pre-arranged and scheduled interviews, especially one-to-one sessions, can generate detailed, confidential and close discussion between the parties, limiting opportunities for passing distraction or peer-influence. Furthermore, there are a range of reflexivities and hierarchies being grappled with by the interviewee which add further richness to the data recorded. Interviewers cannot, in the words of Holstein and Gubrien (in Silverman 2004, p143), 'believe that we simply have to ask the right questions and the other's reality will be ours'. The richness of the information, in other words, lies exactly in the different contexts being described. In this study, factual data, such as the yield of an apple harvest, or the quantity of sales in a given year, represent a straightforward interview transaction, but opinions were also sought about how people feel about what is happening, and what experiences lead them to such opinions. It is by identifying and comparing opinions that over-simplistic

conclusions about social enterprise or national differences can be avoided (based for example, on the extent of traditional orchards in Germany compared to England (see Section 4.4, below)).

Furthermore, while this study is concerned with social enterprise business models and methods, I have presented arguments that cultural, geographical and institutional perspectives are integrated in the way in which social enterprises balance their objectives. This is why it is appropriate for sociological concepts to provide the keystones of my methodology. The suggestion is that the subjectivity of, and empathy with, interviewees, and my own knowledge of orchards (see Section 4.5.2, below), is likely to stimulate, rather than restrict the questioning process, because objective economic facts are only partially sought. The use of 'close dialogue' – which is intimacy between interviewer and interviewee involving a nominal level of technical equality – is regarded as productive for research in economic geography by Gordon Clark (1998). Clark compares what he sees as stylised facts sought by economists and which have been tested against rigid theories, with the empirical diversity pursued by geographers. He suggests that empirical diversity, elicited through 'close dialogue', can be used to challenge or contextualise purportedly objective facts which may seem removed from an experienced reality at a given time. Factual data, nevertheless, allow sceptical reflections on the information emerging from close dialogue, which is open to charges of indulgent and 'insider' confidences. In short, while economic knowledge is model- and fact-based, and geographers celebrate the diversity of experience, both approaches have strengths when combined. Given the range of non-economic contextual factors likely to influence social enterprise operation, data is, I argue, best gleaned from experiences (factual as well as subjective) emerging from intimate, 'close' interviews.

The research task at hand is to compare experiences of social enterprise activity in two separate EU nations, thereby illuminating the multiple goals of the activity, which form its distinguishing characteristics; and to reveal differences in practice that result in the conservation of nature. Positivist methods of objective observation will have been used in recording and monitoring orchard ecology, which in turn provide basic data and arguments for orchard conservation. However, as will be seen, ecological monitoring is not a systematically pursued as a matter of course in the case studies, nor is it necessarily carried out by the social enterprise members. That need not be of concern here. Whether or not the enhancement of ecological biodiversity is cumulatively and objectively recorded,

is secondary in interest to the comparison of contexts which influence the juggling of decision-making in an enterprise designed to save orchards from the destruction associated with conventional approaches to farming. In other words, although orchards fail to pay their way in a conventional market context, social enterprises aim to overcome this tension by negotiating new economic contexts leading to altered social and environmental orders. It is the variety of ways that is of interest, not necessarily the 'true' or best ways, especially when some enterprise objectives are likely to be prioritised over others. In-depth interview discussions, it can therefore be argued, mine rich seams of experienced knowledge and subjective opinion, both about practice and policy, and constitute a valid and rigorous method to pursue geographical knowledge.

There are, even so, potential pitfalls in using interviews as a data collection technique. For example, ontological positivists, in believing that pure knowledge is to be objectively gleaned through controlled observation (Moses and Knutson 2007, p.287), may get little satisfaction from semi-structured interviews which draw out differences as much as commonalities between case studies. Furthermore, my interviews were, in practice, rather flexible as to the boundary between semi- and unstructured, depending on the flow of conversation with the interviewee. At the other extreme, those social constructionists who insist that interviews are no more than an interaction between the interviewer and the interviewee in constructing 'narrative versions of the social world' (Miller and Glassner in Silverman 2004, p.125) might claim that any truth emerging from the interview is accurate only in the context of that contrived discussion. One practical difficulty with comparisons using bounded quantities of in-depth samples, as is the case here, is that the analysis may rely too much on limited data (over-determination), making it much harder to make generalisable claims about the world. To address this, a reasonable number of individuals were recruited to contribute data. To return to Swedberg's (2006) complaint: generalisable claims are not sought, not least because none appear to be possible – each social enterprise context is different and differently understood. Rather it is an understanding how social enterprises influence dynamics within the market in favour of the environmental goal which is of interest.

Challenges remain in case study analysis, especially where extensive description captures geographical diversity. Stoecker (1991) argues that *intensive* case study research design, framed within theory and historical context, can lead to the identification of locally appropriate interventions in the community. Neil Smith (1987), in drawing on

Doreen Massey's research on the geographies of labour, was concerned that enthusiasm for case study empiricism contributed to a shift away from substantive theorising, and diffusion of rather isolated social scientific knowledge. Beckert himself, however, is very keen to base his critiques of rational economic action on the development of empirical evidence that can explain the social nature of economic structures. He suggests that embeddedness *'refers to the processes of the active construction of social preconditions'* (Beckert 2002, p. 294), even in global markets which tend to supress cultural presumptions. It follows then, that a comparative study of local markets must resort to detailed attention to local contexts to understand how the active construction of preconditions is pursued, especially, as will be shown, when the preconditions of change rely on personal relationships and shared environmental values.

4.4 Challenges of comparative national context

So far, an argument has been constructed which upholds the general merits of semi-structured interviews as the preferred method for generating comparative qualitative data. Interest in the primacy of context has been declared. In this study Germany and England are the locations chosen for studying orchard social enterprises. Despite having some similarities – the localised survival of expansive traditional orchards used in the production of drink - production takes place under different conditions. Some of these conditions are conventions, such as the habit of Germans to drink large quantities of apple juice, and subtle differences in perceptions of the functions of orchard landscapes. Other important differences are structural, such contexts within which local Third Sector relationships are framed (Kala 2008), for example with the state. By comparing such differences nationally, it is possible to establish a better understanding of the conditions that allow or impede the ability of rural social enterprises to meet their ends.

For example, in Chapter 2, the British 'big-tent' view of social enterprise of the Blair years was discussed and compared to Germany, where social enterprise is a prescribed function delegated by the state. Three additional differences bear closer examination before assembling methods for comparative analysis: the functions of local (sub-national) government, the varied understandings of the ecological values of orchards and the importance of home consumption of juice in the two countries. It is also worth remembering that the agricultural systems of both England and Germany display regional

variations, so the national frameworks explained below are overlaid upon significant local and regional differences. In the following sections, national distinctions in political governance, in the perception of orchard ecology and in juice consumption are presented, before the choice of case study locations and their regional contexts are explained.

4.4.1 Political systems

The German political system is not simple, but a basic picture is needed to underscore the fundamental concepts of free self-determination and of judicial primacy. In 1949 the founding articles of the Federal Republic, the Basic Law, drew lessons from the experience of the failure of the democratic Weimar Republic, and the Nazi-dictatorship. The Law institutionalises the guarantee of human dignity and subjects all political powers to judicial control. It also compels politicians to afford material security to people in need. In this respect it is impossible to see the federal state of Germany as separate from a welfare state (German Federal Foreign Office, February 2010). Germany is a federal republic of 16 semi-autonomous provinces, called Länder (Land in the singular). The federal system is a quasi-hierarchical system of policy influence, quasi because the German national government will not concern itself with many domestic matters under control of the Länder.

In brief, there are three principal levels of democratically elected representation in Germany. These are the Bund (the Federal Government), the Länder (provinces or states) and the Komunen (local authorities). The Federal Government is bicameral, with members directly elected to parliament (lower chamber); in addition, representatives of the Länder participate in legislation in a second, consultative (or upper) chamber. In terms of, for example, agri-environment policy, the Bund represents German interests at a European Union level, interpreting policy directives and funnelling eligible EU funds into the Federation. In this respect it is important to comprehend the EU as an integral part of the German political system, which contrasts with the more cautious, sometimes ambivalent EU-stance for which Britain is well-known. Using the example of agriculture, once EU funds for the German agri-environment have been negotiated, the enactment of policies within agri-environment reform (ie. the transfer of subsidies from production support to environmental services (Pillar 1 – Pillar 2 following the 2003 CAP reforms), is delegated to the Länder.

Under this system, Baden-Württemberg, a province in south-west Germany, has wide-reaching specific policies and subsidies for orchard conservation[13], while those in Nordrhein-Westfalen (Westphalia), a more industrialised and lowland agricultural landscape of intensive dairying and arable farming, are available only in certain district/city areas where orchards are prioritised[14]. Baden-Württemberg is the richest of the German provinces, which may influence the availability of specific subsidy for orchards, for example to promote orchard tourism[15]. Poorer regions, such as the north-eastern province of Brandenburg, which suffers from the abandonment of agriculture and rural emigration (Rössel 2011), may have other priorities. Having returned a centre-right government since the establishment of the Federal Republic, Baden-Württemberg elected a Green Party government to its Parliament (Landtag) in 2011. NABU's long-standing chief campaigner for orchard conservation, Dr Markus Rösler, was elected for the Greens. This might reasonably carry the prospect of stable or enhanced support for orchard conservation in that province, and indeed since then investment has continued. In short, provincial governments can decide upon the level of support orchards receive via federally delegated EU agri-environment payments.

Within the Länder, at the local level, the Komunen (Komune in singular) oversee the implementation and administration of agri-environmental policies. In addition, Komunen may own orchards and other areas of land with nature conservation interest, which allows them to benefit from agri-environment payments (or may delegate them to third parties) for conservation management of areas under their control, or designated by them (e.g. as landscape reserves). In essence, the Bund and the Land both have legislative and policy-building roles, the local implementation of which the Komunen oversee.

Matters now get more complicated, because political and administrative functions are separated, and because the descriptor of Komune simply denotes the most localised level in the government hierarchy. Komunen themselves are organised according to the extent

[13] Ministerium für Ernährung und Ländlichen Raum (2010) *MEKA III: Ein Agrarumweltprogramm mit sichtbaren Erfolgen*. p.8. Baden-Wurttemberg. Stuttgart.
[14] Ministerium für Umwelt und Naturschutz, Landwirtschaft und Verbraucherschutz des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen (2009) *Streuobstwiesenschutz in Nordrhein-Westfalen: Erhalt des Lebensraumes, Anlage, Pflege, Produktvermarktung*. p.80 Nordrhein Westfalen, Dusseldorf.
[15] Ministerium für Ernährung und Ländlichen Raum Press Release 289/2010. http://www.mlr.baden-wuerttemberg.de/_Streuobsttage_Herrenberg/90072.html

and the types of areas they cover. Within a Land, Gemeinden are parishes, each with an elected, executive Mayor. A number of Gemeinden are administratively clustered to form a Kreis or a Bezirk (depending on where in Germany you are), similar to an English district council. Municipalities may be either part of a Kreis, or are kreisfrei, which means they provide unitary functions within the city or town.

In Britain, our four-tiered system of representative government is more centralised. The national government also secures EU funds for countryside-related activities, but until recently channelled expenditure through regional divisions of state institutions such as ministries (e.g. DEFRA) or quangos (quasi-autonomous non-government organisations, such as Natural England), which latter are independent, advisory, state-funded bodies. Under the Coalition government, which favours local decision-making, state funds have started to be distributed by Local Enterprise Partnerships, which broadly mirror the counties. County or City Councils receive the majority of their income from a combination of central government grants and from non-domestic taxation (business rates) to finance service provision, as well as a proportion of the residential council tax, levied by district authorities. Parish councils have a limited role, including planning scrutiny, parks maintenance or the provision of street markets. It is normally the case that the implementation of policy is carried out by employed officials of the councils/ministries, with political oversight by elected members. Since devolution in 1997, greater policy-making and budgetary control has been delegated to Scottish and Welsh national governments.

This basic summary of British and German government hierarchy serves to contrast the autonomy of the German Länder with the relatively centralised, but changing English system. It also reveals the manifold layers of German bureaucracy.

4.4.2 Understandings of the ecological values of orchards

Ecological data correlating orchard and bird biodiversity losses have been available since the 1970s in Germany, exciting NGO responses, including those featured in this study. In Britain, specific data on orchard biodiversity has surfaced only more recently. DEFRA's predecessor, the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, gathered survey data on orchard fruit production from 1970–1996 reflecting a gradual loss of cider fruit, which is most likely to survive in traditional orchards. Government scientists at the Central Science

Laboratory have suggested that pesticide application in Herefordshire orchards had a detrimental effect on some birds, implying that traditional orchards, being mainly unsprayed, are of ornithological value (Crocker et al. 1998).

Meanwhile, Common Ground's campaign 'Save Our Orchards', which began in 1988, made allies among the conservation establishment, some of which were orchard owners, and who had personal and anecdotal knowledge of orchard biodiversity. In 1999 a joint Common Ground–English Nature conference on orchard wildlife resulted in a renewed interest in orchards as places of floral and entomological richness (Common Ground 1999). In 2007 the case for orchards to be included in the revision of the UK Biodiversity Action Plan (BAP) was accepted by the Joint Nature Conservation Committee (JNCC), although local BAPs in Gloucestershire, Somerset, Worcestershire and Essex (among others) had already been set up a few years earlier.

How can the difference of thirty years in the incidence of scientific concerns about orchard biodiversity be explained between these near neighbours? Certainly, Germany has many more orchards than survive on these shores: official estimates of 24,000 hectares in England were revised downwards in 2011 to under 17,000 hectares following a survey by the People's Trust for Endangered Species. The province of Baden-Württemberg alone contains four times this area. Yet the extremely elusive noble chafer beetle (*Gnorimus nobilis*), a priority BAP-species since the mid-1990s, which inhabits dead cherry and apple trees, became one highly persuasive reason to support the inclusion of orchards in the UK BAP. One state-employed ecologist, in a personal communication, suggested the late awareness among conservationists was partly due to lack of available information, and an under-appreciation of the ecological differences between traditional and intensive bush plantations. Furthermore, Britain's latitude and its isolation as an island results in the wildlife value of English orchards resting in bryophyte, lichen and invertebrate communities, knowledge of which constitutes a rare professional specialism. In southern Germany, at the heart of continental Central Europe, early data came from ornithologists.

4.4.3 Juice consumption

Two additional factors deserve comparative Anglo-German attention here, namely the national consumption of juice, and the importance of home-provisioning, that is the

production of juice from the harvest of trees owned by the consumer. Germans drink large quantities of apple juice[16]. In fact Germany ranks third in the table of world fruit juice consumption (Britain ranks eighth) and has the highest per capita consumption of apple juice in the world (De Souza Oliviera 2007). Within Europe, Germany represents over a quarter of the market share for fruit juice in general, twice as much as the UK. The Streuobst harvest was close to one million tonnes[17] for 2011. In England, the 2010 crop for UK cider apples was a record harvest, at 200,000 tonnes.

In summary, although Germany and Britain share EU membership, thereby contributing to and drawing from rural development budgets which support orchard conservation, a number of important contextual differences are notable. These include:

(i) political attitudes towards the EU;

(ii) the relative autonomies of local government;

(iii) attitudes towards orchards by the conservation establishment;

(iv) the remaining extent of orchards in the countryside;

(v) the relative market for juice, and levels of home production/consumption.

Of additional contextual significance is the different definitional and political meanings assigned to social enterprise already outlined in Chapter 2. The following sections present a research method which makes an asset of such differences.

4.5 Research methods

Having outlined the rationale for the research approach, this section will describe the method of collecting empirical qualitative research data from semi-structured interviews. It begins by providing reasons for the choice of locations in which to carry out interviews, typified as they are, by the survival of substantial tracts of orchards used in the production

[16] Source: http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/foo_fru_jui_con-food-fruit-juice-consumption
[17] http://www.nabu.de/themen/streuobst/vermarktung/14049.html

of drinks. A discussion on positionality and a description of sampling follow. Finally some potential weaknesses in the use of Beckertian field theory as an analytical and methodological structure are explored.

4.5.1 The choice of locations

Germany, as described in section 4.4, retains many orchards, and quarterly NABU newsletters (*Streuobst Rundbrief*), in which orchard conservation activity in Germany is collated, reveal that, in most provinces, attempts are made to fund conservation through social enterprises. In Britain the picture is less clear. Common Ground, until the retirement of its founders in 2013, was an organisation known to hold information and knowledge on community orchards and orchard conservation projects in Britain and Northern Ireland. Regional networks also exist, such as the Northern Fruit Group, or the Gloucestershire Orchards Group. In recent years, orchards work at the National Trust has expanded. 'Apple Day', which was devised in 1990 by Common Ground, and is a public celebration of apples, orchards and fruit variety, has been successfully embraced as a regular event by many National Trust properties to attract visitors. Since 2009, spring blossom days have added a second seasonal public attraction to the Trust calendar.

In response to the inclusion of orchards in the Biodiversity Action Plan (BAP), but also with a growing awareness of the popularity of orchard-related visitor experiences, the National Trust carried out an audit of its orchards in England. This is the subject of a conference report (Cordrey et al 2008). The audit included only orchards under direct Trust stewardship, that is, orchards managed as part a property's estate. The audit did not include orchards on tenanted farmland owned by the National Trust. At the same time, the People's Trust for Endangered Species, funded by Natural England and the charitable Esmée Fairbairn Foundation, began a survey of orchards in search of the noble chafer beetle in the nine main fruit-growing counties of England. Gathered data helped to secure funding to extend the survey to the whole of England, and from 2012, to Wales. Because of the extent of its orchard estate, as well as its ability to deploy specialist staff, English Nature also funded the National Trust to begin a national programme of orchard conservation for three years to March 2011; the Trust also became the lead partner in the implementation of the Habitat Action Plan (HAP) for traditional orchards, via a committee headed by a Trust ecologist. The conservation programme came with grants for orchard

management and training. Most, though not all of this money was allocated in supporting National Trust properties to improve the condition of their orchards for wildlife.

In England (as in Germany) some of the main areas of traditional orchards are the south and south-west. Significant areas of traditional orchards also survive in East Anglia, Kent and Cumbria, Herefordshire and Worcestershire. In the east, these orchards contain dessert and culinary apples. But it is the south-western counties which retain the greatest coverage of traditional orchards retaining economic importance for the production of drink, namely juices, cider and its pear equivalent, perry. Juicing follows particular harvesting and processing routines which vary from place to place, and products are commonly blended from locally distinctive varieties which would be unpalatable to eat. These localised cycles of production embody continuing cultural meanings and social connectivity within the region. In the south-west the link between traditional orchards and cider remain strong.

In Germany, it is the relatively wide-spread survival of orchards, as well as the historical beginnings of orchard social enterprise which draw us to the eastern areas of Baden-Württemberg (historically known as Swabia) and its next-door-neighbour, Franconian Bavaria. Gebhardt (2007, p.248), for example, notes that areas not climatically suited to viticulture were, from the end of the 18th century, planted with orchards, and especially from the early 19th century, when many Swabian vineyards were lost to disease.

To identify research participants, initial contacts with orchard enterprises where sought, initially through discussions with NABU and Deutscher Verband für Landschaftspflege (DVL). This latter is a nation-wide umbrella network of local affiliate associations concerned with landscape conservation. In some cases, affiliates are contracted to undertake landscape projects and practical tasks on behalf of their local authorities, where these own or manage areas of designated landscape interest. DVL offered several compelling reasons for choosing Central Franconia (Mittelfranken) as a complement to orchard enterprises in Baden-Württemberg:

(i) DVL federal headquarters are in the Franconian town of Ansbach;

(ii) The regional DVL affiliate Landschaftspflegeverband (LPV) Mittelfranken, occupies the same building as central DVL;
(iii) LPV Mittelfranken leads a local programme of supporting orchard owners to restore orchards and provides advice on marketing orchard products;
(iv) Two LPV Mittelfranken project officers have served as independent co-directors of an orchard social enterprise adopting a limited company governance model; other local social enterprises have adopted co-operative or associative models, providing a mixture of business formats and capital constraints;
(v) A number of orchards in Mittelfranken are owned by parish councils, which make some degree of provision for public amenity in the orchards.

Snow-balling, that is onward referral by established contacts, revealed a number of other enterprises in the study areas. Further examples were selected on the basis of variation in governance, other particularities (such as organic production), or simply practical chance – who was available at the time of my contact.

In Baden-Württemberg two distinct social enterprise models were sought out, in association with NABU. The first is a common model in Germany, where local NGOs use their networks to facilitate improved links between commercial actors and customers, generating farmer supply premiums for apples, secured through higher product prices. One social enterprise was specifically chosen as a long-standing example of this enterprise method which had achieved large scale throughput – over 500,000 litres of production annually. A second example was chosen because the juicing enterprise is run from a special needs primary school. As well as attempting to conserve old orchards through the production and marketing of juice, this example also adds educational and therapeutic objectives to its multiple goals.

The case could be made for searching over a wider geographical area of both countries, however this was not considered practical. For example, it could be fascinating to understand the circumstances in which social enterprises in eastern Germany operate, linked to the history there of collectivised farming and state-led agriculture. Similarly, in England, a few midland and northern social enterprises market products from bush plantations, including eating apples. But such a geographical spread might cause three

potential difficulties: (i) visiting these regions would require a greater travel budget; (ii) they might uncover fascinating socio-political and historical details which shift the centre of gravity away from nature conservation – a key concern of this research; and (iii) richness of depth may be lost in favour of breadth.

Therefore, locations were chosen which combine (i) a long history of traditional orcharding for the production of drinks; (ii) a continuing economic presence of these orchards within the rural economy; (iii) an established programme of social enterprise activity motivated principally by wildlife objectives; and finally, (iv) onward referral by existing contacts (snowballing), with associated filtering based on variation in model. In total 33 individuals were interviewed in England and 18 in Germany.

4.5.2 Positionality

I must give a personal account of how my interest in orchards arises. Between 1998 and 2001, I worked for Common Ground on a project to advocate the conservation of old and existing orchards and promote the concept of community orchards. During that employment, I came into contact with Naturschutzbund Deutschland (NABU) through their publication *Streuobst Rundbrief*, which details orchard campaigns and activities in Germany and beyond. I visited several schemes with support from the Winston Churchill Memorial Trust (WCMT) in 2001. As a result of visits to Germany, France and Spain I wrote a short report (Keech 2001): *Traditional Orchards – Exploring a Sustainable Future*. This report represented ways in which attempts were being made to save traditional orchards. In brief: French farmers were provided with orchard planting and management advice by a national NGO network; Basque farmers were re-commercialising orchards in response to a revival in cider-drinking – although many new plantings were in fact bush plantations to facilitate precocious cropping to meet demand; and the Germans were expanding their experiments to develop markets for juice from traditional orchards. The link between the three countries was the way in which Third Sector Groups (conservation NGOs in France and Germany, and the Basque farmers' union) attempted to reverse the economic imbalance inherent in contemporary orcharding. My current research might be seen as a detailed extension of the interest kindled by Common Ground and the WCMT, with a redirected focus on social enterprise.

Because of this, it could be presumed that I carry normative commitments to the conservation of orchards which will need to be managed in the research. Three factors assist me in this task. Firstly, while I can admit to supporting the conservation of traditional orchards as landscapes *per se*, this study compares international experiments to do this through social enterprise. Comparing the details of how groups seek to achieve orchard conservation, may lead to conclusions about the effectiveness of enterprise as a method, without affecting enthusiasm for orchards either way. Secondly, my two-year position as senior researcher with the New Economics Foundation (2006-08) led to conclusions that a number of local food networks, while motivated by environmental objectives, frequently struggled to meet them; this, combined with a fairly wide literature on the sustainability credentials of local food has led me to reflect critically on the environmental claims of local food initiatives. Thirdly, and in addition to insights on close dialogue by Clark given above, the application of field theory following Beckert targets analytical attention on reciprocal relationships in production and marketing, rather than on arguments for or against orchards. Orchards, in this study, are the arenas of data collection for gaining an understanding of balancing social enterprise objectives. Orchards themselves are not, in other words, the principal subjects of research. In summary, due to the conceptual framework applied, my enthusiasms for traditional orchards should act as a methodological advantage, rather than as a polemical distraction.

4.5.3 Sampling in England

When contacted, the National Trust immediately expressed interest through its project *Conserving and Enhancing Traditional Orchards, England* in the proposed study, partly with a view to learning from German colleagues. Given my choice in favour of the south-west of England, it was agreed that the sample frame could constitute National Trust properties which received conservation grants in this region. In addition to Trust properties, a number of other non-Trust partners received grants from the project and these were included in the sample, as was a commercial producer involved in supporting the Trust's project. This agreed, Trust officers were then able to help me make contact with grant recipients by emailing a message of introduction. I followed-up this message within three weeks to arrange interviews. I was also given access to the applications of all grant recipients in the Trust's south-west region, and therefore had some prior knowledge of the activities being carried out at each estate.

During the period 21st October 2010 – 20th January 2011, 32 individuals were interviewed, usually face-to-face. Two interviews were conducted by telephone. One interview was conducted in the manner of a survey and returned by post, as it proved difficult to agree a meeting date. Lastly, email correspondence was received based on structured questions in one further case, although questions were expanded upon in the responses offered by the interviewee.

With one exception (which was a chance meeting and therefore unstructured), all these interviews were conducted using semi-structured techniques. Questions were grouped in themes to provide some structure and logical flow to the interview, although interviewees were actively encouraged to deviate from the questions if they were considered restrictive, or if other relevant issues occurred to them. The themes usually grouped together questions about the orchards on the estate, the enterprise of producing and trading, and future plans. Two interviews included three individuals at once, while most others were with single individuals.

Questions were sent in advance of the interview and opportunities were given for questions to be altered or abandoned. This opportunity was taken only once. Interviewees were not automatically given identical questions, instead questions tried to draw out the perspectives and experiences of the individual. For example, property-based rangers and gardeners were given the same sets of questions about their orchard(s) and products, about community connections and about the corporate developments at National Trust Head Quarters. Central staff and regional specialists were questioned about their projects or management responsibilities and how the Trust implements the Habitat Action Plan (HAP) for traditional orchards. Non-Trust partners were asked about their relationship with the Trust as well as their own arena of activity. This approach resulted in a wealth of empirical data and allowed for differing perspectives to be contrasted. All interviewees were guaranteed anonymity to encourage frank and open discussion. I transcribed all interviews myself, in full.

Interviewees have been grouped to reflect their status as:

- *NT trading* properties
- NT properties *not trading* yet but may in future

- non-NT *partners*
- internal NT advisory partners or management staff

An overview of English fieldwork subjects is is given in Appendix A3

One additional interview took place in October 2011 with a large scale commercial apple-producer as a consequence of a contacts made through the Frederick Soddy Trust. This grower provides mainly dessert fruit and juice for the supermarket trade, from conventional bush plantations. The grower, whose company is not a social enterprise, has limited interest in the conservation of traditional orchard habitats but provided some useful insights into the supermarket trade, consumer preferences for table fruit, and provided reflections on the landscape and wildlife value of traditional orchards. This interview is not listed in the table above.

It must be recorded that at the time of these interviews, the National Trust was preparing for a root-and-branch reorganisation. In brief, this process devolved budgetary and management responsibility from the corporate centre, out to the property managers. HQ and regional staff shifted in their roles to become specialist advisors within an internal market, meaning that property managers may now allocate local budgets to use the specialist knowledge (e.g. ecological or archaeological) held at the centre, or in the regions. Details of the reorganisation are outlined in the document 'Going Local' (National Trust 2010). An obvious benefit of this policy has been to considerably empower local managers. A major consequence at the centre was the loss of many jobs, including three of the interviewees. Therefore, the analysis must begin with an indication that some interviewees are no longer in post, and interviewed NT staff may have made comments which reflected enthusiasm or dissatisfaction with the process of change.

4.5.4 Sampling in Germany

In common with English research, interviewees providing German data have done so anonymously. German data was organised slightly differently and based on the format of the social enterprise. While National Trust-led social enterprise activity is uniformly governed, that is within the work programme of an estate, German social enterprise models, it is argued, conform to two generalised models: networked market or market-building. A fuller account will follow in Chapters 6 and 7 respectively. Here it suffices to

distinguish the two models according to the structures and trading strategies they follow. In essence, networked market social enterprises are associative and facilitate new trading relationships; market-building social enterprises behave like conventional companies and trade high volumes directly. An overview of German fieldwork subjects is given in Appendix A3.

For one enterprise (GA), formal interviews were conducted with the enterprise founder – an employee of Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland (BUND) – and with scientists at a fruit research station in the state of Baden-Württemberg. The BUND worker, well known to the scientists, also attended the second session to introduce me. An opportunistic visit to a commercial press involved in the same juicing scheme was also set up, although no audio recordings of the tour of the press were possible. In summary, data on GA is taken from meetings with 4 separate individuals.

At the second social enterprise (GB), an interview with the former co-ordinator of the social enterprise was supplemented by a visit to a local special needs school where he taught before retirement. This teacher is a member of Naturschutzbund Deutschland e.V. (NABU), originally established in 1899, initially with ornithological interests, although these have become more broadly environmental. I visited the school in question. Following lunch with children in the dining hall, I observed discussions between a teacher and two pupils who were calculating accounts. The school buys juice at wholesale rates from the enterprise and then retails it. I also visited another press, this time with more formal note-taking opportunities. GB data, then, comes from the words of 5 people.

The third social enterprise is in Bavaria. A semi-structured interview with two leading representatives of the enterprise was supplemented by a visit they arranged to the director of a nature centre run by the Bund für Naturschutz in Bayern (BN), the Bavarian partner of BUND (see GA above). The NGO provided project management support to the social enterprise in its initiation stages. Three people are the source of data for this social enterprise.

Pre-arranged semi-structured interviews were also carried out with market-building enterprises GF, GG, GH. The encounter with GI was arranged by the Director of GF shortly before my arrival in Germany and was carried out en route to visit various orchards, a press and a meeting. An unstructured discussion was partially audio-recorded and further data was taken from written notes.

In addition to interviews, I have reviewed a number of policy and research documents drafted by departments of the states of Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria, and by the Federal ministry for environmental protection. These advocate, respectively, orchard conservation and the marketing of local products. They contain quantitative data on orchards and local food infrastructure, as well as information on what support orchard interest groups and farmers may be able to secure from the state and other sources for orchard conservation. Alongside these, environmental NGOs themselves provided useful technical reports, website links and pamphlets covering, for example, orchard habitat management, pomological data and brochures concerned with local orchards in the landscape. Recourse to these sources is referenced and is used to complement the interviews.

4.6 Analytical method

4.6.1 Data coding

In this section the method for devising data codes is explained. Codes have been adapted from a combination of criteria used in rural sociology and social economy. In Chapter 2, the work of Thomas Lyson (2004) on the social structuration and connectedness of farming communities was outlined. As explained, Lyson (*ibid.*) suggests that Civic Agriculture constitutes a source of family income for the farmer and a contribution towards the vitality of communities (see also DeLind 2002), based partly on the way that interdependence between farmers and processors causes money to circulate within a rural community. He suggests some distinct criteria for judging the social connectivity of farms, such as the number of trading partners or the extent to which families of farmers belong to civic associations.

Further inspiration for the development of codes came from the cross-national work by EMES which attempted to clearly define the dimensions of a social enterprise (given in Table 1, Section 2.2 above). The great achievements of the EMES project were, firstly, to acknowledge the spectrum of objectives carried by European social enterprises and, while dependent on national contexts, to weave a concise overview of the distinctive attributes of social enterprise; and, secondly, to fix these within a theory of social change linked to the Third Sector. This is especially important given the arguments made for the increasing multi-functionality of the Third Sector in balancing income generation, public service provision, social cohesion and lobbying (Zimmer and Priller in Birkhölzer et al. 2005, p.54)

Thematic coding categories have been devised here by adapting and combining the criteria used in judging the connectivity of Civic Agriculture, with the social enterprise dimensions devised by EMES research. Because these codes are guided by theory, the coding is deductive. A table providing an overview of the coding criteria used for analysing data sets is given at Appendix A4.

Codes were used to thematically analyse text. These code categories were used to manually collate interview data to draw out common themes or reveal divergences. The task of analysing the meanings of the data was also deductive, based upon Beckert's (2010) interpretations of field theory. This will be expanded in the next section.

4.6.2 Thematic analysis of coded data

The operations of social enterprises are explored in new ways through the lens of 'markets as fields' following Jens Beckert (2010), whose position was outlined in Chapter 3 above. Beckert (*ibid.*) considers that the dynamism caused by inherent tensions within markets can be better understood through the inter-relationship of three factors, namely institutions, cognition (ideas and perceptions) and networks. His critique of classical economics is that it considers economic theory as the only cognitive frame which actors use to make sense of the constantly shifting complexities and uncertainties which govern decision-making in the economy. In social enterprises, considerable – if not equal – weight is given to non-economic objectives, lending Beckert's critique special resonance. Social enterprise presents a particularly dynamic field in the light of its peculiar constellations of tensions, which are fundamental to its nature.

Beckert, however, only opens the door to analysis of productive social enterprise to a certain degree. The field within which Beckert (*ibid.*) triangulates the reciprocal tensions between cognition, networks and institutions is the market. For the purpose of my research into orchard social enterprises, the diverse range of activities that constitute the social enterprise are considered to be the field. Methodological advantages flow from the widening of the field of analysis:

(a) Thematic analysis is celebrated for its flexibility in generating rich data-sets in social science (Braun and Clarke 2006). However, table 6 above narrows the number of actively trading social enterprises down to only five within the National Trust's south-west region and seven in Germany. Were market dynamics only being studied, most English interviews would be of limited interest because they are with actors involved in fledgling enterprises not yet trading, or with advisory staff;

therefore,

(b) the social enterprise field refocuses attention upon the multiple strands of social enterprise market activity, not just those strands concerned with direct exchange, but also including co-operative activities observable at pre-market levels, such as production and processing.

Having set out a detailed justification for originating the data sets, and for organising, framing and conceptualising a deductive analysis method, the following three chapters will present and discuss findings.

The chapters are divided to reflect three 'models' of social enterprise which have emerged from field-work research. The first model is called the estate model because enterprises operate from within National Trust estates. The next chapter deals with the networked market model of social enterprise, which is the predominant format adhered to by German apple juice marketing. The final of the three, the market-building model, is distinguished principally by the choices of governance structures that directly affect risk and the nature of the market presence adopted by the social enterprises in question. Market-building

seems to be the most recent and most complex developmental phase of orchard social enterprise, and unique to Bavaria.

Chapter 5 - The 'problem' of market co-ordination within the National Trust

'Why is the National Trust interested in orchards? It's because they fulfil our triple bottom line, which is to invest in people, to improve conservation performance and to finance our future. So, potentially, they're a little pot of gold for National Trust properties.' (ET, p.1)

5.1 Introduction - threading together the empirical chapters

In earlier chapters, I suggested that theories of economic sociology help to present social enterprise as an arena of conflict, because several objectives must be weighed simultaneously in the course of undertaking a commercial activity. In this study, a trio of objectives is juggled by the groups who have provided empirical data:

(i) *Economic* - to generate enough income from the production and sale of juice and/or cider in order to -

(ii) *Environmental* - fund the conservation of threatened orchard habitats for their associated wildlife by -

(iii) *Social* – actively influencing the social value and cultural meanings of orchards and to provide educational and enjoyment opportunities.

In other words, the Third Sector groups I am studying try to create or stimulate commercial incentives to manage orchards, resulting in their conservation as habitats, heritage and public space.

The coming chapter is the first of three that present and analyse empirical research. It discusses work by the National Trust to conserve orchards on three main fronts. Firstly, the Trust plays a national role as the lead partner in implementing the Habitat Action Plan for orchards. Secondly, linked to this national role, the Trust funded a number of its own properties, (and some external partners, including, for example, Wiltshire Wildlife Trust), to engage in surveys and practical orchard conservation. This grant was channelled through a project called *Conserving and Enhancing Traditional Orchards, England* and

was co-ordinated by a dedicated Trust officer between 2008 and 2011. The project was publicly funded, via Natural England. Thirdly, this chapter will especially draw on the efforts by five local National Trust estates in south-west England to produce and market apple juice, cider and other orchard products, the profits from which fund orchard conservation at those locations.

Up to this point in the thesis, social enterprise has been presented as a business model which, more than others, is defined by conflicts or tensions. These tensions are inherent in social enterprise operation due to the fundamental distinction that social enterprises, *a priori*, juggle multiple goals and these tensions become evident within the National Trust. Through the voices of interviewees, I will show:

- that tensions exist between the national conservation responsibilities and the localist corporate policies of the Trust;
- the importance of policies to enhance visitor engagement, which increase demand for orchard products despite a limited capacity for supply;
- the associated opportunities and challenges resulting from having a national trading arm (National Trust Enterprises) and highly localized marketing messages; and
- challenges linked to volunteer labour.

5.1.1 'Going Local' – back to the Trust's roots

The National Trust makes a particularly good case study of how Third Sector organisations manage multiple goals. In addition to the practical tensions outlined above, the scale of Trust means that a variety of motivations and ideologies are represented through its almost 4 million members (Lansley 1996). Current Trust strategy prioritises popular re-engagement beyond the existing membership, and seeks to embed Trust properties within their local communities. This may be a response to the view that the Trust has departed from its founders' intentions, to become an 'aristocratic oligarchy' (Cannadine 1995, p.25). The shift from its early focus on protecting the countryside and making it accessible to urban workers, to the Trust's close association with built heritage began as a result of the Country Houses Scheme of 1937. This enabled owners of country houses to donate their estates to the Trust, tax free, in return for continued residence by

the owners and their descendants. The Trust thus turned from an organization concerned with people to one managing buildings (Weideger 1994, p.68). In addition, '… since the 1970s, the Trust has sought to negotiate its way between the more extreme views of the heritage and environmentalist lobbies' (Cannadine 1995, p.27). While these two lobbies imply a further degree of class conflict, the author in fact interprets the Trust's repeated ability to review its position as an explanation for its broad following.

Even so, the consultation draft of the current Trust corporate strategy, *Going Local*, aspired to the creation of 'properties that are connected to the local community' (National Trust 2010), including through the promotion of local products. Some properties are well-placed to respond and are conscious of how this supports current Trust policies:

> *'Our range of estate products includes cider, chutney, honey, charcoal, we grow our own grain, which is then milled into our own flour, and we also sell logs. We're quite an active estate in producing our own produce. It's quite core to our Going Local strategy, really.'* (EA, p. 2)

Going Local purports to return properties to their historical position at the centre of communities, asserting that 'life is local' and that recently empowered property managers are at liberty to interpret the meaning of 'going local' in their attempts to make everyone, whether or not they are members, value the Trust, in the spirit of its position as a national asset (National Trust 2010b). *Going Local* is informed by four key corporate aims. Firstly, it aims to engage National Trust supporters to become more actively involved in meeting Trust goals. Secondly, conservation and environmental performance should be improved. Thirdly, the Trust wants to support its 'people' (presumably staff and volunteers). Finally, it is concerned with how the organisation can be financed in the long run. It remains to be seen whether the changing circumstances of rural life (e.g. Woods 2004) and the freedom to interpret the meaning of 'local', lead in practice to more democratic engagement in National Trust governance (Lansley 1996) by its supporters, many of whom join to oppose change (Newby 2010). The opposite is also conceivable: Trust estates become fiefdoms run by property managers with so many responsibilities that priorities will depend upon staff capacity and enthusiasms, volunteer support and the ability to raise money.

The unfolding chapter on the National Trust will outline how, in south-west England, the work of a major national environmental charity attempts to reconcile competing objectives through the local market. The tensions are structural, organisational, temporal, commercial, geographical and scalar. The chapter is structured as follows: firstly, the National Trust is re-introduced as a social enterprise via its trading activities in orchard products. Secondly, to facilitate a workable comparison between English experiences and those which follow from Germany, field data is presented as follows: initially, a brief description of the production and supply chain used by estate-based National Trust orchard social enterprises is portrayed. This is followed by a discussion, drawing on interview data, of the environmental, commercial and social goals these enterprises try to reconcile, as local incarnations of the National Trust. Lastly, an analysis of the data using field theory to support an understanding of the reciprocal relationships involved in the tasks of bringing orchard products to market, leads to a view on whether or not the Trust does, indeed, achieve its intended environmental outcomes.

5.2 The National Trust framed as social enterprise

The National Trust, which is a registered charity, can and should be understood as a social enterprise of some scale, because it holds substantial assets on behalf of the public, and pursues income-generating commercial activities to contribute funds towards its environmental mission. The Trust is Britain's largest environmental charity. By 2011 it had achieved a membership of 4 million. It manages more than 300 historic houses and over 600,000 acres of coast and countryside[18], tenanted by around 2,000 farmers making the Trust the UK's biggest single farm owner[19]. The farm estate earns around £10m annually for the Trust. In addition, there is a commercial arm to the Trust, called National Trust Enterprises (NTE). NTE is a company limited by guarantee and allows the Trust to market goods and services. (The exception is catering: offering visitor refreshments is recognized by Customs and Excise as an integral service provided by the charity, and catering income is not commercially taxed). In 2009/10 catering represented £34m (or 47%) of a total of £73m of sales. Retailing brought in £31.5m (43%) and rental income from holiday accommodation represented £7m (10%). Tax nuances aside, NTE is responsible for:

[18] http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-15187147
[19] http://www.nationaltrust.org.uk/what-we-do/who-we-are/fascinating-facts-and-figures/

'… retailing, holiday cottage lets, working holidays and some peripheral activities such as events, income from car parks, bike hire and hospitality. Profits are covenanted back to the charity.' (ER, p.1)

'Commercial activity can be a good earner for bigger properties, with perhaps 10-15% of the property's income coming from commercial activity. A property's main source of income will be from membership credits (which is allocated to the property according to numbers of NT members visiting), as well as income from paying non-members and income from the wider estate, such as rental income from tenants.' (ER, p.2)

By introducing the National Trust through the scale and range of its income generation, my intention is to frame the Trust as a social enterprise. As a charity, it has educational and environmental goals and its estate has been built through a combination of philanthropic legacies, public subscription and state funding. But the task at hand is to cast the Trust as a commercial market actor which, through the provision of goods and services, both to its members and beyond, earns a lot of money – up to 15% of property income. This money is used to protect substantial areas of the countryside and safeguard and open to view some of the nation's finest built and horticultural heritage, in order to stimulate education and human well-being.

The charitable arm of the Trust, through the local properties, is itself also a producer of goods. This can be seen, as the chapter proceeds, in the way that in-house staff, who are substantially supported by volunteers, create products from their orchards. These products are supplied under wholesale arrangements to NTE, and sold to the public in their shops. Products are also sold in NT catering outlets, which are run directly by the property to satisfy charitable income status. Profits are then transferred, depending on the arrangements made for each property, either to the Trust centrally, or directly back to the trading property.

The Trust is, by dint of its commercial and productive activities and structures, not just a social enterprise, but also a market place. However, the separation of the control over production and marketing elements within the NT influences the effectiveness of social

enterprise as a conservation strategy, as will be shown. Because the market dynamics to be investigated occur within the market for orchard products, notably juice and cider, it is first important to grasp how orchards appear within the Trust's work, and what attitudes and meanings they represent within the organization.

5.3 Nature and orchards within the National Trust

The National Trust was formed in 1895 to preserve open spaces of natural beauty and historically important buildings (Cannadine 1995, p.14) by acquiring them and opening them for public enjoyment. The gifting of country houses from the 1930s (*ibid*, p.19) punctuated a shift in emphasis from public access to the countryside, to the protection of aristocratic rural heritage. A second consequence of this, and the original motivation behind the gifting, was the shouldering by the Trust of the cost of the upkeep of the properties.

Today, substantial areas of orchards fall under Trust ownership in three main ways including, firstly, within the immediate envelop of stately houses. One of several examples includes Lytes Cary Manor in Somerset, which contains an attractive quince orchard. This was formally laid out according to contemporaneous fashion, as supplement to the kitchen gardens which, with soft fruits and vegetables, provided fruit throughout the year for the occupants of the house. In addition to their contributions to the household economy, these orchards offered a place of peace and contemplation, providing a cultural link to monastic orcharding traditions (Russell 2007, pp.24-6). This aspect is no less important now for interviewees:

> *'It's a great orchard, it really is lovely. It's just a superb place to be, very spiritual and lovely.'* (ED, p.3)

The task of storing and processing orchard fruits has left the National Trust with artefacts, such as antique apple trays and vintage cider presses. Bridge House in Cumbria was originally a purpose-made apple store for Ambleside Hall.

Beyond the formal enclosures of the house, the second way in which orchards appear within the National Trust's demesne is within open country, familiar as landscape features, for example in south-west England and the Marcher counties of Hereford, Gloucestershire and Shropshire. These orchards were (and are still) used for grazing by the owners of the estate, or their tenants, and managed for cider production, which was commonly part of a labourer's wage until the late 19th century, as described by James Crowden (1999). Several seventeenth century landowners combined opportunities for horticultural excellence with cider production, notably Lord Scudamore, in Herefordshire, who felt that high quality cider gave imported wine a run for its money without the burden of import duty (Morgan and Richards 1993). Cider heritage is an important consideration for current Trust wardens, for example:

> *'We replanted it in 2000 […] primarily they were cider apple trees because it was a cider orchard.*' (ED, p.1)

> *'The vast majority of them are cider orchards, but the vast majority of them have originated from farm orchards, so historically virtually every farm would have had an orchard… Across the estate we have 18 working farms…, and each one of those has an orchard… . Most of them, it's fair to say, are fairly in neglect, but it's something we've been doing quite a lot of work to halt that.'* (EA, p.1)

Thirdly, as the preceding excerpt acknowledges, National Trust orchards may sit within farm or residential tenancies, both within the farm-scape and as kitchen orchards. These are not directly managed by the Trust, but by their tenants. While countryside and ecological specialists within the Trust may be called on by tenants to advise on orchard management, the Trust does not, on the whole, interfere with, or even know about, the occupants' use of the orchards within a tenancy.

> *'We also have wild trees – old abandoned farmhouses, and their trees left over in their garden.'* (EC, p.1)

The Trust's stewardship of orchards, then, can be cast as renewing horticultural heritage linked to stately homes, as managing regionally distinctive historical landscapes, and as arms-length landlord of tenanted rural estates. The extent of orchards under Trust ownership is substantial, although not precisely clear.

> *'I did do … a rather rough-and-ready audit, it's obviously not completely comprehensive, but that shows the Trust has an awful lot of orchards, over a hundred orchards in its care – probably got double that – and there are a real range of orchards. You've got garden and kitchen garden orchards, you've got the wider estate orchards, which will either be tenanted or it will be in-hand, so the warden or the estate staff will manage it.'* (EO, p.1).

In 2007, a year before the National Trust carried out its audit, traditional orchards were included in a revision of the UK Biodiveristy Action Plan (UKBAP), upon recommendations made by English Nature (now Natural England), the government's conservation quango. This Plan records the biological assets of the nation and sets out an agenda for how the conservation of threatened species and habitats should be pursued within the UK and its devolved nations. The origin of the UKBAP lies with the Rio Earth Summit of 1992, where most of the world's national governments signed Agenda 21, thereby committing themselves to dual goals of sustainable development and the conservation of biodiversity. The UKBAP is the British response to Agenda 21's biodiversity goal and was the first national BAP to be produced.

One inspiration for the National Trust audit was to gain knowledge of its orchards, not just for itself, but for its partners within what became the Habitat Action Plan implementation group, which the National Trust, by dint of its orchard holdings, co-chairs with Natural England.

> *They [Natural England] saw us as a big landowner, so there was potential for us to do a lot for orchards, and therefore by showing others how your orchards can be managed, you could encourage others to do that too, possibly.* (Interview EO p.2)

The Trust's audit was presented to the People's Trust for Endangered Species, (PTES) another, much smaller membership charity, who led a national programme of training volunteer surveyors to asses, or 'ground-truth', the status of old orchards which had been identified from maps and aerial photographs. PTES had already been given the remit of leading the species Biodiversity Action Plan for a rare beetle, the noble chafer, which appears in old orchards[20] (Smith, 2002). Initially, PTES surveyed the eight English counties most associated with old orchards, before securing additional funding from Natural England to survey the whole country.

Given the extent of orchards within Trust ownership, the Trust was awarded a substantial grant of £536,000 by Natural England to carry out practical work to improve orchard management within its land holdings, and to invest in orchard conservation beyond the Trust. This money came from a programme called *Countdown to 2010*, to mark 2010 as international the year of biodiversity[21] and enabled the Trust to lead a programme called *Conserving and Enhancing Traditional Orchards: England*, from October 2008 – March 2011. There is no doubt that this programmatic grant stream energized many Trust properties to plant orchards, and added opportunity to those who were already active. Other, less strategic funds, such as donations and one-off grants from the Heritage Lottery Fund have also helped to plant new orchards for predominantly social and educational uses. The Traditional Orchards HAP implementation group includes, in addition to the Trust and its co-chair Natural England, a selected range of interested specialist parties, including local orchard conservation groups. The group's task is to implement and monitor the HAP's targets, namely to stop the loss of traditional orchards in the UK, to improve their condition and to increase their extent to counter recent decline.

The interest in orchards, for scientific bodies such as English Nature or the PTES, is based on their biodiversity importance, with a very particular emphasis:

[20] http://www.ptes.org/files/399_noble_chafer_fact_sheet.pdf
[21] An initiative of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature. DEFRA represents the work of the UK government within IUCN and sits alongside many UK NGO members.

'*Basically, it's based on the invertebrate interest. A lot of people get confused with the BAP and think that it's to do with genetic conservation or the cultural side. They're all important, but the BAP is supposedly just biodiversity, and so it's not because it looks pretty or anything else. Other habitats, for example with grassland, it's because you've got lots of rare wild flowers. The orchard trees aren't native, it's what's found on them – fungi and the lichens and invertebrates*.' (Interview EN, p.1).

These views go some way to demonstrating why the adoption of orchards within conservation policy seems different from the German experience. Invertebrate ecology is a specialized and professionally under-represented field compared, for example, to floral or ornithological expertise, and the breakthrough for orchards came via the association with the very rare noble chafer beetle. Orchards are, according to the quotation above, and forthcoming views of their social and utilitarian properties, principally the setting for other important species. The human connection (farming), removes orchards from the position of 'natural' habitat, which explains the long time it has taken to weave them into conservation policy. Yet the co-productive consequences of humans and nature within orchards, as well as the subsequent neglect of orchard husbandry based on changing agro-economic circumstances which has been so valuable to the very species targeted by policy, namely the deadwood beetles, provide orchards with their unique biodiversity. Human-nature collaboration in the production of biodiversity can be understood via urban ecology (Hinchliffe and Whatmore 2006). Many species find a foothold and thrive in the changing spaces between human citizens. From the human perspective, a social dimension – greater contact with nature – is a key aim of urban ecology (Goode 2005). This co-productive agenda has not yet been fully adopted for rural ecology, perhaps because the countryside is less densely populated – the idea of physically crowded-out rural nature seems ridiculous, although it carries some truth. The social importance of nature is shared by the Trust, which was established by Edwardian philanthropists to help alleviate the human deprivations which emerged out of the industrial revolution. Yet, the Trust's social interest in orchards contrasts with descriptions of the mainly entomological interest so far provided by the scientific conservation establishment.

In summary, within this section, the form that orchards take within the ownership of the National Trust has been described. In addition, the process has been explained by which the Trust supplemented its position as a steward of localized horticultural and landscape heritage, through the investment of national influence and public money, to lead a

partnership of groups responsible for implementing the government's commitments to orchard conservation, within a wider international convention on biodiversity. This bi-scalar perspective has also raised arguments among those concerned with orchard conservation about the value of orchards *per se*, compared with their role as habitats for other creatures, the rarity (and thus scientific interest) of which is a consequence of changes in human and natural interactions, namely (un-)economic farming.

In the following section, we will consider the breadth of meanings which orchards represent to the National Trust. Because the Trust sees several potentials for its orchards, this perspective helps to set the scene for the way in which the Trust, balances its conservation objectives. It should be noted once more at this point that fieldwork for this study took place at a time when new approaches to achieving and paying for the Trust's goals were being finalized and implemented across the organization.

5.4 The multiple meanings of orchards within the Trust

The following section reviews the role of orchards within the Trust's corporate consciousness. They appear in at least four distinct ways, and how these meanings support Trust objectives is quite blurred. For the Trust orchards represent, firstly, the focal points for popular engagement with the National Trust, because they are attractive and sensually stimulating. Secondly, orchards are potentially productive landscapes not yet fully exploited. Thirdly, orchards offer living repositories of horticultural variety, and as stores of biological propagation material. Fourthly, orchards constitute rich natural habitats.

The interest in the habitat value of orchards was framed in section 5.3 above, by recounting the conservation policy contributions of the Trust. Vitally, the National Trust is distinguished by the way it combines social and utilitarian factors with natural dimensions to form a broader, social picture of the value of traditional orchards than a biologically positivist insight alone (ie. privileging invertebrate rarity) allows. It is the co-existence of and tensions between these meanings and potentials which provide the first insights into Trust's activities as a local social enterprise. It is unclear whether the order of the list of orchard meanings above might actually represent a hierarchy of importance, because the voices which follow don't always agree: some people seem aspirational, while others are

sceptical about current corporate directions and seem glad about their property's distance from Trust HQ. Some speakers reflect anxiety about the changes which are taking place, while others are highly motivated by orchards.

The conservation of orchards as a strategic objective (rather than a regular task associated with local estate management), started around the middle of the 1990s.

> *At that time, the driver was concern over the loss of old varieties [of fruit]. The BAP architecture was in place already, following the 1992 Rio Earth Summit processes. At the same time [as Rio], MAFF*[22] *was developing agri-environment schemes for farmers. However, although rare … apple varieties were in drastic decline, [orchards] were falling between the two stools offered by BAP and MAFF, partly because the orchards contained domesticated varieties, but they were not productive or entered into schemes… . The Trust's interest in orchards is framed by its triple bottom line perspective. Orchards are about (i) the economics of sustainable land uses; (ii) the challenge of the loss of domesticated and wild biodiversity; and (iii) engaging people. A single issue approach to biodiversity would not have been so engaging or interesting.*' (EP, p.1)

Another voice reiterates that orchards are symbolic as well as natural places:

> *'…one of the reasons orchards are so unique as a BAP habitat is that they not only have this biodiversity, … but they also have such a community and cultural significance and that social side of things, as well as a potential product.'* (ES, p.8)

The Trust widens the concept of what biodiversity entails in two important ways – for the Trust, biodiversity includes apple cultivars which have a domestic, utilitarian use; there is also a conviction that orchards provide social functions within the rural economy and in

[22] The Ministry for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, which became, in 2002, the Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs.

representing meanings to people. The utilitarian and domestic purposes of orchards are part of a unique value, apparently not fully reflected in other scarce habitats:

> *'Another 2010 priority was reed beds, vital to bittern conservation. But questions arise about what wider benefits are associated with reed bed conservation. There are limited social or economic benefits, beyond the provision of thatching material.'* (EP, p.1)

The combination of biological and social-economic roles sits well with the diverse interests of the Trust. However, there is a self-imposed pressure to emphasise the human meanings of orchards and all other Trust assets. Exciting people by the Trust's agenda is seen as way of creating a longer-term approach to achieving goals:

> *'I have a rule of thumb: if you are running a project, you should expect to put half to three-quarters of resources into community engagement and the remainder into the physical work needed within the project. This is because the effects of the physical work won't last if people don't value it. People are the sine quo non for the National Trust.'* (EP p.4)

The importance attached by this speaker to people for the Trust may seem obvious – the Trust's assets are held for people and its income substantially comes from membership fees, of which a major increase is being planned:

> *'The NT Director-General has a vision, that by 2020 the Trust has 5 million members…'* . (p.4) *…the NT is offering more diverse attractions to visitors. There is still some work to do on this and this direction reflects the Director-General's social reformist agenda. She is pursuing outreach to very new and different audiences, especially those in social bands C2 and D. There is a role for orchards here.'* (p.6)

Strategic objectives to make the Trust relevant to a greater number of lower-income people respond to internal NT research which identifies urban areas with low membership. Increasing membership is both a way to attract more support for the aims of the National Trust, and to finance its work, including on orchards. Engagement objectives and biodiversity concerns need to be balanced and managed within the Trust's operations, however.

> *'I think the benefits [of the orchards project] have been raising awareness of biodiversity. People haven't really thought of orchards as wildlife habitat, and I think it's a good hook for people. People like wildlife generally, as long as it's not destroying their garden.' (ES, p.3)*

> *'I was speaking to the warden there, and he was saying – it's funny – if they are allowing the orchard to be used for a pruning workshop…, they sometimes have to be careful that they don't chop out too much dead wood…. …it's really hard, because people are coming in with a very strong horticultural background, who have been pruning trees all their lives and suddenly to be told "would you mind leaving that dead tree?", they have to take that into account and work around all that.'* (ET, p.2)

Here, differences between supporters and Trust staff appear when synthesizing ecological and horticultural perceptions of orchards. There is evidently a distinction between managing a habitat and a garden. Within the latter wildlife is seen as separate (Macnaghten and Urry 1998) and destructive. The garden-nature dualism represents a symbiotic co-productive relationship between humans and nature, though also a conflict with attitudes to horticultural heritage. The time-limited grant awarded to the Trust to promote orchard conservation reveals among some interviewees a perception that interest in orchards is a temporary preoccupation of Head Office. The following excerpt describes the destruction of an existing orchard, followed by a view that the content of a garden depends on the enthusiasms of the head gardener.

> *'…we are planning to take out the old orchard. …[this] is a Tudor house, and there was a formal garden with hedges and everything at some point … that got tidied away*

and the area got tidied up as an orchard. Basically what we want to do is to put the Tudor garden back and hence the orchard is in the way...' (EK, p.2) … '…we've got to get the present orchard out because it's in the wrong place, and create the new orchard.' (EK, p.5)

'Someone gets involved in these important issues, whether it's orchards or anything else, it's as fickle as anything, if you ask me. … that [orchard project] was all set up and it was for good reasons and it was great, but when you're this far down, you're absolutely nowhere near there [Trust HQ], you can't access it, you haven't got the time, we're so short of staff, we haven't got the time to indulge into things like that, to be honest with you, so we're doing what's right for [this property]… You'll have a head gardener somewhere and he'll leave and whatever he's started will not carry on.' (EK, p.6)

The National Trust holds many, perhaps the majority of, remaining English traditional orchards under its stewardship. But the extent of the Trust's ability to exploit them either commercially or through increased public engagement is compromised by their often neglected state.

'With regards to the location [of the orchard], it is fairly central to the estate, it is next to one of our farm holdings, which would in the past have been a very important farm on the estate. That farm was being farmed until about five years ago, when the tenants moved out because it was no longer viable. … So we took the orchard back in hand.' (EJ, p.1)

'…historically this had been an orchard that had become neglected… . ' (EI, p.2).

'My guess is that it was neglected between 1950 and 2000. We took over the property in 60s-70s-time and certainly nothing happened from the time the Trust took it on until 2000. So it was probably actively managed between 1900 and 1930s, that sort of time.' (ED, p3)

These three voices, which range from west Cornwall to south Dorset, each describe existing orchards. The first suggests that tenants either did not, or could not value the fruits; the last two quotations refer to orchards attached to a house, the former residents of which - a family and its household – has been replaced by non-resident Trust officials and visitors. Not all Trust orchards are relict, awaiting revival. New orchards have been planted at several estates, for a variety of reasons, including future production and engagement, as the next two excerpts reveal:

> *'The orchard we planted in 2007. It's a traditional orchard* [ie. in form] *so it'll be a long time before we get a crop in, but ultimately we're going to get 32 tonnes from that eventually, potentially.* (EE, p.5)

> *'That will be an area where people can do workshops and learn about orchards and making cider, bee-keeping or candle-making, timber-framing and all sorts of stuff.'* (EG p.1) … *'We had a Princes Trust group in, they're teenagers who have fallen out of school, or are not very successful in the formal education system. They came here and dug all the holes for the apples and filled them in…'* (EG p.2)

Some properties are expanding existing orchards with new plantings because of the contribution the fruit varieties make to the Trust's heritage interests. The National Fruit Collection at Brogdale in Kent, a former government research station, is a repository of thousands of fruit varieties. In recent years its vulnerability – to disease, weather or some other mishap – has led the Trust to consider how it can replicate localized versions of Brogdale to disperse the risk of genetic loss, and to earn an income from selling grafts.

> *'That's kind of where we're going with a lot of our stuff – we're looking at where there were once orchards and we're re-establishing them where they've gone, and if there's any remnant fruit trees there, making sure they survive as much as we can. We take grafts off them and get 'son of tree' and plant that into the same spot.'* (EA, p.1)

'…there are some orchards or fruit trees or varieties that are vulnerable and [we're] trying to reinstate those, and we've got a couple of orchards locally where old varieties have been replanted to try and create a mother orchard [for the county]. The historic element is both the old varieties and the association of orchards with particular properties.' (EW, p.1)

'Historically, it's quite important for this estate to have [the orchard] here and it also links in with the heritage around horticulture which is really strong in the valley. … The other things were just really good benefits, like being an educational tool, wildlife benefits are becoming more important, fruit production is quite important, but it's only recently that we've been managing it to try and improve fruit production so we can get fruit off it.' (EE, p.1)

Yet the picture with Trust tenants is different and reveals much about the status of orchards generally within agriculture.

'… you've got to work out what drivers have you got to make that attractive for a farmer who feels business as usual is where they want to be? … So we don't tend to have tenant-run commercial orchards. There's no reason why there shouldn't be, but we just haven't because commercial orchards anyway in the UK took a bit of a nose-dive … and we don't, to my knowledge have any commercial orchards which are tenanted as such, bringing in a major income of scale.' (EQ, p2)

Commercial orchards are barely viable, it seems, within the agricultural economy as a whole, let alone in some National Trust estates. On the other hand, old orchards are valued and new ones have been planted using public grants. We have also seen that new orchards are planned as classrooms for learning about country crafts, and as a way to interact with local communities, some of which have distinctive social needs, and there may be harvesting opportunities in future. Finally, landscape heritage is important to the Trust and orchards are valued where they sit within historically horticultural landscapes, even if these are affected by structural changes in agriculture.

So far in the chapter, I have tried to outline activities pursued by the National Trust, leading to an understanding of how the Trust views orchard within a wide range of inter-related commercial and non-commercial roles. These include:

- Landowner/landlord
- Heritage/environmental steward
- Focal point for community engagement and education
- Campaigning organisation
- Trading retailer and caterer (each with separate governance arrangements)
- Fruit producer
- Policy delivery agent (HAP for orchards)

Orchards, as engagement opportunities, productive landscapes and natural/historical assets, appear in complementary and sometimes conflicting ways within this list of Trust roles. How is the Trust to go about reconciling them? What should the Trust campaign for as a way of supporting the expansion of production, or the stronger protection of barely viable agricultural landscapes? Can the Trust's enterprise experiments with orchards inform new ideas in rural development in a changing rural economy? In considering these questions in the next section, the practical tasks involved in making and marketing orchard goods will be examined, to better understand whether social enterprise is a positive way for the National Trust to conserve its orchards and their 'environmental performance', engage people and finance future habitat management.

5.5 Orchard social enterprises in south-west England

In this section, the product supply chain is briefly described, starting from the apple on the tree and ending with sales. Five properties in particular are engaged in producing and marketing apple juice, cider and other products and it is from these that most voices in this section emerge.

5.5.1 Orcharding and juicing in local National Trust social enterprises

A more-or-less similar routine is followed by each estate to produce juice or cider because, in each case, fruit trees occupy land within the estate of a National Trust property – usually a country house – and their management is the responsibility of a gardener or a ranger. (The difference between these two roles is that gardeners are trained horticulturalists who tend formal gardens associated with the house, while rangers are professional countryside managers responsible for larger areas beyond the immediate enclosures of the house.) Orchards can appear in both scenarios, as described above. There is one exception to this rule within our group of five (identified as property EC in the quotations). In this case, there is no central property and instead the Trust manages an extensive area of countryside. Here, fruit for the production of juice and cider is taken from private gardens, hedges and a few tiny orchards collectively covering little more than an acre.

Labour to maintain and crop orchards is principally supplied by volunteers, especially regular and long-term volunteers who dedicate several hours a week to the Trust. The role of volunteers in the land-based, fruit production side of the process is not to be underestimated. In each of the five cases, the individual social enterprise is comprised of a company of NT estate staff and their band of regular volunteers. None of these groups are formally constituted because they are (and see themselves as) an established element of Trust operations, and the juice marketing activity is simply one seasonal – albeit commercial – endeavour the group carries out over the year, led and managed by the responsible staff member. Qualified staff may organize volunteers but quickly manage to pass on pruning, grafting, picking, pressing, processing and hygiene management skills to volunteers. In short, volunteers pick up valuable technical and horticultural skills from their Trust mentors, who in turn, rely on the volunteer labour to achieve their orcharding and enterprise goals.

The work of volunteers varies a little between properties and may change year on year. For example, while regular volunteers may produce the bulk of the juice, public events also offer day-visitors an entertaining experience of using traditional equipment in return for a taste of fresh juice. These events may include theatrical performances, games or exhibitions of apple varieties. Alternatively, apples gathered by Trust volunteers may be pressed by a commercial contractor, who will bottle and pasteurize the juice and return it

to the Trust for supply to estate shops and cafes. In two cases, the Trust's commercial activity does not extend beyond supplying apples to the press, which will then supply the sales outlets on the estate directly. Where cider is produced, practices again range from keeping the whole fermentation process 'in-house' (ie. carried out *in situ* by the volunteer-staff team), or contracted to the commercial press, which separates NT apples within their plant. Three estates make cider and juice, two make only juice. The diagrams below illustrate the three types of production system, and the areas of direct control which the National Trust staff-volunteer enterprise has over the supply chain. Lighter shading indicates the Trust controls the process in question; darker shading (on the right in the second diagram and in the lower box in the third) indicates work carried out by a commercial press.

In the 'DIY model' the whole process is controlled by the estate-based social enterprise from orcharding to marketing. In the 'wholesale model' there is an overlap with a commercial contractor at the pressing stage: as described, some properties organize pressing events as seasonal public participation opportunities, perhaps using veteran machinery or even horse-powered mills. In such cases the public may be charged a fee to participate, or can bring their own fruit to be pressed. These properties also contract processing services from a commercial press, which handles all subsequent stages of distribution and sales. In the third example, the 'contract model', we note a separation between cider and juice processing. In this system, some cider is fermented in situ and sold 'fresh', that is in kegs, directly to catering outlets. Cider and juice are also bottled by a press and returned to the NT-based orchard enterprise for wholesale to the shop and café. These are not complex arrangements and estates may move, for example between DIY and wholesale models

Figure 4: NT orchard social enterprises – control over production/supply



5.5.2 Marketing the juice

The marketing process for National Trust juice and cider is also straightforward, because the Trust acts monopolistically. The majority of sales for estate-based juice are within Trust outlets at that estate. These outlets take two forms, namely the café/restaurant or the shop. The outlets are separated administratively, with the catering facilities being part of the estate itself, that is, part of the National Trust charity, while the shop is operated by National Trust Enterprises, a limited company and the trading arm of the charity. The social enterprise – the staff/volunteer company – and the café are essentially part of the same structure, namely an individual Trust estate. The enterprise can sell produce directly to the café at a mutually agreeable price and the café will add a mark-up. But where sales are made from the social enterprise to estate shops, the arrangements are more rigid. National Trust Enterprises applies a substantial mark-up formula (usually x2.35) and profits from shop sales may not always be returned directly to the orchard enterprise (or even the estate at which the goods were bought, unless it has trust-in-credit status), although profits will be re-invested back into the Trust overall. An opportunity offered by the café is the ability to stock and sell so-called fresh cider which has a short shelf-life of a few days, compared to bottled cider which will last for 2-3 years. The café outlet can sell both kinds of cider, while the shop will only sell bottled cider. Either way, customers in both scenarios are National Trust visitors.

Still within the Trust, but in addition to sales in official outlets, one estate sells its bottled products to the volunteers who make it, at a small discount. A third sales opportunity is created when individual Trust staff who are involved with the orchard enterprise, personally take produce to external markets and cultural events. It is not completely clear, even for the staff involved, whether or not they do this in an official capacity, or through dedication. During interviews, one estate raised plans to sell bottled juice in local tourist information centres, but eventually found the TIC unsupportive.

The table below provides an overview of the production and marketing circumstances of the five main trading estates in the south-west, from which most empirical data is drawn. Sales/profit data was estimated by interviewees, with varying recourse to accurate

account entries. Notable in the table is the apparently loose relationship between land area and output. The first estate is producing at the rate of about 160 litres per acre, the second about the same, while the fifth manages 250 litres per acre in the production year. A rule-of-thumb estimate of productive capacity[23], based on 40kg of fruit per mature tree, which yields 24 litres of juice, shows that the Trust falls well below its productive capacity. Based on property EA, which has 60 acres of orchards, with an estimated 50 trees per acre, the currently utilised fruit output from per tree is closer to 5kg, although the neglected state of many trees and the naturally occurring inconsistency in annual yield should be noted. The figures are indicative only, and it may be assumed that production will increase eventually, as trees are brought back into management, or newly planted trees become productive. One interesting factor is the overall low level of sales income at this stage, meaning that in most cases the enterprise is not profitable.

Table 4: Orchard social enterprises in the National Trust south west region 2010-11

Estate code	*Orchard area (acres)*	*Output (juice/cider)*	*Marketing model*	*Stated combined profit (or sales) (£)*
EA	60	3,000/6,000	Contract	9,000
EB	20+	2,000/1,000	Contract	(4,000)
EC	$1^1/_4$	500/1,300	DIY	(2,500)
ED	2	1,000/nil	Wholesale	(1,800)
EE	12	3,000/nil	Wholesale	(80)

This section has provided a brief description of the way in which orchards at five NT estates are managed for the production of cider and/or juice. The importance of volunteer labour in this process has been highlighted and three ways of managing the supply chain have been presented, each with varying levels of control (and therefore profit maximization) exercised or abrogated by the Trust. It is acknowledged that these models are porous and that estates may change their levels of control as experiences change.

[23] Simplified figures based on data in Woodward, E. and Merry, K. (eds.) (2010)

The next section begins the critical analysis of the commercial, social and environmental balancing act pursued by the Trust as a potential means to conserve orchards.

5.6 Discussion

Section 5.5 above reflected the way in which five National Trust estates in south-west England manage their orchards and bring products from these to market. This process is designed as way to help maintain orchards for their biodiversity - as was the grant which kick-started or strengthened these efforts - although it also addresses a number of other motivations, such as finding utility for apples and motivating volunteers.

The way in which local Trust social enterprises meet and balance their commercial, environmental and social goals will be reviewed. How does the marketing of products finance orchard conservation and meet corporate aspirations of public engagement which in turn feed demand for products?

5.6.1 Birds and bugs – who is counting?

It seems likely that the potential for increasing production through the economization of Trust orchards will be good for wildlife. Fruit trees are relatively short-lived and both their productivity and longevity can be enhanced by active management such as pruning. Therefore, maintaining orchards in the countryside because they create commercial opportunity seems a good way to secure their future as habitats. Beyond the process of making use of previously abandoned orchard fruits (which, however, provide a winter bonanza for birds) how does the Trust know whether it is fulfilling its environmental mission? In section 5.4, we heard that this mission includes the protection of remaining orchards as a priority habitat, especially for their potential for deadwood invertebrates and lichens. Trust managers also insist that an additional biodiversity facet of orchards is the genetic biodiversity represented by their fruit. Lastly, the landscape contribution orchards make is another environmental contribution. In summary, to meet its environmental agenda, the Trust needs to achieve three goals:

- to increase its knowledge of the ecological value of its orchards
- to protect the range of fruit varieties these hold
- to ensure that orchards on Trust land are well-maintained for wildlife, that is, as multi-structured, productive habitats with connective corridors to other habitats (including orchards) (Robertson et al. 2012)

Every estate is routinely subject to a biological survey.

> *'We have a biological survey team, based at … our HQ. That is a team of entomologists and botanists and also has … different areas of expertise. They … visit every NT property … every 12 years. … they provide management recommendations, as to how to manage each of the habitats.'* (EV, p.4)

However, despite the regularity, employees are under pressure:

> *'Practically, that's not going to happen because the group [survey team] is too small and there are far too many properties … so we … concentrate on sites where there are major changes such as new tenancy …, maybe some major development… I'm working on one that is a National Nature Reserve.'* (EV, p.4) *… 'phew! It's a nigh-on impossible job.'* (EV p.8)

Thus, while the Trust employs its own ecologists, who draft detailed biological records of each estate, they are stretched. There are no designated nature sites within Trust grounds which are also traditional orchards, and, as we heard in section 5.3 above, the Trust does not yet pay close attention to orchards within tenancies. It follows that the regular internal surveys, while valuable as a baseline, are of limited help to rangers who wish to expand orchards or who require more regular insights into biodiversity based on management changes designed to increase juice/cider production. In such cases the PTES surveys will represent a more up-to-date assessment, as will locally organized records. External partners provide management advice to the Trust in specific orchards. For example the Bumblebee Conservation Trust collaborated with the Trust to produce a fact sheet

(Bumblebee Conservation Trust, undated) on bumblebees for private orchard owners, although for Trust orchards the picture is patchy:

> [Do you keep records of wildlife?] *'We keep records on a very low-key, almost anecdotal basis… . We also, every five years, try and do a species list of ground flora. … but I must admit they are not that detailed. Our five-yearly species count probably contains the sorts of things we could feed to into other people.* [Your staff does that count?] *Usually it's volunteers. '*Are there any notable species in the orchards? *'Not off the top of my head. There's nothing humongously rare… the usual sorts of things you'd expect to find…'* (EA, p.3)

Empowered by the Habitat Action Plan (HAP) role and by over £500,000 of environmental grants to help conserve and enhance its extensive traditional orchards, the Trust seems well placed to lead orchard conservation in England, and especially in the south-west. But organizational changes obscure the legacy of the grant scheme and the ability of local managers to champion orchards.

> *'…the Trust is interested in more than nature conservation. … [NT] interest in orchards is nature conservation but on top of that the cultural side of things, the production, the food and farming side, which is a big leader for us… if the Trust is not able to lead on it* [the HAP]*, it's a big worry, because I don't think there is anyone other than the small individual groups in a small area that will be able to take a more strategic lead. But do I honestly think that [NT] will be able to continue to do that? I might be wrong, but the way it's going at the moment, it's unlikely. I don't want to sound too negative but a lot of the things that are happening may not be good for orchards, and possibly for nature conservation, but it this is early days.'* (EV, p. 10)

Genetic diversity is one area of nature conservation where the Trust, with its horticultural expertise, is doing well, as described in section 5.4. Some properties are expanding existing orchards with new plantings because of the contribution the fruit varieties make to the Trust's heritage interests. Knights Hayes, in Dorset, and Hidcote Manor, in Gloucestershire, are NT properties which supply their sister estates with graft-wood. The

Gloucestershire Orchards Group were supported by the Conserving and Enhancing grant for their work with the County Council's mother orchard of local apple and pear varieties, as was the Wiltshire Wildlife Trust, for work in mapping traditional orchards and their varieties and providing management advice to owners.

> *'…there are some orchards or fruit trees or varieties that are vulnerable and trying to reinstate those, and we've got a couple of orchards locally where old varieties have been replanted to try and create a mother orchard [for the county]. The historic element is both the old varieties and the association of orchards with particular properties.'* (EW, p.1)

The picture, then, is of an organization which has many resources at its disposal: large tracts of traditional orchards, specialist staff, repositories of fruit varieties and a network of external allies who can contribute to, and benefit from, data relating to orchard biodiversity in Trust orchards. However, some challenges remain. The Trust itself has a limited ability to focus clearly on orchards when it has a number of financial and social agendas, and a limited capacity to implement national policy, partly as due to its commitment to empowering local managers, for whom orchards may not be a priority. Species rarity, which is the key to scientific and statutory designation, is not likely to help the Trust very much for three reasons. Firstly, systematic records are infrequent. Secondly, the orchards seem not to contain a wealth of rare species, although there have been mistletoe marble moth and noble chafer sightings. In fact, in some properties *'there's an awful lot of mistletoe, which is almost becoming a problem…'* (ED, p.4). Thirdly, local fruit varieties may not always have optimal production qualities:

> *'There's very much this thing that you should plant local heritage varieties to match the area, but a lot of these varieties declined because they weren't that productive.'* (EF, p.2)

Despite these complications in directly linking the marketing of juice with the conservation of orchards, agricultural enterprise does address aspects of the Trust's multiple agendas. The further development of commercial orcharding, in parallel with more existing

conservation approaches, may present a more workable way towards orchard continuity. But what capacity does the Trust have, in the form of local social enterprises, to drive this commercial renaissance?

5.6.2 The commercial picture

For the Trust to have some chance of reviving and expanding commercial husbandry it will require a reliable quantity of fruit (within naturally varying cropping cycles), labour and some external assistance from commercial partners to handle technical, hygiene and production issues, and a market.

5.6.2.1 Labour security

The importance of volunteer labour to NT orchard enterprises has been indicated. Although they work without pay, volunteers are rewarded in at least three ways for their efforts. Firstly, they enjoy their experiences:

> *'It can be very social being out there in a big group picking apples. It's lovely on some days when it's perfect blue skies… Somebody at one of the volunteer sessions said "it's almost spiritual being out there in the orchard."'* (EB, p.10)

Secondly, volunteers learn a range of new skills through practice:

> *'Picking fruit, building and maintaining tree-guards, hedge-laying on the boundaries, fencing, surveying the trees, pruning, photographing, through to dealing with grass collection, cutting, dealing with livestock, dealing with the harvesting, all the pressing, bottling etc. etc. '* (EA p.3)

Thirdly, some volunteers receive a discounted product for the cider they have made. Volunteers represent not only an essential labour-force in the care of orchards and the production of juice or cider, but they become, through regular attendance, skilled at

countryside management techniques, tacitly transferred by professionally trained and qualified Trust staff. Some volunteers come for one-off visits, such as the Princes Trust youth group described earlier. During fieldwork in November 2010, I met and interviewed a volunteer at one property, and picked apples with him a year later. This regularity means volunteers, over time, get a say in the social enterprise.

> *'…really it's been a volunteer-driven project from the start…' (EC p.2) … 'The core workforce, who are my Thursday workforce, whose initially idea it was, they own the project…'* (EC, p.8).

This 'ownership', however, is within the framework of the Trust's operational routines, rather than reflecting formal governance or decision-making power. Volunteers become friends with each other and their NT mentors, who retain responsibility for the orchard enterprise to their managers.

> *'Basically it's run between myself and [my colleague]. We make the decisions but rely heavily on the advice of our retail team, and ultimately the sign-off has to go through our general manager.* [Do volunteers do what they are told?] *Largely, yes, you make it sound very cold, but largely that's correct. …we chat to them and they chat to us, and they've been to other places. …but there's no formal mechanism to sit down and listen to everyone's views. Informally we do that.*' (EA, p.5)

At some properties, another sort of temporary workforce comes from further afield for short-term residential stays, for which they pay.

> [Are volunteers mainly local people?] '*Very much not locals, we have them from all over the country – Scotland, Wales, you name it, we have them.'* [How do Scottish people get to be volunteers here?] '*Through the National Trust website – the working holidays programme. We run a working holiday and they come and help with our cider production. So people from all over the country can come to that. It's residential.'* (EA, p.8)

Volunteers are frequently organized into networks on a sub-county basis. These troupes may travel between properties and gain experience of working in different situations and with different National Trust staff. The network is also a useful communication device revealing that in some cases volunteers are usefully connected.

> *'… through our volunteer network we put a call out to see if anyone had a cider press that we could borrow so that we could make this […] cider. Luckily for us a volunteer knew a local businessman who had this lovely 200 years old cider press and a 150 year old traditional mill, and he said we could borrow it for up to 5 years. He even brought it over for us because he has a lorry haulage firm.'* (EB p.7).

Volunteers then, as happy and in some cases paying workers, are a major asset to the Trust because they immediately remove the pressure which a conventional company would face in terms of labour costs, which are usually the highest proportion of production costs and as such, (as Beckert (2010b) and Marx (*ibid.*) recall) significantly influence the monetary value of the good produced. Volunteers serve another vital purpose to the Trust overall. The Trust's agenda is swinging firmly towards engagement in order to meet its new target of attracting many more members. Consequently, the work of rangers is also changing. Practical tasks which rangers formerly undertook are now increasingly the work of volunteers, under the guidance of junior staff. Therefore, if local orchard enterprises are to succeed, they will rely on a trained workforce which is not employed by the Trust because:

> *'…paid staff are no longer easily able to pursue the same level of practical work as in the past, and the main driver is becoming engagement. Those senior wardens [now renamed rangers] who continue orchards work on their estates are thus individuals who simply love orchards, or who have a supportive manager, or are achieving major engagement gains through orchard work.'* EX, p.2)

In other words, while volunteers also remove labour costs, they present a commercial risk for social enterprise because they are increasingly forming the only skilled orchard

workforce within the Trust. Here, then, we understand the need not just to retain regular local volunteers - usually middle-aged, able-bodied retirees (National Trust 1997, 2004, 2008, 2010[24]), or those seeking future employment with the Trust (although perhaps into increasingly non-practical ranger roles) - but also the younger people coming to the Trust through social programmes, who may wish to learn transferable practical and social skills in alternative educational settings. The regularity of the volunteers is currently secure due to the socio-economic circumstances of these workers, and thanks to the Trust's positive relationship with local charities and civic-minded businesses who can supply a transient workforce. If the Trust's entrepreneurial ambitions succeed in expanding production, the effort that they need to put into retaining and renewing its unpaid workforce may become substantial.

5.6.2.2 National Trust Enterprises

The principal route to market for National Trust orchard products is via its trading arm, National Trust Enterprises (NTE). There is a division within the Trust between properties funded from the centre (general fund) and self-funding properties (trust-in-credit), which must secure the income they need to operate through means including external grants, trading and rental income. In-credit properties have ring-fenced arrangements for income, which means that any money earned is retained within the property's budget, rather than being drawn into the Trust centrally before redistribution. The defining factor of whether or not a property is in-credit is the covenant drawn-up on acquiring a property. In-credit properties are thus more able to directly fund orchard conservation through orchard product sales.

Shops located within properties are managed separately by NTE, by a shop manager and other (including volunteer) staff. Productive orchards are a regional phenomenon and estate-produced cider is largely restricted to the south west, resulting in a limited and localized supply-base:

> *'…selling products from the estate is regarded as a unique selling point for the property and fits in well with the "Going Local" ethos within the Trust.'* (ER, p.3)

[24] National Trust Volunteer Survey reports 1997, 2004, 2008, 2010. In Harflett, N. (forthcoming) PhD Thesis, School of Sociology and Social Policy, University of Southampton.

The popularity of estate-produced cider is illustrated by its availability at other Trust shops within a sub-regional cluster. Therefore, although the estate and NTE are administratively separate, a shared mission and cross-property trading holds good potential for increased sales where some estates are at a more advanced production level than others, or where estates have no orchards.

The best combination to ensure steady returns from retailing and catering to directly fund orchard conservation is a self-sufficient (in-credit) property, with its own outlets. These evidently serve captive but highly receptive customers:

> *'Four pounds seventy-five for a bottle of cider is a fair amount of money and, as I say, at the moment it's flying out of the shop, people are buying more than one.'* (EB, p.8)

While there has been an upsurge in interest in local and alternative food (see for example, Maye and Kirwan 2010) over recent years, Trust shops are additionally successful as local food outlets because in that their customers – a captive audience – adhere to the traits of patrons of charity shops selling mainly or exclusively new goods (Horne and Broadbridge 1993). As members, visitors or ad hoc supporters, Trust shoppers have an affinity with the Trust's aims, the goods available are distinctive (in this case estate-made), and the shop visit forms part of the customer's leisure experience, to great commercial effect. Even so, Trust shoppers are not typical because they are buying souvenirs of their visit, not grocery provisions, and therefore social enterprise sales rely not so much on changing customer practices – although the National Trust is informing these – but on continued visitor (property) throughput. The huge importance of the Trust's engagement agenda is thereby revealed.

> *'Everything we've sold up to date, 95% of it goes through our own shop, so we have 130,000 people come and visit the house every year and that provides a reasonable market. Each one of those are potential customers.'* (EA, p.3)

Orchards are not just sources of cider, but provide other marketable products:

> *'We actually generate more money from mistletoe than we do from apples as a bulk supplier of apples.'* (EE, p.1)

> *'Some windfalls are offered to visitors who are invited to make a donation.'* (ER, p.3)

> *'…hives are situated within our orchards and, yes, the apples that go into making the chutney are the same as those [that] go into the production of our cider… Honey, we sold about 1,200 jars last season and about 400 jars of chutney. Of course we could sell much more of these products, if more could be produced.'* (Property A, supplementary e-mail correspondence 12/05/11)

As described in section 5.5 above, directly-managed orchards hold potential production capacity much larger than the Trust is currently able to realize.

During interviews, some reservations were expressed about the rate of NTE's mark-up, and highlighted in-house cafes as alternative opportunities sales of unprocessed cider, providing greater retention of retail income.

> *'When I sell it [cider] to the shops, Enterprise gets involved. Enterprise is how the shop is run. …* [So what you mean by "getting involved" is that they take a cut?] *A huge cut, a huge cut. …they will buy a bottle of cider from me for £1.75 for a 750ml bottle and they sell it for £4.75, so the shop makes £3 profit and the project doesn't.'* (EB, p.5)

> *'With the cider I sell to the restaurants fresh, so to speak, so I decant it into 15 litre 'manicube' barrels and that's not pasteurised so that goes out to the restaurants fresh. It's sold by the glass in the cafes and restaurants. (EB, p.4)*

In addition to direct supply by the social enterprise, whether to NTE shops or estate cafes, a third route to market is to NTE via external commercial partners.

> *'We've outsourced, the apple juice that we retail is contracted out, so [company] basically receive our apples and they take over the process and then NTE buy the apple juice back, so as far as the gardens department, or the National Trust charity goes, we earn money for the apples, so the bulk, about £120/tonne for 3-4 tonnes of apples, but in the scheme of things NTE get the bulk once they have put on their mark-up. This is not the ideal set-up really for us, because it's quite a lot of work going in for little return. What I think would be better is if a proportion of that went into the conservation of the orchards primarily.'* (EE, p.4)

A presumed advantage of such outsourcing might be the abrogation of supply administration from the social enterprise to the commercial press, which takes on the job of supplying NTE shops. This arrangement however, reduces the income the social enterprise receives, because the added value is lost in favour of the commercial press, and paperwork obligations still exist where social enterprises are obliged to buy back juice from a press before onward sales to NTE shops.

> *'They [NTE] say that we have to sell the apples to a producer and they then sell it back to us [as juice]. We retail it at about £3 a bottle, but I can't remember the wholesale price… something like £1.80. It's a real nightmare, I thought it would be so easy to pay somebody to juice it all and then bring it back to me, and then I distribute it to the shops, but that doesn't work nowadays – you've got paper-trails and god-knows-what.' (ED, p.5) …*

Despite the administrative and income challenges, one clear advantage of outsourcing to a press which can take on direct supply is that the business risk for the social enterprise stops at the point of apple supply. The second quotation reveals some ambivalence towards NTE applying a generous mark-up, resulting in a high retail price compared to locally produced cider in conventional grocers (which is around £3 a bottle). Yet for some,

including the head ranger in the following excerpt, a balance is achieved between the increased effort of dealing with internal structures - including but not exclusively NTE (*'The way NTE works is incredibly complex.'* ED, p.4) - and the pleasure of the orcharding task:

> [Given that you're busy and it's another burden, what makes you motivated to do it?] *I enjoy it and the volunteers really enjoy it. I find it incredibly satisfying. So much of the day job is grind of going through paperwork, to have something like this to involve people with is a fun thing to do, it really makes it satisfying and worthwhile. It motivates you.'* (EC, p.3)

> *'You've got to balance cider-making and all this orchards work with everything I have to do. Although I've said it's a volunteer-driven enterprise, it's me that has to do a lot of the leg-work, sorting out talking to customs and excise, environmental health, and various parts of the NT need to know that we're doing it in a sustainable, hygienic way. The shop and catering enterprises give us various hoops to jump through to meet their demands.' (ED, p.5)*

Nevertheless, local autonomy allows some shop managers to reduce their mark-up rate for local estate-produced goods (for example, from a 2.35 multiple mark-up to double at property EA). Ultimately, wholesale income from NTE shops alone cannot generate enough to fund the management of the orchard.

> *'The biggest business risk for a project such as this, is that it's not necessarily sustainable. … we've got plenty of apples, but we are always going to have to have revenue to get the apples [commercially] pressed, bottled and pasteurised, for the levels we make, I can't do that myself. … It's different with the cider because we mill that here on site and press that on site and we ferment it here. … So unless we can become self-funding and self-sufficient, we'll run at a loss.'* (EB, pp.7-8)

In looking ahead to forthcoming chapters, I suggest that a difference in self-perception between the English and German approaches is that the Trust sees the entrepreneurial

activity of marketing juice as an internal *project* – funded and pursued as an element of a wide range of other tasks by multi-functional staff and volunteers. Local Trust employees aspire to sell enough juice to finance the project. In contrast, the German schemes are separately constituted from the parent organization to allow an independent focus on commercial endeavours in favour of increased producer income.

Despite the free labour, the partnership with regional commercial processors for the production of high quality drinks, the commercial flexibility and regulatory rigour of NTE and, not least, a committed and captive custom, a sense of proportion is needed, as we hear from a regional member of NTE[25]:

> *…most orchard products are well-sold but… each product has to earn its keep, that is, justify its shelf-space. It may be desirable to sell more of a certain product, but it is important to consider this product in relation to overall sales. Cider may sell reasonably well but not as well as biscuits and jams. The question arises: is the demand for cider likely to last in the future? It may prove necessary to market cider beyond the property to expand sales.* (ER, p.4).

This section has described the wholesale relationships in marketing orchard products and highlighted the inconsistencies linked with the financial status of individual properties. For in-credit properties the relationship with the shop is a convenient arrangement, even if retail profits do not always filter back directly to the orchard. For centrally funded properties, the job of funding orchards through sales is harder and the property may not wholesale value-added products, but lower-value bulk apples to a commercial press. Social enterprises, due to charity regulations, can sell directly to their catering outlets, thus channelling income back more directly into orchard schemes. This highlights the point that all Trust orchard social enterprises are not separately constituted but are an element of the charity. Another distinction between the two sales arenas is that cafés can sell unpasteurised ('fresh') cider with a limited shelf-life to diners, while shops require pasteurised bottled products with long shelf-lives. Other forms of marketing outside the Trust do occur, although these rely on the motivations and, occasionally, the personal connections of individual staff.

[25] Interviewee reporting views expressed by regional colleagues.

5.6.3 The social mission

The social capital reproduced in the process of managing orchards and marketing their juice is evident from many excerpts, for example where educational activities simultaneously represent orchard labour. This social type of work is also a source of camaraderie, inspiration and refuge. The Trust's aim to improve a feeling of connection with more British citizens can be understood not just in hopes to recruit more members, but in the light of the external social connections facilitated through public use of Trust assets, including orchards. The next quotation demonstrates a merging of social and environmental goals, through engagement with external parties:

> *'one of them up in the Lake District, in Cumbria, Sizergh Castle, they've got quite good links with a couple of local orchard groups there… the Northern Fruit Group, the South Lakeland Orchard Group, and they host training workshops …but also for fruit ID. …[Estate] have primary school groups coming out to the orchard and they will learn about the different aspects of the ecology of the orchards.'* (ET, p.2)

Within the Trust, however, there is evidence of a less tangible grasp about what social benefits emerge from reviving orcharding, beyond the attainment of corporate ambitions on engagement. In the following excerpt, a NT officer describes how one of the subject social enterprises has benefited from the combination of two grants, and gives a subjective view of what has been achieved there:

> '*They've got a huge amount of visitor engagement, they're just engaging local people brilliantly. …there was probably at least 15-20 people … picking apples and transporting them over to this crusher and … from there to the cider press to get juice. Brilliant engagement really… There's a bloke [a warden] … and he's running […] community orchard and he's brilliant. He's so into community engagement and the orchard is an engagement tool for him and he has used it to bring local people together, he got them involved in wassailing... . Yes, they got food product out of it, but actually it's a really lovely social initiative as well.'* (EU p.2)

Initially, this enthusiastic commentator, based at HQ, describes members of a regular volunteer group. At this estate, while grants helped to increase output, production predated the grants. Then, the 'brilliant' warden illustrates how the Trust not only uses orchards within estates to attract visitors in, but makes them available to the local community for social events, although there is no reflection by the speaker on whether the community orchard is a response to local demand, or a proactive Trust initiative.

Social targets present tensions to other goals, especially where these are tied to funding programmes, including, but not exclusive to the *Conserving and Enhancing…* grant.

> *'I suppose we've got a similar balancing act within [my project], really. [Public funder] want to achieve behaviour change and what the National Trust organizationally want to achieve is a fun time for visitors that come to properties, and some of the properties involved are selling their produce. … There's a community advantage for the local people who get involved in the volunteer project on the ground.'* (EU, p.6)

In this section, the National Trust sees its social mission as educational, leisure-oriented and a way to provide local people with activities linking food, stately homes and the countryside. The regularity of participation and the popularity of events and of orchard produce, evidenced by sales, is testament that the Trust is succeeding in its social mission, although paternalistic (warden-led) approaches occasionally shine through.

Having surveyed the environmental, commercial and social settings of orchard social enterprises, it seems the act of balancing multiple goals is not entirely successful. Environmental objectives, if anything, seem the least prominent, overshadowed by ambitions to engage - local communities, visitors, the wider public – in a sense of public stakeholding in the Trust, without a clear idea of how people engage in conservation or commerce, beyond volunteering or shopping. The reliance by the Trust on volunteers for maintenance work is evident. Much of the latest data on orchard wildlife have come from bodies other than the Trust. Despite exciting efforts to produce high-quality and sellable products, as well as (collectively and individually) fairly extensive and productive estates,

output is very low. Finally, nature conservation grants have kick-started or bolstered economic innovations. To explain these contradictions in the Trust, we return to theory.

5.7 Analysis

Does the trading of orchard products succeed in helping the Trust conserve its nationally scarce orchard landscapes in a region where they are most concentrated, and protect the diversity of the species (including fruit varieties) which inhabit them? The answer to this question is: no. There are some caveats, such as for property C, where, we recall, there are few orchards across the estate and none attached to any particular property falling within its extent; orchards are not locally or historically typical in this pocket of the region.

At the local level within the Trust, successful work on orchards depends on a number of key social and structural ingredients which include staff support and capacity, long-term volunteers and the availability of property-based outlets which benefit from being able to monopolise retail and catering customers. Questions arise about the ability of some properties to develop their orcharding ambitions in the absence of further grant investment. In one case a grant paid for a consultants' feasibility study on the marketing orchard produce. Recommendations have been only marginally taken forward, mainly due to staff capacity issues, as members of NT staff reconsider the hygiene liabilities of juice compared to cider production, and their capacity to engage in production over visitor engagement.

In chapter 3, the concept of fields was introduced as a way to explain the social outcomes which occur when actors change market structures or introduce new ideas, in response to their relative position to competitors and collaborators. The notion that market institutions, ideas, and the people running businesses, all interact with, and affect one another helps to explain why the National Trust is not yet fully able to secure orchard conservation through social enterprise. In the following diagram Beckert's suggestions for analysis are overlain on data from one trading National Trust property.

Figure 5: The social enterprise field for property EA



In the figure above, the National Trust appears as a network, reflecting its collective social capitals which are constituted of professional property-based staff (such as rangers), specialist ecological (and other) advisors, volunteers and paying worker-tourists who form the backbone of the labour-force, as well as the staff in shops and cafes, who sell products to visitors, mainly National Trust supporters. These latter also play an important participatory role in, and moral support for, apple or orchard events hosted by the Trust to promote public engagement at a property.

Additionally, within the network, the supportive managing group of the Orchards Habitat Action Plan who set up Orchard Link appears. Orchard Link is a web-based information and publicity hub for people interested in traditional orchards. National Trust Enterprises (NTE) is also represented. NTE's commercial imperatives take precedence over the wildlife objectives of the social enterprise at property EA, because of tensions between their missions. NTE must maximise a commercial profit which releases unrestricted

income to the NT charity. Although orchard products from the estate are stocked in a special section of the shop at property A, these goods sit within a great range of other non-food and non-local products, some of which attract greater custom. Cider and juices sell well at the shop within property EA, however, their sales income is a marginal proportion of total shop earnings. Expansion of production would change this, although restrictions in network capacity (labour) and other institutional factors (tax thresholds for cider production), hobble the ability of the network to expand production.

Because extensive orchards are owned by the Trust, it is feasible that orchard conservation could be effected through *non-entrepreneurial* means, namely by nature reserve designation based on invertebrate content linked to deadwood and parasitic mistletoe species. In this respect, a complication linked to Beckert's field framework emerges, namely that the National Trust is also a national institution, once its non-enterprising orchard interests are considered. But this point also reinforces the limited effect that social enterprise as a means of conserving nature currently exerts.

It is the institutional and financial support for the Trust from Natural England which has enabled orchard revitalisation in the first place (with some initial resistance from smaller groups who saw the Trust gain public money to, essentially, support its own estates). Grants were allocated to the National Trust due to its potential capacity to enhance conservation performance in orchards (arising, in some cases, from social enterprise), based on the extent of the habitat under Trust stewardship. In this way, the collective experience and productive progress of what can be considered a Trust meta-network, both benefits from, and is restricted by, the institutional boundaries of Natural England as the main funder of the *Conserving and Enhancing Traditional Orchards, England* project. The support from Natural England has provided a considerable boost to orchard conservation objectives in England, mainly through the National Trust estate. As old orchards are revitalized or replanted, future supply potential is affected.

Individual property managers and rangers may not, however, be able to keep up orchard management without successful and expanding social enterprise because, under the cognitive realm of localism, each property-based project must be self-financing. At property A, the motor of the social enterprise comes from the team of two full-time rangers.

Should management change the time these rangers are able to devote to orchards, or were one or both of them to leave, orchard conservation – and the expansion of production – might not be prioritised.

The National Trust, then, is clearly an effective and productive network, which generates entrepreneurial ideas and retail opportunities internally. Externally, it has presented itself as an influencer over institutional power, although it has also seen its networks shaped, at least in the short-term, by the imperatives of the conservation establishment and it is unclear how effective these networks will remain post-grant (and as HAP-processes become nationally reviewed from 2012). Entrepreneurial ideas have led to production of juice and cider, honey and chutneys, sales of mistletoe. The prevailing cognitive frame of localism enables the Trust to work successfully in three spheres of contemporary interest: (i) the 'quality turn' around local food, has helped the Trust sell regionally valorised orchard products at high prices; (ii) the social cohesion agenda, now embedded in the Big Society ideology, chimes well with the convivial, tacitly-trained, regular volunteer labour-force; and (iii) local autonomy which privileges local priorities over central NT policy. On the other hand, given its limited contact with the wider rural economy, the door to new cognitive frames could be restricted by the Trust's localised ability to market products, given constrained human and financial resources, and competing heritage and visitor priorities. Furthermore, the commonly reflected view among staff – that orchard enterprises are a valuable engagement tool but a largely non-commercial 'project' - restricts enterprises within their current capacities, or forces them to expand with help from outside the current network, resulting in changes in the institutional sphere (e.g. through tax liabilities) and through stakeholder and social enterprise governance reforms.

5.8 Conclusions

Having discussed the various outcomes of orchard enterprise through the lens of fields, we can now begin to see how the National Trust's activities in marketing orchard products affects market order – that is equilibrium and stability achieved by the co-ordination of competition, value and co-operation.

Our starting position has been that there is disequilibrium in the market for juice from traditional orchards. In England, this is because (i) agricultural supply values of apples are low and (ii) the supply capacity of traditional orchards is low. Secondly, while customer demand is high, and an ethical premium (Gourevitch in Beckert and Aspers 2011) helps redistribute economic resources back towards the mission, it is the format of retail which affects the value of the product much more than the cost of labour – which is free. While the Trust improves its competitive position through product differentiation (winning regular awards for quality), it faces two competitive problems. Firstly, retail monopoly and co-operative (supportive) custom, are undermined by competition from other non-Trust goods within its own shops. Secondly, restricting its market to be a visitor-based market both limits demand and supply (which are not currently in balance) and limits opportunities for co-operation with other market actors, institutions and cognitive frames.

The Trust does not yet manage to fulfil its environmental mission through social enterprise. Instead it uses limited trade of orchard products as one of several platforms (or projects) to stimulate a highly popular, engaging and vibrant social and educational network, which raises the Trust's profile (with members and local presses), and that of traditional orchards as compelling and beautiful landscapes. To put it another way, engagement (the social mission) is prioritized in the balancing act which is National Trust orchard social enterprise.

Chapter 6 – Supply chain brokerage: the networked market in southern Germany

'The competitive disadvantage of heterogeneous well-structured landscapes needs to be compensated if their social and ecological functions should persist in the long term.' (Schönhart et al. 2011)

'…if I want to conserve orchards through economic husbandry, then I need €20 for 100kg [of apples], or rather that's what the farmer needs, then it will be sufficient. … that's do-able, you just have to organise it…'(GA, p.7)

6.1 Introduction

The preceding chapter explored how the National Trust, through the efforts of five local estates in south-west England, attempt to market juice, cider and other orchard products to visitors to those estates. Three variations of a National Trust estate social enterprise 'model' were illustrated. From a commercial perspective, these efforts are barely viable, and the environmental mission of funding orchard management through sales is dependent on administrative arrangements for each estate. On the other hand, the Trust, with help from the state and other conservation groups, has created a reliable base-line of knowledge about the extent of surviving traditional orchards, and is actively engaged in efforts to replant and maintain them. Limited production but extensive publicity and public engagement – not least as volunteer labour - has created interest in orchards and a demand for a high-priced premium product, sold to willing visitors who wish to capture, or embody, the Trust's values within their souvenir purchase of juice or cider.

The coming chapter will build a contrast to the National Trust's experience of balancing social enterprise goals. In the chapter, social enterprises set up by German conservation NGOs also aim to conserve orchards but they attempt this within existing, commercial, market structures in their locales, to broker what I have called the networked-market model of social enterprise. This name arises from the way that social enterprises seem to

re-organise the connections within an existing supply chain and between market actors to secure environmental and social outcomes.

While the National Trust generally controls its own supply chain, the networked market is a result of brokerage by social enterprises which hold negligible material assets and, where they exercise any control over supply chain operations, it is as a result of small quantities of direct trading. In two of the three cases featured here, the profit made from direct sales is around €3,000 a year. Directly held assets are not central to the operation of the enterprise, because the networked-market social enterprises make use of assets held by third parties.

This does not preclude the production of large quantities of juice and the mobilisation of social, political and cultural assets as a result of the interventions they initiate. The networked-market is, I argue, one way to calibrate the factors that Beckert (2010) suggests need to be organised to create market order – co-operation, competition and value – largely within *existing* commercial supply chain structures.

This chapter now proceeds as follows: firstly, in section 6.2, after introducing the data sources, we revisit Beckert's (*ibid.*) positions on the need to resolve fundamental market 'problems' through the co-ordination of actors' views. This framework of analysis holds the key to explaining the national embeddedness of social enterprise actions in Germany, and goes some way to avoiding common epistemological pitfalls in social enterprise research (see Nicholls 2010, below). Then, in 6.3, a discussion of the historical development of German approaches to nature and landscape conservation further frames the differences of those displayed by the National Trust. A German understanding of the qualities of orchards as important cultural landscapes and as sources of food for home provision helps to legitimate the present intervention of NGOs in local markets as an unremarkable, if enterprising, contemporary development. The role of the state as both an active and commercial partner in orchard conservation further distinguishes Germany from the English example, where in the latter the state has principally been a grant provider. The discussion, however, also reinforces some perspectives on the nebulous nature of local social enterprises emerging from the third sector (Teasdale 2009, 2010; Buckingham et al. 2010), because some are separately incorporated and others are unincorporated alliances.

Thereafter, in 6.4, I present a field analysis of empirical data using Beckert's institutions-networks-cognition framework, followed, under 6.5, by a conclusion that, rather than simply complicating the social enterprise 'juggling act', the adoption of an environmental mission helps to co-ordinate market problems. Even so, the analysis again raises some conceptual challenges. In the preceding chapter, it was not a straightforward task to assign field categories to the National Trust, because the Trust can be cast in more than one structure (network *and* institution). In this chapter, we see that social enterprises in the networked-market model do not to pursue positions of market power. They also actively avoid competition with commercial players, relying instead on the infrastructures and commercial networks in the private sector, to get juice from traditional orchards to market. The social enterprises examined in this chapter manage to transform commercial partnerships into *co-operative civil alliances* by gathering supply chain actors, state and NGO activists around an environmental mission – orchard conservation.

6.2 Introducing the networked-market

Two conceptual contributions emerged from the previous chapter. Firstly, we heard how economic sociology highlights the social structures embedded in market exchange as evidence that market actors are not always 'rational'. Secondly, empirical data drew out the micro-economic foundations for action (Beckert 2012) within individual social enterprises. In other words, we heard about the institutional, social, cultural and policy contexts that inform social enterprise decision-making. We will now develop this second point on the foundation of action with recourse to data relating to three social enterprise approaches to marketing apple juice, as a vehicle for nature conservation.

Beckert's (2007, 2010) position is that all market actors, under which social enterprises can be ranked, are faced with three fundamental problems, which are the alignment of co-operation, competition and value. Actors must co-ordinate their understandings to achieve stability and order in a market. The notion of market order is a contested pre-occupation of Beckert's. Anthony Giddens (1976, cited in Kurtuluş 2012), for example, rejects order as a principal sociological concern in favour of other empirical and theoretical concerns, such as industrial change, modernity or capitalism. Kurtuluş Gemici (2012) has articulated this,

and other concerns, namely that Beckert (2010) does not adequately appreciate purely economic influences on market order, such as interest rates (Gemici 2012).

These critiques do not, however, help in the task of understanding how individual (micro-scale) social enterprises intervene in local market situations to attempt to change their environmental influences. Further critiques indicate that it is impossible to glean macro-insights from social entrepreneurship because the whole field of study is dominated by hero-celebration and the study of ideal business models (Nicholls 2010). The strength of Beckert's framework here, therefore, is to generate new knowledge about the way that social enterprises affect the problem of market co-ordination rather than simply adding to the descriptions of social entrepreneurship case studies. Beckertian micro-analysis, I suggest, helps understand the way in which social enterprise interventions create new reciprocal relationships within a local market where they did not exist before, and which have palpable environmental results.

This section introduces findings from three case studies conforming in slightly different ways to the networked-market model. This model is not suggested as an idealised business model, rather it is way of graphically tracing social enterprise strategies of market intervention to create new, and more, reciprocal market relations. The case studies in question have few material assets and no direct control over the supply chain, but seek to reorganise the market in favour of the farmer, in order that s/he will be financially incentivised to manage orchards for wildlife.

We see these three schemes as social enterprises because:

(i) they seek market-based solutions to their mission
(ii) they themselves engage in trading activity (selling to NGO supporters), profits from which they use to finance their market-based strategies
(iii) the changes they effect by altering market dynamics result in changing social relations between market actors, and in the social values of orchards.

6.2.1 Co-ordination problems and the networked-market

This section begins by briefly describing the co-ordination ‘problems’ faced by three case study social enterprises conforming to the networked market model.

6.2.1.1 Value, co-operation and competition

Firstly, the value problem concerns the fact that farmers of traditional orchards are inadequately incentivised by contemporary market conditions. There is not enough material return from selling apples for farmers to bother keeping them. In addition, commercial farmers will have experienced increases in production costs from environmental regulations relating to animal welfare and sanitary costs. The combined result is what Renting et al. (2003) call the structural ‘squeeze’ in economic margins. The effect on orchards has been that other land uses are turned to, or orchards are left to fall. Here we see that the environmental and economic logic of the orchard clash, resulting, predictably, in the prevailing of the economic arguments. However, in time, the loss of orchards will lead to the loss of local apple supplies, forcing processors to seek them elsewhere, with associated commercial consequences. Awareness of this eventuality is not lost on the Germans, as the section on state interventions will testify. Meanwhile, data suggest that the loss of productive traditional and garden orchards has been dramatic: from 18 million trees in 1965 to around 9 million in 2009 in Baden-Württemberg (MELR 2009, p.5); and from 20 million down to 9 million in Bavaria over roughly the same period (LWG 2006, p.3), representing regional declines of 50% and 45% respectively.

Secondly, co-operation along the supply chain is inadequate. We heard earlier of the German predilection for apple juice, sated in Baden-Württemberg alone by the contributions of 120 juice processors (MLR 2009, p.5). Even so, thirsty consumers do not adequately support traditional orchards, even where these are common cultural landscapes, because hitherto, there has been no way of qualifying the juice they drink as a contribution to orchard management supporting nature.

Thirdly, competition arises in the form of more lucrative land uses (house-building and equine culture present two common solutions to an uneconomic old orchard) and uses which do not require the regular application of relatively technical husbandry skills, which

in any case are fading (pruning, grafting, grassland husbandry, seasonal grazing). Competition also arises from undistinguished juices, or from cheaply priced juiced made from reconstituted and imported concentrates available in highly competitive supermarkets. The additional retail benefit of supermarkets over purchasing from a press, is that the whole household shop can be added to the cart, along with the apple juice. Changes in retail trends in favour of supermarkets are well-documented in Europe and create polarised opinions (Guy 1998, Dawson 2004, Blythman 2004, Kraft and Mantralla, 2010). Despite these competitive factors, the social enterprises in the networked-market do not compete themselves; in fact they avoid competitive roles because their own actions *in* the market are limited. Instead they can be seen more accurately as influencers *of* the market. The figure below describes this market situation that social enterprises try to reconfigure:

Figure 6: Juice production and marketing via a commercial press



Here, the press plays a central role in the supply chain. It buys fruit from its local suppliers. Suppliers can be farmers and householders. It is usual for apples to be delivered by the supplier and, after quality checks and washing, fruit is pressed in volume batches into juice.

Having set out the problems of co-ordination in conventional markets for apple juice in Germany, the question arises: what drives environmental organisations towards social enterprise as a way of solving co-ordination problems?

Nature conservationists with an interest in species and habitats found within farmed (cultural) landscapes face a difficulty: the owners of such habitats, including traditional orchards, may struggle to realise a rent from them. This is a fundamental concern where cultural landscapes and their associated biodiversity have slowly emerged from long-term landscape history (Vos and Meeks 1999), but are now facing very rapid changes from

urbanisation, agricultural intensification and recreation. In Germany, some NGOs recognised that change must be managed through the commercial sphere, as this quotation from the web-site of GA reveals (anonymity retained):

> *'Traditional orchards enhance our region even today. But this idyll is threatened. The unprofitable tall-stemmed apple and pear trees are falling. How can the remaining orchards be retained? Perhaps through another expensive conservation management strategy? Several local BUND and NABU groups recognised a better way as early as 1987: the farmer must again find orcharding rewarding.'*

This is an important analytical and definitional point when seeking to explain the work of social enterprises in the absence of regulatory and governance conformity. In chapter 2 we heard how German social enterprises have prescribed social roles allocated to them by the welfare state. The entrepreneurial efforts discussed here are clearly not captured by such prescriptions. Instead, we recognise in them 'organisations seeking business solutions to social problems' and whose 'assets and wealth are used to create community benefit' (Thompson and Doherty 2006). German NGOs have identified the need for a business solution to the ecological challenge of orchard loss. In the networked-market model case studies in this chapter, minimal material assets are held by the social enterprise organisation, which instead tries to redirect the assets and wealth held by market actors to serve an environmental mission.

In the simplest terms, the principle used by more or less all orchard social enterprises, including those I visited, involves asking consumers to pay a small premium for environmentally qualified juice, in order to fund a premium for supplying apples. The system is called *Aufpries*, or price premium. In other words, *Aufpreis* is a reallocation of material resources from one end of the supply chain (consumers) to the other (farmers). In the earlier market illustration, the price paid by the press for apples is around €5-10 per 100kg, based on global market prices, and tending in recent years to hover around €6-7, in comparison to the optimal price incentive of €20 (Miller 2010). In areas of South Württemberg, some social enterprise schemes are coming close, negotiating €18. The intervention, once organised, changes the relationships evident in the market, as we see in the illustration below:

Figure 7: Networked market supply chain model



In the diagram, the simplified supply chain with the commercial press at its centre is retained. Farmers still supply their apples to the press, which turns them into juice, for sale through market channels via existing distribution networks. The interventions of the social enterprise, however, are now variously brought to bear:

(i) with the press – by negotiating a higher supply price to the farmer which the press must initially carry as an enhanced cost and risk; and by introducing to the press a niche product associated with qualities originating from wildlife rich traditional orchards. The social enterprise will also buy a proportion of this juice for retail to its supporters in the NGO, creating an operational margin.

(ii) with the farmer – who benefits from the higher supply cost only by agreeing under contract with the social enterprise to manage orchards in a way conducive to nature conservation (which in turn qualifies the juice).

(iii) with the parent NGO – from which officers and subscribing members form the separate and independent social enterprise (distancing any trading risk from the NGO).

(iv) with NGO members – who buy the juice and work as volunteers to promote orchard conservation at public events, to councils and to local businesses. Meetings, trade and community fairs, canteens and seasonal promotions may offer juice as refreshments or gifts. The resultant new demand may be satisfied via the usual distribution networks. NGO members also volunteer on farms contracted with the social enterprise, for example for planting or pruning days.

The environmental result of these interventions is that orchards, via their economic revival and social valuation, once again become actively managed, to the benefit of wildlife. Table 8 provides an overview of the number of producers who are contracted to management regimes as a result of *Aufpries* schemes instituted by environmental NGOs using the networked-market approach described. Also detailed are the ways in which environmental monitoring is carried out.

Table 5: Summary details of anonymous case studies GA, GB, and GC

Case study	**Host NGO**	**Suppliers**	**Part'cip Press**	**Output (l)**	***Aufpreis* rate 2011**	**Market channels**	**Envir'mt monitoring**
GA	FoE	100 farmers	2	600,000 of which 10,000 directly traded by the SE	€17.80	Specialist retail Wholesale NGO members Comm'ty events Supermarket franchises	Fruit, leaf, juice and soil inspection. Organic inspection. Management advice. Vol practical work. Free or cheap trees.
GB	NABU	17 farmers	1	15,000	€16.00	NGO members Drinks retailer School	As A minus 3 largest members, who left to go organic direct with press.
GC	AONB equiv	60 house-holders/ orchard owners	1	7,000	€16.00	Member press Slow Food pubs, cafes etc SE Members	Organic only, group certification. Vol management help. Mother orchard and field classroom.

From an environmental perspective, it is clear that the three schemes described in this chapter have contractually tied 177 individuals who own orchards to prescribed ecological management methods. Because traditional orchards are not habitually sprayed or artificially fertilized, organic conversion is not a big leap – other than administratively – for farmers:

'…it's not a problem for the land owner to convert, he doesn't have to change anything in his husbandry. I only have to let my orchard be organically certified, I don't have to convert my whole farm business…' (GA, p.9)

There are, therefore, three direct environmental outcomes from social enterprise market intervention in the networked-market. Firstly, farmers enhance management for biodiversity; secondly, incentivisation means that orchards stay in the landscape (and thereby retain habitat connectivity); and participating farmers are supported by NGOs to become organically certified. The table provides details of the enhanced supply prices offered through each scheme which reward the farmer or householder for this management practice.

Aufpreis is not the only factor leading to the saving of traditional orchards, as detailed analysis of the case studies in this and the next chapter will reveal. It results from a bundle of activities including public outreach work, state supports, self-provisioning and social engagement with conservation work. But the bundle is facilitated by social enterprise and the common goal is conservation:

'…we can very clearly prove that there has hardly been any retreat in Streuobst orcharding in our district in the last 20 years.' (GA, p.13)

6.2.2.2 Aufpreis in comparison with other NGO-led value labels

In many respects, *Aufpreis* is a version of the NGO-inspired, social enterprise system of fair-trade that is increasingly applied to imported commodities such as coffee, tea and cocoa. Fair-trade is a market-based solution to creating social change by securing a voluntary retail premium on the product. This serves to mitigate the inadequate supply price habitually faced by commodity producers, causing and sustaining their poverty. An important similarity between the two valuation schemes is that, in both cases, it is the buyer (the coffee roaster or the apple press) who pays for the costs associated with accreditation, not the farmer (Leigh Taylor 2005). This alleviates one of the causes of the 'squeeze' in economic margins for producers.

However there are some key distinctions between *Aufpreis* and fair trade. Firstly, fair-trade is a way to personalise and localise farmers' identities and community

circumstances within a global commodity chain (*ibid.*). *Aufpreis* supports local farmers via supply premiums, but localises only their environmental identity. The social position of farmers is enhanced not through personal profiles in the market place, but through active civil involvement in managing local orchards (more accessible to consumers than coffee plantations), and personal bonds may develop as a result. The market for the juice is largely local in the first place, and remains so, and the economic first-aid which farmers receive through *Aufpreis* is a means to protect the environmental value of orchards not, as fair trade primarily is, a social justice end.

Secondly, and in common with organic production, fair-trade requires an institutional certification structure to guarantee its integrity, wherein lies its marketable added-value. Through the efforts of NABU, a national criteria for orchard husbandry and juice quality, with an associated label (see section 6.4.2.1 below) has been developed and adopted by most *Aufpreis* schemes. While two of the three cases explored here use only organic apples, verification of the NABU (as opposed to EU-prescribed organic) criteria are unequally implemented. This is partly, as stated, because some juice schemes are organic and others are not; it is also explained by a high degree of civic co-ordination (Renard 2003), namely the acknowledgement, and strengthening, of local ties among actors that allow them to adhere to a set of common principles. In other words, unlike fair trade, the set of principles within *Aufpreis* are locally agreed, even though national NGO-criteria, or EU-level organic criteria offer a more standardised basis for action. *Aufpreis* is, in short, a form of fair-trade because it shares features, mechanisms and objectives with global commodity certification schemes, but its key distinctions lie in the local nature of product, of the market and the social relations between consumers, producers and other supply chain actors.

In this respect, in pursuing the valorization of local products, *Aufpreis* shares some features with the Slow Food movement. Like Slow Food, *Aufpreis* also celebrates the triangulation between taste (a result of apple variety), culture (production, consumption and landscape) and biodiversity (Jones et al. 2003). We will see, in section 6.4.2.2, how enterprise GC has benefitted from the existence of a municipal engagement with Slow Food.

Slow Food emerged in Italy in the 1980s as a reaction against fast food, as the embodiment of the ‘dark side’ of an industrialized food system that combines the erosion of the relationship between the producer and the consumer with the reduction of catering and eating to an efficient, standardized and quick experience (Schlosser 2001, Petrini

2001). The expression of the opposite, namely convivial dining on foods with cultural meaning that exude gastronomic pleasure and enhanced by an understanding of the geography and methods of artisanal production, has become an important aspect of the local and alternative food scene, particularly among urban consumers (Pietrykowski, 2004).

Differences between Slow Food and *Aufpreis*, however, are evident in the generally rural, or at least provincial, consumer-base of *Aufpreis* marketing schemes. Furthermore, apple juice social enterprises in Germany try to co-ordinate market actors in order to change the economic balances and environmental outcomes flowing from of the local market. By contrast, Slow Food is an oppositional lifestyle philosophy grounded in form food hedonism (ibid.), considered by its adherents to be well worth paying for (ibid.).

Finally, *Aufpreis* can be viewed as a locality-based labeling scheme, of which many have emerged over the past two decades. In the discussions played out in chapter 2, it was suggested that one way in which both the Alternative Food Movement and, by appropriation, the corporate food industries value certain foods is by valorizing their geographical qualities, allowing a greater proportion of consumers' retail prices to be returned to the producer. State actors have also fostered local identity schemes as part of their attempts to promote gastronomy-led rural economic development while side-stepping the potential difficulties associated with juggling state-subsidy for social and environmental dimensions and commercial competition.

Precisely because many local food labeling schemes have emerged from the state, private and third sector alliances, it is harder to clearly identify locality labels with NGOs, although the narratives around the value of local and artisanal were informed by the organic and the Slow Food movements and their allies.

Terroir-type labels rest on the idea that within some foods, peculiar constellations of place, knowledge, climate, soil and a range of other attributes conspire to produce a locally distinctive or unique product. If these attributes can be identified and distinguished, they can be better marketed towards consumer perceptions of, for example, authenticity (Sonnino 2007), territoriality (Ilbery et al. 2005, Parrott et al. 2002), health (Lappalainen et al. 1998) and relationships with producers (Whetherell et al. 2003). Such labels are also useful to reflect not just the uniqueness of the food but also of the place of origin and may be linked to rural tourism initiatives.

Labels may be initiated by a hierarchy of authorities, leading to heterogeneity in controls and values associated with them. Locality is not certified in the same structural ways as fair-trade and organics, and local schemes may depend on public finance, resulting in temporary schemes and variation in non-standardised certification controls. For example, the EU awards three designations covering place (Protected Geographical Indication), quality of local ingredients as a guarantee of authenticity (Protection of Designated Origin) and traditional continuity (Traditional Speciality Guarantee). National labeling schemes pertaining to regional and local products are familiar from a number of wine producing countries. Labels distinguishing products from protected landscapes (such as *Level's Best* in the Somerset wetlands and moors), complement those linked to the location of food businesses (such as the Drei Löwen-Klassifizierung which classifies high-value foods produced by firms in Baden-Württemberg).

Aufpreis schemes may, therefore, conform to a number of locality and quality labels at various scales and scopes of interest. Yet what *Aufpries* offers, over and above these other labels is, firstly, a direct link between retail premium, quality and habitat/landscape which may be applied to any (rather than to a protected) area containing traditional orchards. In other words, *Aufpreis* is a way of tracing very specific place-based environmental credentials of fruit products. Consumers of *Aufpreis* products are supporting tall-trees, distinctive fruit varieties, and particular types of traditional and ecological land management within their own localities.

To summarise, *Aufpreis* is a market tool applied by social enterprises to raise the supply price local farmers receive for apples grown in specific orchard types. These social enterprises can be understood as initiatives of NGOs, or as separately constituted organisations seeking market-based solutions to their environmental goals. The increased supply price is secured through additional sales of premium-priced products associated with the conservation mission.

The distinctive issue for this German model is that the marketed juice is identified with orchard biodiversity (the social enterprise mission), but also quite explicitly with the valuing and protection of the regional *Heimat* through a revived and formally organized cultural landscape. To better understand this facet of valuing orchards as a cultural phenomenon, we must briefly turn away from the market and towards historical and cultural geography.

6.3 Cultural landscapes, self-provisioning and the role of the state

6.3.1 Cultural landscapes and Heimat

The German word *Kulturlandschaft* is liberally scattered across brochures and information sheets, which exhort readers to appreciate, and work to protect orchards, for example by becoming members of wildlife and environmental associations. Literally, the word means cultural landscape, but it holds historical meanings that are relevant to a thesis grounded in human geography.

Chapter 2 illustrated how conservation concerns and outdoor physical exercise in the countryside were occupations of emerging urban-based civil organisations, within a rapidly industrialising, unified Germany (Joll 1976). Bismarck had outlawed the German Social Democratic Party, and so working for the protection of nature as a leisure activity and form of spiritual relief became one acceptable way of actively and practically channelling support for and by the urban working classes. The intentions of the National Trust's founders come to mind from the preceding chapter.

At the end of the 19th century the *Heimatsbewegung* – literally: the homeland movement – began to oppose the centralising and industrialising tendencies of the German Empire under its Prussian leadership. Before 1871 Germany was an atomised nation of local, if allied, feudal states. Members of this movement campaigned for the preservation of local treasures, including natural habitats and cultural landscapes as rural antidotes to perceptions of the shallow materialism of urban civilisation (Ditt 1996). At was at this time, rather than during the period of aristocratic artistic romanticism half a century earlier, that inspiration turned to into action, in the form of nature conservation societies that integrated earlier rural/natural and urban/human polarities (Claval 2002). Ideas about the taming of nature through culture (farming) gradually transmuted into patriotic pastoralism, as imperialist and then fascist ideas of an intrinsic Allemanic affinity with nature began to frame the work of many conservation groups in the early decades of the twentieth century (Blackbourn 2006, pp.1-8).

After 1945 another period of rapid urbanisation and agro-industrial developments in Germany had dramatic aesthetic and environmental consequences in the countryside, causing a conceptual divergence between functional, agronomic landscapes and their more 'traditional', cultural landscapes (see Apolinarski et al. 2004). This battle between functionality and tradition was exacerbated by German partition, and played out in openly competitive policies. In the East, land redistribution and collective productivism bound farmers to the state through disastrously inefficient and environmentally destructive agricultural plans, which were, initially, a direct reaction to western restructuring under the Marshall Plan. In response, West Germany doggedly clung to the family-owned farm as the institution within which the industrialisation of agriculture was to be delivered. The subsidised western model was hardly less bound to the state, but the official West German position that socialist farming constituted the destruction of the institution of the self-sufficient family farmer (Bauerkamper 2004), meant that until the 1980s, these oppositional approaches prevailed across the Iron Curtain. A result, in the West, is that self-sufficiency, reliance on family labour and the retention of productive agriculture as a supplementary occupation remains in the cultural and political consciousness of many orchardists in the south. Meanwhile, despite the destructiveness of industrial farming, land holding patterns have, in many parts of Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria, remained highly dispersed, while a prevailing tradition of equal inheritance in the former has resulted in essentially community-owned orchards with shared access.

This is not to suggest that south Germany's orcharding richness is solely thanks to today's agricultural pensioners. The strength, in West Germany, of an environmental movement stimulated by anti-capitalist and radical-left politics (with some echoes of the counter-imperialist *Heimatsbewegung*), meant that in the 1970s *Heimat* and heritage became "viable terms for political mobilisation against unfettered capitalism and inhospitable modernism" (James 2012, p.103). More recently, studies on urban-rural migrations in search of 'The Good Life' (Rössel, 2011) and on the florid illustrations of rurality in popular German magazines (Baumann 2012), suggest that a customer base for Streuobst products is renewable and generationally and spatially dynamic.

6.3.2 Environmental utilitarianism

In consequence, we must understand cultural landscape as a concept that has emerged from Germany's unique political history, especially its imperial and post-war periods. Cultural landscape also represents a multi-dimensional proxy for nature, environment or ecology, terms with explicitly embedded socio-economic factors associated with rural occupations, place and land use traditions. The temporal dimensions of Streuobst – an historic commercial landscape now become uneconomic – remain more clearly within memory of many rural Germans. Unlike the National Trust, which provides living specimen orchards and educational engagement opportunities such as pressing on traditional equipment for visitors, the German social enterprise approach seeks to renew the utilitarian intimacy with the local natural environment. Although social scientific writing on traditional orchards is limited, it is clear from technical journals that it is the structural complexity of cultural landscapes that determine the level of ecological function provided by agriculture (e.g. Schönhart et al. 2010).

The historical and geographical particularities of southern Germany indicate that, to many Germans, nature and social life combine to form culture. Thus, firstly, orchards are cultural landscapes that reinforce local identity, or *Heimat,* in many rural areas; and that in states like Baden-Württemberg, with so many orchards, their sudden loss (as it will seem when the last systematic, post-war, planting of fruit trees move simultaneously out of production) will affect the feel of the place and the identity of those for whom they have been common sights. Secondly, it can be reasoned that contemporary commercial factors challenge conservation charities to become engaged in rural social enterprise because new cultural contributions need to be made in order to renew the utilitarian intimacy with local landscapes. This is not a uniquely German intimacy and has been described in the case of the National Trust, although the Trust represents a paternalistic or hierarchical framework within which a group of regular volunteers finds personal rewards, or day-trippers find fascination. Rural south Germans, for whom orchard ownership – large and small - is more widely distributed than in England, need to be persuaded that juicing is a positive cultural landscape intervention, and mitigates the negative effects on bio- and landscape diversity caused by more industrialised forms of mono-cultural farming (Jongman 2002, in Schönhart et al 2010). Furthermore, the products of agriculture which favours biological diversity may be successfully marketed in independent shops (see for example, Gehrlein and Fick 2007, published by the federal department of nature conservation). Economic, biological and landscape diversity are linked.

I have tried to draw some distinctions between the estate-based focus on orchard conservation in the National Trust chapter, and the approach to landscape-scale conservation in Germany. This is especially evident in the way the National Trust concentrates its efforts on orchards attached to historical buildings, rather than on its commercial tenant farmers. But similarities remain between the two countries. Firstly, the tracts of orchard which form the backdrops of so many places in Württemberg are not universal, as we are reminded by the Franconians:

> *'…in our area there are not such large orchards, there are more likely to be smaller ones and belts of fruit trees around the villages, but they are very important for the landscape picture. … our area here is enhanced also by orchards.'* (GC, p.1)

Secondly, the National Trust's enthusiasm for public engagement is mirrored, historically and currently, in Germany:

> *'The other [members] they simply have an ideology, an interest… the preservation of the landscape and a purposeful leisure occupation. In our current times, with all the hectic, that is a wonderful occupation.'* (GC, p2)

Here, the Bavarian commentator makes a positive, subjective view about the contribution of orchards to the local landscape. He sees involvement in the juicing scheme as an ideological and restorative activity in contrast to the usual experiences offered by everyday routines.

6.3.3 Self-provisioning

A contrast, on the other hand, which has direct environmental implications is the German culture of self-provisioning. It helps explain, firstly, the high levels of juice consumption, and secondly, the idea that for the Germans, the *Aufpreis* strategy is not quite so revolutionary as it may seem to us in England. That rural Germans (among other Europeans – see Smith and Jehlička 2013) still nourish themselves partly through private

production reinforces framings of environmental localism and, more practically, provides a positive springboard from which environmental NGOs can launch economic campaigns to protect familiar but struggling agricultural landscapes.

> *'Many Germans still have an attitude and experience of farming, which is valued, even if the daily connection to the land has been lost. … The smallholder lifestyle was the reality for many rural people until recently in Germany.' (*GE, pp. 2-3)[26]

> *'Now as much as ever what is important for us – and this goes for traditional orchards overall – [is] self-provision, you know, drinking it yourself, that is the most important thing. Luckily, we still have this in Germany.' (GA, p.8)*

As a large and stable EU-economy, globally renowned to the extent of cliché for the reliability of its industrial and hi-tech industries and financial services, it would be ridiculous to paint the Germans as peasants. The simple point is that German citizens (i) were encouraged as part of strategic redevelopment programme to plant orchards after the Second World War (MLR 2009, p.5); (ii) continue to consume products from these orchards at home, and (iii) drink a great quantity of apple juice per head. Home provisioning is, in other words, an important factor influencing the continuation of juicing infrastructure and the survival of large tracts of traditional orchards, compared to England.

To reiterate: the south Germans reflect a close cultural connection with traditional orchards and it is by reviving and renewing this connection that third sector groups attempt to conserve orchard habitats. While the contribution of orchards to landscape and local identity remains, the combination of changing consumer habits, the age profile of large areas of orchards and agricultural production predominantly geared towards globalising commodity markets, means that local market-based solutions are required to ensure cultural engagement continues. The cultural engagement is closely linked to orchard husbandry, and a particular method of husbandry resulting in the connected multi-structural habitats that provide homes for the well-documented (in Germany) orchard biodiversity. Continuing this cycle is what the social enterprises attempt to achieve.

[26] Interview not voice-recorded, but transcribed into English from written notes.

In summary, the conceptual and historical development of a professional German environmental movement may be pictured, supported by successive eras of national (and nationalist) and federal government to reinforce an active cultural and social connection with rural nature. We also understand very clearly that in Germany, the local environment is the landscape, which in turn is structured (for better or worse) by the changing economic interventions of agriculture. Furthermore, regional identities remain informed by distinctive landscape features and the maintenance of regional boundaries is necessary for identity qualities of *Aufpreis* products to gain traction in the local market (Ermann 2005). The environment movement is aware of the continuing cultural value of rural farm landscapes and the effects which human interventions have on the countryside and its biodiversity: such messages are reinforced in NGO literature relating to orchards. By indicating the economic origins of agriculture, and celebrating the act of self-provisioning as contributing to a conservation act, conservationists like those in NABU and BUND are able to develop arguments for the revival of economic agricultural models to underpin orchard biodiversity. These seem plausible to farmers, commercial actors and the provincial authorities. The execution of the networked-market model, is one functional way to unite these parties into shared civil engagement in nature conservation. The institutions of the German state have an important contributory role in responding to and participating in this engagement.

6.3.4 The German state in the networked-market

The preceding chapter described how the national government in Britain, in the form of a half-million-pound grant from the quango Natural England, had stimulated a programme of public engagement, practical conservation and social enterprise channelled through the National Trust. Orchard conservation activities had been gaining ground in the Third Sector from at least 1988, with Common Ground's Save Our Orchards campaign, followed in 1990 by Apple Day. Yet the National Trust's large grant, helped to crystallise, with the Lottery-funded PTES survey, heterogeneous and multi-scale campaigns into government policy through the Habitat Action Plan (HAP). HAPs are to be revised and re-formatted as Local Biodiversity Partnerships and the fate of orchards as a national conservation priority over and above agri-environment reforms are once more unclear. Austerity in public finances is unlikely to support council-run conservation schemes, with a few exceptions (such as a Heritage Lottery-funded scheme in South Somerset District). This reveals the

long-term limitations of the British public sector – essentially grants for heritage – in engaging in orchard conservation.

The German position of the state is both more complex and consistent over the longer-term, thanks in part to the executive and participatory role of the public sector in different scales of the agricultural and municipal sectors. Federal subsidiarity and attitudes towards EU budgets have been described in chapter 2. Awareness of the spatial and temporal importance of German orchards is accepted by the state: Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria both offer financial stimuli delegated from EU agri-environment budgets to commercial actors for activities such as marketing traditional orchard products, organic conversion, purchasing trees, or for the networking of orchard social enterprises (including MEKA[27], LIFE[28], PLENUM[29], Interreg[30]). While helpful, this stimulation is not, in itself, enough to revive commercial arguments for orcharding among farmers, and payments come with restrictions of future land use, which means:

> *'…that the subsidy is not very well taken up, as the grant of €2.50 per tree is not all that much. For 100 trees that's €250 a year. Well, if I can convert my orchard to a field of maize, I can do without the €250 pretty well.' (GA, p.10)*

There is, then, requirement for additional commercial stimulus and the market as the place from which it must emerge. In contrast with the nation state, local state institutions also support orchard conservation as market actors, via delegated federal powers, by making political and budgetary commitments to buy apple juice from *Aufpreis* schemes. This takes three forms: firstly, town and district councils buy apple juice from local schemes as a sign of supporting local conservation efforts (see quotation in section 6.4.2.2). Secondly, district and parish councils may effectively co-opt specialist NGOs as public sector agri-environment land agents:

[27] *Marktentlastungs- und Kulturlandschaftsausgleich* – Baden-Württemberg rural development and cultural landscape support programme.
[28] The EU's financial support programme for nature conservation.
[29] Baden-Württemberg nature conservation, agriculture and tourism/recreation integration programme.
[30] EU programme to promote interregional rural development.

'If, as a farmer, you want to do any of these things, let's say plant trees, you simply go to your local [group] and they will sort it all out for you and add an additional 15% to the overall operational costs.' (GE, p1)

In some areas, GC is one example, local councils own orchards on public land and can pay NGOs to manage this land for them, thereby tying the third sector into policy implementation. Public orchard ownership is not just a cost, because the apples can be sold into *Aufpreis* schemes, although in practice it is usually simpler to auction the standing fruit to an orchard social enterprise (see following chapter).

Thirdly, councils help to directly promote awareness of the values of local orchards and of juice schemes at public events; and indirectly by allowing NGOs and schools to use public orchards for their own educational and entrepreneurial ends.

Studies on other traditional and marginal landscapes with ecological and economic tensions (for example Fleskens 2008 and Duarte et al. 2008 writing on olives) indicate the importance of low labour costs in the form of family labour to maintaining the marketability of fruit. The German state makes indirect intervention in labour costs subsidy where social enterprise is pursued by a recognised environmental group. Two formats of this labour subsidy are military service alternatives and return to employment schemes. The first quotation refers to the engagement of a young man who is working as a volunteer in substitution for compulsory military service to deliver juice to direct social enterprise retail clients (ie. NGO members):

'Our co-worker who is doing his volunteer ecological year with us, he organised this initiative. That comes out of his voluntary service.' (GA, p.11)

Back to work schemes for the employed have also been tried to, with less promising results:

> *'Then I got sick and we employed someone under the €400 scheme, that's something we have in Germany where you can employ someone under the taxable wage limit. And it turned out that although this route is workable, it seldom finds people who can fully engage themselves. He was just so devilishly slow, that he did more damage than good.'* (GB, p.1)

These excerpts suggest that different tiers of the German state have a varied role in supporting orchard conservation beyond being a direct, national grant-giver (as in England), or even as a channel for EU agri-environment funding via provincial subsidiarity and federal governance structures. German district councils in particular hold land, control procurement budgets, and develop contractual environmental service relationships with conservation bodies, which they see as participating as technical specialists in the social and scientific task of conserving the cultural landscape with popular (membership) support. And despite the absence of environmental conservation in the list of prescribed tasks set out for social enterprises by the federal government, social entrepreneurship on the part of NGOs unlocks access to the social labour market, which is a helpful (although evidently still experimental) contribution to the co-ordination of market problems pertaining to traditional orchards.

6.4 The resolution of co-ordination problems

This chapter has explicitly placed the interventions of three German social enterprises within the local market field for the production, distribution and sale of juice. It was suggested that this field was, before the interventions of social enterprises, inherently undesirable in terms of its environmental outcomes. Beckert's interpretation of a stable market is one in which outcomes can be predicted. In some respects this predictability can be achieved in the current, pre-intervention, market order. Namely, if the current situation of under-rewarded farmers persists, the apple supply will evaporate and there will be no market for local apples and they will need to be imported from other areas. The environmental outcome, however, is not balanced by this eventuality and social enterprises become inspired to reconfigure market relations. Furthermore, Beckert suggests that the nature of capitalism – namely its distinguishing requirement to grow –

inherently undermines stability in the search for new profits. Beckert's (2012) macro-economic insights recall his intention to offer broader understandings of the economy than rational action. This serves social enterprise scholarship by positioning such enterprises at the heart of an unstable market, into which non-economic values (nature) are introduced. For the local juice market, these introductions offer value qualities and co-operative opportunities; for the enterprise trying to balance social, commercial and environmental goals the environmental goal produces a sense of altruism and trust among consumers. Beckert insists that the relationship between field structures can be observed by scrutinising empirical data. This scrutiny will now follow for the three environmental social enterprises already introduced as conforming to the networked-market.

6.4.1 The analytical field

In this section we scrutinise empirical data using field theory to observe the dynamism of markets as their actors grapple with co-ordination problems. These problems are inherent within the market; but also within the social enterprise.

Figure 8, below, sets out the field for a localised apple juice market, in relation to the networked market. In it we can observe the positions of networks (who are market actors) in relation to institutions (which are formal institutions, structures and institutions of culture). These latter influence actors' room for manoeuvre, but they are susceptible to the collective influence of actors. The introduction of new commercial ideas and existing understandings of how orchards inform identity, affect the willingness of actors to work together. The cumulative outcomes of these reciprocal relations provide a way to maintain local orchards.

Figure 8: Social enterprise field in the networked market



In more detail, the framework allows us, firstly, to distinguish between different sets of actors. The members of social enterprises GB and GC are apple producers, farmers or mainly householders, respectively. GA, however, is an informal network constructed as a project of BUND and includes a range of market actors and council officials (thus drawing institutions into the network). Other networks include participating presses, supporters of the social enterprise, such as the brewery which transports and bottles juice for GC; or GA's auto-dealer, which provides on loan a van for seasonal deliveries. An important group in the networked social enterprise model is embodied in NGO supporters. These members provide labour to farmers, advocacy at community events, and act as retail customers for juice in the social enterprise scheme (and are thus the source of direct trading income for the social enterprise). The success of the networked market model, especially in southern Germany, has led to alliances of individual, local enterprises, who come together (for example with back-office support from GA's co-ordinator), to share experience and to collectivise their legitimacy as market actors, conservationists and agents who transfers practical knowledge.

The strongly held belief, on behalf of NGOs, that orchards are important elements of local landscape identity and agricultural tradition, is part of the narrative embraced by the participating networks. To complement this cultural cognitive frame, biological data provides scientific information about the unique habitat qualities of traditional orchards. The linking of landscape, identity and biodiversity thus has two important effects. Firstly, these connections generate endogenous feelings of partnership within both actors and state institutions. For example, several of GB's farmers and press workers are also former pupils of the enterprise co-ordinator; GA's juice is stocked in Council outlets and offered to visitors by the Mayor; GC provides environmental education to schools from their base on council land. If conventional market practices threaten orchards, this implies threats to people who earn incomes from them (householders, farmers, processors, catering and retail outlets). As the threats affect several local actors, the social and commercial bonds between them draw them together and provide an impetus to act.

Secondly, a sense of shared responsibility emerges especially from the biological data and the regional and national networking of conservation groups and orchard social enterprises: southern Germany is the location for some of the largest remaining tracts of orchard habitat in central Europe, and a European responsibility rests on the shoulders of the German rural consciousness. GA's co-ordinator notes (p.1) the existence of up to 30 orchard social enterprises in Baden-Württemberg, while GB informs of the collaboration of all councils bordering the Swabian Alb (p.5) for a 'Streuobst offensive', that is a more strategic approach to supporting *Aufpreis* initiatives. These understandings, which reach across cognitive and network structures in the field, represent fertile seedbeds of shared interest from which social enterprises can develop practical, commercial actions.

There is institutional homogeneity among social enterprises in the networked market: all case studies are registered associations (eingetragener Verein). Under Article 21 of the German civil code, such associations may not be established for commercial objectives, but may pursue business activities, which help them attain their non-commercial goals (Münker 1998). Where their activities are in the public interest (as nature conservation is), they qualify for generous tax exemptions. The e.V. institutional structure thus directly restricts the role which social enterprises can play in a networked market, allowing commercial challenges to be tackled by commercial networks, and framing social

enterprise direct trading as a way of financing time for supply chain brokerage, stimulating commercial networks and diffusing support for orchard conservation.

One institutional structure introduced by the social enterprise is the supply contract. This is formalised either with the enterprise or, in the case of GA, with the processor. Before the development of the networked market, farmers had no contractual arrangements with presses:

> *The press receives the fruit from local farmers and pays, as a rule, the market price. Farmers don't have a contract with the press, they just turn up, … I don't need any contract, no agreement, the fruit is simply weighed and I get the current day rate. The day rate, that's a market price, is oriented towards the global market, it's set by global price markets, it's independent of [fruit] quality.* (GA, p.6)

An uncontracted arrangement provides a degree of logistical flexibility to suppliers and processors, yet subjects both parties to non-local price structures. By joining the *Aufpreis* scheme, not only are suppliers logistically separated from others – which ensures that fruit pressed on pre-arranged days does not become mixed with other juice (for example dessert fruit out-grades from local bush plantations) – but the network of social enterprise, processor and farmer becomes a price maker. This is conforms to another theme from economic sociology, namely the use of contracts as an institutional influence over the price of goods considered just by society (Durkheim 1992, in Beckert 2011). To put it another way, social enterprises insist on formalising ecological orchard husbandry (thus tackling neglect as a cause of biodiversity loss and fruit productivity) as the gateway to enhanced supply prices. The juice, in its turn, enters the market with a different set of qualities than hitherto, allowing reflexive local consumers to identify an attachment to the product (Callon et al. 2002).

The commercial interest of the presses, whose proprietors must initially shoulder the burden of the supply premium, is enhanced by the cognitive frames of nature and identity. Essentially, the same suppliers provide the same apples and the same type of juice is bottled before and after the start of *Aufpreis*. But once *Aufpreis* is started, the existing

proportion of juice which was previously unqualified, becomes transparently associated (labelled) with the conservation of the biologically rich cultural landscape.

In summary, the constellation of German field reciprocations means that social enterprises are able to use their environmental mission as a lever with which to broker new civil and market configurations. These configurations depend on the brokerage of the social enterprise, but can be continued independently once the commercial routines are in place. State and regulatory structures provide as much political support and legitimacy to the environmental mission as they do financial help.

6.4.2 Market order?

Preceding sections of the chapter have set the work of three German social enterprises within a conceptual frame borrowed from economic sociology. The purpose of this frame is three-fold:

(i) to observe how certain types of social enterprise pursue their environmental goals;
(ii) to explain the relationships and interdependencies which social enterprise market interventions stimulate within a local field;
(iii) to interpret the meanings of environmental social enterprise activities in relation to place.

This market form emerged as a result of a particular, local co-ordination of market problems. Before the entry of the social enterprises into the market field, a different configuration of problem co-ordination prevailed, one with a negative effect on the status of wildlife-rich orchards. How does the networked-market affect the local environment? In the coming section we seek to answer this question by assessing interview data against market co-ordination problems.

6.4.2.1 Value

As suggested in section 6.2, a value problem facing all EU nature conservationists whose ecological interests sit with farming landscapes, is that, generally, market conditions and trade policy threaten multi-functional, multi-structured habitats which have, over long periods of consistent husbandry, formed unique ecosystems. The policy objective of competitive farming (DEFRA 2011), combined with the shrinking importance of farming to the rural economy (Angus et al. 2009) renders many such habitats, including traditional orchards, economically obsolete, and therefore fragile.

Despite this, the networked market diversifies the types of value associated with orchards and their conservation in a number of ways. These include:

(i) Material value, which is gleaned by farmers in the form of enhanced supply prices as a result of contracting with the social enterprise/press;
(ii) Cultural value, which is promoted as a constituent of local identity and a positive contribution to the continuity of cultural landscape by NGOs and supported by their partners;
(iii) Biological value of traditional orchards, which is retained, enhanced and renewed through contractual association with the *Aufpreis* scheme;
(iv) Knowledge value, whereby farmers are helped/educated in techniques for sustainable orchard management, which in turn leads to continuity of fruit supply, good husbandry practices and the replanting of local fruit varieties which help distinguish the juice by taste;
(v) Temporal product or 'fashion' value, in that German consumers currently prefer naturally cloudy juice, which is not possible to reconstitute from imported concentrate;
(vi) Redistribution value by which individual consumers redistribute wealth within the networked market. Price premium value of the retailed product, which is kept low, thanks to the use of established distribution networks and member mobilisation.

The starting point for many orchard social enterprises has been to acknowledge the uneven nature of the material and natural values of orchards and to co-ordinate a different balance.

> *'Our trick was that we pay more for apples. We make sure that you can earn from apples…'* (GB, p.1)

The idea of increasing retail prices to cover a supplier premium is very similar to the National Trust's technique of charging shop visitors a premium to help support orchard management on the estate. The Trust price is an administrative calculation based on production costs, plus prescribed mark-up rates set by the Trust trading arm. On the other hand, the Germans social enterprises, which have no orchards of their own, have to work out a new value to farmers which will encourage continued orchard husbandry.

> *'If I have a bottle of apple juice – let's take a simple example – costing €1. And if I double the supply price for the landlord … well, let's say €20 instead of €10, then the bottle costs 10 cents more, it costs €1.10. So the retail price doesn't double, it goes up by 10%. The farmer gets double, gets 100% more, but on the bottle I only pay a 10% premium, and the consumer is prepared to pay this 10% premium.'* (GA, p.7)

The accuracy of these hypothetical figures is not under scrutiny here. The key point is that new forms of market co-ordination, initiated by the social enterprise and executed by reciprocal relationships between market partners, has created new material values, and indeed prices, which reflect the value to society of orchards via their products, which represent them in the market.

One material outcome of tackling the problem of value has been to qualify not just the juice produced by the individual local schemes, but to create a new niche quality track for traditional orchard juice, over time, in its own right.

'Additionally, there is this market channel for fruit from traditional orchards that is really gathering pace here in south Germany, and that started about 20 years ago. This separate processing and the separate price that has developed for Streuobst, now also means that more fruit from traditional orchards is being certified organic and marketed as such.' (GA, p.1)

Figure 9: Label used by NABU to identify juice from traditional orchards

The reformation of value in the networked-market cannot simply be attributed to small social enterprises without material assets or power as economic actors. Their efforts are fundamentally reliant on co-operation with and between other market actors. In addition to relations with local actors, important value co-ordination tools are offered to the social enterprise by the host NGO. In two cases these are national organisations linked to international alliances, such as Friends of the Earth International or Bird Life International. Firstly, financial and institutional investments may be tapped into via large-scale habitat or economic development programmes, such as LIFE, Leader and so on. Even at regional level this non-traded, state income can help finance NGO administration of orchard social enterprise, as in the case of GC. More specifically, NABU has developed a quality label now used by the majority of *Aufpreis* schemes in Germany. This label, shown as figure 9, above, reflects the important co-ordination role, which NABU has played in establishing juice quality and orchard husbandry standards for all parties involved in *Aufpreis* social enterprise. Local adaptations of this label have been designed, although most seem to retain the iconic figure of the little owl. Thus the commercial interventions of orchard social enterprises have created social associations with charismatic wildlife (recalling Lorimer 2007).

The association of local social enterprises with international environmental alliances who devise market tools to help guide or influence consumer choice, create material and political values beyond local orchards and facilitate trust and co-operation in the local market.

6.4.2.2 Co-operation

A distinctive feature of the networked market model, is the co-operative division of labour within the supply chain:

> *'We establish the [environmental] criteria and the marketing is done by the commercial partner.'* (GA, p.13)

On one hand, the division reflects a division of specialisms: environmental organisations advise farmers on conservation management, presses produce juice, distributors deliver the bottles to commercial clients, and so forth. But the social enterprise changes the nature of the commercial partnerships to become civil alliances.

> *'It goes without saying, that this juice is available in the town hall and at events in the town.'* (GA, p.3)

Public procurement of the juice is a commercial arrangement. However, it is the result of careful co-operation and organisation between the producing and supplying parties, the council, and the brokerage and persuasiveness of the social enterprise, in meeting strict criteria for public expenditure. These criteria are set out in EU and provincial guidance. Their successful interpretation in favour of local apple juice is a result of co-operation and social enterprise brokerage, rather than revealing a peculiarity of the German national character (see Morgan and Sonnino 2008).

Because social enterprises are limited in their own market power to trade, and by legal restrictions associated with governance structure, any hope of producing sales at an adequate scale to finance a tripling of the conventional market price (from €6-€18 in the case of GA), must rely on co-operation with other market actors.

> *'The apples were pressed, then we've been co-operating so far with a brewery…, they made a tanker available to us, and the juice from the press was put in it and*

then the brewery then bottled it for us. They then helped us, so that the juice was marketed to various pubs etc., catering establishments, through the members of this association "Homeland on a Plate".' (GC, p.5)

In this excerpt, several levels of commercial, civil and civic co-operation are revealed. Firstly, apples from producer members of GC have their apples commercially pressed. Then the bulk juice is transported to a brewery for bottling and distribution. The buyers of the juice, namely brewery clients, are also members of a Slow Food-inspired association. *Cittaslow* (formed from the Italian *Citta*, or city, and the *Slow* Food movement) is a programme which encourages municipalities to promote gastronomic enjoyment of locally distinctive and artisan foods. While the Bavarian state, like its Swabian neighbour to the west, promotes local speciality foods within rural and economic development measures, *Cittaslow* is an added local level of local policy support which promotes food culture and its 'hedonistic' values (Schwartz 1992, in Brunsø et al. 2004), that is, food's sensual enjoyment. The *Heimat auf'm Teller* association (a colloquial spelling of 'homeland on a plate') puts into practice the Slow Food concept that local food is the material embodiment of cultural meanings and places (Pietrykowski 2004).

Commercial support for *Aufpreis* is provided because of the types of innovations the networked-market creates. The influence of the social enterprise may be seen as both social (Mulgan et al. 2007) and radical (Geels and Schott 2007), because it leads to changes in farmer and consumer practices, and, arguably, changes in the way in which all juice from traditional orchards is perceived through its separate market track. But locally, the networked market is really an incremental market innovation (ibid.), because its operation depends on retaining the status quo of market power, asset ownership and operational specialism. In other words, for the networked-market to function, it utilises the existing products, services and networks of existing commercial actors to secure its environmental goal, as this excerpt reinforces:

'…the most important thing for us was to become integrated in the drinks market, to have an outlet in every town and parish [in the district]. That was our breakthrough.' (GA, p.3)

I have suggested repeatedly that social enterprises broker new working and civil relationships between (and as) market actors. Some forms of co-operation rely on personal factors, and at these scales can cause problems of dependency, as GB reveals. The honorary, unpaid organizer of GB established the enterprise while a teacher of a local special school. The parish centres on a small district town with a rural hinterland, and a common refrain in the interview describing both farmers and press owners as *'he was also one of my pupils'.* It is a measure of the teacher's popularity with his pupils that they engage commercially with him in later life, although his retirement has coincided with recurring health problems (GB, p.1).

Founder dependence is a common challenge within third sector organisations (for example Block and Rosenberg 2002, Spear et al. 2007, p.8). Energetic, visionary individuals may try to hang on to the social power afforded by their position; or seek to shed the burden of responsibility. GB falls into the latter category, with the founder's temporary incapacity presenting a serious risk to the enterprise. However, the relations between the retired teacher and adult former pupils endure and facilitate co-operation and trust which are based on friendships rather than the teacher's membership of an environmental group. During my visit to the school, the retired teacher was enthusiastically greeted by many pupils. Community-based sales have been described above, as have orchard field trips. Posters of visits to local orchards managed with the help of pupils decorate the walls of the dining hall, where pupils serve up meals onto the plates of their tablemates. The arithmetical, communication and organisational learning from pupil involvement in the juicing scheme may be imagined; I watched three pupils working under supervision of their current teacher to work out the sums due to the social enterprise for wholesale supplies, retail sales and bottle deposits for November.

The trading activities of the social enterprises may also seem like something of a social service to groups of supporters:

> *'Twice a year, as BUND, we deliver our juice to clients using volunteers, 10 volunteers. … We deliver the juice they have pre-ordered from us, over four weekends. …an auto dealership lends us a van. …In this way we serve our regular customers, have personal contact with customers, gather feedback, and always take*

along a new product … and we carry the juice into their cellars, which is particularly important for older people.' (GA, p.4)

Membership of BUND thus provides access to special social aspects of the market not open to non-members (or at least non-clients); while the support of corporate actors not in any way linked to apples or landscape objectives (the auto dealership) illustrates the wider social civil engagement which the networked-market model is able to generate and exploit. This in turn is based on the reputation for transparency and trustworthiness held by conservation organisations:

'Nature conservation associations have a very good reputation with the public. Nature conservation associations are strongly associated with trustworthiness, and that plays an important role in marketing.' (GA, p.6)

In this sub-section, we have heard that the effectiveness of social enterprise supply chain brokerage is based on the ability to create different co-operative relationships. These can be characterised as commercial, personal and social. Some co-operations involve new arrangements for commercial co-operations between existing supply chain partners, such as between farmers and juice processors. In other cases, existing commercial relations exhibit economic hybridities of the types already described by Billis in chapter 2, for example in the case of the brewery and the auto-dealer. Personal co-operation appears in the case of the teacher who can draw from long-standing and intimate association with former pupils who now grow apples; and social co-operation is evident not just in volunteer delivery runs, but also in the support which NGOs provide farmers in executing their management obligations, for example through pruning and grafting workshops. These create good will between farmers and environmentalists (a significant achievement in the light of BUND's radical stance nuclear energy and corporate power); and social celebrations:

'In spring we always arrange a pruning action, which farmers take turns to host. And then a tree surgeon comes… and demonstrates, and the others, the observers, they don't just watch, they also have to prune the trees. And then the host farmer that

makes the trees available, well he gets three times 10 trees pruned at a stroke. That's nice. And then there is a party, and that's a great experience… So the farmer for whom the trees have been pruned has to pay for the party, and those who helped may attend.' (GB, p.4)

6.4.2.3 Competition

The third Beckertian co-ordination problem is competition, something the trading social enterprises in the networked market give the impression of actively avoiding. This is because the enterprise relies on the commercial functioning of the networked-market for the attainment of conservation objectives:

'…we don't sell [our juice] cheaper than commercial prices, we charge the same, because of course we don't want to compete and wreck the business and price of the commercial people. That means we charge the same price that another drinks merchant also does.' (GA, p.11)

In peak production years of 600,000 litres, GA's direct sales represented about 1/60th of total sales of *Aufpreis* juice, the rest being sold through commercial channels. In this respect, there is no direct competition within the networked market, because the product is held in common across the market. Farmers, processors, distributors and drinkers all play their distinct roles in shared supply chain cycles.

Outside the networked market, other forms of competition exist, such as price competition from supermarkets and cheaper juice products. In some cases, supermarket franchises do take *Aufpreis* juice (temporarily GB, for example, and in schemes in the following chapter), although scale and consistency of supply can be challenge for the smaller production scale schemes, as we will later hear. Competition from another qualified niche, organic juice, presents different complications. For GA and GC, whose farmers are organic, the appearance of an increasingly diverse organic juice range creates a

competitive challenge, especially for GA, for which wholefood shops have been stockists over many years.

> *'We faced increasing competition from organic products, partly ones that were not from our region, and so we had to move in this direction. And it has now become evident that this has taken us a step forward in the market.'* (GA, p.9)

Organic certification has added regulatory, financial and certification complications. GA's co-ordinator believes it is politically and commercially unimaginable for a conservation organisation to market a product and for it not to be certified. The same interviewee indicates that the state will subsidise the conversion of orchards to organic status, the added advantage for farmers of traditional orchards is that the change in management required is less onerous compared to conversion process for bush plantations.

In fact, the success of the German organic juice market is in some ways the ultimate competitive challenge because organic certification is itself an *Aufpreis* scheme, which, although founded in the third sector, has become institutionally appropriated through EU and national regulations. This is both a weakness, because it removes the requirement of social enterprise market interventions, and a strength because NGOs can become fee-earning organic certification agents and, as GB and GC show, organic juice offers a way for social enterprises to eventually withdraw from their market co-ordination activities.

For example, GB had 20 farmer members at its inception on 1995. A decade later, its three largest members converted to organic status and were able to negotiate directly with the press, circumnavigating the brokerage structure which GB had previously offered.

> '...the press guarantees €12, and adds €2 for single varieties. Well, our farmers got €16 last year, because that was double the average [day-rate], und those who delivered directly to the press last year got €12. OK, it's higher with us, but €12 is really a price where you say "I'll take [my apples] to him, even if it's a bit further away".' (GB, p2)

Similarly, in 2010, GC's largest farmer-member, and its vice-chair, decided to install a certified press at his own holding, thereby becoming a buyer of organic apples from the rest of the members, and their main marketing channel for organic and single variety juices under his own label.

But organic must be combined with *Streuobst* if it is to make any contribution to orchard conservation, as the case of GA shows. While it is a system for valuing environmental qualities, organic certification does not specify orchard form or fruit variety, limiting its effectiveness for attachment to local consumers. In other words, organic may compete with *Streuobst* juice because the qualities it certifies are not embedded in *Heimat* in the same way as *Streuobst*.

GB, and GC are both in a position where they are trying to change the market conditions for local juice, in order that local orchards are not grubbed out. They have established familiar and successful, if small-scale systems compared to GA, and now see that a combination of consumer demand (for single variety and organic) both supports their ultimate mission, but allows producers to by-pass their brokerage services. In one sense, we might see the presses as consolidating their market power-base by undercutting the social enterprises enough to gain specialist producers of scale. On the other hand we can see that social enterprise action in the market is (i) innovative, experimental and catalysing, (ii) changing the localised 'social landscape' involved in supply chain and consumer habits (Smith et al. 2005), and (iii), in trying to balance goals, the social enterprise privileges the environmental mission over commercial objectives, by continuing to broker supply premiums for traditional orchards, while the market appropriates social enterprise innovations for the environmentally regulated segment of the market. Although this appropriation happens at a supply price lower than that brokered by the social enterprise, it is with the same press. Curiously, this makes the supply of non-organic fruit more lucrative than organic, but also less expensive for consumers. Beckert's assertion that market actors grapple with co-ordination problems in order to consolidate their power is not borne out in social enterprises GB or GC, because in the networked market social enterprises do not seek to become market actors with power positions. Instead GB and GC share the achievement that their interventions have created workable changes in

competitive, value and co-operative structures in the local market. These have potential to continue without permanent social enterprise intervention.

Finally, in this section, we introduce competition in supply. So far our discussion has highlighted geographies of retail competition, competition from other environmental quality systems and idiosyncrasies of competition in the networked market *viz-à-viz* market power. The continuing habit of self-provision and self-processing, while changing, presents a form of production competition to commercial presses because it removes juicing fruit from the commercial market.

The atomised ownership structure of some Swabian and Bavarian orchards makes it more difficult to manage when and which producers turn up for pressings. In an enterprise like GC where the majority of the 60 producer members are householders, it is harder to co-ordinate deliveries although the quality integrity of the juice depends on separation from other juice products. The larger the number of social enterprise-contracted producers, the easier it is for the press to secure reliability of supply. However, some proportion of apples are either retained for home consumption, or are removed from the retail supply chain through the system of returning unlabelled bottles to producers for their own use (including retail at the farm/home). More significant is the state monopoly on alcohol production. Although the system is currently in the process of reform, the *Brandtwein Monopol* ensures that the state will purchase distilled fruit alcohol from registered home-distilleries, which the state then supplies to variety of industrial buyers. It is unclear to what degree orchard conservation is a spin-off of the monopoly, although a consequence of habitual self-provision and of domestic, small-scale fruit distillation is the removal of apples from *Aufpreis* availability. This is not necessarily a disadvantage because both practices reinforce the routine of orcharding among participants and mitigate the risks which *Aufpreis* schemes present to presses and the social enterprises that work with them:

> *'In this parish [name] alone, a third of the traditional orchard harvest is distilled, a third! So if a third goes for home consumption, a third into distillates, then there is not much left to sell to the press. And therefore, in our area it is only 20-30% of traditional orchard fruit that is sold at market prices. The rest is either used at home, distilled or goes into the Aufpreis scheme.' (GA, p.8)*

To reiterate: the south Germans reflect a close cultural connection with traditional orchards and it is by reviving and renewing these that third sector groups attempt to conserve orchard habitats. While the contribution of orchards to landscape and local identity remains, the combination of changing consumer habits, the age profile of vast tracts of orchards and agricultural production predominantly geared towards globalising commodity markets, means that local market-based solutions are required to ensure cultural engagement continues. This is what the social enterprises achieve.

6.5 Conclusion

In this chapter we have presented and analysed new types of market practices instituted initially by social enterprises. These practices and the relationships and infrastructures upon which they depend we have called the networked-market. The networked-market is a reconfiguration of existing supply chain practices in a locality. The reconfiguration relies on incentives flowing to the participants by (i) brokerage by social enterprises to increase supplier prices, (ii) using existing commercial relationships, equipment and reciprocal relationships along the supply chain, and (iii) presenting the continuation of orchards as more than a market activity, but also as a shared civil responsibility linked to local identity and regional cultural heritage and landscape.

Historical, cultural and political dimensions have been examined that distinguish the German vision for orchards. These relate to shared understanding of cultural landscape and the special German responsibility to protect it, the continuing close conceptual relationships between farming and nature and the persistence of localised orcharding infrastructures and consumption habits.

It is to be expected that such circumstances and details may differ in England. Even so, the use of Beckertian analytical insights into the dealing of the networked-market help to identify the uniquely German aspects of the networked market – such as the practice of home distillery and the more multi-structured food and drink chain. Beckert's (2010) ideas on reciprocal relations and on market co-ordination help to make generalisable claims

about the ability, or even the necessity of the third sector to become an active catalyst, at least in local markets, in order to influence the environmental consequences flowing from market activity.

The networked model is the most common German social enterprise structure for valorising juice from traditional orchards and presents third sector environmental organisations with a fairly low-cost way of reintegrating traditional orchards into an existing but unstable market, at low-risk to the commercial actors. These are reassured by the incremental (non-radical) nature of the supply chain power balance proposed by the social enterprise, despite the very radical supplier incentive needed in advance.

The use of contractual bonds within the *Aufpreis* schemes help commercial juice processors to organise their pressing schedule. It is also a way to provide farmers with commercial reassurance, if they are willing to contract themselves to engage in conservation husbandry. The benefits farmers receive from volunteer labour, demonstration days and the management plans provided by conservation organisations, amount to commercial good practice and increase the likelihood of reliable harvests by distributing risk among more suppliers, within a production sector that must expect annual variation in harvest scale and constitution:

> *Consistency was an issue for [GA] when they only had 10 producers on board. Now they have many. One year to the next the juice tasted differently, now this is not the case because so many farmers are members of the scheme.* (Notes from GD, p.2)

The use of contracts can also be adapted by presses to devise binding new relationships with larger organic suppliers, as we saw in the case of GB.

Juice presses may be relatively unburdened by the *Aufpreis* scheme, if, as for the few annual operational days devoted to the case studies presented, it makes little overall difference to throughput. In return, social enterprises efficiently organise collective supply days for their members, when before they came at their individual convenience. New lines,

including organic and single variety juices are supply price premium schemes which have followed, not pre-dated, local *Aufpreis* schemes for apple juice.

In summary, social enterprises of the networked market identify the dysfunctional market as a cause for orchard habitat loss, and see revival of economic balances in favour of the producer as a method to protect orchard landscapes. As described, the introduction of *Aufpreis* schemes for apple juice, although significantly supported by social capital in its developmental phases, does appear as a successful attempt at market co-ordination and the alignment of social enterprise goals. Enterprise GA claims that after 20 years of activity the loss of traditional orchards has stopped, and planting is beginning to expand. We begin to see, in the networked-market model, the idea that the environmental mission is not just an additional complication to add to commercial and social concerns, but actually is a transferable approach to achieving a more successful economic status quo:

> *'… we have transferred the model to other products, for 10 years we've had green electricity which works in the same way, in that we support biogas farmers. For three years we've had a natural gas product where we establish climate neutral areas in the region through a combination of certification, wet moorland restoration and biogas contribution to the gas supply. So we have three products that work on this basis.'* (GA, p.12)

The next chapter introduces another approach to social enterprise market interventions, where market power, competition, co-operation and value are configured differently. This market-building model must juggle commercial considerations against social and environmental goals more acutely, because the commercial task is directly shouldered by the social enterprise, rather than re-arranged as it is in the networked market.

Chapter 7 – Social skill or mission impossible? Social enterprise beyond the networked market.

'*All the positive things that sit behind [the local food initiatives] are all OK, but earning money is desirable.*' (GFa, p.1)

'*…we are a firm with clear principles, clear quality criteria … we are a firm that has the goal of earning money, not to enrich ourselves, but to be able to pay farmers a decent price for their fruit in ten years' time.*' (GFb, p.11)

7.1 Introduction

The attention of this study has so far focused, firstly, on the very localised efforts of National Trust staff to conserve the orchards within the immediate envelope of an historic house or estate; and, secondly, on the ways in which German environmental membership associations mobilise their workers and supporters to re-organise the commercial and social relationships within an existing local market for apple juice.

Both these formats of social enterprise interventions have reflected degrees of positive environmental change – that is orchards are replanted, and managed for wildlife – thanks to money earned and reinvested in the environmental mission. Often, the enterprises prove effective in co-creating 'interaction' value (Austin et al., 2012) by joint problem-solving with private and state partners, thereby balancing both their environmental mission and commercial endeavours.

In this chapter, the picture becomes significantly complicated. A small group of Bavarian social enterprises have developed a third model of engaging with the market, to add to the two previously introduced. Four case studies will be examined. While all four vary in structure, each is more competitively active in the market, in comparison to the more facilitative, catalytic methods revealed via the networked market. For this reason, the models discussed in this chapter can be classified as market-building social enterprises. Clear differences emerge from market-building case studies. For example, in one case doubt is expressed that attaining the environmental mission is possible. Furthermore, the

social enterprises use governance models that expose them to stresses linked to business risk, personal liability and competition from other environmental agriculture qualification systems – most particularly from organic certification. For the first time a more nuanced view of the role of the local state will be noted, which while generally following the networked model as a vital, supportive part of the collaborative market, now appears in some cases as restrictive and bureaucratic. This does not prevent market-building social enterprises from co-creating 'synergistic' value (*ibid.*) by effectively combining the resources of their stakeholders to achieve social and environmental outcomes which did not exist before collaboration. In this respect, at least, both German models indicate that the conservation of cultural landscapes via market structures is best achieved through hybrid mechanisms involving all three economic sectors: private, public and civil society (cf. Billis 1993, Evers and Laville (eds.) 2004).

In contrast with the rigidities of National Trust structures, and with the flexible but profit-limiting associative structures preferred by *Aufpreis* schemes in Baden-Württemberg, the Bavarian cases in this chapter reveal three key features, namely: heterogeneity of governance; formalised business relations with local authorities as project partners; and, lastly, a new perspective on customer-centred product innovation, informed by the co-option of commercial competitors.

These Bavarian models reconfigure market relations, just as the enterprises in chapter 6 did. But by claiming control of market position occupied by the commercial presses, the new case studies invest material assets to *build* markets. In contrast to the networked market, the success of which, especially in Baden-Württemberg, has been built on a quarter of a century of practice, the Bavarian market-building social enterprises are newer. Trading, although risky, exemplifies a sense of organisational development and ambition within sections of the environmental movement, free from state-generated constraints (such as grant conditions), and provides a chance to engage an audience with the orchard conservation mission that extends beyond members of wildlife associations. In this sense, the market becomes an environmental interface with greater potential for fulfilling the social enterprise mission. In short, in the market building model a different dynamic between cognition, institutions and networks is observable, and market co-ordination is, apparently, harder work.

The chapter follows thus: firstly, in 7.2, new case studies are introduced. The market-building model as a development within a dynamic environmental social enterprise movement in Germany is discussed. An expansion of the use of economic sociology concepts, specifically the idea of social skill in market fields, espoused by Fligstein (2001a), is introduced in order to investigate the more complex enterprises presented in this chapter. Such complexity is linked directly to the enterprises' adoption of some characteristics of private firms in order to secure commercial co-operation partners.

Section 7.3 then considers the effectiveness of market-building social enterprise as a method for achieving conservation goals. The commercial difficulties facing people involved in orcharding lead inevitably and quickly to a decline of the orchard habitat. Social enterprises may not entirely solve this dilemma. Even so the environmental mission reinforces an understanding that the orchard environment can only exist when social and commercial interests converge. That conventional commercial institutions and structures alone fail to make this convergence helps to illuminate:

(i) how market-building social enterprises position themselves within an existing and competitive market for products offering environmental credentials;
(ii) the need to balance competing economic and non-economic interests (which in turn indicates the social construction of local markets); and
(iii) the need to balance those interests against a hierarchy of environmental considerations.

Section 7.4 tackles risk, and how Bavarian social enterprises manage their distinctive exposure to it. Governance structure, the relationship with the state and the adoption of a more directly commercial approach to orchard conservation are key factors in risk management. In pursuing their commercial strategies, market-builders reveal the limits of their efforts, while nevertheless generating new institutional norms as hybrid organisations. In the light of these, a review of how market-building social enterprises approach the co-ordination of Beckertian (2010) 'problems' is pursued, which suggests that market-builders may offer most potential for persuading 'ordinary' consumers to embrace the conservation values embedded in their products.

Having thus distinguished market-building formats from the earlier social enterprise models, on the basis of structure, collaborative market relationships and approaches to managing risk differences, and having introduced supplementary concepts which facilitate their analysis, the conclusion, in section 7.5, prepares the ground for a final discussion on the key features of each model, and the utility of Beckertian themes for social enterprise study, in chapter 8.

7.2 The market building model of environmental social enterprise: case studies and concepts

7.2.1 Introducing market building social enterprise case studies

Four social enterprises provide the data for this chapter. All operate in Bavaria, though in one case, juice is 'imported' across the state boundary with Baden-Württemberg if the local apple harvest proves inadequate. While the three case studies of the networked market were associations, that is, their governance structures are defined by a paying membership, the market building cases exhibit three different organisational structures. Summary details of these were given in table 5, in chapter 4, but for ease of reference:

- GF is a *Gesellschaft mit beschränker Haft* (GmbH), a limited liability company;
- GG is a *Gesellschaft bürgerlichen Rechts* (GbR), a company with unlimited liability;
- GH was a GbR and is now a GmbH;
- GI is an *eingetragene Genossenschaft* (eG), a registered co-operative.

GF is a limited company – *Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haft*, GmbH - established in 2006. Under German company law, this requires, in short, that a board of directors collectively contributes founding capital of at least €25,000 as insurance against liability (by contrast, British directors of limited companies are personally liable for a maximum of £1). The board elects an operational or executive director from their number, who is responsible for the running of the firm. GF was established independently of NGO-hosts,

although it should be noted, firstly, that two founder members remain workers of the Landschaftspflege Verband Mittelfranken (LPV). This NGO is a local member of a national network concerned with landscape conservation. For some years it has supported Franconian apple producers with orchard husbandry and marketing using the networked market model. Of the two LPV staff in question, one was the first operational director, and the second is the current operational director. It should also be noted, secondly, that LPV has provided help and encouragement in the establishment both of GI (see below), and to a local horticultural society that bought its own press for use by members.

GF uses its capital and sales revenue to buy apples directly. The role of commercial presses will be expanded upon, but the key distinction to the networked market is that the press is a commissioned service provider. Similarly, GF engages specialists to produce its bottle-fermented products, jams and vinegars. That means that GF concentrates on organising collections, quality control and delivery of apples to the press. After pressing and bottling, GF stores its own products in a hired warehouse. Waged staff include, in addition to two the part-time operational directors, a part-time warehouse/marketing manager, as well as seasonal workers who receive and inspect apple deliveries at 11 different local village depots, prior to delivery to the press.

Enterprise GG is a hybrid between the market-building and networked market model. Founded by the Bavarian ornithological association LBV in 2001, it became independent under the leadership of one of LBV's staff members, who left to establish the enterprise. Support comes from three local authorities and a fourth public body (a landscape conservation collaboration of councils and other stakeholders). Three presses participate in the scheme, mirroring the networked market method, providing enhanced supply prices and retaining ownership of the product. While councils provide strategic guidance and some initiation funding, the operational social enterprise organises the juicing production and product development along very similar lines to a networked market scheme, but through its own books, effectively an operational subsidiary of the collaborating presses.

GG is constituted as a separate company, namely as a GbR (*Gesellschaft bürgerlichen Rechts*) or a company under civil law. This is a very simple legal form, succinctly summarised by one of the directors of GH which initially also adopted this format, because:

'It's simply the easiest and quickest to set up. We had, as I said, four people, you give yourself a contract, you need neither a notary nor anything else, and it costs more or less nothing, that's it. And we had no money either.' (GH, p.1)

A disadvantage of this format is that it burdens the director(s) with unlimited personal liability for the company's actions. GG's collaborating presses carry out marketing, characteristic of the networked market, but new product development happens at the hands (and to the cost) of the social enterprise director. GF and GG both boast a large range of products, including juices, cider, perry, vinegar and juice blends.

Initially, four orchard owners took over the operation of GH in 1997 as a GbR. It has since become a GmbH with three of the initial founders taking positions as company directors. It produces only juice and its suppliers are mainly householders and part-time farmers, that is: farmers who have other income streams in addition to agriculture. In common with networked market models but distinct from GG, local authority help for GH comes in the form of political and moral support, not finance. Interestingly, the inspirational impetus for GH was not a conservation NGO, but a local authority, which supported the establishment of GH as a local response to Agenda 21.

The last of the case study enterprises, GI, is a registered co-operative (e.G. - *eingetragene Genossenschaft*) of apple producers, initially based within a single parish, but is beginning to expand its local range. It received establishment advice from LPV and has raised enough capital to purchase a modern press, which is housed in a parish-owned building. Its co-operative structure gives it tax advantages over other business formats, because it is regarded as a *Zwecksgemeindschaft* – a community of purpose that reinvests its surplus. Sales of juice in bag-in-the-box formats are available from the press, as are bottles of juice supplied by neighbouring associations. Co-op members, of course, own the enterprise assets and profits. Although the press is in seasonal use, it has excess capacity, allowing GI to diversify into cherry juice, before the start of the apple harvest, and to act as a service provider to another Franconian commercial juice supplier. The principal motivation for establishment is less explicitly nature conservation, but rather the blended values of community cohesion, the collective care of local orchards, and the

provision of convenient infrastructure (the press) that was previously only available some distance away. An important aspect of GI is the ability to provide individual press users with juice from their own trees.

7.2.2 Conceptual expansion: using social skill to adopt the commercial perceptions of market actors

In the preceding chapter, section 6.2.2. outlined the difficulties in the Beckertian co-ordination of market 'problems' for those with an interest in orchards. These were:

(i) the inadequate *value* of apples (low supply price) compared to the increased costs of farming;
(ii) inadequate *co-operation* along the supply chain, resulting in the loss of qualifying messages which link juice and orchard conservation; and finally
(iii) *competition*, in the form of more attractive or lucrative land uses, or from other juice products, both resulting in orchard loss.

While market-building social enterprises, too, see supply price as a key problem centred on value (of apples), the co-ordination of co-operation and competition, however, are more directly affected by organisational structures, and by the social skill of each enterprise to frame the juice market as an aspect of the environmental mission.

As well as being situated within Bavarian Franconia, a different federal province to networked case studies, the social enterprises in this chapter are also distinguished by the nature of their agency within the local field. Actors in the networked market benefit from social enterprise brokerage, and the National Trust operates within particular institutional boundaries (of which government relations, land ownership and volunteering are prominent). By contrast, the market-building enterprises display a different type of agency in their pursuit of creating market order, namely the stimulation of new institutional norms – ways of doing things – to revive the economic opportunity attached to traditional orchards. As such, these social enterprises exhibit social skill.

Social skill is 'the ability of actors to induce co-operation in other actors to produce, contest or reproduce a given set of rules' (Fligstein 2001). The particular social skill of these social enterprises, then, is to secure the help of market actors by behaving like them. Specifically, this includes inviting private sector investment in enterprise establishment, and a risk-taking and/or commissioning arrangement with the juice presses. Social skill is a useful supplementary concept in this chapter to those already introduced, providing three new insights. Firstly, social skill allows social enterprises to frame cognitive factors in the market field, building a shared sense of meaning around the mission of orchard conservation (Fligstein 2001). Secondly, because market-building enterprises *are* interested in power – that is control over sales revenues – social skill is helpful in contextualising power relations in a dynamic field within which social enterprises are trying to co-ordinate market problems. Thirdly, in terms of social enterprise scholarship more generally, social skill (as an aspect of market sociology) offers opportunities for understanding the change-making roles of rural and environmental social enterprise in ways that do not clearly emerge from the established discussions about hero-entrepreneurs, the delegation of public service provision, or new managerialism (see chapter 2).

Fligstein's (2001a) contributions here are important in three specific respects, namely they: (i) plug Beckertian gaps around power and market-building social enterprises can be regarded as collaborative new entrants; (ii) help link the pursuit of market power to the competitive position adopted by the enterprise; and, finally, (iii) they facilitate new insights about the institutional struggles of social enterprises. These issues will now be expanded upon.

Firstly, then, Fligstein helps to clarify some of the meanings and roles played by actors not fully elucidated by Beckert's discussions on co-ordination, stability and fields. For example, Beckert (2010) is not explicit about local markets, while for Fligstein (2001a, drawing on Geertz 1985) local knowledge is an important tool within the cognitive frame of the field. More specifically, the social skill displayed by social enterprises in this chapter is at the heart of their ability, as relatively powerless social movement actors, to organise the field and influence its dynamics, because of their 'cognitive capacity for reading people and environments, framing lines of action, and mobilising people' (Fligstein and McAdam 2011,

p.7). Market-building social enterprises actively seek market power in order to direct sales income flows toward their mission. This is necessary because the status quo in the market does not maintain traditional orchards and their biodiversity. Market power, modest though it is, is gleaned by the entrepreneurial development of a trading market position which co-opts commercial co-operation. As suggested in chapter 3, this is a helpful perspective to introduce in the light of Beckert's (1999) position on market dominance and the ability of powerful actors to resist competitive and institutional change. Beckert (2010) describes how actors can use their market power to influence the way in which networks, institutions and cognition relate in a field. Such actors can resist competitive newcomers, or appropriate new ideas. However, it has already been shown that some social enterprise models hold no market power and actively avoid competition. In this respect, Beckert cannot fully help to explain all aspects of environmental social enterprise influence in a local market, other than generally confirming social enterprise within the economic sociologists' creed that rational action is much too simple an interpretation of why and how people behave in economic exchange (Beckert 2002, White and Godart 2002, Block 1990, p53.)

The practical and financial support secured by social enterprises, however, is not simply provided by commercial colleagues as a gesture of environmental solidarity (although this proves to be an outcome in some cases), but because the environmental mission creates value for a niche product. A direct consequence of environmental practices (varietal selection, land management, harvesting and processing techniques) is the taste of the juice, which offers marketing opportunities beyond a cohort of loyal consumers motivated by 'ethical foodscapes' (Morgan 2010). The inducement of co-operation thus emerges from competitive opportunities. Secondly, then, the concept of social skill empirically reinforces the suggestion that, in the market-building model, social enterprises actively compete within a market. This is not the position for the case studies described thus far.

Thirdly, the market-building model is a new development, more generally, in the operation of alternative local food networks. In this chapter, interviewees claim a progression away from a common starting position of many local food groups, namely of developing parallel or alternative supply chains to the position described of 'get[ting] […] groups to co-operate precisely by putting themselves into the positions of others and creating meanings that appeal to a large number of actors'. (Fligstein 2001a).

Like Beckert (2007, 2010), Fligstein (2001a) also posits power as an important influence on field dynamics, especially when it is exercised to impede new market entrants. There is much relevance to this study in his suggestion that social agency in the field can have co-operative outcomes, and that social skills within the market can result from active agency within it. Knowing the type of agency allows orchard social enterprises models to be distinguished. Agency in the market-building model requires reaching out to private sector collaborators in ways that differ to those displayed in the networked market. The difference between the social agency of the networked market and the market-building approach to social enterprise, is that the latter becomes a commercial market actor, on top of the role of facilitator, organiser and broker. In short, market position, risk and organisational creativity are *additional* factors, wielded to create market co-operation in favour of order, both in the market-place, and environmentally, to institutionalise the goal of orchard conservation. As such, market-builders display social skill in creating co-operative tendencies between commercial actors who might normally compete.

Finally, in emphasising the potential of economic sociology as a way to explain aspects of social enterprise, social skill offers a new perspective. Isomorphism is a process which describes how social enterprises become more like private enterprises as they grow (Scott and Meyer 1994, Dart 2004). On first appearance, this process seems applicable to market building enterprises. I would argue, however, that the appropriation of market actors and attributes is not a developmental consequence, but an intentional objective of this format of social enterprise. German juice enterprises are not contracted within formal state relationships (comparable to Work Integration Social Enterprise (WISE) organisations, for example), neither are their commercial attributes the results of isomorphic drift. It is this special intentional skill of market-building social enterprises in particular which *changes* market dynamism by framing the environmental mission as a shared commercial objective (it was a shared civic objective in the networked market) that is of interest here, not necessarily the risk of isomorphism. In summary, this section has introduced social skill as an additional concept from economic sociology, in order to structure the progression of empirical chapters within the thesis. Market-building social enterprises should be regarded as at the zenith of developmental complexity in pursuing their environmental objectives, compared to the earlier attempts of local environment networks. The next section will illustrate these complex commercial and social

relationships, as they emerge from the case studies, and consider their environmental effectiveness.

7.2.3 Organisational variations

In market building situations there is greater diversity of organisational patterns than displayed in models described earlier, and in the market-building case studies here three wholly different governance structures are used. The National Trust is a charity; GA, GB and GC are all registered associations. However, GF and GH are limited companies, GG is an unlimited company and GI is a co-operative. These governance structures directly affect, and complicate, the generalised picture of the juice market and the relative position of the field elements. For example, governance diversity broadens the institutional influences on the networks needed to operate juice schemes. Actors are required with investment capital and a willingness to adapt or extend their exposure to risk. Cognitive emphases may be more commercial if actors face personal liability should they fail to integrate the economic and social missions. In the particular case of the producer co-op GI, the importance of home consumption as a route towards community cohesion contrasts with GF's focus on emphasising the unique ecological qualities of traditional orchards throughout the wider district and beyond its borders.

Two main generalised operational variations thus emerge from the market-building social enterprise, depending on the type of governance chosen, either private or co-operative company. Although the objective of the social enterprise remains the environmental protection of orchards, governance structure affects how prominent the mission is in balance with other commercial and legal constraints that do not apply to UK charities or to German registered associations. The generalisable operational models in the networked market are outlined below, in figures 9 and 10.

Figure 10: Market-building model as a private company (GF)



Figure 9 shows, on the left, individual shareholders who start a company with a combined personal investment of at least €25,000. This enables the enterprise to secure operational necessities that may include sales staff or warehousing (shown in the figure as infrastructure and labour). Farmers supply apples to the social enterprise via collection points at which seasonal, temporary staff may be hired to provide quality control and cash payments. The main difference to the networked market model is that orchard management contracts are not a prerequisite in all of the four case studies of the market-builders. Only GG makes use of formal supply contracts, while the other enterprises rely on a combination of clear supply guidance and quality inspections at the point of delivery. At this point, as for the networked market, apples cease to become a concern of the

supplier. Yet in the market-building model apples enter the ownership of the social enterprise, not the press. The press is paid a fee to produce juice, just as other processors are paid to produce vinegar, jam and bottled fermented products, for example. Sales income is generated for the social enterprise from clients who buy the apple products. Profits are retained by the social enterprise and, in theory, are distributed among the shareholders. In practice, shareholders benefit from association with the conservation mission of the social enterprises, either as a niche market opportunity, or, if shareholders include local councils, as the fulfilment of public environmental commitments.

Figure 11: Market-building model as a co-operative (GI)



The small circles at the top of figure 10 above represent individuals who join together to form a producer co-operative. They are simultaneously suppliers of apples and, collectively, the embodiment of the social enterprise. The money they invest, in the form of co-operative membership fees, enables the enterprise to purchase or hire equipment and space. In the case of a co-operatively owned press, local people (who could also be co-operative members) are paid to operate the machinery and produce juice. This is sold

through various channels. In this illustration some new flows appear. For example, a local council might be willing to help the social enterprise by offering to let a parish building to accommodate the press machinery. This is the case with GI, which sells juice to local primary schools which come under the control of local councils. Finally, a commercial flow back to co-operative members represents a fourth sales channel, which occurs when co-op members pay for their apples to be pressed for home consumption or home/farm-gate retail.

Notwithstanding their variations, market building orchard social enterprises represent a means to an environmental end. In the next section their effectiveness and approach to reaching the environmental mission will be reviewed.

7.3 Environmental missions of market-building social enterprise

7.3.1 Prioritising environmental values

In the National Trust and networked markets, conservation of orchards landscapes and their associated species (including fruit varieties) are unambiguously identified as the environmental aim of social enterprise. In the market-building model, this is less explicit and in the case of GG, saving old orchards seems a daunting proposition. As suggested in 7.2.3, the organisational diversity of market-builders results in cognition and networks being framed differently in the case study enterprises. Specifically, commercial factors weigh more heavily in the balances because they face commercial and personal risks more directly than the two models introduced thus far. On the other hand, the greater reliance on enterprise profit-generation can open other commercial avenues linked to positive environmental messages, notably honey sales. In this section the environmental messages and achievements of this Bavarian format of social enterprise intervention are assessed.

The decision to shoulder a bigger commercial burden seems surprising given that the networked market model is tried and tested, examples of practice are shared at national, biennial, NABU meetings, and commercial pressures are borne by presses. In the

following paragraphs the way in which the case studies approach their environmental mission despite the apparent security of the networked model is explored. Firstly, market integration is introduced as an historical progression for the environmental movement. Secondly, the claim, suggested by interviewees, that orchard conservation cannot be achieved without the reintegration of these landscapes into the rural economy is discussed. Thirdly, tensions between the environmental messages of organic and geographical integrity are examined.

The desire to gain control over sales income is one motivation behind new ways for social enterprise engagement in the market for juice, inspired by the realisation that earlier attempts by environmental groups to use voluntarism or lobbying produced only marginal results. This is because they were out of kilter with public policy and commercial practice (clearly echoing findings from England, in chapter 5). While GI's reliance on volunteers might be interpreted as strong social capital upon which the enterprise is founded (Putnam 1995, Measham and Barnett 2009), GF, on the other hand, reveals how commercialisation has created different enterprise principles:

> *…it was one of our maxims right from the start that we would have no volunteers. That's what emerges from this commercialisation, that people [sic] what work they do within the firm they also get paid for; not very much, but not voluntarily, rather in the deal: you work, I pay.'* (GFa, p.2)

Here, for the first time in the study, social enterprise activities are described as a firm, not as a project, initiative or association. GF's first director sees the pursuit of profit and independence from volunteers as a departure from local food experiments of the 1980s and 1990s.

> *'…the weakness of a great many of these initiatives is that earning money is bad. …you do it only to do something good and to save the world, to make food available for yourself, and of course it's also about orchard habitats. …But our goal was also to get regional fruit into regional businesses, into catering. That's why*

> *these other cases, these "we're saving the habitat" [schemes], that wasn't a priority for us.'* (GFa, p.2)

The interviewee suggests that political ideology has hobbled the earliest efforts of Bavarian environmentalists. An added problem is that the provincial policies have been motivated not by environmental concerns, but by rural and agricultural economic development, and orchards contributed little to this until GF's new approach was introduced:

> *'In the agricultural ministry orcharding was seen more or less as a hobby. It was nothing you could earn money from … if anything, you'd need to be talking about the classical agricultural products – milk, arable crops, meat – and orchards were marginal. Then, when we went [to the Bavarian agricultural exposition in Munich], and we had great products, a great range and were well presented, they realised for the first time that orchards were relevant to the market.'* (GFa, p.4)

GFa thus introduces two lines of discourse: firstly, that alternative food projects solely based on environmental voluntarism are unstable – a prospect discussed in chapter 5; and, secondly, that the conservation objective expressed as a viable commercial opportunity was the key to securing official and market attention. GFa suggests that, in Bavaria, the prioritisation of regional product marketing has been an agricultural, not an environmental concern; however, meanwhile the early efforts of environmental campaigners failed to integrate orchards into commercial spheres because they were ideologically ambivalent about the market. Nor did EEC grants to subsidise the removal of old orchards help during the 1970s and 80s. GF has reintegrated (or hybridised) commercial and environmental spheres by responding to public environmental concern for orchards by marketing orchard products that reflect the policy concerns of the state, which are grounded in regional agricultural development. In short, GF has conformed to neo-liberal rural development approaches to valorising the environmental qualities of rural landscapes (Guthman 2007, Lockie 2009).

For GFa, the environmental challenge does not lie in measuring biodiversity associated with orchards but in the survival of the orchards *per se*, to be achieved through market-mechanisms:

> *'…whether this orchard is still an orchard after 10 years, or an arable field with its known species, that's where the difference lies. … I believe that's the starting point in the discussion about the conservation performance of orchards.'* (GFa, p.7)

GFa's colleague, the current director, similarly sees commercial use of the orchards as a key to their future. The three-pronged approach (GFb pp.6-7) to achieving this goal lies in ensuring that:

- old orchards are renewed and fallen trees are replanted – which in practice can attract state subsidy for farmers and help from environmental NGOs;
- orchard products are marketed and other groups are supported in doing so;
- and finally, orchard husbandry is incentivised to ensure future productivity.

Additional environmental objectives, beyond the general ambition to retain orchards, are specified in memoranda that define the principles of the company[31]. These include the promotion of honey from local beekeepers, whose bees pollinate the orchards (*paragraph 6*), and the insistence that fruit must originate from unsprayed orchards (*Erleuterungen [Elucidations] p.1*). Selling honey is also an environmental proxy for the co-director of co-operative GI, allowing orchards to be connected to a wider portfolio of ecosystem services (Kremen et al. 2007):

> *'…what I'd still like to do is for us to tie in the whole ecological message, so that consumers become aware that we are not just conserving orchards, but also supporting apiarists, and that's why they should buy honey. Without honey there is no fruit.'* (GI, p4)

[31] Grundsätze der [GF] GmbH, 30th May 2011

In assessing the success of GF against its own environmental criteria, interviewees estimate that 170 hectares of traditional orchard are actively husbanded as a direct result to selling to GF, of which up to 80 hectares have been newly planted since 1999[32]. A number of new plantings have been supported through state planning procedures such as planning-gain funding following wind farm construction. The existence of local orchard social enterprises weighs in favour of public investment in new orchard plantings. On the face of it, this seems like public policy enlightenment, compared to the grubbing grants of earlier decades. Yet the effect can be negative. New orchards planted through planning-gain may not survive at all because little consideration is given to their future care (GG, p.6 and p.9), the suitability of planting locations and disease resistance of fruit varieties selected, because professional knowledge of traditional orchards has dissipated.

The localised nature, and interpretation, of the success of the environmental mission becomes evident within GG. A challenging picture is painted through research undertaken by its director, a former employee of the LBV, the Bavarian ornithological association, which values Bavarian orchards as a refuge for the little owl. However, the prospects of retaining orchards as conservation reserves is recognised as unrealistic (GG, p.1, and cf. GA in previous chapter), requiring the large-scale purchase of land. The initial inspiration for staring an *Aufpreis* scheme, therefore, came from LBV as an alternative method for achieving ornithological objectives. In contrast to GF, start-up funding for GG came from an application to the state-financed Bavarian nature conservation fund (*Naturschutzfond*[33]). This fund was established in 1982 from interest from proceeds of provincial asset and service privatisations (GG, p.1).

GF and GG reveal that, firstly, over a distance of little more than 100 miles, the motivations towards starting an enterprise were influenced, respectively, by landscape and ornithological environmental concerns of the host institutions; and secondly, that there are different cognitive frames at work in the two firms, namely, that GF's directors were energised by the failure of environmental campaigning to make connections with commercial agriculture, which they regard as essential for achieving ecological and economic integration; while GG's mission is hinged around species-specific ornithological conservation considerations closer to the English experience.

[32] Supplementary e-mail correspondence 8th January 2013
[33] http://www.stmug.bayern.de/umwelt/naturschutz/naturschutzfonds/index.htm (most recent access 8th Jan 2013)

Aside from its ornithological foundations, GG is distinctive because balances and choices emerge within the environmental mission itself. Specifically these are the question of organic certification in relation to other environmental, health and place-based quality controls, and whether or not the environmental mission of orchard conservation is a prospect which social enterprise increases improves. In other words, a contribution of GG to understanding how environmental enterprises approach their mission, is to reveal the multi-faceted nature of the mission. In the first instance, environmental goals need to be weighed against social and commercial factors, such as profitability, community and farmer network development and risk. However, secondly, one environmental consideration is weighed against another: organic certification may be a route to increased retail profit but, because it is not place-specific, contrasts with the environmental qualities embodied in conserving Franconian orchards for little owls. This is to say, that GG is faced with an environmental dilemma: on one hand agri-economic structures create a familiar conservation challenge:

> *'I think it's simply down to a really major structural change. The orchards currently standing around us were all planted in the 1930s and 40s, when orcharding was economically necessary to keep head above water. People earned or supplemented their income with them. The people don't live off them anymore, and that's why they are not husbanded.'* (GG, p.5)

On the other hand, GG introduces a new insight about the scale of the challenge of conserving large tracts of traditional orchards as important habitats, and the ability of social enterprise to renew the economic and environmental relationship which orchards previously represented. It is the scale of the now fragile and teetering biological resource that GG's co-ordinator today finds so daunting:

> *'…one has to recognise quite clearly, that [utility of orchards] will not occur in the scales it did 30, 40, 50 years ago. For that reason, the conservation of the orchards, the orchards we have now in Germany, cannot really be achieved within the current structures.'* (GG, p.7)

This realisation contrasts with the optimism generated by GA and GF: these two schemes alone have brought close to 300 hectares of orchards into active production and utility – roughly the equivalent of 1.5% of all English traditional orchards – and around 120 schemes exist across Germany, mainly in the south, where orchards are most plentiful. However, figure 11 below illustrates the scale of the conservation task:

Figure 12: Age profile of fruit trees serving GG (source: GG)



The graph shows that at two years after the establishment of the enterprise, about three-quarters of the trees used for juice production are either in full productive flow or the later stages of their life. This is a happy short–term picture for a social enterprise start-up, requiring a reliable productive fruit source. The picture is not so simple, either in the medium term, or in relation to the little owl, which nests in the hollows of mature trees. Reaching this state may take a tree 50 years. Meanwhile, the graph shows that the trees in pre-optimum productive stages are fewer than existing productive and post-productive trees.

'…currently there is a continual decline in the old orchards… we can plant as much as we like, we won't be able to stop it… simply because it's a gigantic quantity of trees involved. So we won't succeed in tackling the decline of orchards using our current means.' (GG. p7)

Net orchard decline is partly inevitable, because today demand for apples is less so framed by self-provisioning and domestic self-sufficiency than it was in the period when the orchards were planted. However, the current picture of mainly post-productive trees is optimal for little owls, although that will soon change and replanting will inevitably leave a habitat gap because 50 years may pass before replanted trees mature and develop hollows suitable for owls. The question remains how effective social enterprise is in producing environmental gain. Currently, GF and GG offer different interpretations of success explained by their different approaches to their environmental goals. For GF, survival of orchards is the main goal, and replanting has been substantial. For GG, despite similar success in replanting, this can only be enough if agri-economic structures shift, and even in that case, the little owl could face a period of decline while trees mature.

GG's environmental focus, therefore, has become pragmatic and markedly social, not least because the age-profile of the trees is analogous (GG, p.8) with the age-profile of the people tending them: the generations who planted them are the main users of the orchards. Therefore a social effort is needed to achieve a much greater public and community engagement with orchards as valued landscapes. Meanwhile, the best environmental goal GG can achieve is to:

'…develop enterprise goals, so that orchard spaces can still be [utilised] by firms – let's call them homeopathic spaces, this is landscape acupuncture – so that in various places orchards can still exercise their biological functions. A goal in all this must be that biotopes become connected across the region.' (GG, p.7)

Even though the goal of orchard replanting seems ambitious in the short-term, the conservation strategy is nevertheless in place: orchards must be socially reintegrated into people's lives, which means developing commercial opportunities connected to particular

and biologically functioning orchards. These represent spaces within a regional biotope. According to estimates by GG, the re-commercialisation of local orchards may lead to an eventual retention of about 45% of current orchards (GG, p.11) simply because the majority of existing trees are beyond economic utility.

> *'…the whole thing only makes sense if you use the fruit. Just to plant [trees] so that they stand there in the landscape, of course that's nice, but it makes little commercial sense.'* (GG, p11)

These tensions reveal new spheres of negotiation for environmental social enterprises, which previous models have not. On one hand, the excerpt above is a simple dilemma between retaining landscapes of natural and cultural importance and how to pay for them – the clash of the economic and ecological logics. Yet, GG's pragmatism, although the interviewee is a trained horticulturalist, landscape expert and former ornithological professional, fits into the changing representation of *Kulturlandschaft* – the co-production through human agricultural interventions of cultural landscapes to reproduce *Heimat* (Jordan 2011, p55). In this respect, the environmental mission of GG is not a hopeless case which flies in the face of history but rather the social enterprise format is a contribution to renewing the social and environmental relationship which is agriculture.

Environmentally, GF and GG make a number of useful contributions to understanding how German social enterprises view and integrate the environmental mission of their work. Some of these views echo previous enterprises, for example the trio of planting, husbandry and marketing are familiar tactics in the networked market. However, these two cases have been more specific about the need to integrate market and environment, although they reveal different environmental balances. Interview data suggest that:

(i) without market-based incentives orchards will continue to decline, due to structural changes of agriculture, modern lifestyles and the social limitations of environmental voluntarism;
(ii) the re-economisation of orcharding does directly support orchard conservation, but the extent of the area retained varies from place to place;

(iii) public programmes to replant fruit trees, while in contrast to earlier grubbing out policies, lead to a very high tree mortality rate, in other words they do not make a significant contribution to orchard restocking;

(iv) orchards must be valued not just as important habitats in their own right but also as contributors to habitat mosaics (Vogrin 2011);

(v) species-specific conservation may, as the little owl reinforces, result in clashes between environmental and economic considerations if specifically targeted species require cycles of orchard development at odds with those for optimal fruit productivity.

In summary, the market-building model indicates that the framing of the environmental mission depends on which environmental factors are prioritised within hierarchies of environmental goal-setting. In other words, a range of environmental objectives needs to be considered even before they are balanced with social and economic matters. Despite the difficulties presented by the scale of existing orchards in the light of agricultural and economic restructuring, social enterprises nevertheless reveal two successful environmental results: firstly, the success of the enterprise really does incentivise farmers to replant – both GF and GG show this. Secondly, in areas with successful juice enterprises supplementary grant-aided plantings linked to development are easier for the authorities to swallow, because, in time, the fruit of potentially neglected trees has a better chance of reaching market, thus incentivising tree care.

Finally, the scale of the challenge of conserving all remaining Franconian orchards can be seen, in economic terms, as a surplus capacity problem. The social and agricultural circumstances that governed the orchards' planting have changed. In response, social enterprises have developed pragmatic commercial strategies which attempt to commercialise as many remaining orchards as possible, meanwhile underscoring the environmental importance of restocking, their social value and of biosphere connectivity.

The task of commercialising orchards, as discussed in chapters 5 and 6, relies heavily on the co-ordination of value. This can be achieved partly by mobilising cognitive frames to extract transferable value from landscapes and from fruit juice. A useful method for assuring the environmental credentials of such value extraction is organic certification. In further examining the multi-faceted environmental balancing act, the following section now

considers the consequences of organic certification, both as guarantee of good husbandry, and, in moving towards commercial discussions, as a marketable quality criteria in competition with other product messages linked to traditional local orchards.

7.3.2 Organic certification – help or hindrance?

In the German enterprises, an important environmental pre-requisite of orchard husbandry and consequent apple supply is that orchards must not be sprayed or fertilised with chemicals. This is stipulated in supply agreements with farmers. Social enterprise employees regularly carry out soil inspections and leaf and fruit samples in supplying orchards to test compliance. Where these inspections are formalised within organic criteria, organic certification becomes a guarantee of environmental integrity, the standards for which are prescribed by the EU and regulated by independent certification bodies. Farmers conforming to organic standards tend to be identified with positive outcomes for biodiversity (Hole et al. 2005), partly due to restrictions on the applications of chemical sprays. The reward for organic certification – increased consumer confidence and higher retail prices – comes at a cost to the party seeking certification. For some this is prohibitive:

> *'Well, we're totally, let's say, organic. We always have been. But we're not certified, you know, we've given ourselves the certification, you might say, because certification costs too much, I have to be honest. Too expensive, we can't afford it.'* (GH, p.2)

For GH, certification is too costly, even though 100 producers supply the enterprise. GB, a small networked enterprise outlined in chapter 6, markets organic juice from 17 suppliers, but in that case certification costs are borne by the press, helping to contextualise GH's view, and illustrating a clear difference between networked, and market-building social enterprise balances.

Organic certification does not affect the producer in isolation. Although it offers opportunities to increase sales income thanks to a retail premium, thereby compensating for certification costs, certification costs also affect processors. In contrast to GG, which certifies produce on behalf of the participating presses, GI actively avoids organic juice from a certified farmer due to the added trouble of certifying the press:

> *'Well, there is this big organic farmer here who said: "If you want to, you can have my certified organic apples, but you'll have to have your plant [press] certified, too." …we could actually sell ours as organic juice, so to speak, of course not with the stamp, but in theory it is organic.'* (GI, p.2)

In the case of GI, then, a key environmental indicator of supply chain performance has been rejected, initially on the basis of cost, but also because interpersonal trust is an intrinsic part of this local producer co-operative (Smith 2008). Additional certification of environmental quality is deemed unnecessary.

Similarly, for GF, organic labels offer no additional environmental qualification of the product, but instead restrict the richness of the *Streuobst* story by channelling the message about local orchards (which is necessarily place-based, and therefore environmental) towards a health discourse (Lockie 2006). GF's director expresses dissatisfaction when his enquiries reveal that fruit for a well-known product made by one of Bavaria's largest drinks manufacturers originates in Turkey. Although there is symmetry in this, given the cultural contributions by Turkish immigrants to contemporary German identity (see for example Cox 2011, Ehrkamp 2006, Horrocks and Kolinsky 1996), importing concentrate reveals little about the environmental credentials of Franconian orchards. For juice social enterprises, with territorially and ecologically distinguished products, a range of environmental messages are lost with organic certification. They include distinctions between concentrate and fresh juice ('*Direktsaft*'), between bush and standard orchards, between local and distant suppliers, and between the use of surplus dessert apples and locally unique varieties particularly suited to juicing.

Over and above the inability of organic certification, in isolation, to tell a full environmental story, environmental consumerism is not without its own tensions. The following anecdote may cause amusement, but shows a seam of serious opposition to organic consumer cultures (and reciprocal preconceptions) by localists:

> *'Then a couple came along, I guess age 50, civil servants, teachers or something similar, with their noses slightly in the air. They walked past our stand and the woman asked me – I was next to our stand with all the products, ... "is this organic?" And I said, "no, this isn't organic." Then she says "Thank you", and walks past. So I went after her and said: "May I explain why we are not organic and what our criteria are?" She looked at me and said no, they only buy organic. So I said: "Please, let me explain: we do good things, we're concerned about traditional orchards." "That doesn't interest me, I only buy organic." And so the matter was settled. Then she bought [brand name] organic juice made with Polish apples. Full-stop. That opened my eyes: I don't want an organic label and neither do I want organic customers, they should shop in organic shops. There's an end to it. We can sell very well to other people.'* (GFb, p.11)

This excerpt reiterates the idea that organic food faces an intrinsic problem of anonymity in the mainstream, namely that organics are territorially 'disembedded' (Goodman and DuPuis, 2011, p.93). Such a view, looking back, is shared at National Trust property GA, in chapter 5, where it is claimed that organic adds nothing to the existing 'story' of the orchards. It remains unexplained why the woman (in this isolated case, perhaps specifically recounted for its effect) could not be persuaded to share GF's concern for doing 'good things' in traditional orchards. As a consequence of the woman's determination, a whole consumer segment is rejected by GF. By contrast, in the networked market it was shown that wholefood shops represent reliable outlets for *Streuobst* juice patronised by customers with environmental interests. In addition, GG, as a certified enterprise, found such retailers to be immediate supporters (*'That clientele was very easy to reach.'* (GG.p15)) and was able to persuade these shops, within two years, to displace juice produced outside Franconia.

State subsidy for organic product development is another cause of environmental tension. In the preceding chapter, all three networked market social enterprises received nominal or start-up support from local authorities, or from programmes such as CittaSlow. Start-up support is valued also in the market-building sphere, because of the additional infrastructure costs directly required by the social enterprise:

> *'To build up a limited company, I have to look for people, … I have to make contracts, …I have to think about labels… so I need a lot up front at a time when there is not yet any money in the pot. …But you only need start-up finance. …Over time, subsidy makes you complacent.'* (GFb, p11)

This excerpt introduces some of the tensions created by operational state subsidy, raised via GF's detailed critique of an organic networked market enterprise in Baden-Württemberg. The social enterprise in question was not interviewed as part of German fieldwork for this study. It receives funding from the PLENUM initiative, an EU agri-environment programme to promote regional products from five designated areas in Baden-Württemberg. These areas are selected because their landscapes (including orchards) are regionally distinctive and characteristic[34].

> *'The deciding point is that for [enterprise name], which hasn't even been around for 10 years… from 2003 to 2010, PLENUM invested €200,000. For ideas, for new products, flyers and and and… The fact is that [name] now has five products and we have 27.'* (GFb, p.2)

GF evidently prides itself on the range of products it has developed by contrast to the scheme subsidised via PLENUM. The interviewee then continues, expressing surprise at the results of this state investment, in the light of rising demand for the consumption of Schorle, a bottled blend of apple-juice and carbonated spring water.

[34] See http://www.regiomarket.org/index.php?id=27 accessed on 23rd January 2013.

'…Schorle has gone up dramatically between 2005 and 2010… So [name] started again, also with money, €40,000… to develop an organic apple Schorle. …The result was that 40,000 bottles were sold in 2009. I have to add that this is a clear [ie. filtered] Schorle, that's very important. I was told that in 2010 only 32,000 bottles were sold. …everywhere the consumption of Schorle is rising, just not with them. Why? An organic Schorle must stand out in the market. That won't happen if it's clear… If two organic Schorle drinks are next to one another in a supermarket, this one costs 79 cents and this one costs 83 cents, how can the consumer tell where the difference lies?' (GFb, p. 2-3)

Here GF's director claims that a total of €240,000 have been invested in the establishment of an enterprise but with the result that it is losing sales in a rising market. Furthermore, the subsidised development of a product, although organic, cannot be distinguished from imported clear concentrate-based drinks, other than on its price, which is higher. In short, state subsidy has, in this case, created a regional product designed to embody the cultural landscape, but which fails to compete because of the market tensions between price, distinctiveness and appearance. The competitive distinctiveness of organic apparently removes any added value advantage for which the regional product development subsidy was designed, partly on the basis of the product's appearance.

Another contribution to the tensions between organic and territorial *Streuobst* concerns poor productivity of fruit trees due to under-fertilisation. Limited consumer insights into what organic agricultural practice entails (Yeridoe et al. 2005, Harper and Makatouni 2002) meet received wisdom by conservationists about fertilisation in orchards:

'For years nature conservation here has preached: traditional orchards are nature conservation and fertilisation and conservation don't go together. So the trees never got fertilised, no manure, no nitrogen etc. That results in low resistance to disease… only a quarter of the [4,000] trees we surveyed were [in a] vital [condition].' (GG, p.9)

Organic certification does not proscribe fertilisation, although it restricts synthetic inputs. Misinformed views of conservationists linked to the weakness of detailed environmental

qualification through labelling helps explain why several juicing enterprises chose to develop their own husbandry criteria and embedded labels. In the case of GG, where organic certification is carried, it comes third in the hierarchy of other environmental qualities which are transferred into marketing messages, ranking behind nature conservation and regionality (GG, p.15).

Organic certification serves, finally, as a bridge between environmental discussions and the next section, which will deal with the consequences of the commercial distinctions of the model. GG acts as a group certification organiser for local producers and helps inspect their orchards. This produces an additional income for the enterprise, on top of juice trading. However, advanced fixed costs such as registrations and labour of up to €12,000 a year (GG, p.17) need to be met. In years of surplus fruit the organic premium may not be considerable compared to *Aufpreis*, leading fewer farmers to choose the more administratively onerous route to the organic market. This affects GG's costs. The issue here is that, in the networked market, organic registration costs are paid by the presses, even when inspections are undertaken by social enterprise representatives. In the market-building sphere, all commercial liabilities, even ones which seek to qualify environmental product dimensions, are a burden of the social enterprise.

To summarise, this section has outlined three distinctive environmentally-linked characteristics of the market-building social enterprise model, namely:

(i) The market-building social enterprise is a development of, and springs from, the campaigning environmental third sector and has emerged from a recognition of the limitations of protest campaigns and a reliance on voluntarism.

(ii) Like other social enterprise formats (by definition), market-builders also regard the revival of economic husbandry to be the best currently available route to renewing the biosphere. Some market builders, uniquely, acknowledge the possibility that the existing extent of regional orchards cannot be retained and have developed pragmatic alliances which advocate peer-learning, commercial co-operation (social skill) and biosphere connectivity as a conservation goal.

(iii) Organic certification, distinct from the networked model but in common with the National Trust, does little to qualify place and habitat-specific environmental messages in the market. Furthermore, certification may expose risk-taking social enterprises to increased costs. State subsidy may mitigate some costs but are no guarantee of market success for products which carry environmental assurances.

Given the additional work and costs involved in developing a market-building social enterprise, the question arises of why these Franconian case studies have not followed the well-trodden networked market path. The next section will examine this with reference to the distinctive role of risk, its management and rewards.

7.4 Risk, order and the creation of new institutional meanings

The willingness to take risk is an attribute of social entrepreneurship discussed in chapter 2. In their review of the literature on the matter Weerawardena and Mort (2006) offer a model whereby social enterprises triangulate risk, productiveness and innovativeness within a framework of their individual social mission, the wider environment (or external context) and the requirement for economic sustainability. While this view helps contextualise social service providing enterprises, the authors' proposal that social enterprises distance themselves from risk-taking will shortly be challenged via market-building environmental enterprises in Bavaria. Furthermore, this section will propose that Elizabeth Chell's views that, because social entrepreneurship creates *'"social and economic value" [it] may thus be applied to both private, entrepreneurial ventures, as well as social enterprises*' (Chell 2007) increasingly seems open to debate. That social value can flow from private entrepreneurship is not in question. However, from what follows, ensuring a diverse and collaborative field where entrepreneurial behaviour is grounded in a shared non-commercial mission and constructed by means of social skill, *requires the presence of social enterprises*, not just socially motivated entrepreneurs. However, market building requires a different social enterprise engagement with risk to the previous two models because it behaves more closely like a conventional firm, through choices of governance structures and the willingness to shoulder private capital risk.

In previous cases risk was dissipated. At the National Trust, a property manager may be able to blur the boundary between financial implications linked to juice production and sales, by benefitting from the social engagement (and publicity) that public orchard events bring to the property as a whole. Furthermore, the risk of retail lies with another branch of the Trust, and labour costs are negligible. In networked models, the risk is not (or barely) borne by the social enterprise itself, but by commercial actors, even in quite large throughput schemes, such as GA.

7.4.1 How risk affects the field

Nevertheless, all the juice social enterprises face some degree of risk as they are involved in trading. The main distinctions between market-building and networked market social enterprises are that: (i) individuals in the former shoulder the burden of commercial risk compared to the latter, where the distribution of risk was not altered as a result of social enterprise interventions; (ii) the risk consequences of variable harvests, which are an inherent production cycle associated with traditional orchards, is therefore heightened in market-building formats; and (iii) market-builders face higher capital costs linked to their direct purchase of equipment, labour, goods and services and may seek this capital in the private sector. These risks involved in market-building contribute to the Beckertian notion of market uncertainty (especially for new entrants) and social enterprises must attempt to overcome this through their co-ordination efforts. However, risks are not solely commercial and relate also to trading standards and environmental health regulations. For example, GG had to pay a fine for using non-organic sugar in the production of sparkling organic cider (GG, p.17). While the fine was modest, the principle of producer public liability means that market-building social enterprises inherit additional responsibilities.

Governance structure, hitherto framed within institutional arrangements, becomes an important factor in market-building models, requiring them to balance registration costs with risk management. As has been previously described, while the GbR structure, adopted by GG and initially by GH, is an administratively simple procedure for the establishment of a company, but renders company director(s) personally responsible for the full extent of any liabilities arising from disputes or damages. GmbH limits liability but requires a substantial establishment stake held against potential future liabilities, meaning

that the money is not available for commercial investment or the direct promotion of the environmental mission.

In deciding whether sole-trading, limited liability or co-operation is the best structure for managing trading, a balance also needs to be struck against the extent to which each format offers the freedom to reinvest profits for the environmental mission. The balance between risk and establishment costs in the GbR format, for example, can create personal pressures, as explained by GG, and then GH:

> *'I'm quite clear [about the implications]: when you have a family, of course it creates a belly-ache…'* (GG, p.17)

> *'[a GmbH] is not quite so easy, but it was a consideration for our security. With a GmbH your liability is tied to a capital reserve, whereby with a GbR I am there with house and home, everything, cash reserves, everything, and that's a problem, because you never know what may be.'* (GH, p. 1)

Although GH is fairly relaxed about the risks associated with producing apple juice (*'Well, it wasn't as bad as all that!' (p. 1)*), the principal difficulty for social enterprises appears to be how to manage the biennial nature of the fruit harvest. Harvest patterns affect all commercial actors including farmers, presses and consumers, although the liabilities of the market-building enterprises (rent, labour costs and market presence) mean harvests directly affect other commercial considerations:

> *'…to engage in the market, I need equipment, I need stock, I need labels, I need structures, and that always costs money, but the deciding factor for our model is: will there be enough fruit this year? That means we now face enormous costs..'* (GFb, p.15).

A medium-term strategy to improve fruit production is to encourage environmental orchard husbandry. In the short-term some enterprises diversify, and keep their fingers crossed:

> *'So far we've had amazing luck that we haven't been confronted with [a failed harvest]. …we have a pure pear juice, and we have a mixed juice with 10% pears in it... . We spoke about it early on within the company …that we'd let the pear juice just sell out … and instead keep producing this red mixed juice that is very much in demand.'* (GFa, p.5)

In this case of a limited stock of pears, supplies can be made to go further by blending with apple juice and, by having flexibility in production and good market knowledge, production can be switched entirely from pears into a different product, in this case a popular apple and elderberry blend. Early planning within the company, as shown, may mean that the troughs and dips of biennial harvest cycles are managed, although gluts can be as troublesome as scarcity:

> *'…we just about get through the year with 250 tonnes, but then we have no buffer. In 2008 we bought 530 tonnes but after that we had no money, no storage capacity, nothing.'* (GFa, p6)

GF draws fruit from other schemes when things get tight:

> *'…our region has an overlapping supply range with a BUND-led initiative that uses the same criteria to buy [fruit for] juice, and that stores [its products] at the same presses. And so we have an agreement that, in the case of need, we can use their regional harvest – you see it is stored regionally because they operate both in Baden-Württemberg and in Bavaria – then we can use their juice as a buffer.'* (GFa, pp.5-6)

This excerpt introduces interesting commercial tactics, namely co-operation with a scheme operating according to the networked market configuration. This latter draws fruit from the borderlands of Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria, working with presses on each side of the border. Because the Bavarian supply ranges overlap, any necessary purchases do not compromise the territorial Franconian integrity of GF's products.

In Beckertian terms, this agreement is an innovative way to co-ordinate *co-operation*. GF can, if necessary, co-operate to form a new kind of cross-model network between itself, the neighbouring scheme and its press, benefitting all three: GF gets pressed Bavarian fruit to supplement its supply in lean times, and buys this juice from the press. The fruit from which the juice is made comes from areas local to GF, but will include fruit from other farmers, hence the existence of apples not previously available to GF from its regular suppliers. The neighbouring scheme is not threatened by allowing the pressed juice to appear in the market under the label of GF, because, as a networked market social enterprise, it seeks no market position for itself, limiting its market activities to creating supply chain arrangements aligned to a shared environmental mission. That mission also ensures that apples are sourced from appropriately managed orchards. The co-operation, as a risk management strategy in the case of poor harvests, expands the market field because, firstly, cross-enterprise co-operation extends the range of network actors in the field as well as the extent of the field itself; and secondly through the collaboration between social enterprise models, *Aufpreis* becomes an environmental *institution* that allows multiple approaches to configure field relations in favour of *stability* and *order*.

In conclusion, risk and its management affects the dynamics of the field more directly in this than in other social enterprise models. Social skill can be employed by social enterprises to infiltrate a local market as a co-operative actor, because of its ability to introduce a new social and environmental understanding among market actors, by adapting the perspectives of the existing market actors. This has cognitive consequences in terms of personal liability in some cases, compensated for by enhanced commercial understanding of consumer markets in general. In short, through this examination of the role of risk in the market field, the utility of economic sociology in explaining environmental social enterprise action is emphasised.

It has been argued above that social entrepreneurship literature (Dees et al. 2001, Weerawardena and Mort 2006) frames risk management in terms of the risk aversion of social enterprise managers. This is because many are constrained by the administrative arrangements of state funding awarded for delegated services. Alternatively, social enterprises are regarded as more innovative than their for-profit equivalents due to the limitations of funding sources open to them. In the case of the market-building social enterprises it is notable that the innovative approach to securing funding lies in harnessing private sector investment by presenting profitable co-operation opportunities and in some cases, GG in particular, this sharpens personal risk, while in other cases, such as GF, it dissipates it. Market-builders act in more conventionally commercial ways compared to their facilitative networked cousins and the English institutionalised models. Moreover, they are not inclined to be risk averse by their nature, as the literature suggests is the case for social (as opposed to environmental) enterprises. That is to say their organisational structures and their field position in relation to the state expose them to risk in ways which do not conform to most other social enterprise incarnations.

Nevertheless, the state remains a key institutional influence on social enterprise operation. This is evident in policy-making, especially rural development, nature conservation and planning, as has been described. In market-building social enterprise, the state also emerges in varying forms, as a collaborator, a start-up funder and a break on innovation, all of which influence field dynamics. The next section will trace the contributions of state institutions to the Franconian market-building model.

7.4.2 The state and market-building social enterprises

Bavaria, like Baden-Württemberg, is a prosperous province (OECD 2011[35]) and grants are available through a variety of agri-environment budgets. Provincial support in the form of stalls at public fairs promoting organic or regional products, and the emerging relationship between juicing social enterprises and planning authorities awarding approvals for wind farms, have also been referred to.

[35] Bavarian GDP per head is consistently above federal averages.

In the market-building model, the role of the state extends beyond the grant-giving and scientific support from which the National Trust benefitted; or the influence of local authorities on juice demand through procurement and public information about orchards in the networked market. This extension takes two forms. In GG four public sector partners form part of the strategic, yet not the operational structure of the enterprise. In GH, the local authority initiated the enterprise as a contribution to Local Agenda 21 and helps to promote it through environmental web-sites and the distribution of information flyers in council outlets, reaching urban and rural citizens, and tourists. Procurement of juice for council offices mirrors the situation described in chapter 6 for GA. Yet most support for GH is symbolic, as the two interviewees (A and B) reveal:

> *A: OK, you do have the non-financial support, that's clear. The councillor will come to a public opening, that's nice, he'll stand there. And they help out should some crisis happen, you need that relationship, I'd say. … OK, if you needed a video [about the scheme], you'd get that, probably. But if you needed €5,000, you wouldn't get that.'*
>
> *B: 'Well, it's not needed.'*
>
> *A: 'We've managed to do it ourselves.'* (GH, pp.12-13)

Publicity as a simple form of state support for environmental projects conforms to EU regulations to protect competition (state-aid rules) and creates media opportunities for rural politicians. The security of knowing that the council can be relied upon in times of crisis reveals the state's potential in correcting, or compensating, for market-failures, especially where the latter are related to the provision of consumer information which helps people make purchasing decisions in favour of regional food qualities (Gorton and Tregear 2008). In England, such interventions have led to the state supporting the development of often competing rural development projects, rather than necessarily adding to economic development in rural areas (Marsden and Sonnino 2008). This is different in German social enterprise, because in both GG and GH, the state plays a more direct role within the market beyond environmental information provider, namely as consumer, supplier or enterprise partner. A local expression of this is in the indirect participation by parish councils in the enterprise:

'It's an historical thing that local councils own land on which there are fruit trees, and it appears in every parish.' (GFa, p. 4)

GFa does not buy fruit directly from parish councils, instead fruit is publicly auctioned as a standing crop and the winner of the auction might supply GF. The local state is therefore not a direct trading partner with GF but represents a significant source of fruit. Parishes also purchase juice (pressed partially from their own orchards) and host environmental activities and demonstration work arranged by GF for local farmers.

To recap German peculiarities from this and the preceding chapter: firstly, the state sees regional foods - and in the southern provinces this especially includes *Streuobst* products - as an on-going iteration of *Kulturlandschaft*. Secondly, the connection of the state to orchards – through ownership and rural development programmes - is important because '*These apples both shape and are shaped by memory and identity as people seek to preserve the traditional varieties of particular regions as well as the landscapes they create. … German national identity happened through, rather than in opposition to, local and regional identities*' (Jordan 2011, p. 46). In other words, regional distinctiveness is part of national identity and apples embody areas of the German environment in the post-industrial rural economy. Thirdly, in developing new market orders and relationships that seek environmental outcomes different to the status quo, state actors influence the co-ordination of market problems, by financing social enterprise start-ups and by contributing to the management structures of individual social enterprises. GG is an example of the latter, as illustrated in figure 12 below:

Figure 13: Multi-sectoral relationships within social enterprise GG



This illustration, adapted for anonymity from a graphic provided by GG, reveals two spheres of social enterprise activity. The upper, strategic sphere includes four public sector actors – three district-level councils collectively covering urban and rural areas, and a public sector-led partnership of parishes working to protect a designated landscape area. They are joined by the Bavarian ornithological trust, LBV, an NGO from which GG has become independently established as an unlimited company under the direction of two individuals, one of whom had worked as an employee of LBV.

The role of these strategic partners is two-fold: to support the operation of GG, for example by registering a label which is nominally owned by LBV, and to act as a collective, regional alliance which provides a focus for combined environmental strategy implementation.

> *'…they were really quite glad to be able to participate, because we were looking for a regional identity project. I mean by that a project where you can say the whole region stands behind it. That had not happened before in respect of local product marketing…'* (GG, p. 2)

GG represents a focus for collective environmental and landscape policy implementation (orchard conservation), thereby avoiding, Marsden and Sonnino's (2008) problem of competing local food projects. A disadvantage of this format is the potential tensions of co-operation within the strategic sphere, which subsequent social enterprise establishment helped to solve:

> *'When we started, I kept having to ask at LBV if something was possible, then the city said it should be like this, everybody thought he had to steer [the project] somewhere, or to intervene, and you can't work with politicians, it's a catasprophe!'* (GG, p. 20)

This section has revealed, through particular reference to GH and GG, how state institutions can catalyse social enterprise development. The forms of this help have included: (i) policy focus (LA21 or landscape conservation), (ii) strategic and publicity support, and (iii) supporting social enterprise as a form of operational independence within a collaborative strategic partnership. Public commitment to the success of the juicing scheme can thus help create continuity and consistency. Council support encourages stability and legitimates attempts to alter field relations in favour of environmental change. A disadvantage, illustrated by the last quotation, is the culture of decision-making within the local authorities in question, which has created tensions at the interface of the two spheres of GG.

In the next section, the way in which market-building social enterprises resolve their co-ordination problems will be explored. It outlines how the model harnesses a wide consumer base than earlier models, through co-option of market actors and consideration of operational structures. Particular attention is paid to the distinctive competitive position of market builders, which affords a degree of market power, releases greater profits from trading and exposes enterprises to typical market-entry challenges linked to the creation of product value.

7.4.3 Building new market orders

The preceding chapter has already provided an introduction to Beckert's concept of how actors must solve problems that they inherently face within markets. The current analysis need not repeat those discussions in full. Market-building enterprises employ different co-ordination strategies in comparison to the generally consistent networked market approaches, and the rigidity of the National Trust's institutional structures. Reasons for this emerge from the commercial burdens experienced (and chosen) by market-building enterprises, which weigh more heavily in job of balancing multiple goals, compared to the other two formats.

7.4.3.1 Normative values and the environmental mission

In this section, the co-ordination of the value problem is discussed for the market-building model. It is delineated from the value co-ordination of earlier models, although there are sometimes similarities, notably the redistribution of retail premiums towards enhanced supply price. The main distinctions in market-building value co-ordination are to be found in three closely-related factors:

(i) The greater importance of commercial objectives in the balancing act inherently facing social enterprises;
(ii) The ability of market-builders to match value distinctions with the normative preferences of environmentally motivated *and* more conventional consumer preferences simultaneously;
(iii) The expansion of the potential market by co-opting other market actors' know-how, systems, outlets and customer bases.

These distinctions will now be examined in greater detail. Beckert (2007) suggests that one purpose of value is to distinguish different kinds of product in the same market. He draws on Parsonian (1937, cited in Beckert 2007) concepts of social preferences in guiding economic action: although technical classifications (such as organic labels) enhance the distinguishing purpose of value, social and political processes also influence

market behaviour. Additionally, Beckert draws inspiration from classical influences on economic sociology such as Marx, Durkheim and Weber, and suggests that their intellectual authority emerged from a desire for social reform[36]. In terms of social enterprises marketing products associated with environmental objectives, it is possible to consider the value associated with these products as normative, and a result of human agency (Gregory 1981). In other words, purchasing juice is simultaneously a procedure for influencing social order in the market, and for achieving environmental protection.

This section addresses two questions: how do market-building social enterprises differ from other models in the co-ordination of value problems? And how do the socially constructed values help to distinguish apple juice (and related social enterprise products) in the local market? The commercial burden carried by social enterprise stake- and shareholders answers the first question. None of the other social enterprise models studied here have been so pre-occupied with commercial values as the market-building format. This pre-occupation is the result of three factors:

(i) A governance structure (most especially for GF), where private capital is invested to provide start-up costs, and/or to set against potential liabilities;
(ii) A requirement to enhance sales income in order to meet operational costs, which are higher compared to the other social enterprise formats. These costs include labour, contracted processing, rents and marketing.
(iii) A desire to control money flows within the market. In previously described formats, money flows are either subject to institutional budgeting within a national charity; or stay unchanged, even though the redistributive flow from consumer to farmer is re-negotiated. By contrast, in the market-building format, redistribution is the task of the social enterprise, not the press.

The question of value distinction can be addressed by examining the normative value of Franconian apple juice produced through the market-building model. By way of comparison, in the networked market, the value of the juice is directly connected to its associated range of civil society and environmental performances. These include education, community participation, municipal partnerships and emphasizing *Heimat* and

[36] *Jens Beckert answers ten questions about economic sociology. http://www.mpifg.de/people/jb1/downloads/06-08-00_Beckert_econsoc_07-3.pdf*

ongoing cultural contributions of orchards. By buying juice through a networked market consumers join a civil, environmental endeavor. Seyfang (2006) describes this sort of informed consumerism within local and organic food networks as 'ecological citizenship'. The monetary cost to consumers of participating in this endeavor is the retail price premium on a bottle of juice. The value of the juice, therefore, is that it matches a social preference: when juice sellers (NGOs, presses, distributors and outlets etc.) are able to demonstrate this value to normative buyers, the co-ordination 'problem' is solved.

This sociological mechanism applies equally in the market-building model. However, in order to release environmental utility from the co-ordination of market value, social enterprises in the market-building format need to transform normative value into financial value, and secure its control. This is because the enterprise itself stimulates market activity to finance the conservation of orchards; it needs hard cash to pay its suppliers, workers and production partners, and to finance conservation activity including outreach, marketing and the provision of farmer advice.

The opportunity to realise financial value relies on committed consumers, or 'ecological citizens'. But market-builders via their commercial investors and stakeholders, are informed about consumer dynamics. This facilitates the release of environmental utility from juice sales because even those customers less inspired by the environmental mission of the juice may find some lure in the products introduced to them (such as the elderberry blends of GF), or not (as in the failure to sell sparkling cider in the case of GG, see below). In other words, while market-builders may rely on a cohort of motivated customers who support environmental conservation, there is another, more conventional segment of consumers for whom the environmental mission is secondary to contemporary fashions in taste, product presentation and price factors. GG's director fell foul of these when considering bottle presentation:

> *'We had a problem with our [high quality] sparkling cider partly because the bottle qualities were poor, now we have a problem marketing them and I went in with €40,000 in advanced costs, and now I'm sitting on the stuff.'* (GG, p. 17)

GG is targeting a higher-end market with champagne-style cider. The marketing difficulty, however, lies in the cosmetic qualities of the bottles, which not all customers paying the quality premium can swallow. In other words, market-building social enterprises have to build up their market through conventional commercial means, namely by balancing product values with civil but also with social preferences. When the system works well market-building social enterprises can realise environmental utility from product value from two types of normative customer: those with environmental commitments, and those who value quality attributes linked to taste and appearance.

Additional social value is created in the market-building model (distinct from earlier models) through direct job creation (in GF, GG and GI). Existing jobs in other firms are also supported when services are bought, such as pressing (GF, GG and GH), cider and vinegar production (GF, GG) and exotic fruit imports (GI produces blends of apple and goji-berry). GI, as the only owner of a press among the four case studies, hires out its pressing services to other local producers of single-variety juice with separate sources of apples. Job-creation as an outcome of small and medium-scale production and processing recalls Lyson's contributions on civic agriculture, described in chapter 2. Because market-building social enterprises are fully occupied with commercial activities, they are constrained in their abilities to engage directly with farmers beyond the level of a supply relationship; nor can they directly mobilise troupes of volunteers, as both networked models and the National Trust are able to, in order to assist and educate farmers in orchard habitat management techniques. This task falls to local NGOs. The latter are no longer hosts to social enterprises (except, nominally, in GG's case). Instead they are reservoirs of practical environmental knowledge and sit at the centre of local social networks through their participation in rural development projects. In this sense, NGOs add human capacity to the financial, environmental and social values which market-building enterprises co-ordinate.

In pursuing market distinction for products, especially where comparable products are available more cheaply, market-building social enterprises create environmental and territorial identity values by linking juice products directly with the consumer interest in local products, or, in the unique case of GG, by organic certification. Furthermore, innovation value emerges from the development of new products that meet contemporary consumer demand (for *Schorle* and juice blends). Knowledge of demand is enhanced by

the embeddedness the social enterprise within local private catering outlets, such as pubs and cafes, and through the co-opted knowledge of commercial share- and stakeholders.

Finally, by directly embodying public sustainability policy, GH creates political value, which legitimises both the enterprise network and state advocacy of orchard conservation (further discussed in the field analysis). Even so, the local identity value of the local orchard landscape may seem diluted as GF and GI expand their operations, sharing sourcing areas with those outside the district, or even outside Bavaria. On the other hand, expansion can be understood as an effort to realise normative value from a greater pool of custom. For this, co-operation with other actors is needed.

7.4.3.2 Co-operative variations

It has been suggested, above, that the concept of social skill helps to explain how market-building social enterprises succeed. The ability to position themselves within a commercial sphere with attributes of and engagement from commercial partners contributes to improved environmental outcomes from market exchange. However, social skill is also considered to be a faculty employed to reconfigure market hierarchies by new market entrants. As newcomers, the four market-builders in this study are distinguished by their proactive, innovative and co-operative approaches to developing market niches and *sharing* these through co-operation with existing market actors. Governance structure is the main tool for balancing investment and co-operation with profit generation to finance environmental aims. In the particular case of the producer co-operative GI, it can be argued that the social enterprise has captured the market for local juices because member producers/householders are encouraged to home-consume and retail their juice through the co-operative ownership of a press.

In GG's operational sphere, illustrated in figure 12 in section 7.4.2 above, the enterprise organizes apple supplies and inspections as an agent for a national organic certification body. The cost of certification is carried by the commercial presses, which pay GG. GG's structure reveals the existence of several different commercial governance structures

operating co-operatively: LBV is a registered association, the presses are limited companies, while the operational focal point, GG, is an unlimited company.

GG displays similarities to the networked market approach. For example, presses pay the supply premium that binds farmers into orchard management contracts. Meanwhile, state authorities collaborate with a provincial NGO within a forum for the conservation of Franconian orchards, the produce of which is distinguished through a regional labeling scheme. What, then, makes GG a market-building social enterprise? The difference lies in the institutional conduit that GG represents. Presses pay farmers via GG's books and GG contracts directly with farmers providing organic juice production through the presses, because they are partners within the collective operational scheme. Finally, because of this, while presses make their market channels available to the scheme's distinctive products, any potential market failure of these is a responsibility of GG. In other words, GG has become a quality niche subsidiary for the presses, which thereby escape the burden of additional risk-taking, in exchange for donations towards GG's project costs.

The presses in the GG's scheme were already co-operating commercially, before the social enterprise invited them to participate in the juicing scheme. The benefit to the presses, therefore, is that by joining the operational sphere of GG, the social enterprise arranges all organic certification and inspection of supplying farmers, which previously was not done. Another advantage is that GG provides a conduit between contracted farmers and technical product development and marketing opportunities with the presses.

In GF, a different configuration is evident, as figure 9 shows in section 7.2.3. That illustration describes the operation of GF, the distinguishing features of which are that the enterprise buys and owns apples, commissions products to be made commercially on its behalf, and finances its operations through trade, the full profits of which are retained and re-invested. As within GG, the market appearance of qualified juice becomes a niche occupation for commercial actors. Yet for GF, the commercial actors are not just the presses but also the commercial shareholders of the enterprise. Thirty-four shareholders have financed the establishment of GF, which include businesses such as pubs, honey producers and local drinks merchants. For these actors, GF's establishment might have presented competition problems for their own products and services. Instead, membership

of GF provides a territorially and environmentally co-ordinated niche through which existing product ranges can be extended and collaboration across the supply chain is formally created. Meanwhile, indirect links to public sector and NGO partners allow for a greater range of publicity opportunities and access to greater environmental expertise.

However, publicity is not just a benefit of public sector involvement. The *Interessegruppe* (IG – interest group) *Fränkische Moststraße*[37] has been established to promote visitor enjoyment of the Franconian cider and juice route. Members of this initiative include six categories – catering businesses (pubs and dining establishments), juice processors, orchards (public and privately owned), beekeeping spaces, outdoor and environmental education facilities and retail outlets. Through these co-operating publicity nodes GF's products become exposed and expanded. Furthermore, environmental and commercial interests are hybridized, by fusing 'alternative hedonism' (Soper 2004) through the commercial promotion of Franconian cultural landscapes.

Meanwhile, co-operation with regional, but non-local social enterprises of the networked market format is a form of co-operation that makes the best of social enterprise governance diversity, to create an effective risk-management strategy when low harvest cycles create commercial pressures.

This section has outlined different ways in which the market-building social enterprises co-operate. To summarise, GI supports the co-operative desire of local producers to consume their own juice. GG juggles a more complex co-operation arrangement between public bodies wishing to protect orchards, an NGO similarly motivated and which owns its product label, presses which benefit from GG's orcharding know-how and willingness to face product development and harvest risks, and the organic certification body whose delegation of inspections earns GG added income. GF enhances its competitive position and remains a 'lean' operation because its co-operative structures are formally harnessed by the co-option of market actors as shareholders. GH sees co-operation as a cultural and political asset, drawing on alliances with councils, gravel pit contacts and local shops as part of a broad aspect of its social and environmental missions, as well as a social vehicle for increasing sales.

[37] www.fraenkische-moststrasse.de

7.4.3.3 Competition

The third Beckertian co-ordination problem is competition. For the National Trust, the main competitive pressure of selling juice was the marginal income it generates compared to other ‘souvenirs’ sold in their shops. In the networked market competition is avoided. Following Beckert (2010) and Fligstein (2001a), the entry of market-building social enterprises as actors in an established market would suggest the start of a competitive struggle, during which the most powerful actors consolidate or alter their position within the market hierarchy, resulting in a new social order within the local market. However, a high degree of social skill, most evident in GF, transforms the struggle with existing commercial actors into co-operation. GF, however, in rejecting the organic consumer motivations, faces clearly expressed competition from that market segment, in contrast to GG.

For the expanding geographical sales area of GI, the inherent trust in localised governance, production and processing processes are likely to require supplementary protection from external competition. Currently, local self-provisioning and local retailing form the co-op’s main sales channels. As this changes – with a growing, non-producer, customer-base more remote from the location of production, and with the expansion of pressing for third parties - the ‘theoretical’ environmental standards of GI’s juice will need to be verified in order to withstand competition. These may come in the form of certified juices, or those produced by schemes more proximate to consumers. In other words, for GI competition is a potential market problem linked to the constraints of producer governance and the potential shift in product quality from being local to being territorially distinguished.

For GH two main competitive factors have been aligned. Firstly, the struggle between the administrative simplicity of personal liability and the benefits of limited company has been decided in favour of the latter, despite the consequences for the availability of liquid capital. This can be used to good effect to professionalise the directors, and to strengthen links with state and NGO partners, a strategy which has proved effective in GG. Secondly,

the price of the GH's juice is one of the lowest of all the enterprises in this study, at just over €1 a litre. Within GH, the press acts also as a distributor:

> *[The press just has to deliver?] 'That's it, exactly. It remains the distributor, more or less. We … set up the connection. We send the press a delivery note … it says who gets what, where, when, and then they drive it there.'* (GH, p. 4)

The competitive price of GH's juice presents no threat to local presses, because the sales volumes are relatively marginal, and the press charges GH a delivery fee. The prevailing structure of small to medium-scale and often family-run juice presses which rely on local suppliers, means that working with social enterprises that support rural development and environmental protection is regarded as a positive association.

In ways identical to the enterprises in the networked market, market-builders must respond to consumer demand. GF and GG have extensive product ranges. GF specifically benefits from commercial shareholders who promote sales in cafes, pubs and shops. The opportunity to harvest elderberries, and to branch out experimentally into cherries (GI, p.3) is exciting and demonstrates the kind of flexibility that allows GF to adapt to consumer preferences, for example for 'red' drinks. However, dynamism and the direction of consumer tastes may prove a competitive challenge if products cannot be (substantially) produced from Franconian orchards. Consumer responsiveness, in other words, is a competition co-ordination problem in waiting.

Finally, GG captures the competitive distinction of a market-building format by linking product price to the size of the market:

> *So if I sell the apple juice for €3 instead of €2 or €2.50, I can't sell so much of it and I then I can take fewer [orchard] areas into care… that's why our prices in comparison to other initiatives is not so high.'* (GG p.11)

Networked market social enterprise leaders were explicit about the need to avoid competitive behaviour – they rely on the market and do not wish to undercut other local businesses with which they are in alliance. Here though, GG's director suggests that the lower the juice price, the bigger the market potential and, as a consequence, the greater the chance of attaining an environmental goal. Because the first and fundamental object of the enterprise is orchard conservation and marketing is simply a method of achieving this, it is unlikely that two schemes have to compete in one area. However, GG's commercial position is clearly linked with the director's perceived ability to achieve the conservation objective. This perception is a form of competition co-ordination because GG has competitively priced products as a consequence of weighing up commercial and environmental factors.

7.5 The analytical field

In this chapter, by examining the approaches to problem co-ordination, it has been possible to present the market-building model as more complex than the earlier social enterprise formats. In addition, an inconsistency has appeared within Beckert's co-ordination narrative when this is related to market-building social enterprise, which will now be explored. Beckert insists that market dynamism is as important an influence as problem co-ordination on how social order is obtained (Beckert 2007). His explanation is that, while actors search for order to have some chance of anticipating the outcome of their investments and purchasing decisions, markets grow and shrink in scale, 'value attributions' change and co-operation is influenced by new social alignments caused by competition and innovation.

The inconsistency lies in the issue that social enterprises, while populating the market and seeking to win a profit, are not occupied with the pursuit of market order for the same reasons as conventional firms. For each social enterprise format it has been explained that market mechanisms are a means towards an environmental and spatial goal. Conventional capitalist markets, holds Beckert, are dynamic (and therefore inherently uncertain) because of their inherent expansionary trajectory. This is, in turn, caused by changes in competitive structures. The market building-social enterprise is different from its sister formats because it adopts positions in the market more closely comparable with

conventional private companies. Nevertheless, the centrality of the environmental goal – via the incentivisation of farmers – sets social enterprises apart from conventional firms. The propensity to pursue conventional capitalist expansion and dynamic innovation must be seen in this light.

This does not mean that market problem co-ordination is not a useful framework for interpreting social enterprise behaviours, especially for those understudied social enterprises in pursuit of an environmental goal. But it reinforces the need to resort to a range of Beckertian, and allied, concepts: an examination of problem co-ordination has presented distinct challenges faced by the Franconian market-builders; social skill has provided insights, especially into co-operative market strategies; field analysis now follows, beginning in figure 13 below.

Figure 14: Social enterprise field in the market-building model



The diagram outlines risk as a special distinction of the market-building social enterprises that have been studied. This cognitive frame puts pressure on individuals for whom risk is a personal burden, leading some to select governance models which institutionalise risk. Where alternatives have been chosen – co-ops and limited companies in this chapter – formal state institutional factors begin to play a much more pronounced role in guiding investments and risk management. The state safeguards and regulates such institutions, yet also actively guides social enterprise operation, sells fruit and promotes the continuation of the philosophical and well as the economic and environmental value of *Kulturlandschaft*. Thus the state becomes an actor in *all three* field structures.

A benefit that offsets an increase in risk, whether personal or 'corporate', is the power of market-builders to control profit. The potential to do this nevertheless relies on corporate actors who are happy to financially invest in, effectively, a subsidiary. The moderately successful, localised and goal-centred proposition of the environmental institution of *Aufpreis* helps to persuade private investors to back market-building social enterprises.

The state, in one of its incarnations, further stabilises the value of traditional orchards as a socially relevant ambition by participating in market-building as a normative quasi-capitalist occupation, thereby helping to verify the values of the juice, commercially, politically and environmentally. The combination of political and commercial validity means that a greater range of customers can be attracted, compared to the narrow band of National Trust members, or committed civil alliance of networked market supporters. Thus, market-builders see themselves as more proactively in control of their market positions.

New networks have also joined the field in the form of collaborations with cross-regional juicing initiatives. Finally, control of profits and the opportunity to extract rent from excess capacity on enterprise-owned equipment is a further cognitive expression of the reciprocity between goal-oriented networks, albeit across distinct geographical spaces.

7.6 Summary and conclusion

This chapter has analysed the factors which distinguish, and link, the market-building version of social enterprise from formats discussed earlier in the thesis. The distinctions lie, largely, in the methods and structures chosen by market-builders that enable them to act in a way more aligned with conventional firms. Increased risk, commodity ownership, the need for capital and the ability to control re-investment are principal attributes of these market building enterprises.

The examples presented here, despite their evident environmental successes, have introduced the idea that losses of all remaining orchards cannot be halted without major structural and cultural changes. While these proceed slowly, a more general view of the environmental mission – conservation, replanting and marketing – is adopted. Concerted attention must be paid in the market-building model to the general matter of commercial operation, as well as the specific reporting and accounting details linked to legal governance forms. NGOs, however, remain vital partners in promoting conversion of land to agri-environment schemes and can themselves attain grants to promote regional product promotion programmes without fear of direct market exposure.

Lastly, Beckertian concepts (2007, 2010) have provided a deeper understanding of the difficult balancing act that social enterprises face when they become fully and pragmatically enmeshed in the co-ordination of order by adopting the position of a market actor. On one hand Beckert's (*ibid.*) ideas apply most closely to the market-builders; on the other hand, it is only with support from associated sociological ideas, especially Fligstein's (2001a) social skill and new institutionalism, that field theory proves its utility as an analytical tool for social enterprise. In particular, market-building social enterprises exhibit social skill in three ways. Firstly, (quoting from Fligstein 2001a, p. 106) they 'provide identities and cultural frames to motivate others' to act collectively towards a regional environmental imperative. The skill of *motivation* and they share with networked market colleagues as collective goal, rather than on self-interest.

Secondly, market-builders provide 'new systems of meaning', to conventional businesses by offering them and investment opportunity to extend or diversify their competitive foothold, thus effecting order in a local market hitherto dominated by more powerful actors unable to support orchard biodiversity. The co-option of existing market channels reaches a wider range of consumers than the earlier social enterprise models. Thus, market-building social enterprises attempt to mobilise the social skill of *agenda setting* to alter the environmental outcome of the market. A*genda setting* is a social skill particular to market-builders, defined by controlling their own resources, rather than relying on grants, or the market influence of other commercial actors. The position of such actors instead becomes institutionalised within the social enterprise itself.

Thirdly, the profitability of the social enterprise and its ability to pay its workers, will determine its ability to *create new institutional norms* – in other words facilitate acceptance of *Aufpreis* as a market mechanism in conservation activist circles, harnessing the expertise of environmental networks. *Aufpreis* is, under other names including adding value, or valorisation, a familiar commercial institution in rural development. This study argues that *Aufpreis* has also become a new institution of the environmental movement through the development of social enterprise.

Fligstein (2001a) finally cautions that social skill helps in the study of 'how actors sometimes can transform social structures [of the market] but most of the time fail to do

so.' The contribution of this chapter, then, is not to advocate market-building as a social enterprise model more or less conducive to environmental success. Instead, the market-builders are distinguished in their attempts to save orchards via re-commercialisation because they assume market characteristics, and display social skill, through which they may be regarded as new entrants who attempt to reform social order. The balancing of social, environmental and commercial objectives thereby becomes critical to the success of these social enterprises.

Chapter 8 – Conclusion

8.1 Introduction

This thesis has examined how a variety of English and German social enterprises juggle their multiple goals, paying particular attention to how their environmental mission of conserving traditional orchards complicates the balancing act inherent in social enterprise. The literature section revealed how these entrepreneurial efforts become 'snagged' on arguments about the capacity of social enterprise to create change (for example Amin et al. 2002, Teasdale 2009), and by the environmental credentials or the marginal scale of local food. Literature on local food (for example Goodman et al. 2011, Seyfang 2006), while revealing entrepreneurial approaches to solving environmental problems - for example in the development of networks and supply chains and which serve as a proxy for positive environmental action - nevertheless tends to raise more questions than it answers about the hybrid nature of markets, the struggle for power and the influence of new ideas, and which environmental interventions may be required to sustain biodiversity, and for whom (Yussof 2012).

Economic sociology theories have therefore been progressively applied to scrutinise empirical data relating to three emergent models of social enterprise: the estate model in England; and in Germany the networked market and the market-building models and a summary of the key differences between each follows below. Recourse to economic sociology has avoided the scale and 'alternativity' cul-de-sacs of much local food scholarship, in favour of a method for examining the market outcomes of social enterprise interventions. A field analysis of each model has helped to explain how social enterprises enter and operate within a given local market, what practical and material resources they wield in facing difficulties and opportunities, and the extent to which they are able to create permanent change to support their environmental objectives.

This thesis has attempted to address two related research questions, namely:

- How do rural social enterprises attempt to meet their environmental aims? and

- Which factors influence their ability to do so?

How each of the three models examined achieves its environmental aims to greater or lesser extent has been presented by scrutinising social enterprise methods in relation to particular constellations of inter-relating cognitive, institutional and network factors. The next section will provide a descriptive summary of these in each case.

8.2 Summary of key points

8.2.1 Environmental mission as a social enterprise dimension

This section describes the effectiveness of each of the three social enterprise models in meeting the environmental mission of orchard conservation. First, an overview of the distinctive aspects of each model is offered, in table 6, below:

Table 6: Overview of the main features of each social enterprise model

Features	Estate model	Networked market	Market-building
Labour	Dependent on regular volunteers.	Various: National service alternative (GA); Back-to-work scheme (GB); Use of volunteers for promotion, driving, orchard management.	All labour paid by SE.
Land	NT-owned, linked to historic house/ landscape.	Held by farmers.	Held by farmers.
Max output (litres)	9,000 combined juice and cider (EA).	600,000 (GA).	80,000 (GG).
Pricing	Imposed 2.35x wholesale mark-up by NT Enterprises.	Approx. double market supply rate premium, covered by volume sales with small retail premium.	As networked, plus expansion of market channels.
Governance	Internal estate project.	Association.	Co-op, limited and unlimited liability companies.
Funding	Significant state subsidy.	State start-up support.	State start-up support. Private investment/ loan.
Risk	Low.	Low.	High.
Env'tal impact	Low.	High.	High.
Key success	Public engagement	Increased sales/new market alliances.	Diversification of rural market structures.

It has been suggested throughout this study that having an environmental mission adds complexity to the social enterprise balancing-act. This is discussed below with reference to each model, expanding the summary details given in table 6. In each case, models display different levels of environmental effectiveness depending on their resources, governance models, the nature of the supporting stakeholders and a variety of other distinctive local factors.

8.2.1.1 The estate model

Orchards are attached to an historic property and are viewed as an elemental attraction of the wider estate by visitors. This is clear from the popularity of an expanding range of public and educational events. Volunteers, upon whom the labour for the productive activities for harvesting relies, find a social and spiritual reward from working with like-minded peers in beautiful settings. The bygone landscape, a museum-piece, is embodied in the juice bought by Trust members who feel they are buying a representation of the historic orchard as a reminder of their visit to the estate, especially if they have had a hand in pressing juice on an antique press. Trust juice transcends time (Rössel and Beckert 2012) by connecting drinkers to a past agricultural landscape and there is a limited connection between the Trust's social enterprise efforts and the wider rural industry through processors and local consumers. This in turn limits sales and relies on members to pay substantially over the odds for cider and juice.

However, because of the administrative arrangements for some Trust properties, the orchard must vie with other environmental and heritage objectives within an estate, and not all juicing enterprises are able to forge a direct link between their sales and orchard conservation. Significant conservation support came from the state, which solidified a handful of social enterprise schemes, which have been discussed. The internalised nature of the market for National Trust apple juice allows orchards, workers, managers and consumers to feel connected through the aesthetics and symbolism of the historic house and landscape. This solidarity is enhanced where nationally rare species occur. That these are usually deadwood-loving species means that orchards need replanting to balance the needs of future productivity with the provision of future deadwood habitat niches.

In short, although social enterprise is an effective means of meeting the Trust's corporate objectives for social engagement, it does not contribute a substantial income stream to fund the job of conserving old orchards. That has relied on the priorities of dispersed property managers and state grants, although there is potential for entrepreneurial development. Such potential is well-demonstrated in the networked market.

8.2.1.2 The networked market

The networked market appears as a progression from the National Trust's efforts and is longer-established. In this model, commercial farmers own orchards. The key commercial and environmental challenges for the networked market are fused together: farmers are incentivised to manage their orchards for nature without the institutional and infrastructural supports of the National Trust. Instead, supply chain activities including processing and logistics, are retained by commercial specialists. The principal successes of the networked market are to realise income for the environmental mission by expanding sales; to redistribute this income directly to orchard conservation via contracts; and to balance embedded environmental product quality with high quantities of sales, making the end products affordable.

The field element of cognition in the networked market emphasises a different relationship to nature and landscape compared to the English discussion. In Germany the emphasis has been to revive the positive relationship between orchards and commerce that originally co-produced a rich ecosystem. This relationship is embedded in Germany within a shared understanding of *Kulturlandschaft* (cultural landscape), a biophysical constituent of collective and personal attachment to place and home or *Heimat*. Networked market enterprises manage to infuse belonging with a progressive market innovation in favour of redistribution of supply chain revenue to farmers. The result is that a civil alliance of market actors finds it possible – logistically, commercially and ideologically – to participate in the environmental mission. This is helped substantially by institutional factors unique to Germany, such as a high degree of self-provisioning, executive parish political leadership, federal rural development governance and the ownership of orchards by local councils.

Social enterprise leaders, although a facilitative force in the market, also appear as environmental technicians and quality control inspectors in the networked market. The key

point is that networked models employ the environmental mission to align actors in the co-ordination of the market 'problems' inherent in contemporary orcharding, to very good conservation effect, but with low commercial risk or capital requirements, while improving the market position of farmers. Such commercial considerations are more evident in the market-building model.

8.2.1.3 The market-building model

This last model appears as the most commercially sophisticated of the three, although it shares many features with the networked market. Inspired by the grant dependence of many associative NGO-led models, the market-building model deploys social skill and conventional business tactics to secure private sector support for market entry. This results in control over sales revenue as the principle means to finance the protection of orchards. Institutional arrangements appear as formalised and sometimes convoluted governance structures. Increased commercial risk is created by the need for capital to directly meet supplier, labour, processing and distribution costs. This money is harnessed from commercial investors who have allied interests and existing market channels. Compared to the networked market, a potentially heavy burden of risk falls on market-building social enterprise managers, who may find themselves out of pocket, under regulatory scrutiny and personally liable for poor performance.

These new tactics for securing the environmental mission, although individually commercially successful – none make a loss – raise questions about the likelihood that orchard conservation can be realised without some wider structural reforms in the rural economy. Such changes require the political support, if not always the funding of the state and the influencing role of the parent NGOs from which market-builders have separated on local institutions. Market-building social enterprises should be regarded as an experimental market innovation for the environmental food movement, having recast *Aufpreis* from being a market tool, to an environmental policy institution.

In the cases studied, the environmental tensions between place-based (local), and biological (organic) quality criteria, come into focus or in other words, market-builders face a multi-faceted environmental mission in which elements may need to be prioritised. However, the quality and contemporary appeal of the products, combined with the market

access provided by co-opted commercial stakeholders allows a much broader base of customers to be cultivated in the market-building than in the preceding models. In those earlier models, custom is more dependent on the appeal of unique heritage or civic attachment to *Heimat*. Lastly, alliances with enterprises in neighbouring regions help to overcome potential market instabilities caused by environmental challenges such as weather and unstable yield.

A final reflection, which links the perception of the environmental mission of all three models, is the relative value of apples compared to orchards in each case. Although chapter 3 clearly articulated orchard conservation for the sake of biodiversity as the key environmental mission in all three models, it can be suggested that the importance of orchards is directly linked to the level of direct market engagement. For the National Trust, for all its interest in genetic heritage, the idealised rurality of the country house is enhanced by the historic orchard landscape. The market-building model relies on a reliable source of apples, otherwise its engagement opportunities are limited. Networked market social enterprises sit somewhere between the two, celebrating the orchard but not directly affected by the harvest volume.

8.3 Methodological reflections

Data collection via face-to-face interviews has provided a rich body of evidence. Personal visits to orchard landscapes revealed useful insights into the cultural and geographical importance of orchards in each area. Furthermore, visiting social enterprise leaders in person allowed for a much longer and detailed discussion than a time-limited discussion by telephone or written correspondence might have. In two cases, interviews also led to opportunistic visits to presses and distillers. These visits were undertaken in the spirit of 'you've come all this way, so while you're here…'.

In terms of sampling, the National Trust offered a strong institutional backdrop to a Beckertian analysis, both in terms of the edifice of the Trust's structures, but also in terms of its formal links with Natural England. By contrast, the German cases were either linked to regional offices of national NGOs, or were more loosely linked, given the motivation to separate the host NGO from financial risk when trading. This potentially lays the study

open to the charge that the English and German cases are not being compared on a like-for-like basis. To avoid this pitfall, therefore, a cumulative, progressive analysis of the interventions of three formats of social enterprise in their local markets has been presented. In each case, Beckert's ideas have been tested within a context of rural geography. An alternative could have been to study independent schemes, such as those community orchards set up by city farms, city councils or under the Local Food programme. However, these schemes do not all trade and cannot be so clearly framed as social enterprises compared to the National Trust. The relationship between the Trust and National Trust Enterprises has also provided a useful setting for discussing how social enterprises balance environmental with commercial imperatives. As a landowner of a considerable proportion of England's remaining traditional orchards, the Trust represents a key position in developing cognitive framings of orchards in the market.

Ideally, with the benefit of more time and research funds, it may have proved interesting to interview more *Aufpreis* schemes situated in different regions, for example in northern Germany, where industrial agriculture is more prevalent, but where a greater concentration of cities may have offered different marketing opportunities; or in eastern provinces where co-operation and state involvement have distinctive resonances, linked to the experiences of compulsory collectivism and a different history of community-state relationships. A broadening of research data could generate opportunities for further international comparisons on rural social enterprise, for example linked to olive or truffle cultivation, or agroforestry.

Lastly, it has been discussed how Beckert does not provide an analytical strategy which is wholly suited to social enterprise scholarship. As discussed above, recent scholarship of local food projects has made very good use of transition theories and this thesis could have been framed in respect of the effect of orchard enterprises have on the dominant regime for apple juice. However, transition theories would have required the greater inclusion of supermarkets and the expansion of the field beyond the local, a situation which would have excluded the Trust in England (which produces too little juice for supermarket needs) and rebalanced the emphasis of this study from production and marketing stages to retailing. In short, Beckert's contribution is liberating and, excepting work by Sunley and Pinch, entirely novel in social enterprise scholarship, offering potential for applied findings and opening doors into additional research arenas. Several are suggested below.

8.4 Further research

This section has re-traced the distinctive attributes of each social enterprise, and how they face their environmental mission. In each case, the mission has complicated social enterprise operations because of biological, cultural and political challenges. The presentation of distinctions between the models draws out the need for further thought about the needs and possibilities for linking social enterprise with environmental missions.

Transferability is one case in point. For example, traditional orchards raise specific challenges both about their economic viability for farmers, and how to ensure that orchard succession maintains an on-going orchard life-cycle to support the widest range of biodiversity possible. This study has cautioned against assuming Anglo-German experiences are easily transferable, despite the potentials presented by the combination of Big Society ideology, a delegating state, emphases on regional policy and the recent growth in community food projects. However, the principle of third sector intervention in rural markets could be transferable within each country across other products and services. A comparative study of the broad principles of *Aufpreis* as applied to energy and meat, building on the experiences touched upon in GA and GC, could be fruitful.

A second, related consideration for orchard enterprises is the variability of localised rural infrastructure. Southern Germany still benefits from the existence of regional distribution networks, via the breweries, drinks wholesalers and presses. In England, the National Trust's engagement with the wider economy represents, despite awards for juice quality, marginal pressing custom. Further work seems needed to explore the extent to which presses in Somerset and Devon can integrate the expansive orchard estates of the Trust, given its administrative strictures. It might be possible to transfer orcharding to National Trust Enterprises or, recalling the super-regional arrangements of GF, by linking with the multitude of small, urban and sub-urban non-commercial community orchards, some of which are on National Trust land.

Thirdly, commercial questions also arise, given the capital needs of market-builders. For example, could preferential interest rates be provided for enterprises with such overtly non-commercial ends? In an age of austerity, could a move to loans rather than grants become a service of the state, or under-written by the state when provided through banks, some of which operate ethical loans policies (such as The Co-operative, Triodos and Unity). Asset-stripping in the private sector has led to the controversial sale of county farms[38] and allotments, and the emergence of community land trusts (for example Wessex Community Assets 2010) in England. Yet orchard ownership seems to provide a modest income for German parish councils. What factors, if any, could engage councils in land ownership in Britain? Finally, recalling GF and GG's experiences, if private companies are to become investors in social enterprises, then research will be useful on the levels and types of investment (financial, technical or service-related) and returns that may make this viable.

Fourthly, the networked model suggests that inter-connectedness of mainstream and alternative local markets, the dominance of the retailers in the food chains and the popularity of local food in both countries, may mean that *Aufpreis* has potential to be framed as a supply chain 'performance' (Bush 2007) within a regionally managed retail sector. This opens up theoretical debates about whether social enterprise is really a development of (or an apology for) neo-liberalism, or whether it reveals different supply chain performances from conventional business models during a period of energetic civil society responses to modern capitalism. Should *Aufpreis* be appropriated more widely by the private sector, social enterprises may no longer be needed, or would face competition. This may not worry networked market actors, who see their role as a means to an end. However, the loss of market-builders could be a set-back in the journey towards a more collaborative and multi-functional rural economy within the EU, needed to face the sustainability challenges ahead (Ambler-Edwards et al. 2009). Research is needed not just in the efficacy of environmental social enterprises and their capacity to achieve their goals, but to what extent they are increasingly envisaged as integrated in municipal and civil food networks (Renting et al. 2012).

How such applied research opportunities become conceptually framed brings Beckert back into focus. The next section considers how useful economic sociology has been in

[38] See for example http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-somerset-13726251

exploring and explaining social enterprise practices in the rural market, and how in some cases the environmental mission is not simply a complication, but a way to re-order market dynamics.

8.5 Beckert: Conceptual steps forward?

On first reading, Jens Beckert (2007, 2010) seems an unlikely participant in this thesis, given his preoccupation with power dynamics and the stability of market relations. He is known for his commentaries on classical economic sociologists (2007b) and the construction of value in markets (2011) for the arts, finance and wine, (2010b) and his institutional insights into corruption and inheritance (2007c). Beckert does not directly, to my knowledge, consider specifically rural or environmental perspectives in localised markets such as the ones explored here. It has been noted above that his focus on the social structures of markets (2007, 2010) misses the social contributions made to market outcomes rooted in pre-market production and in post-market husbandry, which, presumably, can be regarded as constituents of broader social institutions, such as family farming. In this respect, the critique that field theory is not social enough to capture the depth of social preferences (Sunley and Pinch 2013) rings true. Moreover the market power won by social enterprises is marginal. Yet his insights are particularly helpful in two key respects:

Firstly, he liberates alternative food scholarship from arguments about scale (Goodman 2004, Goodman et al. 2011, Crabtree et al. 2012) and opposition to the mainstream (Ilbery and Maye 2005, Sonnino and Griggs-Trevarthen 2013) by refocusing attention on market relationships and the factors that influence market dynamics (Beckert 2010). Institutions, networks and cognitive frames have proved to be practical analytical categories for observing the effects of market interventions by social enterprises with environmental goals. Secondly, by conceptualising this thesis deductively through Beckert's economic sociology (1997, 2007, 2010), two modest conceptual advances have been achieved.

The first of these has been the shift from *social* to *environmental* order emerging from market dynamics. Beckert's (2010) position is that a market's field dynamics affect its

social order, or hierarchy, whereby stability is achieved by aligning actors' interests. In this thesis, the environmental mission becomes complicated when it encounters a range of market attributes – quality certification, consumer behaviour, embodied locality, infrastructure availability, risk management, retail competition – which create additional environmental challenges beyond the conservation of biodiversity and which enterprises need to negotiate and prioritise. In other words, Beckert's (2007) notion of social order in markets, when applied to environmental enterprises conforming to the models described, generates environmental order shifts, and these can be examined and observed in the reciprocal relations of the field elements. Despite limited and uneven environmental successes, environmental social enterprises have caused new market dynamics which produce environmental results: orchards persist through social enterprise interventions while conventional market forces have caused their loss.

Secondly, deductive applications of field theory (Beckert 2010) have also enabled inductive theorising allowing the formation of social enterprise models. These have been presented in a systematic, cumulative order to demonstrate progressive complexities of social enterprise development. Such development does not necessarily conform to time or organisational progressions, because some have appeared through a variety of overlapping if sometimes unrelated historical, political or commercial stimuli. Some of the latest social enterprise scholarship is concerned with the absence of theorisation of social enterprise markets (Sunley and Pinch 2013) and Beckert contributes no silver bullet. His concepts have, however, provided a systematic, developmental framework through which a narrative of rural social enterprise markets within the EU can be presented and understood. This holds some practical potential for policy-makers, conservationists and economic development professionals who may wish to consider which policy tools, rural infrastructure needs and business models might be applied to best effect when considering where to invest their energies and funds.

Even so, Beckert comes with several theoretical challenges. Chapter 7 in particular has required help from Fligstein (2001a) to explain how social enterprises deal with issues of power and stimulate new institutional behaviours, for example around shareholder co-option, or the benefits of *Aufpreis* schemes in relation to wind-farm compensation funds. Yet even Fligstein's help is not fully adequate: it was shown in chapter 6 how social enterprise innovations in the networked model retain market power balances; and in the market-building model, the clever positioning of social enterprises as a niche for existing

commercial actors helps recruit investors, but suggests power structures remain unequal and in favour of larger commercial players who can outcompete social enterprises on price. How would the environmental mission fare should the investors find more conventional routes to profit? Nevertheless, in both German models it is the farmers who gain market power – to keep orchards, to diversify land use, to connect to consumers, processors and the state – through their enhanced position of suppliers of unique fruits within the social enterprise-stimulated markets displaying medium- term stability.

Another problem is that Beckert's (2010) concept of institutions can be understood as mainly including commercial ownership of knowledge, legal regulations and routines of market behaviours. By contrast, the orchard story is linked to the generation of a shared valuing of orchard landscapes within the market field by, to all intents and purposes, external facilitators. This does not reflect the Beckertian (2007, 2010) vision of strong market actors who use their positions to lever institutional advantages over competitors. Beckert (2010) also makes a strong argument for separating cognitive and institutional field elements, when his predecessors and contemporaries, including Fligstein (2001), incorporate cognitive dimensions within institutional frames. This incorporation may seem appropriate in the case of the National Trust chapter, which revealed that state conceptions of the value of old orchards combined with charity organisational structures support or inhibit the attainment of the conservation goal in different ways. However, analysis of the varied roles of orchards played out in each model does benefit from separate attention to cognitive frameworks, even if these have institutional foundations. For example, the National Trust places its orchards within an idealised view of rurality linked to the past. In this situation the orchard landscape is a vital contributor to the marketable meaning of the historic estate and house. In the networked model, the orchard landscape is idealised as an optimal biosphere and the clever marketing of apples helps finance its realisation. In the market-building model, the orchard landscape is a product of commercial apple husbandry to be revived, while the conventional strategies employed by conservationists for their protection must be reviewed in the face of agro-economic re-structuring.

Furthermore, in all three models, the enterprises sit slightly outside conventional social enterprise formats: they do not conform to, or make use of, British definitions or structures provided for social enterprise, such as a Community Interest Company; or to the German system of contracted social service provider. In England the environmental social

enterprises of the National Trust are a direct attempt to meet a social and fundraising mission: public engagement. In Germany the market interventions up-end the Beckertian instabilities of the market that inhibit the commercial viability of traditional orchards in today's agricultural sector, at least at the local level. In both countries, social enterprise works, despite significant difficulties and limitations. The market-building model, although complex compared to the other two, reveals that new observational tools are required beyond the current geographical mainstays of actor-network theory (which field theory somewhat resembles), Marxian-inspired local alternative economics, qualities associated with embeddedness, socio-technical niche theories or local resilience.

In conclusion, field theory through a Beckertian lens may not be the theoretical holy-grail hotly sought by third sector and entrepreneurship scholars (for example Birkhölzer 2005, Swedberg 2006, Nicholls (ed.) 2008, Teasdale 2009). However, in this thesis its application has helped to escape some common dead-ends linked to local food, which has for several years fetishised scale, alterity and the potential of niches; it has produced new analytical results which offer transferability into application in rural practice; and it innovatively frames the environmental objectives as a balancing act of competing environmental objectives. In other words, Beckert makes a useful and complementary contribution to the study of environmental social enterprises operating in rural agri-food settings.

8.6 Social enterprise geographies

Lastly, this study has contributed modestly to the furtherance of understanding of social enterprise geography. It has explored the factors which influence operations and motivations of unstudied social enterprises in two EU countries and examined how variations in, for example, governance, culture, place-based quality assurances, organisational structures and state interventions have resulted in different blends of enterprise effectiveness.

Word count: 77,183 (not including appendices and bibliography = 8,748).

Appendices

A1 Questions for National Trust interviewees

Section A – The orchard

1. **Please describe the orchard(s) on your estate**
   - form (extensive, cider, kitchen, ornamental, bush etc)
   - tree fruit (apples, pears, cherries etc) and varieties if known
   - other products (meat, hay, mistletoe…)
   - extent (e.g. in acres)

2. **For what purpose are the orchards managed?**
   - primarily for wildlife, fruit production, grazing, education, horticultural heritage, a mixture?
   - has that purpose changed over time?

3. **Who is involved in maintaining and cropping it?**
   - volunteers?
   - estate staff?
   - others?

4. **Do you keep records of wildlife?**
   - Who does this?
   - Which notable species inhabit/visit your orchards?
   - Do you receive agri-environment payments for the orchards?

Section B – Orchard products

5. **If the products of the orchard are sold, where is the market?**
   - produce is sold in the café
   - produce is sold to visitors
   - produce is sold elsewhere beyond the estate
   - no produce is sold

6. **Is the sale of produce integral or separate?**
   - The orchard enterprise is part of the property's normal routine
   - The orchard products are marketed by a third party

7. **Typically, what income do you earn from the sale of produce, and do you expect this to change in future?**

8. **Has the management of the orchard enterprise affected the way you run other estate activities?**

9. **Who makes decisions about the orchard enterprise?**
    - Property Manager
    - Head Gardener
    - regional NT staff
    - local people
    - NT Members
    - volunteers
    - orchard enterprise company
    - other partners (e.g. county naturalists)

10. **What messages are you trying to send about the produce?**
    - natural, healthy, local products
    - higher than usual quality
    - supporting the wider local/regional economy
    - keeping orchards in good heart
    - supporting wildlife
    - unique varieties/taste

11. **How are these messages conveyed, to whom?**
    - Marketing information and labelling (incl. any certification/quality marks)
    - Open days, training events, tours and tasting events
    - Signs and posters
    - Presence at trade events and economic/agricultural for a, village functions

12. **What business risks are linked to the orchard enterprise and how are they managed?**

Section C – Orchard management and enterprise knowledge

13. **Why did you start selling orchard produce?**
    - Restoration of former economic use
    - To earn an income
    - Links with local groups
    - Restoration of habitat and landscape

14. **Did you get help with the establishment of the enterprise? Where from?**
    - NT orchards project, or other NT technical staff
    - Business Links
    - Established farmer groups – Soil Association, NFU…
    - Community groups, local farmers…
    - Wildlife groups
    - Grants and donations specific to the orchard
    - Other businesses, such as juice/cider makers, beekeepers

15. **Would you have pursued your current activities without having received this help?**

Section D – Social outcomes

16. **How is the orchard workforce motivated?**
    - They are paid (with money or produce)
    - They are regular NT volunteers
    - They are new volunteers attracted specifically by the orchard
    - They get training
    - They get social rewards such as companionship, exercise, new skills
    - You have an arrangement with a local school

17. **How active are the people who work in your orchard in terms of:**
    - Local institutions (parish council, societies, church, school)
    - Deciding the future of the orchard and its potential
    - Do you think they have become inspired to become active elsewhere as a result of the work in the orchard?

18. **May local residents visit the orchard, or is access restricted to NT members?**

19. **What plans have you got for the orchard in future?**

A2 Questions for German interviewees

A. Streuobstwiesen

1. Warum hält [organisation name] Streuobstwiesen für wichtig?

2. Beschriebe wie [organisation name] Streuobsterhaltung unterstützt, und wie Du daran beteiligt bist?

3. Arbeitet [organisation name] mit anderen Gruppen zusammen z.B. NABU oder BUND? Wie ist euer Ansatz verschieden?

4. Was sind, Deiner Meinung nach, die hauptsächlichen Herausforderungen verbunden mit der Erhaltung von Streuobstflächen, z.B:

- Verlust wegen Bebauung oder Unterbewirtschaftung
- Bedarffragen oder Konkurrenz von Saftimport
- Mangelndes Bewußtsein von der Streuobstbiospäre
- Finanzielle und landwirtschaftliche Bedingunen
- usw...

5. Das Kulturlandschaftkonzept ist in Deutschland besonders geprägt. Kannst Du erklären was es bedeutet?

B. Sozialunternehmung bzw. gemeinnützige Organisationen

6. NABU-Kollegen schalgen vor, daß es jetzt weit über 100 Initiativen in Deutschland gibt, die versuchen Streuobstwiesen wiederzubewirtschaften. Was meinst Du sind die Stärken und Schwächen von diesen örtlichen oder regionalen Versuche?

7. Welche vermarktungs Konzepte werden durch den Verkauf von Saft und andere Streuobstprodukte gefördert? Z.B.

- natürliches (unverarbeites) Produkt
- Natur- bzw. Landschaftsschützend
- aus der Lokalität oder Region
- bio-erzeugt
- von eine gemeinnützige Organisation produziert
- usw

8. Wer sind die Kunden fuer die Produkte (Saft usw)?

9. Welche Faktoren beeinflßen die Operation von Streuobstinitiativen in Deine Gegend am meisten? Z.B.:

- Startfinanzierung

- Struktur des Unternehmens (Genossenschaft, e.V., GmbH usw)
- Nachfrage/Kundschaft (kommerzial und privat)
- Anliegende Infrastruktur, z.B. Pressen, Verkaufsstellen...
- Einkommen/Profit
- Arbeitskraft
- Fähigkeit
- Unterstützung der Landwirte
- Konkurrenz

10. Welche Geschäftsrisikos müssen die Initiativen tragen?

11. Was für Leute leiten oder arbeiten mit den Streuobstinitiven, z.B.

- Berufsleute mit besondere Kenntnisse
- Rentner mit Zeit
- Begabte Gartner
- Leute aus der umittelbaren Umgebung
- Mitglieder
- Freiwillige arbeiter/innen die sozialen Kontakt suchen
- usw...

12. Wie wichtig eine Rolle spielt der Staat (Gemeinde, Land oder Bund) um den Erfolg von den Streuobstinitiativen zu sichern?

13. Hat sich die Qualität der regionalen Streuobstbiosphäre durch diese gemeinsame Mühe verbessert – und wie ist das bestätigt?

14. Beschriebe Deine Zukunftspläne.

A3 Overview of English and German fieldwork subjects

Overview of English fieldwork subjects

	ID code	Status	County	Interviewees
	EA	NT trading	Devon	2
	EB	NT trading	Somerset	2
	EC	NT trading	Dorset	1
	ED	NT trading	Devon	1
	EE	NT trading	Cornwall	1
Sub-total				7
	EF	NT non-trading	Wiltshire	3
	EG	NT non-trading	Devon	1
	EH	NT non-trading	Devon	1 (by post)
	EI	NT non-trading	Cornwall	1
	EJ	NT non-trading	Dorset	1
	EK	NT non-trading	Cornwall	2
Sub-total				9
	EL	NT external partner	Wiltshire	1 (by phone)
	EM*	NT external partner	Gloucestershire	3
	EN	NT external partner	n/a	2
	EO	NT external partner	n/a	1
Sub-total				7
	EP	Manager/advisor	HQ	1
	EQ	Manager/advisor	HQ	1
	ER	Manager/advisor	HQ	1 (by phone)

	ES	Manager/advisor	HQ	1
	ET	Manager/advisor	HQ	1
	EU	Manager/advisor	HQ	1
	EV	Manager/advisor	Region	1
	EW	Manager/advisor	Region	1
	EX	Manager/advisor	Region	1 (unstruct'd)
Sub-total				9
Total				32

* Denotes commercial partner.

Overview of German fieldwork subjects

ID	Data Collection	Interviewee (n=)	Province (Initiating group)	SE Structure
GA	Semi-structured i'view arranged from UK	SE co-ordinator (1)	Baden-Württemberg (Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland)	Association
GB	Semi-structured i'view arranged from UK	SE co-ordinator (1)	Baden-Württemberg (Naturschutzbund Deutschland)	Association
GC	Semi-structured i'view arranged from UK	SE Chair and Treasurer (2)	Bavaria (Bund für Naturschutz in Bayern)	Association
GD	Unstructured i'view arranged from UK	Director and researcher of fruit research station in district of GA (2)	Baden-Württemberg	n/a
GE	Notes from opportunistic, unstructured interview in district of GC	Director of area-based landscape NGO (1)	Bavaria	n/a
-	Notes from opportunistic visit to commercial press in district of GA	Press proprietor (1)	Baden-Württemberg	n/a

-	Notes from opportunistic visit to commercial press in district of GB	Press proprietor (1)	Baden-Württemberg	n/a
-	Notes from a planned visit to a special needs school in the district of GB	Observations of discussions between a teacher and two pupils (3)	Baden-Württemberg	n/a
GF	Semi-structured interview arranged from UK	Former director GFa (1) and current director GFb (1).	Bavaria (Landschaftspflegeverband Mittelfranken)	Limited company (GmbH)
GG	Semi-structured interview arranged from UK	Current director (1)	Bavaria (Landesbund für Vogelschutz in Bayern)	Unlimited company (GbR)
GH	Semi-structured interview arranged from UK	Current director (1) and host (1).	Bavaria (Landkreis Bamberg)	Transition from GbR to GmbH
GI	Notes from a previously unannounced visit organised by GF	Current Co-director (1)	Bavaria (Landschaftspflegeverband Mittelfranken)	Cooperative (eG)
Total		18		

In the table above, three networked market case studies are identified as GA, GB and GC (where G stands for Germany, to distinguish them from National Trust case study labels). GD and GE identify data from interviews with people not directly involved with the social enterprise case studies, but who have specialist interests related to orchards. Three interviewees in the table directly relate to particular social enterprises, as shown. Finally, four market-building social enterprises are identified as GF, GG, GH and GI.

A4 Overview of thematic codes

Theme	Commentary
History	With few exceptions, orchards have been historically present at the locations where their conservation is pursued. In the case of the NT this is within the historic estate; in Germany the renewal of the orchard landscape is required to achieve environmental goals.
Heritage	Fruit varieties are locally distinctive or unique. These are actively conserved or planted. In some cases the orchard itself has a heritage value.
Biodiversity	Orchards are managed to improve biodiversity. Knowledge of biodiversity is systematically pursued to greater or lesser extent.
Governance	NT corporate policy from April 2011 pursues the devolution of decision-making to individual property managers. This freedom comes with the responsibility that local activities need to be financially viable. There are positive and negative perceptions of NT in the locality ('community field' Fløysand and Jakobsen 2010). In Germany the choice of governance model affects the environmental outcomes of market interventions by social enterprises.
Labour	Provided by NT ranger or gardens staff (sometimes reciprocally), volunteers and those paying for the experience/learning new skills. Labour may be as paid, unpaid, informally paid (e.g. in cider or apples). In Germany labour is supplied by the orchard holder (farmer) or paid employees of the social enterprise.
Market	Sphere of sales, where these occur, is principally internal within the NT – the shop and other catering facilities of the NT, run by National Trust Enterprises. In few cases sales occur externally, in other cases no sales are sought. There may be barriers to sales, such as tax, period of return, or time. In Germany products are sold on the open market, or through networks of NGO supporters via home deliveries or informal/time-bounded outlets.
Social connectivity	External links are made to actors who provide technical advice, labour, custom, engagement and publicity.
Financial sustainability	Money for investment in aspects of the orchard enterprise, from husbandry through to marketing includes grants, donations, wholesale and retail sales income.
Risk	Enterprise risks may include a lack of time, an uncertain economic climate, competing local priorities, hygiene/safety controls and product qualities, harvest reliability and sales.
Redistribution	To what extent is profit socially redistributed as a result of the enterprise earnings to support farmers or [other] low-income groups (see Goodman and Redclift 1991)?

A5 Glossary

AFN- Alternative Food Network

BAP – Biodiversity Action Plan

BN – Bund für Naturschutz in Bayern

BUND – Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland

CCT – Compulsory Competitive Tendering

CDA – Co-operative Development Agency

CIC – Community Interest Company

CONCISE – Contribution of Social Capital in the Social Economy to Local Economic Development in Western Europe

DEFRA – Department of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs

DVL – Deutscher Verband für Landschaftspflege

EEC – European Economic Community (now EU)

eG – eingetragene Genossenschaft

EU – European Union

eV – eingetragener Verein

FARMA – National Farmers‘ Retail and Markets Association

GbR – Gesellschaft bürgerlichen Rechts

GmbH – Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haft

HAP – Habitat Action Plan

HQ – Head Quarters

Interreg – EU Inter-regional economic and social cohesion programme

JNCC – Joint Nature Conservation Committee

LIFE – EU Environment and nature conservation programme

LPV – Landschaftspflegeverband Mittlefranken

MEKA - Marktentlastungs- und Kulturlandschaftsausgleich

NABU – Naturschutzbund Deutschland

NAFM – National Associaton of Farmers‘ Markets (now FARMA)

NE – Natural England

NGO – Non-Governmental Organisation

NT – National Trust

NTE – National Trust Enterprises

PLENUM – Projekt des Landes zur Erhaltung und Entwicklung von Natur und Umwelt

SE – Social Enterprise

SEL – Social Enterprise London

SOT – Social Origins Theory

TSRC – Third Sector Research Centre

WISE – Work Integration Social Enterprise

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