

University of Southampton Research Repository ePrints Soton

Copyright © and Moral Rights for this thesis are retained by the author and/or other copyright owners. A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge. This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the copyright holder/s. The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.

When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given e.g.

AUTHOR (year of submission) "Full thesis title", University of Southampton, name of the University School or Department, PhD Thesis, pagination

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON

SCHOOL OF HUMANITIES

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

**THE PROBLEM OF THE HUNGARIAN BORDERS AND MINORITIES IN
BRITISH FOREIGN POLITICAL THOUGHT, 1938-41**

by

ANDRÁS BECKER

THESIS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

November 2013

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON

ABSTRACT:

SCHOOL OF HUMANITIES

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

Thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

THE PROBLEM OF THE HUNGARIAN BORDERS AND MINORITIES IN
BRITISH FOREIGN POLITICAL THOUGHT, 1938-41

András Becker

This thesis analyses the British official attitudes and the gradual change of British policy towards Hungary and Hungarian revisionism in the period from the Anschluss in March 1938 to December 1941, when the British government declared war on Hungary. The primary focus of this thesis lies in the impact of Hungary's territorial claims on British policy towards Hungary and Central Europe and upon the criteria Britain judged the territorial gains of Hungary between 1938 and 1941. This work is the result of the author's research in British, American and Hungarian archives, along with his reflection on numerous documentary editions, diaries, memoirs and secondary sources. It aims to deepen our knowledge of Anglo-Hungarian relationship, British Central European policy and the British view of regional territorial disputes. At the same time, it is keen to dispel the myths and stereotypes of the British and Hungarian historiography, which have so far viewed Hungary as an unimportant factor in British Central European strategy.

Table of Contents:

ABSTRACT:	ii
Table of Contents:	iii
List of Maps:	vi
List of Tables:	viii
Declaration of Authorship:	ix
Acknowledgements:	x
Abbreviations:	xi
1. Introduction:	2
1.1. The aims and focus of the study	2
1.2. Structure	6
1.3. Background	8
1.4. Sources	16
1.5. Historiographical survey	22
1.5. 1. British historiography and the image of Hungary in Britain.....	22
1.5. 2. Hungarian historiography.....	32
1.6. Methodology, the problem of British foreign policy-making and the differences between East and West.....	39
1.7. Note on the terminology.....	42
2. British official policy towards Hungarian revisionism and the Czechoslovak crisis, 1938-1939:	44
2.1 Introduction	44
2.2 The impact of the Anschluss on the Anglo-Hungarian relationship	48
2.3 The implications of the Chamberlain-Hitler Berchtesgaden meeting on Hungary	53
2.4 From Bad Godesberg to Munich.....	57
2.5 From Munich to Vienna	61
2.6 The British reaction to the First Vienna Award	66
2.7 From Vienna to Ruthenia.....	73
2.8 British reaction to the Hungarian occupation of Ruthenia	79
2.9 The Polish and Romanian guarantees and the Anglo-Hungarian relationship.....	84
2.10 Hungary between territorial claims and neutrality before the outbreak of the war.....	90
2.11 Conclusion.....	96
3. Illusions and Disappointments: The Anglo-Hungarian relationship	98

during the 'Phoney War':	98
3.1 Introduction.....	98
3.2 British views of the Hungarian-Romanian dispute in the last days of peace	103
3.3 British view of the Hungarian-Romanian territorial dispute during the Polish campaign	109
3.4 Soviet penetration into East Central Europe.....	118
3.5 Walking on very thin ice. Hungary between Germany and Britain at the end of 1939...	124
3.6 The bewilderment of British policy in the maze of Hungarian territorial claims.....	131
3.7 Conclusion	142
4. A Step too far: The problem of the German 'military passage' through Hungarian territory and the collapse of British confidence in Hungary:.....	144
4.1 Introduction.....	144
4.2 British Balkan policy and Hungary in the last months of the 'Phoney War'	146
4.3 Hungary grants military passage to Germany.....	152
4.4 The military and economic implications of the Hungarian 'droit' on Anglo-Hungarian relationship and British Balkan strategy	161
4.5 "Our fate is being decided now between Namur and Sedan" The Anglo-Hungarian relationship in the first weeks of the Battle of France	165
4.6 Conclusion	169
5. Contemplating Alternatives: Britain and Hungary between rapprochement and conflict in the summer of 1940:	170
5.1 Introduction.....	170
5.2 The implications of the Allied collapse on the Western front on British Central European policy	174
5.3 Hungarian territorial claims (July-August 1940).....	186
5.4 British reaction to the Second Vienna Award	199
5.5 Conclusion	207
6. Passing the Zenith ...reaching the Nadir: Anglo-Hungarian relationship from late 1940 to the declaration of war:	210
6.1 Introduction.....	210
6.2 British post-war planning accelerated.....	213
6.3 The priorities of British strategy in the Balkans in late 1940	219
6.4 Hungary turns its attention southwards	222
6.5 A radical change in the tone of the Central department	232
6.6 The nadir of their fortunes	238
6.7 The end of Anglo-Hungarian relationship	243
7. Conclusion:	252

8. Appendices:	264
8.1. Maps	264
8.2. Tables	282
9. Glossary:	288
10. Bibliography:	290

List of Maps:

Map 1.1: The stages of Hungarian territorial revision (1938-1941).....	p. 268
Map 1.2: The ethnic map of Hungary (circa 1880).....	p. 268
Map 1.3: The territorial consequences of the Treaty of Trianon.....	p. 269
Map 2.1: The strategic implications of a German-Hungarian military cooperation against Czechoslovakia (1938).....	p. 269
Map 2.2: The Little Entente.....	p. 270
Map 2.3: The recommendation of the Foreign Office on the Hungarian-Czechoslovak frontier (September 1938).....	p. 270
Map 2.4: The '80 percent' recommendation of the Foreign Office (September 1938), compared to the First Vienna Award (2 November 1938).....	p. 271
Map 2.5: The strategic railway connection between Czechoslovakia and Romania (1938).....	p. 271
Map 2.6: The districts of Ruthenia inhabited by Magyars.....	p. 272
Map 2.7: The First Vienna Award (2 November 1938).....	p. 272
Map 2.8: Romanian demands in Ruthenia in March 1939.....	p. 273
Map 2.9: The Slovak territory occupied by Hungary in the mini-war (April 1939) p.	273
Map 2.10: The Corridor plans in Transylvania (1939).....	p. 274
Map 3.1: The Kassa-Velejte railway line.....	p. 274
Map 3.2: The Hungarian strategic claim of the East-Carpathians (late 1939).....	p. 275
Map 3.3: The frontiers of the November 1939 Foreign Office secret plan and Churchill's proposition at the Teheran Conference (November 1943).....	p. 275
Map 3.4: Teleki's concept for revision in January 1940.....	p. 276
Map 3.5: The German offer of the Polish gas-fields to Hungary (September 1939).....	p. 276
Map 3.6: The British-Romanian proposition for revision (January 1940).....	p. 277
Map 3.7: Foreign Office sketch-map of the anticipated Hungarian claims in Romania (January 1940).....	p. 277

Map 3.9: The 'extended corridor-plan' in Transylvania (February 1940).....	p. 278
Map 3.10: Teleki's official territorial claims (February 1940).....	p. 278
Map 4.1: British and Italian positions in the Mediterranean (spring 1940).....	p. 279
Map 4.2: The presumable route of the German military passage through Hungary (spring 1940).....	p. 279
Map 5.1a: The Arad-Sigeth line.....	p. 280
Map 5.1b: The Arad-Sigeth line.....	p. 280
Map 5.2: Mabbott's recommendations for the Hungarian-Romanian frontier (May 1940)	p. 281
Map 5.3: Bulgarian territorial claims for Southern Dobruja (1940).....	p. 281
Map 5.4: The Second Vienna Award (30 August 1940) compared to Hungary's original demands.....	p. 282
Map 6.1: Bulgaria's territorial changes.....	p. 283
Map 6.2: Hungarian claim for the Drava triangle.....	p. 283
Map 6.3: The Teschen dispute between Czechoslovakia and Poland.....	p. 284
Map 6.4: Ruthenia, as a corridor between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union...	p. 284
Map 6.5: The German plan for a Swabian buffer state (1941).....	p. 285
Map 6.6: The Hungarian occupation of Northern parts of Yugoslavia (April 1941).....	p. 285

List of Tables:

Table 1.1: List of diplomatic representatives in selected countries (1938-41).....	p. 286
Table: 1.2: The Central department of the Foreign Office (1938).....	p. 287
Table: 1.3: The Southern department of the Foreign Office (1938).....	p. 287
Table: 1.4: The Central department of the Foreign Office (1939).....	p. 288
Table: 1.5: The Southern department of the Foreign Office (1939).....	p. 288
Table: 1.6: The Central department of the Foreign Office (1940).....	p. 289
Table: 1.7: The Southern department of the Foreign Office (1940).....	p. 289
Table: 1.8: The Central department of the Foreign Office (1941).....	p. 290
Table: 1.9: The Southern department of the Foreign Office (1941).....	p. 290
Table 1.10: The ethnic structure of Hungary (1910).....	p. 291
Table 2.1: The recommendation of the Foreign Office of the cities and towns to be transferred to Hungary (September 1938).....	p. 291

Declaration of Authorship:

I, ...András Gábor Becker..... [please print name]

declare that this thesis and the work presented in it are my own and has been generated by me as the result of my own original research.

[title of thesis] ...The Problem of the Hungarian Borders and Minorities in British Foreign Political Thought, 1938-41

I confirm that:

1. This work was done wholly or mainly while in candidature for a research degree at this University;
2. Where any part of this thesis has previously been submitted for a degree or any other qualification at this University or any other institution, this has been clearly stated;
3. Where I have consulted the published work of others, this is always clearly attributed;
4. Where I have quoted from the work of others, the source is always given. With the exception of such quotations, this thesis is entirely my own work;
5. I have acknowledged all main sources of help;
6. Where the thesis is based on work done by myself jointly with others, I have made clear exactly what was done by others and what I have contributed myself;
7. Either none of this work has been published before submission, or parts of this work have been published as: [please list references below]:

Signed:(ANDRAS BECKER).....

Date: 18 November 2013.....

Acknowledgements:

First and foremost, I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor Prof Mark Cornwall for his continuous support, advice and guidance throughout my Ph.D. candidature. His patience and knowledge guided me through difficult times. My sincere thanks also go to Prof Neil Gregor, the advisor of my thesis for offering his advice on important aspects of this research.

I shall thank my fellow Ph.D. students, who shared this enjoyable journey with me, and offered their advice and experience.

I would like to thank all the members of staff at the various archives and libraries I have visited throughout this research project. Their expertise has guided me through the plethora of primary and secondary material of the inter-war period and the Second World War.

I dedicate my thesis work to the memory of my father, whose passion for history I inherited, and to the memory of my grand-father, whose stories and anecdotes of this era grabbed my attention as a child.

I specially dedicate this thesis to Anikó, who have patiently supported me throughout the process.

Abbreviations:

BEF – British Expeditionary Forces

COS – Chiefs of Staff

FO – Foreign Office

FPC – Foreign Policy Committee

FRPS – Foreign Research and Press Service

JPC – Joint Planning Committee

MI3 - the British Military Intelligence

MI5 - the United Kingdom's domestic counter-intelligence and security agency

MI6 - the British agency which supplies the British Government with foreign intelligence

PID – Political Intelligence Department

RAF – Royal Air-Force

RIIA – Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House)

SOE – Special Operations Executive

‘The whole lot, Czechs, Magyars, Poles, Jugos, Romanians
should be put in a bag and shaken up, and then handed over to
a decent Briton to administer.’¹
(Sir George Clerk, 1919)

1. Introduction

1. 1. The aims and focus of the study:

Sylvia Stevenson travelled through the border country of Hungary and Czechoslovakia in the troubled times of the Czechoslovak crisis of 1938-39. She noted her experiences in a travel journal. At the outset of her journey she was unable to comprehend the petty quarrel over a tiny strip of territory between two small nations, Hungarians and Slovaks. By the end of her journey, after arriving at Munkács [Mukachevo] she exclaimed in her journal with burning enthusiasm: ‘They [the Hungarians] were right, [frontier revision was] not a mere childish clinging to sentimentalism.’² *The Spectator* had given a sarcastic and hostile review of Stevenson’s account and accused her of glorifying the whole episode into a sort of crusade, being hopelessly susceptible to the romantic appeal of dashing Hussars, and being overwhelmed by anti-Czech Hungarian propaganda and the Nazi suggested estimate of the allegedly dismaying condition of the Magyar minorities in Czechoslovakia.³ It is difficult to decide whether Stevenson or the reviewer was more influenced by propaganda and personal experiences. This example nevertheless vividly demonstrates that British perceptions about Hungary and Hungarian revisionism were formulated on limited background information, and were indeed very reliant on personal experiences and external data. This thesis argues that key British policy-makers were also quite susceptible to these influences, and made decisions about Hungary on limited background knowledge.

¹ Quoted by: A. Orzoff, *Battle for the Castle: The Myth of Czechoslovakia in Europe, 1914-1948* (New York, 2011), p. 144. Clerk was the first British minister in Czechoslovakia. He retired from diplomatic service in 1937. See: G. J. Prothero, *Searching for Security in a New Europe: The Diplomatic Career of Sir George Russell Clerk* (London, 2006).

² S. Stevenson, *Ride to Battle* (London, 1939), p. 45.

³ *The Spectator*, ‘Ride to Battle, by Sylvia Stevenson’, 12 May 1939, p. 36.

This study is concerned with the official British-Hungarian relationship and official British opinions about Hungary's territorial gains between 1938 and 1941. It is particularly interested in how key British policy-makers perceived Hungary and its territorial ambitions, and aims to identify what factors and principles influenced their decisions and policy towards Hungary. The primary objective is to determine how the British officially saw the dramatic territorial transformation of Hungary between 1938 and 1941. The First Vienna Award (2 November 1938), the Hungarian occupation of Ruthenia (March 1939), the Second Vienna Award (30 August 1940) and the Hungarian occupation of the northern parts of Yugoslavia (April 1941) (map 1.1) had increased the territory and population of Trianon Hungary by more than 50 percent. This extensive territorial adjustment made Hungary the dominant power of the Carpathian basin, and formidably increased its strength compared to its rivals in the region.

The historiography so far has focused on the British reaction to these territorial changes, but neglected the dynamics of British opinion in the intervals between these four events and how British decisions were made.⁴ Moreover, it has crucially overlooked the wider Central European perspective of the problem and the fact that the Hungarian territorial question had strong implications for British regional policy. This wider perspective provides a clearer picture of the position of Hungary in British policy and helps us in understanding the sudden shifts in British policy towards Budapest. Also, Britain's relationship with Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia cannot be entirely understood without considering the British attitude towards the 'Hungarian question'. Since the end of the First World War, Hungary persistently contested its frontiers with these countries. Upholding favourable relations with the West and cooperation with Germany for satisfying revisionist aims, Hungary's foreign policy was an intricate web of seeming contradictions, which baffled outsiders, but made perfect sense to Hungarians. These inevitably had a crucial implication on Britain's relationship with Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia. An analysis from a wider Central European context has been provided by Gábor Bátonyi, who has focused on Britain's relationship with Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia between 1919 and 1933.⁵

⁴ A. D. Bán, *Hungarian-British Diplomacy 1938-1941, the attempt to maintain relations* (London, 2004); I. Romsics, 'A brit külpolitika és a „magyar kérdés”, 1914-1946' in *Helyünk és sorsunk a Duna-medencében*, ed. by I. Romsics (Budapest, 2005), pp. 34-132.

⁵ G. Bátonyi, *Britain and Central Europe, 1918-1933* (Oxford, 1999).

Miklós Lojkó has applied the same approach, but covering a shorter period of time, and demonstrated the challenges of British policy towards Poland and Hungary.⁶ Unfortunately there has been no comparable analysis for the period under consideration here.⁷

This study is not a rewriting of the Anglo-Hungarian relations, but a more focused analysis of the impact of the territorial question on British opinion and bilateral relations. As revisionism was the central theme of inter-war Hungarian foreign policy, it crucially affected all aspects of the Anglo-Hungarian relationship; hence reviewing British official opinions and the bilateral relations from this perspective offers a more reliable image than previous historical approaches. We are aiming to clarify questions, such as how British political, economic and strategic interests affected views on Hungary. Eventually, the analysis is directed to demonstrate the British long-term view of Hungary's territorial changes, and to demonstrate whether policy-makers in Whitehall considered them sustainable and viable. It will be crucial to identify what were the British criteria in judging the territorial changes of Hungary and for redrawing Hungary's frontiers after the war. We are seeking to address whether the concept of 'self-determination', the original aim of the Versailles peace settlement, was considered by Whitehall as a viable solution for reconstructing the region after the Second World War, or whether more forceful approaches, such as creating ethnographic frontiers by population transfers, redrawing frontiers on the basis of economic viability or historical precedence were contemplated as workable solutions.

Fundamentally, the analysis is interested in official British opinion, but a different set of questions are posed to those normally found in conventional diplomatic narratives, which concentrate on Great Power diplomacy and exile politics. Diplomatic development provides the framework of British debate within and outside of official

⁶ M. Lojkó, *Meddling in Middle Europe: Britain and the 'Lands Between', 1919-1925* (Budapest, 2006).

⁷ The synthesis of Elisabeth Barker, although very useful, is only a collection of separate analyses of British policy towards the countries of the region: E. Barker, *British policy towards South-East Europe in the Second World War* (London, 1976). András Bán has provided a preliminary study of British policy towards Central Europe from the late 1930s until the end of the war, but his premature death left his work unfinished: A. D. Bán, 'British foreign policy towards East Central Europe and Hungary, 1937-1947' in *20th century Hungary and the Great Powers*, ed. by I. Romsics (New York, 1995), pp. 114-132. Gerard Van Kessel has presented a comparative analysis of British economic policy towards the Balkan, but he did not discuss Hungary: G. J. Van Kessel, *The British Reaction to German Economic Expansion to South East Europe, 1936-1939* (unpublished PhD thesis, London University, 1972).

circles, but the analysis takes a different tack by probing and examining the way in which advice, decision, intervention and thinking unfolded in London about Hungary. Essentially, it tries to understand the forces that had driven policy-makers.⁸

Through this perspective, the subsequent chapters are building up a new and more comprehensive interpretation of the dynamics of the Anglo-Hungarian relationship. By introducing a large set of unresearched British and Hungarian primary sources, and reinterpreting the old, this thesis seeks to dispel some long established myths surrounding the British view of Hungary between 1938 and 1941. The image of Hungary as a German satellite is very much overdrawn by historiography. This perspective suggested that Hungarian territorial demands and acquisitions were automatically condemned by London, because they were achieved with the help of Hitler and Mussolini, and that the opinion of British policy-makers was constantly anti-Hungarian during the Second World War. It also indicated that due to Hungary's officially pro-German foreign political orientation, London automatically supported Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia and the restoration of the Versailles status quo after the war. This research has proved that in spite of the fact that Hungary was condemned for following a pro-German policy, in the background policy-makers planned a fair treatment for Hungary after the war. However, the most significant argument put forward by this thesis is that Hungarian territorial demands overall did not affect British perceptions on Hungary, and that British opinions about the frontiers of Hungary were the subject of the international situation, and current British strategy.

⁸ One of our primary aims in this context is to review the opinion of the Foreign Office. For the list of Foreign Office officials dealing with Hungary between 1938-41, see: tables 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 1.7, 1.8.

1. 2. Structure:

The particular timeframe of 1938-41 has been chosen, because both starting and ending points mark defining junctures in the Anglo-Hungarian relationship. In 1938 the Munich crisis drastically transformed British policy towards the Central European region, as it seemed that Britain had decided to withdraw from the region completely. This year also marked the first stage of the enlargement of Hungary. In the aftermath of the Munich Agreement, the First Vienna Award reincorporated into Hungary a wide strip of territory, which had been lost to Czechoslovakia in 1920. In April 1941 London severed diplomatic relations and in December declared war on Budapest. Within this timeframe our argument follows a chronological approach, as far as possible, but occasional overlaps will be necessary to enable the complete consideration of the long-term British view on specific territorial changes.

The text is divided into five chapters, each of which represents a significant stage either in the territorial aggrandisement of Hungary, or a shift in British perceptions toward it. Each chapter is exploring a series of themes and turning points through which the dynamics and complexity of the formulation of British opinion is disentangled, focusing particularly on the question of how British views changed.

The Introduction, apart from presenting the sources and addressing historiographical and methodological questions, will also acquaint the reader with the British attitude towards Hungary before the late 1930s. It will explain some aspects of the Treaty of Trianon (1920), the peace treaty between the Allies and Hungary, and will briefly cover the Anglo-Hungarian relationship up to 1938.

The first chapter is concerned with the Hungarian angle of the Munich crisis. It explores British reaction to the Hungarian territorial claims on Czechoslovakia and how London consequently judged the First Vienna Award. The aim is to demonstrate whether London drew a distinction between the German and the Hungarian claims on Prague, and to identify on what principles British policy-makers accepted the adjustment of the Hungarian-Czechoslovak frontier. Besides, it demonstrates the British response to the Hungarian occupation of Ruthenia in March 1939, which was the outgrowth of the German destruction of Czecho-Slovakia. London however viewed the

Hungarian takeover with forbearance. Bringing new evidence forward this chapter highlights that Hungary's role in British strategy before the outbreak of the war was more significant than has been previously understood.

Chapter three begins by laying out the effect of the outbreak of the war on British Central European policy. The war changed British views on European territorial questions in various ways. Post-war planning started immediately, and perceptions about future frontiers were placed in the context of war strategy. The period of the 'Phoney War' is one of the least known periods of the Anglo-Hungarian relationship. Until now, historians have agreed that the outbreak of the war diminished British interest in the region and that Hungary was written off as a German satellite. We will prove that although Hungary and Romania were devalued militarily, London showed strategic interest towards these countries until Italy entered the war in June 1940.

The fourth chapter offers the most significant turning point in the bilateral relationship and is contradictorily the least researched period. In April 1940 Budapest agreed to grant *droit de passage* (right of military passage) for German troops in the future if Berlin requested it. This radically transformed British views of Hungary, which was now considered to be in the German camp by its own choice. New evidence reveals that the 'droit' had a devastating effect on the Anglo-Hungarian relationship, and also gravely affected British opinions of Hungary's territorial aspirations.

The focus of the fifth chapter is the British reaction to the Axis arbitration of the Hungarian-Romanian territorial dispute, the Second Vienna Award. It aims to decide why Romania was given priority by London in its dispute with Hungary, while both Budapest and Bucharest were condemned by Whitehall for following a pro-Axis policy.

The beginning of 1941 brought a new positive approach towards Hungary in the Foreign Office. Our last chapter asks the reason for this sudden change of perspective, and identifies why London eventually decided to break off diplomatic relations with Hungary in April, and declared war in December. It also assesses how official British policy envisaged the post-war frontiers of Hungary.

1.3. Background:

A number of problems, such as the Treaty of Trianon and British policy towards Hungary before 1938, have to be introduced prior to the presentation of sources.

The Treaty of Trianon, the peace agreement between the Allies and Hungary after the First World War, regulated the status of Hungary and defined its frontiers.⁹ It is not our aim to analyse or critique Trianon, but to sketch its territorial, demographic and minority implications and its impact on the Hungarian mind, Hungarian foreign policy and inter-war revisionism.¹⁰ It will also be important to highlight British policy towards the collapse of Austria-Hungary and the dismantling of Hungary, as it will demonstrate British attitudes towards the questions of national independence and frontier change. It is similarly crucial to exhibit the British attitude towards Hungarian territorial claims during the 1920s and 1930s and how far Britain judged the Versailles status quo as viable in that period.

Before its dismemberment in 1920 Hungary was a multi-ethnic state, with nearly half of the population non-Magyars (map 1.2, table 1.10). Trianon left Hungary with 32 percent of its original territory (map 1.3), and 36 percent of its population.¹¹ The area allocated to the neighbouring states possessed the majority of the non-Magyar

⁹ For the antecedents of the Treaty of Trianon, see M. Ormos, *Paduától Trianonig, 1918-1920* (Budapest, 1978).

¹⁰ The historiography of Trianon is immense, and its analysis is beyond the scope of this study. For a comprehensive and recent analysis of Trianon; see: I. Romsics, *A trianoni békeszerződés* (Budapest, 2001). Romsics and Stephen Várdy have analysed the implications of Trianon on Hungarian historiography: I. Romsics, *Clió bővületében. Magyar történetírás a 19-20. században – nemzetközi kitekintéssel* (Budapest, 2011), pp. 293-315, 356-376, 481-490; S. Várdy, 'Trianon in Interwar Hungarian Historiography' in *Total War and Peacemaking. A Case Study of Trianon*, ed. by B. Király, P. Pastor, and I. Sanders (New York, 1982), pp. 361-89. For the impact of Trianon upon inter-war Hungary, see: S. Várdy, 'The Impact of Trianon upon Hungary and the Hungarian Mind: The Nature of Interwar Hungarian Irredentism', *Hungarian Studies Review* 37 (1983), pp. 21-42.

¹¹ All data quoted here uses the 1910 census and refers to the territory of 'Hungary proper', which excludes Croatia-Slavonia, which, since 1102 was in a union with Hungary. The 1910 census has been criticised by many. It classified the population by mother tongue and religion, which may or may not have corresponded to the individual's national identity, due to the fact that individuals of a national group often declared themselves Magyars to ensure social and professional development. In ethnically mixed regions people were also often bi- or trilingual. David K. Paul, Péter Hanák and László Katus have stated that the data of the census is reasonably accurate, quoted by: P. R. Brass, *Ethnic Groups and the State* (London, 1985), pp. 132-133, 156. Others believed that the number of Magyars was exaggerated: V. Bystricky, 'Slovakia from the Munich Conference to the declaration of independence' in *Slovakia in History*, ed. by M. Teich et al (Cambridge, 2011), pp. 157-174 (p. 165); A. Murad, *Franz Joseph I of Austria and his Empire* (New York, 1968), p. 20.

population, but about 3-3.5 million Magyars were also forced to live outside the newly defined frontiers. Predominantly Magyar settlements, consisting of about 2 million Magyars, were situated in a typically 50 km wide strip along the new borders, in foreign territory.¹² The initial aim of the Versailles peace settlement was to redraw the map of Central Europe and the Balkans on the principles of national self-determination. Peacemakers however believed that the strengthening of Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia would bring stability to the region, therefore this criterion was neglected at the expense of Germany, Hungary and Bulgaria. The new frontiers favoured the strategic interest of the newly created states with little or no regard to the historical, cultural, ethnic, geographic and economic characteristics of the region.¹³ Hungarian propositions and complaints were disregarded, and the Hungarian delegation was excluded from the treaty negotiations.

Before 1914, the Foreign Office knew very little about the national question of Austria-Hungary. In 1914, Britain did not declare war for the cause of national self-determination, or for the purpose of changing the existing territorial structure of Central Europe, but to maintain the balance of power. Since the region was an area of secondary importance, the government gave very little thought to its post-war settlement. Aims were considered only in the most general terms, and British policy-makers would have been satisfied by a settlement which would be conducive to peace and stability.¹⁴ However, by the turn of 1917 and 1918 the Allies could not afford abstaining from turning the nationalities against Austria-Hungary.¹⁵ When a separate peace with Austria-Hungary proved impossible, the Entente decided to give maximum support to the separatism of the nationalities.¹⁶ Before and during the war, the national question of

¹² K. Kocsis and E. Kocsis-Hódosi, *Hungarian Minorities in the Carpathian Basin* (Toronto, 1995), pp. 13-28.

¹³ L. Arday, *Térkép csata után, Magyarország a brit külpolitikában 1918-1919* (Budapest, 2009).

¹⁴ Mark Cornwall has pointed out that as early as late 1914, the Foreign Office viewed Hungarian chauvinism as a liability to the stability of the region. He has argued that this notion became the basis of viewing Greater Hungary as non-viable, but pointed out that the dismemberment of Hungary had not been decided at this time: M. Cornwall, 'Great Britain and the Splintering of Greater Hungary, 1914-1918' in *British-Hungarian relations since 1848*, ed. by L. Péter and M. Rady (London, 2005), pp. 103-122.

¹⁵ Hungarian territories were promised to Serbia and Romania in 1915. However, these were secret agreements, which did not constitute the integral part of official British policy: Cornwall, 'Great Britain and the Splintering of Greater Hungary', pp. 110-111.

¹⁶ K. J. Calder, *Britain and the Origins of the New Europe 1914-1918* (Cambridge, 2008), pp. 214-215, 218; see also: M. Cornwall, *The Undermining of Austria-Hungary. The Battle for Hearts and Minds*

Hungary received much prominence in British public discourse. Scholars have argued that the anti-Hungarian tone of the writings of R. W. Seton-Watson and Wickham Steed had substantially coloured the viewpoint of the British public, and most crucially the Foreign Office.¹⁷

Before turning our attention to the British attitude towards Hungary after the Great War, and the question of frontier revision in the inter-war period, it is crucial to briefly sketch the aims and arguments of Hungarian revisionism after Trianon. In contemporary Britain, 'revisionism' was interpreted as the reconsideration of the entire peace settlement, not only the reconsideration of its territorial conditions, as the problem was mostly viewed by Hungary.¹⁸ English-language historiography has concentrated on German and Italian revisionism, and Hungarian and Bulgarian ambitions to reverse the status quo have received less attention from historians.¹⁹ This thesis is arguing that Hungarian territorial ambitions were one of the main reasons for the British failure to conjoin the countries of the region into a firm block against Germany in the late 1930s.²⁰

Since 1928, Hungary had openly challenged Trianon. The treaty was called into question from historic, ethnographic, economic, moral and legal perspectives.

(London, 2000), pp. 218-221. For British policy towards Austria-Hungary before the war; see: F.R. Bridge, *Great Britain and Austria-Hungary 1906-1914* (London, 1972).

¹⁷ Cornwall, 'Great Britain and the Splintering of Greater Hungary', p. 115; G. Jeszenszky, *Az elveszett presztizs: Magyarország megítélésének megváltozása Nagy-Britanniában (1894-1918)* (Budapest, 1994), pp. 12-14. See particularly: R. W. Seton-Watson, *Racial Problems in Hungary* (London, 1908); Ibem, *Roumania and the Great War* (London, 1915); Ibem, *German, Slav, and Magyar: A Study in the Origins, of the Great War* (London, 1916); H. W. Steed, *The Habsburg Monarchy* (London, 1913). See also: H. and C. Seton-Watson, *The Making of a New Europe: R.W. Seton-Watson and the Last Years of Austria-Hungary* (London, 1981), p. 41.

¹⁸ We will not consider the differences between revisionism, separatism, irredentism and expansionism. 'Revisionism' will be used throughout the thesis for describing Hungarian aspirations to regain the territories lost in Trianon. For an in-depth analysis of the terminology; see: A. A. Kallis, *Fascist Ideology. Territory and Expansionism in Italy and Germany, 1922-1945* (London, 2000), pp. 111-121.

¹⁹ C. Fink, 'Revisionism' in *A Companion to Europe, 1900-1945*, ed. G. Martel (Oxford, 2010) pp. 326-340. See particularly: G. Bátonyi, 'British foreign policy and the problem of Hungarian revisionism in the 1930s' in *British-Hungarian relations since 1848*, ed. by L. Peter and M. Rady (London, 2005), pp. 205-216.; Kallis, *Fascist Ideology*, pp. 104-115.

²⁰ In the plethora of historiography on the outbreak of the Second World War the question of Hungarian revisionism is not more than a passing reference. To mention only the most important studies: A. J. P. Taylor, *The Origins of the Second World War* (London, 1961); *Origins of the Second World War Reconsidered*, ed. by G. Martel (London, 1999); *The Origins of World War Two: The Debate Continues*, ed. by R. Boyce and J. A. Maiolo (London, 2003); P. M. H. Bell, *The Origins of the Second World War in Europe* (London, 2007); *The Origins of the Second World War: An International Perspective*, ed. by F. McDonough (London, 2011).

Hungarian governments in the inter-war period contested the legality and validity of the treaty on the basis that the Hungarian delegation was not invited to the peace conference, hence the treaty constituted a *diktat*. Questioning the morality and sincerity of the entire Versailles settlement was directly connected to this. Budapest claimed that self-determination was only a bombastic catchphrase, which ignored 3-3.5 million Magyars, and was intentionally applied at the expense of the defeated. The demographic and minority consequences of Trianon were however only one side of the Hungarian grievances. Principally, Trianon was a territorial trauma for Hungarians. The notion of the '1000 year old kingdom of St. Stephen' was based on the unquestionable territorial integrity of Hungary.²¹ The Foreign Office considered this state-concept as archaic, and its reiteration in the inter-war period by Hungary was viewed as a sign of instability.²² Most crucially, the territorial fixation and inward-looking nature of Hungarian national mythology, and the concept of the supremacy of state over national independence alienated British policy-makers, who interpreted integral Hungarian revisionism in the late 1930s and early 1940s as aiming to restore Magyar supremacy over other nations.²³ This eventually became one of the key reasons for rejecting the reincorporation of territories inhabited by non-Magyars into Hungary.²⁴

Balázs Ablonczy has argued that Pál Teleki's view-point on revisionism during his premiership (1939-41) was defined by these principles. Teleki regarded anything less than integral revision as a gallant concession to the nationalities and a compromise on the altar of European peace.²⁵ However, the Hungarian elite recognised that integral

²¹ The Christian Hungarian state was founded by Stephen (Saint) I (1001-1038) in 1001. The 'State-concept of Saint Stephen' is a complicated mixture of the tradition of the establishment of the Hungarian state, Magyar rule in the Carpathian basin, and Christianity. This concept was mingled with the notion that throughout history Hungary protected Western civilization from the barbaric hordes of the East. For Teleki's interpretation of the state concept, as the basis of Hungary's future; see: P. Teleki, 'Szent István birodalma 1941-ben' in *Teleki Pál válogatott politikai írások és beszédek*, ed. by B. Ablonczy (Budapest, 2000), pp. 496-519; P. Teleki, 'A szentistváni állameszme' (speech made at the *Catholic Demonstration*), Budapest, 19 May 1939, <<http://www.regnumportal.hu/>> [accessed 24 June 2013].

²² G. Bátonyi, 'British foreign policy and the problem of Hungarian revisionism in the 1930s', p. 205.

²³ Integral revisionism aimed to completely restore the pre-Trianon frontiers of Hungary.

²⁴ The primacy of state over nation was advocated by most of the Hungarian politicians and scholars in the inter-war period, see particularly: P. Teleki, 'Szent István birodalma 1941-ben'; Gy. Székfű, *Három nemzedék* (Budapest, 1920), pp. 389-390.

²⁵ B. Ablonczy, *Pál Teleki, The Life of a Controversial Hungarian Politician* (New York, 2006), p. 93. See also: G. Bátonyi, (book review) 'Ablonczy, Balázs. Pál Teleki (1874–1941): The Life of a Controversial Hungarian Politician' in *Austrian History Yearbook*, ed. by Gary B. Cohen et al, vol. 42 April 2011 (Minneapolis, 2011), pp. 248-249.

revision could not be presented as an aim to the international community, as its scale would have alienated foreign governments. Consequently, Hungarian politicians were very circumspect in defining the extent of Hungary's territorial claims during the inter-war years.

Gábor Bátonyi and Mark Cornwall have pointed out that British representatives in the region, particularly the British minister in Prague, Sir Joseph Addison, were revisionist voices. Bátonyi has stressed however that the viewpoints of these British ministers should not be confused with those of British policy-makers in London, who expressed more rigid opinions.²⁶ The memory of the Great War and the German-Austro-Hungarian alliance crucially determined the mind-set of British policy-makers towards Hungary.²⁷ As we will see, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that the German-Hungarian military alliance and the notion of German-Hungarian 'war guilt' in the First World War, and the German cultural tradition in Hungary largely determined Hungary's place in British thought. While Czechs, Slovaks, Romanians and Yugoslavs were known for their struggle for independence, Hungary was only remembered for its negative role in the Great War. Adding to this, Cornwall has emphasized that the idea that Hungarian sympathy with England was fully reciprocated in London stuck fast among the Magyar political elite and the public.²⁸ Misreading British opinion in Budapest indeed became the main reason for misunderstanding between London and Budapest in the late 1930s and early 1940s.

These, as we will see, crucially affected both the British view of Hungarian territorial claims, and the interpretation of British attitudes in Budapest. This study has not had space to detail the labyrinth of Hungarian territorial claims and revisionist propaganda in the 1920s and early 1930s.²⁹ Our aim here is briefly to describe how London judged the questions of revisionism and frontier revision in this period.

²⁶ Bátonyi, 'British foreign policy and the problem of Hungarian revisionism in the 1930s', pp. 205-206; Cornwall, 'Great Britain and the Splintering of Greater Hungary, 1914-1918', p. 103.

²⁷ György Barcza, the Hungarian minister in London (1938-41), also noted in his memoirs that because of the German-Austro-Hungarian alliance in the Great War, the Hungarian diplomatic corps during the inter-war period was essentially viewed by the Foreign Office as the instrument of German diplomacy: Gy. Barcza, *Diplomataemlékeim, Magyarország volt vatikáni és londoni követének emlékirataiból 1911-1945*, 2 vols, vol. 1 (Budapest, 1994), p. 423.

²⁸ Cornwall, 'Great Britain and the Splintering of Greater Hungary', p. 103.

²⁹ For the aims and tools of Hungarian revisionism in the inter-war years, see: M. Zeidler, *A magyar irredenta kultusz a két világháború között* (Budapest, 2002); Idem, *A revíziós gondolat* (Budapest, 2009);

The continuous 'Justice for Hungary' press campaign of Lord Rothermere on the pages of the *Daily Mail*, and the petition of British MPs in 1933 for 'justice to the Hungarian nation' negatively affected British official opinion about Hungarian territorial aspirations.³⁰ However, due to the Great Depression, British official opinion softened on the question of revision, because London recognised that the economic and territorial strains of the peace treaties obstructed the economic development of Central Europe, which eventually injured interstate relations and hampered stability.³¹ In the mid-1930s British disapproval of Hungarian revisionism was mainly the consequence of Hungary asking for a territorial price to participate in initiatives like the Danubian Customs Union Plan (1932) and the Tardieu Plan (1932) which intended to solve regional problems.³² Indeed, it was evident that London did not contemplate the complete reversal of the territorial structure, but only to remove the most urgent antagonisms. The Four Power Pact (1933), which meant to ensure the cooperation of Italy, France, Britain and Germany, initially called for the limited revision of Hungary's frontiers, applying ethnographic criteria. The plan originated from Mussolini, but the British Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald, received it with passionate enthusiasm. When he commented in the House of Commons that 'Every treaty is holy, but none are eternal[...]' it caused sensation in the world press, as it was the first occasion that a British Prime Minister officially and openly had espoused the principle of revision.³³

E. B. Weaver, *Revision and Its Modes: Hungary's Attempts to Overturn the Treaty of Trianon 1931-1938* (unpublished D.Phil. thesis, University of Oxford, 2008).

³⁰ Lord Rothermere, *My Campaign for Hungary* (London, 1939); I. Romsics, 'Hungary's Place in the Sun. A British Newspaper Article and its Hungarian Repercussions', in *British-Hungarian relations since 1848*, pp. 193-204; Bátonyi, 'British foreign policy and the problem of Hungarian revisionism', p. 211. For the petition in the House of Commons and Lords, see: R. E. L. V. Williams, *The Hungarian question in the British Parliament: speeches, questions and answers thereto in the House of Lords and the House of Commons from 1919 to 1930* (London, 1933); also: Sir R. Gower, *Treaty-revision and the Hungarian Frontiers* (London, 1936); Idem, *The Hungarian Minorities in the Successor States* (London, 1937).

³¹ Bátonyi, 'British foreign policy and the problem of Hungarian revisionism', pp. 213-214.

³² I. Diószegi, 'Gazdasági egyesítési tervek a Duna medencében az 1929-33-as gazdasági világválság időszakában' in *Integrációs törekvések Közép-és Kelet-Európában a 19. és 20. Században*, ed. by I. Romsics (Budapest, 1997), pp. 63-115; S. Bethlen, 'The Danubian States and the Tardieu Plan', *Political Science Quarterly* 141 (1932), pp. 352-362; F. G. Stambrook, 'A British Proposal for the Danubian States: the Customs Union Project of 1932', *The Slavonic and East European Review* 98 (1963), pp. 64-88; Bátonyi, 'British foreign policy and the problem of Hungarian revisionism', p. 209.

³³ *Hansard* (Commons), vol. 276, p. 511, Ramsay MacDonald, 29 March 1933. See also: K. Morgan, *Ramsay Mac Donald* (London, 2006), p. 79. The Foreign Office was of the opinion that as the result of the Four Power Pact the Polish Corridor would be diminished, and Hungary would receive the adjacent territories populated by Magyars: TNA, FO 371/16683, C 2608/2607/62; FO 371/16691, C 5740/2607/62.

Eventually, out of suspicion of Hitler's intentions, all references to frontier revision were omitted from the Four Power Pact.³⁴

Sensing the softening of British views, Count István Bethlen went on a lecture tour to Britain in 1932-33 to influence British opinion. His main goal was to present the viability of broad frontier revision. He called for the creation of an independent Transylvania and the transferring of a wide strip of territory along Hungary's frontiers.³⁵ The Foreign Office, although considering Bethlen a moderate politician, refused to see him and gave a frosty reception to his lecture tour.³⁶ After Hitler's accession to power Britain's interest in adjusting the peace treaties through peaceful negotiations drastically diminished. There was also particular concern about the dictatorial methods of Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Gömbös (1932-36), which made London cautious towards the question of frontier revision.³⁷ With the appearance of a revisionist Germany, Hungary expected a rapid realization of its revisionist hopes. However, in order not to cause a landslide in the region, London categorically disapproved of any attempt to link Hungarian and German demands, and was convinced that the Hungarian problem was the less pressing issue, and therefore could be postponed. Eventually, the search for Hitler's support for territorial aspirations, as we will demonstrate, undermined the Hungarian moral case in international forums of seeking justice for the Magyars living under alien rule. Bátonyi has argued that the aggressiveness of Germany discontinued British public support for creating justice in Central Europe, and consequently all the British public wanted was to avoid war.³⁸

Following the remilitarization of the Rhineland, Ramsay MacDonald declared that he was pleased that the Versailles status quo was disappearing.³⁹ British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, initiated discussions in Whitehall on the reconsideration of

³⁴ K. H. Jarausch, *The Four Power Pact* (Milwaukee, 1965), pp. 49, 116, 129-130.

³⁵ I. Romsics, *Bethlen István. Politikai életrajz* (Budapest, 1991), pp. 248-249.

³⁶ TNA, FO 371/ 16786, C 10499/10499/21.

³⁷ *British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print* (BDFA), ed. by K. Bourne and D. C. Watt part II. vol. 3 (Cleveland, 1990), Viscount Chilston to Sir J. Simon, 12 June 1933, pp. 318-19. Gömbös' territorial claims were based on the economic and strategic interests of Hungary. For his foreign policy and territorial claims, see: P. Pritz, *Magyarország külpolitikája Gömbös Gyula miniszterelnöksége idején 1932-1936* (Budapest, 1982).

³⁸ Bátonyi, 'British foreign policy and the problem of Hungarian revisionism', p. 216.

³⁹ D. Stevenson, 'France at the Paris Peace Conference: Addressing the Dilemmas of Security' in *French Foreign and Defence Policy, 1918-1940: The Decline and Fall of a Great Power*, ed. by R. W. D. Boyce (London 1998), pp. 10-29 (p. 18).

the status quo of the Central European region. Sir Alexander Cadogan, Assistant Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, recommended the rewriting of the League of Nations Covenant and the territorial restructuring of the region. Cadogan's recommendation however did not reflect sympathy towards revision, but rather an attempt to save whatever was left of the Versailles system.⁴⁰ Eden's initiative also cannot be interpreted as the embracing of revision. It was no more than an inquiry. These kinds of investigations died away under the premiership of Neville Chamberlain, who, from 1937, took the initiative to appease Germany. With appeasement, British efforts for constructing an anti-German bloc in Central Europe ceased completely, and Chamberlain, as we will see, showed only limited interest towards the territorial questions of the region. British interest in Hungarian territorial claims only intensified in 1938 as a result of the Munich crisis.

⁴⁰ Bátonyi, 'British foreign policy and the problem of Hungarian revisionism', p. 219.

1. 4. Sources:

This thesis is analysing British and Hungarian official and private papers, which are scattered in numerous British and Hungarian archives. The primary sources used for this thesis and their usefulness will be briefly discussed here.

The National Archives (TNA) in Kew was consulted extensively. Most of the material used was drawn from the Foreign Office general political correspondence (FO 371), which in itself reflects the intensely political nature of the study. Research aids, such as the *Foreign Office Index for Correspondence* proved to be very useful, particularly in cases when the Hungarian problem was intermingled with Czechoslovak, Romanian, or Yugoslav questions. Its indexing however is too general to be used as a sole guide of research reference. Our aim to examine the way in which advice, decision, intervention and thinking unfolded in Whitehall; and the goal to identify international and Hungarian developments affecting British views, made reviewing most of the Hungarian boxes between 1938 and 1941 inevitable. The material we have found most useful in filling the gaps in our knowledge about the Anglo-Hungarian relationship were the annual reports on Hungary, the reports of the British commercial and military attachés, and most crucially the diplomatic reports of the British minister in Budapest.⁴¹ Owen O'Malley, compiled extensive, thorough and illuminating reports. Diplomatic reports, intelligence data and press articles were the main source of information of a foreign country. Therefore the fact that only a fraction of O'Malley's diplomatic dispatches has been analysed by historians, shows the current limitations of our knowledge of the Anglo-Hungarian relationship.

The most important evidence for understanding how decisions were made about Hungary are Foreign Office minutes. When a report arrived at the Foreign Office, after deciphering, it was seen by the junior officials of the relevant department, then, depending on its importance, it worked its way up the hierarchy. Negligible reports on Hungary were only minuted by junior clerks, but important ones, affecting British policy in the region reached the desk of the departmental head and the permanent undersecretary of state for foreign affairs within less than a week. In most cases, reports

⁴¹ For the list of selected British diplomatic representatives in the region, and the representatives of foreign countries in London, see: table 1.9.

about territorial questions were seen and minuted by senior officials, which reflects their interest towards the future status quo of Central Europe. The importance of these Foreign Office minutes lies in their uniqueness in reflecting the perceptions and mind-sets of policy-makers. Moreover, the minute sheets are echoing debates between officials or the various departments of the Foreign Office. As the papers, diaries and memoirs of key policy-makers, such as Lord Halifax, Anthony Eden, Frank Roberts, or Alexander Cadogan reveal little about their perceptions on Hungary; their minutes on Hungarian files provide useful clues for their approach and attitude.⁴² Besides, in cases when a problem required the attention of other governmental agencies, their advice was also sought. Consequent exchanges of opinion were preserved on these minute sheets, which vividly demonstrate the process of advising, the prolonged method of evaluating information, the formulation of opinion, and most crucially the level of influence of ministries and individuals in the maze of the policy-making process. Apart from diplomatic reports and minutes, the most decisive evidence for the opinion of Whitehall are then the instructions sent to the British minister in Budapest.

Understandably, the attention of Hungarian historians has centred around the final policy adopted by London towards Hungary, while the labyrinth of the British foreign policy-making process for the most part was overlooked on the possible assumption that that path was less important. However, a major problem with this approach is that it generalises the foreign policy of Britain, assuming that Whitehall followed the same principles in decision-making with all countries at all times.⁴³ The essential questions have not been asked: In what ways can British foreign policy towards Hungary be distinguished from the relationship of Britain with the rest of the region; and did London follow specific principles in its policy towards Budapest? Deciding this question is one of the cornerstones for understanding the British approach

⁴² Lord Halifax, *Fullness of Days* (London, 1957); A. Eden, *The Eden Memoirs*, vol. 3: *The Reckoning* (London, 1965); F. Roberts, *Dealing with Dictators: The Destructions & Revival of Europe, 1930-70* (London, 1991); *The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan*, ed. by D. Dilks (London, 1971). Although the diaries of Cadogan reveal his antipathy towards Hungary, he felt similarly towards most of the countries of the region, Romania in particular. His diaries however provide no clues as to whether his animosity played any role in his decisions. Other key policy-makers, such as Orme Sargent, the senior official of the Southern department, did not leave diaries or memoirs for posterity, hence the analysis of their minutes are essential. Keith Neilson's study of Sargent concentrates on the pre-war years, and reveals nothing about Sargent's opinion about Hungary: K. Neilson, 'Orme Sargent, Appeasement and the British Policy in Europe, 1933-39', *Twentieth Century British History* 85 (2010), pp. 1-28.

⁴³ The special problems of British foreign policy-making process, which needs to be considered for this study, will be reviewed at a later stage in the Introduction.

towards Hungary therefore cannot be ignored. Similarly, the British view of Hungary's territorial ambitions was seen in this same limited context and it has not been analysed how far Hungary's territorial ambitions and the question of treaty revision in Central Europe influenced British policy towards Hungary.

The papers of the Cabinet (CAB) and the Prime Minister's Office (PREM) were also consulted for this research. Despite the fact that they contain very little on Hungarian questions, they were most useful in identifying British regional priorities. We were aiming to pinpoint the memoranda which served as a basis for decision-making on Hungary. Deciding the author of these memoranda is a well-known problem in the analysis of British foreign policy-making. Although in most cases documents were initialled by the Foreign Secretary, the text itself often originated from one of the senior officials of the Foreign Office, or the private secretaries of the Foreign Secretary. It has been most challenging to decide the original author, which indeed in some cases proved to be impossible. Similarly to Foreign Office minutes, the minutes of Cabinet meetings are valuable to learn the opinions of cabinet members about Hungary. Various other materials have been consulted to a more limited extent at the TNA: the papers of the War Office (WO), the Ministry of Information (MoI), the Political Intelligence Department (PID)⁴⁴, and the papers of Halifax, Cadogan and Sargent (FO 800).

The Magyar Országos Levéltár (MOL [Hungarian State Archives]) supplied a significant part of material for Hungarian aspects of this project. A considerable part of the inter-war diplomatic correspondence of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry was destroyed in the calamities of 1944-45. Anglo-Hungarian correspondence was particularly affected; most of the papers of 1940 and 1941 were lost. Some of the surviving materials are very fragmented or are in an extremely bad condition.⁴⁵ The papers of the Political Department (K 63), the so called 'Reserved' (confidential) files (K 64), the papers of the Minority Department (K 28) and the documents of the Press and Cultural Relations Department (K 66) were consulted in Budapest. The fact that research aids, such as the *Foreign Office Index for Correspondence* were not available;

⁴⁴ The PID was a department of the Foreign Office during the war. It was established in 1939; its main function was the production of weekly intelligence summaries, but from 1940 it became very influential in political propaganda and policy-making towards Central Europe and the Balkans, see particularly: D. Garnett, *The secret history of PWE, 1939-46. The Political Warfare Executive* (London, 2002), pp. 7-59.

⁴⁵ Some of the destroyed documents have survived in copies, which were made earlier at the request of Pál Teleki, but these are only a small portion of the whole; see: MOL, MS-Szentiványi.

and that in most cases the files are arranged by countries and themes, or simply batched loosely together, made research in the MOL a time-consuming process. Due to these difficulties, and in an attempt to fill the gaps in the availability of archival materials, it was important to inspect not solely the correspondence between Budapest and London, but also the reports about Britain's relationship with Hungary's neighbours. Although the Hungarian Foreign Ministry applied the same minuting method as the Foreign Office, the surviving Anglo-Hungarian files bear only a very limited number of minutes. This obviously made it very difficult to disentangle Hungary's policy towards Britain and to reveal how British policy influenced Hungarian actions and tactics, and territorial claims in particular.

However, the diaries of György Barcza, Hungarian minister in London (1938-41) bridge some of these large gaps. So far historians have only analysed Barcza's memoirs.⁴⁶ This study is the first analysis of the diaries.⁴⁷ The diaries are held at the Hoover Institution Archives (HIA) in the United States, where they are organised in 12 large boxes. Barcza rigorously kept his diaries on a daily basis. Their value as historical evidence is incomparable to the memoirs which were written only in the 1950s. Moreover, the diaries are lengthier, and they reveal a great deal more of Barcza's activities in London. They give unique insights into Barcza's attempts to maintain the Anglo-Hungarian relationship, and shed fresh light on the Foreign Office attitude towards Hungary and also Hungarian policy towards Britain. The diaries also illuminate how Barcza was often defiant both towards the Foreign Office and Budapest, and often undertook secret initiatives. The diaries were used to discover Barcza's views on the Hungarian territorial problem, and how he represented the question at the Foreign

⁴⁶ Barcza, *Diplomataemlékeim*, 2 vols.; P. Pritz, 'Barcza György visszaadja a "kölcönt" Bárdossy Lászlónak' in *Tanulmányok a 60 éves Romsics Ignác Tiszteletére*, ed. by P. Pritz (Eger, 2011), pp. 246-262; P. Pritz, 'Barcza György két arca – emlékirata és jelentései tükrében' in *Pártok, politika, történelem. Tanulmányok Vida István egyetemi tanár 70. születésnapjára*, ed. by P. Pritz (Budapest, 2010), pp. 305-319; P. Pritz, 'Emlékirat és történeti valóság. Barcza György emlékiratai fényében. Londoni évek I.' in *Nemzetek és birodalmak. Diószegi István 80 éves*, ed. P. Pritz (Budapest, 2010), pp. 547-560; P. Pritz, 'Emlékirat és történeti valóság. Barcza György emlékiratai fényében. Londoni évek II.' in *Emlékkönyv L. Nagy Zsuzsa 80. Születésnapjára*, ed. by Z. Kovács and L. Püski (Debrecen, 2010), pp. 303-313; P. Pritz, 'Búcsú Londontól – Barcza György Magyar királyi követ utolsó hetei Angliában', *Kommentár* 34 (2010), pp. 24-36; P. Pritz, 'Emlékirat és történeti valóság. Barcza György emlékiratai fényében. Londoni évek III.' in *Európa, nemzet, külpolitika. Tanulmányok Ádám Magda 85. születésnapjára*, ed. by P. Pritz (Budapest, 2010), pp. 197-210.

⁴⁷ A short preliminary analysis of the diaries was made by András Bán, who translated and annotated a selection of the diary entries: A. D. Bán, 'Naplórészletek, 1938-1944, Barcza György', *2000* 26 (1996), pp. 37-54.

Office and attempted to influence British policy. There are also significant differences between the entries of his diaries on the one hand, and his memoirs and diplomatic dispatches to Budapest on the other, therefore special attention will be placed demonstrating these contrasts and disentangling the reasons behind them.

In terms of private papers, the papers of the historian, Carlile Aylmer Macartney (PCAM) in the Bodleian Library of Oxford (BLOU) have been scrutinised by many scholars, mostly interested in the academic spat between Macartney and R. W. Seton-Watson, Macartney's views on Trianon, Hungarian revisionism, and Macartney's views on the post-war shape of Central Europe.⁴⁸ Macartney's papers still offer interesting opportunities for researching frontier questions in Central Europe in the inter-war years and the Second World War. His papers elucidate the early stages of British post-war planning (1940-41), an aspect much overshadowed by the analysis of the final form of British peace plans, which crystallised only by 1942-43. For a study which analyses the formulation of British foreign policy, the understanding of this initial stage is pivotal. The most interesting part of the Macartney papers is his academic and personal correspondence. Macartney knew some of the leading political figures personally, both in Britain and Hungary, and he was on friendly terms with members of the Hungarian elite.⁴⁹ Our ambition was to find evidence for contacts between Macartney and the Foreign Office in the 1930s and 1940s. Unfortunately we have found little evidence for regular contacts between Macartney and Whitehall in the Macartney papers. A limited part of this official correspondence is however available in the TNA.

The transcripts of Macartney's Hungarian talks in the BBC Written Archives Centre (BBC-WAC) were also consulted. These broadcasts have been analysed by Ágnes Beretzky, but the role these broadcasts played in British propaganda towards

⁴⁸ Ambrus Miskolczy, László Péter and Ágnes Beretzky have compared the views of Macartney and Seton-Watson on the problems of Hungarian frontier revision and the situation of the Magyar minorities: A. Miskolczy, 'Barát, vagy ellenség? R.W. Seton-Watson és Macartney', *Holmi* 10 (1994), pp. 1502-1512; L. Peter, 'The political conflict between R.W. Seton-Watson and C.A. Macartney over Hungary' in *British-Hungarian relations since 1848* (London, 2004), pp. 167-192; Á. Beretzky, *Scotus Viator és Macartney Elemér: Magyarország-kép változó előjelekkel (1906-1945)* (Budapest, 2005).

⁴⁹ Robert Evans has reviewed Macartney's correspondence related to the writing of Macartney's history of inter-war Hungary: C. A. Macartney, *October Fifteen. The History of Modern Hungary 1929-1945* (Edinburgh, 1957); R. J. W. Evans, 'The Making of October Fifteenth: C. A. Macartney and his Correspondents' in *British-Hungarian relations since 1848* (London 2005), pp. 259-270.

Hungary is still unclear.⁵⁰ The territorial aspect was a regular theme of these talks. Comparing these to the under-researched files of the PID on political propaganda towards Hungary offers an interesting insight into the British opinion and the Hungarian territorial question.

The papers of R. W. Seton-Watson (SEW) in the School of Slavonic and Eastern European Studies Library (SSEES) in London were also consulted for this study. On numerous occasions in the late 1930s and 40s Seton-Watson attempted to convince Whitehall that returning to the Versailles status quo was the only sensible solution. Seton-Watson however was not as influential then, as earlier in the era of the First World War. His failure to affect policy helps in demonstrating the contrast between British policy after the First World War and British principles for peace-making in the 1940s.

In the middle of the 20th century press reports were a crucial source of information both for the public and policy-makers. As will be demonstrated, Whitehall often had to rely on press information in formulating opinion about Hungarian questions. In terms of newspapers, this thesis examines the tone of the British quality press about the Hungarian territorial question and traces the influences on press editors. The Hungarian Legation in London rigorously collected British articles about Hungary, and made a monthly analysis of the image of Hungary in Britain. These reports admit that Budapest made relentless efforts to influence the tone of the British press. We are also investigating how far Whitehall attempted to influence the tone on Hungarian questions in the British press, which will demonstrate the aims of British policy, and the image of Hungary Whitehall aimed to project to the British public. We have already noted that non-experts had limited background information on the Hungarian question; therefore it will be important to determine the sources of distinctly pro and anti-revisionist articles, as these showed the marks of external influences.

⁵⁰ Á Beretzky, 'C. A. Macartney. A Devoted and Frustrated Friend of Hungary (1939-1945). Service in the Foreign Office and the BBC' in *British-Hungarian relations since 1848*, ed. by L. Peter, M. Rady (London, 2005), pp. 237-246.

1. 5. Historiographical survey:

1. 5. 1. British historiography and the image of Hungary in Britain

British historians in the 19th and 20th century rarely saw Hungary independently. As part of the Habsburg Monarchy, Hungary had been viewed within the German sphere of influence. After Versailles, most scholars accepted that the liberation of the suppressed nationalities of Austria-Hungary, the Russian and the Ottoman Empires, and the creation of a New Europe based on the independence of national states served justice in the region. Trianon Hungary was viewed in this context.

The 1848-49 Hungarian revolutions against Habsburg supremacy propelled British interest in Hungary, and until the Compromise the cause of Hungarian independence ensured British sympathy.⁵¹ After 1867 the situation largely changed. Hungary became recognised as a separate polity. The nationality question however was not viewed as a pressing political issue by the British, who viewed Hungary under firm Magyar control.⁵² A popular Orientalist in Britain, Ármin Vámbéry, presented a romanticised view of Hungary in his synthesis of Hungarian history.⁵³ The centre of his argument was that Hungarian heroism guarded the West for centuries from the 'barbarism of the East'. Until the early 20th century these works determined British perceptions on Hungary, which was sympathetic towards Magyar rule.

At the beginning of the 20th century W. B. Forster Bovill emphasized the viability of the peaceful coexistence of Hungarians and other nationalities, while Gyula Andrassy and Elemér Hantos pointed to the constitutional parallels between Britain and Hungary.⁵⁴ Their studies however were overshadowed by the fierce critiques of dualism and Magyarization. R. W. Seton-Watson and Wickham Steed sharply criticised the

⁵¹ The Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 established the dual monarchy of Austria-Hungary. It re-established the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Hungary, separating it from the Austrian Empire.

⁵² For example Arthur J. Patterson justified the confidence and supremacy of Magyars with their historic rule in the Carpathian basin over other nationalities: A. J. Patterson, *The Magyars: Their Country and Institutions*, 2 vols. (London, 1869).

⁵³ Á. Vámbéry, *Hungary in Ancient, Medieval and Modern Times* (London, 1886).

⁵⁴ W. B. Forster Bovill, *Hungary and the Hungarians* (London, 1908); J. (Gyula) Andrassy, *The Development of the Hungarian Constitutional Liberty* (London, 1908); E. Hantos, *The Magna Carta of the English and the Hungarian Constitution* (London, 1904).

social anachronism and the ethnic intolerance of the Monarchy and Hungary.⁵⁵

According to Robert Evans, these studies enjoyed huge popularity in Britain, and they substantially influenced Foreign Office opinion.⁵⁶ More importantly, these books largely determined the perception of policy-makers about Hungarian questions in the inter-war years. In contrast, Hungarian revisionist propaganda was hitting hopelessly outdated tones attempting to score points in London by reiterating the constitutional and social similarities between Britain and Hungary.⁵⁷ Trianon was viewed by London as a step in the national development of the nationalities of Hungary; therefore the Hungarian argument, which used historical precedences for explaining present claims, was essentially judged unjust by London. The studies of Seton-Watson in the 1930s on the history of Czechs, Slovaks, and Romanians were acclaimed in Britain, which attested that the nationalities of Hungary were claiming their own future in Europe.⁵⁸

Between the wars, the question of Hungary was very much associated with the works of Seton-Watson and Macartney. In 1934 both historians expressed their views on the question of treaty revision. Seton-Watson opposed any radical adjustment, and argued that the ultimate aim was the reconciliation of the nations of the region by reducing the importance of frontiers and by perfecting the machinery of minority protection.⁵⁹ By contrast, in 1934 Macartney underscored the geographical coherence of pre-Trianon Hungary.⁶⁰ The conflict between the two historians dated from this time. By 1937 Macartney had polished his viewpoint. His analysis of the consequences of the treaty of Trianon was still the antithesis of Seton-Watson,⁶¹ but Macartney left the idea of the integral restoration of Greater Hungary behind, and instead argued for frontier adjustment in order to strengthen regional stability. In the late 1930s the Foreign Office

⁵⁵ See particularly: Seton-Watson, *Racial Problems in Hungary*; Idem, *German, Slav, and Magyar: A Study in the Origins, of the Great War*; Steed, *The Habsburg Monarchy*. On the effect of these studies on British public and official opinion; see: H. and C. Seton-Watson, *The Making of a New Europe*, pp. 41-44.

⁵⁶ R. J. W. Evans, 'Hungary's position in British historiography' in *Das Ungarnbild der deutschen Historiographie*, ed. by M. Fata (Stuttgart, 2004), pp. 110-125 (p. 118).

⁵⁷ Zeidler, *A revíziós gondolat*, pp. 94-95.

⁵⁸ Evans, 'Hungary's position in British historiography', p. 120. See: R. W. Seton-Watson, *A History of The Roumanians* (London, 1934); Idem, *A History of The Czechs And Slovaks* (London, 1943).

⁵⁹ R. W. Seton-Watson, 'The Problem of Treaty Revision and the Hungarian Frontiers', *International Affairs* 52 (1933), pp. 481-503; R. W. Seton-Watson, *Treaty Revisions and the Hungarian Frontiers* (London, 1934), pp. 53-59, 69-70.

⁶⁰ C. A. Macartney, *Hungary* (London, 1934).

⁶¹ C. A. Macartney, *Hungary and Her Successors. The Treaty of Trianon and its Consequences 1919-1937* (London, 1937).

often used this work as a reference book for Hungarian questions, but after the outbreak of the war it became forgotten.

In the 1920s, the consequences of the Versailles treaties for Central Europe sparked mixed emotions in Britain. The forerunner of critics was John Maynard Keynes, who argued that the European economy could not prosper without an effective and integrated economic system, which the peace treaties were unable to provide.⁶² The new territorial order was also vehemently criticised.⁶³ Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett, a British war correspondent, who, along with Hungarian right-wing officers, fought the Bolshevik regime of Béla Kun in 1919, sharply condemned the dismemberment of Hungary, as he believed that the successor states were too weak to protect themselves alone.⁶⁴ Sir Charles Cunningham, the former editor of the *Daily Chronicle* visited Hungary and Slovakia in 1930 and recommended frontier revision, but because his contacts were mostly Magyars, his account is heavily biased towards Hungary.⁶⁵ In the early 1930s a 'Friends of Hungary' group was formed in the House of Commons. They were mostly back-benchers, and the membership constantly fluctuated. The most prominent member, Sir Robert Gower, a Labour MP, published two books on the conditions of the Magyar minorities and the territorial consequences of Trianon.⁶⁶ Gower, along with other members of the group, was lavishly entertained in Hungary on several occasions; hence his account, just like those of Ashmead-Bartlett and Cunningham, is tendentiously pro-Hungarian. These books made no impact on the Foreign Office, and did not enjoy much publicity, unlike the enthralling narratives of British travellers to Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia: Cecil Street's popular travelogue, *East of Prague* depicted a journey from Germany to Ruthenia. Street described the Czechs and Slovaks as clear-sighted heroes, but pictured the Germans and Hungarians as untrustworthy, and put their irredentist aims in a very negative

⁶² J. M. Keynes, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* (London, 1919), pp. 129-144. Keynes' analysis, which became a bestseller in both Britain and the United States, had a significant influence on British public opinion and official policy. The perception that Germany had been treated unfairly and that as a consequence the peace treaties needed revision largely rooted in Keynes' thesis.

⁶³ For the attitude of British historians towards the Versailles peace settlement; see: C. A. Cline, 'British Historians and the Treaty of Versailles', *Albion* 20 (1988) pp. 43-58.

⁶⁴ A. E. Bartlett, *The Tragedy of Central Europe* (London, 1923).

⁶⁵ C. Cunningham, *What I saw in Hungary* (London, 1931).

⁶⁶ Gower, *Treaty-revision and the Hungarian Frontiers*; Idem, *The Hungarian Minorities in the Successor States*.

perspective.⁶⁷ Moreover, Street's pamphlet, *Slovakia: Past and Present* dismissed Hungarian revisionism and similarly contrasted Slovaks and Hungarians by stressing that the Slovaks were less advanced only because of the 900 year long Magyar rule.⁶⁸

According to Andrea Orzoff, these books on Czechoslovakia, and *That Blue Danube, Roumanian Journey* and particularly *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon* significantly reinforced British sympathies towards Czechs, Slovaks, Romanians and Yugoslavs in Britain in the 1930s and 40s.⁶⁹ Family ties between the Romanian and British royal families further strengthened these feelings. For instance, the memoirs of Marie, the Queen of Romania and cousin of Queen Victoria, enjoyed great popularity in Britain.⁷⁰ It is not difficult to perceive that books about Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia were more popular than publications about the defeated Hungary. In the Great War these countries were fighting for their independence, they were viewed by the British public as allies and they were the pillars of the Versailles system in Central Europe. It is therefore more useful to determine why accounts of Hungary were received with suspicion both by the public and policy-makers.

In her travel journals, Sylvia Stevenson noted that since the Great War the British public perceived Hungary as part of the German sphere by its own choice. Besides, she emphasized that it was a deeply held belief that Hungary was feudal, autarchic and repressed its nationalities; therefore Trianon was the righteous remedy.⁷¹ Regardless of the sympathies towards Czechs, Romanians and Yugoslavs, popular British culture continued thinking in stereotypes; the entire Central European and Balkan region was viewed as a mystic Orient, full of strange and uncivilised character.⁷² We aim to demonstrate to what extent these books and pamphlets affected the opinion of key officials in Whitehall. The question then arises as to whether popular perception towards the region was significantly different from the views of British policy-makers.

⁶⁷ C. J. C. Street, *East of Prague* (London, 1924).

⁶⁸ C. J. C. Street, *Slovakia: Past and Present* (London, n.d.).

⁶⁹ Orzoff, *Battle for the Castle*, pp. 148-149; J. D. E. Evans, *That Blue Danube* (London, 1935); S. Sitwell, *Roumanian Journey* (London, 1938); R. West, *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon* (London, 1941).

⁷⁰ T. Frank, 'Luring the English-Speaking World: Hungarian History Diverted', *Slavonic and East European Review* 69 (1991), pp. 60-80 (p. 62); see: Marie, Queen of Romania, *The Story of My Life* (New York, 1934).

⁷¹ Stevenson, *Ride to Battle*, pp. 16-17.

⁷² Agatha Christie's *The Secret of Chimneys* presented the image of an imaginary Balkan state, 'Herczegoslovakia', whose inhabitants were the most uncivilised people: A. Christie, *The Secret of Chimneys* (London, 1924).

András Bán has emphasized that compared to this, the publication of Hungarian literature in the English-language, such as Kosztolányi's *Nero*, Imre Madách's play *The Tragedy of Man* in 1933, or Frigyes Karinthy's autobiographical *Journey Around my Skull* in 1939, were all flashes in the pan.⁷³

Hitler's accession to power disturbed British historians, who being concerned about its implications for British interests, became interested in the security and future of Central Europe.⁷⁴ Before the outbreak of the Second World War a number of British historians warned that the consequence of British passivity in Central Europe would encourage German penetration, which would negatively affect British imperial strategy. These predictions identified the Hungarian question as a destabilizing factor, but a solution to the problem was not offered.⁷⁵ During the war the most influential scholarly work of the Danube region appeared from the pen of A. J. P. Taylor. His study of the Habsburg Monarchy, similar to most of the anglophone histories of the era, largely ignored the Hungarian question, but his claim that the Monarchy had sunk to the status of a German vassal by 1918, reinforced British perception that its resuscitation would be a mistake.⁷⁶ During the Second World War several scholars and publicists criticised British foreign policy during the 1930s. They mostly blamed the war on the missed opportunity confronting Germany in Central Europe. They however considered the territorial ambitions of Hungary as only a secondary issue.⁷⁷

⁷³ A. D. Bán, 'Friends of England: Cultural and Political Sympathies on the Eve of the War', *Hungarian Quarterly* 153 (1999), pp. 23-35.

⁷⁴ Gerhard Schacher discussed the economic alternatives of the area. He favoured the Little Entente as the basis for the economic organization of the Danubian countries. His book had a strong anti-German and anti-Hungarian bias: G. Schacher, *Central Europe and the Western World* (London, 1936). William O' Molony studied the nationality problems arising out of the peace and minority treaties. Interestingly, his discussion is not ethnocentric. He emphasized the demographic consequences of the collapse of Austria-Hungary pointing out the implications of demographic losses and gains for Austria, Hungary and the successor states. This method might seem limited and outdated, but it reflects that between the wars the ethnocentric perspective was only one of the several methods under consideration: W. O' Molony, *Nationality and the Peace Treaties* (London, 1934). Robert MacHray examined various alternatives for regional cooperation. Although he also favoured the Little Entente, he pointed out that regional antagonisms limited its purpose for policing the region: R. MacHray, *The Struggle for the Danube and the Little Entente, 1929-1938* (London, 1938).

⁷⁵ E. H. Carr, *Britain: A Study of Foreign Policy from the Versailles Treaty to the outbreak of War* (London, 1939); R. W. Seton-Watson, *From Munich to Danzig* (London, 1939); E. Wiskemann, *Prelude to War* (London, 1939).

⁷⁶ A. J. P. Taylor, *The Habsburg Monarchy* (London, 1941), pp. 268-269.

⁷⁷ E. Wiskemann, *Undeclared War* (London, 1939); Ibem, *Prelude to War*. Cato, *Guilty Men* (London, 1941).

After the war, the descent of the 'Iron Curtain' on Europe overshadowed British scholarly interest in inter-war Hungary. Because interest mostly came from a small number of specialists, it is difficult to systematise British historiography about Hungary, or to identify clear trends. British historians intensely debated the reasons for appeasement, the role of continental commitment in British pre-war strategy, the pace of rearmament before the war, Anglo-German rivalry, and the disintegration of the British Empire. A history of inter-war Hungary, and beyond, appeared from Macartney in 1957.⁷⁸ Although some of its conclusions are now considered out-dated, and Macartney hit a distinctly pro-Hungarian tone, it is still indispensable, because some of the papers and testimonies of contemporaries were only available to Macartney. For a long time, Macartney's monumental study was a solitary monograph on Hungary in the English language.⁷⁹

Questions about Central Europe were mostly raised in these contexts, and the Anglo-Hungarian relationship, or British policy towards Central European territorial disputes did not form the subject of independent inquiries.⁸⁰ Our aim is to demonstrate that post-war British historiography unduly neglected the Hungarian question, which had important implications for British Central European and Balkans policy. In the discourse over the reasons for appeasement, focus usually did not go beyond whether Chamberlain had offered Hitler a sphere of influence in Central Europe in order to gain time to rearm. R. A. C. Parker denied that Chamberlain offered Hitler a free hand in Central Europe, while Clement Leibovitz and Vít Smetana have argued that Chamberlain used Central Europe to bargain with Hitler over more important global issues, such as world trade, raw materials and the question of the return of German

⁷⁸ C. A. Macartney, *October Fifteen*.

⁷⁹ A History of Hungary appeared from Ervin Pamlényi in 1973. Due to the fact that this analysis is a translation from Hungarian, which originally appeared in the 1970s in Hungary, it has a strong mark of Marxist approach on its view-point towards Hungarian revisionism; it condemned Hungary for threatening inter-war peace. The study analysed Anglo-Hungarian relationship only to a very limited extent: *A History of Hungary*, ed. by E. Pamlényi (New York, 1973).

⁸⁰ See particularly: M. Howard, *The Continental Commitment: The Dilemma of British Defence Policy in the Era of the Two World Wars* (London, 1972); D. Kaiser, *Economic Diplomacy and the Origins of the Second World War: Germany, Britain, France and Eastern Europe, 1930-1939* (Trenton, 1980); G. C. Peden, 'The Burden of Imperial Defense and the Continental Commitment Reconsidered', *The Historical Journal*, 110 (1984), pp. 405-423.; B. Correlli, *The Collapse of British Power* (London, 1984); G. Schmidt, *The Politics and Economics of Appeasement* (Leamington, 1986); A. J. Prazmowska, *Britain, Poland and the Eastern Front, 1939* (Cambridge, 2004).

colonies.⁸¹ David Gillard's recent study of appeasement and Central Europe has demonstrated the relative insignificance of the Danube region in British strategy, but his wide scope has failed to note that Central European territorial disputes, including the Hungarian question, presented significant complications for British regional policy.⁸² An analysis of British policy towards South East Europe and Hungary appeared from Elisabeth Barker. Barker's analysis lacks the comparative approach, as she missed demonstrating how London's relationship with one country affected policy towards another. This study argues that such a perspective is essential for understanding of British policy towards Hungary.⁸³

After 1945 numerous diaries and memoirs were published by British policy-makers. In most cases these are very tight-lipped about Central Europe, the Anglo-Hungarian relationship and territorial and minority questions. Senior Foreign Office officials, such as Cadogan, Roberts and Vansittart, who were dealing with the Hungarian question on a regular basis, considered the 'Hungarian problem' as an irritating by-product of the German question, and labelled Hungarian revisionism hopelessly unrealistic and ethnographically unjust.⁸⁴ Foreign Secretaries and other government ministers also thought about Central Europe as an essentially German issue, and only mentioned Hungary over aspects specific to the writer of the memoirs.⁸⁵ Also, in the memoirs of other British politicians or diplomats Hungary is no more than a passing reference.⁸⁶ What is more surprising is that authors and politicians, who were

⁸¹ R. A. C. Parker, *Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War* (London, 1993), pp. 128-169; C. Leibovitz, *The Chamberlain-Hitler deal* (London, 1993); V. Smetana, *In the Shadow of Munich: British Policy towards Czechoslovakia from the Endorsement to the Renunciation of the Munich Agreement (1938-1942)* (Prague, 2008), pp. 41-43. The historiography on appeasement is obviously significantly greater. Our intention here is to demonstrate the main tendencies, and the extremes of opinion regarding the role of Central Europe in appeasement. A brief, but very useful summary of the historiography of appeasement has recently been given by: D. Hucker, *Public Opinion and the End of Appeasement in Britain and France* (Farnham, 2011), pp. 7-12.

⁸² D. Gillard, *Appeasement in Crisis, From Munich to Prague, October 1938-March 1939* (London, 2007).

⁸³ Barker, *British policy towards South-East Europe*.

⁸⁴ *The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan*, ed. by Dilks; F. Roberts, *Dealing with Dictators*; Vansittart, *The Mist Procession* (London, 1958). The author and politician, Harold Nicolson expressed similar views in his diaries: *H. Nicolson, Diaries and letters 1930-1939*, ed. by N. Nicolson (London, 1967). The recollections of Frank Roberts appeared much later, but his similar tone shows that the approach did not change.

⁸⁵ Halifax, *Fullness of Days*; Eden, *The Eden Memoirs: The Reckoning*; H. Dalton, *The Fateful Years: Memoires 1931-1945* (London, 1957).

⁸⁶ For example: B. Lockhart, *Guns or Butter. War countries and peace countries of Europe revisited* (London, 1938); Simon, Viscount, *Retrospect* (London, 1952); *The Diaries of Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart*, 2 vols. ed. by K. Young (London, 1973, 1980); J. Colville, *The Fringes of Power: Downing Street Diaries*

interested in Hungary hardly mentioned Hungary at all. Henry James Bruce, the head of the Hungarian section of the Ministry of Information, or Thomas Hohler, British minister in Hungary after the Great War, revealed nothing about their activities in the 1920s, 30s and 40s to influence London towards a pro-Hungarian policy.⁸⁷ Owen O'Malley similarly dedicated only ten pages to his years in Budapest in his memoirs.⁸⁸ The fact that Hungary occupied an insignificant place in personal recollections indicates that it was rarely the major concern of British policy-makers. However, the tone of the memoirs is a good indication of these key players' outlook.

Since the 1980s and 1990s, the English-language historiography has become more forward on Hungary's role in the international history of the era. Thomas Sakmyster studied Hungary's balancing acts between the great powers in the 1930s.⁸⁹ As we have noted, Gábor Bátonyi's study of British policy towards Central Europe is an important analysis, as for the first time, it has provided a comprehensive and comparative analysis of British attitudes towards Czechoslovakia, Austria and Hungary.⁹⁰ In 2004, some of the most distinguished exponents of the history of Hungary gathered at a conference at the School of Slavonic and Eastern European Studies. Questions, such as British opinions about Hungarian revisionism in the 1930s, British propaganda towards Hungary during the war, and Churchill's and Eden's image of Hungary were discussed.⁹¹ This study picks up the thread of Gábor Bátonyi's analysis of Hungarian revisionism in 1938 and demonstrates that Hungarian territorial aspirations affected the Anglo-Hungarian relationship in later years just as critically as in the inter-war period. Recently, Tibor Frank and Éva Haraszti-Taylor have enriched our understanding of the Anglo-Hungarian relationship by focusing not on political relations, but on cultural contacts and the image of Hungary in Britain.⁹² The past

1939-1945 (London, 1985); N. Chamberlain, *The Struggle for Peace* (London, 1939); *The Diplomatic Diaries of Oliver Harvey 1937-1940*, ed. by J. Harvey (London, 1970).

⁸⁷ H. J. Bruce, *Silken Dalliance* (London, 1947); H. J. Bruce, *Thirty Dozen Moons* (London, 1949); T. Hohler, *Diplomatic Petrel* (London, 1942).

⁸⁸ O. St. C. O'Malley, *The Phantom Caravan* (London, 1954).

⁸⁹ T. L. Sakmyster, *Hungary, the Great Powers and the Danubian Crisis 1936-1939* (Athens, 1980).

⁹⁰ Bátonyi, *Britain and Central Europe*.

⁹¹ Bátonyi, 'British foreign policy and the problem of Hungarian revisionism in the 1930s', pp. 205-216; Beretzky, 'C. A. Macartney. A Devoted and Frustrated Friend of Hungary (1939-1945)', pp. 237-246; Peter, 'The political conflict between R.W. Seton-Watson and C.A. Macartney over Hungary', pp. 167-192; Lojkó, 'Churchill, Eden and Hungary' in *British-Hungarian relations*, pp. 217-236.

⁹² T. Frank, 'Luring the English speaking World: Hungarian History Diverted', pp. 60-80; T. Frank, 'Editing as Politics: József Balogh and the Hungarian Quarterly', *The Hungarian Quarterly* 129 (1993), pp. 5-13; T.

decade has seen a considerable expansion in the historiography too. This has adjusted the historiography by rethinking overdrawn perceptions, such as the image of Hungary as a German satellite, but they have not brought forward considerable achievements in the study of Anglo-Hungarian relationship.⁹³

The concept that the Anglo-Hungarian relationship cannot be viewed in isolation is central to my research. For this reason, studies of British policy toward other Central European and Balkan countries were also used.⁹⁴ Mention finally has to be made of general studies and document collections which have also influenced this work. E. H. Carr's study of international relations in the inter-war years is still a valuable survey by an insightful witness. Carr criticized heavily the utopian theories of the peace-makers.⁹⁵ Zara Steiner's two monumental analyses of international relations between the wars were invaluable, most importantly, because similarly to Palmer and Macartney in their study of Central Europe in the inter-war period, she has tried to measure the impact of regional antagonism on the security of Europe.⁹⁶ Anita Prazmowska's study of the Central European origins of the Second World War has also highlighted the devastating impact of territorial disputes on the security of the region, but the Hungarian part of her

Frank, 'Magyarország a brit politikai gondolkodásban 1919–1945', *Limes* 38 (2008), pp. 45-57; É.

Haraszti-Taylor, 'In Memoriam of Georges Buday and the PWE's Clandestine Hungarian Petőfi Radio' in *Scribble, scribble, scribble - historical essays, documents, reviews and personal reflections on Britain and Hungary*, ed. by É. Haraszti Taylor (Nottingham, 2001), pp. 123-130.

⁹³ See particularly: C. D. Eby, *Hungary at War: Civilians and Soldiers in World War II* (State College, 1998); D. S. Cornelius, *Hungary in World War II, Caught in the Cauldron* (Fordham, 2011); see also: L. Kontler, *A History of Hungary: Millennium in Central Europe* (London, 2002); B. Carthledge, *The Will to Survive: A History of Hungary* (London, 2011).

⁹⁴ Most importantly: A. M. Cienciala, *Poland and the Western Powers 1938-1939: a study in the interdependence of Eastern and Western Europe* (London, 1968); M. Cornwall, 'The rise and fall of a 'special relationship': Britain and Czechoslovakia, 1930-1948, in *What Difference did the War Make?*, ed. by B. Brivati and H. Jones (Leicester, 1993), pp. 130-150; R. J. W. Evans, *Great Britain and East-Central Europe, 1908-48. A Study in Perceptions* (London, 2002); Evans, 'Hungary's position in British historiography', pp. 110-125; R. J. W. Evans, 'The Successor States', in *Twisted Paths: Europe 1914-1945*, ed. by R. Gerwarth (Oxford, 2007), pp. 210-36; R. Denniston, *Churchill's Secret War: Diplomatic Decrypts, the Foreign Office and Turkey 1942-44* (London, 2009); R. Haynes, *Romanian Policy towards Germany, 1936-40* (London, 2000); J. B. Hoptner, *Yugoslavia in Crisis 1934-1941* (New York, 1962); D. B. Lungu, *Romania and the Great Powers, 1933-1940* (Durham, 1989); V. Smetana, *In the Shadow of Munich*.

⁹⁵ E. H. Carr, *International Relations Between the Two World Wars, 1919-1939* (London, 1947). Carr's study was criticised by: C. Jones, *E. W. Carr and International Relations: A Duty to Lie* (Cambridge, 1998). The other valuable analysis of British attitude towards revisionism as a European problem is: A. Lentin, *Lloyd George and the Lost Peace: From Versailles to Hitler, 1919-1940* (Basingstoke, 2001).

⁹⁶ Z. Steiner, *The Lights that Failed: European International History 1919-1933* (Oxford, 2007); Idem, *The Triumph of the Dark, European International History, 1933-1939* (Oxford, 2011); C. A. Macartney and A. W. Palmer, *Independent Eastern Europe* (London, 1962).

analysis is very sketchy.⁹⁷ The most important British, German, Italian and Hungarian diplomatic documents have been published in annotated volumes in the course of the decades after the war. These have helped in identifying the foreign political priorities of countries.⁹⁸

⁹⁷ A. J. Prazmowska, *Eastern Europe and the Origins of the Second World War* (London, 2000).

⁹⁸ *Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939* (DBFP), ser. 3, vols. 3-5, ed. by E. L. Woodward et al (London, vol. 3: 1950; vol. 4: 1951; vol. 5: 1952); *Documents on German Foreign Policy* (DGFP), ser. D, vols. 7-12, ed. by P. R. Sweet et al (Washington, 1954); *I documenti diplomatici italiani* (DDI) (Ottavo serie: 1935–1939) vol. 8-11, ed. by G. Andre (Rome, 2007); *Diplomáciai iratok Magyarország külpolitikájához 1936-1945* (DIMK), 5 vols., ed. by M. Ádám, L. Kerekes and L. Zsigmond, (Budapest 1965-1982).

1.5.2. Hungarian historiography

Hungarian historiography needs a separate analysis from the British, mainly because of the differences in focus. Here, we aim to demonstrate the effects of Trianon on Hungarian historiography and revisionism, as well as highlighting how historians in the different political eras of the 20th century viewed the problem of Hungary's frontiers. Hungarian historians were politically and ideologically influenced and controlled both during the Horthy era and the communist decades, and at the same time were significantly coloured by the social and economic turmoils of the century.

In the dualist era the nationality question was an important political and public topic of discussion in Hungary. Hungarian scholars viewed the problem through the prism of Magyar supremacy and the irrefutable territorial integrity of Hungary.⁹⁹ During the Great War, Gyula Szekfű also reinforced the notion of Magyar control over the nationalities.¹⁰⁰ The inter-war Hungarian elite, who were raised, educated and lived most of their lives in the milieu of Magyar dominance, were strongly influenced by these notions, which consequently dominated their attitude towards the question of frontier revision.¹⁰¹ These ideas were contested by Oszkár Jászi in 1918, who recommended the federalization of the Monarchy and Hungary.¹⁰²

The military defeat and the territorial mutilations occurring after the Great War had a profound effect on all aspects of Hungarian life. It did not shatter the concept of Magyar superiority, but mixed it with frustration, anger and denial. Although Ignác Romsics has argued that the historiography of the Horthy era moved away from the earlier romanticisation of the past towards scientific methods, nevertheless it is crucial to point out that the traumas at the end of the Great War considerably distorted the interpretations of the immediate past.¹⁰³ We have to differentiate two dimensions in the

⁹⁹ Ignác Acsárdy's verbose study of the Hungarian Empire is the touchstone of these limitations: I. Acsárdy, *A magyar birodalom története*, 2 vols. (Budapest, 1904). Lóránt Tilkovszky gives a short, but useful summary of Hungary's nationality policy in the early 20th century: L. Tilkovszky, *Nemzetiségi politika Magyarországon a 20. században* (Debrecen, 1998), pp. 3-12.

¹⁰⁰ Gy. Szekfű, *A magyar állam életrajza* (Budapest, 1918).

¹⁰¹ Even though they were careful articulating their opinion, the prime ministers of Hungary between 1938 and 1941, were all certain of the supremacy of the Magyars in the Carpathian basin. They also favoured the complete restoration of the pre-1920 frontiers.

¹⁰² O. Jászi, *A Monarchia jövője. A dualizmus bukása és a Dunai Egyesült Államok* (Budapest, 1918).

¹⁰³ I. Romsics, *Clió bűvöletében*, pp. 310-311.

historiography of this era. Firstly, we are reviewing opinions about Trianon and frontier revision, which can be used to highlight the contrast between British and Hungarian perceptions over the territorial question. Then, materials intended to influence the English speaking world about Hungary will have to be briefly considered.

Studies appearing immediately after the Great War show that notions of Magyar supremacy were mingled with frustration. In 1920, Tibor Joó labelled the repressive Magyarisation as the primary reason for Trianon, but he declared that a return to ethnic tolerance could justify Magyar supremacy again.¹⁰⁴ Gyula Szekfű identified Trianon as the final stage of decline, which he believed to be the result of the uncontrolled influx of nationalities into Hungary.¹⁰⁵ His *Három Nemzedék* is not a historical study, but a conceptualization of the conservative and anti-liberal ideology of the Horthy era, which essentially blamed Trianon on others, namely the nationalities and the West. Others, such as Elemér Mályusz and Ferenc Eckhart, dared to confront these limitations. They emphasized that the heroisation of the past and the concept of state versus religion, culture and language, as nation-forming factors, were outdated.¹⁰⁶ The 1930s witnessed two projects, which both aimed at laying the foundations of a 20th century Hungarian historiography. The *Magyar Történet* of Hóman and Szekfű and the *Egyetemes Történet* both aspired to avoid mingling scholarly work with sentiments, and attempted to understand past centuries on their own terms.¹⁰⁷ Both projects nevertheless viewed Trianon as a national tragedy. It is apparent that the historians of inter-war Hungary pursued new methods, but the proximity of Trianon made objectivity difficult.¹⁰⁸ This emotionally-charged approach is in stark contrast with the pragmatic British attitude towards Trianon, which as we have stressed, essentially judged it as a progress in the struggle of non-Magyar nationalities.

¹⁰⁴ T. Joó, *A magyar nemzeteszme* (Budapest, 1920).

¹⁰⁵ Gy. Szekfű, *Három Nemzedék*.

¹⁰⁶ E. Mályusz, *A népiség története* (Budapest, 1931); F. Eckhart, *Jog és alkotmánytörténet. A magyar történetírás új útjai* (Budapest, n. d. [1929?]).

¹⁰⁷ B. Hóman – Gy. Szekfű, *Magyar Történet*, 5 vols. (Budapest, 1928); B. Iványi-Grünwald, *Egyetemes történet*, 4 vols. (Budapest, 1935). In the wake of the Second World War Szekfű was commissioned to write a short history of Hungary, which aimed to represent the official Hungarian views on territorial issues for an English audience. Szekfű finished the manuscript in Hungarian, but the English translation was never completed: Gy. Szekfű, *Rövid magyar történet 1606-1939* (Budapest, 2002).

¹⁰⁸ Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky a prominent Hungarian politician questioned wider revisionist aims, and advocated only ethnographic revision and the united effort of the Central European states against Germany: K. Vigh, *Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Endre külpolitikai nézeteinek alakulása* (Budapest, 1979), pp. 79-109.

Hungarian revisionist propaganda abroad became active in the late 1920s.¹⁰⁹ With the approval and support of the Hungarian prime minister, István Bethlen (1921-31), a large amount of material appeared in the English language.¹¹⁰ These works tried to acquaint the British and the American elite and public with the injustices of Trianon, but the Hungarian minister in London, Count László Széchenyi (1933-35) reported that both the British public and official policy disliked and discouraged these propaganda activities. The publication of the transcripts of Bethlen's 1933 lectures in Britain aimed at explaining the necessity of frontier revision for European stability, and at the same time contested R. W. Seton-Watson's thesis about the justness of Trianon.¹¹¹ The publication of Seton-Watson's history of Romania, which had a distinctive anti-Hungarian bias, provided the impetus for Bethlen to bring out a 'Hungarian History' in the English and French language.¹¹² Tibor Frank has argued that Bethlen wished to provide a Hungarian national propaganda for the English-speaking world, to counter the distorting mirrors of the Little Entente.¹¹³ Domonkos Kosáry, on the initiative of the later prime minister Pál Teleki, published parts of this project in 1941. Eventually, it proved to be the only publication of the 'Hungarian History' serving propaganda purposes, but reaching a very limited number of readers in Britain.¹¹⁴ Frank has interpreted the failure of the whole undertaking as a clear sign of the non-viability of a pro-Anglo-American political orientation. It is certainly telling that the Foreign Office did not react to the project at all.¹¹⁵

¹⁰⁹ See: I. Bethlen, 'Beszéd Debrecenben Magyarország külpolitikai helyzetéről és a határrevízió szükségességéről (1928)' in *Bethlen István: Válogatott politikai írások és beszédek*, ed. by I. Romsics (Budapest, 2000), pp. 240-251.

¹¹⁰ To name just a few, see: *Justice for Hungary!*, ed. by A. Apponyi (Budapest, 1928); Gy. Lukacs, *Injustices of the Treaty of Trianon* (Budapest, 1928); Hungaricus Viator [M. Fenyő], *The Trianon Treaty and its Consequences* (Budapest, 1929). The work of Ferenc Eckhart represented the Magyar-chauvinist slant: F. Eckhart, *A Short History of the Hungarian People* (London, 1931).

¹¹¹ Count S. Bethlen, *The Treaty of Trianon and European Peace* (London, 1934); R. W. Seton-Watson, *Treaty Revisions and the Hungarian Frontiers* (London, 1934).

¹¹² Seton-Watson, *History of The Roumanians*.

¹¹³ T. Frank, 'Luring the English-Speaking World: Hungarian History Diverted', pp. 63-64. The project eventually failed, due to personal antagonisms between the editors.

¹¹⁴ D. Kosáry, *A History of Hungary* (New York, 1941). See Kosáry's later reflection on the whole enterprise: D. Kosáry, 'The Idea of a Comparative History of East Central Europe: the Story of a Venture' in *Historians as Nation-Builders. Central and South-East Europe*, ed. by D. Deletant and H. Hanak, (Basingstoke, 1988), pp. 124-138.

¹¹⁵ In Britain, in the late 1930s a number of unscholarly works also appeared about Hungary. Similar to the 'Hungarian History', these also failed to make any impact on British official policy. Tersánszky's book was intended for a younger generation: J. E. Tersánszky, *The History of Hungary* (Budapest n. d., [1938?]). Otto Zarek's unscholarly *The History of Hungary* was supported by the Hungarian legation in

After the war, in the shadow of the Soviet Union, unbiased historical discussions were impossible. A Marxist historiographical viewpoint was dictated by the communist party, which labelled Trianon the direct result of the rigid, feudal and autarchic system of the Hungarian Kingdom, which repressed democratic and national developments.¹¹⁶ Revisionism and the foreign policy of Horthy's Hungary were despised to the extent that Marxist historiography proclaimed a complete discontinuity with the past. One of the most significant weaknesses of Hungarian Marxist historiography was that it overstated Hungary's revisionist successes as being due to German and Italian assistance, and steadfastly maintained that the British negative view was the direct consequence of this.¹¹⁷ Although under ideological constraint, valuable works appeared in the so called 'liberalised' communist era about the foreign policy of Hungary,¹¹⁸ and the collapse of Austria-Hungary.¹¹⁹ At the end of the 1970s, the '10 volumes' history of Hungary held Hungarian imperialism and the repression of modern political and social theories as responsible for Trianon.¹²⁰ In the 1970s and 80s valuable works appeared from Gyula Juhász on the Anglo-Hungarian relationship during the war and Hungarian foreign policy, but the scope of these studies were limited.¹²¹

From the 1990s, after the fall of communism, ideological restrictions disappeared. However, a number of sensitive issues remained which divided many. Junctures of the traumatic past, such as Trianon, Hungary's role in the Second World War, frontier revision and Hungary's role in the Holocaust, remained the fault lines

London and the Hungarian Foreign Ministry as propaganda material: O. Zarek, *The History of Hungary* (London, 1939).

¹¹⁶ After the war, the leading Marxist theorist was Erzsébet Andics: E. Andics, *Nemzetiségi kérdés, nemzetiségi politika* (Budapest 1946); Idem, *Fasizmus és reakció Magyarországon* (Budapest, 1946).

¹¹⁷ For example: Andics, *Fasizmus és reakció Magyarországon*, pp. 177-179, 183-185.

¹¹⁸ After the 1956 revolution, and then later from the late 1960s, the tight ideological grip on historiography had somewhat softened. Criticising Trianon, or raising the question of frontier revision remained taboos, but the violent rejection of the Horthy era quietened. Sensitive issues however were buried. For example: Gy. Juhász, *A Teleki-kormány külpolitikája 1939-41* (Budapest, 1964), pp. 177-179, 183-185.

¹¹⁹ Péter Hanák still identified the rigid and feudal characteristic of Hungary as the main reason for Trianon, and disregarded the effects of the Great War: P. Hanák, 'A Monarchia alkonya' in *Magyarország története* vol. 2, ed. by E. Molnár (Budapest, 1964), pp. 270-282.

¹²⁰ J. Galántai and P. Hanák, 'Egy korszak lezárása' in *Magyarország története tíz kötetben*, 10 vols., vol. 10, ed. by P. Hanák et al, pp. 1231-1233.

¹²¹ Gy. Juhász, *Brit-magyar titkos tárgyalások 1943-ban* (Budapest, 1978); Idem, *Magyarország külpolitikája 1919-1945* (Budapest, 1988).

between different social, cultural and political segments of society.¹²² Sensitive historical questions such as Trianon and frontier revision have also often been hijacked for political purposes, which hindered more objective historical analysis. After 1990, there has been an increasing interest in the Anglo-Hungarian relationship. Historians have primarily been interested in the diplomatic and cultural spheres, but far too little attention has been paid to the formulation of British opinions about Hungary and its frontiers.

The diplomatic and cultural aspect was thoroughly examined by András Bán, whose study has been the starting point for this research. Although Bán's study is the most complete analysis of the relationship, it essentially views bilateral relations from the Hungarian perspective, and there is a certain degree of inaccuracy in his analysis of the British decision-making process over Hungarian questions. Our aim has been to remedy these shortcomings and to provide a deeper survey of the causes and effects of British decisions about the Hungarian territorial question.¹²³ Bán also published the documents of the Foreign Research and Press Service (FRPS) on the post-war reconstruction of Central Europe.¹²⁴ Our last chapter provides a valuable background to these documents by introducing the initial phase of British post-war planning about Hungary and Central Europe in 1940-41, a period, which so far has not been analysed. Romsics has also investigated French, British, Italian, German and American official opinions about the Hungarian frontiers in the inter-war period. He accurately demonstrates British official reaction to the territorial gains of Hungary, but

¹²² Krisztián Ungváry has recently examined the Horthy era from the perspective of its social politics and its role in the Holocaust: K. Ungváry, *A Horthy-rendszer mérlege - Diszkrimináció, szociálpolitika és antiszemitizmus Magyarországon* (Budapest, 2012). A similar analysis of the foreign policy of the Horthy era could potentially remove some of the anachronistic Cold War attitudes towards inter-war Hungarian foreign policy, which exaggerated Hungary's role as a German satellite before 1941.

¹²³ A. D. Bán, *Hungarian-British Diplomacy 1938-1941*.

¹²⁴ A. D. Bán, *Pax Britannica, Brit külügyi iratok a második világháború utáni Kelet-Közép-Európáról 1942-1943* (Budapest, 1996). The Foreign Research and Press Service functioned as a government agency from the outbreak of war, to collect data and write foreign press summaries. Until late 1940 it collaborated also in propaganda work, and only started post-war planning thereafter. Distinguished historians, such as Arnold Toynbee, R. W. Seton-Watson, Elisabeth Barker and Macartney worked in the hope to avoid what they saw as the mistakes of the previous war by scanning the past for clues to a better future. For the FRPS, see: J. Baylis, 'British Wartime Thinking about a Post-War European Security Group' *Review of International Studies* 40 (1983), pp. 265-281; R. H. Keyserlingk, 'The Rehabilitation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire: British Post-War Planning in the Second World War', *Hungarian Studies Review* 46 (1986), pp. 63-74, (pp. 65-66); R. H. Keyserling, 'Arnold Toynbee's Foreign Research and Press Service, 1939-43 and Its Post-War Plans for South-East Europe', *Journal of Contemporary History* 88 (1986), pp. 539-558, (p. 541).

concentrates less on the backgrounds and circumstances of decision-making.¹²⁵ Indeed, both Bán's and Romsics' analysis suffer from confusing British official and non-official opinions on Hungary.

The subject of frontier revision has recently been the interest of many in Hungary. Pál Pritz has examined the role of revisionism in inter-war Hungarian foreign policy-making, Tibor Frank has studied the formulation and development of revisionism, while Miklós Zeidler has reviewed its tools and aims.¹²⁶ Also, there has been an increasing amount of literature about Macartney and Seton-Watson. Ágnes Beretzky has summarised their views and their attempts to influence British policy, but her analysis on the 1930s and 1940s is superficial.¹²⁷ András Bán and Miklós Lojkó have also summarised the views of Seton-Watson and Macartney on the future territorial structure of Central Europe respectively.¹²⁸ This thesis brings new evidence forward to clarify in what ways Seton-Watson and Macartney affected British policy-making in the early years of the war.

Others have investigated the Anglo-Hungarian relationship in different inter-war periods. Although these studies do not concentrate on the frontier question, they were very useful for mapping the general trend of Anglo-Hungarian relations after the First World War.¹²⁹ Finally, mention has to be made of general studies of Hungarian foreign policy, which have guided the Hungarian aspect of this research. Romsics' synthesis of 20th century Hungary and his edited volume on Hungarian foreign political thinking

¹²⁵ I. Romsics, 'A brit külpolitika és a „magyar kérdés”, 1914-1946', pp. 34-132.

¹²⁶ P. Pritz, 'Revíziós törekvések a magyar külpolitikában 1920-1935' *Magyar Tudomány* 44 (1979), pp. 272-279; T. Frank, 'A revíziós politika alapvetése', *Filozófiai Szemle* 34 (1980), pp. 931-943; M. Zeidler, *A magyar irredenta kultusz*; Idem, *A revíziós gondolat*.

¹²⁷ Á. Beretzky, *Scotus Viator és Macartney Elemér*. Beretzky also studied Macartney's Hungarian broadcasts in the BBC: Á. Beretzky, 'C. A. Macartney. A Devoted and Frustrated Friend of Hungary (1939-1945), Service in the Foreign Office and the BBC', pp. 237-246.

¹²⁸ A. D. Bán, 'R.W. Seton-Watson and the Hungarian problem in Czechoslovakia, 1919-1938' in *Scotland and the Slavs*, ed. by M. Cornwall and M. Frame (Newtonville, 2001), pp. 127-38; M. Lojkó, 'C. A. Macartney and Central-Europe', *European Review of History* 32 (1999), pp. 37-57.

¹²⁹ L. Arday, 'Magyarország és Nagy-Britannia diplomáciai kapcsolatai' in *Az Egyesült Királyság és Magyarország: Nagy-Britannia és a Magyar-Angol kapcsolatok a 20. században*, ed. by L. Arday (Budapest, 2005), pp. 47-148.; Idem, *Térkép csata után*. Tibor Frank has explored the importance of Hungarian questions in British foreign policy, but he concentrated more on the 1930s, and the part on the 1940s is incomplete: T. Frank, 'Magyarország a brit politikai gondolkodásban 1919-1945', pp. 45-57. See also: M. Lojkó, *British Policy on Hungary, 1918-1919: A Documentary Sourcebook* (London, 1995); Ibid, *Meddling in Middle Europe*.

have been utilised to a great extent.¹³⁰ Pritz's analysis on Hungarian diplomacy and foreign political thinking was also used, as well as his analyses of György Barcza.¹³¹ Although the shadow of Trianon is a dormant issue in contemporary Hungarian society, with the possibility of explosive future implications, Hungarian historiography has moved away from heroic and sentimental notions, and committed itself to a less subjective, emotional approach.¹³²

¹³⁰ I. Romsics, *Magyarország története a XX. században* (Budapest, 2005); Idem, *Trianon és a magyar politikai gondolkodás 1920-1953* (Budapest, 1998). See also: M. Fülöp, P. Sipos, *Magyarország külpolitikája a XX. században* (Budapest, 1998); J. Johancsik, *Magyarország külpolitikája 1918-1999* (Budapest, 2010).

¹³¹ P. Pritz, *Magyar diplomácia a két világháború között* (Budapest, 1995); Ibid, *Magyar külpolitikai gondolkodás a 20. században* (Budapest, 2006); Idem, *Az objektivitás mítosza? Hazánk és a nagyvilág. 20. századi metszetek*, (Budapest, 2011).

¹³² Romanticised, nationalistic and often chauvinistic historical interpretations are gaining popularity in contemporary Hungary. These however are on the periphery of Hungarian historiography.

1. 6. Methodology, the problem of British foreign policy-making and the differences between East and West:

Historians have long been interested in a wide array of aspects of British foreign policy-making, such as the functioning and organisation of the Foreign Office, the role of the British diplomatic service in decision-making, the decision-making process to go to war or the strategic priorities of British imperial policy.¹³³ Studies on British foreign policy towards individual Central European countries have recently appeared, but policy towards Central Europe as a whole between 1938 and 1941 has not been examined.¹³⁴ Such an analysis however provides important benefits. London's relationship with individual states in Central Europe cannot be understood in isolation, precisely because of the existence of interstate territorial disputes, which obviously affected British policy towards the protagonists. Moreover, this approach clarifies the place of Central Europe in British war strategy, which so far has been a thinly researched subject.¹³⁵ It is increasingly difficult to avoid a comparative analysis of British foreign policy towards Austria, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria particularly regarding the territorial disputes of these countries. It helps in answering questions such as whether Britain had a collective policy, based on principles, towards territorial questions, or whether individual problems were viewed on their own merits. It also gives a useful insight into the subject of the small state – large state relationship, a topic

¹³³ See particularly: R. Bullen, *The Foreign Office, 1782-1982* (London, 1984); V. Cromwell, 'The Foreign and Commonwealth Office' in *The Times Survey of the Foreign Ministries of the World*, ed. by Z. Steiner (London, 1982), pp. 541-573; J. Charmley, 'Splendid Isolation to Finest Hour: Britain as a Global Power, 1900-1950' in *The Foreign Office and British Diplomacy in the 20th Century*, ed. by G. Johnson (London, 2005), pp. 130-146; J. Connel, *The 'Office': A study of British foreign policy and its makers, 1919-1951* (London, 1985); D. Dilks, 'The British Foreign Office between the wars', in *Shadow and Substance in British Foreign Policy 1895-1939, Memorial Essays Honoring C. J. Lowe*, ed. by B. J. C. McKercher and D. J. Moss (Edmonton, 1984), pp. 35-54; C. Hill, *Cabinet Decisions on Foreign Policy, October 1938-June 1941* (London, 1991); B. J. C. McKercher, 'The Foreign Office: 1930-1939. Strategy, Permanent Interests and National Security' in *The Foreign Office and British Diplomacy*, ed. by G. Johnson (London, 2005), pp. 87-109; T. Otte, *The Makers of British Foreign Policy: From Pitt to Thatcher* (London, 2001); Z. Steiner, 'The Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Resistance and Adaptation in Changing Times' in *The Foreign Office and British Diplomacy*, G. Johnson (London, 2005), pp. 13-30; G. Warner, 'The Impact of the Second World War upon British Foreign Policy' in *What Difference Did the War Make?*, ed. by B. Brivati and H. Jones (London, 1995), pp. 99-105.

¹³⁴ See particularly: K. Sword, 'British Reactions to the Soviet Occupation of Eastern Poland in September 1939', *Slavonic and East European Review* 182 (1991), pp. 81-101; V. Smetana, *In the Shadow of Munich*; E. McGilvray, *A Military Government in Exile: The Polish Government in Exile 1939-1945, a Study of Discontent* (London, 2010).

¹³⁵ Barker, *British policy towards South-East Europe*.

which has received surprisingly little attention from historians.¹³⁶ This thesis therefore places special attention not only on British opinion about the territorial changes of Hungary between 1938 and 1941, but compares it to British attitudes towards other states of the region.

The other fundamental problem this thesis assesses is how British foreign policy was made towards Hungary. We aim to evaluate to what extent pressure and influence were applied on the Foreign Office on Hungarian questions, and what role these influences made in decision-making. David Dilks has argued that a 'collective opinion' never existed in the Foreign Office, as decisions were the results of debates.¹³⁷ This argument is certainly true for critical questions, such the 'German problem' which affected all aspects of British policy, and therefore triggered intense discussions. Our hypothesis however is that secondary issues, such as the Hungarian territorial problem did not generate considerable discussion and the Foreign Office often had a collective opinion on Hungary, which individuals rarely contested. The question of individual versus collective opinion is directly connected to the problem of debate versus *diktat* in the Foreign Office. It is important to evaluate the level of elbow room senior officials had in deciding policy towards Hungary, and to decide to what extent they carried out, or attempted to curb official policy towards Budapest.¹³⁸

This thesis is also aiming to contribute to other fields by considering under-researched aspects of British Central European policy. There are a number of East-West contrasts which need attention here. For example, control over territory played a significantly more important role in Central Europe and the Balkans than in Britain, where the territory of the state was more enduring. Territorial disputes triggered markedly different collective emotions and political attitudes in these different geographical contexts. In Central Europe national territory was under constant threat

¹³⁶ The subject has been analysed brilliantly by David Vital: *The inequality of states: A study of the small power in international relations* (London, 1967); Iben, *Survival of Small States: Studies in Small Power/Great Power Conflict* (London, 1971).

¹³⁷ D. Dilks, 'The British Foreign Office between the wars', pp. 181-202 (p. 195).

¹³⁸ Anthony Barker and Graham K. Wilson have examined the question of the disobedience of the Foreign Office, but their analysis concentrated on the post-1945 era: A. Barker and G. K. Wilson, 'Whitehall's Disobedient Servants? Senior Officials' Potential Resistance to Ministers in British Government Departments', *British Journal of Political Science* 110 (1997), pp. 223-246. This thesis argues that due to its secondary importance, Hungarian question were often dealt with directly by the Foreign Office without referring the question to the Cabinet. We are keen to demonstrate to what extent the Foreign Office attempted making its own policy towards Hungary in the process.

and frontiers fluctuated frequently. Consequently territorial disputes triggered a more vehement and radical response than in Britain.

The markedly different perceptions about the question of territory and frontiers in Britain and Hungary however are not the only example of the differences in the way of thinking. The British perception of the Hungarian problem cannot be analysed without understanding the fundamental psychological differences between East and West. László Cs. Szabó has noted that the English way of thinking differed considerably from the Hungarian. Szabó stressed that it was typical of Churchill and Halifax, but also of the English in general that they sought to adjust their ideas to circumstances and never vice versa.¹³⁹ As we have noted, the Trianon trauma largely affected Hungarian public and foreign political thought, and policy-making was fundamentally adjusted to this circumstance.

Moreover, Pál Pritz has also pointed out that there were significant differences in the Western and Eastern European perceptions of how far yielding to great power pressure and collaboration was considered acceptable, in order to preserve some sort of independence. Pritz noted that what seemed acceptable and sensible for Budapest was intolerable for the British. Regrettably, he did not bring this interesting theory to a conclusion.¹⁴⁰ David Vital has also emphasised the importance of this question, and has stressed that the problem is fundamentally underpinned by the characteristics of small and large state relations, and is not necessarily the typical feature of contrasts between Western and Eastern Europe.¹⁴¹ This question nonetheless became the focal-point of the Anglo-Hungarian relationship in the era under consideration here.

¹³⁹ L. Cs. Szabó, *Doveri átkelés, Nyugat-európai helyzetkép* (Budapest, 1937), p. 32.

¹⁴⁰ P. Pritz, 'Magyar külpolitika – a csatlósság és revízió között' in *Az objektivitás mítosza? Hazánk és a nagyvilág, 20. századi metszetek*, ed. by P. Pritz (Budapest, 2011), p. 126.

¹⁴¹ D. Vital, *The inequality of states*, pp. 10-39.

1. 7. Note on the Terminology:

There has been considerable disagreement among historians about defining the name of the geographical area occupied by Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania.¹⁴² The Foreign Office divided the region into a Central and a Southern department. From 1940, Hungary was moved from the Southern department to the Central in the presumable effort to amalgamate the German and the Hungarian problem under one roof, which however did not necessarily mean that Hungary was automatically viewed as a German satellite.¹⁴³ As Whitehall appeared to look upon Hungary as a Central European country, we have decided to use 'Central Europe' for describing the region occupied by Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania.¹⁴⁴ Concerning other geographical names, such as the *Carpathians*, the English name will be utilised, if there is one available. However, we will be using the Hungarian names of cities, counties and regions, with their foreign name in brackets, if they belonged to a foreign country at some point in the period (e. g. Kassa [Košice]). Although the Hungarian language does not make a distinction between Hungarians and Magyars, this study, following the methodology of the English-language historiography, will refer to Hungarian speakers living outside of the frontiers of Hungary as Magyars to define them ethnically, and will call the population of Hungary Hungarians.

¹⁴² Central Europe, Eastern Europe and East Central Europe are interchangeably used by most historians. For the debate on the topic; see: I. Romsics, *Nemzet, nemzetiség és állam Kelet-Közép- és Délkelet Európában a 19. és 20. században* (Budapest, 2004), pp. 17-30. On most occasions Romania has been viewed by historians as part of the Balkans. For the reason that in this thesis Romania mostly appears in the context of its territorial dispute with Hungary, we will refer to Romania as a Central European country.

¹⁴³ It is indeed very difficult to decide the reason why Hungary was moved to the Central department in 1940. The tone of the minutes and instructions sent to Budapest indicate that from the outbreak of the war Hungary was judged to be part of the German sphere of influence, therefore its transfer seemed to serve practical reasons.

¹⁴⁴ Countries south of Central Europe will be referred to as the Balkans or South East Europe.

*'Not a soul is going to stir a finger to save Hungary.'*¹

(Orme Sargent's comment on Hungary's position after the Anschluss)

2. British official policy towards Hungarian revisionism and the Czechoslovak crisis, 1938-1939

2.1 Introduction

A 1938 anecdote tells the story about Chamberlain's perceptions of Central Europe. A reporter asked the Prime Minister whether he believed that Prague was handling the minority situation in Czechoslovakia correctly. Chamberlain gave an affirmative answer and noted that his information came from a most authentic source. The reporter was persistent and asked who the source was, to which Chamberlain replied that it was Jan Masaryk, the Czechoslovak Minister in London. György Barcza, the Hungarian Minister, observed this anecdote with utter astonishment.² He felt that it described British policy toward Central Europe with chilling accuracy. Barcza argued that it proved, the Czechs had gained the trust of the British, which made Hungarian minority complaints and territorial demands in Slovakia seem absurd in British eyes because they contradicted Czech claims.³ However, British official sources tell a different story. This chapter demonstrates that Czech opinion was not singled out in Whitehall, and Hungarian claims and complaints were also taken into consideration by British policy-makers.

On the other hand, British interest towards the territorial and minority disputes of Czechoslovakia worked in a very limited context. Ward Price noted in his memoirs that '[...] the British race seldom shows concern for any foreign problem before it has reached a state of crisis.'⁴ Truly, London became only attentive towards the Czechoslovak question when Germany's strong interest threatened the outbreak of war. This suggests that British interest was underpinned by strategic considerations, namely to avoid war with Germany. It is our hypothesis that London viewed Hungarian

¹ TNA, FO 371/22380, R 3469/719/21, minute by Sargent, 2 April 1938.

² HIA, Barcza, Diaries, 2 July 1938.

³ Andrea Orzoff has pointed out that Jan Masaryk was indeed popular in London, but his good reputation was an exception, and fundamentally the British distrusted all Central Europeans: Orzoff, *Battle for the Castle*, p. 10.

⁴ W. Price, *Year of Reckoning* (London, 1939), p. 206.

territorial demands through this lens, and throughout the Czechoslovak crisis of 1938-39 the official opinion changed according to Britain's strategic interests.

Appeasement remains a vibrant field of scholarly interest, and it is one of the most thoroughly researched eras of the British-Central European relationship. The historiography of appeasement has been covered to some extent in the Introduction, therefore here we will only concentrate on introducing scholarly studies which put forward relevant arguments for the British view of the Hungarian angle of the Czechoslovak crisis. The studies of Bátonyi on British policy towards Central Europe and Hungarian revisionism provide the picture of British policy and perceptions towards the region and Hungary on the eve of the Sudeten crisis, and serve as a crucial starting-point for this chapter.⁵ Mark Cornwall has studied the British official opinion on Czechoslovakia and has proved that as a result of the anti-Czech reports of the British minister in Prague, senior decision-makers, such as Orme Sargent and Frank Roberts in the Foreign Office, were deeply sceptical about the good treatment of the Sudeten-Germans.⁶ As the British minister seldom reported about the Magyar question in Czechoslovakia, it will be crucial to examine how the British minister in Budapest reported the Magyar claims in Slovakia.

Hungary's role in the Munich crisis have been studied by a number of historians, but they mostly concentrated on Hungarian foreign-policy and the German-Hungarian relationship, and dedicated less attention to the Anglo-Hungarian relationship during the Czechoslovak crisis.⁷ István Janek has recently studied the British view of the First

⁵ Bátonyi, *Britain and Central Europe*; Bátonyi, 'British foreign policy and the problem of Hungarian revisionism in the 1930s', pp. 205-216. The following also provide a useful analysis of British policy from a broader Central European and Balkan perspective before the Czechoslovak crisis: M. Ádám, *The Versailles System and Central Europe* (London, 2004); D. Bakić, *Great Britain, The Little Entente and Security in the Danubian Europe, 1919-1936* (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Leeds, 2010); M. Newman, 'The Origins of Munich: British Policy in Danubian Europe, 1933-1937', *The Historical Journal* 212 (1978), pp. 371-386; Sakmyster, *Hungary, the Great Powers*. For the Sudeten question, see: M. Cornwall, 'A Leap into Ice-Cold Water': the Manoeuvres of the Heinlein Movement in Czechoslovakia, 1933-1938' in *Czechoslovakia in a Nationalist and Fascist Europe, 1918-1948*, ed. by M. Cornwall and R. J. W. Evans (Oxford, 2007), pp. 123-142; M. Hauner, 'The Sudeten Crisis of 1938: Beneš and Munich' in *The Origins of the Second World War: An International Perspective*, ed. by F. McDonough (London 2011), pp. 360-374.

⁶ M. Cornwall, 'The rise and fall of a 'special relationship'?', pp. 130-150.

⁷ M. Ádám, 'The Munich crisis and Hungary, the fall of the Versailles settlement in Europe' in *The Munich crisis, 1938: prelude to World War II*, ed. by I. Lukes and E. Goldstein (Basingstoke, 1999) pp. 82-122; E. B. Gastony, 'Hungarian Foreign Minister Kálmán Kánya, Hitler, and Peace in Europe, August-September, 1938', *Hungarian Studies Review* 53 (1986), pp. 3-34; C. A. Macartney, 'Hungary and the Present Crisis', *International Affairs* 28 (1938), pp. 749-768; P. Pritz, 'A kieli találkozó', *Századok* 236 (1974), pp. 646-

Vienna Award, but his analysis was based on limited research and he concentrated only on the official response.⁸ The First Vienna Award was thoroughly studied by Gergely Sallai and Edward Császár, but they were more interested in German and Italian attitudes towards the Hungarian-Slovak dispute than the policy of London.⁹ From the plethora of British historiography relating to appeasement, David Gillard and R. A. C. Parker showed more interest in the role of Central Europe in appeasement, hence their analysis is our guiding point when considering the position of the region from the perspective of the wider British strategy.¹⁰

In the history of the Czechoslovak crisis the Sudeten German question has been thought of as the key factor. Historians have not considered Magyar minority demands and Hungarian territorial claims in Czechoslovakia as a key issue between Germany and Britain. This perspective suggests that London was not interested in Hungary and was unconcerned about Hungarian territorial claims. However, this limited approach did not reveal that during the Sudeten crisis, in the background, London continuously weighed the potential threat from Hungary. By involving new evidence in the analysis, such as the documents of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, the overlooked recommendations of the Foreign Office on the Hungarian frontiers, György Barcza's diaries; and by re-examining and reinterpreting Cabinet documents on Hungary, this research has revealed that regardless of British suspicions towards Hungarian revisionism, London did not reject Hungarian territorial claims *per se*, but only discouraged them due to current strategic considerations.

Consequently, the aim of this chapter is to challenge the consensus that Britain washed its hands of Central European commitments after Munich. It will prove that regardless of official disinterest towards the Hungarian question, Hungary and the

680; T. L. Sakmyster, 'Hungary and the Munich Crisis: The Revisionist Dilemma', *Slavic Review* 58 (1973), pp. 725-740; B. J. Winchester, 'Hungary and the "Third Europe" in 1938', *Slavic Review* 58 (1973), pp. 741-756. For the role of Slovakia in the Munich crisis and its aftermath from a Slovak perspective, see: Bystricky, 'Slovakia from the Munich Conference to the declaration of independence', pp. 157-174.

⁸ I. Janek, 'Az első bécsi döntés és Nagy-Britannia álláspontja', *Új Szó*, 28 October 2005, pp. 17-18. Janek also studied Hungarian revisionism in Slovakia during the Munich crisis: I. Janek, 'Magyar törekvések a Felvidék megszerzésére 1938-ban', *Történelmi Szemle* 105 (2010), pp. 37-66.

⁹ E. Császár, *Decision in Vienna: The Czechoslovak-Hungarian border dispute of 1938* (Bratislava, 1978); G. Sallai, *Az első bécsi döntés* (Budapest, 2002). Sallai was also interested in the role of the Magyar minorities in the Hungarian-Czechoslovak interstate relations: G. Sallai, "A határ megindul..." *A csehszlovákiai magyar kisebbség és Magyarország kapcsolatai az 1938-1939. évi államhatár-változások tükrében* (Budapest, 2009).

¹⁰ Gillard, *Appeasement in Crisis*; Parker, *Chamberlain and Appeasement*.

region held strategic importance for London in late 1938 and early 1939 in the diplomatic battle against Germany. It is also important to disentangle on what basis Britain contemplated changes to the frontiers of Hungary. The Munich agreement dealt with the German-Czech dispute on an ethnographic basis. We are particularly interested to find out whether the application of the same criteria was acceptable for British policy-makers for solving the Hungarian territorial question, or whether due to strategic considerations London showed more flexibility, and supported wider Hungarian demands.

Firstly, the consequences of the Anschluss on the Anglo-Hungarian relationship will be analysed, which will be followed by the examination of the implications of the Hitler-Chamberlain meetings on the British view of Hungarian territorial claims. Then we will concentrate on the Hungarian question at the Munich Conference and the British view of the First Vienna Award. Finally, we will analyse the British view of the Hungarian occupation of Ruthenia, and in what ways the British guarantees to Poland and Romania changed British perceptions of Hungary.

2.2 The impact of the Anschluss on the Anglo-Hungarian relationship

The Anschluss had a profound effect on British Central European policy and the British view of Hungarian revisionism.¹¹ Chamberlain and Halifax reservedly accepted the Anschluss, because they considered that the risk of precipitating the hostility of Germany by condemning the German action should have been avoided.¹² Renouncing the option to confront Germany meant that London accepted having limited political influence in the region.¹³ Bátonyi has stressed that in the years before the Anschluss, London had already disapproved Hungarian territorial claims, but the Anschluss seemed to mark the beginning of further deterioration of British opinion.¹⁴ Orme Sargent, a senior official of the Southern department of the Foreign Office, was certain that after the Anschluss, Hungary would willingly join the German camp. He predicted that the pro-German policy of the Hungarian Prime Minister Kálmán Darányi would lead to a far-right coup, and that consequently Hungary would join Germany as a semi-independent state, submitting its army, economy and foreign policy to German tutelage. Moreover, the Foreign Office associated the recent German-Hungarian overtures with German-Austrian-Hungarian cooperation during the Great War.¹⁵ Reflecting on Hungarian territorial ambitions, Sargent claimed that a rapprochement between Hungary and its neighbours (the Little Entente [map 2.1]) would now be impossible, as Budapest sold itself to Germany in order to realise its territorial aims against them.¹⁶ Alarming reports from the British Legation in Budapest also fuelled British suspicions of German-Hungarian cooperation. After receiving reports of the immediate German occupation of

¹¹ For the Anschluss, see: J. Gehl, *Austria, Germany, and the Anschluss, 1931–1938* (London, 1963). Gábor Bátonyi has contested the historiographical consensus that Britain was indifferent towards the survival of Austria, and has pointed out that the small countries of the region had important strategic implications for Britain: G. Bátonyi, 'Anglo-Austrian relations between the wars' in *Von Saint Germain zum Belvedere, Österreich und Europa 1919–1955, Außenpolitische Dokumente der Republik Österreich 1918–1938* (ADÖ) Special Issue, ed. by K. Koch and A. Suppan (Munich and Vienna, 2007), pp. 115–129.

¹² TNA, CAB 27/624, Foreign Political Committee Conclusion, 27 March 1938.

¹³ Bán, *Hungarian–British Diplomacy, 1938–1941*, pp. 42–43; Juhász, *Magyarország külpolitikája 1919–1945*, pp. 177–179, 183–185.

¹⁴ Bátonyi, 'British foreign policy and the problem of Hungarian revisionism', pp. 214–216.

¹⁵ TNA, FO 371/22373, R 3497/97/21, minute by Noble, 1 April 1938, minutes by Ingram and Sargent, 2 April 1938, minutes by Cadogan and Halifax, 5 April 1938; TNA, FO 371/22380, R 3302/719/21, Sargent's report on conversations with Szilárd Masirevics (Hungarian minister), 17 March 1938; R 3105/719/21, minutes by Noble and Ingram, 23 March 1938.

¹⁶ TNA, FO 371/22380, R 3302/719/21, minute by Sargent, 17 March 1938. Earlier, London exerted influence on Budapest to put aside its territorial claims on its neighbours, and form a bloc with the Little Entente to jointly counter German influence.

Hungary, Edward Ingram, the head of the Southern department, supported the recommendation of Geoffrey Knox, the British minister in Budapest, to suspend all future economic concessions to Hungary.¹⁷ Moreover, Gascoigne, the first secretary in Budapest, also raised alarms by reporting the immediate conclusion of a German-Hungarian military alliance.¹⁸ Consequently, London became very distrustful towards Hungarian revisionist intentions, which were viewed as a German-Hungarian tool to turn the regional status quo upside-down. During the inter-war years Hungary's persistent territorial claims on its neighbours were already viewed suspiciously by London; but now that Hungary seemed to commit itself on the side of Germany, the British attitude stiffened even further. As a result, the Foreign Office agreed that Hungarian territorial claims would be rejected, and any direct Hungarian intervention regarding Magyar minority questions should be bluntly rebuked, and Budapest would be warned that minority complaints had to be referred to the League of Nations in accordance with the terms of the Treaty of Trianon.¹⁹ Regardless of Hungary's deteriorating image in Whitehall, Pritz's claims that after the Anschluss Hungary was written off in London, seem to be depthless and oversimplified.²⁰ As it will be shown, until Hungary allowed the entrance and passage of German troops, it remained an important factor in British Central European policy.

British perceptions seemingly changed with the replacement of the pro-German Darányi with the pro-British Béla Imrédy. Imrédy's financial expertise was respected by the financial circles of the City, and his appointment had a positive reception. To support his efforts, the News Department of the Foreign Office instructed the British

¹⁷ TNA, FO 371/22380, R 5416/626/21, minute by Ingram, 14 June 1938. Knox was British minister in Budapest between 1936 and 1939. He strongly disliked Hungary and the Hungarian political elite, which greatly affected his diplomatic reports about Hungarian revisionism. Earlier, he was closely connected to the League of Nations; he was the commissioner of the Saar-plebiscite in 1935, where he advocated the preservation of the Versailles status quo. He retained these strong anti-revisionist views during his years in Hungary.

¹⁸ Gascoigne predicted that during the July visit of the chief of staff of the Wehrmacht to Budapest Hungary granted *droit de passage* to Germany. Gascoigne warned that in the event of a German-Czechoslovak war, the Wehrmacht would outflank the Czechoslovak army from Hungarian territory (map 2. 2): TNA, FO 371/22380, R 6743/719/21, Gascoigne (Budapest) to Halifax, 28 July 1938. Consequently, until the Munich Agreement, the Foreign Office and the Cabinet regarded a German-Hungarian military cooperation against Czechoslovakia a certainty: TNA, WO 190/606; WO 190/681; WO 190/691; WO 691/694.

¹⁹ TNA, FO 371/22377, R 5245/178/21, 9 June 1938, Sargent to Knox, 9 June 1938.

²⁰ P. Pritz, 'Emlékirat és történeti valóság. Barcza György emlékiratai fényében. Londoni évek I.', pp. 547-560 (p. 549).

press to praise Imrédy's anti-Nazi step.²¹ Moreover, György Barcza, the Hungarian minister in London, also reported that the inevitable expansion of German-Hungarian trade was understood by the British, and London appreciated Hungarian efforts to maintain political independence.²² By all appearances, British policy remained friendly towards Hungary.²³

However, closer analysis of the sources reveal a more nuanced picture. Regardless of the amiable official tone, under the surface distrust prevailed towards Hungarian revisionism over the summer of 1938. András Bán argued that as a result of Imrédy's anti-Nazi policy and the agreement between Hungary and the Little Entente at Bled, British opinion had taken a positive turn.²⁴ The British press though reacted very positively to the Bled agreement,²⁵ but Bán did not distinguish between the hurrying tone of the papers and the tone of discussions of the Southern department, which was markedly distrustful. Officials were very suspicious about Hungary's role in the Bled agreement, and the fact that the treaty remained uninitialled with Czechoslovakia, triggered alarms in London about Hungary's intentions.²⁶ Moreover, Bán disregarded Sargent's opinion as not necessarily influential, and put more weight on the friendly official declarations of British policy, which, as we have pointed out, did not reflect the true British perception.²⁷ In this thesis we are aiming to contest the view-point that British foreign political thought can be sketched only by the analysis of official communications and diplomatic dispatches. As we will see, particularly in the case of Hungary, senior Foreign Office officials often made direct decisions on Hungarian

²¹ TNA, FO 371/22380, R 6900/719/21, minute by Nichols, 9 August 1938.

²² MOL, K 63, 11. cs., 1938-2/1, I. 96/pol. 1938, Barcza to Kánya, 24 July 1938; II. 84/pol. 1938, Barcza to Kánya, 22 June 1938. See also: Barcza, *Diplomataemlékeim*, vol. 1, p. 318.

²³ As we have seen, Gascoigne predicted a German-Hungarian military alliance, but he remained very cordial towards Hungarian officials. For instance he assured Budapest that it can expect a favourable British opinion on Magyar minority complaints: MOL, K 63, 11. cs., 1938-2/1, II., 2744i/1938, Apor to Kánya, 30 August 1938.

²⁴ Bán, *Hungarian-British Diplomacy 1938-41*, pp. 37-38. The treaty signed between Hungary and the Little Entente in Bled in late August 1938 announced the joint renunciation of the use of force and recognised Hungary's equal right to armaments. For the Bled Agreement, see: M. Ádám, *Hungary and the Little Entente* (Budapest, 1976); Juhász, *Magyarország külpolitikája*, pp. 186-187.

²⁵ MOL, K 66, 14/pol. 1938, 'A bledi egyezmény visszhangja a brit sajtóban', Marosy (London) to Kánya, 26 August 1938.

²⁶ London welcomed the Bled agreement officially, as a sign of independent Hungarian foreign policy: MOL, K 74, 1938, London, 6097/83. The Foreign Office however immediately understood that Budapest did not sign the agreement with Prague, because of its revisionist aims: TNA, FO 371/22378, R 7338/178/21, minute by Noble, 27 August 1938.

²⁷ Bán, *Hungarian-British Diplomacy 1939-41*, pp. 43-46.

questions without needing to consult the Foreign Secretary or the Cabinet, whose authority was felt only in Hungarian questions with primary implications. As a result, the opinion of senior Foreign Office officials should be weighed more heavily in analysing British policy towards Hungary.

Hungarian territorial claims seemed radical from London, but Imrédy, and Foreign Minister Kálmán Kánya, followed a cautious foreign policy and were careful not to alienate the opinion of the international community by expressing radical revisionist claims. Territorial claims were not declared officially. Since the end of 1937 Budapest was aware of Hitler's plan to destroy Czechoslovakia, and a major rearmament programme was initiated, to prepare for the realisation of revisionist dreams. On the other hand, the Hungarian political elite were keen to maintain good relations with London and Paris, and therefore refused to officially commit Hungary's aims to those of Germany.²⁸ Concurrently with the Bled Agreement, Horthy, Imrédy and Kánya arrived in Germany for an official state-visit. They were received lavishly, and the Germans evidently tried to present the meeting to the world as the conclusion of a German-Hungarian alliance. The meetings provided very controversial results. Hitler offered Slovakia for Hungarian participation in a war against Czechoslovakia, but due to the weakness of their army, the Hungarians were very reluctant to commit to this plan. These meetings nevertheless clarified that due to the fear of losing German support for frontier revision, the Hungarian elite decided that under specific circumstances it would side with Germany in a German-Czechoslovak war.²⁹ It is crucial to note that London did not have reliable information on the German-Hungarian negotiations, and reacted positively to the apparent lack of an immediate agreement.³⁰

The analysis of new sources have revealed that after the Anschluss, due to Hungary's flirtations with Germany, Hungarian revisionism was viewed suspiciously by

²⁸ Gastony, 'Hungarian Foreign Minister Kálmán Kánya', pp. 7-8; Steiner, *The Triumph of the Dark*, pp. 371-372.

²⁹ The sources of the German-Hungarian negotiations are providing a very ambiguous picture. The Hungarians were very reluctant to participate in a war against Czechoslovakia, and Horthy reminded Hitler that British imperial and naval power would eventually prevail in a global conflict. Juhász and Pritz agreed that the fervent Hungarian will for revision was the underpinning reason for eventually agreeing to participate in a war against Czechoslovakia, with the condition of guaranteed Yugoslav neutrality and that the war would be localised between Germany and Czechoslovakia: Juhász, *Magyarország külpolitikája*, p. 188; P. Pritz, 'A kieli találkozó', pp. 646-680.

³⁰ MOL, K 66, 113/pol.1938, Marosy to Kánya, 26 August 1938.

London. While British official opinion towards Budapest remained amiable, the apparent hostility of the Foreign Office towards Hungarian territorial claims, and the widely held opinion in Whitehall that British political influence in Central Europe had diminished, projected a limited British interest towards the territorial shape of Hungary on the eve of the Munich crisis.

2.3 The implications of the Chamberlain-Hitler Berchtesgaden meeting on Hungary

Historians paid very limited attention to how Britain perceived Hungarian territorial claims on the eve of the Czechoslovak crisis.³¹ The Hitler-Chamberlain Berchtesgaden meeting brought the subject of Hungary into the international forefront. Consequently, Hungarian revisionism played an important role in British policy towards Czechoslovakia. New evidence suggests that Britain did not reject Hungarian territorial claims *per se*, and only discouraged satisfying Hungarian demands in Slovakia because the question was raised by Hitler, which therefore was viewed as a threat from Germany's side.

It is important to sketch Chamberlain's and Halifax's perceptions of Central European territorial and minority issues before the Czechoslovak crisis. During his infamous visit to Germany in 1937, Halifax vaguely assured Hitler of Britain's flexibility towards the Central European status quo. Cabinet documents and Chamberlain's intimate letters to his sisters prove that Chamberlain and Halifax were fundamentally disinterested about Central European territorial quarrels, and their attention stopped at the eastern frontiers of Germany.³² Parker has added that the aim of preventing the opening up of new problems in Central Europe was the underlying reason of Chamberlain's disinterest.³³ Cabinet minutes are supporting this theory. In August, the Cabinet decided that exactly for this reason, London would not raise the Magyar minority question in Czechoslovakia.³⁴ It is therefore no surprise that when Lord Runciman was sent to mediate between the Sudeten Germans and Prague, he was instructed by Chamberlain to concentrate only on the Sudeten-German problem.³⁵

³¹ The most important exception is: M. Ádám, 'The Munich crisis and Hungary', pp. 82-122.

³² Chamberlain, in a letter to his sister, Ida, admitted that Britain would not oppose Hitler, if he satisfied his demands in Austria and Czechoslovakia by peaceful means: DBFP, ser.2, vol. 9, 349., N. Chamberlain to Ida Chamberlain, 9 July 1938. Halifax also recommended to the Cabinet that the colonial question could be used to achieve a settlement with Germany after Germany dealt with the Austrian and Czech problem: Z. Steiner, *The Triumph of the Dark*, p. 339.

³³ Parker, *Chamberlain and Appeasement*, pp. 141-144.

³⁴ TNA, CAB 23/95, Cabinet Conclusion 64 (38), 13 August 1938.

³⁵ Consequently, Runciman showed no interest in the Magyar minority question of Slovakia. Runciman promised to visit Slovakia, but asked the Magyars not to make any demonstrations, in which case he declared that he would leave Slovakia immediately. The visit eventually never materialised, and Runciman met Péter Eszterházy, the leader of the Magyar Party in Czechoslovakia only very briefly: MOL, K 63, 11. cs., 1938-2/1, II. 201/pol. 1938, Vörösmarty to Kánya, 17 August 1938. For the Runciman-

After the failure of the Runciman mission, Chamberlain decided to personally negotiate with Hitler to prevent the escalation of the Sudeten crisis into a European war. It is problematic to determine Chamberlain's disposition towards the Magyar question at this stage, but the evidence suggests that he was certain that the Magyars were content in Czechoslovakia.³⁶ At their meeting in Berchtesgaden, Hitler demanded a plebiscite in the Sudetenland, and its consequent annexation to Germany if the plebiscite favoured it. Hitler's demand for plebiscites for the Magyar and Polish minorities caught Chamberlain by surprise. Upon Chamberlain's return from Berchtesgaden, the Cabinet eventually agreed to Hitler's demands in the Sudetenland, but just like previously, decided that plebiscites in the Magyar areas would not be supported as it would set a precedent, and would lead to new complications in the region.³⁷ The Cabinet decision was followed by Anglo-French negotiations, which agreed to the transfer of the Sudetenland, but endorsing the British Cabinet decision also disapproved plebiscites in territories inhabited by Magyars and Polish in order to prevent the complete disintegration of Czechoslovakia.

Rumours that a plebiscite in the Sudetenland would be approved, but a Magyar would not, had an intense effect on Hungarian policy. Anxious not to be left out of the settlement Budapest indignantly demanded 'equal consideration' for the Magyars of Czechoslovakia.³⁸ Besides, Budapest also demanded a plebiscite in the predominantly

Eszterházy meeting: K 64 pol. 1938 7/4, 72/2396. For the Runciman mission, see: P. Vyšný, *The Runciman mission to Czechoslovakia, 1938: prelude to Munich* (Basingstoke, 2003).

³⁶ Sakmyster, *Hungary, the Great Powers and the Danubian Crisis*, pp. 185-186, 192-193. Chamberlain's memoirs, his letters to his sister, Cabinet minutes and Foreign Office files reveal close to nothing about Chamberlain's perceptions. Immediately before he travelled to Berchtesgaden, through Sir Ralf Glynn, who had recently visited Hungary, Chamberlain received secret messages from the Hungarian political elite that Budapest intended to follow a peaceful policy: MOL, K 63, 11. cs., 1938-2/1, II., 115/pol. 1938, Marosy to Kánya, 9 September 1938. Other British personalities, such as Sybil Glyn, Lady Snowden and Lady Londonderry also visited Hungary in the course of 1938, but on their return they were not able to influence British policy on Hungarian questions: Országos Széchényi Könyvtár (OSZK), Fond X, Géza Szüllő Papers.

³⁷ TNA, CAB 23/95, Cabinet Conclusions 39 (38), 16 September 1938; CAB 23/95, Cabinet Conclusions 41 (38), 21 September 1938. For the German account of the Berchtesgaden meetings, see: DGFP ser. D., vol. 2., 896. Parker is on a different opinion. He stresses that cabinet ministers aimed to postpone plebiscites, in order to provide an orderly fashion to the eventual dismemberment of Czechoslovakia: Parker, *Chamberlain and Appeasement*, pp. 161-162.

³⁸ DIMK, II., 314: Kánya to Villani, 6 September 1938; Ibid, 346: Kánya to Knox, 16 September 1938; Ibid, 351: Kánya to Barcza, 16 September 1938. The Hungarians apparently evoked Vansittart's slip of the tongue, who earlier in August, promised 'equal consideration' for the Magyars in a very different international situation, when the cession of the Sudetenland to Germany was not on the table yet. Until mid-August, Budapest remained silent in the Sudeten crisis, and the sources suggest that Budapest

Slovak and Ruthenian areas of Czechoslovakia, which belonged to Hungary before 1920. It is crucial to note that this was the first time that Hungary officially presented territorial claims on Czechoslovakia in the 1930s.³⁹ The Foreign Office briskly rejected these demands and bluntly stated that without the Magyar districts Czechoslovakia would not be able to exist.⁴⁰ Halifax also side-tracked the problem, and assured Barcza that Hungary's claims would be considered at the appropriate moment, but at present Britain was preoccupied by its attempts to avert war. He warned the Hungarians against extending the crisis, and referring to claims on Slovak and Ruthenian areas, Halifax called for moderation.⁴¹

Barcza was keen to support Hungary's bid.⁴² In order to circumvent the hostility of the Foreign Office, he sent a memorandum about the demands of Hungary directly to Chamberlain, via Andrian Dingli.⁴³ Barcza's diaries crucially reveal the differences in the perceptions of Chamberlain and the Foreign Office towards Hungary, which so far were not apparent from official British documents. Compared to the abrupt disapproval of the Foreign Office, Chamberlain promised fair treatment for the Magyars and praised Hungary's peaceful attitude.⁴⁴ Moreover, Chamberlain seemed to be pleased to establish a secret channel with Barcza; he complained to Barcza that Cadogan and Sargent were withholding information from him and were trying to lock him away from foreign diplomats.⁴⁵

activated their revisionist rhetoric for German pressure: DIMK, II, 361: Sztójay to Kánya, 17 September 1938.

³⁹ Holly Case has also emphasized that before the Munich crisis the Hungarians presented their case on international forums as a minority problem, and it only became a territorial question in the autumn of 1938. Case has unduly overemphasised this question. Truly, Hungary had submitted numerous complaint about the treatment of Magyars, but even though territorial demands had not been put forward in London until August 1938, it was well-known that Budapest was aiming for territorial revision: H. Case, *Between States, The Transylvanian Question and the European Idea during World War II*, (Stanford, 2009), p. 31.

⁴⁰ HIA, Barcza, Diaries, 17 September 1938, Box 0008; MOL, K 74, 1938, London, 5909/64.

⁴¹ TNA, FO 371/21568, C 10591/2319/12, Halifax's note on the conversation with the Hungarian minister, 21 September 1938; DIMK II., 370, Barcza to Kánya, 20 September 1938.

⁴² Interestingly, Barcza's opinion about frontier revision in his diaries significantly differ from the tone of his memoirs. While Barcza was very critical about the revisionist fervour in Hungary in his memoirs, he enthusiastically supported revision against Czechoslovakia in his diaries: Barcza, *Diplomataemlékeim*, p. 372; compare to: HIA, Barcza, Diaries, 19 September 1938, Box 0008.

⁴³ HIA, Barcza, Diaries, 19 September 1938, Box 0008. Andrian Dingli was the legal counsellor of the Italian Embassy in London, and regularly served as a contact between Barcza and Chamberlain.

⁴⁴ Chamberlain also sent a similarly worded official letter to Barcza, in which he promised to keep Hungary's case carefully in his mind: MOL, K 74, 1938, London, 6097/83.

⁴⁵ HIA, Barcza, Diaries, 19 September 1938, Box 0008.

In the Cabinet, Chamberlain and Halifax noted their openness towards the revision of Hungary's frontiers, but when the Cabinet discussed a guarantee for Czechoslovakia on the 21 September, due to the possibility of German interference with the Magyar question, Hungarian and Polish territorial aspirations became one of the underlying reasons that the territorial integrity of Czechoslovakia was not guaranteed. Samuel Hoare's comment, who was the Home Secretary in 1938, dramatically changed the tone of the meeting and proved the existence of deep seated prejudices about Hungary, which evidently influenced British perceptions on Hungarian revisionism to a great extent. Hoare noted that because of Hungary's maltreatment of its nationalities in the past non-Magyars should not be transferred to Hungary if revision was approved. The Cabinet unanimously agreed with Hoare's opinion.⁴⁶ The following days seemed to prove British suspicions, as a strongly worded Hungarian-Polish *démarche* was sent to London, demanding the transfer of Magyar and Polish minority territories, if the Sudetenland was ceded to Germany.⁴⁷ The *démarche* significantly damaged British opinion towards Hungary. The Foreign Office did not hesitate to send a harshly worded reply, which warned Hungary against taking military action against Czechoslovakia.

The Sudeten problem had been the primary attention of Whitehall and now that Hitler connected the Magyar problem to it, the Magyar question also attained prominence in British thought. The opinion of the Foreign Office on Hungary was momentarily overshadowed, and due to its urgency, the Cabinet, and particularly Chamberlain, dealt directly with the Magyar question.⁴⁸ Barcza managed to build contacts with Chamberlain, who however remained very cautious towards Hungarian claims, mostly because of Hitler's interference in the problem.

⁴⁶ TNA, CAB 23/95, Cabinet Conclusions, 40 (38), 19 September 1938.

⁴⁷ DIMK, II., 371: Kánya to Barcza, 20 September 1938; 387: Kánya to Barcza, 23 September 1938.

⁴⁸ G. C. Peden has also argued that in era of the Munich crisis, the inner circle of Chamberlain (Chamberlain, Horace Wilson, the private secretary of Chamberlain, Halifax, Samuel Hoare, and Lord Simon) kept a monopoly over decision-making, see: G. C. Peden, 'Sir Horace Wilson and Appeasement', *The Historic Journal* 220 (2010), pp. 983-1014. The examination of their papers and memoirs provided no evidence that any of them applied any particular pressure on Chamberlain in Hungarian questions.

2.4 From Bad Godesberg to Munich

At Bad Godesberg, Hitler shocked Chamberlain by demanding the immediate transfer of the Sudetenland, and the settlement of Hungarian and Polish territorial claims in Czechoslovakia.⁴⁹ Earlier, the Cabinet had decided that further demands would not be tolerated, so therefore Chamberlain returned to London. Consequently, Chamberlain found himself at odds with Halifax in the Cabinet. Chamberlain seemed ready to yield to Hitler's demands, but Halifax disagreed, and openly challenged the Prime Minister. They also diverged on how to handle Hungarian territorial claims. Halifax recommended an arbitrary decision, as otherwise, he argued, the problem would lead to a new crisis.⁵⁰ Cabinet minutes suggest that Chamberlain was still aiming to cooperate with Hitler and in order to remove potential frictions with Germany he wanted to postpone dealing with the Hungarian problem. Halifax's so called 'rebellion' after Bad Godesberg intensified the debate in Whitehall on what policy to follow towards Germany and Czechoslovakia. As a result, discussions on the Hungarian question were pushed into the background.⁵¹

London did its utmost to argue Hungary out of escalating the crisis, and now the official view on Hungarian claims in Czechoslovakia until Munich was that there was no official view. Although Halifax recommended an arbitrary decision in the Cabinet, during a meeting with Barcza he warned that Hungary should not attempt an immediate settlement by direct military action. Halifax recommended peaceful negotiation, and as an alternative, the mediation of the League of Nations. It says much about the lack of Halifax's understanding of the nature of Central European territorial disputes that at this stage he suggested the mediation of the League, which was viewed in Hungary to be incapable of solving minority disputes. Halifax was also greatly

⁴⁹ D. Faber, *Munich, The 1938 Appeasement Crisis* (London, 2008), pp. 334-337; Sakmyster, *Hungary, the Great Powers*, p. 203; R. Self, *Neville Chamberlain, a biography* (Aldershot, 2006), pp. 316-320.

⁵⁰ TNA, CAB 23/95, Cabinet Conclusions 42 (38), 24 September 1938.

⁵¹ The escalation of the international situation after Bad Godesberg also reduced the importance of the Hungarian question in London. Prague rejected the new German demands and mobilised for war. To highlight the dynamics of Hungarian foreign policy, it has to be noted here that even though Hitler offered the re-annexation of Slovakia to Hungary, Imrédy and Kánya rejected the German demand to present a *fait accompli* to Britain by attacking Czechoslovakia while Chamberlain was negotiating with Hitler in Bad Godesberg: M. Ormos, *Magyarország a két világháború korában* (Budapest 2000), pp.195-196.

uninformed, and Barcza had to explain the basics of the Magyar problem to him.⁵²

Halifax's views on the necessity of frontier revision nevertheless seemed to alter the rigid standpoint of the Foreign Office. Sargent, who had previously condemned Hungary's pro-German policy, and had disapproved of any territorial alterations in favour of Hungary, changed his viewpoint and expressed a very similar opinion to that of Halifax. He declared that London should eventually accept that the Magyars should receive similar treatment to the Sudeten-Germans, and territories would have to be ceded to Hungary.⁵³

So far it has been pointed out that British policy-makers viewed Hungarian territorial aspirations in Czechoslovakia unsympathetically. Essentially however, Whitehall did not reject revision, but in the midst of the Sudeten crisis, the problem fell victim to the geopolitical priorities of Britain, which in this case was to avoid disagreements with Germany. Decisions on Hungary were formulated on this basis, and the British delegation went to the Munich conference with this mind-set.

Even though the British showed complete indifference towards Hungary at Munich, Foreign Office memoranda provide evidence that the British arrived with clear views on Hungary's frontiers. Philip Nichols and Sargent explained the opinion of the Southern department in a series of memoranda.⁵⁴ They recommended that Prague should be pressured to cede territories to Hungary. Sargent and Nichols argued that there was an ethnographic justification for frontier change, but due to Hungary's past intolerance towards its own nationalities, they noted that only the Csallóköz and Beregszász [Berehove] should be transferred (map 2.3), which had an 80 percent or higher Magyar population.⁵⁵ The memorandum used Macartney's study of Trianon as a

⁵² It is interesting to note that Barcza reported his impression to Budapest that Halifax contemplated the comprehensive reconstruction of Central Europe, under the aegis of the League, with British leadership. This notion however did not appear in his diaries, which suggest that Barcza intentionally projected a friendlier British attitude towards Hungary than it actually was, probably in order to encourage Budapest to a more amiable attitude towards London: DIMK, II., 391, Barcza to Kánya, 24 September 1938; Ibid, 427a, Barcza to Halifax, 29 September 1938; compare to: HIA, Barcza, Diaries, 21, 25 September 1938. We will have cause to return to this argument later.

⁵³ TNA, FO 371/21568, C 10782/2319/12, minute by Sargent, 23 September 1938. It is interesting to note that Sargent used the word '*similar*', and not '*the same*', which indicates that he still had reservations towards satisfying Hungarian demands.

⁵⁴ This set of memoranda was taken by the British delegation to Munich as a reference on the Hungarian question.

⁵⁵ TNA, FO 371/22380, R 8359/97/21, P. B. Nichols and O. Sargent, 'Hungarian Minority in Czechoslovakia', 28 September 1938.

reference book.⁵⁶ More crucially, it mentioned that in formulating British opinion on the frontiers of Hungary, the opinion of former British representatives in Budapest were sought. Sir Thomas Hohler, Henry James Bruce and Sir William Goode all spoke in favour of Hungary.⁵⁷ Hohler, Bruce and Goode were all well-known pro-Hungarians in Whitehall, and their surprising influence on decision-making refutes suggestions that the Czech opinion was favoured in London. It proves that pro-Hungarian voices had weight in London, and that frontier revisions were not rejected. As we have seen, by the end of September policy-makers in London were already considering revision as an option, but the opinion of Hohler, Bruce and Goode seemed to tilt the balance. An alternative recommendation, based on the 1930 Czechoslovak census, advised the transfer of a number of towns and cities (map 2.4 and figure 2.1). This alternative would have returned 425,000 Magyars to Hungary, who comprised 73 percent of the population of the territory under consideration.

The importance of these documents is that they enable us to probe British views on Hungarian territorial claims in a period, when official opinion on the problem was silent for strategic reasons. They also prove that fundamentally Whitehall did not reject frontier revision, but was aiming to deal with the problem in an orderly manner. In order to promote stability, and to harmonise with the criteria applied to the Sudetenland, a new frontier, which closely followed the ethnographic dividing-line between nationalities was recommended.⁵⁸ However, the memory of 19th century 'Magyarization' was evidently a deeply held argument against revision on a larger scale. These pieces of evidence also help us to understand the British opinion of the First Vienna Award, which settled the Hungarian-Czechoslovak territorial dispute a month later, and of which only ambiguous analysis has emerged so far.⁵⁹ The influence of Hohler, Bruce and Goode on British policy is arresting and it highlights that opinion

⁵⁶ Macartney, *Hungary and Her Successors*. Attached to the memorandum was a short study, which describes the historical background of the problem. Although it is unsigned, its views very closely resemble to Macartney's views, see: Macartney, *Hungary and Her Successors*, pp. 246-250.

⁵⁷ Thomas Hohler was British minister in Hungary from 1921 to 1924, Henry James Bruce was an adviser to the Hungarian National Bank in the 1930s, and Sir William Goode was an adviser of the Hungarian government in the 1920s and the unofficial financial adviser of the Hungarian Legation in London from 1936.

⁵⁸ It has to be noted here that the Czechoslovak refusal to consider ceding territory to Hungary made no influence on formulating British policy: TNA, FO 371/21568, C 11042/2319/12, Newton (Prague) to Halifax, 28 September 1938.

⁵⁹ The next section will analyse the British view on the First Vienna Award in greater depth. As it will be discussed, London was very reluctant to express an official opinion on the award, which however drew a frontier very similar to this British recommendation.

outside of Whitehall could potentially have carried significant weight.⁶⁰

According to the Munich Agreement, districts with a 51 percent or higher German majority had to be evacuated by Czechoslovakia. London and Paris pledged to guarantee the new frontiers against unprovoked aggression, which Hitler and Mussolini also promised, after which the Magyar and Polish minority questions would be settled. At Munich, the Hungarian question was raised by Mussolini, but Hitler refused to include it in the immediate settlement. As a result of this German disapproval, Chamberlain also expressed his disinterest.⁶¹ Mussolini prepared a minority draft, which provisioned equal treatment for the minorities of Czechoslovakia, which was rejected by all parties.

Chamberlain, Daladier and Hitler however agreed to sign an appendix, which asked the Hungarian and Czechoslovak governments to seek a solution by direct negotiations, and stated that if an agreement could not be reached in three months, the case should be the subject of a new four-power conference. Hence, although indirectly, London officially recognised the existence of a Hungarian-Czechoslovak territorial and minority problem, which it had refused to do earlier. Under pressure from Berlin, London accepted the 51 percent rule in the Sudetenland, which it was able to refuse for the other minorities of Czechoslovakia, because Hitler did not insist on the immediate settlement of these questions. Therefore, Whitehall formulated an independent opinion on the Magyar problem, and consequently, an opinion less radical than the 51 percent rule emerged.

⁶⁰ Earlier, Barcza and Budapest failed to persuade London about the necessity of revision. However, because in the past Hohler, Bruce and Goode had conveyed messages to the highest British circles on behalf of Hungary, it seems highly probable that their advice before the Munich Agreement reflected Hungarian opinion. However, there is no evidence to prove that in this particular case Hohler, Bruce and Goode acted on Hungarian influence. The fact that they acted simultaneously suggests Hungarian manoeuvres in the background.

⁶¹ Before travelling to Munich, István Csáky, the Hungarian deputy Foreign minister met Mussolini. Csáky then presented the Hungarian demands, which Mussolini promised to support.

2.5 From Munich to Vienna

As a signatory power of the Munich agreement, Britain officially had to support the Hungarian-Slovak negotiations, which commenced in Komárom shortly after Munich.⁶² Difficulties emerged from the outset, as Hungarian and Slovak concepts of an agreement were very different. The Slovaks offered the Csallóköz and territorial autonomy for the rest of the Magyars, while Hungary demanded the cession of territories with a 51 percent or higher Magyar population, and a plebiscite for the rest of Slovakia and Ruthenia.⁶³

After Munich, the primary aim of London was to support the parties in reaching an ethnographically just and mutually acceptable solution.⁶⁴ Regardless of the official support, Cabinet documents prove that from the beginning of the negotiations, Whitehall tried its utmost to avoid being drawn into the dispute.⁶⁵ In order to ensure a favourable outcome, constant pressure was applied on Prague to reach an agreement with Budapest on an ethnographic basis.⁶⁶ Despite this, London openly declared its commitment to Munich, and to a new four-power arbitration, if negotiations proved to be unsuccessful.⁶⁷

Unaware of the influence of their opinion, Hohler, Goode and Macartney began petitioning the Foreign Office after Munich. Hohler argued that Hungary could be won over, because the Hungarian people were fond of Britain, but hated Germany.⁶⁸ Similarly, Goode also recommended that active British support for frontier change

⁶² On 6 October Slovakia became an autonomous state of Czecho-Slovakia. Note that until Munich the country was called Czechoslovakia. The new name of Czecho-Slovakia reflected the Slovak autonomy. As the problem mainly concerned Slovakia, negotiations with Hungary were conducted by Slovaks and not Czechs.

⁶³ Sallai, *Az első bécsi döntés*, pp. 82-84, 278-279.

⁶⁴ It is difficult to determine what London considered as 'ethnographically just' at this stage. Judging from the 80 percent rule, and the 51 percent basis of the Munich agreement, London presumably contemplated a solution anywhere between the two figures. More crucially however, London desired a mutual agreement without the threat of force.

⁶⁵ TNA, CAB 23/95, Cabinet Conclusions 47 (38), 30 September 1938.

⁶⁶ DIMK II, 451a: Halifax to Barcza, 2 October 1938; 451b: Barcza to Halifax, 3 October 1938; 452: Barcza to Kánya, 3 October 1938; 503: Barcza to Kánya, 11 October 1938; 699: Barcza to Kánya, 17 October 1938.

⁶⁷ DIMK II, 452: Barcza to Kánya, 3 October 1938; 478: Barcza to Kánya, 7 October 1938; TNA, FO 371/21568, C11293/2319/12, minute by Strang, 3 October 1938; C12507/2319/12, minute by Strang, 4 October 1938; C13057/2319/12, minutes by Strang, 6 October 1938.

⁶⁸ TNA, FO 371/21570C11976/2319/12, Hohler to Cadogan, 9 October 1938.

could turn Hungary against Germany.⁶⁹ Macartney argued that London could weaken the pro-German elements in Hungary by supporting reasonable Hungarian territorial claims.⁷⁰ Like previously, the views of Hohler, Goode and Macartney were taken seriously, and senior officials noted that if Hungary stood by her ethnic claims and did not couple claims with threats, then London would support frontier revision.⁷¹

In mid-October the Foreign Office produced a number of memoranda on the Hungarian question. Their recommendations demonstrably aimed to correspond to the ethnographic principle, which was advocated by the Munich Agreement. A memorandum on the future of Slovakia acknowledged that a wide southern strip would eventually be ceded to Hungary because it was mainly inhabited by Magyars. Strikingly, the objective to follow the Munich-idea essentially overrode earlier British strategic concerns. Namely, the memorandum neglected the strategic importance of Czechoslovak authority over Ruthenia's Magyar districts, which previously was the strategic cornerstone of the Little Entente. Czecho-Slovakia and Romania were connected through these Magyar districts, and the Romanian Army was supplied from the Czechoslovak Skoda arms concern through this territory (map 2.5).⁷² The fact that strategic interests, which were previously considered important, were now disregarded in such an abrupt manner points towards a dramatic shift in British policy towards the region.

Another memorandum on Ruthenia, Czecho-Slovakia's easternmost province, recommended the transfer of the entire province to Hungary on economic and historical grounds. This document showed considerable confusion towards the future of Ruthenia. Contradicting the previous claim, it suggested that only compact blocks of Magyars should be ceded to Hungary due to Hungary's impatient minority policy in the past.⁷³ Both documents received limited attention in the Foreign Office which indicated

⁶⁹ TNA, FO 371/21570, C12104/2319/12, Goode to Cadogan, 10 October 1938; TNA, FO 371/21572 C13087/2319/12, Goode to Gladwyn Jebb, 27 October 1938.

⁷⁰ TNA, FO 371/21571, C12627/2319/12, Macartney, 'The Hungarian Question', 10 October 1938.

⁷¹ TNA, FO 371/21570, C12104/2319/12, Jebb to Goode, 25 October 1938; FO 371/21571, C12627/2319/12, minute by Ingram, 13 October 1938, minute by Sargent, 15 October 1938.

⁷² TNA, FO 371/21570, C12133/2319/12, Mallett, 'The Future of Slovakia', 10 October 1938. Bucharest asked for British mediation for ensuring that Hungary would guarantee the uninterrupted movement of transport on this railway-line, in the event that it would be ceded to Hungary. Noble and Cadogan noted that Britain had no interest in raising this question at any forum: TNA, FO 371/21570, C13578/2319/12, minute by Noble and Cadogan, 16 October 1938.

⁷³ TNA, FO 371/21571, C12378/2319/12, Stevens, 'Ruthenia', 10 October 1938. According to the 1910 and the 1930 censuses, the Magyar population of Ruthenia was between 17-21 percent.

momentary disinterest and suggest that the final decision had not been made on the future of Ruthenia. Cadogan, Sargent, Nichols and Stevens accepted that the Magyar districts would eventually be returned to Hungary, but they hesitated on deciding the future of the rest of the province (map 2.6). Analysing British opinion towards Ruthenia in mid-October provides the archetype of British policy towards Hungary, and more broadly towards the entire Central European region. Hesitating about the direction of policy towards Ruthenia, the Foreign Office endlessly debated alternatives without making a decision. However, a factor is missing from the equation; namely Germany. Halifax plainly noted to the Cabinet that London could not formulate a policy until Germany had made a decision on the future on Ruthenia, which Britain would discreetly adopt. Halifax added that in the meantime London had officially taken the line that it was not concerned in the matter.⁷⁴

Diplomatic reports had been an important component of decision-making in the inter-war period, it is therefore curious that neither the opinion of Newton or of Knox influenced British decisions at this stage. Their views were acknowledged, but as we have seen British tactics were largely directed by the attitude of Germany. Newton and Knox were sending very contrasting opinions from Prague and Budapest. Newton suggested that Hungarian demands had to be satisfied in Slovakia, because they were justified ethnographically, but Knox in Budapest disagreed, and wanted to limit frontier revision as far as possible.⁷⁵ Nonetheless, it has to be highlighted that while the opinion of Newton was trusted, there were signs that Knox's evident hostility towards Hungary was considered counterproductive by policy-makers.⁷⁶

Negotiations between Budapest and Bratislava broke down on the 13 October, mainly due to the fundamental disagreement in the interpretation of the censuses of the

⁷⁴ TNA, CAB 23/96, Cabinet Conclusions 50 (38), 26 October 1938. *The Times* went directly against British official policy and supported the Hungarian acquisition of Ruthenia: 'Poland and Hungary', *The Times*, 7 October 1938. Frank Roberts remembered that this caused much annoyance in the Foreign Office: Roberts, *Dealing with Dictators*, p. 29.

⁷⁵ TNA, FO 371/21570, C11899/2319/12, Newton to Halifax, 3 October 1938; TNA, FO 371/21570, C12001/2319/12, Newton to Halifax, 6 October 1938; TNA, FO 371/21570, C12081/2319/12, Newton to Halifax, 8 October 1938; TNA, FO 371/21570, C 11903/2319/12, Knox to Halifax, 9 October 1938.

⁷⁶ For instance, Knox's recommendation that Hungary should be left 'to be organised by the Germans', met with strong displeasure in the Foreign Office. The Southern department was furious with Knox, who was viewed to be the obstacle to the development of the Anglo-Hungarian relationship: TNA, FO 371/21571, C12586/2319/12, Knox to Halifax, 20 October 1938; minute by Mallet and Noble, 22 October 1938. Interestingly, London notified the Hungarians that Knox's negative opinion towards Hungary was not necessarily taken seriously: MOL, K 63, 11. cs., 1938-2/1, II., 115/pol. 1938, Marosy to Kánya, 9 September 1938.

disputed territories. The Hungarians contested the 1930 Czechoslovak census, which was favourable for Slovak claims, but the Slovaks contested the 1910 Austro-Hungarian census, which was more acceptable to the Hungarians. Viewpoints had arguably come closer, but authority over the larger cities, such as Pozsony [Bratislava], Nyitra [Nitra], Kassa [Košice], Ungvár [Uzhhorod] and Munkács [Mukachevo] divided the parties.⁷⁷ Throughout the negotiations, the Hungarians relinquished very little of their original demands for territories with a 51 percent Magyar majority. Similarly to the British view, Budapest clung to the 51 percent rule in order to harmonise with the Munich idea.⁷⁸

Whitehall desired a peaceful agreement, therefore, when negotiations broke down, Halifax instructed Newton to apply pressure on the Slovaks to assent to the ethnographic demands of Hungary.⁷⁹ To solve the deadlock, Mussolini and Ciano proposed a new four power conference, which was rejected by Hitler. Afterwards, due to firm German pressure, negotiations resumed. This German intervention had a crucial impact on British policy. It signalled that Hitler wished to solve the dispute alone, something the British readily accepted. Consequently, to avoid disagreements with Berlin, London gave up supporting four power arbitration.⁸⁰ Subsequently, the British hastened the conclusion of an agreement and strong pressure was applied on Prague to satisfy moderate Hungarian demands.⁸¹

At the end of October, the negotiation reached its second, and now final deadlock. Horthy and Kánya both insisted on four-power arbitration as they believed

⁷⁷ For the numerous Hungarian demands and Slovak counter-offers during the negotiations; see: Sallai, *Az első bécsi döntés*, pp. 278-279.

⁷⁸ Macartney argued that after Munich the Hungarians gave up claiming the entire territory of Slovakia, and demanded only an ethnographic frontier, in respect for the British opinion: Macartney, *October Fifteenth*, p. 250. Hungarian primary sources and recent historical analysis have proved that although Budapest was responsive to alleged British opinion, but most crucially wanted to follow the Munich idea dictated by Berlin. Also, Budapest shelved its more radical claims, because was convinced that in the long-run Slovakia would join Hungary by its own choice due to economic reasons: MOL K 27, Minisztertanácsi Jegyzőkönyvek, 13 October 1938; see also: I. Janek, 'Magyar törekvések a Felvidék megszerzésére 1938-ban', pp. 37-66.

⁷⁹ DIMK II, 503: Barcza to Kánya, 11 October 1938. Barcza later claimed that the British applied pressure on the Slovaks due to his influence: MOL, K 63, 11. cs., 1938-2/1, I., 159/pol. 1938, Barcza to Csáky, 14 December 1938. The evidence however clarify that during October-November the British supported the ethnographic principle in order to follow the Munich idea.

⁸⁰ Noble's minute is telling: 'Until we don't know the German point of view, we can't appeal to a four power conference': TNA, FO 371/21571, C12666/2319/12, minute by Noble, 22 October 1938.

⁸¹ DIMK II, 548: Barcza to Kánya, 17 October 1938; DBFP ser. 3. vol. 3. 227: Cadogan to Krofta, 17 October 1938. In his diaries Cadogan showed evident annoyance towards Hungarian demands: 'Barcza with a map to show me what his beastly government are claiming. Not so bad as I thought.': *The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan*, 17 September 1938.

that it would provide permanence.⁸² Officially, Prague and Budapest jointly applied for German-Italian arbitration, instead of a four-power conference, but historians so far have been unsure of how this scenario came about. New evidence suggests that the Germans persuaded Budapest to give up insisting on a four power arbitration.⁸³ Be that as it may, the British were satisfied to be left out of the arbitration and Ciano was informed that London welcomed a German-Italian decision in the Hungarian-Slovak dispute.⁸⁴

The Munich Agreement changed British policy towards Hungary in many ways. Compared to the viewpoint of historiography, London was not disinterested in Hungary after Munich. British policy towards Hungary after Munich essentially worked in two dimensions; firstly strong official support for finding a peaceful solution for the Hungarian-Slovak dispute, and active debates on the future of Hungary, Slovakia and Ruthenia in Whitehall, which suggested that London aimed to create stability in the region. In order to achieve this London supported the creation of ethnographic frontiers. The other dimension of the problem is the German factor, which restricted room for manoeuvre and decision. As the primary aim in Europe was to avoid conflict with Germany, supporting ethnicity depended upon this. However, quite conveniently for Britain, in October 1938, Germany momentarily also advocated the creation of ethnographic frontiers in the region. Therefore, the long standing British tradition of supporting justice and stability coincided with London's strategic interest in the region. When Hitler rejected four-power arbitration, British policy shifted, but only in order to harmonise itself to German interests. As a result of this, the 80 percent rule, advocated before Munich was forgotten and London seemed to accept the adjustment of the Hungarian-Slovak frontier on the basis of a bare majority.

⁸² MOL K 27, Minisztertanácsi Jegyzőkönyvek, 13 October 1938. Horthy appealed for British support in a personal letter to Chamberlain: *Horthy Miklós titkos iratai*, ed. by M. Szinai and L. Szűcs, (Budapest 1962), pp. 179-180. In his reply, Chamberlain supported the ethnographic frontiers and a decision in accordance with the Munich powers, but said nothing about British arbitration: DIMK II, 603: Chamberlain's letter to Horthy, 28 October 1938.

⁸³ George Ogilvie-Forbes, the counsellor of the British embassy in Berlin reported that Ribbentrop suggested that the Hungarians had to be pressured to give up their idea for a Munich style arbitration: TNA, FO 371/21573, C13751/2319/12, Ogilvie-Forbes to Halifax, 27 October 1938.

⁸⁴ TNA, FO 371/21572, C12924/2319/12, Halifax to Perth (Rome), 25 October 1938; *Palazzo Chigi*, 190: Attolicio (Berlin) to Ciano, 26 October 1938.

2.6 The British reaction to the First Vienna Award

Germany and Italy, seeking a non-violent way to end the territorial dispute between Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia, decided to settle the question through an arbitrated decision, which became known as the First Vienna Award.⁸⁵ This decision claimed to apply the ethnographic criteria, and it ceded the southern strip of Slovakia and Ruthenia to Hungary (map 2.7). It transferred approximately 10,000 square kilometers of territory and 1 million inhabitants.⁸⁶ The arbiters based their decision on the 1910 Hungarian census, because they disputed the data of the more recent Czechoslovak census of 1930. According to the 1910 Hungarian census, 80 percent of the population was Magyar, while the 1930 Czechoslovak one claimed a 55 percent Magyar majority.

Britain and France did not take part in the arbitration. In order to understand the British reaction to the award, firstly the British opinion on the population statistics of the territory have to be considered. We have pointed out that in formulating the '80 percent rule', British policy-makers used the 1930 Czechoslovak census because it was considered more representative than the 1910 Hungarian poll. The Foreign Office argued that the latter intentionally provided inaccurate information by manipulating the data collecting methods.⁸⁷ However, when it became clear in London that a solution to the Hungarian-Slovak dispute would be dictated by Germany, the Foreign Office decided to accept the German decision to base the arbitration on the 1910 Hungarian census.⁸⁸

London gave a very positive official reaction to the award. Chamberlain in the

⁸⁵ The First Vienna Award has recently triggered intense disagreement between Hungarian and Slovak historians. Hungarian historians are eager to point out that the award was a balanced decision and was made on the basis of ethnicity. Slovak scholars on the other hand view the decision as the starting point of a 7 year long Hungarian occupation. On both sides, the literature of the subject is vast, however, the followings offer a good starting point: L. Deák, *Viedenská arbitráž - "Mníchov pre Slovensko"* (Bratislava 1998); Sallai, *Az első bécsi döntés*. The author himself personally experienced this disheartening nationalistic attitude at an international conference in Šurany in 2011; see: *Juh Slovenska po Viedeňskej arbitráži 1938 – 1945*, ed. by J. Mitáč (Bratislava, 2011).

⁸⁶ The new frontier provided numerous anomalies. It did not strictly follow the ethnographic dividing line between Hungarians and Slovaks, and it also separated economically coherent regions, and cut numerous roads and railways. See particularly: Sallai, *Az első bécsi döntés*, pp. 153-173.

⁸⁷ TNA, FO 371/21571, C12848/2319/12, minute by Mallet, 25 October 1938; minute by Lancelot Oliphant, 26 October 1938. The 1910 Hungarian census disregarded questions on the 'nationality' of citizens, and instead it asked for the 'most commonly spoken language'. Being the official language of Hungary, Hungarian was commonly spoken by most of the nationality groups of Hungary in 1910. Asking for the 'most commonly spoken language', instead of 'nationality', the census provided controversial information.

⁸⁸ TNA, FO 371/21572, C12924/2319/12, minute by Oliphant, 26 October 1938.

House of Commons, and Halifax in the House of Lords both welcomed the award, but they did not recognise it *de jure*.⁸⁹ Cabinet documents also prove that Chamberlain and Halifax readily accepted the new frontiers, as they were in concert with the Munich Agreement. A. N. Noble and William Strang in the Foreign Office also praised the agreement on the same grounds.⁹⁰ Ignác Romsics has argued that Churchill similarly welcomed the decision. However, it seems that Churchill shared the distaste of most of the key British policy-makers towards Magyarisation in the 19th century, and admitted that he was glad that Hungary did not receive large numbers of non-Magyars.⁹¹

The Southern department nonetheless voiced its doubt. Noble recognised that a rough decision was made, which did not satisfy either side.⁹² London however seemed to accept the 1910 census as the basis of the decision. In a lengthy document, in which Mallet summarised British policy towards the new frontier, he noted that it was ethnographically acceptable, all the more so, as large numbers of non-Magyars were not transferred to Hungary. According to both the 1910 and 1930 censuses, the population of the Vienna Award territory had a Magyar majority, hence British recognition of its ethnographic character seems to be less important than the second part of Mallet's argument. The British disapproval of ceding non-Magyars to Hungary became a recurring argument in Whitehall in the future against more extensive revision. This argument would have crucial implications for the British perceptions on Hungarian claims in Ruthenia, Transylvania and the northern parts of Yugoslavia later, because none of these territories had an outright Hungarian majority.

The same document suggests that immediately after Munich, different strategic alternatives appeared. Mallet noted that when it became clear that in one way or another Germany would dominate Czecho-Slovakia, London recognised that checking German eastward penetration would be possible in Slovakia by supporting Slovak independence,

⁸⁹ *Hansard* (Commons), vol. 353, p. 122, 4 November 1938; *Hansard* (Lords), vol. 110, p. 1622, 4 November 1938. The appendix of the Munich agreement declared that if the Hungarian-Slovak negotiation would fail to provide a satisfactory outcome, a new four power conference would decide in the dispute. Chamberlain interpreted the Hungarian-Slovak appeal for German-Italian arbitration as the successful outcome of the negotiation, which consequently relieved Britain from taking part in the arbitration. It is critical to note that Chamberlain gave this explanation in order to show that the British government were still following the Munich idea.

⁹⁰ TNA, CAB 23/96, Cabinet Conclusions 53 (38), 7 November 1938; TNA, FO 371/21572, C13476/2319/12, minute by Noble, 3 November 1938, minute by Strang, 4 November 1938.

⁹¹ I. Romsics, *Magyar sorsfordulók 1920–1989* (Budapest 2012), p. 62; compare to: MOL, K 63, 15. cs., 1939-2/7, I., 172/pol. 1939, Marosy to Csaky, 23 December 1938. Miklós Lojkó also stressed that Churchill rejected the First Vienna Award in late 1938: Lojkó, 'Churchill, Eden and Hungary', pp. 217-236.

⁹² TNA, FO 371/21572, C13331/2319/12, minute by Noble 3 November 1938.

or by dividing Slovakia between Hungary and Poland. The wording of Mallet's notes is very vague, but it sheds a fresh light on British perceptions towards Central Europe and Hungary's territorial claims. It proves that London was interested in the region, and out of strategic interests a complete reversal of British policy was considered. This alternative eventually fell victim to British weakness in the region; London relied on French and Romanian support to realise this strategy, but they disapproved this alternative. British policy therefore took a very different direction. Consequently, it was decided to discourage the creation of a common Hungarian-Polish frontier by the Hungarian occupation of Ruthenia because it would be a weak barrier against German expansion,⁹³ and it was hoped that British disinterest towards Ruthenia would direct German attention to the province and away from Western Europe.⁹⁴

Consequently, the Hungarians were told that claims in Ruthenia could not be supported, as they were not justified ethnographically.⁹⁵ Mallet's note had however proved that British eyes were not closed to frontier revision on bases other than ethnographic ones, and the official British declaration of 'no support' was only the result of strategic considerations. As a result, Britain was indifferent towards Hungary's persistent attempts to acquire Ruthenia. The Vienna Award only transferred the southern part of Ruthenia to Hungary, which was inhabited by Magyars. Hungary however did not give up its aspirations for the entire region, something which Poland fully supported.⁹⁶ London was fully aware of these plans, but the Cabinet expressed complete disinterest and decided to accept any future German policy on Ruthenia.⁹⁷ A Hungarian occupation was planned for the end of November, but the strong German objection quickly upset the scheme.

The reaction of the British press to the Vienna Award provides an intriguing

⁹³ TNA, FO 371/21573, C 13549/2319/12, minute by Mallet, December 1938.

⁹⁴ TNA, FO 371/21573, C13549/2319/12, minute by Mallet, 10 November 1938. Since the Sudeten crisis, Hungary and Poland aspired to create a common frontier in Ruthenia. On the one hand Budapest and Warsaw viewed the common frontier as a strategic advantage against Germany, but the centuries long friendship of the two nations were also considered important in this claim.

⁹⁵ MOL, K 63, 11. cs., 1938-2/1, I., 4467/pol. 1938, Barcza to Csáky, 29 December 1938; TNA, FO 371/22373, R 10213/97/21, minute by Ralph Murray, 3 January 1939; minute by Nichols, 5 January 1939; minute by Rab Butler, 11 January 1939.

⁹⁶ See: J. Kasparek, 'Poland's 1938 Covert Operations in Ruthenia', *East European Quarterly* 34 (1989), pp. 365–373.

⁹⁷ TNA, FO 371/21573, C14295/2319/12, Knox to Halifax, 20 November 1938; TNA, CAB 23/96, Cabinet Conclusions 56 (38), 22 November 1938.

image of perplexity, lack of background knowledge, and the unmistakable evidence of external influence. Lajos Arday has suggested that in the 1930s, Hungary as a subject, appeared in the British press only through the influence of politicians or other influential personalities.⁹⁸ Indeed, there is strong evidence that background information were supplied, or entire articles were written by outsiders, who were keen to determine the tone of the press on Hungary. For example, Hungarian sources prove that the distinctively pro-Hungarian articles of Rothermere's *Daily Mail* were suggested directly by the Hungarian Legation and Stephanie Hohenlohe, Rothermere's Hungarian mistress.⁹⁹ The *Daily Mail* welcomed the Vienna Award, and described it a just decision which finally remedied the glaring errors of Trianon. Horthy's entry into Komárom [Komárno] and Kassa [Košice] was lauded as the heroic culmination of Hungary's decade-long revisionist struggle.¹⁰⁰ In contrast, Beaverbrook's *Daily Express* evidently aimed to minimise the relevance of the award for Britain. With a mildly sarcastic tone it mocked the petty quarrel between Hungarians and Slovaks.¹⁰¹ *The Times* and the *Daily Telegraph* hit a more impartial tone, but their choice of words suggested their faint disapproval.¹⁰² There is evidence that the Foreign Office directly intervened to influence the press. In mid-October, Cadogan noted to Barcza that in accordance with British official policy, press editors were instructed to write about the Hungarian-Slovak territorial dispute only from the minority and ethnographic perspective, and were told to disregard economic, historical or other basis for frontier revision.¹⁰³ Accordingly, *The Times* and the *Daily Telegraph* declared that Britain supported only the ethnic

⁹⁸ L. Arday, 'Magyarország és Nagy-Britannia diplomáciai kapcsolatai' in *Az Egyesült Királyság és Magyarország: Nagy-Britannia és a Magyar-Angol kapcsolatok a 20. században*, ed. by L. Arday (Budapest, 2005), pp. 47-148 (pp. 68-72).

⁹⁹ MOL, K 63, 10. cs., 1937-2/7, 92/pol. 1937, Masirevich to Kánya, 21 June 1937; MOL, K 64, 1936, II., 786/res. pol., Masirevich to Kánya, 9 December 1936. In his memoirs, Rothermere openly admitted his support for Hungarian revisionism: Rothermere: *My Campaign for Hungary*. Collin Brooks, the close associate of Rothermere also mentions Rothermere's Hungarian contacts: *Collin Brooks, Fleet Street, Press Barons and Politics: The Journals of Collin Brooks, 1932-1940*, ed. by N. J. Crowson (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 164, 173, 220-227. For Stephanie Hohenlohe, see: M. Schad, *Hitler's Spy Princess* (London, 2004).

¹⁰⁰ 'Horthy in Slovakia', *Daily Mail*, 9 November 1938; 'Cheering for the Regent in Kassa', 11 November 1938. Intriguingly, the First Vienna Award frontier was very similar to the so called 'Rothermere line', a frontier recommended by the lord in 1926. Rothermere was personally present at Horthy's entry into Kassa [Košice].

¹⁰¹ 'Czech cities ceded', *Daily Express*, 14 November 1938.

¹⁰² 'Hungarian-Slovak dispute resolved', *The Times*, 11 November 1938; 'Ceded territories', *Daily Telegraph*, 9 November 1938.

¹⁰³ MOL, K 63 1938-2/1, 159., Cadogan to Barcza, 5 October 1938; HIA, Barcza, Diaries, 6 October 1938, Box 0008.

criteria.¹⁰⁴ On the other hand, the documents of the Press Department of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry establish that during September and October pro-Hungarian British personalities, such as Lord Newton, a member of the House of Lords, Sir Robert Gower, a Labour MP, and the historian Macartney were persuaded by the Hungarian Legation to submit pro-revisionist open letters to the press, in order to influence both the opinion of press editors and the British public.¹⁰⁵

Influences from outside Fleet Street evidently had a strong impact on the tone of the press on Hungary, but their impact on the public remains highly questionable.¹⁰⁶ This brief analysis of the reaction of the British press to the Vienna Award demonstrates how easy it was to manipulate the tone of papers on Central European territorial disputes, which were mostly unknown to both editors and the public.

Opinion at the official level was also diverse, but for very different reasons. A memorandum, initialled by Halifax reflects hesitation and the contrast between desires and feasibility. On the one hand it recognised the recent political and economic changes of the region as inevitable and beneficial,¹⁰⁷ but on the other, it expressed the view that the containment of Germany was highly desirable in the region. The document pointed out that the primary British aim was to prevent Germany acquiring the raw materials of the region. The memorandum noted only generalities about Hungary. It declared British support for any moderate Hungarian government, but pointed to Hungary's political and economic instability and weakness in the geographical proximity of Germany. Nevertheless, it recommended the extension of Anglo-Hungarian trade.¹⁰⁸ An attached report, written by Leith-Ross, the chief economic advisor to the Cabinet, confirms that although there was political will to confront Germany in the region and to give more support to Hungary, it was impossible due to British military and economic weakness. Leith-Ross claimed that Hungary was already in the German economic orbit, and

¹⁰⁴ 'Hungary', *The Times*, 19 October 1938; 'Magyars in Slovakia', *Daily Telegraph*, 25 October 1938.

¹⁰⁵ MOL, K 66, (without number), L. Sima, 'The Hungarian-Czech problem in the British press', 10 October 1938; Lord Newton, 'Grievances of Minorities', *The Times*, 7 October 1938; Sir Robert Gower, 'Letters on the Munich agreement', *Manchester Guardian*, 4 October; C. A. Macartney, 'The Question of Revision', *Contemporary Review*, December 1938.

¹⁰⁶ Newspapers were an important source of information even for the Foreign Office. Therefore it is more important to analyse, how articles affected the views of Whitehall on Hungary. As we will see, after the outbreak of the war, particularly *The Times* often went against British official policy on Hungary, which then sparked intense debates in the Foreign Office.

¹⁰⁷ It is very unclear what Halifax meant here. In most likelihood, he argued for the benefits of the reorganisation of the region on the ethnographic basis, namely the Anschluss, the Munich Agreement and the First Vienna Award.

¹⁰⁸ TNA, CAB 24/280, Halifax, 'Central and South Eastern Europe', 10 November 1938.

accordingly the Ministry of Agriculture and the Board of Trade advised against extending Anglo-Hungarian trade.¹⁰⁹

Paul Hehn and David Kaiser have also argued that regardless of the political will, there was a noticeable economic disinterest towards extending trade with Central Europe at the end of the year, mostly due to the lack of financial and industrial means to counter German positions.¹¹⁰ Barcza's impressions were similar; he reported British reluctance to purchase petroleum from Romania and wheat from Hungary.¹¹¹ Cadogan noted the same indifference in his diaries.¹¹²

From early 1939 the situation changed slightly. The Board of Trade became more interested in trading with the region, but a political decision was slow to follow.¹¹³ Kaiser has argued that golden opportunities were missed due to the lack of a clear and coordinated strategy.¹¹⁴ The first sign of change in the political sphere was an extra £10 million provision for commercial credits. On the priority list of the Committee of Imperial Defence the first country was Belgium, Yugoslavia 10th, Romania 11th and Bulgaria 12th, but Hungary was not on the list.¹¹⁵ Newly granted commercial credits were the indicators of increasing British interest towards a country, but Hungary's absence from the list confirms its low priority in British economic policy. On Halifax's advice, Chamberlain finally agreed to buy 200, 000 tonnes of Romanian wheat out of

¹⁰⁹ TNA, CAB 24/280, Leith-Ross, 'Interim Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on Central and South Eastern Europe', 26 October 1938. It has to be pointed out here that until the outbreak of the war quite interestingly the Foreign Office had no influence on policies and negotiation about foreign trade. It was under the control of the Board of Trade.

¹¹⁰ P. N. Hehn, *A Low and Dishonest Decade, the great powers, Eastern Europe, and the economic origins of World War II, 1930-1941* (New York, 2006), pp. 135-139, 307-309; Kaiser, *Economic Diplomacy and the Origins of the Second World War*, p. 290. A crucial factor in the lack of British economic interest towards Central Europe was the 1932 British Empire Economic Conference (also known as the Ottawa Conference), which established a zone of limited tariffs within the British Empire, but high tariffs with the rest of the world. This was called 'Imperial preference' on the principle of 'home producers first, empire producers second, and foreign producers last': R. A. MacKay, 'Imperial Economics at Ottawa', *Pacific Affairs* 25 (1932), pp. 873-885. Moreover, in November 1938 a British-American trade pact allowed the United States to sell its wheat surplus, duty and tax free, in Britain. These factors diminished British interest to buy large quantities of agricultural products from Central Europe.

¹¹¹ DIMK. III, 77: Barcza to Kánya, 24 November 1938.

¹¹² 'We don't want the damned stuff (wheat).': *The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan*, 17 October 1938.

¹¹³ TNA, BT 11/1073, minute by Fraser, 7 June 1939. According to Barcza, Oliver Stanley, the President of the Board of Trade from 1937-40, was particularly interested in extending British trade with Hungary: Barcza, *Diplomataemlékeim*, p. 368.

¹¹⁴ Kaiser, *Economic Diplomacy*, pp. 91, 183, 284.

¹¹⁵ Kaiser, *Economic Diplomacy*, p. 293. An arms-export priority list was also compiled, on which Yugoslavia was the 7th, Poland 13th and Romania 14th, with Egypt topping the list, but Hungary's name did not appear on this record either: Kaiser, *Economic Diplomacy*, pp. 82-86.

the 1.7 million tonnes of the total Romanian surplus.¹¹⁶ He only agreed to buy a small amount, because he was concerned that a spike in Anglo-Romanian trade would provoke Germany. Hungary also offered its total surplus of 1 million tons of wheat to Britain in early 1939, but it was rejected.¹¹⁷ This clarifies that in the first months of 1939 Britain was in no position to challenge Germany's trade and economic positions in the region. Kaiser however has argued that these purchases were only political assurances, so called 'political purchases', of British interest towards the region.¹¹⁸ Trade statistics show a four-fold overall increase of British agricultural imports from the region, but despite this, Central Europe and the Balkans still accounted for only 8 percent of the total British agricultural imports in the first half of 1939. The position of Hungary, not surprisingly, looked even bleaker. Although British import nearly doubled from Hungary in a year, it still only accounted for 0.1 percent of the overall import.¹¹⁹

It is important to stress that Hungarian territorial aspirations in the region played no role in British economic policy towards Hungary. The underlying reason for Hungary's unfavourable position in British trade was Germany's dominant position in Hungary's economy. Trade with Germany accounted for 50 percent of both Hungary's imports and exports.¹²⁰ Henry Bruce attempted to exert influence on both the Board of Trade and the Foreign Office to consider the extension of Anglo-Hungarian trade, but his efforts were in vain.¹²¹

Often there is very little said about the foreign policy aims of the political opposition. Here it seems useful to highlight the perceptions of the British Labour Party towards Central Europe and frontier revision, particularly because it had a very strong emphasis on economic policy, and as a consequence of Munich it went through a radical transformation. Before Munich, Ralph Glynn, a Labour MP, was touring Central Europe in the name of pacifism. He noted to the Hungarians that frontier disputes were now the past and that Labour was contemplating a major reorganisation of the region along the

¹¹⁶ TNA, CAB/24/279, C. P. 226 (38), 'Purchase of Romanian wheat', 14 October 1938.

¹¹⁷ Macartney, *October Fifteenth*, p. 353.

¹¹⁸ Kaiser, *Economic Diplomacy*, pp. 290-293.

¹¹⁹ Kaiser, *Economic Diplomacy*, p. 320.

¹²⁰ For a thorough analysis of Anglo-Hungarian trade and the dominating economic role of Germany in Hungary, see: Gy. Ránki, *Gazdaság és külpolitika, a nagyhatalmak harca a délkelet-európai gazdasági hegemoniáért, 1919-1939* (Budapest, 1981); Gy. Ránki, *A Harmadik Birodalom árnyékában* (Budapest, 1988).

¹²¹ Bruce assured the Foreign Office of Teleki's trustworthiness: TNA, FO 800/318, Bruce to Hudson (on microfilm) 1 April 1939, pp. 121-122.

lines of economic cooperation between the Danubian states.¹²² Soon however, Hugh Dalton, the Labour foreign policy spokesman, moved the party away from pacifism to a policy of the armed deterrence of Germany. Dalton stressed that the Hungarian occupation of Ruthenia would provide strategic advantages for Britain in the effort to stop further German expansion. Dalton also proposed the open cooperation of Britain, France, the Soviet Union, Poland, Romania, Greece and Turkey, but his motion was ignored and he was unable to assert influence on British policy.¹²³

British official reaction to the First Vienna Award was determined by the same strategic interest which defined British policy towards the Sudeten question and the Hungarian-Slovak negotiations, namely that decisions on Central European questions had to be adjusted to the interests of Germany. New evidence has demonstrated that although there was a political will to block Germany's eastwards expansion, it was hampered by British military and economic inadequacies. The official British opinion on the Vienna Award would go through a significant transformation in the coming years, therefore we shall return to the subject at a later stage.

¹²² MOL, K 63, 12. cs., 1938-2/7, I., 131/pol. 1938, Marosy to Kánya, 6 October 1938. The foreign policy of the Labour towards Central Europe and Hungary in the 1930s is an under-researched area. For a general overview of the foreign policy of the Labour Party in the inter-war period, see: M. R. Gordon, *Conflict and Consensus in Labour's Foreign Policy, 1914-1965* (Stanford, 1969), pp. 45-83.

¹²³ MOL, K 63, 15. cs., 1939-2/7, I., 172/pol. 1939, Marosy to Csáky, 23 December 1938; Gillard, *Appeasement in Crisis*, p. 67.

2.7 From Vienna to Ruthenia

Between November 1938 and the final destruction of Czecho-Slovakia in March 1939, British policy towards Central Europe and the Balkans went through a significant transformation. Policy-makers were divided on which course to follow, but the continuous development of British armed strength allowed more flexibility in decision-making. As we have noted, due to strategic considerations London yielded to German interests at the Munich Conference and at the Vienna Award. London also acquiesced in the German economic domination of Central and South East Europe. However, when Germany aimed to completely squeeze Britain out of its economic positions, and increased its own political influence in the region, British policy changed.

Increasing German penetration into the region deeply alarmed Whitehall and sharply divided policy-makers. Halifax gave up the Danube region strategically and was convinced that Germany would not be satisfied with an informal economic empire in the region. Therefore, he recommended accelerating British rearmament, in order to be in a better position to protect vital interests in the Mediterranean.¹²⁴ Laurence Collier, the head of the Northern department similarly predicted that Germany would soon completely dominate Central Europe. Cadogan also took a gloomier viewpoint, and projected that due to British military weakness, the whole region would be lost to Germany. Sargent agreed with Cadogan, and stressed that the Danubian countries had no strategic interest for Britain. Aston-Gwatkin, the head of the economic section of the Western department, was ready to accept German domination in the Danubian states, in return for the assurance of British positions in Greece and Turkey.¹²⁵ In contrast, Frank Roberts, a senior official of the Central department remained the sole idealist; he called for an active policy in the region and noted that Britain should not make deals at the expense of the possession of Central European nations.¹²⁶

These differences however were quickly resolved. A Joint Planning Committee (JPC) report in January 1939 recommended that a British failure to intervene would have serious moral and political repercussions, which would seriously undermine

¹²⁴ TNA, FO 371/21659, C 14471/42/18, Halifax, 'British Strategy', 25 November 1938; DBFP, ser. 3, vol. 3, 285; Halifax to Kennedy (American ambassador in London), 12 October 1938.

¹²⁵ Gillard, *Appeasement in Crisis*, pp. 21-23.

¹²⁶ Gillard, *Appeasement in Crisis*, pp. 76-77.

British reputation in the world, and would likely to deprive Britain of later support in its struggle against Germany and Japan.¹²⁷ This report was taken very seriously by the Foreign Policy Committee (FPC) and the Cabinet, but it has to be stressed that strategic implications were considered to be more decisive than the moral consequences.¹²⁸ Reports of the immediate German invasion of Holland and the rumour of an aerial knockout blow against Britain further increased Whitehall's concerns. According to Gillard, these were the key factors in making the decision that Germany had to be deterred.¹²⁹ The Chiefs of Staff recommended that the opinion of the Dominions were crucial in this context, but historians have recently proved that neither domestic and political pressures nor the opinion of the Dominions were considered crucial in the decision to deter Germany in Central Europe.¹³⁰

In Budapest, the euphoria of the First Vienna Award left very few caring about the opinion of London. The revisionist hysteria, which was partly fuelled by the government, created a dangerous spiral of relentless public demand for further territorial gains. This left Hungary in an unstable internal and external condition; the failure to achieve further revision could have swept the Imrédy government away.¹³¹ Barcza also welcomed the Vienna Award, but was deeply alarmed by the blindness of the Hungarian government and public. His conversations with Imrédy and the new Foreign Minister István Csáky convinced him that Hungary was crumbling under immense German pressure. What he considered more alarming was that Imrédy and Csáky evidently were not concerned with British opinion, and they stressed to Barcza that improving the Anglo-Hungarian relationship was no longer a priority.¹³² Macartney claimed that the reason for Imrédy's sudden turn towards a pro-German policy was information received from the City, which declared that due to the implementation of

¹²⁷ TNA, CAB 53/44, Chiefs of Staff (COS) memorandums, 830 (JPC), 24 January 1939.

¹²⁸ The question of the 'loss of credibility' in relation to appeasement has been studied by D. G. Press from the broad geographical perspective of the British Empire. A similar analysis has not been made by historians in a Central European and Balkan context, which could clarify how important strategic consideration were in British regional policy, see: D. G. Press, 'The Credibility of Power Assessing Threats during the Appeasement Crises of the 1930s', *International Security* 119 (2004/2005), pp. 136-169.

¹²⁹ Gillard, *Appeasement in Crisis*, pp. 86, 90, 93, 111.

¹³⁰ For the Chiefs of Staff report, see: Parker, *Chamberlain and Appeasement*, pp. 190-191; compare to: E. M. Andrews, *Isolationism & Appeasement in Australia - Reactions to the European Crises, 1935-1939* (London, 1970), p. 70; T. L. Lewis, *Prisms of British Appeasement, Revisionist reputation of John Simon, Samuel Hoare, Anthony Eden, Lord Halifax, Alfred Duff Cooper* (Eastbourne, 2011), p. 104.

¹³¹ M. Ormos, *Magyarország a két világháború korában*, pp. 195-196; Zeidler, *A revíziós gondolat*, p. 85.

¹³² HIA, Barcza, Diaries, 20 January 1939, Box 0009.

the First Anti-Jewish Law, it withdrew its support from Imrédy.¹³³ However, the disapproval of the City was not the most important factor in the formulation of British policy. The Foreign Office did not share these views, and until Imrédy resigned in early 1939 it supported him, as the alternative was an openly pro-German government.

Barcza nevertheless did not feel disheartened and continued making relentless efforts to improve relations with London. He contacted Dingli, his link with Chamberlain.¹³⁴ Barcza stressed to Chamberlain that Knox, the British Minister in Budapest was a barrier to the development of good Anglo-Hungarian relations, as he was strongly prejudiced against Hungary. In his reply Chamberlain conveyed his goodwill and assured Barcza that the replacement of Knox was already being contemplated. Barcza's efforts were constantly supported by William Goode. Goode proved to be extremely influential in Whitehall; in February, he brought Barcza and Sir Joseph Ball, the propaganda chief of the Conservative Party and intimate advisor of Chamberlain, together. Ball also forwarded Chamberlain's understanding towards Hungary and asked for trust in the growing power of Britain. For Barcza's continued insistence, Ball promised that Knox would soon be replaced.¹³⁵ Barcza's initiative seemed to advance Knox's removal, as he was replaced with Owen O'Malley in less than two months.¹³⁶ It is crucial to stress the importance of this British diplomatic move. The replacement of Knox, whose aversion to Hungary was disliked by the Foreign Office, with O'Malley, who, as an influential figure in the Southern department was already well known for supporting an active British policy towards Central Europe, is a definite sign that London was interested in the development of Anglo-Hungarian relationship.

This new wave of British interest towards Central Europe and Hungary was the result of the recent increase in British military strength. Historians have intensely

¹³³ Macartney, *October Fifteenth*, pp. 327-328. Both Marosy, the first secretary of the Hungarian legation in London, and Barcza reported the same about the City's attitude: MOL, K 63, 15. cs., 1939-2/1, II., Marosy to Csáky, 23 December 1938; HIA, Barcza, Diaries, 20 January 1939, Box 0009; see also: P. Sipos, *Imrédy Béla és a Magyar Megújulás Pártja* (Budapest 1970). The First Anti-Jewish Law was promulgated on 29 May 1938. It restricted the number of Jews in certain professions, such as in commercial enterprises, in the press, among doctors and lawyers to 20 percent.

¹³⁴ W. C. Mills, 'Sir Joseph Ball, Andrian Dingli, and Neville Chamberlain's 'Secret Channel' to Italy, 1937-1940', *The International History Review* 98 (2002), pp. 278-317.

¹³⁵ HIA, Barcza, Diaries, 14 February 1939, Box 0009.

¹³⁶ HIA, Barcza, Diaries, 20 January 1939, Box 0009; compare to: MOL, K 63 1938-2/1, 115., 'The weakening position of Knox', December 1938.

debated the burden of imperial defence and continental commitment, and also the conflict between rearmament and strict fiscal policy.¹³⁷ Regardless of the fact that Britain was indeed militarily overstretched, the speeding up of rearmament gave more elbowroom for foreign policy. This was clearly reflected in the British attitude towards Central Europe and Hungary. 'Rab' Butler, the Under secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and Cadogan, confidentially told Barcza in February that due to its increased strength, Britain would support the Hungarian occupation of Ruthenia and the creation of the Hungarian-Polish common frontier, something London had discouraged earlier because of the German veto. Macartney argued that the Foreign Office recognised Hungary's historic and economic claims for Ruthenia, but new evidence proves that there were only strategic reasons behind this shift in British policy.¹³⁸

On the other hand, in early 1939 confidence in Hungary was severely shaken by the fact that Budapest acceded to the Anti-Comintern Pact, the agreement between Germany, Italy and Japan against the Communist International, but which was essentially viewed by London as a German alliance system. Both Bán and Macartney failed to recognise the impact of Hungary's adhesion on British opinion.¹³⁹ Officially, Britain did not condemn Hungary's adherence, but Cabinet documents clarify that the Hungarian action had a significant impact on British judgement of Hungary. Whitehall was convinced that politically and militarily Hungary was now dominated by Germany.¹⁴⁰ Most importantly, Hungary's pro-German policy turned British strategy in the Balkans up-side-down, which also accounted for the deteriorating British view. Since the Munich crisis, London was aiming to facilitate a rapprochement between Bulgaria and Romania, to strengthen the cooperation of the Balkans against Germany. For this reason, Romania was pressured to return Southern Dobruja to Bulgaria, which Bucharest acquired after the Great War. However, as a result of Hungary's entry into the Anti-Comintern Pact, Halifax was convinced that this would now be impossible,

¹³⁷ The literature on this area is vast; see particularly: G. C. Peden, *British Rearmament and the Treasury, 1932-39* (Edinburgh, 1979); B. Bond, *British Military Policy between the Two World Wars* (Oxford, 1980); P. Neville, 'Lord Vansittart, Sir Walford Selby and the Debate about Treasury Interference in the Conduct of British Foreign Policy in the 1930s', *Journal of Contemporary History* 148 (1984), pp. 623-633; J. P. Levy, *Appeasement & Rearmament: Britain 1936-1939* (London, 2006).

¹³⁸ Macartney, *October Fifteenth*, p. 333; MOL, K 63, 15. cs., 1939-2/1, I., 5209/1939, Barcza to Csáky, 18 February 1939.

¹³⁹ Macartney, *October Fifteenth*, pp. 318-319; Bán, *Hungarian-British Diplomacy 1938-41*, p. 56.

¹⁴⁰ TNA, WO 190/747, 'Report on Hungary to the Cabinet, after Hungary joined the Anti-Comintern Pact in January 1939', n. d.

because it would immediately trigger Hungarian demands in Transylvania, something he was keen to avoid.¹⁴¹

By the end of 1938 it was decided in London that due to strategic reasons, further German expansion would have to be checked. As a result of the rearmament programme, policy-makers had more room for manoeuvre in the diplomatic sphere, and although senior officials judged that Central Europe would eventually fall under German supremacy, it was decided that deterring Germany in the region would be advantageous.

¹⁴¹ TNA, CAB 27/627, Halifax, 'Central and South-Eastern Europe', 30 January 1939; FO 417/39, R 712/126/7, Halifax to Rendel (Sofia), 16 February 1939.

2.8 British reaction to the Hungarian occupation of Ruthenia

When Germany marched into Prague on the Ides of March, simultaneously with the German aggression, Hungary occupied Ruthenia. London condemned the German aggression, but the Hungarian action was received with passive acceptance. The Hungarian occupation could not be justified by ethnographic claims, therefore it will be crucial to disentangle why London reacted positively to it.

As we have noted, Hungary's accession to the Anti-Comintern Pact deeply affected British perceptions of Hungary. Bán and Macartney both emphasized that the appointment of Teleki as Prime Minister in early 1939 was positively received in Whitehall. Truly, Teleki's appointment was attended by great expectations, because he was a well-known Anglophile, but Bán and Macartney were wrong in assuming that the replacement of the increasingly pro-German Imrédy instantly blew British suspicions away.¹⁴² The cordial reception of the Hungarian occupation of Ruthenia has to be viewed in this context, and should not be overstated.

The Slovak declaration of independence from Prague in mid-March had important implications for both British and Hungarian foreign policy. London declared earlier that a Slovak or Ruthenian declaration of independence would nullify all British commitments to Czecho-Slovakia.¹⁴³ It also offered an exit strategy to declaring war on Germany or Hungary, in response to the German occupation of Bohemia-Moravia and the Hungarian takeover of Ruthenia. At the same time, Slovak independence awakened Hungarian hopes for further territorial gains. Barcza inquired of the Foreign Office about the British attitude, but Cadogan retracted any earlier assurances of British understanding and noted that Hungary had to agree with Germany on the fate of Ruthenia.¹⁴⁴ It is apparent that although Ruthenia was strategically important for

¹⁴² Count Pál Teleki, the Premier of Hungary (1920-21, 1939-41) was a well-known and widely respected geography scholar. Later, Teleki's anti-Nazi policy indeed convinced London of his trustworthiness, but the change was not instant: Macartney, *October Fifteenth*, p. 362, 372, 375. For the development of the British opinion on Teleki, see: TNA, FO 417/39, C 2539/166/21, Gascoigne to Halifax, 27 February 1939; FO 800/318, Halifax papers, microfilm pp. 121-122; SEW 12/2/1, *Weekly Political intelligence Summary*, 31 October 1939; SEW 12/2/2, *Weekly Political intelligence Summary*, 16 April 1940.

¹⁴³ TNA, CAB 24/280, 'British Guarantee to Czechoslovakia', 12 November 1938.

¹⁴⁴ MOL, K 63 1939-33/a 414, Cadogan to Barcza 11 March 1939; Macartney, *October Fifteenth*, p. 333.

Britain, by the time the destruction of Czecho-Slovakia seemed imminent London did not desire to confront Germany over its future.

Hungary occupied Ruthenia between 15 and 18 March. In the Commons Chamberlain acknowledged the Hungarian action and expressed his reluctance to take any further action in the matter.¹⁴⁵ The Cabinet and the Foreign Office were reserved, as they were mainly concerned with German aggression, and because very little information was available about the situation in Ruthenia.¹⁴⁶ The fact that opinion could not be formulated before reports from the Budapest legation arrived, points to the dependence of the Foreign Office on diplomatic reports. This was particularly true for Hungary, where, compared to larger countries like Germany, the British intelligence and diplomatic presence was more limited. Because Ruthenia had economic ties with Hungary, Knox recommended the acceptance of the occupation. However he pointed out that the way Hungary had acquired the province was unacceptable.¹⁴⁷ Ágnes Beretzky claimed that the Foreign Office instructed the press to refrain from criticising the Hungarian action, and indeed, the occupation was hardly commented upon and only the German aggression was criticised.¹⁴⁸

London was more worried that tensions between Hungary and Romania, reawakened by the Hungarian take-over of Ruthenia, could plunge Europe into a war.¹⁴⁹ After the destruction of Czecho-Slovakia, due to deep seated mutual distrust, Hungary and Romania mobilised along their common frontier. The Hungarian-Romanian discord deeply concerned Whitehall, because it was believed that Germany would take

¹⁴⁵ *Hansard* (Commons), vol. 345, p. 632, Chamberlain's answer to Major Stautorn, 16 March 1939.

¹⁴⁶ At the Cabinet on the 15 March, Leslie Hore-Belisha, the Secretary of State for War noted that the Hungarian occupation was in the interest of Britain, but Chamberlain expressed that he did not wish to consider the matter any further: TNA, CAB 23/98, Cabinet Conclusions 11 (39), 15 March 1939. For Barcza's summary of the British reaction, see: MOL, K 63, 15. cs., 1939-2/7, I., 30/pol. 1939, Barcza to Csáky, 18 March 1939.

¹⁴⁷ TNA, FO 417/39, C 5188/71/21, Knox to Halifax, 7 April 1939.

¹⁴⁸ Beretzky does not disclose her source and no evidence was found about this instruction, see: Beretzky, *Scotus Viator és Macartney Elemér*, p. 105. 'Prague Occupied', *The Times*, 16 March 1939. In February, *The Times* was reporting on Hungary's righteous claims for Ruthenia: 'Hungary and Ruthenia', *The Times*, 21 February 1939.

¹⁴⁹ TNA, FO 371/23061, C 3665/3365/18, Halifax to Perth (Rome), 24 March 1939. Since Trianon, Hungary persistently contested Romanian authority over Transylvania. The successful revision of Hungary's northern frontier deeply alarmed Bucharest, and it was expected that Budapest would soon officially step up with claims in Romania.

advantage of the dispute to overrun both countries.¹⁵⁰ Although London applied pressure on both Hungary and Romania to demobilise, as a result of the recent evidence of Hungary's pro-German policy, the Foreign Office held Budapest responsible for the mobilization.¹⁵¹ Based on Romanian sources, Béni Balogh has suggested that there was a Polish-Romanian agreement to occupy the easternmost corner of Ruthenia before Hungarian troops could reach the area, because a railway line, which connected the two countries ran through this territory (map 2.8).¹⁵² Similar to its earlier attitude, the Foreign Office was indifferent about strengthening Romanian lines of communication and even refused to support the Romanian claims for a number of villages inhabited purely by Romanians (map 2.8), and advised Bucharest not to force its claims.¹⁵³

Ruthenia clearly was not the main issue in the Anglo-Hungarian relationship after the disappearance of Czecho-Slovakia. During an interview with Barcza, immediately after the Hungarian occupation, Sargent was more interested in Hungary's attitude towards future German aggression. He emphasised that Hungary would soon need to decide between an open alliance with Germany, willy-nilly collaboration, and resistance. Barcza gloomily reported to Budapest that Britain was not interested in Hungary at all, and British policy-makers only focused on these three alternatives in the judgement of Hungary.¹⁵⁴ These indeed became the main British criteria for assessing Hungary's attitude until the end of the 'Phoney War'. Hungary's official communications, the tone of the Hungarian press, policy towards Romania and Germany, and most importantly Hungarian territorial claims were judged from these perspectives.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵⁰ MI3 reported large-scale Hungarian and Romanian mobilisation and predicted a Hungarian-Romanian war: TNA, WO 190/765, MI3 information, 19 March 1939.

¹⁵¹ TNA, FO 371/23108 Foreign Office (unsigned) to Budapest, Bucharest and Warsaw, 21 March 1939; FO 371/23108, Knox to Foreign Office, 22 March 1939; Hoare to Foreign Office, 22 March 1939. *The Times* was also convinced that Hungary was responsible for escalating the tensions: 'Hungarian troop movements', *The Times*, 20 March 1939; 'Suspensions of Hungary', *The Times*, 23 March 1939; 'Rumania and the Crisis', *The Times*, 28 March 1939.

¹⁵² L. B. Balogh, *A magyar-román kapcsolatok 1939-1940-ben és a második bécsi döntés* (Csíkszereda, 2002), p. 57. See also: TNA, WO 106/5387, Kennard to Halifax, 19 March 1939.

¹⁵³ TNA, FO 371/23061, C 3665/3365/18, Halifax to Knox and Hoare, 23 March 1939.

¹⁵⁴ MOL, K 64 1939-2/1, 10., 19 March 1939; HIA, Barcza, Diaries, 18 March 1939, Box 0009.

¹⁵⁵ After the meeting, Sargent minuted that in the near future Germany would undoubtedly encourage Hungary to attack Romania, and Berlin would intervene in the conflict: TNA, FO 371/23061, C 3980/3356/18, minute by Sargent, 22 March 1939. Interestingly, the three alternatives presented by Sargent had crucial implications for Hungarian foreign policy-making. Sargent did not specify British

The comparison of the British attitude towards the Hungarian-Romanian discord and the Hungarian-Slovak so-called 'mini-war' (map 2.9) offers intriguing insights into British priorities and the irrelevance of Hungary's territorial adjustments for British regional strategy.¹⁵⁶ The Hungarian-Slovak 'mini-war' in the second half of March, did not gather much attention from London, and German pressure on Hungary to stop the incursions was accepted by the Foreign Office without hesitation.¹⁵⁷ Interestingly, *The Times*, in comparison to its earlier understanding towards Hungary's territorial claims in Slovakia, now openly blamed Hungary for the conflict and labelled Hungarian territorial aspirations as being too radical, because they went beyond the ethnographic criteria.¹⁵⁸ The Hungarian occupation of a narrow Eastern Slovakian strip in this conflict improved communication between Hungary and Poland, but as we have seen, the strengthening of Hungarian-Polish cooperation was now irrelevant for London. For the reason that Slovakia was now under direct German political, economic and military influence, which was not challenged by London, the Hungarian-Slovak war did not threaten any British interest. Romania, on the other hand, which Germany did not control yet, had a much greater economic potential and strategic significance. Even though defending Romania was considered highly problematic, it was a British priority to prevent Germany acquiring its petroleum and agricultural resources, hence the British interest in the Hungarian-Romanian dispute.

Compared to official British policy and the opinion inside the Foreign Office, the scholarly world approached the destruction of Czecho-Slovakia and the question of Hungarian revisionism in early 1939 from very different perspectives. The opinion of Macartney and Seton-Watson on the recent territorial changes of Hungary is important, as later during the war both attempted to exert influence on British post-war policy on Central Europe. In late 1938 Macartney recommended a general European settlement, which would involve the revision of both Hungary's and Bulgaria's frontiers. He accepted the Vienna frontier as ethnically just, although he pointed out its economic

attitude towards the second option, 'willy-nilly collaboration'. Teleki, until the last moment, followed the policy of cooperating with Germany to the verge of completely losing Hungarian independence. He was convinced that London did not favour, but accepted this 'willy-nilly' policy.

¹⁵⁶ In an attempt to occupy Eastern Slovakia, the Hungarian army, upon completing the occupation of Ruthenia turned westwards and attacked Slovakia.

¹⁵⁷ TNA, FO 371/23108, Foreign Office to Knox, 4 April 1939.

¹⁵⁸ 'Slovak-Hungarian differences', *The Times*, 24 March 1939; 'Slovak frontier affrays', *The Times*, 27 March 1939; 'Disputed Slovak frontier', *The Times*, 29 March 1939.

anomalies. Macartney agreed to Ruthenia being adjoined to Hungary both on economic grounds and on the basis that the Ruthenians lacked a distinct national consciousness.¹⁵⁹ He received strong criticism from Seton-Watson on the grounds that his suggestions went against the ethnic principle. Seton-Watson strongly criticised the Hungarian occupation of Ruthenia because it violated this principle. His main argument against Hungarian authority was that the region had achieved a special autonomous position under Czech rule.¹⁶⁰

Hungary's adherence to the Anti-Comintern pact seriously shook British confidence in her, as she was now viewed as a German ally. Ruthenia was deemed irrelevant to British strategy once Germany controlled most of the former Czecho-Slovakia. Due to this, and because London was interested in maintaining cordial relations with Budapest until it was fully committed to Germany, the Hungarian occupation of Ruthenia was acknowledged as a *fait accompli*. This however did not mean that Britain accepted the current status of Ruthenia as permanent and its future remained highly questionable. Whitehall was more concerned by the Hungarian-Romanian dispute, as it had strong strategic and economic implications for Britain.

¹⁵⁹ C. A. Macartney, 'Hungary and the Present Crisis', *International Affairs* 57 (1938), pp. 762-763. For the development of Ruthenian national identity, see: P. R. Magocsi, *The Shaping of a National Identity: 'Subcarpathian Rus', 1848-1948* (Cambridge, 1978), pp. 234-240.

¹⁶⁰ R. W. Seton-Watson, 'The Problem of Small Nations and European Anarchy', *Montagu Burton International Relations Lecture*, 1939, pp. 13-15, quoted by: Beretzky, *Scotus Viator és Macartney Elemér*, p. 105.

2.9 The Polish and Romanian guarantees and the Anglo-Hungarian relationship

After the destruction of Czecho-Slovakia, with an evident sense of urgency, Britain guaranteed the independence of Poland and Romania on 31 March and 13 April respectively. Historians have scrutinised the reasons for this unprecedented British decision, but a satisfactory conclusion has not been reached about its genesis.¹⁶¹ However, historians have not pointed out that the decision to provide guarantees, and also their application had important Hungarian angles which crucially affected British policy towards the region. This part provides new evidence, which suggests that although Hungarian territorial aspirations were discouraged, Hungary had a very important role in the British guarantees and in British policy to deter German expansion in Central Europe. The Romanian and Polish guarantees bring up various questions if they are considered in the context of the Anglo-Hungarian relationship. It is important to analyse how the British attitude changed towards the region after these guarantees and how these influenced both the British and Hungarian attitudes towards Hungarian revisionism. It is also crucial to understand how far London considered the guarantees as binding, and how British policy-makers interpreted their application, particularly in the context of Hungarian-Polish friendship and the Hungarian-Romanian discord.

Crucially, the British guarantees were a political decision and attempted to diplomatically deter Germany from further expansion in the region.¹⁶² The political diaries of Chamberlain contain a revealing entry on 2 April 1939, which gives an insight into his attitude about frontier change. In connection with the Polish guarantee, Chamberlain noted that Britain was not concerned with the boundaries of the Central

¹⁶¹ Lungu has emphasized the effect of Tilea's communication on London that Romania received a German ultimatum: Lungu, *Romania and the Great Powers*, pp. 163-73. Cienciala stressed that the pressure of the British public to stop Hitler was a significant factor in the decisions: Cienciala, *Poland*, p. 225. Newman and Gillard had looked the question from a broader perspective and explained that the guarantees were given for the global strategic reason to stop Germany and to project strength: S. Newman, *March 1939: The British Guarantee to Poland: Study in the Continuity of British Foreign Policy* (Oxford, 1976); Gillard, *Appeasement in Crisis*, pp. 126-129. Bruce Strang has pointed out that the underlying reasons were to silence Dominion and American criticism of British passivity: G. B. Strang, 'Once More unto the Breach: Britain's Guarantee to Poland, March 1939' *Journal of Contemporary History*, 128 (1996), pp. 721-751. See also: Prazmowska, *Britain, Poland and the Eastern Front*, pp. 38-56.

¹⁶² Chamberlain openly declared that he considered the Polish guarantee only as a diplomatic deterrence, without commitments, see: Cienciala, *Poland*, p. 224. Brian Bond has sharply criticised decision-makers for overlooking the warnings of the Chiefs of Staff of the military implications of the guarantees: Bond, *British Military Policy*, pp. 305-307.

European states, but with their independence.¹⁶³ This seemingly questions our earlier argument that Chamberlain perceived the ethnographic reconstruction of Central Europe as the only 'just' solution, but he had declared that view in a different international climate, when he still believed cooperation with Hitler was possible. Therefore we agree with Parker's argument that the Polish and Romanian guarantee served strategic purposes, to distance Poland from Berlin and to turn the Polish-Romanian anti-Soviet alliance into an anti-German cooperation.¹⁶⁴ At the same time, Britain guaranteed only independence, but not territorial integrity which arguably left the door open for negotiations with Germany.¹⁶⁵ London received numerous reports about the immediate threat to Romania, but firstly a guarantee was given to Poland.¹⁶⁶ The underlying reason for the Polish guarantee was to assure Warsaw of Anglo-French aid, and to persuade the Polish to come to Romania's aid, in the event of a German aggression.

The Hungarian context of the Polish guarantee has so far been ignored by historians. There is strong evidence that after the guarantee, as the result of the positive change in Hungarian foreign policy and the firm Polish declaration that Polish-Hungarian friendship was pivotal for Warsaw, London was contemplating a radical change in its Central European policy.¹⁶⁷ In a private message through Thomas Moore, a Conservative MP, Horthy asked for a similar British guarantee for Hungary and

¹⁶³ University Of Birmingham, Papers of Neville Chamberlain (NC), 18/1/1092, 2 April 1939.

¹⁶⁴ Parker, *Chamberlain and Appeasement*, pp. 212-219. *The Times* interpreted the guarantee to Romania (and Greece) as the dawning of a new British policy in the Balkans. It however neglected the Hungarian context: 'New Policy in South-Eastern Europe', *The Times*, 14 April 1939.

¹⁶⁵ TNA, CAB 23/97, Cabinet Conclusions 6 (39), 8 February 1939. A. J. P. Taylor and Cienciala have argued that the guarantees did not constitute a shift in British policy, but they were the continuation of appeasement, as by guaranteeing only the independence of Poland and Romania, they allowed room for further adjustments and bargaining: Taylor, *The Origins of the Second World War*, pp. 240-241; Cienciala, *Poland*, pp. 200-210.

¹⁶⁶ From Bucharest Hoare reported that 25 German divisions were stationed along the Hungarian-German frontier and in Eastern Slovakia and were ready to attack Romania: TNA, FO 371/23108, Hoare to Foreign Office, 25 March 1939. It has already been mentioned that Tilea set the alarms off in London by reporting about a German ultimatum to Romania. According to Olivier Harvey, the private secretary of Halifax, these had a significant effect on Halifax: *The Diplomatic Diaries of Oliver Harvey 1937-1940*, 18 March 1939. The publicist, Wickham Steed, who had excellent connections in Romania, also informed the Foreign Office of a German ultimatum: TNA, FO 371/23061, C 3749/3356/18, Vansittart to Halifax, 17 March 1939. Gafencu, Romanian foreign minister, during his visit to London in April, also colourfully described the immediate danger faced by Romania. According to Barcza, Gafencu told the story in London that the Germans accidentally put up posters in the Romanian language in Prague, instead of Bucharest, about the occupation. Barcza reported that this had an alarming effect in London, DIMK IV, 111: Barcza to Csáky, 1 May 1939; see also: G. Gafencu, *Last Days of Europe, A Diplomatic Journey In 1939* (London, 1948).

¹⁶⁷ Beck refused the British demand to guarantee Romania due to this reason: DIMK, IV, 103b: Csáky on Hungarian foreign policy, 18 April 1939.

expressed that he would welcome an immediate British invitation for discussions.¹⁶⁸ Consequently, the Cabinet was discussing the possibilities of bringing Hungary into the guarantee-system. Although Halifax, Simon and Hore-Belisha were initially concerned about this possibility, later they decided that if Hungary was attacked first by Germany and Poland entered the war on Hungary's side, then Britain could come immediately to their aid. Halifax voiced concerns about the means of actively assisting a Hungarian-Polish resistance, and was convinced that such a resistance would not be long and successful. The view that under specific circumstances Hungary could have been attracted to regional cooperation changes our understanding of British foreign policy towards Hungary and Central Europe.¹⁶⁹ The consensus among historians has been that Hungary was never considered to be included in the British guarantees and was simply written off as a German satellite at this time. This new evidence changes this understanding and clarifies that London was interested in including Hungary in a British alliance system. Although Hungary followed a pro-German policy earlier, London was open to changes. In other respects, Hungarian territorial claims in Romania were excluded from this policy. Whitehall did not react to the Polish diplomatic initiative in April to persuade Hungary to sign a non-aggression pact with Romania in return for a narrow strip along the Hungarian-Romanian frontier.¹⁷⁰ The adjustments of the Hungarian-Romanian frontier would have alienated Bucharest, making a combined effort against Germany impossible. Moreover, Budapest was not interested in this proposition either.¹⁷¹

The fundamental change in British attitude towards this scenario in the summer of 1939 illustrates that the main reason underpinning British opinion towards Hungarian revisionism was strategic. We shall return to the subject at a later stage, when in August 1939, in order to keep Hungary out of the war, Britain reconsidered its opinion and secretly recommended that Bucharest should cede a narrow strip of territory to Hungary on the ethnographic basis. Whether Hungary was viewed differently at that time, or

¹⁶⁸ TNA, FO 371/23062, C 4927/3356/18, Lieutenant Colonel Sir Thomas Moore to Halifax, 3 April 1939.

¹⁶⁹ TNA, CAB/23/98, Cabinet conclusion 19 (39) 5 April 1939; Cabinet Conclusion 20 (39), 8 April 1939; DIMK IV, 63: Barcza to Csáky, 5 April 1939; also Lungu, *Romania*, p. 139.

¹⁷⁰ DIMK IV, 47: Hory to Csáky, 31 March 1939.

¹⁷¹ Budapest declared that a frontier revision in this case could only be of a limited extent, which it found unacceptable, DIMK IV, 57: Hory to Csáky, 3 April 1939.

London simply reconsidered its stand for strategic reasons to localise the imminent German-Polish war, will be the subject of our next chapter.

Although the Polish guarantee had an important Hungarian angle, Hungarian revisionism did not affect its creation. However, Hungarian territorial demands played a critical role in creating the Romanian guarantee. Regardless of considering the inclusion of Hungary into a British guarantee-system, Hungarian-Romanian mobilization, and reports of German military preparation after the Hungarian occupation of Ruthenia confirmed the Foreign Office in its suspicion that Hungary would do Germany's bidding, and would attack Romania in the near future.¹⁷²

New sources suggest that refusing to guarantee the integrity of Romania had a Hungarian angle. In response to an expected Romanian guarantee, Hungarian diplomacy became very active in London. György Buday, a well-known Hungarian artist, living in Britain since the 1920s, conveyed a secret message from Teleki to the Foreign Office. Teleki assured London that he would not allow the German military passage to Romania through Hungarian territory, but begged London not to guarantee Romania's territorial integrity, because it would make Hungarian territorial aspirations in Transylvania impossible, which would eventually sweep away his government.¹⁷³ It is extremely interesting that a report on Teleki's message was sent to Hoare in Bucharest along with the official communication of the British guarantee to Romania. This makes it highly probable that Teleki's pleas played an important role in guaranteeing only the independence of Romania on 13 April, but not its territorial integrity. This indicates that London was interested in distancing Hungary from Germany, and for strategic advantages Whitehall was ready to reconsider its attitude toward the question of frontier revision.

The Sargent-Barcza conversation, immediately before the Romanian guarantee, also proves that the attitude of Hungary was not irrelevant for Britain. Barcza declared his objections to the guarantee. In an exceptionally amiable manner Sargent assured him that Britain would only guarantee independence, not the integrity of Romania. Sargent also conveyed that Britain understood Hungary's claims in Romania, but warned that

¹⁷² TNA, FO 395/662, C 3434/3356/18, Knox to Halifax, 18 March 1939.

¹⁷³ TNA, FO 371/23061, C 4633/3356/18, minute by Mallet, 3 April 1939.

Hungarian revisionism was a good weapon in the hands of Germany.¹⁷⁴ 'Revisionism as a German tool' became one of the uniform British responses to Hungarian territorial claims in Romania, until Bucharest renounced the British guarantee in the summer of 1940.¹⁷⁵ Nonetheless, both Barcza and Budapest were shocked and puzzled. It was not understood how Hungary's territorial claims in Transylvania were 'understood' and Romania guaranteed at the same time.¹⁷⁶ It could not be interpreted why Britain guaranteed Romania, which – according to Hungary – was leading a dubious policy and which extensively cooperated with Germany economically.¹⁷⁷ Until Romania renounced the guarantee, Hungary's aim was to extract an official assurance from London that the guarantee was only for independence and not for territorial integrity; London refused to declare this officially.

Macartney suggested that the Romanian guarantee had a distinct anti-Hungarian bias.¹⁷⁸ The text of the Romanian guarantee did not mention it directly,¹⁷⁹ but Foreign Office discussions clarify that Romania was assured of British support against threats other than Germany. Moscow did not recognise Romanian authority over Bessarabia, which was occupied by Romania during the Russian Civil war, but both London and Moscow worked towards regional cooperation against Germany, therefore the Soviet threat can be excluded.¹⁸⁰ Macartney argued that London would have treated a Hungarian attack against Romania as an indirect German attack, which would have activated the British guarantee. British official sources support Macartney's claims.

¹⁷⁴ HIA, Barcza, Diaries, 12 April 1939, Box 0009.

¹⁷⁵ The differences are striking between Sargent's friendly attitude towards Barcza (here and later also), and Sargent's minutes in the Foreign Office. His minutes were mostly anti-Hungarian in their tone. He argued that Romania was more valuable economically, Bulgaria strategically, but Hungary had completely sold itself to Germany, hence did not deserve any British help: TNA, FO 371/23116, C 4000/4000/21, Sargent's minute, 2 April 1939. Barcza's dispatches also conveyed a more amicable British approach towards Budapest than it was in reality. Barcza did not misjudge the Foreign Office's attitude, as his diaries do not repeat these arguments. Just as before, probably he intentionally projected a more amicable British approach towards Hungary to awaken Hungarian interest in London. Barcza regularly reported to Budapest that the British public and the Foreign Office understood Hungary's problems, and looked favourably upon them, which was far from the reality: DIMK IV: 111., Barcza to Csáky, 1 May 1939.

¹⁷⁶ MOL, K 63 1939-2/1, 39, Barcza to Csáky, 18 April 1939; 53, Barcza to Csáky, 30 May 1939.

¹⁷⁷ Bán, *Hungarian-British Diplomacy 1939-41*, p. 65.

¹⁷⁸ PCAM, MSS. ENG.c. 3302, Box 23, Doc 13, C. A. Macartney, 'British Policy towards Hungary in the Second World War' 1977.

¹⁷⁹ *Hansard*, (Commons), vol. 346, p. 654, 13 April 1939.

¹⁸⁰ Although both deeply suspicious towards each other, until mid-August Britain and the Soviet Union were engaged in negotiations to create a collective security system against German aggression, see: M. J. Carley, *1939: The Alliance That Never Was and the Coming of World War II* (London, 2009).

Halifax and Sargent both emphasised that a Hungarian attack, or a Hungarian invasion disguised as German aggression, would undoubtedly have activated the British guarantee.¹⁸¹

The way the Foreign Office handled the proposal of the influential Rothschild family to invite István Bethlen to London after the guarantee showcases British attitude towards Hungary. The Rothschild family in the spring of 1939 wanted to invite Bethlen for unofficial talks, in order to influence Hungarian policy towards Britain. Knox admitted that this was desirable, but pointed out that Hungary's geographical position made British help impossible, and this move would probably attract unnecessary German attention, which could be embarrassing for London. The Foreign Office agreed with Knox's disapproval and Sargent instructed the new British minister O'Malley, to do everything possible to flatter Budapest and make the Hungarians believe that London was supporting them, but not to encourage discussions with Bethlen.¹⁸² The Foreign Office was also afraid that Bethlen might lecture about revision whilst in London, as he did in 1933.¹⁸³ Non-interference with Germany's interests in the region seemed to be a stronger priority than influencing Hungary towards the policy of Britain, therefore territorial revision, even on the level of discussions did not fit into this approach.

Hungary's insistence on revision was viewed by London as an indirect German threat to Romania. Accordingly, the guarantee to Bucharest was not a direct British judgement on Hungarian territorial aims in Transylvania, but a countermove against German aggression, masked in Hungarian revisionism. Budapest was aware that as long as the British guarantee was in place, revision could not be achieved in Transylvania with the consent of London and Paris.

¹⁸¹ DBFP ser. 3, vol. 4, 460: Halifax, 'The Romanian guarantee', 2 May 1939.

¹⁸² Sir Owen O'Malley was born English, but his family had Irish origins, thus looked sympathetically on the territorial and minority problems of small nations, such as the Hungarian. In an interview with Macartney, he admitted that he found Hungarian claims somewhat exaggerated, but looked favourably upon them. As we will see, he often reported in favour of revision to London. See: PCAM, MSS. ENG. c. 3311, Box 32, O'Malley to Macartney, May 1952.

¹⁸³ TNA, FO 371/23116, C 4000/4000/21, minute by Sargent, 2 April 1939.

2.10 Hungary between territorial claims and neutrality before the outbreak of the war

By guaranteeing Polish and Romanian independence, London officially demonstrated its strategic priorities in the region. Regardless of the fact that London indicated its flexibility on Romanian territorial integrity, the guarantees put British attitude towards Hungarian revisionism into a radically new context. Taking no notice of British hesitations about discussing Hungarian territorial demands in Romania, Budapest persistently lobbied for frontier revision in London. After the destruction of Czechoslovakia, Teleki anticipated that Britain would remain diplomatically active towards Central Europe and the territorial and minority disputes in the region would be dealt with during a second Munich-style conference. For this reason, he wanted to keep Hungarian grievances prominent in London, which would prompt the Foreign Office to form much the same view as it had over the First Vienna Award.¹⁸⁴ Cadogan however explained to Barcza on 14 June that it was hard for London to recognise territorial claims in Romania, because of the guarantee and problem of ethnically mixed areas.¹⁸⁵

In his diaries, Barcza complained bitterly about the lack of instructions from Budapest about this crucial question. Relying on his own judgement, he noted to Cadogan that a transfer of a wide strip of territory along the Hungarian-Romanian frontier would be desirable. He also noted that this was the first occasion when he was asked about Hungarian demands in Romania, and was the first time had specified Hungary's territorial claims to London. The apparent lack of Hungarian interest to inform Barcza about the extent of Hungarian territorial demands supports the arguments of Balázs Ablonczy and Tibor Frank, who have both stressed that Teleki's priority was revision and the British consent was only secondary in this context.¹⁸⁶ We know that over the summer of 1939 various schemes of territorial claims were compiled in

¹⁸⁴ DIMK IV, 187: Csáky to Barcza, 13 June 1939. See also: Bán, *Hungarian-British Diplomacy 1939-41*, p. 66.

¹⁸⁵ Budapest worked out various versions of territorial demands in Romania, but none of these were declared as official. By mid-1939, the so called corridor-plan was the most widely accepted version (see map 2. 10). This claimed a 80-100 km wide territory along the Hungarian-Romanian frontier, which were connected with the Székely districts at the South-Eastern corner of Transylvania with a 50-100 km corridor: A. Czettler, *Teleki Pál és a magyar külpolitika 1939-41*, (Budapest, 1997), p. 69.

¹⁸⁶ Ablonczy, *Pál Teleki*, pp. 93, 111, 175-176; T. Frank, 'Treaty revision and doublespeak: Hungarian neutrality, 1939-41' in *European Neutrals and Non-Belligerents during the Second World War*, ed. by N. Wylie (Cambridge, 2010), pp. 150-173 (p. 163).

Hungary under the direct leadership of Teleki.¹⁸⁷ Most of these claimed the larger part of Transylvania, which sharply differed from the claim presented by Barcza to Cadogan. Another possible explanation is that Teleki was aware of the British disapproval of wider Hungarian demands, and Barcza was intentionally left uninformed.¹⁸⁸ In any case, Barcza attempted to turn Britain against Romania by claiming that the British guarantee had given free rein to the Romanian oppression of Magyars in Transylvania. Cadogan was deeply sceptical and promised an answer for the Hungarian territorial demands upon receipt of a memorandum about the condition of the Magyars in Romania.¹⁸⁹

As we have noted, in March 1939, London did not support the Polish initiative to persuade Romania to cede a strip of territory along the frontier to Hungary in return for rapprochement; this policy was revisited by June 1939. It seems that having an interest in bringing the Hungarians and Romanians closer to each other, Whitehall was skilfully playing off one against the other. While on the one hand Cadogan showed lukewarm interest in revision to Barcza, the evidence suggests that Bucharest was questioned on the possibility of appeasing Hungary with frontier adjustment. It is known from Máriássy, the Hungarian minister to Turkey that Bucharest was outraged by the British insistence on satisfying Hungarian claims. Máriássy had the opportunity to look into a third party's documents in Ankara. These documents mentioned a letter, supposedly written by Chamberlain to Calinescu, the Romanian prime minister in 1939, in which Bucharest was questioned on the possibilities of frontier adjustment.¹⁹⁰ Our research has been unable to confirm the existence of this letter, and the evidence points to a different scenario. Macartney pointed out that the initiative was supported by Halifax, which we have been able to confirm.¹⁹¹ By June 1939, Halifax was ready to recognise the existence of a territorial dispute between Hungary and Romania. He continuously refuted the anti-Hungarian tones of the reports coming from Bucharest,

¹⁸⁷ A. Rónai, *Térképezett történelem* (Budapest, 1989), pp. 217-237.

¹⁸⁸ Truly, Hungarian claims were not clarified intentionally on international forums. It was not admitted, but Budapest wanted integral revision ('Mindent Vissza!' ['Give Everything Back!']) which would have included 5-6 million minorities in the aggrandised Hungary. This would have caused international resentment, which Budapest wanted to avoid.

¹⁸⁹ It is rather symptomatic of the conduct of Hungarian foreign policy that the Germans were informed that such a memorandum would be handed to the British: HIA, Barcza, Diaries, 14 June 1939, Box 0009; DIMK IV, 205: Vörnle to Sztójay, 27 June 1939.

¹⁹⁰ MOL, K 64 17főn/1939, 559, Máriássy to Csáky, 30 May 1939.

¹⁹¹ Macartney, *October Fifteenth* p. 355.

and declared that he would not fall for the Romanian attempts to convince Britain that Hungarian and Bulgarian revisionism in Romania were the result of German encouragement. He stressed that Hungary's and Bulgaria's adhesion to the Axis could be prevented, and for this reason revisionism could not be rejected openly.¹⁹² The existence of such an unexpected British initiative inevitably forces us to ask the reasons behind the sudden change in British policy. Béni Balogh's analysis of Romanian cabinet minutes has revealed that London advised Bucharest to settle territorial disputes with Budapest in a friendly atmosphere during direct negotiations.¹⁹³ British sources are also very tight-lipped about this proposition. Most crucially we do not know the territorial extent of the British recommendation, and it can only be presumed that London recommended a limited revision. Bucharest however refused revision in any form, and declared that the strengthening of Hungary would only make the Axis stronger; this seemed to convince London to drop the proposal. As in March 1939, the primary reason for working for a Hungarian-Romanian accord was the aim to prevent a Hungarian-Romanian war, which could have provided a convenient pretext for German intervention.

Even so, the British policy fluctuated wildly towards Romania. By July 1939, the British policy of working for a rapprochement between Budapest and Bucharest had undergone a radical transformation, which significantly affected British policy towards Hungarian revisionism in Romania. Based on a Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) report the decision was made in June that a belligerent Romania would be more beneficial for the Allies than a neutral one. It was declared that the only benefit to keep Romania neutral was the assumption that it would keep Hungary neutral. The CID report reiterated that German aggression would come through the Hungarian Plains, which Hungary would not be able to resist. Hungary's military weakness, its pro-German policy and the failure of facilitating a Hungarian-Romanian agreement led to the decision in June 1939 to induce Romania to either adopt the status of 'benevolent neutrality', or enter the war on the side of the Allies, if it would break out.¹⁹⁴

¹⁹² TNA, FO 417/39, R 5490/140/37, Le Rougetel (Bucharest) to Halifax, 30 June 1939; R 5538/661/67, Halifax to Le Rougetel, 11 July 1939; TNA, FO 417/40, R 6029/10/37, Halifax to O'Malley, 8 August 1939.

¹⁹³ Balogh, *A magyar-román*, pp. 68-69.

¹⁹⁴ TNA, FO 417/40, R 4700/133/37, 'Report on the Policy of Britain towards Romania', n. d. At the same time, the Hungarians were flattered that a neutral Hungary was Britain's primary interest: DIMK IV, 181:

The tone in the Foreign Office reflected a growing fear of the likely consequences of Hungarian revisionism. When the young R. W. Selby suggested that promises should be made to Hungary on frontier change to encourage Budapest towards an anti-German policy, Sargent excluded this possibility and minuted that promises should not be made to Budapest in order to influence Hungarian policy, and Britain could only hope for Hungary's desire to stay independent.¹⁹⁵ O'Malley's pro-Hungarian recommendations were also silenced. O'Malley suggested that the transfer of a 15 km wide territory along the Hungarian-Romanian frontier, or the promise of it, could direct Hungarian policy towards a pro-British course, but he was instructed that this was not the British policy.¹⁹⁶

Earlier in June, Barcza promised a memorandum to Cadogan about the Romanian ill-treatment of Magyars since Britain guaranteed Romania. This memorandum was given to the Foreign Office in July and was duly passed on to Bucharest for comments. D. C. Watt stressed that the British had implied to Gafencu that even if Romania fought on the Allied side, it could not keep the same frontiers once the war ended. However, because D. C. Watt's analysis relied on French-Romanian diplomatic correspondence it is likely that although London raised the issue in Bucharest, such threats were never made, and Gafencu was simply complaining about the British inquiry to the French.¹⁹⁷ Nevertheless, British and Hungarian sources prove that the Hungarian complaints about the Romanian treatment of Magyars were badly received in London, and based on Romanian information, they were labelled as German and Hungarian fabrications.¹⁹⁸ It is most intriguing that based on only Romanian assurances on the good condition of Magyars in Romania, without due reflection, Hungarian complaints were rejected in Whitehall.

Barcza to Csáky, 4 June 1939; MOL, K 64 1939, 562., Utassy (Hungarian military attaché in London): Conversations with Banfield (the Eastern European referee of the War Office), 3 June 1939.

¹⁹⁵ This memorandum typically shows the attitude within the Foreign Office towards Hungary. Lower rank clerks such as Selby, Orchard and Speaight urged for a favourable attitude towards Budapest, but Cadogan and Sargent and other senior members such as Strang and Nichols, showed a rigid view-point and were against giving any favours towards Hungary: TNA, FO 371/23116 C 14406/4000/21, Selby's memorandum and minutes by Orchard, Speaight and Sargent, August 1939.

¹⁹⁶ TNA, FO 371/24431 Annual report on Hungary, 1939.

¹⁹⁷ D. C. Watt, *How War Came: The Immediate Origins of the Second World War, 1938-1939* (London, 1989), pp. 303-304.

¹⁹⁸ MOL, K 64 17főn/1939, 'Az angol garancia hatása a magyar kisebbségek helyzetére Romániában', 24 July 1939; TNA, 417/39, R 5490/140/37, Le Rougetel to Halifax, 30 June 1939.

The Sargent-Barcza meeting in July went in the same brusque manner. Sargent made it clear to Barcza that revision could not be promised, and he rejected to putting pressure on Bucharest in any form. Evidently showing deliberate indifference towards the problem Sargent incidentally asked: 'What does Hungary actually want?'¹⁹⁹ Barcza still had no instructions on how to respond to these inquiries. He complained bitterly in his diaries about the inconsistent, unsystematic and harmful nature of Hungary's revisionist policy. He found it appalling that he had no instruction to answer such questions, now that the British seemed to be interested in the problem.²⁰⁰ Barcza insisted on the transfer of a strip along the frontier, which he had already communicated to Cadogan, but could not specify Hungarian aims in Transylvania proper, but promised to prepare a memorandum on this question.²⁰¹ Barcza only received instructions on Hungarian territorial claims in Transylvania a week before the outbreak of the war. Csáky informed him that if asked in the Foreign Office, he should insist on territories with a 50 percent Magyar population or higher.²⁰²

Sensing the growing British annoyance towards Hungarian demands Teleki sent a number of private messages and special envoys to London to assure London of Hungary's peaceful attitude. Iván Rubido-Zichy, former Hungarian minister in London, was sent to London with Teleki's promise that Hungary would not join any groupings and would protect its independence with arms.²⁰³ Later, in July, Georgina Festetics - daughter of a very rich Hungarian landowner - arrived in London with Teleki's memorandum. In this document Teleki explained Hungary's difficult internal and external position and suggested that due to public pressure, if Germany offered Transylvania, it would be hard to say no.²⁰⁴ In August, in another letter, Teleki

¹⁹⁹ DIMK IV 250: Barcza to Csáky, 31 July 1939.

²⁰⁰ HIA, Barcza, Diaries, 1 August 1939, Box 0009.

²⁰¹ DIMK IV 250: Barcza to Csáky, 31 July 1939; MOL, K 63 1939-2/1, 83., Barcza to Csáky, 31 July 1939.

²⁰² Budapest probably chose the 50 percent claim, as this was the British criteria at Munich. This demand left the Foreign Office confused, as it was well known that the Transylvanian problem could not be solved on this basis, due to ethnically mixed areas in the province: DIMK IV 264: Ghyczy to Barcza, August 1939; MOL, K 64 1939/2-1, 705., Barcza to Csáky, 20 August 1939.

²⁰³ It is one of the few occasions when Teleki specifically assured London of a Hungarian armed resistance. Possibly Teleki wanted to raise Hungary's position after the guarantee to Romania, as armed resistance was known to be a British priority in formulating opinion about Central European states: HIA, Barcza, Diaries, 30 April 1939, Box 0009.

²⁰⁴ According to Barcza this was the first occasion that London was informed that Hungary would not be able to resist, if revision was to be offered in Transylvania by the Germans. Teleki possibly wished to extract British understanding, but Barcza believed that his statement produced the opposite reception in London: HIA, Barcza, Diaries, 26, 29 July, Box 0009.

promised armed resistance once again, and pledged to protect Hungarian independence against anyone.²⁰⁵ Barcza was disconcerted with these personal visits, and believed that Hungary was conducting misguided diplomacy, insisting on territorial revision in a difficult international situation.²⁰⁶

August of 1939 brought yet another radical change in the British attitude towards Hungary. The press hit an entirely new, positive tone.²⁰⁷ Seemingly, Sargent also completely reversed his views and declared that if Hungary was to be attacked, together with Poland, Britain would come to their aid. Sargent also suggested that in case Hungary was not attacked, but declared neutrality, its future would be secured by Britain.²⁰⁸ Macartney and Bán have argued that the underlying reason for the dramatic shift in British policy were Teleki's promises.²⁰⁹ The evidence, set out in the next section, will refute these argument and will clarify that the British strategic interest to ensure Hungarian neutrality in the approaching German-Polish war underpinned the dramatic shift in the British tone.

British policy towards Hungarian revisionism until the outbreak of the war was determined by strategic interest. Official attitude towards Hungary fluctuated correspondingly, and neither Hungarian territorial demands, nor Teleki's promises about Hungary's peaceful attitude affected it significantly. In the background the Foreign Office viewed the Hungarian arguments in the Hungarian-Romanian dispute with prejudice, and Romanian arguments were understood and mostly considered as just. On the eve of the war, the Foreign Office were thinking along the lines of the old Great War alliances, in which Hungary was viewed as Germany's ally and pawn.

²⁰⁵ HIA, Barcza, Diaries, 25 August 1939, Box 0009.

²⁰⁶ HIA, Barcza, Diaries, 29 July 1939, Box 0009.

²⁰⁷ 'The Peace Front', *The Times*, 17 August 1939.

²⁰⁸ HIA, Barcza, Diaries, 26, 27 August 1939, Box 0009.

²⁰⁹ Macartney, *October Fifteenth*, p. 362; Bán, *Hungarian-British Diplomacy 1939-41*, pp. 74-75.

2.11 Conclusion

In one year, from the Anschluss, to the dismemberment of Czecho-Slovakia, the map of Central Europe went through a radical transformation. The Anschluss had a powerful impact on British policy towards Central Europe and Hungary. London recognised its diminishing influence in the region, and this inevitably resulted in limited interest towards Budapest. More crucially however, newly presented evidence suggests that Hungary's openly pro-German policy after the Anschluss brought deep seated suspicions about Hungary in the Foreign Office to the surface, and consequently Hungarian territorial claims were viewed with strong antipathy. These therefore clarify that the cordial official tone towards Budapest did not reflect actual British perceptions, and the analysis of official opinion and British perceptions have to be separated.

The Hitler-Chamberlain meetings brought the Hungarian question to the centre of international attention. As Hitler connected the Sudeten question with the Magyar one, Chamberlain viewed Hungarian territorial demands with suspicion, but Barcza's diaries have proved that Chamberlain was more open towards moderate Hungarian claims than has been previously understood.

The British Prime Minister deliberately avoided the issue of the Hungarian frontiers at Munich, but our findings have demonstrated that the British delegation arrived in Munich with very clear views on the question. The perception that Hungary treated its nationalities harshly in the dualist era largely determined British views on Hungarian revisionism at this time, which became the underlying reason why London would have recommended a very limited frontier revision. At Munich Hitler achieved what he wanted, and his lack of interest towards Hungary's claims testifies that earlier in Berchtesgaden and Bad Godesberg he used the Magyar question only in order to apply pressure on Chamberlain. Before Munich, the British Prime Minister evidently refrained from any discussions about Hungary, and therefore Hitler's disinterest came in handy.

The British lack of interest in Munich suggested that in the near future London would bow to the German policy on the Magyar question and would not voice its own opinion. Consequently, London closely followed the German policy towards the Hungarian-Slovak negotiations, and the First Vienna Award. Apart from conforming to German wishes in the Hungarian-Slovak dispute, the evidence presented here testifies

that Britain's ultimate aim was to create justice in the region, by drawing ethnographic frontiers between the quarreling nations. At this stage, London was unable to act on this notion, but as we will demonstrate, this criteria became the guiding principle of planning the post-war shape of the region during the war.

London considered the First Vienna Award to be ethnographically just, therefore it was welcomed. However, Hungary's adherence to the Anti-Comintern pact seriously undermined the image of Hungary in London, which was now viewed as Germany's ally. Nevertheless, London was eager to maintain cordial relations with Budapest; therefore the Hungarian occupation of Ruthenia was acknowledged as a *fait accompli*, which did not however mean that Britain accepted it as final.

The ideal of creating justice soon became the victim of strategic interests. The Hungarian-Romanian discord after the destruction of Czecho-Slovakia was viewed from the perspective of its strategic implications, namely Romania's economic and geo-strategic value. Hungary's persistent claims in Romania, similar to in the Czechoslovak crisis, were viewed by London as a German interest and therefore it was discouraged. Nonetheless, new evidence suggests that even though Romania was guaranteed by Britain, at the insistence of Hungary the door was left open for future frontier change. Crucially, this became the underpinning reason for guaranteeing only the independence and not the territorial integrity of Romania.

The consulted archival material refutes the consensus of historiography that Hungary was a German satellite after the destruction of Czecho-Slovakia. The analysis of overlooked official British sources sheds new light on Hungary's position in the British policy to encircle Germany. Under specific circumstances, Britain considered guaranteeing and helping Hungary if war broke out. This is an intriguing new development in the study of British policy toward Central Europe and in our understanding of British opinion of Hungary. However, Hungarian territorial claims complicated the encirclement policy, because it created antagonism in the region, and therefore the British priority was to put these claims into abeyance.

‘When the horses start kicking each other,
it is better for the donkeys to stand aside.’¹
(King Boris of Bulgaria)

3. Illusions and Disappointments: The Anglo-Hungarian relationship during the ‘Phoney War’

3.1 Introduction

Before the outbreak of the war Britain only showed passive interest towards Hungarian frontier revision. The First Vienna Award and the occupation of Ruthenia were quietly acknowledged, but London refused to officially recognise them, or to actively raise the question of further frontier revision. Our principal aim here is to decide how far the outbreak of hostilities shifted this approach, and from what criteria London reacted to territorial claims put forward by Hungary in the first six months of the Second World War. The Munich Agreement and the First Vienna Award both declared the aim of drawing ethnographically balanced frontiers. The most crucial task therefore is to examine whether this principle persisted in British thought after September 1939, and what role it had in the planning of the post-war frontiers of Hungary.

In Britain, the outbreak of the war seemed to justify the critics of appeasement and the earlier submissive approach towards Germany was condemned by many.² E. H. Carr, the distinguished historian, in 1939 saw the war as the direct result of the failure of the inter-war international system, but he did not see Central European frontier revision as a key issue.³ A large and growing body of literature has investigated the views of contemporary British scholars, such as R. W. Seton-Watson and Macartney on

¹ King Boris of Bulgaria commenting on the outbreak of the war, quoted by: V. Dimitrov, ‘Bulgarian Neutrality: Domestic and International Perspectives’ in *European Neutrals and Non-Belligerents during the Second World War*, ed. by N. Wylie (Cambridge, 2010), p. 192.

² See particularly: Cato, *Guilty Men*. For a more scholarly contemporary criticism, see: R. W. Seton-Watson, *From Munich to Danzig* (London, 1939).

³ Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis*; Idem, *Britain: A Study of Foreign Policy*. A study of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA) on South East Europe, although similarly concentrated on the Nazi threat, was able to record the geographical, political, economic and cultural frictions in the area as factors of instability: *South-Eastern Europe: A Political and Economic Survey*, ed. by A. Toynbee et al (London, 1939).

Hungarian revisionism, but these studies have paid less attention to clarifying their views towards the frontiers of Hungary after war broke out and how they attempted to influence British foreign policy.⁴

Historiography has also rarely commented on the British-Romanian aim in 1939-40 to create a Balkan neutral bloc of Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary. British views on the position of Hungary in this bloc help us to clarify British priorities in the region, and most crucially the role of Hungarian revisionism in British Central European policy. Historians have also disregarded the general diplomatic correspondence of the Foreign Office of late 1939 and early 1940 to great extent; although at this time the Foreign Office already expressed opinions about the post-war territorial extent of Hungary and Romania. The crucial questions of Hungary's position in British Balkan strategy and how Hungary's growing subservience towards Germany influenced British views on territorial questions can only be ascertained through analysing the Anglo-Hungarian and Anglo-Romanian diplomatic correspondence, since most of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry papers were destroyed during the war.

A brief analysis of British and Hungarian foreign policy and strategy before and at the outbreak of the war is necessary here, in order to fully understand the mind-set of British and Hungarian policy-makers. The British cabinets of the 1930s were all aware that a simultaneous war on the European continent, in the Mediterranean and in the Far East was militarily impossible.⁵ There were heated debates about rearmament and the defence of the Empire, which were all viewed through the prism of keeping financial stability. The destruction of Czecho-Slovakia and the declaration of war with Germany brought the alliance with France and the question of continental commitment to the forefront. The army in the months preceding the war had been subjected to a series of revolutionary changes; both the territorial and regular army divisions were raised and British contribution to the Allied cause had been substantially increased, although still remaining meagre, compared to the French strength on the continent. The Royal Air

⁴ Á. Beretzky, 'A revízió és a magyar kisebbség helyzetének megítélése R. W. Seton-Watson műveiben', *Tiszavirág* 8 (1999), pp. 12-17; Á. Beretzky, 'R. W. Seton-Watson és az "Új Európa" (1920-45)', *Valóság* 27 (2000), pp. 65-78; Á. Beretzky, 'C.A. Macartney nézetei a revízióról és magyar kisebbség helyzetéről (1929-1941)', *Pro Minoritate* 32 (2004), pp. 34-48.; A. Miskolczy, 'Barát, vagy ellenség? R.W. Seton-Watson és Macartney', *Holmi* 22 (1994), pp. 36-54; L. Peter, 'The political conflict between R.W. Seton-Watson and C. A. Macartney over Hungary', pp. 121-145.

⁵ *Grand Strategy*, vol. 2, ed. by J. R. M. Butler (London, 1957), pp. 6-7, 11, 26; Bond, *British Military Policy*, pp. 188-189.

Force (RAF) was gradually gaining strength compared to the size of the German Air Force (Luftwaffe). In Europe, the threats from the Italian navy was balanced by the French, hence the Royal Navy only had to keep the German Navy (Kriegsmarine) at bay. As regards to equipment there was however a very serious shortage of air defence guns and searchlights.⁶ Through the fog of the English Channel, the latter appeared as the biggest threat in the light of the constant fear of a knock-out German bombing campaign against British cities.⁷ Besides, the memory of the loss of a generation on the battlefields of the Somme was still very vivid.⁸ Due to these, Britain declared war with great reluctance. As regards to war aims, trying to learn from the mistakes of the past, in order to avoid the reoccurrence of the ill-fated secret treaties and territorial commitments of the Great War, at the outbreak of the war policy-makers declared that Britain would refuse making territorial promises while hostilities continued.⁹ Also, during the Great War there had been little attempt to discuss a comprehensive peace settlement, and at Versailles hasty and unbalanced decisions were made on frontiers and minorities.¹⁰ In 1939, post-war planning started soon after the outbreak of hostilities, with the aim to create a carefully thought-out new world order, based on the principles of ethnographic self-determination and 'justice'.¹¹ British reluctance to officially declare policy on frontier questions therefore largely determined the official British reaction to Hungarian territorial claims, but as we will see, behind closed doors, passionate discussions on the future frontiers of Central Europe were well underway from as early as September 1939.

⁶ Butler, *Grand Strategy*, pp. 27, 33-34.

⁷ U. Bialer, *The Shadow of the Bomber: The Fear of Air Attack and British Politics, 1932-1939* (London, 1980).

⁸ The term 'the death of a generation' usually describes the Battle of Somme (July-November 1916), but it similarly evokes the immense casualties of Britain in the First World War: J. Harris, *The Somme: Death of a generation* (London, 1966).

⁹ V. H. Rothwell has analysed British war aims, but he did not discuss the role of Central Europe in British strategy: V. H. Rothwell, *War Aims in the Second World War: The War Aims of the Key Belligerents, 1939-1945* (Edinburgh, 2005), pp. 64-70.

¹⁰ During the First World War, secret treaties, with far reaching territorial implications, were signed with neutral powers, to encourage them to join the war on the Entente's side. For instance, the Treaty of London (1915) with Italy, and the Treaty of Bucharest (1916) with Romania, promised Austro-Hungarian territories, which were already agreed to be ceded to Serbia. At the end of the war this led to serious disputes between the Entente powers.

¹¹ The notions of 'justice' and 'justice for all' had been the recurrent ideas of British post-war planning in the early months of the war. The FRPS was the first department to start peace planning in late 1939. The first memoranda compiled by the academics of the FRPS often referred to 'World justice' as a British war aim, by which they meant ethnographic self-determination, international cooperation and free trade: TNA, FO 800/321 (microfilm), folios 339-352.

The foreign political goals of Hungary were in direct contrast to British priorities. Budapest essentially wanted to overturn the Treaty of Trianon and foreign policy-making, especially from the mid-1930s became subordinated to frontier revision. Besides, the experience of military defeat, collapse and territorial dismemberment at the end of the Great War was a constant backdrop in the hearts and minds of most Hungarians. Therefore, during the Second World War Budapest was eager to preserve its strength for expected post-war territory-grabbing.¹² Concessions to Nazi Germany mostly became subordinated to this complex course. Essentially however, this policy was viewed by London as fundamentally dishonest, and as from September 1939 resistance towards Germany became the barometer for judging the region in London. The most crucial collision-points in the Anglo-Hungarian relationship were about the concessions Budapest made to Berlin, and the different interpretations of what was considered acceptable. These apparent contrasts of British and Hungarian foreign political ideas made cooperation and mutual understanding on territorial questions very unpromising. This chapter will point out how these differences affected the question of frontier revision in late 1939.

The analysis will essentially follow a chronological approach and the argument has been divided into five sections. The first deals with Hungary's position in British strategy immediately before the outbreak of the war. The question asked here is how far Hungarian-Polish friendship or the Hungarian-Romanian territorial dispute affected British regional strategy. The second part will be looking at the same question in the context of the German-Polish war. Thirdly, we will be examining the impact of the Soviet occupation of Eastern Poland on British, Hungarian and Romanian foreign-policies and whether the Soviet expansion was reflected in British judgements about the Hungarian-Romanian territorial dispute. The fourth part will be looking at why Britain considered it impossible to attach Hungary to the Balkan neutral bloc in late 1939. This part will also discuss the mostly unresearched proposition of Bucharest for frontier revision in January 1940. New evidence will be brought forward to challenge our understanding of the British role in this scheme. The final part examines the visit of the British historian, Carlile Macartney, to Hungary in early 1940, and the role his visit had in British foreign policy. On Macartney's advice, Teleki moderated Hungarian

¹² P. Teleki, 'Magyarország külpolitikájának alapelveiről' in *Magyar Történelmi Szöveggyűjtemény 1914-1999*, vol. 1, ed. by I. Romsics (Budapest, 2000), p. 327.

territorial claims on Romania, which were put into official form in February 1940 in a lengthy memorandum. Disentangling British response to Teleki's fresh claims will be crucial, as since the Munich crisis, this was the first official articulation of Hungarian territorial claims.

3.2 British views of the Hungarian-Romanian dispute in the last days of peace

In recent years, the debate continued about the underlying reasons of the outbreak of the Second World War, but there has been little agreement. A large number of studies have looked beyond the standard approach of viewing the problem solely from the German perspectives and the aggressive nature of Nazism, and have taken a broader international approach.¹³ However Central European territorial and minority disputes, and particularly the Magyar minority question and Hungarian revisionism received less prominence.¹⁴ It is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore the impact of Hungarian and Bulgarian territorial claims on the stability of the region, which, this thesis argues, fuelled regional resentment and eventually allowed an easy German penetration.¹⁵ It is similarly important to review and adjust the consensus of the historiography that Britain showed minimal interest towards the region and gradually withdrew from Central Europe during the 'Phoney War'. The evidence set out here suggests that the effects of the Hungarian-Romanian and the Bulgarian-Romanian territorial disputes had a broader impact on British Balkan and Mediterranean strategy. The following will analyse the British view of the Hungarian-Romanian territorial dispute on the eve of the war.

As our previous chapter has concluded, Britain showed great concern about Hungarian-Romanian tensions after the destruction of Czecho-Slovakia. Hungarian mobilization and the aggravating tensions between Budapest and Bucharest in mid-March was viewed as a result of German temptations to press territorial claims in Transylvania, and London anticipated that tensions would eventually lead to German-

¹³ Anita Prazmowska had taken up the pioneering project of displaying the Eastern European origins of the Second World War: Prazmowska, *Eastern Europe and the Origins of the Second World War*. A broad international perspective had been taken by the edited volume of Frank McDonough, but the Hungarian question had not been mentioned at all: *The Origins of the Second World War: An International Perspective*, ed. by F. McDonough (London, 2011).

¹⁴ András Bán analysed to what extent the Magyar question affected Czechoslovak foreign policy: Bán, 'R.W. Seton-Watson and the Hungarian problem', pp. 127-38. A study recently appeared from the pen of Tibor Frank, who has analysed the nature of Hungarian foreign policy at the outbreak of the war: Frank, 'Treaty revision and doublespeak', pp. 150-173.

¹⁵ The actual extent of the Hungarian territorial claims in Romania at the outbreak of the war is very hard to specify. Officially, no demands were put forward to Bucharest, and revisionist claims intentionally remained in a vague form. Towards Britain, revisionist propaganda remained constrained and mostly reduced to emphasizing the viability of Greater Hungary on the pages of *The Hungarian Quarterly*. Before the outbreak of the war, Hungary claimed Romanian territories with a 50 percent or higher Magyar populations, but in September this formula was withdrawn: HIA, Barcza, Diaries, 26 August 1939, Box 0009.

Hungarian aggression against Romania.¹⁶ Tensions between Budapest and Bucharest were renewed in the mounting Polish crisis of late August, which was received in London with the same alarm. By soothing the tension between Budapest and Bucharest, London was hoping to localise a German-Polish conflict.

Discussions in the Foreign Office about the Hungarian-Romanian problem immediately before the outbreak of the war capture the political, economic and military dilemmas of British policy and clarify how far Hungarian territorial claims influenced British regional policy. In August 1939, Halifax was inclined to officially recognise the existence of the Hungarian-Romanian territorial dispute, to ensure that Hungary would not lobby for territorial revision in Berlin.¹⁷ Although he did not attach immediate frontier revision to the recognition, Halifax's proposition caused deep anxiety in Bucharest. A meeting of Halifax, Edward Ingram, the head of the Southern department and Philip Nichols, a senior official in the same department, discussed British policy on the Hungarian-Romanian problem. The meeting was hastily called, because Bucharest threatened to disrupt diplomatic relations with Britain, if London made positive comments about the Hungarian territorial claims in Transylvania.¹⁸ The vehement Romanian refusal to consider frontier change and the fact that the guarantee was still in place tied British hands.¹⁹ The assumption that Romania was ready to fight, while Hungary was judged more reluctant, strengthened the argument of supporting Bucharest's point of view. Consequently, the meeting had taken Romanian anxieties seriously, and it was decided that Hungarian territorial claims would not be officially encouraged during the war without Romanian consent. The term 'for the duration of the war' suggested a strategic British commitment, and not the definite rejection of frontier change, but the favouring of the Romanian viewpoint is arresting.

Yet, a radically different declaration of this meeting captures British long-term strategic dilemmas. Beside the decision that Romanian anxieties had to be taken into account, for the first occasion by such high-profile figures, the desire to redraw the

¹⁶ Macartney, *October Fifteenth*, p. 375.

¹⁷ TNA, FO 417/40, R 6440/661/67, Halifax to Le Rougetel, 14 August 1939.

¹⁸ TNA, FO 371/23843, R 6427/140/37, Le Rougetel to Foreign Office, 11 August 1939.

¹⁹ Gafencu categorically stressed to Le Rougetel that giving up territory to Hungary was out of the question: TNA, FO 417/40, R 6434/170/37, Le Rougetel to Halifax, 10 August 1939; FO 371/23843, R 6427/140/37, Le Rougetel to Halifax, 10 August 1939. Gafencu devoted no attention to the Magyar question in Transylvania in his memoirs, but dealt extensively with the threat from Germany's side: Gafencu, *The Last Days of Europe*.

Hungarian-Romanian frontier on the ethnographic basis was also declared. Nichols went so far as to recommend that this principle should be officially declared in the near future.²⁰ Officially, acknowledging the mistakes of Versailles generally appeared in the context of the German peace treaty, but openly critical tones of the Treaty of Trianon had rarely been articulated by senior officials.

Very different opinions were expressed at a second meeting in late August, and radically different conclusions were reached. During the meeting of Ingram, Cadogan, and Vansittart, the chief diplomatic advisor, the revisionist tone melted away and they emphasized that stability in the region was only possible by retaining the Versailles status quo in some form. The meeting refused to recognize the existence of a territorial issue between Hungary and Romania, and the acceptance of the Hungarian-Romanian frontier was required from Hungary as a prerequisite for negotiations.²¹ The conclusions of the second meeting were adopted as British official policy, and assurances were given to Romania that Britain would not raise the territorial issue, and would show ambivalence, if any other power raised it.²²

The facts that the 'for the duration of the war' formula was omitted at the second meeting, and Cadogan and Vansittart preferred the reconstruction of the Versailles status quo in Central Europe to the major territorial reorganisation of the region indicates that besides the strategic decision to support the economically more important Romania, deeper seated aversions to frontier change were also recognisable in the perceptions of key policy-makers. However, care has to be taken not to overstate the declarations of this meeting. Although references to the Versailles order were articulated, these were too vague to define them as the definitive British criteria for post-war Central Europe.

It is therefore more useful to use this evidence to demonstrate the contrast of opinions in the British foreign policy-making elite. Cadogan's influence was not surprising, but Vansittart's weight in decision-making, who, as a 'chief diplomatic advisor' did not have direct influence on foreign political decisions at this time, seems

²⁰ TNA, FO 371/23843, R 6427/140/37, minute by Nichols, 14 August 1939.

²¹ TNA, FO 371/23843, R 6525/140/37, minute by Cadogan, 17 August 1939; Cadogan to Le Rougetel, 18 August 1939.

²² TNA, FO 371/23843, R 6540/140/37, Ingram to Florescu (Romanian charge de affairs, London), 16 August 1939.

most interesting. It also cannot be overlooked that Cadogan and Sargent were not present at the first meeting, where Halifax's habit of over-simplifying Central European disputes provided the more 'revisionist' tone. The final decision to support Romania against Hungarian territorial claims is a vivid example of British decision-making about Hungary. Decisions on relatively unimportant issues, such as this question, were made directly by the senior officials of the Foreign Office in the absence of the Foreign Secretary or without bringing the matter up at a cabinet meeting. Halifax, as we will see, although supported limited revision in the region, evidently did not insist on making it the official policy.

Others also joined the discussion over the Hungarian-Romanian dispute. John "Jock" Colville, Chamberlain's assistant private secretary, reaffirmed the Prime Minister's earlier view that it was not in Britain's interest to replace Germany, as the champion of revision in the region. According to Colville, Chamberlain believed that it would result in losing Romania, while nothing could be gained from Hungary, as Budapest was already following a pro-German policy.²³ During the Czech crisis Chamberlain had already expressed his concern that the Hungarian question might be exploited by Germany to destabilise the region.²⁴ David Gillard has also emphasized that after the destruction of Czecho-Slovakia the Prime Minister believed that the position of Hungary was very fragile and Hungarian revisionism would result in eventual German-Hungarian cooperation.²⁵ Colville's tone in late August 1939 suggested that Chamberlain's opinion of Hungary had significantly changed since March. While during the 1938-39 Czechoslovak crisis Chamberlain believed that Hungary was buckling under German pressure, by August 1939 he was convinced that Hungary was decidedly in the German sphere of its own choice.

The problem becomes more interesting if we juxtapose these British views with the positive communications made to Hungary earlier in August. Orme Sargent assured the Hungarian Minister in London that Britain was committed to a just settlement.²⁶ In the previous chapter it has already been pointed out that such positive diplomatic

²³ TNA, FO 371/23843, R 6497/140/37, minutes by Colville, 9-10 August 1939. Unfortunately, Colville's famous Downing Street diaries did not deal with his or Chamberlain's perceptions of Hungary in depth: Colville, *The Fringes of Power*.

²⁴ TNA, CAB 23/95, Cabinet Conclusion 41 (38), 21 September 1938.

²⁵ D. Gillard, *Appeasement in Crisis*, p. 138.

²⁶ HIA, Barcza, Diaries, 26, 27 August 1939, Box 0009.

communications should be considered reservedly. For the Hungarian ear, Sargent's assurances meant the pro-Hungarian reconsideration of the frontier question after the war. But, putting Sargent's promises in the context of the two crucial Foreign Office meetings and Chamberlain's opinion, clarifies that Sargent was playing for the inclination of the Hungarians to interpret positive British references on frontiers as promises. These assurances simply served British strategic interests to encourage Hungary to resist Germany, at a time when war was approaching. The opinions expressed during the secret Foreign Office meetings undoubtedly carry more weight. Views expressed during internal meetings and discussions are the clearer indications for the perceptions of foreign policy-makers, as conclusions made at these meetings were not designed for public or diplomatic consumption.

Compared to the views of Whitehall, Owen O'Malley made very different recommendations about the Hungarian-Romanian problem. He strongly suggested that the only way to increase the stability of the region, and to localise a German-Polish conflict, was frontier revision in favour of Hungary.²⁷ At any rate, his recommendations were completely ignored and the Foreign Office instructed O'Malley not to encourage Budapest.²⁸ O'Malley nevertheless was advised to maintain contacts with known Anglophiles, especially with Antal Ullein-Reviczky at the Press Department of the Foreign Ministry, but the Foreign Office bluntly declared that political propaganda was only conducted in Hungary over the summer to demonstrate to Greece and Turkey, whose opinion was more crucial for British strategy that Britain did not abandon the region completely.²⁹

²⁷ TNA, FO 371/23843, R 6578/140/37, O'Malley to Foreign Office, 14 August 1939. Before the outbreak of the war O'Malley, proposed the revision of Hungary's frontiers, but did not make specific recommendations for a new Hungarian-Romanian frontier. Supposedly his opinion at this time was similar to the recommendations he had made after the collapse of Czecho-Slovakia. In April 1939 he believed that the ceding of an approximately 15 km strip to Hungary would satisfy the Hungarians: TNA, FO 371/24431 Annual report on Hungary, 1939.

²⁸ TNA, FO 371/23116, C 14182/4000/21, O'Malley to Foreign Office, 10 September 1939.

²⁹ TNA, FO 371/23116, C 16558/4000/21, report by F. G. Redward (British press attaché in Budapest), 8 October 1939; FO 371/23114, C 15696/530/21, Foreign Office to O'Malley, 13 October 1939. Increasing the level of propaganda, to encourage Hungarian resistance was ruled out, as German influence was believed to be too strong to counter. Meagre financial support was provided for the liberal *Magyar Nemzet*, and for the publication of Lajos Iván's anti-German book: TNA, FO 371/23111, C 9350/75/21; *A Palazzo Chigi és Magyarország*, 334: Vinci to Ciano, 29 August 1939; I. Lajos, *Németország háborús esélyei a német szakirodalom tükrében* (Budapest, 1939). See also: G. Murányi, *Egy epizódista főszerepe. Lajos Iván történész élete és halála* (Budapest, 2006).

The outbreak of the war raised tensions along the Hungarian-Romanian frontier. Out of mutual fear of each other, both armies mobilised. To contain the Hungarian-Romanian tensions, London was aiming to facilitate a non-aggression pact between the arguing parties. Italian sources suggested that the proposition came from Bucharest, but the discussions of the Foreign Office in late August and Barcza's diary clarify that the initiative was indeed British.³⁰ On the basis that the pact would be signed in the shadow of Romanian mobilisation, Budapest refused to consider it. This step had a very negative effect in the Foreign Office and the British press, and was interpreted as a clear sign of Hungary's aggressive intentions.³¹ Consequently, the opinion in the Foreign Office about Hungary further stiffened and the Hungarian occupation of Transylvania, simultaneously with German aggression into Poland, was anticipated.

Thus, in evaluating London's attitude towards Hungarian revisionism, it is clear that the British priority was to prevent Germany accessing Romanian raw materials and to keep the region out of the war. Our evidence has demonstrated that Hungarian territorial claims in Romania were judged as a threat to this policy. Immediately before the outbreak of the war the perception of the Foreign Office and Chamberlain shifted from viewing Hungary as a victim of German aggression, and revisionism was now directly connected to a possible German-Hungarian cooperation against Romania. Therefore, the decision was made to discourage frontier change and to support Romania.

³⁰ TNA, FO 371/23843, R 6540/140/37, Foreign Office to O'Malley, 18 August 1939; R 6999/88/37, Sargent to Barcza, 28 August 1939; compare to *A Palazzo Chigi és Magyarország*, 336, 339: Vinci to Ciano, 30 August 1939.

³¹ TNA, FO 371/23843, R 6999/88/37, Sargent to Barcza, 28 August 1939; FO 417/40, C 12507/350/21, Halifax to O'Malley, 29 August 1939; HIA, Barcza, Diaries, 2 September 1939, Box 0009; 'Hungary and Romania', *The Times*, 28 August 1939.

3.3 British view of the Hungarian-Romanian territorial dispute during the Polish campaign

After Germany invaded Poland on the 1 September 1939, the British and French declared war on Germany on 3 September.³² The opinions of historians vary on the role of the Polish guarantee in the decision, but the Anglo-Polish relationship and the decision to honour the commitment to Poland have mostly been isolated from other regional issues by historians. A much neglected aspect of Anglo-Polish cooperation is the traditional friendship between Warsaw and Budapest, which had strong implications for the British aim to facilitate an Anglo-Polish-Romanian alliance over the spring and summer of 1939. As we have seen, the Polish guarantee in the spring had an important Hungarian angle, and contrary to the opinion of most historians, Britain considered helping Hungary. Therefore, it will be crucial to review whether Hungary retained its importance in this equation at the outbreak of the war, and how far the German-Polish war shifted British policy towards Hungary.

During the spring of 1939 Britain had contemplated helping Hungary against German aggression, if Poland had declared war on Hungary's side. But because Chamberlain and the Foreign Office considered Hungary in late August too pro-German, any British references about helping Hungary were excluded from the Anglo-Polish military alliance on 26 August.³³ More crucially, the Poles frustrated the British aim to facilitate Polish-Romanian cooperation in the framework of the Anglo-Polish alliance by stressing that Romanian aid, in case of a war with Germany, was not required as it would bring Hungary into the war. Warsaw, being friendly both towards Budapest and Bucharest refused to pick sides.³⁴ Following the failure of the Anglo-Polish-Romanian alliance, the subject of whether Romania should be dragged into the war was widely debated in the Foreign Office.³⁵ The problem's military implications were highlighted by a Chiefs of Staff Committee report, which recommended that due to the fact that the defence of Romania was impossible, British military intervention and

³² Hill, *Cabinet Decisions on Foreign Policy*, pp. 85-100.

³³ D. Williams, 'Negotiations Leading to the Anglo-Polish Alliance', *Irish Historical Studies* 10 (1956-57), pp. 59-93, 156-192; A. Prazmowska, *Britain, Poland and the Eastern Front*, p. 203.

³⁴ TNA, FO 371/23840, R 6785/133/37, 'Chiefs of Staff Subcommittee Report', 2 September 1939; Lungu, *Romania*, p. 181.

³⁵ TNA, FO 371/23840, R 6785/133/37, minute by Nichols 27 August 1939.

the plan to supply Poland through Romania had to be abandoned, because a German-Hungarian countermove was anticipated. Hence, based on the assumption that a neutral Romania would not serve any pretexts for Hungarian or German-Hungarian aggression, and at the same time Hungary's entry into the war and its accession to the Axis could be delayed, it was decided that Romania should be encouraged to stay neutral in the German-Polish war.³⁶

Romania declared neutrality on 5 September. Confidence in Hungary in the Foreign Office was rapidly decreasing, because Budapest instead of declaring neutrality, announced the status of 'armed neutrality'. In the light of the Hungarian refusal to sign a non-aggression pact with Romania and the recent Hungarian mobilization close to the Romanian frontier, the Foreign Office was convinced that Hungary was conspiring with Germany in the dismemberment of Romania, and expected a Hungarian aggression in the immediate future.³⁷

The British anticipation of German-Hungarian cooperation against Romania at the outbreak of the war brings up the inevitable question, whether the British guarantee to Romania was applicable against Hungary. We have noted that after the destruction of Czecho-Slovakia Halifax and Sargent declared that the British guarantee would have come into force in the event of a Hungarian aggression. New evidence suggests that this opinion was maintained over the autumn. After requesting instructions on how to handle Romanian inquiries about the Soviet threat, the British ambassador in Paris, Eric Phipps was informed in October that Soviet aggression would not, but a German and/or Hungarian aggression would have enforced the British guarantee during the German-Polish war.³⁸ Although the Foreign Office only specified British attitude for the time of the Polish campaign, this document finally clarifies some of the uncertainties as to whether a Hungarian action to regain Transylvania in September 1939 had activated the British guarantee. Even though the Hungarian attack never materialised, the British

³⁶ TNA, CAB/66/1/3, Hoare to Foreign Office, 24 August 1939; 'Report by the Chief of Staff Committee', 4 September 1939; see also: P. D. Quinlan, *Clash over Romania, British and American Policies towards Romania: 1938-1947* (Los Angeles, 1977), p. 55. A neutral Romania was also believed to be able to block German pressure to ship an increasing amount of oil products, which was also a vital British interest.

³⁷ Macartney stressed that an outspokenly pro-Allied Hungary would have embarrassed Britain in September, as due to insufficient resources London was unable to provide adequate help: Macartney, *October Fifteenth*, p. 372.

³⁸ TNA, FO 371/23846, Foreign Office to Phipps, 6 October; see also: J. Herman, *Paris Embassy of Sir Eric Phipps: Anglo-French Relations and Foreign Office, 1937-1939* (London, 1998), p. 220.

judgement over this question crucially affects our understanding of the image of Hungary in London in the autumn of 1939. However, we cannot fail to notice that the information was given retrospectively to Phipps and only defined British policy for the duration of the Polish campaign.

During the German-Polish war, reflecting on the expected German-Hungarian cooperation, Sargent and Cadogan were already secretly discussing the possibilities of the restorations of the Versailles *status quo*. Similarly to their reaction to the Hungarian-Romanian dispute in August, they noted that returning to the Versailles order would provide stability, and declared that the liberation of the Czechs and Slovaks would eventually become one of the primary war aims of Britain. They contemplated the restoration of Czechoslovakia after the war, but made only very vague references on its territorial shape. Their tone suggested the possibility of a small rectification in 'Northern Hungary'.³⁹ The comment on 'Northern Hungary' illustrates that Sargent and Cadogan, who tended to rigidly disapprove frontier revision, considered to rethink the 1920 Hungarian-Czechoslovak frontier, but it is evident that the frontier change was planned to be very limited. It also has to be noted that instead of the 'First Vienna Award', the term 'Northern Hungary' was used, which suggests that the viability of the award was now under discussion and curtailing Hungary's acquisition was already planned.

Although the Foreign Office now discussed the First Vienna Award and the question of frontier revision in general, declaring any official opinion was considered very untimely.⁴⁰ This had been reflected in the reaction to the publication of Lord Rothermere's memoir, *My Campaign for Hungary* in mid-September. The book praised the First Vienna Award and the Hungarian acquisition of Ruthenia and called for the ethnic reconstruction of the region.⁴¹ Objections were expressed by senior officials of the Foreign Office, not particularly because Rothermere called for the application of the ethnic principle, but mainly due to fears of the book's effects on the public's war effort. The Foreign Office was also concerned that Bucharest might interpret the recommendations of Rothermere as British official policy. Attempts were therefore

³⁹ TNA, FO 371/23114, C 13573/530/21, minutes by Sargent and Cadogan, 5 September 1939.

⁴⁰ TNA, FO 371/23114, C 13573/530/21, minute by Sargent, 5 September 1939.

⁴¹ Rothermere, *My Campaign for Hungary*.

made to limit the distribution of the book, and Bucharest was hastily informed that the views of Rothermere had no relevance to official British policy, and London would adhere to its promise not to make references to the Hungarian-Romanian frontier without Bucharest's consent.⁴²

Ralf Walford Selby, a junior official in the central department, was the lone voice to abandon the central line of disapproving frontier revision after war broke out. He recommended the revision of the Hungarian-Slovak and the Hungarian-Romanian frontiers at the post-war settlement, but his propositions were killed in their early stage.⁴³ It seems that his young age was not the only factor in disapproving his opinions. His father, Sir Walford Selby, minister in Vienna in the 1930s, accused Vansittart and the Foreign Office of condoning the Anschluss and of giving Germany a green-light in the Danubian-region.⁴⁴ The young Ralf evidently inherited his father's conviction that London should give more support to the Central European countries against Germany. Whether his pro-Hungarian views or the memory of the spat with his father made his propositions continuously overruled in the Foreign Office cannot be proved satisfactorily, but being the lone pro-Hungarian voice in the first months of the war, his views have to be considered for our analysis. Selby was also the only public servant who seemed to understand the reason of misapprehension between Budapest and London. He pointed out that British appraisals to reconstruct a free Hungary after the war were interpreted by Budapest as the appreciation of Hungarian territorial claims and the promise to recreate Hungary in a larger form after the war.⁴⁵ The senior diplomats in Whitehall however showed no interest in paying a price for Hungarian resistance and

⁴² TNA, FO 371/23114, C 13573/530/21, minutes by Makins, Nichols and Selby, 5 September 1939; also, HIA, Barcza, Diaries, 22 September 1939, Box 0009.

⁴³ TNA, FO 371/23114, C 13487/350/21, minute by Selby, 5 September 1939; FO 371/23114, C 13487/350/21, minutes by Kirkpatrick, Nichols, Strang and Troutbeck, 5 September 1939.

⁴⁴ W. Selby, *Diplomatic twilight, 1930–1940* (London, 1953), p. 138; Neville, 'Lord Vansittart, Sir Walford Selby and the Debate about Treasury Interference in the Conduct of British Foreign Policy in the 1930s', pp. 623–633.

⁴⁵ TNA, FO 371/23114, C 14232/530/21, minute by Selby, 19 September 1939. Macartney also believed that this was one of the key factor in the misunderstanding between London and Budapest: Macartney, *October Fifteenth*, pp. 365–366. Hungary was indeed expecting British territorial promises, as a reward for resisting Germany. Csáky vaguely referred to this in September 1939 to O'Malley, but at the climax of the Anglo-Hungarian relationship, when in April 1940 Hungary granted military passage to Germany, Teleki made it clear to O'Malley that the reason for Hungary's pro-German policy was the lack of British support for frontier revision: TNA, FO 371/23114, C 12979/350/21, O'Malley to Foreign Office, 5 September 1939; K 63, 16. cs., 1940-2/1. ad 266/pol., 2597/1940, O'Malley to Csáky, 11 May 1940; Teleki to O'Malley 11 May 1940.

neutrality. Hungary was expected to show clear signs of resistance without the promise of reward.

Barcza, recognising British resentment towards revisionism, recommended a pro-Western rhetoric to Budapest, and the shelving of the territorial questions for the duration of the war. But Csáky ignored this recommendation, and instructed Barcza that Hungary did not demand Romanian territories with a 50 percent or higher Magyar population any more and instead, to keep a free hand in the war Hungary did not want to specify the extent of its territorial claims. Arthur Henderson, a Labour MP, who was in regular contact with Barcza, admitted to the Hungarian minister that this new change in demands considerably confused British circles, mostly due to the inconsistency in Hungarian foreign policy. It was particularly suspicious in London that even though Hungary kept revisionism on the surface, was evidently reluctant to specify its claims.⁴⁶

Csáky's attitude in early September gave no reason to the Foreign Office to consider a more flexible approach towards frontier change. After the outbreak of war Csáky led a nebulous revisionist policy mixed with violent outbursts against Britain and France. On the 14 September he publicly blamed the Versailles settlement and the Western powers for the war and declared the importance of further frontier revision.⁴⁷ In his diaries, Barcza had revealed the deep resentment he felt towards Csáky's foreign policy in late 1939, as it ruined his laborious efforts to achieve understanding towards Hungary in London. He admitted that in order to avoid distressing the British, he intentionally failed to comply with some of the most absurd of Csáky's instructions, such as asking the British to stop publishing pro-Czech articles in the press, and to delay the contraband control only towards Hungary.⁴⁸

Besides, Barcza's diaries reveal crucial aspects of the yet mostly unexplored Teleki-Csáky conflict, which were particularly apparent in Hungarian diplomacy towards London. Barcza's diaries attest that Teleki strongly encouraged him to conduct diplomacy behind the back of Csáky, whom he regarded as too subservient towards

⁴⁶ HIA, Barcza, Diaries, 6 September 1939, Box 0009.

⁴⁷ DIMK IV, 395: Barcza to Ghyczy, 15 September 1939.

⁴⁸ HIA, Barcza, Diaries, 13 December 1939, Box 0009.

Germany.⁴⁹ In personal letters, sent by special couriers, as telegrams and the diplomatic bag was the regular target of German agents, Barcza was encouraged to project the image of an able and strong Hungary, which was ready to defend its independence. The outbreak of the war made these secret communications even more difficult. Consequently, delicate issues were discussed through unofficial channels. One of these contacts was the Hungarian born Lady Listowel (Judit Márffy-Mantuano), who conveyed the message of a neutral and independent Hungary to Halifax and Chamberlain in mid-September.⁵⁰

Despite the efforts of Barcza and Teleki, Hungary's vague assurances to stay neutral in the war had by all means failed their purpose. One of the underlying reasons was the openly pro-German attitude of the Hungarian press. Historians have stressed that London understood Hungary's difficult position and turned a blind eye to the outrages of the Hungarian press against the Allies.⁵¹ Yet, Foreign Office discussions attest very different opinions, and while the friendly official tone towards Hungary was kept, the pro-German attitude of Budapest was registered.⁵²

The loss of confidence in Hungary is similarly recognisable in the perception of Halifax, and since September 1939 he also approached revision with more reluctance. In a memorandum summarizing British Balkans policy, he retracted his lenient views on frontier revision expressed before the war, and articulated an anti-revisionist opinion. The memorandum put Hungary in the German sphere of influence and judged Budapest's temptation for revision as a constant threat to the region. Regardless of disapproving revisionism, this memorandum demonstrates a crucial new phenomenon in British policy towards Hungary. Despite a critical view of Hungarian territorial claims, it articulated very positive perceptions of Hungary's will for neutrality and independence. Halifax expressed the British aim to bring a so called neutral bloc in

⁴⁹ Macartney defends the attitude of the Hungarian foreign minister. According to Macartney, Csáky conducted a pro-German policy to achieve integral revision with German help as soon as possible. Csáky believed that Greater Hungary would be able to defend itself against anyone, even Germany: Macartney, *October Fifteenth*, p. 365.

⁵⁰ DIMK IV, 395: Barcza to Ghyczy, 15 September 1939. Later, in early 1940, for Barcza's request, a \$500 annual payment was approved for Lady Listowel to talk and write about Hungarian revisionism in Britain and America: MOL, K 66, 293/res., Barcza to Csáky, 4 March 1940.

⁵¹ Macartney, *October Fifteenth*, pp. 366, 375; Juhász, *Magyarország külpolitikája*, p. 227.

⁵² TNA, FO 371/23114, C 13491/350/21, Foreign Office to O'Malley, 12 September 1939.

South Eastern Europe into being and he thought it possible to attach Hungary to it.⁵³ Visibly, the perceptions on Hungarian territorial claims were separated from overall judgements about Hungary. This is a new phenomenon became the characteristic of British thought from the outbreak of the war. Historiography has failed to recognise this new current, and that is one of the reasons András Bán has labelled British foreign policy towards Hungary puzzled and inconsistent.⁵⁴

By the time this memorandum was completed on the 12 September, Halifax was probably aware of Teleki's secret pledge to keep Hungary neutral. In all likelihood he also knew that Budapest refused to grant *droit de passage* to Germany for the Kassa-Velejte railway-line (map 3.1), which Pál Pritz, without due reflection has called the decision of the century.⁵⁵ Before the outbreak of the war Teleki had already notified Hitler that it was against Hungary's moral conviction to participate in a conflict against Poland. Receiving the German request for a right of military passage on 6 September, Csáky informed Ciano that Hungary would refuse to assist German movement against Poland, but a similar request, to enter Romania would be granted.⁵⁶ Halifax's memorandum reflected British appreciation of Hungarian resistance, and, as we noted, the inclusion of Hungary in the forming neutral bloc was expressed.⁵⁷ However, it further has to be emphasized that the question of frontier revision was disapproved in the Halifax memorandum, as it was believed to threaten the neutrality of the region.

⁵³ TNA, CAB/66/1/25, Halifax, 'Position in the Balkans', 12 September 1939.

⁵⁴ Bán, *Hungarian-British Diplomacy 1938-1941*, p. 88-96.

⁵⁵ P. Pritz, 'Emlékirat és történelmi valóság. Barcza György emlékiratai fényében' in *Az objektivitás mítosza? Hazánk és a nagyvilág, 20. századi metszetek*, ed. by P. Pritz (Budapest, 2011), pp. 197-210 (p. 200). The Hungarian refusal triggered mixed feelings in the Foreign Office. Csáky's promise that the railroad tunnels would be blown up, if the Wehrmacht tried to force the passage, turned out to be lies, which repulsed the Foreign Office: TNA, FO 371/23114, C 13491/350/21, Foreign Office to O'Malley, 12 September 1939. Juhász has also pointed out that it was believed in London that Hungary asked for a free hand in Transylvania for allowing a German military passage and only when Germany rejected it made the decision to refuse the passage: Juhász, *Magyarország külpolitikája*, p. 223. Macartney also concluded that the Hungarian plan to occupy Transylvania was renounced when Germany protested: Macartney, *October Fifteenth*, p. 386.

⁵⁶ Macartney, *October Fifteenth*, p. 366; G. Ciano, *Diaries, 1937-1943. The Complete, Unabridged Diaries of Count Galeazzo Ciano, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1936-1943*, ed. by R. Miller et al (London, 2002), 6 September 1939. We cannot fail to stress Csáky's communication to Ciano that Hungary would not resist a German request for military passage to enter Romania. This request had not materialised in the autumn of 1939, but clearly demonstrates the Hungarian attitude towards Bucharest. A German request was finally granted by Hungary in April 1940, which, as we will see, had devastating consequences for the Anglo-Hungarian relationship. For a detailed analysis of the question of military passage see our next chapter.

⁵⁷ TNA, FO 371/23114, C 13491/350/21, Foreign Office to O'Malley, 12 September 1939.

Although territorial claims on Romania were in the forefront of Hungarian foreign policy in September 1939, there is evidence for a very different current. A yet unknown Hungarian initiative at the outbreak of the war proves that certain segments of the Hungarian elite attempted to confront the current crisis, and sensing the stiff British and Romanian attitude, wanted to soften the rigid Hungarian revisionist rhetoric. Peace feelers sounded Bucharest and London on the possibilities of rapprochement. For instance, István Bethlen, the Hungarian prime minister in the 1920s, was very uneasy about the perpetual misunderstanding with Romania and approached Le Rougetel at the British Embassy in Bucharest. The evidence, though very thin, suggests that Bethlen offered his influence to put pressure on Teleki, to renounce Hungarian territorial claims in Transylvania in favour of a rapprochement between Budapest and Bucharest and cooperation against Germany.⁵⁸ Unfortunately, the lack of evidence prevents us from deciding whether Bethlen followed his own initiative, or acted with the consent of Teleki or Horthy, but using this new evidence to probe the Hungarian-Romanian dispute at the outbreak of the war, sheds fresh light on the foreign political thought of Hungary and reflects on Budapest's broader understanding of the situation. Apart from the fact that Hungary was constantly associated with 'revision', very influential segments of the Hungarian elite clearly did not exclude the renunciation of frontier revision to reach an understanding with Bucharest. Evidence of this mostly unknown venture is very scarce. Hungarian sources are silent and the reaction of the Foreign Office is also unknown. Perhaps the delicacy and secrecy of this contact did not allow written answers and discussions, or simply the outbreak of the war diminished the practicability of this scheme.⁵⁹

This research has established that attempts were made from very prominent Hungarian quarters to project the image of a strong, neutral and pro-British Hungary.

⁵⁸ TNA, FO 371/23843, R 6540/140/37, Le Rougetel to Foreign Office, 18 August 1939. The diaries of Rudolf Andorka, Hungarian minister in Madrid, also prove that over the autumn of 1939 Bethlen was actively seeking a rapprochement between Hungary and Romania: *A madridi nagykövetségtől Mauthausenig. Andorka Rudolf Naplója*, ed. by Zs. Lőrincz (Budapest, 1978), pp. 90-91, 95-96. Neither the memoir of Bethlen, nor the political biography of Bethlen mentions this initiative: *Bethlen István emlékirata 1944* ed. by I. Romsics (Budapest, 1988); Romsics, *Bethlen István*.

⁵⁹ Bethlen's initiative is most interesting if we are comparing it with his earlier views on Transylvania. During his 1933 lecture tour in Britain he had recommended the independence of Transylvania. His new initiative seems strange if we are considering the fact that before Trianon he was one of the richest landowners in Transylvania; rumour had it that behind his revisionist rhetoric there were crude personal and financial reasons.

London on the other hand was expecting a consistently pro-Allied policy from Budapest, and the contrast between secret pro-Western messages and official pro-German policy left policy-makers in London disillusioned and confused. The results of our investigation have proved that disapproving the revision of the Hungarian-Romanian frontier in September, according to the decisions of the Foreign Office in August, was now an established British viewpoint. Moreover, key policy-makers, such as Cadogan and Sargent were already contemplating the reconstruction of the Versailles status quo after the war.

3.4 Soviet penetration into East Central Europe

On the 17 September the Red Army entered Eastern Poland. Soviet penetration significantly affected British attitude towards the territorial status quo of Central Europe. We are particularly interested to demonstrate how Soviet expansion into Central Europe was received and interpreted in the light of the British guarantees to Poland and Romania, and how these events shifted British perceptions towards Hungarian revisionism.

The question of how Soviet aggression against Poland and Romania affected British views on the future shape of the region has received minimal attention in the historiography. Michael Carley has examined the failure of the Anglo-Soviet negotiations before the war, while others, such as Martin Kitchen and Graham Ross have analysed Anglo-Soviet relationship during the war.⁶⁰ Keith Sword has studied the reaction of the Foreign Office to the Soviet occupation of Eastern Poland and Victoria Child analysed Anglo-Soviet relationship from 1939 to 1942 in the context of the Baltic states, but a wider perspective, which goes beyond the analysis of Anglo-Polish and Anglo-Soviet relationships, and considers the impact of Soviet aggression on Britain's relationship with other states in the region, such as Hungary, is completely absent in the historiography.⁶¹ Hungarian historiography has presented only monocausal explanations for Britain's diminishing interest towards Hungary after the destruction of Poland; and Soviet expansion, as one of the key reasons in the shift in British perceptions on the frontiers of Hungary has not been explored.⁶²

Similarly in fact, the Soviet aggression in 1939, compared to the German, received considerably less attention from the Foreign Office, although, as Christopher Catherwood has emphasized, Hungary and Romania were more terrified of Bolshevism

⁶⁰ Carley, *1939: The Alliance That Never Was*; M. Kitchen, *British Policy Towards the Soviet Union During the Second World War* (Basingstoke, 1986); G. Ross, *The Foreign Office and the Kremlin: British Documents on Anglo-Soviet Relations 1941-45* (Cambridge, 1984). Many others have analysed the diplomatic manoeuvres, which were taking place before the war, from which, due to its interest in wider regional implication, Anita Prazmowska's study has to be distinguished; A. Prazmowska, *Poland*.

⁶¹ Sword, 'British Reactions to the Soviet Occupation of Eastern Poland'; V. J. Child, 'British policy towards the Soviet Union, 1939-42, with special reference to the Baltic States' (Unpublished thesis [D.Phil.]-University of Oxford, 1995).

⁶² Bán, *Hungarian-British Diplomacy 1938-1941*, p. 88-92.

than Nazism.⁶³ In the following, firstly, a brief overview will be given concerning how far the Soviet penetration changed Hungarian and Romanian foreign policy. This will be followed by an analysis of the radical shift in British strategy after the collapse of Poland, and the British reaction to the changes in Hungarian and Romanian foreign policy.

As a result of the Soviet occupation of Eastern Poland, the Hungarian-Polish common frontier was now occupied by the Red Army. The Hungarian elite, terrified by Communist propaganda and an immediate Soviet military aggression promptly started to construct fortification along the frontier. The fact that the Hungarian-German frontier was not strengthened, while the Hungarian-Soviet was now heavily manned and fortified, increased British suspicions of a German-Hungarian conspiracy: it was widely believed that Hungary would not offer resistance to German penetration.⁶⁴

The Soviet appearance in the Carpathians arguably weakened the Hungarian room for manoeuvre, but at the same time supplied a convenient argument for pressing territorial claims in Romania. The threat of a quick Soviet advance towards the Balkans and the Romanian oilfields was much overplayed by Budapest, especially to the British minister, and the new strategic situation was now used as a justification to claim the frontier along the crest of the Carpathians to Hungary. Hungarian control over the Eastern Carpathians, argued Teleki, could serve as a bulwark against further Soviet penetration into the Balkans which would benefit the West also. This argument was also shared by Macartney, who believed that historical precedents clearly proved that this frontier could check southward Soviet movements through the strategically crucial Focşani-Galati gap (map 3.2).⁶⁵

O'Malley was seemingly strongly influenced by the views of the Hungarian elite. From mid-September, echoing their views, he had stressed the strong strategic case behind the Hungarian claim to acquire the Eastern crest of the Carpathians.⁶⁶ After

⁶³ C. Catherwood, *The Balkans in World War Two: Britain's Balkan Dilemma* (Basingstoke, 2003), pp. 5-8.

⁶⁴ TNA, FO 371/24431 Annual report on Hungary, 1939.

⁶⁵ Macartney, *October Fifteenth*, p. 387. The Austro-Hungarian control of the Carpathians had threatened Russian operations in the Romanian principalities during the Crimean War (1853-56) and the Russian-Turkish War of 1877-78 by the possibility of cutting Russian supply-lines at the Focşani-Galati gap.

⁶⁶ TNA, FO 371/23114, C 15765/530/21, O'Malley to Foreign Office, 1 October 1939; C 17002/350/21, O'Malley to Foreign Office, 13 October 1939. O'Malley was in regular contact with Antal Ulléin-

the destruction of Poland, the role of the Carpathian boundary in stopping the expansion of the Soviet Union towards the Straits recurrently emerged in O'Malley's thought until the Second Vienna Award in August 1940, when this frontier eventually materialised.⁶⁷ Cadogan admitted that the Trianon Hungarian-Romanian frontier was not ideal, but dismissed O'Malley's proposition, due to its radical nature. Consequently, O'Malley was only instructed to encourage Hungarian resistance to German and Soviet aggression.⁶⁸

Soviet expansion also had a similarly significant impact on Romanian foreign policy. Since the Romanian occupation of Bessarabia (modern Moldova) in 1918, authority over the province was the subject of Soviet-Romanian dispute. Moscow had never recognised the new frontier, which left no doubt of future Soviet intentions.⁶⁹ Armand Calinescu, the Prime Minister of Romania between March and September 1939, and King Carol followed a cautious pro-Western policy at the outbreak of the war.⁷⁰ After the Soviet invasion of Eastern Poland they sounded out London and Reginald Hoare, the British minister, on several occasions over whether the guarantee applied against the Soviet Union or Germany only. Hoare encouraged Bucharest to resist Germany and Hungary, and his reports clearly fuelled the suspicion of the Foreign Office towards Hungary, as he constantly raised the alarm of German-Hungarian cooperation.⁷¹ The Foreign Office repeatedly gave evasive answers to Romanian enquiries about the guarantee, but as we have seen the guarantee indeed applied against Germany and Hungary, but not against the Soviet Union.⁷²

The Foreign Office left Hungarian and Romanian worries over the Soviet threat unanswered. The immediate British response to the Soviet occupation of Eastern Poland was of confusion and disbelief. Foreign Office debates also attest remarkable optimism

Reviczky, the Anglophile head of the Cultural and Press Department of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry and Teleki himself. For the Hungarian theory that by controlling the passes of the Carpathians Hungary could act as a vanguard against the spread of Communism, see: MOL, K 63, 259. cs. 27. t. 1940-27/7/8.

⁶⁷ The Second Vienna Award was a German-Italian decision, which ceded Northern Transylvania to Hungary on 30 August 1940. Chapter 5 gives an in-depth analysis of the British reaction to the award.

⁶⁸ TNA, FO 371/23116, C 14182/4000/21, Cadogan to O'Malley, 29 September 1939.

⁶⁹ The Nazi-Soviet Pact recognised that Bessarabia was a Soviet sphere of influence.

⁷⁰ Rebecca Haynes has reinterpreted the foreign policy of Bucharest and argued that from 1938 Romania paid lip service to the Western powers, Germany and the Soviet Union simultaneously: Haynes, *Romanian Policy towards Germany*.

⁷¹ TNA, FO 371/23840, R 6785/133/37, Hoare to Halifax, 23, 25 August; 2, 3 September 1939.

⁷² TNA, FO 371/23846, Foreign Office to Phipps, 6 October; see also: Herman, *Paris Embassy of Sir Eric Phipps*, p. 220.

and wishful thinking, as an immediate German-Soviet dispute was anticipated now that the buffer-state, Poland, was removed.⁷³ However, after the conclusion of the German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty (also known as the Second Nazi-Soviet Pact) on 28 September, the tone of the press and the Foreign Office had shifted, and Germany appeared as the sole oppressor of the Polish nation.⁷⁴ Most importantly, Halifax and the Foreign Office seemed to accept that the Soviet Union was only occupying the frontiers set by the Versailles treaty of 1919.⁷⁵ The opinion was also expressed that an ethnographically just line had been reached, which could possibly form the future post-war frontier between Poland and the Soviet Union.⁷⁶ The early expression of the possible acceptance of the Curzon-line, as the future Polish-Soviet frontier places the prolonged Anglo-Soviet dispute during the war over the future of Poland in new light. Besides, most crucially, it demonstrates that the application of ethnographic criteria in the post-war settlement was one of the key principles of British thought. By all appearances, Whitehall accepted the Nazi-Soviet demarcation line as the frontier of the Soviet Union, on the basis that it ran along the ethnographic dividing line between Poles and Belarusians. Fundamentally, this frontier was a result of aggression, but the British approval nevertheless indicates that after the outbreak of the war London was still thinking along the lines of the reconstruction of Central Europe on the ethnographic basis, which potentially had strong implications for the British perceptions on the Hungarian-Romanian frontier.

Regardless of the idea of an ethnographically just Central Europe, the disappearance of Poland and the Soviet expansion significantly affected Britain's Balkan and Mediterranean strategy, which had immediate implications for British

⁷³ K. Sword, 'British Reactions to the Soviet Occupation of Eastern Poland', p. 88. For the reason that an active German-Soviet cooperation against Britain was ruled out, the Cabinet decided that declaration of war on Moscow should not be considered: Butler, *Grand Strategy*, pp. 68-69.

⁷⁴ The territories occupied by the Soviet Union were dominated by Belarusians and Ukrainians, which became one of the reasons that the Soviet action was not condemned in London. The Polish expert of the Foreign Office, Frank Savory however refuted this justification and emphasized that Eastern Poland also had a strong Polish characteristic: Sword, 'British Reactions to the Soviet Occupation of Eastern Poland', p. 94.

⁷⁵ *Hansard* (Lords), vol. 114, p. 1570., Lord Halifax's exposé on the Soviet action against Poland, 17 September 1939. The Curzon Line was put forward by the Allied Supreme Council after the First World War as a demarcation line between Poland and Bolshevik Russia, and was supposed to serve as the basis for a future border. The demarcation mostly followed the ethnographic line between the Polish and Ukrainian/Belarusian nations.

⁷⁶ Sword, 'British Reactions to the Soviet Occupation of Eastern Poland', p. 92.

attitudes towards Hungary. A fresh memorandum of the Chiefs of Staff, written on 18 September, emphasized the importance of cooperation with Italy in the region and anticipated that Germany, lacking a direct connection with Romania, would use Hungary to push towards the Ploiesti oil-fields. This memorandum restated the conclusions of the earlier decision of September, namely that due to geographical impracticability it was impossible to help Hungary and Romania to resist German pressure: Budapest and Bucharest were written off in British military strategy.⁷⁷ In the light of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, for the recommendation of the Chiefs of Staff, it was now considered impracticable to induce Romania and the Balkan states to enter the war on the side of the Allies. British strategy, for the third time in the last six months, made a U-turn towards the region and Romanian neutrality was again supported.⁷⁸ Accordingly, French propositions for the immediate opening of a Salonika front were rejected. The first line of defence in the Balkans was moved to Northern Greece and Bulgaria, but the defence of the Balkans became largely overshadowed by vital Mediterranean interests.⁷⁹ Turkey became increasingly the centre of British attention. Chamberlain, Halifax and the Foreign Office unanimously considered Turkey as the key to British Mediterranean and imperial strategy.⁸⁰ After the British-French-Turkish Tripartite Treaty, signed on 19 October 1939, Allied military presence in the Balkans became completely dependent on Turkish help and agreement.⁸¹

Although by the autumn of 1939 Hungary and Romania were written off in British military planning, diplomatic efforts were made to prevent the region from falling under German supremacy. At the outbreak of the war Halifax had already

⁷⁷ TNA, CAB/66/1/33, 'Possible Future Course of the War', 18 September 1939; CAB 66/3/49, 'Policy in the Balkans and the Middle East', W.P. 149 (39), 5 December 1939.

⁷⁸ TNA, CAB/66/1/3, 'Position of Romania', W. P. (39) 3, 4 September 1939; FO 417/40, R 6785/133/37, Committee of Imperial Defence. Chief of Staff Sub-Committee, 20 September 1939.

⁷⁹ TNA, CAB/66/1/33, 'Possible Future Course of the War', 18 September 1939. CAB/66/2/24, 'Appreciation by the Chiefs of Staff Committee of the situation created by the Russo-German agreement', W. P. 74 (39), 9 October 1939; CAB/66/4/9, 'The Balkan Problem', W. P. 39 (159), 13 December 1939.

⁸⁰ R. M. Salerno, *Vital Crossroads: Mediterranean Origins of the Second World War, 1935-1940* (New York, 2002), pp. 158, 203; S. Lawlor, *Churchill and the politics of war, 1940-1941* (Cambridge, 1994), p. 10.

⁸¹ It has to be noted here that on 8 October Hitler made a peace offer to Britain, but it was swiftly rejected by the Cabinet: TNA, PREM 1/395, 'Prime Minister's reply to Hitler's Peace Offer', 10 October 1939. Among economic and colonial questions Hitler recommended the settlement of Central European territorial questions. Obviously, the latter proposition was not the underlying reason for the British rejection.

expressed British support for a Balkan neutral bloc of Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary. Now after the Soviet aggression against Poland, support for this scheme was renewed, with the aim of facilitating collective security in the region, including both revisionist states, Hungary and Bulgaria. The idea of the bloc came from Bucharest, and by supporting its creation, Britain limited its elbow room by accepting the Romanian principle that Hungary and Bulgaria would only be allowed to join, if territorial claims were renounced.⁸² Similarly to the earlier decision to refrain from making references to frontier revision, London considered it strategically necessary to shelf the question of Romania's frontiers.⁸³ Distinction however has to be immediately made between the Romanian and British approaches. While Romania categorically refused to discuss frontier revision, the British reluctance to raise the territorial question was underpinned only by the strategic interest to create the neutral bloc. The example of the Soviet frontier in Poland amply demonstrated that Whitehall contemplated the ethnic reconstruction of the region at the post-war settlement, which potentially questioned the Hungarian-Romanian frontier.

Direct British military support to Hungary and Romania against German and Soviet aggression was ruled out, but London was keen to politically support the creation of a Balkan neutral bloc. To assist regional cooperation, Hungarian radical claims were discouraged. Even though British policy was subordinated to strategic considerations during the war, the most significant finding to emerge is that British policy-makers agreed to the forceful changes of the status quo. Considering the ethnographic criteria as a potentially viable option for redrawing the frontiers of the region had very strong implications for the British assessing how or whether to revise Hungary's future frontiers.⁸⁴

⁸² Lungu, *Romania*, pp. 168, 208.

⁸³ *The Times*, articulated a surprisingly revisionist view on frontier revision, and suggested that the prerequisite of a successful Balkan cooperation was the revision of Hungary's and Bulgaria's frontier with Romania, 'Balkan Policy': *The Times*, 21 November 1939.

⁸⁴ The first official indication that Britain would accept the Curzon-line as the frontier between Poland and the Soviet Union was made by Eden during his visit to Moscow in the winter of 1941: TNA, CAB/66/20/39, War Cabinet Conclusions W. P. 42 (8), 'Mr Eden's visit to Moscow', 5 January 1942.

3.5 Walking on very thin ice. Hungary between Germany and Britain at the end of 1939

By the end of 1939 the Anglo-Hungarian relationship was standing at an important crossroad. Officially, Budapest was following a friendly policy towards Nazi Germany and was trumpeting the need of further territorial gains. Secretly however, Budapest was sending signals to London that resisting Germany and preserving the country's independence took precedence over all else. Regardless, London was growing impatient towards Hungary's obscure foreign policy and Hungary's persistent territorial demands annoyed policy-makers in Whitehall, because they hampered British strategy in Central Europe and the Balkans. In late 1939, Britain brought forth a new proposal for creating a neutral bloc in the region. London was keen to include Hungary in this cooperation, but Budapest had to renounce its claims as a prerequisite. It is intriguing that historians paid limited attention to this period. András Bán has failed to disentangle why London expressed positive opinions of Horthy, Teleki and other members of the Hungarian elite, but treated frontier revision with a measure of reserve.⁸⁵ This part demonstrates that Hungary was increasingly losing its significance in British regional policy, which inevitably brought a deepening disinterest towards Hungarian territorial claims. On the other hand, the amiable tone was maintained on the official level.

November 1939 witnessed a significant modification in British perceptions of Hungary's position in a neutral bloc. The Cabinet referred to Germany and Hungary as potential aggressors against Romania, and as a consequence Hungary's adhesion to the neutral bloc was now ruled out.⁸⁶ The conclusion's remarkable resonance with the information sent earlier to Phipps in Paris, which also stated that Hungary was viewed as a potential enemy during the Polish campaign, indicates that this notion became dominant in the minds of policy-makers after the collapse of Poland. The openly pro-German tone of the government-controlled *Pester Lloyd*, the suppression of liberal papers, such as the *Pesti Napló* and *Az Est*, the Hungarian refusal to grant import licenses to Jewish-owned British firms, and most importantly demanding frontier

⁸⁵ Bán, *Hungarian-British Diplomacy 1938-1941*, pp. 77-78.

⁸⁶ TNA, CAB/65/2/3, Cabinet Conclusion 89 (29), 3 November 1939.

revision in exchange for joining the neutral bloc, were among the reasons for the growing British mistrust of Hungary.⁸⁷

Cadogan's conversation with Barcza in late November reflected this shift in British opinion. The meeting went along diplomatic niceties, and ended without much substance. Hungary's peaceful conduct was praised and the well-known argument of the British desire to create a just peace was repeated.⁸⁸ Sargent's conversation with Barcza in November had followed the same lines of cordiality and evasiveness. Delicate issues, such as frontier revision, were avoided and Sargent went so far as to flatter Barcza, thanking him for opening London's eyes about Romanian intrigues.⁸⁹ What has to be pointed out, is not only the fact that the Foreign Office reduced its communication on territorial revision to generalities, but also that Cadogan's and Sargent's blandishing tone towards Barcza was once again in high contrast to their tone in the Foreign Office. This further confirms the argument expressed in chapter 1 that the British tone used during conversations with Barcza, and in diplomatic communications in general, cannot serve as firm evidence in the analysis of British thought on the Hungarian territorial problem.

Foreign Office minutes reveal a very different picture of British perceptions. On the one hand Budapest was praised in diplomatic communications, in order to encourage a stiffer resistance towards Germany, but on the other, discussions about the neutral bloc demonstrate that Hungary's claims in Transylvania were seen as an obstacle to bring about cooperation in the region against Germany. Moreover, Hungarian claims also did not receive the same attention as Bulgaria's in Southern Dobruja. From November, strong pressure was put on Bucharest to give territorial concessions to Bulgaria in order to help the creation of a neutral bloc.⁹⁰ Compared to this, as we have seen, London sounded out Bucharest on the possibilities of territorial concession to Hungary, but the firm Romanian refusals brought British proposals on the Hungarian-Romanian frontier to an end.⁹¹ Sargent added that promises could not be

⁸⁷ Frank, 'Treaty revision and doublespeak', pp. 163, 166.

⁸⁸ MOL, K 63, 15. 1939-2/1, I. Barcza to Csáky, 23 November 1939.

⁸⁹ MOL, K 63, 15. 1939-2/1, I. Barcza to Csáky, 14 November 1939.

⁹⁰ TNA, FO 417/39, R 1069/126/7, Halifax to Rendel, 4 November 1939.

⁹¹ TNA, FO 371/23116, C 17357/4000/21, minute by Mallet, 5 November 1939.

made to defend Hungary or to influence Hungarian foreign policy, as Britain was unable to bribe Hungary by territorial offers.⁹²

Besides short-term strategic planning, the Foreign Office was already discussing the future shape of the region after the war. Leading figures were debating a yet mostly unknown plan by historians. The Foreign Office was on the opinion that after the war Germany should be divided and a new state, consisting of South Germany, Austria and Hungary would be created. This new state was believed to be an adequate check against the penetration of Prussian militarism into the Danubian region and the Balkans.⁹³ This plan was later attributed to Churchill, who brought it forward at the Teheran Conference in November 1943, but clearly, this scheme had already been considered much earlier in Whitehall.⁹⁴ According to Barcza, Hungary in this scheme would be enlarged with the adjacent territories populated mostly by Magyars. This was in direct contrast with Churchill's plan in 1943, which considered the adhesion of Hungary to this state in its Trianon form. The fact that the Foreign Office in November 1939 believed that Hungary should receive the adjoining Magyar territories confirms that the minds of British policy-makers at this stage of the war were still set on frontier adjustments based on ethnicity (map 3. 3).

The Hungarian and the Czechoslovak questions became closely connected from late 1939 in British thought. British official attitudes towards the Czech émigrés soon became a barometer for the Anglo-Hungarian relationship. It is evident that until the Beneš émigré group received official recognition as a 'Committee' in December 1939, London was very careful to refer to Czechs and Slovaks, and not Czechoslovaks in official communications, to avoid attributing territorial connotations to the problem.⁹⁵ One of the reasons behind the British reluctance to give full recognition to the Czech émigrés at the early stage of the war was that Hungary was still not quite viewed as a German satellite. The Foreign Office considered it to be crucial not to alienate the Hungarians by making references to the reconstruction of Czechoslovakia, which could

⁹² TNA, FO 371/23116, C 17357/4000/21, minute by Sargent, 17 November 1939.

⁹³ MOL, K 63, 15. cs., 1939-2/7, I., 276/4. res. 1939, Barcza to Csáky, 1 November 1939.

⁹⁴ The plan was reiterated by the American president, Franklin D. Roosevelt at the Yalta Conference in February 1945, but due to the Soviet military presence in the region it failed to come to fruition: *Köztes-Európa térképtár, 1763-1993*, ed. by L. Pándi et al (Budapest, 1993), 232c, 232d.

⁹⁵ In November, in a carefully worded broadcast, Churchill referred to the freedom of Czechs and Slovaks, see: MOL, K 66 1939-I.-5/a-1. 397. cs. 40326/3.res. Barcza to Csáky, 14 November 1939.

have potentially been interpreted in Budapest as the renunciation of the First Vienna Award.⁹⁶

The problem of the Czechoslovak émigrés in London raised other delicate questions, such as the future of Slovakia and whether it would be united with Bohemia-Moravia after the war. Whitehall's view of the puppet state of Slovakia attests the lack of clear policy. Arthur Henderson, after discussions with Barcza, raised the question of British policy towards Slovakia in the House of Commons. 'Rab' Butler, the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in a somewhat dubious answer labelled Slovakia as a territory under enemy occupation, refusing to recognise it *de jure*, but noted that Britain was continuing to recognise the Slovak representative in London.⁹⁷ The remarkable similarity between the subject of the Barcza-Henderson conversation, and the topic Henderson raised in the Commons, makes it likely that Henderson's enquiry was for Barcza's influence, to sound out British intentions on the future of the Vienna Award and Slovakia. In late 1939, London apparently kept the door open for different alternatives.

Regardless of the plan to attach an enlarged Hungary to a South German state, and the views that Hungary was still not fully on the side of Germany, the Foreign Office increasingly believed that Hungarian foreign policy had become completely dependent on the question of revision and it was expected that Budapest would decide between the Axis and the Allies depending on the extent of their territorial offers.⁹⁸ This perception eventually led to a shift in British policy in a matter of months, regarding the question of the Czecho-Slovak National Committee which received recognition on 29 December 1939 as a 'Committee' representing the Czecho-Slovak nations.⁹⁹

Barcza felt disillusioned by the mistrust of the Foreign Office. Keen to improve Hungary's image in London, he contacted Chamberlain directly in November. He asked

⁹⁶ At the end of 1939, Halifax, and Frank Roberts in the Foreign Office in particular was very suspicious about Czech propaganda and political machinations in London and Paris, which aimed to make the liberation and reconstruction of Czechoslovakia an Allied war-aim. See particularly: TNA, FO 417/40, C 15436/7/12, Halifax to Phipps, 4 October 1939; also: Smetana, *In the Shadow of Munich*, pp. 173-180.

⁹⁷ *Hansard* (Commons), vol. 352, pp. 211-212, Butler's answer to Henderson, 9 October 1939. Compare to: HIA, Barcza, Diaries, 11 October 1939, Box 0009.

⁹⁸ MOL, K 63, 15. cs., 1939-2/7, I., 140/pol. Barcza to Csáky, 30 September 1939; TNA, FO 371/23116, C 17357/4000/21, minutes by Roberts and Selby, 3 November 1939.

⁹⁹ Smetana, *In the Shadow of Munich*, pp. 145-150; M. Brown, *Dealing With Democrats: The British Foreign Office and the Czechoslovak Émigrés in Great Britain, 1939 to 1945* (London, 2006), pp. 38-40.

Andrian Dingli to convey Budapest's wish to solve the Hungarian-Romanian dispute peacefully.¹⁰⁰ Although Dingli forwarded Chamberlain's appreciation of Hungary's struggle for independence, compared to his positive attitude before the Munich Agreement, Chamberlain seemed less enthusiastic, and Barcza was now unable to confer over the Magyar question directly with Chamberlain. Cabinet minutes from the end of 1939 also prove that Chamberlain paid less and less attention to Hungarian matters.

Our argument until now has contested András Bán's and Macartney's viewpoints, who both emphasized that Hungary's foreign policy at the end of 1939 was understood in London. One of the key limitations of their explanation is that they did not separate the general opinion on Hungary from the judgement about territorial claims. Bán also failed to weigh the importance of different official British sources, and often interpreted the opinion of junior Foreign Office diplomats as official British views.¹⁰¹ As before, the official appreciation of Hungarian foreign policy was used to encourage Hungarian resistance, and the rigid disapproval of frontier revision persisted in the background.

Official Hungarian visitors to London, such as Richard Quandt, the chairman of the Hungarian National Bank, a close ally of Teleki, was warmly welcomed and was courted assiduously. When Quandt came to London in October 1939, to negotiate a war trade agreement with Britain, the Foreign Office was very interested meeting him in order to assure him of Britain's increasing strength, and to encourage Teleki and Horthy to resist German pressure. Quandt's stay was treated as a unique opportunity to negotiate with Hungary, in times when direct contacts were impossible due to the war. The Foreign Office and Henry Bruce in the Ministry of Economic Warfare organised aircraft factory and air-defence visits for him, with the admitted goal of impressing Quandt.¹⁰²

¹⁰⁰ DIMK IV. 473: Barcza to Csáky, 18 November 1939; MOL, K 63, 16. 1940-2/1, 133/pol, Barcza to Csáky, 12 December 1939.

¹⁰¹ Bán, *Hungarian-British Diplomacy 1938-41*, pp. 84-86; Macartney, *October Fifteen*, p. 375.

¹⁰² TNA, FO 371/23116, C 17663/17663/21 minute by O'Malley, 28 October 1939; C 18126/17663/21, minute by O'Malley November 1939. On trade and contraband-policy towards Hungary, See: TNA, CAB/68/1/11, 1st Weekly Summary on Economic Warfare, 14 September 1939. The fact that armament factories and military installations were shown to Quandt proves that the British trusted Anglophile Hungarians.

Quandt's visit also enjoyed prominence in the press. The *Daily Telegraph* praised Hungary's openness for extended trade, and reported that the reason for Quandt's visit was to find alternatives for trading with Germany. In effect, Quandt was keen to increase Anglo-Hungarian trade, but presenting his visit in an anti-German context terrified policy-makers in Budapest, who were afraid to anger Germany. Hence, protests were immediately made to prevent the recurrence of such articles.¹⁰³ Lord Perth, the chief advisor on foreign publicity had instructed the press in November to write favourably about Hungary, not to give excuses for Germany to intervene.¹⁰⁴ The Foreign Office evidently displayed understanding towards Budapest's worries, but the Hungarian will to court Berlin and the inability to confront Germany had a negative effect on the already sceptical views.

Quandt's name is similarly very frequent in Barcza's diaries. Secret negotiations were underway between them to deposit large amounts of sterling into banks in London, Paris, Canada and the United States for the purpose of a Hungarian émigré government.¹⁰⁵ Indeed, Hungary at this time dedicated considerable attention to the creation of an émigré government, perhaps as a response to the positive British attitude towards the Czecho-Slovak National Committee. John Pelényi mentioned that only Teleki, Barcza and Lipót Baranyai, the chief executive of the Hungarian National Bank, knew about the plan at this stage, but Barcza's diaries prove that Quandt also had an important role in this scheme.¹⁰⁶

Genuine respect was not only articulated towards Quandt. The Regent of Hungary was a well-known admirer of British naval power and his statesmanship enjoyed much appreciation in London.¹⁰⁷ To encourage Horthy to resist Germany, the BBC on 6 December, which was the name-day of the Regent, broadcast Admiral Carr's congratulatory message, with very positive references to Horthy's acclaimed role as the

¹⁰³ 'Talks with Mr. Quandt': *Daily Telegraph*, 4 December 1939; MOL, K 66, 389. cs., 'Report on the British Press, 1-31 December 1939', 2 January 1940.

¹⁰⁴ MOL, K 66, 397. cs., 1939-I.-5/a-1., 40403, Barcza to Csáky, 30 November 1939.

¹⁰⁵ HIA, Barcza, Diaries, 3 December 1939, Box 0009.

¹⁰⁶ J. Pelényi, 'The Secret Plan for a Hungarian Government in the West at the outbreak of World War II, *The Journal of Modern History* 136 (1964), pp. 170-177, (p. 171). We will have cause to return to the question of the Hungarian émigré government in Chapter 6.

¹⁰⁷ Frank, 'Anglophiles in 1930s Hungary', pp. 60-72.

leader of Hungary.¹⁰⁸ Similarly, in January 1940, the official paper of the BBC, the *Listener* published the very warm speech of Marjorie Harrison, a publicist, about Horthy.¹⁰⁹ These were not unique examples of trust in the Regent's statesmanship, which was constant until the spring of 1940, when Hungary granted right of military passage to Germany. Halifax and Cadogan also made congenial references to Horthy, Teleki and the pro-British views of the Hungarian people.¹¹⁰ It is clear that London attempted to mobilise the pro-British segments of the Hungarian elite, such as Teleki, Horthy and Quandt, to encourage them to resist Germany. Elisabeth Barker later criticised this British approach, and pointed out that the failure of Britain to prevent Hungary's final accession to the Axis was the result of neglecting the support of the similarly pro-British Hungarian middle classes.¹¹¹

This part has demonstrated that officially London encouraged Hungary to resist German penetration, and also there were signs that Whitehall genuinely respected the Hungarian political elite. However, as the Balkans and Central Europe gradually lost its strategic significance for Britain, Whitehall became progressively detached from the territorial demands of Hungary. The recognition of the organisation of the Czechoslovak émigrés as a 'Committee' reflected a considerable shift in British policy, indicating that the reconstruction of Czechoslovakia became important for Britain. The recognition however still did not determine Czechoslovakia's future frontiers, which effectively left questions unanswered on the viability of the First Vienna Award. The influential members of the Foreign Office, such as Cadogan and Sargent, also moved another step away from considering frontier revision in favour of Hungary, and the view that Hungary tied its future to the realization of revision became widely accepted in Whitehall. By the end of 1939 this perception had solidified, which in essence persisted until the end of the war. Besides, it was believed that Hungary would not be able to resist temptations for further revision, if they were offered by Germany.

¹⁰⁸ HIA, Barcza, Diaries, 6 December 1939, Box 0009. A name-day is a tradition in many countries in Europe that consists of celebrating the day of the year associated with one's given name.

¹⁰⁹ MOL, K 66, 1940-I.-5. 436. csomó, 570, Balássy to Csáky, 26 January 1940.

¹¹⁰ TNA, CAB/66/4/15, 'The Balkan Situation', 16 December 1939; Macartney, *October Fifteenth*, p. 376.

¹¹¹ Barker, *British Policy in South-East Europe*, p. 9.

3.6 The bewilderment of British policy in the maze of Hungarian territorial claims

As we have witnessed, the first months of the war did not see final conclusions on how the Hungarian territorial question should be handled after the war. The first months of 1940 produced various territorial schemes, all attempting to solve the Hungarian-Romanian dispute. The analysis of plans presented by Gafencu, the Romanian Foreign Minister, Carlile Macartney, the British expert on Hungarian history, and Teleki will form the centre of this part. We are particularly interested to uncover the official British view on these mostly unknown schemes, which were the first major territorial propositions during the war.

As we have noted, Teleki's policy to pay lip service to Germany on the official level, while assurances were given to Britain unofficially, caused dissatisfaction in London. The policy of doublespeak continued in 1940. The firm Hungarian declaration to refrain from stabbing Romania in the back, if the Soviet Union declared war to regain Bessarabia, had a very positive reaction in the Foreign Office.¹¹² However, a fresh set of territorial demands immediately followed this declaration. In January 1940, Teleki noted to O'Malley that in order to create strategic frontiers, Hungary would need to expand northwards to the crest of the Carpathians and also in the south at the expense of Yugoslavia (map 3.4). Teleki interpreted O'Malley's positive response, as a generally positive British approach towards his proposition, but pointed out that the promise to refrain from attacking Romania would not apply if Bucharest voluntarily ceded territory to the Soviet Union or Bulgaria, in which case Hungary would step forward with its own territorial claims in Transylvania.¹¹³

Halifax was clearly satisfied with Hungarian conformity to non-aggression and this declaration essentially determined his positive judgement of Hungarian foreign policy until the Second Vienna Award, in August 1940. However, as we have argued, Hungary in general and Hungarian territorial claims were judged differently. In a lengthy personal letter to the British minister in Bucharest, Halifax praised the

¹¹² TNA, FO 371/24985, R 406/246/37, O'Malley to Halifax, 31 December 1939; minute by F. D. Brown 9 January 1940; minute by Nichols 13 January 1940; see also: Barker, *British Policy in South-East Europe*, pp. 11-12.

¹¹³ TNA, FO 371/24427, C 2310/529/21, O'Malley to Foreign Office, 13 January 1940.

encouraging Hungarian policy, but noted that the Hungarian condition on 'voluntary territorial transfer' complicated Britain's Balkan strategy, as it made bringing about a Balkan cooperation very problematic. Halifax and the Foreign Office now ruled out trying to persuade Romania to voluntarily cede Southern Dobruja to Bulgaria, due to the expected Hungarian counterclaims.¹¹⁴ The last meeting of the Balkan Entente in February 1940 confirmed that the transfer of Southern Dobruja had to be postponed, but the existence of the issue, unlike the Transylvanian-problem, was officially recognised.¹¹⁵ Halifax praised the Balkan Entente's declaration for cooperation, but failed to recognise that the failure to remove antagonisms in the region played into Hitler's hands. Hungary's territorial demands once again blocked regional cooperation, just as it did earlier in 1939.

The Halifax-Barcza meeting in February, which received much prominence in the historiography, has to be viewed in the light of these developments.¹¹⁶ Halifax expressed his appreciation that Barcza promised Hungarian resistance against any power and that Budapest would not participate in an anti-British German-Soviet alliance. Halifax also praised Hungary for refusing to grant right of military passage for the Wehrmacht during the Polish campaign and that Hungary declined the German offer to occupy the Polish gas-fields in Galicia (map 3.5).¹¹⁷ The friendly tone of the interview however should not be overstated. The Halifax letter to Hoare puts the Halifax-Barcza meeting into context. Halifax, abiding by the views expressed to Hoare was reluctant to give any assurance to Barcza to treat the Hungarian-Romanian dispute fairly and separately at the peace settlement, because of Hungary's persistency in expressing claims in Romania.¹¹⁸

Halifax's reluctance to make promises on the fair treatment of the Hungarian problem at the peace conference was the result of Hungary's refusal of the Romanian proposition to consider frontier adjustment. In January, a message containing a

¹¹⁴ TNA, FO 800/322, Halifax to Hoare, 19 January 1940; also: FO 371/24985, R 485/246/37, minute by Nichols, 10 January 1940.

¹¹⁵ Barker, *British Policy in South-East Europe*, p. 12.

¹¹⁶ Bán, *Hungarian-British Diplomacy 1938-41*, p. 87.

¹¹⁷ It is difficult to define the extent of this territorial offer, but it has to be noted that Ribbentrop offered the Polish gas-fields to Hungary, which, according to the Nazi-Soviet Pact were in the Soviet sphere of influence.

¹¹⁸ HIA, Barcza, Diaries, 8 February 1940, Box 0010; DIMK IV. 529, Barcza to Csáky, 9 February 1940; Macartney, *October Fifteenth*, p. 375.

territorial offer from the most unlikely quarter arrived in Budapest. Gafencu, in order to reduce the number of Romania's enemies, came forward with a proposition to revise the Hungarian-Romanian frontier. The proposition offered the transfer of a relatively wide (50-100km) strip to Hungary, including the cities of Temesvár [Timișoara], Arad [Arad], Nagyvárad [Oradea] and Szatmárnémeti [Satu Mare] (map 3.6). What is more interesting is that new evidence suggests that the Gafencu proposition was influenced by British circles. According to Reginald Hoare, Ernst Jäckh 'our friend' influenced Gafencu, to consider some territorial concessions, to strengthen Romania's position.¹¹⁹ The evidence is too thin to determine whether the Foreign Office or in fact Hoare himself was behind this scheme, but it can be established that Jäckh most probably did not act in his own capacity.

The Foreign Office however agreed with the Romanian idea that as part of the transfer of territory, the Székely-Magyar population from the South-East corner of Transylvania should be transferred to the Temes region, which was now offered to Hungary, to solve minority issues between Hungary and Romania once and for all.¹²⁰ This radical scheme applied the ethnic criteria, but combined it with a mass population transfer, a notion, which later reoccurred during the Hungarian-Romanian negotiations prior to the Second Vienna Award in August 1940.

On the other hand, Halifax was very reluctant to officially endorse this project, but nevertheless raised the question in the Foreign Office, hinting his preference to send a positive note to Barcza on the revision of the Hungarian-Romanian frontier after the war.¹²¹ Roger Makins in the Central department praised Hungarian neutrality and pointed out that both the elite and the Hungarian people wished for an Allied victory, but after a brief discussion the question over whether to send a note was brushed aside by Sargent, the head of the Southern department. The compelling observation to emerge from this evidence is the disagreement between the Central and Southern departments about how to handle Hungarian claims. Sargent made it clear that Britain would abide by its promise to Bucharest that unilateral promises on frontier revision would not be

¹¹⁹ TNA, FO 371/24985, R 953/246/37, Hoare to Nichols, 1 February 1940; FO 371/24887, R 3171/5/67, Knatchbull-Hugenssen (Ankara) to Halifax, 1 March 1940. Ernst Jäckh, a historian and journalist of German-Jewish stock, immigrated to London in 1933. He became the head of the British New Commonwealth Institute and in this capacity he served Britain in various diplomatic missions.

¹²⁰ TNA, FO 371/24985, R 953/246/37, Hoare to Nichols, 12 January 1940.

¹²¹ DIMK IV. 529: Barcza to Csáky, 9 February 1940.

made to Budapest, and his opinion on Romanian questions, which belonged to his department, proved to be the most influential one.¹²² The firm stance of Sargent and the relative unimportance of the question seemingly disheartened Halifax to raise the question again, and then eventually no message was sent to Budapest about frontier revision.

This British-Romanian scheme of frontier adjustment however soon collapsed, because László Bárdossy, the Hungarian minister in Bucharest, who later became Prime Minister, stressed that the transfer of the Székely districts to Hungary was an unconditional Hungarian territorial demand. The refusal estranged the Foreign Office, which was unable to understand Hungarian reluctance to consider this territorial offer, while for years, frontier revision had been stressed *ad nauseam* by Budapest. Sargent was extremely irritated at the Hungarian designs on the larger part of Transylvania and at the Hungarian refusal to accept the Romanian territorial offer, which he believed would finally solve the dispute. He summarised British policy towards Hungary with intense annoyance:

How does an encouraging note to Hungary serve our war effort? The answer for this is negative, as Hungary is not a free agent and has to adjust her policies to her powerful neighbour [Germany]. Hungary renders us no service in the war, it is not worthwhile to make sacrifices on her behalf, [...] we recognise that Hungary is in the German sphere. [...] No anti-German front is possible, which includes Hungary and we cannot guarantee her against Germany.¹²³

Views, expressed on a sketch-map hastily drawn in the Foreign Office showing Hungary with the Székely districts bluntly questioned Hungarian political sense (map 3.7). Parallels were drawn between the consequent wedge-shaped geographical form of Hungary and the similar geographical form of former Czechoslovakia, which here was considered as the main reason for its collapse in March 1939. The Hungarian unconditional demand for the Székely districts was considered very dangerous, and

¹²² TNA, FO 371/24427, C 2163/529/21, minute by Makins and Nichols, 15 February 1940; minute by Sargent 16 February 1940.

¹²³ TNA, FO 371/24427, C 2163/529/21, minute by Sargent, 22 February 1940.

Budapest's policy was denounced, because it was believed that frontier revision was placed over good sense.¹²⁴

Due to the outright Hungarian rejection, the transfer of population, as a means to solving the Hungarian-Romanian dispute was shelved. Studies on population transfer however were appearing from the FRPS. Population transfer was for example one of the first questions Macartney examined at the FRPS in early 1940. The Hungarian refusal to agree to the transfer of the Székelys to the Temes region is very much reflected in Macartney's views, who had only recently returned from a visit to Hungary. He recommended the transfer of population only as a last resort, and only in the form of population exchange, with equal numbers to be involved in those transferred on each side. Macartney stressed that population exchange between two states would only be beneficial if it solved the minority dispute completely. He argued that exchange could not be applied to solve the Transylvanian problem, as the ratio of Magyar and Romanian minorities in the respective states was 20:1. Arnold Toynbee, the head of the FRPS, shared Macartney's opinion.¹²⁵

After the Hungarians refused the British-Romanian frontier revision proposal in January 1940, the Foreign Office had found it useful to send Macartney to Budapest to sound out the intentions of the Hungarian elite. Macartney, due to his pro-Hungarian views on frontier revision, enjoyed huge popularity in Budapest. The Foreign Office also hoped that Macartney's visit would be interpreted by Budapest as a sign of British interest, and would encourage the Hungarian elite to resist Germany. O'Malley also expected that Teleki and Horthy would share views with Macartney, which otherwise would have been hidden from his eyes.¹²⁶

Brown, in the Southern Department drafted a letter to Toynbee, the direct superior of Macartney at the FRPS, and recommended that the historian should visit

¹²⁴ TNA, FO 371/24985, R 1892/246/37, Sargent to Hoare, 2 February 1940; minute by Brown, 15 February 1940.

¹²⁵ PCAM, MSS. ENG. c. 3281, Box 2, doc. 22, folios 169-183, 'Transfer of Population', April 1940. A more developed memorandum was written in late 1944 by Macartney. A significant difference is that in 1944, he suggested population exchange only on a local level, along the frontiers, when a reasonable one was already established. On the other hand, in 1944, Macartney specifically mentioned the Hungarian-Romanian dispute, where population transfer could be considered, see: PCAM, MSS. ENG. c. 3281, Box 2, doc. 23, folios 184-196, 'Transfer of Minorities', 30 November 1944.

¹²⁶ TNA, FO 371/23116, C 18636/17663/21, O'Malley to Foreign Office, 21 November 1939.

Transylvania to collect fresh data, and also suggested picking Macartney as the author of the peace handbook about the contested region.¹²⁷ Brown's proposal was side-tracked by senior officials, which once again signalled the contrast of opinion between junior and senior members. Nichols, in a sense of urgency, immediately contacted Rex Leeper, the head of the PID, to prevent the too pro-Hungarian Macartney digging deeper into minority issues in Transylvania. Senior officials, such as Nichols and Sargent, clearly did not desire Macartney to fish in the troubled waters of Hungarian revisionism, and wanted him to stay put in Budapest.¹²⁸

Halifax and O'Malley encouraged Macartney to travel around the Carpathian basin. As we have stressed, minor and low priority issues, such as this, were normally dealt with personally by the senior officials of the Foreign Office. Halifax's different, occasionally pro-Hungarian, approach was not usually more than a short minute on a Foreign Office document, which due to its unimportance was often not followed up by him. This is what happened in this instance. Nichols expressed to Leeper that the official policy was that the PID would edit the peace handbook, as it had more political acumen than Macartney or the other scholars at the RIIA. The sole role of Macartney was therefore to collect data for a peace handbook. Moreover, it is evident that already at this early stage both the Foreign Office and the PID made efforts to corner out the opinion of scholars on post-war planning, and were aiming to make a political decision on the peace treaties.¹²⁹

Fully aware of the implication of the pro-Hungarian Macartney's tour to Hungary, Seton-Watson also expressed his opinion on the question of the future of Hungary's frontiers. He noted to the Ministry of Economic Warfare that the Vienna Award and the Hungarian occupation of Ruthenia violated the ethnographic principle, and Ruthenia should be returned to Czechoslovakia after the war. He also stressed that there was no justification to revise the Hungarian-Romanian frontier.¹³⁰ Seton-Watson's advice attracted no attention, and his opinion was ignored. The elderly professor had seemingly lost his influence in Whitehall.

¹²⁷ TNA, FO 371/24429, C 1967/1967/21, Foreign Office (Brown) to Toynbee, January 1940.

¹²⁸ TNA, FO 371/24429, C 1967/1967/21, Nichols to Leeper, January 1940.

¹²⁹ TNA, FO 371/24429, C 1967/1967/21, minute by Nichols and Roberts, 31 January 1940. We will have good reason to return to the conflict between the Foreign Office and the FRPS about peace planning in the last chapter of this thesis.

¹³⁰ SEW 12/1, R. W. Seton-Watson to Ronald Storrs (Ministry of Economic Warfare), 12 February 1940.

On his return from Hungary, Macartney summarised his experiences of his visit and expressed his views on Hungarian foreign policy and frontier revision in 'Report on Hungary'. Previously he had been anxious to encourage a more active British policy towards Hungary in the Foreign Office. Therefore, it is not surprising that this memorandum drew an assertive picture. He admitted that resisting German temptations for territorial gains in Transylvania would be exceptionally hard for Budapest, but emphasized Teleki's and Horthy's firm decision to defend Hungarian independence. Implying the benefits of frontier revision to London, he pointed out that Hungary would be more content with a reduced acquisition offered by the Western Powers than an extensive one from Germany. His suggestive tone however fell on deaf ears, just like his attempts to clarify Transylvania's sentimental value to Hungary. For the Foreign Office such justifications for frontier revision had a strong pro-Hungarian overtone, and as we will see from the official reaction to Macartney's memorandum, were not welcomed.¹³¹

Despite this, it would be misleading to use this memorandum, simply as evidence for Macartney's pro-Hungarian opinion. The document doubtlessly advised frontier revision, in favour of Hungary, but it rejected radical Hungarian claims. Besides, unlike Seton-Watson, Macartney attempted to balance economic, ethnographic, geographic, strategic and historical criteria in his recommendations, and also considered the perspective of the local population and the possibilities of a regional cooperation.¹³²

Moreover, 'Report on Hungary' did not focus only on the Transylvanian problem. As with his 1937 views,¹³³ Macartney strongly argued for a union between Hungary and Slovakia, as the best economic and geographic option. He painted the Hungarian aim of taking over Slovakia through economic pressure in rosy colours, and described the union as in the natural economic interest of both countries. He evidently preferred to solve the Hungarian-Slovak frontier disputes by drawing mutually beneficial economic frontiers, but did not fail to say that on ethnographic grounds, the

¹³¹ The Hungarian sentimental attachment to Transylvania was the least understood element of Hungarian claims in Britain. The Foreign Office believed that Budapest was simply taking advantage of Romania's difficult position and was willing to take any territory offered by Germany. Hungarian sentimental attachment was connected with the historical claims for Transylvania, and as such, was only believed to be used as a pretext.

¹³² Compare to: Seton-Watson, 'The Problem of Treaty Revision and the Hungarian Frontiers', pp. 481-503.

¹³³ Macartney, *Hungary and her Successors*, pp. 212-215.

First Vienna Award was after all acceptable. He refrained from expressing a clear recommendation for Transylvania, but drew attention to the fact that even moderates, such as Teleki and Bethlen, would not be satisfied with a minor frontier adjustment. Thus, he judged the so called Hungarian 'corridor-plan' (map 3.8) economically impracticable and suggested that the most recent unofficial Hungarian claim, the so called 'extended corridor-plan', which seemed to be the lowest common denominator between himself and Teleki, was the most viable solution at the moment, taking the current Hungarian revisionist uproar into account (map 3.8).¹³⁴ This scheme planned to transfer everything north of the original 'Hungarian-corridor' to Hungary and was considered by Macartney as the best solution, balancing both ethnographic and economic considerations.

In 'Report on Hungary' Macartney conveyed Teleki's message to the Foreign Office that even if Hungary occupied the whole of Transylvania during the war without British consent, the problem would be submitted to the peace conference after the war.¹³⁵ The Foreign Office found the memorandum useful, but only as a reference for a peace handbook, as Macartney's views were considered too pro-Hungarian. Nonetheless, it is arresting that no opinion was expressed over Macartney's recommendations for territorial revision. Both the Foreign Office and the PID requested a second opinion on the Hungarian-Romanian problem from the British consuls in Kolozsvár [Cluj] and Bucharest, to be able to make a judgement on Macartney's views.¹³⁶ Without debating Macartney's recommendations, the Foreign Office concluded that the PID should coordinate the compilation of the final version of the peace handbook on the Transylvanian problem. Senior officials agreed that someone of the calibre of George Prothero should be commissioned to write the peace handbook on Transylvania.¹³⁷ The reaction to Macartney's 'Report on Hungary' captures the dilemma of the British foreign policy-making elite. The opinion of pro-Versailles experts, such as Leeper and Prothero were considered important, which proves that Versailles-reflexes were still present. However, the fact that Macartney was sent to

¹³⁴ TNA, FO 371/24429, C 4668/1967/21, 'Report on Hungary', March 1940.

¹³⁵ Macartney, *October Fifteenth*, p. 391.

¹³⁶ TNA, FO 898/29, Leeper to Foreign Office, 16 April 1940.

¹³⁷ TNA, FO 371/24429, C 1967/1967/21, minutes by Nichols and Sargent, 27 January 1940; C 2311/1967/21, minute by Hancock, February 1940; C 4668/1967/21, Leeper to Makins, 16 April 1940. Sir George W. Prothero was a writer and historian. Prothero worked as a historical adviser to the Foreign Office and in this capacity attended the Paris Peace Conference in 1919.

collect fresh data confirms that London contemplated making changes to Versailles, which proved to be unstable. This duality will not fully crystallise in the period under consideration by this thesis, and it was the freak of British pragmatism that by the time it had finally taken its final form in 1942-43, it was already outdated by the emergence of the Soviet Union and the United States as the dominating powers of the post-war world.

Macartney's stay in Budapest had a significant influence on Hungarian territorial claims. Macartney later claimed that Teleki, through the influence of an English friend - who Antall Czettler believed was Macartney himself - had given up demanding the whole of Transylvania and toned down the unofficial declaration that Hungary wanted to acquire Transylvania at the end of the war with force.¹³⁸

After Macartney's visit, a memorandum, compiled by Teleki, finally brought the so far unofficial Hungarian claims to Transylvania to the official level. The lengthy memorandum, which was sent to several capitals in Europe, rejected the Treaty of Trianon and demanded extensive frontier adjustments. The memorandum outlined a minimum and a maximum claim. In the maximum claim Teleki aggrandised the 'extended-corridor' and claimed everything north of the river Maros. This would have amounted to about two-thirds of the territory ceded to Romania in 1920 (map 3.9). The memorandum backed the territorial claims with historic grounds and strategic considerations, emphasizing Transylvania's Hungarian past and the importance of Hungarian control over the Carpathians in order to stop the spreading of Bolshevism. The minimum demand also claimed a significantly larger territory which the British were willing to consider.¹³⁹ As we have seen, only a significantly smaller revision was contemplated in London, in January 1940 (map 3.6), not to mention that Teleki seemed

¹³⁸ Czettler, *Teleki Pál és a magyar külpolitika*, p. 46; Macartney, *Hungary and her Successors*, 391; Macartney, *October Fifteenth*, pp. 387-388. Unfortunately, very little evidence survived of Macartney's crucial visit to Hungary. We know very little of Macartney's conversations with the Hungarian political elite. Macartney reported very vaguely to O'Malley about his conversations with Teleki about the question of frontier-revision. He only noted that Teleki wanted 'the bigger portion of Transylvania': PCAM, MSS. ENG. C. 3287, doc. 1, Macartney to O'Malley, 29 February 1940.

¹³⁹ For Teleki's memorandum, see: TNA, FO 371/24427, C 10537/529/21; Macartney, *October Fifteenth*, pp. 387-390; Bán, *Hungarian-British Diplomacy 1938-41*, p. 91; Romsics, 'A brit külpolitika és a „magyar kérdés”', pp. 75-76. The minimum-plan (very similar to the extended-corridor plan) claimed approximately half of Transylvania, with an approximately 50 percent Magyar population, while the maximum-plan claimed about two-thirds of the province with a roughly 40 percent Magyar population (this was Teleki's two-thirds plan), Czettler, *Teleki Pál és a magyar külpolitika*, pp. 75-76.

completely to disregard the fact that the British guarantee to Romania was still in operation.

The reaction at the Foreign Office was predictably reserved and negative, and the claims were judged exaggerated and unfounded.¹⁴⁰ It was argued that the realisation of these demands would have significantly altered the regional balance and would have strategically shaken Romania. Bruce Lockhart, the director general of the PID, also pointed out that the memorandum was biased and used evidence selectively.¹⁴¹ Hungarian historiography has failed to clarify the attitudes of the Foreign Office and has argued that the claims were acknowledged, but shelved, due to their untimeliness.¹⁴² However, there is no doubt that the sheer geographical extent of Teleki's demands shocked the Foreign Office, and it became evident in London that British and Hungarian concepts on frontier revision were far apart.¹⁴³

Teleki's memorandum however raised the question of the Czechoslovak-Hungarian frontier in the Foreign Office. The limited geographical extent and the unquestionable Hungarian majority of the First Vienna Award was now contrasted with Teleki's exaggerated claims in Transylvania. Roberts and Ross both noted that a frontier similar to the First Vienna Arbitration was acceptable for both Britain and the Czech émigrés at the time.¹⁴⁴ Although the future of the Award was still questionable, as Sargent and Nichols earlier expressed, its limited nature was now held as an example to be followed. This indicated that only a similarly limited revision would be acceptable for London in the Hungarian-Romanian dispute, something radically different from Teleki's claims.

The official British reaction foreshadowed a limited revision and the application of ethnographic criteria, as the guiding criteria of the peace treaties. When they

¹⁴⁰ DIMK IV, 551: Bartók (Zagreb) to Csáky, 29 February 1940; TNA, FO 371/24427, C 3525/529/21, minute by Roberts, 12 March 1940. The reception of the memorandum was severely compromised by Csáky's anti-Czech and anti-Allied outbursts in early March 1940. Csáky heavily criticised the Sikorski-Beneš declaration of Polish-Czech cooperation after the war, and accused Britain of exploiting the nations of the region. Barcza expressed his gravest disillusionment over Csáky's conduct and complained that Teleki's memorandum was now completely discredited: HIA, Barcza, Diaries, 8 March 1940, Box 0010.

¹⁴¹ Bán, *Hungarian-British Diplomacy 1938-41*, p. 90.

¹⁴² Bán, *Hungarian-British Diplomacy 1938-41*, p. 92.

¹⁴³ TNA, FO 371/24427, C 3525/529/21, minute by Roberts, 12 March 1940.

¹⁴⁴ TNA, FO 371/24427, C 3525/529/21, minute by Roberts, 12 March 1940, minute by Ross, 8 April 1940.

discussed Teleki's memorandum, Cadogan expressed a rigid viewpoint to Barcza. He admitted that due to ethnically mixed areas, the problem could not be solved solely by applying the ethnographic principle, but clearly stressed that historic and strategic claims, which the Hungarians insisted upon, could only complement the ethnographic basis at the post-war settlement.¹⁴⁵ Outwardly, there seems to be an obvious contradiction in Cadogan's thinking, but this resulted more from the different interpretation of the ethnographic principle in London and Budapest. While Cadogan was thinking along the lines of a limited revision in applying the ethnographic criteria, Teleki aimed to create an ethnographic equilibrium in Transylvania, drawing a frontier which, according to him would have balanced the number of minorities on each side. As this solution required territorial revision on a grand scale London judged it as a Hungarian attempt to merge historic and strategic principles with the ethnographic bases, in order to gain as much territory as possible.

The British view of the frontier proposition of January 1940 and of Teleki's memorandum clearly demonstrates that policy-makers in London were indeed thinking of drawing an ethnographic frontier between Hungary and Romania. However, the application of this principle was tendentiously selective. The evidence suggests that in theory this meant the reincorporation of the predominantly Magyar border-districts in Romania into Hungary, which would have left more than a million Magyars under the rule of Bucharest. Fresh evidence set out here has proved that Britain played a significant role in a new attempt to solve the Hungarian-Romanian dispute along these lines in January 1940. The Hungarian blunt refusal of this proposal, and Teleki's exaggerated territorial demands, which were just as selective as the British views, made clear that any concepts on frontier revision were very different.

¹⁴⁵ DIMK IV, 562: Barcza to Csáky, 6 March 1940.

3.7 Conclusion

This chapter has determined what affected British perceptions of Hungary's borders in the first six months of the Second World War. In this investigation, the aim was to assess whether the British view in 1938, to redraw the frontiers of the region applying the ethnographic criteria persisted during the war. We were particularly interested in how British views were formulated over the permanent Hungarian-Romanian territorial dispute, and what sort of plans were compiled behind closed doors in the early period of the war to solve this problem. The historiography has often over-simplified British perceptions on Central Europe and Hungary, and conclusions have lacked an analysis based on crucial British and Hungarian sources.

A certain duality in fact existed in British perceptions of Hungary. Official relations remained friendly, but Hungarian territorial claims were discouraged and rejected, as they were viewed as threatening the security of the region. The annoyance of London was more the result of inflated Hungarian territorial demands and not the concept of frontier revision *per se*. Although different opinions were expressed about the future frontiers of Hungary in the Foreign Office, the British foreign policy-making elite were united in refusing to make territorial promises for the duration of the war, to avoid the repetition of the ill-fated territorial promises of the First World War.

There is enough evidence to suggest that Britain during the 'Phoney War' already contemplated the ethnic reconstruction of the region at the post-war settlement. The positive reaction of London to the Soviet penetration to the Curzon line, which closely followed the ethnographic line between Polish and Ukrainians, proves this argument. Later in early 1940, although showing great caution, Britain also played a leading role in a proposition to revise the Hungarian-Romanian frontier. The British role in this scheme challenges our understanding, which until now has presented a picture of rigorous British aloofness from such projects. The plan recommended a limited frontier revision on the basis of ethnicity, combined with population transfer, which would have transferred a wide strip to Hungary. The Hungarian refusal to consider the January 1940 plan was the first step on the road towards complete estrangement. Teleki's counter-claims in February for the larger part of Transylvania were considered particularly untimely, unfounded and exaggerated. It became clear both in London and Budapest

that policies and demands were far apart. By March 1940 it became evident that the decision on future frontiers would be made on political grounds and the opinion of scholars would be mostly side-tracked. Sargent and Cadogan declared that they agreed with the recommendations of Rex Leeper in the PID on the future boundaries of Central Europe and not the views of the scholars of the FRPS. This projected the image of the recreation of the Versailles frontiers, with minor amendments to apply some ethnic criteria.

`The Hungarians now informed Mr O`Malley
That they will give the Germans right of passage
if requested to do so. `¹
(Frank Roberts)

4. A Step too far: The problem of the German `military passage` through Hungarian territory and the collapse of British confidence in Hungary

4.1 Introduction

Hungarian historiography has tended to analyse British judgements on the territorial aggrandisements of Hungary by only examining the immediate British responses to the four stages of territorial revision.² Crucial periods, such as the spring of 1940 have remained almost completely un-researched, which has resulted in a superficial understanding of British policy-making. As a result, key watersheds in the Anglo-Hungarian relationship, such as the question of German military passage through Hungary have been almost entirely over-looked. Historians such as Ignác Romsics, Béni L. Balogh and György Réti have argued that Britain condemned the Second Vienna Award in August 1940, because it was enforced on Romania by Germany and Italy, and as a consequence Hungary was simply viewed as a German puppet in London.³ The official British response indeed suggests this viewpoint. However, prior to the arbitration, Hungary was already judged as a German satellite, and the British strongly encouraged the Romanians to resist Hungarian territorial demands. Compared to London`s fundamentally positive attitude towards the policy of Teleki and Horthy in early 1940, this was a radically different British approach. Historiography has failed to conclusively interpret the reason for this dramatic shift in British policy, generally explaining it through Hungary`s increasing pro-German policy. The evidence presented

¹ TNA, FO 371/ 24427, C 6321/529/21, 8 May 1940, minute by Roberts.

² Namely, the First Vienna Arbitration (2 November 1938), the Hungarian occupation of Ruthenia (March 1939), the Second Vienna Arbitration (30 August 1940) and the Hungarian occupation of Northern-Yugoslavia (April 1941).

³ Romsics, `A brit külpolitika és a „magyar kérdés”`, pp. 106-108; L. B. Balogh, `A második bécsi döntés`, *Limes* 43 (2001), pp. 22-29; Balogh, *A magyar-román kapcsolatok 1939-1940-ben*, pp. 304-309; Gy. Réti, `A második bécsi döntés`, *Külpolitika* 31 (2000), pp. 1-2., 182-204; Gy. Réti, *Budapest-Róma Berlin árnyékában, magyar-olasz diplomáciai kapcsolatok 1932-1940* (Budapest, 1998), pp. 251-256.

here proves that the Hungarian decision to grant *droit de passage* to Germany in April 1940 to enter Romania was responsible for the shift in British perceptions of Hungary.⁴ Thereafter Budapest was judged as fully being in the German orbit.

This chapter will juxtapose German, Italian and Hungarian sources with the unresearched documents of the Foreign Office. It will present new evidence, which puts the Anglo-Hungarian relationship in new light, arguing that the Hungarian decision to grant military passage to Germany in April was a critical watershed in the formulation of British views of Hungary, and was just as important as the breaking off of diplomatic relationship a year later and the declaration of war in December 1941.

Firstly, it is necessary to review British policy towards the region in the wake of the Battles of Norway and France. It is particularly important to determine the British views over the Czech-Slovak National Committee before the 'droit'. It is similarly vital to review whether London was still contemplating the creation of a neutral bloc immediately before Hungary agreed to grant military passage. Comparing these with British opinions after the 'droit' will demonstrate the impact of the Hungarian decision on the image of Hungary in London. Secondly, it seems crucial to put the problem in a regional context, which will highlight the effect of the 'droit' on British Danubian, Balkan and Mediterranean military strategy, and political and economic aims.

⁴ Instead of 'droit de passage', the shortened version of 'droit' will be used throughout the chapter.

4.2 British Balkan Policy and Hungary in the last months of the 'Phoney War'

The Nazi-Soviet aggression against Poland presented insoluble political and military dilemmas for London in Central Europe and the Balkans. Losing Poland as an ally crucially weakened British political and military positions in Central Europe and at the same time it highlighted the military incapability of Britain to actively support its allies in the region.⁵ The collapse of Poland and Nazi-Soviet cooperation forced London to reconsider its Danubian and Balkan strategy. Central Europe now lost its military and strategic significance, and the military strategic emphasis shifted to the Mediterranean (map 4.1).⁶ In contrast, British political influence in the region was still judged to be very strong by London. Memoranda compiled by the Foreign Office about political strategy in the region showed unfounded optimism, which was based on the anticipation of an imminent German economic and financial collapse and German-Soviet dispute over Central Europe.⁷ The following discussion considers Britain's military strategy in the Danubian region and the Balkans immediately before the Battle of Norway, and points to the contrast between British immediate strategic and long-term political interest in the region. The aim is to outline British priorities before Budapest made the decision to grant military passage to Germany.

A fresh memorandum by the CID in March 1940 confirmed the conclusions reached in October 1939 that Hungary, Romania and Yugoslavia could not be defended. It also completely ruled out the possibility of an Allied Balkan front or any successful defence of Hungary, Yugoslavia or Romania against German aggression. The memorandum was promptly accepted by the Cabinet as the base for future Allied policy.⁸ Compared to the views of October, when the Hungarian-Romanian dispute significantly affected British military strategy, this new memorandum indicated a shift in British opinion about the role of Hungary and Hungarian revisionism in British strategy. This fresh analysis demonstrated complete ambiguity towards territorial

⁵ TNA, CAB/66/4/15, W. P. (39) 145, 'Situation in the Balkans', 16 December 1939; Butler, *Grand Strategy*, pp. 298-299; N. Smart, *British Strategy and Politics During the Phoney War: Before the Balloon Went Up* (Westport, 2003), pp. 29-30.

⁶ TNA, CAB/66/3/48, W. P. (39) 148, Chiefs of Staff Committee, 'Review of Military Policy in the Middle East', 5 December 1939.

⁷ TNA, CAB/66/4/15, W. P. (39) 145, 'Situation in the Balkans', 16 December 1939; Kessel, *The British Reaction to German Economic Expansion*, p. 212.

⁸ TNA, CAB/66/6/33, 'Grand strategy of the Allies', 23 March 1940.

disputes, and German encouragements to further Hungarian territorial claims were not viewed as a threat to British Balkan strategy any longer.

Historians, such as MacGregor Knox and Christopher Catherwood have pointed to the elusive nature of British strategy and criticised the lack of British initiative in Central Europe in 1940. Knox has stressed that the presumption that Italy could be forced to cooperate by economic means was no more than wishful thinking, which eventually disrupted British strategic planning.⁹ Catherwood and Case has also sharply criticised Britain for abandoning the region, but expecting Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria to resist German pressure.¹⁰ Elisabeth Barker has examined the impact of British military weakness on the foreign policy of the Balkan states, and similarly to Kaiser, she criticised the political commitments undertaken without possessing the military means to fulfil them.¹¹ However, David Gillard has pointed out that military limitations did not rule out engagement on the political level, which still offered possibilities to counter German influence.¹² Indeed, the evidence tells us that in the spring of 1940, although the chances of Hungarian resistance were considered slim in London, from a political perspective Budapest still had a significant role in British regional policy, and efforts were made in London not to antagonise Hungary unnecessarily.

For example, the problem of whether the Czech émigrés in London and Paris should receive political recognition from the Allies had an important Hungarian angle. This question increasingly determined the British view of the 'Hungarian-question' from the outbreak of the war, but the factor that Hungary still did not follow a completely pro-German policy seemingly affected British policy towards the Czechs. As we have noted, as early as September 1939 Halifax, Kirkpatrick and Cadogan had agreed that the liberation of the Czechs was a British war aim.¹³ In December the British

⁹ M. Knox, *Mussolini Unleashed, 1939-1941, Politics and Strategy in Fascist Italy's Last War* (Cambridge, 1982), pp. 72-75.

¹⁰ Catherwood, *The Balkans in World War Two*, p. 5; Case, *Between two states, the Transylvania question*, p. 4.

¹¹ E. Barker, *British policy towards South-East Europe*, p. 5.; D. Kaiser, *Economic Diplomacy and the Origins of the Second World War*, pp. 250-254.

¹² D. Gillard, *Appeasement in Crisis*, p. 29.

¹³ Ivone Kirkpatrick was a former diplomatist to Rome and Berlin and soon became one of the most influential officials of the Foreign Office. His role will be more important for our analysis as a director of the Foreign Division of the Ministry of Information from April 1940, and as a controller of the European

and French cabinets also reached a joint agreement that Poland and Czechoslovakia should be liberated after the war. However, in both instances it had been stressed that official recognition should not be given to the Beneš-group, because Beneš was personally disliked in Poland and Hungary, and a Czechoslovakia under his leadership would alienate Budapest and the Polish émigrés from cooperating with Britain.¹⁴ Smetana has argued that O'Malley's strong reservations to Beneš significantly affected British opinion.¹⁵ Indeed, the Foreign Office assured O'Malley that Britain wanted to avoid any unnecessary irritation of Hungarian sentiments.¹⁶ Both Smetana and Taborsky have pointed out that the recognition of the Beneš-group as a 'Committee' in December 1939 was far from an open British commitment to restore Czechoslovakia in its original form, but a crude political calculation to prevent Czech-Soviet and Czech-German rapprochement.¹⁷ Historians have not stressed, although the evidence clearly demonstrate that until Hungary did not fully commit itself on the side of Germany, London was keen to remain impartial towards Czech and Hungarian territorial questions.

Indeed, vague official declarations and unofficial discussions in the Foreign Office suggest that opinion over the Czechoslovak-Hungarian frontier was still in the melting pot in early 1940. For example, Chamberlain on 24 February referred to the independence of the Czech nation in the House of Commons, and Halifax, on the anniversary of the German occupation of Prague, made a similar public comment, to encourage Czech resistance. These remarks seem to be very pro-Czech at first glance, but Foreign Office discussions on how these speeches were worded prove the contrary.¹⁸ Roberts in the Central department explained that references to 'Slovakia' and

services of the BBC later in 1941: M. Gilbert, *Finest Hour. Winston S. Churchill 1939-1941* (London, 1983), pp. 1086-1087.

¹⁴ TNA, FO 371/22898, C 13131/7/12, minute by Halifax, 5 September 1939; minute by Cadogan, 5 September 1939; minute by Kirkpatrick, 20 September 1939; FO 371/22899, C 13304/7/12, Troutbeck, 'The Beneš-group', 1 September 1939; minute by Strang, 4 September 1939; FO 371/22899, C 15436/7/12, Kirkpatrick to Phipps, 4 October 1939. See also: Smetana, *In the Shadow of Munich*, pp. 170-173.

¹⁵ Smetana, *In the Shadow of Munich*, pp. 179-180.

¹⁶ TNA, FO 371/22899, C 16878/7/12, O'Malley to Halifax, 19 October 1939; minute by Roberts, 24 October 1939; FO 371/22900, C 18635/7/12, O'Malley to Halifax, 7 December 1939.

¹⁷ Smetana, *In the Shadow of Munich*, pp. 179-180; E. Táboršky, *President Edvard Benes: Between East and West, 1938-48* (Stanford, 1981), pp. 112-113. See also: J. Musil, *The End of Czechoslovakia* (Budapest, 2000), pp. 181-186; S. Talmon, *Recognition of Governments in International Law with particular reference to governments in exile* (Oxford, 1998), p. 119.

¹⁸ TNA, FO 371/24427, C 4666/529/21, minute by Roberts, 24 March 1940.

'Czechoslovakia' were carefully avoided and comments on the independence of the Czech nation lacked territorial preciseness, such as promising the reconstruction of Czechoslovakia, because this could have been interpreted in Budapest as the British renunciation of the First Vienna Award, which Whitehall wanted to avoid.¹⁹

Hungarian historiography has failed to consider the formulation of the Chamberlain and Halifax speeches, and therefore interpreted British policy as pro-Czech in early 1940. Bán asserted that the Chamberlain and Halifax speeches declared the reconstruction of Czechoslovakia as a British war aim.²⁰ The same study also suggested British dishonesty, when assurances were later made to Budapest on the non-territorial nature of these pro-Czech statements.²¹ The discussions of the Foreign Office on how these speeches were drafted however clearly refute Bán's opinion, and attest that in March 1940 the Foreign Office was scrupulously trying to maintain distance between pro-Czech and pro-Hungarian declarations.²²

However, by the spring of 1940 the Foreign Office was gradually getting fed up with Hungary's exaggerated criticism of the British support to Beneš. Bruce Lockhart, the liaison officer to the Czechoslovak government-in-exile, seemed to have a crucial impact on the British recognition of the Czecho-Slovak Committee and that London eventually disregarded the Hungarian opinion and moved towards a Czech orientation in its Central European policy.²³ As well as the influence of Bruce Lockhart, since the spring of 1940 O'Malley's anti-Beneš susceptibilities were also ignored, and when O'Malley made friendly references to Horthy on the future sustainability of the First Vienna Award, it caused intense annoyance in the Foreign Office.²⁴ British opinion towards Czechoslovakia and Hungary evidently went through a significant

¹⁹ TNA, FO 371/24427, C 4666/529/21, O'Malley to Kirkpatrick, 24 March 1940. Robert's minute is particularly interesting: 'We are doing our best [to convince the press not to use the word: Czechoslovakia]', 25 March 1940; FO 371/24288, C 5750/2/12, minute by Roberts, 18 April 1940. In late 1939, the British policy towards Slovakia was very ambiguous. Slovakia's future had not been decided in London. Slovak independence was not recognised, and on 6 September Whitehall declared that Slovakia was a state under enemy control: Smetana, *In the Shadow of Munich*, p. 170.

²⁰ Bán, *Hungarian-British Diplomacy 1938-41*, p. 90.

²¹ Bán, *Hungarian-British Diplomacy 1938-41*, p. 91.

²² TNA, FO 371/24427, C 4666/529/21, minute by Roberts, 24 March 1940.

²³ TNA, FO 371/24288, C 6035/2/12, Lockhart, 'The Czecho-Slovak National Committee', 12 May 1940; Smetana, *In the Shadow of Munich*, pp. 191-192. For Lockhart's contacts with Czech émigrés during the war, see particularly: B. Lockhart, *Friends, Foes, and Foreigners* (London, 1957).

²⁴ TNA, FO 371/24427, C 3937/529/21, O'Malley to Foreign Office, 7 March 1940; C 3766/529/21, Foreign Office to O'Malley, 11 April, 1940.

transformation over the spring, but annoyance over Hungarian complaints about an increasingly pro-Czech British policy does not seem to explain this dramatic shift. As we will see, the underlying reason was the Hungarian decision to grant military passage to Germany in April.

While Hungary still played an important political role in British regional planning, the position of Budapest was much weaker in British military strategy. The Foreign Office expected a swift German dash towards the Black Sea or the Straits, simultaneously with the offensive on the Western Front. The chances of Hungarian resistance were intensely debated. Based on a trust in Teleki and Horthy, Roberts and Kirkpatrick expected that as long as the Prime Minister and the Regent were in office Hungary would not submit to Germany. The radical territorial claims of Teleki in Transylvania seemingly had not eroded his reputation, and along with Horthy, Teleki was trusted anti-Nazis and was still highly regarded in London for his determination to preserve Hungarian independence. Kirkpatrick was convinced that Horthy and Teleki would be able to preserve Hungarian independence and Orchard and Roberts also expressed sympathy towards Hungary's difficult position.²⁵ Highlighting the seemingly ambivalent and erroneous view of the Foreign Office towards the difficult strategic position of Hungary refutes Catherwood's argument that attempts were made in London to drag Hungary into the war. According to Barcza, the Hungarian elite were ready to follow Britain if firm promises had been given, but this card was never played by London. The Foreign Office turned the cold shoulder to the bids of the British Embassy in Budapest who lobbied for political and military support for Hungary.²⁶ O'Malley and Barclay, the military attaché in Budapest, after consultations with Teleki reported that Hungary would offer resistance if there was an Allied military presence in the Balkans, but they forecast only token Hungarian resistance to a German invasion, if the Allies' landing failed to materialise.²⁷ Archibald Wavell, the British Commander-in-Chief in the Middle East believed that an offensive against Germany was possible from the direction of South East Europe, hence he supported a British-French landing in the

²⁵ TNA, FO 371/24427, C 3916/529/21, minute by Orchard 18 March 1940; minute by Roberts 19 March 1940.

²⁶ TNA, FO 371/24427, C 3916/529/21, O'Malley to Halifax, 9 March 1940; Catherwood, *The Balkans in World War Two*, p. 12.

²⁷ TNA, FO 371/24427, C 3917/529/21, Barclay to Halifax, 9 March 1940.

Balkans in the spring of 1940.²⁸ The reports of O'Malley and Barclay about Hungary's token resistance however noticeably transformed the views of the Foreign Office over Hungary. Their arguments were used selectively and the parts commenting on Hungary's willy-nilly resistance were taken very seriously, and the assumption that Hungary would only offer 'face-saving' resistance essentially determined formulating opinion on Hungary in the Foreign Office.

Our findings suggest that immediately before the Battles of Norway and France, British perceptions on the future frontiers of Central Europe were mostly viewed in the light of the level of resistance London hoped from the countries of the region against Germany. The idea of defending the region against German aggression was dismissed. Hungary was still judged as a reluctant ally of Germany, and as long as it remained so, it continued to be an important factor in British policy.

²⁸ Lawlor, *Churchill and the politics of war*, p. 115. The 1940 dilemma of Balkan landings has been thoroughly investigated by Elisabeth Barker and Sheila Lawlor, who both have pointed to the fundamental differences between the British and French interests in the Balkans, and have conclusively shown the impossibility of such an enterprise for Britain: Barker, *British Policy in South East Europe*, 13-17; Lawlor, *Churchill and the politics of war*, pp. 118-133.

4. 3 Hungary grants military passage to Germany

The German aggression against the Romanian oil-fields had been the subject of British anxieties since the destruction of Czecho-Slovakia and the Foreign Office expected that the German army would be using Hungarian territory, as it was the most obvious transit route towards Romania. Whether Hungary would offer resistance to a German aggression, or grant military passage to avoid occupation, was a constant subject of Foreign Office discussions in the spring of 1940.²⁹ As early as September 1939, Csáky had indicated to Ciano, the Italian foreign minister that Hungary would not resist a peaceful German military passage through its territory to Romania. The first indication that Hungary might be willing to grant the passage was reported to London by O'Malley in early March 1940. Horthy confessed to him that Hungary would allow the passage of the Wehrmacht, if Germany invaded, or offered Transylvania to Hungary for cooperation.³⁰ This part seeks to remedy the uncertainties surrounding the question of a German military passage through Hungarian territory, and based on unresearched British archival sources prove that Hungary granted military passage to Germany in the spring of 1940.

Several studies have produced sketchy analyses of this problem, but until now no reliable evidence has been brought forward to suggest that Hungary granted military passage to Germany in April 1940.³¹ Until now, German, Italian, and Hungarian sources have provided the largest set of evidence, but all of these are very vague on the subject. The question presented a delicate and top secret issue for all parties; therefore the problem is absent from official documents. The published diplomatic documents of the German Foreign Ministry and the German-Hungarian diplomatic correspondence do not

²⁹ TNA, FO 371/24427, C 3916/529/21, minute by Orchard, 18 March 1940, minute by Roberts 19 March 1940. Budapest was aware of the consequences of allowing the passage of German troops. Sargent made it clear to Barcza after the Hungarian occupation of Ruthenia that whether Hungary decided to resist German pressure, or allowed the passage of the Wehrmacht would crucially affect the British view of Hungary: DIMK III., 500: Barcza to Csáky, 20 March 1939; HIA, Barcza, Diaries, 18 March 1939, Box 0009.

³⁰ TNA, FO 371/24427, C 3916/529/21, O'Malley to Halifax, 9 March 1940. See also: Barker, *British policy towards South-East Europe*, p. 63.

³¹ Focus was on October-November 1940 when German troops indeed passed through Hungarian territory: Romsics, 'A brit külpolitika és a „magyar kérdés”, pp. 153-155; Bán, *Hungarian-British Diplomacy 1939-41*, pp. 100-101.

mention that Berlin asked for a military passage from Budapest in the spring of 1940.³² Italian sources are also very obscure on the question. Talamo, the Italian minister in Budapest, reported on several occasions in April that Berlin possibly requested a military passage through Hungarian territory, but remained silent on whether the Hungarians actually granted the passage.³³ The *I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani*, the published diplomatic sources of Italian foreign policy reveals nothing about the 'droit' either. The surviving Hungarian sources are similarly silent. Neither the DIMK, nor the diplomatic correspondence between Rome and Budapest mention anything about a German request and a Hungarian decision. The minutes of the Hungarian Cabinet meetings offer no further evidence on the 'droit' either.³⁴ A memorandum handed by Lipót Baranyai, the anglophile president of the Hungarian National Bank and a close ally of Teleki, directly to Ciano on the 8 April is one of the rare documents clearly indicating that the Germans contacted Budapest about a military passage. In a questionnaire Baranyai inquired about whether Italy was willing to defend Hungary against German aggression. With remarkable honesty he also noted that for the judgement of history, a futile, but heroic resistance would be preferable and made it clear that the Italian response would be crucial in formulating Hungarian policy. Frontier revision appeared in Baranyai's memorandum as a strategic necessity, which, he argued, was also in the strongest interest of Italy. Baranyai insisted that a German military transit through Hungary would trigger Soviet countermeasures, which could only be repelled if Hungary controlled the mountain passes in Eastern Slovakia.³⁵ Mussolini's answer to the Hungarian inquiry, after consultation with Berlin, was abrupt and laconic:

³² *Documents on German Foreign Policy* (DGFP), ser. D, vols. 7-12, ed. by P. R. Sweet et al (Washington, 1954); *A Wilhelmstrasse és Magyarország, Német diplomáciai iratok Magyarországról 1933-1944*, ed. by Gy. Juhász et al (Budapest, 1968).

³³ *A Palazzo Chigi és Magyarország*. 550-551, 554, 555: Talamo to Ciano, 15, 19, 24 April 1940.

³⁴ Gyula Juhász claimed that the Hungarian Cabinet discussed the problem of a possible German request in early April, but the minutes do not refer to the 'droit' in any form. Ironically, Teleki at the Cabinet meeting held on April Fools' Day mentioned that during his discussions in Rome, and similarly at the Brenner Pass, Hungary's relation to Germany was not touched on although, as we will see, the Brenner Pass meetings of Hitler and Mussolini crucially determined Hungary's future: Juhász, *Magyarország külpolitikája*, pp. 231-232; compare to: MOL K 27, Minisztertanácsi jegyzőkönyvek, (1940. 03. 31; 04. 01; 04. 06; 04. 12).

³⁵ *A Palazzo Chigi és Magyarország*, 547, Baranyai to Ciano, 8 April 1940.

I am Hitler's ally, and wish to remain so.³⁶

Mussolini's evasive response prompted Budapest to look for alternatives elsewhere. A similarly worded memorandum and questionnaire was prepared for the Foreign Office by Teleki, which inquired about the British attitude towards Hungarian occupation of Transylvania and allowing a German military passage. Even though Teleki was ready to refer the question of the Hungarian occupation of Transylvania to the peace conference after the war, this memorandum harbours clear evidence of the Hungarian detachment from British expectations. The memorandum pointed out that the British response would significantly determine the Hungarian decision, but Csáky wrote on the bottom of the page that the memorandum was never sent to London.³⁷ On the 17 April Teleki assured Hitler in a personal letter that in return for German support for Transylvania, Hungary would allow the passage of the Wehrmacht to Romania.³⁸ It can thus be suggested that the reason for holding the memorandum back was either the fact that British opinion was not considered important any more, or that Budapest made the decision to allow the military movements of the Wehrmacht on Hungarian territory before the 17 April, or perhaps both.

The current research has found that British sources, which so far have been completely disregarded, present clear and conclusive evidence for a Hungarian decision. O'Malley's diplomatic reports convincingly prove that Hungary eventually granted the 'droit' in early April, but the exact date of the decision and the actual form of the German request is very uncertain. On 9 March O'Malley reported that Teleki's evasive answers for any inquiries about the 'droit' assured him that the question was brought up by Berlin.³⁹ Then in April, O'Malley was more precise and gloomily noted that Hungary was asked to grant military passage, if such necessity arose, and the permission was given by Budapest.⁴⁰

³⁶ Ciano, *Diaries*, 9 April 1940.

³⁷ DIMK IV, 584: 'Memorandumtervezet Ófelsége kormánya számára német átvonulásról Románia felé', 17 April 1940.

³⁸ Quoted by: Ablonczy, *Pál Teleki*, p. 206. This is the only document which mentions the Hungarian agreement to a German passage. On the other hand it does not prove in what circumstances and with what condition it was requested.

³⁹ TNA, FO 371/24427, C 3916/529/21, O'Malley to Halifax, 9 March 1940.

⁴⁰ TNA FO 371/24427, C 6495/529/21, O'Malley to Halifax, 26 April 1940. For good measure we have to add that even though Hungary granted passage, German troops did not enter the country *en masse* and the military passage did not materialise in the spring of 1940. Not as the direct result of the 'droit', but

German pressure had already been immense on Hungary since the mid-1930s to follow a pro-German foreign policy, to grant economic concessions for the *Reich* and minority rights for the Swabians living in Hungary; hence, Hungary's compliance in April 1940 cannot simply be explained with by reiteration of this argument.

The Hitler-Mussolini meeting at the Brenner Pass in March 1940 has been viewed as a crucial step in the materialization of an active German-Italian military alliance in the war, but historians have not recognised its implications for the future of Hungary and its connection with the Hungarian decision to allow a German military transit through Hungary. Sources about the Brenner meeting are limited and ambiguous,⁴¹ therefore uncertainty surrounds them, and particularly the decisions made about Hungary.⁴² Hungarian historiography has not recognised the consequences of the Brenner meetings for Hungary either, and therefore paid only limited attention to the meetings. Although historians have noticed that Hungary consequently slipped into the German orbit, this was viewed solely as a reflection of Mussolini's diminishing interest in Central Europe. New evidence suggests that a secret deal was struck between the two dictators on Hungary. It seems that for a greater influence in Greece and the Mediterranean, Mussolini had given up the protection of Hungary, and as a consequence Budapest definitively fell into the German sphere of influence.⁴³ Richard Bosworth and Mária Ormos have mentioned that by the spring of 1940 Italy had given up the protection of Hungary.⁴⁴ However, it has not yet been adequately stressed that Hungary, having lost the nominal protection of Italy at the Brenner, was now

there is evidence that the covert infiltration of German 'engineers', 'teachers', 'interpreters' etc. to Hungary and Romania was already under way on a relatively large scale in the spring of 1940: *A Palazzo Chigi és Magyarország*, 571: Talamo to Ciano, 13 May 1940; 587: Talamo to Ciano, 25 May 1940.

⁴¹ Most crucially, documents regarding German-Italian discussions on Hungary are absent from the sources. The DDI and the DGFP document collections do not mention Hungary in connection with the Brenner meetings, DDI 9. ser. III. vol.; DGFP ser. D. vol. 9.

⁴² The main theme of the Brenner meetings was the war with Britain and France. Mussolini as a consequence of the meeting definitively decided to join the war on the side of Germany, if it initiated an offensive on the Western Front, S. Corvaja, *Hitler and Mussolini: The Secret Meetings* (London, 2008), pp. 95-116.

⁴³ TNA, FO 371/24427, C 6323/529, 21, O'Malley to Halifax, 23 April 1940. Although the importance of Italian-Hungarian friendship and Italy's role as the vanguard of Hungarian revisionism was very much overplayed in Budapest, Rome indeed was the counterbalance to German penetration into the Danubian region in the 1930s. The disappearance of Poland, and Italy's growing reliance on Germany altered the situation, and German influence in Hungary became more explicit. The conclusions of the Hitler-Mussolini conversations at the Brenner Pass undoubtedly reflect this tendency and was the culmination of this process.

⁴⁴ R. Bosworth, *Mussolini* (London, 2010), p. 295; M. Ormos, *Mussolini* (Budapest, 1973), p. 265.

defenceless against forceful German penetration. If Germany were to decide to forcefully take the Romanian oil-fields, Hungary was left with the decision to yield or be crushed and occupied. The British Cabinet was aware that the status of Hungary in the Axis had changed as a result of the Brenner conference. Referring to undisclosed, but reliable diplomatic and intelligence information British policy-makers knew that at the Brenner Pass Italy had discontinued its support for Hungarian revisionism if the latter was against German interests and Mussolini also promised that protests would not be made against German troops passing through Hungarian territory.⁴⁵ The Foreign Office was also aware that Budapest had given an affirmative answer for a German request of passage as a result of losing Italian protection at the Brenner. The immediate response of Roberts, in the Central department was resigned and negative:

Nothing we can say further, it will have effect!⁴⁶

The Foreign Office was also convinced that Hungary would receive Eastern Slovakia for its services. It needs emphasis that the prospect of further Hungarian frontier revision in Eastern-Slovakia was instantly viewed in the context of increasing Hungarian-German cooperation. Eastern Slovakia was believed to be part of the secret Hungarian-German accord against Romania. The senior officials of the Foreign Office, Cadogan, Sargent, and Nichols viewed the Hungarian action as a coherent element of a tendentiously, and now openly pro-German foreign policy.⁴⁷

The fact that Budapest after the Brenner conference was directly sounded out by Berlin about a military passage is unknown to historians, and connections between the two events have not been made. The issue of the 'droit' has been recognised by historians, but analysis has remained on a theoretical level. András Bán recognised that the 'droit' presented a dilemma for Hungarian foreign policy, but he failed to fully identify its impact on the Anglo-Hungarian relationship.⁴⁸ György Réti has also paid

⁴⁵ TNA, CAB 65/6, W. M. 97 (40), 19 April 1940; FO/371/24430, C 6327/529/21, Campbell to Foreign Office, 15 May 1940.

⁴⁶ TNA, FO 371/24427, C 6321/529/21, minute by Roberts, 8 May 1940.

⁴⁷ TNA, FO 371/24430, C 6327/529/21, minute by Nichols, Cadogan, Sargent, 18 May 1940. Hungary receiving territory as a reward for her subservience was a recurrent notion of senior officials. Macartney labelled it as the 'Jackal-theory', and considered it as the consequence of the Second Vienna Award: Macartney, *October Fifteen*, p. 424. It is evident that this stigma was present in the perceptions of the senior officials of the Foreign Office much earlier. After the 'droit' it became a permanent pattern in the British judgement of further Hungarian territorial aggrandisements.

⁴⁸ Bán, *British-Hungarian Diplomacy, 1938-41*, pp. 93-94.

some attention to the problem, and stressed that the lack of Italian encouragement to resist a German request put Hungary in a difficult situation, but his scope of analysis was limited to German, Italian and Hungarian sources.⁴⁹ Elizabeth Wiskemann claimed that the German demand for a passage through Hungary served as a cover for the invasion of Denmark and Norway, to direct attention away from Scandinavia. Wiskemann unfortunately did not disclose her source, but her surmising was valid, as the Hungarian decision occurred simultaneously with the Scandinavian campaign.⁵⁰

Even after the 'droit' was granted, Teleki continued his assurances policy to London, but these now fell on deaf ears, and 'treaty revision and doublespeak' was consequently viewed with much suspicion.⁵¹ The 'droit' proved to be a critical watershed in Anglo-Hungarian relationship. The reason for Hungary's *volte-face* was mostly blamed on Horthy's inability to control the German-oriented Hungarian army and his disinterest in resisting German demands.⁵² Confidence in Teleki and Horthy were shaken, and Hungary was now viewed as a German satellite. The Foreign Office thereafter lent a deaf ear to the reports of the second secretary in Budapest, who anticipated that Teleki and Horthy would firmly resist a German passage.⁵³ Roberts and Orchard at the Central department of the Foreign Office, who earlier had approached the difficulties of Hungary with understanding, now expressed their deepest irritation over Teleki's dubious policy. When Teleki sent a message, through the Hungarian-born Lady Listowel, to restore confidence, they minuted that further assurances were unnecessary to sooth Hungarian anxieties regarding Anglo-Czechoslovak friendship or the future Czechoslovak frontiers.⁵⁴

The tone demonstrated that as a result of the 'droit' views in the Foreign Office about Czechoslovakia and Hungary were transformed; Hungarian complains about pro-

⁴⁹ Réti, *Budapest-Róma Berlin árnyékában*, pp. 220-224.

⁵⁰ E. Wiskemann, 'Hungary' in *Survey of International Affairs 1936-46, The Initial Triumph of the Axis*, ed. by A. Toynbee and V. M. Toynbee (Oxford 1958), p. 322.

⁵¹ Frank, 'Treaty revision and doublespeak', pp. 150-173.

⁵² Lóránt Dombrády and Thomas Sakmyster have demonstrated Horthy's inability to retain his influence over the army and how the Hungarian general staff mingled into Hungarian foreign policy: L. Dombrády, *Hadserg és politika Magyarországon 1938-1944* (Budapest, 1986); T. L. Sakmyster, 'Army Officers and Foreign Policy in Interwar Hungary, 1938-41', *Journal of Contemporary History* 10 (1975), pp. 19-40.

⁵³ TNA, FO 371/24429, C 5900/734/21, Sommers Cocks to Foreign Office, 19 April 1940.

⁵⁴ TNA, FO 371/24427, C 6321/529/21, Sir N. Charles (Rome) to Foreign Office, 24 April 1940; minute by Orchard and Roberts 8 May 1940. Lady Listowel conveyed that the Hungarians were worried that an Allied victory would leave the country at the mercy of the Soviet Union and the peace treaty would restore the Trianon frontiers: HIA, Barcza, Diaries, 17 May 1940, Box 0010.

Czech British policy were consequently ignored, and Whitehall moved towards a Czech-orientation. After the Hungarian 'droit' British understanding towards the First Vienna Award and the Hungarian occupation of Ruthenia had also ceased and perceptions on Hungarian revisionism radically shifted.⁵⁵ The 'droit' became the critical element in the British decision to give the Czecho-Slovak National Committee recognition as a provisional government in July 1940 and full recognition in 1941. Makins, a senior official in the Central department argued that Hungary could now be written off. Roberts added that support would be given to nations who were willing to fight.⁵⁶ From 1941 the Foreign Office openly questioned the First Vienna Award, even though the full recognition still had not contained territorial provisions for the future Czechoslovak state.

So far, we have demonstrated the reaction of the Foreign Office to the Hungarian decision to grant military passage to Germany and it has been established that the senior members of the Foreign Office viewed the Hungarian decision as a watershed in the Anglo-Hungarian relationship. The opinion of the Foreign Secretary has so far been neglected. Andrew Roberts, the biographer of Halifax, has stressed the Foreign Secretary's fatalistic approach to the German penetration into Central Europe, but concentrated very little on Halifax's opinion about Hungary.⁵⁷ Halifax's memoranda on the Balkans and Central Europe in the spring of 1940 indeed exhibited a large amount of indifference. Dilks has pointed out that memoranda initialled by Halifax were often not written by him, but were compiled in the Foreign Office, following Halifax's guidelines.⁵⁸ Yet, this view-point has to be contested, as the tone of the Foreign Office on the question of Hungary in the spring of 1940, and the memoranda initialled by Halifax significantly differ. This suggests that the latter were indeed written by either Halifax, or his private secretary Oliver Harvey.

Halifax indeed reacted to the oncoming German-Soviet onslaught of Central Europe with aloofness and naivety, and neither his memoirs, nor his official memoranda deals with the Hungarian 'droit'. In late March, Halifax had dwelt extensively on

⁵⁵ TNA, FO 371/24427, C 6327/529/21, minutes by Orchard and Roberts, May 1940.

⁵⁶ TNA, FO 371/24288, C 7504/2/12, minute by Makins, 21 June 1940; FO 371/24289, C 7646/2/12, minute by Makins, 24 June 1940; FO 371/26389, C 235/235/12, minute by Makins 8 January; minute by Roberts 10 January 1941. See also: Smetana, *In the Shadow of Munich*, pp. 192-193.

⁵⁷ A. Roberts, *Holy Fox: Biography of Lord Halifax* (London, 1997), pp. 149-150, 156-157.

⁵⁸ Dilks, 'The British Foreign Office between the wars', pp. 193-194.

insignificant issues, such as his belief that the region did not expect a German victory, and ungrounded optimism that the loss of British prestige would only be temporary in South-Eastern Europe.⁵⁹ Markedly, even in late April, Halifax had not completely excluded the possibility of an Anglo-Italian rapprochement and the Italian protection of Hungary against German aggression. Considering the question of Hungary as an unusually high priority in Italian policy, and completely neglecting the implications of the Brenner meetings, he expected, or perhaps wished for, a German-Italian quarrel over Hungary or other positions in the Balkans. Most strikingly this was posed as one of the arguments not to go to war with Italy, if Mussolini attacked Yugoslavia.⁶⁰ Another memorandum in late April similarly misjudged the Balkan status quo, and Halifax proudly declared that the Balkan Bloc, consisting of Romania, Yugoslavia, Hungary and Bulgaria had been created and declared that British prospects in the Balkans, with the backing of the Anglo-French-Turkish alliance, were highly promising.⁶¹

Halifax had shown a similarly modest concern towards the dangers faced by the region at the Balkan Conference of the British ministers in London in April 1940. Discussions went along very general lines. Halifax emphasized that the projection of British air and naval-strength was essential to maintain hope in the region, but expressed British disinterest to actively intervene. He affirmed that assistance to Romania was conditional on Italian and Turkish consent, which in reality was a close to impossible combination.⁶² The conclusions of the meeting highlighted his favourite obsession, the subject of Anglo-Italian cooperation extensively. The prospect of Hungarian frontier revision was treated with a measure of tact at the conference. British support was distinctly articulated for the reincorporation of Southern Dobruja into Bulgaria to befriend Sofia, but the Hungarian demands in Transylvania were completely ignored. O'Malley's silence at the conference, and the fact that Hungary was hardly

⁵⁹ TNA, FO 371/24887, R 3856/5/67, W. P. 110 (40), Halifax, 'South-Eastern Europe', 26 March 1940.

⁶⁰ TNA, CAB 66/7/21, Halifax, 'Policy in the event of an Italian attack on Yugoslavia', 29 April 1940.

⁶¹ TNA, FO 371/24889, R 5565/5/67, Halifax, 'The Balkan Front', War Cabinet (40) 140, 29 April 1940. The Anglo-French-Turkish Pact was concluded on 19 October 1939. It provided for British and French assistance to Turkey in the event of aggression against the latter, and also provided for Turkish aid in the event of an act of aggression committed by a European power and leading to war in the Mediterranean Sea involving France and the United Kingdom. Turkey was very reluctant to promise military aid to any of the Balkan countries in the name of common defence, which in effect rendered the pact defensive only, see: Catherwood, *The Balkans in World War Two*, pp. 90-103.

⁶² Denniston, *Churchill's Secret War*, p. 9; Smart, *British Strategy and Politics During the Phoney War*, pp. 126, 207.

discussed during the entire conference accentuate the diminishing role of Budapest in British thought.⁶³

Even though the British foreign policy-making elite now seemed to have lost faith in Hungary, their reaction to a yet mostly unknown Hungarian proposition, from a very different Hungarian quarter, suggests that the lack of trust was only felt towards the current Hungarian political elite. Historiography usually suggests that Count Mihály Károlyi, the president of Hungary (1918-19), had only taken up a political role in the Hungarian anti-fascist emigration in Britain from 1941.⁶⁴ New evidence however suggests that he was active as early as April 1940. Urievicz, a close friend of Károlyi, called on the Foreign Office in late April and requested British approval for Károlyi's plan to offer Ruthenia to the Soviet Union in return for a Soviet guarantee for Hungary's independence. Minutes suggest that Orchard and Robert approached Károlyi's group positively, and were keen to sound out Urievicz on the views of a Hungarian political group which opposed both Hitler and the current Hungarian regime. However, because of the Nazi-Soviet cooperation the Foreign Office was convinced that Moscow would not support such a scheme, therefore Károlyi's emissary was not received.⁶⁵

⁶³ TNA, FO 371/24902, R 4832/4156/67, 'Meeting of the British ministers in London from South-Eastern Europe', 8, 11 April 1939. The possibility that these memoranda were compiled considerably later than their date, and were intentionally written in a rosy tone to veil failures seems very remote, but cannot be completely ruled out.

⁶⁴ Gy. Kellner, *Magyar antifasiszták Angliában, 1940-1945* (Budapest 1983), p. 117; T. Hadju and Gy. Litván, 'Count Michael Károlyi in Wartime England. From His Correspondence, 1941-1946', *The Hungarian Quarterly* 172 (2003), pp. 104-105, 108-109.

⁶⁵ TNA, FO 371/24430, C 6206/6206/21. The Foreign Office claimed that even Barcza supported this scheme. Neither Barcza's memoirs, nor his diaries mention Károlyi's proposition. As we will see, from 1941 Károlyi's and other anti-fascist Hungarian political groups were not allowed to play any crucial role in representing Hungary in Britain.

4. 4 The military and economic implications of the Hungarian 'droit' on Anglo-Hungarian relationship and British Balkan strategy

Although the Hungarian decision to grant military passage to Germany did not overturn British Balkan strategy, it posed serious questions. We have already pointed out that the Balkans was considered indefensible, but a smooth and rapid German transit through Hungarian territory alarmed British policy-makers. It allowed an easy German access to Romanian oil, and potentially troubled Britain's East Mediterranean positions, especially in Turkey.⁶⁶ The aim of this part is to determine how far the Hungarian 'droit' affected British military planning, and how far it forced London to reconsider its economic and trade policy towards Hungary, which regardless of the war and strict contraband control, had shown surprising lenience towards Budapest.

The military implications of the 'droit' immediately became the subject of intense discussions as the news of the Hungarian decision reached the Foreign Office. Evidence clearly indicates that the swift German occupation of South East Europe was expected in London as soon as hostilities broke out on the Western Front and the Hungarian decision was believed to assist this possibility. Based on intelligence reports and the recommendations of Barclay, the British military attaché in Budapest, the possibility of Hungarian resistance to the German passage was ruled out.⁶⁷ Reports of German divisions, stationed along the Hungarian frontier in late April, strengthened the belief that the invasion of Hungary and Romania was indeed imminent.⁶⁸ Polish sources also reported the conclusion of a secret Hungarian-German military alliance against

⁶⁶ According to a humorous anecdote, the Hungarian agreement for military passage and occupation actually made the task of the Wehrmacht harder and not easier. A diplomat asked a German general how long the occupation of Hungary would actually take if the Hungarians granted passage. The general answered that it would not take more than 24 hours. However, he quickly added that if the Hungarians resisted, it would only take 12 hours, as in that case welcome speeches would not be made. This anecdote actually described the circumstances of the Germany occupation of Hungary in March 1944, but it also perfectly catches the atmosphere of the 1940 'droit':

<<http://www.roncskutatas.hu/node/9603>> [accessed 22 October 2013].

⁶⁷ TNA, FO 371/24427, C 6327/529/21, Barclay to Foreign Office, May 1940; TNA, FO 371/24889, R 5540/5/67, Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, German Intentions in South East Europe, War Cabinet J. I. C. 42 (40), 29 April 1940.

⁶⁸ TNA, CAB 65/6, W. M. 97 (40), 19 April 1940. Lipót Baranyai's memorandum to Ciano and the reports of the Italian consul in Vienna also gave accounts of German troop concentrations along the Hungarian frontier and on the possible route of the German military passage through Hungary (map 4.2): *A Palazzo Chigi és Magyarország*, 547: Baranyai to Ciano, 8 April 1940; 557: Rochira (Vienna) to Ciano, 25 April 1940.

Romania.⁶⁹ The Cabinet was also convinced that Mussolini had attempted to persuade Teleki to escalate the territorial dispute with Romania, and spark off a conflict, which would allow the quick Axis occupation of the Balkans.⁷⁰ After the Hitler-Mussolini Brenner meetings, Whitehall was expected that Mussolini would enter the war against the Allies. Hence, on the 18 April the Cabinet instructed the Chiefs of Staff to consider the implications of Italy's immediate entry into the war.⁷¹

The question of Hungarian-German military cooperation against Romania was also enthusiastically discussed by the British press. The *Evening Standard* claimed that Hungary was raising an army to regain Transylvania, and would allow a German military passage in return for territorial rewards.⁷² The Hungarian minister, being completely unaware of the 'droit', immediately protested against the publication of such articles, which, he believed, unduly put Hungary in a negative context.⁷³ Cadogan was convinced that a joint Hungarian-German effort to undermine Romania indeed existed, but to maintain cordiality, he had taken steps to prevent the recurrence of such press incidents.⁷⁴

The outbreak of the war had witnessed the introduction of certain controlling measures on the press, but the Press Department of the Foreign Office was only able to enforce a limited 'voluntary censorship'. This meant that during weekly, and later daily press conferences, the official line on certain sensitive issues was strongly suggested to press editors. In the first 6 months of the war Hungarian protests against articles were met with genuine sympathy, and steps were taken not to aggravate Hungary's position with negatively toned articles. For instance, a passionate debate on Ruthenia in the pages of *Free Europe* in March 1940 was cut short by the Foreign Office. The paper was funded by the British government and it was judged that anti-Hungarian opinion could lead to unnecessary disputes between the nations of the region.⁷⁵

The Hungarian 'droit' radically transformed the British approach. Roberts was particularly annoyed with the report that Budapest would not consider British press

⁶⁹ TNA, FO 371/24430, C 6630/2472/21, O'Malley to Halifax, 8, 14 May 1940.

⁷⁰ TNA, CAB 65/6/42, War Cabinet (40) 97, Conclusions, 19 April 1940.

⁷¹ Butler, *Grand Strategy*, pp. 298-299.

⁷² 'Hungary is Raising an Army in Secret', *Evening Standard*, 4 May 1940.

⁷³ MOL, K 66, 1940-I.-5. 436. cs., 2998/1940, Barcza to Csáky, 16 May 1940.

⁷⁴ TNA, FO 371/24430, C 6618/2472/21, Cadogan to Barcza, 8 May 1940.

⁷⁵ MOL, K 66, 1940-I.-5. 436.cs., 86/biz., Barcza to Csáky, 8 March 1940.

representations,⁷⁶ and emphasized that as long as there was no Hungarian reciprocity, and the tone of the Hungarian press was pro-German, an occasional rebuke against Hungary was necessary.⁷⁷

Despite the growing antagonism felt towards Hungary, the official relationship remained cordial, mostly for economic reasons. Even though O'Malley recommended lenience towards Hungary, he also believed that the Hungarian decisions would have the gravest consequences for Anglo-Hungarian trade.⁷⁸ He immediately proposed the reduction of war material export to Hungary and suggested a carefully worded warning. Despite this, he advised that the friendly tone towards Budapest should not be changed, to avoid antagonising Hungary completely.⁷⁹

Indeed, before the 'droit', Hugh Dalton, who was Minister of Economic Warfare in 1940, was convinced that Hungary could be encouraged to resist if supplementary export and import quotas were granted, as Hungary was in desperate need of raw materials. Now, reflecting on Hungary's decision to cooperate with the Wehrmacht, he completely reversed his views and proposed the suspension of all war material exports and the refusal of granting further import quotas.⁸⁰ Halifax and the Foreign Office unanimously agreed to a more rigid set of criteria, which did not allow special considerations for countries in special circumstances if it involved giving economic advantage to Germany. The Foreign Office agreed that contraband-control should be kept tight and the excessive export of war material to Hungary should be prohibited, because it was believed that strengthening the Hungarian Army would eventually strengthen the Wehrmacht, which after the probable occupation of Hungary would disarm the Hungarians.⁸¹

⁷⁶ TNA, FO 371/24430, C 6618/2472/21, O'Malley to Foreign Office, 13 April 1940.

⁷⁷ F. G. Redward, the press attaché in Budapest reported to Cadogan that Teleki had instructed the press to put German news on the front page, and the Allied only on the last pages, only in order to silence German and Hungarian far-right protests. Cadogan judged this explanation very self-serving: TNA, FO 371/24430, C 5833/5833/21, minute by Roberts, 16 April 1940; FO 371/24429, C 6325/734/21, Redward to Foreign Office, 18 April 1940.

⁷⁸ O'Malley's recommendation to rethink and loosen the strict criteria of neutrality, in order to allow more flexible political and economic relations with Hungary, was ignored in London.

⁷⁹ TNA, FO/371, C 6495/529/21, O'Malley to Halifax, 6 May 1940.

⁸⁰ TNA, FO 371/24427, C 6495/529/21, Ministry of Economic Warfare to Cadogan, 16 May 1940; FO 371/24428, C 6882/529/21, minute by Dalton, June 1940.

⁸¹ The Ministry of Economic Warfare admitted that even before Hungary granted military passage to Germany, the arming of Hungary was never considered, as it was believed that supplying adequate

Despite the fact that the 'droit' acutely affected Anglo-Hungarian trade, there is evidence for cross-currents in British commercial policy. The top secret scheme, to import Bofors air-defence guns and ammunition, manufactured in Hungary under Swedish licence, for the defence of Portugal and Britain seemed to have a very crucial role in the decision to maintain friendly relations with Hungary.⁸² Although Halifax showed little enthusiasm towards German penetration into the Danubian states, he was very interested in acquiring arms from Hungary. He believed that putting political and economic restrictions on the Anglo-Hungarian relationship would cause resentment in Hungary, which could endanger the Bofors scheme.⁸³ As a consequence of these economic interests O'Malley was instructed that in response to the 'droit' no official démarche should be issued, and Budapest should only be warned of the 'droit's inconsistency with Hungarian neutrality in a personal letter addressed to Csáky.⁸⁴

A joint meeting of the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Economic Warfare in late May raised the question of Hungary's status in British policy, now that the country voluntarily granted military passage to Germany and examined the political, legal and moral implications of strict British raw material and contraband control on neutrals. The question was asked whether non-belligerents, such as Hungary, should be harmed with contraband and trade restrictions, and if yes, to what extent. On the grounds that the 'droit' had not actually occurred and that Hungary had made considerable attempts to stay neutral, the meeting recommended that Hungary should still not be considered as territory under enemy occupation and correct Anglo-Hungarian relations ought to be maintained.⁸⁵

amount of armament could not have been facilitated: TNA, FO 837/509, Ministry of Economic Warfare to Foreign Office, 18 May 1940.

⁸² The deal involved importing 6 guns to Portugal and 6 for Britain.

⁸³ TNA, FO 371/24428, C 6882/529/21, minute by Halifax, 23 May 1940.

⁸⁴ TNA, FO 371/24427, C 6495/529/21, Foreign Office to O'Malley, 10 May 1940; FO 837/509, Makins to Ministry of Economic Warfare, 23 May 1940.

⁸⁵ TNA, FO 371/24428, C 6882/529/21, 'Memorandum of a conference attended by attorney-general, the procurator-general and the legal advisors of the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Economic Warfare', 29 May 1940.

4. 5 “Our fate is being decided now between Namur and Sedan”⁸⁶ The Anglo-Hungarian relationship in the first weeks of the Battle of France

The decisive moment on the Western Front came on 10 May, when Germany launched a major offensive against the Allies. György Barcza in London, and the Hungarian elite in Budapest, anxiously waited for the outcome of the battle, praying for an Allied victory. The aim here is to determine whether the outbreak of hostilities on the Western Front brought change into the Anglo-Hungarian relationship, and in what direction the war pushed the crippled image of Hungary in London. Particular attention will be placed on British expectations from Hungary in the grave hours of the Battle of France, and how far the consequences of the Hungarian ‘droit’ affected these calculations.

Immediately before the Battle of France O’Malley had sounded out Teleki on Hungary’s attitude towards the war and Germany. The intense conversation highlighted the distance between Hungarian and British perceptions on the limits between acceptable cooperation and open collaboration between Budapest and Berlin. Frustrated over the lack of information Teleki was providing about Hungary’s future attitude, O’Malley indicated that a Hungarian ‘droit’ could have grave consequences for the Anglo-Hungarian relationship and could result in reducing British raw material export to Hungary. A seemingly very enervated Teleki claimed that this would definitely push Hungary into the arms of Germany.⁸⁷ The reason for Teleki’s frustration, apart from being indignant about the lack of British support, can indeed be the fact that a positive answer to a German transit had already been given.

Barcza’s diaries also partly explain Teleki’s attitude. Barcza perceived that Teleki and Horthy had arrived at the conclusion that during the life and death struggle on the Western Front, Transylvania should be occupied regardless of Western or German disapproval.⁸⁸ Ablonczy has also pointed out that Teleki, guided by the vision of Hungary’s messianic mission in the Carpathian basin, believed that integral revision would guarantee the security of Hungary against anyone.⁸⁹ British policy-makers were unable to accept that the purpose of frontier revision was to build a geographically and

⁸⁶ HIA, Barcza, Diaries, 17 May 1940, Box 0010.

⁸⁷ TNA, FO 371/24427, C 6323/529/21, O’Malley to Foreign Office, 23 April 1940.

⁸⁸ HIA, Barcza, Diaries, 14 May 1940, Box 0010.

⁸⁹ Ablonczy, *Pál Teleki*, pp. 96, 111, 106-107.

militarily strong Hungary and to achieve it Teleki was prepared to collaborate with Germany until the limit of physical German occupation.⁹⁰

The Teleki-O'Malley meeting on 11 May resonates with this notion. Teleki, once again showed considerable annoyance towards O'Malley and blamed British lack of support for agreeing to allow a German passage, if asked. Teleki was particularly harsh, declaring that the current situation on the Western front was the result of the failure of the West to check Hitler when it was still possible, and to address the territorial problems of Central Europe. He also indicated that he would not accept territory from either Britain or Germany, and hinted that Hungary wished to take matters into its own hands.⁹¹ The Hungarian anger and self-pity over Trianon, which earlier was rigorously projected towards Britain in an attempt to gather sympathy, now in the dilemma of collaboration or occupation, turned into violent irritation at Britain. The argument that Hungary would not defend Romania, by refusing military passage to Germany, appeared during this meeting for the first time, and concurrently served as a justification for action towards London. The fact that the concept only appeared about a month after the actual Hungarian decision ocured questions its genuiness. Whether Teleki used this argument as a pretext cannot be decided conclusively, but nevertheless it failed to deceive O'Malley and the Foreign Office, who considered the Hungarian argument very artificial.

Teleki, although irritated at British passivity, continued the policy of reassurance towards London. He sent Béla Randvászky to London, with the message that Hungary would protest at a German military passage, but the regime and Horthy would stay in place to prevent the appointment of a Quisling government and any *Gleichschaltung* of the country.⁹² As we have noted, earlier in 1939 during the Polish crisis, Barcza did not sympathise with Teleki's policy to conduct diplomacy through unprofessional agents. The droit-crisis however completely changed his approach and Barcza viewed these emissaries more positively, particularly because it provided a channel to bypass the progressively pro-German Csáky.

⁹⁰ Ablonczy, *Pál Teleki*, pp. 106-107, 111.

⁹¹ MOL, K 66 1940-I.-5. 436. csomó, 2597/1940, Teleki-O'Malley conversation, 11 May 1940.

⁹² HIA, Barcza, Diaries, Box 0010, 14 May 1940. Teleki's emissary was the son of Baron Béla Randvászky, a well-known politician and historian of the dualist era.

Regardless of the efforts of Teleki, these reassurances had failed to influence Western perceptions, as Hungarian promises were intentionally left vague to avoid angering Berlin with a pro-British policy.⁹³ Ambiguous promises were unable to outweigh the official pro-German rhetoric of Budapest and the violent anti-Western invectives of Csáky.⁹⁴ Britain expected a more concrete Hungarian foreign policy, and as Hungarian promises never categorically reassured London on the British primary criteria of armed resistance to Germany, they were bound to fail. These kind of diplomatic balancing acts were acceptable for London during the Czech crises of 1938, but since the outbreak of war it caused displeasure. István Bibó, the Hungarian political theorist, who as early as the 1930s called Hungarian revisionism the major obstacle to regional rapprochement, also pointed out later that Hungarian historical arguments for frontier revision did not influence British perceptions and were considered as naive and extreme in London.⁹⁵

A hitherto unknown interlude confirms Bibó's sobering analysis, and provides further evidence as to why Teleki's assurance-policy failed to convince British policy-makers. As a sign of understanding and rapport, Teleki was cordially asked in April to renew his membership at the Royal Geographical Society. Ironically his membership had been suspended when Austria-Hungary declared war on Great Britain in 1914. Barcza bitterly described his and London's disappointment over Teleki's refusal, who asked to delay his renewal due to the difficult international situation. According to Barcza, this was taken in London as a clear and definite sign of German orientation, as it was believed that due to the fear of German reprisals even this minor issue could not be considered by Teleki independently. The conclusion was drawn that even Teleki had lost his ability and will to fight for independence.⁹⁶

Although Teleki felt let down by Britain, we have demonstrated that he did not want to antagonise London completely, and made attempts to save whatever was left of

⁹³ N. Dreiszinger, 'Bridges to the West, the Horthy regime's reassurance policies in 1941', *War and Society* 29 (1989), pp. 1-23.

⁹⁴ Csáky, on the 8 March addressed a sharp rant against the Allies for supporting a Czech-Polish confederation after the war. Barcza reported that the Foreign Office was surprised, but restricted the publication of the speech in the press. Barcza on the other hand was unaware that the speech caused resentment towards Hungary in the Foreign Office: MOL, K66 1940-I.-5. 436.csomó, 86/biz., Barcza to Csáky, 8 March 1940.

⁹⁵ Bibó István *Összegyűjtött Munkái* vol. 4, ed. by I. Kemény és M. Sárközi (Bern, 1984), p. 1210.

⁹⁶ HIA, Barcza, Diaries, Box 0010, 12, 13 April 1940.

British sympathy.⁹⁷ Csáky on the other hand now followed an openly pro-German foreign policy. The fact that Csáky had failed to inform his minister in London about the 'droit' testifies to his German-orientation, and that British approval mattered less and less for him. Barcza's diaries reveal his anger and astonishment when he was informed of the 'droit' by Sargent, and not Budapest, during their meeting on 14 May.⁹⁸ Diplomatic dispatches conceal the conflict between Barcza and Csáky, but Barcza's diaries did not hide his bitter disappointment in Csáky's increasing German orientation. During 1940, hopelessness and irritation over the lack of information and instruction from Budapest is a common feature of the Barcza diaries. While Barcza's isolation tells us much about Budapest's disregard of London as a point of reference, furthermore it also indicates Barcza's marginal position in London, as a representative of Hungary. As we have pointed out, the Foreign Office had information about the 'droit' through O'Malley since March, and although Barcza was in regular contact with Sargent and Cadogan, they failed to question the Hungarian minister on this crucial question for more than month.

⁹⁷ Ablonczy, *Pál Teleki*, p. 206.

⁹⁸ HIA, Barcza, Diaries, Box 0010, 14 May 1940.

4. 6 Conclusion

This chapter set out to determine whether it could be proved that Hungary granted military passage to Germany in April 1940. Historiography so far has been unable to prove that such a decision was made in Budapest, and the issue remained theoretical in historical analyses. The failure to conclusively answer the question was partly due to the fact that a German military passage through Hungarian territory did not materialise until the autumn of 1940, therefore the problem was overlooked. It has been demonstrated here that British sources prove beyond question that a positive Hungarian answer was given to the German request in early April.

Returning to the question about how far the Hungarian decision influenced British views on the Hungarian territorial question and the image of Hungary in London, it is clear that the decision had pivotal implications for the Anglo-Hungarian relationship. Although the effects of the 'droit' had not fully developed until 1941, it is evident that the 'droit' had a particularly negative reception in London, and crucially affected perceptions of Hungary. The future of the First Vienna Award, and Hungarian authority over Ruthenia was now openly questioned in the Foreign Office, and similarly reserved opinions were articulated towards the question of the Hungarian-Romanian territorial dispute. The change of tone evidently suggests that confidence was shaken in the Hungarian elite. The British approach towards Hungary's renewed claims in Romania in the summer of 1940, and the official opinion about the Second Vienna Award largely reflected this perception.

Henceforth, London disregarded Hungarian concerns about the recreation of Czechoslovakia after the war, and more openly supported the cause of the Czech émigrés. Besides, London discontinued its leniency in controlling contra-band imports to Hungary. One of the more significant findings to emerge from the analysis of the 'droit' is that the evidence presented here on the actual occurrence of the Hungarian decision clearly explains the radical contrast between the positive British opinion of Hungary in early 1940 and the condemnation of the Second Vienna Award in August 1940. This, until now, has only been explained by the vague and generalizing argument that Hungary followed an increasingly pro-German policy.

`[...] we do not propose to recognise any territorial changes
which take place during the war,
unless they take place with the free consent
and good will of the parties concerned.`¹
(Churchill)

5. Contemplating Alternatives: Britain and Hungary between rapprochement and conflict in the summer of 1940

5.1 Introduction

Only a few days after initiating an attack on the Western front, the German army broke through the gap in the Allied front, close to Sedan, and were rolling towards the English Channel at breakneck speed. Reaching the coast a few days later they had trapped about half a million Allied troops, including the British Expeditionary Forces (B.E.F.).² Although the Allies managed to evacuate more than 300,000 British and French soldiers to England between the 26 May and 4 June 1940, the defeat seemed embarrassingly total.³

These dramatic developments increased the anxieties of Central European governments, which were forced to adjust their policy according to the changed circumstances. Most crucially, the Allied defeat had shaken belief in the ultimate British victory. On 21 May Teleki asked János Pelényi, the Hungarian minister in Washington, to send back the \$5 million, originally intended for establishing a Hungarian émigré government in America.⁴ A few days later, the Romanian cabinet declared an adjustment of its policy towards Germany and renounced the British guarantee.⁵ As a result of the Allied defeat on the Western front not only Central European, but British political and military strategy also underwent a major revision. The immediate priority

¹ *Hansard* (Commons), vol. 365, pp. 40-41, Winston Churchill, 05 September 1940.

² W. S. Churchill, *The Second World War. Their Finest Hour*, vol. 2, (Cambridge, 1949), pp. 40-46; B. Bond, *Britain, France and Belgium, 1939-1940* (London, 1990), pp. 8, 28-30.

³ See also: J. Lukacs, *Five Days in London, May 1940* (New Heaven, 2001).

⁴ Pelényi, 'The Secret Plan for a Hungarian Government in the West', p. 171; see also: Gy. Borbándi, 'A Teleki-Pelényi terv nyugati Magyar ellenkormány létesítésére', *Új Látóhatár* 36 (1966), pp. 155-170.

⁵ Balogh, *A magyar-román kapcsolatok 1939-1940-ben*, p. 62. As we have noted, Romania received a British guarantee for its independence on 13 April 1939.

was to prepare for the invasion of the British Isles, and as a result British continental priorities were downgraded. A large and growing body of historical literature has investigated this shift in British strategy, but the position of the Danubian region and the Balkans in this new situation have received limited attention. Historians have recognised that Central Europe and the Balkans retained only a very limited strategic importance in the context of British Mediterranean and Middle Eastern strategy, but so far historians provided limited evidence, particularly if we are looking at London's relationship with countries far away from the 'Middle Sea'.⁶ Although several studies have recognised the devastating effect of the Allied collapse on Britain's relationship with the region, the problem of how British policy shifted, as a consequence of the fall of France, has received very little attention in British historiography.⁷

Evidence suggests that although countries such as Hungary and Romania lost their strategically important position in British planning, June and July witnessed crucial decisions in British post-war planning, and the attitude of Budapest and Bucharest in this period critically affected the ways London contemplated the reconstruction of the region after the war. Hungarian historiography has also paid little attention to the summer months of 1940 in the Anglo-Hungarian relationship. Although offering a comprehensive picture of the latter, András Bán's analysis needs clarification. He raised the crucial question of how the evolution of the Anglo-Czech and Anglo-Romanian relationships influenced British views on Hungary, but by using limited sources, he was unable to elucidate the correlations.⁸ Ignác Romsics' analysis of the 'image of Hungary' in the summer of 1940 also reached limited conclusion due to the same reasons.⁹ Gábor Bátonyi, Tibor Frank, and Miklós Lojkó have analysed Anglo-

⁶ Jack Greene and Alessandro Massignani have recently put the Mediterranean and the Balkans in the context of both Allied and Axis grand strategy: J. Greene and A. Massignani, *Naval War in the Mediterranean* (London, 2011). For the role of the Mediterranean and the Balkans in British strategy, see also: Salerno, *Vital Crossroads*; Playfair et al, *The Mediterranean and the Middle East*, vol. 1.

⁷ The analysis of British policy towards South East Europe in the summer of 1940 is very limited in general surveys of British grand strategy and foreign policy: Butler, *Grand Strategy*; Woodward, *British Foreign Policy in the Second World War*. The study of Elizabeth Barker still offers the most comprehensive view of British foreign policy towards the region during the war: Barker, *British policy towards South-East Europe*. Christopher Catherwood has demonstrated the position of the Balkans in British Mediterranean strategy, but his focus is mostly limited to Anglo-Turkish and Anglo-Greek relationship: Catherwood, *The Balkans in World War Two*. Sheila Lawlor has brilliantly demonstrated the contradictions between British military and political goals in the Balkans, but her analysis also followed a Greek-Turkish focus: Lawlor, *Churchill and the politics of war*, pp. 123-133.

⁸ Bán, *British-Hungarian Diplomacy, 1938-41*, pp. 100-105.

⁹ Romsics, 'A brit külpolitika és a „magyar kérdés”', pp. 105-107.

Hungarian relations in a broader time-frame and crucially recognised that judging Hungarian policy worked in a regional framework in British thought.¹⁰ The new sources examined here will complement our understanding of how Britain judged the Hungarian territorial claims and will show that the views on Hungary were ambiguous and inconclusive in the immediate aftermath of the catastrophes of the summer of 1940.

We are seeking also to go beyond investigating British policy towards the region solely through the prism of diplomatic correspondence and the simple analysis of official policy. The political correspondence of the Foreign Office provides the general framework of the analysis, but we will pursue un-researched evidence in the files of the PID and the FRPS, responsible for propaganda and post-war planning at this stage of the war. As we have noted, most of the Hungarian archival materials covering Anglo-Hungarian relationship in 1940-41 were destroyed during the war. This has largely hampered the analysis, especially in determining to what extent Budapest relied on British official opinion in formulating its foreign policy in mid-1940. Some of the crucial aspects of Hungarian foreign policy can however be reconstructed from the diaries of György Barcza, which therefore will form an important part of our inquiry. Romanian sources have recently been thoroughly examined by Béni L. Balogh, but for the most part he concentrated on Romanian-Hungarian and Romanian-German relations; therefore looking at British sources for Romania will also be crucial.¹¹

This chapter will also address largely unexplored questions, such as propaganda towards Hungary and Romania in mid-1940.¹² The evidence suggests that London was very active in this sphere, perhaps as propaganda remained the sole method to influence the region. The analysis of this field in the context of British views on the ongoing Hungarian-Romanian territorial dispute in the summer of 1940 will bring us closer to answer one of the key question of this study: why were the two countries viewed

¹⁰ G. Bátonyi, 'Magyarország világháborús részvétele brit szemszögből' in *Háború, Hadsereg, Összeomlás: Magyarpolitika, katonapolitika a második világháborúban*, ed. by Gy. Markó (Budapest, 2005), pp. 61-70.; Frank, 'Magyarország a brit politikai gondolkodásban 1919-1945', pp. 45-57; Lojkó, 'Churchill, Eden and Hungary', pp. 217-236.

¹¹ Balogh, *A magyar-román kapcsolatok 1939-1940-ben*; also: B. L. Balogh, *The Second Vienna Award and Hungarian-Romanian relations, 1940-44* (New York, 2011).

¹² Robert Cole has provided a comprehensive analysis of British propaganda towards neutrals, but his analysis of agitation towards Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria remains very sketchy: R. Cole, *Britain and the "War of Words" in Neutral Europe, 1939-45: Art of the Possible* (Basingstoke, 1990).

differently in London, if both were viewed as Axis satellites? ¹³ Answering this question will also help understanding British disapproval of the Second Vienna Award, which was a German-Italian arbitration of the Hungarian-Romanian territorial dispute on 30 August 1940.

¹³ Ágnes Beretzky has suggested that Romania, regardless of turning its back on the Allies, continued to be viewed positively in London, but she has not fully explored this intriguing controversy: Beretzky, 'C. A. Macartney. A Devoted and Frustrated Friend of Hungary', pp. 237-246.

5. 2 The implications of the Allied collapse on the Western front on British Central European policy

I.

The collapse of France, and Italy's entry into the war was the worst possible combination for British Balkan and Mediterranean strategy.¹⁴ As early as 1936, the Chiefs of Staff had warned of the difficulties of waging simultaneous wars against Germany on the continent, Italy in the Mediterranean and Japan in the Far East. The 'Three Power Enemy' threat presented an impossible financial and strategic burden for Britain. The problem sparked intense debate between the Treasury, the Foreign Office and the Armed Services, leading to the conclusion that Italian non-belligerence was essential for keeping imperial communications open in the Mediterranean.¹⁵ A memorandum, prepared by the Chiefs of Staff at the outbreak of the war further emphasized the importance of Italian neutrality in British Mediterranean strategy, pointing out that the attitude of Italy would also crucially influence the attitude of Turkey and Balkan countries towards Britain.¹⁶

After Italy declared war on Britain and France on 10 June 1940, a fresh Chiefs of Staff report recommended the complete reverse of British Balkan policy. It noted that the earlier aim to keep the war away from the region, by creating a Balkan neutral bloc, consisting of Romania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Hungary, should now finally be abandoned. This loss of interest was twofold. The memorandum stressed that the only way to limit the implication of the catastrophes of Norway and the Western front was to extend the war to the Balkans, which at the same time would relieve the strain and pressure on Gibraltar, Malta, Egypt, and the British Isles.¹⁷ The document stressed that the German-Italian occupation of the region suddenly became a British interest, as it could potentially cause communicational and economic disruptions for the Axis. The report was briefly discussed by the Cabinet on 13 June, where Halifax proposed that

¹⁴ E. G. H. Pedalin, 'Change and Continuity in British Foreign Policy towards Italy, 1939-42' in *What Difference Did the War Make?*, ed. by B. Brivati and H. Jones (London, 1995), pp. 151-164.

¹⁵ Playfair et al., *The Mediterranean and the Middle East*, vol. 1., pp. 5, 11, 39.

¹⁶ TNA, CAB/66/1/33, 'Possible Future Course of the War', 18 September 1939; FO 371/24887, R 3856/5/67, W. P. 110 (40), Halifax, 'South-Eastern Europe', 26 March 1940. See also: M. Williamson, 'The Role of Italy in British Strategy 1938-39', *Journal of the Royal United Services Institution for Defence Studies* 124 (1979), pp. 43-49.

¹⁷ TNA, CAB 65/7, War Cabinet Conclusion 164 (40), 10 June 1940.

Yugoslavia and Greece should immediately be induced to intervene actively on the side of the Allies. His recommendation was accepted without discussion, but further decisions on the Balkans were postponed until the situation in France and in the Mediterranean clarified. The Cabinet nevertheless agreed that immediate action should be taken to organise acts of sabotage to destroy stocks, harvest and disrupt communication in order to disturb the shipping of supplies from the region to Germany.¹⁸ Apart from this occasion, the Cabinet paid very little attention to the Balkans and focus unsurprisingly was centred on the dramatic situation of the Western front.¹⁹

The apparent lack of Cabinet attention on South East Europe in June and July supports the viewpoint of Gabriel Gorodetsky and Valerie Cromwell, who have both argued that due to Churchill's and Halifax's lack of interest, policy was mainly conducted by the Foreign Office towards South Eastern Europe.²⁰ However, their argument fails to deal with the crucial questions of how far the Foreign Office and its senior officials followed the general guidelines of Halifax, and to what extent they attempted to go against Cabinet instructions, which will be examined here. We have argued that Hungarian questions were normally dealt with by the Foreign Office, due to Chamberlain's, Churchill's and Halifax's lack of interest; this argument will be put to the test here. A circular telegram instructed British representatives in the region according to 13 June decisions of the Cabinet. Apart from emphasizing that the present chaotic situation should also be exploited to organise acts of sabotage, it stressed that causing friction between Germany and the Soviet Union was now paramount.²¹

The change in British policy was radical. Countries, which only a few months before had been promised economic and military aid, now became the subject of discussions about subversive actions. Preparations for sabotage commenced

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ TNA, CAB 65/7 War Cabinet Conclusion 160 (40), 10 June 1940; CAB 65/7 War Cabinet Conclusion 161 (40), 11 June 1940.

²⁰ G. Gorodetsky, *Stafford Cripps' Mission to Moscow, 1940-42* (Cambridge, 2002), pp. xix, 9-10; Cromwell, 'The Foreign and Commonwealth Office', pp. 541-573.

²¹ TNA, FO 371/24890, Foreign Office to Budapest, Bucharest, Belgrade, Sofia, Athens and Ankara, 5 July 1940. Although the British representatives in the region were asked to radically change their attitude towards the Soviet Union, it was soon admitted in London that opportunities were very limited to carry out these instructions: TNA, FO 371/24890, 'Policy in the Balkans after the French Collapse', Chiefs of Staff Committee, 28 June 1940; 'Policy in the Balkans after the French Collapse', Chief of Staff Committee, 3 July 1940; Barker, *British policy towards South-East Europe*, p. 18.

immediately in the D section of MI6, which later became the foundation of the Special Operations Executive (S.O.E.). Keith Jeffrey's recent monograph of MI6 has demonstrated that between 1939 and 1941 British intelligence activities in Hungary were very limited.²² Basil Davidson, an intelligence officer, was sent to Hungary in late 1939 with the vague instruction to 'promote resistance'. He reported that Hungarians were hard to bribe and were reluctant to destroy their stocks and property for the Allied cause.²³ For instance, his preparations to blow up bridges on the Danube was halted by O'Malley, who forced him to throw the explosives into the Danube.²⁴ Later, in 1943-44, during the Anglo-Hungarian secret negotiations, the same problem became the cornerstone of Hungary's possible surrender to the Allies.²⁵ Miklós Kállay, the Hungarian prime minister at the time, expressed his particular annoyance regarding the British request that Hungary should show its pro-Allied inclination by organising acts of sabotage.²⁶

²² K. Jeffrey, *The History of the Secret Intelligence Service, 1909-1949* (London, 2011), pp. 412-418.

²³ B. Davidson, *Special Operations Europe: Scenes from the Anti-Nazi War* (London, 1980), pp. 88-89. For a broader perspective of British intelligence activities in the region, see: A. Ogden, *Through Hitler's Back Door: SOE Operations in Hungary, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria 1939-45* (London, 2010).

²⁴ B. Davidson, *Special Operations Europe*, pp. 54-60. Davidson's failure made London sceptical about the possibilities of carrying out subversive actions in Hungary, and organizing operations in Hungary were halted. When the question was discussed in the Foreign Office, Cadogan noted that the Cabinet only approved actions in Regensburg, Vienna, Bratislava and the Romanian section of the Danube: TNA, FO 371/24984, R 6415/195/37, minute by Cadogan, 7 June 1940.

²⁵ For Anglo-Hungarian secret negotiations in 1943 about the surrender of Hungary, see: Juhász, *Brit-magyar titkos tárgyalások 1943-ban*, pp. 29-41; 51-65.

²⁶ L.-L. Veress, *Clear the Line, Hungary's Struggle to Leave the Axis during the Second World War* (Cleveland, 1995), p. 97.

II.

The circular telegram, informing the British representatives in the region about the shift in Balkan policy, and crucially of a changed policy towards the Soviet Union, had critical implications for British policy towards the small nations of Central Europe. British policy towards the Soviet Union in the summer of 1940 encapsulates the controversies of British policy towards Central Europe and Hungary. Over the summer of 1940 Britain aimed to prevent a close German-Soviet cooperation and was making efforts to avoid estranging Moscow. This policy was not a new phenomenon. Although Chamberlain, Churchill and Halifax were very suspicious towards the USSR, Moscow was viewed as the smaller evil in the region, and since the Nazi-Soviet Pact, a German-Soviet conflict was expected over controlling Central Europe and the Balkans in particular. Sir Stafford Cripps, a staunch advocate of the Soviet Union was appointed as ambassador in Moscow in May 1940 with the intention of facilitating an understanding between London and the Soviet regime. He was allowed greater latitude than that of a regular ambassador and was given the instruction to approach Anglo-Soviet relationship from the general standpoint of European equilibrium.²⁷ Cripps recommended that for cooperation against Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union should be granted greater influence in the Balkans and the Baltic. His recommendations were received with scepticism in the Foreign Office,²⁸ but Churchill and Halifax disagreed with the Foreign Office and assured Moscow that Britain might accept Soviet annexations in Poland, Romania and the Baltic for a closer cooperation.²⁹

The Soviet ultimatum to Bucharest on 26 June, which demanded the return of Bessarabia, along with Northern Bukovina, prompted perplexity in the Cabinet. Halifax expressed his hope that the Soviet step would lead to conflict between the two

²⁷ TNA, FO 371/ 24849, N 5729, 18 June 1940, minute by Sargent; Gorodetsky, *Stafford Cripps' Mission to Moscow*, pp. 33, 44.

²⁸ Halifax viewed Soviet expansion in the Balkans as a threat, and viewed it as a continuation of Tsarist designs for the Straits: TNA, FO 837/1127, exchange of notes between Hugh Dalton and Halifax, 24, 26 June 1940.

²⁹ CAB 66/9, W.P. 254 (40), 14 July 1940; TNA, FO 371/24902, R 7463/4156/67, minute by Halifax, 5 September 1940; H. Hanak, 'Sir Stafford Cripps as British Ambassador in Moscow May 1940 to June 1941', *The English Historical Review* 370 (1979), pp. 64-66; Romsics, 'A brit külpolitika és a „magyar kérdés”', p. 117.

dictators.³⁰ Similarly to the British reaction to the Soviet occupation of Eastern Poland in September 1939, any suggestions of sending a warning to Moscow were ruled out and London adopted a reserved attitude on the question, in effect *de facto* recognising this frontier change.³¹ Moreover, Churchill, in a personal letter to Stalin, suggested the continuation of negotiations between London and Moscow, a move, which suggested that London might turn a blind eye towards Soviet territorial expansion in Romania.³²

It also seems useful to briefly juxtapose the British reaction to the Soviet aggression against Bessarabia with that against the Baltic States, as they contrast considerably. Although covertly, Britain had harboured and aided the transport of volunteers to Finland, to fight the Soviet Union in the 'Winter War'. More crucially, the British Cabinet and the Foreign Office expressed their sharp disapproval of the Soviet penetration into Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania during the summer of 1940. Moscow's control over the Baltic was viewed as a sign of Soviet naval penetration, in possible cooperation with Germany, towards the North Sea.³³ This comparison demonstrates that naval threats triggered fierce protests in London, even though the protection of the Baltic States was impossible at the time. On the other hand, as long as the Soviet Union was satisfied with Bessarabia in the Balkans, and did not go beyond its original demand, escalating the relationship with Moscow with a warning was ruled out.

On the other hand it is crucial to point out that compared to the British sympathies towards the ethnographic frontier between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, created by the Soviet occupation of Eastern Poland in 1939, the Soviet takeover of Bessarabia could not be justified ethnographically.³⁴ The Soviet occupation re-established the historical frontier between Romania and the 'Russian Empire'. The fact that Whitehall supported the alteration of frontiers in Bessarabia, which could not be justified ethnically, refutes our earlier hypothesis, which, using the example of the

³⁰ Halifax admitted that he had little news about the situation in Romania beyond what had appeared in the newspapers: TNA, CAB 65/7 War Cabinet 185 (40), 28 June 1940; 187 (40), 29 June 1940. Hanak, 'Sir Stafford Cripps', pp. 56, 64.

³¹ TNA, FO 371/24844 N 5853, minute by Sargent, 28 June 1940.

³² The letter was written immediately after receiving the news of the Soviet ultimatum to Romania: J. Lukacs, *The Duel: The Eighty-Day Struggle Between Churchill and Hitler* (New Haven, 2001), pp. 229-230.

³³ Child, British policy towards the Soviet Union, 1939-42, with special reference to the Baltic States, pp. 120-122; Hanak, 'Sir Stafford Cripps', pp. 52-54; E. Bojtár, *Európa megrablása. A balti államok bekebelezésének története dokumentumok tükrében, 1939-1989* (Budapest, 1989), pp. 5-12.

³⁴ According to the 1930 Romanian census, Bessarabia had an absolute Romanian-Moldavian majority (56 percent).

positive British opinion of the ethnographic frontier of the Soviet Union in occupied Poland claimed that London contemplated redrawing of the future regional frontiers on an ethnographic basis. The problem has very important Hungarian implications. The Soviet aggression reinvigorated Hungarian territorial claims in Romania. Budapest, similarly to Moscow, attempted to re-establish the historic frontier between Hungary and Romania along the crest of the Carpathians, which was not supported by London. The next section will analyse the renewed Hungarian territorial claims on Romania in July in greater depth; therefore here we will limit our attention to establishing whether there was a Hungarian angle in the British policy over Bessarabia.

One of the reasons for the reserved British attitude towards the Soviet aggression against Romania was the supposition that if London told Bucharest to yield to Soviet demands, it would prompt Budapest to immediately come forward with their set of territorial claims. We have noted that Hungarian territorial claims were viewed as German tools to dismember Romania, which was seen as the first step of German penetration towards the Straits in Whitehall. The British will to avoid this scenario seems to contradict our earlier argument, which suggested that extending the war to the Balkans became the new British strategy after the collapse of France. Looking at the formulation of British policy on this particular question demonstrates one of the crucial problems surrounding the analysis of British foreign policy. The separate analysis of these two seemingly contradictory policies would lead to inaccurate assumptions. This realization points to the pitfalls of looking at British policy towards a country in isolation and highlights the necessity of analysing the bigger picture of British regional policy. The contradiction of aiming to bring the war to the Balkans, while making efforts to prevent the disintegration of Romania can be used to highlight that formulating policy was at an intermediate stage.

This stage of discussions brought unusual propositions forward. Orme Sargent in the Southern department suggested a radically different approach to Hungarian revisionism. For strategic consideration, he proposed that Britain should support Hungarian territorial claims in Romania and Yugoslavia, because Hungarian expansion could potentially set the region alight, because both Belgrade and Bucharest pledge

active military help to each other in the event of Hungarian aggression.³⁵ Supporting Hungarian territorial claims for immediate strategic interest was a new approach. However, it has to be stressed that Sargent only proposed supporting Hungarian territorial claims to gain strategic advantages for Britain; the primary strategic aim was to cause trouble for the Axis. His proposition was unanimously rejected by the Foreign Office due to the fact that Sir Ronald Campbell, the British minister to Belgrade, reported that the Yugoslavs were also going out of their way to accommodate the Axis.³⁶

³⁵ TNA, FO 371/24890, R 6689/5/67, minute by Sargent, 3 July 1940.

³⁶ TNA, FO 434/8, R 7164/415/92, Campbell (Belgrade) to Halifax, 16 July 1940; R 7069/89/92, Campbell to Halifax, 13 August 1940.

III.

In July British policy towards the region was evidently in the process of transformation. Hungary and Romania now entirely disappeared from memoranda discussing British Balkan strategy, which demonstrate that they lost all strategic significance after the French defeat. Since strategic interests did not play any prominence, it will be crucial to identify what set of criteria were used in the consequent judgement of Hungary and Romania.

Looking at the Czechoslovak angle of the Anglo-Hungarian relationship after the collapse of France provides some answers to this question. Hungarian historiography has failed to recognise that until the `droit` the Czech émigré question in London had a Hungarian angle, and London was reluctant to decide between Prague and Budapest.³⁷ In early July however, at the recommendation of Halifax, the Cabinet decided to recognise the Czecho-Slovak National Committee as the provisional government of the Czecho-Slovak peoples.³⁸ The reasons for the decision were both strategic and political. As a result of the defeat of France and Hungary's openly pro-German policy, Halifax stressed that the opinions of Paris and Budapest could now be ignored.³⁹ Concerns were also expressed that German successes might turn the Czechs and Slovaks towards Berlin, and in desperate need for allies Britain felt it essential to officially recognise the Czecho-Slovak National Committee.⁴⁰ Despite the recognition, London still explicitly refused to commit to the future frontiers of the Czecho-Slovak state, but compared to late 1939, this now did not have any Hungarian dimension.⁴¹

The recognition of the Czech émigrés brought the disagreement between the Foreign Office and O'Malley to the surface, which eventually clarified where London

³⁷ Bán, *British-Hungarian Diplomacy, 1938-41*, p. 105.

³⁸ TNA, FO 417/42, C 7646/2/12, 'The Recognition of the Czecho-Slovak National Committee', 1 July 1940; J. W. Brugel, 'The recognition of the Czechoslovak government in London', *Journal of Czechoslovak and Central European Studies*, 1983/2., pp. 1-15; Smetana, *In the Shadow of Munich*, pp. 208-214.

³⁹ Smetana, *In the Shadow of Munich*, pp. 179-183.

⁴⁰ TNA, CAB 67/7/18, 'Recognition of the Czecho-Slovak National Committee', 1 July 1940; Macartney, *October Fifteenth*, p. 424.

⁴¹ It seems important to point out that as a consequence of the recognition of the Czecho-Slovak Committee, Csáky had seriously contemplated demonstratively sending Barcza on a leave, or even breaking diplomatic relations with London; see: DIMK V, 214: Barcza to Csáky, 23 July 1940.

stood on the question of frontier revision. Earlier in February Sargent had noted his dissatisfaction over O'Malley's pro-Hungarian inclination and minuted that '[...] the Hungarians have an eloquent advocate in the person of His Majesty's representative'.⁴² Later in July Sargent was particularly annoyed over O'Malley's recommendation to reverse British policy on Hungarian territorial claims, and to support the Carpathian frontier.⁴³ Due to O'Malley's pro-Hungarian views on frontier revision, and perhaps to avoid unnecessary protests, the Foreign Office deliberately failed to inform him that the Czech émigrés would receive recognition. O'Malley, on receiving the news felt let down and deprived of any opportunities to sooth Hungarian anxieties or to influence Hungarian foreign policy.⁴⁴ One of the most significant results to emerge from the spat between the Foreign Office and O'Malley was that during the ensuing discussion, the Foreign Office categorically asserted that the Hungarian decision to grant military passage to Germany in April crucially influenced the decision to recognise the Czecho-Slovak Committee as a provisional government.⁴⁵ The recognition had not immediately brought discussions forward about the future of the First Vienna Award and Ruthenia between Whitehall and Beneš, but as we will see, it had a crucial impact on the future of Hungary's territorial gains in Czechoslovakia.

The Czech question also brought discussions forward on the issue of the Hungarian-Romanian territorial dispute. Opinions demonstrated that apart from singling out the Czech view point, the Foreign Office also drifted towards favouring the Romanian opinion as a result of the Hungarian 'droit'. In the Central department Frank Roberts now stressed that:

Nothing can be hoped from Hungary in this war, but [...] Romania [...] might change government, so we are supporting them.⁴⁶

The fact that Romania renounced the British guarantee on 1 July, and officially declared that in the future it would exclusively follow Axis policy, makes Roberts' remark

⁴² Barker, *British policy towards South-East Europe*, p. 62.

⁴³ TNA, FO 371/24890, R 6689/5/67, minute by Sargent, 3 July 1940. Barker, *British policy towards South-East Europe*, p. 64. The Cabinet ignored O'Malley's propositions and instructed him according to the decisions of 13 June, which stressed that the situation should be used to carry out acts of sabotage in the region.

⁴⁴ TNA, FO 371/24428, C 8204/529/21, O'Malley to Halifax, 7 August 1940.

⁴⁵ TNA, FO 371/24428, C 8204/529/21, minute by Roberts, 10 August 1940.

⁴⁶ TNA, FO 371/ 24428, C 8204/529/21, minute by Roberts, 10 August 1940.

exceptionally curious. Sir Reginald Hoare, the British minister in Bucharest felt disgusted at the Romanian *volte face* and recommended radically rethinking British policy towards Bucharest. His anxiety fell on deaf ears in London.⁴⁷ The most influential members of the Foreign Office - Halifax, Cadogan, Sargent, Roberts and Nichols - were all convinced that even though Romania should now be considered as territory under enemy control, this could not be officially declared for a number of reasons. Hoare was instructed that due to British investments in the Romanian oil industry and Danubian shipping, the relationship had to be officially maintained.⁴⁸

What is also significant to add is that the Foreign Office drew distinctions between the behaviour of the Hungarian and Romanian nations. The assumption that the Romanian nation was more sympathetic towards the Allied cause became one of the key elements in the formulation of British policy over the Hungarian-Romanian territorial question after Romania turned its back on Britain. As Roberts' comment shows, the Foreign Office was convinced that the Romanian people had genuine pro-Western feelings, and expected them to overthrow their pro-Axis government.

This notion crucially separated the orientation of the Romanian people from the mistakes of the current pro-German Romanian government, which resulted in giving a blind eye to the renunciation of the British guarantee. Besides, based on the reports of Hugh Seton-Watson, who at this time worked at the British legation in Bucharest, London put exceptionally high hopes on the ability of Iuliu Maniu, the leader of the National Peasant Party (PNȚ), and earlier Prime Minister of Romania (1928-1933), to resist German and Hungarian territorial claims.⁴⁹ On the other hand London ignored supporting the democratic Hungarian opposition, and neglected the pro-British persuasion of the Hungarian middle classes.⁵⁰ The question inevitably arises, why the

⁴⁷ TNA, FO 371/ 24988, R 6681/392/37, Hoare to Halifax, 1, 2 July 1940.

⁴⁸ The Goeland Transport and Trading Company Ltd., owned by the British government, was formed in Romania in 1940 to purchase, charter and operate vessels on the Danube, in order to hamper Germany transporting Romanian oil. Halifax believed that the Anglo-Romanian diplomatic relationship had to be maintained until its operations had not been liquidated. For the activities of the Goeland in 1940, see TNA, MT 71, 72, 73.; TNA, FO 434/8, R 6681/392/37, R 6696/392/37, Halifax to Hoare, 7 July 1940.

⁴⁹ TNA, FO 434/8, R 7352/475/37, Hugh Seton-Watson, Memorandum on Romania, 22 July 1940; R 6822/1073/37, Hankey (Bucharest) to Halifax, 26 July 1940; Quinlan, *Clash over Romania*, p. 64; Barker, *British policy towards South-East Europe*, p. 73.

⁵⁰ Barker, *British policy towards South-East Europe*, p. 9. The Hungarian anti-fascist movement became active after 1941; therefore their contacts with London fall outside of the scope of this thesis. Even then they failed to make an impact on British policy. What needs emphasis is that the active members of

pro-British segments of the Hungarian elite and the Hungarian masses were considered less 'revolutionary' than the Romanian? The answer seems to lie in the contrast between the diplomatic reports coming from Belgrade, Bucharest and Budapest. Outlining the attitude of Central European nations towards Britain had always been the key element of British diplomatic reports. Before the French defeat, representatives of Britain unanimously reported the strong belief of Central European nations in the ultimate victory of Britain. After the French surrender, O'Malley recounted the disillusionment of the Hungarian public in British strength.⁵¹ On the other hand, Hoare reported a continuous disposition towards Britain among the Romanian public throughout 1940.⁵²

There is a more speculative answer, which draws upon deep-seated perceptions and prejudices of British policy-makers. It uses the assumption that the long established British perceptions viewed Hungary, the Hungarian elite and the Hungarian political and social system negatively. Sylvia Stevenson, an English journalist, who travelled through Northern Hungary and Ruthenia on horseback in 1938, recounted that the English perceived the Hungarian elite as feudal, autarchic and harsh on their peasants and minorities.⁵³ The *Magyarization* of the late dualist era, the undemocratic character and backwardness of the Hungarian society, the lack of land reform was indeed held against Budapest in the Foreign Office when the question of the reconstruction of Central Europe was discussed.⁵⁴ These questions were also raised by historians, such as Macartney and Seton-Watson, who, although having very different views on the

these groups in the West, such as Tibor Eckhardt, were viewed as connected to the Hungarian ruling elite to an unacceptable extent, which eventually ruled out British support. Eckhardt's views on revision were viewed as too radical. His memorandum on the 'Danube Valley Question' was ignored and shelved by Sargent and Rex Leeper, the head of the PID: TNA, FO 898/217, Bruce Lockhart to Leeper, 16 April 1940. See also: G. Bátonyi, 'Magyarország világháborús részvétele brit szemszögből', p. 64. London, as we have noted, was more sympathetic towards Count Mihály Károlyi, the prime minister of Hungary in 1919, who lived in exile in Britain. He was significantly less radical on the question of revision, but in 1940 was still reluctant to lead the anti-fascist Hungarian emigration in Britain. He would be more prominent in 1941.

⁵¹ TNA, FO 417/42, C 8209/529/21, O'Malley to Halifax, 7 August 1940.

⁵² TNA, FO 371/24984, R 3820/195/37; Hoare to Halifax, 23 March 1940; FO 434/8, R 6681/392/37, Hoare to Halifax, 22 July 1940.

⁵³ Stevenson, *Ride to Battle*, p. 5.

⁵⁴ This view was expressed as early as October 1938 in the Foreign Office: TNA, FO 371/21571, C 12378/2319/12, Stevenson, Sub-Carpathian Russia, 10 October 1938; minute by Speaight 9 October 1938; minute by Mallet, 11 October 1938; minute by Cadogan 17 October 1938; FO 371/21573, C13549/2319/12, minute by Mallet, 10 November 1938.

question of frontier revision, agreed that after the war Hungary would need to undergo extensive democratization.⁵⁵

The perception that the Hungarian people was less enthusiastic towards the Allied cause, and the Hungarian opposition less powerful to overthrow the government than the Romanian, became recurrent when Whitehall formulated an opinion about the Hungarian-Romanian territorial dispute in July, and became the basis of the condemnation of the Second Vienna Award later in August.

⁵⁵ PCAM, MSS. Eng. c. 3287, Doc 2, Macartney: Report on Hungary, March 1940, (fols 3-125), 4-5, 12; R. W. Seton Watson, 'The Era of Reform in Hungary', *Slavonic and East European Review* (American Series) 10 (1943), pp. 145-166.

5. 3 Hungarian territorial claims (July-August 1940)

I.

Since the outbreak of the war, Hungary had been keen to bring the question of Transylvania to a head. The suddenness of the Allied collapse convinced Teleki that the war was approaching its end and he was desperately looking for an opportunity to recover Transylvania.⁵⁶ Based on the experiences of the chaotic climax of the First World War, when the Romanian occupation of Transylvania was accepted by Britain and France as a *fait accompli*, Teleki was now eager to regain the province before the end of the war.⁵⁷ He was certain that London would be preoccupied with more important questions at the future peace conference and would simply acknowledge the reincorporation of Transylvania into Hungary. Moreover, both Teleki and Csáky assumed that London would not raise its voice against the Hungarian occupation, due to Romania's *volte face*.⁵⁸ Barcza, who earlier was convinced of Britain's ultimate victory, was now also shaken in his views as a consequence of the swift German victory. He made the surprising remark in his diary that Transylvania had to be occupied immediately, even considering the threat of disruption of diplomatic relations with London.⁵⁹

At the end of 1939 Hungary had promised not to stab Romania in the back, if it had to defend itself against the Soviet Union. On the other hand Barcza was instructed to forewarn London that Hungary would not tolerate discrimination, and the free surrender of Romanian territory to the Soviet Union would encourage Hungary to demand Transylvania.⁶⁰ When Romania handed Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to the Soviet Union on 28 June, Budapest immediately presented its claims, and ordered

⁵⁶ After the Soviet occupation of Bessarabia Teleki sent various questionnaires to Mussolini sounding out Italy's response to a Hungarian action against Romania. Mussolini on all occasions called for patience: A *Palazzo Chigi és Magyarország*, 615: Talamo to Ciano, 28 June 1940; 633: Teleki to Mussolini, 3 July 1940; 672: Teleki to Mussolini 3 August 1940. See also: Gy. Réti, 'Teleki Pál 1940 augusztus 3-i levele és emlékeztetője Benito Mussolininek', *Századok* 231 (1999), pp. 828-841.

⁵⁷ Juhász, *Magyarország külpolitikája*, pp. 234-235; Ablonczy, *Pál Teleki*, pp. 93, 106-107, 169.

⁵⁸ DIMK V, 189: Barcza to Csáky, 11 July 1940.

⁵⁹ HIA, Barcza, Diaries, 29 July, 5 September 1940, Box 0010; compare to Barcza's memoirs, where he discussed frontier revision more sceptically: Barcza, *Diplomataemlékeim*, vol. 1, pp. 393-394.

⁶⁰ Macartney, *October Fifteenth*, p. 405.

full mobilization.⁶¹ In the past, Berlin had vetoed any Hungarian actions in Transylvania. Now, Otto von Ermsdorff, the German minister in Budapest, although assuring that Hungarian territorial claims were supported, warned against escalating the situation.⁶²

The Foreign Office judged that due to the German-Italian veto on Hungarian action, the problem would not escalate into an open conflict. Hence, London showed limited interest towards the problem in the first half of July. On the day of the Soviet occupation of Bessarabia, O'Malley advised that allowing Hungary to declare war on Romania would serve British interests, as it would lead to the Hungarian occupation of the crest of the Carpathians, which could check Soviet expansion towards the Straits.⁶³ Halifax dismissed this proposition on the basis that Germany had already declared that a Hungarian occupation would not be allowed.⁶⁴

What is instantly apparent from the diplomatic reports coming from Bucharest is that the Transylvanian question was the least of British worries among the plethora of problems Romania presented. London's paramount concern was the fate of British investments in Romanian shipment and oil companies and the treatment of British subjects in the country, now that Romania was on the verge of adhering to the Axis.⁶⁵ These predicaments were all rooted in the U-turn of Romanian foreign policy, and Hungarian territorial claims in Transylvania, either supported or discouraged by London, seemed to have no effect on these questions. However, it would be a mistake to interpret the initial British disinterest towards the Hungarian claims as British detachment from the Hungarian-Romanian dispute, as the later German attention in August sparked intense British interest. It will be crucial to identify why London became suddenly interested in the question and whether this had any implications for British perceptions of the post-war reconstruction of the region and the redrawing of the Hungarian-Romanian frontier in particular.

⁶¹ Juhász, *Magyarország külpolitikája*, pp. 234-235; DIMK V, 135: Csáky's circular telegram to all Hungarian legations, 30 June 1940. The renewed territorial claims were the reiteration of the demands of Teleki's February memorandum, which claimed two-thirds of Transylvania: Balogh, *A magyar-román kapcsolatok*, p. 63.

⁶² *A Wilhelmstrasse és Magyarország*, 329: Ermsdorff to Ribbentrop, 27 June 1940; 332: Ermsdorff to Ribbentrop, 2 July 1940.

⁶³ TNA, FO 434/8, R 6667/246/37, O'Malley to Halifax, 28 June 1940.

⁶⁴ TNA, FO 434/8, R 6733/5/67, Halifax to O'Malley, 11 July 1940.

⁶⁵ TNA, FO 371/24988, R 6681/392/37, Hoare to Halifax, 4 July 1940; Halifax to Hoare 7 July 1940.

It deserves to be highlighted too that in July British opinion of the Transylvanian problem was mainly formulated in diplomatic reports from Bucharest. As noted, O'Malley's judgement on the question was not trusted, as he was viewed to be under the influence of the Hungarian elite. The recommendations of Hoare on the other hand constantly reappeared during discussions in the Foreign Office. Regarding the Hungarian-Romanian quarrel, Hoare projected the image of a tolerant Romania, which in the previous 20 years was following a patient minority policy. On the other hand he described Hungary as a country which had been refusing every sensible compromise by insisting on highly inflated territorial demands.⁶⁶

It is clear that the superabundance of Hungarian and Romanian propaganda material, which attempted to influence policy-makers in London on the Transylvanian problem, largely missed their target.⁶⁷ Interestingly enough, out of the vast number of pamphlets and other materials, only Marcu Beza's study on Bessarabia and Transylvania was used as a reference point by Foreign Office officials during July and August 1940.⁶⁸ Beza's pamphlet attempted to refute the Hungarian historic claims to the province by arguing for the Daco-Roman continuity theory, which emphasized that Romanians were the direct descendants of Dacia from the Roman times, and indeed had been living in Transylvania before the Magyars arrived.⁶⁹ Beza also emphasized Transylvania's Romanian cultural and ethnographic character based on the fact that the majority of the peasant population were Romanian.

⁶⁶ TNA, FO 434/8, R 6871/195/37, Hoare to Halifax, 31 July 1940.

⁶⁷ Hungarian and Romanian propaganda in the 1930s and 1940s towards Britain regarding the Transylvanian question has been analysed by Case: *Between two states, the Transylvania question*, pp. 40-49.

⁶⁸ TNA, FO 371/24984, R 6731/195/37, Marcu Beza, *Bessarabia and Transylvania. An Explanation with 5 Maps* (London, 1940).

⁶⁹ The question of Daco-Roman continuity is still contested by historians. For the modern Romanian perspective, see: L. Boia, *History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness* (London, 2001), pp. 47, 113-114. For the modern Hungarian view, see: I. Bóna, 'From Dacia to Transylvania: The Period of the Great Migrations (271-895) and The Hungarian-Slav Period (895-1172)' in *History of Transylvania*, ed. by I. Bóna (Budapest, 1994), pp. 62-177.

II.

British opinion worked within these limitations, until Germany decided to intervene in the dispute. In mid-July a Hungarian, and later a Romanian delegation was invited to Germany for discussions. The German diplomatic intervention suggested that the dispute would eventually lead to German dictated frontier change between Hungary and Romania. Britain paid attention to the question in order to limit the advantages Berlin hoped to gain by solving the quarrel. London predicted that a German involvement would end in a frontier revision in favour of Hungary, which was viewed as a threat to Romania.⁷⁰

In the Foreign Office very few had questioned that Romania should be encouraged to resist Hungarian claims. Austin Haigh, the liaison officer between the News and Central departments recommended that now that Romania was lost, Britain should gain credit in Hungary by supporting their claims.⁷¹ Haigh's proposition was swept aside and it was firmly expressed that Britain had no interest in playing second fiddle to Germany as a mediator.⁷² The Foreign Office viewed the question more as a minority problem than a territorial one, and adopted Hoare's recommendations that the transfer of Magyars from Romania and Romanians from Hungary would put an end to the dispute.⁷³ The Romanian declaration that ceding Romanians to Hungary would not be accepted resonated with British preferences for solving territorial disputes with minority transfers. Consequently, discussion about transferring territory to Hungary worked in the context of minority transfer which was considered in order to accommodate the substantially larger number of Magyars, who might be transferred in the process. Robin Hankey, the first secretary of the British legation in Bucharest, suggested that Romania would agree to the cession of territories west of the Arad-Máramarossziget [Sighet] line to Hungary (map 5.1a, 5.1b), if this could involve transferring the entire Magyar minority of Romania to this area. The Foreign Office had

⁷⁰ Budapest, as always, left the extent of its claims in a very vague form. Therefore it was difficult to judge the extent of Hungarian claims in London. It was estimated that Teleki's memorandum on Hungary's official claims, written in February, formed the basis of the fresh set of Hungarian claims.

⁷¹ TNA, FO 371/24984, R 6871/195/37, minute by R. J. Bowker (Eastern Department), 30 July 1940.

⁷² TNA, FO 371/24984, R 7003/246/37, minute by D. M. Ross, 14 August 1940.

⁷³ TNA, FO 371/24984, R 6871/195/37, minute by Nichols, 6 August 1940.

already proposed a similar solution in January 1940, which, as we have seen, was rejected by Budapest. Nichols claimed that the Arad-Máramarossziget [Sighet] frontier would still be an acceptable compromise for London, but pointed out that the Hungarians, as in January, would not be satisfied with such a small territorial gain.⁷⁴

As we have noted, Macartney had studied the question of population transfer in the FRPS from early 1940. Contrary to the Foreign Office opinion he recommended that only equal number of minorities should be involved in a population exchange.⁷⁵ The historian, J. D. Mabbott had also examined the question of population transfer in the FRPS in May 1940. He suggested that the Hungarian-Slovak frontier should be drawn in a way to balance the number of minorities on each side, which would allow a possible exchange of population. The question of the Hungarian-Romanian frontier was more complex, and here Mabbott recommended three alternatives (map 5.2). The first possibility was to transfer the district lying adjacent to Hungary, because here Magyars comprised of over 80 percent of the population. As a second option Mabbott recommended the transfer of a wider strip of territory to Hungary along the existing frontier. This was very similar to the January 1940 recommendation of the Foreign Office. Interestingly, the third recommendation suggested a frontier very similar to the Second Vienna Award line, drawn by Hitler later at the end of August 1940.⁷⁶

As Keyserling have pointed out, there is no evidence that these memoranda reached the Foreign Office in mid-1940, and Whitehall formulated its opinions on Hungary's territorial claims on Romania in the summer of 1940 on very different criteria.⁷⁷ As the discussion reached the top of the Foreign Office hierarchy, the opinion became more negative towards Hungary. Sargent, known for his anti-Hungarian rants, stressed that Hungary could serve no British purpose in the war. Besides, Halifax,

⁷⁴ TNA, FO 371/24984, R 6871/195/37, minutes by E. M. Rose and Nichols, 2 August 1940; FO 371/24985, R 6897/246/37, minute by Nichols, 2 August 1940.

⁷⁵ PCAM, MSS. ENG. c. 3281, Box 2, doc. 22, folios 169-183, Transfer of Population, April 1940. Keyserling, 'Arnold Toynbee's Foreign Research and Press Service', p. 546.

⁷⁶ SEW 13/1, J. D. Mabbott, 'The Transfer of Minorities', 14 May 1940. Mabbott also referred to the question of the Hungarian-Austrian frontier, which he recommended to leave unchanged. Since the Anschluss, Whitehall dedicated minimal attention to this frontier, because Berlin declared it final in March 1938, and it was presumed that Hungary would not contest it. 1942 witnessed the appearance of a number of memoranda in the FRPS dealing with Austria. These recommended the restoration of Austrian independence and the retention of the current Hungarian-Austrian frontier: PCAM, MSS. ENG. C. 3286, doc. 6, 'Austria and the South-East European Question (British attitude)', 20 February 1942; doc. 9, 'Frontiers of Austria and Hungary', 17 February 1943.

⁷⁷ Keyserling, 'Arnold Toynbee's Foreign Research and Press Service', p. 546.

Sargent and Cadogan all emphasized that Romania should be encouraged to resist Hungarian territorial claims, as they were convinced that it could stimulate Romania to return to the Allied camp.⁷⁸ Accordingly, Hoare was instructed to encourage Bucharest to resist Hungarian claims.⁷⁹ As always, Cadogan hit a completely different tone with Barcza during their conversations on the 16 July. He thanked Barcza for the sincere attitude of the Hungarians, and noted his devastating opinion of Romania after it openly started following the policy of the Axis.⁸⁰ In fact Cadogan wanted to maintain friendly relations with Hungary and said what Barcza wanted to hear. This disingenuousness eventually fuelled the Hungarian perception that the Romanian *volte face* had morally elevated Hungary in British eyes. The minutes of the Foreign Office clearly demonstrate that such a shift did not occur and the notion that the Romanian nation was more likely to turn against the present pro-German regime than the Hungarian continued to determine British thought.

The comparison of the British reaction to Hungarian and Bulgarian claims in Romania over the summer of 1940 puts Hungarian revisionism in a regional context and illustrate the differences of how London contemplated solving different territorial disputes in the region and answers questions such as why different territorial claims were viewed differently in London. Sofia's claims on Southern Dobruja (map 5.3) had a distinctively different reception in London, compared to the ones presented by Budapest, due to Bulgaria's strategically important position. The Southern Dobruja dispute was the only regional territorial dispute during the Second World War which the Foreign Office actively encouraged to be solved on a revisionist basis.

The U-turn of Romania brought the German threat closer to the Straits. Bulgaria had not yet followed an openly pro-German policy, therefore supporting its claims for Southern Dobruja served the strategic aim of keeping a foothold in the Balkans.⁸¹ The

⁷⁸ TNA, FO 371/ 24985, R 6897/246/37, minutes by Sargent, 3, 10 August 1940; minute by Halifax, 10 August 1940.

⁷⁹ TNA, FO 371/ 24985, R 6897/246/37, Halifax to Hoare, 6 August 1940.

⁸⁰ HIA, Barcza, Diaries, 16 July 1940, Box 0010.

⁸¹ British reaction to the Southern Dobruja claim offers a wide gap in the research of British Balkan and Mediterranean policy. Stoyan Rachev's comprehensive study of the Anglo-Bulgarian relationship in the war provides very little detail, and Elisabeth Barker is similarly restrained on the question: S. Ratchev, *Anglo-Bulgarian relations During the Second World War (1939-1944)* (Sofia, 1981), pp. 28-29, 36; Barker, *British policy towards South-East Europe*, pp. 57-58. For Bulgaria's struggle for neutrality between Britain, Germany and the Soviet Union see: V. Dimitrov, 'Bulgarian Neutrality: Domestic and

radical change in Romanian policy also crucially shifted British attitudes towards a closer cooperation with Bulgaria. Halifax informed George Rendel, the British minister in Bulgaria, that due to the drastic alteration of Romania's attitude towards the Allies Bulgaria's immediate interests in Southern Dobruja were now fully supported.⁸² Halifax and the Foreign Office articulated that it was desirable to solve this question before Germany awarded the region to Bulgaria, in order to gain credit in Sofia for the Allied cause.⁸³ In contrast, Hungarian demands in Transylvania were not supported, as it lacked strategic implications for Britain.

Halifax also began to feel that British support for Bulgaria offered even more strategic potential. Based on the notion of the long outdated Balkan neutral bloc, he drafted a scheme which outlined the cooperation of Romania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria in order to check German penetration towards the Straits. The project was relying on too many 'ifs', notably, the moral and material support of the Soviet Union and the participation of Romania, which was already Germany's ally.⁸⁴ We could quickly disregard the project as an example of Halifax's self-deception and wishful thinking, if it had not had a crucial Hungarian angle. Halifax firmly believed that the Transylvanian movement, which was forming under the leadership of Iuliu Maniu's Nationalist Party, could successfully resist Hungarian territorial demands, if it received British support. Consequently, argued Halifax, this would allow Romania to return to the Allied camp.⁸⁵

The strategic implication of Southern Dobruja was evidently the primary concern of Whitehall and the ethnographic and minority angles were hardly mentioned. The fact that Bulgaria's claim was ethnically justifiable, while the Hungarian was not, certainly legitimized British official support, but the evidence demonstrates that this was not the decisive criterion.⁸⁶ Comparison on this basis demonstrates the reasons behind British discouragement of Hungarian designs on Transylvania. We have

International Perspectives' in *European Neutrals and Non-Belligerents during the Second World War*, ed. by N. Wylie, (Cambridge, 2010), pp. 192-216.

⁸² TNA, FO 434/8, R 6775/320/7, Halifax to Rendel, 16 July 1940.

⁸³ TNA, FO 434/8, R 6733/5/67, Halifax to Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen (Ankara), 13 July 1940.

⁸⁴ TNA, FO 434/8, R 6879/624/7, Halifax to Knatchbull-Hugessen, 12 July 1940.

⁸⁵ We do not know much about the extent of British support to Maniu's movement. After the Second Vienna Award London expressed criticism of Maniu for failing to organise widespread resistance.

⁸⁶ According to the 1930 Romanian census the region had a 37 percent relative Bulgarian majority, while Romanians only comprised 20 percent of the population: S. Mănuilă, *La Population de la Dobroudja* (Bucarest: Institut Central de Statistique 1939), pp. 146-147.

established that the British disapproval had a complex background, and the primary reason was not London's preoccupation with the Battle of Britain, as Hungarian historiography has suggested.⁸⁷

Events followed each other in rapid succession and by the time the quarreling parties were forced by Berlin to the negotiating table at Turnu Severin, it was too late for London to influence the events or to actively support Romania in any form. Outwardly, Cadogan assured Barcza that London would accept any peaceful solution, reached by the equal consent of Budapest and Bucharest, but in the background, Bucharest was encouraged to resist Hungarian claims.⁸⁸

⁸⁷ Bán, *British-Hungarian Diplomacy, 1938-41*, p. 104.

⁸⁸ HIA, Barcza, Diaries, 21 August 1940, Box 0010; DIMK V, 149: Barcza to Csáky, 2 July 1940; 189: Barcza to Csáky, 11 July 1940; 298: Barcza to Csáky, 17 August 1940.

III.

British wartime propaganda towards Hungary and Romania gives a different perspective of British policy towards the region. Propaganda broadcasts to Hungary and Romania had started immediately after the outbreak of the war.⁸⁹ The comparison of the aims, tools and arguments of the Hungarian and Romanian broadcasts in July and August reflects London's actual aims and priorities over the Transylvania dispute. We will see they are in direct contrast with officially articulated British opinion, especially concerning Hungary.

Paradoxically, a new and increasing campaign was initiated in the summer of 1940, at the time when British influence was seemingly decreasing in the region. The broadcast service of the BBC towards Central Europe and the Balkans is an intriguingly under-researched area.⁹⁰ The sudden increase of British propaganda activity towards Hungary and Romania in itself contests the commonly accepted historiographical viewpoint that Britain withdrew from the region and detached itself from the maze of regional territorial and minority questions. The initiative of a comprehensive propaganda campaign towards Hungary came from Elisabeth Barker and Sir Ralph Murray.⁹¹ Influenced by the reports of the British writer, Vernon Duckworth Barker, who in the 1920s and 30s had spent several years in Hungary, Barker and Murray were

⁸⁹ A. Briggs, *The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom*, vol. 3 (Oxford, 1970), p. 176. In the Second World War the Hungarian service of the BBC comprised Hungarian news bulletins, broadcasting of talks to Hungary and the supporting of Hungarian clandestine radio services. The most prominent of the latter, Radio Petőfi, started broadcasting in early 1942. It articulated a very violent and often vulgar voice against the Horthy regime. See: TNA, FO 898/58, 59; E. Haraszti-Taylor, 'In Memoriam of Georges Buday and the PWE's Clandestine Hungarian Petőfi Radio' in *Scribble, scribble, scribble - historical essays, documents, reviews and personal reflections on Britain and Hungary*, ed. by E. Haraszti-Taylor (Nottingham, 2001), pp. 123-130.

⁹⁰ Ágnes Beretzky was the first to analyse the propaganda aspect of the BBC Hungarian service. She focused on the talks of Macartney, but overlooked crucial questions, such as why it was believed in London that propaganda talks could turn Hungary towards the Allies: Beretzky, 'C. A. Macartney. A Devoted and Frustrated Friend of Hungary', pp. 237-246.

⁹¹ Elisabeth Barker who later became a distinguished historian of South East Europe, at this time was the news editor of the Overseas Department of the BBC. Ralph Murray was responsible for writing propaganda material towards Germany and occupied Europe in Electra House, which from July 1940 became the propaganda arm of the SOE. For the BBC's Hungarian Service, see: M. Balfour, *Propaganda in War, 1939-1945: Organisations, Policies and Publics in Britain and Germany* (London, 2010), pp. 88-92; Garnett, *The secret history of PWE, 1939-46*, pp. 11, 156-157.

convinced that Hungary could be influenced towards the Allied cause.⁹² They articulated a distinctively different view from the Foreign Office in connection with what policy should be followed towards Hungary. Due to Murray's close working relationship with Ivone Kirkpatrick, an influential member of the Foreign Office and the director of the Foreign Division of the Ministry of Information, a scheme for a new Hungarian 'talk service' was set up in June 1940. These Hungarian talks were broadcasts by Macartney. Macartney's weekly talks commenced on 7 July 1940. Because the BBC believed that Macartney carried influence in Hungary, initially he was free to compile the scripts. During the summer of 1940, there was no particular pressure on Macartney to voice an either pro or anti-Hungarian tone. In July and August Macartney markedly avoided commenting on the Hungarian-Romanian dispute but, hitting a pro-Hungarian tone, conveyed British understanding towards the difficult situation of Hungary and put special attention on convincing his listeners that collaboration with Nazi Germany would lead to losing Hungarian wealth and independence.⁹³

For some time, these Hungarian talks went along with little supervision from the Foreign Office. The Foreign Office on the other hand had taken every opportunity to influence the content of the Hungarian, and particularly the Romanian news bulletins.⁹⁴ The Southern department asserted that the 'threat of another Vienna Award' had to be used to induce Romania to resist.⁹⁵ The Ministry of Information also attempted to influence the BBC to encourage Romanians in its bulletins to resist Hungarian territorial claims.⁹⁶ Consequently, in the Romanian news, negative analogues were made between the earlier revisionist gains of Hungary and the current Hungarian-Romanian quarrel, and Romanians were encouraged to cling to their territorial integrity.

⁹² BBC-WAC, C. A. Macartney, Contributors Talks, file 1, Barker to Macartney, 16 January 1940; Barker to Toynbee, 31 May 1940; E2/ 356, Murray to Kirkpatrick, 27 December 1941. For the reports of Duckworth-Barker from Hungary, see: BBC WAC, E/1 863, E/2 356.

⁹³ BBC WAC, Hungarian Talk Scripts, C. A. Macartney, Hitler's Pamphlets and Salzburg Promises, 4 August 1940; The Battle of Hungary, 15 August 1940; Nazi Propaganda Strategy, 25 August 1940.

⁹⁴ It is very important not to confuse the BBC's regular Hungarian and Romanian news bulletins with talks, such as the ones broadcasted by Macartney.

⁹⁵ TNA, FO 371/24984, R 7402/246/37, minute by Ross, 28 August 1940; TNA, FO 371/24985, R 6897/246/37, minute by Sargent, 3 August 1940.

⁹⁶ TNA, FO 371/24985, R 6897/246/37, minute by Haigh, 9 August 1940.

London's pro-Romanian propaganda however had no influence on the events that followed. Direct negotiations in mid-August between Budapest and Bucharest at Turnu Severin had failed, due to the incompatibility of Hungarian and Romanian theoretical approaches to the problem and the large gap between what the Hungarians wanted and the Romanians were willing to offer.⁹⁷

The British press reaction to the Transylvanian question was mixed. The *Daily Telegraph* on 8 August examined the issue solely from a Romanian perspective.⁹⁸ *The Times* on the other questioned the sincerity of Romanian minority policy and blamed the escalating dispute on the short-sightedness of Bucharest in failing to solve its minority and territorial problems.⁹⁹ Whitehall was however very sensitive towards any speculations about frontier change and the press coverage of the Turnu Severin negotiations. The Foreign Office reaction to one article, published in *The Times* on 28 August, demonstrates the sentiments and mind-sets of policy-makers. Geoffrey Dawson, the editor of *The Times*, and the most prominent members of the Foreign Office were engaged in a prolonged quarrel in late August. The article emphasized that due to the disproportionate number of minorities in Transylvania, a substantially large portion of territory would have to be transferred to Hungary, to accommodate the Magyar minority of Romania.¹⁰⁰ Sargent found the article so mischievous that he hastily proposed that Halifax should immediately 'meet the case' in a personal letter to Dawson.¹⁰¹ Halifax hastily sent the letter the very next day which pointed out that Britain opposed Hungarian claims, and wanted to strengthen the pro-British Romanian opposition, which could eventually form the nucleus of a Romanian national revival.¹⁰² Dawson was not hesitant sending a reply. On the 30th in a sharply-toned letter he stood

⁹⁷ Without going into unnecessary details, at Turnu Severin Hungary demanded approximately two-thirds of Transylvania, and agreed to any population transfer only after gaining territory. Romania however was willing to give only 1/4 of the province and was insistent that a population transfer had to be part of any agreement. For a detailed analysis of the Turnu Severin conference, see: Balogh, *A magyar-román kapcsolatok 1939-1940-ben*, pp. 232-270.

⁹⁸ 'Roumania', *Daily Telegraph*, 8 August 1940; HIA, Barcza, Diaries, 9 August 1940, Box 0010.

⁹⁹ 'Minority grievances of Roumania', *The Times*, 28 June 1940; HIA, Barcza, Diaries, 29 June 1940, Box 0010.

¹⁰⁰ 'Hungary and Rumania' *The Times*, 28 August 1940.

¹⁰¹ TNA, FO 371/24988, R 7405/246/37, minute by Sargent, 28 August 1940.

¹⁰² TNA, FO 371/24988, R 7405/246/37, Halifax to Dawson, 29 August 1940.

by the arguments of the article and educated the Foreign Office on the advisability of frontier revision in order to create stability.¹⁰³

Most strikingly, Barcza's diaries reveal that William Goode, the unofficial advisor of the Hungarian Legation, and Barcza himself were behind the revisionist articles of *The Times*. During the course of August they had had several long conversation with Aubrey Leo Kennedy, the 'foreign leader writer' of *The Times*, and for hours had tried to convince him to voice a Hungarian perspective in the paper which, so far, they believed had voiced only the Romanian.¹⁰⁴ The article which caused the nuisance on the 28th appeared following one of these meetings.¹⁰⁵ This intermezzo demonstrates that the quality press, and particularly *The Times*, often represented a cross-current to official foreign policy, and indeed made every effort to maintain its own freedom. The example also highlights the ease of conducting covert propaganda on the pages of British papers, taking advantage of the relative lack of specialist knowledge regarding complex Central European issues.

We have set out to determine the British reaction towards Hungarian territorial claims in Romania after the dramatic defeat of the Allies in the West. We aimed to review the over-simplified historiographical view-point that Britain, due to other vital interests and the Battle of Britain, showed passivity towards Central Europe and the Balkans. Arguably, Britain was more reactive than proactive in the region, but new evidence has proved that London was still very keen to limit German penetration into the region. As other examples have already shown, since the outbreak of the war, territorial disputes in the region worked in the context of grand strategy, and the Hungarian –Romanian dispute in July-August was no exception. Most intriguingly however, a large scale propaganda campaign towards Hungary and Romania was also initiated in these months, which challenges our understanding of British policy towards the region and suggests a much more receptive and concerned Britain than has usually been understood by historians. Since the German interest in the Transylvanian question

¹⁰³ TNA, FO 371/24988, R 7405/246/37, Dawson to Halifax, 30 August 1940. What also seems interesting is that Dawson was a life-long friend and dining companion of Lord Halifax. This spat gives a new insight into their relationship also. The diaries of Geoffrey Dawson unfortunately did not reveal anything about Hungarian influences on *The Times*: MSS. Dawson, 1-3. The biography of Dawson is similarly silent about Hungary: J. E. Wrench, *Geoffrey Dawson and our times* (London, 1955).

¹⁰⁴ HIA, Barcza, Diaries, 6 August 1940, Box 0010.

¹⁰⁵ HIA, Barcza, Diaries, 28 August 1940, Box 0010.

in July 1940, London expected a Vienna-style arbitration. Sketch maps were drawn up in the Foreign Office which outlined the British propositions for the frontier between Hungary and Romania, and recommended a limited adjustment. As there was a huge gap between these and the Hungarian demands, London made no attempt to persuade Budapest to accept these.

5. 4 British reaction to the Second Vienna Award

When negotiations at Turnu Severin ended without a result, London expected that war between Hungary and Romania was only a matter of time.¹⁰⁶ However, as a conflict in the region would have threatened Germany's food and oil supplies, Hitler decided to solve the dispute with a German-Italian arbitration. He personally drew the new frontier between Hungary and Romania, based on the recommendations of the German ministers in Budapest and Bucharest.¹⁰⁷ The decision, which became known as the Second Vienna Award, was announced on 30 August. Hungary reincorporated 43 104 km², approximately 42 percent of its former territories lost to Romania after the First World War (map 5.4).¹⁰⁸ The 1930 Romanian census had registered a 47 percent relative Romanian majority. According to both the 1910 and 1941 Hungarian censuses there was a 51 percent absolute Magyar majority and 1 million Romanians in the territory ceded by the award.¹⁰⁹

The new frontier did not satisfy either side. The Romanians were shocked at the extent of territory transferred to Hungary, and some of the Hungarian claims were also ignored. Far from settling matters, the award exacerbated the Hungarian-Romanian relationship. It did not solve the nationality problem, as the transferred territory contained one million Romanians, and 400,000 Hungarians were left in South-Transylvania under Romanian rule.¹¹⁰ The territorial problem also remained unsolved, as now both countries became revisionist and made various attempts to overturn the award in the next five years.

Compared to the view of historiography, which so far has analysed British opinion solely through the prism of British immediate reaction, the evidence presented

¹⁰⁶ TNA, FO 371/ 24985, R 7056/246/37, Le Rougetel to Halifax, 16 August 1940.

¹⁰⁷ On the details of the German decision, see: Balogh, *A magyar-román kapcsolatok 1939-1940-ben*, pp. 280-288.

¹⁰⁸ Réti, 'A második bécsi döntés', pp. 1-2., 182-204; Z. Szász, 'A második bécsi döntés', *Együttélés* 16 (2000), pp. 79-84; Réti, *Olasz diplomáciai dokumentumok a második bécsi döntésről*; Balogh, 'A második bécsi döntés', pp. 61-88.

¹⁰⁹ It is difficult to decide which census described the actual ethnographic conditions more accurately. Macartney, critical of censuses conducted both by Budapest and Bucharest, suggests that the truth lay between the two statistics: Macartney, *Hungary and Her Successors*, pp. 286, 313, 341.

¹¹⁰ K. Hitchins, *Rumania 1866-1947* (Oxford, 1994), p. 486; see also: Balogh, *The Second Vienna Award and Hungarian-Romanian relations*, pp. 335-356.

here demonstrates a more complex and subtle explanation of decision-making, which was the result of a combination of decisions made in various governmental bodies.¹¹¹ David Reynolds has pointed out that British foreign policy-making was a delicate balance of rationality, order and effectiveness between different governmental departments, while Hungarian historians evidently dedicated significance only to official communications.¹¹² Indeed, opinions, expressed by policy-makers behind the scenes, were very different from official declarations, particularly with regards to the Second Vienna Award.

Hungarian historians have been keen to point out Churchill's criticism of Trianon in his speech in response to the Second Vienna Award on 5 September.¹¹³ Churchill declared that the Vienna decision was unacceptable to Britain because it was forced on Romania:

I have never been happy about the way in which Hungary was treated after the last war. We have not at any time adopted, since this war broke out, the line that nothing could be changed in the territorial structure of various countries. On the other hand, we do not propose to recognise any territorial changes which take place during the war, unless they take place with the free consent and good will of the parties concerned.¹¹⁴

Officially declaring that the status quo could be reassessed was certainly a big leap in British policy, but overstating Churchill's speech and presenting it as the credo of a 'new wave' of British foreign policy is too simple and a deeper analysis is necessary of how British opinion was formulated over the Second Vienna Award.

¹¹¹ Romsics, 'A brit külpolitika és a „magyar kérdés”', pp. 107-108; Bán, *British-Hungarian Diplomacy, 1938-41*, pp. 106-107.

¹¹² Reynolds, *Britannia Overruled*, p. 54.

¹¹³ Romsics, 'A brit külpolitika és a „magyar kérdés”', p. 107; Bán, *British-Hungarian Diplomacy, 1938-41*, p. 106.

¹¹⁴ *Hansard* (Commons), vol. 365, pp. 40-41, Churchill, 05 September 1940. Halifax noted the same opinion in the House of Lords: *Hansard* (Lords), vol. 117, pp. 366-367, Viscount Halifax, 5 September 1940. For the official British response, see also: *War and Peace Aims of the United Nations: September 1 1939-December 31 1942*, ed. by Louise W. Holborn (New York, 1943), pp. 190-191. For contrast, the British reaction to the Craiova conference, which on 5 September settled the Southern Dobruja question, has to be mentioned here. Churchill and Halifax in the same speech declared that Britain welcomed the Craiova decision, which was reached with the equal consent of Romania and Bulgaria, without Axis pressure.

The first direct consequence of the Vienna decision was that Lord Londonderry, in protest at the Axis pressure on Romania, resigned from the presidency of the Anglo-Hungarian Society.¹¹⁵ Alongside these official manifestations of British disapproval, the conversations between the Foreign Office and the Hungarian and Romanian ministers also highlight British criticism, and most crucially illustrate the difference in the perception towards Hungary and Romania. Sargent received Barcza on the day of the award and pointed out that Britain could not accept Hungarian claims, as Hungary was under the influence of Berlin and the Hungarian press was ever more violent against the Allies. Sargent, referring to the Hungarian decision to grant military passage to Germany earlier in April, also suggested that Britain could not support a country which had lost its will for self-defence.¹¹⁶

Halifax had very different conversations with Viorel Tilea, the Romanian minister. As a result of the Vienna decision and Romania's pledge to follow Axis policy, Tilea, who was judged to be too pro-British by Bucharest, was recalled from his post. Tilea decided to stay in London in a personal capacity, and evidently had a strong influence on formulating British opinion over the Vienna Award. In early September, amidst the gravest hours of the Battle of Britain, although not Romanian minister anymore, he managed to meet Halifax on several occasions. On the 2 September meeting with Halifax and Sargent, he explained the demographic and economic implications of the transfer of Northern Transylvania to Hungary from the Romanian perspective, using the 1937-38 Romanian Annual Statistical Bulletin, which claimed less than 1 200,000 Magyars in Romania, although in fact there were more than 1

¹¹⁵ The Anglo-Hungarian Society was a cultural organization with no political role. On the influence of William Goode, Cadogan intervened and only Lord Londonderry made a symbolic resignation. According to Londonderry's earlier plan, all prominent British members would have been forced to resign their membership. Goode's mediation prevented a diplomatic embarrassment both for Britain and Hungary, as O'Malley, the vice-president of the society and active minister in Budapest would also had been forced to resign: HIA, Barcza, Diaries, 5 September 1940, Box 0010. Ian Kersaw's study of Lord Londonderry does not reveal anything of this episode: I. Kersaw, *Making Friends with Hitler: Lord Londonderry and Britain's Road to War* (London, 2005).

¹¹⁶ MOL, K 66, 443. cs. 1940, I-5., 233, Barcza to Csáky, 31 August 1940. Hungarian historiography tends to misinterpret Barcza's meetings with Sargent and Cadogan. This meeting is a highly illustrative case. Romsics has suggested that Sargent's declaration for a 'just settlement' for post-war Europe during this meeting was reference to frontier revision in favour of Hungary. Although a 'just settlement' was an undeclared British war aim by 1940 Sargent rather meant 'just settlement' for all, and not for Hungary only. His complaint about Hungary's decision to grant military passage to Germany is a more crucial opinion. See: Romsics, 'A brit külpolitika és a „magyar kérdés”', p. 107.

600,000.¹¹⁷ He pointed out that the transfer of one million Romanians to Hungary was everything he protested against, and it would have grave consequences for the region's stability.¹¹⁸ It is crucial to note that the only source of up-to-date information London received in wartime was diplomatic and intelligence reports and personal accounts, all of which provided very limited data about territorial and minority questions. The supply of newspapers was also very limited; therefore the specialised information of Tilea, a representative of a country which used to be the close friend of Britain must have carried some weight in the formulation of official opinion. The fact that diplomatic reports from Bucharest also provided limited information about the consequences of the award adds further significance to the information Tilea provided.¹¹⁹

From Budapest, O'Malley observed the situation very differently. Although he seemingly disagreed with the level of German influence in Hungary, he reported that the new frontier would indeed serve the stability of the region.¹²⁰ Although this opinion was left without a response, later discussions prove that Whitehall viewed the problem from a different perspective and O'Malley's opinion was ignored. September had witnessed a shift in the Southern department's attention and interest, which confirms that the data supplied by Tilea made a significant impression on British perceptions. London now became extremely interested in the demographic implications of the award, and the statistics provided by Tilea about the number of Romanians transferred to Hungary were analysed to great extent.¹²¹

We have already noted that as a consequence of Hungarian territorial gains a legend started to spring up in Britain. The Jackal-theory, as Macartney labelled it became particularly strong after the Second Vienna Award and exaggerated the extent of the territory annexed by Hungary. According to this, Romania had been punished by Germany for her pro-Allied policy, with the transfer of two-thirds of Transylvania to Hungary.¹²² As we have noted, the Second Vienna Award transferred only 42 percent of

¹¹⁷ Kocsis-Hódosi, *Hungarian Minorities in the Carpathian Basin*, p. 69.

¹¹⁸ *Envoy Extraordinary: Memoires of a Romanian Diplomat*, Viorel Virgil Tilea, ed. I. Tilea (London, 1998), p. 282.

¹¹⁹ TNA, FO 434/8, R 7379/246/37, Hoare to Halifax, 30 August 1940; R 7521/246/37, Hoare to Halifax, 31 October 1940.

¹²⁰ TNA, FO 371/24428, C 9096/529/21, O'Malley to Halifax, 6 September 1940.

¹²¹ TNA, FO 371/24984, R 7685/195/37, Foreign Office to Hoare, 23 September 1940; Hoare to Halifax, 31 October 1940.

¹²² Macartney, *October Fifteen*, pp. 424-425.

Transylvania to Hungary. The notion that Hungary snatched Ruthenia like a jackal when Hitler marched into Prague had emerged much earlier, but the Vienna decision strengthened this theory. Halifax and other senior officials in Whitehall were indeed convinced that Hungary received two-thirds of Transylvania, and the BBC evening news-talk also mentioned the two-thirds theory to the British public.¹²³ It is difficult to identify the source of this misconception. Most probably it was not a result of deliberate misrepresentation, but possibly due to the fact that the Hungarians demanded two-thirds of Transylvania originally, and were awarded two-thirds of this demand (map 5.4).¹²⁴ The 'two-thirds theory' proved to be very persistent and even some of the English language historiography notes the transfer of two-thirds of Transylvania to Hungary.¹²⁵

The Second Vienna Award brought disagreement between the Central and the Southern department to the surface. As we have seen, Sargent in the Southern department viewed the award as the mutilation of the Romanian nation. On the other hand, policy-makers in the Central department would have been satisfied with the new frontier if it had removed antagonisms. The tone of the minutes suggests that the new frontier, if combined with extensive minority transfers, would have been an acceptable solution for Makins and Roberts; both of them stressed that the award should not necessarily be reversed,¹²⁶ and they were convinced that there were possibilities for an Anglo-Hungarian rapprochement on the basis of this frontier.¹²⁷ The change of attitude in the Central department was surprisingly influenced by Macartney, who, in early September analysed the policy of Hungary and Romania in a long memorandum directed to the Foreign Office.¹²⁸ He argued that the new frontier was 'economically and geographically bad', but stressed that it would be a mistake to nullify it later, only

¹²³ *Hansard* (Lords), vol. 117, pp. 366-367, Viscount Halifax, 05 September 1940; BBC-WAC, T 624, Radio Talks Scripts, G. F. A. Voigt news-talk, 1 September 1940.

¹²⁴ R. Hoare also reported the transfer two-thirds of Transylvania: TNA, FO 434/9, R 4962/2/37, Hoare to Eden, 21 February 1941.

¹²⁵ Quinlan, *Clash over Romania*, p. 64; P. E. Mosely, 'Transylvania Partitioned', *Foreign Affairs* 45 (1940), pp. 237-244 (p. 241).

¹²⁶ TNA, FO 371/24984, R 7685/195/37, Hoare to Foreign office, 9 October 1940; Foreign Office to Hoare 28 October 1940. The question of population transfer in British thought has been thoroughly studied by Matthew Frank. Although Frank's study illustrates that transfer as a principle was regarded as a possible solution in London, he has neglected the question of Magyar minorities: M. Frank, *Expelling the Germans: British Opinion and Post-1945 Population Transfer in Context* (Oxford, 2008).

¹²⁷ TNA, FO 371/24984, R 7406/246/37, minute by Roberts, 6 September 1940.

¹²⁸ TNA, FO 371/24985, R 7406/246/37, Macartney, 'Attitude towards Hungary and Roumania', 4 September 1940.

because it was dictated by Hitler. Macartney pointed out that the dividing line was slightly biased towards Hungary, but it could be used as a basis for a more justifiable solution. Hungary – he argued – was friendly towards Germany only owing to the question of frontier revision, and the overwhelming majority of the nation hated and feared Germany. The Central department eventually took the advice of Macartney and recommended that Britain should remain uncommitted to either Romania or Hungary regarding the territorial question.¹²⁹ The impact of Macartney's opinion is surprising, because earlier, especially after his visit to Hungary in early 1940 his recommendations for a more positive British policy towards Hungary failed to have an effect.

Besides, Macartney's memorandum also influenced the decision over the new line of propaganda towards Hungary and Romania after the award. A meeting of representatives of the BBC, the Ministry of Information and the Foreign Office on 9 September discussed the points Macartney raised. They decided that neither Hungary nor Romania should be distinguished or favoured and the priority of British propaganda should be to convince both that the award only benefited Nazi Germany. They made the decision that Hungary should not be criticised, especially in Hungarian news bulletins and broadcasts, as it would alienate pro-British Hungarians.

However, a closer examination of the list of decision-makers at this meeting put things into different perspective. It is immediately apparent that both the Foreign Office and the BBC were represented by younger and lower rank officials, who, as we have seen earlier, often advocated a more revisionist policy. Dixon and Randal from the Foreign Office had supported a more positive British policy towards Hungary and Bulgaria earlier; while Henry James Bruce, the head of the Hungarian section of the Ministry of Information was a well-known friend of Hungary. Also, Elisabeth Barker, the overseas news editor of the BBC, also present at the meeting, was actually the person who supported the setting up of the Hungarian broadcasts of Macartney back in early 1940.¹³⁰ The absence of senior members, such as Sargent and Kirkpatrick, the prominent figures responsible for Central Europe and propaganda, made the permanency of this new policy questionable. Lower rank officials were allowed to make

¹²⁹ TNA, FO 371/24984, R 7406/246/37, minute by Nichols, 5 September 1940; minute by Roberts, 6 September 1940.

¹³⁰ TNA, FO 371/24428, C 10028/529/21, Hungary and Rumania, Contact Meeting, 9 September 1940.

decisions on secondary issues, such as Hungary and Romania, which later were reviewed by senior figures. Nevertheless, this example resonates with Reynolds' concept that British foreign political decisions in the war period were largely the result of quick, random reactions rather than considered verdicts on comprehensive evaluation.¹³¹

The question of whether R. W. Seton-Watson should broadcast to Romania on the BBC, immediately confirms that senior members like Sargent and Nichols approached the question with different mind-sets. The question emerged, as it was believed that Seton-Watson, who had a great reputation in Romania, could encourage Romanians to resist further demands from Germany and Hungary. Nichols warned that the name of Seton-Watson was explosive in the region, especially among Hungarians, therefore insisted on toning down the provocative script proposed by Seton-Watson, and suggested that radical parts on the Munich Agreement and Hungary should be omitted.¹³² Sargent made the final decision and cut only the inciteful parts about Munich, but retained the Hungarian ones in the script. The message in the name of Seton-Watson was eventually read out in the Romanian broadcasts on 5 September, but not with his voice. Hitting a markedly anti-Hungarian tone, the broadcast declared that Hungary wished to restore the 1918 oppressive rule of the Magyars in the Carpathian basin, and the First Vienna Award and now the 'Second' were the first steps in that process.¹³³

Finally, mention has to be made of the Hungarian response to the British reaction to the Second Vienna Award, as it demonstrates a shift in Hungarian foreign policy. The news of the award sparked a wave of euphoria across Hungary. Teleki officially praised Hitler and Mussolini as the allies of Hungary and for helping to regain a part of Transylvania, but inside he felt deeply concerned about the price Hungary would have to pay to Germany in return for the support.¹³⁴ Moreover, Teleki openly declared to O'Malley that a closer cooperation with Germany was inevitable, primarily

¹³¹ Reynolds, *Britannia Overruled*, pp. 54-55.

¹³² TNA, FO 371/24988, R 7480/392/37, minute by Nichols, 2 September 1940.

¹³³ TNA, FO 371/24988, R 7480/392/37, Seton-Watson's message to Romania (BBC broadcast), 5 September 1940. It has to be noted that the Second Vienna Award indeed transferred one million Romanians to Hungary, but the First Vienna Award, transferred the same number of inhabitants, the majority of them were Magyars.

¹³⁴ Ablonczy, *Pál Teleki*, pp. 212-216.

because further territorial gains could only be achieved through friendship with the Axis. He also stressed that Hungary's future depended on its successful rearmament, for which it needed German arms and raw material, which Britain was unable to provide.¹³⁵

Our aim has been to demonstrate that official British disapproval of the Second Vienna Award was only one dimension of British perceptions of the Hungarian-Romanian territorial question. We have seen the contrast between official declarations and thoughts articulated in internal discussions, which once again point to the limitations of analysing the relationship of two countries solely from the perspective of diplomatic communications. Furthermore, we have demonstrated that the Transylvanian problem even after the Second Vienna Award had a crucial propaganda angle, which occupied a key place in British regional policy. On the other hand, interpreting the evident impartiality of propaganda towards Hungary and Romania as the key basis for solving their territorial dispute after the war would be misleading. Senior officials at Whitehall, such as Sargent, demonstrated a markedly anti-Hungarian opinion, which he derived from Hungary's pro-German policy in the past. This dichotomy was noticeable since the Munich crisis and Sargent's key position in decision-making predicted that at the post-war settlement the Hungarian-Romanian frontier would be redrawn taking the Trianon frontier into account and not the Second Vienna Award. The positive opinion of the Central department, which was not responsible for Romania, seems to be less influential on the question of the Hungarian-Romanian frontier.

¹³⁵ TNA, FO 371/24428, C 11355/529/21, O'Malley to Halifax, 20 October 1940.

5. 5 Conclusion

We have investigated the impact of the Allied defeat in France on the Anglo-Hungarian relationship during the summer months of 1940. We have put particular attention on disentangling whether the position of South East Europe, and Hungary in particular, changed in British strategy as a consequence of the British-French collapse on the continent. We have also examined the British view of the Hungarian-Romanian territorial dispute, which in July and August had reached a new phase, and the criteria which governed London's approach to the Second Vienna Award. We have aimed to determine how far these dramatic events influenced British perceptions about the future shape of the region and notably Hungary.

This chapter has also challenged the widely accepted view of historians that London was not interested in the complicated territorial and minority questions of the region, as it was fully absorbed in fighting for its own survival. The new evidence presented here has vividly demonstrated that, regardless of the fact that the region lost its strategic importance and that Britain was entangled in defending the British Isles, in the sphere of propaganda Britain was more active than ever before towards the region. Crucially, a comparison of the aims and tools of the British propaganda campaigns towards Hungary and Romania has answered one of the key questions of our study: why Hungary was viewed more negatively than Romania, and was it only because of Hungary's persistent territorial ambitions? Our findings clearly suggest that historical perceptions about Hungary persisted in the Foreign Office. As at the end of the Great War, and during the Czechoslovak crisis of 1938-39, Hungary was viewed as a feudal and socially backward country, which treated its minorities harshly. Most importantly London viewed the rule of the Hungarian elite as so absolute that no support was contemplated to democratic movements in 1940. In comparison, the Romanian will for resistance against Germany was believed to be more genuine and potent; therefore London stood by Bucharest, its traditional ally, even though Romania turned its back on Britain momentarily. These notions had crucially affected the views of key policy-makers regarding the future form of Hungary, and it seemed that the Romanian and Czechoslovak arguments would take precedent at the post-war determination of Hungary's frontiers.

The traditional method of writing the relationship of two countries solely through the prism of diplomatic correspondence has been contested here. The analysis of the opinion of governmental bodies and other institutions, such as the PID, the FRPS, or the BBC for instance, has highlighted the complexity of British foreign policy-making process and how views and influences were evaluated by decision-makers, especially for second-tier countries like Hungary. The relevance of this method is clearly supported by the current findings of this study, as the specialised subject of the Hungarian territorial question was viewed differently at the various spheres and stages of policy-making. On the other hand, the 'traditional method' is still beneficial, for considering the Hungarian question in a regional context. The juxtaposition of British official opinion on the questions of Soviet-occupied Poland, Bessarabia, or Southern Dobruja with the Hungarian claims in Transylvania has validated our hypothesis that London viewed territorial disputes in the region from the perspective of its own strategic interests.

Although, the official reaction to the Second Vienna Award significantly differed from opinion expressed during internal Foreign Office discussions, British policy largely worked within the limitations of past perceptions, current strategic interests and vague ideas about post-war Europe. The summer of 1940 did not provide final answers to these complex problems; final conclusions had not yet been reached on the future frontiers of Hungary.

‘Nothing can be hoped, I fear, from Hungary until the military tide begins to turn and until this happens, this Legation can hope to achieve little more than to keep alive friendship with Britain [...] and stimulate the belief in the possibility of British victory. There are some signs that this belief is growing.’¹
(O’Malley)

6. Passing the Zenith ...reaching the Nadir: Anglo-Hungarian Relationship from late 1940 to the declaration of war

6.1 Introduction

There has been a historiographical consensus that following the Second Vienna Award, and Hungary’s adhesion to the Tripartite Pact in November 1940, the image of Hungary in London was damaged beyond repair, and the Anglo-Hungarian relationship were heading towards final disruption.² British official declarations undoubtedly suggested this viewpoint. These conclusions however stemmed from analysing only a small amount of the diplomatic correspondence between London and Budapest. The perceptions of influential British policy-makers, discussions on Hungary in the Foreign Office, what priorities Britain actually followed, and how decisions were made on Hungary from late 1940 to late 1941 – these have not been analysed. Considerable research has been done on the plans made by the FRPS on post-war Central Europe and the Balkans, but the views of this essentially academic body have not been juxtaposed with the opinion of policy-makers on the post-war world.³ It has also not been stressed enough by historians that the post-war planning entered an advanced and accelerated phase in late 1940. At the same time, British strategic interests, propaganda policy, the aim of creating a more stable Central Europe, and the ideal to construct a just world clashed and pulled British policy in different directions. It will be crucial to analyse the interactions of these factors and to demonstrate the differences between their aims regarding Central Europe, Hungary and Hungary’s frontiers. Here we are interested in

¹ TNA, FO 371/24428, C 11325/529/21, O’Malley to Halifax, 20 October 1940.

² Bán, *Hungarian-British Diplomacy 1938-41*, pp. 110-111; I. Romsics, ‘A brit külpolitika és a „magyar kérdés”’, p. 109.

³ Keyserling, ‘Arnold Toynbee’s Foreign Research and Press Service’, pp. 539-558; C. Brewin, ‘Arnold Toynbee and Chatham House’, in: *Chatham House and British Foreign Policy*, ed. by A. Bosco and K. Navari (London, 1994), pp. 137-161.

demonstrating how far strategic interests in the war affected post-war planning both on the official and academic level, and to what extent decision-makers clung to their idea of creating a just and stable Central Europe. As the previous chapter has noted, British propaganda towards Hungary and Romania was particularly active from the second half of 1940, and was fundamentally independent from Whitehall. It will be crucial to analyse the relationship between British official policy towards these countries and British propaganda after the Second Vienna Award, and it will be analysed what priorities and criteria British propaganda followed and how far it served official British policy towards these countries.

The lack of Hungarian sources has presented a compelling problem in the analysis of the relationship after late 1940, and therefore some very crucial questions, such as how the territorial problem was viewed by London, cannot be answered by analysing Hungarian sources alone. Research was further encumbered by the circumstance that for the 1 January – 31 May 1941 period Barcza's diaries are not available.⁴ Crucially however, O'Malley's diplomatic reports have survived, and will be the focus of our attention here. To surmount the problem of the lack of evidence, Anglo-Czechoslovak, Anglo-Romanian and Anglo-Yugoslav relations will also be analysed, since the British view about the fate of these states had crucial Hungarian implications.

Another under-researched angle of British policy towards the region is how far the dynamics of Anglo-Soviet relations influenced British wartime policy there as well as post-war planning.⁵ The Soviet Union was an increasingly formidable factor in the region, and after the fall of France, although with much suspicion, Whitehall was in the process of rethinking its policy towards Moscow for the strategic reason to defeat Nazi Germany. As we have stressed, this policy had a critical impact on British attitude towards the frontiers of Central Europe after the Soviet Union occupied Bessarabia. How this policy developed from late 1940, and how the Anglo-Soviet alliance after the

⁴ According to his own account, Barcza, on his return from London, left it with Andor Wodianer, the Hungarian minister in Lisbon: Barcza, *Diplomataemlékeim* vol. 1, p. 506. Presumably the diaries had sensitive information on Barcza himself or on other key Hungarian figures. I have not found the missing part in the papers of the Hungarian Legation in Lisbon.

⁵ Hungarian-Soviet relations have been analysed by: P. Pastor and Gy. Juhász, *A moszkvai magyar követség jelentései: 1935-1941* (Budapest, 1992); A. Kolontári, *Magyar-szovjet diplomáciai kapcsolatok 1920-1941* (Budapest, 2009).

German invasion of the Soviet Union affected British policy towards the region and Hungary will also be our focus here.

The current chapter covers the crucial turning points in Anglo-Hungarian relations: Hungary's adherence to the Tripartite Pact, the breaking of diplomatic relations and the declaration of war. It asks how far these crises affected British views over the future geographical shape of Hungary. Firstly, we will be examining the aims of British peace planning. Secondly, we will be demonstrating the benefits of integrating the analysis of British Central European, Balkan and Mediterranean strategy for the study of Anglo-Hungarian relations; this will be followed by the examination of the impact of Czechoslovak-Polish fraternization on Anglo-Hungarian relations in 1940-41. Finally the exceptionally positive opinion of the Central department on Hungary will be put to the test in the context of the crucial question: who made British policy on Hungary in 1941?

6.2 British post-war planning accelerated

In Britain, planning the peace started as soon as war broke out in 1939. Preparation was conducted on multiple levels from the outset. The FRPS was set up in Oxford out of highly qualified academic experts to provide scholarly background information. Simultaneously, the PID was in the process of compiling peace handbooks and was responsible for conducting political propaganda towards Central Europe and the Balkans. Naturally, the Foreign Office was also discussing future plans over the first year of the war, but as we have seen, until the collapse of France these remained in a superficial form.

Although during the first year of war planning went on slowly, it was clear that compared to the post-First World War settlements, a completely new approach would be taken. Nationalism as a legitimate organizing factor in Central Europe and the Balkans was repudiated, and planners hoped to create stability by scanning the past for clues to a better future. The post-war planning of the FRPS has received some coverage in historiography, but its role have been often overstated in peace-planning.⁶ The activities of the PID in 1940-41 have so far mostly been neglected by historians, and we also know very little of the opinion of key Foreign Office officials in this period about Hungary's post-war frontiers.⁷ Our aim is to highlight the limitation of viewing the post-war planning of these different governmental agencies in isolation and to demonstrate that British war strategy, propaganda and peace aims were directly affecting each other and therefore their analysis should be synthesised.

In the second half of 1940, senior politicians and Foreign Office officials, such as Halifax, Duff Cooper, Cadogan, Kirkpatrick and Aston-Gwatkin were making plans for the coordination of the works of these different agencies, in order to increase the efficiency of post-war planning. In the autumn of 1940, the War Aims Committee was

⁶ See particularly: Keyserling, 'Arnold Toynbee's Foreign Research and Press Service', pp. 542-545; Idem, 'The Rehabilitation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire', pp. 69-74; Bán, 'Angolszász tervek keletközép-európai konföderációk létrehozására', pp. 12-15.

⁷ V. H. Rothwell has stressed that Churchill had a strong aversion to peace-planning and instead concentrated only on war strategy: Rothwell, *War Aims in the Second World War*, p. 65. Churchill's approach to post-war planning is indeed an under-researched area. Neither Churchill himself, nor Roy Jenkins' biography dedicate much attention to it: W. S. Churchill, *The Second World War*, vol. 6: *Triumph and Tragedy* (London, 2005), p. 210; Jenkins, *Churchill*, p. 760.

set up to oversee British peace planning. Our research suggests that since the autumn of 1940 contacts between the Foreign Office, the FRPS, the PID and the War Aims Committee became more regular, which suggests a more organised and developed policy-making system than usually depicted by historians.

By late 1940, the Foreign Office and FRPS officials had all reached the same conclusions regarding the future of Central and South Eastern Europe. They were convinced that the future pointed towards the creation of a number of multinational confederations, which would provide opportunities for economic cooperation, and common defence against Germany and Russia.⁸ The FRPS compiled two memoranda on British war aims. These documents addressed questions such as reconstruction, security, welfare, and the political and economic problems of Europe from the general, and rather idealistic, perspectives of creating a world system based on cooperation, justice and free trade. The memoranda neglected Central European territorial questions, but stressed that a new territorial settlement had to be based on ethnographic justice.⁹ Halifax and Duff Cooper recommended that the newly created War Aims Committee should coordinate official policy and the scholarly research of the FRPS, and they proposed that the two FRPS memoranda should be the basis of planning.¹⁰ An extended and updated version was written later on over the summer of 1941 which covered some of the critical territorial questions of Central Europe. It declared that the absolute sovereignty of the 'lesser state' was outdated, and recommended that the triangular zone between the Baltic, the Aegean and the Adriatic be organised into confederations. The document recommended the renunciation of the First Vienna Award on the basis that it was an Axis arbitration, and proposed the cantonization of Transylvania.¹¹ This memorandum proved to be the prologue to the final version of the FRPS recommendations for Central European confederations, which in 1942 was submitted to

⁸ For the Central European experience of federalism, see: V. Mastny, 'The Historical Experience of Federalism in East Central Europe', *East European Politics and Societies* 53 (1999), pp. 64-96. Gábor Bátonyi has reviewed the Hungarian perspective of federalism in the inter-war period: G. Bátonyi, 'A dunai konföderáció gondolata a két világháború közötti Magyarországon', *Alföld* 98 (1985), pp. 35-43.

⁹ TNA, FO 800/321, War Aims Committee, 'Proposed Terms of Reference', 'A' and 'B', (n. d., [early-1941?]).

¹⁰ TNA, FO 800/321, Duff Cooper to Halifax, 9 September 1940. The War Aims Committee was coordinated by Sir George Crystal, under the supervision of Clement Attlee.

¹¹ SEW 12/3/1, 'Policy and Propaganda', unsigned, (n. d. [early 1941?]). It is very difficult to decide the author of this memorandum. Probably it was a synthesis of the current state of FRPS research, compiled either by the historians David Mitrany or Arnold Toynbee.

the Foreign Office, and in 1943 endorsed by the Cabinet as the official British war aim in the region.¹²

György Barcza also reported the increasing interest of the Foreign Office towards the future of Europe. He recorded that despite declaring the untimeliness of territorial questions, the Foreign Office was making secret decisions. Referring to a 'reliable source', which most probably was William Goode, the primary aim of the Foreign Office was to create a United Europe, comprising nationally homogeneous states with ethnographic frontiers. Most crucially, reported Barcza, Czechoslovak and Polish interest would be the priorities, and countries like Hungary, which were indirectly helping the Axis cause, would be left with strict ethnic frontiers.¹³ The view of the Foreign Office resembles that of the FRPS, but evidently had moved away from the idealized image of a new Europe, adjusting it to British strategic interest in the regions. What this meant for Hungary's frontiers and the future of its recent territorial acquisition is difficult to decide at this intermediate stage. It however suggested that territorial gains would be curtailed at the peace conference. It is also clear that the British strategic aim was to create stability in the region. Fundamentally, Whitehall viewed Central European territorial disputes as minority problems, and judged that ethnographic frontiers without large numbers of minorities on either side of the border would serve stability.¹⁴

In the first part of 1941 Whitehall was tightening its grip on post-war planning. In an attempt to raise its efficiency, and to ensure a more direct governmental control, the activities of the FRPS were reviewed by Ashton-Gwatkin, the Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.¹⁵ Similarly to Duff Cooper, he recommended the amalgamation of the War Aims Committee and the FRPS, to ensure that balanced decisions were made both politically and scientifically. For the same reasons, he also

¹² András Bán published the final version of the document in Hungarian: Bán, *Pax Britannica*. The final version of the memorandum will be thoroughly analysed at a later stage in this chapter.

¹³ MOL, K 64, 1941, 2. tétele, Barcza to Teleki, January 1941; see Barcza's similar report to Bárdossy: K 63, 15. cs., 1941-2/1, I tétele, 5952/1941, Barcza to Bárdossy, 25 March 1941.

¹⁴ This notion very much resonates with the earlier recommendation of the Foreign Office for population transfer or exchange. However, these terms were not mentioned in this instance.

¹⁵ Aston-Gwatkin promoted radical change in the administration of Britain's overseas relations, and was later responsible for preparing the so called 'Eden reform' of the Foreign Office in 1943, which, merging the foreign and diplomatic service, created the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

suggested that post-war planning should be separated from the propaganda activities of the PID.¹⁶

Robert Cole has stressed that during Chamberlain's premiership British propaganda was hopelessly inadequate and inefficient. Propaganda activity in the first year of the war towards Central Europe was described by Cole as 'a leap in the dark', noting that propagandists were clueless about the region and conducted the wrong kind of propaganda.¹⁷ The propaganda policy towards Central Europe was set out by Halifax at the outbreak of the war, and did not change significantly until 1941. The new line stressed the ethical, moral and material supremacy of the Allies and presented Britain as the champion of smaller and weaker peoples.¹⁸ Also, there were tailored first lines of propaganda for each individual country. Interestingly, towards Hungary the British desire for the extension of Anglo-Hungarian trade was stressed. This was a dicey point, as one of the pillars of British strategy against Germany was the tight maintenance of the economic blockade, which hit the economic position of neutrals particularly hard, and forced them to trade even more with Germany. What is also important to stress is that Britain at this point left the door open for a future Anglo-Soviet alliance and for this reason refrained from anti-Communist propaganda. This was a crucial deficiency, as Hungary was terrified of Bolshevism, and even though was scared also of German supremacy, saw Germany as the only European power stepping up against Bolshevism.¹⁹ As a result, propaganda only reassured the already converted pro-British, the others were left in doubt and fear of Germany and the Soviet.

Elizabeth Wiskemann, the distinguished historian of Central Europe, who at the time was responsible for propaganda towards Czechoslovakia, also pointed out that both the PID and the BBC was confused in their propaganda policy towards Hungary. She complained about the difficulties of conducting propaganda, due to the weakness of the

¹⁶ TNA, FO 898/29, Ashton-Gwatkin, 'Report on the FRPS of Chatham House', 10 January 1941. See also: Garnett, *The Secret History of PWE*, pp. 11, 182.

¹⁷ R. Cole, 'The Other 'Phoney War: British Propaganda in Neutral Europe, September-December 1939', *Journal of Contemporary History* 91 (1987), pp. 455-479 (p. 457).

¹⁸ TNA, FO 930/1, Lord Halifax, 'Propaganda Policy', 1 September 1939.

¹⁹ O'Malley and Hoare were instructed to assure Budapest and Bucharest that the Sovietisation of Central Europe was not a British interest. O'Malley however reported that these kind of vague messages failed to convince the Hungarian, and the Hungarian elite believed that Britain, in return for cooperation against Germany, was ready to acknowledge a Soviet sphere of influence in Central Europe: TNA, FO 371/24902, R 7463/4156/67, Cadogan's circular telegram, n. d. (? September 1940); O'Malley to Cadogan, 12 October 1940.

pro-British middle classes, the unapproachability of the peasantry and the strength of German propaganda.²⁰ Gábor Bátonyi has also pointed out that a BBC directive on Hungary stressed that due to the weakness of the pro-British elements among the Hungarian elite, it was difficult to conduct propaganda in Hungary.²¹ Seton-Watson suggested the same to Rex Leeper, the head of the PID, and made attempts to convince him that propaganda was futile towards Hungary. He stressed that nothing could be expected from the Hungarians, and warned that Budapest would make every effort to overturn the post-war confederations.²²

Macartney's Hungarian broadcasts in the BBC also served propaganda purposes, but have to be distinguished from propaganda designed by official agencies, such as the PID. It is not the aim of this study to analyse Macartney's broadcasts; it only seeks to use them to demonstrate the contrasts and controversies in British propaganda and post-war policy.²³ Macartney's broadcasts, as we have noted, had started in mid-1940 as the personal venture of a handful of people, such as Ralph Murray, Elisabeth Barker and Macartney himself. The talks received tacit official approval in mid-1940, but Macartney's critical but friendly voice towards Hungary complicated the propaganda schemes of the PID from late 1940, and also official policy after April 1941. Although Macartney hit a critical tone about Hungary's subservience towards Germany, he designed the broadcasts to encourage the pro-British segments of Hungarian society. He projected an image of British strength, and conveyed the message that Britain would not necessarily dismantle Hungary at the peace conference.²⁴ Macartney's broadcasts were often criticised. Vansittart and the Czech émigrés complained that they were too friendly, and demanded the removal of the 'Hungarian nest' from the BBC.²⁵ On

²⁰ TNA, FO 898/150, Elizabeth Wiskemann, 'Propaganda to Hungary', (n. d., [late 1940?]). In her memoirs Wiskemann did not reveal much about her role as a propagandist during the war, and criticised Hungary's persistence in demanding frontier revision: E. Wiskemann, *The Europe I saw* (London, 1968), p. 28.

²¹ Bátonyi, 'Magyarország világháborús részvétele brit szemszögből', p. 65.

²² SEW 12/5, 1, R. W. Seton-Watson to R. Leeper, 16 November 1940.

²³ See: Beretzky, 'C. A. Macartney. A Devoted and Frustrated Friend of Hungary', p. 238.

²⁴ BBC-WAC, C. A. Macartney, Hungarian Broadcasts, 'Hungary Joins the Axis', 21 November 1940; 'British Power', 22 September 1940; 'The so called "Függetlenség"', 6 October 1940.

²⁵ TNA, FO 371/26624, C 3949/2240/21, Vansittart to Foreign Office, 17 April 1941.

Kirkpatrick's inquiry, Frank Roberts at the Central department however defended Macartney's broadcasts as being very useful to keep Hungary away from Germany.²⁶

In late 1940, the Labour Party also published its views on the future of Europe. In the inter-war period Labour was a strong advocate of the League of Nations and minority protection, as the mean of solving territorial disputes.²⁷ From late 1940, the criteria of Labour changed. Hugh Dalton proclaimed that the post-war world had to be based on freedom and equality.²⁸ A short pamphlet stressed that the wrongdoings done to the Czechoslovaks and Polish would have to be remedied, but apart from this short reference it focused mainly on the German problem, and the questions of the new world system.²⁹ Judged from the pamphlet's vagueness on territorial questions, the utilization of the word 'Czechoslovaks', instead of 'Czechs' and 'Slovaks', seemed to be unintentional and most probably had no connotation on the territorial shape of future Czechoslovakia.³⁰ With the progression of the war this policy steadily eroded and the arguments for the transfer of Germans and the creation of multinational confederations also became more popular in the Labour Party.³¹

At the end of 1940, British post-war planning was in the stage of transformation. Until then, comprehensive schemes were drawn up only by the scholars of the FRPS, but there were signs that the government was aiming for more coordinated peace planning, considering political, strategic and ethnographic criteria for a future peace. In the meantime, propaganda was largely unsupervised and uncoordinated with these efforts, and often went opposite to British policy.

²⁶ TNA, FO 371/26624, C 5898/2240/21, minute by Roberts, 6 June 1941. Macartney's broadcasts were terminated later in 1943 after London renounced the Munich Agreement and the First Vienna Award.

²⁷ A. Henderson, *Labour's Foreign Policy* (London, 1933), pp. 23-24.

²⁸ H. Dalton, *Hitler's War Before and After* (London, 1940), pp. 156-168, 183-191.

²⁹ MOL, K 63, 16. cs., 1940-2/1, ad 266/pol. 1940, Barcza to Csáky, (n. d., [November-December 1940?]).

³⁰ As we have noted, in official communications 'Czechoslovaks' or 'Czechs' and 'Slovaks' made a huge difference, particularly in the Hungarian angle of the Czechoslovak question.

³¹ J. Grantham, 'Hugh Dalton and the International Post-war Settlement: Labour Party Foreign Policy Formulation, 1943-44', *Journal of Contemporary History* 59 (1979), pp. 713-729.

6. 3 The Priorities of British strategy in the Balkans in late 1940

British policy-makers contemplated an equal role for Hungary in post-war Europe. This perception did not change throughout 1941, regardless of the fact that Hungary actively participated in the Axis invasion of Yugoslavia. It is crucial to examine how far British strategic priorities shifted in the region after the Second Vienna Award, to fully understand why Britain eventually broke off diplomatic relations with Hungary in April 1941 and declared war in December.

Due to Italy's entry into the war, and the fall of France, British Mediterranean and Middle Eastern positions became very vulnerable. In order to maintain a line of communications with the Eastern part of the Mediterranean, it was crucial to ensure the security and cooperation of Greece and Turkey. Several studies have stressed that Greece, Turkey, and to a lesser extent Yugoslavia, were solely viewed by Churchill from the perspective of their strategic usefulness to the British war effort.³² Initially, the priority of arm supplies was given to Turkey, as the Chiefs of Staff were expecting a German attack towards Iraq through Bulgaria and Turkey. After the threat of the invasion of Britain eased, and the British army achieved successes against the Italians in Northern Africa, Churchill decided against the advice of the military and moved larger British land forces into Greece.³³ Historians have argued that the decision was a military gamble, which did not defend Greece, but with British military presence in the Balkans, provoked a German attack.³⁴ The Cabinet however stressed that the decision served long term political purposes, such as raising the confidence of the Balkan states in British power.³⁵

When the Italians invaded Greece in late October, apart from meagre military aid London was only able to support Ioannis Metaxas, the Greek Prime Minister, diplomatically and morally.³⁶ London made desperate attempts to localise the conflict.

³² Barker, *British Policy in South East Europe in the Second World War*, pp. 111-126; Lawlor, Churchill and the politics of war, pp. 10, 118-133. See also: Denniston, *Churchill's Secret War*, pp. 33-49.

³³ J. Connell, *Wavell, scholar and soldier: To June 1941* (London, 1964), pp. 286-287, 335-336.

³⁴ Barker, *British Policy in South East Europe*, p. 101; Lawlor, *Churchill and the Politics of War*, pp. 148-149.

³⁵ It was explicitly expressed in the Cabinet that a military commitment in the Balkans would strengthen the image of Britain in the region: TNA, CAB 65/6, WM (40) 282, 4 November 1940.

³⁶ Barker, *British Policy in South East Europe*, pp. 98-102.

Since Bulgarian aspirations for Southern Dobruja were satisfied, London expected that Sofia would step forward with claims on Western Thrace, the other province Bulgaria had lost after the First World War (map 6. 1). After Italy declared war on Greece Bulgaria was under immense British pressure to shelve its claims in Greece. Rendel, the British minister in Sofia was instructed to threaten the Bulgarians with the loss of Southern Dobruja and a punitive peace, if Bulgaria attempted to grab Western Thrace.³⁷ The new British opinion on Southern Dobruja proves that although its reincorporation into Bulgaria was supported earlier on ethnographic grounds, London would not have hesitated to reconsider its support for strategic purposes.

Halifax was eager to find a more peaceful solution. Heartened by the euphoria of the successes of the British army in Libya against the Italians in late 1940, he rekindled his favourite obsession, the cooperation of the Balkan states against Germany. He was convinced that Yugoslav, Greek and Turkish cooperation could check German penetration into Bulgaria and Greece.³⁸ As winter faded into spring it became clear that a German invasion of Greece would be inevitable. In late February the Germans put across a treaty of non-aggression between Bulgaria and Turkey, which ruled out a unified Balkan front and guaranteed the safe passage of the Wehrmacht into Bulgaria. The invasion of Greece was only a matter of time.

Another angle needing consideration is the Soviet. Late 1940 witnessed a critical shift in British perception towards Moscow which, as we will see, had important implications for British perceptions about the future of Central Europe. Since the fall of France, to prevent the southward penetration of the Axis, London was contemplating radically rethinking its relationship with Moscow. Halifax was very suspicious of Soviet intentions in the Balkans, but was convinced that the primary enemy was not Moscow but Germany because it was much stronger and more efficient. Therefore, to check Germany, he speculated on a closer cooperation with Moscow, even at the expense of acknowledging Soviet expansion across greater parts of Europe.³⁹ Stafford Cripps, the British ambassador in Moscow, also suggested that the only chance of retaining British

³⁷ TNA, FO 434/8, R 7058/764/19, Halifax to Rendel, 18 November 1940. See also: V. Dimitrov, 'Bulgarian Neutrality: Domestic and International Perspectives', pp. 192-216.

³⁸ Lawlor, *Churchill and the Politics of War*, pp. 148-149.

³⁹ TNA, FO 434/8, R 7481/5/37, Halifax to Campbell, 14 September 1940.

influence in the region was to make extensive territorial concessions to the Soviets.⁴⁰ After some hesitation Halifax gave his approval for approaching Stalin with the offer of a Soviet sphere of influence.⁴¹ The Soviet leader however reacted with less enthusiasm, as he still hoped that cooperation with Germany was possible.⁴² The British offer therefore received no response from Moscow. Elisabeth Barker has argued that the British offer raised Molotov's bargaining position with Hitler. The Soviets consequently raised their price with Germany, which Hitler was not ready to accept, instead deciding to attack the Soviet Union. Eventually, the British, although rather unexpectedly, had succeeded 'embroiling' the Nazis and the Soviets.⁴³

As we have demonstrated, analysing British Mediterranean, Balkan and Central European strategy and post-war planning as one, provides a wider and yet unconsidered context. This helps clarifying how strategic necessities formulated British perceptions on the post-war shape of Europe. Reviewing the Anglo-Hungarian relationship from this viewpoint helps us decide whether policy-makers saw the mutilation of Hungary, and the strict ethnographic frontiers provisioned for Hungary in the confederation plans, as an ethnically just solution, or perhaps as a strategic decision, made to support British allies in the region. Here we have only drafted the benefits of this perspective, in order to highlight its usefulness for the analysis of British policy. A detailed analysis of how post-war planning affected British war strategy, or vice versa, would usefully form the subject of future studies.

⁴⁰ Bodleian Library Oxford, Monckton Papers, Box 3, Cripps to Halifax, 3 December 1940, quoted by Bányai, 'Magyarország világháborús részvétele brit szemszögből', p. 61.

⁴¹ TNA, CAB 65/9, 270 (40) 3, 14 Oct 40; 271 (40) 4, 15 Oct 1940; *The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan*, p. 332; see also: Gorodetsky, *Stafford Cripps' Mission*, pp. 76-78.

⁴² In November, Molotov arrived in Berlin to negotiate an agreement concerning the Soviet Union's possible entry into the Axis. Hitler felt that the Soviet demands were excessive, which eventually left the talks unresolved, see: A. Millett and M. Williamson, *A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War* (Cambridge, 2001), pp. 110-112.

⁴³ Barker, *British Policy in South East Europe*, pp. 26-27.

6. 4 Hungary turns its attention southwards

The position of Yugoslavia in British strategy requires a separate analysis from overall British Balkans strategy for the obvious reason that it had an important Hungarian angle. In late 1940 Yugoslavia was a weak outpost in the British Balkan and Mediterranean strategy. Prince Paul was keen to follow a pro-British policy, but his position was hampered by internal quarrels with the Croats and other minorities, and the proximity of hostile and expansionist powers, Germany and Italy.⁴⁴ Based on the experiences of the First World War, the Serbs were viewed as great and heroic soldiers by the British.⁴⁵ By 1918 Britain had embraced the idea of Yugoslavism, and the positive attitude formed in this period proved remarkably enduring in the inter-war years.⁴⁶ British and French investments played a crucial role in the modernization of certain sectors of Yugoslav industry, particularly the mining of non-ferrous metals. Until 1939 however Yugoslavia played a pro-German policy, mainly to counter the Italian threat, but by 1940 German political and economic pressure was openly threatening Yugoslav independence.

In the second half of 1940, British policy towards Yugoslavia and Hungary was very much akin. London encouraged both countries to resist the Axis, but could not provide the means of doing so. After the French defeat, just like O'Malley from Budapest, Campbell in Belgrade reported the collapse of Yugoslav confidence in ultimate British victory, due to London's inability to provide adequate support. Yugoslavia was indeed in a tricky political and economic position. Campbell reported that the Serb elite was keen to resist Germany and was eager to maintain their traditional friendship with Britain, but could only hope to avoid an Axis occupation by either sacrificing British economic interests to Germany and Italy, or receiving

⁴⁴ For a general review of Yugoslavia's role in inter-war Europe, see: B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans: Volume 2: Twentieth Century* (Cambridge, 1983), pp. 143-157. Magyars only comprised 4 percent of the population of Yugoslavia, but they lived in a compact block adjacent to the Hungarian-Yugoslav frontier. For the position of Hungarian minorities in Yugoslavia in the inter-war period, see: A. Sajti Enikő, *Impériumváltások, Revízió, Kisebbség. Magyarok a Délvidéken, 1918-1947* (Budapest, 2004).

⁴⁵ For Serbia in the Great War, see: A. Mitrovic, *Serbia's Great War, 1914-1918* (Lafayette, 2007).

⁴⁶ J. Evans, *Great Britain and the Creation of Yugoslavia: Negotiating Balkan Nationality and Identity* (London, 2007), pp. 159-185.

substantial British military support.⁴⁷ As we have noted, active British military aid to Hungary, Romania and Yugoslavia was impossible after the Polish defeat; therefore London, although keen to induce Belgrade to resist, could only rely on the relentless will for independence and sacrificial resistance of Yugoslavia.⁴⁸

Campbell reported the correct relationship between Hungary and Yugoslavia during the summer of 1940, and the question of frontier revision was entirely absent from his report in the first part of the year.⁴⁹ In the inter-war years there had been some half-hearted propositions on either side to revise the frontier, in an attempt to facilitate closer cooperation, but these came to nought. During the Czech crisis of 1938, and until as late as 1941, Budapest was keen to attain Yugoslav neutrality towards Hungary's aspirations for Czechoslovak and Romanian territories, and therefore Hungarian claims in Yugoslavia were shelved. Belgrade in turn reacted very cautiously to the Hungarian-Romanian territorial dispute and the Second Vienna Award. Campbell was convinced that Belgrade would not fulfil any of its treaty obligations to the Balkan Entente or Romania, if the dispute over Transylvania escalated into open conflict.⁵⁰ Indeed, Eugene Boia's thorough study of Romanian archival material has proved that Belgrade was keen to find an excuse to free itself from any commitment to Bucharest, giving unclear and evasive answers to the Hungarian and Romanian ministers when they asked about the Yugoslav attitude.⁵¹

However, immediately after the Second Vienna Award, Budapest raised the question of revision of the Yugoslav border. After a conversation with Csáky or Teleki,

⁴⁷ TNA, FO 434/8, R 7164/415/92, Campbell to Halifax, 16 July 1940; R 7069/89/92, Campbell to Halifax, 11 October 1940. Germany and Italy were very keen to take over the British concessions and shares in the Trepča mines.

⁴⁸ London made personal appeals to Prince Paul. On the recommendation of the Foreign Office, King George sent a number of personal letters, which praised Prince Paul's steadfastness and assured him of British understanding of his difficult position: TNA, FO 371/25033, R 6629/415/92, letter from His Majesty to Prince Paul, 3 July 1940; FO 371/25034, R 8249/415/92, letter from His Majesty to Prince Paul, 15 November 1940; Hoptner, *Yugoslavia in Crisis*, pp. 144-145; L. E. Modisett, *The Four-Cornered Triangle: British and American policy toward Yugoslavia 1939-1945* (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Georgetown University, 1981), pp. 80-81.

⁴⁹ TNA, FO 434/8, R 7069/89/92, Campbell to Halifax, 13 August 1940.

⁵⁰ TNA, FO 434/8, R 7069/89/92, Campbell to Halifax, 13 August 1940. Since the collapse of the Little Entente in 1938, Yugoslavia was bound to Romania as a member of the Balkan Entente, which aimed at maintaining the territorial status quo of the region. With the Romania *volte face* in July 1940, the alliance became effectively dead.

⁵¹ E. Boia, *Romania's Diplomatic Relations with Yugoslavia in the Interwar Period: 1919-1941* (New York, 1993), pp. 276-278.

O'Malley reported limited Hungarian demands. O'Malley noted that claims were not expressed for Croatia, but Budapest only aimed to regain the Drava-triangle for strategic reasons (map 6. 2).⁵² London showed complete disinterest towards this question and was concerned with more important strategic issues, such as the question of German military passage through Hungary and Yugoslavia. By signing the Second Vienna Award, Budapest agreed to allow the passage of the Wehrmacht to Romania.⁵³

As we have seen, the prospect of Hungarian acquiescence to a German military passage had deeply alarmed London in April. Budapest agreed to allow a free passage, but the 'droit' had not actually happened then. Compared to this, now in October, a German military mission passed through Hungarian territory and arrived in Bucharest on 11 October to set up air-defences around the Ploiești oil-fields and to instruct the Romanian army.⁵⁴ London protested, but Hungarian acquiescence did not disturb the Foreign Office to the same extent as the 'droit' of April.⁵⁵

O'Malley however reported that Hungarian sympathies towards Britain were diminishing rapidly. He warned Horthy that after the war Hungary would be judged by how far it attempted to maintain its independence and to what extent it resisted German pressure. He noted with disappointment that Horthy expressed his deep affection towards Britain, but did not hide his plan of recovering the rest of Transylvania at the earliest possible moment. Horthy also insisted on territorial claims on Yugoslavia, although described them as 'not very extensive'. Horthy also intimated that Hungary would be soon pressed to join the Tripartite Pact and explained that he would not attempt to resist such a request. O'Malley strongly recommended the redirection of Hungarian policy and threatened that the openly pro-German attitude would result in a sharp deterioration of the Anglo-Hungarian relationship. With much irritation, he

⁵² TNA, FO 434/8, C 9096/529/21, O'Malley to Halifax, 6 September 1940. The Drava triangle offered a strategic bridgehead for Yugoslavia north of the confluence of the Danube and the Drava rivers. The district was inhabited by Magyars and Croats, both comprising equally 50-50 percent of the population.

⁵³ Barker, *British policy in South-East Europe*, p. 65.

⁵⁴ Hitchins, *Rumania*, pp. 436-455. It has to be mentioned that the Germans passed through Hungary in civilian clothes with tourist transit visas.

⁵⁵ MOL, K 63, 15. cs., 1940-2/31, I. tétel, 262/pol. 1940, Barcza to Csáky, 7 October 1940. Macartney also defended the Hungarian decision to grant passage to Germany in October as the only possible solution, saving German military occupation: Macartney, *October Fifteen*, pp. 440-441. Gy. Juhász wrote very negatively about the Hungarian decision, and argued that as a result Hungary became a German base: Juhász, *Magyarország külpolitikája*, p. 239. As we will demonstrate, in effect until February 1941 Hungary was 'only' a corridor of the Wehrmacht.

reported that Horthy, just like the whole Hungarian elite, was deaf to any kind of warnings. He concluded with disappointment that his mission now only had representational purposes until the tide might begin to turn.⁵⁶

Romania received even stronger warnings for turning the country into a German base. Halifax criticised Romania in unusually harsh language and threatened Florescu, the Romanian chargé d'affaires, that nations failing to resist would have a very dark future after the British victory.⁵⁷ As we have seen, Romania was encouraged by the Foreign Office to resist Hungarian territorial demands, and Whitehall was convinced that the Romanian nation would eventually rise against the pro-German regime. The question inevitably arises why British perceptions shifted so dramatically towards Romania in a matter of weeks, and whether this change triggered any shift in views on the post-war Hungarian-Romanian frontier. The question essentially has two dimensions. Firstly, Maniu, the last best hope of London, although managing to organise mass protests against the Vienna Award, was unable to grab power and steer Romania back to the Allied camp.⁵⁸ Also, Antonescu, the *Conducător* (leader) of the new Romania, arrested British nationals in the country and accused them of espionage, which infuriated British policy-makers.⁵⁹ Most crucially however, Romania provided military bases for the Wehrmacht and airfields for the Luftwaffe. For these reasons London broke off diplomatic relations with Bucharest in January 1941.

We can immediately jump to the hasty conclusion that as a consequence of the German military occupation of Romania, London viewed the Romanian political elite as corrupt, ungrateful and dubious, and as a result British attitudes towards Hungary radically changed and Hungarian revisionism was viewed more favourably. Halifax explained to O'Malley that Hungary's amicable attitude towards British subjects, especially compared to Romania's and the correct treatment of Polish refugees and

⁵⁶ TNA, FO 434/8, C 11020/529/21, Halifax to O'Malley, 23 October 1940; FO 371/24428, C 11325/529/21, O'Malley to Halifax, 20 October 1940. O'Malley's remarks triggered intense mind-searching in Budapest, but as we will see, it resulted in anger towards Britain, especially from Teleki, and not in any redirection of Hungarian policy.

⁵⁷ TNA, FO 434/8, R 7925/392/37, Halifax to Hoare, 14 October 1940.

⁵⁸ TNA, FO 434/8, R 8156/246/37, Hoare to Halifax, 16 September 1940; D. Deletant, *Hitler's Forgotten Ally: Ion Antonescu and his Regime, Romania 1940-1944* (London, 2006), pp.48–51.

⁵⁹ TNA, FO 434/8, R 7746/392/37, Halifax to Hoare, 29 September 1940.

prisoners of war would be held in Hungary's favour in the future.⁶⁰ Consequently, the Foreign Office made a clear distinction between Teleki's 'reluctant cooperation' and Antonescu's 'voluntary subservience', but regardless of this Roberts' minute proves beyond doubt that the Foreign Office essentially viewed Hungary an Axis satellite, and were already contemplating reversing the territorial changes of 1938-40.⁶¹

Since the fall of France British contacts with Budapest and Bucharest were reduced anyway to a minimum, due to fear of German espionage. Therefore, it is difficult to form a clear picture on how the breaking of diplomatic relations with Bucharest affected British opinion towards the post-war future of these countries. Moreover, the lack of extant Hungarian archival material further hampers research. Also, during the course of 1940 and 1941 the confidential papers of the British Legation in Budapest were destroyed on numerous occasions due to the fear of a German occupation of Hungary. For the reasons above, it is profitable to move from analysing the Anglo-Hungarian relationship to concentrating on how the Anglo-Czechoslovak and the Anglo-Polish relationship affected Hungary's post-war position in British thought. After all, Czechoslovak-Polish fraternization had crucial implications for Hungary's post-war role and shape.

The Czechoslovak-Polish relationship in the inter-war period had been burdened with a dispute over Teschen, a small, but industrialised district in Silesia (map 6. 3).⁶² Władysław Sikorski, the head of the Polish government-in-exile approached Beneš, with the aim of burying the hatchet and forming a closer cooperation after the war. Initially, Beneš was reluctant to cooperate with Poland, and only agreed to engage in talks, lest his government be marginalised by the Foreign Office.⁶³ Anita Prażmowska has pointed out that the Teschen dispute became one of the major issues of contention

⁶⁰ TNA, FO 434/8, 12482/12482/21, Halifax to O'Malley, 2 December 1940. For the subject of Polish prisoners of war in Hungary, see: L. Antal, J. R. Nowak and T. Olszański, *Barátok a bajban: lengyel menekültek Magyarországon, 1939-1945* (Budapest, 1985).

⁶¹ TNA, FO 371/26603, C 387/123/21, minute by Roberts, 14 January 1941. Romsics wrongly assumed that due to Romania's *volte face* and the breaking of diplomatic relations with Bucharest, the Second Vienna Award was recognised and Hungary's further territorial claims in Romania were supported by London: Romsics, 'A brit külpolitika és a „magyar kérdés”', pp. 108-109.

⁶² In early 1940 Beneš was very keen that the Zaolzie district of the Teschen territory, occupied by Poland in the chaotic aftermath of the Munich Conference, be regained by Czechoslovakia: Orzoff, *Battle for the Castle*, p. 199.

⁶³ P. S. Wandycz, *The United States and Poland* (Cambridge, 1980), pp. 245-246.

during these conversations,⁶⁴ but in mid-September, Bruce Lockhart, the British minister to the Czecho-Slovak National Committee, reported that the parties agreed that territorial disputes would not encumber future cooperation.

Historians have failed to identify the implications of this newly found Czechoslovak-Polish accord for Hungarian territorial aspirations. Most crucially, Beneš and Sikorski addressed not only Teschen, but other territorial questions such as Slovakia. Sikorski agreed that Poland would refrain from intervening in Slovak internal affairs, and would stop flirting with the idea of a Polish-Hungarian influence over Slovakia.⁶⁵ This declaration questioned the viability of Hungarian acquisitions in Czechoslovakia, which had been achieved with Polish encouragement in 1938-39.

The Magyar question and the future of the First Vienna Award rarely formed the subject of the Beneš-Lockhart discussions. Lockhart reported that Beneš was careful avoiding the question of Ruthenia, but Lockhart was convinced that the Czechs would eventually demand the province to create a corridor with the Soviet Union after the war (map 6. 4). On the question of the First Vienna Award, Beneš seemed to have an even more ambiguous viewpoint, which becomes interesting in the light of future developments. He told Lockhart that he did not want a large Magyar minority in the new Czechoslovakia, but suggested that the reincorporation of Kassa [Košice] would be demanded (map 6. 4). This declaration seemed very precise and straight forward in a 1940 context. It suggested that Beneš was contemplating only minor rectifications to the Vienna frontier, in order for it to follow the ethnographic line between Magyars and Slovaks even closer. In the light of the expulsion of Sudeten-Germans and some of the Magyars from Czechoslovakia after the war, Beneš's opinion however resonates very differently and suggest that in the autumn of 1940 Beneš was already contemplating the expulsion of Magyars from Slovakia. Lockhart supported Beneš' views of creating ethnographic frontiers and recommended to the Foreign Office that backing a Czechoslovak-Polish confederation on this basis could form the nucleus of Central European confederations.⁶⁶

⁶⁴ A. Prażmowska, *Britain and Poland 1939-1943: The Betrayed Ally* (Cambridge, 1995), p 142.

⁶⁵ TNA, FO 434/8, C 9969/853/12, Lockhart to Halifax, 12 September 1940.

⁶⁶ TNA, FO 434/8, C 10776/2/12, Lockhart to Halifax, 7 October 1940.

Beneš was mostly fixated on German issues, and since the Czechoslovak Committee was recognised by Britain as a provisional government in July 1940, he was aiming to exert British agreement for the repudiation of Munich and the transfer of the Sudeten-Germans to Germany. Even though the First Vienna Award and Ruthenia was a secondary problem for both Beneš and Lockhart, the Czech view on the Sudeten-question had crucial implications for Beneš' real aims regarding the future of the First Vienna Award and the Magyar minorities, and predicted that Beneš wanted to regain Southern Slovakia and Ruthenia and transfer the Magyars.⁶⁷

Regardless of these Czech-Polish declarations, British policy-makers were still reluctant to make references to Czechoslovakia's future geographical form.⁶⁸ These developments however essentially changed British perceptions towards the First Vienna Award. In late December Barcza formally questioned one of Beneš' speeches, in which Beneš had claimed that Britain did not recognise the Munich Agreement and the First Vienna Award anymore. Cadogan made it clear that because London recognised the Czechoslovak Committee as a provisional government, Whitehall was now viewing the question of the First Vienna Award according to the declarations made after the Second Vienna Award on 5 September, which had declared that Britain would not recognise changes to the status quo made without the free consent of the parties involved. He added that Britain had no responsibility for the First Vienna Award, as it was made without British consent.⁶⁹ Although Britain was careful not to recognise the pre-Munich frontiers of Czechoslovakia officially, the First Vienna Award and Hungarian authority over Ruthenia was openly questioned by key policy-makers.⁷⁰

⁶⁷ The Czechoslovak and Polish governments on 23 January 1942 agreed to form a confederation after the war, with common foreign, defence and economic policies: L. Kühnhardt, *Crises in European integration: challenge and response, 1945–2005* (London, 2009), p. 23.

⁶⁸ London officially declared the Munich Agreement null and void only in early 1942: M. Cornwall, 'The rise and fall of a 'special relationship'', p. 141.

⁶⁹ HIA, Barcza, Diaries, 19 December 1940; TNA, FO 434/8, C 13413/2/12, Halifax to O'Malley, 28 December 1940; DIMK V, 535: Cadogan's letter to Barcza, 28 December 1940.

⁷⁰ Since late 1940, Hungarian left wing and democratic politicians and intellectuals, such as Pál Ignotus, a journalist and now the Hungarian assistant at the European Intelligence Department of the BBC, Béla Iványi, historian, György Mikes, the editor of the *8 Órai Újság*, were in the process of discussions with the Beneš group in London about Hungarian-Czechoslovak rapprochement. These contacts were in their initial process, but the democratic Hungarians were evidently of the opinion that the First Vienna Award and the Hungarian occupation of Ruthenia would have to be reversed. Whitehall was aware of the Hungarian-Czechoslovak fraternizations, but because its aims were not clarified was reluctant to support

Although the cooperation of Czechoslovakia and Poland was viewed with sympathy, Britain was more concerned with the Southern part of the Balkans for strategic reasons. Hence, when Hungary, Romania and Slovakia joined the Tripartite Pact of Germany, Italy and Japan in late November, it did not gather much attention in London. András Bán emphasized that Hungary's adherence to the Tripartite Pact was a watershed in Anglo-Hungarian relations, and consequently caused the loss of British confidence in Hungary.⁷¹ Later developments clarify that Hungary's adherence was long expected and did not have any impact on the British opinion of Hungary and Hungarian revisionism.

From Budapest O'Malley did everything to convince the Foreign Office that Hungary's adherence to the Tripartite Pact did not change Hungary's aim to maintain friendly relations with Britain. Regardless of Horthy's earlier declaration that Hungary had to follow Germany to gain further territories, he regarded the step as 'window dressing', and reported that Teleki was still keen to maintain Hungarian independence and cordial relationship with Britain. Taking O'Malley's advice, Whitehall adopted a conciliatory attitude. Cadogan assured Barcza that Britain understood the step. When Barcza then complained that Hungary had joined the Axis due to the lack of British support for revision, Cadogan even declared that if the occasion presented itself the matter might be re-considered by London. This message was intended to be conciliatory and promising at the same time. It vaguely hinted that Britain might take a positive attitude towards Hungary's territorial acquisitions if Budapest changed its pro-German policy. Cadogan however noted with regret that Hungary had finally committed itself on the Axis side, and added dispassionately that Hungary signed the pact simultaneously with two states who were not masters of their own will.⁷² In contrast to the official

it: TNA, FO 898/150, 'Report on possible Czechoslovak-Hungarian cooperation', (unsigned, n. d. [possibly late 1940]).

⁷¹ Bán, *Hungarian-British Diplomacy 1938-41*, p. 110.

⁷² For Barcza's report of the meeting, see: MOL, K 63, 16. cs., 1940-2/1, 294/pol. 1940, Barcza to Csáky, 30 November 1940. For Cadogan's report, see: TNA, FO 371/24426, C 13131/86/21, minute by Cadogan, 29 November 1940. Cadogan was indeed very lenient towards the event. Csáky was very anxious to announce to the world that Hungary joined the Pact as first in the region, which made it *primus inter pares* among the small allies of the Axis. Hungary joined the Pact on 20 November, Romania on 23 November and Slovakia on 24 November.

reassurance, Barcza in his diaries recounted British distrust towards Hungary and now complained frustratedly that he was seen as the representative of an enemy country.⁷³

In essence, Halifax, Strang, Roberts and Makins fully approved O'Malley's recommendations that policy towards Hungary should not be changed, but recommended that the tone of propaganda should be stiffened towards Budapest.⁷⁴ The Foreign Office instructed O'Malley along these lines and pointed out that the legation had to stay at all costs, as it provided unique opportunities to collect German intelligence data. Moreover, the Foreign Office expressed in early December that maintaining diplomatic representations in Hungary would help associate Hungary with the formulating Czechoslovak-Polish confederation.⁷⁵ This benevolent approach towards Hungary received a slap in the face the very next day, when Csáky, on 3 December, told the Polish Legation in Budapest that Hungary was withdrawing its recognition. Although O'Malley stressed that the severing of diplomatic relations with Poland was necessary to compensate for Hungary's friendly policy towards Yugoslavia in the eyes of Germany, Halifax was dispassionate and noted with irritation that Hungary's betrayal of its only friend in the region would affect relations in the present and future also.⁷⁶

Hungary's disloyalty to Poland indeed had a crucial effect on British views of the Hungarian-Yugoslav rapprochement, initiated by Budapest in the autumn of 1940. Although the Hungarian initiative to make friends with Belgrade demonstrated that Budapest was anxious to find a way out of the German pincer, O'Malley's reports prove that London viewed the Hungarian-Yugoslav fraternization and the Treaty of Eternal Friendship, signed between the two countries on 12 December, with great suspicion.⁷⁷ Budapest in fact intended to use the new-found friendship with Yugoslavia to open a

⁷³ HIA, Barcza, Diaries, 29 November, 21 December 1940, Box 0010.

⁷⁴ TNA, FO 434/8, C 12482/12482/21, O'Malley to Halifax, 21 November 1940; minutes by Makins and Roberts, 27 November 1940.

⁷⁵ TNA, FO 434/8, C 12482/12482/21, Halifax to O'Malley, 2 December 1940. Hungary's adherence to the Tripartite Pact frustrated Barcza to the extent that he offered his resignation. Horthy allegedly begged Barcza to change his mind, who eventually stayed in his post. Barcza was very secretive about this intermezzo, which was not even revealed in his diaries. We only know about it from Cadogan's report of their conversation on the 13 December: TNA, FO 434/8, C 13131/86/21, Halifax to O'Malley, 17 December 1940. It is possible that this was never discussed between Horthy and Barcza, and Barcza only came up with this story to raise his position as an Anglophile in London.

⁷⁶ TNA, FO 434/8, C 12967/25/55, Halifax to O'Malley, 4 December 1940. Breaking off diplomatic relations with Poland is a vivid example of Hungary's 'give and take' diplomacy.

⁷⁷ TNA, FO 434/8, R 8902/1232/92, O'Malley to Halifax, 17 December 1940.

window to Britain, and made efforts to project the treaty as part of an anti-German policy.⁷⁸ The treaty declared that all future disputes would be dealt with peacefully. This formula was a compromise, which for the moment satisfied both Budapest and Belgrade. Budapest interpreted it as a way of dealing with Hungarian territorial claims at a future date, while Belgrade was satisfied that direct references to frontier revision were left out of the treaty. Macartney however was extremely critical of the Hungarian policy of presenting the treaty to London as an anti-German accord. He proved that the treaty was signed with the agreement, and possibly on the initiative of Hitler, to bring Yugoslavia closer to the Axis. He therefore condemned Budapest for misguiding London, which he eventually believed to be the main reason for British disillusionment with Hungary, leading eventually to the breaking of diplomatic relations in April 1941.⁷⁹

⁷⁸ *A Wilhelmstrasse és Magyarország*, 367: Ermansdorff to Ribbentrop, 30 November 1940; TNA, FO 434/8, R 8902/1232/92, O'Malley to Halifax, 17 December 1940.

⁷⁹ Macartney, *October Fifteenth*, pp. 448-454.

6. 5 A radical change in the tone of the Central Department

From 1941, Ivone Kirkpatrick, the head of the Central department which dealt with Hungarian questions, left the diplomatic service to take over the control of the European Services at the BBC. He was succeeded by Roger Makins. Frank Roberts, the second secretary in 1940, was also promoted to first secretary, effectively becoming the deputy-head of the department.⁸⁰ They had already articulated pro-Hungarian opinion earlier; therefore their promotion projected a change of attitude towards Hungarian matters in 1941.

Hungarian historiography has shown considerable confusion about British policy towards Hungary in the winter of 1940-41. The most serious weakness of András Bán's and Ignác Romsics' analyses is that they understood the British foreign policy-making process as a series of meticulous debates, which balanced every possible scenario, in order to achieve the best decisions. They interpreted official British foreign policy as a series of decisions made with the consensus of the Cabinet, the Foreign Secretary and the Foreign Office. In effect, as we have already pointed out, the policy-making process was largely the uncoordinated interaction of governmental departments and influential officials. Decisions, particularly on secondary issues such as Hungary, were often made hastily, based on limited information. Hungarian historiography consequently reached questionable conclusions. Bán argued that Cadogan's irritation at the Second Vienna Award proved that British attitudes towards Hungarian territorial aspirations remained negative. On the other hand, he stressed that the positive opinion of Roger Makins on the same questions meant that the image of Hungary had improved in London by early 1941. Although both Bán and Romsics indicated that there was a difference of opinion between Makins and Cadogan, they did not weigh the influence of policy-makers.⁸¹

We need to stress that Makins' views cannot be interpreted as the articulation of British official policy. Makins as the head of the Central department directed the everyday conduct of policy-making towards Hungary and made recommendations to his

⁸⁰ G. E. P. Hertslet et al, *The Foreign Office List and Diplomatic and Consular Yearbook for 1941* (Harrison and Sons, London 1941), pp. 14-15.

⁸¹ Bán, *Hungarian-British Diplomacy 1938-41*, pp. 118-119; see also: Romsics, 'A brit külpolitika és a „magyar kérdés”', p. 109.

direct superior, Cadogan, on what policy to follow towards Budapest. Analysing the recommendations of the heads of the departments, Cadogan then made independent decisions, or represented the Foreign Office's viewpoint (and his own) at the Cabinet or at special committee discussions on crucial foreign political matters. Hungarian historians have not analysed the minutes of internal discussions of the Central department, and therefore they have overlooked whether Makins' pro-Hungarian views, or Robert's evident annoyance at Beneš, shifted official British policy towards Hungary and the frontier questions. Here therefore we will focus on comparing the recommendations of the Central department with the officially adopted foreign policy towards Hungary.

As we have stressed, after joining the Tripartite Pact in November 1940, Budapest made efforts to articulate its continued sympathy towards Britain. The Hungarian-Yugoslav treaty had failed to move British feelings, and therefore Teleki wrote to Macartney, asking him to convey a message to London. The Hungarians inquired about British opinion about Hungary's role in post-war Central Europe.⁸² Nichols, anxious to avoid opening the frontier question, immediately recommended that Macartney should be seen as soon as possible '[...] otherwise he might get on the wrong line.'⁸³ It is evident that although Macartney was allowed to broadcast to Hungary, compared to the Munich crisis, he did not carry influence in the Foreign Office. Seemingly, the Foreign Office viewed Macartney as a mouthpiece of Hungarian revisionist demands.

Perhaps due to the same Hungarian influence, O'Malley recommended that to the well-known 5 September declaration about Britain rejecting any territorial changes during the war, it should be added that London was striving for a just and sensible solution which would be based on how far countries attempted to preserve their sovereignty.⁸⁴ Strang immediately recognised that this would be interpreted by Budapest as a British approval of its double-dealing tactics between Germany and Britain. Strang, Cadogan and Eden, the new Foreign Secretary agreed that promising

⁸² TNA, FO 371/26603, C 123/123/21, Macartney to Foreign Office, n. d. (late December 1940?).

⁸³ TNA, FO 371/26603, C 123/123/21, minute by Nichols, 2 January 1941. Makins saw Macartney a couple of days later, but unfortunately the report of their meeting did not survive.

⁸⁴ TNA, FO 417/43, C 837/123/21, O'Malley to Eden, 9 January 1941.

territory to Hungary was not advisable, as it would have no effect on its subservience towards Germany.⁸⁵

Reflecting on Macartney, Roberts too made an interesting remark, which puts the handling of frontier questions in the Foreign Office into a new perspective. Commenting on the Transylvanian problem, he noted that the question belonged to the Southern department, which dealt with Romanian questions, and redirected all discussion to them. This demonstrates that although the Central department viewed Hungary positively, it did have limited authority over the Hungarian-Romanian dispute, which still belonged to the Southern department. Here, the anti-Hungarian views of Sargent guaranteed a pro-Romanian British opinion on the Transylvania question.

Bán and Romsics have dedicated much attention to the conversations of Barcza and Eden on 6 February 1941. During the meeting Eden expressed his disapproval of Hungarian foreign policy and explained that Britain so far had showed patience towards the Hungarian decision to allow the passage of German troops, turned a blind eye to Hungary's adherence to the Axis and to the violently pro-German tone of the Hungarian press and radio. Yet, Eden warned Barcza that at the peace conference British attitudes would be influenced by the degree and manner in which Hungary had endeavoured to withstand Axis pressure and maintain a genuinely neutral attitude. Bán and Romsics interpreted Eden's words as the manifestation of his anti-Hungarian views, which they believed determined British foreign policy towards Hungary in early 1941.⁸⁶ The documents of the Central department however reveal that these mild warnings did not reflect Eden's views at all, as he was simply using the guidelines drafted and compiled by the Central department for him.⁸⁷ Eden's post-meeting report reveals that he did indeed stick to these guidelines, which tells us much about the influence of the Central

⁸⁵ TNA, FO 371/26603, C 387/123/21, minute by Strang, 16 January 1941; minute by Cadogan, 17 January 1941; minute by Eden 18 January 1941; see also: R. R. James, *Anthony Eden* (London, 1987); D. R. Thorpe, *Eden: The Life and Times of Anthony Eden First Earl of Avon, 1897-1977* (London, 2004).

⁸⁶ Bán, *Hungarian-British Diplomacy 1938-41*, pp. 120-121; Romsics, 'A brit külpolitika és a „magyar kérdés”', pp. 110-111. The papers of Anthony Eden at the National Archives contain only duplicated Foreign Office documents about Hungary: TNA, FO 800/750-851. The biographies of Eden are also limited in their perspective in this respect: D. Carlton, *Antony Eden* (London, 1981); A. C. Johnson, *Anthony Eden: A biography* (London, 2010). In his study of Eden and Churchill, Miklós Lojkó also dedicated very little attention to Eden's views of Hungary in the early months of his tenure as Foreign Secretary: Lojkó, 'Churchill, Eden and Hungary', pp. 219-222.

⁸⁷ TNA, FO 371/26603, C 1033/123/21, 'Note for the Secretary of States' conversation with the Hungarian minister', n. d. (early February 1941).

department, and Eden's lack of knowledge of Hungarian questions. Eden made one personal comment to Barcza, which was not in the Foreign Office guideline, which indicated his perception of Hungarian territorial expansion. Reflecting on the question of Hungary's recent aggrandisement he remarked:

I thought the Hungarian Government and people should bear in mind the distinction between the German attitude and our own. A German domination of Europe meant the complete subjection of all peoples, Hungarians included. [...] The Hungarian Minister appeared to agree [...] that [...] it was better for any nation to be free in a small area than slave in a large area.⁸⁸

This was a veiled criticism of the Hungarian policy of 'cooperation for territory', and his personal declaration of disapproval of an extensively enlarged Hungary.

Yet, although disapproval of Hungarian policy was articulated outwardly, the internal discussion of the Foreign Office shows a very different picture. Analysing the Central department's reaction to the Eden-Barcza meeting and the reception of Hungarian propositions in early 1941 attests that Eden's harsh words towards Barcza were only intended to direct, rather than to warn or threaten. During the course of the first three months of 1941 the senior officials of the Central department, Makins and Roberts, articulated a very lenient and friendly tone towards Hungary, which suggested that they were contemplating an equal position for Hungary in post-war Europe. Moreover, the tone occasionally suggested that Roberts and Makins were toying with the idea of basing British post-war Central European strategy on a strong and geographically bigger Hungary. Reacting to Barcza's and O'Malley's request for a vague encouragement on rightful Hungarian territorial aspirations, Roberts noted that Britain could not applaud the recent territorial changes, but might approve them, if Hungary would openly follow the Allied cause.⁸⁹ Makins went a step further. He believed that a friendly reference to Hungary's territorial acquisitions might be possible in the near future, as although Hungary was exposed to the highest German pressure in

⁸⁸ TNA, FO 371/26603, C 1228/123/21, Eden to O'Malley, 6 February 1941.

⁸⁹ TNA, FO 371/26603, C 1228/123/21, minute by Roberts, 17 February 1941.

the region, she was still able to maintain a significant level of independence, and showed national unity.⁹⁰

Although in the background the Central department seemed to demonstrate unusual lenience towards Hungary, on the official level Budapest received repeated solemn warnings. O'Malley, on 26 January gave a strongly worded aide-memoire to Horthy, which described the possible course of Anglo-Hungarian relations. The document attempted to appeal to Hungary's revisionist agenda. It questioned Hungary's recent territorial gains by declaring that states, which decided to be allies of Germany, were unlikely to be aggrandized to the extent of the victims of Nazi aggression. Hitting a threatening tone, the memorandum advanced that England would not feel sympathy '[...] for those proven unready when circumstances demanded it to hazard their own lives in the service of truth and freedom.'⁹¹ Horthy assured O'Malley that he would resign if the Germans went too far in threatening Hungarian independence, and would appoint an émigré government, which would be represented by István Bethlen in London and Tibor Eckhart in Washington.⁹² Makins and Roberts reacted very positively towards the possible formulation of a Hungarian government-in-exile; they evidently respected Bethlen and Eckhart, and were eager to facilitate their journey to Britain.⁹³

Yet, Makins and Roberts were not without an opposition in the Foreign Office; the earlier difference between the Central and Southern departments as to how to deal with Hungarian revisionism escalated. The Southern department and Orme Sargent in particular, who had articulated his antipathy of Hungary on numerous occasions, was startled that London still maintained contacts with a country which allowed the passage of Nazis towards the Mediterranean.⁹⁴ Robert Vansittart also recommended that

⁹⁰ TNA, FO 371/26603, C 1228/123/21, minute by Makins, 18 February 1941.

⁹¹ TNA, FO 417/43, C 4215/80/21, O'Malley to Eden, 27 January 1941. We should also draw a parallel between British policy towards Hungary and Yugoslavia in early 1941. Due to British concerns over allowing the passage of the Wehrmacht, Prince Paul received the same warnings which were stressing that in the event of acceding to German demands, Yugoslav interests would not be considered at the peace settlement: Hoptner, *Yugoslavia in Crisis*, p. 205; *Undeclared War, 1940-1941*, ed. by W. I. Everett Gleason and S. Langer (New York, 1953), pp. 396-398.

⁹² TNA, FO 371/26602, C 837/80/21, O'Malley to Eden, 26 January 1941.

⁹³ TNA, FO 371/26603, C 1105/123/21, O'Malley to Eden, 3 February 1941; minute by Makins, 7 February 1941; C 837/80/21, minute by Roberts, 1 February 1941. Eckhardt left Hungary in February 1941. He arrived in the United States only after months of delay in Egypt. Interestingly enough, the British refused his visa to leave Africa, as by that time the view of Hungary had changed for the worse in the Foreign Office: K. Kádár-Lynn, *Tibor Eckhardt: His American Years, 1941-1972* (New York, 2003).

⁹⁴ Barker, *British policy towards South-East Europe*, p. 65.

diplomatic relations with Hungary should be immediately severed, as the Hungarian elite were completely on the side of Nazi Germany and the country was under enemy control.⁹⁵ These opinions were immediately side-lined. Roberts defended Hungary and praised the pro-British sentiments of Horthy, Teleki and Bethlen, explaining that Hungary was only a corridor for Germany, not like Romania which had become a German base.⁹⁶ Failing to exert influence on the Central department, Vansittart attempted to influence the views of the British public. In the *Sunday Times* he published a violent and very derogatory rant against the Axis satellites, threatening them with no sympathy this time.⁹⁷ Despite the official criticism, the Central department remained very friendly towards Hungary until the invasion of Yugoslavia, because compared to Romania Hungary was not the base of the Wehrmacht.⁹⁸

Roberts' and Makins' suspicion towards Beneš, could also be one of the reasons for the more friendly tone towards Hungary.⁹⁹ Beneš' protest at a Hungarian-Polish declaration for a common Hungarian-Polish frontier was viewed with suspicion in the Central department. An unidentifiable Hungarian officer and Dembinski, a general of the Polish Home Army commandeered by Sikorski, called for the Hungarian occupation of further Slovak territories, to strengthen the common frontier between Hungary and Poland.¹⁰⁰ Roberts and Makins instructed the European Service of the BBC to ban propaganda about Ruthenia, the province which was connecting Hungary and Poland, and rejected the Czech excitement, stressing that the Hungarian-Polish declaration was indeed encouraged as it promoted Hungarian-Polish friendship.¹⁰¹

⁹⁵ TNA, FO 371/26603, R 1101/80/37, Vansittart to Eden, February 1941.

⁹⁶ TNA, FO 371/26603, C 1494/123/21, minutes by Makins and Roberts, 21 February 1941. Barcza recounted very different British perceptions towards Teleki in his diaries. He noted that since Teleki's congratulatory message to Mussolini on the successful occupation of British Somaliland in the summer of 1940, Teleki was not trusted anymore by the Foreign Office. It is true however that Barcza did not mention the Central department in this context, but Whitehall in general: HIA, Barcza, Diaries, 18 November 1940, Box 0010.

⁹⁷ R. Vansittart, 'First Principle, The Best Form of Propaganda', *Sunday Times*, 17 August 1941.

⁹⁸ TNA, FO 371/26603, C 1228/123/21, minutes by Nichols and Sargent, 18, 22 February 1941.

⁹⁹ Vít Smetana has stressed the conflict between Bruce Lockhart and Frank Roberts regarding Czech questions, and Roberts' suspicion towards the covert actions of Beneš in London: Smetana, *In the Shadow of Munich*, pp. 218-219, 221-223, 227-228.

¹⁰⁰ TNA, FO 371/26401, C 3031/3031/12, Lockhart to Eden, 24 March 1941.

¹⁰¹ TNA, FO 371/26401, C 3031/3031/12, Strang to Maurice Peterson, 5 April 1941.

6. 6 The nadir of their fortunes

By February the level of German transport through Hungary had reached an alarming level, but it still had not affected the positive tone towards Hungary. O'Malley protested against the transshipping of 20 German divisions, and Cadogan also explained to Barcza that if Budapest decided to quarter the Wehrmacht, like Romania, it would be treated as an enemy.¹⁰² It seemed that opening Hungary to the Wehrmacht would not alarm London, as long as Hungary was only a 'corridor' and not a base, like Romania.¹⁰³ In late February, when Hungary went another step further in contingencies towards Germany, the Central department finally reached the end of its tether. When O'Malley reported that German troops were quartered around the Hungarian city of Kolozsvár [Cluj] in Transylvania, the attitude towards Hungary completely changed. Roberts remarked with frustration: 'It seems that Hungary now is not simply a corridor, as it used to be, but a base.'¹⁰⁴

Teleki and László Bárdossy the new Hungarian Foreign Minister, justified the Hungarian acquiescence, explaining that Romania explicitly asked Budapest to allow the passage of German troops.¹⁰⁵ Roberts refuted such justifications and quoted article 2 of the Hague Convention (1907) which declared that allowing the transportation of ammunition and troops through neutral territory was forbidden by international law.¹⁰⁶

Despite this change of attitude towards Hungary, it is evident that at this point the Foreign Office did not contemplate severing diplomatic relations. Drafting the answer for a parliamentary question clearly demonstrates this attitude. William Wedgwood Benn, a Labour M.P., proposed the question whether Britain contemplated withdrawing its legation from Budapest. Drafting the answer, Makins stressed that O'Malley had to be kept at his post, because breaking off relations might give the impression of an unfriendly Britain towards other neutrals, such as Spain and Portugal,

¹⁰² TNA, FO 371/26602, C 901/80/21, O'Malley to Eden, 26 January 1941; MOL, K 63, 15. cs., 1941-2/7, l. tetel, 31/1941, Barcza to Csáky, 19 February 1941.

¹⁰³ On the basis that Hungary was not a base, but 'only' a German corridor, Roberts resisted the request of the Treasury to block Hungarian balances in Britain. He stressed that such a move would alienate pro-British Hungarians: TNA, FO 371/26613, C 461/392/21, Roberts to S. D. Waley (Treasury), 21 January 1941.

¹⁰⁴ TNA, FO 371/26602, C 901/80/21, minute by Roberts, 21 February 1941.

¹⁰⁵ DIMK V, 573: Bárdossy to Barcza, 12 February 1941.

¹⁰⁶ TNA, FO 371/ 26602, C 2319/80/21, minute by Roberts, 11 March 1941.

which London was very keen to avoid. It also might fuel public demands for military action, argued Makins, for which Britain was still unprepared.¹⁰⁷ It is immediately apparent that the pro-British feelings of the Hungarian elite and nation were not used anymore as a justification for keeping the legation open. The amicable tone turned more neutral towards Hungary.¹⁰⁸

Teleki bitterly complained to Barcza about the British lack of understanding. He was furious that Britain expected Hungary to defend its territory with arms for British imperial interests, and explained to Barcza that London should not be surprised that after giving no support, Hungary was looking for help from other quarters for its righteous claims.¹⁰⁹ In early March Teleki felt it necessary to further explain his actions to London. He declared that the priority of Hungary in the current war was to preserve its armed forces and national wealth, as it was surrounded by enemies.¹¹⁰ Bán claims that Barcza only received this letter in late March. We have found no evidence that the Foreign Office ever saw this report, although Barcza probably used it during his next meeting with Eden in late March. No report has survived of this meeting in the documents of the Foreign Office, and Eden also did not mention it in his memoirs.¹¹¹ The meeting however was a crucial one, and the only report we have is Barcza's. Eden warned that if Hungary served as a base for German military operations against one of Britain's allies, London would break off diplomatic relations with Budapest. On the other hand, if Hungary joined the German campaign, Britain would have no other option but declare war on Hungary and bomb German military formations and supply lines in Hungary.¹¹² Previously it has been understood that Hungary became a base of the Wehrmacht only directly before the Yugoslav campaign in April 1941. British intelligence reports however demonstrated that German military preparations in Hungary were well under-way before the Yugoslav coup. In March, the British military attaché reported a high level of German military presence along the Hungarian-Yugoslav frontier and noted that the Luftwaffe was using Hungarian airfields at will. He complained that the Hungarian Defence Ministry was using all kinds of excuses to

¹⁰⁷ TNA, FO 371/26620, C 2609/949/21, minute by Makins, 9 March 1941.

¹⁰⁸ TNA, FO 371/ 26602, C 2319/80/21, Foreign Office to O'Malley, 15 March 1941.

¹⁰⁹ MOL, K 64, 1941, 2. tétel, Teleki to Barcza, n. d. (February 1941?).

¹¹⁰ DIMK V, 594: Teleki to Barcza, 3 March 1941.

¹¹¹ Eden, (Lord Avon), *The Reckoning*.

¹¹² György Barcza, *Diplomataemlékeim*, vol. 1, p. 485; ibid vol. 2, p. 300.

cover the operation, and predicted that this was the first step in the complete occupation of the country.¹¹³

A *coup d'état*, led by General Dušan Simović, overthrew the Yugoslav government after Yugoslavia signed the Tripartite Pact.¹¹⁴ Simović declared loyalty to the Axis, but Hitler nevertheless decided to invade Yugoslavia along with the planned invasion of Greece. Hitler offered the Hungarians the possibility to fulfil their revisionist aims, and suggested that Horthy determine the line of Hungarian annexation.¹¹⁵ The Hungarian Crown Council, after prolonged discussions and hesitation, decided that Hungary would only participate in the campaign after Yugoslavia broke up as a country.¹¹⁶ The Hungarian decision to participate in the invasion of Yugoslavia can be described as the interplay of Horthy's enthusiasm to revitalise First World War German-Hungarian armed comradeship, the interference of the Hungarian military in politics, the marginalization of the pro-British segments of the Hungarian political elite, and the unquenchable will to reincorporate lost territories; all was coupled with Teleki's fatigue, depression and eventual suicide.¹¹⁷

As we have noted, the Hungarian sources for the Anglo-Hungarian relationship in March and early April are very scarce. The British reaction to Hungary's slippery slope from the sudden gleam of hope for revision to opening the country to the Wehrmacht can however be reconstructed from the diplomatic dispatches of O'Malley, which have not been used by historians. These reports attest that the Hungarian tone towards London also radically changed after early April as a result of the decision to accept Hitler's offer to reincorporate some of the territories lost to Yugoslavia at

¹¹³ MOL, K 63, 15. cs., 1941-2/7, I. tétel, 4144/1941, Barclay (M.A. Budapest) to Foreign Office, 25 March 1941.

¹¹⁴ For Britain's role in the Yugoslav coup d'état, see: S. Onslow, 'Britain and the Belgrade Coup of 27 March 1941 Revisited', *Electronic Journal of International History* 33 (2005), pp. 359–370.

¹¹⁵ Macartney, *October Fifteenth*, p. 455.

¹¹⁶ Bán, *Hungarian-British Diplomacy 1938-41*, p. 127. Hungarian troops crossed the Yugoslav frontier on the 11 April, after Croatia declared its independence on the 10 April (map 6. 6).

¹¹⁷ Sakmyster, 'Army Officers and Foreign Policy in Interwar Hungary', pp. 35-40; Dreisziger, 'The Hungarian General Staff and Diplomacy, 1939-1941', pp. 260-267. For decades, Hungarian historiography intensely debated the reasons and circumstances of Teleki's suicide. Among the reasons were mentioned Barcza's 2 April report, which notified Teleki that Britain would break off relations, if Yugoslavia was attacked by the Wehrmacht from Hungarian territory, and would declare war if the Hungarian army participated in the campaign: DIMK V, 681: Barcza to Bárdossy, 2 April 1941. It is not our aim to enter this debate. We agree with András Bán, who stressed that Teleki was well aware of the possible British reactions to allowing the Germans to attack Yugoslavia from Hungarian territory: Bán, *Hungarian-British Diplomacy 1938-41*, pp. 130-131.

Trianon.¹¹⁸ Horthy and Bárdossy were abrupt and now showed complete indifference towards British opinion. During a conversation with Horthy on 3 April and with Bárdossy on the next day O'Malley warned that Hungarian participation in the war against Yugoslavia might result in war between Britain and Hungary. According to O'Malley, both Horthy and Bárdossy completely disregarded British threats on the grounds of Britain's notorious lack of attention towards Hungarian problems and on German-Hungarian traditional friendship.¹¹⁹ Grasping at straws, O'Malley reported on 5 April that there might be an improvement in Hungarian attitude, as Bethlen was attempting to restrain Horthy and the Hungarian military, but O'Malley's hope collapsed very soon.¹²⁰ The next day, which proved to be the last day of his mission, as London broke diplomatic relations with Budapest on 7 April, he reported in disillusionment that Horthy had completely betrayed his promise to appoint an émigré government and resist German pressure. Moreover, Bethlen also sent a message to him, explaining that he would not leave for England, contrary to what he had promised if the Germans occupied Hungary.¹²¹

Cadogan informed Barcza on 6 April that since the Wehrmacht had attacked Yugoslavia from Hungarian territory, British diplomatic representation would be withdrawn the next day.¹²² Now that Hungary had committed itself to the Axis the opinion of the Central department became more critical. As we have noted, in connection with the question of the Czech émigrés in London, the Central department had voiced a very friendly tone towards Hungary; now this argument was turned around. Roberts noted that Britain had to stand by the Czechs, who were ready to

¹¹⁸ A strong reason for joining the campaign against Yugoslavia, apart from the incentive of territorial gain, was that Budapest was threatened with the creation of a South-German 'Swabian' state out of the Serb Bácska and Bánát, the Romanian Bánát and the Hungarian Bánát and Baranya (map 6. 5). According to this plan the state would have been created if Budapest decided to allow a German passage but refused to participate actively in the campaign: *Köztes-Európa térképtár, 1763-1993*, ed. by L. Pándi ed. et al (Budapest, 1993), 211, 224.

¹¹⁹ TNA, FO 371/26602, C 2319/80/21, O'Malley to Eden, 3 April 1941; FO 371/26603, C 3345/123/21, O'Malley to Eden, 4 April 1941. During his war crime trial after the war, Bárdossy claimed that O'Malley on 1 April had promised British support for keeping the recently reincorporate territories if the Hungarian government went to England and continued functioning as a government-in-exile: Juhász, *Brit-magyar titkos tárgyalások 1943-ban*, p. 23; see also: P. Pritz, *Bárdossy László* (Budapest, 2001); Idem, *The War Crimes Trial of Hungarian Prime Minister László Bárdossy* (New York, 2005). O'Malley remained silent in his reports about this promise, but it seems possible that he made such a promise, as a last resort.

¹²⁰ TNA, FO 371/26603, C 3363/123/31, O'Malley to Eden, 5 April 1941.

¹²¹ TNA, FO 371/26602, C 3462/80/21, O'Malley to Eden, 6 April 1941.

¹²² DIMK V, 703, Barcza to Bárdossy, 6 April 1941.

fight.¹²³ During their last meeting, Eden asked Barcza to convey his deepest disappointment towards the Hungarian government. He said that attacking a country, with which Budapest only recently signed a pact of eternal friendship, would always be to the shame of Hungary, and Britain would remember this at the peace conference. He also noted that Britain would never negotiate with those currently ruling Hungary.¹²⁴

¹²³ TNA, FO 371/26602, C 3392/80/21, minute by Roberts, 7 April 1941.

¹²⁴ György Barcza, *Diplomataemlékeim*. vol. 1, p. 500. It is not our goal to analyse the activities of the various 'Free Hungary' movements in Britain and America during the Second World War. These organizations only became active from late 1941, and their activities had no influence on the formulation of British policy towards Hungary at this time. The British official attitude towards these organizations was very similar to the opinion of Whitehall about Hungarian-Czechoslovak fraternization in late 1940. Eden proclaimed in October 1941 that none of these émigré movements enjoyed British recognition, or support, for the reason that their aims were unclear, they were not supported by the majority of the Hungarian nation and because the Foreign Office suspected that they covertly represented the current Hungarian government: TNA, FO 434/9, C 9383/7460/62, Eden to Halifax (Washington), 4 October 1941. For an in-depth analysis of the activities of the Hungarian émigré movements in 1941, see: TNA, FO 371/26642, C 13505/13505/21, Macartney, 'The Magyars Abroad', November 1941. See also: N. Dreisziger, 'Az atlanti demokraciák és a 'Szabad Magyarországért' mozgalmak a II. világháború alatt' in *Magyarország és a nagyhatalmak a 20. században*, ed. by I. Romsics (Budapest, 1995), pp. 149-62.

6. 7 The end of Anglo-Hungarian relationship

The period between Britain breaking off relations with Hungary and declaring war in December 1941 has received little attention from historians. This short span of time however provides crucial implications for British post-war policy. Although official contacts ceased, the question of Hungary was still intensely debated in the Foreign Office.

Roberts and Makins, although supporting breaking off relations with Hungary, had not changed their views about Hungary's future position in the region. They fully agreed with O'Malley's recommendation of considering Bethlen as the future leader, and regardless of past events, Makins was still convinced that Hungary could form the basis of British policy in the region.¹²⁵ Hungary's declaration of war on the Soviet Union received very little attention in Whitehall. The question whether Britain should declare war on Hungary came up in July in the House of Commons, but not in the context of Hungary's operations in the Soviet Union.¹²⁶ John Parker, a Labour M. P., inquired why the British government showed leniency in their propaganda towards Quislings, such as Horthy and Antonescu, and whether it was time to declare war on them.¹²⁷ Roberts, drafting the answer, pointed out that British policy should not demean itself by becoming personal in its propaganda, and pointed out that Britain could still count on the loyalty of some Hungarians.¹²⁸ Consequently, an evasive answer was given in the Commons, pointing out that Britain had already expressed its policy by breaking off relations.¹²⁹

It is crucial to address why Hungary retained its positive image in the Central department even after relations were broken, and whether this positive opinion was reflected in perceptions towards the territorial questions. Due to the fact that since the Second Vienna Award, the Hungarian problem had largely lost its Romanian angle, Hungarian questions were now mostly dealt within the Central department. During the

¹²⁵ TNA, FO 371/26602, minute by Roberts and Makins, 1 May 1941.

¹²⁶ Hungary declared war on the Soviet Union on the 26 June 1941. For Hungary's military operations in the Soviet Union in 1941, see: P. Gosztonyi, *A magyar honvédség a második világháborúban* (Budapest, 1992), pp. 43-58.

¹²⁷ *Hansard* (Commons), vol. 373, p. 149, Parker to Eden, 9 July 1941.

¹²⁸ TNA, FO 371/26620, C 7737/949/21, minute by Roberts, 8 July 1941.

¹²⁹ *Hansard* (Commons), vol. 373, p. 149, Parker to Eden, 9 July 1941.

summer months of 1940, O'Malley's recommendations were side-lined by Sargent, but in 1941 Roberts and Makins trusted his propositions, which were often adopted as official policy without much debate in the Central department. O'Malley was critical of Hungarian foreign policy, but continuously reported that the pro-British part of the elite and the Hungarian nation were gaining strength and increasingly believed in ultimate British victory. These factors explain why the Hungarian people continued to be trusted, even when confidence was lost in the Hungarian elite after it decided to participate in the invasion of Yugoslavia.

The question then inevitably arises why diplomatic relations were broken off and war declared later in 1941 if the department which was dealing with Hungarian questions had such a positive opinion about Hungary? This question directs the attention to one of the key questions surrounding the British foreign policy-making process, and more crucially to the question: who made British foreign policy? The example of Hungary attests that even the head of the Central department, Roger Makins, or its senior official, Frank Roberts was unable to exert much influence on strategic decision-making. Their opinions on Hungary were overruled by Cadogan and Eden, who were more senior, and carried more influence in the decision-making process.¹³⁰ With the entry of the Soviet Union into the war, and as the result of the Anglo-Soviet military alliance (12 July 1941), British opinion on Central Europe became more and more conditioned by the external factor of Soviet opinion and interest.

Even before the Anglo-Soviet military accord was signed, Moscow had put indirect pressure on British policy in Central Europe. In early July, the Soviet Union recognised the pre-Munich frontiers of Czechoslovakia, and the judicial continuation of the Czecho-Slovak National Committee and inter-war Czechoslovakia.¹³¹ After the Anglo-Soviet treaty, London was forced to give similar recognition. On 18 July the Committee was recognised by London as 'enjoying a judicial position identical with that of the Allied [...] governments', but Whitehall still upheld its reservation on the questions of judicial continuity and full territorial restoration.¹³² By the end of the

¹³⁰ Barker, *British Policy in South East Europe*, p. 245.

¹³¹ TNA, FO 417/43, C 7680/7140/12, Lockhart to Eden, 9 July 1940.

¹³² TNA, FO 417/43, C 7680/7140/12, The Recognition of the Czecho-Slovak National Committee, 18 July 1941. This declaration was designed to follow Soviet policy, but to give nothing to the Czechs. Munich and the First Vienna Award would be repudiated only later in 1942. This new declaration did not address

summer Britain and the Soviet Union formed a unified front on post-war policy. Moscow signed the Atlantic Charter, which defined Allied war aims. The Charter stated the aim of the war: no territorial aggrandizement, no territorial changes made against the wishes of the people, and restoration of self-government. The Atlantic Charter questioned all territorial changes occurring since January 1938, among them all of Hungary's territorial acquisitions.

By the autumn of 1941 Moscow requested the British to demonstrate more fully their commitment to the alliance with the Soviet Union and Molotov demanded a British declaration of war on Hungary, Romania and Finland. Churchill and Eden in order not to compromise British post-war positions in these countries were able to resist this demand until the end of the year.¹³³ In December, Moscow however pressed the claims with intense vigour. With the Wehrmacht at the gates of Moscow, London was concerned that Stalin might be tempted to sign a separate peace with Hitler, and declared war to ensure continued Soviet participation. On 3 December an ultimatum was sent to Budapest that unless the Hungarian army ceased hostilities against the Soviet Union, the ally of Britain, in two days, war would be declared between Britain and Hungary.¹³⁴ Budapest did not respond, hence, although reluctantly, London declared war on Hungary on 5 December 1941.

The problem of declaring war on the small Axis-satellites symbolises the closing chapter of unravelled British decision-making on Central Europe and the Balkans. The reluctance of Churchill, Eden and the Central department to declare war proves that on the altar of the Anglo-Soviet alliance certain sacrifices had to be made. Makins frustratingly noted that the Hungarians would now throw everything behind the Axis, as they could see no hope from the West, and as a consequence the war might even be prolonged.¹³⁵ Strang's comments described the British situation with great accuracy:

the question of the Vienna Award at all which, as we have seen continued to be viewed according to the 5 September 1940 declarations about territorial changes occurred during the war.

¹³³ Barker, *British Policy in South East Europe*, pp. 128-129;

¹³⁴ TNA, FO 434/9, N 7038/185/56, Eden to Halifax, 6 December 1941.

¹³⁵ TNA, FO 371/26620, C 13346/949/21, minutes by Makins, 28 November, 3 December 1941.

The trouble about having allies is that one has to take some account of their wishes, especially if they have a large share of the fighting.¹³⁶

December 1941 also clarified that post-war planning would be subdued to the requirements of Anglo-Soviet alliance. This had a decisive effect on British policy towards Central European territorial questions. During Eden's discussion with Soviet leaders in December 1941 it became clear that Moscow would demand a dominant role in the region. Stalin and Molotov insisted on the immediate *de jure* recognition of the June 1941 frontiers of the Soviet Union, which would have meant the British recognition of Soviet aggression against Poland, Romania, Finland and the Baltic states. Eden was reluctant to give such assurances of his own accord, and returned to London.¹³⁷ As a consequence of the experiences of the Moscow discussion, the Foreign Office immediately requested the FRPS to prepare memoranda on the territorial disputes and questions of the region.¹³⁸ A comprehensive memorandum, dealing with the territorial, economic and political problems of the European region wedged between Germany and the Soviet Union, was submitted to the Foreign Office in September 1942.¹³⁹ The process of post-war planning went along with remarkable sluggishness in 1940 and 1941, and the impetus to deal with the territorial questions of Central Europe came as a reaction to the strong Soviet interests and territorial demands in the region.¹⁴⁰

The document, now in front of the Foreign Office, recommended the reorganization of the region, and redrawing its frontiers applying a combination of ethnographic, economic and strategic principles, with the close appreciation of Soviet interests. It recommended the creation of two confederations, the first based on the Polish-Czechoslovak cooperation, the other on the Yugoslav-Greek, with the explicit aim to attach other countries to these. It stressed that frontiers between the members had

¹³⁶ TNA, FO 371/26620, C 13346/949/21, minute by Strang, 3 December 1941.

¹³⁷ TNA, CAB/66/20/39, War Cabinet Conclusions W. P. 42 (8), Mr Eden's visit to Moscow, 5 January 1942; D. Hall, *The changing course of British Foreign Policy: Eden's Visit to Moscow December 1941*, <http://www.academia.edu/2594449/The_changing_course_of_British_foreign_policy_Edens_visit_to_Moscow_December_1941> [accessed 06 June 2013].

¹³⁸ TNA, FO 371/32481, W 335/81/49, minute by N. B. Ronald, 2 January 1942. See also: Frank, *Expelling the Germans*, p. 52.

¹³⁹ TNA, FO 371/31500, U 420/61/72, 'Confederations in Eastern-Europe', 1 September 1942. András Bán published the final version of the memorandum in Hungarian with an explanatory introduction: Bán, *Pax Britannica*.

¹⁴⁰ See particularly: V. Mastny, *Russia's Road to the Cold War: Diplomacy, Warfare and Politics of Communism, 1941-1945* (New York, 1980).

to be mainly ethnographic.¹⁴¹ Additionally, based on the failure of inter-war minority protection, it recommended the exchange, or transfer of national minorities, to remove sources of antagonism between member states.¹⁴² Hungary would have belonged to the Northern confederation, within strict ethnographic frontiers, which meant that it would have been able to retain only a fraction of the First Vienna Award, if anything. The document dealt with the Transylvanian problem in a separate section, recognising its difficulties. It essentially offered three solutions: creating an independent state, serving as a buffer between the two confederations; cantonization and attachment to one of the confederations; or dividing it between Hungary and Romania, and transferring a 50-100km wide strip to Hungary in the process.¹⁴³

From 1942 onwards, it became clear for British policy-makers that the confederations would become the subject of friction with Moscow. Molotov articulated an increasing distaste towards the plans, convinced that they were directed against the Soviet Union. He also raised explicit objections against attaching Hungary and Austria to any of the confederations.¹⁴⁴ By this time, Soviet policy seemed to determine British plans to an ever greater extent. Responding to Soviet opinion, a memorandum on Hungary, prepared by Roberts for the Teheran Conference stressed that the alteration of Hungary's Trianon frontier with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia was not a British interest.¹⁴⁵ At the Teheran Conference, Churchill's plan to open the European Second Front in the Balkans, and not in France, was rejected by the Soviets and Americans, which technically put an end to British confederation plans, and it became certain that Central Europe would be occupied by the Soviet Union. Churchill, keen to retain a position for Britain in the region, travelled to Moscow with Eden in October 1944, and

¹⁴¹ The memorandum recommended that the external frontiers of the confederations, especially the German-Polish, would have to be drawn applying economic and strategic considerations, with the aim of strengthening the confederations.

¹⁴² In July 1942, the Cabinet had accepted population transfer as a general, but still a somewhat last resort method for solving minority disputes: Frank, *Expelling the Germans*, pp. 37, 45. The acceptance of the concept was a significant shift from the 'protection of minorities' at Versailles after the First World War. As the memorandum attests, it became one of the recognised principles in the reorganization of Central Europe. See also: C. A. Macartney, *National States and National Minorities* (London, 1968), pp. 430-439.

¹⁴³ Ban, *Pax Britannica*, p. 257.

¹⁴⁴ Romsics, 'A brit külpolitika és a „magyar kérdés”', pp. 119-120. For the Soviet Union, the confederation plans resembled the idea of the *cordon sanitaire*, a planned alliance system of the so called 'border states' (states, which newly became independent from Imperial Russia) after the First World War to contain Communism.

¹⁴⁵ TNA, FO 371/34504, C 14616/1421/21, Roberts, 'The Future of Hungary', 27 September 1943.

agreed with Stalin to divide the countries of the region into spheres of influence. The so called 'Percentages Agreement' determined the percentage of Soviet and British influence in the countries of the region, and divided Hungary 80-20 in favour of the Soviets.¹⁴⁶ Romsics has interpreted the agreement as a well-calculated British move to forestall Soviet dominance, while Kolko has pointed out the cynicism with which the future of the region was dealt with.¹⁴⁷ The meeting actually was the last attempt at checking Soviet supremacy in the region, which eventually resulted in British humiliation. All of the British and American proposals regarding the political and geographic shape of the region were rejected by the Soviets at the Paris Peace Conference in 1947 and the region soon fell under the Soviet yoke.¹⁴⁸ Britain was only able to maintain a fragile influence in Greece.

¹⁴⁶ See: G. Kolko, *The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy 1943-1945* (New York, 1968), pp. 144-146. The Hungarian aspects of the agreement have been analysed by András Bán: A. D. Bán, 'A „Százalékegyezmény”. Európa megmentése vagy Kelet-Európa „elárulása”?', *Európai Utas* 25 (2000), pp. 12-25.

¹⁴⁷ Romsics, 'A brit külpolitika és a „magyar kérdés”', p. 123; Kolko, *The Politics of War*, p. 145.

¹⁴⁸ The British proposed the rectification of the Trianon Hungarian-Romanian frontier to reduce antagonism in the region: I. Romsics, *Az 1947-es Párizsi Békeszerződés* (Budapest, 2006), pp. 138-155, pp. 204-225. M. Fülöp, *A Befejezetlen Béke. A Külügyminiszterek Tanácsa és a Magyar Békeszerződés (1947)* (Budapest, 2008), pp. 22-27, 81-84, 151-157, 237-246. In 1947, compared to Trianon, Hungary lost a further 3 villages to Czechoslovakia in the Bratislava bridgehead.

6. 8 Conclusion

This chapter has considered the Anglo-Hungarian relationship after the Second Vienna Award, with special focus on how Hungary's adherence to the Tripartite Pact, the breaking of diplomatic relations and finally how the declaration of war influenced British perceptions about the future geographical shape of Hungary. We have kept a close attention on British official perception of post-war Central Europe, which was compared to the academic viewpoints of the FRPS and British propaganda policy.

We have found that both the planning in the Foreign Office and in the FRPS arrived at same conclusions; supporting the creation of multi-national confederation in the region between Germany and the Soviet Union, from Finland in the north, to Greece in the south. The confederations would have been organised on the principle of 'justice', which projected a peace treaty without victors or defeated. One of the most important aims of the confederation were to remove antagonisms between the states of Central Europe and the Balkans, which peace-planners were hoping to achieve by drawing ethnographic frontiers, and transferring national minorities. The confederation plans had not been finalised until the autumn of 1942, therefore it is difficult to accurately tell what frontiers were planned for Hungary at the end of 1941. The memoranda of the FRPS, the initial discussions of the War Aims Committee, the propaganda activities of the PID and the internal discussions in the Foreign Office all suggested that Hungary's recent territorial acquisitions would be curtailed at the peace conference.

This chapter has also demonstrated that the analysis of British foreign policy towards Central Europe has to leave its geographical limitations, and broaden its context by considering other angles, such as the Balkans, the Soviet Union and even the Mediterranean, as all these regions were connected in British grand strategy. British peace-planning was only accelerated in late 1941 as a reaction to increasing Soviet interests and claims. It was rather unfortunate, or perhaps symptomatic of the sluggishness of British foreign policy-making process that by the time the Cabinet made the decision to endorse the confederation plan scheme in 1943 as official policy, it was already outdated due to Soviet disapproval.

It has been further demonstrated that the Anglo-Hungarian relationship also has to step out of its geographic limitations, and other aspects, such as the Czechoslovak, Polish, Romanian and Yugoslavian have to be considered. An examination of the papers of the Czechoslovak-Polish confederation proves that policy-makers in London always favoured nations which were ready to make sacrifices and actively resist Germany. Regardless of the sympathy of the Central department, a future Hungary could only exist in this context. Although this did not limit Hungary's role in the future Europe, it certainly limited its geographical extent. Keeping territorial gains in late 1941 seemed to be very remote. Eventually at the Paris Peace Conference, the frontiers of Hungary were determined by Moscow, and were readjusted to Trianon.

The positive opinion of the Central department about Hungary has been contrasted to the view of key policy-makers. Eden and Cadogan did not share the sympathetic views of the Foreign Office, and were convinced of Hungary's fundamentally pro-German orientation. The views of the Central department were therefore ignored and Eden and Cadogan condemned Hungary for following an increasingly pro-German policy. Allowing the passage of 20 German divisions to Romania and Bulgaria in October 1940, adhering to the Axis in November and finally Hungary's participation in the attack on Yugoslavia were all viewed to be the culmination of Hungary's pro-German policy, which had been gradually unfolding since the Munich crisis.

7. Conclusion

This thesis has focused on the official British-Hungarian relationship and official British views about Hungary's territorial aggrandisements between 1938 and 1941. The primary aim has been to demonstrate the impact of Hungary's territorial claims on British policy towards Hungary and Central Europe and the criteria by which Britain judged Hungary's territorial gains and revisionism.

The study has not been a rewriting of Anglo-Hungarian relations, but a more concentrated analysis of how the territorial question affected British official opinion and bilateral relations. As revisionism was the central theme of inter-war Hungarian foreign policy, it crucially influenced all aspects of the Anglo-Hungarian relationship; hence reviewing British official opinions and bilateral relations from this perspective has offered a more complicated image than previous historical approaches. The thesis is not a typical diplomatic case study. It has asked a different set of questions from those normally posed in conventional diplomatic narratives and viewed the problem from a broader theoretical perspective. Diplomatic developments have provided the framework for an analysis of the formulation of British attitudes towards Hungary, but the argument has taken a different tack by examining the way in which thinking unfolded in Whitehall. This approach has vividly illuminated that perceptions and prejudices were just as important in formulating policy towards Hungary as the interpretation and analysis of current international developments.

Moreover, we have provided a wider geographical perspective for the analysis of the Anglo-Hungarian relationship and have shown that the Hungarian territorial question had strong implications for British Central European and Balkan strategy. This broader perspective gives a clearer image of London's relationship with Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia, confirming that exactly because Hungary had contested the territorial status quo of these countries, their relationship with London cannot be entirely understood without considering the British attitude towards the 'Hungarian question'.

Many historians have addressed the immediate British reaction to the Hungarian and other territorial changes in the region. However, the dynamics and evolution of

British opinion and London's long term view about the post-war shape of Central Europe and Hungary has received little attention. Hence, the analysis has been directed towards demonstrating whether British policy-makers considered the territorial gains of Hungary as sustainable and viable. We have aimed at identifying the British criteria in judging the territorial changes of Hungary and for redrawing Hungary's post-war frontiers. It has also been questioned whether the concept of 'national self-determination', the original aim of the Versailles peace settlement, was still considered by Whitehall as a viable solution for reconstructing the region after the Second World War, or whether more forceful solutions, such as creating ethnographic frontiers by population transfers or redrawing frontiers on the basis of economic considerations or historical precedence, were contemplated as workable alternatives.

We have also sought to dispel some of the deeply held beliefs of the historiography about British views between 1938 and 1941. The image of Hungary as a German satellite is very much overstated in the historiography. The danger of this viewpoint is that it suggests that Whitehall condemned Hungarian territorial gains and automatically supported Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia and the restoration of the Versailles status quo after the war.

This research has proved that the Anglo-Hungarian relationship was conditioned by the international situation, the current military and economic strength of Britain and Hungary's geographical position, and not primarily by the conduct and direction of Hungarian foreign policy or Hungarian territorial gains and further demands. For these reasons, the question of frontier revision was underpinned and treated by British policy-makers with a measure of tact, unaccompanied by any firm commitment. Promises were guided by strategic necessity rather than long term political or other considerations. This was in spite of the fact that Hungary was condemned for following a pro-German policy; in the background policy-makers planned a fair treatment for Hungary after the war, which would have involved limited frontier revision.

Historians have suggested that after the Anschluss London had written Hungary off as a German satellite.¹ In fact British opinion was more complex. In the aftermath of the Anschluss, the Cabinet showed limited interest towards the fate of Hungary.

¹ Bán, *Hungarian-British Diplomacy*, pp. 27-30.

Certainly, Hungary's openly pro-German policy was received with deep dissatisfaction by Orme Sargent, the head of the Southern department of the Foreign Office. Newly presented evidence suggests that Hungarian policy in 1938 brought deep-seated Foreign Office suspicion to the surface from the era of the Great War, which essentially determined British opinion about Hungarian revisionism. Sargent, who was the key figure determining British policy towards Hungary at the time, connected Hungary's military alliance with Germany in the Great War with current developments; and his minutes were full of antagonistic comments about Hungary's social backwardness and the past ill-treatment of nationalities. Whether Sargent's opinions were very persuasive in the Foreign Office or whether he simply brought these prejudices to the surfaces we cannot decide conclusively, but these arguments became recurrent in Whitehall until 1941. Consequently, the Foreign Office was deeply suspicious about Hungarian territorial claims. On the other hand, the official tone towards Budapest did not reflect this strong dislike, because Hungary was still not fully on the side of Germany. This duality of opinion persisted throughout the period up to 1941, hence the analysis of official opinion and British perceptions have been separated.

The Czechoslovak crisis in the autumn of 1938 brought Central European territorial and minority conflicts to the international forefront. Chamberlain had taken the diplomatic lead to solve the Sudeten question. It has been the consensus of historians that Chamberlain had been completely disinterested in the Magyar question of Czechoslovakia, and was only reacting to Hitler's demands. Barcza's diaries and unresearched British official documents have shown that Chamberlain was more open towards moderate Hungarian claims than was previously understood by historians. Scholars have not emphasised that the fact that the Magyar demands were raised by Hitler crucially affected British attitudes toward Hungary. For the reason that Hitler connected his demands for the Sudetenland with Hungarian territorial claims, Chamberlain viewed the latter as a German pretext for destabilising the status quo of the region, and therefore viewed it with suspicion. This notion essentially persisted in London throughout the period and was understandably connected with Hungary's continuous pro-German official rethoric. András Bán mentioned that recommendations were made in the Foreign Office about the revision of Hungary's frontiers before

Munich, but he did not fully explore the aims and background of this proposition.² Our findings have demonstrated that the British delegation arrived in Munich with very clear views on the question. Chamberlain was ready to recommend the transfer of a small number of towns and villages to Hungary, which were mainly inhabited by Magyars. This recommendation displays the marks of both Chamberlain's and the Foreign Office's opinion. The aim to create ethnographic frontiers originated from Chamberlain, who was convinced that the application of these criteria would bring long sought stability to the region. Limited revision and the cession of as few non-Magyars to Hungary as possible was recommended by Sargent and Nichols, due to the harsh past treatment of nationalities in Hungary. These notions largely determined British views on Hungarian revisionism at this time, which became the underlying reason for recommending only a very limited frontier revision in favour of Hungary. However, due to Hitler's disinterest towards settling the Magyar claims at Munich, the British did not raise the question either.

After Munich, both Chamberlain and the Foreign Office accepted Germany's leading role in determining the territorial status quo of Central Europe. This however was not simply due to German pressure. New evidence presented here has proved that at the end of 1938 ethnographic frontiers in the region would have also been Whitehall's preferred criteria in reconstructing the status quo of Central Europe. For this reason, London welcomed the First Vienna Award, which was felt to follow the ethnographic line between Hungarians and Slovaks.

Historians have not perceived that Hungary's adherence to the Anti-Comintern pact in January 1939 seriously undermined Hungary's image in London, because it was viewed as a gratitude to Germany for the First Vienna Award.³ The First Vienna Award, Hungary's first revisionist gain, immediately brought the underlying differences between British and Hungarian perceptions to light. In order to regain its lost territories, which was considered as the basis for Hungary's revival, Teleki was ready to flirt with Germany to the verge of open collaboration. Teleki expected London to understand this policy, and when faced with British disapproval and lack of support, he turned to Berlin for assistance in his revisionist aims. London expected clear and open Hungarian resistance, and was not satisfied with Hungary's lukewarm assurances. Nevertheless,

² Ibid, p. 44.

³ Ibid, pp. 55-57.

London was still eager to maintain cordial relations with Budapest, as long as Hungary showed signs of possible resistance. Hence, the Hungarian occupation of Ruthenia in March 1939 was acknowledged as a *fait accompli* and marked a notably different British reception compared to the German aggression against Bohemia-Moravia.

As a military conflict with Germany seemed more and more inevitable after the destruction of Czecho-Slovakia, the ideal of creating ethnographic justice and balance soon became the victim of strategic interests. The Hungarian-Romanian discord after the Hungarian occupation of Ruthenia was viewed from the perspective of its strategic implications, namely that economically and strategically Romania was more valuable. Hungary's persistent claims in Romania, as with the Czechoslovak crisis, were viewed by Chamberlain and the Foreign Office as occurring through German encouragement, and even though there were more than 1 600,000 Magyars in Romania, the revision of the Hungarian-Romanian frontier was discouraged.

Nonetheless, British strategy in the region was in the process of transformation and Whitehall contemplated the creation of an anti-German regional bloc. The new evidence brought forward by this thesis suggests that Teleki's anti-Nazi policies convinced London that Hungary had a place in this combination. Even though Romania was guaranteed by Britain, through Hungary's insistence the door was left open for future frontier change. Crucially, this became one of the underpinning reasons for guaranteeing only the independence and not the territorial integrity of Romania. The consulted archival material also revealed (previously unknown to historians) that in the spring of 1939 under specific circumstances, Britain considered guaranteeing and helping Hungary if war broke out. It is an intriguing new development in the study of British policy toward Central Europe and in our understanding of British opinion of Hungary. However, it has to be stressed that the shift in British opinion was underpinned by the strategic interest of encircling Germany. Hungarian territorial claims complicated this policy by creating antagonism in the region, therefore they were swept under the carpet.

The outbreak of the war put British opinion about Hungarian revisionism in a whole new context. British attitudes towards the frontiers of Hungary essentially worked in two dimensions: war strategy and post-war planning. For some time, these worked alongside each other, following very different aims. The British foreign policy-making elite were united in refusing to make territorial promises for the duration of the

war, to avoid the repetition of the ill-fated territorial commitments of the Great War. This became one of the reasons for discouraging Hungarian claims during the war. Hungary's dubious foreign policy during the first months of the war also disheartened British hopes of any accord with Hungary and made London reluctant to consider Hungarian demands. For example, the Hungarian refusal to grant military passage for the Wehrmacht during the German-Polish war, and the cordial treatment of Polish refugees by Hungary had a positive reception in London. On the other hand Budapest's refusal to declare neutrality, and the proclamation of 'armed neutrality' was viewed as a definite sign of a German-Hungarian military cooperation against Romania. However, as earlier, the amicable tone was maintained outwardly. For these reasons, until the end of 1939 the contrast between the friendly official attitude and the discouragement of frontier revision persisted.

Then again, in the last days of 1939, Hungary was sending positive signals to the West. Budapest declared it would stay neutral if a Soviet-Romanian war broke out over Bessarabia. This marked a significant shift in the British attitude. Possibly as a reaction to this positive change in Hungary's policy, although showing great caution, in early 1940 London attempted to mediate between Budapest and Bucharest. A proposition was put forward about a small modification of the Hungarian-Romanian frontier, which would have been combined with the transfer of the entire Magyar minority in Romania to Hungary. The British role in this scheme has so far been unknown to historians, and challenges our understanding of the British 'no territorial commitment' policy over the war. The Foreign Office opinion was drawn up by Sargent and Cadogan, who were disgusted by Hungary's refusal to consider this territorial offer, which indeed was the first step on the road towards complete estrangement between London and Budapest. The Foreign Office was unable to understand all the fuss about revisionism over the last two decades in the light of the Hungarian refusal to consider the January 1940 offer. At this point the Foreign Office's and Halifax's opinion markedly differed. Even after the fiasco of this proposition, completely unaware of the realities of the time and the region, Halifax became a staunch advocate of the creation of a neutral bloc consisting of Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, in order to keep these countries out of the German sphere.

This was the point when Teleki put forward his counter-claims in February 1940 for two-thirds of Transylvania, which finally let the cat out of the bag and made it clear that British and Hungarian policies and perceptions about Hungary's future frontiers were a huge distance apart. Teleki's claim of two-thirds of Transylvania was considered particularly untimely, unfounded and greatly exaggerated by London, even though Teleki viewed it as a generous compromise.

Although post-war planning had started as soon as war broke out, until late 1940 the process was in its infancy. Nonetheless, it was clear from the outset that the FRPS academics, mandated to work on post-war planning, were contemplating the future territorial status quo of Central Europe on the principle of drawing frontiers running along ethnographic lines, as it was considered the only solution to achieve stability. The implications of this for Hungary's future frontiers were very unclear at this early stage because from early 1940 the Foreign Office aimed to assume a tighter control over peace plans. This transformation coincided with receiving Teleki's counterclaims. Due to these, Sargent and Cadogan declared in March 1940 that after the war a political decision would be made about Hungary's frontiers and in this context the level of Hungary's resistance to German pressure would be carefully weighed. However, as early as the spring of 1940 it was clear that the scholarly opinion of the FRPS would be mostly side-tracked. The intervention of Sargent and Cadogan ensured that Teleki's proposal would be completely dismissed and the Versailles frontiers would be restored, with only minor rectifications based on ethnicity.

Since the destruction of Czecho-Slovakia in March 1939, Whitehall's primary strategic aim in the region was to prevent Germany from controlling the Romanian oil-fields. Hungarian territorial claims for Transylvania were seen as a German Trojan horse, and became one of the underlying reasons for the discouragement of wider Hungarian claims in Romania. From the outbreak of war London expected that Hungary in return for support from Germany for its demands in Transylvania, would attack Romania in cooperation with Germany, or as a least worst scenario, would allow the free passage of the Wehrmacht through its territory. London was unaware that during the German-Polish war, István Csáky had already promised free passage to Germany for supporting Hungarian aspirations for Transylvania. Historians have been aware that allowing a military passage had been the Gordian knot for Teleki, who was keen to

preserve Hungarian independence, but so far the issue remained theoretical in the historiography.

British official sources have now shown that Berlin requested a passage in March, and the request was granted by Budapest in early April. The Hungarian compliance changes our understanding of Hungarian foreign policy and suggests that contrary to the previous historiography, Teleki lost faith in the possibility of an ultimate Allied victory even before the collapse of France and seemingly made a final decision to side with Germany in return for territorial gains. It is clear that the Hungarian decision had pivotal implications for the Anglo-Hungarian relationship. Hungary's action had a particularly negative reception in London, and crucially affected perceptions of Hungarian revisionism. As a result, the future of the First Vienna Award, and Hungarian authority over Ruthenia, was now openly questioned by key policy-makers, and similarly reserved opinions were articulated towards the question of the Hungarian-Romanian territorial dispute. The change of tone evidently suggests that confidence was shaken in the Hungarian elite. It has also been demonstrated that the British approach towards Hungary's renewed claims in Romania in the summer of 1940, and the judgement of the Second Vienna Award, largely reflected this perception. The Hungarian 'droit' also crucially determined British views about the future status quo of the region. Henceforth, London viewed the Czecho-Slovak émigrés more positively, and disregarded Hungarian concerns about the recreation of Czechoslovakia after the war. One of the most significant findings to emerge is that the Hungarian 'droit' clearly explains the radical contrast between the positive British opinion of Hungary in early 1940 and the condemnation of the Second Vienna Arbitration in August 1940. This, until now, has only been explained by historians with the vague argument that Hungary followed a more and more pro-German policy.

This thesis has also challenged the widely held belief that after the Allied defeat on the Western Front London was not interested in Central Europe and its complicated territorial and minority questions, because Britain was fully absorbed in fighting for its own survival. The new evidence has vividly demonstrated that, regardless of the fact that the region lost its strategic importance, in the sphere of propaganda Britain was more active than ever before towards the region. In July 1940 Romania turned its back on Britain and openly sided with Germany. Crucially, a comparison of the aims and

tools of the British propaganda campaigns towards Hungary and Romania in an era when both countries were viewed as German satellites has answered one of the key questions of our study: why was Hungary viewed more negatively than Romania, and was it only because of Hungary's persistent territorial ambitions? It is clear that historical perceptions guided the viewpoints of the Foreign Office about Hungary, but this was not the only reason for favouring Romania. As at the end of the Great War, and during the Czechoslovak crisis of 1938-39, Hungary was usually viewed as a feudal and socially backward country, which traditionally cooperated with Germany and treated its minorities harshly. In comparison, the will of the Romanian nation for independence, and the chances of Romanian resistance against Germany were believed to be more genuine and potent; therefore London stood by Bucharest, even though Romania turned its back on Britain after the French defeat. These notions had crucially affected the views of key policy-makers regarding the future geographical form of Hungary, and it seemed that the Romanian and Czechoslovak arguments would take precedence at the post-war determination of Hungary's frontiers.

For all these reasons, the Second Vienna Award was officially rejected by London. Although, the official reaction to the Second Vienna Award significantly differed from opinion expressed during internal Foreign Office discussions (which surprisingly viewed the award as a potential basis for redrawing the Hungarian-Romanian frontier), the perception of key policy-makers largely worked within the limitations of past perceptions about Hungary, current strategic interests and vague ideas about post-war Europe.

By late 1940, discussion in the Foreign Office about post-war Central Europe, and scholarly analysis in the FRPS reached the same conclusions. In order to remove antagonisms between the states of the region, to provide stability and to increase the chance of future regional cooperation against Germany, the creation of multi-national confederations were recommended. The confederations would be organised on the principle of 'ethnographic justice', which peace-planners were hoping to achieve by drawing ethnographic frontiers and transferring national minorities. The confederation plans were not finalised until the autumn of 1942, therefore it is difficult to accurately tell what frontiers were planned for Hungary at the end of 1940 and in 1941. The FRPS memoranda, the initial discussions of the War Aims Committee, the propaganda

activities of the PID and the internal discussions in the Foreign Office - all suggested that most of Hungary's recent territorial acquisitions would be reversed at the peace conference.

Britain broke its diplomatic relationship with Bucharest in January 1941 because the country became the base of the German army. As a result, opinions about Romania seriously deteriorated in London, and faith in the Western sympathy of the Romanian nation had also been shaken. Consequently, British perceptions towards Hungary were transformed radically. One of the other reasons for the change in the British attitude was that Hungary was transferred from the Southern to the Central department, in which the senior officials, Frank Roberts and Roger Makins, in comparison to Sargent's anti-Hungarian tone, displayed warm friendship and understanding towards Hungary. They turned a blind eye towards the pro-German tone of the Hungarian press, the passage of the German army to Romania through Hungarian territory, and argued that compared to the political machination of the Czechs in London and the unreliability of Romanians, the Hungarians had genuine pro-British feelings. The paradox of the Anglo-Hungarian relationship is that in spite of the Central department's positive opinion, London broke off diplomatic relations with Hungary in April 1941 and declared war later in December. Analysing this problem more closely has answered one of the key questions of this research: who made foreign policy towards Hungary in Whitehall? We have shown that in questions of war and peace the opinion of Foreign Office officials counted for very little. The Cabinet and the new foreign secretary Anthony Eden made decisions on their own judgement and on the recommendations of Cadogan, the effective head of the Foreign Office; the views of Roberts and Makins were side-lined. Even though the Central department was firmly against severing diplomatic relations and declaring war, Eden and Cadogan followed British strategic aims, which dictated supporting anyone fighting Hitler.

This result also shows why British opinion fluctuated so dramatically towards Hungary throughout these years. András Bán suggested that the occasional positive signals from Budapest about Hungary's pro-British feelings had a crucial impact on London. It is however evident that these shifts occurred due to the nature of the British foreign policy-making process. During times of international crisis, policy was made at the highest level of hierarchy. Amid the Czechoslovak crisis of 1938-39 policy-making

was governed by Chamberlain and Halifax. Again, in April 1941, when the Axis overran Yugoslavia and Greece, decisions about Hungary were made by Eden and Cadogan, who viewed Hungary's adherence to the Axis in November 1940 and Hungary's participation in the attack on Yugoslavia as the culmination of Hungary's tendentiously pro-German policy. In the period between these two crises, the everyday conduct of policy towards Hungary was largely made by the Foreign Office, where policy-making was divided between a larger number of senior officials, who often made decisions without consulting each other.

The traditional method of writing the relationship of two countries solely through the prism of diplomatic correspondence has been contested here. Analysing the opinion of governmental bodies and other agencies, such as the PID, the FRPS, or the BBC for instance, has highlighted the complexity of the British foreign policy-making process and how views and influences were evaluated by decision-makers, especially for second-tier countries like Hungary. It is clear that the specialised subject of Hungary's territorial question was viewed differently at the various spheres and stages of policy-making. Also, the juxtaposition of British official opinion on the questions of Soviet-occupied Poland, Bessarabia or Southern Dobruja with the Hungarian claims in Transylvania has provided a comparative regional perspective and validated the hypothesis that London viewed territorial disputes in the region from the perspective of its own strategic interests.


This research has therefore demonstrated that both the analysis of the Anglo-Hungarian relationship and British foreign policy towards Central Europe has to leave its geographical limitations, the context broadened by considering other angles such as the Czechoslovak, Romanian, Balkan and Soviet and even the Mediterranean, as all these regions were linked in British strategy. The Hungarian 'droit' and the strategic need to find allies on the continent shifted British attitudes: the Czechoslovak émigrés were viewed with more sympathy. However, after 1941, the Soviet Union had a massive impact on British post-war planning. British peace-planning was only accelerated in late 1941, in reaction to increasing Soviet interests and territorial claims.

A number of lines are set out for future historical inquiry. Little has been written about the impact of Hungarian revisionism on the relationship between Hungary and its

neighbours. Due to the destruction of archival materials during the war some of these questions are problematic to analyse. The generally well-informed British sources can possibly remedy this lacuna. Equally, this study provides a valuable perspective for historians researching London's relationship with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia. It therefore appears increasingly desirable to bring the historians of regional states together, in order to better synthesize British policy towards Central Europe and the Balkans.

8, Appendices

8. 1. Maps:



Map 1.1: The stages of the aggrandizement of Hungary (1938-1941) [the map is the a modified version of: *Köztes-Európa térképtár*, ed. by Pándi et al, map 224]



Map 1.2: The ethnic map of Hungary (circa 1880) [source: 'The ethnic map of Hungary, 1880', - See more at: <http://www.hunsor.se/trianon/treatyoftrianon1920.html> (accessed: 1 November 2013)]




Map 1.3: The territorial consequences of the Treaty of Trianon [the map is the modified version of:
Köztes-Európa térképtár, ed. by Pándi et al, map 322]



Map 2.1: The Little Entente [source: I. Deak, 'The Versailles System and Central Europe', *The English Historical Review* 490 (2006), p. 338]



Map 2.2: The strategic implications of a German-Hungarian military cooperation against Czechoslovakia (1938) [the map is the modified version of: 'The map of Czechoslovakia 1938', - See more at: <http://althistory.wikia.com/wiki/File:Map_of_Czechoslovakia_1938.png> (accessed: 1 October 2013)]




Map 2.3: The recommendation of the Foreign Office on the Hungarian-Czechoslovak frontier [red shaded areas] (September 1938) [the map is the modified version of: *Köztes-Európa térképtár*, ed. by Pándi et al, map 198]



Map 2.4: The alternative recommendation of the Foreign Office (September 1938), compared to the First Vienna Award (2 November 1938) [the settlements marked with the circles represent the towns and cities of figure 2.1] [the map is the modified version of: 'The physical map of Slovakia', - See more at: <<http://www.ezilon.com/maps/europe/slovakia-physical-maps.html>> (accessed: 1 July 2013)]

The '80 percent recommendation'	
The First Vienna Award	




Map 2.5: The strategic railway connection between Czechoslovakia and Romania (1938) [the map is the modified version of: *Köztes-Európa térképtár*, ed. by Pándi et al, map 198]



Map 2.6: The districts of Ruthenia inhabited by Magyars (marked by the red line)

(Note that the Vienna Award closely followed the ethnographic line and ceded these territories to Hungary on 2 November 1938) [source: 'Ruthenia, First Vienna Award', - See more at: <<http://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=233880>> (accessed: 1 November 2013)]



Map 2.7: The First Vienna Award (2 November 1938) [source: 'Az első bécsi döntéssel visszacsatolt területek', in *A XX. század krónikája*, ed. by I. Karádi et al (Budapest, 1994), p. 533.]




Map 2.8: Romanian demands in Ruthenia in March 1939 [the map is the modified version of: 'Ruthenia', - See more at: <http://www.euratlas.net/history/hisatlas/balkan_states/199445RU.html> (accessed: 12 November 2013)]

(**red area** – initial Romanian demand; **yellow area** – last Romanian demand; **blue line** – Rahó-Kőrösmező railway line)



Map 2.9: The Slovak territory occupied by Hungary in the mini-war (blue shaded area, April 1939) [source: 'Atlas of Slovakia', - See more at: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Atlas_of_Slovakia (accessed 15 July 2012)]



Map 2.10: The Corridor plans in Transylvania (1939) [the map is the modified version of: 'Magyarok Erdélyben' - See more at: <http://nagymagyarország.network.hu/kepek/klubkepek/magyarok_erdelyben> (accessed: 4 January 2013)]



Map 3.1: The Kassa-Velejte railway line (TNA, FO 925/20115)

		
Trianon frontier of Hungary (1920)	The First Vienna Award frontier (1938)	The Kassa-Velejte Railwayline



Map 3.2: The Hungarian strategic claim of the East-Carpathians (late 1939)


[the map is the modified version of: 'The map of Romania', - See more at: <<http://www.world-geographics.com/maps/europe/map-of-romania/>> (accessed: 12 April 2013)]

Hungarian frontier (September 1939)	Hungarian claim for the Eastern-Carpathians	The strategically crucial Focșani-Galați gap




Map 3.3: The frontiers of the November 1939 Foreign Office secret plan

Churchill's proposition at the Teheran Conference (November 1943) [the map is a modified version of: *Köztes-Európa térképtár*, ed. by Pándi et al, map 232c]




Map 3.4: Teleki's concept for revision in January 1940 [the map is the modified version of: 'Magyarország térképe 1939', - See more at: <<http://hungary-maps.myhonet.com/en/View-Map/Hungary-map-1939/mo1939/>> (accessed 7 June 2012)]




Map 3.5: The German offer of the Polish gas-fields to Hungary (September 1939)

[the map is the modified version of: *Köztes-Európa térképtár*, ed. by Pándi et al, map 205]




Map 3.6: The British-Romanian proposition for revision (January 1940) [the map is the modified version of: 'East Central and Southeast Europe nationality map', - See more at: <<http://www.mappery.com/East-Central-and-Southeast-Europe-Nationality-Map>> (accessed: 11 September 2012)]




Map 3.7: Foreign Office sketch-map of the anticipated Hungarian claims in Romania

(January 1940) (TNA, FO 371/24985, R 1892/246/37)



Map 3.8: The 'extended corridor-plan' in Transylvania (February 1940) [the map is the modified version of: 'Magyarok Erdélyben' - See more at: <http://nagy-magyarorszag.network.hu/kepek/klubkepek/magyarok_erdelyben> (accessed: 4 January 2013)]



Map 3.9: Teleki's official territorial claims (February 1940) [the map is the modified version of: 'Magyarok Erdélyben' - See more at: <http://nagy-magyarorszag.network.hu/kepek/klubkepek/magyarok_erdelyben> (accessed: 4 January 2013)]



Map 4.1: British and Italian positions in the Mediterranean (spring 1940)

Malta, etc. – British possessions, Tripoli, etc. – Italian possessions

[source: 'Allied Maritime Responsibilities', - See more at: <<http://www.naval-history.net/WW2CampaignsRNMed.htm>> (accessed: 3 May 2013)]



Map 4.2: **The presumable route** of the German military passage through Hungary (Spring 1940) [Note that the route crosses Yugoslav territory.]

[the map is the modified version of: 'Germany's borders before World War Two' in *Collier's World Atlas and Gazetteer*, ed. by P. F. Collier et al (London, 1940), p. 34]



Map 5.1a: The Arad-Sigeth line (TNA, FO 371/ 24984, R 6731/195/37)



Map 5.1b: The Arad-Sigeth line (TNA, FO 371/ 24984, R 6871/195/37)



Map 5.2: Mabbott's recommendations for the Hungarian-Romanian frontier (May 1940) (SEW 13/1)



Map 5.3: Bulgarian territorial claims for Southern Dobruja (1940)

[the map is the modified version of: 'Dobruja', - See more at: <<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dobruja>> (accessed: 9 November 2012)]


	1878-1913 frontier (the Bulgarian claim in 1940)
	1919-1940 frontier



Map 5.4: The Second Vienna Award (30 August 1940) compared to Hungary's original demands

[the map is the modified version of: 'Evolutia administrativ-teritoriala a Romaniei de la Cuza pana azi' - See more at: <<http://surupaceanu.ro/2011/06/evolutia-administrativ-teritoriala-a-romaniei-de-la-cuza-pana-azi/#sthash.9OPaQ2KQ.dpuf>> (accessed: 4 August 2012)]

The Hungarian demand	
The Second Vienna Award	



Map 6.1: Bulgaria's territorial changes


Bulgaria in the interwar period

Bulgarian territorial claims: **Thrace** and **South-Dobruja**


[the map is the modified version of: *Köztes-Európa térképtár*, ed. by Pándi et al, map 325]



Map 6.2: Hungarian claim for the **Drava triangle** [the map is the modified version of: 'Map of Yugoslavia 1939', - See more at: <<http://maps.nationmaster.com/country/yu/1>> (accessed: 11 October 2012)]




Map 6.3: The Teschen dispute between Czechoslovakia and Poland [the map is the modified version of: 'Czechoslovakia 1938', - See more at: <<http://movelands.com/czechoslovakia/>> (accessed: 21 August 2013)]



Map 6.4: Ruthenia, as a corridor between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union

[the map is the modified version of: *Köztes-Európa térképtár*, ed. by Pándi et al, map 198]



Map 6.5: The **Hungarian occupation** of Northern parts of Yugoslavia (April 1941)

[the map is the modified version of: *Köztes-Európa térképtár*, ed. by Pándi et al, map 211]



Map 6.6: The German plan for a **Swabian buffer state** (1941)

[the map is the modified version of: *Köztes-Európa térképtár*, ed. by Pándi et al, map 224]

8. 2. Tables

	Central Department (1938)
Head of Department	William Strang
Superintending Under-Secretary	Orme Sargent
Senior official	C. W. Baxter
Senior official	W. I. Mallet
	F. K. Roberts
	R. E. Barkley
	W. G. Lawford
	P. F. Hancock
Responsibility: Belgium, Danzig, Germany, Poland, Europe general	

Table: 1.1: The Central department of the Foreign Office (1938)

	Southern Department (1938)
Head of Department	E. M. B. Ingram
Superintending Under-Secretary	O. Sargent
Senior official	P. B. B. Nichols
	A. N. N. Noble
	C. Bramwell
	G. L. McDermott
	A. D. M. Ross
Responsibility: Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Austria, Yugoslavia, Romania, etc.	

Table: 1.2: The Southern department of the Foreign Office (1938)

	Central Department (1939)
Head of Department	William Strang
Superintending Under-Secretary	Orme Sargent
Senior official	I. A. Kirkpatrick
	R. M. Makins
	F. K. Roberts
	R. L. Speaight
	R. E. Barclay
	R. W. Selby
Responsibility: Belgium, Danzig, Germany, Poland, Europe general	

Table: 1.3: The Central department of the Foreign Office (1939)

	Southern Department (1939)
Head of Department	E. M. B. Ingram
Superintending Under-Secretary	O. Sargent
Senior official	P. B. B. Nichols
	A. N. N. Noble
	J. E. Coulson
	C. H. S. Barclay
	F. D. W. Brown
Responsibility: Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Austria, Yugoslavia, Romania, etc.	

Table: 1.4: The Southern department of the Foreign Office (1939)

	Central Department (1940)
Head of Department	I. A. Kirkpatrick
Superintending Under-Secretary	William Strang
Senior official	R. M. Makins
	F. K. Roberts
	A. F. Orchard
	G. P. Young
	R. E. Barclay
Responsibility: Germany, Poland, Hungary, France, Europe general, etc.	

Table: 1.5: The Central department of the Foreign Office (1940)

	Southern Department (1940)
Head of Department	P. B. B. Nichols
Superintending Under-Secretary	O. Sargent
Senior official	A. N. N. Noble
	R. J. Bowker
	P. Broad
	C. A. E. Suckhburg
	F. D. W. Brown
Responsibility: Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, etc.	

Table: 1.6: The Southern department of the Foreign Office (1940)

	Central Department (1941)
Head of Department	R. M. Makins
Superintending Under-Secretary	William Strang
Senior official	F. K. Roberts
	G. M. Warr
	J. G. Ward
	M.S. Williams
	J. Y. Mackenzie
<u>Responsibility:</u> Germany, Poland, Hungary, France, Europe general, etc.	

Table: 1.7: The Central department of the Foreign Office (1941)

	Southern Department (1941)
Head of Department	P. B. B. Nichols
Superintending Under-Secretary	O. Sargent
Senior official	R. J. Bowker
	P. J. Dixon
	E. M. Rose
	E. R. Warner
<u>Responsibility:</u> Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, etc.	

Table: 1.8: The Southern department of the Foreign Office (1941)

The ethnic structure of Hungary (1910) (without Croatia)	
Magyars	54%
Germans	10.5%
Romanians	16%
Slovaks	10.5%
Serbs	2.5%
Ruthenians	2.5%
Others	4%

Table 1.9: The ethnic structure of Hungary (1910)

Country (Location of Embassy/Mission):	British Representative:	Representative in Britain:
Bulgaria (Sophia)	George Rendel	Nicolas Momtchiloff
France (Paris)	Sir Eric Phipps, Sir Ronald H. Campbell (from 1/11/39)	Charles Corbin
Hungary (Budapest)	Sir Geoffrey Knox, Owen O'Malley (from 11/04/39)	György Barcza
Italy (Rome)	Lord Perth, Sir Percy Loraine (from 1/9/39)	Giuseppe Bastianini
Poland (Government in Exile, Angers)	Sir Howard Kennard	Count Edward Raczyński
Romania (Bucharest)	Sir Reginald Hoare	Viorel Virgil Tilea
U.S.A. (Washington)	Lord Lothian, Lord Halifax (from 30/11/40)	Joseph Kennedy
U.S.S.R. (Moscow)	Sir William Seeds, Sir Stafford Cripps (30/5/40)	Ivan Maisky
Yugoslavia (Belgrade)	Sir R.H. Campbell, Ronald I. Campbell (from 13/12/39)	Ivan Soubotich

Table 1. 1: List of diplomatic representatives in selected countries (1938-41)

<u>List of districts in Slovakia having Magyar majorities.</u>			
	<u>No. of CS subjects.</u>	<u>No. of Magyars</u>	
Dala Stara	52,676	36,940	70%
Feledince	32,565	25,195	77%
Galanta	66,922	41,474	62%
Chlumec Královský	37,817	29,832	79%
Kapušany Velké	20,304	11,314	58%
Komárno	64,098	53,154	83%
Sahy	23,671	16,983	72%
Moldava nad Bodvou	29,739	16,737	56%
Parkan	48,413	39,483	88%
Streda Dunajská	44,296	39,070	92%
Saľa	51,192	28,431	56%
Samorín	35,135	27,030	77%
Tornal'a	21,297	17,701	80%
<u>Carpathian Russia</u>			
Berehovo	59,330	42,321	72%

Table 2.1: The recommendation of the Foreign Office of the cities and towns to be transferred to Hungary (September 1938)

9. Glossary:

Cordon Sanitaire – “sanitary cordon”; after the Great War it originally denoted a barrier (consisting of the Baltic States, Poland and Romania) implemented to stop the spread of Communism.

De facto - In international law, it means “in practice, but not officially established.” It is commonly used in contrast to *de jure*.

De jure - “concerning law”.

Démarche – a formal and often strongly worded diplomatic representation of the official position, on a specific subject from one government to another.

Diktat - A diktat is a statute or harsh settlement imposed upon a defeated party or country by the victor(s).

Droit de passage - right of military passage.

Fait accompli – “an accomplished fact”

Gleichschaltung – “the forced exploitation, or standardization of political and social institutions under an authoritarian regime”

Per se – “as such, or as a matter of law”

Primus inter pares – “first among equals”

Volte face – “a dramatic change in mood or tone”

10. Bibliography:

UNPUBLISHED PRIMARY SOURCES:

GREAT BRITAIN

LONDON

THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES (TNA):

Board of Trade: BT 11: Commercial Relations and Exports

BT 60: Department of Overseas Trade: Correspondence and Papers

British Council: BW 36: British Council: Registered Files, Hungary

Cabinet Office: CAB 23: Cabinet Minutes and Conclusions (pre-1939)

CAB 24: Cabinet Memoranda (pre-1939)

CAB 27: Foreign Policy Committee Minutes and Conclusions (pre-1939)

CAB 65: War Cabinet Minutes and Conclusions

CAB 66: Chiefs of Staff Committee Meetings

CAB 67: War Cabinet Minutes and Conclusions

CAB 68: War Cabinet Memoranda

CAB 117: War Cabinet: Reconstruction Secretariat: Correspondence and Papers

Foreign Office: FO 371: Foreign Office: General Correspondence, Political Correspondence, etc. of the Political Departments

FO 395: News Department

FO 404: Confidential Print Central Europe

FO 417: Confidential Print Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary

FO 434: Confidential Print Southern Europe

FO 800: Private Office papers of Foreign Secretaries, etc.

The Papers of Sir Orme Sargent, FO 800/272-279

The Papers of Sir Alexander Cadogan, FO 800/293-294

The Papers of Lord Halifax, FO 800/309-28

FO 898: Files of the Political Intelligence Department (P.I.D.)

FO 925: Maps and Plans

FO 930: Ministry of Information and Foreign Office: Foreign Publicity Files

MPK 1: Maps and plans extracted to flat storage from various series of records of the Foreign Office

Ministry of Economic Warfare:

FO 837: War trade and contraband control

Ministry of Transport:

MT 70-73: Shipping Division

Papers of the Prime Minister's Office:

PREM 1: Correspondence and Papers

PREM 3: Prime Minister's Office Papers (1940)

PREM 4: Prime Minister's Office Papers (1941)

Treasury files: T 160: Finance files

T 188: Papers of Sir Frederick Leith-Ross

War Office: WO 106: Directorate of Military Operations and Military Intelligence, and predecessors: Correspondence and Papers

WO 190: Directorate of Military Operations and Intelligence: German and adjacent Countries Military Situation Reports (Appreciation Files)

WO 193: Directorate of Military Operations and Plans, later Directorate of Military Operations: Files concerning Military Planning, Intelligence and Statistics (Collation Files)

SCHOOL OF SLAVONIC AND EASTERN-EUROPEAN STUDIES LIBRARY (SSEES):

R. W. Seton-Watson papers - SEW

Oxford

WESTERN MANUSCRIPT COLLECTION, BODLEIAN LIBRARY (BLOU):

Papers of Geoffrey Dawson – MSS Dawson

Papers of C. A. Macartney - PCAM

Birmingham

UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM, SPECIAL COLLECTIONS DEPARTMENT, CHAMBERLAIN
ARCHIVES:

Papers of Neville Chamberlain - GB 150 NC

Cambridge

CHURCHILL COLLEGE, CHURCHILL ARCHIVES CENTRE (CAC)

Papers of Sir Alexander Cadogan - GBR/0014/ACAD

Caversham

BBC WRITTEN ARCHIVES CENTRE (BBC-WAC)

Contributors Talk: C. A. Macartney

E 1: Countries: Hungary

E 2: Foreign General: Hungarian Service

Hungarian Talk Scripts, C. A. Macartney

Radio Talks Scripts: T 624

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

STANFORD UNIVERSITY

HOOVER INSTITUTION ARCHIVES (HIA):

Diaries of György Barcza

HUNGARY

BUDAPEST

MAGYAR ORSZÁGOS LEVÉLTÁR (MOL):

MS-Szentiványi

The Papers of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

K 27 Minutes of Cabinet Meetings

K 28 Minority Department

K 63 Political Department

K 64 Reserved (Top Secret) files

K 66 Press Department

ORSZÁGOS SZÉCHENYI KÖNYVTÁR (OSZK)

Fond X, Géza Szüllő Papers

PUBLISHED DOCUMENTS:

I documenti diplomatici italiani (DDI) (Ottavo serie: 1935–1939) vol. 8-11, ed. by G. Andre (Rome, 2007)

Documents on International Affairs, 1936, 1937, 1938, 1939-45, ed. by M. Curtis (London, 1939-43).

Diplomáciai iratok Magyarország külpolitikájához 1936-1945 (DIMK) 5 vols., ed. by M. Ádám, L. Kerekes and L. Zsigmond (Budapest 1965-1982)

München 1938, Diplomáciai és Politikai Dokumentumok, ed. by I. Harsányi et al (Budapest, 1988)

Parliamentary Debates, *Hansard* (Commons)

Parliamentary Debates, *Hansard* (Lords)

War and Peace Aims of the United Nations: September 1 1939-December 31 1942, ed. by L. W. Holborn (New York, 1943)

A Wilhelmstrasse és Magyarország, Német diplomáciai iratok Magyarországról 1933-1944, ed. by Gy. Juhász et al (Budapest, 1968)

British Policy on Hungary, 1918-1919: A Documentary Sourcebook, ed. by M. Lojko (London, 1995)

Ciano's diplomatic papers, ed. by M. Muggeridge (London, 1948)

A Palazzo Chigi és Magyarország. Olasz Diplomáciai Dokumentumok Magyarországról. A Darányi-kormány megalakulásától a Szovjetunió elleni hadüzenetig (1936-1941), ed. by Gy. Réti (Budapest , 2007)

British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print (BDFA), ed. by K. Bourne and D. C. Watt part II. vol. 3 (Cleveland, 1990)

Documents on German Foreign Policy (DGFP), ser. D, vols. 7-12, ed. by P. R. Sweet et al (Washington, 1954)

Horthy Miklós titkos iratai, ed. by M. Szinai and L. Szűcs (Budapest, 1962)

The Hungarian question in the British Parliament, ed. by R. E. L. Williams (London, 1933)

Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939 (DBFP), ser. 3, vols. 3-5, ed. by E. L. Woodward et al (London, vol. 3: 1950; vol. 4: 1951; vol. 5: 1952)

PRIMARY PUBLISHED SOURCES:

- Gy. Barcza, *Diplomataemlékeim, Magyarország volt vatikáni és londoni követének emlékirataiból 1911-1945*, 2 vols. (Budapest, 1994)
- H. J. Bruce, *Silken Dalliance* (London, 1947)
- H. J. Bruce, *Thirty Dozen Moons* (London, 1949)
- R. A. Butler, *The Art of the Possible. The Memoires of Lord Butler* (London, 1971)
- N. Chamberlain, *The Struggle for Peace* (London, 1939)
- W. L. S. Churchill, *The Second World War*, vol. 1: *The Grand Alliance* (Boston, 1951)
- J. Colville, *The Fringes of Power: Downing Street Diaries 1939-1945* (London, 1985)
- Collin Brooks, *Fleet Street, Press Barons and Politics: The Journals of Collin Brooks, 1932-1940*, ed. by N. J. Crowson (Cambridge, 1998)
- L. Cs. Szabó, *Doveri átkelés, Nyugat-európai helyzetkép* (Budapest, 1937)
- H. Dalton, *The Fatefull Years: Memoires 1931-1945* (London, 1957)
- B. Davidson, *Special Operations Europe: Scenes from the Anti-Nazi War* (London, 1980)
- The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan*, ed. by D. Dilks (London, 1971)
- A. Eden, *The Eden Memoires*, vol. 3: *The Reckoning* (London, 1965)
- G. Gafencu, *Last Days of Europe, a Diplomatic Journey in 1939* (New Heaven, 1948)
- Lord Halifax, *Fullness of Days* (London, 1957)
- The Diplomatic Diaries of Oliver Harvey 1937-1940* 2 vols, ed. by J. Harvey (London, 1970)
- T. Hohler, *Diplomatic Petrel* (London, 1942)
- Gy. Kellner, *Magyar antifasiszták Angliában, 1940-1945* (Budapest, 1983)
- B. Lockhart, *Guns or Butter. War countries and peace countries of Europe revisited* (London, 1938)
- B. Lockhart, *Friends, Foes, and Foreigners* (London, 1957)
- A madridi nagykövetségtől Mauthausenig. Andorka Rudolf Naplója*, ed. by Zs. Lőrincz (Budapest, 1978)
- Marie Queen of Romania, *The Story of My Life* (New York, 1934)
- G. Ciano, *Diaries, 1937-1943. The Complete, Unabridged Diaries of Count Galeazzo Ciano, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1936-1943*, ed. by R. Miller et al (London, 2002)

H. Nicolson, Diaries and letters 1930-1939, N. Nicholson (London, 1967)
O. St. C. O'Malley, The Phantom Caravan (London, 1954)
The Second World War Diary of Hugh Dalton 1940-45 2 vols., ed. by B. Pimlott
 (London, 1986)
W. Price, Year of Reckoning (London, 1939)
F. Roberts, Dealing with Dictators: The Destructions & Revival of Europe, 1930-70
 (London, 1991)
Rothermere, 1st Viscount: My Campaign for Hungary (London, 1939)
W. Selby, Diplomatic Twilight, 1930-40 (London, 1953)
S. Stevenson, Ride to Battle (London, 1939)
Viscount Simon, Retrospect (London, 1952)
Envoy Extraordinary: Memoires of a Romanian Diplomat, Viorel Virgil Tilea, ed. by I.
 Tilea (London, 1998)
R. G. Vansittart, The Mist Procession (London, 1958)
The Diaries of Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, 2 vols. ed. by K. Young (London 1973,
 1980)
E. Wiskemann, The Europe I saw (London, 1968)

NEWSPAPERS:

Contemporary Review
Daily Express
Daily Mail
Daily Telegraph
Evening Standard
Free Europe
Manchester Guardian
Sunday Times
The Economist
The New Statesman
The Times

SECONDARY PUBLISHED SOURCES

BOOKS:

- B. Ablonczy, *Pál Teleki, The Life of a Controversial Hungarian Politician* (New York, 2006)
- I. Acsárdy, *A magyar birodalom története*, 2 vols. (Budapest, 1904)
- M. Ádám, *Hungary and the Little Entente* (Budapest, 1976)
- M. Ádám, *The Versailles System and Central Europe* (London, 2004)
- J. (Gyula) Andrásy, *The Development of the Hungarian Constitutional Liberty* (London, 1908)
- E. Andics, *Nemzetiségi kérdés, nemzetiségi politika* (Budapest, 1946)
- E. Andics, *Fasizmus és reakció Magyarországon* (Budapest, 1946)
- E. M. Andrews, *Isolationism & Appeasement in Australia - Reactions to the European Crises, 1935-1939* (London, 1970)
- L. Antal, J. R. Nowak and T. Olszański, *Barátok a bajban: lengyel menekültek Magyarországon, 1939-1945* (Budapest, 1985)
- Justice for Hungary!* ed. by A. Apponyi (Budapest, 1928)
- L. Arday, *Térkép csata után, Magyarország a brit külpolitikában 1918-1919* (Budapest, 2009)
- M. Balfour, *Propaganda in War, 1939-1945: Organisations, Policies and Publics in Britain and Germany* (London, 2010)
- B. L. Balogh, *A magyar-román kapcsolatok 1939-1940-ben és a második bécsi döntés* (Csíkszereda, 2002)
- B. L. Balogh, *The Second Vienna Awards and Hungarian-Romanian relations, 1940-44* (New York, 2011)
- A. D. Bán, *Pax Britannica, Brit külügyi iratok a második világháború utáni Kelet-Közép-Európáról 1942-1943* (Budapest, 1996)
- A. D. Bán, *Hungarian-British Diplomacy 1938-1941, the attempt to maintain relations* (London, 2004)
- E. Barker, *British policy towards South-East Europe in the Second World War* (London, 1976)
- A. E. Bartlett, *The Tragedy of Central Europe* (London, 1923)

- G. Bátonyi, *Britain and Central Europe, 1918-1933* (Oxford, 1999)
- P. M. H. Bell, *The Origins of the Second World War in Europe* (London, 2007)
- South-Eastern Europe. A Political and Economic Survey prepared by the Information Department of the Royal Institute of International Affairs in collaboration with the London and Cambridge Economic Service*, ed. by F. Benham (Oxford, 1939)
- Earl of Birkenhead, *The life of Lord Halifax* (London, 1965)
- Á. Beretzky, *Scotus Viator és Macartney Elemér: Magyarország-kép változó előjelekkel (1906-1945)* (Budapest, 2005)
- Count S. Bethlen, *The Treaty of Trianon and European Peace* (London, 1934)
- M. Beza, *Bessarabia and Transylvania. An Explanation with 5 Maps* (London, 1940)
- U. Bialer, *The Shadow of the Bomber: The Fear of Air Attack and British Politics 1932-1939* (London, 1980)
- L. Boia, *Romania's Diplomatic Relations with Yugoslavia in the Interwar Period: 1919-1941* (New York, 1993)
- L. Boia, *History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness* (London, 2001)
- E. Bojtár, *Európa megrablása. A balti államok bekebelezésének története dokumentumok tükrében, 1939-1989* (Budapest, 1989)
- B. Bond, *British Military Policy between the Two World Wars* (Oxford, 1980)
- B. Bond, *Britain, France and Belgium, 1939-1940* (London, 1990)
- R. Bosworth, *Mussolini* (London, 2010)
- The Origins of World War Two: The Debate Continues*, ed. by R. Boyce and J. A. Maiolo (Basingstoke, 2003)
- W. B. Forster Bovill, *Hungary and the Hungarians* (London, 1908)
- P. R. Brass, *Ethnic Groups and the State* (London, 1985)
- F.R. Bridge, *Great Britain and Austria-Hungary 1906-1914* (London, 1972)
- A. Briggs, *The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom*, vol. 3: *The War of Words* (Oxford, 1995)
- M. D. Brown, *Dealing With Democrats: The British Foreign Office and the Czechoslovak Émigrés in Great Britain, 1939 to 1945* (London, 2006)
- R. Bullen, *The Foreign Office, 1782-1982* (London, 1984)
- K. J. Calder, *Britain and the Origins of the New Europe 1914-1918* (Cambridge, 2008)
- D. Carlton, *Antony Eden* (London, 1981)
- M. J. Carley, *1939: The Alliance That Never Was and the Coming of World War II*

(London, 2009)

E. H. Carr, *Britain: A Study of Foreign Policy from the Versailles Treaty to the outbreak of War* (London, 1939)

E. H. Carr, *International Relations between the Two World Wars, 1919–1939* (London, 1947)

B. Carthledge, *The Will to Survive: A History of Hungary* (New York, 2011)

H. Case, *Between States, The Transylvanian Question and the European Idea during World War II* (Stanford, 2009)

C. Catherwood, *The Balkans in World War Two: Britain's Balkan Dilemma* (Basingstoke, 2003)

Cato, *Guilty Men* (London, 1941)

E. Chászár, *Decision in Vienna: The Czechoslovak-Hungarian border dispute of 1938* (Bratislava, 1978)

W. S. Churchill, *The Second World War. Their Finest Hour*, vol. 2, (Cambridge, 1949)

W. S. Churchill, *The Second World War*, vol. 6: *Triumph and Tragedy* (London, 2005)

A. Christie, *The Secret of Chimneys* (London, 1924)

A. M. Cienciala, *Poland and the Western Powers 1938-1939: a study in the interdependence of Eastern and Western Europe* (London, 1968)

R. Cole, *Britain and the "War of Words" in Neutral Europe, 1939-45: Art of the Possible* (Basingstoke, 1990)

Collier's World Atlas and Gazetteer, ed. by P. F. Collier et al (London, 1940)

J. Connel, *Wavell, Scholar and Soldier to June 1941* (London, 1964)

J. Connel, *The 'Office': A study of British foreign policy and its makers, 1919-1951* (London, 1985)

D. S. Cornelius, *Hungary in World War II, Caught in the Cauldron* (Fordham, 2011)

M. Cornwall, *The Undermining of Austria-Hungary. The Battle for Hearts and Minds* (London, 2000)

B. Correlli, *The Collapse of British Power* (London, 1984)

C. Cunningham, *What I saw in Hungary* (London, 1931)

A. Czettler, *Teleki Pál és a magyar külpolitika 1939-41* (Budapest, 1997)

H. Dalton, *Hitler's War Before and After* (London, 1940)

L. Deák, *Viedenská arbitráž - "Mnichov pre Slovensko"* (Bratislava, 1998)

D. Deletant, *Hitler's Forgotten Ally: Ion Antonescu and his Regime, Romania 1940-*

- 1944 (Basingstoke, 2006)
- R. Denniston, *Churchill's Secret War: Diplomatic Decrypts, the Foreign Office and Turkey 1942-44* (London, 2009)
- L. Dombrády, *Hadsereg és politika Magyarországon 1938-1944* (Budapest, 1986)
- C. D. Eby, *Hungary at War: Civilians and Soldiers in World War II* (State College, 1998)
- F. Eckhart, *Jog és alkotmánytörténet. A magyar történetírás új útjai* (Budapest, n. d.)
- F. Eckhart, *A Short History of the Hungarian People* (London, 1931)
- J. Evans, *Great Britain and the Creation of Yugoslavia: Negotiating Balkan Nationality and Identity* (London, 2007)
- R. J. W. Evans, *Great Britain and East-Central Europe, 1908-48. A Study in Perceptions* (London, 2002)
- J. D. E. Evans, *That Blue Danube* (London, 1935)
- Undeclared War, 1940-1941*, ed. by W. I. Everett Gleason and S. Langer (New York, 1953)
- M. Frank, *Expelling the Germans: British Opinion and Post-1945 Population Transfer in Context* (Oxford, 2008)
- M. Fülöp and P. Sipos, *Magyarország külpolitikája a XX. században* (Budapest, 1998)
- M. Fülöp, *A Befejezetlen Béke. A Külügyminiszterek Tanácsa és a Magyar Békeszervződés (1947)* (Debrecen, 2008)
- D. Garnett, *The secret history of PWE, 1939–46. The Political Warfare Executive* (London, 2002)
- J. Gehl, *Austria, Germany, and the Anschluss, 1931–1938* (London, 1963)
- Grand Strategy*, vol. 1-6, ed. by J. R. M. Butler et al (London, 1956-1976)
- D. Gillard, *Appeasement in Crisis, From Munich to Prague, October 1938–March 1939* (London, 2007)
- M. Gilbert, *Winston Spencer Churchill. Finest Hour 1939-1941* (London, 2009)
- M. R. Gordon, *Conflict and Consensus in Labour's Foreign Policy, 1914-1965* (Stanford, 1969)
- G. Gorodetsky, *Stafford Cripps' Mission to Moscow, 1940-42* (Cambridge, 2002)
- P. Gosztonyi, *A magyar honvédség a második világháborúban* (Budapest, 1992)
- Sir R. Gower, *Treaty-revision and the Hungarian Frontiers* (London, 1936)
- Sir R. Gower, *The Hungarian Minorities in the Successor States* (London, 1937)

- J. Greene and A. Massignani, *Naval War in the Mediterranean* (London, 2011)
- W. D. Grenzebach, *Germany's Informal Empire in East-Central Europe: German Economic Policy Toward Yugoslavia and Rumania, 1933-1939* (London, 1988)
- R. Győri Szabó, *Magyarország 20. századi külpolitikája* (Budapest, 2010)
- Károlyi Mihály levelezése*, ed. by T. Hajdu (Budapest, 1978)
- E. Hantos, *The Magna Carta of the English and the Hungarian Constitution* (London, 1904)
- V. O' Hara, *Struggle for the Middle Sea. The great navies at war in the Mediterranean* (London, 2009)
- Scribble, scribble, scribble - historical essays, documents, reviews and personal reflections on Britain and Hungary*, ed. by É. Haraszti-Taylor (Nottingham, 2001)
- J. Harris, *The Somme: Death of a generation* (London, 1966)
- R. Haynes, *Romanian Policy towards Germany, 1936-40* (Basingstoke, 2000)
- P. N. Hehn, *A Low and Dishonest Decade, the great powers, Eastern Europe, and the economic origins of World War II, 1930-1941* (New York, 2006)
- A. Henderson, *Labour's foreign policy* (London, 1933)
- J. Herman, *Paris Embassy of Sir Eric Phipps: Anglo-French Relations and Foreign Office, 1937-1939* (Eastbourne, 1998)
- The Foreign Office List and Diplomatic and Consular Yearbook for 1941*, ed. by G. E. P. Hertslet et al (London, 1941)
- C. Hill, *Cabinet Decisions on Foreign Policy, October 1938-June 1941* (London, 1991)
- K. Hitchins, *Rumania 1866-1947* (Oxford, 1994)
- War and Peace Aims of the United Nations: September 1 1939-December 31 1942*, ed. by Louise W. Holborn (New York, 1943)
- B. Hóman and Gy. Szekfű, *Magyar Történet*, 5 vols. (Budapest, 1928)
- J. B. Hoptner, *Yugoslavia in Crisis 1934-1941* (New York, 1962)
- M. Howard, *The Continental Commitment: The Dilemma of British Defence Policy in the Era of the Two World Wars* (London, 1972)
- D. Hucker, *Public Opinion and the End of Appeasement in Britain and France* (Farnham, 2011)
- Hungaricus Viator [M. Fenyő], *The Trianon Treaty and its Consequences* (Budapest, 1929)
- B. Iványi-Grünwald, *Egyetemes történet*, 4 vols. (Budapest, 1935)

- R. R. James, *Anthony Eden* (London, 1987)
- K. H. Jarausch, *The Four Power Pact* (Whitewater, 1965)
- O. Jászi, *A Monarchia jövője. A dualizmus bukása és a Dunai Egyesült Államok* (Budapest, 1918)
- K. Jeffrey, *The History of the Secret Intelligence Service, 1909-1949* (London, 2011)
- B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans: vol. 2: Twentieth Century* (Cambridge, 1983)
- R. Jenkins, *Churchill: A Biography* (London, 2002)
- G. Jeszenszky, *Az elveszett presztízs: Magyarország megítélésének megváltozása Nagy-Britanniában (1894-1918)* (Budapest, 1994)
- J. Johancsik, *Magyarország külpolitikája 1918-1999* (Budapest, 2010)
- A. C. Johnson, *Anthony Eden: A biography* (London, 2010)
- C. Jones, *E. H. Carr and International Relations: A Duty to Lie* (Cambridge, 1998)
- T. Joó Tibor, *A magyar nemzeteszme* (Budapest, 1939)
- Gy. Juhász, *A Teleki-kormány külpolitikája 1939-41* (Budapest, 1964)
- Gy. Juhász, *Brit-magyar titkos tárgyalások 1943-ban* (Budapest, 1978)
- Gy. Juhász, *Magyarország külpolitikája 1919-1945* (Budapest, 1988)
- D. Kaiser, *Economic Diplomacy and the Origins of the Second World War: Germany, Britain, France and Eastern Europe, 1930-1939* (Princeton, 1980)
- A. A. Kallis, *Fascist Ideology. Territory and Expansionism in Italy and Germany, 1922-1945* (London, 2000)
- K. Kádár-Lynn, *Tibor Eckhardt: His American Years, 1941-1972* (New York, 2007)
- Bibó István Összegyűjtött Munkái*, 4 vols., ed. by I. Kemény and M. Sárközi (Bern, 1984)
- A XX. század krónikája*, ed. by I. Karádi et al (Budapest, 1994)
- I. Kershaw, *Making Friends with Hitler: Lord Londonderry and Britain's Road to War* (London, 2005)
- I. Kertész, *Általános békerevízió vagy a Trianoni béke revíziója?* (Budapest, 1933)
- J. M. Keynes, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* (New York, 1971)
- M. Kitchen, *British Policy Towards the Soviet Union During the Second World War* (Basingstoke, 1986)
- M. Knox, *Mussolini unleashed, 1939-1941: politics and strategy in fascist Italy's last war* (Cambridge, 1982)
- K. Kocsis, E. Kocsis-Hódosi, *Hungarian Minorities in the Carpathian Basin* (Toronto,

1995)

G. Kolko, *The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy 1943-1945* (New York, 1968)

A. Kolontári, *Magyar-szovjet diplomáciai kapcsolatok 1920-1941* (Budapest, 2009)

L. Kontler, *A History of Hungary: Millennium in Central Europe* (London, 2002)

D. Kosáry, *A History of Hungary* (New York, 1941)

L. Kühnhardt, *Crises in European Integration: challenge and response, 1945–2005* (London, 2009)

I. Lajos, *Németország háború esélyei a német szakirodalom tükrében* (Budapest, 1939)

S. Lawlor, *Churchill and the politics of war, 1940-1941* (Cambridge, 1994)

C. Leibovitz, *The Chamberlain-Hitler deal* (London, 1993)

T. L. Lewis, *Prisms of British Appeasement, Revisionist reputation of John Simon, Samuel Hoare, Anthony Eden, Lord Halifax, Alfred Duff Cooper* (Eastbourne, 2011)

M. Lojkó, *Meddling in Middle Europe: Britain and the 'Lands Between', 1919-1925* (Budapest, 2006)

Gy. Lukacs, *Injustices of the Treaty of Trianon* (Budapest, 1928)

J. Lukacs, *The Duel: The Eighty-Day Struggle Between Churchill and Hitler* (New Heaven, 2001)

J. Lukacs, *Five Days in London, May 1940* (New Heaven, 2001)

D. B Lungu, *Romania and the Great Powers, 1933-1940* (Durham, 1989)

C. A. Macartney, *Hungary* (London, 1934)

C. A. Macartney, *Hungary and Her Successors. The Treaty of Trianon and its Consequences 1919-1937* (London, 1937)

C. A. Macartney, *The Danubian Basin* (London, 1939)

C. A. Macartney, *Problems of the Danubian Basin* (Cambridge, 1942)

C. A. Macartney, *October Fifteen. The History of Modern Hungary 1929-1945* vol. 1-2, (Edinburgh, 1957)

C. A. Macartney and A. W. Palmer, *Independent Eastern Europe* (London, 1962)

C. A. Macartney, *National States and National Minorities* (London, 1968)

R. MacHray, *The Struggle for the Danube and the Little Entente, 1929-1938* (London, 1938)

P. R. Magocsi, *The Shaping of a National Identity: 'Subcarpathian Rus', 1848-1948*, (Cambridge, 1978)

- E. Mályusz, *A népiség története* (Budapest, 1931)
- S. Mănuilă, *La Population de la Dobroudja* (Bucarest, 1939)
- Origins of the Second World War Reconsidered*, ed. by G. Martel (London, 1999)
- V. Mastny, *Russia's Road to the Cold War: Diplomacy, Warfare and Politics of Communism, 1941-1945* (New York, 1980)
- The Origins of the Second World War: An International Perspective*, ed. by F. McDonough (London, 2011)
- E. McGilvray, *A Military Government in Exile: The Polish Government in Exile 1939-1945, a Study of Discontent* (London, 2010)
- W. M. Medlicott, *The Economic Blockade* 2 vols. (London, 1953, 1959)
- Juh Slovenska po Viedeňskej arbitráži 1938 – 1945*, ed. by J. Mitáč (Bratislava 2011)
- A. Millett and M. Williamson, *A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War* (Cambridge, 2001)
- A. Mitrovic, *Serbia's Great War, 1914-1918* (Lafayette, 2007)
- W. O'. Molony, *Nationality and the Peace Treaties* (London, 1934)
- K. Morgan, *Ramsay Macdonald* (London, 2006)
- A. Murad, *Franz Joseph I of Austria and his Empire* (New York, 1968)
- G. Murányi, *Egy epizódista főszerepe. Lajos Iván történész élete és halála* (Budapest, 2006)
- W. Murray and A. Millett, *A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War* (Cambridge, 2001)
- J. Musil, *The End of Czechoslovakia* (Budapest, 2000)
- K. Naziny, *The Political Economy of Grand Strategy* (New York, 2007)
- K. Neilson, *Britain, Soviet Russia and the collapse of the Versailles order, 1919-1939*, (Cambridge, 2009)
- S. Newman, *March 1939: The British Guarantee to Poland: Study in the Continuity of British Foreign Policy* (Oxford, 1976)
- A. Ogden, *Through Hitler's Back Door: SOE Operations in Hungary, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria 1939-45* (London, 2010)
- M. Ormos, *Mussolini* (Budapest, 1973)
- M. Ormos, *Padutól Trianonig, 1918-1920* (Budapest, 1978)
- M. Ormos, *Magyarország a két világháború korában* (Budapest, 2000)
- A. Orzoff, *Battle for the Castle: The Myth of Czechoslovakia in Europe, 1914-1948*

(New York, 2011)

The Makers of British Foreign Policy: From Pitt to Thatcher, ed. by T. Otte

(Basingstoke, 2001)

A History of Hungary, ed. by E. Pamlényi (New York, 1973)

Köztes-Európa térképtár, 1763-1993, ed. by L. Pándi et al (Budapest, 1993)

R. A. C. Parker, *Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War* (London, 1993)

P. Pastor and Gy. Juhász, *A moszkvai magyar követség jelentései: 1935-1941* (Budapest, 1992)

A. J. Patterson, *The Magyars: Their Country and Institutions*, 2 vols. (London, 1869)

G. C. Peden, *British Rearmament and the Treasury, 1932-39* (Edinburgh, 1979)

The Mediterranean and the Middle East, vol. 1. *The Early Successes against Italy*, ed. by I. S. O. Playfair et al (London, 1954)

A. J. Prazmowska, *Britain and Poland 1939-1943: The Betrayed Ally* (Cambridge, 1995)

A. J. Prazmowska, *Eastern Europe and the Origins of the Second World War* (Basingstoke, 2000)

A. J. Prazmowska, *Britain, Poland and the Eastern Front, 1939* (Cambridge, 2004)

P. Pritz, *Magyarország külpolitikája Gömbös Gyula miniszterelnöksége idején 1932-1936* (Budapest, 1982)

P. Pritz, *Magyar diplomácia a két világháború között* (Budapest, 1995)

Integrációs törekvések Közép- és Kelet-Európában a 19-20. Században, ed. by P. Pritz (Budapest, 1997)

P. Pritz, *Bárdossy László* (Budapest, 2001)

Magyarország helye a XX. századi Európában, ed. by P. Pritz et al (Budapest, 2002)

P. Pritz, *The War Crimes Trial of Hungarian Prime Minister László Bárdossy* (New York, 2005)

P. Pritz, *Magyar külpolitikai gondolkodás a 20. században* (Budapest, 2006)

P. Pritz, *Az objektivitás mítosza? Hazánk és a nagyvilág. 20. századi metszetek*, (Budapest, 2011)

G. J. Prothero, *Searching for Security in a New Europe: The Diplomatic Career of Sir George Russell Clerk* (London, 2006)

P. D. Quinlan, *Clash over Romania, British and American Policies towards Romania:*

1938-1947 (Los Angeles, 1977)

Gy. Ránki, *Gazdaság és külpolitika, a nagyhatalmak harca a délkelet-európai gazdasági hegemóniáért, 1919-1939* (Budapest, 1981)

Gy. Ránki, *A Harmadik Birodalom árnyékában* (Budapest, 1988)

S. Ratchev, *Anglo-Bulgarian relations During the Second World War (1939-1944)* (Sofia, 1981)

Gy. Réti, *Budapest-Róma Berlin árnyékában, magyar-olasz diplomáciai kapcsolatok 1932-1940* (Budapest, 1998)

Gy. Réti, *Olasz diplomáciai dokumentumok a második bécsi döntésről* (Budapest, 2000)

D. Reynolds, *Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Powers in the 20th Century* (London, 2000)

V. H. Rothwell, *War Aims in the Second World War: The War Aims of the Key Belligerents, 1939-1945* (Edinburgh, 2005)

A. Roberts, *Holy Fox: Biography of Lord Halifax* (London, 1997)

Bethlen István emlékirata 1944, ed. by I. Romsics (Budapest, 1988)

I. Romsics, *Bethlen István. Politikai életrajz* (Budapest, 1991)

I. Romsics, *Magyarország a XX. században* (Budapest, 2000)

Trianon és a magyar politikai gondolkodás 1920-1953, ed. by I. Romsics (Budapest, 1998)

I. Romsics, *A trianoni békeszerződés* (Budapest, 2001)

I. Romsics, *Nemzet, nemzetiség és állam Kelet-Közép- és Délkelet Európában a 19. és 20. században* (Budapest, 2004)

I. Romsics, *Az 1947-es párizsi békeszerződés* (Budapest, 2006)

I. Romsics, *Magyar sorsfordulók 1920–1989* (Budapest, 2012)

I. Romsics, *Clió bővületében. Magyar történetírás a 19-20. században – nemzetközi kitekintéssel* (Budapest, 2011)

A. Rónai, *Térképezett történelem* (Budapest, 1989)

G. Ross, *The Foreign Office and the Kremlin: British Documents on Anglo-Soviet Relations 1941-45* (Cambridge, 1984)

T. L. Sakmyster, *Hungary, the Great Powers and the Danubian Crisis 1936-1939* (Athens, 1980)

R. M. Salerno, *Vital Crossroads: Mediterranean Origins of the Second World War, 1935-1940* (New York, 2002)

- G. Sallai, *Az első bécsi döntés* (Budapest, 2002)
- G. Sallai, *A határ megindul... A csehszlovákiai magyar kisebbség és Magyarország kapcsolatai az 1938–1939. évi államhatár-változások tükrében* (Budapest, 2009)
- A. Sajti Enikő, *Impériumváltások, Revízió, Kisebbség. Magyarok a Délvidéken, 1918-1947* (Budapest, 2004)
- G. Schacher, *Central Europe and the Western World* (London, 1936)
- M. Schad, *Hitler's Spy Princess* (London, 2004)
- G. Schmidt, *The Politics and Economics of Appeasement* (Leamington, 1986)
- H. and C. Seton-Watson, *The Making of a New Europe: R.W. Seton-Watson and the Last Years of Austria-Hungary* (London, 1981)
- R. W. Seton-Watson, *Racial Problems in Hungary* (London, 1908)
- R. W. Seton-Watson, *Roumania and the Great War* (London, 1915)
- R. W. Seton-Watson, *German, Slav, and Magyar: A Study in the Origins, of the Great War* (London, 1916)
- R. W. Seton-Watson, *Treaty Revisions and the Hungarian Frontiers* (London, 1934)
- R. W. Seton-Watson, *A History of The Roumanians* (London, 1934)
- R. W. Seton-Watson, *From Munich to Danzig* (London, 1939)
- R. W. Seton-Watson, *A History of The Czechs And Slovaks* (London, 1943)
- R. W. Seton-Watson, *Transylvania, a key problem* (Oxford, 1943)
- R. Schleisinger, *Federalism in Central and Eastern Europe* (London, 1945)
- S. Sitwell, *Roumanian Journey* (London, 1938)
- N. Smart, *British Strategy and Politics during the Phony War: Before the Balloon Went Up* (Westport, 2003)
- V. Smetana, *In the Shadow of Munich: British Policy towards Czechoslovakia from the Endorsement to the Renunciation of the Munich Agreement (1938-1942)* (Prague, 2008)
- H. W. Steed, *The Habsburg Monarchy* (London, 1913)
- Z. Steiner, *The Lights that Failed: European International History 1919-1933* (Oxford, 2007)
- Z. Steiner, *The Triumph of the Dark, European International History, 1933-1939* (Oxford, 2011)
- C. J. C. Street, *East of Prague* (London, 1924)
- C. J. C. Street, *Slovakia: Past and Present* (London, n.d.)
- Gy. Szekfű, *A magyar állam életrajza* (Budapest, 1918)

- Gy. Szekfű, *Három nemzedék* (Budapest, 1922)
- Gy. Szekfű, *Rövid magyar történet 1606-1939* (Budapest, 2002)
- E. Táboraky, *President Edvard Beneš Between East and West 1938-1948* (Stanford, 1981)
- S. Talmon, *Recognition of Governments in International Law with particular reference to governments in exile* (Oxford, 1998)
- A. J. P. Taylor, *The Habsburg Monarchy* (London, 1941)
- A. J. P. Taylor, *The Origins of the Second World War* (London, 1961)
- P. M. Taylor, *The Projection of Britain: British Overseas Publicity and Propaganda 1919-1939* (Cambridge, 2007)
- J. E. Tersánszky, *The History of Hungary* (Budapest, 1938)
- D. R. Thorpe, *Eden: The Life and Times of Anthony Eden First Earl of Avon, 1897-1977* (London, 2004).
- L. Tilkovsky, *Nemzetiségi politika Magyarországon a 20. században* (Debrecen, 1998)
- South-Eastern Europe: A Political and Economic Survey*, ed. by A. Toynbee et al (London, 1939).
- K. Ungváry, *A Horthy-rendszer mérlege - Diszkrimináció, szociálpolitika és antiszemitizmus Magyarországon* (Budapest, 2012)
- Á. Vámbéry, *Hungary in Ancient, Medieval and Modern Times* (London, 1886)
- L. L. Veress, *Clear the Line, Hungary's Struggle to Leave the Axis during the Second World War* (Cleveland, OH, 1995)
- P. Vyšný, *The Runciman mission to Czechoslovakia, 1938: prelude to Munich* (Basingstoke, 2003)
- K. Vigh, *Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Endre külpolitikai nézeteinek alakulása* (Budapest, 1979)
- D. Vital, *The inequality of states: A study of the small power in international relations* (London, 1967)
- D. Vital, *Survival of Small States: Studies in Small Power/Great Power Conflict* (London, 1971)
- P. S. Wandycz, *The United States and Poland* (Cambridge, 1980)
- Personalities and Policies: Studies in the Formulation of British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century*, ed. by D. C. Watt (London, 1965)
- D. C. Watt, *How War Came: The Immediate Origins of the Second World War, 1938-1939*, (London, 1989)

R. West, *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon* (London, 1941)
 E. Wiskemann, *Prelude to War* (London, 1940)
 E. Wiskemann, *Undeclared War* (London, 1939)
British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, vol. 1-5., ed. by E. L. Woodward
 (London 1962 - 1976)
 J. E. Wrench, *Geoffrey Dawson and our times* (London, 1955)
 O. Zarek, *The History of Hungary* (London, 1939)
 M. Zeidler, *A magyar irredenta kultusz a két világháború között* (Budapest, 2002)
 M. Zeidler, *A revíziós gondolat* (Budapest, 2009)

ARTICLES/ESSAYS:

M. Ádám, 'The Munich crisis and Hungary, the fall of the Versailles settlement in Europe' in *The Munich crisis, 1938: prelude to World War II*, ed. by I. Lukes and E. Goldstein (London, 1999) pp. 82-122.
 L. Arday, 'Magyarország és Nagy-Britannia diplomáciai kapcsolatai' in *Az Egyesült Királyság és Magyarország: Nagy-Britannia és a Magyar-Angol kapcsolatok a 20. században*, ed. by L. Arday (Budapest, 2005), pp. 47-148.
 L. B. Balogh, 'A második bécsi döntés', *Limes* 43 (2001), pp. 61-88.
 A. D. Bán, 'Angolszász tervek keletközép-európai konföderációk létrehozására a második világháború alatt', *Regio* 8 (1997), pp. 12-22.
 A. D. Bán, 'Friends of England: Cultural and Political Sympathies on the Eve of the War', *Hungarian Quarterly* 153 (1999), pp. 23-35.
 A. D. Bán, 'R.W. Seton-Watson and the Hungarian problem in Czechoslovakia, 1919-1938' in *Scotland and the Slavs*, ed. by M. Cornwall and M. F. Murray (Newtonville, 2001), pp. 127-38.
 A. D. Bán, 'British foreign policy towards East Central Europe and Hungary, 1937-1947' in *20th century Hungary and the Great Powers* ed. by I. Romsics (New York 1995), pp. 114-132.
 A. D. Bán, 'Naplórészletek, 1938-1944, Barcza György', *2000* 26 (1996), pp. 37-54.
 A. D. Bán, 'A „Százalékegyezmény”. Európa megmentése vagy Kelet-Európa

„elárulása”?, *Európai Utas* 25 (2000), pp. 12-25.

G. Bátonyi, 'A dunai konföderáció gondolata a két világháború közötti Magyarországon' *Alföld* 98 (1985), pp. 35-43.

G. Bátonyi, (book review) 'Ablonczy, Balázs. Pál Teleki (1874–1941): The Life of a Controversial Hungarian Politician' in *Austrian History Yearbook*, ed. by G. B. Cohen et al vol.42 April 2011 (Minneapolis, 2011), pp. 248-249.

G. Bátonyi, 'Magyarország világháborús részvétele brit szemszögből', in *Háború, Hadsereg, Összeomlás: Magyarpolitika, katonapolitika a második világháborúban*, ed. by Gy. Markó (Budapest 2005), pp. 61-70.

G. Bátonyi, 'British foreign policy and the problem of Hungarian revisionism in the 1930s' in *British-Hungarian relations since 1848*, ed. by L. Peter and M. Rady (London, 2005), pp. 205-216.

G. Bátonyi, 'Anglo-Austrian relations between the wars' in *Von Saint Germain zum Belvedere, Österreich und Europa 1919–1955, Außenpolitische Dokumente der Republik Österreich 1918–1938 (ADÖ) Special Issue*, ed. by K. Koch, and A. Suppan (Munich and Vienna, 2007), pp. 115-129.

A. Barker and G. K. Wilson, 'Whitehall's Disobedient Servants? Senior Officials' Potential Resistance to Ministers in British Government Departments', *British Journal of Political Science* 110 (1997), pp. 223-246.

J. Baylis, 'British Wartime Thinking about a Post-War European Security Group' *Review of International Studies* 40 (1983), pp. 265-281.

Á. Beretzky, 'A revízió és a magyar kisebbség helyzetének megítélése R. W. Seton-Watson műveiben', *Tiszavirág* 18 (1999), pp. 12-23.

Á. Beretzky, 'R. W. Seton-Watson és az "Új Európa" (1920-45)', *Valóság* 27 (2000), pp.65-78.

Á. Beretzky, 'C.A. Macartney nézetei a revízióról és magyar kisebbség helyzetéről (1929-1941)', *Pro Minoritate* 32 (2004), pp. 34-48.

Á. Beretzky, 'British Confederation Plans concerning Central and Eastern Europe (1939-1945)', in *A Pentatonic Landscape. Central-Europe, Ecology, Ecumenism* ed. by Sz. Nagypál and P. Sajda, (Budapest, 2002), pp. 34-42.

Á. Beretzky, 'Magyarország változó képe R.W. Seton-Watson műveiben (1905-1918)', in *Angliától Nagy-Britanniáig* ed. by T. Frank and L. Máthé (Budapest, 2003), pp. 45-56.

- Á Beretzky, 'C. A. Macartney. A Devoted and Frustrated Friend of Hungary (1939-1945). Service in the Foreign Office and the BBC' in *British-Hungarian relations since 1848*, ed. by L. Peter, M. Rady (London, 2005), pp. 237-246.
- S. Bethlen, 'The Danubian States and the Tardieu Plan', *Political Science Quarterly* 141 (1932), pp. 352-362.
- I. Bethlen, 'Beszéd Debrecenben Magyarország külpolitikai helyzetéről és a határrevízió szükségességéről (1928)', in *Bethlen István: Válogatott politikai írások és beszédek*, ed. by I. Romsics (Budapest, 2000), pp. 240-251.
- I. Bóna, 'From Dacia to Transylvania: The Period of the Great Migrations (271–895)'; 'The Hungarian–Slav Period (895–1172)' in *History of Transylvania*, ed. by I. Bóna (Budapest, 1994), pp. 62–177.
- Gy. Borbándi, 'A Teleki-Pelényi terv nyugati Magyar ellenkormány létesítésére', *Új Látóhatár* 36 (1966), pp. 155-170.
- C. Brewin, 'Arnold Toynbee and Chatham House' in *Chatham House and British Foreign Policy*, ed. by A. Bosco and K. Navari (London 1994), pp. 137-161.
- J. W. Brugel, 'The recognition of the Czechoslovak government in London', *Journal of Czechoslovak and Central European Studies* 23 (1983), pp. 3-5.
- V. Bystricky, 'Slovakia from the Munich Conference to the declaration of independence' in *Slovakia in History*, ed. by M. Teich et al (Cambridge, 2011), pp. 157-174.
- J. Charmley, 'Splendid Isolation to Finest Hour: Britain as a Global Power, 1900-1950' in *The Foreign Office and British Diplomacy in the 20th Century*, ed. by G. Johnson (London, 2005), pp. 130-146.
- C. A. Cline, 'British Historians and the Treaty of Versailles', *Albion* 20 (1988), pp. 43–58.
- R. Cole, 'The Other 'Phoney War: British Propaganda in Neutral Europe, September-December 1939', *Journal of Contemporary History* 91 (1987), pp. 455-479.
- M. Cornwall, 'The rise and fall of a 'special relationship?: Britain and Czechoslovakia, 1930-1948' in *What Difference did the War Make?*, ed. by B. Brivati and H. Jones (Leicester, 1993), pp. 130-150.
- M. Cornwall, 'Great Britain and the Splintering of Greater Hungary, 1914-1918' in *British-Hungarian Relations since 1848*, ed. by L. Peter and M. Rady (London, 2004), pp. 103-122.

- M. Cornwall, 'A Leap into Ice-Cold Water: the Manoeuvres of the Henlein Movement in Czechoslovakia, 1933-1938' in *Czechoslovakia in a Nationalist and Fascist Europe, 1918-1948*, ed. by M. Cornwall and R. J. W. Evans (Oxford, 2007), pp. 123-142.
- V. Cromwell, 'The Foreign and Commonwealth Office' in *The Times Survey of the Foreign Ministries of the World*, ed. by Z. Steiner (London, 1982), pp. 541-573.
- D. Dilks, 'The British Foreign Office between the wars' in *Shadow and Substance in British Foreign Policy 1895-1939, Memorial Essays Honoring C. J. Lowe*, ed. by B. J. C. McKercher (London 2009), pp. 35-54.
- V. Dimitrov, 'Bulgarian Neutrality: Domestic and International Perspectives' in *European Neutrals and Non-Belligerents during the Second World War*, ed. by N. Wylie, (Cambridge, 2010), pp. 192-216.
- I. Diószegi, 'Gazdasági egyesítési tervek a Duna medencében az 1929-33-as gazdasági világválság időszakában' in *Integrációs törekvések Közép –és Kelet-Európában a 19. és 20. században* ed. by I. Romsics (Budapest, 1997), pp. 63-115.
- M. Dockrill, 'The Foreign Office, Dr Beneš and the Czechoslovak government-in-exile, 1939-1941', *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 28 (1995), pp. 701-718.
- N. Dreisziger, 'The Hungarian General Staff and Diplomacy, 1939-1941' in *Proceedings of the First Banff Conference on Central and East European Studies*, ed. by T. M. S. Priestly (Edmonton, 1977), pp. 247-67.
- N. Dreiszinger, 'Bridges to the West, the Horthy regime's reassurance policies in 1941', *War and Society* 29 (1989), pp. 1-23.
- N. Dreisziger, 'Az atlanti demokraciák és a 'Szabad Magyarországért' mozgalmak a II. világháború alatt' in *Magyarország és a nagyhatalmak a 20. században*, ed. by I. Romsics (Budapest, 1995), pp. 149-62.
- R. J. W. Evans, 'Hungary's position in British historiography' in *Das Ungarnbild der deutschen Historiographie*, ed. by M. Fata (Stuttgart, 2004), pp. 110-125.
- R. J. W. Evans, 'The Making of October Fifteenth: C. A. Macartney and his Correspondents' in *British-Hungarian relations since 1848*, ed. by L. Peter and M. Rady (London, 2005), pp. 259-270.
- C. Fink, 'Revisionism' in *A Companion to Europe, 1900-1945*, ed. by G. Martel (Oxford, 2010), pp. 326-340.
- T. Frank, 'A revíziós politika alapvetése', *Filozófiai Szemle* 34 (1980), pp. 931-943.
- T. Frank, 'Luring the English speaking World: Hungarian History Diverted', *Slavonic*

and East European Review 69 (1991), pp. 60-80.

T. Frank, 'Editing as Politics: József Balogh and the Hungarian Quarterly', *The Hungarian Quarterly* 129 (1993), pp. 5-13.

T. Frank, 'Anglophiles in 1930s Hungary', *Hungarian Quarterly* 178 (2006), pp. 60-72.

T. Frank, 'Magyarország a brit politikai gondolkodásban 1919–1945', *Limes* 38 (2008), pp. 45-57.

T. Frank, 'Treaty revision and doublespeak: Hungarian neutrality, 1939-41' in *European Neutrals and Non-Belligerents during the Second World War*, ed. by N. Wylie (Cambridge, 2010), pp. 150-173.

J. Galántai and P. Hanák, 'Egy korszak lezárása' in *Magyarország története tíz kötetben*, vol. 10, ed. by P. Hanák (Budapest 1983), pp. 1231-1233.

E. B. Gastony, 'Hungarian Foreign Minister Kálmán Kánya, Hitler, and Peace in Europe, August-September, 1938', *Hungarian Studies Review* 53 (1986), pp. 3-34.

J. Grantham, 'Hugh Dalton and the International Post-war Settlement: Labor Party Foreign Policy Formation, 1943-44', *Journal of Contemporary History* 59 (1979), pp. 713-729.

T. Hadju and Gy. Litván, 'Count Michael Károlyi in Wartime England. From His Correspondence, 1941-1946', *The Hungarian Quarterly* 172 (2003), pp. 104-115.

H. Hanak, 'Sir Stafford Cripps as British Ambassador in Moscow May 1940 to June 1941', *The English Historical Review* 370 (1979), pp. 48-70.

P. Hanák, 'A Monarchia alkonya' in *Magyarország története* vol. 2, ed. by E. Molnár (Budapest, 1964), pp. 270-282.

É. Haraszti-Taylor, 'In Memoriam of Georges Buday and the PWE's Clandestine Hungarian Petőfi Radio' in *Scribble, scribble, scribble - historical essays, documents, reviews and personal reflections on Britain and Hungary*, ed. by E. Haraszti-Taylor (Nottingham, 2001), pp. 123-130.

M. Hauner, 'The Sudeten Crisis of 1938: Beneš and Munich' in *The Origins of the Second World War: An International Perspective*, ed. by F. McDonough (London 2011), pp. 360-374.

I. Janek, 'Az első bécsi döntés és Nagy-Britannia álláspontja', *Új Szó*, 28 October 2005, pp. 17-18.

I. Janek, 'Magyar törekvések a Felvidék megszerzésére 1938-ban', *Történelmi Szemle* 98 (2010), pp 37-66.

- G. Johnson, 'Introduction: The Foreign Office and British Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century' in *The Foreign Office and British Diplomacy in the 20th Century*, ed. by G. Johnson (London, 2005), pp. 1-12.
- J. Kasperek, 'Poland's 1938 Covert Operations in Ruthenia', *East European Quarterly* 34 (1989), pp. 365-373.
- R. H. Keyserling, 'Arnold Toynbee's Foreign Research and Press Service, 1939-43 and Its Post-War Plans for South-East Europe', *Journal of Contemporary History* 88 (1986), pp. 539-558.
- R. H. Keyserling, 'The Rehabilitation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire: British Postwar Planning in the Second World War', *Hungarian Studies Review* 46 (1986), pp. 63-74.
- D. Kosáry, 'The Idea of a Comparative History of East Central Europe, the Story of a Venture' in *Historians as Nation Builders*, ed. by D. Deletant and H. Hanák (Basingstoke, 1988), pp. 124-138.
- M. Lojkó, 'C. A. Macartney and Central-Europe', *European Review of History* 32 (1999), pp. 37-57.
- M. Lojkó, 'Churchill, Eden and Hungary' in *British-Hungarian relations since 1848*, ed. by L. Peter and M. Rady (London, 2005), pp. 217-236.
- C. A. Macartney, 'Hungary and the Present Crisis', *International Affairs* 28 (1938), pp. 749-768.
- T. Magyarsics, 'Nagy-Britannia Közép-Európa politikája 1918-tól napjainkig', *Pro Minoritate* 22 (2000), pp. 3-49, 61-96.
- V. Mastny, 'The Historical Experience of Federalism in East Central Europe', *East European Politics and Societies*, 53 (1999), pp. 64-96.
- R. A. MacKay, 'Imperial Economics at Ottawa', *Pacific Affairs* 25 (1932), pp. 873-885.
- B. J. C. McKercher, 'The Foreign Office: 1930-1939. Strategy, Permanent Interests and National Security' in *The Foreign Office and British Diplomacy in the 20th Century*, ed. by G. Johnson (London, 2005), pp. 87-109.
- W. C. Mills, 'Sir Joseph Ball, Andrian Dingli, and Neville Chamberlain's 'Secret Channel' to Italy, 1937-1940', *The International History Review* 98 (2002), pp. 278-317.
- A. Miskolczy, 'Barát, vagy ellenség? R.W. Seton-Watson és Macartney', *Holmi* 22 (1994), pp. 36-54.
- K. Neilson, 'Orme Sargent, Appeasement and the British Policy in Europe, 1933-39',

- Twentieth Century British History* 85 (2010), pp. 1-28.
- M. Newman, 'The Origins of Munich: British Policy in Danubian Europe, 1933–1937', *The Historical Journal* 212 (1978), pp. 371 – 386.
- P. E. Mosely, 'Transylvania Partitioned', *Foreign Affairs* 45 (1940), pp. 237-244.
- P. Neville, 'Lord Vansittart, Sir Walford Selby and the Debate about Treasury Interference in the Conduct of British Foreign Policy in the 1930s', *Journal of Contemporary History* 148 (2000), pp. 623-633.
- S. Onslow, 'Britain and the Belgrade Coup of 27 March 1941 Revisited', *Electronic Journal of International History* 33 (2005), pp. 359–370.
- E. G. H. Pedalin, 'Change and Continuity in British Foreign Policy towards Italy, 1939-42' in *What Difference Did the War Make?*, ed. by B. Brivati and H. Jones (London, 1995), pp. 151-164.
- G. C. Peden, 'The Burden of Imperial Defense and the Continental Commitment Reconsidered', *The Historical Journal* 110 (1984), pp. 405-423.
- G. C. Peden, 'Sir Horace Wilson and Appeasement', *The Historic Journal* 220 (2010), pp. 983-1014.
- J. Pelényi, 'The Secret Plan for a Hungarian Government in the West at the outbreak of World War II', *The Journal of Modern History* 136 (1964), pp. 170-177.
- L. Peter, 'The political conflict between R.W. Seton-Watson and C.A. Macartney over Hungary' in *British-Hungarian relations since 1848*, ed. by L. Peter and M. Rady (London, 2004), pp. 167-192.
- D. G. Press, 'The Credibility of Power Assessing Threats during the Appeasement Crises of the 1930s', *International Security* 119 (2004/2005), pp. 136-169.
- P. Pritz, 'A kieli találkozó', *Századok* 236 (1974), pp. 646-680.
- P. Pritz, 'Revíziós törekvések a magyar külpolitikában 1920-1935', *Magyar Tudomány* 44 (1979), pp. 272-279.
- P. Pritz, 'Barcza György visszaadja a "kölcstönt" Bárdossy Lászlónak' in *Tanulmányok a 60 éves Romsics Ignác Tiszteletére*, ed. by P. Pritz (Eger, 2011), pp. 246-262.
- P. Pritz, 'Barcza György két arca – emlékirata és jelentései tükrében', in *Pártok, politika, történelem. Tanulmányok Vida István egyetemi tanár 70. Születésnapjára*, ed. P. Pritz (Budapest, 2010), pp. 305-319.
- P. Pritz, 'Emlékirat és történeti valóság. Barcza György emlékiratai fényében. Londoni évek I.' in *Nemzetek és birodalmak. Diószegi István 80 éves*, ed. by P. Pritz (Budapest

2010), pp. 547-560.

P. Pritz, 'Emlékirat és történeti valóság. Barcza György emlékiratai fényében. Londoni évek II.' in *Emlékkönyv L. Nagy Zsuzsa 80. Születésnapjára*, ed. by Z. Kovács and L. Püski (Debrecen, 2010), pp. 303-313.

P. Pritz, 'Emlékirat és történeti valóság. Barcza György emlékiratai fényében. Londoni évek III.' in *Európa, nemzet, külpolitika. Tanulmányok Ádám Magda 85. Születésnapjára*, ed. by P. Pritz (Budapest, 2010), pp. 197-210.

P. Pritz, 'Búcsú Londontól – Barcza György Magyar királyi követ utolsó hetei Angliában', *Kommentár* 24 (2010), pp. 24-36.

P. Pritz, 'Emlékirat és történelmi valóság. Barcza György emlékiratai fényében' in *Az objektivitás mítosza? Hazánk és a nagyvilág, 20. századi metszetek*, ed. by P. Pritz (Budapest, 2011), pp. 197-210.

P. Pritz, 'Magyar külpolitika – a csatlósság és revízió között' in *Az objektivitás mítosza? Hazánk és a nagyvilág, 20. századi metszetek*, ed. by P. Pritz (Budapest, 2011), pp. 121-145.

Gy. Réti, 'Teleki Pál 1940 augusztus 3-i levele és emlékeztetője Benito Mussolininek', *Századok* 231 (1999), pp. 828-841.

Gy. Réti, 'A második bécsi döntés', *Külpolitika* 31 (2000), pp. 1-2., 182-204.

G. Romsics, 'Hungary in the Journal Foreign Affairs 1922-1939', *Hungarian Studies Review* 128 (2005), pp. 15-40.

I. Romsics, 'Hungary's Place in the Sun A British Newspaper Article and its Hungarian Repercussions' in *British-Hungarian relations since 1848*, ed. by L. Peter and M. Rady (London, 2005), pp. 193-204.

I. Romsics, 'A brit külpolitika és a „magyar kérdés”, 1914-1946' in *Helyünk és sorsunk a Duna-medencében*, ed. by I. Romsics (Budapest, 2005), pp. 34-132.

T. L. Sakmyster, 'Hungary and the Munich Crisis: The Revisionist Dilemma', *Slavic Review* 58 (1973), pp. 725-740.

T. L. Sakmyster, 'Army Officers and Foreign Policy in Interwar Hungary, 1938-41', *Journal of Contemporary History* 10 (1975), pp. 19-40.

R. W. Seton-Watson, 'The Problem of Treaty Revision and the Hungarian Frontiers', *International Affairs* 27 (1933), pp. 481-503.

R.W. Seton-Watson, 'The Problem of Small Nations and European Anarchy', *Montague Burton International Relations Lecture*, 1939, pp. 1-15.

- R. W. Seton Watson, 'The Era of Reform in Hungary', *Slavonic and East European Review* (American Series) 10 (1943), pp. 145-166.
- G. B. Strang, 'Once More unto the Breach: Britain's Guarantee to Poland, March 1939', *Journal of Contemporary History* 128 (1996), pp. 721-751.
- F. G. Stambrook, 'A British Proposal for the Danubian States: the Customs Union Project of 1932', *The Slavonic and East European Review* 98 (1963), pp. 64-88.
- Z. Steiner, 'The Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Resistance and Adaptation in Changing Times' in *The Foreign Office and British Diplomacy in the 20th Century*, ed. by G. Johnson (London, 2005), pp. 13-30.
- D. Stevenson, 'France at the Paris Peace Conference: Addressing the Dilemmas of Security' in *French Foreign and Defence Policy, 1918-1940: The Decline and Fall of a Great Power*, ed. by R. W. D. Boyce (London 1998), pp. 10-29.
- K. Sword, 'British Reactions to the Soviet Occupation of Eastern Poland in September 1939', *Slavonic and East European Review* 182 (1991), pp. 81-101.
- Z. Szász, 'A második bécsi döntés', *Együttélés* 16 (2000), pp. 79-84.
- P. Teleki, 'Magyarország külpolitikájának alapelveiről' in *Magyar Történelmi Szöveggyűjtemény 1914-1999* vol. 1, ed. by I. Romsics (Budapest, 2000), p. 327.
- P. Teleki, 'Szent István birodalma 1941-ben' in *Teleki Pál válogatott politikai írások és beszédek*, ed. by B. Ablonczy (Budapest, 2000), pp. 496-519.
- S. Várdy, 'Trianon in Interwar Hungarian Historiography' in *Total War and Peacemaking. A Case Study of Trianon*, ed. by B. Király, P. Pastor, and I. Sanders (New York, 1982), pp. 361-89.
- S. Várdy, 'The Impact of Trianon upon Hungary and the Hungarian Mind: The Nature of Interwar Hungarian Irredentism', *Hungarian Studies Review* 37 (1983), pp. 21-42.
- S. Várdy, 'The Trianon Syndrome in Today's Hungary', *Hungarian Studies Review* 91 (1997), pp. 73-79.
- G. Warner, 'The Impact of the Second World War upon British Foreign Policy' in *What Difference Did the War Make?*, ed. by B. Brivati and H. Jones (London, 1995), pp. 99-105.
- B. J. Winchester, 'Hungary and the "Third Europe" in 1938', *Slavic Review* 58 (1973), pp. 741-756.
- D. Williams, 'Negotiations Leading to the Anglo-Polish Alliance', *Irish Historical Studies* 10 (1956-57), pp. 59-93, 156-192.

M. Williamson, 'The Role of Italy in British Strategy 1938-39', *Journal of the Royal United Services Institution for Defense Studies* 124 (1979), pp. 43-49.

E. Wiskemann, 'Hungary' in *Survey of International Affairs 1936-46, The Initial Triumph of the Axis*, ed. by A. Toynbee and V. M. Toynbee (Oxford 1958), pp. 322-329.

PHD/D.PHIL THESIS:

D. Bakić, Great Britain, The Little Entente and Security in the Danubian Europe, 1919-1936 (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Leeds 2010)

V. J. Child, British policy towards the Soviet Union, 1939-42, with special reference to the Baltic States (unpublished D.Phil thesis, University of Oxford, 1995)

G. J. Van Kessel, The British Reaction to German Economic Expansion to South East Europe, 1936-1939 (unpublished PhD thesis, London University, 1972)

L. E. Modisett, The Four-Cornered Triangle: British and American policy toward Yugoslavia 1939-1945 (unpublished PhD thesis, Georgetown University, 1981)

P. S. Wandycz, Czechoslovak-Polish Confederation and the Great Powers, 1940-43 (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Indiana-Bloomington, 1956)

E. B. Weaver, Revision and Its Modes: Hungary's Attempts to Overturn the Treaty of Trianon 1931-1938 (unpublished D. Phil thesis, University of Oxford, 2008)

ONLINE MATERIAL:

'Allied Maritime Responsibilities', - See more at: <<http://www.naval-history.net/WW2CampaignsRNMed.htm>> [accessed: 3 May 2013]

'Anekdota', - See more at: <<http://www.roncskutatas.hu/node/9603>> [accessed 22 October 2013].

'Atlas of Slovakia', - See more at:

<http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Atlas_of_Slovakia> [accessed 15 July 2012]

`Czechoslovakia`, - See more at: <<http://movelands.com/czechoslovakia/>> [accessed: 21 August 2013]

`The ethnic map of Hungary 1880`, - See more at: <http://www.hunsor.se/trianon/treatyoftrianon_1920.html> [accessed: 1 November 2013]

`Dobruja`, - See more at: <<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dobruja>> [accessed: 9 November 2012]

`East Central and Southeast Europe nationality map`, <<http://www.mappery.com/East-Central-and-Southeast-Europe-Nationality-Map>> [accessed: 11 September 2012]

`Evolutia administrativ-teritoriala a Romaniei de la Cuza pana azi` - See more at: <<http://surupaceanu.ro/2011/06/evolutia-administrativ-teritoriala-a-romaniei-de-la-cuza-pana-azi/#sthash.9OPAq2KQ.dpuf>> [accessed: 4 August 2012]

D. Hall, `The changing course of British Foreign Policy: Eden's Visit to Moscow December 1941`, - See more at: <http://www.academia.edu/2594449/The_changing_course_of_British_foreign_policy_Edens_visit_to_Moscow_December_1941> [accessed 06 June 2013]

`Magyarország térképe 1939`, - See more at: <<http://hungary-maps.myhunet.com/en/View-Map/Hungary-map-1939/mo1939/>> [accessed 7 June 2012]

P. Teleki, `A szentistváni állameszme` (speech made at the Catholic Demonstration), Budapest, 19 May 1939, - See more at: <http://www.regnumportal.hu/> [accessed 24 June 2013].

`The map of Czechoslovakia 1938`, - See more at: <http://althistory.wikia.com/wiki/File:Map_of_Czechoslovakia_1938.png> [accessed: 1 October 2013]

`The map of Romania`, - See more at: <<http://www.world-geographics.com/maps/europe/map-of-romania/>> [accessed: 12 April 2013]

`Map of Yugoslavia 1939`, - See more at: <<http://maps.nationmaster.com/country/you/1>> (accessed: 11 October 2012)]

`The physical map of Slovakia`, - See more at: <<http://www.ezilon.com/maps/europe/slovakia-physical-maps.html>> [accessed: 1 July 2013]

`Ruthenia`, - See more at: <http://www.euratlas.net/history/hisatlas/balkan_states/199445RU.html> [accessed: 12 November 2013]

`Ruthenia, First Vienna Award`, - See more at:

<<http://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=233880>> [accessed: 1 November 2013]