The fairest core in cooperative games with transferable utilities
The fairest core in cooperative games with transferable utilities
The core and the Shapley value are important solution concepts in cooperative game theory. While the core is designed for the stability of the game, the Shapley value aims for fairness among the players. However, the Shapley value might not lie within the core and a core solution might not be ‘fair’. We introduce a new solution concept called the ‘fairest core’, one that aims for both stability and fairness. We show attractive properties of the fairest core.
cooperative games, the core, the shapley value, stability, fairness
1-10
Nguyen, Tri-Dung
a6aa7081-6bf7-488a-b72f-510328958a8e
2014
Nguyen, Tri-Dung
a6aa7081-6bf7-488a-b72f-510328958a8e
Nguyen, Tri-Dung
(2014)
The fairest core in cooperative games with transferable utilities.
Operations Research Letters, 43 (1), .
(doi:10.1016/j.orl.2014.11.001).
Abstract
The core and the Shapley value are important solution concepts in cooperative game theory. While the core is designed for the stability of the game, the Shapley value aims for fairness among the players. However, the Shapley value might not lie within the core and a core solution might not be ‘fair’. We introduce a new solution concept called the ‘fairest core’, one that aims for both stability and fairness. We show attractive properties of the fairest core.
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- Author's Original
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Published date: 2014
Keywords:
cooperative games, the core, the shapley value, stability, fairness
Organisations:
Centre of Excellence for International Banking, Finance & Accounting, Operational Research
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 369712
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/369712
ISSN: 0167-6377
PURE UUID: 69741d96-0f90-46db-aa24-006dda16c75b
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Date deposited: 08 Oct 2014 14:43
Last modified: 15 Mar 2024 03:37
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Author:
Tri-Dung Nguyen
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