Fitting belief
Fitting belief
Beliefs can be correct or incorrect, and this standard of correctness is widely thought to be fundamental to epistemic normativity. But how should this standard be understood, and in what way is it so fundamental? I argue that we should resist understanding correctness for belief as either a prescriptive or an evaluative norm. Rather, we should understand it as an instance of the distinct normative category of fittingness for attitudes. This yields an attractive account of epistemic reasons.
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McHugh, Conor
0b73a7bf-51bf-4883-b62e-f6071f25194d
10 February 2014
McHugh, Conor
0b73a7bf-51bf-4883-b62e-f6071f25194d
McHugh, Conor
(2014)
Fitting belief.
Soteriou, Matthew
(ed.)
In Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society: 135th Session.
The Aristotelian Society.
.
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Conference or Workshop Item
(Paper)
Abstract
Beliefs can be correct or incorrect, and this standard of correctness is widely thought to be fundamental to epistemic normativity. But how should this standard be understood, and in what way is it so fundamental? I argue that we should resist understanding correctness for belief as either a prescriptive or an evaluative norm. Rather, we should understand it as an instance of the distinct normative category of fittingness for attitudes. This yields an attractive account of epistemic reasons.
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Fitting Belief - preprint for eprints.pdf
- Author's Original
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Published date: 10 February 2014
Organisations:
Philosophy
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Local EPrints ID: 367383
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/367383
PURE UUID: cb8fbcf7-3932-4798-9901-a8e3c7b1b3d3
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Date deposited: 29 Jul 2014 10:39
Last modified: 14 Mar 2024 17:28
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Editor:
Matthew Soteriou
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