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Reasons as premises of good reasoning

Reasons as premises of good reasoning
Reasons as premises of good reasoning
Many philosophers have been attracted to the view that normative reasons are premises of good reasoning – that for some consideration to be a normative reason to ? is for it to be the premise of good reasoning towards ?-ing. However, while this reasoning view is indeed attractive, it faces a problem accommodating outweighed reasons. In this paper, I argue that the standard solution to this problem is unsuccessful, and propose an alternative, which draws on the idea that good patterns of reasoning can be defeasible. I conclude by drawing out some implications of the resulting view for the debate over pragmatic reasons for belief and other attitudes and one influential form of reductionism about the normative.
0279-0750
251-270
Way, Jonathan
2c3f95c6-ba9f-4640-b2f6-d23363a96c48
Way, Jonathan
2c3f95c6-ba9f-4640-b2f6-d23363a96c48

Way, Jonathan (2017) Reasons as premises of good reasoning. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 98 (2), 251-270. (doi:10.1111/papq.12135).

Record type: Article

Abstract

Many philosophers have been attracted to the view that normative reasons are premises of good reasoning – that for some consideration to be a normative reason to ? is for it to be the premise of good reasoning towards ?-ing. However, while this reasoning view is indeed attractive, it faces a problem accommodating outweighed reasons. In this paper, I argue that the standard solution to this problem is unsuccessful, and propose an alternative, which draws on the idea that good patterns of reasoning can be defeasible. I conclude by drawing out some implications of the resulting view for the debate over pragmatic reasons for belief and other attitudes and one influential form of reductionism about the normative.

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Accepted/In Press date: 13 September 2014
e-pub ahead of print date: 19 November 2015
Published date: June 2017
Organisations: Philosophy

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 369153
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/369153
ISSN: 0279-0750
PURE UUID: 541c5844-6cd2-4240-b68e-d7325ca02ade

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Date deposited: 01 Oct 2014 10:39
Last modified: 27 Apr 2022 11:00

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