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UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON

FACULTY OF HUMANITIES

Department of History

Kashmir, 1945-66: From Empire to the Cold War

By

Rakesh Ankit

Thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

September 2014

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON

ABSTRACT

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This thesis is a study of the international dimensions of the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan from before its outbreak in October 1947 till the Tashkent Summit in January 1966. By focusing on Kashmir's under-researched transnational dimensions, it represents a different approach to this intractable territorial conflict. Concentrating on the global context(s) in which the dispute unfolded, it argues that the dispute's evolution was determined by international concerns that existed from before and went beyond the Indian subcontinent.

Based on new and diverse official and personal papers across four countries, it foregrounds the Kashmir dispute in a twin setting of Decolonisation and the Cold War and investigates the international understanding around it within the imperatives of these two processes. In doing so, it traces Kashmir's journey from being a residual irritant of the British Indian Empire, to becoming a Commonwealth embarrassment and its eventual metamorphosis into a security concern in the Cold War climate(s). A princely state of exceptional geo-strategic location, complex religious composition and unique significance in the context of Indian and Pakistani notions of nation and statehood, Kashmir also complicated their relations with Britain, the United States, Soviet Union, China, the Commonwealth countries and the Afro-Arab-Asian world.

The thesis begins with British anxieties regarding independent India's international identity that arose in 1945-47 and covers the international involvement in the first Kashmir conflict (1947-49). Next, it undertakes a survey of the initial American attitude to India (1945-47) and situates the early American approach to Kashmir (1947-49) in that light. The thesis then shows the transformation of Kashmir from being a Commonwealth concern to becoming an American affair (1949-53). Further, it traces the dispute's transition from the prism of Western pact-politics to that of Subcontinental package-proposal (1953-61). The thesis ends with comparing the last Anglo-American intervention in Kashmir (1962-63) with its Soviet counterpart (1965-66).

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Key Personalities: India, Pakistan, Kashmir and the Soviet Union

British India

Archibald Wavell, Viceroy (1943-47)
Louis Mountbatten, Viceroy (1947) and Governor-General (1947-48)
Hastings Ismay, Chief of Staff to Mountbatten (1946-48)
Claude Auchinleck, C-in-C of British Indian Army (1943-47)
Rob Lockhart, C-in-C of Indian Army (1947-48)
Roy Bucher, C-in-C of Indian Army (1948-49)
Frank Messervy, C-in-C of Pakistan Army (1947-48)
Douglas Gracey, C-in-C of Pakistan Army (1948-51)
George Cunningham, Governor of the North-West Frontier Province (1937-46, 1947-48)
Olaf Caroe, Governor of the North-West Frontier Province (1946-47)
Francis Mudie, Governor of Sindh (1946-47) and West Punjab (1947-49)
Frederick Puckle, Advisor on Indian Affairs, UK Embassy (Washington), (1943-47)

India

Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister (1946-64)
Vallabh Bhai Patel, Deputy Prime Minister and Home Minister (1946-50)
C Rajagopalachari, Governor-General (1948-50) and Home Minister (1950-51)
Lal Bahadur Shastri, Prime Minister (1964-66)
V Pandit, Ambassador to USSR (1947-49), USA (1949-51), High-Commissioner to UK (1954-61)
BN Rau, India's Representative to the UN (1950-52)
NG Ayyangar, Prime Minister of Kashmir (1937-43) and Leader of UN Delegation (1948)
S Radhakrishnan, Ambassador to USSR (1949-52) and President (1962-67)
TT Krishnamachari, Finance Minister (1956-58, 1964-66)
Swaran Singh, Minister for Railways (1964-66)
VK Krishna Menon, High Commissioner to UK (1947-52) and Defence Minister (1957-62)
Girja Shankar Bajpai, Secretary General in Ministry of External Affairs (1947-52)
NR Pillai, Secretary General in Ministry of External Affairs (1952-55)
KPS Menon, Foreign Secretary (1948-52) and Ambassador to USSR (1952-61)
Asaf Ali, Ambassador to US (1947-48)
GL Mehta, Ambassador to US (1952-58)
MC Chagla, Ambassador to US (1958-61)
BK Nehru, Ambassador to US (1961-68)
YD Gundevia, Commonwealth Secretary (1961-64), Foreign Secretary (1964-66)
MJ Desai, Foreign Secretary (1961-63)

Pakistan

Liaquat Ali Khan, Prime Minister (1947-51)
Zafrullah Khan, Minister of Foreign Affairs (1947-54)
Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan (1958-69)
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Minister of Foreign Affairs (1963-66)
Aziz Ahmed, Ambassador to US (1959-63) and Foreign Secretary (1963-66)

Kashmir

Hari Singh, Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir (1945-47)
Ramachandra Kak, Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir (1945-47)
MC Mahajan, Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir (1947)
Henry Scott, Chief of Staff, Jammu and Kashmir State Forces (1936-47)
Sheikh Abdullah, Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir (1947-53)

Soviet Union

JV Stalin, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (1922-53)
Vyacheslav Molotov, Minister of Foreign Affairs (1939-49)
Anastas Mikoyan, Deputy Chairman (1955-64) and Chairman (1964-65) of Ministers
Andrei Vishinski, Minister of Foreign Affairs (1949-53)
KV Novikov, Ambassador to India (1947-53)
Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Communist Party (1953-64)

Key Personalities: United States of America and the United Kingdom

United States of America

Harry Truman, President (1945-53)
George Marshall, Secretary of State (1947-49) and Defence (1950-51)
Dean Acheson, Secretary of State (1949-53)
George McGhee, Asst. Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (1949-51)
Henry Grady, Ambassador to India (1947-48)
Loy Henderson, Ambassador to India (1949-51)
Chester Bowles, Ambassador to India (1951-53, 1963-69)
Paul Alling, Ambassador to Pakistan (1947-48)
Avra Warren, Ambassador to Pakistan (1950-52)

Dwight Eisenhower, President (1953-61)
John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State (1953-59)
George Allen, Ambassador to India (1953-55)
John Sherman Cooper, Ambassador to India (1955-56)
Ellsworth Bunker, Ambassador to India (1956-60)
Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., Ambassador to UN (1953-60)
Horace Hildreth, Ambassador to Pakistan (1953-57)
William Rountree, Ambassador to Pakistan (1959-62)

John Kennedy, President (1961-63)
Lyndon Johnson, President (1963-69)
Dean Rusk, Secretary of State (1961-69)
Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defence (1961-68)
Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State (1961-65)
Adlai Stevenson, Ambassador to UN (1961-65)
Averell Harriman, Secretary of Commerce (1946-48)
Paul Nitze, Secretary of Navy (1963-67)
McGeorge Bundy, National Security Adviser (1961-66)
Robert Komer, National Security Adviser (1966)
Walt Rostow, National Security Adviser (1966-69)
George Ball, Under Secretary of State (1961-66)
Roger Hilsman Jr., Assistant Secretary of State (1963-64)
John Kenneth Galbraith, Ambassador to India (1961-63)
Walter McConaughy, Ambassador to Pakistan (1962-66)

United Kingdom

Clement Attlee, Prime Minister (1945-51)
Ernest Bevin, Foreign Minister (1945-51)
Stafford Cripps, Chancellor of the Exchequer (1947-1950)
Frederick Pethick-Lawrence, Secretary of State for India (1945-47)
Listowel (William Hare, 5th Earl of Listowel), Secretary of State for India (1947)
AV Alexander, Minister of Defence (1946-50)
Philip Noel-Baker, Commonwealth Relations Minister (1945-50)
Patrick Gordon-Walker, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations (1950-51)
Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Representative to the United Nations (1946-50)
Archibald Nye, High-Commissioner in India (1948-52)
Laurence Graffety-Smith, High-Commissioner in Pakistan (1947-51)
Terence Shone, High-Commissioner in India (1946-48)

Winston Churchill, Prime Minister (1951-55)
Anthony Eden, Prime Minister (1955-57)
Selwyn Lloyd, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (1955-60)
Malcolm MacDonald, High-Commissioner in India (1955-60)

Harold Macmillan, Prime Minister (1957-63)
Alec Douglas-Home, Prime Minister (1963-64)
Duncan Sandys, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations (1960-62)
Paul Gore-Booth, High-Commissioner in India (1960-65)

Harold Wilson, Prime Minister (1964-70)
Michael Stewart, Foreign Secretary (1965-66)
Arthur Bottomley, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations (1964-66)
CS Pickard, High-Commissioner in Pakistan (1966-71)
John Freeman, High-Commissioner in India (1965-68)
ACB Symon, High-Commissioner in Pakistan (1960-62)
Gilbert Laithwaite, High-Commissioner in Pakistan (1953-55)
Morrice James, High Commissioner in Pakistan (1962-1965)

Maps

Jammu and Kashmir: The Broader Region



Source: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/kashmir_region_2004.jpg

Jammu and Kashmir: The Contested Territory



Source: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/kashmir_disputed_2003.jpg

Academic Thesis: Declaration of Authorship

I, **Rakesh Ankit**, declare that this thesis and the work presented in it are my own and have been generated by me as the result of my own original research.

Kashmir, 1945-66: From Empire to the Cold War

I confirm that:

1. This work was done wholly or mainly while in candidature for a research degree at this University;
2. Where any part of this thesis has previously been submitted for a degree or any other qualification at this University or any other institution, this has been clearly stated;
3. Where I have consulted the published work of others, this is always clearly attributed;
4. Where I have quoted from the work of others, the source is always given. With the exception of such quotations, this thesis is entirely my own work;
5. I have acknowledged all main sources of help;
6. Where the thesis is based on work done by myself jointly with others, I have made clear exactly what was done by others and what I have contributed myself;
7. Either none of this work has been published before submission, or parts of this work have been published as: [please list references below]:

Forthcoming

'Pakistan in Kashmir, 1947-49' (Monograph): Pakistan Studies Programme, Academy of International Studies, Jamia Millia Islamia (New Delhi)

Published

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'Britain and Kashmir, 1948: The Arena of the UN', in *Diplomacy and Statecraft* (24: 2, June 2013), pp. 273-90

'Great Britain and Kashmir, 1947-49', in *India Review* (12: 1, 2013), pp. 20-40

'1948 in the History of Kashmir', in *Economic and Political Weekly* (45: 11, March 13-19 2010)

'Great Britain, Cold War and Kashmir, 1947-49', in *Ex plus Ultra* (1, September 2009), pp. 39-58

'The Cold War and its Impact on the Evolution of the Kashmir Crisis, 1947-48', in *Journal of the Oxford University History Society* (6, February 2009)

'Looking beyond the Domestic', *Himal SouthAsian*, April 2011

'Forgotten Men of Kashmir', *Himal SouthAsian*, February 2010

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Date: **30 September 2014**

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Introduction: A ‘ghost’ of Empire, a ‘game’ of the Cold War

The dispute between India and Pakistan over Jammu and Kashmir remains fundamental to their quest for nationhood. An unusual dispute, it originated at the confluence of an Imperial withdrawal and the appearance of successor-states competing for this key princely state, while cultivating contrasting international identities in the early days of the Cold War. This thesis is a study of the Kashmir dispute, from October 1947 to January 1966, against this confluence of Decolonisation and the Cold War.

Books that present Kashmir as either a ‘ghost’ of empire or a ‘game’ of the Cold War are almost as old as the dispute itself.¹ However, their trickle has become a flood only in the last twenty years with the opening of government archives in first the United Kingdom (UK), the United States (US) and the Commonwealth countries and then, the Russian Federation and former Eastern Bloc nations, apart from an increasing access to primary material in India and Pakistan. In the following ways, this thesis seeks to distinguish itself from this group.

First, it demonstrates Kashmir’s presence in the international calculus of London and Washington from the very outset. There is a near-unanimity in the existing literature that the Kashmir dispute was not looked at through the prism of the prevailing international climate when it broke out in 1947 or when it reached the United Nations (UN) in 1948. The two years from January 1952 to February 1954 are usually acknowledged as the first milestones in this regard. This thesis, instead, argues that London, from even before 1947, and Washington, from that year onwards, saw events in Kashmir through an international lens. With the British, the institutional memory of the 19th century *Great Game* fed into this understanding while, post-1945, American hopes from India and fears for Pakistan vis-à-vis the former Soviet Union (USSR), Afghanistan and the Middle-East added to it.

This application of larger calculations to a local crisis was not unique to Kashmir. In this period, a similar attitude was evinced towards Greece (1947), Palestine (1948), Indonesia (1949), Korea (1950) and subsequently Vietnam (1954).² While these have been studied in

¹ See Josef Korbel, *Danger in Kashmir* (Princeton: PUP, 1954) and Vijay Kumar, *Anglo-American Plot against Kashmir* (Bombay: PPH Ltd, 1954).

² On Greece see Bruce Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East* (Princeton: PUP, 1980), Heinz Richter, *British Intervention in Greece* (London: Merlin Press, 1985), A Nachmani, ‘Civil War and Foreign

terms of their international dimensions, similar work on Kashmir is much less developed. This is surprising because it was in Kashmir that for the first time, the difficulties of Decolonisation confronted the calculations of the Cold War directly. John Lewis Gaddis has called ‘geography, a neglected dimension of Cold War history’ and Kashmir has remained a region, which this history has ‘bypassed’ for the period 1947-52.³

Second, the thesis shows that inside their international calculus, London and Washington approached Kashmir with rather different aims in mind. On the one hand, Kashmir impinged upon Britain’s continued post-imperial presence in India and Pakistan, its hopes from them in the Middle-East and the Far-East and, above all, its efforts to effect a smooth transition from the Empire to the Commonwealth. On the other hand, Kashmir was a spanner in the American wheels of collective security against the Soviet Union and Communist China. This difference of emphasis, ‘regional’ in the case of the UK and ‘global’ in the case of the US, meant that there was, often, no common ‘Anglo-American’ approach on Kashmir.

This difference in strategic goals also led to a divergence in their tactical approach towards Kashmir, which was enhanced by the fact that there was, almost always, more than one ‘official mind’ in the two capitals. In London, the Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO), the Foreign Office (FO), the Chiefs of Staff (CoS) and the Colonial Office (CO) were usually on different pages while in Washington, the many bureaus within the State Department, the National Security Apparatus and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) seldom sang the same tune. This state of affairs especially prevailed during 1949-53 and 1962-66.

Third, the thesis demonstrates a re-fashioning of Kashmir within a changed Cold War context in the period 1958-62. At this time, Washington, in particular, added Chinese frames to its Soviet spectacles to look at Kashmir. This was also accompanied by a transition of influence

Intervention in Greece, 1946-49’, *Journal of Contemporary History* Volume 25 (1990), pp. 489-522 and Howard Jones, *A New Kind of War* (New York: OUP, 1997). On Palestine, to give just one name, see Ilan Pappé, *Britain and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948-51* (London: Macmillan, 1988). On Indonesia, see Robert McMahon, *Colonialism and Cold War* (Ithaca: Cornell, 1981) and Richard Mason, ‘The United States, the Cold War and the Nationalist Revolution, 1945-1950’, *Journal of Oriental Studies*, Volume 30, Nos. 1 and 2 (1992), pp. 60-75. On Korea, see Jian Chen, *China’s Road to the Korean War* (New York: CUP, 1994) and Zhihua Shen, *Mao, Stalin and the Korean War* (New York: Routledge, 2012). On Vietnam, for an overview of historiography, see Simon Hall, ‘Scholarly Battles over the Vietnam War’, *Historical Journal* 52 (September 2009), pp. 813-29 and Frederick Logevall, *Embers of War* (New York: Random House, 2012).

³ John Lewis Gaddis, ‘On Starting All Over Again: A Naïve Approach to the Study of the Cold War’, pp. 27-42 in Odd Westad (ed.) *Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory* (London: Frank Cass, 2000)

from the UK to the US in South Asia as Washington out-muscled London in terms of economic and military aid to India and Pakistan, respectively. These shifts, the thesis argues, began a reversal of fortunes for the two disputants as Kashmir began to be looked upon within the context of India's new importance against China, alongside Pakistan's old value against the USSR.

The apogee of this recasting of Kashmir was reached in the aftermath of the India-China border war of October-November 1962. Over the following twelve months, the last Anglo-American attempts at mediation in Kashmir were hinged upon their concerns about China, the Sino-Pakistan closeness and the Sino-Soviet split. So much so that after their failure to settle the dispute, Washington was willing, and London acquiesced, to let the Soviet Union act as peacemaker during and after the India-Pakistan war of 1965 in order to keep China at bay. To adapt a passage in de Tocqueville on America and Russia, their starting points may have been different but their ends in Kashmir and South Asia in 1965-66 were same.

Kashmir: 'Where three empires met...'⁴

A key prologue for this thesis is the 19th century British understanding of Kashmir as the place 'where three empires met', which provided an element of institutional continuity for the changing post-1947 geopolitics.⁵ British interest and involvement in this part of the subcontinent dated from the 1840s and British perceptions of the Kashmir dispute emerged from that memory of the whole uneasy frontier with the 'uncertain' Persians, the 'suspect' Afghans, the 'hostile' Russians and the 'unknown' Chinese.⁶ Kashmir had always been viewed as an 'exposed edge' of this frontier.⁷

Speaking at the ninth meeting of the Imperial Defence Council in London on 26 October 1926, FE Smith, the Secretary of State for India, had emphasised the 'new and dangerous [Bolshevik] Russian aggression towards India' instigating the Afghans, utilising the frontier

⁴ Foreign Office (FO) Memo dated 1 December 1947 on 'The Russian Menace to India', F 15955/8800/85, L/PS/12/3303, India Office Records (IOR), British Library (London)

⁵ See Robert Huttenback, *Kashmir and the British Raj 1847-1947* (Oxford: OUP, 2004) and Rob Johnson, *Spying for Empire* (London: Greenhill Books, 2006).

⁶ See speeches by Aubrey Metcalfe (24 April 1945, Reference No. 8/1108), George Cunningham (13 June 1946, 8/1244) and Olaf Caroe (4 February 1948, 8/1498) at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA), Chatham House (London); also Dominions Office (DO) 142/370, The National Archives (TNA), Kew (London)

⁷ See DO 134/5 (1/1710), TNA

tribes and employing the ‘new factor – aircraft’ to attack Kashmir, Punjab and penetrate to the ‘warm waters’ of the Indian Ocean.⁸ Similarly, speaking at the Indian Institute of International Affairs in New Delhi on 1 March 1940, Major-General GN Molesworth, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, British Indian Army, had remarked: ‘The Soviet general policy, which has come on a legacy from the old Tsarist idea, is that the best way to destroy the British Commonwealth is to attack it through India (via the north-west)’.⁹

Post-1945, as ‘the shadows lengthened from the north’, there arose in British minds an imperative of establishing ‘a close accord of Great Powers around the Muslim Lake’.¹⁰ In 1947, the Kashmir conflict erupted at the very edge of this ‘Muslim Lake’, where a Great Power (Soviet Union), potentially great powers (China and India) and Muslim Powers (Pakistan and Afghanistan) met. Anticipating Kashmir’s key place in India’s defence without direct British control, Leopold Amery, the Secretary of State for India (1940-45), had written to the Viceroy (1936-43) Linlithgow: ‘Looking back, one can never help regretting that we did not keep Kashmir after the Sikh War...’¹¹ It was not just the British who reasoned like this. KM Panikkar, the pre-eminent Indian strategic thinker of his generation and later India’s first Ambassador to Communist China (1947-52), circulated a memorandum in 1943 that re-affirmed the importance of Kashmir’s frontiers, which touched ‘the Islamic states of the Middle-East, the Soviets and the growing military power of China’.¹²

Ten years later, an author echoed Panikkar’s comments by lamenting the ‘triple tragedy’ of the history of Kashmir dispute: local, subcontinental and international.¹³ The same can be said about the history-writing on the dispute.¹⁴ It began with numerous works on the subcontinental level debating the events of 1947. It saw the eruption of a local phase in the 1990s; a phase that continues. And, in the last decade, it has seen more books than ever touching upon aspects of the international dimensions of the dispute.

⁸ MSS Eur C 152/2, Item No. 18, Birkenhead Papers, IOR

⁹ 6505 – 55 – 2 – 3, Molesworth Papers, Templer Study Centre, National Army Museum (NAM), London; also Molesworth, ‘In the Shadows of the War God’, 24 and 31 December 1939, *Illustrated Weekly*.

¹⁰ Olaf Caroe, *Wells of Power* (London: Macmillan, 1951), p. 185 and *Soviet Empire* (London: Macmillan, 1967), p. xxviii; also Caroe, ‘The Beam in the Eye’: *The Round Table*, No. 203, 1961.

¹¹ 1 October 1943, Amery to Linlithgow, Item No. 157, Volume IV, Nicholas Mansergh, Edward Lumby and Penderel Moon (ed.), *The Transfer of Power (TOP), 1942-7* (London: HMSO, 1970-82)

¹² MSS Brit Emp. S403, File No. 2, Coupland Papers, Rhodes House, Oxford. Also see Panikkar, *The Future of South-East Asia* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1943) and Moon, *The Future of India* (London: Pilot, 1945).

¹³ SN Shivpuri, *The Grim Saga* (Calcutta: Das Gupta and Co. Limited, 1953), p. ii

¹⁴ For a latest overview of the state of historiography on Kashmir especially on the trends since 1990 see Chitralekha Zutshi (2012). Whither Kashmir Studies? : A Review. *Modern Asian Studies*, 46, pp. 1033-1047

Competing Nationalism(s)

As the Kashmir dispute is often called an ‘unfinished business of partition’, first writings on it grew out of the early partition historiography focusing on Indian and Pakistani involvements.¹⁵ Early pro-Pakistan accounts presented the Kashmir dispute within the ‘two-nation theory’. Religious bonds, geographical position, economic ties, transport and communication links – all indicated Kashmir’s natural integration with Pakistan. Moreover, Kashmir was a defensive imperative for Pakistan, given its lack of strategic depth, strained relations with Afghanistan and the challenge of controlling the adjoining tribal areas.¹⁶

Early Indian accounts, on the other hand, approached Kashmir from a grand self-perception of a syncretic India and, highlighting Kashmir’s legal accession to India, charged Pakistan with aiding and abetting an invasion of Indian Territory.¹⁷ By the 1960s, the claims and counter-claims regarding Kashmir were well-established. The classic statements of the Indian and Pakistani positions come from this decade.¹⁸ In them, Kashmir became, alternatively, a symbol of a territorial challenge for a secular democracy and a religious dispute of self-determination.¹⁹ This India-Pakistan binary was embellished by participant accounts.²⁰

¹⁵ For example, see Christopher Birdwood, *Two Nations and Kashmir* (London: Robert Hale, 1956) and Hugh Tinker, *India and Pakistan* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1967). For discussion of partition historiography see Tai Yong Tan and Gyanesh Kudaisya, *The Aftermath of Partition in South Asia* (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), pp. 9-19 and Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh, *The Partition of India* (Cambridge: CUP, 2009), pp. 8-23

¹⁶ See Richard Symonds, *The Making of Pakistan* (London: Faber, 1951) and Aziz Beg, *Captive Kashmir* (Lahore: Allied, 1957).

¹⁷ See Maurice Cohen, *Thunder over Kashmir* (Hyderabad: Orient Longman, 1955), VP Menon, *The Story of the Integration of the Indian States* (Bombay: Orient Longman, 1956) and Jyoti Bhushan Das-Gupta, *Indo-Pakistan Relations: 1947-1955* (Amsterdam: Djambatan, 1958).

¹⁸ On the Indian side, see Sisir Gupta, *Kashmir: A Study in India-Pakistan Relations* (London: Asia Publishing House, 1966) and Jyoti Bhushan Das Gupta, *Jammu and Kashmir* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968). For Pakistani arguments, see Alastair Lamb, *Crisis in Kashmir: 1947-1966* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966) and GW Choudhury, *Pakistan’s relations with India, 1947-66* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1968).

¹⁹ Other notable pro-India works from this time include JS Bains, *India’s International Disputes: A Legal Study* (London: Asia Publishing House, 1962), AG Noorani, *The Kashmir Question* (Bombay: Manaktalas, 1964), PB Gajendragadkar, *Kashmir: Retrospect and Prospect* (Bombay: University Press, 1967) and BL Sharma, *The Kashmir Story* (London: Asia Publishing House, 1967). For Pakistani views from this period see WA Wilcox, *Pakistan: The Consolidation of a Nation* (New York: CUP, 1963) and Muhammad Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967). For a Kashmiri perspective see Prem Nath Bazaz, *Kashmir in Crucible* (New Delhi: Pamposh Publications, 1967).

²⁰ See LP Sen, *Slender was the Thread* (Delhi: Orient Longman, 1969), Akbar Khan, *Raiders in Kashmir* (Islamabad: National Book Foundation, 1970), Zafrulla Khan, *The Agony of Pakistan* (London: Kent Publications, 1973), Conrad Corfield, *The Princely India I Knew: From Reading to Mountbatten* (London: Indo-British Historical Society, 1975) and HL Saxena, *The Tragedy of Kashmir* (Delhi: Nationalist Publishers, 1975).

Publication of the *Transfer of Power* documents in the next decade and the subsequent opening of relevant public records and private papers in Britain saw a revision of the outbreak of the crisis through the ‘grand designs’ of the British, India/Congress and Pakistan/Muslim League.²¹ The pantheon of personalities and the logics of paramountcy were re-dramatised, the sequence of invasion and accession were again debated, and the reputations of the usual suspects were attacked and defended.²²

Kashmiriyat

The period 1975 to 1989 also saw a mounting disenchantment with the gap between the ideals of India’s democracy and the reality of its relationship with Kashmir. It provided the context for the emergence of a second school of history-writing. The violent turn of events inside the Indian Kashmir from November 1989 was held as ‘the most serious challenge to India’s secular and democratic credentials’.²³ It brought to the forefront the feeling that while Kashmir may be ‘inextricably linked with both her neighbours, it belongs to Kashmiris’.²⁴ The core of this school was the relationship between an assertive centre (India) and an alienated periphery (Kashmir).²⁵ It contained various sub-strands.

First, there were Pakistani works condemning the Indian state by cataloguing its repression in Kashmir.²⁶ Then came those Indian works, which were critical of the Indian state for its petty

²¹ See Philip Ziegler, *Mountbatten: The Official Biography* (London: Guild Publishing, 1985), RJ Moore, *Making the New Commonwealth* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), DA Low (ed.), *The Political Inheritance of Pakistan* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991), Sumit Ganguly, *The Origins of War in South Asia: Indo-Pakistani Conflicts Since 1947* (Boulder: West View Press, 1994), Robert Wirsing, *India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Dispute* (London: Macmillan, 1994) and Ian Copland, *The Princes of India in the Endgame of Empire, 1917-1947* (Cambridge: CUP, 1997).

²² See Alastair Lamb, *Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy 1846-1990* (Hertingfordbury: Roxford, 1991), *Birth of a Tragedy: Kashmir 1947* (Hertingfordbury: Roxford, 1994) and *Incomplete Partition: The Genesis of the Kashmir Dispute* (Hertingfordbury: Roxford, 1997) and Prem Shankar Jha, *Kashmir, 1947: Rival Versions of History* (Delhi: OUP, 1996), pp. 83-118 and *Kashmir 1947: The Origins of a Dispute* (Delhi: OUP, 2000). Also see Andrew Roberts, *Eminent Churchillians* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1994) and Stanley Wolpert, *Nehru: A Tryst with Destiny* (Delhi: OUP, 1996).

²³ Ajit Bhattacharjea, *Kashmir: The Wounded Valley* (New Delhi: UBSPD, 1994), p. xiv

²⁴ Prem Nath Bazaz, *The History of Struggle for Freedom in Kashmir* (New Delhi: Kashmir Publishing Company, 1954), pp. xv-xvi and *Kashmir in Crucible* (Delhi: Pamposh Publications, 1967). Also see Rajesh Kadian, *The Kashmir Tangle: Issues and Options* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993) and Ayesha Jalal, ‘A Terrible Beauty is Torn – Kashmir Scars’, *The New Republic* (23 July 1990, No. 4, Volume 203), pp. 17-20

²⁵ Bhattacharjea, *Kashmir*, p. xiv

²⁶ See Shaheen Akhtar, *Terror in Indian-held Kashmir: Massive Violation of Human Rights* (Islamabad: Institute of Regional Studies, 1993), K Yusuf (ed.) *Perspectives on Kashmir* (Islamabad: Pakistan Forum, 1994) and Tahir Amin, *Mass Resistance in Kashmir* (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1995).

politicking, heavy-handed security and prejudice in Kashmir and about Kashmiri Muslims.²⁷ There was also a re-emergence of the mystique of *Kashmiriyat* as an autonomous and non-sectarian identity.²⁸ Third, books appeared that highlighted the flight of the Kashmiri Hindus in the wake of violence in the state against them in the 1990s.²⁹ These blamed Pakistan for this violence,³⁰ and also understood it within the relationship of the Hindu Jammu with the Muslim Kashmir.³¹ Fourth, an international scholarship developed that critiqued both India and Pakistan and supported Kashmiri aspirations of autonomy.³²

But the most important contribution to this historiography was made by those academics who sought to understand Kashmir through the prisms of sub-nationalism, self-determination and separatism drawing parallels with rest of the world.³³ From the nature of British disengagement and India-Pakistan involvement,³⁴ scholarship moved to identify with ‘those on the ground’.³⁵ It was argued that in the course of all the legal wrangling by India and moral wrangling by Pakistan ‘the central participants in the drama have been rather lost to

²⁷ See Asghar Ali Engineer (ed.) *Secular Crown on Fire* (Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1991), MJ Akbar, *Kashmir: Behind the Vale* (New Delhi: Viking, 1991), Balraj Puri, *Kashmir: Towards Insurgency* (Hyderabad: Orient Longman, 1993), Tavleen Singh, *Kashmir* (Delhi: Viking, 1995) and Manoj Joshi, *The Lost Rebellion: Kashmir in the Nineties* (Delhi: Penguin, 1999).

²⁸ Riyaz Punjabi, ‘Kashmiriyat: The Mystique of an Ethnicity’, *India International Centre Quarterly*, Volume 17, No. 2 – 1990, p. 114, Peer Gias-Ud-Din, *Understanding the Kashmiri Insurgency* (Delhi: Anmol, 1992).

²⁹ See Anil Maheswari, *Crescent over Kashmir: Politics of Mullaism* (Delhi: Rupa, 1993), Dina Nath Raina, *Kashmir – Distortions and Reality* (Delhi: Reliance, 1994), Pyarelal Kaul, *Crisis in Kashmir* (Srinagar: Suman, 1991) and *Kashmir: Trail and Travail* (Srinagar: Suman, 1996), Pran Chopra, *India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Tangle* (New Delhi: Indus, 1994) and Hari Jaisingh, *Kashmir: A Tale of Shame* (Delhi: UBSPD, 1996).

³⁰ Afsir Karim, *Kashmir: The Troubled Frontiers* (Delhi: Lancer, 1994) and DP Kumar, *Kashmir: Pakistan’s Proxy War* (Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 1994).

³¹ See Balraj Puri, *Simmering Volcano: Study of Jammu’s relations with Kashmir* (Delhi: Sterling, 1983).

³² See Paula Newberg, *Double Betrayal: Repression and Insurgency in Kashmir* (Washington: Carnegie, 1995) and Vernon Marston Hewitt, *Reclaiming the Past* (London: Portland Press, 1995).

³³ See Sten Widmalm, *Democracy and Violent Separatism in India: Kashmir in a Comparative Perspective* (Uppsala: University Press, 1997), GC Raju Thomas (ed.) *Perspectives on Kashmir: The Roots of Conflict in South Asia* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), Sumit Ganguly, *The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace* (Cambridge: CUP, 1997), Sumantra Bose, *The Challenge in Kashmir: Democracy, Self-determination and a Just Peace* (Delhi: Sage Publications, 1997), Ishtiaq Ahmed, *State, Nation and Ethnicity in Contemporary South Asia* (London: Pinter, 1996), Mushtaqur Rahman, *Divided Kashmir: Old Problems, New Opportunities for India, Pakistan and the Kashmiri People* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), Ashutosh Varshney, ‘India, Pakistan and Kashmir: Antinomies of Nationalism’, *Asian Survey*; Volume 31, No. 11 – November 1991, pp. 997-1019, Iftikhar Malik, ‘Kashmir Dispute: A Stalemate or Solution?’, *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*; Volume 16, No. 4 – 1993, pp. 55-72, Reeta Chowdhari Tremblay, ‘Nation, Identity and the Intervening Role of the State: A Study of the Secessionist Movement in Kashmir’, *Pacific Affairs*; Volume 69, No. 4 – 1997, pp. 471-97, Seema Kazi, *Between Democracy and Nation* (New Delhi: Women Unlimited, 2009), Aasma Barlas, *Democracy, Nationalism and Communalism* (Boulder: Westview, 1995), Atul Kohli, *Democracy and Discontent* (New York: CUP, 1990) and Suranjan Das, *Kashmir and Sindh* (London: Anthem Press, 2001).

³⁴ Ganguly, *The Origins of War in South Asia*, p. 9

³⁵ M Siraj, *Kashmir: Desolation or Peace* (London: Minerva, 1997), p. xiv; Hewitt, *Reclaiming the Past*, p. 2

sight'.³⁶ The dispute was presented in its 'contemporary dynamics and manifestation' with which, 'the historical roots of the crisis [had] little to do'.³⁷ One explanation compared Kashmir with similar disputes over power-sharing that New Delhi had with other states.³⁸ Another compared Kashmir with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Northern Ireland.³⁹ Yet another drew parallels with Balochi and Sindhi aspirations for autonomy in Pakistan.⁴⁰

For these writings the crux was 'a lack of reconciliation between Indian nationalism and Kashmiri ethno-nationalism'. The crisis was 'a failure to harmonise nation-building and democratisation' and the culprit was 'an Indian state, absorbed in its secular psyche and security concerns'.⁴¹ The consequence of this was that 'internal political issues are increasingly determining the international character of the dispute'.⁴² All this was part of a non-state theme of contemporary South Asian studies that compared the historic evolution of state, society and polity in the Indian sub-continent beyond the post-colonial boundaries.⁴³

Post-9/11, the scholarship on Kashmir has become, what Chitrlekha Zutshi calls, 'a veritable industry'.⁴⁴ It interprets Kashmir's history externally in a four-fold scheme of regional rivalry, global intervention, religious identity and conflict resolution.⁴⁵ Internally, it identifies three levels of relationships: between its princely rulers and the colonial state until 1947 and between its political leaders and India/Pakistan since then, between the 'state' and the 'subject' within Kashmir and, thirdly, between its different population-groups.⁴⁶ Above all, it is firmly placed in a realm of 'people-centred narratives'.⁴⁷

³⁶ Low (ed.), *The Political Inheritance of Pakistan*, p. 219

³⁷ Bose, *The Challenge in Kashmir*, p. 10

³⁸ See Kohli, *Democracy and Discontent* and Widmalm, *Democracy and Violent Separatism in India*

³⁹ See Bose, *The Challenge in Kashmir*

⁴⁰ MA Shah, *The Foreign Policy of Pakistan: Ethnic Impacts on Diplomacy, 1971-94* (London: IB Tauris, 1997)

⁴¹ Das, *Kashmir and Sindh*, p. 76

⁴² Iffat Malik, *Kashmir: Ethnic Conflict, International Dispute* (Oxford: OUP, 2002), p. x

⁴³ Ayesha Jalal, *Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia* (Cambridge: CUP, 1995), pp. xi-xiii and Sugata Bose and Jalal, *Modern South Asia* (New York: Routledge, 2004)

⁴⁴ Zutshi, 'Whither Kashmir Studies?', p. 1033

⁴⁵ See Wirsing, *Kashmir in the Shadow of War: Regional Rivalries in a Nuclear Age* (Armonk: ME Sharpe, 2003), K Leather, *Kashmiri Separatists: Origins, Competing Ideologies and Prospects for Resolution of the Conflict* (New York: Novinka, 2003) and Victoria Schofield, *Kashmir in Conflict* (London: IB Tauris, 2002).

⁴⁶ See Mridu Rai, *Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects* (London: Hurst, 2004) and Abdul Majid Mattu, *Kashmir Issue: A Historical Perspective* (Srinagar: Ali Mohammad and Sons, 2002).

⁴⁷ For example, see Humra Quraishi, *Kashmir: The Untold Story* (New Delhi: Penguin, 2004), Andrew Whitehead, *A Mission in Kashmir* (New Delhi: Penguin/Viking, 2007), David Devadas, *In Search of a Future* (New Delhi: Penguin/Viking, 2007), Navnita Chadha-Behera, *Demystifying Kashmir* (Washington DC: Brookings Press, 2006), Sumantra Bose, *Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace* (Cambridge: HUP, 2003) and Haley Duschinski, 'Destiny Effects: Militarisation, State Power and Punitive Containment in Kashmir

These seek to transcend ‘geographical and political determinism’, present Kashmir as ‘a complex but not unique entity’ and explore its ‘particular shape in [subcontinental] imaginations’.⁴⁸ They are part of the wider debates on Islam and *jihad*, ‘region, nation and community’, ‘colonial ideologies and post-colonial cultures’ and migrants, refugees and warriors.⁴⁹ They have also been joined by fiction and poetry, art and cinema that are providing a creative outlet for Kashmiris to voice their fears, disillusionment and hopes.⁵⁰

Kashmir and International Relations

The Cold War remains the dominant paradigm of the literature on political and military thinking post-1945. In recent years, the relationship between the Superpower ‘centres’ and the Asian and African ‘peripheries’ has been reflected upon,⁵¹ challenging the old understandings,⁵² and, historiographically, the Cold War has now reached South Asia for the period 1945-65.⁵³

With respect to Kashmir, works on its international dimensions started emerging from as early as 1953-54.⁵⁴ Josef Korbel, the Czech academic, who as a member of the United Nations Commission on Kashmir was intimately involved in the diplomacy around the conflict in 1948, devoted two chapters on the ‘shadow from the north’ in his 1954 book, *Danger in Kashmir*. In the 1950s, the UN’s role in Kashmir came under regular scrutiny.⁵⁵

Valley’, *Anthropological Quarterly*, 82:3, pp. 691-718 and ‘Survival is now our Politics: Kashmiri Hindu Community Identity and the Politics of Homeland’, *International Journal of Hindu Studies*, 12:1, pp. 41-64

⁴⁸ Zutshi, ‘Whither Kashmir Studies?’, p. 1033-37

⁴⁹ Zutshi, ‘Whither Kashmir Studies?’, p. 1038-47; also see Mohd Ishaq Khan, *Kashmir’s Transition to Islam* (Delhi: Manohar, 1994), Zutshi, *Languages of Belonging: Islam, Regional Identity and the Making of Kashmir* (Oxford: OUP, 2004), Ananya Jahanara Kabir, *Territory of Desire* (Minnesota: UMP, 2009), Manu Bhagavan (ed.) *Heterotopias: Nationalism and the Possibility of History in South Asia* (Delhi: OUP, 2010) and Cabeiri Robinson, *Body of Victim, Body of Warrior* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013).

⁵⁰ See MA Mansoor, *Yeh Basti Azaboon Ki* (Bandipora: Mir Publications, 2009), Basharat Peer, *Curfewed Night* (London: Harper Press, 2011), Sanjay Kak (ed.) *Until My Freedom Has Come* (Delhi: Penguin, 2011), M Waheed, *The Collaborator* (Delhi: Penguin, 2011), TN Madan and Aparna Rao (ed.) *The Valley of Kashmir* (Delhi: Manohar, 2008) and Nyla Ali Khan (ed.) *The Parchment of Kashmir* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2012)

⁵¹ See Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War* (Cambridge: CUP, 2007).

⁵² For example, see JPD Dunbabin, *The Post-Imperial Age* (London: Longman, 1994).

⁵³ See Paul McGarr, *Britain, United States and the Cold War in South Asia, 1947-1965* (Cambridge: CUP, 2013).

⁵⁴ Apart from Korbel, see Michael Brecher, *The Struggle for Kashmir* (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1953).

⁵⁵ See MMR Khan, *The United Nations and Kashmir* (Groningen: JB Wolters, 1955) and BV Govind Raj, *India and Disputes in the United Nations: 1946-54* (Bombay: Vora, 1959).

The India-Pakistan war of 1965 and its diplomatic aftermath saw quite a few studies on Kashmir and 'Power Politics'.⁵⁶ The landmark publication in this decade was John Kenneth Galbraith's *An Ambassador's Journal* that presented a participant's account of the Anglo-American attempts to settle Kashmir in the aftermath of the India-China war of 1962.⁵⁷

After the 1971 war and the 1972 Simla Agreement between India and Pakistan, which recast the dispute as a bilateral matter, discussions of Kashmir became submerged within broader analyses of India's and Pakistan's international relations.⁵⁸ It was after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 that the 'roots of confrontation' in this region were dug afresh.⁵⁹

From the mid-1980s, a number of important books appeared on British Decolonisation and its place in the Anglo-American relations.⁶⁰ Simultaneously, quite a few works on the military complex and foreign relations of Pakistan and India were published. Each of these had something to say about Kashmir.⁶¹

⁵⁶ See Rahmatullah Khan, *Kashmir and the United Nations* (Delhi: Vikas, 1965), PNK Bamzai, *Kashmir and Power Politics* (Delhi: Metropolitan, 1966), Mushtaq Ahmad, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy* (Karachi: Space Publishers, 1968), Surendra Chopra, *UN Mediation in Kashmir: A Study in Power Politics* (Kurukshetra: Vishal, 1971) and Mujtaba Razvi, *The Frontiers of Pakistan* (Karachi: National Publishing House, 1971).

⁵⁷ See John Kenneth Galbraith, *An Ambassador's Journal* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1969); also see Paul Gore-Booth, *With Great Truth and Respect* (London: Constable, 1974).

⁵⁸ See M Aslam Qureshi, *Anglo-Pakistan relations, 1947-76* (Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, No. 38), W Brown, *The United State and India, Pakistan and Bangladesh* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), William J Barnds, *India, Pakistan and the Great Powers* (Council of Foreign relations, Praeger, 1972), SM Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis* (London: OUP, 1973) and *Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policies* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1974), GW Choudhury, *India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Major Powers: Politics of a Divided Sub-continent* (NY: The Free Press, 1975) and Lawrence Ziring (ed.), *The Subcontinent in World Politics* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1978).

⁵⁹ See Wolpert, *Roots of Confrontation in South Asia* (Oxford: OUP, 1982), BL Kak, *Kashmir: Problems and Politics* (Delhi: Seema, 1981), Rizvi and Buzan (ed.) *South Asian Insecurity and the Great Powers* (London: Macmillan, 1986), Stephen Cohen (ed.) *The Security of South Asia: American and Asian perspectives* (Illinois: CUP, 1986), K Warikoo, *Central Asia and Kashmir: As Study in the Context of Anglo-Russian Rivalry* (Delhi: Gian, 1989) and Denis Wright, *India-Pakistan Relations, 1962-69* (Delhi: Sterling, 1989).

⁶⁰ See Alan Bullock, *Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary* (London: WW Norton, 1983), CJ Bartlett, *The Special Relationship* (London: Longman, 1992), John Baylis, *The Enduring Alliance* (Manchester: University Press, 1997), Ritchie Owendale, *The English-speaking Alliance: Britain, the US, the Dominions and the Cold War, 1945-51* (London: Routledge, 1985), John Darwin, *Britain and Decolonisation* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1988) and *The End of the British Empire: The Historical Debate* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), Peter Clarke, *Hope and Glory: Britain 1900-1990* (London: Penguin Books, 1997) and *The Last Thousand Days of the British Empire* (London: Allen Lane, 2007).

⁶¹ See Hasan-Askari Rizvi, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan, 1947-86* (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1986), Shivraj Ganguly, *US Policy towards South Asia* (Oxford: Westview Press, 1990), Ayesha Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defence* (Cambridge: CUP, 1990), Brian Cloughley, *A History of the Pakistan Army: Wars and Insurrections* (Karachi: OUP, 1999).

Then, the new international politics of the 1990s began to be reflected in writings on South Asia.⁶² On the one hand, a policy-oriented scholarship emerged.⁶³ On the other hand, with the opening of archives in the Anglo-American world, first works started coming on the emergence of the Cold War on the ‘periphery’, Anglo-American relations with India and Pakistan during that period and implications for disputes like Kashmir.⁶⁴

Since the turn of the century, a substantial literature on international involvements in South Asia and Kashmir from the mid-1940s to the present day has appeared. It can be divided into three groups. First, broader surveys of Anglo-American relations in South Asia,⁶⁵ second, histories of independent India and Pakistan,⁶⁶ and third, books probing the international involvement in war and diplomacy around Kashmir.⁶⁷

Kashmir’s evolution from being a Commonwealth crisis to becoming a Cold War dispute has been illuminated in each of these and this thesis has benefited from them. However, as set out

⁶² See Vernon Hewitt, *The International Politics of South Asia* (Manchester: MUP, 1992), Hasan-Askari Rizvi, *Pakistan and the Geo-strategic Environment* (London: Macmillan, 1993) and Wirsing, *Kashmir: Resolving Regional Conflict* (Meerut: Kartikeya Publications, 1996).

⁶³ See Syed Ali Gowher Rizvi, *South Asia in a Changing International Order* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1993), MG Chitkara, *Kashmir Imbroglio: Diagnosis and Remedy* (Delhi: APH, 1996) and Ijaz Hussain, *Kashmir Dispute: An International Law Perspective* (Islamabad: National Institute of Pakistan Studies, 1998).

⁶⁴ See for example Robert McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan* (New York: CUP, 1994), Dennis Kux, *Estranged Democracies: The United States and India, 1941-1991* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1994) and *The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies* (Washington DC: Wilson Centre Press, 2001), Hafeez Malik, *Soviet-Pakistan Relations and post-Soviet Dynamics, 1947-92* (London: Macmillan Press, 1994), Farooq Naseem Bajwa, *Pakistan and the West: The First Decade* (Karachi: OUP, 1996), Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History* (London: Hurst, 1998), SB Brysac and Karl Meyer, *Tournament of Shadows: The Great Game and the Race for Empire in Asia* (Counterpoint LLC, 1999) and Graham Chapman, *The Geopolitics of South Asia* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000).

⁶⁵ See NS Sarila, *The Shadow of the Great Game* (New Delhi: Harper Collins, 2005), Peter John Brobst, *The Future of the Great Game* (Akron: University Press, 2005), Tariq Ali, *The Duel: Pakistan on the Flight Path of American Power* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2008), WM Roger Louis, *Ends of British Imperialism* (London: IB Tauris, 2006) and (ed.) *Penultimate Adventures with Britannia* (New York: IB Tauris, 2008), John Kent, *The Foreign Office and the Defence of the Empire* (London: Routledge, 2008), Calder Walton, *Empire of Secrets* (London: HarperPress, 2013), Roby Barrett, *The Great Middle East and the Cold War: US Foreign policy under Eisenhower and Kennedy* (London: IB Tauris, 2010), McGarr, *The Cold War in South Asia* and Rudra Chaudhuri, *Forged in Crisis: India and United States since 1947* (London: Hurst, 2014).

⁶⁶ See Hussain Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military* (Washington: Carnegie, 2005), Ramachandra Guha, *India After Gandhi* (London: Macmillan, 2007), Ayesha Siddiq, *Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy* (London: Pluto Press, 2007), Shuja Nawaz, *Crossed Swords* (Karachi: OUP, 2008) and Srinath Raghavan, *War and Peace in Modern India* (New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2010).

⁶⁷ See CS Dasgupta, *War and Diplomacy in Kashmir 1947-48* (Delhi: Sage, 2002), Ganguly (ed.), *The Kashmir Question: Retrospect and Prospect*, Vaughan Lowe, Adam Roberts, Jennifer Welsh and Dominik Zaum (ed.), *The UNSC and War: The evolution of thought and practice since 1945* (Oxford: OUP, 2008), Howard Schaffer, *The Limits of Influence: America’s Role in Kashmir* (Brookings Institution Press, 2009), Saroja Sundarajan, *Kashmir Crisis: Unholy Anglo-Pak Nexus* (New Delhi: Kalpaz, 2010) and Christopher Snedden, *Kashmir: The Unwritten History* (Delhi: HarperCollins, 2013).

earlier, there remain important gaps in the historical understanding of Kashmir's evolution from the 'derisory loss of India' to the West in the *Great Game* in 1947 to the dismaying status of the Anglo-Americans in the subcontinent in the Cold War in 1966.⁶⁸

The fascinating flux of the five years from 1947-52 with respect to Kashmir has been largely broad-brushed, 'for better or worse'.⁶⁹ The differences of opinion within and between the British and American governments remain under-appreciated. The re-fashioning of Kashmir within a changed Cold War context in the period 1958-63 has been under-played. Finally, the passing of the Kashmiri parcel to the Soviet Union in 1965 is under-exhibited. The two global frames of Kashmir, Decolonisation and the Cold War, were complicated processes with multiple phases as illustrated by the flux of 1947-49, the thaw of 1949-53, the freeze of 1953-57, the shift of 1957-62, and the cross-currents of 1962-66. They invite multiple examinations.

As has been recently shown in the case of the creation of Bangladesh, another so-called 'unfinished business of partition', viewing a regional conflict in a global perspective is 'not merely the conceit of a historian'.⁷⁰ The twin frames of Decolonisation and the Cold War within which it emerged and evolved were not particular to Kashmir. Moreover, Kashmir's resonance retains a contemporary relevance. Similar regional disputes and their attendant international debates continue to occur. These can only be fully understood by situating them in their wider global contexts and by examining the impact of their international dimensions.

Sources and Structure

This thesis' revision of the Kashmir dispute in its international contexts is enabled by the author's ability to access new and diverse material in four of the possible six countries.⁷¹ First, those records relating to the British foreign, commonwealth and defence affairs for the years 1947-53, which were closed for sixty-five years, have been released since 2008. Second, files of the Ministries of States, Home and External Affairs in India from the 1950s and 60s can now be accessed. Third, in the United States, more than the well-mined general records of the

⁶⁸ Louis and Robinson, 'The Imperialism of Decolonization', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, XXII-1994 (pp. 462-511)

⁶⁹ Anita Inder Singh, *The Limits of British Influence* (London: St. Martin's Press, 1993), p. 29 (en.)

⁷⁰ Raghavan, *1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh* (Cambridge: HUP, 2013), p. 10

⁷¹ Except Pakistan and China for reasons political and linguistic, respectively.

State Department, this study draws upon the less explored Bureau, Lot and Office Files of different departments and individuals within it. It supplements them with records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, US Information Agency, National Security Council, the CIA and the US Delegation to the UN. Finally, in perhaps a first for works of its kind, this thesis uses relevant documents from the Russian State Archives of Social-Political (RGASPI) and Contemporary History (RGANI).

These public records are complimented by the personal papers of a large number of relevant figures. Here too, the thesis seeks to go beyond the usual pantheon of personalities and brings to bear upon Kashmir light from figures like Frederick Puckle, Henry Scott, Laurence Graffety-Smith and Alexander Cadogan in Britain, MO Mathai, Vijayalakshmi Pandit, BN Rau and BK Nehru in India, Henry Grady, George McGhee, W Averell Harriman and Paul Nitze in America and V Molotov and A Mikoyan in Russia, to name some. All this evidence allows us to place Kashmir in, what RJ Moore called, the ‘revived *Great Game* in Asia’ from 1947 itself,⁷² and probe its multiple phases, earlier and more than hitherto acknowledged or analysed.

The structure of the thesis is chronological, with sections within chapters addressing particular themes. Opening with Viceory Wavell’s visit to Kashmir in October 1945, it begins with the three British concerns regarding independent India’s international identity that arose in 1945-47 and provided the first contexts in which the Kashmir dispute evolved. The thesis then covers the first Kashmir conflict (1947-49) and shows how soon and how much the dispute became a ‘plaything of power politics’.⁷³ A survey of the initial American attitude to India (1945-47) and its impact on the early American understanding of the Kashmir dispute (1947-49) follows.

The thesis then shows the transformation of Kashmir from being a Commonwealth concern to becoming an American affair between 1949 and 1953. This is followed by the long period 1953-61 during which the changing Cold War context saw Washington and London approach Kashmir first through the prism of their pact-politics and then through their package proposal to India and Pakistan. The final chapter analyses the last Anglo-American attempts at

⁷² RJ Moore, ‘India in the 1940s’ (pp. 230-242) in Robin Winks (ed.) *Volume V: Historiography of The Oxford History of British Empire* (General Editor: WM Roger Louis), Oxford: OUP, 2001; pp. 240-41

⁷³ 13 September 1948, Delhi to CRO, No. 3194, File L/WS/1/1145, IOR

mediation in Kashmir in the twelve months period from November 1962. The thesis ends with an epilogue covering the years 1964-66 and offers concluding thoughts on this circle of international designs and subcontinental desires within which the Kashmir dispute evolved.

Before embarking upon this discussion of the wider context, a brief word about the dispute's content would not be out of place here. Kashmir's modern history is that of 'Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects'.⁷⁴ In 1945-47, its future alongside other 550-odd princely states in the subcontinent was considered a problem 'secondary' to the partition of British India.⁷⁵ By the autumn of 1947, however, external pressure on its ruler Hari Singh to accede by India and Pakistan, internal opposition to him by the Kashmiri politician Sheikh Abdullah and his party the National Conference, rebellions against his rule in Poonch and Gilgit, south-western and north-western corners of the state, and tribal incursions from Pakistan's NWFP had created an explosive situation. Indian military and diplomatic response, fuelled by Abdullah's close relations with India's Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, and Pakistan's first covert and then overt participation catapulted the war and diplomacy on Kashmir to the international stage. In the following pages, this thesis seeks to situate this narrative within the twists and turns from Empire to Cold War(s) in South Asia from 1945 to 1966.

⁷⁴ See Mridu Rai, *Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects*

⁷⁵ Yasmin Khan, *The Great Partition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007, pp. 97-99)

The International Setting, 1945-47: ‘Fighting the Same Struggle as our Fathers and Grandfathers’¹

Introduction

In October 1945, Viceroy Archibald Wavell visited Jammu and Kashmir. Upon his return to New Delhi, Wavell listed the ‘possibilities of political trouble’ there.² These arose from the character of the ruler Hari Singh, the intentions of his premier Ramachandra Kak (1945-47), the communal divide of the population, the politicking engaged therein by the Indian political parties, Congress and the Muslim League, and the vulnerable northern and western borders of the state, adjoining Punjab and the NWFP, in the near-vicinity of Afghanistan, the Central Asian Soviet Republics and the Chinese Sinkiang.

Wavell’s trip had been prompted by a report from the Foreign Secretary Olaf Caroe that, after emphasising Kashmir’s ‘supreme strategic importance’, had noted a growing inclination on the part of Hari Singh and Kak ‘to obtain a status’ as near as possible to independence.³ Moreover, since 1943, successive British residents in Kashmir had been sending reports warning about the nature and scope of communist agitations.⁴

These concerns about Kashmir merged with Wavell’s prime external worries at this time, which were the strong feelings of over ninety million Muslims in India towards the idea of Pakistan and events in Palestine, the need to keep India ‘in the empire’ and ‘the difficult and unfriendly attitude of Russia’.⁵ These, in turn, fed into larger hopes and fears about independent India, its international attitude and its impact on continuing imperial concerns that grew in the two year period 1945-47 and solidified around three themes: the value of India’s membership of the British Commonwealth, questions accompanying India’s emerging attitude at the United Nations and fears about India’s advances towards the Soviet Union.

¹ 29 January 1949, Philip Price to Attlee, MS Attlee Dep. 77, Attlee Papers, Bodleian Library, Oxford

² Penderel Moon (ed.), *Wavell: The Viceroy’s Journal* (London: OUP, 1973), p. 177

³ 15 January 1945, Caroe’s note recounted by Fry, 25 January 1947, File No. 258-CA/47 (GOI, EA, CA), National Archives of India (NAI); Olaf Caroe (1892-1981; ICS, 1919), later Governor of the NWFP (1946-47).

⁴ See L/PS/13/1265 and L/PS/13/1266, IOR, containing reports by JG Acheson and WF Webb, 1943-47.

⁵ Moon (ed.), *Wavell*, p. 80, 118 and Roger Louis, *Ends of British Imperialism*, pp. 402-03

Taken together, these constituted what has been called, the ‘crisis of India’s international identity in 1940s’.⁶ This chapter situates British concerns about the future of Jammu and Kashmir within this crisis. It shows that the former were understood in the light of the latter. It represented a coming together of an old continuum of ideas about imperial security and the changes of what William Strang, Permanent Under-Secretary of the British Foreign Office (FO) 1949-53, called the ‘new and portentous’ post-1945 world.⁷

Against this confluence, an autonomous let alone independent Kashmir filled British policy-makers with apprehension. Neither London nor New Delhi, therefore, responded with any enthusiasm when Ramachandra Kak had pointed it out to Wavell that Kashmir possessed a healthy fiscal surplus and a better law and order situation than the neighbouring British India provinces.⁸ As the leading South Asian historian Judith Brown has noted:

India’s own experience of the final years of Empire was not isolated...Once India was independent, the logistics of the Empire were radically changed...From the imperial order emerged two independent nations...whose damaging conflict with each other was to feed the fears and aspirations of the two great superpowers in the ensuing Cold War...⁹

India: ‘The Expedient Dominion’¹⁰

The ‘final years of Empire’ therefore are an important prelude to the ‘damaging conflict’ and the place of an independent India in a remodelled Commonwealth comprised the first set of questions regarding India’s international identity in those years that later had an impact on the

⁶ Moore, ‘India in the 1940s’, Robin Winks (ed.) *Volume V: Historiography of The Oxford History of British Empire* (Oxford: OUP, 2001), p. 232; also see Anita Inder Singh, *The Limits of Influence*, pp. 46-52

⁷ 20 October 1959, William Strang to Elizabeth Monroe, GB 165-0207, Elizabeth Monroe Papers (Middle-Eastern Archives Centre, St Antony’s College, Oxford)

⁸ It would do so till 1947-48. The state’s estimated revenue for that year was Rs. 5, 94, 25000/- and expenditure 5, 92, 88000/- thus yielding savings of 1, 37000/-. File No. 5 (6)-P (S)/47 (Political), NAI; also see Kak’s note on ‘Jammu and Kashmir State in 1946-47: Dilemma of Accession – The Missing Link in the Story’, Richard Powell Papers, MSS Eur D 862, IOR and Rakesh Ankit, ‘Pandit Ramchandra Kak: The Forgotten Premier of Kashmir’, *Epilogue* (Volume 4, Issue 4), April 2010, pp. 36-39

⁹ Judith M Brown, ‘India’, Judith M Brown and WM Roger Louis (ed.) *Volume IV: The Twentieth Century of The Oxford History of British Empire* (Oxford: OUP, 2001), pp. 421-22

¹⁰ Harshan Kumarasingham (2013). The ‘Tropical Dominions’: The Appeal of Dominion Status in the Decolonisation of India, Pakistan and Ceylon. *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 23, pp. 223-245

evolution of the Kashmir dispute.¹¹ On the nature of British connection,¹² imperial ideologues had well-demonstrated doubts about India.¹³ Nehru, especially, appeared to them ‘to be the Indian Washington, not Walpole’.¹⁴ Within this broad band of uncertainty, there was also a stratum of apprehension about the future of Kashmir and other princely states. Indeed, the chronological overlap between the first Kashmir conflict and the negotiations leading to the making of the New Commonwealth is striking.¹⁵

In London, the end of the Second World War had brought about a change of the political guard and, consequently, a new look at ‘Britain’s India Problem’.¹⁶ Clement Attlee, the socialist Prime Minister but ‘a dedicated enthusiast for King and Country’ was an old India-hand who had been a member of the Simon Commission in 1928 and who, along with his party man Stafford Cripps had a long and sympathetic association with the Congress-led mainstream of the Indian national movement.¹⁷ He saw British interests best safeguarded by a strong and unitary British and Princely India within the Commonwealth.¹⁸ Ernest Bevin, his Foreign Minister, too was ‘deeply attached’ to Empire,¹⁹ ‘hated the idea of leaving India’ and wanted to reorganise British dominance around it in ‘the East’.²⁰

They sent a three-member Cabinet Mission to India in the summer of 1946.²¹ The disputes over its dealings with the Congress and the Muslim League have obscured its simultaneous

¹¹ See Anita Inder Singh, ‘Imperial Defence and the Transfer of Power in India, 1946-1947’, *International Historical Review*, 4, 4 (November 1982), pp. 562-88 and ‘Keeping India in the Commonwealth: British Political and Military Aims, 1947-1949’, *Journal of Contemporary History*, 20, 3 (July 1985)

¹² John Darwin, ‘A Third British Empire? The Dominion Idea in Imperial Politics’, Brown and Louis (ed.) *Volume IV: The Twentieth Century*, p. 77 and *Unfinished Empire* (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), p. 202

¹³ See M Mazower, *No Enchanted Place: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the UN* (Princeton: PUP, 2009), David McIntyre, *The Britannic Vision: Historians and the Making of the British Commonwealth of Nations, 1907-48* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2009) and AG Hopkins, ‘Rethinking Decolonisation’, *Past and Present*, 200 (August 2008)

¹⁴ Kumarasingham (2013), *The ‘Tropical Dominions’*, p. 232

¹⁵ See RJ Moore, *Making the New Commonwealth*

¹⁶ Moon (ed.), *Wavell*, p. 165; 11 May 1949, Wavell to Basil Liddell-Hart, LH 1/733, Basil Liddell-Hart Papers, Liddell-Hart Centre for Military Archives (KCL); also see Moore, *Endgames of Empire: Studies of Britain’s India Problem* (Oxford: OUP, 1988)

¹⁷ See Kenneth Harris, *Attlee* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1982) and Nicklaus Thomas-Symonds, *Attlee: A Life in Politics* (London: IB Tauris, 2012)

¹⁸ Kenneth Morgan, *Labour People* (Oxford: OUP, 1989), p. 146

¹⁹ Morgan, *Labour People*, p. 157; 18 October 1958, Richard Crossman to Elizabeth Monroe and 29 October 1958, Arthur Creech-Jones to Monroe, GB 165-0207, Monroe Papers

²⁰ Moon (ed.), *Wavell*, p. 399; 1 February 1944, Bevin to Cranborne, BEVN 3/1, Bevin Papers, Churchill Archives Centre (CAC), Cambridge; report of conference on British Policy in Middle-East, E 7151/175/G, 18 October 1945, Box VI, File I, GB 165-0072, Alan Cunningham Papers, Middle-Eastern Archives Centre.

²¹ Comprising Pethick-Lawrence, Stafford Cripps, and AV Alexander, it arrived in India in March 1946 and departed in July. See Moon (ed.), *Wavell* and Peter Clarke, *The Cripps Version* (London: Allen Lane, 2002).

pursuit of strategic concerns.²² The possibility of Pakistan with its volatile north-west frontier and consequent vulnerability vis-à-vis Afghanistan and Russia, in the neighbourhood of Kashmir served to complicate these.²³ While Cripps and Pethick-Lawrence, the Secretary of State for India, have dominated the historical attention on the Cabinet Mission, it was Albert Alexander, the Defence Minister and the self-proclaimed 'silent man',²⁴ who, having monitored aspects of imperial defence, advocated 'retaining imperial positions in India'.²⁵ On this, he clashed with Indians and Britons alike and threatened to return home.²⁶ He received support from Bevin's 'analysis of the possible effect upon foreign relations of developments in India'.²⁷

The Cabinet Mission also visited Kashmir. It met Hari Singh and Kak as well as the two leading politicians of the state, Sheikh Abdullah and Ghulam Abbas of the Muslim Conference.²⁸ Its visit coincided with Abdullah's 'Quit Kashmir' agitation against Hari Singh, which was inspired by the Congress' 1942 'Quit India' campaign against the British and was supported enthusiastically by Nehru, to the discomfort of both the British and some of his own party colleagues.²⁹ Alexander also noted 'increasing communist activity in Srinagar', a feeling that would be strengthened when the British Communist Rajni Palme Dutt visited Kashmir in July 1946.³⁰ New Delhi was already suspicious of Abdullah's associates especially BPL Bedi and GM Sadiq.³¹

The unsatisfactory end of the Cabinet Mission was followed by Wavell's so-called *Breakdown Plan* of September 1946, of which Kashmir was an integral part. The plan envisioned a British sphere of influence in the Punjab, Baluchistan, Kashmir and the NWFP.³² Remembering the summer of 1946, Alexander thought that while 'Wavell had no conscious feeling of being partisan in favour of the Muslim League', having been the Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) in India in 1942 he was bound to remember Congress' 'Quit

²² See volumes VI and VII of *TOP*; 13 March 1946, Leslie Hollis to Monteath, Item No. 521, Volume VI, *TOP*

²³ 13 February 1946, Note on 'Viability of Pakistan' by Pethick-Lawrence, Item No. 427, Volume VI, *TOP*

²⁴ 12 April 1946, AVAR 6/2, Diary of the Mission to India, AV Alexander Papers, CAC

²⁵ Kenneth Morgan, *Labour in Power, 1945-51* (Oxford: OUP, 1984), p. 194, 220

²⁶ 11 and 20 May, 3, 11 and 24 June 1946, AVAR 6/2, Alexander Papers; Morgan, *Labour in Power*, p. 221

²⁷ Moore, *Escape from Empire*, p. 188

²⁸ 21 April 1946, AVAR 6/2, Alexander Papers; see Ian Copland, 'The Abdullah Factor: Kashmiri Muslims and the Crisis of 1947', Low (ed.) *The Political Inheritance of Pakistan*, pp. 218-54

²⁹ 29 May 1946, Patel to Nehru, Correspondences file, MO Mathai Papers, NMML

³⁰ See L/PS/12/1266, IOR

³¹ 5 March 1947, No. F.6-C/47, Reports from Kashmir Residency, File No. 5 (6)-P (S)/47 (Political), NAI

³² For the *Breakdown Plan*, see Volumes VII and VIII of the *TOP*.

India' campaign 'whilst he was trying to keep the Japanese out of India'. Five years on, the Soviets had replaced the Japanese as Wavell's and Alexander's key external concern towards which the Congress appeared, if anything, more impervious.³³

One individual who was alive to these concerns and regularly sought to apprise Nehru accordingly was his London-based friend VK Krishna Menon. Throughout 1946, Menon warned him that the 'essentially imperialist' Britain desired India as a 'satellite' and its policy towards India was a part of its international effort against Russia: 'The conflict with Russia was and is serious. This time the USA plays the bigger part. Bevin wants the Moslem States and India to assist Britain against Russia. We should not be drawn into this business'.³⁴ Eighteen months later, in December 1947, Menon would firmly believe that the Anglo-American interest in Kashmir was 'primarily and basically tied up with the question of [military] bases'.³⁵ Menon, at this time an old friend, unofficial spokesman and literary agent for Nehru in the UK, would soon become a contentious representative at the UN (1946) and a controversial High-Commissioner in London (1947) where his pro-Communist leanings and associations would make Britons as well as many Indians uncomfortable.³⁶

On the other side, Mohammad Ali Jinnah was receiving similar analysis from his confidants. Mir Laik Ali, who would go on to represent Pakistan at the UN, and MAH Ispahani, who would serve as Pakistan's first envoy to the US (1947-52), after their travels in the West in 1945-46, wrote to Jinnah about the Western desire to prepare China, India and the Arab world as their 'first line of defence' against Russia.³⁷

The Cabinet Mission had been banking on 'the hope' that many Indians – liberals, conservatives, Princes and the right-wings of both the Congress and the Muslim League – were said to be 'much alarmed of Russia'.³⁸ The crux of the strategic matter was whether it was better to have a close military relationship with a Pakistan, which was considered

³³ 26 June 1946, AVAR 6/2, Alexander Papers

³⁴ Menon to Nehru, letters and telegrams dated 28 January, 20 February, 11 March, 24 March, 17 April, 29 April and June 1946; Correspondences with Krishna Menon, Mathai Papers

³⁵ Menon's handwritten note to Nehru, December 1947, Subject File Serial No. 18, Mathai Papers

³⁶ See TJS George, *Krishna Menon: A Biography* (New York: Taplinger, 1965), Judith Brown, *Nehru: A Political Life* (New Haven: YUP, 2003) and Guha, *India After Gandhi*, pp. 166-7

³⁷ 1 October 1945, Laik Ali to Jinnah, Item No. 168, Second Series – Volume XII, *Jinnah Papers* (ed. ZH Zaidi), Culture Division, Government of Pakistan (Islamabad, 2004); 2 November 1946, Puckle to Joyce, Box II, File 16, Frederick Puckle Papers, The Centre of South Asian Studies (CSAS), Cambridge

³⁸ Undated, Frank Turnbull to Monteath, Item No. 32, Volume VII, *TOP*

‘intrinsically less desirable’ or whether they could count upon an India, which was expected to be neutral.³⁹ The FO and the Dominion Office (DO) too awaited the Mission’s outcome from their vantages of the ‘Russian game’, ‘Palestine and Egyptian problems’ and the growing American insistence to ‘not abandon essential strategic positions in India’.⁴⁰

Wavell had put it to the Cabinet Mission that he anticipated Pakistan to turn to the Middle-East and India to Africa and the Far-East, possibly China and perhaps Russia.⁴¹ The Viceroy’s feeling symbolised the growing conviction among the British officials in India that Nehru could not be relied upon for the pursuit of vital imperial interests.⁴² The Conservative opposition in London, reflecting its old attitudes towards the Congress, was anyway pouring scorn upon ‘India’s continued association with the Commonwealth’.⁴³ In time, even Bevin would come to feel that ‘India was not going to be morally committed to us’.⁴⁴ It was against this unpromising background that an Interim Government led by Nehru but without any Muslim League members was sworn in by Wavell on 2 September 1946. Bevin and Pethick-Lawrence anticipated that

Our interests might be affected by Nehru’s emotionalism, his sympathy for fellow Asiatics and his handling of tribal affairs. Nehru has well-defined views but a lack of experience and an impatience to carry out his ideas without regard to wider implications for the British Commonwealth in which India must, at least during this period, continue to participate.⁴⁵

Others were equally pessimistic. Christopher Addison, the last Dominion Secretary, termed India ‘more of a menace’.⁴⁶ Philip Noel-Baker, his successor at the new Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO), would declare Nehru’s foreign policy as ‘a great drawback’.⁴⁷ Oliver Lyttelton, later the Conservative Colonial Secretary (1951-54), summed up his party’s

³⁹ 9 April 1946, Note by William Croft and Frank Turnbull, Item No. 78, Volume VII, *TOP*

⁴⁰ 12 June and 14 June 1946, Defence Committee Paper DO (46) 68 and Cabinet Paper CP (46) 222, Item Nos. 509 and 528, Volume VII, *TOP*

⁴¹ 10 April 1946, Wavell-Cabinet Mission meeting, Item No. 82 and 13 April 1946, Attlee to Cabinet Mission and Wavell, Item No. 105, Volume VII, *TOP*

⁴² 3 November 1946, PJ Griffith to Pethick-Lawrence, Item No. 249, Volume VIII, *TOP*; 13 November 1946, Pethick-Lawrence to Wavell, Item No. 34, Volume IX, *TOP*

⁴³ Salisbury quoted in Louis, *Ends of British Imperialism*, p. 417

⁴⁴ 10 February 1949, Bevin’s note to the Cabinet, GNWR 1/6, Patrick Gordon-Walker Papers, CAC

⁴⁵ 30 August 1946, Cabinet Paper CP (46) 329, L/PS/12/4631, IOR

⁴⁶ 5 November 1947, Cabinet Paper on ‘The Indian Scene’, CA (47) 11, FO 371/63571, TNA

⁴⁷ 15 March 1949, Noel-Baker to Archibald Nye, DO 121/71, TNA

feelings as, ‘we had better get rid of this perpetual nagging’.⁴⁸ This was in stark contrast to the Muslim League which, only too aware of the lack of strategic depth of a future Pakistan, was desirous to keep a ‘close connection’ with the British and aware of ‘the NWFP and Kashmir as one large vulnerable defence area’ against the ‘avaricious’ Russians and the antagonist Afghans.⁴⁹

On his very first day as the head of the Interim Government, Nehru wrote to Field Marshal Claude Auchinleck, C-in-C of the British Indian Army (1943-47), about his desire to transform ‘the whole background of the Indian Army’ and make it ‘a national army of India’. He demanded its removal from frontier defence and return from Indonesia and Iraq.⁵⁰ He also desired election to the UN Security Council. To this, the India Office remarked that the ‘Interim government has not yet had much chance of acquiring wisdom in international affairs [and] should not be allowed to launch itself just now in troubled waters’.⁵¹

For General Frank Messervy, who was then commanding the huge and strategically significant North-Western Command and would later be the first C-in-C of Pakistan Army, these were straws in wind enough to make him write to Lord Mountbatten that ‘India is not what it was...it stands a 50-50 chance of coming through...either as a Dominion or closely bound to us’.⁵² Exactly a year later, in his first report to the King as independent India’s first Governor-General, Mountbatten himself would reflect on how Nehru still looked upon the army and the civil service as ‘British-controlled machines’ and wished to rapidly nationalise them. In stark contrast, Pakistan was already offering very good terms for British officers prepared to serve there,⁵³ that this was due to the relative weakness and fragility of Pakistan was neither lost on Mountbatten nor on the government in London.

⁴⁸ 27 February 1960, Interview by Max Beloff (p. 37), MSS Brit Emp S525, Lyttelton Papers, Rhodes House

⁴⁹ 23 May 1946, Shafaat Ahmad Khan to Jinnah, Item No. 108, Second Series, Volume XIII and 3 August 1946, Churchill to Jinnah, Item No. I.1 and October 1946, Nawab Mohammad Yusuf to Jinnah, Item No. 206, Second Series, Volume XIV, *Jinnah Papers*; 31 October 1946, Monteath to Hollis, Item No. 537, Volume VIII, *TOP*; 7 December 1946, Sargeant to Monteath, Item No. 173, Volume IX, *TOP*; 9 January 1947, Pethick-Lawrence to Dominion High-Commissioners, Item No. 268, Volume IX, *TOP* and 5 November 1947, Cabinet Paper on ‘The Indian Scene’, CA (47) 11, FO 371/63571, TNA

⁵⁰ 2 September 1946, Nehru to C-in-C India’s Committee (46) 380), POLL 3/1/5, Enoch Powell Papers, CAC

⁵¹ 24 September 1946, India Office to Gore-Booth (FO), C&O 4022/46, L/PS/12/4701, IOR

⁵² 5 November 1946, Messervy to Mountbatten, MB1/E106, Mountbatten Papers, Hartley Library, Southampton

⁵³ 2 September 1947, GG’s personal report no. 1, MB1/D86, Mountbatten Papers

It was against this backdrop that in November 1946, WF Webb, the Resident in Kashmir, reported that Hari Singh and Kak were 'seriously considering' independence. Their attitude seemed to be that once British paramountcy ended, Kashmir would be free to ally with any power, 'not excluding Russia'.⁵⁴ Webb was immediately instructed to emphasise to Kak that given Kashmir's economic dependence on British India and its strategic importance, any alienation between the two was out of question.⁵⁵ After all, the end of British paramountcy in India, as Bevin wrote to Attlee, would not mean an end of British concerns about Russia or its desire to strengthen the Commonwealth in 'a much wider area'.⁵⁶

As 1947 dawned, Attlee sent Mountbatten as Viceroy to make a last attempt to alert the Indian politicians to the strategic requirements of a united India or a divided India with a united defence.⁵⁷ In Kashmir, his announcement of 20 February 1947 triggered a discussion about the future of Gilgit and the fear of Communists.⁵⁸ Mountbatten's first interviews with the Indian leaders, however, further strengthened beliefs about Congress' ambivalence and Muslim League's enthusiasm towards the emerging 'inflammable ideological world'.⁵⁹ While Jinnah assured Terence Shone, first UK High-Commissioner in India, that 'Britain was the devil he knew', Nehru 'did not consider it possible for India to remain in the Commonwealth due to psychological and emotional reasons'.⁶⁰

This initial impudence assumed significant proportions when combined with Stalin's imprudence with which he spoke to Bevin about India when he visited Moscow just when Mountbatten assumed charge in New Delhi.⁶¹ Lieutenant-General Archibald Nye, Governor of the Communist plagued province of Madras (1946-48), was insisting that 'the only real

⁵⁴ 14 November 1946, Webb to Griffin, Item No. 37, Volume IX, *TOP*

⁵⁵ 2 December 1946, Wakefield to Webb, Item No. 140, Volume IX, *TOP*

⁵⁶ 1 January 1947, Bevin to Attlee, FO 800/470, TNA; also see item nos. 157 and 186, 5 December and 11 December 1946, Volume IX, *TOP*

⁵⁷ See Partha Sarathi Gupta, 'British Strategic and Economic Priorities during the Negotiations for the Transfer of Power in South Asia, 1945-47', *Bangladesh Historical Studies*, 7 (1983), pp. 39-51

⁵⁸ 15 January, 5 March and 18 March 1947, No F.6-C/47, Fortnightly Reports from Kashmir Residency, File No. 5(6)-P(S)/47, (Political Department, Political Branch), NAI

⁵⁹ 2 April 1947, Mountbatten to Attlee, MB1/E128 and 25 April 1947, Third (47) meeting of the Defence Committee of India, DCI/I-174/47, MB1/D42, Mountbatten Papers

⁶⁰ Notes dated 16 April 1947, Shone-Jinnah meeting, Item No. 159, Volume X, *TOP*; Shone had earlier served as the British Minister in Cairo (1940), Syria and Lebanon (1944-46).

⁶¹ 12 April 1947, Pethick-Lawrence to Mountbatten, MB1/D40, Mountbatten Papers

threat to India is from Russia' and hoped that Nehru, 'an interesting combination of a clear-headed realist and a not-so-clear-headed idealist', would be aware.⁶²

Meanwhile, in a series of five documents prepared between May 1945 and July 1947, the CoS was establishing the future of British strategic concerns. Even before the formal end of the war, 'the Soviet Menace' to India had been identified,⁶³ with respect to which, the importance of north-west India was highlighted.⁶⁴ Auchinleck looked upon this region, which would become Pakistan, as a lever to dominate Hindustan, influence the Middle-East and prevent Soviet advance if a united and willing India inside the Commonwealth could not be realised.⁶⁵ In July 1946, the CoS had highlighted the essential arc from Turkey to north-west India in meeting the Russian threat.⁶⁶ By November 1946, together with the FO, they had identified 'Western India' as crucial for British interests, given its location and religious composition.⁶⁷ In March 1947, they concluded that 'if power is transferred to a divided India, we would wish to support the power controlling the western frontier and the Indus valley'.⁶⁸ Kashmir was added to this region in a paper on the 'economic viability' of Pakistan prepared in April.⁶⁹ Five weeks before partition, the CoS would rest their case:

The area of Pakistan is strategically the most important in India and the majority of our strategic requirements could be met, though with considerable greater difficulty, by an agreement with Pakistan alone. We do not therefore consider that failure to obtain agreement with India would cause us to modify any of our requirements.⁷⁰

By November 1947, the CoS would seem to both Wavell and Mountbatten 'to be playing with the idea of making a base of Pakistan and letting India go'.⁷¹ This analysis had been echoed in Bevin's speech at a Labour Party Conference in May when he explained withdrawal from a divided India in terms of a consolidation in the Middle-East against Soviet

⁶² 2 May 1947, Nye to Mountbatten, Item No. 282, Volume X, *TOP*

⁶³ 19 May 1945, Post-Hostilities Planning Staff (45) 15 (0), L/WS/1/983-988, IOR

⁶⁴ 18 April 1946, CoS Report No. (46) 19 (0), TNA

⁶⁵ 11 May 1946, MUL 1152, Auchinleck Papers, John Rylands Library (JRL), Manchester

⁶⁶ 10 July 1946, Cabinet Paper (46) 267, CAB 129/11, TNA

⁶⁷ 4 and 31 October 1946, Item Nos. 408 and 537, Volume VIII, *TOP* and 29 November 1946, CoS (46-47), L/WS/1/1030, IOR

⁶⁸ 18 March 1947, CoS Committee Paper (47) 59 (0), Item No. 544, Volume IX, *TOP*

⁶⁹ 5 April 1947, 'The economic viability of Pakistan' by Maurice Zinkin (Finance Deptt.), MS 350 A3002/3/2/18, Alan Campbell-Johnson Papers, Hartley Library, Southampton

⁷⁰ 7 July 1947, JP (47) 90, Item No. 554, Volume XI, *TOP*; also see 14 October 1947, Hamidullah to Jinnah, F.603/9-11, (No. 63) accompanying note, F.785/219-26, First Series, Volume VI, *Jinnah Papers*

⁷¹ Moon (ed.), *Wavell*, p. 437

Russia. It prompted Krishna Menon to ask Mountbatten if the north-west frontier was ‘still the hinterland’ of British military strategy. Elaborating, Menon contextualised Kashmir in this mosaic:

Does Britain still think in terms of being able to use [NWF] territory? If Kashmir chooses to be in Pakistan, there is a further development in that direction...The attitude of India would be resentful and British hold on Pakistan would not improve it...If Kashmir and NWFP go to Pakistan, all hopes of the [partition] plan being a settlement will prove fanciful.⁷²

The answer was yes. London was keen to use this territory and anxious to preclude any turn to a foreign power, not excluding the United States, by India, Pakistan or Kashmir.⁷³ It was in this scenario that Mountbatten made an ultimately futile visit to Kashmir over 18-23 June 1947 to convince its ruler to accede to India.⁷⁴ The Viceroy had been able to turn his attention to the future of the princely states only in the last weeks before the transfer of power.⁷⁵ He had originally envisaged a Commonwealth Realm of princely states, which foundered on Congress’ apprehensions and agreements.⁷⁶

Subsequently, he urged upon Jinnah and Vallabhbhai Patel, Nehru’s deputy and the Home Minister, the desirability of early, long-term Commonwealth defence arrangements between India, Pakistan and Britain at a meeting of the provisional Joint Defence Council in August. With partition prejudicing the security of the subcontinent, London was anxious for discussions about defence arrangements as soon as possible and keen to keep them ‘under constant review in the light of the ever-changing world situation’.⁷⁷

Naturally, an unsettled Kashmir, given where it was located, ‘disturbed’ Lord Listowel, Pethick-Lawrence’s successor at the India Office, as the clock wound down on British India.⁷⁸ Two days before the transfer of power, Webb summarised the instability in Kashmir

⁷² 14 June 1947, Krishna Menon to Mountbatten, MB1/E104, Mountbatten Papers

⁷³ 15 July 1947, Item No. 118 and 1 August 1947, Listowel to Mountbatten, Item No. 310, Volume XII, *TOP*; the CoS also conveyed similar feeling, 6 August 1947, MB1/D143 (Folder 2), Mountbatten Papers

⁷⁴ 17 June 1947, Mountbatten to Akbar Hydari, F 200/13, Mountbatten Papers, IOR and 27 June 1947, Mountbatten to King, MB1/D84 (Folder 1), Mountbatten Papers

⁷⁵ See Ian Copland, *The Princes of India in the Endgame of Empire, 1917-1947*

⁷⁶ Apart from Copland, see Harshan Kumarasingham, *A Political Legacy of the British Empire*, pp. 92-101 and Ramusack, *The Indian Princes and their States* (Cambridge: CUP, 2004), pp. 272-73

⁷⁷ 6 August 1947, MB1/D59 (Folder 2), Mountbatten Papers

⁷⁸ 9 August 1947, Listowel to Mountbatten, MB1/D41, Mountbatten Papers

and the dilemma for Hari Singh, ending with a warning about ‘repercussions outside state’.⁷⁹ These repercussions were understood within the ever-changing world situation and Nehru’s desire to step into it.

India at the UN, 1946: ‘Interim’, not ‘independent’⁸⁰

The first illustration of this desire causing dismay in London was the behaviour of the Indian delegation at the UN in October-November 1946.⁸¹ This delegation was selected by Nehru as the Interim Prime Minister, was led by his sister Vijayalakshmi Pandit and included Krishna Menon. Nehru would proudly call it ‘our first venture on a somewhat different plane from those previously’.⁸² This pride continues to this day in self-congratulatory Indian writings, which laud Nehru’s vision and its presentation by Pandit.⁸³ However, the first impression this venture caused would later become important when Kashmir became the first inter-state dispute to be discussed at the UN Security Council in January 1948.

The India Office first took notice of the Congress’ efforts in the international arena in January 1945 when Pandit attended the Institute of Pacific Relations Conference. Frederick Puckle, Advisor on Indian Affairs in the British Embassy in Washington, felt that she had been ‘a great social success’,⁸⁴ but her political predicament had been whether to give Indian independence ‘priority over the war’, what to answer when questioned about Pakistan and how to convince the Americans that this was India’s internal business.⁸⁵

Puckle’s confidence was not shared by the External Affairs department in New Delhi though, which was worried about any embarrassment that Pandit might cause to the official Indian delegation at the San Francisco Conference in April.⁸⁶ However, in the aftermath of *Yalta*,⁸⁷

⁷⁹ 13 August 1947, Webb to Abell, No. 86, MB1/D206, Mountbatten Papers

⁸⁰ Vijayalakshmi Pandit, *The Scope of Happiness: A Memoir* (New York: Crown Publishers, 1979), p. 215

⁸¹ An Indian delegation had attended the IPR conference (Hot Springs, January 1945), the San Francisco Conference (April-June 1945) and the inaugural UN sessions (London, January 1946).

⁸² 5 December 1946, Nehru to KPS Menon, Correspondence file, Mathai Papers; others in the delegation included HN Kunzru, Raza Ali, Frank Anthony, Maharaj Singh, MC Chagla, RL Deshmukh and Azim Hussain.

⁸³ See Manu Bhagavan, *The Peacemakers: India and the Quest for One World*

⁸⁴ 10 and 16 January 1945, Box I, File 2; 22 March 1945, Puckle to Joyce, Box II, File 16, Puckle Papers

⁸⁵ 26 February 1945, Puckle to Patrick, Box II, File 15, Puckle Papers

⁸⁶ 10 April 1945, Caroe to Puckle, No RB/392, Box II, File 17, Puckle Papers; the official Indian delegation comprised non-Congress Indians and Britons including Ramaswamy Mudaliar, Feroz Khan Noon, VT Krishnamachariar, KPS Menon and WJ Cawthorn.

⁸⁷ See SM Plokhly, *Yalta: The Price of Peace* (London: Penguin, 2010).

Americans were more anxious to know ‘what part India is likely to play in the world in future than to be told about what India is’.⁸⁸ The cryptic remark of the Soviet representative Vyacheslav Molotov that ‘India was not but would be independent’ fed into the increasing American worry about the spread of Communism and, Puckle hoped, ‘might dispose some people to look with a more kindly eye on the preservation of British influence in India’.⁸⁹

As the second part of the first session of the General Assembly and Security Council began in October-November 1946, Puckle anticipated that Nehru’s delegation would ‘display ostentatious independence’.⁹⁰ London knew that before coming to New York to join Pandit, Krishna Menon had met Molotov at Paris, at Nehru’s behest, and discussed opening diplomatic relations. Menon was fast becoming a ‘serious menace to security’ for the British Intelligence given the nature of his relationship with the Communist Parties of Great Britain and Soviet Russia.⁹¹ This would not bode well for the Indians as public opinion in America at this time was ‘practically unanimous in dubbing Russia the bad boy and applauding toughness in its treatment’.⁹² Puckle concluded that the Indians ‘had better be careful not to vote with the Russian bloc, if they value US sympathy’.⁹³

It was, however, not merely a matter of personal prejudice or reflexive behaviour. There was a genuine divergence between India and Britain on a range of issues. These included the India-South Africa dispute over racial discrimination, creation of a South-West African Union, the work of the Trusteeship Council in the-then Tanganyika, the Dutch presence in Indonesia and India’s bid to become a member of the Security and Trusteeship Councils.⁹⁴ New Delhi was especially interested in, as RN Banerjee the Indian Civil Service (ICS) member attached to the delegation, remembered, the treatment of Indians in South Africa.⁹⁵ On the first three of these, the Soviet-bloc and India voted similarly. This did not go unnoticed. Lord Inverchapel, the British Ambassador in the US (1946-48), wrote to Bevin:

⁸⁸ 31 May 1946, Puckle to Patrick, Box II, File 21, Puckle Papers

⁸⁹ 21 June 1946, Diary entry, Box I, File 2, Puckle Papers

⁹⁰ 13 September and 23 October 1946, Box I, File 3; 20 November 1946, Puckle to Patrick, Box II, File 15, Puckle Papers

⁹¹ See Paul McGarr, ‘A Serious Menace to Security’: British Intelligence, VK Krishna Menon and the Indian High Commission in London, 1947-52, *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Volume 38, Issue 3, 2010, pp. 441-469

⁹² 9 September 1946, Diary entry, Box I, File 3, Puckle Papers

⁹³ 28 September and 21 October 1946, Puckle to Joyce, Box II, File 21, Puckle Papers

⁹⁴ 21 October 1946, Box I, File 3 and 3 December 1946, Puckle to Patrick, Box II, File 15, Puckle Papers

⁹⁵ Oral History Transcripts, RN Banerjee, Acc. No. 366, p. 77, NMML

At the moment, behind all changes in the east the nervous see the spectre of Russia. Vague uneasiness of this kind is stimulated by Mr Nehru's proposal of a Pan-Asiatic conference in New Delhi. It is evident that the behaviour of the Indian Delegation and, in particular, its attitude to Soviet Russia will be closely watched.⁹⁶

The British and the Indian delegations came face to face in the last week of October 1946. The first impressions were on expected lines: Pandit was 'friendly' and Krishna Menon appeared 'venomous'.⁹⁷ The key fault-line among the Indians was immediately apparent. While Krishna appeared to be 'doing his best to stir up trouble', KPS Menon, the veteran ICS, was his usual 'very sensible' self. Pandit and Krishna, in competition for Nehru's ear, already showed signs of 'getting a bit tired' of each other.⁹⁸ This internal division between 'officials' and 'politicals', which was also acknowledged by Pandit in her letters to Nehru,⁹⁹ prompted comparisons with Browning's character that had 'two soul faces'.¹⁰⁰

The Indian delegation was aware that a pro-Russian or anti-British attitude would earn them unnecessary Anglo-American suspicion and harm their bid for a non-permanent seat on the Security Council.¹⁰¹ Vijayalakshmi Pandit, who remained optimistic despite acknowledging the potential Anglo-American opposition, was also disappointed by the modus operandi of the UN: 'Everything here is decided over the lunch table or in the bar'.¹⁰² RN Banerjee complained that 'the only delegation which took any socio-official notice of us as a delegation of India was the Soviet Delegation'.¹⁰³ Puckle, whose job it was to attend lunches and frequent bars, where people were commenting on the 'unreal and intemperate' Krishna and the 'theatrical and erratic' Pandit, knew even before the voting began for the Security Council that the Indians had lost because of 'the rather irresponsible way in which [they] talked on world affairs coupled with their apparent readiness to make allies of the Russians'.¹⁰⁴

⁹⁶ 5 November 1946, Inverchapel to Bevin, Box II, File 21, Puckle Papers

⁹⁷ 23 October 1946, Diary entry, Box I, File 3, Puckle Papers

⁹⁸ 24 October 1946, Diary entry, Box I, File 3, Puckle Papers

⁹⁹ 20 November 1946, Pandit to Nehru, Subject File Serial No. 47, Pandit Papers (I Instalment), NMML

¹⁰⁰ 2 November 1946, Puckle to Joyce, Box II, File 21, Puckle Papers

¹⁰¹ 11 November 1946, Puckle to Patrick, Box II, File 15; 11-12 November 1946, Box I, File 3, Puckle Papers

¹⁰² 30 October 1946, Pandit to Nehru, Subject File Serial No. 47, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

¹⁰³ Oral History Transcripts, RN Banerjee, Acc. No. 366, p. 87, NMML

¹⁰⁴ 14 and 18 November 1946, Diary entries, Box I, File 3, Puckle Papers

When the inevitable reverse came, the surprising aspect was the pattern of votes. India got nothing from the Soviet bloc 'in spite of the pleasant flirtation that had been going on'.¹⁰⁵ Puckle hoped that Nehru would wake up to this 'piece of petty treachery'.¹⁰⁶ Pandit was dismayed. She had lobbied hard with everyone bar the Americans who did not seem friendly to her and wondered whether India 'shall ever get in' given the prevalent 'bloc voting'.¹⁰⁷

London welcomed this defeat of the 'untutored, naïve, enthusiastic amateurs', which it expected would teach the Indians who their real friends were. The only trouble was that the Indian delegation was now expected to be more desirous of the Trusteeship Council where they could be 'an infernal nuisance' for Britain. But opposing India's candidature for the Trusteeship Council was more difficult as it had taken a prominent part in the discussions and its election over British opposition, a distinct possibility, would have been embarrassing. Complicating the British dilemma was the Indian delegate on the Trusteeship Council: the 'anti-British Soviet agent *Pandarus* – Krishna Menon'.¹⁰⁸

Apart from the Security and Trusteeship Councils, it was clear that on South Africa, the Indians and the British would square off. To London, the Indians appeared to have come determined to generate publicity for their case regardless of upsetting General Smuts. To Indians, the British appeared equally determined to pull strings to protect him.¹⁰⁹ Puckle knew the Indians would be 'sour about lack of Commonwealth support against South Africa' but had not expected them to be 'quite so persistent in their efforts'.¹¹⁰ He concluded that:

The [Indians] came here to crusade... Inevitably the delegation looked for allies wherever they could find them... I do not think that the fact that they found themselves so often on the opposite side to us bothered them very much. We are going to have to face situations like this again...¹¹¹

The Indians, too, had not been sanguine about their experience. Vijayalakshmi Pandit was distraught at the behaviour of her delegation. While Krishna Menon had been 'irresponsible,

¹⁰⁵ 19 November 1946, Diary entry, Box I, File 3, Puckle Papers; India got 13 votes – 1 (own), 4 (Commonwealth; Canada but not South Africa), 5 (Arab League), 1 (China), 2 (from among Liberia, Afghanistan, Ethiopia and Philippines)

¹⁰⁶ 22 November 1946, Box I, File 3 and 20 November 1946, Puckle to Patrick, Box II, File 15 Puckle Papers

¹⁰⁷ 20 November 1946, Pandit to Nehru, Subject File Serial No. 47, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

¹⁰⁸ 20 November 1946, Puckle to Patrick, Box II, File 15, Puckle Papers

¹⁰⁹ 4 November 1946, Pandit to Nehru, Subject File Serial No. 47, Pandit Papers, (I Instalment)

¹¹⁰ 27 November 1946, Diary entry, Box I, File 3, Puckle Papers

¹¹¹ 3 December 1946, Puckle to Patrick, Box II, File 15, Puckle Papers

intolerable, utterly non-cooperative and entirely prejudiced in favour of the Soviets’, KPS Menon was ‘a great disappointment, the one discordant note – bureaucratic, narrow in outlook, one-track mind [who] practically lives in the pocket of the British’.¹¹² A distressed Nehru resolved to put an end to the ‘hostile and unsympathetic ICS’,¹¹³ but also accepted that their policies seemed ‘rather confused [with] a tendency to adapt ourselves to this or that [of] others’ and determined to not allow it ‘to go far and have a very definite policy of our own in future’.¹¹⁴ To Puckle, the overall drift was unmistakable:

An India outside the Commonwealth might be a much more useful, reliable and generally satisfactory friend than an India which felt that the existence of political ties, however tenuous, made it always incumbent on her to kick against them and show publicly and offensively how independent she really was.¹¹⁵

In November-December 1946, the feeling at the India Office was that relations with India were ‘so impossible’ that one could not say what ‘the right line’ was in international gatherings.¹¹⁶ As for the future, it expected from India ‘personal attractiveness, emotional oratory, capability in official and committee work [but] unsatisfactory political nous and weak public standing, especially in the West’.¹¹⁷ Each of these was exhibited at one time or another during Kashmir debates at the UN from 1948 to 1964.

As of now, Pethick-Lawrence worried that the British response would determine ‘the extent to which India will be drawn further into association with the USSR’.¹¹⁸ In the Colonial Office (CO), Arthur Creech-Jones, the Secretary of State, was similarly noting ‘the unacceptable and most uncooperative’ attitude of the Indians who had been, apart from the Soviets, the main opponents on colonial and trusteeship questions at the UN.¹¹⁹

¹¹² 4, 20, 26 and 29 November 1946, Pandit to Nehru, Subject File Serial No. 47, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

¹¹³ 5 December 1946, Nehru to Pandit, Correspondences file, Mathai Papers

¹¹⁴ 5 December 1946, Nehru to KPS Menon, Correspondence file, Mathai Papers

¹¹⁵ 20 November 1946, Puckle to Patrick, Box II, File 15, Puckle Papers

¹¹⁶ 30 November 1946, Patrick to Puckle, Box II, File 15, Puckle Papers

¹¹⁷ 27 December 1946, Curson to London and Puckle on Curson’s note, 13 January 1947, Puckle Papers

¹¹⁸ 1 November 1946, Pethick-Lawrence to Wavell, Item No. 541, Volume VIII, *TOP*

¹¹⁹ 16 January 1947, CP (47) 5, Report on Trusteeship (Cabinet Memorandum), Box 54, File No 3, MSS Brit Emp S332 and Secret Report on “the colonial question” after the 4th regular session of the UN General Assembly, 1949, Box 54, File No 3, MSS Brit Emp S332, Arthur Creech-Jones Papers, Rhodes House

As 1946 ended, Puckle sketched in his diary a typical early UN scene in which ‘Western Europe plus the White Commonwealth plus USA’ squared off against ‘a motley crowd of smaller nations influenced by race, colour or sentiment’ with the Soviet bloc poised to exploit it, the Arab bloc prepared to heavily horse-trade, the Latin bloc preferring to act together to defy the crack of the US whip and the Asiatics preferring to hang together and get into alliances with the Soviets.¹²⁰ To the British Embassy in Washington, ‘India was not to be taken altogether seriously’ in this set-up, yet.¹²¹

Nine months later, just after Indian independence, there began another round at the UN between India and the West; the last before the Kashmir dispute reached there in January 1948. This time, Vijayalakshmi Pandit found herself the target of a propaganda campaign of ‘Nehru leaning towards Moscow influenced by his sister’.¹²² This was an allusion to her Ambassadorship to Moscow since April 1947. A new element in the mix now was the Pakistan Embassy in Washington from where Ambassador Ispahani was directing the campaign that Pakistan was ‘pro-British’ and India ‘pro-Soviet’.¹²³ As Paul Gore-Booth, then a member of the UK delegation to UN and later the UK High-Commissioner to India (1960-65), remembered, in 1947, the ‘independent’ Indian delegation worked closely with the Chinese, vociferously against the South Africans and visibly with the Soviets.¹²⁴

In September 1947, Pandit came to the UN with two aims: India’s election to the Security Council and her own selection as the President of the General Assembly. She was hopeful of support from the Commonwealth, Arab states and the Slav bloc and wary of the ‘non-committal’ British and the ‘very hostile’ Americans, but argued that there was prestige to be gained in standing even if India lost, for it was ‘fit for lining up with great powers’.¹²⁵ As she elaborated to Nehru:

We are in the midst of a real fight for a seat in the Security Council. As you know, I had stood out on a question of making a bid for this in preference to standing for some of the smaller councils. I

¹²⁰ 10 December 1946, Diary entry, Box I, File 3, Puckle Papers

¹²¹ 27 December 1946, BR Curson to London, Puckle Papers

¹²² 15 September 1947, Pandit to Nehru, Subject File Serial No. 47, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

¹²³ MAH Ispahani (1902-81), barrister, served as Pakistan’s first Ambassador to the US (1947-52) and later as envoy to the UK (1952-54) and Afghanistan (1973-4).

¹²⁴ Paul Gore-Booth, *With Great Truth and Respect* (London: Constable, 1974), p. 154, 158

¹²⁵ 21 September 1947, Pandit to Nehru, Subject File Serial No. 47, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

am convinced we did the right thing. From being a dominion, we have stepped right into the international picture...¹²⁶

On 11 October 1947, however, Pandit sent a furious letter to Nehru, as it became clear that India had lost a second successive bid to become a member of the Security Council. What had transpired was that America was pledged to support Argentina, Canada and Czechoslovakia but the Secretary of State George Marshall told Pandit that if Ukraine substituted Czechoslovakia, then America would give India its third vote. The British took a similar stand. The Soviets, on the other hand, had decided that the Slav group would vote for Czechoslovakia and India and had one undecided vote. The USSR Foreign Minister Andrei Vishinski asked Pandit if India could vote for itself and Czechoslovakia while withholding its third vote. She replied that India was not committed to Argentina and could withhold the third vote. This seemed to have the makings of a deal between India and the Slav bloc.

However, to Pandit's surprise, next day the Soviet Union replaced Czechoslovakia with Ukraine and made a deal with Argentina. The Americans and the British now informed Pandit that they were now free to vote for India. They felt confident that India would be elected on the second ballot. With Canada and Argentina assured of election, India and Ukraine were opposing each other on the second ballot. Argentina and other South American countries voted for Ukraine in lieu of the Slav votes for Argentina. Voting went on for ten ballots as neither India nor Ukraine achieved two-thirds majority.¹²⁷

As the Soviets sought to influence votes for Ukraine, Pandit was in a fix. India had lost the bid to join the Security Council, made no attempts to join any other Council and was being increasingly 'lumped together' with Pakistan.¹²⁸ In fact, in the eyes of many, Zafrullah Khan, Pakistan's representative at the UN, had 'hit all round the wicket in perfect style' and won Pakistan a host of friends.¹²⁹ Independent India's baptism at the UN, thus, was with 'the language of power and success and bloc groupings'.¹³⁰ The Americans remained distant, the British cordial and the Soviets ambiguous.¹³¹

¹²⁶ 3 October 1947, Pandit to Nehru, Subject File Serial No. 48, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

¹²⁷ 30 December 1947, Erskine Crum to Mountbatten, MB1/D221, Mountbatten Papers

¹²⁸ 11 October 1947, Pandit to Nehru, Subject File Serial No. 48, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

¹²⁹ 27 November 1947, No. 223, MAH Ispahani to Jinnah, First Series, Volume VI, *Jinnah Papers*

¹³⁰ 14 November 1947, Pandit to Nehru, Subject File Serial No. 47, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

¹³¹ 9 October 1947, Pandit to Bajpai, Subject File Serial No. 55, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

Alongside its Security Council candidature, India also had a difficult time on the Palestine Question with significant implications for Kashmir. Between August and November 1947, India had been caught between the public expectation of the Arab States for outright support and the private pressure of the Jews (and their supporters) for, at least, staying neutral.¹³² Pandit and the Indian Delegation felt ‘very strongly’ that India should intervene on the side of Arabs, not so much because of the merits of their case or that Palestine was of direct concern to the Muslim population in India, but more because, as Pandit put it, this issue was to decide the Third World leadership.¹³³ For this, they were ‘not unmindful’ of alienating America.

Girja Shankar Bajpai, the influential Secretary-General of the Ministry of External Affairs, had to repeatedly exhort them to behave on ‘reason, logic and principles’ and ‘not passions or tactics’. He wanted them to take ‘a moderate, pro-Arab position with a saving clause for Jews’.¹³⁴ This felt like an inadequate stand to the delegation and MK Vellodi, Pandit’s deputy, explained the reality of India’s situation to Bajpai:

There is the larger question of India’s future position...On every side there are signs of increasing indifference if not unfriendliness...By our UNSC candidature we have incurred the displeasure of the Soviets [without gaining] any greater friendship of USA/Latin America... Neutral attitude on Palestine will make us lose Arab support – the only bloc that has consistently supported us.¹³⁵

Two months later, on the eve of Kashmir being referred to the UN, the attitude of the Arab states would become important. Jinnah’s envoy Firoze Khan Noon had returned from there with a ‘gloomy report’ about partition, Pakistan and Jinnah himself vis-à-vis the more popular Nehru and the stronger India. New Delhi and Karachi both knew that propaganda on Kashmir in the Arab League was a ‘crying necessity’ paralleling their own respective positions on Palestine.¹³⁶

¹³² 24 and 30 November 1947, Vellodi and Pandit to Bajpai, GA-243 and GA-268, File No. 2 (53) UNO I/47 (GOI, MEA & CR, UNO Branch), NAI

¹³³ 5 and 8 October 1947, Pandit to Bajpai, GA-67 and GA-79, File No. 2 (53) UNO I/47 (GOI, MEA & CR, UNO Branch), NAI

¹³⁴ 12 September and 12 October 1947, Bajpai to Pandit, No. 7540 and No. 8542, File No. 2 (53) UNO I/47 (GOI, MEA & CR, UNO Branch), NAI

¹³⁵ 9 October 1947, Vellodi to Bajpai, GA-88, File No. 2 (53) UNO I/47 (GOI, MEA & CR, UNO Branch), NAI

¹³⁶ 30 December 1947, Intelligence Report re: sympathy and support shown by the Middle-East towards Kashmir, File No. 19 (28) – IA/48 (GOI, MEA & CR, IA Branch), NAI

Despite this, in February 1948, Mountbatten would write to Attlee about the feeling in New Delhi that as Britain and America regretted the bitterness created over the partition of Palestine, they were ‘anxiously looking for a means to placate [Arabs]’ i.e. Kashmir.¹³⁷ The parallels with Palestine, ignored in much of the conventional literature on Kashmir, would assume special salience between March and May 1948. Ronald Brockman, a key aide, urged Mountbatten to ‘inject’ into Nehru’s mind the larger international picture involving Palestine.¹³⁸ What Wm. Roger Louis has called ‘the ten year ring to the Indian and Palestinian developments’ enveloped Kashmir in the summer of 1948.¹³⁹

It has been an axiom for writings in India on the diplomacy around Kashmir that, as Nehru bitterly complained to Mountbatten, ‘power politics and not ethics’ ruled the UN.¹⁴⁰ A special treatment has been reserved in this for the Philip Noel-Baker led UK delegation to UN on Kashmir. It has been variously explained as a ‘hangover’ from pre-Independence days, a ‘compensation’ for the creation of the state of Israel and a ‘tactic’ in the struggle against the Soviet Union for the strategically better located, religiously more homogenous and politically more willing Pakistan.¹⁴¹

It is, however, forgotten that the Indian delegation’s behaviour, activities and voting at the international arena in 1946-47 provided the key backdrop, the crucial prism through which first London and later Washington anticipated India’s positions on international matters. In the immediate aftermath of independence, the first impressions created just before went a long way in determining the hopes and fears of British and American governments regarding New Delhi’s potential and performance in those early days of the Cold War which, in the words of Raymond Aaron, were like an ‘echo chamber’.¹⁴²

In 1949, the FO looked back at India’s behaviour at the UN over the last three years. For all the ‘simplicity of India’s role of the wise friend of East and West, understanding both and partisan of neither’, there were conflicts, first and foremost of which was Kashmir. Secondly,

¹³⁷ 25 February 1948, Mountbatten to Attlee, MB1/D212 and 27 February 1948, Mountbatten to Gordon-Walker, MB1/D132/22-45 (Folder 2), Mountbatten Papers

¹³⁸ 17 March 1948, Brockman to Mountbatten, MB1/D320, Mountbatten Papers

¹³⁹ Reginald Coupland, *Hindustan Times*, 6 May 1946, quoted in Louis, *Ends of British Imperialism*, p. 392

¹⁴⁰ HV Hodson, *The Great Divide* (Oxford: OUP, 1985), pp. 469-70

¹⁴¹ Guha, *India After Gandhi*, p. 73

¹⁴² Moore, *Making the New Commonwealth*, p. 64

India seemed desirous of being simultaneously ‘the great force in the world organisation’ and the ‘general representative of the coloured and the underprivileged peoples’. Thirdly, India’s views ‘often coincided’ with those expressed by the Soviet speakers, on a range of issues from ‘Asianism, Anti-Colonialism, Arabism and Racial Equality’.¹⁴³

India and the Soviet Union, 1946-47: ‘Folly at [a] critical juncture’

Alongside the Commonwealth and the United Nations, the third aspect of the ‘crisis of India’s international identity in 1940s’ was Nehru’s desire to establish relations with the ‘especially unique’ USSR.¹⁴⁴ The question of India, while still a British dominion and when older dominions like Canada had only recently done so, establishing diplomatic relations with the former Soviet Union was termed by Listowel as a ‘folly at this critical juncture’ to Mountbatten in July 1947.¹⁴⁵ But, long before then, Nehru had found a ‘suitable person’ for the task: Krishna Menon.

In September 1946, overriding his External Affairs department, he had asked Wavell to authorise an exploratory visit by Menon to Europe and Russia.¹⁴⁶ An opportunity came up when, later in the month, the Food Department recommended an appeal to the Soviet Government for food grains for India. The India Office, keen to thwart any direct contact, was inclined to approach the Soviets through the British Embassy in Moscow but Nehru got Krishna Menon to deliver a personal request to Molotov in Paris. The India Office fretted:

What India is after is a new Asiatic bloc... This would certainly be anti-British and anti-American. It must either reach a modus vivendi with or be swallowed up by Russia... There is no room for consistent membership of the British Commonwealth as we know it. How to deal frankly or consistently with a country in whose case all references to Russia have to be bowdlerised...¹⁴⁷

An alarmed FO, already unhappy at the gathering pace of Nehru’s activities in the international sphere and especially dismayed at his choice of Krishna Menon, ‘India’s

¹⁴³ 1 June 1949, FO’s note on ‘India in the UN’, FO 371/78787, TNA

¹⁴⁴ 26 August 1947, Nehru to Pandit, Correspondences file, Mathai Papers; see Subimal Dutt, *With Nehru in the Foreign Office* (Calcutta: Minerva, 1977), p. 190

¹⁴⁵ 14 July 1947, Listowel’s cabinet memorandum, Item No. 106, Volume XII, *TOP*

¹⁴⁶ 21 November 1946, Nehru to Wavell, Correspondence file, Mathai Papers

¹⁴⁷ 14 October 1946, Anderson to Turnbull, Item No. 446, Volume VIII, *TOP*

Rasputin',¹⁴⁸ as a personal representative, knew that it could not dissuade India from establishing diplomatic relations with Moscow after it had done so with America and China. It wanted Wavell to at least delay the inevitable until the 'political outlook in India became less uncertain'.¹⁴⁹ It would have been more worried had it known that elements in the Soviet Foreign Ministry were starting to feel that diplomatic exchange with India and China was 'essential' in the near-future.¹⁵⁰

Aware of the less than total enthusiasm for Russia in the Congress, Nehru had cautioned Menon that the party did not want 'to be entangled' in bloc politics.¹⁵¹ Nevertheless, Menon's unofficial stunt was, for the India Office and Wavell, an 'embarrassing, ill-advised and ill-timed adventure'.¹⁵² Nehru, in turn, charged them with 'functioning in complete accordance with the Muslim League'.¹⁵³ Krishna Menon's meeting with Molotov in Paris in September 1946 did not yield any grain but Menon got Molotov's agreement to his visit to Moscow to discuss the exchange of diplomatic relations.

Having reckoned with Nehru's determination, a product of his idealist fascination with the Soviet Union, above all its economic system, since his first visit there in November 1927,¹⁵⁴ his British officials at the External Affairs department decided to do the next best thing. They 'thought it preferable to make an official approach to Russia' and, aided by Wavell, prevailed upon Nehru to decide on KPS Menon as the official special representative to Moscow. As a civil servant since 1920, KPS was trusted by the British while the External Affairs department considered Krishna Menon's 'inexperience potentially embarrassing'.¹⁵⁵

To console Krishna, he was appointed as India's official representative to Europe though even here he was to steer clear of Yugoslavia and Poland.¹⁵⁶ This decision to send the 'British government servant antagonistic to the Soviets' to Moscow 'depressed' Krishna and left

¹⁴⁸ See Paul McGarr, "India's Rasputin?": VK Krishna Menon and Anglo-American Misperceptions of Indian Foreign Policymaking, 1947-1964, *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, 22: 2, 239-260

¹⁴⁹ 28 September 1946, Bevin to Roberts (Moscow), Item No. 378, Volume VIII, *TOP*

¹⁵⁰ 28 July 1945, Dimitrov to Molotov, Fond 82, Opis 2, No. 1196, Molotov Papers, RGASPI, Moscow

¹⁵¹ 5 May 1946, Nehru to Menon, Correspondences file, Mathai Papers

¹⁵² Wavell-Pethick Lawrence exchange, item nos. 357 and 500, Volume VIII, *TOP*

¹⁵³ 21 November 1946, Nehru to Wavell, 5 December 1946, Nehru to Pandit, Correspondence, Mathai Papers

¹⁵⁴ Guha, *India After Gandhi*, pp. 161-2

¹⁵⁵ 30 October 1946, H Weightman's note, File No. 1-EUR/47 (MEA and CR, Europe), NAI

¹⁵⁶ 21 November 1946, Nehru to Wavell, Correspondence file, Mathai Papers; 28 November 1946, Item No. 109, Volume IX, *TOP*

Pandit ‘unhappy’.¹⁵⁷ Nehru responded by making it clear to KPS that he was not to enter into policy discussions and was to merely fix up technical details about the exchange of diplomatic representatives. Fully aware that there was ‘not much love lost’ between Moscow and London, Nehru was determined not to be a party to ‘the British Foreign Policy or the old methods of the British Foreign Office...’¹⁵⁸

The India Office was, naturally, relieved that the mandarin Menon was going to Moscow as opposed to the mercurial Menon. Thanks to British intelligence, which had picked up Menon’s reports to Nehru of his meetings with Molotov, Pethick-Lawrence knew that Krishna had indicated to Molotov ‘India’s desire to line up in the international field with Russia’. The Russian, in turn, was believed to have assured him that ‘Russia will support India in the UN’.¹⁵⁹ The FO too shared this relief.

However, as it turned out, KPS did not go to Moscow. Vijayalakshmi Pandit was told by Molotov in New York in December 1946 that his talks with Krishna had ‘covered a wide field’ and all that was left was a swift exchange of missions.¹⁶⁰ Nehru agreed, aborted KPS Menon’s visit to Moscow and instead asked him to obtain all the technical and logistical information from Leolyn Dana Wilgress, the Canadian Ambassador in Moscow.¹⁶¹ ‘Anxious’ for establishing diplomatic relations with Russia, Nehru was himself ‘eager’ to visit Moscow, ‘as early as possible – if things go well...about the middle of next year [1947] or earlier’.¹⁶²

Krishna Menon now re-entered the fray and pleaded with Nehru to be sent to Moscow as the ‘bridge’ in this ‘transition period’. Keen to disperse ‘the cloud that appears to hang over me in this matter’, hitting out at London and showing the uneasy coexistence of the British ‘officials’ and the Indian ‘politicals’ during the Interim Government, especially in foreign affairs, he complained about their unjust ‘public reprimand’ to him.¹⁶³

¹⁵⁷ 29 November 1946, Pandit to Nehru, Subject File Serial No. 47, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

¹⁵⁸ 5 December 1946, Nehru to KPS Menon (New York), Correspondences file, Mathai Papers

¹⁵⁹ 11 October 1946, Pethick-Lawrence to Wavell, Item No. 431, Volume VIII, *TOP*

¹⁶⁰ 6 December 1946, Pandit to Nehru, GA-57, L/PS/12/4639A, IOR

¹⁶¹ 8 December 1946, Menon to Nehru, GA-58; 11 December 1946, GOI to New York, L/PS/12/4639A, IOR

¹⁶² 5 December 1946, Nehru to Pandit, Correspondence file, Mathai Papers

¹⁶³ Undated, handwritten note from Menon to Nehru, Subject File Serial No. 28 (XIV), Mathai Papers

The official wheels started turning in February 1947 and by June, New Delhi, London and Moscow had agreed on the name of Vijayalakshmi Pandit.¹⁶⁴ It had neither been easy nor straightforward as the Muslim League members in the Interim Government had made it clear that they did not wish to see an Ambassador appointed to Moscow, much less Nehru's sister.¹⁶⁵ However, the British, the Muslim League as well as Patel, had earlier not liked Nehru's choice of Asaf Ali as Ambassador to America and, now, they were equally keen to prevent Krishna Menon from going to Moscow.¹⁶⁶ The Muslim League was also unwilling to accept Nehru's nomination of Akbar Hydari, another non-Leaguer Muslim, for London. Pandit's name offered a way out. She would go to Moscow and Krishna to London. Simultaneously, appointments were made to her staff: the ICS men AV Pai and TN Kaul. Assessing the Brahman trio, Terence Shone termed them 'sensitive, sensible and suspicious', respectively, to British concerns.¹⁶⁷

Pandit arrived in Moscow in the first week of August 1947. While she waited to present her credentials, the British Embassy noted that she had got a good reception. To begin with, she had been allowed to come in her own aircraft, an honour that had been previously accorded to only the American and British Ambassadors. Then, she was almost immediately given a house unlike some other delegations, which had arrived before her and were staying in hotels.¹⁶⁸ Pandit presented her credentials to Marshal Shevernik and Andrei Vishinski three days before the transfer of power in India.

In her first report to her brother and to Bajpai, she exclaimed 'an inferiority complex' at the 'deep knowledge' that Shevernik and Vishinski seemed to possess of India and confessed at being 'just a little frightened'.¹⁶⁹ Nehru was excited to read his sister's personal impressions, while Bajpai had 'never expected otherwise'.¹⁷⁰ Through the first month, all went well. Vishinski assured Pandit that he was aware of the food situation in India and the Soviet

¹⁶⁴ 17 February 1947, GOI to India Office, L/PS/12/4639A, IOR; 10 April 1947, GOI to India Office, L/PS/12/4639A, IOR; 15 April 1947, Moscow to FO, T. No. 935; 26 April 1947, Cabinet Office to New Delhi; and, 25 April 1947, Shone to CRO, T. No. 35, L/PS/12/4639A, IOR; 4 June 1947, Nanking to FO, T. No. 570, L/PS/12/4639A, IOR

¹⁶⁵ Philip Ziegler, *Mountbatten: The Official Biography* (London: Guild Publishing, 1985), p. 395

¹⁶⁶ Pandit, *The Scope of Happiness: A Personal Memoir*, p. 227

¹⁶⁷ 2 and 9 July 1947, New Delhi to CRO, T. No. 65 and 72, L/PS/12/4639A, IOR

¹⁶⁸ 8 August 1947, Roberts to Sargeant, L/PS/12/4639A, IOR

¹⁶⁹ 13 August 1947, Pandit to Nehru, Correspondences file, Mathai Papers

¹⁷⁰ 26 August 1947, Nehru to Pandit, Correspondences file, Mathai Papers and 23 August 1947, Bajpai to Pandit, Subject File Serial No. 56, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

government would like to help pending their assessment of the year's harvest. Mikhailov in the Russian Foreign Office impressed her with his 'wide and accurate knowledge' of India, but also left her under no illusions that, in international matters, the Russians did not make much of the implications of the transfer of power in India.¹⁷¹

The name of Pandit's Soviet counterpart, KV Novikov, was announced within weeks of India's independence. Frank Roberts, British minister in Moscow (1945-47), summed up Novikov as 'straightforward and cooperative...as good a man as possible' and the FO was relieved to have one of a 'modern brand of rather dour ex-engineers' in India rather than an 'attractive and active personality of the Maisky type'.¹⁷² But soon Novikov would puzzle London with his remarks that India and the Soviet Union had a common frontier of sixteen miles in northern Kashmir.¹⁷³ This area, comprising Gilgit and adjoining territories, and its future had been a particularly sensitive spot for the British over 1945-47.¹⁷⁴

At the cusp of independence then, India provided deep concerns to London with its opposition to old imperial strategic plans in the realm of external relations, if not internal intelligence,¹⁷⁵ its ambivalence towards the New Commonwealth, its activist, anti-colonial foreign policy at the United Nations and its inclinations towards the Soviet Union. If Mountbatten's staying on as Governor-General, not to mention Auchinleck's continuing as Supreme Commander, was a 'hope of continuity',¹⁷⁶ then Hamidullah, the Nawab of Bhopal and one of Mountbatten's oldest friends among Princely India, discomfited him thus:

As a constitutional Governor-General of Hindustan alone you are bound to come into conflict with the interests of Pakistan and the States, which in view of coming international situation should be avoided. The strategic position, vis-à-vis Russia, of Pakistan and the Middle-East would demand the closest understanding between Great Britain, USA and the Moslem world. A friendly Hindustan is also essential provided we can save it from Communism. But can this be achieved by the present leaders of the Congress?¹⁷⁷

¹⁷¹ 18 and 31 August 1947, Pandit to Nehru, Subject File Serial No. 53, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

¹⁷² See L/PS/12/4046, IOR; Novikov had been a counsellor in London till 1943. In August 1945, he had replaced Maisky on the Reparations Commission. He also had a stint at the UN in April 1946. He was the Soviet representative on the Four-Power Austrian Treaty Commission at the time of his appointment to India.

¹⁷³ 3 February 1948, 5312/48, L/PS/12/4639A, IOR

¹⁷⁴ January and March 1947, File No. 5 (6)-P (S)/47 (Political), Fortnightly Reports from Kashmir, NAI

¹⁷⁵ See Calder Walton, *Empire of Secrets* (London: Harper Press, 2013)

¹⁷⁶ Ziegler, *Mountbatten*, p. 390; also see item nos. 354, 369, 416 and 473, Volume XI, *TOP*

¹⁷⁷ 7 July 1947, Hamidullah to Mountbatten, MB1/E9, Mountbatten Papers

In London, Krishna Menon appeared to be a ‘weak link in the Commonwealth security chain’,¹⁷⁸ and was meeting, to the great suspicion of his hosts, Arab Ministers, European envoys and the Soviet Ambassador, who seemed to be ‘almost expecting’ him.¹⁷⁹ He was especially ‘persona non grata’ with the Conservative opposition.¹⁸⁰ There was a growing feeling even in New Delhi that he was ‘not really fit’ for his post.¹⁸¹ From Moscow, Vijayalakshmi Pandit was conveying the Russian feeling that India was making ‘too much of the transfer of power’ and permitting itself ‘to be lulled into a false sense of security’.¹⁸²

In New Delhi, after hosting the Asian Relations Conference, Nehru was busy emphasising the merits of non-Anglo-American arbitration in Indonesia.¹⁸³ Soon his foreign policy attitude would seem to the CRO, ‘a picture not only of an ever enlarging sphere of regional co-operation but also of expanding Indian ambitions of hegemony’.¹⁸⁴ It also caused some disquiet among his close associates. In October 1947, Pandit wrote to Bajpai:

One of our great handicaps today is the lack of any clearly defined foreign policy – we have said that we shall not ally ourselves to any group and will consider each question on merit. This sounds well enough but means nothing. Inevitably one finds oneself aligned on one side or the other. Up to now we had no special stakes in the international field...now the position is changed...every problem is a contest between two main groups and one must be exceedingly careful...every progressive issue is supported by the USSR – it is a little difficult for us to take any other stand and yet on some major issues diplomacy and our own wide interests demand that we ally ourselves to other groups. The time has come when we must be clear in our own mind where our interest lies...¹⁸⁵

The dilemmas for the British were different. Despite their best intentions, their withdrawal from India had caused the chaos of partition and produced charges of partisanship. These joined their list of troubles: economic problems, division of Europe, delicate relations with

¹⁷⁸ See Paul McGarr, ‘A Serious Menace to Security’

¹⁷⁹ 20 July, 30 July and 17 August 1947, Menon to Nehru, Correspondence file, Mathai Papers and 18 July 1947, Menon to Mountbatten, MB1/E104, Mountbatten Papers

¹⁸⁰ 18 July 1947, Listowel to Mountbatten, MB1/D41, Mountbatten Papers

¹⁸¹ Oral History Transcripts, MC Setalvad, Acc. No. 176, p. 31, NMML

¹⁸² 31 August 1947, Pandit to Nehru, Subject File Serial No. 53, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

¹⁸³ 22 July 1947, Nehru to Menon, Correspondences file, Mathai Papers

¹⁸⁴ 16 February 1949, Graffety-Smith to Noel-Baker, 95 (S9), File 1/1, GB165-0123, Graffety-Smith Papers, Middle-Eastern Archives Centre

¹⁸⁵ 9 October 1947, Pandit (New York) to Bajpai, Subject File Serial No. 55, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

America over the creation of Israel, need for goodwill in the Middle-East and, above all, confronting the advance of Russia.¹⁸⁶ From October 1947, the dispute in Kashmir would evolve in this matrix.

Before that, though, the CRO would find itself caught between Pakistan's request for mediatory action with India on post-partition riots, refugee movements, division of assets and Junagadh.¹⁸⁷ It felt 'embarrassed' by Jinnah's call for a Commonwealth team to visit the subcontinent for it knew that New Delhi took a dim view of 'family' adjudication.¹⁸⁸ Even before Kashmir posed its greatest challenge, the CRO found itself trapped between upholding constitutional nicety on the one hand and facing disillusionment on the other.¹⁸⁹ In the early days of the Kashmir dispute, in December 1947, Laurence Graffety-Smith, UK's first High-Commissioner in Pakistan (1947-52), sent a telegram to the CRO that neatly contextualised the Kashmir dilemma for the Commonwealth:

There is no precedent for a situation fringing war between two members of the Commonwealth...It would be unrealistic to pretend that Great Britain and the Commonwealth have not lost a great body of goodwill and friendship...¹⁹⁰

Conclusion

In November 1947, when Mountbatten visited London, Winston Churchill told him that it was 'terrible to think that he, an Englishman and a cousin of the King, should have got himself into a position where he was now backing those enemies of Britain – Nehru, Patel and party – against those proven friends of many years – the Muslims [Pakistan]'.¹⁹¹ Two days later, Churchill sent a long note, which charged Attlee and Mountbatten of ignoring Pakistan as a 'bastion' against Communism and not 'turning a hair' on Kashmir.¹⁹²

¹⁸⁶ 23 October 1961, Arthur Creech-Jones to Elizabeth Monroe, GB 165-0207, Monroe Papers

¹⁸⁷ 14 September 1947, Karachi to CRO, T. No. 56, GB165-0123, File 1/1, Graffety-Smith Papers; on Junagadh, see Srinath Raghavan, *War and Peace in Modern India*, Chapter 2, 'Junagadh 1947', pp. 26-64

¹⁸⁸ 23 September 1947, Karachi to CRO, T. No. 82, GB165-0123, File 1/1, Graffety-Smith Papers

¹⁸⁹ 2 and 13 October 1947, Karachi to CRO, T. Nos. 97 and 126, GB165-0123, File 1/1, Graffety-Smith Papers

¹⁹⁰ 5 December 1947, Graffety-Smith to Archibald Carter, S/9/47, GB165-0123, File 1/1, Graffety-Smith Papers

¹⁹¹ 19 November 1947, Mountbatten-Churchill talks, MB1/D74 (Folder 2), Mountbatten Papers

¹⁹² 21 November 1947, Churchill to Mountbatten, MB1/N39, Mountbatten Papers

Churchill, who had asked Wavell in 1945 to ‘keep a bit of India’,¹⁹³ had become concerned at India’s emerging international identity over 1946-47. He would send a memorandum to Mountbatten in May 1948, anticipating the pact-politics of the 1950s. It termed Pakistan ‘the keystone of the strategic arch of the Indian Ocean’ and identified five bricks in the wall against Soviet expansionism in the Middle-East and South-Central Asia: Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan.¹⁹⁴

In 1948-49, for Bevin too, ‘the Middle-East [would] stretch to Pakistan’.¹⁹⁵ In January 1949, within days of the ceasefire in the first Kashmir war, Morgan Philips Price, the Labour Party MP, would congratulate Attlee and remind him that the Kashmir dispute was a part of ‘the same struggle that our fathers and grandfathers fought [against] the direct territorial expansion of Russia in the great Moslem block lying between the Bosphorus and the Indus’.¹⁹⁶

Emerging against this old mosaic of the ‘Russian Menace to India’, the Kashmir dispute would merge into a new *Great Game*.¹⁹⁷ Kashmir was where three empires had historically met and now it seemed not far from ‘Stalinabad’.¹⁹⁸ The three-fold anxieties regarding the strategic reliability of the Nehru Government i.e. its vacillations towards the Commonwealth, its independent performance at the UN in 1946-47 and its eagerness for diplomatic links with Moscow comprised the important ‘back story’ to the Kashmir dispute. In the light of these continuities, Nehru’s non-alignment was considered a departure for the Commonwealth, from the Cold War and to the Soviet Union.

Habib Ibrahim Rahimtoola’s first impression as Pakistan’s first High-Commissioner in London confirmed the stress in the English circles ‘on the importance of the Muslim bloc in the present conflict of ideologies, Pakistan’s very great role [within it]’ and the ‘strong feeling in our favour over Kashmir’.¹⁹⁹ Among the Indians, Vallabhbhai Patel put it to Mountbatten thus:

¹⁹³ Moon (ed.), *Wavell*, p. 168

¹⁹⁴ 19 May 1948, Memorandum on ‘The Strategic and Political Importance of Pakistan in the event of War with the USSR’, F 200/39, Mountbatten Papers, IOR

¹⁹⁵ 26 January 1949, MS Attlee Dep. 77, Attlee Papers

¹⁹⁶ 29 January 1949, Philip Price to Attlee, MS Attlee Dep. 77, Attlee Papers

¹⁹⁷ 1 December 1947, ‘The Russian Menace to India’, F 1595/8800/85, L/PS/12/3303, IOR

¹⁹⁸ 4 February 1948, Graffety-Smith to CRO, T. No. 339, L/PS/12/3303, IOR

¹⁹⁹ 27 November and 8 December 1947, Rahimtoola to Liaquat, FOA, IU.28/20, No. 224 and 252, First Series, Volume VI, *Jinnah Papers*

We were now repaying the fruits of three cardinal blunders...the appointment of Krishna Menon as High-Commissioner in UK...the appointment of Asaf Ali as Ambassador in US since his wife Aruna was practically a communist...the support Mrs Pandit gave to USSR in the UNO...The tragedy was that Pandit Nehru was neither a communist nor pro-Russian but he had succeeded in giving [that] impression.²⁰⁰

British concerns about the 'crisis of India's international identity in the 1940s' formed the key background for their attitude towards Kashmir. Apprehensions about India's willingness and ability to perform its old role in the new Commonwealth, ambivalence about its foreign policy orientation and anxiety about the Soviets were to shape this attitude. London's response to Kashmir over 1947-49 was shaped by ideas inherited from 1945-47, which impacted upon Kashmir's reception. The forthcoming historical narrative flows from this acknowledgement, as it explores this response.

²⁰⁰ 14 February 1948, Patel to Mountbatten, MB1/D76 (Folder 2), Mountbatten Papers

Britain and Kashmir, 1947-49: ‘Whose was Kashmir to be? The Raja, his Pandits, Sheikh Abdullah, the tribes or *Russia*?’¹

Introduction

In September-October 1947 when crisis erupted in Kashmir, there were almost 800 senior British civil and police officials in the Indian subcontinent.² India’s defence forces had more than 500 senior British officers, Pakistan’s over a thousand. Britons also held influential political, bureaucratic and diplomatic positions in the two dominions thereby providing London with a unique insight and influence in their attitudes towards Kashmir. Their cast included: Lord Mountbatten (Governor-General, India), Claude Auchinleck (Supreme Commander, India and Pakistan Army), George Cunningham (Governor of NWFP, Pakistan), Francis Mudie (Governor of West Punjab, Pakistan), Frank Messervy and Douglas Gracey (first two C-in-Cs of the Pakistan army), Rob Lockhart and Roy Bucher (their Indian counterparts) and the British High-Commissioners Laurence Graffety-Smith (Pakistan) and Terence Allan Shone and Archibald Nye (India).

These men held very definite perceptions about the origins and evolution of the crisis in Kashmir and its potential impact on British concerns. Both India and Pakistan were not just dependent on Britain for economic, military and diplomatic support but also for their very foundational structures.³ Well into the 1950s, Britain retained an ‘influence of friendship’ in India and Pakistan.⁴ Yet, barring recent exceptions, the conflict in Kashmir in 1947-49 has been understood in terms of the political objectives, military capabilities and moral positions of the disputants.⁵ But as Ilan Pappé demonstrated in another context, the deeply involved British offer the ‘best vantage point’ for describing conflicts in the wake of empire.⁶

¹ Randolph Holmes, ‘Khyber Frontiers in Turmoil’, MSS Eur F 265/18, IOR, p. 111

² 23 September 1947, Diary entry, Box I, File 4, Puckle Papers

³ See Harshan Kumarasingham, *A Political Legacy of the British Empire* (London: IB Tauris, 2013)

⁴ Michael Brecher, *Nehru: A Political Biography* (London: OUP, 1959), p. 570, Brown, *Nehru*, pp. 251-55; also see Mohammad Ayub Khan, *Friends not Masters: A Political Autobiography* (London: OUP, 1967)

⁵ See Dasgupta, *War and Diplomacy in Kashmir, 1947-8* and Nawaz, *Crossed Swords*

⁶ Ilan Pappé, *Britain and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948-51* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988), p. viii

This chapter turns the spotlight on the British individuals in the subcontinent and the British institutions in London and shows their understanding of the dispute. This understanding, which emerged against the larger concerns regarding India and the Commonwealth and the Cold War, as we saw in the previous chapter, had four features: First, the impact of Kashmir's strategic location on the geopolitical considerations of the retreating British and the emerging Americans, second, the significance of Kashmir's Muslim population yet its political accession to India for their relationship with the Arab-Muslim world, in the light of creation of Israel in 1948, third, the historical continuity between British and American strategic concerns with the north-west of the Indian subcontinent and, fourth, the different approaches of India and Pakistan towards the Cold War.

These characteristics are presented here by first, probing the outlook of the 'men on spot' in 1947-49. Then, London's response to the problem arising from British servicemen facing each other as combatants in an India-Pakistan military conflict is presented. It is followed by a view of the wider diplomatic universe of the UN, where Philip Noel-Baker led the UK delegation on Kashmir. The chapter concludes by highlighting that by early 1949, British perceptions on Kashmir were firmly entrenched within their wider concerns regarding the internal Communist threat there, the external Communist shadow of the Soviet Union, the imperatives in Afghanistan and the Middle-East and their evaluation of India's and Pakistan's potential to partake in these. Ironically, as the penultimate section shows, their apprehensions about Nehru's relations with Moscow were far from the reality of India's relationship with the USSR, at this time.

'Look after UK interests in Kashmir...'⁷

Among the Britons in Kashmir in September 1947, no one was more important than Brigadier Henry Lawrence Scott (1882-1971) who had been the Chief of Staff of Hari Singh's forces since 1936. Scott remained in the state till 29 September when, having declined an extension, he left and produced a couple of reports.⁸ These reveal the presence of a Hindu coterie around Hari Singh, which, notwithstanding his pro-independence attitude, strongly favoured union with India, secured Premier Kak's dismissal, ensured Sheikh

⁷ 12 October 1947, CRO to Terence Shone and Graffety-Smith, T. No. 210, L/PS/13/1845b, IOR

⁸ 'The Situation in Jammu and Kashmir' and 'The Options in 1947', MSS Eur D 862, IOR; Janak Singh, the Deputy Prime Minister RB Batra, Maharani's brother, the 'Household Minister' Chand and a Hindu Swami.

Abdullah's release and embarked on a policy of 'pin-pricks' towards Pakistan.⁹ Scott also noted the limits of Abdullah's influence outside the Valley of Kashmir, in the northern and western areas adjoining Pakistan, and predicted imminent trouble, as much from internal disaffection as external incursion. He asserted that majority of Kashmiris had no strong bias for either India or Pakistan,¹⁰ and called them a choice between the 'frying pan and fire'.¹¹

Scott's last days in Kashmir were marked by two rebellions against Hari Singh's rule in Poonch and Gilgit.¹² While he was able to re-establish authority in Poonch,¹³ Gilgit – the 'thin end of the Soviet wedge' – slipped out of his hands.¹⁴ Major WA Brown and Captain AS Mathieson, 'mercenary soldiers' employed in Kashmir armed forces, achieved a fait accompli in Gilgit so as to ensure 'a continuity of administration, peace, security and unity' in a region 'religiously, economically and strategically' linked to Pakistan.¹⁵ More importantly to them, it was the 'British Commonwealth's only common frontier with the Soviet Union'.¹⁶ These incidents made British High-Commissions in India and Pakistan, always alive to the 'Russian bogey', more alert to the 'uneasy' situation.¹⁷

From London, the CRO was watching closely and on 12 October 1947, it reminded the High-Commissions to 'look after UK interests in Kashmir'.¹⁸ Over the next ten days, the CRO prepared two memoranda expressing its wider concerns. First, it envisaged a possible downfall of Pakistan at India's hands with probable participation of the frontier tribes, Afghans and Soviet Russia and its effects on British interests in the Middle-East. It was worried that any intervention to stabilise Pakistan might lead to India's withdrawal from the Commonwealth. Second, it felt that Pakistan's collapse would be understood as a British failure, 'after all the partition plan was an Act of the British Parliament'. Third, it believed

⁹ 25 October 1947, Webb's report on Kashmir, MS 350 A 3002, Campbell-Johnson Papers

¹⁰ R Ankit, 'Henry Scott: The Forgotten Soldier of Kashmir', *Epilogue* (Vol 4, Issue 5), May 2010, pp. 44-49

¹¹ See DO 142/529, TNA and MSS Eur D 862, IOR

¹² See R Ankit, 'The Contrasting Fortunes of the Flanks: Ladakh and Gilgit', *Epilogue* (Volume 4, Issue 9), September 2010, pp. 49-51 based on Jamwal and Shattock Papers, MSS Eur Photo Eur 394 and MSS Eur F 226/27, IOR and 'The Problem of Poonch', *Epilogue* (Volume 4, Issue 8), August 2010, pp. 8-10

¹³ 30 November 1947, Richard Symonds to Nehru, File No. 7 (58)-K/50 (GOI, MOS, Kashmir), NAI; also see Snedden, *The Untold Story of the People of Azad Kashmir*

¹⁴ 10 October 1947, Note by FP Mainprice (ICS) on Gilgit and 25 October 1947, comments on it by GH Nicholls, MS 350 A 3002, Campbell-Johnson Papers

¹⁵ 'Gilgit 1947 and After', Note by Major WA Brown (MBE), FP Mainprice Papers, CSAS

¹⁶ 10 October 1947, 'Note on the Gilgit Agency' by Mainprice, Mainprice Papers

¹⁷ 13 September 1947, Stephenson to Shone and 6 October 1947, Shone to CRO, L/PS/13/1845b, IOR

¹⁸ 12 October 1947, CRO to Terence Shone and Graffety-Smith, T. No. 210, L/PS/13/1845b, IOR

that ‘collapse and chaos along the north-west frontier will profoundly affect questions of imperial strategy’. Finally, it stared at the unpalatable choice of ‘assisting Pakistan at the risk of ruining relations with India’.¹⁹

Trouble in Kashmir broke out over 25-27 October 1947.²⁰ The CRO’s first reaction to the still-disputed sequence of tribal invasion, Kashmir’s accession and air-lift of Indian troops was that ‘powerful forces in India, which bitterly resented partition, were determined to bring about the collapse of Pakistan’.²¹ This drew upon the letter Auchinleck had sent to Attlee eight weeks into partition in which he had ‘no hesitation whatsoever in affirming that the present India cabinet are implacably determined to do all in their power to prevent the establishment of the Dominion of Pakistan’.²²

Auchinleck, who was presiding over the re-constitution of the British Indian Army, was forced to recommend the closure of his office because of the ‘hostile and obdurate attitude’ of Nehru’s government.²³ He feared that ‘if Indian forces establish control over Kashmir, it may be followed by severe repercussions against Muslims with Afghan help and Russian support leading to a fanatical war’.²⁴

The second paramount thought in the CRO’s mind was the impact of the trouble in Kashmir on the defence of the NWFP and Pakistan’s ability to control the frontier tribes. A related aspect of this was the tension between Pakistan and Afghanistan, which the CRO felt might increase Pakistan’s ‘persecution complex’.²⁵ Then it reasoned that Russia was bound to be interested ‘in what was happening next to the Soviet border’.²⁶ Finally, there was the ‘huge

¹⁹ 14 October 1947, F 200/102 and 22 October 1947, F 200/103, Mountbatten Papers, IOR; 23 October 1947, Note by Archibald Carter on ‘aid to Pakistan’, MB1/D240 (Folder 1), Mountbatten Papers

²⁰ See the Lamb-Jha debate of 1990s. For its recent avatar, see Raghavan, *War and Peace in Modern India* and Nawaz, *Crossed Swords*. For third party perspectives, see books by Andrew Whitehead and Snedden.

²¹ 25 November 1947 and 26 February 1948, CRO to its mission worldwide, DO 35/3178 and DO 133/73, TNA

²² 28 September 1947, Auchinleck to Attlee, MUL 1262, Auchinleck Papers

²³ 13 and 16 October 1947, MB1/D50, Folder 1, Mountbatten Papers; 21 October 1947, Auchinleck to Geoffrey Scoones (CRO), d/o no. 80/S-1, MUL 1271 and 24 October 1947, Auchinleck to Scoones (CRO), 351-G, 14230/14273, MUL 1273, Auchinleck Papers; 30 October 1947, Auchinleck to Noel-Baker, 270021/DSC, MUL 1276-77, Auchinleck Papers; also see R Ankit, ‘Auchinleck: Af-Pak and Kashmir’, *Epilogue* (Volume 4, Issue 6), June 2010, pp. 47-49 and John Connell, *Auchinleck* (London: Cassell, 1959).

²⁴ 8 November 1947, Auchinleck to RHS Allen, FO 371/63574, TNA

²⁵ 16 July 1947, F 9522, FO 371 / 63565; 13 October 1947, FO 371/63570 and 6 November 1947, F 14832, FO 371/63571, TNA

²⁶ 10 November 1947, Archibald Carter’s minutes, DO 142/493, TNA

Islamic aspect'.²⁷ To this, the FO added that the 'Russians tend to favour India as against Pakistan'. Even disregarding that, it concluded that the 'real danger' to the subcontinent, had always come from a 'power west of Hindu Kush',²⁸ as the 'former ages stood testimony'.²⁹

Meanwhile, Laurence Graffety-Smith in Karachi was convinced that early Anglo-Pakistan relations were 'shipwrecked on attitudes in London formed by the Labour Party's long and historic association with the Congress Party'.³⁰ Terming Kashmir's accession as 'the heaviest blow yet sustained by Pakistan in her struggle for existence', the High-Commissioner warned against the reappearance of London as 'Aunt Sally' in Pakistan.³¹ It was Graffety-Smith who provided many of the pivots of the CRO's early position on Kashmir: strategic imperatives towards 'Pathanistan', Afghanistan and Russia, economic and refugee problems and religious hurt. Together these could create a situation 'such as Russia has never failed to exploit' and to which London and Washington 'cannot, without danger, remain indifferent'.³²

On the other hand, Shone, Graffety-Smith's counterpart in India, ACB Symon, Shone's deputy, and General Hastings 'Pug' Ismay, Mountbatten's Chief of Staff, were putting forward India's case with equal vigour, while similarly raising the Russian bogey.³³ Mountbatten himself and Archibald Nye, Shone's successor, would not be slow either in countering Graffety-Smith by reminding the CRO of India's 'greatest potential'.³⁴ They shared 'common sympathies' on this matter and, in May 1948, Mountbatten would recommend Nye for his post.³⁵

The CRO agreed that the post of the High-Commissioner in India was one of 'great delicacy', especially after Mountbatten's departure from there in June 1948.³⁶ Nye, the vice-chief of Imperial General Staff from 1941-45, and his wife were 'great friends' with Attlee and

²⁷ 1 December 1947, Scoones' minutes, MSS Eur D 714/84, IOR; 29 December 1947, Scoones to Gordon-Walker, GNWR 1/6, Gordon-Walker Papers and 13/14 May 1948, FO 371/69717, TNA

²⁸ 5 November 1947, Moscow to FO, FO 371/63571, TNA

²⁹ 3 December 1947, FO 371/63568, TNA

³⁰ Graffety-Smith's note of January 1973 accompanying his papers at St Antony's College, Oxford

³¹ 6 November 1947, Graffety-Smith to Archibald Carter, 339/47, MB1/D240 (Folder 1), Mountbatten Papers

³² 6 and 29 October 1947, Graffety-Smith to Noel-Baker, T. No. 158, L/PS/13/1845b, IOR; see FO's appreciation of 10 and 30 October 1947, FO 371/63570, TNA

³³ 29 October 1947, Shone to CRO, T. No. 1116, L/PS/13/1845b; 31 October 1947, T. Nos. 1142 and 1144, Ismay and Shone to Noel-Baker, L/PS/13/1845b, IOR

³⁴ 11 February 1948, Nye to Gordon-Walker, DO 121/71, TNA

³⁵ Oral History Transcripts, Lady Colleen Nye, Acc. No. 398, pp. 3-6, NMML

³⁶ 13 May 1948, CRO to Nye, MB1/D322, Mountbatten Papers

Cripps, who had sent him as Governor of Madras in 1946. There he had developed good relations with his Congress Ministers and ‘got on very well’ with Nehru.³⁷ Later they would have difficulties. In December 1948, Nye would present Nehru on Kashmir as a ‘very emotional and psychological problem’ and, in June 1949, would term his foreign policy as ‘unrealistic thinking’.³⁸

These ‘over-partisan’ exchanges set the tone for a ‘telegraphic war’ of their own between the High-Commissioners,³⁹ and would lead Attlee to censure Graffety-Smith in March 1948 for becoming a ‘partisan’ of Pakistan.⁴⁰ For the moment, in November 1947, as early attempts at conciliation between India and Pakistan failed, the CRO got worried, first, about ‘other Great Powers fishing’ in Kashmir and, second, about British officers becoming combatants on both sides.⁴¹ Its sympathy for the ‘preparatory school Pakistan’ clashed with its awareness of the importance of ‘Oxbridge India’, producing *cold douche* for both.⁴²

Apart from the High-Commissioners in the capitals, British officials in the field had a keener sense of the Kashmir dispute’s causes, course and consequences for Britain. George Mallam, a member of the ICS with thirty years’ experience on the north-west frontier, wrote for the majority when he remembered the Muslim League and the Khans as ‘the most stable, pro-British element in the country’.⁴³ Reflecting the strains between the Labour government and the conservative officials, he bristled at the Attlee cabinet, ‘who knew nothing of India’ and nothing about the irresistible cry of ‘Islam in Danger’, as it was raised for Kashmir. He was supported by FP Mainprice, another old Frontier, Gilgit and Kashmir hand.⁴⁴ Others like Assistant High-Commissioner HS Stephenson in Rawalpindi and military attaché Colonel AH Reed in Peshawar regularly contextualised Kashmir in Commonwealth versus Communism terms, as much as Pakistan versus India.⁴⁵

³⁷ 4 June 1948, Nye to Mountbatten, MB1/D322, Mountbatten Papers

³⁸ 28 December 1948 and 21 June 1949, Nye to Noel-Baker and Liesching, DO 121/71, TNA

³⁹ 27 January, 22 and 24 March 1948, Carter to Attlee, PREM 8/813; 23 December 1948, DO 142/524, TNA

⁴⁰ 18 March 1948, From Karachi to CRO, 265, File 1/1, GB165-0123 and 25 March 1948, Archibald Carter to Graffety-Smith, File 1/1, GB165-0123, Graffety-Smith Papers

⁴¹ 7 and 11 November 1947, Rumbold to Patrick and Carter and 6 November 1947, Alexander to Auchinleck, L/PS/13/1845b, IOR

⁴² 20 November 1947, Grey to Shone, L/PS/13/1845b, IOR; Graffety-Smith’s letters to the CRO dated 14, 23 September; 2, 13 October and 5 December 1947, File 1/1, GB165-0123, Graffety-Smith Papers

⁴³ George Leslie Mallam, *The Imperial Frontier: The Last Thirty Years*, unpublished manuscript, CSAS, p. 244

⁴⁴ See Mainprice Papers, CSAS

⁴⁵ Majority of Graffety-Smith’s despatches to the CRO were based on Reed’s and Stephenson’s reports.

Among the military chiefs, Rob Lockhart, the Indian C-in-C, was sympathetic to Pakistan's political and religious inability to stop the enthusiastic tribesmen in Kashmir.⁴⁶ Lockhart's successor Bucher felt it 'well-nigh impossible for Pakistan' to resist this tribal determination.⁴⁷ Throughout the war in 1948, he would moderate military decisions not only because of 'incalculable political repercussions', but also because he believed that the Kashmir conflict made the 'rapid spread of Communism all over Asia the more likely'.⁴⁸ Bucher also appreciated Pakistan's vital need for Kashmir 'in terms of defence, water supplies and to keep the NWFP quiet'.⁴⁹

Lockhart's counterpart in Pakistan, Frank Messervy, feared 'the cry of Islam in danger' in Kashmir.⁵⁰ He successfully negotiated the terms and conditions for British officers and ranks to serve Pakistan, something that the Indians were unable to achieve.⁵¹ Gracey, his successor, held that 'the real job we are here for is to train the two forces so that together they can deal with the Communist menace, which is the only one that really matters'.⁵² Gracey was also very suspicious of Nehru and, once, asked Bucher, 'Has the mantle of Tojo fallen upon Nehru and is a Greater East Asia sphere, as visualised by the Japanese, being reconstituted?'⁵³ Little has been written about these assessments made by these four C-in-Cs of the early international dimensions of the conflict.

Among the civilian authorities, Olaf Caroe and George Cunningham, Governors of the NWFP between 1937 and 1948, saw the continuation of the 19th century *Great Game* most clearly into the 20th century Cold War. They believed that Kashmir lay intertwined with the imperatives of the sub-continent's defence against Russia.⁵⁴ In Peshawar, Cunningham had

⁴⁶ 18 December 1947, Lockhart to ACB Symon, File No. 8310-154-77 to 105, Lockhart Papers, NAM

⁴⁷ 17 November 1947, Bucher to Baldev Singh, File No. 19 – Part I, BN Rau Papers (I Instalment), NMML and 24 September 1948, Bucher to Elizabeth Bucher, File No. 7901-87-6-1, Bucher Papers, NAM

⁴⁸ 24 June 1948, Bucher to HM Patel and TW Elmhirst, File No. 19 – Part I, BN Rau Papers (I Instalment), NMML and 13 December 1948, Bucher to Elizabeth Bucher, File No. 7901-87-6-1, Bucher Papers, NAM

⁴⁹ January 1951, File No. 7901-87-6-3, Bucher Papers, NAM; also see R Ankit, 'Right Man in the Wrong Place', *Epilogue* (Volume 4, Issue 7), July 2010

⁵⁰ 25 June 1948, Speech by Messervy at the RIIA (Ref. 8/1558), Chatham House

⁵¹ 20 November 1947, CB 6(15)/47, 15th meeting of the Defence Committee, MD1/D43, Mountbatten Papers

⁵² 21 June 1948, Gracey to Elmhirst, ELMT 3/1, Elmhirst Papers, CAC

⁵³ 30 October 1948, Gracey to Bucher, File No. 7901-87-6-2, NAM; also see R Ankit, 'The Defiant Douglas', *Epilogue* (Volume 4, Issue 1), January 2010

⁵⁴ 13 June 1946, Speech by Cunningham (8/1244) and 4 February 1948, Speech by Caroe (8/1498), RIIA

seen the ‘talk of war’ in early October develop into a ‘holy war’ by early December.⁵⁵ Caroe was later extolled for being the father of the idea of the ‘Northern Tier’, from Turkey to Pakistan, as a barrier against Russian expansion.⁵⁶

They were strongly supported by Robert Francis Mudie in West Punjab, for whom there were three threats to Pakistan’s existence: ‘Afghan-Russia’, ‘India-Abdul Ghaffar Khan’ and the conflict in Kashmir.⁵⁷ The ‘snake in grass’ to Indians,⁵⁸ Mudie would declare that ‘Pakistan is the barrier which prevents Communism spreading south of the Himalayas. Pakistan is the link between the Middle-East and the Commonwealth, between the Middle-East and the South-East’.⁵⁹ The Kashmir dispute weakened Pakistan and thus went ‘right to the root of the matter’.⁶⁰

Perhaps the last word in this regard should be left to Major-General WJ Cawthorn, founder of Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI). Speaking at the Chatham House in September 1948, the Australian eloquently voiced all the British strategic fears arising from the Kashmir dispute:

Whatever the legal position, from the political, economic and strategic points of view; Pakistan could not afford to have a hostile India right up to the western borders of Jammu and Kashmir. It would bring Indian Army within thirty miles of the military headquarters of Pakistan and right behind the vital north-south communication line. It would give India control over the waterworks of Chenab, Jhelum and Indus rivers. It would give India direct contact with Afghanistan, Chitral and Swat in the backdrop of indications that the Indian National Congress and the Young Afghan Party were jointly encouraging the Pathanistan idea and it would also place India in an almost direct contact with Russia.⁶¹

⁵⁵ See Cunningham’s diary, MSS Eur D670/6 and 2 April 1948, Cunningham to Caroe, MSS Eur F 164/19, IOR; see R Ankit, ‘The Cunningham Contribution’, *Epilogue* (Volume 4, Issue 3), March 2010; also see DO 142/494, TNA and 8 December 1947, (No. KR-456), First Series, Volume IX, *Jinnah Papers*

⁵⁶ *Memoirs of Sir Olaf Caroe*, MSS Eur C 273, Caroe Papers, IOR, p. 106; also see Peter Brobst, *The Future of the Great Game: Sir Olaf Caroe, India’s independence and the Defense of Asia* (Akron: University Press, 2005)

⁵⁷ MSS Eur F 164/12, MSS Eur F 164/48, IOR; also see R Ankit, ‘Whose was Kashmir to be?’, *Epilogue* (Volume 4, Issue 10), October 2010

⁵⁸ 17 October 1947, Short to States Ministry, MB1/D240 (Folder 1); for Nehru’s complaint against Mudie, see letter to Mountbatten dated 7 October 1947, MB1/D241, Mountbatten Papers

⁵⁹ 11 November 1948, Mudie to Maurice Hallett, MSS Eur D 714/84, Mudie Papers, IOR

⁶⁰ 22 February 1950, Mudie to Hallett, MSS Eur D 714/84, Mudie Papers, IOR

⁶¹ 28 September 1948, Speech by Cawthorn at the RIIA (8/1575), Chatham House

‘Putting the cart before the horse...’⁶²

Among the galaxy of Britons who stayed back, none found himself in a more awkward position than Lord Mountbatten whose Governor-Generalship of India foundered on three crises of accession – Junagadh, Kashmir and Hyderabad. By the time he left India in June 1948, he found himself regarded as the ‘protagonist of Hindustan’ in Pakistan,⁶³ ‘one-sided [presenter] of the Indian view’ at the CRO,⁶⁴ and above all losing his ‘once great’ influence in India.⁶⁵ His personal position in India, as Ismay reminded him, needed ‘very careful consideration’, for ‘the Governor-General of a British dominion to acquiesce in action [against] another British dominion was completely unprecedented’.⁶⁶

Even before the crisis in Kashmir had erupted, Mountbatten had profound differences with Auchinleck on ‘political matters’ surrounding army’s re-constitution.⁶⁷ His cabinet regarded Auchinleck as the ‘champion of Pakistan’s interests’,⁶⁸ and gradually he himself found it difficult to see ‘eye to eye’ with Auchinleck.⁶⁹ Exhorted by Nehru and Patel,⁷⁰ and supported by the CoS and Ismay in London and Lockhart and Bucher in India,⁷¹ Mountbatten made it clear to Auchinleck that he would have to leave by 30 November 1947.⁷²

Mountbatten was well-aware that the greatest concern for London in India was that there would be ‘chaos so great that a vacuum would be created into which Russia would almost automatically be drawn’.⁷³ Personally, he felt that a war in Kashmir would merely serve to give the upper-hand to the two superpowers in the subcontinent at the Commonwealth’s expense.⁷⁴ Mountbatten told Ismay to warn the CRO of the strong feeling in India that the

⁶² 24 February 1948, Mountbatten to Attlee, T. No. 459, L/WS/1/1141, IOR

⁶³ 5 November 1947, Duke (Peshawar) to Graffety-Smith, MB1/D240 (Folder 1), Mountbatten Papers

⁶⁴ 2 March 1948, Archibald Carter’s note, DO 142/507, TNA

⁶⁵ 3 February 1948, GG’s personal report no. 8, MB1/D88, Mountbatten Papers

⁶⁶ 17 September 1947, Ismay to Mountbatten, MB1/D201/1-24, Mountbatten Papers

⁶⁷ 6 October 1947, Mountbatten to Ismay, MB1/D302, Mountbatten Papers

⁶⁸ 26 September 1947, Mountbatten to Auchinleck, DO No. 3/7/67/38, File No. 3/7/67, Ismay Papers

⁶⁹ Thomas Elmhirst, *Recollections*; privately published by RT Roger Elmhirst (1991), CAC, p. 110

⁷⁰ 2 August 1947, Patel to Mountbatten, MB1/D198 and 2 September 1947, Mountbatten’s personal report no. 1 and 10 October 1947, Mountbatten’s personal report no. 4 as Governor-General, MB1/D86, Mountbatten Papers

⁷¹ 6 October 1947, MB1/D302 and 7 October 1947, MB1/D196A, Mountbatten to Ismay, Mountbatten Papers

⁷² 7 October 1947, Mountbatten to Ismay, MB1/D196A and MB1/D302; 8 October 1947, COS (47) 125 meeting, MB1/D302, 17 October 1947, Mountbatten to Ismay, MB1/D196 and 18 October 1947, Mountbatten to Ismay, MB1/D303, Mountbatten Papers

⁷³ 26 September 1947, Mountbatten’s personal report no. 3, MB1/D86, Mountbatten Papers

⁷⁴ 4 October 1947, Mountbatten to Ismay, MB1/D182, Mountbatten Papers

transfer of power was a ruse to *reculer pour mieux sauter* and London desired to use Pakistan in much the same way that the East India Company had used Bengal in the late-18th century.⁷⁵

Adding to this regional conundrum was the bigger calculus: Kashmir was contiguous to India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Russia, Chinese Turkestan and Tibet.⁷⁶ Any political settlement thus required the two dominions' cooperation,⁷⁷ but, despite his repeated attempts, Mountbatten found Nehru 'not particularly concerned' about it.⁷⁸ In January 1948, the visiting Patrick Gordon-Walker, Noel-Baker's deputy at the CRO, warned Bajpai that 'India could not disinterest herself [from Russia] any more than we could disinterest ourselves [from] the Rhine'.⁷⁹ Finally, Mountbatten, like many others, was not 'entirely convinced' of the soundness of Pakistan.⁸⁰

By January 1948, as the first discussions on Kashmir in the UN Security Council did not go according to Indian expectations, Mountbatten who had been the prime mover to get the Nehru government to take Kashmir to the UN found himself in the firing line from his cabinet.⁸¹ It was not just the Indians who felt that strategic considerations had played a part in the discussions on Kashmir at the UN. *Manchester Guardian's* Kingsley Martin, no supporter of India on Kashmir, told Mountbatten that American global strategy of controlling 'the perimeter around Russia' meant that they might be looking upon Pakistan with increased interest in this regard particularly in view of their failure in China and the 'politically confused and unreliable' India.⁸² Martin felt that India lost the case at UN because the sense was that 'to give India a formal legal verdict would make war more rather than less likely...and war would continue a general mix-up which would spread far beyond'.⁸³

Mountbatten, who was determined to keep India in the Commonwealth, consistently reminded Noel-Baker to act on Kashmir keeping in mind its repercussions for the

⁷⁵ 22 October 1947, Ismay to Archibald Carter (CRO), MB1/D240 (Folder 1), Mountbatten Papers

⁷⁶ 30 October 1947, Mountbatten to Ronald Brockman, MB1/D206, Mountbatten Papers

⁷⁷ 31 October 1947, VP Menon to George H Nicholls, MB1/D206, Mountbatten Papers

⁷⁸ 22 January 1948, Mountbatten-Nehru talks, MB1/D76 (Folder 1), Mountbatten Papers

⁷⁹ 29 January 1948, Gordon-Walker to Bajpai, MB1/D76 (Folder 1), Mountbatten Papers

⁸⁰ 1 November 1947, Mountbatten to Nehru, MB1/D182, Mountbatten Papers

⁸¹ 9 January 1948, Mountbatten's talks with MacDonald, Arthur Henderson, Shone and Symon, MB1/D75 (Folder 2), also see MB1/D208 and MB1/D209, Mountbatten Papers

⁸² 17 February 1948, Mountbatten-Kingsley Martin talks, MB1/D76 (Folder 2), Mountbatten Papers

⁸³ 25-26 February 1948, Martin to Campbell-Johnson, MS 350 A2096/4, Campbell-Johnson Papers

Commonwealth.⁸⁴ In March 1948, he warned the King that the price for Muslim solidarity in Middle-East seems to be an India ‘gravitating’ towards the USSR.⁸⁵ At this time, Mountbatten was even attracted by the ‘independent Kashmir’ idea. Promoted by the Canadians and supported by the Australians, Americans, Belgians and the Chinese, it obliged India and Pakistan to undertake joint defence of Kashmir thus keeping them together.⁸⁶

In his last months in India, Mountbatten became more concerned with Hyderabad than Kashmir but he remained active on behalf of Nehru with Attlee and Cripps.⁸⁷ He was hampered on three counts: the strategic importance of Pakistan, Nehru’s declarations of neutralism, considered unrealistic in London and Washington,⁸⁸ and, above all, his own behaviour in India. As this was considered ‘hopelessly one-sided’ by the CRO,⁸⁹ Ismay urged him to keep out of publicity.⁹⁰

As Perry Keene, Pakistan’s first Air Chief remembered, the position of Britons in India and Pakistan was ‘not easy’. They now served the dominions but held the King’s Commission and therefore kept ‘open a hot line to London’.⁹¹ Their overwhelming concern remained to safeguard vital interests in the region with respect to the fast-changing international climate. Thus, their attitude to Kashmir reflected the crystallisation of international calculations on a regional crisis. By January 1948, they had lined up the strategic and religious aspects of the dispute along with the ‘new international position’.⁹² Nehru came face to face with this when he visited London and Paris in October 1948. In a letter to Patel, he captured the mix well:

Definitely India is considered as a potential great power and especially in Asia...The UK and the Commonwealth countries are very conscious of this. The USA progressively realises it, the Middle-Eastern countries also appreciate this...So far as Kashmir is concerned, people cannot get rid of the idea that Kashmir is predominantly Muslim and therefore likely to side with Pakistan.⁹³

⁸⁴ 20 February 1948, MB-Gordon-Walker talks, MB1/D77 (Folder 1), Mountbatten Papers

⁸⁵ 19 March 1948, GG’s personal report no. 9, MB1/D88, Mountbatten Papers

⁸⁶ 30 October 1947, Brockman to Crum, MB1/D206 and 17 March 1948, Mountbatten-Kearny talks, MB1/D77 (Folder 2), Mountbatten Papers

⁸⁷ 11 April 1948, Mountbatten-Shone and 29 April 1948, Mountbatten-Nehru talks, MB1/D78 (Folder 1), Mountbatten Papers; on Hyderabad, see Raghavan, *War and Peace*, Chapter 3, ‘Hyderabad’, pp. 65-100

⁸⁸ 8 May 1948, Mountbatten-Davey (PS to HH Bhopal) talks, MB1/D79 (Folder 1), Mountbatten Papers

⁸⁹ 2 March 1948, Archibald Carter’s note, DO 142/507, TNA

⁹⁰ 1 October 1948, Ismay to Mountbatten, MB1/F36, Mountbatten Papers

⁹¹ Allan Perry-Keene, *Reflected Glory: An Autobiography*, unpublished manuscript, p. 89, CSAS

⁹² 5 August and 3 December 1947 and 29 January 1948, Puckle to Joyce, Box II, File 16, Puckle Papers

⁹³ 27 October 1948, Nehru to Patel, Correspondence file, Gopalaswami Ayyangar Papers, NMML

‘It turned out to be a war unlike all others in that the respective Commanders communicated daily by telephones between Rawalpindi and New Delhi’.⁹⁴

The ‘most serious aspect’ of the British involvement in Kashmir in 1947-49 was whether to issue an order of ‘stand down’ to British military personnel, considering the way in which they were being ‘forced to take sides’.⁹⁵ After all, a simple withdrawal would have meant ‘a confession of Britain giving up’.⁹⁶ In March 1947, there had been five thousand more British (13, 500) than Indian officers in the Indian army. Auchinleck had voiced their concern with respect to the future thus:

I have no idea whether India will stay in the Commonwealth or go out of it...I and all my senior commanders and staff officers are most anxious at the way in which the politicians (and some of the senior Indian officers) are trying to force the pace of nationalisation [of the army].⁹⁷

The danger of withdrawing all British military influence from India was clear: ‘laying the two relatively defenceless [and mutually hostile] Dominions open to attack from Russia’.⁹⁸ Nevertheless, it was clear to the CoS in London and Mountbatten and Auchinleck in New Delhi that in case of hostilities breaking out between India and Pakistan, British officers should not participate.⁹⁹ Accordingly, Auchinleck issued orders on 30 September 1947 requiring them to ‘stand down’ in such an eventuality.¹⁰⁰

This had been in response to a note by the three Indian Chiefs, Lockhart, Admiral JTS Hall and Air Commander S Mukherjee, submitted three days earlier in anticipation of imminent hostilities between India and Pakistan in Junagadh, which had highlighted the ‘impossibility’ of British officers to take part in a war between the dominions.¹⁰¹ A month later, as Indian troops were airlifted to Kashmir, Winston Churchill sought and received an assurance from

⁹⁴ Henry Devereux, *My Tour with the Pakistan Artillery*, ACC 197, IOR, p. 7

⁹⁵ 3 November 1947, Auchinleck to Alexander, F 146/86, FO 371/63570, TNA

⁹⁶ 4 November 1947, Alexander to Auchinleck, 270029 DSC, FO 371/63570, TNA

⁹⁷ 2 March 1947, Auchinleck to Scoones, d/o no. 80/S-3/47/6, MUL 1215, Auchinleck Papers

⁹⁸ Sir William Barton, ‘The Defence of India’, *The Fortnightly*, 16 July 1947, F 9522, FO 371/63565, TNA

⁹⁹ 15 July 1947, Auchinleck-Mountbatten meeting, Item No. 113, Volume XII, TOP

¹⁰⁰ 13 October 1947, CAB 134/54 and 15 October 1947, Attlee to Auchinleck, PREM 8/800, TNA; 28 October 1947, Auchinleck to UK Chiefs of Staff, L/WS/1/1138, IOR

¹⁰¹ 27 September 1947, MS 350 A3002/3/2/40, Alan Campbell-Johnson Papers

Noel-Baker that British officers would not be employed in a combatant capacity on either side.¹⁰² London's early position was that

“Stand down” should take place only if there is a danger of British officers actually taking the field against each other. Planning in the two headquarters against each other is obviously highly embarrassing and distasteful but we doubt if it is in itself a reason for final withdrawal...it is likely to have less effect on India than on Pakistan.¹⁰³

In early December, Lt General Russell, GOC Delhi and East Punjab Command, visited Kashmir. He went with the approval of Nehru and Roy Bucher but without the knowledge of Auchinleck's successor Arthur Smith, who immediately pointed to the political objections of such a visit. Mountbatten, Shone and Alexander all thought it best ‘not to take notice’ but all were aware that it would be ‘inadvisable to regard it as a precedent’ given the political capital involved.¹⁰⁴ But what was to be done? Given the preponderance of British officers, they had to have responsibility for military operations if not, as yet, being actual combatants, and were, in fact, already ‘taking up cudgels’ on behalf of the two dominions.¹⁰⁵ A letter from a British Colonel in Pakistan Army neatly captures the military bind British officers were in:

The Kashmir show looks like the beginning of the end. Pakistan has, of course, got nothing. This Kashmir show was unwise and amounts to an unofficial war on Pakistan's side. A very dangerous machine [tribesmen] has been let loose one, which I doubt Pakistan can control. I do not give this country more than six months... [However] there seems to be an idea in some government circles that America would never allow Pakistan to go down for fear of letting Russia in.¹⁰⁶

With winter stalling the fighting over December-January, it was clear that this issue would assume troublesome proportions later. In January 1948, Graffety-Smith forewarned the CRO that ‘Gracey and other British officers cannot be expected to obey “stand down”’. This was because, while the British would be restricted to an advisory role in India from 31 March, in Pakistan, they were in operational command.¹⁰⁷ The CRO assured him that they were aware

¹⁰² 30 October 1947, CRO to Shone, T. No. 663/1208, DO 133/68, TNA

¹⁰³ 6 November 1947, Alexander to Auchinleck, L/PS/1845b, IOR

¹⁰⁴ 10 December 1947, Shone to CRO, No. 1404; 23 December 1947, Shone to Mountbatten and Brockman to Shone, MB1/E158, Mountbatten Papers

¹⁰⁵ 1 November 1947, Peter Murray (CRO) to FO, F 14613/8800/85, FO 371/63570, TNA

¹⁰⁶ 1-3 December 1947, Bucher to HM Patel and Mountbatten, MB1/D220, Mountbatten Papers

¹⁰⁷ 23 January 1948, Graffety-Smith to CRO, T. No. 88, DO 142/429, TNA

that “stand down” ‘would be a far greater blow to Pakistan’ and were ‘not in the least likely to issue such an order save in the very last resort...’¹⁰⁸

On 11 February 1948, Douglas Gracey took over as Pakistan Army Chief from Frank Messervy. His first challenge was India’s spring offensive expected in March 1948, which was looked upon in London as a ‘fait accompli’ against Pakistan as well as the UN.¹⁰⁹ The advantages of having British generals at the helm of warring sides now became clear as Bucher and Gracey, in rather ‘Gilbertian negotiations’,¹¹⁰ mutually sought to employ defensive positions.¹¹¹ As Lt Gen Loftus Tottenham, commanding a division of Pakistan army, later remembered: ‘The Kashmir war was queer in that it was fought under certain restrictions. The attitude was and had to be, you can hit them so hard but not too hard, otherwise there will be all kinds of repercussions’.¹¹²

Over 4/5 May 1948, Graffety-Smith informed the CRO of the presence of Pakistan army troops in Kashmir.¹¹³ More worryingly, he also mentioned that two British officers, Lt Col Milne and Captain Skellon, were in Kashmir with Gracey’s concurrence. Soon, he reported that three Pakistani battalions were present in Kashmir with Indian commanders aware of this and ‘manoeuvring so as to avoid any clash’.¹¹⁴ Gracey had personally informed Bucher about their presence ‘for “defensive purposes”’.¹¹⁵ Quite naturally, the CRO’s bigger worry was the presence of British officers in Kashmir: ‘a prospect of embarrassment’.¹¹⁶

By June 1948, the presence of Pakistan troops in Kashmir was ‘indisputable’. London’s position formulated by Bevin was ‘not to take any action’.¹¹⁷ Alexander and the CoS agreed ‘not to press any enquiries’ and British envoys everywhere were instructed to avoid the

¹⁰⁸ 30 January 1948, CRO to Shone and Graffety-Smith, T. No. 337 and 224 respectively, DO 142/429, TNA

¹⁰⁹ 11 March 1948, Burnett (Karachi) to Carter (CRO), T. No. 339, DO 133/77, TNA

¹¹⁰ 26 March 1948, Graffety-Smith to CRO, T. No. 294, DO 142/510, TNA

¹¹¹ 26 and 28 March 1948, Karachi-Delhi-London, T. Nos. 294 and 770 respectively, L/WS/1/1141, IOR; also see Dasgupta, *War and Diplomacy*, pp. 133–42

¹¹² ‘Lessons of Kashmir Campaign’, Comd 7 Division, File Number K/18/Hist Sec, Pakistan Army GHQ Archives, quoted in Nawaz, *Crossed Swords*, p. 71

¹¹³ 4 and 5 May 1948, Graffety-Smith to CRO, T. No. 465 and 470, L/WS/1/1142, IOR

¹¹⁴ 8 May 1948, Graffety-Smith to CRO, T. No. 485, L/WS/1/1142, IOR

¹¹⁵ 12, 19 and 29 May 1948, Shone to CRO, T. Nos. 1393, 1499 and 1657, L/WS/1/1142, IOR

¹¹⁶ 12 May 1948, Graffety-Smith to CRO, T. No. 501, L/WS/1/1142, IOR

¹¹⁷ 26 May 1948, CRO to Washington, New York, Delhi and Karachi, T. No. 5697, L/WS/1/1152, IOR; 4 June 1948, Carter (CRO) to Shone and Graffety-Smith, DO 133/79, TNA

topic.¹¹⁸ The reason was simple. As Shone put it, if India asked for a ‘stand down’ order, it would cripple Pakistan for there was ‘no one competent’ to take over the senior positions.¹¹⁹

India’s silence thus far was due to ‘Bucher counselling them to keep quiet’.¹²⁰ He also moderated plans for army offensives and air attacks proposed by Indian Generals.¹²¹ Nevertheless, the FO expected and resolved to resist any Indian request, ‘with every argument that we can muster’.¹²² A prominent reason for this resolve was, as Graffety-Smith had reported, that Gracey was a ‘strong, out-spoken protagonist against “stand down” [with] no effect of HMG’s delicate position on him [and I am] at a loss to suggest effective, secure course of action to ensure Gracey’s loyalty’.¹²³

In July 1948, London was shocked to know that ‘8-12 British officers were serving in Kashmir’.¹²⁴ The silver lining in this darkening cloud was Bucher’s restraint in India. He was anxious ‘to avoid a head-on clash with Pakistan’ and used his influence to stop ‘any precipitate action on the part of an Indian commander’.¹²⁵ Mountbatten wanted him, along with Naval Chief Parry and Air Chief Elmhirst, to keep ‘close personal touch and [give] dispassionate advice’ to Nehru.¹²⁶ Bucher was always conscious that ‘military operations must be linked with political policy’ on Kashmir.¹²⁷

What forced the CRO’s hand was the inevitable death of one of the British officers in Kashmir. Major RE Sloan (No. 352677 A) was killed on Saturday 10 July at 0915 hours in Tithwal sector while commanding 71 Field Company, Royal Pakistan Engineers.¹²⁸ It could not agree to this,¹²⁹ but was also anxious to ensure that ‘circumstances of Sloan’s death should [not] become public’.¹³⁰

¹¹⁸ 8 and 18 June 1948, CRO to New York, T. No. 2569, L/WS/1/1152; G 2275/30, L/WS/1/1142, IOR

¹¹⁹ 9 June 1948, Shone to CRO, T. No. 1804, L/WS/1/1142, IOR

¹²⁰ 11 June 1948, Shone to CRO, T. No. 1844, L/WS/1/1142, IOR; also see MB1/D272, Mountbatten Papers and Dasgupta, *War and Diplomacy*, pp. 151-54

¹²¹ 23 June 1948, Elmhirst to Bucher, 24 June 1948, Bucher to Patel, Subject File 19-Pt I (1947-48), Rau Papers

¹²² 14-16 June 1948, Pol Ext 16232/48, FO 371/69719, TNA

¹²³ 23 June 1948, Graffety-Smith to Carter (CRO), S/41, DO 133/80, TNA

¹²⁴ 28 June 1948, PIN/21/48; Graffety-Smith sent this to Carter (CRO) on 9 July 1948, S/24, DO 142/429, TNA

¹²⁵ 12 July 1948, Shone to CRO, T. No. 2247, L/WS/1/1142, IOR

¹²⁶ 28 May 1948, Mountbatten-Elmhirst meeting, MB1/D80 (Folder 1), Mountbatten Papers

¹²⁷ 10 April 1948, Bucher-Mountbatten meeting, MB1/D78 (Folder 1), also see MB1/D216, Mountbatten Papers

¹²⁸ 15 July 1948, Graffety-Smith to CRO, T. No. 161, PREM 8/801, TNA

¹²⁹ 16 July 1948, CRO to Graffety-Smith, 17132/111, PREM 8/801, TNA

¹³⁰ 16 July 1948, CRO to Shone, T. No. 1186, PREM 8/801, TNA

Sensing that this death might force the government on the defensive, Noel-Baker submitted to Attlee a note arguing against enforcing 'stand down'. Firstly, it would remove the influence of moderation and secondly, it would be disastrous for Pakistan. Consequently, 'our relations with Pakistan would be gravely embittered'.¹³¹ From Karachi, Graffety-Smith sent Pakistan's 'categorical assurance' that no British personnel would be employed in Kashmir.¹³² Consequently, Attlee turned down Nehru's request for a general 'stand down' by arguing that 'if it is substantiated that certain British officers have been to Kashmir, we should recall those...only'.¹³³ Meanwhile, there was no let-up in British officers going into Kashmir. Archibald Carter at the CRO blamed the 'wrong, unwise or weak' Gracey for this and called him 'a servant of the Pakistan government...more than a 100% Pakistani', who did not 'realise the danger of having British officers in Kashmir'.¹³⁴

In August 1948, Nehru tried again for 'stand down'; this time through Cripps and Ismay. This met a coordinated response from Noel-Baker and Bevin. The question for them was simple. The Pakistan army would disintegrate without British officers, 'was that in the UK's interests?' The answer was an obvious 'no'. Pakistan was 'a barrier to Russian penetration' and a lever in 'the delicate relations' with the Muslim world.¹³⁵ Moreover, the UN Commission on Kashmir, which was by now in the subcontinent, looked upon British officers as a 'valuable, stabilising and essential influence for enforcement of ceasefire'.¹³⁶ The CRO agreed to put British officers 'at its disposal'.¹³⁷ By now, there were 351 British personnel in the Indian armed forces and 801 in their Pakistan counterpart.¹³⁸ Finally, 'stand down' would have broken the direct, personal link between Gracey and Bucher.¹³⁹

Therefore, Attlee declined Nehru's request citing desperation and disillusionment in Pakistan, defiance by British officers there, Muslim hostility and Communist profit.¹⁴⁰ Four months

¹³¹ 15-16 July 1948, Noel-Baker to Attlee and Alexander, S. No. 46/48, DO 142/429, TNA

¹³² 17 July 1948, Graffety-Smith to CRO, T. No. 777, PREM 8/801, TNA

¹³³ 22 July 1948, M 120/48, PREM 8/801, TNA

¹³⁴ 27 July 1948, Carter (CRO) to Noel-Baker, DO 142/429, TNA

¹³⁵ 9 August 1948, F 11799/6/85/G, FO 371/69721, TNA

¹³⁶ 11 August 1948, Graffety-Smith to CRO, T. No. 910, F 11799/6/85/G, FO 371/69721, TNA

¹³⁷ 25 March 1948, Archibald Carter to Graffety-Smith, File 1/1, GB165-0123, Graffety-Smith Papers

¹³⁸ Moore, *Making the New Commonwealth*, p. 89; there were 277 British officers in the Indian army to 405 in Pakistan; 24 in Indian navy to 19 in Pakistan and 7 in Indian air force to 35 in Pakistan.

¹³⁹ 10 August 1948, Col. AH Reed (Rawalpindi) to SJ Oliver (Karachi), DO 142/429, TNA

¹⁴⁰ 20 August 1948, PREM 8/800, TNA; also see Dasgupta, *War and Diplomacy*, pp. 155-60

later, Nehru raised the issue once more. Attlee's response, this time formulated by Alexander, would be that the above concerns 'still seemed relevant'.¹⁴¹ By now, the British officers in Pakistan army were 'freely supporting defensive operations in Kashmir'.¹⁴² India's new Governor-General Rajagopalachari complained to his predecessor, Mountbatten that this was a 'most untenable position' where 'the distinction between field service and HQ work is wholly meaningless now'.¹⁴³

In November 1948, Lt Gen Gerald Templer's report confirmed that 440 British officers served in executive positions in Pakistan as opposed to 3 out of 230 Britons in India.¹⁴⁴ This imbalance was exacerbated by Bucher's 'relative detachment, effective restraint and calm temperament', along with 'a clearer grasp of political issues' compared to Gracey's 'impulsive behaviour'.¹⁴⁵ Bucher got the Attlee Government their desired ceasefire fifteen days before he relinquished his office.¹⁴⁶ But he had to defend himself against charges of 'dancing to Pakistan piping'.¹⁴⁷

Bucher had counselled restraint because of vulnerabilities of supply and communication lines, extravagant expenditure on equipment, lack of training and tiredness and ennui among soldiers.¹⁴⁸ Throughout 1948, he would comment on the 'religious war' in Kashmir under the shadow of Russia and confide about the 'tricky' position of British officers on both sides, which raised questions of 'conscience'.¹⁴⁹ The only way out he saw, of this personal and professional impasse, was to keep a 'limited and controlled' lid on Kashmir operations.¹⁵⁰ In this endeavour, he had 'more in common' with his political leaders than 'with the senior Indians in the services'.¹⁵¹ Patel 'supported [Bucher's] arguments against large scale

¹⁴¹ 20 December 1948, Nehru to Menon, No. 729, File No. 28 (London), Mathai Papers; 22 December 1948, Alexander to Attlee, DO 142/429, TNA; 23 December 1948, Attlee to Nehru, T. No. 4390, L/WS/1/1144, IOR

¹⁴² 6 November 1948, Graffety-Smith to CRO, S/24, DO 133/82, TNA

¹⁴³ 10 August 1948, Rajagopalachari to Mountbatten, MB1/F39 (Folder 1), Mountbatten Papers

¹⁴⁴ 20 November 1948, L/WS/1/1153, IOR

¹⁴⁵ 19 December 1948, Graffety-Smith to CRO, T. No. 1550, L/WS/1/1144, IOR; 24 December 1948, Graffety-Smith to Nye and Carter, S/24, DO 142/524; 30 December 1948, Carter to Graffety-Smith, DO 134/5, TNA

¹⁴⁶ 30-31 December 1948, Exchanges between Bucher and Gracey, 220835/M03 and 220837/M03, Rau Papers

¹⁴⁷ 29 December 1948, Nehru to Bucher and 31 December 1948, Bucher to Nehru, DO No. 17/C-in-C, Subject File 19-Pt. I (1947-48), Rau Papers

¹⁴⁸ November-December 1948, Bucher to Baldev Singh, HM Patel and Nehru, Subject File 19-Pt I (1947-48), Rau Papers

¹⁴⁹ 24 November 1947, 1 July, 10 August and 24 September 1948, Bucher to Elizabeth Bucher, File No. 7901-87-6-1, Bucher Papers

¹⁵⁰ 21 January 1949, Bucher to Mountbatten, MB1/F6 (Folder 1), Mountbatten Papers

¹⁵¹ 5 November 1949, Bucher to Mountbatten, MB1/F5 (Folder 2), Mountbatten Papers

offensive in Kashmir'.¹⁵² Nehru, who had a 'grasp' of the military situation in Kashmir not often granted, too was alive to Bucher's views about how this situation was 'influenced by the presence of the UN Commission'.

For the FO and the CoS, as Basil Liddell-Hart, military historian and theorist, remembered later, Pakistan was a 'more important factor in the peace of Middle-East than India' but, its ability to act was hampered by Kashmir.¹⁵³ Moreover, unlike India, which sought to equate Russia's 'active expansionism' with America's 'economic expansionist tendencies' at a time when the UK sought 'collective defence' against the 'Communist menace', Pakistan repeatedly announced itself 'ready and willing to play her full part in defensive preparations against Communism'.¹⁵⁴ Thus, Auchinleck could declare that

Discontent and disturbed conditions due to India's actions and proposed views in an area of vital strategic importance to the defence of the Commonwealth against the USSR must be avoided and it is in this context that the future of Kashmir must be understood, interpreted and settled.¹⁵⁵

'Driving from the Dicky'¹⁵⁶

Ultimately, the future of Kashmir was understood, interpreted and settled at the apex of decision-making in London, where stood the pragmatic Attlee, the Cold Warrior Bevin, the Quaker Pacifist Noel-Baker, the quiet Imperialist Alexander and the veteran India-hand Cripps. Theirs was a divided house. Broadly speaking, for Attlee, Pakistan was 'the more reliable ally, India the more valuable partner'.¹⁵⁷ Bevin, 'fascinated by the Middle East',¹⁵⁸ tended to support Pakistan. Noel-Baker was pro-Pakistan, while Cripps 'more Indian than Indians'.¹⁵⁹ Alexander, who tended to side with India, was told by Attlee to think about Pakistan in 'regard to the importance of the Middle-East'.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵² Oral History Transcripts, Roy Bucher (Acc. No. 59), pp. 8-9, NMML

¹⁵³ 5 January 1951, LH/15/5/425, Liddell-Hart Papers, KCL

¹⁵⁴ Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, 19-20 October 1948, PMM (48) 10th and 12th meeting, Subject File Serial No. 25, Mathai Papers

¹⁵⁵ 20 April 1950, Speech by Auchinleck at the RIIA (Ref. 8/1800)

¹⁵⁶ 24 July 1948, Rumbold to Gordon-Walker, DO 142/516, TNA

¹⁵⁷ R Pearce (ed.) *Patrick Gordon-Walker: Political Diaries 1932-1971* (London: Historian's Press, 1991), p. 22

¹⁵⁸ Pimlott (ed.), *The Political Diaries of Hugh Dalton, 1945-60* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1986), p. 369

¹⁵⁹ 4 April and 11 November 1948, Noel-Baker to Gordon-Walker, GNWR 1/6, Gordon-Walker Papers

¹⁶⁰ 4 May 1949, Attlee to Alexander, M 100/49, PREM 8/997, TNA

At the FO, Bevin's aim was to lead a united Muslim world of former British colonies and mandates against the Soviet spectre from Turkey to Sinkiang. Whether arguing for a 'Third Force' or a 'Western Union', for Bevin a retreat from the Muslim World was unimaginable.¹⁶¹ Therefore, he was 'most anxious not to lose the confidence of Pakistan', which in his eyes stood 'as a barrier to Russian penetration'.¹⁶² Thus, Bevin approached Kashmir keeping in mind its impact on Pakistan and, in turn, its implications for Britain.

Bevin also believed that India had acted unfairly in the division of military and economic assets and agreed that Pakistan's difficulties would be worsened by India's control over Kashmir.¹⁶³ He was perturbed that 'Pakistan may make overtures to Russia'.¹⁶⁴ To preclude any involvement by the USSR or its ally into Indian affairs, Bevin had wanted a Commonwealth Commission on Kashmir.¹⁶⁵ Concerned at the 'unimaginative' Americans,¹⁶⁶ Bevin reminded George Marshall in October 1948 that 'Kashmir was on the Soviet frontier. Russia might well intervene as in Greece and China'.¹⁶⁷

As a Muslim country as well as a Commonwealth member, Pakistan was the ideal inclusion in any defence scheme against Russia between Greece and China. But Bevin knew that until Kashmir was settled, Pakistan could not be included in any such scheme without incurring Indian ill-will.¹⁶⁸ The dilemma facing Bevin's mandarins over Kashmir was whether to help Pakistan and risk India's secession from the Commonwealth or risk Pakistan's collapse and lose prestige and influence in the Muslim world. As one of them elaborated:

With the darkening world situation, that corner of the world represented by Persia, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India is bound to be one of the danger spots in Soviet schemes for expansion. The

¹⁶¹ Sean Greenwood, *Britain and the Cold War, 1945-91* (London: Macmillan, 2000), pp. 32-37. Also see John Kent, 'Bevin's Imperialism and the idea of Eur-Africa, 1945-49', pp. 47-76 in Michael Dockrill and John W Young (eds.) *British Foreign Policy, 1945-56* (London: Macmillan, 1989). Between January and March 1948, Bevin produced two key memorandums on 'The Threat to Western Civilisation' from Russia and the consequent 'Future Foreign Policy' of Britain, CAB 129/23 and 129/25. These were discussed at the Cabinet on 5 March 1948, CM (47), CAB 195/5, TNA

¹⁶² 11 August 1948, Bevin-Noel-Baker meeting, F 11799, FO 371/69721, TNA

¹⁶³ 24 December 1947 and January 1948, Bevin to Mountbatten, FO 371/63574 and FO 371/69705, TNA

¹⁶⁴ 13 May 1948, Bevin to Attlee, Ind/48/24, FO 800/470, TNA

¹⁶⁵ 14 February and 15 April 1948, FO 371/69709 and FO 371/69715, TNA

¹⁶⁶ 29 October 1958, Arthur Creech-Jones to Elizabeth Monroe, GB 165-0207, Monroe Papers

¹⁶⁷ 27 October and 6 December 1948, Bevin to Marshall, Ind/48/33, FO 800/470; No. 12938, DO 142/522

¹⁶⁸ 19 October 1949, CP (49) 209, FO memo, Box 59, File 3, MSS Brit Emp S332, Creech-Jones Papers

main bar to unity in this region is the Kashmir dispute and we cannot help feeling that this dispute should be viewed in the light of the wider considerations mentioned above.¹⁶⁹

The FO viewed the Kashmir conflict as a religious war, worried that it ‘might be used by Russia as a pretext for intervening’,¹⁷⁰ and believed that Moscow would favour India.¹⁷¹ Finally, ‘the present difficult position over Palestine’ made any ‘talks about HMG being unfair to Pakistan [over Kashmir] undesirable’.¹⁷² British embassies in the Middle-East were instructed to remind their governments that having facilitated ‘the creation of a separate independent Muslim state [in India] by going out of way’, London ‘would always come to Pakistan’s help’.¹⁷³

Bevin and his FO were almost ‘Curzonian’ in this understanding of Britain as an Islamic Power, consideration of the Muslim world as a whole and concern of how Pakistan’s position in Kashmir might be viewed there.¹⁷⁴ Moreover, with deteriorating situations in Greece, China and Palestine drawing the Americans,¹⁷⁵ the FO felt chary of giving the Americans an ‘impression [on Kashmir] that we are trying to get them to pull one of our chestnuts out of the fire’.¹⁷⁶

The FO was also sympathetic about Pakistan’s ‘inherited responsibility for the NWFP’,¹⁷⁷ especially with a ‘conspiring’ Afghan government next door.¹⁷⁸ It did not consider Pakistan’s political existence ‘a good risk’,¹⁷⁹ and there was little question of increasing that risk in Kashmir;¹⁸⁰ particularly when India did not appreciate Pakistan’s difficulties over the tribesmen and anxieties over the fate of Muslims in Kashmir. These were issues important enough for the FO ‘to justify incurring some degree of ill-will from India’.¹⁸¹

¹⁶⁹ 21 October 1948, DO 142/521, TNA

¹⁷⁰ 6 November 1947, FO 371/63570, TNA

¹⁷¹ 23 October and 5 November 1947, FO 371/63574 and 63571, TNA

¹⁷² 20 November 1947 and 1 December 1947, FO 371/63568, TNA

¹⁷³ 4 and 6 December 1947, FO 371/63568 and FO 371/63571, TNA

¹⁷⁴ Ronald Hyam, *Britain’s Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonisation, 1918-1968* (Cambridge: CUP, 2006), p. 154; also see Francis Robinson, ‘The British Empire and the Muslim World’, in Brown and Louis, eds., *Oxford History of the British Empire, Vol. IV*, pp. 398-420 and Roger Louis, *The British Empire in the Middle-East, 1945-1951* (New York: OUP, 1984; 20 April 1948, Denning to Bevin, FO 371/69721, TNA

¹⁷⁵ 28 May and 4 June 1948, FO 371/69718, TNA

¹⁷⁶ 11 and 17 November 1948, Sargeant to Attlee, FO 371/69723, TNA

¹⁷⁷ 27 January 1948, Cadogan to FO, T. No. 357, FO 371/69707, TNA

¹⁷⁸ 12 January 1948, Squire to FO, FO 371/69705 and 29 January 1948, FO 371/69708, TNA

¹⁷⁹ 27 November 1947, Inverchapel to FO, FO 371/63574, TNA

¹⁸⁰ 20 November, 1 December and 16 December 1947, FO 371/63574, TNA

¹⁸¹ 11 June and 6 September 1948, FO to CRO, FO 371/69719 and FO 371/69721, TNA

Finally, it held ‘the bigger partner, India’ responsible for the ‘original fundamental error’ over Kashmir. This was particularly irresponsible in the light of ‘the spread of Bolshevism in South-East Asia’. As far as the FO was concerned, Nehru’s foreign policy made ‘no sense’ and ‘whatever the merits of [his] case might be’, Kashmir came with the ‘most serious problems’.¹⁸²

Bevin’s counterpart at the CRO, Philip Noel-Baker, worked tirelessly to pursue his vision of a safe Kashmir that led to a safe Pakistan, which contributed to a safe South Asia and Middle-East thus promoting a safe world for British interests. He was convinced that ‘Russia’s game is to prevent a settlement’.¹⁸³ His worries were two-fold: ‘advancement of Communism in Asia’ and ‘the present Middle-Eastern difficulties’.¹⁸⁴

More than anyone else in the cabinet, barring Cripps, Noel-Baker also had a clear position on the merits of the respective cases of the disputants.¹⁸⁵ In November 1947, he told Mountbatten that Pakistan ‘had a right to expect’ that Muslim Kashmir would join them and he was apprehensive at the consequences of a ‘disillusioned’ Pakistan.¹⁸⁶ In December, he told Shone that he considered India’s view on Kashmir as ‘unrealistic’.¹⁸⁷ Mountbatten worried that with ‘his conduct’ at the UN, Noel-Baker had ‘almost wrecked’ the prospects of India remaining within the Commonwealth.¹⁸⁸

For Noel-Baker, Kashmir and Afghan frontiers of Pakistan were two sides of the same coin: Pakistan’s security. Over and above these was the threat of ‘Russian intervention’.¹⁸⁹ The overall political thrust at the FO and the CRO, during 1948, then was to ‘adjust our relations with India [and] avoid infuriating Pakistan’.¹⁹⁰ India was left in no doubt that a political

¹⁸² 28 September 1948, FO 371/69721, October 1948, DO 142/521 and 20 May 1949, DO 142/529, TNA

¹⁸³ 9 February 1948, Noel-Baker to Shone, T. No. 470, FO 371/69710, TNA

¹⁸⁴ 2 May 1949, Noel-Baker to Attlee, DO 142/529, TNA

¹⁸⁵ Noel-Baker thought Kashmir’s accession to India was ‘humbog’, 1 February 1957, Noel-Baker to Alexander, 20 February and 6 March 1957, Noel-Baker to the Editor, *Manchester Guardian*, NBKR 4/419, 4/420, Noel-Baker Papers, CAC. To this Cripps would counter that ‘the issue [is] whether the action of Pakistan in permitting and encouraging the passage of tribesmen across their territory to attack Kashmir was an act of aggression against India?’ 26 February 1948, Cripps to Attlee, PREM 8/1455/2, TNA

¹⁸⁶ 26 November 1947, F 15639/8800/85, FO 371/63568, TNA

¹⁸⁷ 27 December 1947, Noel-Baker to Shone, T. No. 1590, DO 142/543

¹⁸⁸ 11 April 1948, Mountbatten-Shone meeting, MB1/D78 (Folder 1), Mountbatten Papers

¹⁸⁹ William Barton, ‘Note on Kashmir and Afghan Frontier’, NBKR 4/419, Noel-Baker Papers

¹⁹⁰ 5 March 1948, GNWR 1/6, Gordon-Walker Papers

settlement was necessary in Kashmir, since Kashmir presented ‘an admirable opportunity for Russia to make mischief’. The preferred policy, acknowledged as ‘extremely unfortunate’, was to force the issue with India, most visibly at the UN, ‘in view of the grave consequences for our relations with Pakistan’.¹⁹¹

Performing the ‘Pantomime’ at the UN¹⁹²

At the very outset of the discussions on Kashmir in New York, the CRO made it clear to the UK delegation to the UN that ‘the point at issue is how to stop the fighting and bring about a fair plebiscite rather than arbitration’.¹⁹³ The FO’s early analysis was that Pakistan, if the whole matter i.e. the religious partition, Hari Singh’s unpopularity and Pakistan’s weakness to stop raiders is gone into, ‘should be able to put up a fairly convincing case’.¹⁹⁴

On 2 January 1948, ‘a little puzzled’ FO had the unpleasant task of informing Alexander Cadogan, UK’s permanent representative at the UN (1945-50), of Attlee’s decision to make Noel-Baker the head of the delegation on Kashmir. The FO had understood that it was the Cabinet’s particular desire to keep a low profile at the UN on what was essentially an embarrassing Commonwealth matter. If a Cabinet Minister represented the UK, however, this was bound to attract increased attention. It was also a personal disappointment for Cadogan.¹⁹⁵ Nevertheless, the FO asked him to talk to both parties in a last-ditch effort to keep the matter inside the Commonwealth.¹⁹⁶

The CRO, meanwhile, was already laying out the early diplomatic line: Pakistan to stop aiding rebels, India to withdraw troops, appointment of a UN administration and holding a plebiscite over May-June 1948.¹⁹⁷ Noel-Baker was clear that the UK delegation ‘will have to take the lead’, given its special knowledge of the region.¹⁹⁸ His energy and zeal attracted Attlee’s attention. The Prime Minister advised him to carefully handle the disputants: Pakistan, ‘in view of the Palestine situation’ and India, ‘on account of their emotional

¹⁹¹ September 1949, Gordon-Walker to Liesching, DO 142/537, TNA

¹⁹² 24 February 1950, Diary entry, ACAD 1/21, Cadogan Papers, CAC

¹⁹³ 5 January 1948, L/PS/13/1948, IOR

¹⁹⁴ 1 January 1948, POL 1726/47, FO 371/69705, TNA

¹⁹⁵ 1-2 January 1948, FO 371/69705, TNA

¹⁹⁶ 3 January 1948, FO to New York, F 89/6/85, FO 371/69705, TNA

¹⁹⁷ 3 January 1948, CRO to Washington, Delhi and Karachi, T. No. 30, L/WS/1/1148, IOR

¹⁹⁸ 9 January 1948, Noel-Baker to London, T. No. 51, FO 371/69705, TNA

condition'.¹⁹⁹ In his first meeting with them, Noel-Baker stressed that 'any UN action should not prejudice strategic requirements'.²⁰⁰

On 20 January 1948, the Security Council passed its first resolution on Kashmir. Its terms reflected British objectives: check disputatious and hostile Afghanistan, discourage 'Pathanistan' and deny an independent Kashmir by the Soviet border.²⁰¹ The resolution was moved by Van Langenhove, the Belgian Chairman of the Council but the extent of British influence behind the scenes was noted with some satisfaction by Noel-Baker: 'The fact that Van Langenhove is largely guided by us is not known...and we take every precaution to ensure that it is not known...'²⁰²

Noel-Baker also noted that the USSR had opposed the British position. The Indians suspected this British role. Nehru asked his delegation to be careful of the 'unhelpful British'.²⁰³ To his sister, he wrote, 'the US and the UK talk patronisingly of being neutral. But, they incline towards Pakistan. The Belgian Chairman, much to our surprise and annoyance, has also not been very impartial'.²⁰⁴

By the end of January 1948, it was clear that any UN solution was going to be 'highly distasteful to India' but London decided it 'worthwhile to accept risk of unpopularity'.²⁰⁵ Gordon-Walker visited New Delhi and found Nehru resentful against the Americans and Patel bitter against the British.²⁰⁶ Foreshadowing the Cold War contours of 1950s, the Indians felt that only the 'USSR could be relied upon for a sympathetic hearing'.²⁰⁷ Mountbatten now pleaded directly with Attlee along political and personal lines:

¹⁹⁹ 10 January 1948, Attlee to Noel-Baker, T. No. 131, L/WS/1/1148, IOR

²⁰⁰ 12 January 1948, L/WS/1/1148, IOR; 13 January 1948, FO to New York, T. No. 172, FO 371/69705, TNA

²⁰¹ 21 January 1948, FO to Cadogan, FO 371/69706; It established a UN Commission, sought to persuade India for a UN administration in Kashmir headed by a 'neutral' Chairman and with a 'neutral' C-in-C appointed by the UN; 6 November 1947 F 146/86, FO 371/63570, 27 January 1948, Cadogan to FO, T. No. 357, FO 371/69707, 29 January 1948, FO 371/69708 and 7 February 1948, FO to Kabul, T. No. 29, FO 371/69709, TNA

²⁰² 21 January 1948, Noel-Baker to CRO, T. No. 158, L/WS/1/1148, IOR

²⁰³ 23 January 1948, Delhi to CRO, T. No. 177, L/WS/1/1148, IOR

²⁰⁴ 23 January 1948, Nehru (Delhi) to Pandit (Moscow), Subject File Serial No. 54, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

²⁰⁵ 28 January 1948, New York to CRO, T. No. 243, L/WS/1/1148, IOR

²⁰⁶ 30 January 1948, Gordon-Walker's conversations with Nehru and Patel, DO 142/506

²⁰⁷ 7 February 1948, Shone to CRO, T. No. 298, L/WS/1/1140, IOR; also see, MB1/D210, Mountbatten Papers

I am convinced that this attitude of the US and the UK is completely wrong and will have far reaching results. Any prestige I may previously have had with my Government has of course been largely lost...It appears to me that Russia may well win India to her side...²⁰⁸

On 10 February 1948, India nominated Czechoslovakia to the UN Commission on Kashmir (UNCIP). Nehru knew fully well that choosing Czechoslovakia 'meant lining up in the eyes of the world with the Soviet bloc' and affecting 'India's Kashmir position'.²⁰⁹ Nonetheless, fed up with the UK-led 'dirty and partisan' Security Council, he decided to give 'the Anglo-American group a bit of a shock'.²¹⁰ He had initially wanted Belgium, to which his UN delegation responded with China or Czechoslovakia. Nehru rejected both for their Russian angle and suggested Sweden, while his cabinet recommended Canada. The Indian delegation was wary of both on account of their closeness to America and brought up Ukraine. Finally, Nehru decided on Czechoslovakia being 'internationally less embarrassing' than Ukraine.

He expressed himself strongly to Attlee in correspondence and to Gordon-Walker in person against the 'outwardly friendly [but] meaningless [British] manner'. To Krishna Menon he wrote in terms rather personal: 'Noel-Baker is your old Professor and friend. He has behaved very badly in the Security Council and ought to be made to realise how we feel about it...'²¹¹

With the Communist take-over imminent in Prague, the FO concluded that Nehru saw Czechoslovakia as 'independent of the Western Union and the Anglo-American bloc'.²¹² Noel-Baker wanted to know the identity and suitability of the Czechoslovak member in advance and urged the FO to get in touch with Prague.²¹³ Bevin however demurred and remarked that 'we have been a little too active on this issue...If it becomes known that Noel-Baker has been lobbying the Czech government we may find this used against us'.²¹⁴ From India, Mountbatten was not holding back either and wrote to Attlee:

²⁰⁸ 8 February 1948, Mountbatten (Delhi) to Attlee, DO 35/3164, TNA

²⁰⁹ 23 January 1948, Nehru to Pandit, Subject File Serial No. 54, Pandit Papers (I Instalment); also see MB1/D223 and 5 February 1948, Erskine to Mountbatten, MB1/D210, Mountbatten Papers

²¹⁰ 16 February 1948, Nehru to Pandit, Subject File Serial No. 54, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

²¹¹ Nehru-Gordon-Walker talk, 30 January 1948, MB1/D76 (Folder 1), Nehru to Attlee, 8 February 1948, No. 45/1161, MB1/D224, Mountbatten Papers and 20 February 1948, Nehru (Delhi) to Menon (London), Subject File Serial No. 54, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

²¹² 14 February 1948, FO 371/69709, TNA

²¹³ 20 February 1948, FO 371/69709, TNA

²¹⁴ 24 February 1948, FO 371/69709, TNA

I am at a loss to understand why India...the only country now likely to give a lead in the Far East, is being treated this way. The policy which you initiated and which I have endeavoured to carry out...is now being compromised by...Noel-Baker's obvious antagonism to India.²¹⁵

Noel-Baker was not unduly worried by this 'bad blood' with Mountbatten.²¹⁶ What concerned him though was that Henry Grady, the American Ambassador in New Delhi, was telling the Indians that America would have been sympathetic 'if it had not been for the pressure exerted by the UK'.²¹⁷ Bevin too was uneasy that Britain risked finding itself in Kashmir in a position similar to that of America in Palestine,²¹⁸ but warned, when Noel-Baker suggested that the 'Communist proclivities of Sheikh Abdullah' might usefully be employed at the UN, that this would lend colour to the 'the imputation that considerations of a strategic character were at the bottom of UK policy'.²¹⁹

This was rather Freudian for when in March 1948, it appeared that China, Belgium and Canada looked favourably upon independence for Kashmir, the FO cautioned the Canadians that their idea would be opposed because it would 'open the path for Soviet intrigue as Sheikh Abdullah has Communist contacts'.²²⁰ As Noel-Baker put it delicately, while 'we must not lend colour to the accusations that our attitude has been dictated by power politics; it would be necessary to weigh strategic consequences [in] Kashmir'.²²¹

Shone met Kearney, Canada's High-Commissioner in India and Prince de Ligne, Belgium's Ambassador to India, and urged them to view Kashmir 'in the light of recent world events and the imminent world struggle' and the consequent desirability to block 'any aggression from north'.²²² Nevertheless, by the end of March 1948, given the sustained pressure from Cripps, Bevin and Mountbatten, Attlee finally reined in Noel-Baker:

It appears to me that you give a very wide interpretation when it is a question of pressing India. Addison and Cripps share my view that all the concessions are being asked from India. The

²¹⁵ 24 February 1948, Mountbatten (Delhi) to Attlee, T. No. 459, L/WS/1/1141, IOR

²¹⁶ 4 March 1948, Carter (CRO) to Ismay, File No. 3/7/1-15; Document No. 3/7/15/1, Ismay Papers, KCL

²¹⁷ 1 March 1948, CA (48) 3RD Meeting, CAB 134/55, TNA

²¹⁸ 11 March 1948, Bevin to Attlee, PM/48/33, PREM 8/1455/3, TNA

²¹⁹ 16 March 1948, POL 601/1948, DO 142/497, TNA

²²⁰ 15 March 1948, FO to New York, FO 371/69712, TNA and 19 March 1948, FO to Ottawa, T. No. 1011, L/WS/1/1141, IOR; 11 May 1948, GS Bajpai to Pandit, Subject File Serial No. 56, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

²²¹ 17 March 1948, New York to FO, T. No. 910, L/WS/1/1141, IOR

²²² 24 March 1948, Shone to CRO, T. No. 739, L/WS/1/1141, IOR

attitude seems to be that it is India which is at fault whereas the complaint was rightly lodged against Pakistan...²²³

Attlee would eventually lose confidence in Noel-Baker's judgement on Kashmir and overall performance in the CRO,²²⁴ and substitute him with Gordon-Walker, whom Bevin also thought 'good and reliable'.²²⁵ For the moment, in April-May 1948, Bevin's worst fears were coming true. India was 'disillusioned', Pakistan was 'distracted' and the spectre of the 'canny and ambiguous' Russians hung in air.²²⁶ Nehru told Mountbatten about the 'recent attitude of Russia',²²⁷ as reflected in Novikov's and Gromyko's assurances that they would veto anti-India resolutions.²²⁸ Attlee's reprimand to Noel-Baker did little to satisfy the Indians.²²⁹ It did convince the Pakistanis though that London 'had veered violently towards India'.²³⁰ Bevin admitted to Attlee that he was

...seriously perturbed at the trend of feeling in Pakistan...that we are unwilling to seek a settlement of the Kashmir dispute fair to Muslim interests...Indications reveal a distinct danger that Pakistan may make overtures to Russia and the consequences of that would be most serious not only locally but in the whole of the Middle-East.²³¹

Pakistan threatened to quit the Commonwealth and offered to exchange ambassadors with Russia, a decision 'almost certainly derived from resentment' at UK's behaviour on Kashmir.²³² Graffety-Smith warned that neither threat should be 'under-rated'.²³³ The FO shared this 'real danger' with Washington, implored it to get involved and hastened the proceedings of the UNCIP.²³⁴

²²³ 4 April 1948, Attlee to Noel-Baker, T. No. 1392, IND/48/16, FO 800/470, TNA

²²⁴ ATLE 1/17, pp. 8 and 16, Attlee Papers and GNWR 1/6, diary, 21 April 1948, Gordon-Walker Papers; see Ronald Hyam, *Britain's Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonisation, 1918-1968*, p. 101

²²⁵ ATLE 1/17, p. 16, Attlee Papers; see Ronald Hyam, *Britain's Declining Empire*, p. 102 and Francis Williams, *A Prime Minister Remembers*, p. 167

²²⁶ 13 April 1948, Shone to CRO, T. No. 939, L/WS/1/1141, IOR; 8 May 1948, Ayyangar to Vijayaragavacharya, Subject File Serial No. 16, Gopaldaswamy Ayyangar Papers

²²⁷ 29 April 1948, Nehru-Mountbatten meeting, MB1/D78 (Folder 1), Mountbatten Papers

²²⁸ 12 April 1948, Iyengar to Ayyangar, T. No. 3358/135, MB1/D214, Mountbatten Papers

²²⁹ 25 March 1948, Nehru (Delhi) to Pandit (Moscow), Subject File Serial No. 54, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

²³⁰ 1 May 1948, Shahabuddin (Pakistan HC in India) to Mountbatten, MB1/D78 (Folder 2), Mountbatten Papers

²³¹ 13 May 1948, Bevin to Attlee, PM/48/52, FO 371/69717, TNA

²³² 16 June 1948, Graffety-Smith to CRO, T. No. 480, L/PS/12/4729, IOR

²³³ 14 May 1948, Graffety-Smith to CRO, POL 8144/48, FO 371/69717, TNA

²³⁴ 14 and 24 May 1948, FO 371/69717, TNA

The UNCIP finally got together in June. Not only did it have a difficult task, it would also run into a strong feeling among the disputants that ‘any outside body can do no good’.²³⁵ Its members were Czechoslovakia (Josef Korbel – nominated by India), Argentina (Ricardo Siri – nominated by Pakistan) and three Security Council nominees: Belgium (Egbert Graeffe), Columbia (Alfredo Lozano) and USA (Jerome Klahr Huddle).²³⁶ London influenced the composition of the UNCIP secretariat. It was led by Erik Colban (Norwegian Ambassador to the UK, 1934-47) and had the British Quaker Richard Symonds as secretary to Colban.

The FO was, however, disappointed with Huddle, the American Ambassador to Burma. It felt that the Americans were ‘back-peddalling’ in appointing a man ‘who could not lead’. It put this down to the American desire to avoid incurring the enmity of either India or Pakistan, ‘in view of the Palestine embroglio’.²³⁷ It quickly became evident that the UNCIP members had conflicting ideas. The CRO’s dilemma was that while it ‘did not wish to be conspicuous’, it was perturbed by this leading to a ‘slowness of its proceedings’.²³⁸ Ominously for London the UNCIP members ‘appeared permeated with suspicion of the British’.²³⁹

The UNCIP reached the subcontinent in July. Soon, Shone reported that the Belgian Graeffe was persisting with the idea of independence for Kashmir ‘guaranteed by India, Pakistan and the UN’.²⁴⁰ He was being supported by Siri, Lozano and Korbel while Huddle remained ‘an enigma, a negative sceptic’.²⁴¹ London now sent Grey to Geneva to meet Colban and Huddle and Rumbold to Brussels to make it clear that independence was the ‘worst possible solution’ as ‘this would play into Russian hands’.²⁴² This worked and Shone and Symon were soon reporting that deliberations of the UNCIP reflected wariness towards independence in light of the realisation that ‘Russians must at all costs be kept out of Kashmir’.²⁴³

²³⁵ 20 June 1948, Sri Prakasa (Karachi) to GS Bajpai, File No. 18 (Kashmir), Mathai Papers

²³⁶ 14 June 1948, No. 1727, New York to FO, DO 142/515, TNA

²³⁷ 4 June 1948, FO 371/69718, TNA

²³⁸ 22 June 1948, CRO’s note, DO 142/513, TNA

²³⁹ 29 June 1948, Graffety-Smith to CRO, T. No. 700, L/WS/1/1142, IOR

²⁴⁰ 13 July 1948, Shone to CRO, T. No. 2267, L/WS/1/1143, IOR

²⁴¹ 23 July 1948, Symonds to FO, L/WS/1/1143, IOR

²⁴² 29 June 1948, Report on Grey’s visit of 25-27 June, DO 142/513 and 24 July 1948, DO 133/80, TNA

²⁴³ 29 August 1948, Shone to CRO, T. No. 2979, L/WS/1/1143, 27 July 1948, No. 2465, DO 142/513 and 12 September 1948, Symon to CRO, T. No. 3183, DO 142/517, TNA

The UNCIP members were aware that if Kashmir went back to the Security Council, it was bound to become a 'plaything of power politics'.²⁴⁴ But there was not much they could do beyond stressing a ceasefire. As Korbelt laid it out in a visit to the FO: India did not agree to a plebiscite unless they themselves conducted it, Pakistan agreed neither to partition nor to a plebiscite-cum-partition, neither agreed to arbitration, no one, barring possibly the Russians, wanted independence and, after the Palestine experience, the British and the Americans did not want to mediate.²⁴⁵

In November-December 1948, as India and Pakistan moved towards ceasefire, London had other things on its mind too. Nye informed the CRO that Noel-Baker's 'very extreme' attitude on Kashmir had surprised even the 'anti-India' Argentinian Ambassador.²⁴⁶ Like Krishna Menon, it was clear to Nye that India and the UK needed to 'come to terms' with each other, as negotiations had been simultaneously going on with respect to India's membership of the Commonwealth. He reminded London that 'nothing would be more unwise than to give India the impression that we and the USG were lined up'.²⁴⁷

Menon, in his turn, sought to assure Nehru that Noel-Baker had been 'subdued' and that, in addition to Cripps, India could also count on the 'friendly' Herbert Morrison, the Deputy Prime Minister.²⁴⁸ Menon's assurances were timely, for opinion in India was hardening on joining the Commonwealth because of London's attitude on Kashmir.²⁴⁹ To Attlee and Amery alike, a 'sceptical' BN Rau, the Indian handling the Commonwealth discussions, and an 'impatient' if sincere Nehru were easy to contrast with the 'very imperially-minded' and anxious Liaquat.²⁵⁰

Indeed, the Commonwealth Declaration of 1949 did not mention 'military, security or political cooperation' and the reasons were related to India: non-alignment and Kashmir.²⁵¹

²⁴⁴ 13 September 1948, Shone to CRO, T. No. 3194, L/WS/1/1145, IOR

²⁴⁵ 2 October 1948, FO 371/69722, TNA

²⁴⁶ 31 December 1948, Nye to CRO, T. No. 4488, L/WS/1/1144, IOR

²⁴⁷ 26 November 1948, DO 142/525, TNA

²⁴⁸ Menon to Nehru, 13 August 1948, Correspondences, Mathai Papers

²⁴⁹ Nehru to Menon, 12 January 1949, Subject File Serial No. 24, Gopaldaswami Ayyangar Papers

²⁵⁰ 21 October 1948, Amery to Wavell, 2 November 1948, Wavell to Amery, AMEL 2/3/13, Leo Amery Papers, CAC and 27 December 1948, Rau to Nehru, Correspondence file with Nehru, BN Rau Papers (I Installment); also see Louis, *Ends of British Imperialism*, pp. 386-7

²⁵¹ Dennis Judd, *Empire* (London: IB Tauris, 2012), p. 341; Ronald Hyam, *Understanding the British Empire* (Cambridge: CUP, 2010), p. 212

Pakistan's desire for a defensive association 'was ignored for fear of offending India' on Kashmir: the 'key to the whole problem'.²⁵² If the Commonwealth was designed as a web of 'informal affiliations to serve imperial objectives', Kashmir would severely test it.²⁵³

Through it all, Alexander Cadogan had a ringside view of the Kashmir deliberations in New York. An influential titan of the FO, Cadogan had contempt for Nehru whom he privately termed a 'slippery eel'.²⁵⁴ On 26 January 1950, the day India proclaimed itself a Republic, Cadogan expressed his frustrations on Kashmir and Commonwealth thus: '...In default of any protest or reproach, Nehru becomes even more intransigent and, like Hitler, feels free to take the next step'.²⁵⁵ Add the third dimension, Russia, and the contrast with Jinnah, who had noted that 'Russia alone of all the great countries had not sent a congratulatory message on the birth of Pakistan' and mentioned a Muslim bloc against it to Gordon-Walker as early as February 1948, could not have been greater.²⁵⁶

Indo-Soviet relations, 1948: 'As weak as water'

Ironically, London's worries about India's actions in Kashmir and attitude vis-à-vis the USSR were far from the reality of India's relationship with Moscow in 1948. Indeed, Nehru and his Ambassador Vijayalakshmi Pandit were thoroughly disillusioned by the Kremlin at this time and the British Embassy in Moscow as well as the UK High-Commission in New Delhi had more than an inkling of this. As Andreas Hilger has shown, Stalin's 'preoccupation with ideological purity as well as his broad understanding of security prevented him from seeing possible advantages in intensified relations with the newly independent India'.²⁵⁷

In September 1947, when the British Embassy in Moscow took stock of the situation, it noted that while 'the Soviet authorities had gone out of their way to be helpful', the Indians had not been very impressed. Politically 'nothing very important' had happened yet but

²⁵² Sean Greenwood, *Britain and the Cold War, 1945-91* (London: Macmillan, 2000), pp. 82-3

²⁵³ Louis, *Ends of British Imperialism*, p. 458 and Martin Wainwright, *Inheritance of Empire: Britain, India and the Balance of Power in Asia, 1938-55* (Westport: Praeger, 1994), p. 115

²⁵⁴ Diary entries for 29-30 December 1949 and 17 January 1950, ACAD 1/20, Cadogan Papers

²⁵⁵ 26 January 1950, ACAD 1/21, Cadogan Papers

²⁵⁶ 7, 9 and 11 September 1947, 67/CF/47, NDC, Islamabad, quoted in Kux, *The United States and Pakistan* and 21 January 1948, Cadogan to FO, T. No. 139, FO 371/69706 and 22 February 1948, DO 142/507, TNA

²⁵⁷ Andreas Hilger, 'The Soviet Union and India: the Years of Late Stalinism', Introduction, *Indo-Soviet Relations Collection* edited by Andreas Hilger et al, September 2008, www.php.isn.ethz.ch, p. 1

Vijayalakshmi Pandit seemed desirous to show the Soviets that the 'Indian Embassy was not just a member of the Commonwealth bloc'. Nevertheless, Frank Roberts concluded optimistically that the:

Soviet government machine is incapable of attracting such a person as Mrs Pandit and her contacts with Russians are likely to be limited. There is no threat to Anglo-Indian relations through any exaggerated Soviet-Indian flirtations here in Moscow.²⁵⁸

After shouldering her UN duties over September-November 1947, Pandit passed through New Delhi on her way back to Moscow. She told Shone that she was not exactly looking forward to returning as 'neither the house nor the life' there had proved to her liking. She had not seen Stalin. She had found it difficult to make contacts with Russians. She was 'exasperated' with the Soviet bureaucracy and 'disillusioned' with the Soviet state.²⁵⁹ In Moscow, in January 1948, she informed the British Ambassador, Maurice Peterson, of the difficulty that the Indian Communists were posing in Nehru's equations with Stalin. With the Kashmir dispute in the UN, she herself was apprehensive of the American reaction to any growing cultural and commercial closeness between India and the USSR.²⁶⁰

In the second-half of January, Pandit sent the first of her doubtful letters to New Delhi. Noting the 'recent rather disturbing indictment against the "reactionary Congress Party leadership"', she warned Nehru not to bank on Soviet professions of friendship and understanding in the UN because while there may have been 'sympathy to India on Kashmir, [there was] no open condemnation of Pakistan' at the Kremlin.²⁶¹ The Soviet Press charged the Anglo-Americans with harbouring a desire to establish military bases in Kashmir and claimed that India and Pakistan both remained under British influence.²⁶²

In reply, Nehru acknowledged that India was placed in a difficult situation because it refused 'to line up with any group'. He asked his sister to speak frankly to the Russians that it was quite absurd for anyone to think that India was tied to England or desired a tie-up with America. Nehru wished Moscow to know that he wanted to be 'especially friendly' with

²⁵⁸ 12 September 1947, Roberts to Bevin, T. No. 690 (213/15/47), L/PS/12/4639A, IOR

²⁵⁹ 30 December 1947, Shone to CRO, L/PS/12/4639A, IOR

²⁶⁰ 6 January 1948, Peterson to Attlee, 21/1/48, No. 13, L/PS/12/4639A, IOR

²⁶¹ 19 January 1948, Pandit to Nehru, Subject File Serial No. 53, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

²⁶² 14 January, 28 February and 8 March 1948, Peterson to FO, FO 371/69706 and FO 371/69711, TNA

Russia because ‘not only...we can learn much more from her but also because she represents, in our view, in many ways the future pattern’.²⁶³ But his admiration for the USSR was also increasingly accompanied by annoyance at the Communist Party of India (CPI), which was openly dubbing his government a camp-follower of the Anglo-Americans.²⁶⁴

From February 1948, Pandit faced a ‘balancing trick’ in an unfriendly and non-cooperative Kremlin. Her exchanges were totally ‘one-sided’, but what was worse was the ‘suspicious atmosphere’ in Moscow. Remembering wistfully the warm welcome she had received as the ‘UNO heroine’, when she was ‘made to feel I was to be one of them’, she reported the Soviet dislike of the ICS staff in her Embassy, termed as ‘reactionary servants’. She felt sad that the Kremlin was ‘not convinced of our impartiality’ due to the continuing Commonwealth connection. She was bothered, above all, by a nagging sense that there was ‘very little one can do here’.²⁶⁵ She was hurt when she came to know that Stalin had met with the Polish and Romanian Trade Delegations while she was still waiting.²⁶⁶ Her personal and political disillusionment near-complete, she wrote: ‘You cannot imagine what a difficult place Moscow is for anyone but a Slav or an American’.²⁶⁷

In contrast to her difficulties, Gopaldaswami Ayyangar, leading the Indian delegation at New York and even Bajpai at New Delhi were coming to the conclusion that on Kashmir, India ‘would find sympathy with Russia and Russia alone’.²⁶⁸ While Ayyangar did so after becoming disillusioned with the Anglo-Americans at the UN, Bajpai – ‘having had enough dealings with Russia’ – was more reluctant and embarrassed about it. At the very least, Russia could become a ‘friend of convenience’.²⁶⁹ Gordon-Walker outlined the potential consequences of such an equation to caution his zealot boss Noel-Baker:

I do not think India will sell out to Russia...but if Russia saves India by a veto it would unquestionably improve Indo-Soviet relations...the danger of a reaction against us in favour of

²⁶³ 23 January 1948, Nehru to Pandit, Subject File Serial No. 54, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

²⁶⁴ On CPI as hurdle in India-USSR relations in 1948-49 see Dutt, *With Nehru in the Foreign Office*, p. 191

²⁶⁵ 11 February 1948, Pandit to Nehru, Subject File Serial No. 57, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

²⁶⁶ 12 February 1948, Pandit to Nehru, Subject File Serial No. 57, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

²⁶⁷ 26 February 1948, Pandit to Mathai, Correspondences file, Mathai Papers

²⁶⁸ 20 February 1948, Erskine Crum to Gordon-Walker, MB1/D212, Mountbatten Papers

²⁶⁹ 21 February 1948, Gordon-Walker to Noel-Baker, No. 184, MB1/D212, Mountbatten Papers

Russia should not be lightly dismissed. We must also consider whether or not India remains in the Commonwealth may be at issue...²⁷⁰

In March 1948, Pandit reported that given the 'Soviet desire to make the isolation of the foreign colony in Moscow complete', France, America and the Netherlands were reducing their Embassy staff. The Soviet Press was reporting British attempts to form a 'Muslim League' against the Soviet Union. With respect to the Indo-Soviet relations, the key question was not Kashmir but wheat. In a 'hurried, brief and sudden' interview with Molotov, Pandit was informed of the Soviet terms: 50, 000 tons of wheat in exchange for tea or shellac or hard currency.²⁷¹ Sending a description of the meeting to her brother, she wrote:

Talking with Molotov is like a fencing match. He seldom gives direct answers but always parries and puts question for question. It is a most difficult and irritating business...I always feel as weak as water when I enter the Kremlin.²⁷²

June 1948 was a watershed in early Indo-USSR relations. On 21st, a day after the Mountbattens left Delhi, Nehru sent a long letter to his sister setting the Indian case against Moscow. He had asked Bajpai to call Novikov for a frank chat and wanted Pandit to meet Molotov. She was to explain that while India remained 'anxious to develop friendly relations', it could not line up in international affairs with the Soviets; nor, however, was it 'lining up with British or Americans'. Secondly, Moscow would have to accept that New Delhi's internal policy in regard to Communists had nothing to do with its foreign relations.

Nehru was disappointed that Moscow had rebuffed India's friendly attitude. Pandit's embassy was more or less isolated. She had not met Stalin while Indian Communists had a long interview. 'What did all this signify?' Nehru was tired of the Russian line that India was tied to British policy. Certainly there was cooperation in defence and industry due to the colonial past but, in political and international matters, 'India was completely free to decide what it wanted'. Moscow treated his government with scant courtesy and if it thought that the Communists were going to capture power in India, 'it was very much mistaken and

²⁷⁰ 22 February 1948, Gordon-Walker to Noel-Baker, MB1/D212, Mountbatten Papers

²⁷¹ 30 March 1948, Pandit to Nehru, Subject File Serial No. 57, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

²⁷² 15 April 1948, Pandit to Nehru, Subject File Serial No. 57, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

exceedingly foolish'. Nehru was unable to understand why Russians were being so 'gauche' in dealing with his desire to remain 'neutral subject to developments'.²⁷³

Bajpai told Novikov that there was not even the 'remotest possibility' of India's attitude or policy being influenced by Britain. Reminding Novikov of Nehru's publicly expressed desire as Interim Prime Minister in 1946 for direct diplomatic relations with the USSR, Bajpai pointed out that Pandit's appointment was the proof of the importance Nehru attached to Moscow but her treatment showed 'an inexplicable contrast' in Kremlin's feelings. Moreover, the Indian economic policy of state ownership of basic industries was in common with Russian economic plans.²⁷⁴

Sending a report of the Bajpai-Novikov meeting to Krishna Menon, Nehru was convinced that 'time had come to clear the matter of the progressive deterioration in Indo-Soviet relations'. His sister felt 'morally defeated' there.²⁷⁵ He had a 'great fund of friendship' towards them, which was gradually disappearing because of their attitude. He was deeply annoyed that 'the whole basis of Russian policy appears to be that no essential change had taken place in India'.

As the Indian Embassy in Moscow approached its first anniversary, its British counterpart sent another appraisal to London. Starting from the top, the report noted that the Indian Ambassador was 'not sympathetic to Communism at all'. In fact, she was 'shocked at many things in the USSR' and had reduced her activities to 'cultural involvement'. Her deputy, the Oxford educated and British-trained civil servant Rajeshwar Dayal was also considered very friendly to the West.²⁷⁶

In August 1948, however, Pandit had a surprising and significant encounter in Moscow. In a meeting arranged by the Soviet Foreign Office, she was invited to meet Alexandra Kollontai, the first female ambassador of modern times. Kollontai, a Communist revolutionary, had served as the Soviet Ambassador to Norway (1923-24), Mexico (1926-27) and Sweden

²⁷³ 21 June 1948, Nehru to Pandit, 885-PM, Subject File Serial No. 54, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

²⁷⁴ 25 June 1948, Bajpai-Novikov meeting (sent to Mrs Pandit on 27 June 1948, No 450-PASG/48, Subject File Serial No. 56, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

²⁷⁵ 26 June 1948, Nehru to Menon, 903-PM, Subject File Serial No. 54, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

²⁷⁶ 6 July 1948, Moscow to FO, L/PS/12/4639B, IOR

(1930-45). With the Soviet attitude towards India being distinctly cold and almost hostile, Pandit concluded that Kollontai was ‘conveying a message’ that the Soviet government desired India’s friendship but ‘on their own terms’.²⁷⁷

In a long chat, Kollontai told Pandit that ‘as a friend’ she was disappointed to find Nehru at the head of a ‘reactionary’ government, which was suppressing the Communists. She had hoped that India and the USSR would together resist British influence. Pandit, ‘stunned’ at this assertion of loyalty to ideology over nation, in turn reiterated India’s policy of non-alignment, called Indian Communists a threat to law and order and said that ‘friendship was a matter of reciprocity’. Nehru found Kollontai’s interview ‘most surprising – a culmination of many things’.²⁷⁸ He agreed that better relations were not ‘a one-sided matter’ and again wrote to Krishna Menon at length about the ‘very short-sighted, discouraging, critical and bullying’ Soviet attitude towards which he found it ‘impossible to feel friendly’.²⁷⁹

Frank Roberts, a good friend and observer of Pandit’s early enthusiasm, now found the Indian Ambassador a ‘sadder’ woman.²⁸⁰ She left Moscow on 30 August 1948 and would not return until January 1949. Rajeshwar Dayal took charge in her absence. From October onwards, he started to report ‘a slow loosening up of the Soviet attitude’. On Kashmir, the official Soviet view was starting to appear ‘favourable’ to India insofar as Moscow ‘definitely considered Pakistan to be a British stooge’.²⁸¹ Probably the frank talks with Novikov were finally producing an effect or perhaps the Soviets wanted to go slow on India while the question of its relations with the Commonwealth was ‘on the tapis’. Whatever the reason, it seemed to Dayal that things were beginning to look ‘somewhat easier’.²⁸²

Mikhailov of the Foreign Office informed him that Nehru’s meetings with Vishinski in Paris on the sidelines of the UN session had covered ‘everything’ and impressed the Soviets.²⁸³

Pandit agreed and wrote to Kaul how ‘Vyshinsky went all out to capture the PM...there were

²⁷⁷ 5 August 1948, Pandit to KPS Menon (Delhi), Subject File Serial No. 9, Pandit Papers (II Instalment)

²⁷⁸ 19 August 1948, Nehru to Pandit, Subject File Serial No. 54, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

²⁷⁹ 19 August 1948, Nehru to Krishna Menon, Subject File Serial No. 54, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

²⁸⁰ 9 August 1948, Roberts-Pandit talk, L/PS/12/4639B, IOR

²⁸¹ 5 October 1948, Dayal to Pandit (Paris), Subject File Serial No. 3, Pandit Papers (II Instalment)

²⁸² 21 October 1948, Dayal to KPS Menon, Subject File Serial No. 3, Pandit Papers (II Instalment)

²⁸³ 9 November 1948, Pandit (Paris) to Dayal and 11 November 1948, Dayal to KPS Menon, Subject File Serial No. 3, Pandit Papers (II Instalment)

four meetings in all'.²⁸⁴ Over November-December 1948, Dayal continued to affirm 'a slight softening of the Soviet attitude'.²⁸⁵ The only fly in the ointment seemed to be India's relationship with the Commonwealth. As Mikhailov put it, anything less than a 'completely independent line' on this matter would be considered 'unnatural'.²⁸⁶

Pandit's last months in Moscow coincided with the creation of the NATO. The Soviet Press continued to attack the 'repression' of the Indian Communists 'under pressure from America'.²⁸⁷ In January 1949, Rajeshwar Dayal sent a long note on Soviet policy towards India. Noting that action against the Communists and India's Commonwealth connection were the main reasons for the Soviet characterisation of Nehru and Congress as a 'reactionary, plutocratic tool of British Imperialism', Dayal nevertheless remembered that Moscow in September 1947 had listed India, alongside Egypt and Syria, as anti-imperialist sympathisers of the USSR. Arguing that there was no support to be had from the Anglo-Americans on Kashmir, Dayal recommended a policy of 'positive neutrality' towards Moscow.²⁸⁸

And so it would be in future but for now, in April 1949, when Vijayalakshmi Pandit left Moscow for the last time, Indo-USSR relations appeared 'weakest' compared to India's relations with Britain and America. In New Delhi, Bajpai feared that India had 'blotted its copybook' with the Kremlin.²⁸⁹ As TN Kaul, who left alongside Pandit, remembered, the lesson from Moscow was that 'we had perhaps expected too much without paving the ground for our expectations'.²⁹⁰

Unknown to them, the Soviet Foreign Ministry was starting to draw its own conclusions about Kashmir, the India-Pakistan war and the 'Anglo-American' diplomacy around it. On 23 May 1949, Mikhailov prepared a report on the 'present position in Kashmir'.²⁹¹ A hitherto unused document, the report began by noting that unlike Indian Kashmir, Azad Kashmir was looked after by the British Governor of the NWFP. Observing the visit of Loy Henderson, the

²⁸⁴ 8 November 1948, Pandit to Kaul, Correspondence, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

²⁸⁵ 11 November 1948, Dayal to KPS Menon, Subject File Serial No. 3, Pandit Papers (II Instalment)

²⁸⁶ 6 December 1948, Dayal to KPS Menon, Subject File Serial No. 3, Pandit Papers (II Instalment)

²⁸⁷ 7, 17 February and 1 March 1949, Pandit to Nehru, Subject File Serial No. 57, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

²⁸⁸ 13 January 1949, Dayal to Pandit, Subject File Serial No. 11, Pandit Papers (II Instalment)

²⁸⁹ S Gopal, *Radhakrishnan* (Oxford: OUP, 1989), p. 214 and 18 November 1949, Bajpai to Jefferson Jones, 22 November 1949, Jones to Washington, No. 1001, US SDR (India: Foreign Affairs, 1945-49, reel 2), CSAS

²⁹⁰ TN Kaul, *Reminiscences: Discreet and Indiscreet* (New Delhi: Lancers, 1982), p. 152

²⁹¹ 23 May 1949, No. 268, K Mikhailov's brief report on the 'Present Position in Kashmir', Fond 82, Opus 2, No. 1199, Molotov Papers, RGASPI

American Ambassador in India, whom Mikhailov called the 'well-known master of intrigue', to Kashmir on 11 May, the report weighed the idea of an independent state of Kashmir, as desired by Sheikh Abdullah.

Going into the history of the dispute, the report argued that the division of Kashmir between India and Pakistan was an important part of the British strategy on this regional border of the USSR, situated 'a stone's throw' away from Pakistan. Secondly, the US had already 'penetrated' in Kashmir through the UN Commission and the military observers. It seemed that the US plan, the report continued, was to transfer the command in Kashmir to Admiral Chester Nimitz, the plebiscite administrator, and thus control the internal situation there.

Outwardly, the report claimed, this was a cover for achieving a sovereign Kashmir for Sheikh Abdullah but, more likely, it was an Anglo-American plot that also took care of Pakistan's 'dissatisfaction' with India on Kashmir, as well as Hyderabad. This would be done by joining Gilgit with Pakistan. Mikhailov felt that at first, London had looked at the Kashmir conflict through a 'big lens' and thought that the whole of Kashmir could be added to Pakistan. However, a division of Kashmir also guaranteed UK's interests by securing Gilgit in the north of Kashmir, where the UK could base military units. The report ended by emphasising that the UK-US interest in Kashmir had deepened after the Communist success in China and the political activities of the socialist bloc in South-east Asia.

Three months after this report, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, the new Indian Ambassador, arrived in Moscow and, in his very first meeting, told Vishinski that he 'saw no hurdle' in improving Indo-USSR relations as both countries had 'identical foundations' in their external politics. Vishinski agreed but argued that for the USSR, internal and external politics were identical thereby implying that this was not the case in India, which saw no contradiction in siding with the Communists internationally and suppressing them internally. Radhakrishnan responded to this by saying that New Delhi was engaged in creating equal economic opportunity for everyone in India, another goal it shared with the Soviet Union. Finally, Radhakrishnan made a request for a 'visit to Stalin'.²⁹² A new chapter was about to open in India's relations with Moscow.

²⁹² 7 September 1949, Radhakrishnan-Vishinski Talks, Fond 82, Opis 2, No. 1196, Molotov Papers, RGASPI

By 1949, then, the diplomatic dispute over Kashmir was well and truly caught up in an international matrix where, in the words of the old-India hand EWR Lumby, India was ‘reluctant to accept the proposition that the world must necessarily be divided up into two’.²⁹³ Russia continued to assume that India would follow British policies especially once Nehru chose to remain within the Commonwealth,²⁹⁴ and looked forward, ‘as of old, [to] cash in on British susceptibility to the “Russian Bogey”’.²⁹⁵ Britain estimated that while the ‘Reds’ had ‘initiative’ in Greece and Burma and were ‘progressing’ in Iraq and Java, it was Palestine and India which were their ‘hotbeds’.²⁹⁶

Kashmir could not be a vacuum in this ‘restive’ context.²⁹⁷ On the one hand, a TASS report of 6 July 1949 was openly warning about Anglo-American aggression against the USSR through Gilgit and contrasting the suppression of Communists in Pakistan with the anti-feudal Abdullah and the petty-bourgeoisie Nehru.²⁹⁸ On the other hand, reflecting upon not just India’s but also Pakistan’s relations with Moscow, Horace Rumbold at the CRO painted a dismal picture of the impotent British, interested Russians and indifferent Americans on Kashmir in a memorandum of 18 July 1949.²⁹⁹ With respect to the latter, there was a growing feeling in the subcontinent that ‘the Anglo-American bloc is using the Commonwealth as an auxiliary to the main purpose of its foreign policy, the build-up against Russia, and that wherever the interests of a Commonwealth state clash with this main purpose the former must yield place to the latter’.³⁰⁰

In 1949, one regional and one internal concern added to London’s anxieties. First, patronised by Kabul and sympathised by New Delhi, the Faqir of Ipi established a provisional government in Pakhtoonistan thereby issuing a challenge to Karachi.³⁰¹ Second, concerns about the spread of Communism in Kashmir emerged. The CRO noted Sheikh Abdullah’s *Naya [new] Kashmir* manifesto for a socialist Kashmir. Graffety-Smith had been long

²⁹³ MSS Eur D 1033/13, EW Lumby (India Office, 1934-48) Papers, IOR

²⁹⁴ Brown, *Nehru*, p. 245; see the chapter ‘Creating an International Identity’, pp. 244-271

²⁹⁵ MSS Eur F 154/50, Joseph Skrine Papers, IOR

²⁹⁶ 1 October 1948, Pyman to Dempsey, File No. 7/3/1-13, Document No. 7/3/13, Pyman Papers, KCL

²⁹⁷ Randolph Holmes (spent 33 years in the NWFP), *Khyber Frontiers in Turmoil*, MSS Eur F 265/18, IOR

²⁹⁸ 6 July 1949, TASS report on India, Fond 82, Opis 2, No. 1208, Molotov Papers, RGASPI

²⁹⁹ File 1/1, GB165-0123, Graffety-Smith Papers

³⁰⁰ AH Reed (Rawalpindi) to SJ Oliver (Karachi), S/24, 12 July 1949, GB165-0123, Graffety-Smith Papers

³⁰¹ 4 January 1951, SK Banerji to Rajaji, Subject File S. No. 20, Rajagopalachari Papers (VI-X Instalments)

warning about the Communist backing of Abdullah.³⁰² As early as June 1948, the CRO had been informed about the odd assortment of Abdullah's associates and by December, despite occasional reports about 'opportunism' as against Communism,³⁰³ it had no doubt that Abdullah was 'sailing very close to the wind...more deeply involved with the Communists than is known'.³⁰⁴ Abdullah's 'constant touch' with Russians was repeatedly invoked,³⁰⁵ to explain the 'steadily gaining' communist influence in Kashmir.³⁰⁶ By February 1949, this worry had crossed the Atlantic. London stressed upon Washington that 'Communist danger in Kashmir cannot be dismissed'³⁰⁷ and the latter was urged to take seriously the 'delicate' situation produced by the 'Communist tones and lines' of Abdullah's administration.³⁰⁸

Two dossiers were prepared on Abdullah and his associates on the basis of British Residents' reports from 1942 to 1947 and a *TRUD* article of 29 September 1949. These added to a memorandum Cawthorn had prepared in January in which he had claimed the presence of 2300 Communists in Kashmir. The CRO's information gleaned from New Delhi was that there were at least '100, 000 [Communists] in India...1, 500 in prisons'.³⁰⁹ Over the months of June-July, the fear of a red mist over Kashmir deepened when Liaquat accepted the Russian invitation to visit Moscow.³¹⁰ This left senior British civil and military officials serving in Pakistan, the CRO and even Attlee worried as they could not fail to notice the growing bitterness in Pakistan towards Britain and the Commonwealth connection.³¹¹

Conclusion

The way ahead for London was obvious: union in the Western and Eastern Worlds with America as the senior partner,³¹² and the Commonwealth as a vital cog inside which, Pakistan

³⁰² 19 November 1948, No. 287, Graffety-Smith to Noel-Baker, DO 142/370, TNA

³⁰³ June 1948, 48/P/75, DO 142/370; Sadiq-leftist, Beg-rightist and Bakshi-opportunistic. In December, BN Mullick assured the CRO that Abdullah was essentially an "opportunist".

³⁰⁴ 9 December and 12 December 1948, CRO notes, DO 142/491, TNA

³⁰⁵ 21 December 1948, No. 37, CRO to Karachi, DO 142/491, TNA

³⁰⁶ 7 January 1949, CRO note, DO 142/491, TNA

³⁰⁷ 9 February 1949, No. 181, Graffety-Smith to CRO, DO 142/491, TNA

³⁰⁸ 14 February 1949, 64/48, CRO note, DO 142/491, TNA

³⁰⁹ See DO 133/138 and DO 133/185; Iyengar to William Strang, January 1949, STRN 2/5, Strang Papers, CAC

³¹⁰ 5 March 1949, PIN/8/49 and 14 June 1949, PIN/20/49, Reed to Oliver, DO 142/528, TNA

³¹¹ 28 June, 5 and 12 July 1949, PIN/22/49 and S/24, Reed to Oliver, DO 142/528; Francis Mudie's resignation from the governorship in Punjab was another factor, Noel-Baker to Attlee, 12 July 1949, 76/49, DO 142/536

³¹² 'The Responsibility of Middle-East Land Forces', File No. 7/2/4, Pyman Papers, KCL

would look towards North-west Asia and India to the South-east.³¹³ The problem was not only the ‘vain, idealist’ Nehru with his ‘impractical’ foreign policy and his ‘obsession’ with Kashmir.³¹⁴ Leopold Amery summed the British misgivings when he wrote to a friend that ‘only time can show whether Nehru will prove another Botha and find a Smuts to follow him or whether he will be a Cosgrave to be followed by a De Valera’.³¹⁵

The problem was also that there was ‘no prospect of favourable response’ from Pakistan towards any collaboration in the Middle-East as long as Kashmir remained unsettled.³¹⁶ Liaquat had a five-fold complaint against London: retention of a republic India within the Commonwealth on exactly the same footing as the still loyal-to-Crown Pakistan, denial of arms to Pakistan, recall of British officers from India and Pakistan, the aborted defence deal and the deadlock over Kashmir.³¹⁷ Graffety-Smith forwarded this adding his colourful metaphor: Pakistan ‘has been offered the mystic marriage of St Catherine when she had been hoping for the more solid satisfactions of a double bed’.³¹⁸

With Nehru soon to visit Washington in October 1949, the British, according to Nye, needed to ‘help overcome Indian suspicions of America and persuade the US to produce an Asian equivalent of the Marshall Plan’. After all, the US ‘would not want to be disappointed with Nehru like it got with Chiang Kai-Shek’.³¹⁹ Nye, still cordial with Nehru and optimistic about the ‘development of British influence in India’,³²⁰ worried that Nehru might lecture the Americans ‘about there being little to choose between the two power blocs’.³²¹ He urged Mountbatten to encourage Nehru to settle Kashmir in the light of international opprobrium.³²²

The preponderant British presence in India and Pakistan in 1947-49 thus affected the war and diplomacy around Kashmir. The outcome was a stalemate in which India’s democratic

³¹³ William Strang’s Visit to Karachi, 14-16 January and New Delhi, 16-20 January 1949, STRN 2/5, William Strang Papers, CAC

³¹⁴ 28 December 1948, Nye to Noel-Baker; 15 March 1949, Noel-Baker to Nye and 25 April 1949, Nye to Noel-Baker, DO 121/71, TNA

³¹⁵ 4 May 1949, Amery to Clive Baillieu, AMEL 1/7/75, Leo Amery Papers, CAC

³¹⁶ 25 July 1949, Graffety-Smith’s note, File 1/1, GB165-0123, Graffety-Smith Papers

³¹⁷ 24 June 1949, Graffety-Smith to Philip Noel-Baker, 348 (S9), File 1/1, GB165-0123, Graffety-Smith Papers

³¹⁸ 3 September 1949, Graffety-Smith to Viscount Addison, 497 (S9), GB165-0123, Graffety-Smith Papers

³¹⁹ 21 June 1949, Nye to Liesching, DO 121/71, TNA

³²⁰ Nye to Strang, January 1949, STRN 2/5, William Strang Papers, CAC

³²¹ 29 June 1949, Nye to Mountbatten, MB1/F7, Folder 2, Mountbatten Papers

³²² HVR Iyengar to William Strang, January 1949, STRN 2/5, William Strang Papers, CAC and 10 July and 2 September 1949, Mountbatten to Nehru, MB1/F7, Folder 1, Mountbatten Papers

desires and Pakistan's security aims were stymied on the altar of greater concerns – Attlee's and the CRO's for the Commonwealth; Bevin's and the FO's for the Middle-East. During this period, the dispute was framed within Commonwealth versus Communism terms, both internally and externally. The British did reasonably well considering the Indian intransigence and Pakistani insecurities.

London knew that supporting India could destroy Pakistan, believed that a Muslim Pakistan would stand up against the Communist Russia more than a non-aligned India and admitted that it could not afford to totally alienate India given the economic investments and military ties. Each of these concerns came together on the two questions of whether or not to issue 'stand down' orders to British officers serving in India and Pakistan armies and what ought to be the diplomatic drift at the UN.

This stirred the Soviet Union, which was an informed and involved actor on Kashmir from much before than is credited for. The opening of Soviet archives and new research based on them help undermine this persistent myth about Soviet aloofness. Next, the Americans would come in and wrestle with Kashmir while seeking to achieve their pacts with Pakistan and expand economic relations with India. The Kashmir dispute had embarked upon a spell of internationalisation that would only culminate fifteen years later in a second war.

America, India and Kashmir, 1945-49: ‘If ignorance about India in this country is deep, ignorance about the States is abysmal’.¹

Introduction

It has become conventional for writings on Indo-US relations during the 1940s to trace a curve of hope and disappointment, given a rich history of the US’s engagement with India in the inter-war years.² Common staples in this discourse are: JJ Singh and the India League of America,³ ‘anti-imperialist’ Roosevelt’s pressure on Churchill about India in 1941 and his sending of Louis Johnson to India during the Cripps Mission in 1942,⁴ ‘Friends of India’ in America led by Eleanor Roosevelt, Norman Cousins, Louis Fischer and Marquis Childs,⁵ and Vijayalakshmi Pandit’s public forays to great acclaim there in 1944-45.⁶ After that, however, comes Truman who had a ‘limited interest’ in India,⁷ and after 1947, there come an assortment of differences around Colonialism, Commerce and the Cold War.⁸

Notable about this narrative of rise and fall of relations is its teleological nature. This chapter attempts an alternative examination of the ambiguous American interest in India in a sub-period within this decade and therein situates the early American attitude to Kashmir. It argues that the two years from 1945 to 1947, the years of the emergence of Decolonisation and the Cold War, provide a more relevant historical precedent for what comes thereafter and examines their influence on America’s attitude first towards India and then towards Kashmir.

Secondly, while the succeeding two year period 1947-49 in the Indo-US relations has been looked at in great detail with respect to the probability of a military alliance, assumption of

¹ 7 June 1944, Puckle to Patrick (Box II, File 15), Puckle Papers

² See Holden Furber, ‘Historical and Cultural Aspects of Indo-American Relations’, *Journal of the University of Bombay* (1965), Volume 34 Issue 67/68, pp. 95-116 and Eric Rubin, ‘America, Britain, and Swaraj: Anglo-American Relations and Indian Independence, 1939–1945’, *India Review*, Volume 10, Issue 1 (2011) pp. 40–80

³ See Robert Shaffer, ‘JJ Singh and the India League of America, 1945-1959: Pressing at the Margins of the Cold War Consensus’, *Journal of American Ethnic History* Volume 31, No. 2 (Winter 2012), pp. 68-103

⁴ See A Weigold, *Churchill, Roosevelt and India: Propaganda During World War II* (London: Routledge, 2008)

⁵ See K Clymer, *Quest for Freedom: The United States and India’s Independence* (New York: CUP, 1995)

⁶ See Manu Bhagavan, *The Peacemakers*

⁷ Rudra Chaudhuri, *Forged in Crisis: India and United States Since 1947* (London: Hurst, 2014), pp. 14-17

⁸ See McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery*, Kux, *Estranged Democracies*, Brands, *The Specter of Neutralism* (New York: CUP, 1989) and Rotter, *Comrades at Odds*; also Guha, *India After Gandhi*, pp. 155-61

Cold War rhetoric, evolution of Nehruvian non-alignment, economic aid and possible treaty arrangements and Nehru's October 1949 visit to America,⁹ Kashmir's place in this mapping has been over-shadowed. This is true of both the orthodox literature that established the dichotomy between post-imperial ideals and material interests in Indo-US relations and new works that argue for a duality of interests and ideas.¹⁰ The second half of this chapter, therefore, is devoted to providing the 'pure particular' of the early American position on Kashmir within this matrix.¹¹

'India is not an American "interest" in the same sense as China or the Philippines...'¹²

The starting point is that Washington's criticism of the British in India over the period 1941-44 was arguably a result and not a cause of a traditional anti-British attitude.¹³ Interest in Indian affairs in America was derived from India's 'usefulness in shortening the war against Japan' and the desire of an 'orderly transition' in Asia.¹⁴ It had none of the 'sentimental affection and admiration' that Americans had, for instance, for China.¹⁵ If 1943 saw concern in American official and public circles about the combined effect of the famine in Bengal and the Japanese propaganda,¹⁶ the next year 1944 saw American forces stationed in India and a shift of focus to their battles in Burma.¹⁷ The American standpoint was 'cold, vigilant and businesslike towards the subcontinent's strategic and logistical utility'.¹⁸

Interest in India peaked in the summer of 1944 when Japan seemed likely to get a firm foothold in Assam, but as their threat ebbed so did the American interest.¹⁹ Vice-President Henry Wallace made it plain in July that if it was not America's mission to underwrite continuing empires, then it was also not its mission to write declarations of independence for

⁹ Chaudhuri, *Forged in Crisis*, pp. 25-47; also see Dennis Merrill, *Bread and Ballot* (UNC Press, 1990)

¹⁰ Chaudhuri, *Forged in Crisis*, pp. 27-8

¹¹ Paul Schroeder, 'History and International Relations Theory: Not Use or Abuse, But Fit or Misfit', *International Security*, 22, 1 (Summer 1997), p. 65

¹² December 1945, Washington to London, L/PS/12/4627, IOR

¹³ 3 February 1943, F 674/186/61, in Halifax's words, 'envy, suspicion and hostility', to Eden, L/PS/12/4628, IOR; 11 May, 19 June and 22 July 1944, Puckle to Patrick (Box II, File 15); 31 May 1946, Puckle to Patrick (Box II, File 21), Puckle Papers

¹⁴ 22 February, 8 March, 14 April and 4 October 1944, Puckle to Patrick (Box II, File 15); 3 April 1944, Puckle to Joyce (Box II, File 16), Puckle Papers

¹⁵ 11 June 1942, Clarke to Eden, F 4320/4320/61, L/PS/12/4628, IOR

¹⁶ Reports from Washington to London, August to November 1943, L/PS/12/4627, IOR

¹⁷ Reports from Washington to London, January to March 1944, L/PS/12/4627, IOR

¹⁸ Connell, *Auchinleck*, p. 727

¹⁹ Reports from Washington to London, April to June 1944, L/PS/12/4627, IOR

the colonies.²⁰ William Phillips, Roosevelt's Special Ambassador to India, reminded the President that it was 'in view of the military position...that India is our business'.²¹ As that improved, so did the American opinion towards Britain's role in the subcontinent.²² By mid-1945, European re-construction, China-Japan and Palestine, not to mention Russia, were edging India and its independence out of the American political and public space,²³ and the British Embassy in Washington could confidently report that

India is not an American "interest" in the same sense as China or the Philippines. It is a theme for moral reprobation of Colonial Powers and Empires. India must choose not only an internal polity but an external policy. The days of secure isolated independence are over.²⁴

The key external themes of Communism and Islam, which later became prominent in London and Washington with respect to the international dimensions of Kashmir came together for the first time in June 1945 in the diary of the British Advisor on Indian Affairs in America. Noting that Britain was 'the greatest Muslim power in the world', Frederick Puckle asked Foreign Secretary Olaf Caroe in New Delhi to look out for any signs of Russian interest in India. Both these were topics of some tales he had been hearing in Washington, where a considerable debate was beginning about India's strategic importance to the US.²⁵

In November, Secretary of State James Byrnes asked Ambassador Halifax whether Britain could keep two bases in India, outside Karachi and Calcutta.²⁶ In January 1946, Truman sent Averell Harriman to talk to Wavell about the possibilities of defence agreements.²⁷

Deteriorating relations with Moscow and American entanglement in China had brought this greater realisation of the difficulties of Decolonisation under the shadow of Communism.

Washington was now inclined to acknowledge that 'while the Western Powers have to get out, they cannot simply march down to their ships careless of what they may leave behind'.²⁸

²⁰ 10 July 1944, Puckle to Patrick (Box II, File 15), Puckle Papers

²¹ William Phillips to FDR, Report over 'July-September 1944', L/PS/12/4629, IOR

²² 27 November 1944, Patrick to Puckle (Box II, File 15), Puckle Papers

²³ 27 August, 14 September and 19 November 1945, Puckle to Joyce (Box II, File 16), Puckle Papers

²⁴ December 1945, Washington to London, L/PS/12/4627, IOR

²⁵ 1 June 1945, Diary entry (Box I, File II) and 1 June 1945, Puckle to Caroe (Box II, File 17), Puckle Papers

²⁶ 9 November 1945, No. 7516, Halifax to Bevin, FO 800/470; these requests continued till March 1946 – 27 February 1946, No. 1264, Washington to FO and 2 March 1946, Ind/46/7, FO to CRO, FO 800/470, TNA

²⁷ 11 January 1946, Diary entry (Box I, File III), Puckle Papers; 24-25 January 1946, L/PS/12/1128, IOR

²⁸ 16 January and 27 February 1946, Puckle to Joyce, (Box II, File 16), Puckle Papers; Anita Inder Singh, *The Limits of British Influence*, p. 54; pp. 52-62

Simultaneously, America registered and expanded its independent presence in India. By September 1946, decks had been cleared for an exchange of Ambassadors and there were twice as many American correspondents in New Delhi as British. The fact was not lost on Wavell who put it down to America's 'shrewd idea of the importance of India as a market'.²⁹ Overcoming its misgivings, London accepted this American attention 'in view of the Russophile tendencies' of Nehru.³⁰ Bevin was nevertheless particular that 'Britain, rather than the United States, supplied [India] with capital goods'.³¹ A second impetus was the common desire to avoid another China in India.³²

In November 1946, Truman sent an Air Mission to India and the Middle-East. It found Nehru 'cooperative, cordial and friendly' towards a commercial air agreement but no more. More significantly, in a telling episode symbolising American ignorance about Indian politics, Truman's representative mistook the Congressman Ali Zaheer (Minister of Communications) for a 'Hindu' who was replaced by the 'Muslim' Leaguer Abdur Rab Nishtar. For his troubles, George Brownell was subjected to a vehement talk on the fate of Muslims in India and Palestine by Nishtar and Liaquat.³³ While Brownell was in India, Ispahani and Begum Shah Nawaz (1896-1979), the Muslim League's reformer-politician, were in America presenting the case for Pakistan to Dean Acheson, then the Under-Secretary of State.³⁴

By December 1946, as Nehru's and his UN delegation's 'independence of thought and action' started becoming 'disagreeable' to Washington, it urged London to talk to him.³⁵ Truman may have disliked Bevin personally, but he recognised that 'Bevin was sound on Russia'.³⁶ For the British, the irony was bitter-sweet, especially to Wavell. In less than five years, Washington had come from criticism to cooperation on India; from urging London to give up, to urging it to hold on and not leave India to anarchy or worse, to Russia.³⁷

²⁹ 17 September 1946, Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, Item No. 329, Volume VIII, *TOP*

³⁰ 9 September 1946, No. 2329, London to Washington, RG 59 (CDF, 1945-49) Box 2962 (NARA-II, College Park, Maryland); 20 September 1946, Pethick-Lawrence to Wavell, Item No. 346, Volume VIII, *TOP*

³¹ BR Tomlinson, *The Political Economy of the Raj 1914-1947* (London: Macmillan, 1979), p. 166

³² 27 November 1946, Bevin to Attlee, Ind/46/28 [Byrnes had written to Bevin earlier], FO 800/470, TNA

³³ 2 December 1946, Report of George Brownell, White House Confidential Files, (Box 38, Folder 2 of 5), Harry Truman Papers, Truman Presidential Library, Independence

³⁴ 14 November 1946 (Box 12, Folder Near-East, African and South-Asia Affairs, 1945-48), Loy Henderson Papers, Library of Congress (LoC), Washington DC

³⁵ 4 December 1946, No. 2248, Cadogan to FO, FO 800/470, TNA; Singh, *The Limits of British Influence*, p. 55

³⁶ 29 October 1958, Knox Helm to Monroe, GB 165-0207, Elizabeth Monroe Papers

³⁷ 27 March 1944, Box I, File 7, Puckle Papers and 24 December 1946, Moon (ed.) *Wavell*, p. 399

In January 1947, the State Department asked its Consul in India, George Merrell, to share its concerns about Russia with Nehru and Jinnah.³⁸ As the Attlee Government announced in February its definite intention to leave India, some Americans started to ‘...add up Egypt, Burma, Palestine and India and arrive at a formidable total of responsibilities’, which now would have to be borne by somebody else.³⁹ Collapse in China added to this realisation and ‘really altered American thinking’ towards West and East Asia.⁴⁰

It was in this fast-changing international scenario that Nehru chose the lawyer-Congressman Asaf Ali to become India’s first Ambassador in Washington. Ali was a strange choice. Aruna, his communist wife was bound to be, at the very least, a ‘bit of a nuisance’ in America.⁴¹ Moreover, as a Muslim, Ali’s appointment was seen as ‘another taunt to the Muslim League’.⁴² Once again, the two themes of Communism and Islam were converging at an important moment in India’s relations with the West. In his first meeting with George Marshall on 26 February 1947, Ali, whom Nehru had appointed over the objections of the Muslim League, Wavell and Patel,⁴³ had little to contribute as Marshall discussed China and emphasised unity and democracy in Asia against Communism.⁴⁴ It was Ali’s job to convince those who mattered in America that partition did not detract from the ‘solid core’ that remained India.⁴⁵ Five months later, when Ispahani arrived as Pakistan’s first Ambassador, two seasoned observers accurately predicted that Ali would not last long ‘in competition with the attractive, fluent and keen Ispahani’.⁴⁶

Ali’s counterpart was equally a misfit though for different reasons. Henry Grady left San Francisco in May 1947 as America’s first Ambassador to an India, which no longer existed by the time he reached New Delhi in June.⁴⁷ The 3rd June Partition Plan was well in motion when he arrived on the scene and one of the first things he had to do was to ask the State

³⁸ 3 January 1947, India Office to Puckle, Box I, File IV, Puckle Papers; 6 January 1947, Memorandum from American Consulate, Karachi to Jinnah, F.142/1 (No. 360), Second Series, Volume XIV, *Jinnah Papers*

³⁹ 24 February 1947, Box I, File IV and 28 February 1947, Puckle to Patrick, Box II, File 15, Puckle Papers

⁴⁰ 20 October 1959, General Sir John Crocker to Monroe, GB 165-0207, Elizabeth Monroe Papers

⁴¹ 22 November 1946, Patrick to Puckle, Box II, File 17, Puckle Papers

⁴² 7 December 1946, No. 7008, Washington to FO, FO 800/470, TNA

⁴³ 21 November 1946, Nehru to Wavell, Item No. 67, Volume IX, *TOP*; 24 February 1947, ‘Asaf Ali is a little cock-sparrow who would like to be a peacock’ – Wavell to the King, Item No. 460, Volume IX, *TOP*

⁴⁴ 26 February 1947, (701.4511/2-2647) RG 59 (CDF, 1945-49) Box 2962, NARA-II

⁴⁵ 12 June 1947, Asaf Ali to Rajagopalachari, Subject File 40, Rajagopalachari Papers (V Instalment), NMML

⁴⁶ 23 September 1947, Graffety-Smith’s note, L/PS/12/4724, IOR and 3 December 1947, Puckle to Joyce, Box II, File 16, Puckle Papers

⁴⁷ ‘Adventures in Diplomacy’, Subject File Box 1 (Folder 2 of 2), p. 167, Henry Grady Papers, Independence

Department to arrange for the appointment of an Ambassador to Pakistan. With a Catholic background and a lifetime in trade and commerce, Grady understood the Cold War as a moral and economic war, which he was determined to fight in the three countries he served as Ambassador – India, Greece and Iran.

It was an axiom with Grady that ‘an American Ambassador always has a Russian problem in his hands’.⁴⁸ Moreover, he was not a stranger to India. He had been part of the American technical mission sent to India in April 1942 to investigate the possibilities of producing war equipment and, therefore, approached India primarily in terms of its ‘great natural resources’.⁴⁹ Upon return, he had prepared a report envisaging an integrated programme of industrial development directed primarily towards the needs of the Indian Army, which thus equipped could be used elsewhere as well. But his plan had died following the decline of the Japanese threat. Grady, nonetheless, came to India imbued by that old spirit ‘to stimulate the production of a friendly country by a powerful ally’.⁵⁰

However, this overt stress on the economic side of things combined with a suspicion of the British and a lack of political currency with the State Department, especially Acheson,⁵¹ produced misgivings in India about Grady. On the very day of his appointment, Asaf Ali had complained to Under-Secretary Lovett that Grady treated India as no more than ‘a source of material supply’.⁵² Krishna Menon mocked Grady by telling Mountbatten that Grady wants to help India towards independence but does not say ‘independence from whom’.⁵³

Mountbatten himself believed that ‘Grady had been sent here for one purpose only...to sell American industrialisation’.⁵⁴ London had to reassure him that Grady was ‘entirely reliable, well-disposed to us and business-like’.⁵⁵ Nehru considered him a good man but ‘rather 19th century in his economics’.⁵⁶ Unlike Jinnah, he did not attend the 4th July party given for

⁴⁸ ‘Adventures in Diplomacy’, Subject File Box 1 (Folder 1 of 2), pp. iv-v, 53, Grady Papers

⁴⁹ ‘Adventures in Diplomacy’, Subject File Box 1 (Folder 2 of 2), pp. 117-20, Grady Papers

⁵⁰ ‘Adventures in Diplomacy’, Subject File Box 1 (Folder 2 of 2), pp. 122-23, Grady Papers

⁵¹ John McNay, *Acheson and Empire: The British Accent in American Foreign Policy* (Columbia: UMP, 2001), pp. 107-09 and ‘Adventures in Diplomacy’, Subject File Box 1 (Folder 1 of 2), p. 61, Grady Papers

⁵² 4 April 1947, Memo on conversation (701.4511/4-47) RG 59 (CDF, 1945-49) Box 2962, NARA-II

⁵³ 10 June 1947, Menon to Mountbatten, MB1/E104, Mountbatten Papers

⁵⁴ Mountbatten to Shone, quoted in Ziegler, *Mountbatten*, p. 467

⁵⁵ 3 April 1947, Pethick-Lawrence to Mountbatten, MB1/D40, Mountbatten Papers

⁵⁶ 30 January 1948, Nehru to Gordon-Walker, DO 142/506, TNA

Grady by Mountbatten.⁵⁷ Grady would return the compliment by calling Nehru ‘uninformed in world affairs’ during the early days of Kashmir debates at the UN.⁵⁸

Grady’s arrival also coincided with the first signs of Washington’s unease about the position of the princely states in India.⁵⁹ Initially, they were concerned about the tribal territory along the Afghan border.⁶⁰ Soon, they noticed Hyderabad, Kashmir and their desire for independence and informed London that they had ‘no intention of according any Indian state, especially Hyderabad or Kashmir, diplomatic recognition’.⁶¹ The State Department added that they might modify their support if London ‘contemplated maintaining direct relations with the Princely States after the transfer of power’.⁶²

The State Department was also not wasting time on another question. One month before the transfer of power, Loy Henderson, the influential Head of the Near-Eastern Affairs Bureau, prepared a memo on America’s recognition of Pakistan. The memo stressed Pakistan’s status as the largest Muslim country in the world and its location as ‘one of the most strategic’.⁶³ It assumed importance when Grady wrote to Truman that the ‘growing sense of nationalism in India’ was taking ‘the form of criticising the Western Powers’,⁶⁴ and gained significance when Kashmir came to a boil. In September 1947, wondering about India’s new international position and worried about Pakistan’s vulnerability in the light of its territorial proximity to Afghanistan and Russia,⁶⁵ Henderson shared with the British Embassy his expectations from Pakistan’s ‘value’ and contrasted it with his scepticism about Nehru’s ‘irrational fear of dollar imperialism’.⁶⁶ As the situation in Kashmir deteriorated, Asaf Ali was told that if it was ‘not checked, chaos might follow...a vacuum would be created into which Russia would almost automatically be drawn in’.⁶⁷

⁵⁷ 28 June 1947, Mountbatten to Rajaji, No. 448-G/43, Subject File Serial No. 45, CR Papers (V Instalment)

⁵⁸ 9 February 1948, No. 308, Shone to CRO, DO 142/506, TNA

⁵⁹ 21 May 1947, Diary entry, Box I, File IV, Puckle Papers

⁶⁰ 29 July 1947, Diary entry, Box I, File IV, Puckle Papers

⁶¹ 25 July 1947, Listowel to Mountbatten, Item No. 231, 8 August 1947, Item No. 380, Volume XII, *TOP*

⁶² 25 April 1947, Listowel to Mountbatten, Item No. 220, Volume X, *TOP*

⁶³ 17 July 1947, Marshall to Truman, Official File (Box 298 Folder OF 48-T Pakistan (1 of 2)), Truman Papers; (Box 12, Folder Near-East, African and South-Asia Affairs, 1945-48), Henderson Papers

⁶⁴ 19 July 1947, Grady to Truman, Secretary’s Files (Box 158, Folder India: General), Truman Papers

⁶⁵ 5 August 1947, Puckle to Joyce, Box II, File 16, Puckle Papers

⁶⁶ 12 September 1947, Patrick to FO (containing minutes of conversation with Loy Henderson on 11 September), F 12589, FO 371/63568, TNA; 5 September 1947, Puckle to Patrick, Box II, File No 21, Puckle Papers and ‘Adventures in Diplomacy’, Subject File Box 1 (Folder 2 of 2), p. 182, Grady Papers

⁶⁷ 26 September 1947, GG’s personal report no. 3, MB1/D86, Mountbatten Papers

When, against this backdrop, crisis in Kashmir broke in late-October 1947, the State Department's first much-quoted reactions were that they would much prefer that Kashmir be settled by direct negotiations between India and Pakistan or by the UK and the Commonwealth. But their accompanying remarks on the international dimensions of the dispute, which were not dimmed even in this first paper prepared by Henderson, have gone comparatively unnoticed: '...but if a third power intervention occurs then the US position must be further studied'.⁶⁸ There were only two candidates for such an intervention: the Afghans and the Russians. Grady and Charles Lewis Jr., the Charge d Affairs in Karachi, noticing India's 'hand to mouth' policy towards Pakistan on Kashmir,⁶⁹ framed the Kashmir developments from the first in terms of the drain on the subcontinent's defence against the Soviet Union.⁷⁰

'...The Indian appeal to UNO is only too likely to involve Indian affairs in the whirlpool of current Great Power Rivalries...'⁷¹

Thus commented *The Economist* on 3 January 1948 and yet it has been commonplace for historians to describe America's early understanding of the Kashmir conflict as an issue unconnected with this gathering 'whirlpool of great power rivalries'.⁷² It has been argued that the Kashmir dispute remained outside the scope of the-then prevailing international climate 'until the beginning of 1952'.⁷³ Recent literature has further shifted the first milestone of international dimensions to America's 1954 security alliance with Pakistan.⁷⁴ This assertion has, ironically, gone hand-in-hand with an acknowledgement that 'growing US-India confrontation over Kashmir took place against a background of rising foreign policy differences between the two countries on a broad range of international issues'.⁷⁵

⁶⁸ 12 November 1947, Henderson's (NEA) position paper (Box 20, Folder GA 2nd session, India-Pakistan Dispute over Kashmir) (Entry 3039E), UN Delegation Position Papers, 1945-64, RG 59, NARA-II

⁶⁹ 21 November 1947, Grady to Marshall, (No KR-449), First Series, Volume IX, *Jinnah Papers*

⁷⁰ 27 October 1947, Lewis to Marshall, (No KR-407), 31 October 1947, Donovan to Marshall, (No KR-414) and 14 November 1947, Grady to Marshall, (No KR-437), First Series, Volume IX, *Jinnah Papers*

⁷¹ Box 14, Folder 1 (1947-49 India-Pakistan Dispute over Kashmir), Office of UN Political and Security Affairs, 1945-57 Subject Files (Lot 58D742 and 59D237), RG 59, NARA-II

⁷² Kux, *Estranged Democracies*, p. 67 and Schaffer, *The Limits of Influence*, p. 13

⁷³ Kux, *The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000*, p. 40

⁷⁴ Schaffer, *The Limits of Influence*, p. 4

⁷⁵ Schaffer, *The Limits of Influence*, p. 25

Even those works, which highlight the presence of an ‘east-west lens’ in the American consciousness, in the wake of the hasty British withdrawal from a partitioned India with all its implications, begin from the Korean War.⁷⁶ They argue that the State Department, if not the Pentagon, continued with an ‘integrated approach to South Asian affairs’ till then.⁷⁷ It was only after Mao triumphed that Kashmir was contextualised in ‘an over-all situation of near-chaos’, which would benefit the Soviet Union.⁷⁸ In fact, as shown on the question of American aid to India, on Kashmir too, US policy ‘neatly coincided with shifting tides in the history of the Soviet-American confrontation’.⁷⁹

The following section shifts the focus from these attempts to argue for an integrated American approach to India and Pakistan, which anyway the conflict in Kashmir put paid to. Instead it shows how soon, how much and how comprehensively Kashmir impinged upon the various sections of the American government through an international prism. While America may have liked India-Pakistan to fight Britain and not each other, it was never unaware of the wider implications of Kashmir.⁸⁰ As early as December 1947, the State Department contextualised the conflict within the Soviets’ ‘special interest because of Kashmir’s proximity to their southern boundary’, as well as the Chinese ‘historic interest in the area’.⁸¹

At the very first US-UK meeting on Kashmir when the dispute reached the UN in January 1948, when Noel-Baker wondered whether Russia ‘would be quiescent in Kashmir’, Robert Lovett replied that ‘Russia...could adopt an obstructionist role in order to keep the pot boiling’, especially as ‘Mrs Pandit had worked rather closely with the Russians in previous UN meetings’.⁸² Moreover, at this time, Afghanistan was also considered another thin edge of the Soviet wedge.⁸³

⁷⁶ See McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery* and, ‘Decolonization and Cold War in Asia’, pp. 304-22, Paterson and McMahon (eds.) *The Origins of the Cold War* (Lexington: DC Heath and Company, 1991)

⁷⁷ 16 September 1948, CIA Report SR-21; see McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery*, p. 12

⁷⁸ 19 April and 23 May 1949, SANACC 360/14; 19 May 1948, Hare to Henderson, SANACC folder, NEA Lot 484 and 23 December 1949, NSC 48/1; see McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery*, pp. 13-17

⁷⁹ Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, p. 3 and ‘Indo-American Relations, 1947-50: A Missed Opportunity in Asia’, *Diplomatic History* 11 (1987), pp. 204-225; also see speech by J Hennessy at the RIIA, 30 September 1947 (8/1423) and H Pyman to Dempsey, 1 October 1948, 7/3/13, Pyman Papers, KCL

⁸⁰ March-April 1949, Washington-London diplomatic correspondence, L/PS/12/1394, IOR

⁸¹ 26 December 1947, (501.BC Kashmir) RG 59 (CDF, 1945-49) Box 2160, NARA-II

⁸² 10 January 1948, Lovett-Noel-Baker-Ismael-Henderson meeting (501.BC Kashmir) RG 59 (CDF, 1945-49) Box 2159 and Henderson’s brief for Lovett (Box 8 of 10) (Lot File No. 57D373) RG 59, NARA-II

⁸³ 21 January 1948, (Box 8 of 10) (Lot File No. 57D373) RG 59, NARA-II

The ball was set rolling by the Office of Soviet and East European Analysis within the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in the State Department. It prepared an analysis on the 'Probable Soviet Reaction in the Security Council to the Kashmir Controversy' on 12 January 1948.⁸⁴ This hitherto unseen document identified the Kashmir dispute as an 'opportunity' for the USSR in India. Beginning with Nehru's Interim Government, it noted the 'active cooperation' between the Indian and Soviet delegations at the UN and contrasted it with Moscow's lack of 'cordial feelings towards Pakistan'. In subcontinental matters, 'on several counts Moscow [appeared] in support of Nehru and in direct opposition to Pakistan'.

Coming to Kashmir in particular, the memo was unambiguous: 'On no single issue does Communist and Congress party policies coincide more closely than in support of...Sheikh Abdullah'. It anticipated Kashmir to be another lever in the basic Communist policy in India, 'predicated on the assumption that Soviet-Communist cooperation with Nehru...can be encouraged with profit to the USSR. No such basis for Soviet cooperation with Pakistani leaders exists'. To the Bureau, it appeared that an expression of Soviet sympathy to India on Kashmir could achieve several of Moscow's aims at once. It could 'mollify in some measure India's disappointment' over having lost to Ukraine for a seat on the Security Council; it could 'blacken the continuing role of British within the Government of Pakistan' and it could further the cause of a left-leaning, autonomous Sheikh Abdullah-led government in Kashmir.

Quite naturally, it was the American Embassy in Karachi with the recently appointed first Ambassador Paul Alling,⁸⁵ which from February 1948 presented Kashmir within the contrast between Pakistan's almost 'contiguous border with the Soviet Union and proximity to the Persian Gulf' and Nehru's neutralism.⁸⁶ The Indian officials too knew that the 'undefined Kashmir frontiers in Gilgit, Sinkiang and Tibet' handicapped India's international position.⁸⁷ Soon Grady was also cautioning Acheson that action on Kashmir would affect 'future dealings' with India.⁸⁸

⁸⁴ Box 6, Folder OIR-4590-PV, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Office of Soviet and East European Analysis, Intelligence Reports on the USSR and Eastern Europe, 1942-60, Lot 86D232) RG 59, NARA-II

⁸⁵ Alling (1896-1949) was a Middle-East hand having served in Syria and Morocco, L/PS/12/4743, IOR

⁸⁶ 14 February and 24 April 1948, N Hoskot (Karachi) to Washington (845F.00/2-1448 and 845F.00/4-2448) and 22 March 1948, No. 133, Alling to Marshall, (No KR-481), First Series, Volume IX, *Jinnah Papers*

⁸⁷ 23 February 1948, Note by H Dayal, File No. 155-CA/48 (GOI, MEA & CR, CA Branch), NAI

⁸⁸ 8 March 1948, No. 201, Grady to Acheson, (SDR – India: Internal Affairs, 1945-49, Part I – reel 14), CSAS

Through March and April, as the Security Council debated Kashmir, the State Department remained conscious of its repercussions in ‘other directions’.⁸⁹ Its increasing interest was reflected in Grady’s admission in New Delhi that while previously Washington’s position was that ‘this ball is at the feet of UK’, they were now getting increasingly dissatisfied.⁹⁰ When Warren Austin shared this with Abdullah at the UN, he got a ‘bit of his mind’ for his troubles.⁹¹ The Canadian High-Commissioner in India told Nehru that this attitude was a folly and India’s case would be received ‘more sympathetically’ if framed in strategic terms.⁹² Zahid Hussain, Pakistan’s High-Commissioner in New Delhi, was quick to counter this by pointing that this had been ‘exactly the argument against the formation of Pakistan’.⁹³

By May 1948, the US Army started to become ‘particularly interested in Pakistan’ and Kashmir.⁹⁴ Major Francis Smith was attached to the UNCIP as its military advisor.⁹⁵ The Intelligence Community too was alive to the breakup of colonial empires and its implications for US security and was warning about Soviet exploitation of the former dependent areas.⁹⁶ Nothing highlights the CIA’s interest in Kashmir more than the little-known fact of the appointment of one of its officers, Calvin Hawley Oakes, as the political advisor to Huddle, America’s representative on the UNCIP, in June.⁹⁷ This was considered desirable ‘in view of the presence of a Czech representative therein’.⁹⁸ Huddle may have appeared as ‘the great enigma’ to the British but he was sound on two key matters: the Russian threat to northern and western parts of Kashmir (adjoining Pakistani territory) and thus, despite Abdullah’s desire, opposed to independence for Kashmir.⁹⁹ Huddle’s lack of ‘force and conviction’ did not however endear him to some of his fellow Americans.¹⁰⁰

⁸⁹ 16 March 1948, State Department-FO officials meeting, F 4152/6/85/G, FO 371/69712, TNA

⁹⁰ 23 March 1948, HVR Iyengar to Bajpai, No. 2666/88, MB1/D214, Mountbatten Papers

⁹¹ 5 February 1948, Erskine Crum to Mountbatten, MB1/D210; also see MB1/D223, Mountbatten Papers

⁹² 19 March 1948, No. 592, New Delhi to CRO, DO 142/504, TNA

⁹³ 2 November 1947, Zahid Hussain to Ikramullah, (No KR-428), First Series, Volume IX, *Jinnah Papers*

⁹⁴ 14 May 1948, Memorandum of Conversation on ‘exchange of military information between India and the US’, US State Department Records (India: Foreign Affairs, 1945-49, Reel 2), CSAS and 24 May 1948, Chairman (SANACC) to NEA (Box 9, Folder Military Affairs and Defence Matters-General), Office of South Asian Affairs, 1939-59 (Files relating to India, 1945-52) (Lot 54D341), RG 59, NARA-II

⁹⁵ File No. 2(2)-K/48, (MOS, GOI, Kashmir Branch), 1948, NAI

⁹⁶ 3 September 1948, CIA booklet ‘The Breakup of the Colonial Empires and its implications for US security’, ORE 25-48, (Box 1, Folder Personal), Records of Robert Komer, 1948-68 (Lot 69D303) RG 59, NARA-II

⁹⁷ CIA-CREST Digitised Records (accessed on 26 August 2013), NARA-II

⁹⁸ 11 May 1948, Henderson-Rusk memo for Lovett (Box 8 of 10) (Lot File No. 57D373), RG 59, NARA-II

⁹⁹ 23 July 1948, Symonds to Patrick; 27 July 1948, No. 2465, Shone to CRO, DO 142/513 and 12 September 1948, No. 3183, ACB Symon to CRO, DO 142/517, TNA

¹⁰⁰ 24 April 1949, Allen (UNCIP) to Bancroft, (Box 4, Folder 2 (Ind-Pak Dispute Over Kashmir, 1947-49), Office of UN Political and Security Affairs, 1945-57 Subject Files (Lot 58D742 and 59D237) RG 59, NARA-II

Meanwhile, Grady's Embassy was sending detailed notes on the 'orientation of the Kashmir Government', which were categorical that Abdullah was trying to develop Kashmir along the Soviet lines. Arguing that Abdullah would like to be independent of India and Pakistan, the Embassy believed that his leadership benefitted from Communist contacts. The report pointedly noted that Kashmir's National Flag, red with white plough, was comparable to the USSR's and concluded that 'a free and independent Kashmir would strongly tend to drift into the Soviet orbit'.¹⁰¹ All this represented an 'unsatisfactory, unfinished business' for Grady, who would soon leave India.¹⁰² The report fed directly into the guidance prepared for Huddle on the UNCIP. The interesting part was the paragraph on 'The Soviet Position'.¹⁰³

It is not easy to access the Soviet position...Gromyko seemed in the beginning more inclined to favour India. At present, USSR has a line of friendliness toward both and commitments to neither...US has sought and will seek to minimise Soviet participation on UNCIP and elsewhere on Kashmir.

Simultaneously, from Karachi, the American Embassy was reporting about the developments in the NWFP, the activities of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and the Faqir of Ipi in relation to the Indian offensive in Kashmir. In September 1948, a National Intelligence Estimate identified Kashmir as a 'promising field for increased Soviet activity' and presented Abdullah as a man with 'Soviet dealings...compatible with the communist line'.¹⁰⁴

It was against this backdrop that Nehru made his maiden appearance at the UN session in Paris in October 1948. The State Department readied for the 'naïve, absolutist, ivory-tower Brahmin' who, in the words of Grady, went 'beyond neutrality'.¹⁰⁵ George Marshall, who had been briefed by his Department that the Indian Prime Minister 'epitomised' India's 'immaturity and self-righteousness on Kashmir and other matters of international relations',¹⁰⁶ put Nehru on the defensive straightaway by telling him that Kashmir was a

¹⁰¹ 17 May 1948, (Box 7 of 10) (Lot File No. 57D373) RG 59; it was prepared by Harold Roser (Junior), Third Secretary after talks with BPL Bedi and GM Sadiq; also see David Reynolds, *Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the Twentieth Century* (London: Pearson, 2000; first edition, 1991), pp. 175-6

¹⁰² 22 June 1948, No. 505, Grady to Acheson, SDR (India: Foreign Affairs, 1945-49, reel 2), CSAS

¹⁰³ June 1948, 'Kashmir Commission-Guidance for Huddle', (Box 7 of 10) (Lot File No. 57D373) RG 59, NARA-II; 15 and 17 June 1948, Nos. 294 and 338, First Series, Volume VII, *Jinnah Papers*

¹⁰⁴ 16 September 1948, India-Pakistan (Box 220 Folder (220-5), Secretary's Files, Truman Papers

¹⁰⁵ 'Adventures in Diplomacy', Subject File Box 1 (Folder 2 of 2), pp. 183-4, Grady Papers

¹⁰⁶ 5 October 1948, (Box 1), Records of John Foster Dulles as a member of the US Delegation to the UN (Lot No 71D325) RG 84, NARA-II

‘difficult local issue [complicating] the world situation’.¹⁰⁷ Later, giving an account of his talk with Nehru to Bevin, Marshall said that it would surprise him if ‘our talk did not add to his [Nehru’s] appreciation of the Russian menace’.¹⁰⁸

Already, the State Department viewed the anti-communist, strategic character of Pakistan as an ‘opportunity’. It remained confident that despite the fact that Pakistan had agreed to exchange Ambassadors with China and opened diplomatic relations with the USSR,¹⁰⁹ it remained ‘basically pro-USA’.¹¹⁰ The British were not so sanguine. Pakistan’s decision to establish diplomatic relations with the USSR in May 1948 had come as a shock as they had been representing Pakistan in Moscow and had been confident that ‘no countries in the Russian orbit had suggested diplomatic relations to Pakistan’.¹¹¹ They pondered whether pique over Kashmir had prompted this decision.¹¹² Nevertheless, Marshall assured Liaquat that America had very much in mind the arc from Greece to Pakistan via Turkey and Iran, notwithstanding the two hurdles of Palestine and Kashmir.¹¹³

Marshall felt that while India and Pakistan spoke ‘the same language’ when stressing the communist threat, they did not seem willing ‘to suit action to their words’ on Kashmir.¹¹⁴ On Palestine, Jinnah had been bitter about London ‘throwing up the sponge’ in face of American pressure,¹¹⁵ and would, in his last *Eid* message, club together the ‘power politics in Palestine, Indonesia and Kashmir’.¹¹⁶ But apart from Palestine, the attitude of Pakistan’s delegation to the UN had coincided more closely with that of the US than India’s.¹¹⁷ By now, the Pentagon had started to argue for a cosying up with the ‘martial’ Pakistan in the fight against Communism.¹¹⁸

¹⁰⁷ 16 October 1948, Paris to Washington, DELGA 368 (501.BC Kashmir) RG 59 (CDF, 1945-49) Box 2159

¹⁰⁸ 20 October 1948, Paris to Washington, DELGA 418 (501.BC Kashmir) RG 59 (CDF, 1945-49) Box 2159

¹⁰⁹ L/PS/12/4732 and L/PS/12/4729, IOR

¹¹⁰ 25 October 1948, Washington to Paris, GA DEL 296 (501.BC Kashmir) RG 59 (CDF, 1945-49) Box 2159

¹¹¹ 12 August 1947, New Delhi to Moscow and 5 November 1947, Graffety-Smith to CRO, L/PS/12/4724, IOR

¹¹² 4 June 1948, Carter to Graffety-Smith and 16 June 1948, No. 480, Graffety-Smith’s reply, L/PS/12/4729

¹¹³ 29 October 1948, Paris to Washington, DELGA 531 (501.BC Kashmir) RG 59 (CDF, 1945-49) Box 2159

¹¹⁴ 10 November 1948, Cadogan-Marshall conversation (501.BC Kashmir) RG 59 (CDF, 1945-49) Box 2159

¹¹⁵ 29 December 1947, Donovan to Marshall, (No. 282), First Series, Volume VI, *Jinnah Papers*

¹¹⁶ 6 August 1948, (No. 474), First Series, Volume VII, *Jinnah Papers*

¹¹⁷ 15 June 1948, Note on Pakistan and the UN (Box 4, Folder 1 – Ind-Pak Dispute over Kashmir, 1947-49), Office of UN Political and Security Affairs, 1945-57 Subject Files (Lot 58D742 and 59D237) RG 59, NARA-II

¹¹⁸ Oral History Interview of Elbert Mathews, Consul in Calcutta (1946-47), Asst. Chief of South-Asian affairs, State Department (1947-48), Chief (1948-49) and Director (1950-51) (Box 51, 288), pp. 42-3, Independence

A key change of personnel darkened the emerging red mist. Loy Henderson, much against his wish and under an anti-Semitic cloud,¹¹⁹ had succeeded Henry Grady in New Delhi in November 1948. An ‘old-line Foreign Service Officer’,¹²⁰ Henderson was very influential in Washington,¹²¹ where as the Director of Near-East and South Asia Affairs he had several key ‘headaches’: Palestine, aid to Greece and Turkey, India-Pakistan and Kashmir.¹²² He viewed the posting in New Delhi as a ‘mixed blessing’, having hoped to go to Turkey.¹²³ Aptly, the ‘cold warrior’s’ arrival in India coincided with a hardening of lines in the Cold War.¹²⁴ On Kashmir especially, two key strains of Henderson’s personality and long-held views, namely staunch anti-communism and pro-Arabism came together.

‘Primed by experience to see the cynical and self-serving in international affairs’, Henderson came to India keen to influence Nehru and, ‘with nothing but the Soviet Union on his mind’, to resolve Kashmir.¹²⁵ His first impression of Nehru was ‘friendly and favourable’ if ‘reserved and non-committal’. In time, their relations deteriorated.¹²⁶ When he first arrived in India, Henderson felt that the Soviet Union was following policies critical of Nehru, while the latter was making special efforts to improve that. Soon Henderson ‘would not think that India was following a really neutral position’; in turn, Nehru would be irritated about American policies with regard to Kashmir.¹²⁷ With Henderson following Frank Roberts, the UK’s Deputy High-Commissioner, to India, some Indian officials wondered if the posting of Russian experts to the two Western missions in New Delhi had ‘any significance’.¹²⁸

By December 1948, Huddle and the US delegation to the UN too desired Washington to lead in the matter so as to ‘prevent Kashmir from deteriorating into another China’.¹²⁹ Indeed, almost a year before the Communist victory in China, the Near-East Bureau was conscious

¹¹⁹ On Henderson see HW Brands, *Inside the Cold War: Loy Henderson* (New York: OUP, 1991)

¹²⁰ Oral History Interview of Evan Wilson, Consul in Calcutta, 1952-54 (Box 43, 259), p. 67, Independence

¹²¹ Oral History Interview of Nicholas Thacher, Third Secretary in US Embassy, Karachi (August 1947) and later Consul in Calcutta, 1950-52 (Box 78, 487), p. 33, Independence

¹²² 31 July 1948, Norman Armour on Henderson (Box 2, Folder A), Henderson Papers

¹²³ Box 8, Folder India: Re: Appointment, Henderson Papers

¹²⁴ Brands, *Inside the Cold War*, p. 199; Oral History Interview of Nicholas Thacher, p. 40, Independence

¹²⁵ Brands, *Inside the Cold War*, p. 201, 230; Oral History Interview of Nicholas Thacher, p. 40, Independence

¹²⁶ 18 November 1948, No. 1280, Henderson to Washington (Box 1, Folder Miscellaneous), Office Files of Ambassador Loy W Henderson, 1948-59 (Lot 67D44) RG 59, NARA-II; Oral History Interview of Fraser Wilkins, Political Counsellor in Delhi 1949-53 (Box 52, 291), p. 74, Independence

¹²⁷ Oral History Interview of Loy Henderson (Box 29, 156), pp. 169-70, 180-81, Independence

¹²⁸ 6 December 1948, Dayal to Menon, D.6688A-Eur/48, File No. 20 (17) EUR (1948, MEA, Europe), NAI

¹²⁹ 26 November 1948, No. 127, Paris to FO, DO 142/525 and 8 December 1948, No. 5149, London to Washington and 29 December 1948, Huddle to Lovett (501.BC Kashmir) RG 59 (CDF, 1945-49) Box 2159

that ‘decisions which we may make in that regard would doubtless [affect] the concentration and nature of our effort [on Kashmir]’.¹³⁰ Elbert Mathews, Chief of the Division of South Asian Affairs, recalled the feeling of having a ‘political stake in the democratic experiment in India as contrasted with the Communist experiment in China’.¹³¹ On top of them, Marshall himself was alluding to ‘difficulties’ in China in discussions with the British on Kashmir.¹³² Lovett even requested Defence Secretary James Forrestal for 15-20 American officers as UN observers for the ceasefire in Kashmir and pointed to the ‘intelligence value’ of such a step ‘in view of recent events in China and Indonesia’.¹³³

As 1948 lurched to a close, the State Department gathered its thoughts on this ‘bit of unfinished British business in South Asia’. It had noticed over the last ten months, a ‘pronounced tendency for the British to side rather heavily first with Pakistan, then with India and now with Pakistan depending on...Commonwealth interests’. Nicholas Thacher, who served in both Pakistan and India, remembered the ‘natural and observe-able’ British inclination to be pro-Pakistan, for after all ‘they helped Pakistan to get going’.¹³⁴ What then of the American perspective on the problem? The answer: it related ‘to the critical situation in Asia generally and the importance to US and the West of a peaceful and economically prosperous South Asia, closely linked to the West’.¹³⁵

By the time Truman took oath as President in his own right with his new Secretary of State Dean Acheson, the State Department was torn between the recognition of the defence problem of a volatile, vulnerable and strategically significant area,¹³⁶ and the realisation that America was constantly being pressed from all directions to take leading parts in various disputes – Palestine, Indonesia and Kashmir – at a time when the American Congress, press and public preferred to keep American commitments down.¹³⁷ The new Secretary of State

¹³⁰ 30 November 1948, Hare to Thurston (Box 8 of 10) (Lot File No. 57D373) RG 59, NARA-II

¹³¹ Oral History Interview of Elbert G Mathews, p. 28, Independence

¹³² 10-11 November 1948, Cadogan-Marshall meetings (Box 8, Folder India 1947-49), US Mission to UNO, Central Subject Files (1946-1963) RG 84, NARA-II

¹³³ 27 December 1948, Lovett to Forrestal, (Box 14, Folder 1 (1947-49 India-Pakistan Dispute over Kashmir), Office of UN Political and Security Affairs, 1945-57 Subject Files (Lot 58D742 and 59D237), NARA-II

¹³⁴ Oral History Interview of Nicholas Thacher, (Box 78, 487), p. 34, Independence

¹³⁵ 24 November 1948, Thurston to Jessup (Box 8, Folder India 1947-49), US Mission to UNO, Central Subject Files (1946-1963) RG 84, NARA-II

¹³⁶ 3 January 1949, Lewis to Hare and 13 and 26 January 1949, Patrick to Lewis and Hare (501.BC Kashmir) RG 59 (CDF, 1945-49) Box 2160, NARA-II

¹³⁷ 4 January 1949, Lovett to Huddle (501.BC Kashmir) RG 59 (CDF, 1945-49) Box 2160, NARA-II

considered himself a 19th century man.¹³⁸ He was also appalled by India.¹³⁹ His response to Kashmir would reflect this deference of the British and despise for Indians.¹⁴⁰

‘No one realises the international implications of the Kashmir conflict better than the Communists...’¹⁴¹

Few events deepened the connection between Kashmir and Communism in London and Washington than the delayed impact of the February 1948 Communist take-over in Czechoslovakia on the UN Commission for Kashmir. This was the substitution of the pro-West Czech representative Josef Korbel by Dr Ing Oldrich Chyle in February 1949. Chyle has remained a virtual unknown. Americans saw him as a ‘faithful servant of Moscow’ who was also in ‘close communication with Sheikh Abdullah’.¹⁴² Korbel himself did more than most to contextualise Kashmir within the East-West confrontation and, requesting asylum in America, claimed that his refusal to follow the Soviet policy in the UNCIP had led to his removal.¹⁴³ Five years later, in his book, he would write in ringing terms: ‘To [Communists], a divided Kashmir is another divided Korea, another divided Indo-China, another divided Germany, another divided Austria...’¹⁴⁴

Simultaneously, reports about Abdullah’s ‘pro-Communist’ aims, associates and associations started to pour into London and Washington.¹⁴⁵ Having returned from Kashmir feeling ‘uneasy’, Henderson wrote that the Communist influence in Kashmir was ‘greater than the Indian Government cares to admit’.¹⁴⁶ The FO too noticed a contrast between Nehru’s

¹³⁸ 31 March 1962, Address at Truman Library (Box 51, Folder 54), Acheson Papers, Independence

¹³⁹ 18 March 1959, Acheson to Devilin (Box 7, Folder 96), Acheson Papers

¹⁴⁰ See McNay, *Acheson and Empire*, especially the chapter ‘The Kashmir Connection’, pp. 101-28

¹⁴¹ Korbel, *Danger in Kashmir*, p. 272

¹⁴² 13 May 1949, A-927, London to Washington, A-927 (501.BC Kashmir) RG 59 (CDF, 1945-49) Box 2160;

13 June 1949, Collins (UNCIP) to Thurston (US Emb, Moscow), (Box 8 of 10) (Lot File No. 57D373) RG 59

¹⁴³ 2 February 1949 (Box 8 of 10) (Lot File No. 57D373) RG 59; 2 February 1949, Korbel-Power (USUN) talks (Box 17, Folder IO: SC UNCIP), US Mission to UNO, Central Subject Files (1946-1963) RG 84; 12 February 1949, Korbel to Austin, (Box 4, Folder 2 (Ind-Pak Dispute Over Kashmir, 1947-49), Office of UN Political and Security Affairs, 1945-57 Subject Files (Lot 58D742 and 59D237) RG 59, NARA-II

¹⁴⁴ Korbel, *Danger in Kashmir*, p. 272; see ‘Communist Harvest’ and ‘The Double Shadow’, pp. 249-306

¹⁴⁵ 28 January 1949, No. 1157, 16 February 1949, No. 1640, FO to Washington, L/PS/13/1908-II; 14 February 1949, (SDR, India: Internal Affairs, 45-49, Part I – reel 14), CSAS; 22 March 1949, Lewis to Washington, 21 April 1949, No. 454, Henderson to Washington, 9 June 1949, No. 651, Henderson to Washington, 29 June 1949, No. 555, Henderson to Washington, (501.BC Kashmir) RG 59 (CDF, 1945-49) Box 2160, NARA-II

¹⁴⁶ 23 April 1949, A-394, Henderson to Acheson, (US State Department Records – India: Internal Affairs, 1945-49, Part I – reel 14), CSAS and 18 May 1949, X919, Nye to CRO, DO 142/370, TNA

firmness in dealing with Communists elsewhere compared to Kashmir.¹⁴⁷ Nye and Graffety-Smith had been warning about Abdullah's strong left-leanings for some time and now the CRO saw Abdullah's advocacy of an independent Kashmir in line with the 'gradual but steady' assertion of Russian control in next-door Sinkiang.¹⁴⁸ London was starting to wonder if the Commonwealth link meant anything at all if it could not even talk to the Indians frankly about Kashmir.¹⁴⁹ Washington shared its doubts about India's legal position in Kashmir, defence of Pakistan's limitations and distress at Russia's plans.¹⁵⁰

With the UNCIP grinding to a halt at the hands of Chyle and his 'monkey wrenches',¹⁵¹ by December 1949, memos were being prepared in Washington on 'similarities' between Chyle on the UNCIP and the Soviets on Indonesia 'so as to anticipate the Soviet position on Kashmir'.¹⁵² In March 1949, Chester Nimitz, who compared Nehru on Kashmir to Hitler on Sudetenland,¹⁵³ was chosen as the plebiscite administrator for Kashmir.¹⁵⁴ The State Department gave him a note on the 'relationship of Kashmir question to US interests in South Asia'. It termed Kashmir a 'dual UK-US responsibility',¹⁵⁵ which like Palestine and Indonesia was at the vantage of Communism and Islam.¹⁵⁶

Acheson sympathised with the British caught between an intransigent India and an insecure Pakistan,¹⁵⁷ and sought to lend a helping hand. Aware that London was keen to pressure India on Kashmir by linking it with their desire for a seat on the Security Council, Acheson told Vijayalakshmi Pandit obliquely that he hoped Kashmir would not affect India's leadership in

¹⁴⁷ 24 March 1949, POL 2190/49, PJ Patrick to Archibald Nye, DO 133/138, TNA

¹⁴⁸ 21 April 1949, P/203, Nye to Liesching, DO 133/138; 5 April and 24 May 1949, CRO to Delhi, DO 142/370; 31 May 1949, Graffety-Smith to CRO and 16 June 1949, Outward Telegram from CRO, L/PS/12/4787, IOR

¹⁴⁹ 8 June 1949, Frank Roberts to Archibald Nye, DO 133/86, TNA

¹⁵⁰ 12 September 1949, FO to Washington, T. No. 8652 and 19 September 1949, Washington to FO, T. No. 4552, L/PS/13/1908-Pt I, IOR

¹⁵¹ 12 July 1949, No. 3545, Washington to FO, L/PS/13/1908-II, IOR; 7 September 1949, Macatee to Ward Allen (UNCIP), Box 4, Folder 2 (Ind-Pak Dispute Over Kashmir, 1947-49), Office of UN Political and Security Affairs, 1945-57 Subject Files (Lot 58D742 and 59D237) RG 59, NARA-II

¹⁵² 20 December 1949, Bancroft's note, Box 4, Folder 2 (Ind-Pak Dispute Over Kashmir, 1947-49), Office of UN Political and Security Affairs, 1945-57 Subject Files (Lot 58D742 and 59D237) RG 59, NARA-II

¹⁵³ 16 June 1949, Nimitz-Malony-Austin-Maffitt meeting (Box 8, Folder India 1947-49), US Mission to UNO, Central Subject Files (1946-1963) RG 84, NARA-II

¹⁵⁴ 21 March 1949, No. 1625, Washington to FO, L/PS/13/1908-II, IOR

¹⁵⁵ 8 April 1949, Power (US Mission UN) to Nimitz, (Box 8 of 10) (Lot File No. 57D373) RG 59; (Box 8, Folder India 1947-49) US Mission to UNO, Central Subject Files (1946-1963) RG 84, NARA-II

¹⁵⁶ 3 June 1949, Conversation of 23 May with Michael Walker (UK Embassy), (501.BC Kashmir) RG 59 (CDF, 1945-49) Box 2160 RG 59, NARA-II

¹⁵⁷ See L/PS/13/1908-II, IOR

the wider Arab-Asian world against Communism.¹⁵⁸ The CRO was soon informing Indian supporters like New Zealand and Canada that Washington agreed that Indian intransigence on Kashmir made it difficult to support the Indian candidature.¹⁵⁹ All this served to strengthen Pandit's feeling that 'Kashmir is the price we are asked to pay for a seat in the SC'.¹⁶⁰

By mid-1949, Acheson considered Kashmir a 'handicap' at the UN because any debate 'would provide opportunity to Soviets'.¹⁶¹ From London, Bevin added that internally too there were 'signs of USSR involvement'.¹⁶² The US Embassy in Moscow also sent its appreciation. Writing on the second anniversary of India's independence, Ambassador Alan Kirk had no doubt that the Kremlin followed Kashmir 'with interest', was pleased that the impasse obstructed 'a natural working out of forces' and demonstrated 'UN fallacy'.¹⁶³

An opportunity for a 'frank exchange' with Nehru was his upcoming October trip to the US. The onus to pave the way fell firstly on Loy Henderson. A lot has been written about Henderson's difficulties with Nehru but, as Fraser Wilkins, his political counsellor in New Delhi, remembered, the first year of Henderson's Ambassadorship was 'not too bad'.¹⁶⁴ Similarly, Elbert Mathews, the Chief of South Asian Division when Henderson went to India and Nehru came to America, recalled him always weighing the problem of legality of Kashmir's accession in the light of maintaining the integrity of India.¹⁶⁵

More interesting is Henderson's diffidence with the British.¹⁶⁶ Henderson believed that London looked upon the UK-India-US relations as a zero sum game.¹⁶⁷ He advised that insofar as Kashmir was concerned it could either be framed in subcontinental terms with the

¹⁵⁸ 29 June 1949, Acheson-Pandit meeting, (501.BC Kashmir) RG 59 (CDF, 1945-49) Box 2160; 14 July 1949, No. 800, Donovan to Acheson, (501.BC Kashmir) RG 59 (CDF, 1945-49) Box 2160; 14 July 1949, Washington to FO, T. No. 3579, L/P&S/13/1908-II, IOR

¹⁵⁹ 5 August and 23 August 1949, DO 35/3038, TNA

¹⁶⁰ 2 September 1949, Pandit to Nehru, Subject File Serial No. 59 and Pandit to Bajpai, 2 September 1949, Subject File Serial No. 56), Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

¹⁶¹ 8 July 1949, No. 478, Washington to Delhi and 28 July 1949, Henderson-Bajpai talks, (501.BC Kashmir) RG 59 (CDF, 1945-49) Box 2160, NARA-II

¹⁶² 22 July 1949, Bevin to Acheson, (501.BC Kashmir) RG 59 (CDF, 1945-49) Box 2160; 12 September 1949, No. 8652, FO to Washington, L/PS/13/1908-I, IOR

¹⁶³ 15 August 1949, No. 2051, Moscow to Washington, (501.BC Kashmir) RG 59 (CDF, 1945-49) Box 2161

¹⁶⁴ Oral history Interview, Fraser Wilkins (Box 52, 291), p. 74, Independence

¹⁶⁵ Oral History Interview, EG Mathew (Box 51, 288), p. 25, Independence

¹⁶⁶ 18 June 1949, Henderson to Acheson (Box 8, Folder India: Re: Appointment), Henderson Papers

¹⁶⁷ 13 June 1949, Henderson to Harry Vaughan (military attaché to Truman) (Box 1, Folder Documents regarding Near-East Asia), Office Files of Ambassador Loy W Henderson, 1948-59 (Lot 67D44) RG 59

British in the lead i.e. Decolonisation or in international context with America in forefront i.e. the Cold War.¹⁶⁸ He had an unsatisfactory interview with Bevin in London enroute to take up his post and was never at ease with Nye in India. Among the Indians, his relations with Bajpai compensated to some extent for his difficulties with Nehru. Pressing upon Bajpai the shadow of 'external aggression', he pointed out that if Washington appeared more inclined to accept Pakistan's views on Kashmir, it was because India appeared 'uncooperative in various aspects of US-Soviet relations'.¹⁶⁹ He hoped that Nehru's visit would alter that.¹⁷⁰ Ominously, Bajpai reminded him that Nehru 'did not believe in appearing as an apologist'.¹⁷¹

Henderson thought it fair to tell Bajpai privately that some officials of the State Department were inclined to accept Pakistan's views on Kashmir due to 'the assiduous work which Pakistan's Ambassador [was] putting in'. If the Indian Ambassador in the US was being out-worked by her Pakistani counterpart, then Henderson himself was out-done by his counterpart in Pakistan. He admitted that some officers in the State Department 'felt the same way as members of the US Embassy in Karachi'.¹⁷² Secondly, Henderson made it clear that Washington believed that strategic considerations in Kashmir put aside the legal aspects of the Indian position.¹⁷³ Bajpai replied that the State Department's thinking was 'wrong' in this matter. India 'did not see how anyone could threaten the subcontinent across the snowy wastes that lie to the north of the state'.¹⁷⁴

In the meantime, on 12 May 1949, Vijayalakshmi Pandit had presented her credentials as India's Ambassador to Truman. Henderson and the Near-East Bureau had urged Acheson to make every effort 'to give Madame Pandit a cordial welcome to impress upon her some of the differences between US and Soviet Union'.¹⁷⁵ Both knew that Pandit, an admirer of the Soviet experiment, had been repelled by Moscow, her disillusionment had a 'deep effect' on Nehru's pro-Soviet tendencies and 'a successful mission for her in the US' would augment

¹⁶⁸ 29 September 1949, 'Guide for discussion with Nehru' (Regional Conferences and Country Files, Box 2, Folder India, 1949-51), Bureau of Near-Eastern and South-Asian Affairs, 1951-55 (Entry A1 1534), RG 59

¹⁶⁹ Oral History Interview, Loy Henderson (Box 29, 156), pp. 171-80, Independence

¹⁷⁰ 28 July 1949, Henderson-Bajpai talks, Subject File Serial No. 22, Rau Papers (I Instalment)

¹⁷¹ 9 August 1949, Bajpai-Henderson talks, Correspondence File (GS Bajpai), Rau Papers (I Instalment)

¹⁷² 29 July 1949, Bajpai to Rau, Correspondence File, Rau Papers (I and II Instalments)

¹⁷³ 9 August 1949, Henderson's Memorandum to Bajpai, Correspondence, Rau Papers (I and II Instalments)

¹⁷⁴ 27 August 1949, Bajpai to Rau, No. 561-PASG/49, Correspondence, Rau Papers (I and II Instalments)

¹⁷⁵ 23 April 1949, Henderson to Acheson, No. 3689 (Box 2962) RG 59 (1945-49), NARA-II

this process.¹⁷⁶ As a good omen, on the same day, Nehru's October visit to America was announced.¹⁷⁷ Louis Johnson, the Secretary of Defence and a friend of Nehru since he was 'ordered' by Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull to 'cultivate' him in 1942, had warmly recommended it to Truman 'particularly in light of the China situation'.¹⁷⁸ Thus, received exceptionally well, Pandit started her tenure feeling 'overwhelmed'.¹⁷⁹

She had assumed her post in the immediate aftermath of India's decision to remain in the Commonwealth and reported 'mixed reactions' to Nehru about it. The State Department had welcomed it, but the Treasury Secretary Snyder told her that he hoped India 'did not intend to cripple' itself permanently by such an alliance.¹⁸⁰ Nehru replied at length:

An India isolated from the Commonwealth would inevitably have to slope in the direction of the US...America wants very much to tie ourselves to her foreign policy in regard to her Asian policy...The State Department has been far from friendly. The recent military mission did not achieve anything... In the UNCIP, the US member is hostile to us. On Kashmir, US diplomacy is immature or too sure of its physical might. They had a very bad setback in China and yet in Indonesia they support Dutch terms. We rely upon them inevitably and want to be a friendly neutral but there are some things we just cannot swallow.¹⁸¹

Mindful of the economic help India could get from America, aware that the State Department needed to be cultivated,¹⁸² and, above all, painfully conscious of the acute economic crisis in India,¹⁸³ Nehru desired financial help but did not wish to get tied up with American business interests. It was an axiom for him that American thought was 'a mixture of good intentions, private profit and national policy'.¹⁸⁴ He had also belatedly realised that under Asaf Ali and BN Rau, Indian diplomacy in Washington had been rather ineffective and hoped that Pandit's well-known presence would be 'the best propaganda for the GOI'.¹⁸⁵ Bajpai, an old

¹⁷⁶ 9 May 1949, Satterthwaite to Acheson (Box 2962) RG 59 (1945-49), NARA-II and 21 July 1949, American Embassy, Canton to Washington, No A-37, US SDR (India: Foreign Affairs, 1945-49, reel 2), CSAS

¹⁷⁷ See L/PS/12/1412, IOR

¹⁷⁸ 23 April 1949, Johnson to Truman (Folder India: General), Secretary's Files Box 158, Truman Papers

¹⁷⁹ 10 May 1949, Pandit to Nehru, Subject File Serial No. 59, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

¹⁸⁰ 12 May and 20 May 1949, Pandit to Nehru, Subject File Serial No. 59, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

¹⁸¹ 8 June 1949, Nehru to Pandit, Subject File Serial No. 60, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

¹⁸² 17 May 1949, Nehru to Pandit, Subject File Serial No. 60, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

¹⁸³ 31 May 1949, Nehru to Pandit, Subject File Serial No. 60, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

¹⁸⁴ 9 June 1949, Nehru to Pandit, No. 714-PM, Subject File Serial No. 60, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

¹⁸⁵ 25 May-2 June 1949, Pandit-Bajpai correspondence, Subject File Serial No. 56, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

Washington hand, though cautioned Pandit that ‘people are apt to forget the very real difference between public relations and publicity...’¹⁸⁶

Pandit’s first task was to plan Nehru’s engagements in concert with the State Department but, initially, she was battling not just American policies, but prejudices as well. In the euphoria of her public acclaim, it is not often appreciated that her appointment was something of a ‘challenge to the State Department’. America was then, as now, a land of amazing contrasts and she soon found out that the privileges women enjoyed were ‘of a superficial nature and not a result of equality and responsibility shared with men’.¹⁸⁷ This mutual lack of respect with the State Department was to harm Nehru’s programme because Pandit charted such a public course for her brother that Bajpai was compelled to offer his view that Nehru would ‘achieve much more by personal contacts and by speaking to selected groups than by addressing immense audiences...’¹⁸⁸

The spectres of China and Kashmir loomed large over the trip. Nehru told Pandit that he could not shut his eyes to the facts on the ground in China for all his friendship for Chiangs.¹⁸⁹ He could not possibly ally with the Kuomintang merely because of the past. India was in no hurry to recognise Communist China, as was being urged by Moscow,¹⁹⁰ but he wanted Pandit to tell the Americans that it was ‘just not going to stand up as crusaders against it’. Calling the Chinese Revolution the ‘biggest fact of this decade’, he feared that India would be condemned if it stood up for the ‘bankrupt, stiff-necked Kuomintang’ and ‘it would give fillip to Communism in India’.¹⁹¹ Equally, on Kashmir, he was not going to be weakened by the unfavourable American meddling reflected in Nimitz’s appointment and had expressed himself to Henderson rather forcibly.¹⁹²

By August 1949, Nehru’s tour programme had become a ‘tug of war’ between Pandit, supported by Louis Johnson, and the State Department. Pandit complained to her brother:

¹⁸⁶ 7 June 1949, Bajpai to Pandit, 316-PASG/49, Subject File Serial No. 56, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

¹⁸⁷ 17 June 1949, Pandit to Nehru, Subject File Serial No. 59, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

¹⁸⁸ 25 June 1949, Bajpai to Pandit, 388-PASG/49, Subject File Serial No. 56, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

¹⁸⁹ See Guido Samarani, *Shaping the Future of Asia: Chiang Kai-Shek, Nehru and China-India Relations During the Second World War Period*, Working Papers in Contemporary Asian Studies, Issue 11, 2005, Centre for East and Southeast Asian Studies, Lund University

¹⁹⁰ 7 November 1949, Novikov-Rajagopalachari talks, Fond 82, Opis 2, No. 1196, Molotov Papers, RGASPI

¹⁹¹ 1 July 1949, Nehru to Pandit, Subject File Serial No. 60, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

¹⁹² 11 July 1949 and 24 August 1949, Nehru to Pandit, Subject File Serial No. 60, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

The State Department wishes to present you as a prima donna...It seems to me a complete waste of time for you to come here in order to be guarded and kept in purdah. The people of America are hungry to meet Nehru, the fighter for Indian independence, the writer, the world citizen [and] the man who is creating the new India. They are not interested in the PM as such...¹⁹³

Needless to say, the State Department did not share these feelings. Meanwhile, whether or not the American public was waiting breathlessly for Nehru and the State Department was feeling nervous about it,¹⁹⁴ Loy Henderson suggested to Nehru that it was necessary that Bajpai should accompany him. The Americans rightly believed that Bajpai strove for closer Indo-US relations.¹⁹⁵ Nehru would have liked Bajpai to stay in India during his absence but agreed to this sensible proposal.

He also mildly rebuked his sister by letting her know that he disliked 'this business of speaking a lot...I have been troubled a little by the fact that you have delivered numerous speeches...I have wondered if it is wise to talk too much about our high ideals. Our immediate past and present is not in consonance with these high ideals and we may lay ourselves open to a courteous retort'.¹⁹⁶ As the time of his trip neared, Nehru felt both 'excited and overwhelmed'.¹⁹⁷ Opening up to his sister, he revealed something of his innermost thoughts about the trip:

I think often [about] this coming American visit. In what mood shall I approach America? Which facet of myself should I put before the American public? I want to be friendly with the Americans but always making it clear what we stand for. I want to make no commitments which come in the way of our basic policy.¹⁹⁸

To Mountbatten, he wrote that he was clear in his mind that he shall not 'entangle' himself in 'any detailed talks', be it Kashmir or India's economic difficulties.¹⁹⁹ In the event, this reluctance was amply displayed.²⁰⁰ A visit that took place against a backdrop of the

¹⁹³ 3 August 1949, Pandit to Nehru, Subject File Serial No. 59, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

¹⁹⁴ 3 August 1949, Pandit to Bajpai, Subject File Serial No. 55, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

¹⁹⁵ 30 November 1949, Hare to Acheson, US SDR (India: Foreign Affairs, 1945-49, reel 2), CSAS

¹⁹⁶ 6 August 1949, Nehru to Pandit, Subject File Serial No. 60, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

¹⁹⁷ 22 September 1949, Nehru to Mountbatten, MB1/F8, Mountbatten Papers

¹⁹⁸ 24 August 1949, Nehru to Pandit, Subject File Serial No. 60, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

¹⁹⁹ 22 August 1949, Nehru to Mountbatten, MB1/F7 (Folder 1), Mountbatten Papers

²⁰⁰ 20 October 1949, Oliver Franks to FO, T. No. 5006, L/PS/12/1412, IOR

successful detonation of the first Soviet atomic device and the triumph of the Chinese Communists fittingly saw wide-ranging talks, especially with Acheson, covering Indonesia and Indo-China. Rather symbolically when they finally turned to Kashmir, Acheson 'either due to the lateness of the hour or the complexity of the subject' became confused.²⁰¹

So much prose has been produced on Nehru's first, anti-climactic trip to America that perhaps it is best to take recourse to some poetry.²⁰² At the Near-East and South-Asia Bureau, McGhee's opinion of Nehru on Kashmir was expressed thus:

...In India, there dwelt a Pandit, (It should, but does not, rhyme with Bandit); A statesman full of high ideals, which like the cloak that oft conceals; A dirty shirt, were sometimes flaunted, to cover what the Pandit wanted... The idealistic cloak was waved, The Army moved, Kashmir was saved

To make the dicker look all right, our statesman said a plebiscite... Would be arranged to let Kashmir, decide on where she would adhere... Drunk with success, like other men, he took the matter to UN... Believing it would but concede, all virtue was with Brahma's breed

But with chagrin he had to note..., the blighters really thought a vote; Controlled by someone rather tough, And honest, would be just the stuff... The nasty prospect faced our hero, of possibility [of] obtaining zero... This would not do, he had to stall, Before the vote began to fall

A hundred schemes were set-a-cooking, but dammit all, UN was looking; Until he struck the happy thought, which gave exactly what he sought; When you have found the trick to use, the thing to do is to accuse... The other fella of the crime, you are preparing at the time²⁰³

At a State Department meeting held shortly after Nehru's departure, McGhee spoke about Kashmir and Palestine in tandem as serving to 'complicate the southern bastion to Russian expansionism'.²⁰⁴ Nehru who had wanted 'to learn, to be receptive [and] to see their good points' came away without abandoning his critical views of America. To do so would require 'to be swept away by them and of that there was not much chance'.²⁰⁵

²⁰¹ 12 October 1949, (Folder India: Nehru), President's Secretary's Files Box 158, Truman Papers

²⁰² See books by McMahan, Kux, Brands, Merrill, Rotter, Brown, Guha, Schaffer, McGarr and Chaudhuri.

²⁰³ Untitled, undated poem on Nehru and Kashmir, George McGhee Papers, 1945-53 (Lot 53D468) (Box 13, Folder India Memoranda 1949) RG 59, NARA-II

²⁰⁴ 2 November 1949, Transcript of proceedings of State Department meeting (Division of Central Services), (Box 1) George McGhee Papers (Office Files of Under-Secretary for Political Affairs, 1961-63), NARA-II

²⁰⁵ 24 August 1949, Nehru to Pandit, Subject File Serial No. 60, Pandit Papers (I Instalment); also 'Adventures in Diplomacy', Subject File Box 1 (Folder 2 of 2), p. 185, Grady Papers

‘Geography and Cold War strategy should determine who got Kashmir or what part of it each got’²⁰⁶

While Nehru was still on the American soil, Dean Rusk noted in a memo that ‘time had now come when the Commonwealth nations should recognise their responsibility to settle Kashmir’.²⁰⁷ This was partly to jolt London that had been quietly pleased with Nehru’s trip because even though America and India had talked past each other on Communism and Colonialism,²⁰⁸ the Soviet press had declared Nehru the ‘new, obedient agent’ of Washington,²⁰⁹ developments that could only bind India to the Commonwealth.

It also, however, reflected the way in which the wind was blowing in the State Department, especially on the UN desk and in the South Asia bureau. Unable to get through to Nehru,²¹⁰ it was disappointed at the general Indian attitude, which seemed to be: ‘We are a big country, leave us alone; when we want your help, we will come for it’.²¹¹

In New Delhi, Henderson rued Nehru’s lack of ‘practical realism’, his ‘woolly, evasive and frankly bad’ impression and his ‘vague, incoherent, general’ defence on Kashmir.²¹² Bajpai, ever the acute observer, told the British Deputy High-Commissioner Frank Roberts that ‘both sides now know each other better’, but the future ‘depended on Indian policy and American interests’.²¹³ The British analysed the trip as ‘more of a tribute to Nehru the individual than to the Prime Minister of India’.²¹⁴ No agreements of any kind were signed. Nehru himself called the visit of ‘educational value’ and, in words welcomed at the CRO, said that he had felt more ‘at home’ in the Commonwealth dominion of Canada.²¹⁵

²⁰⁶ Rotter, *Comrades at Odds*, pp. 142-44

²⁰⁷ 14 October 1949, Rusk memorandum for Jessup before the latter’s meeting with Lester Pearson, (501.BC Kashmir) RG 59 (CDF, 1945-49) Box 2161, NARA-II; Bancroft (UNP) and Mathews (SOA) had briefed Rusk

²⁰⁸ 3 November 1949, No. 5198, Washington to FO and 13 December 1949, CRO’s note, L/PS/12/1412, IOR

²⁰⁹ 26 October 1949, No. 923, Moscow to FO, L/PS/12/4769, IOR

²¹⁰ 1 November 1949, New York to FO, POL 2749/49, L/PS/12/1412, IOR

²¹¹ 26 October 1949, Oliver Franks to Bevin, T. No. 774, L/PS/12/1412, IOR

²¹² 9 December 1949, Nye to CRO, X2089, L/PS/12/1412, IOR

²¹³ 19 November 1949, Bajpai to Roberts, L/PS/12/1412, IOR

²¹⁴ 3 November 1949, Washington to FO, T. No. 5198, L/PS/12/1412, IOR

²¹⁵ 9 November 1949, Nehru to Noel-Baker, L/PS/12/1412, IOR

The CRO, which had ‘not [been] consulted’ about Nehru’s visit,²¹⁶ had been initially unhappy about it, more so when it heard that Huddle had told the Pakistan Ambassador in Burma that Nehru had been invited ‘on the advice of the HMG’.²¹⁷ Annoyed at the State Department, it had attributed the trip, along with America’s decision to support India’s candidature for the Security Council, to a growing realisation of India’s key role in South-east Asia. It had to be assured by the State Department that ‘no special political significance should be attached to this visit, which was essentially a goodwill tour’.²¹⁸ The CRO had also been worried that Nehru was not taking any ‘responsible official’ with him and had been relieved to know that Bajpai accompanied him.²¹⁹

A fresh bout of despair had been caused by a secret report prepared on the second anniversary of Indian independence by India’s naval chief Vice-Admiral WE Parry on Nehru’s defence and foreign policies. While acclaiming Nehru’s decision to remain inside the Commonwealth and to send Vijayalakshmi Pandit to Washington, which reflected a stemming of the distinct move in 1946-47 towards Moscow, Parry’s overall prognosis was mixed. While internally India was seriously alarmed at the Communist menace and could become the bastion against Communism in South-east Asia, equally however it was tending towards leadership of the Asiatic people.²²⁰ As Bajpai had told Pandit, unlike the Anglo-Americans, they were ‘reluctant’ to divide the region from Turkey to Australia on the basis of religion, ‘the Muslim Middle-East and the non-Muslim Far-East’.²²¹ The CRO summed up the trip thus:

The main value of the tour may well be that Nehru has learned the strength of public opinion in US in favour of a strong policy against Russia and America in turn has learnt that India’s support cannot be bought as a ready-made replacement of China in the Cold War against Communism.²²²

McGhee visited India soon after and told Nye of the ‘very definite limit’ of American interest in India.²²³ The Rhodes Scholar from Texas, who counted Robert Clive and Warren Hastings among his heroes, McGhee unsurprisingly found Nehru all but impossible to deal with.²²⁴ He

²¹⁶ 28 September 1949, RH Scott to G Crombie, 1015/85, L/PS/12/1412, IOR

²¹⁷ 30 August 1949, G Crombie to FO, T. No. 293, L/PS/12/1412, IOR

²¹⁸ 1 October 1949, Chancery (Washington) to FO, 1419/10/49, L/PS/12/1412, IOR

²¹⁹ 8 September 1949, Frank Roberts to CRO, L/PS/12/1412, IOR

²²⁰ 2 September 1949, Parry to Mountbatten, MB1/F8, Mountbatten Papers

²²¹ 31 August 1949, Bajpai to Pandit, 570-PASG/49, Subject File Serial No. 56, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

²²² 13 December 1949, CRO’s note, L/PS/12/1412, IOR

²²³ 14 and 22 December 1949, New Delhi to CRO, Nos. 1627 and 326, L/PS/12/1432, IOR

²²⁴ George McGhee, *I did it this Way* (Danbury CT: Rutledge, 2001), pp. 126-77

went back empty-handed on Kashmir, left the Indians empty-handed on aid and was convinced that America could never forge a firm relationship with India while Nehru was in charge.²²⁵ Simultaneously, Washington was becoming interested in Pakistan. Since November 1947, when Jinnah requested a \$ 2 billion loan from the US, the New World had been called upon 'to redress the balance of the Old',²²⁶ and since Liaquat's acceptance in July 1949 of Moscow's invitation to visit, London had emphasised the implications of this 'unfortunate development'.²²⁷ The making of a 'most allied ally' against a potentially hostile Soviet Union was about to begin thereby affecting South Asia and Kashmir.

McGhee now prepared memos putting together Pakistan's increasing interest in Soviet Union and Pakistan's 'cooperative attitude' on Kashmir.²²⁸ He had been urged to do so by, among others, Henry Cabot Lodge (Jr.) who had been warned by the Aga Khan about increasing Pakistan-Russian relations. Moreover, an invite to Liaquat could create a favourable impression throughout the Muslim world as well as sending a positive signal to Pakistan itself where America had been without an Ambassador for more than a year.²²⁹

Truman approved an invitation to Liaquat to visit Washington as soon as his visit to Moscow was cancelled.²³⁰ This was managed by the FO, with the British Ambassador in Moscow still handling Pakistan's interests there.²³¹ On 21 November 1949 Moscow announced the appointment of Ivan Bakulin as its first envoy to Pakistan. He was known to the FO as the enfant terrible from his years in Kabul (1943-47). It did not take long for the CRO to put out the Russian-Afghan-Indian triangle together against Pakistan, on Kashmir.²³² Soon a Soviet trade and cultural delegation visited Pakistan.²³³ Wavell spoke for many Britons when he wrote, 'I am very glad that Liaquat Ali Khan is going to America...India has had too much of the limelight since partition'.²³⁴

²²⁵ McGhee, *I did it this Way*, p. 132; he found Pandit friendly and attractive and had a good equation with her.

²²⁶ Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History* (2nd edition; London: Hurst, 2005), pp. 370-1

²²⁷ 26 July 1949, No. 91, CRO to worldwide, DO 35/2275, TNA; 6 August 1949, No 7637 and 18 October 1949, No. 9965, FO to Washington, L/PS/13/1908-II, IOR

²²⁸ 18 and 24 October 1949, McGhee to Rusk and Acheson, (Box 16, Folder Pakistan 1948 Memoranda), George McGhee Papers, 1945-53 (Lot 53D468) RG 59, NARA-II

²²⁹ 31 October 1949, Webb to Truman and 4 November 1949, Acheson to Truman, (Box 40 Folder 1 of 3) White House Confidential Files and Official File - (Box 298 Folder OF 48-T Pakistan (1 of 2)), Truman Papers

²³⁰ 12 November 1949, No. 10705, Bevin to Washington, FO 800/470, TNA

²³¹ 7 November 1949, (Box 8, Folder India 1947-49), USUN, Central Subject Files (1946-1963) RG 84

²³² Scoones-Lancaster correspondence, November-December 1949, L/PS/12/4753, IOR

²³³ See L/PS/12/4797 and L/PS/12/4788, IOR

²³⁴ 13 December 1949, Wavell to HM Close (Peshawar), MSS Eur Photo Eur 393, Wavell Papers, IOR

Conclusion

Thus, after the Indo-Soviet relations, Pakistan-Soviet relations too were employed to judge the Soviet threat on Kashmir.²³⁵ These came together in a CIA memo of 20 December 1949. In a hitherto overlooked note to Truman on ‘observations of Nehru on US, UK and the Soviet Union’, Director RH Hillenkoetter wrote:

India cannot forget that in Kashmir it has a common frontier with the USSR. It desires to maintain good relations with Moscow...Moscow has [not] been very active in this sector [but] Liaquat for some time had solicited an invitation to go to Moscow as a means of pressure on Washington and London. Now [we] have explicitly told Pakistan that [we] do not desire this visit to take place and he has had to renounce it. This cannot be to the advantage of Pakistan before Moscow.²³⁶

Similarly, the National Security Council (NSC) was declaring it ‘unwise’ to regard India as the ‘sole’ bulwark against Communism given Kashmir and India’s non-alignment.²³⁷ As the new decade began, McGhee told Rusk and Acheson that Washington ought not to accept the Indian position on Kashmir in its entirety, any more than New Delhi accepted the American position on Communist China in its entirety.²³⁸ The CIA wanted to give serious consideration to New Delhi’s position in the world balance of power in order to assess India’s will and capability to resist Soviet Union and China in Asia – given Nehru’s ‘middle-course’, China’s advance into Tibet, the activities of the CPI in India and the Kashmir dispute.²³⁹

Interestingly, on the same day that Truman was reading from Hillenkoetter, Ambassador Radhakrishnan was explaining Nehru’s visit at the Soviet Foreign Ministry. Carrying Nehru’s letter to Stalin containing birthday greetings, Radhakrishnan started with the old point about the criticism of India in the Soviet press, which was making for a ‘difficult interaction’ between the two countries. Re-emphasising non-alignment, Radhakrishnan pointed it out to

²³⁵ 22 December 1949, Maffitt to Nimitz, ‘The Soviets in Kashmir Question’ dated 20/12/49 (Box 8, Folder India 1947-49), US Mission to UNO, Central Subject Files (1946-1963) RG 84, NARA-II

²³⁶ 20 December 1949, Hillenkoetter (Rear-Admiral, US Navy and Director, CIA) to Truman, President’s Secretary’s Files - (Box 213 Folder Memorandum, 1949 (213-3)), Truman Papers

²³⁷ 23 December 1949, NSC 48/1; McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery*, p. 59

²³⁸ 7 January 1950, McGhee to Acheson (via Rusk), (Box 4, Folder 2 (Ind-Pak Dispute over Kashmir, 1950-51), Office of UN Political and Security Affairs, 1945-57 Subject Files (Lot 58D742 and 59D237) RG 59, NARA-II

²³⁹ 5 January 1950, CIA memo, CIA-CREST Records (accessed on 26 August 2013), NARA-II

Vishinski that there could be no better evidence of this than Nehru's visit during which he 'was not lured' to do any pact with the US.

In reply, Vishinski asked Radhakrishnan that, if so, then why did India not find it possible to come closer to the USSR? Why did it put itself under the 'constraints' of the Commonwealth? Radhakrishnan argued that the foundation of this impression in the USSR was the continuing presence of the slowly departing British in India and assured Vishinski that if his government would change its position towards the USSR, he would 'immediately leave his post'. Finally, Radhakrishnan once again expressed his 'hope' that it would be 'possible' for him to meet Stalin, a wish that was soon to be granted.²⁴⁰

So, as the Soviet attitude to India was showing the first signs of warming up, the American attitude towards India was getting distinctly cooler. It also provided the hinge upon which lay the initial American understanding of the Kashmir dispute over 1947-49. American determination to confront the Cold War, doubts with respect to India at the UN and disappointment at Nehru's personality and policies shaped this understanding.

Historians have often treated Kashmir as a manifestation of the unfinished past. The main impediments to square the circle have, of course, been the profoundly different geopolitical aspirations and underlying differences in political culture between India and Pakistan. But one forgets that in 1947-49, both India and Pakistan were in a poor bargaining position and, initially led by Britain, the Americans had much to offer to them. Sure, it also required a good deal from them and it was this that saw the transition of Kashmir into Washington's larger calculations albeit, as the next chapter shows, not yet decisively.

²⁴⁰ 20 December 1949, Radhakrishnan-Vishinski Talks, Fond 82, Opis 2, No. 1196, Molotov Papers, RGASPI

Kashmir, 1949-53: ‘When the US blew hot, the British blew cold and when the British blew hot, the US blew cold’¹

Introduction

In January 1951, two senior and influential Senators, Theodore Francis Green (Democrat, Rhode Island) and Homer Samuel Ferguson (Republican, Michigan),² met Dean Acheson and George McGhee to discuss Kashmir and conveyed the prevailing feeling in the US Senate that London and Washington had not been quite in tandem on this matter. This chapter probes, what Green and Ferguson termed, the ‘blow-hot-blow-cold’ approach among the Anglo-Americans two years either side of this meeting.

In doing so, it has three aims: first, it chronicles the journey of Kashmir from being a Commonwealth concern over 1949-51 to becoming an American affair in the period 1951-53, while continuing to challenge the conventional understanding that Kashmir did not get caught up in the global context until the return to power in 1951 of the Conservatives in Britain and the onset two years later of the Republican administration in America in 1953. Then, this period in India’s relations with the two Western powers is usually studied through the prisms of the New Commonwealth (1949), New China (1949) and the Korean War (1950-53).³ My purpose is to add Kashmir to this list. Finally, the chapter shows how, on the one hand, in its last years the Attlee Government was wary of the American desire to do ‘something rash and stupid’ on Kashmir,⁴ while, on the other hand, in its final months the Truman Administration found the British ‘dog-in-the-manger’ attitude on Kashmir inexcusable.⁵ This difference was, nevertheless, produced by the same impulse: the threat of Communism, internal and external, in Kashmir. Events in 1951 and 1952 were especially significant in this regard.

¹ Office of South Asian Affairs, 1939-59 (Files relating to India, 1945-52) (Lot 57D259, Box 7), RG 59

² Green had been a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee since 1938 and Ferguson was the chairman of the Republican Policy Committee.

³ See Anita Inder Singh, *The Limits of British Influence*, pp. 62-71 and Chapter 3; for recent works, see McGarr, *The Cold War in South Asia*, Chapter 1 and Rudra Chaudhuri, *Forged in Crisis*.

⁴ 1 September 1951, CRO’s note, DO 35/3030; Gordon-Walker’s note of 5 September 1951, DO 35/3008, TNA

⁵ 9 February 1951, Berry to Henderson (Box 3, Folder “H”) McGhee Papers, 1945-53 (Lot 53D468), NARA-II

Kashmir, 1949-51: 'From UN to Commonwealth level'

1950s began with a bang in India's relations with the West when Stalin met Radhakrishnan on 14 January, only the third envoy he had seen in the last six months.⁶ One of the first things Stalin asked Radhakrishnan was whether the Indian army was really independent of British control.⁷ Within days, in its very first vote as a non-permanent member on the Security Council, India voted with Russia. London and Washington wondered whether this was due to the Stalin-Radhakrishnan meeting or a result of India's accumulated pique over Kashmir.⁸ For London, this assumed significant proportions because the Americans, after the events of 1949 – the end of the UNCIP, the failure of Nimitz and McNaughton Missions and Nehru's US visit, wanted to shift Kashmir 'from UN to Commonwealth level'.

The State Department wanted the UK to take the initiative as early as the January 1950 Colombo Conference of Commonwealth Foreign Ministers. It agreed with Loy Henderson and the CIA that Kashmir was the 'stubborn fact affecting the sealing off of Communist zone of influence'.⁹ This particular memorandum drafted by McGhee and Hickerson has often been held up as the 'first, candid, comprehensive and authoritative' State Department document, one that remained the touchstone of US policy throughout the Truman administration.¹⁰ Interestingly while its content on the Indian intransigence is well-documented, its concomitant context of the Cold War gets glazed over. Fifteen months in India had convinced Henderson that Nehru was never going to satisfy the US on Kashmir,¹¹ and he was never able to focus their conversations on Kashmir.¹² Nehru, who had 'no particular grievance' against Henderson, in turn believed that Henderson's thinking was 'governed' by factors that had no direct bearing upon India.¹³

⁶ See L/PS/12/4639B and L/PS/12/1442, IOR

⁷ 22 July 1950, FK Roberts to FO, FO 371/86746, TNA; HVR Iyengar had shared this with Roberts.

⁸ 5 January 1950, No. 47, CRO to Delhi, L/PS/12/4784, IOR

⁹ 6 February 1950, McGhee (NEA) and Hickerson (UNA) memo (357.AB) RG 59 (CDF, 1950-54) Box 1370; 6 February 1950, No. 281, Henderson to Washington (690D.91) RG 59 (CDF, 1950-54) Box 2998; 16 March 1950, No. 343, Henderson to Washington (357.AB) RG 59 (CDF, 1950-54) Box 1370, NARA-II and 18 January 1950, CIA 1-50 Review of the World Situation (Box 214 Folder CIG, CIA, 1946, 1948-50 (214-1) (1 of 2), President's Secretary's Files, Truman Papers

¹⁰ Schaffer, *The Limits of Influence*, p. 29; Kux, *India and the United States*, p. 68

¹¹ 6 February 1950, Henderson to Mathews (Box 1, Folder Mathews, EG), Office Files of Ambassador Loy W Henderson, 1948-59 (Lot 67D44), NARA-II

¹² 21 February 1951, No. 1952, Henderson to Washington (Box 1, Folder Miscellaneous), Office Files of Ambassador Loy W Henderson, 1948-59 (Lot 67D44), NARA-II

¹³ 29 May 1950, Nehru to Pandit, No. 729-PM, Subject File Serial No. 60, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

The British, wary of once again being caught in the Kashmir cleft, would have liked to keep matters at the UN.¹⁴ However, they too were conscious of Kashmir's vulnerability to Communism.¹⁵ Kashmir was duly discussed by the Commonwealth Foreign Ministers,¹⁶ although greater efforts were devoted to the creation of the Colombo Plan.¹⁷ Afterwards, Bevin told the Americans that Nehru had been 'difficult',¹⁸ but the Canadian Foreign Minister Lester Pearson had spoken about 'the shadow of Kashmir in the light of Communist threat in Asia'.¹⁹ Indeed, more than Bevin, Pearson and the Australian Foreign Minister Percy Spender had emphasised that 'looked at in the general context of Asia, the sands are running out on Kashmir'.²⁰ There was a feeling among these older members that, with India and Pakistan having established relations with Moscow and accorded recognition to Peking, it was more important than ever that the 'Commonwealth should present a united and unbroken front',²¹ and its 'dirty linen' should not be washed at the UN.²²

The Commonwealth's efforts acquired yet-more urgency, when in March-April 1950, India and Pakistan almost 'talked themselves into a war' in Bengal.²³ The CIA would call it Pakistan's 'hot war with India' compared to its 'cold war with Afghanistan'.²⁴ Fortunately for the West, apart from Nehru's and Liaquat's level-headedness and the Governor of East Bengal Frederick Bourne's behind-the-scenes influence,²⁵ a good number of senior Britons still served in India and Pakistan bearing crucial restraint: 67 officers in Indian Navy and 32 in Pakistan, 157 officers in Indian Army and 344 in Pakistan and 23 officers in Indian Air Force and 43 in Pakistan.

¹⁴ 5 January 1950, No. 7, USUN to Acheson (357.AB) RG 59 (CDF, 1950-54) Box 1370, NARA-II

¹⁵ 6 February 1950, McGhee to Rusk and Acheson (Box 8 of 10) Lot File No. 57D373, RG 59 and 20 February 1950, Mathews to Henderson (Box 1, Folder Mathews, EG), Office Files of Ambassador Loy W Henderson, 1948-59 (Lot 67D44) RG 59, NARA-II

¹⁶ 17 and 19 January 1950, New Delhi to CRO, Nos. 47 and 212, L/PS/12/4777, IOR

¹⁷ 15 February 1950, No. 887, London to Washington (741.0141E) RG 59 (CDF, 1950-54) Box 3519, NARA-II

¹⁸ 29 January 1950, No. 95, London to Washington (741.0141E) RG 59 (CDF, 1950-54) Box 3519, NARA-II

¹⁹ 22 February 1950, No. 42, Ottawa to Washington (741.0141E) RG 59 (CDF, 1950-54) Box 3519, NARA-II;

24 February 1950, No. 36, Ottawa to CRO, DO 35/3036, TNA

²⁰ February 1950, FO to New York, DO 35/3037; 8 February 1950, No. 40, Canberra to CRO, DO 35/3036

²¹ 21 February 1950, CRO's note, L/PS/12/4752; for China see L/PS/12/4794, IOR

²² 27 June 1951, Gordon-Walker-Pearson talks, DO 35/3027, 30 July 1951, Canberra to CRO, 2/145/9, DO 35/3029, TNA

²³ 22 March 1950, Bajpai to Pandit, 72-SG/505, Subject File Serial No. 56, Pandit Papers (I Instalment) and April 1950, CoS (50) 116, DO 35/2280, TNA

²⁴ 15 March 1950, CIA 3-50 Review of the World Situation (Box 214 Folder CIG, CIA, 1946, 1948-50 (214-2) (2 of 2), President's Secretary's Files, Truman Papers

²⁵ See Frederick Bourne Papers, MSS Eur E 364, IOR

Few historians have acknowledged this restraining legacy from colonial rule. On the other hand, in Moscow, precisely these Britons represented the ‘foreign influence’, the ‘only hurdle to achieve agreement’ in Kashmir. Vishinski lauded Nehru and Liaquat for taking charge of the affairs in Bengal and urged upon Radhakrishnan, a similar initiative on Kashmir.²⁶

The Colombo Conference led to the Owen Dixon Mission (April-August 1950) on Kashmir.²⁷ Acheson was happy that the Commonwealth was being utilised ‘more fully’. He assured Bevin that America would ‘supplement’ it.²⁸ The Americans kept up their indirect pressure by calling Kashmir the key to ‘keep Communist virus in that area under control’ and the ‘tragic symbol of the inability of the free world to strengthen its Asian foundations’. They were however reluctant to intervene directly for fear of its ‘repercussions on India’s and Pakistan’s orientation towards USSR’.²⁹ Henderson told Nehru that the US policy was ‘determined rather by the UK approach’.³⁰ Vijayalakshmi Pandit from Washington and BN Rau from New York were also reporting that ‘it was the UK that had influenced the USA’.³¹

However, with ‘war-hysteria [and] witch-hunt’ rising in America in the spring-summer of 1950,³² there was a shift in Washington away from India.³³ This was reflected in the preparations for Liaquat’s May-June 1950 trip in which McGhee stressed the Pakistan’s Prime Minister’s friendliness towards America and the many points of similarity between the two countries,³⁴ contrasting them with Nehru’s ‘socialist leanings’.³⁵ As Maffitt put it to Austin, if there seemed ‘a *non sequitor*’ in India’s charge that US favoured Pakistan because of its usefulness in the Cold War, ‘the Indians [had] something in this point’.³⁶

²⁶ 7 April 1950, Vishinski-Radhakrishnan Talks, Fond 82, Opus 2, No. 1196, Molotov Papers, RGASPI

²⁷ See Philip Ayers, *Owen Dixon* (Melbourne: Miegunyah Press, 2003); also, Brecher, *The Struggle in Kashmir*

²⁸ 25 April 1950, Bureau of Near-Eastern and South-Asian Affairs (Records relating to Kashmir, 1952-64) and 17 April 1950 Lot File No. 57D373 (Box 8 of 10), RG 59, NARA-II

²⁹ 22 February 1950, No. 626, Moscow to Washington (690D.91) RG 59 (CDF, 1950-54) Box 2998, NARA-II

³⁰ 24 February 1950, Menon to Pandit, D867-AMS/50, Subject File Serial No.14, Pandit Papers (II Instalment)

³¹ 10 March 1950, Pandit to Bajpai, Subject File Serial No. 55, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

³² 27 March 1950, Pandit to Nehru, Subject File Serial No. 59, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

³³ 2 April 1950, Pandit to Bajpai, Subject File Serial No. 56, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

³⁴ 25 April 1950, (Box 16, Folder Pakistan 1948 Memoranda) (Lot 53D468) George McGhee Papers, 1945-53; McGhee’s points were: essentially religious and home-loving people, essentially agricultural economies, common international relations and conservative personalities.

³⁵ 22 May 1950, Pandit to Nehru, Subject File Serial No. 59 and 1 July 1950, Nehru to Pandit, 814-PM, Subject File Serial No. 60, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

³⁶ 14 April 1950, Maffitt to Austin and Gross (Box 37, Folder India 1950-), US Mission to UNO, Central Subject Files (1946-1963) RG 84, NARA-II

Soon, however, Lester Pearson questioned the policy of ‘pressing India too hard’ within the Commonwealth.³⁷ After the failure of the Dixon Mission, the Australians also started to urge the Americans to take the lead in Kashmir ‘in view of Korea’.³⁸ Owen Dixon, having ‘found it impossible’ to deal with Nehru,³⁹ told Acheson that Nehru was ‘the most dangerous enemy of the West [and] must be played down in Asia’.⁴⁰ Nehru had expected this and wrote to his sister pointing to the events in Greece and Korea as a ‘warning to us’.⁴¹ He braced for, what to him appeared as, Washington’s ‘concerted attempt to build up Pakistan and build down India’ in Kashmir as well as Asia at large.⁴²

By June 1950, Nehru’s positions on Kashmir and other international affairs were getting an ‘extremely critical’ reception in America.⁴³ Once war broke out in Korea, aptly called the ‘first real international test’ for Nehru’s foreign policy and attitude to the US,⁴⁴ the Near-East Bureau in Washington did not take much time in putting together Korea-Formosa-Indo-China and Kashmir as problems facing Communist aggression.⁴⁵ To this list, the CIA added the Soviet domination of the uranium-rich Sinkiang whose proximity to Kashmir meant a steady flow of refugees and possible subversion from there.⁴⁶

Contrasting Kashmir with Korea, the American Embassy in Moscow reported on 5 September 1950 that the Kremlin appeared ‘to favour Indian claims probably with the aim to encourage Indian intransigence’.⁴⁷ The Korean situation ‘complicated’ the understanding on Kashmir in London and Washington to an extent that is not realised.⁴⁸ Kashmir precluded any possibilities of Pakistan providing troops in Korea and affected Pakistan’s defence talks with

³⁷ 24 May 1950, Pearson to Patrick Gordon-Walker, DO 35/3019, TNA

³⁸ 23 August 1950, (357.AB) RG 59 (CDF, 1950-54) Box 1370, NARA-II

³⁹ 23 August 1950, Dixon to Nehru, Subject File Serial No. 37, Ayyangar Papers

⁴⁰ 16 October 1950, Pandit to Bajpai, Subject File Serial No. 56, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

⁴¹ 9 May 1950, Nehru to Pandit, 509-PM, Subject File Serial No. 60, Pandit Papers (I instalment)

⁴² 10 May and 29 May 1950, Nehru to Pandit, Subject File Serial No. 60, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

⁴³ 20 June 1950, Bajpai to Pandit, 247-SG/50, Subject File Serial No. 56 and 29 June 1950, Pandit to Nehru, Subject File Serial No. 59, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

⁴⁴ Chaudhuri, *Forged in Crisis*, p. 50

⁴⁵ 11 August 1950 (Box 13, (Folder India, Top Secret), George McGhee Papers, 1945-53 (Lot 53D468) RG 59

⁴⁶ 20 July 1950, CIA-CREST Records (accessed on 26 August 2013), NARA-II

⁴⁷ No. 608, (357.AB) RG 59 (CDF, 1950-54) Box 1370, NARA-II

⁴⁸ 14 August 1950, Memo to Webb (690D.91) RG 59 (CDF, 1950-54) Box 2998, NARA-II; 31 August 1950, Bevin-Owen Dixon talks, FO 800/470, TNA

the UK and the US.⁴⁹ At the same time, the Korean War enhanced the urgency of a Western defence plan in the Middle-East towards which Kashmir was proving a hurdle. Despite an emphasis by the CoS, urgings by the MoD and increasing interest of the Americans, the CRO found it 'derisory' that the US-UK should give Pakistan a 'blanket' assurance on Kashmir.⁵⁰ Cawthorn and Gracey warned London that Pakistan would opt for 'neutrality' if the West did not assist it in settling Bengal and Kashmir.⁵¹

The trouble was that the neutral neighbour's plight seemed hardly worth emulating. Bajpai was contrasting the 'hysterical' US and the 'unhelpful' UK with the 'totalitarian' and 'fearful' USSR.⁵² Internally, Sheikh Abdullah had become 'openly defiant' and 'most irresponsible'. With Pandit reporting that Kashmir was 'linked up' in people's minds in Washington with Korea, Bajpai was wondering whether the 'uneasy partnership' with Abdullah would end in 'complete estrangement'.⁵³ As Nehru put it to his sister, 'the most difficult thing in life is what to do with one's friends'.⁵⁴ Patel brought out the intermingled nature of the UN's diplomatic involvement in Kashmir and Korea. On Radhakrishnan's suggestions to Vishinski on Korea viz. demilitarisation, presence of UNCIP troops, UN administration for 3-6 months, election of government, Patel reminded Nehru that

What he [Radhakrishnan] has suggested is precisely what Dixon suggested to us in connection with Kashmir... We specifically desired that we should avoid any suggestion which might recoil on us in dealing with Kashmir... I only hope his suggestion will not be exploited further by Vyshinsky when UNSC comes to deal with Kashmir.⁵⁵

For a year from June 1950 onwards, Korea overshadowed Kashmir in India's interaction with the West, especially with Washington. This is most evident from Rau's and Pandit's correspondence with Nehru in this period. Along with Communist China's admission to the UN, it became an 'acid test' for Nehru.⁵⁶ On these, he was not going 'to line up [with US] in

⁴⁹ 4 December 1950, Cawthorn to Scoones, DO 35/2274, TNA and 11 May 1951, No. 727 and 24 May 1951, No. 782, Washington to Karachi, (357.AB) RG 59 (CDF, 1950-54) Box 1370, NARA-II

⁵⁰ April 1950, CRO's note on Addison-Graffety Smith letter, 23 August 1949 (D 2000/91), DO 35/3008, TNA

⁵¹ 18 March 1950, No. 180812Z, Karachi to Washington (690D.91) RG 59 (CDF, 1950-54) Box 2998, NARA-II

⁵² 20 July and 30 July 1950, Bajpai to Pandit, 319-SG/50 and 335-SG/50, Subject File Serial No. 56, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

⁵³ 31 July 1950, Pandit to Bajpai, Subject File Serial No. 56 and 10 August 1950, Nehru to Pandit, Subject File Serial No. 60, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

⁵⁴ 10 May 1950, Nehru to Pandit, Subject File Serial No. 60, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

⁵⁵ 11 September 1950, Patel to Nehru and Rajaji, DPM/697/50, Subject File 62, CR Papers (IV Instalment)

⁵⁶ 23 September 1950, No. 1374-PM, Nehru to BN Rau, Correspondence File, Rau Papers (I Instalment)

any way'.⁵⁷ Russia remained 'a new world' to him, China 'friendly' and the US-UK 'Gilbertian'.⁵⁸ This meant that India remained 'unpopular' in America and this unpopularity fed into other issues closer to India – Kashmir, South Africa and Tibet.⁵⁹ By 1954, the 'experience of Korean negotiations' would show the 'reality and importance of non-alignment' to the Americans; even if India's approach to China and opposition to collective security grated with the Republicans and confirmed Eisenhower's 'funny people' thesis.⁶⁰

For the moment, however, Rau told Nehru that the US-UK combine 'cannot even think of any solution not entirely acceptable to Pakistan' on Kashmir.⁶¹ Nehru's reply reflected more his concern about establishing friendly relations with China than Kashmir on which he was 'tired of the intrigues of the UK, USA'.⁶² By the second half of 1950, battling in Korea, Washington needed no convincing of the same Communist danger threatening Kashmir.⁶³ The CIA reported that Soviet Union was pursuing a 'soft policy' toward Iran, Afghanistan and India.⁶⁴ Tired of Nehru's 'idealistic air',⁶⁵ the State Department urged London to take advantage of the fact that India was 'isolated' on Kashmir and Korea within the Commonwealth.⁶⁶ The South-Asia Bureau was ready to prod India and pressure Afghanistan on Kashmir and Pashtoonistan, respectively 'if it was to expect Pakistan to stand by US vis-à-vis China and the USSR'.⁶⁷ The US Mission to UN too urged a UK lead.⁶⁸

In December 1950, the CIA prepared a note on Communist personalities and activities in Kashmir that named BPL Bedi, his wife Freda, GM Sadiq, Mirza Afzal Beg, Muhiuddin Kara

⁵⁷ 30 August 1950, Nehru to BN Rau, Correspondence File, Rau Papers (I Instalment)

⁵⁸ 30 August 1950, Nehru to Pandit, Subject File Serial No. 60, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

⁵⁹ 31 October 1950, Rau to Nehru, Correspondence File, Rau Papers (I Instalment)

⁶⁰ Chaudhuri, *Forged in Crisis*, p. 50, 76; see the chapter 'Funny People', pp. 49-77

⁶¹ 13 November 1950, Rau to Nehru, Correspondence File, Rau Papers (I Instalment)

⁶² 17 November 1950, Nehru to Rau, No. 1834-PM, Correspondence File, Rau Papers (I Instalment)

⁶³ 8 November 1950, No. 3113, Nye to CRO, FO 371/8423 and FO's note, November 1950, FO 371/84233, TNA; 29 September 1950, No. 799, Henderson to Washington (690D.91) RG 59 (CDF, 1950-54) Box 2998 and 17 November 1950, State Department memo (Box 8 of 10) Lot File No. 57D373, RG 59, NARA-II

⁶⁴ 20 September 1950, CIA 9-50 Review of the World Situation (Box 214 Folder CIG, CIA, 1946, 1948-50 (214-2) (2 of 2), President's Secretary's Files, Truman Papers

⁶⁵ 3 October 1950, Henderson to Jessup (Box 1, Folder Papers relating to India, 1948-51), Office Files of Ambassador Loy W Henderson, 1948-59 (Lot 67D44), NARA-II

⁶⁶ 19 September 1950, Webb to Truman (Box 532 Folder OF 85-P Kashmir Commission), Official File, Truman Papers; 29 October 1950, Bajpai to Pandit, 503-SG/50, Subject File Serial No. 56, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

⁶⁷ 21 December 1950, Kennedy (SOA) to McGhee (NEA), (Box 4, Folder 1, Ind-Pak Dispute over Kashmir, 1950-51) and (Box 14, Folder 1, 1950-51) Office of UN Political and Security Affairs, 1945-57 Subject Files (Lot 58D742 and 59D237) RG 59, NARA-II

⁶⁸ 11 September 1950, Austin to Acheson (Box 37, Folder India 1950-) US Mission to UNO, Central Subject Files (1946-1963) RG 84, NARA-II

and Dhanwantri. It highlighted publications like *Noor*, *Uplift* and *Burj*, which it claimed were funded by the Soviet and Czech embassies in New Delhi.⁶⁹ It was especially concerned about BPL and Freda Bedi, whom it had earlier called the ‘leading light’ of Communism in Sheikh Abdullah’s administration.⁷⁰ The Bedis were instrumental in keeping the ‘inner core’ of Abdullah, Bakshi and Sadiq intact. Deeply involved in the ‘nationalisation’ of land as well as textbooks, Bedi, however, disturbed New Delhi as much as he was bothering Washington and London. Between 1947 and 1953, he was a key pointsman and draftsman for Abdullah with the governments of India and Pakistan and the subcontinental and international press.⁷¹

The State Department, therefore, considered ‘assuming the initiative’ if the UK failed in the Commonwealth Prime Minister’s Conference of January 1951 to settle Kashmir.⁷² It was not sanguine of the UK’s ability for its ‘deathly’ fear of antagonising its ‘Commonwealth daughters’.⁷³ Nevertheless, for its final tilt at the windmills in Kashmir, the Attlee Government sought to ‘get India and Pakistan to recognise that the Kashmir dispute must now be looked at in a wholly new [Communist] perspective’.⁷⁴ Over December 1950-January 1951, the CRO prepared two memoranda stressing the settling of the Kashmir dispute in the light of ‘communist imperialism’ as it ‘prevents India-Pakistan from standing together’ in the Far-East and the Middle-East.⁷⁵ The CRO stressed that ‘a new appreciation of world strategy is required in Kashmir’ since the Chinese actions in Korea.⁷⁶ The FO added its appreciation:

We are struck by the great gap left in our Asian defence position owing to the fact that India and Pakistan neutralise each other... We hope that the obvious danger that India may find herself more or less isolated with a successful Communist China on her borders would have its effect and induce an attitude favourable to negotiations [on Kashmir].⁷⁷

⁶⁹ 6 December 1950, CIA-CREST Records (accessed on 26 August 2013), NARA-II

⁷⁰ 14 February 1949, ‘Communism in Kashmir’, SDR (India: Internal Affairs, 1945-49, Part I – reel 14), CSAS

⁷¹ Oral History Transcripts, BPL Bedi (270), pp. 232-37, NMML; Sheikh Abdullah’s first cabinet had GM Bakshi (Deputy), Afzal Beg (Revenue), Budh Singh (Health), GM Sadiq (Development), SL Saraf (Food), GL Dogra (Finance) and Pir Mohammad Khan (Education).

⁷² 21 December 1950, NEA-SOA Meeting (Box 8 of 10) Lot File No. 57D373 (Box 8 of 10); 3 January 1951, UNP memo, (Box 16, Folder Pakistan 1948 Memoranda) McGhee Papers, 1945-53 (Lot 53D468) RG 59

⁷³ 14 November 1950, Maffitt to Austin (Box 37, Folder India 1950-) US Mission to UNO, Central Subject Files (1946-1963) RG 84, NARA-II

⁷⁴ 12 December 1950, CRO to Delhi (3005), Karachi (1977), DO 134/13; 14 December 1950, DO 35/3007

⁷⁵ 19 December 1950 and 3 January 1951, PREM 8/1455/10, TNA

⁷⁶ 11 December 1950, CRO’s note, DO 35/3007, TNA

⁷⁷ 15 December 1950, Strang to Liesching, DO 35/3007, TNA

Gordon-Walker held that the ‘urgency of the world situation will brook no delay’ on Kashmir given ‘the preponderance of Russian menace, fifth column activities of Communists [and] China’s actions in Korea [and] Tibet’.⁷⁸ Bevin urged a new approach to Nehru ‘linking the question of Kashmir with the whole problem of defence against Communism’.⁷⁹ Attlee was anxious ‘about Kashmir given the deteriorating situation actually in the Far-East and potentially in the Middle-East’.⁸⁰ To this list, the FO and the CRO added the India-Afghanistan ‘marriage of convenience’ against Pakistan.⁸¹

In January 1951, however, Liaquat threw a spanner in the wheel by threatening to skip the Commonwealth Conference unless it was guaranteed that Kashmir would be discussed there. His stand was supported by Menzies (Australia) and Holland (New Zealand).⁸² This activism on the part of the Australians did not go unremarked in New Delhi, which was by now convinced that led by Australia the old dominions, barring Canada, were greatly ‘pro-Pakistan’.⁸³ Attlee replied that Liaquat was being ‘impracticable’ and ‘it would hurt Pakistan to be obdurate and indulge in blackmail’.⁸⁴ Nothing could be ‘committed’ but, along with his Canadian, Australian and New Zealand counterparts, Attlee would be prepared to join Liaquat in discussing Kashmir with Nehru, subject to the latter’s willingness.⁸⁵ Nehru agreed to an informal talk but Liaquat insisted on ‘a joint discussion’.⁸⁶ Prodded by the CRO and pressurised by the white Commonwealth,⁸⁷ Attlee agreed.⁸⁸

On 10 January 1951, in Menzies’ room in the Savoy, Attlee, Nehru and Liaquat discussed Kashmir in the presence of their Commonwealth counterparts. Five days later, at Chequers, they were again joined by Menzies, who was the most vocal participant alongside the Canadian St Laurent. Together they confronted Nehru to consider Kashmir in the light of the ‘world situation’ i.e. China and Korea.⁸⁹ Separately, Bevin told Nehru and Bajpai that

⁷⁸ 19 December 1950, Gordon-Walker to Bevin, DO 35/3007, TNA; also see FO 371/84236, TNA

⁷⁹ 8 December 1950, Bevin to Gordon-Walker, DO 35/3007, TNA; also see FO 371/84235, TNA

⁸⁰ 22 December 1950, New Delhi (3122) and Karachi (2039), DO 35/3007, TNA

⁸¹ See FO 371/92099, TNA

⁸² 1 January 1951, No. 1, Singapore to FO and Nos. 4 and 5, Karachi to CRO, CAB 21/1782, TNA

⁸³ 14 November 1950, Sita Ram to Bajpai, No HC-959, File No 14 (8) -K/50 (GOI, MOS, Kashmir), NAI

⁸⁴ 2 January 1951, Nos. 6 and 7, CRO to Karachi, CAB 21/1782, TNA

⁸⁵ See CAB (51) 1st meeting, CAB 21/1782, TNA

⁸⁶ 3 January 1951, No. 11, CRO to Karachi; 3 January 1951, Nos. 10 and 12, Karachi to CRO and 4 January 1951, Nos. 19 and 21, CAB 21/1782, TNA

⁸⁷ 5 January 1951, Nos. 27 and 28, Karachi to CRO, CAB 21/1782, TNA

⁸⁸ 4 January 1951, No. 20 and 5 January 1951, No. 28, CRO to Karachi, CAB 21/1782, TNA

⁸⁹ 10 January 1951, Nehru’s notes of the Savoy Talks, Subject File 62, CR Papers (IV Instalment)

‘Kashmir must be looked upon within the strategies of Russia and China’.⁹⁰ With the Indian Prime Minister unfazed, they all, including Attlee, ‘reluctantly concluded’ that Nehru did not want Commonwealth arbitration.⁹¹ Pakistan indulged in some talk of ‘turning to Russia’, which the FO dismissed as ‘primarily blackmail’.⁹²

Washington, though, informed the FO that with the Commonwealth’s latest failure, it was inclined to take the lead so as to ‘counteract mounting anti-UK/US feeling in Pakistan’. As far as the State Department was concerned, Kashmir was ‘standing in the way of almost everything we were trying to do in Asia and not only in Asia’.⁹³ The action thus shifted back to New York and Washington where, according to Pandit, a ‘hymn of hate’ against India was on.⁹⁴ Chester Nimitz was once again approached to be the plebiscite administrator.⁹⁵ This chimed in with the position of General Omar Bradley, the influential Chairman of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), who expected Nimitz to strengthen the UN’s position in Kashmir precluding the need for any ‘unilateral US action’.⁹⁶ It also reflected the CIA’s analysis for the next two years in Kashmir:

The character of developments in South Asia will depend largely on the turn taken by the Kashmir dispute. If modus vivendi reached then Pakistan would lean pro-West, Indians more cooperative with US and more suspicious of Chinese; otherwise Pakistan would not make any contribution to Western mutual defence programmes. If war then all bets off.⁹⁷

Kashmir, 1951: ‘A point of No Return’

As the Commonwealth talks were going on in January 1951, Loy Henderson complained to McGhee that the British had not ‘always been frank’ on Kashmir. Henderson was starting to believe that America could no longer ‘trust the British to represent our partnership in South Asia’. McGhee too was puzzled somewhat by the ‘brazen and cynical’ British and his Bureau was starting to drop its illusions about the British stature in South Asia and be keen on an

⁹⁰ 27 February 1951, Bevin to Frank Roberts, FO 800/470, TNA

⁹¹ See CAB 21/1782, TNA

⁹² 1 February 1951, FL1015/76, FO 371/92856, TNA

⁹³ 6 January and 8 January 1951, FN 1015/9, FO 371/92854, TNA

⁹⁴ 5 February 1951, Pandit to Nehru, Subject File Serial No. 59, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

⁹⁵ 19 February 1951, No. 526, Washington to FO, FO 371/92857 and 357.AB/3-2351, CDF (1950-54) Box 1371

⁹⁶ 15 January 1951 (Section 10), Box 2, Folder 092 (Asia), General Omar Bradley, 1949-53, RG 218 Records of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman’s File, NARA-II

⁹⁷ CIA Staff Planning Project No. 26 (South Asia), 1951, CIA-CREST Records (accessed on 26 August 2013)

independent US policy there.⁹⁸ With the Commonwealth efforts foundering, the Near-East, UN and Far-East Bureaus within the State Department wanted ‘a stronger, more pointed and comprehensive’ American position on Kashmir. Putting Indian intransigence on Kashmir and Indian criticism of America on Korea together, they believed that Washington had reached, for the present, ‘a point of no return’, and wanted to move beyond India’s ‘unwillingness’ and take ‘more radical steps’, be it in Korea, Kashmir or Iran.⁹⁹

A stream of new intelligence was coming in to produce this resolve. In January 1951, Colonel Coblenz of the US Army and the acting chief of UN’s Kashmir Observers returned to Washington after serving there for two years and told the State Department that the Abdullah regime, which according to Coblenz had ‘no following’ and survived on ‘intimidation’, represented ‘the nearest thing to turning over the state to the Communists’. He was convinced that Abdullah’s Ministers for the key portfolios of Communication and Education were Communists.¹⁰⁰ Meanwhile, London sent to Washington Graffety-Smith’s report on Kashmir impairing the ‘buttress against Communism’ in South Asia.¹⁰¹

Simultaneously, Henderson’s military attaché too submitted a memorandum reiterating the usefulness of ‘air bases in Kashmir’.¹⁰² Senior British and American military men in the Middle-East were arguing that ‘political and military considerations could not be separated’ in Kashmir.¹⁰³ The dominant feeling was that India was a worthwhile long-term military risk and Pakistan an immediate prospect for a Middle-East pact.¹⁰⁴ In India, the new Home Minister Rajagopalachari perceived this well and it seemed to him ‘an elementary necessity for India to have to go with either bloc’.¹⁰⁵

⁹⁸ 8 January 1951, Henderson to McGhee and 9 February 1951, Berry to Henderson (Box 3, Folder “H” Letters) McGhee Papers, 1945-53 (Lot 53D468) RG 59, NARA-II

⁹⁹ Collins to Mathews (SOA), 19 January 1951 (Box 4, (Folder 1, Ind-Pak Dispute over Kashmir, 1950-51) Office of UN Political and Security Affairs, 1945-57 Subject Files (Lot 58D742 and 59D237) and 28 February 1951, Memo on US policy on Kashmir, CDF (1950-54) Box 2998 (690 D.91) RG 59, NARA-II

¹⁰⁰ 24 January 1951 (Box 63, Folder Kashmir), Office Files of Harry Howard, 1945-60 (Entry A1 1291) (Lot 61D214) RG 59, NARA-II

¹⁰¹ 10 January 1951, FO 371/92863, TNA

¹⁰² 22 January 1951, Memo on “problems of military assistance” submitted by Military Attaché of American Embassy, New Delhi (Box 4, Folder New Delhi Documents, 1951), (Entry A1 1534; Regional Conferences and Country Files, Bureau of Near-Eastern and South-Asian Affairs, 1951-55 (RG 59), NARA-II

¹⁰³ 13 March 1951, Combined letter from C-in-C NELM and C-in-C, ME to the UK CoS and the US JCS, MIL/3039/ME and 6 April 1951, Shinwell to Gordon-Walker, DO 35/3008, TNA

¹⁰⁴ 10 March 1951 (Section 13), Cdr, Middle-Eastern Force to Chief of Naval Operations, Box 2, Folder 092 (Asia), General Omar Bradley, 1949-53, RG 218 Records of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman’s File

¹⁰⁵ Rajaji’s note of 1950-51, Subject File Serial No. 20, Rajagopalachari Papers (VI-X Instalments)

A key fork in the road was the South Asian Regional Conference of American Ambassadors held in Colombo from 26 February to 2 March 1951. Existing scholarship on Kashmir has tended to omit its importance in the shift of American position.¹⁰⁶ New material shows the envoys frustrated with the slow tempo on Kashmir ‘thrown into sharper focus by the release of other tensions’: the Russian attitude, importance of Kashmir to South Asia and the US policies on Korea.¹⁰⁷ Unimpressed by Nehru’s ‘highly personal foreign policy over Kashmir and China’, they contrasted it with the possibilities of Pakistan’s moderating influence in the Middle-East.¹⁰⁸ McGhee and Henderson even spoke about ‘bypassing’ India by giving it ‘such [economic] guarantees as might ensure her benevolence’ and concentrating on Pakistan.¹⁰⁹ After the conference, McGhee met Nehru and Bajpai and was dismissed by them as having developed a ‘Communist disease’.¹¹⁰

Soon after the conference, articles started appearing in the *Crossroads*, a CPI publication, about Anglo-American designs in Kashmir.¹¹¹ Another, overlooked, reason for this was Stalin’s meeting with the CPI leadership in Moscow on 9 February 1951. Apart from meeting him, Rajeshwar Rao, S Dange, AK Ghosh and B Punnaiya also met with Malenkov, Suslov and Yudin. Rao and Muzaffar Ahmed had written regularly to Stalin between May and October 1950, apprising him with the situation in India.¹¹² The Soviet interest in India continued to be linked first and foremost with the CPI and secondly with Nehru’s emerging position on the Korean War, which Stalin termed as ‘manoeuvring between England and America’.¹¹³ This was good enough for London and Washington to exchange notes about the growing indications of Soviet and Yugoslav interest in Kashmir in March, ten months before the Soviet representative Jacob Malik’s UN speech on Kashmir usually held as the first Cold War moment for Kashmir.¹¹⁴

¹⁰⁶ See Schaffer, *The Limits of Influence*, pp. 30-3

¹⁰⁷ 4 January 1951, Paper prepared on “US objectives and policies in the light of the current situation”, CDF (1950-54) Box 0531 (120.434) RG 59 and Pakistan, Karachi Embassy Records re: South Asian Regional Conference, 26 February-2 March 1951 - Avra M Warren Files, RG 84 and 6 March 1951, Ross to Gross (Box 37, Folder India 1951) US Mission to UNO, Central Subject Files (1946-1963) RG 84, NARA-II

¹⁰⁸ 12 April 1951, BA Burrows (Washington) to FO, 2230/1/2/51, DO 35/3008, TNA

¹⁰⁹ 13 April 1951, Graffety-Smith to Liesching, No S/66 and 28 April, Nye to Liesching, CS/15, DO 35/3008

¹¹⁰ 13 March 1951, Bajpai to Pandit, 90-SG/51, Subject File Serial No. 56, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

¹¹¹ 3 March 1951, No. 359, Delhi to CRO, DO 35/3025, TNA

¹¹² 9 February; 4 and 6 February 1951, Fond 558, Opis 11, No. 310 and No. 308-09, Stalin Papers, RGASPI

¹¹³ Hilger, ‘The Soviet Union and India: the Years of Late Stalinism’, p. 2, 4

¹¹⁴ 7 March 1951, No. 1234, New York to Washington (Box 9 of 10), Lot File No. 57D373 and 8 March 1951, No. 1245, New York to Washington, CDF (1950-54) Box 1371 (357.AB) RG 59, NARA-II

In Washington, McGhee's Bureau looked upon the whole scenario thus: Pakistan was 'strained from the Commonwealth', India was the 'leader of a group who would yield to Chinese aggression on Korea', the British leadership in South Asia was 'very weak' and, therefore, America would now 'find it difficult to remain inactive'. In this context, Kashmir was the 'key problem' and the solution was to 'bring pressure on India to carry out its undertakings or accept a reasonable alternative'.¹¹⁵ McGhee could not know at this stage that while India might be prepared to 'yield' to China on Korea, on Kashmir it was very vigilant about any Chinese infiltration.¹¹⁶

On 5 March 1951, the American Embassy in Moscow sent a long telegram on Kashmir. Analysing the Soviet position, it felt that the 'Soviets did not want to alienate either India or Pakistan' and wanted 'to let the onus fall on US-UK for almost inevitably unpopular character in one country or another of a given territorial decision'. Drawing parallels with the Soviet policy in Palestine, 'formulated on same premises and with similar concerns', it argued that should the Soviets become active

They would almost certainly adopt a pro-India position though they would probably prefer a weak, independent Kashmir. A pro-Indian position would encourage Indian neutralism and at the same time embitter Pakistan's relations with US-UK by making it even more difficult for the latter to 'deliver the goods'. Indian commies would be able to capitalise, within Kashmir opportunities for commie penetration would be better under India-supported Abdullah...¹¹⁷

Irritation was growing in Washington at the unresolved Kashmir issue forcing America, as an NSC report put it, to 'adapt policies' in India and Pakistan thus affecting the entire area from the Far-East to the Near-East.¹¹⁸ Kashmir had become 'the point at which America's international obligations clashed with its national interests'.¹¹⁹ China (Sinkiang), the Middle-East and, above all, the Soviet Union comprised these international obligations and Kashmir

¹¹⁵ February 1951 (Box 4, Folder London Talks), (Entry A1 1534; Regional Conferences and Country Files, Bureau of Near-Eastern and South-Asian Affairs, 1951-55 (RG 59), NARA-II

¹¹⁶ 13 March 1951, Report from J&K Government, S.52/51-EA, File No. 1 (19)-K/51 (MOS, Kashmir), NAI

¹¹⁷ 5 March 1951, Moscow to Washington, No. 1611, CDF (1950-54) Box 1371 (357.AB) RG 59, NARA-II

¹¹⁸ 7 April 1951, Washington to Karachi, A-224, CDF (1950-54) Box 0532 (120.4346E) RG 59; 26 April 1951 (Box 13, Folder India 1951), George McGhee Papers, 1945-53 (Lot 53D468) and 26 April 1951 (Section 12), Executive Secretary's report to the NSC on US objectives, policies and courses of action in Asia, Box 2, Folder 092 (Asia), General Omar Bradley, 1949-53, RG 218, NARA-II

¹¹⁹ 3 April 1951, Memo-"Kashmir: Future Policy", CDF (1950-54) Box 2998 (690 D.91) RG 59; 3 April 1951, Ross to Gross (Box 37, Folder India 1951), US Mission to UNO, Central Subject Files (1946-1963) RG 84

was unique in being involved with each of them.¹²⁰ BN Rau and Vijayalakshmi Pandit kept Nehru informed of this rising American interest in Kashmir.¹²¹ The Indian Prime Minister noted the contrast with the British anxiety to do nothing to ‘irritate Indian opinion’, which he put down to a change in personality in the British FO where, after the death of Bevin in April 1951, a pro-India Herbert Morrison had taken charge.¹²²

By mid-1951, the State Department was convinced that Kashmir was ‘the strategic stepping stone for USSR and PRC’ in the subcontinent. Abdullah and his associates were considered in concert with ‘Kremlin and Peiping’.¹²³ Kashmir was alongside Korea, Formosa, Indo-China, Northern Burma, Tibet, Afghanistan and Iran in the long list of ‘ideal opportunities for Soviet intervention and Communist subversion’.¹²⁴ Indian intransigence on Kashmir especially grated when put together with Indian ‘neutralism’ on these other matters.¹²⁵ The question for Truman and Acheson was how long to let Kashmir remain a Commonwealth matter with the deteriorating British prestige everywhere from Turkey and Iran to India and Pakistan.¹²⁶ Journalist Norman Cousins, a ‘friend of India’, warned Rau that ‘public opinion in the US has been veering away from India’.¹²⁷

One of the reasons holding them back was the Frank Graham Mission on Kashmir over the months of July, August and September 1951. Its failure, joining previous such attempts by McNaughton, Nimitz and Dixon, prompted the CIA to remind the State Department that ‘the strategic position of Kashmir will decide the final scene of drama of Sinkiang’.¹²⁸ The US Mission to UN added Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Arab World to the Soviet Union’s

¹²⁰ (690.D 91/5-1451) CDF (1950-54) Box 2998 (690 D.91); 2 May 1951, Box 9, Folder Military Affairs and Defence Matters-General, Office of South Asian Affairs, 1939-59 (Files relating to India, 1945-52) (Lot 54D341); 3 May 1951, Box 7 (Files relating to India, 1945-52) (Lot 57D259) Office of South Asian Affairs, 1939-59 (RG 59), NARA-II; 11 May 1951, JD Murray (FO) to N Pritchard (CRO), DO 35/3008, TNA

¹²¹ 4 April 1951, Rau to Nehru, Correspondence File, Rau Papers (I Instalment) and 14 May 1951, Pandit to Nehru, Subject File Serial No. 59, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

¹²² 17 April 1951, Nehru to Rau, Correspondence File, Rau Papers (I Instalment)

¹²³ 5 June 1951, Weil to Mathews (Box 14, Folder 1, 1950-51) Office of UN Political and Security Affairs, 1945-57 Subject Files (Lot 58D742 and 59D237) RG 59, NARA-II

¹²⁴ 5 June 1951, State Department Memo (690D.91/6-551), CDF (1950-54) Box 2998 (690 D.91) RG 59

¹²⁵ 9 July 1951, State Department Memo, CDF (1950-54) Box 2998 (690 D.91) RG 59, NARA-II

¹²⁶ 14 July 1951, Acheson to Karachi/Delhi, CDF (1950-54) Box 2998 (690 D.91), 19 July 1951 (Box 14, Folder 1, 1950-51), Office of UN Political and Security Affairs, 1945-57 Subject Files (Lot 58D742 and 59D237)

¹²⁷ 31 July 1951, Norman Cousins to BN Rau, Subject File Serial No. 27, Rau Papers (I and II Instalments)

¹²⁸ 25 August-1 September 1951, CIA-CREST Records (accessed on 26 August 2013), NARA-II and 14 September 1951, CIA’s report (Box 215 Folder (215-6) NIE-41, President’s Secretary’s Files, Truman Papers

‘embarrassment of riches’.¹²⁹ They would have been even more alarmed had they known that in this same period, May to November 1951, the CPI leadership wrote regular letter to Stalin about India’s international position as well as the failed ‘imperial interference’ of Graham.¹³⁰

Nehru was naturally not going to ‘submit to any further bullying’ from the ‘partisan’ US,¹³¹ and criticised it of desiring ‘faithful allies’;¹³² but, London too was not entirely happy at this turn in American thinking. While the CRO wanted Washington to be supportive and agreed with the FO on the need to keep closely in touch with the Americans, it did not want them ‘directly associated especially so long as they are in bad odour with the Indians’.¹³³ Gordon-Walker was ‘sure that we should not be a party, with or without US, to a guarantee to Pakistan against India’ on Kashmir,¹³⁴ even as McGhee was telling his officials that they should not worry about the offence pressure on Kashmir would cause to India, as ‘Nehru could not go anywhere’.¹³⁵

When told that the UK did not entirely share these views, McGhee replied that he had often felt that the UK was too soft with India. In September 1951, in an initiative, which is little known, Dean Acheson wrote to Attlee about offering a technical and economic package to India in lieu of getting Kashmir settled so that Pakistan’s value for the Middle-East could be realised.¹³⁶ In perhaps his last decision on Kashmir, Attlee demurred and minuted that Britain ‘must not allow the Americans to drag us into policies that would seriously alienate India and achieve nothing’.¹³⁷

McGhee warned Acheson that this ‘slowness in making progress [on] Kashmir’ was causing Pakistan to ‘examine its Western orientation’. Together with ‘the contribution Pakistan could make to the defence of the Middle-East’, this made it important that America gave earnest

¹²⁹ 4 September 1951, ‘A General Consideration on Kashmir and UNO’ (Box 37, Folder India 1951), US Mission to UNO, Central Subject Files (1946-1963) RG 84, NARA-II

¹³⁰ August 1951, Fond 558, Opus 11, No. 312-13, Stalin Papers and AK Ghosh and others from the CPI to Stalin, 5 October 1951, Fond 82, Opus 2, No. 1211, Molotov Papers, RGASPI

¹³¹ 2 June 1951, Nehru to Pandit, Subject File Serial No. 60, Pandit Papers (I Instalment) and 23 June 1951, Nehru to Rau, Correspondence File, Rau Papers (I Instalment)

¹³² 6 August 1951, Nehru to Pandit, Subject File Serial No. 60, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

¹³³ 23 August 1951, N Pritchard (CRO) to RH Scott (FO), DO 35/3030, TNA

¹³⁴ 5 September 1951, Gordon-Walker’s note, DO 35/3008, TNA

¹³⁵ 13 September 1951, McGhee-Weil-Scott-Fowler-Belcher talks at the State Department, DO 35/3030, TNA

¹³⁶ 17 September 1951, Acheson to Attlee and 20 September 1951, Liesching to Attlee, DO 35/3008, TNA

¹³⁷ 20 September 1951, Attlee to Liesching, PREM 8/1455/11, TNA

consideration to Kashmir.¹³⁸ The State Department started casting around for ‘external factors’ that might help a settlement on Kashmir, for example, Chinese pressure on the flanks of Kashmir.¹³⁹ There was at least one individual in the CRO who whole-heartedly supported McGhee, General Geoffrey Scoones. The last military secretary of the old India Office and the principal staff officer of the CRO when disturbances broke out in Kashmir in 1947, Scoones had long concluded that the British policy on Kashmir had not produced any positive results because of ‘efforts to treat both Commonwealth countries alike’ and urged his civilian counterparts to go out for ‘one or the other country’.¹⁴⁰

By October 1951, the month in which Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated and Winston Churchill returned to power, Kashmir had become firmly enmeshed in the thinking around US-Pakistan mutual security programme in Washington.¹⁴¹ The State Department had started to ‘attach less weight’ than the British ‘to unfavourable reactions in India’ and ‘more weight’ ‘to the value of Pakistan’s association with the [M-E] command’.¹⁴² When Mohammad Mossadegh, the ill-fated Iranian Prime Minister, visited Washington a couple of days after Liaquat’s assassination, Truman told him that ‘there were problems throughout the area, in Kashmir, in Suez. Russia was sitting like a vulture on the fence’.¹⁴³

Differing from the British on the relative significance of the Middle-East compared to the Far-East, where India could be helpful in discussions with China,¹⁴⁴ the Americans, barring one, had concluded that the British-led inaction on Kashmir was suiting nobody except Moscow.¹⁴⁵ Away from this universe, the Kashmiris in Kashmir were ‘rather unconcerned’ that their state was being understood to ‘menacing the security of Asia’, as Taya Zinkin, wife of the ICS Maurice Zinkin, discovered to her surprise in a visit to Kashmir at this time.¹⁴⁶

¹³⁸ 22 October 1951, McGhee to Acheson, CDF (1950-54) Box 1371 (357.AB) RG 59, NARA-II

¹³⁹ 13 September 1951, Washington to FO, DO 35/3031, TNA

¹⁴⁰ 5 May and 7 June 1951, Scoones’ notes, DO 35/3008, TNA

¹⁴¹ 18 October 1951, McGhee-Kennedy Memo (Box 16, Folder Pakistan 1948 Memoranda), George McGhee Papers, 1945-53 (Lot 53D468) RG 59, NARA-II

¹⁴² 9 November 1951, Franks to FO, No. 1150, DO 35/3008; also Washington to FO, No. 3238, 8 October 1951 and CRO’s note, 16 October 1951, DO 35/3008, TNA

¹⁴³ 23 October 1951, Memoranda of Conversations, 1951 (Box 69), Acheson Papers

¹⁴⁴ 13 November 1951, Nye to Liesching, DO 35/6650, TNA

¹⁴⁵ 24 September 1951, Karachi to Washington, No. 321, CDF (1950-54) Box 2999 (690 D.91) RG 59

¹⁴⁶ October 1951, 16976/1395, File No. 8 (23)-K/51 (MOS, Kashmir), NAI

The odd American was out in the field too: Ambassador Chester Bowles in New Delhi, whom Pandit had recommended to her brother as ‘the exact opposite of Loy Henderson’.¹⁴⁷ Freshly arrived in India in November, Bowles warned Washington in his first despatches that ‘if India goes it is likely that all of South Asia and the Middle-East will also go’.¹⁴⁸ His sympathy for India might have been dated,¹⁴⁹ but he was correctly ahead of his time in at least one sense. In December 1951 itself, he was writing that ‘in the coming years, danger from the [Chinese] is likely to be much greater’.¹⁵⁰ In fact, Bowles’ tenure was dominated by Korea and China, as is clear from the reports of his conversations with Jawaharlal Nehru as well as his correspondence with Bajpai and RK Nehru.¹⁵¹ Bowles found Nehru ‘full of contradictions’ on Communism and ‘irritatingly obstinate’ on Kashmir but argued with Washington that India, with Japan, was the ‘key to Asia’.¹⁵²

As his Political Counsellor later recalled, Bowles was disregarded at the State Department as ‘just too pro-Indian’.¹⁵³ Bowles however did have one early, memorable exchange with Nehru that has been over-looked in the literature where his pro-India portrait dominates.¹⁵⁴ When Nehru complained to him that the ‘US-UK should not insist that there was no difference between the basic positions of India and Pakistan on Kashmir’, Bowles was combative enough to remind the Indian Prime Minister of ‘about the Indian views on the respective responsibility of the US and USSR for the Cold War’.¹⁵⁵ Nehru could not equivocate about the Cold War and not get a taste of his own medicine on Kashmir.

As 1951 ended, the CRO summed up various positions for the new Prime Minister, Winston Churchill. Britain’s aim, put simply, was ‘to exert the maximum pressure on India to exhibit

¹⁴⁷ 19 September 1951, Pandit to Nehru, Subject File Serial No. 59, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

¹⁴⁸ 11 December 1951, Bowles to Truman (Folder India: General) President’s Secretary’s Files - Box 158, Truman Papers; 8 and 17 November 1951, Bowles to McGhee (Entry A1 1534; Regional Conferences and Country Files, Box 2, Folder India, 1951-52) RG 59, NARA-II

¹⁴⁹ Oral History Interview of Evan Wilson, CG-Calcutta, 1952-54 (Box 43, 259), p. 77, Independence

¹⁵⁰ 6 December 1951, Bowles to Acheson (Folder India: General) President’s Secretary’s Files - Box 158, Truman Papers; 7 December 1951, Bowles to McGhee (Entry A1 1534; Regional Conferences and Country Files, Box 2, Folder India, 1951-52) RG 59, NARA-II

¹⁵¹ (Box 97, Folder 15/12 Bajpai, Girja) and (Box 99, Folder 5/4 GOI Nehru, RK - 1952-53) (Series II), Part III: 1951-53, India and Nepal Correspondences, Chester Bowles Papers MS 628, Sterling Library, Yale University

¹⁵² 15 July 1952 (Box 98, Folder 9/19 GOI Nehru, Jawaharlal - 1951-53) (Series II), Part III: 1951-53, India and Nepal Correspondences, Bowles Papers

¹⁵³ Oral History Interview of Fraser Wilkins (Box 52, 291), pp. 77-8, Independence

¹⁵⁴ On Bowles see Howard Schaffer, *New Dealer in the Cold War* (HUP, 1993) and Richard Dauer, *A North-South Mind in an East-West World* (Praeger, 2005)

¹⁵⁵ 10 January 1952 (Box 104, Folder Bowles’ Memo of Conversations) (Series II), Part III: 1951-53, India and Nepal Correspondences, Bowles Papers

some willingness to compromise'. On the other hand, America, which in the past had 'looked to the UK to take the lead', was 'impatient' with India and 'more definitely condemnatory' of it on Kashmir – an attitude that was a product of 'the general American tendency to write off India as a potential asset to the Western powers'. The CRO anticipated correctly that the 'American interest in problems of Middle-East may lead her still further towards a pro-Pakistan' position. This American impatience was complemented inside the Commonwealth by Menzies, while the Canadians were contriving 'to preserve an impartial position'.¹⁵⁶

The FO agreed that it would be 'unwise' to approach Pakistan for the Middle-East's defence at present for it would not produce any 'effective contribution on Kashmir'.¹⁵⁷ On the contrary, there could be 'some real disadvantages' vis-à-vis India. Washington's dismissal of this possibility was a key difference between them.¹⁵⁸ Well aware of this, the State Department urged Truman to take initiative on Kashmir with Churchill 'in case the Prime Minister does not raise the question', in their first meeting, after the latter's return to power, in January 1952.¹⁵⁹ After all, the CIA had stepped up its warnings about the 'Communism-tinged' Sheikh Abdullah.¹⁶⁰

Kashmir, 1952: 'Soviet trap'

All this changed dramatically when, on 17 January 1952, Jacob Malik of the Soviet Union made a speech in the Security Council accusing America and Britain of 'crude, imperial intervention' in Kashmir.¹⁶¹ The American delegation to the UN saw great significance in this speech. It could simultaneously favour the CPI in the-then on-going first general elections in India and harm Pakistan not just with India but also Egypt for the mantle of leadership in the Middle-East. The British added that it also reflected the Soviet desire to support an 'independent Kashmir under the leftist Abdullah'.¹⁶²

¹⁵⁶ 26 November 1951, CRO Memorandum on India-Pakistan relations, F 4100/2, PREM 11/920, TNA

¹⁵⁷ 12 December 1951, FO to Franks, No. 6167, DO 35/3008, TNA

¹⁵⁸ 8 January 1952, FO to Washington, 1027/29/G, DO 35/3008, TNA

¹⁵⁹ 2 January 1952, Memo for Truman, CDF (1950-54) Box 1371 (357.AB) RG 59, NARA-II

¹⁶⁰ 8 November and 12 November 1951, CIA Intelligence Bulletin and Review, CIA-CREST Records (accessed on 26 August 2013), NARA-II

¹⁶¹ 17 January 1952, Paris to FO, No. 30, DO 35/3032, TNA

¹⁶² 17 and 19 January 1952, Paris to FO, No. 31 and 106, DO 35/3032 and FO 371/101202, TNA and 19 January 1952, CIA-CREST Records (accessed on 26 August 2013), NARA-II

Malik's speech set off a flurry of diplomatic cables from New Delhi and Karachi to London and Washington. Nye was assured by Bajpai, and accepted the assurance, that the Russian intervention on Kashmir was a complete surprise to India.¹⁶³ Gilbert Laithwaite, an old India Office man who had succeeded Graffety-Smith, reported Pakistan's shock and expected 'the episode to do us some good'.¹⁶⁴ Bowles looked upon Malik's remarks as an attempt by the USSR to kill many birds by one stone: 'disrupt Indo-US relations, make Kashmir an item of ideological conflict where Indo-USSR views were similar, encourage Indian communists, support Kashmir government and discredit UN'.¹⁶⁵ Avra Warren, Laithwaite's opposite number, reported that Khwaja Nazimuddin, Pakistan's Prime Minister, told him that he would 'review his government's hitherto negative attitude towards Russia'.¹⁶⁶

Shortly after Malik's outburst in the Security Council, Sheikh Abdullah reached Paris worrying the CRO that he might have been behind the speech. It asked Nye to seek a clearer demonstration from Bajpai that given Abdullah's complicity and the Soviet meddling, India was alive to the need to settle Kashmir in 'its own interests and those of the Free World'.¹⁶⁷ The CRO had well-founded doubts, for Bajpai's aforementioned assurances as well as subsequent historiographical assertions notwithstanding, the Soviet documents reveal that the Indian Minister-Counsellor Yezdi Gundevia had expressed 'deep satisfaction' to Zorin in Moscow on Malik's statement. Gundevia conveyed the Indian gratification for the Soviet advice on this matter, for Malik's criticism of the UN's role in Kashmir and said that Malik's statement was the full reflection of Indian point of view.¹⁶⁸

Meanwhile, the FO, as always, was emphasising the 'wider implications' of Kashmir 'at a time when the Muslim world is in turmoil and anti-British sentiment predominates' there.¹⁶⁹ Abdullah's remarks to Selwyn Lloyd, the British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, in Paris about his ideal, 'independence for Kashmir', and his indifference, towards the Soviet threat, further confirmed that his ideas were 'completely contrary to those of HMG'.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶³ 18 January 1952, Delhi to CRO, No. 96, FO 371/101202, TNA

¹⁶⁴ 21 January 1952, Karachi to CRO, No. 97, DO 35/3032, TNA

¹⁶⁵ 20 January 1952, Delhi to Washington, No. 2577, CDF (1950-54) Box 2999 (690 D.91) RG 59

¹⁶⁶ 21 January 1952, Karachi to Washington, No. 745, CDF (1950-54) Box 2999 (690 D.91) RG 59

¹⁶⁷ 19 and 23 January 1952, CRO to Delhi, DO 35/3033, TNA

¹⁶⁸ 26 January 1952, Zorin-Gundevia meeting, Fond 82, Opis 2, No. 1196, Molotov Papers, RGASPI

¹⁶⁹ 23 January 1952, FO to CRO, FY 1041/59, FO 371/101202, TNA

¹⁷⁰ 4 February 1952, Paris to FO, No. 78, FO 371/101203, TNA

By the end of the month, it was clear that this Soviet attempt ‘to muddy the waters’ benefitted nobody save Abdullah and the CPI.¹⁷¹ The FO analysed that while Moscow was certainly not hoping to win Pakistan’s sympathy, it also seemed to have overlooked that Nehru was against the CPI, concerned about internal Communism and, above all, dead opposed to an independent Kashmir.¹⁷² Willi Nedou, Abdullah’s Liaison Officer in Paris, had told the British that Abdullah was seeking the Soviet support for his dream.¹⁷³ The CRO’s appreciation too focussed more on Abdullah, the ‘dangerous opportunist willing to be used by Soviets’.¹⁷⁴

The State Department’s early assessment was, if anything, even more bi-polar. It read Malik’s speech within the Soviet aims of laying the groundwork for an eventual Communist coup in Kashmir and supporting the Chinese campaign in Kashgar of ‘liberating’ Gilgit and Ladakh thus creating ‘Communist pressure in an almost unbroken line from Indo-China to Afghanistan, a ring of independent pro-Soviet states on India’s northern border’.¹⁷⁵ It did not believe that Pakistan would seriously consider aligning with USSR although ‘a reappraisal of policy [was] possible’.¹⁷⁶ As for India, while Bowles was urging everyone to ‘relax and avoid emotional involvement’ in what he called was a ‘Soviet trap’ in Kashmir,¹⁷⁷ the State Department was convinced that Kashmir was an aspect of the overall Communist strategy ‘in and on borders of subcontinent’ that indicated ‘immediate threat’.¹⁷⁸

On one thing it was absolutely clear. Pakistan stood to lose whether Moscow supported India or Abdullah. As Acheson wrote to Averell Harriman, then Director for Mutual Security, ‘Pakistan, strategically athwart the historic invasion route to the subcontinent, has exhibited strong pro-Western attitudes... We cannot be complacent about Pakistan’s continued friendly cooperation’.¹⁷⁹ Bowles was instructed to tell the Indians that American arms would not be

¹⁷¹ 30 January 1952, FO to Washington, FY1041/65, DO 35/3033, TNA

¹⁷² 22 January 1952, FO’s note, FO 371/10121, TNA

¹⁷³ 17 January 1952, Selwyn Lloyd to FO, No. 32, FO 371/10121, TNA

¹⁷⁴ CRO’s note, DO 35/3033, TNA

¹⁷⁵ 31 January 1952, No. 5781, Praveen Chaudhry and Vanduzer-Snow (eds.), *The United States and India: A History Through Archives – The Formative Years* (New Delhi: Sage and ORF, 2008), p. 468

¹⁷⁶ 24 January 1952, Near-East Bureau’s Memo to Acheson, CDF (1950-54) Box 1371 (357.AB) RG 59 and 23 January 1952, CIA-CREST Records (accessed on 26 August 2013), NARA-II

¹⁷⁷ 31 January and 12 February 1952, Bowles to Acheson, Nos. 2718 and 2851, CDF (1950-54) Box 1371 (357.AB), NARA-II; 29 January 1952 (Box 104, Folder Bowles’ Memo of Conversations) (Series II), Part III: 1951-53, India and Nepal Correspondences, Bowles Papers

¹⁷⁸ 18 February 1952, Washington to Delhi, No. 1686, CDF (1950-54) Box 1371 (357.AB) RG 59, NARA-II

¹⁷⁹ 8 February 1952 (Folder India: Bowles, Chester), President’s Secretary’s Files - Box 158, Truman Papers

forthcoming in any substantial quantities so long as the Kashmir problem remained,¹⁸⁰ which must be seen not within 'claims and counterclaims', but 'present hostilities and outside aggression'.¹⁸¹ Finally, the State Department was also wary of Abdullah's associate, Mirza Afzal Beg's proposed trip to Peking in March.¹⁸²

Once the Soviet cat was out of the bag, the State Department wanted to press forward with 'a constructive policy towards Pakistan', overcoming the CRO's 'rigid preoccupation' with India,¹⁸³ and was willing to minimise 'short-term difficulties and risk with India'.¹⁸⁴ It had the FO's support in this checkmating of the now-open Soviet attitude to Kashmir and India by equally openly identifying with Pakistan.¹⁸⁵ Not so the CRO, which in these early days of the Conservative administration was helmed by Ismay. Prodded by Mountbatten,¹⁸⁶ Nehru had sent Bajpai to assure him that India had 'no illusions' about the 'acquisitive, Communist menace'.¹⁸⁷ From New Delhi, Archibald Nye, now in his last days as High-Commissioner, had similarly appealed to his old friend to stem the rising FO-State Department tide against India.¹⁸⁸ The core of this rising sentiment was, as an FO note said,

Whether we play ball with them over Kashmir or not, we will get nothing helpful out of the Indians. And if we let Pakistan down...we will certainly lose valuable goodwill and may find ourselves with a formidable opponent in a Pakistan closely aligned with other potential Egypts and Persias...¹⁸⁹

In March 1952, Ismay left the CRO for NATO and was replaced by the Marquis of Salisbury, not a fan of the non-aligned India. In a telling coincidence, in the week of Ismay's departure, the CRO officials produced a note on possible lines of action in Kashmir upon the completion of the Graham Mission which read:

¹⁸⁰ 22 January 1952, Hickerson and Weil to Bowles (Lot 57D259, Box 6), Office of South Asian Affairs, 1939-59 (Files relating to India, 1945-52) RG 59, NARA-II

¹⁸¹ 27 February 1952, Warren Austin to Bowles (Box 38, Folder India 1952) US Mission to UNO, Central Subject Files (1946-1963) RG 84, NARA-II

¹⁸² 28 January 1952, Washington to Karachi, 1-2852, CDF (1950-54) Box 2999 (690 D.91) RG 59 and CIA No. 49520, 31 January 1952, CIA-CREST Records (accessed on 26 August 2013), NARA-II

¹⁸³ 2 February 1952, Washington to FO, 11928/7/52G, DO 35/3008, TNA

¹⁸⁴ See (51) 693, DO 35/3008, TNA

¹⁸⁵ 26 February 1952, Note on 'the Soviet attitude to Kashmir', FY1041/92, DO 35/3033 and FO 371/101203

¹⁸⁶ 29 October 1951, Mountbatten to Nehru and 2 November 1951, Nehru to Mountbatten, MB1/G28, Folder 2, Mountbatten Papers

¹⁸⁷ 7 February 1952, Ismay-Bajpai talks, FO 371/101203, TNA

¹⁸⁸ 13 February 1952, Nye to CRO, No. 204, FO 371/101204, TNA

¹⁸⁹ 23 February 1952, FO's note on CRO's changing attitude on Kashmir, FY1041/113, FO 371/101204, TNA

We have to bear in mind in all this the overriding objectives of policy which determine our attitude to the Kashmir dispute...A just solution of the Kashmir dispute is not in itself an objective for us...We must not therefore lose sight of the wood for the trees...¹⁹⁰

To this, the FO added that ‘the Asians in general might even enjoy a certain “schadenfreude” if India were taken down a peg on [Kashmir] where they feel she is not practising what she preaches’.¹⁹¹ It was convinced that Moscow was ‘waiting for a suitable moment to take a frankly pro-Indian and anti-Pakistani line’,¹⁹² and like the State Department, believed that Abdullah’s associates were ‘more than fellow travellers’.¹⁹³

From New Delhi, Bajpai’s pleadings forwarded by Nye that the Russian intervention in Kashmir was unwelcome to India, that India would not stand for an independent Kashmir,¹⁹⁴ and that Abdullah was becoming an ‘embarrassment’ for Nehru lost out to the reportage from Moscow, which considered it significant that Stalin saw Radhakrishnan in April 1952, the first envoy Stalin had seen for two years.¹⁹⁵ Noting the ‘deference’ shown to Radhakrishnan on his departure, which included a lunch with Vishinski who had facilitated on short notice Radhakrishnan’s farewell call on Stalin, who had seen neither the British nor the American Ambassador on their departure, the British Embassy in Moscow saw it as a ‘measure of the hopes which the Soviet Government place on India’.¹⁹⁶

For Kashmir, this meant that while the Soviet policy hitherto had been ‘fluid’ and sat uneasy with the Kremlin’s criticism of Nehru as a ‘bourgeois democrat’, in the long run Moscow looked upon India as ‘a better horse to back and Kashmir must in consequence go to India’. To this was added the ‘genuine fear’ of Anglo-US installations on adjacent territories like Kashmir.¹⁹⁷ The FO was already speculating as to where would India turn after the crisis in its relations with the West, to Russia or China.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁰ 5 March 1952, FY 1041/118, FO 371/101204, TNA

¹⁹¹ 20 March 1952, FO 371/101204, TNA

¹⁹² 12 March 1952, FO’s note, FO 371/101202, TNA

¹⁹³ 12 March 1952, Washington to FO, FO 371/101204, TNA

¹⁹⁴ 17 March 1952, Delhi to FO, FO 371/101205, TNA

¹⁹⁵ 7 April 1952, Moscow to FO, No. 162, FO 371/100837 and 29 April 1952, Delhi to CRO, FO 371/101205

¹⁹⁶ 7 April 1952, Grey to Eden, No. 72 (190.13/4/52G), FO 371/100837, TNA; 31 March, Radhakrishnan-Vishinski meet; 6 April, Radhakrishnan to Vishinski, Fond 82, Opis 2, No. 1196, Molotov Papers, RGASPI

¹⁹⁷ 26 March 1952, Moscow to FO, FO 371/101205, TNA

¹⁹⁸ 1 April 1952, Scott to Strang, FO 371/101206, TNA

From this diplomatic hullabaloo emerged the rather damp squib of the second Graham Mission on Kashmir, which took place between February and May 1952. After its failure, Colonel Joy Dow, military aide to Graham, told the State Department officials that the only way to prod India towards a reassessment on Kashmir was ‘by putting it in a new perspective’, something like a Chinese military move into Burma, which he thought was possible.¹⁹⁹ Soon, the American Embassy in Moscow reported a Soviet broadcast on Kashmir of 20 May 1952 which the State Department took as another example of the growing Soviet interest.²⁰⁰ Kashmir also found a mention in the CIA’s digest on the ‘Soviet Orbit’, at this time.²⁰¹ The UN Bureau of State Department argued that the future of Kashmir hinged not on action at the Security Council but on either ‘Abdullah’s antics or Communist threat’ influencing India.²⁰²

By the summer of 1952, the question remained how best to interpret the five Soviet interventions on Kashmir in the last five years,²⁰³ twice in 1948 (criticism of the UNCIP’s composition), once in December 1949 (of the UN representative), once in April 1951 (of Graham’s appointment) and then on 17 January 1952 (independent Kashmir). The Americans believed that either the Soviet Union would use its veto to win India into its camp or would support the cause for Kashmir’s independence.²⁰⁴ The British concurred but also felt that India ‘would be embarrassed by [an] alignment with [the] Soviet Union...’²⁰⁵

Meanwhile, in May-June 1952, the American Embassy in New Delhi reported that Sheikh Abdullah was repeatedly sending ‘feelers’ for support for Kashmir’s independence. It wondered whether Abdullah was being genuine or power-hungry or ‘playing a subtle game in league with Soviets’.²⁰⁶ It did not dismiss the devious communist possibility but understood them more in line with Abdullah’s opportunism.²⁰⁷ The British were more confident than the Americans that it was ‘inconceivable that Nehru, for all his delusions and close personal

¹⁹⁹ 14 May 1952, Dow-Devers-De Lattre talks, CDF (1950-54) Box 1371 (357.AB) RG 59, NARA-II

²⁰⁰ 20 May 1952, Moscow to Washington, No. 2215, CDF (1950-54) Box 2999 (690 D.91) RG 59, NARA-II

²⁰¹ 1 May 1952, (CIA-RDP80B01676R00 2700110004-9), (accessed on 26 August 2013), NARA-II

²⁰² 11 June 1952, ‘Future Steps in the Kashmir Case’, (Box 4, Folder Ind-Pak Dispute Over Kashmir, 1952-54), Office of UN Political and Security Affairs, 1945-57 Subject Files (Lot 58D742 and 59D237) RG 59; 10 June 1952, Memo (Box 38, Folder India 1952) US Mission to UNO, Central Subject Files (1946-1963) RG 84

²⁰³ See FO 371/101207, TNA

²⁰⁴ 9 May 1952, New York to FO, No. 273, FO 371/101208, TNA

²⁰⁵ 12 May 1952, FO-Jebb correspondence, No. 299 and 19 May 1952, CRO Memorandum, FO 371/101208

²⁰⁶ 23 May 1952, Delhi to Washington, No. 4379, CDF (1950-54) Box 2999 (690 D.91) RG 59, NARA-II

²⁰⁷ 14 June 1952 (690 D.91/6-252 and 6-1452) RG 59, NARA-II

friendship, should not know Abdullah's plans', but were equally wary that Abdullah's immediate interests were 'closely parallel to those of Soviet Russia'.²⁰⁸ While it was difficult to assess how far the Soviet threat in Kashmir was 'serious or immediate', it would only hurt to be 'complacent'.²⁰⁹

Undoubtedly, from the West's perspective, there was 'very little positive' one could say about the part that Russians might be playing in Kashmir. The hope was that 'the emergence of the Communist opposition in India' would increase Nehru's 'awareness of the dangers of international communism'.²¹⁰ The jury on Abdullah in London was out in June-July 1952. Was he a Communist or merely a 'political opportunist of left-wing leanings who had long moved in fellow-travelling circles?' Abdullah mocked the question by pointing that he was charged with being 'communalist, communist in the same breath'.²¹¹

The verdict seemed to be that whatever he was, he was 'quite ready to turn to Russia and, meanwhile, was using a pseudo-communist programme to offset the appeal of Islam to the Kashmir Muslims'. His entourage definitely included 'several active Communists, chief among who was GM Sadiq'. Washington agreed with this.²¹² Abdullah himself admitted that 'Sadiq admires Russia'.²¹³

Whether that warranted any conclusion about the entire Kashmir leadership was another matter. The CIA was more concerned that Sadiq's upcoming trip to Moscow in November for medical treatment would give him an ideal opportunity to 'report to Kremlin'. With prominent leftists and 'commie regular operators' in the State Government, it saw 'Commies confident' about Kashmir.²¹⁴ The only silver lining in this dark cloud of Abdullah's 'tactical flirtation' with Russia was that first Nehru remained 'strongly placed to control Abdullah' and second Nehru would 'certainly not tolerate any overt Soviet intervention' for independent Kashmir.²¹⁵ Abdullah's dependence on India put shackles on his Communists-stoked desire

²⁰⁸ 23 May 1952, FO to CRO, FY 1041/291, FO 371/101208, TNA

²⁰⁹ 30 May 1952, CRO to Delhi, DO 35/6650, TNA

²¹⁰ 12 June 1952, Delhi and Karachi (S/24) to CRO, DO 35/6650, TNA

²¹¹ 8 September 1952, Abdullah to JJ Singh, Subject File 114, JJ Singh Papers (I and II Instalments), NMML

²¹² 12 September 1952, Delhi to Washington, No. 745, CDF (1950-54) Box 2999 (690 D.91) RG 59, NARA-II

²¹³ 24 November 1952, Abdullah to Singh, 3395/PRS, Subject File 114, JJ Singh Papers (I and II Instalments)

²¹⁴ 10 September 1952, OCI No. 8871, CIA-CREST Records (accessed on 26 August 2013), NARA-II

²¹⁵ 3 July 1952, CRO's Memorandum on 'position of Sheikh Abdullah', DO 35/6650, TNA

for independence,²¹⁶ and, in fact, the CIA wanted to take advantage of this by using the Ladakh-Tibet trade mission of 1953 for gathering intelligence in Sinkiang.²¹⁷

In August 1952, the British CoS renewed their request that it was ‘most desirable militarily that Pakistan should join’ the proposed Middle-East Defence Organisation (MEDO). However, the FO and the CRO could only agree to India and Pakistan being ‘informed of the plans for a MEDO’. While they remained alive to any indications that Pakistan’s feeling of frustration with the Commonwealth was on the increase, for it bore ‘a close relation to the current stage of the Kashmir dispute’,²¹⁸ they felt confident that Pakistan would not leave the Commonwealth because of India, Afghanistan and Russia, and any threat was ‘an attempt to bring pressure on the UK in connection with Kashmir’.²¹⁹

It was from September 1952 that the interrelation of Kashmir and MEDO i.e. Kashmir within a matrix of ‘Near-Middle and Far-Eastern pressures’ as well as Soviet ‘political manoeuvres’ seemed to come to a head.²²⁰ Chester Bowles warned Acheson that he felt that Washington was ‘already much too prominent in Kashmir dispute’ and MEDO would deteriorate Indo-US relations as well as give another opportunity to Moscow to ‘denounce the US-UK’.²²¹ Instead, Bowles recommended concentrating on supporting India in the Far-East against China and let the UK handle Pakistan’s participation in the Middle-East.²²² The State Department replied that Nehru was the ‘real difficulty’,²²³ and, pointing to his double standards in Kashmir as against Korea, hoped Bowles would work on him.²²⁴

By December 1952, it was clear to the State Department that while the risk of strong Indian reactions to MEDO was well-recognised, it must be seen against the positive advantages of Pakistan’s association. As there was no likelihood of a solution on Kashmir anyway, ‘it

²¹⁶ 1 November 1952, NI-Digest, CIA-CREST Records (accessed on 26 August 2013), NARA-II

²¹⁷ 7 November 1952, Information Report, CIA-CREST Records (accessed on 26 August 2013), NARA-II

²¹⁸ 5 August 1952, FO to Washington, DO 35/6650, TNA

²¹⁹ 8 November 1952, Laithwaite to Liesching, No. 1225 and 17 November 1952, CRO to Karachi, No. 1475, DO 35/6595, TNA

²²⁰ 12 September 1952, Memo on ‘Next UN action in Kashmir’ (Box 38, Folder India 1952) US Mission to UNO, Central Subject Files (1946-1963) RG 84, NARA-II and 31 October 1952, (215-7) NIE-47, President’s Secretary’s Files, Box 158, Truman Papers

²²¹ (Box 104, Folder Bowles’ Memo of Conversations) (Series II), Part III: 1951-53, India and Nepal Correspondences, Bowles Papers

²²² 13 and 25 November 1952, Nos. 2028 and 2172, Bowles to Acheson, CDF (1950-54) Box 2999 (690 D.91)

²²³ 20 and 26 November 1952, Nos. 1510 and No. 1574, CDF (1950-54) Box 2999 (690 D.91) RG 59, NARA-II

²²⁴ 19 November 1952, CDF (1950-54) Box 1372 (357.AB) RG 59, NARA-II

would be imprudent to hold up on account of Kashmir positive policies, which were otherwise considered to be of unquestioned importance'. Moreover, by now with the Republicans under General Eisenhower having won the 1952 election and poised for a comeback in Washington, Bowles was a lame-duck envoy waiting to be ushered out soon.²²⁵

Nehru, who was 'rather sorry' that Eisenhower had 'got in' and the 'very earnest, hard-working and friendly' Bowles 'will go soon',²²⁶ had little doubt that the US and the UK were making efforts to rope in Pakistan into their military orbit. He knew that the Pakistan leaders were agreeable to this but he doubted 'if they can deliver the goods'. Always willing to give the British the benefit of doubt, he was characteristically critical of the Americans: '[They] can apparently only think in military terms now and forget that human beings have to be handled differently'.²²⁷

Acheson's designated successor, John Foster Dulles, was receiving advice on Kashmir as soon as his name was announced. Commander John Cadwalader (USNR, USS *Marquette* and one of the UN Military Observers in Kashmir in 1951) wrote on 5 December 1952 that while 'Pakistan was dependably anti-communist', India was 'self-serving, shrewd, ungrateful [and] flirtatious with Moscow'. Cadwalader reckoned that 'a stiffening of attitude' was needed. A MEDO, with Pakistan in it, would go a 'long way towards recapturing Muslim goodwill' as well as show determination 'to stop accepting every ruse of Nehru's on Kashmir'.²²⁸ From Canberra, Menzies called about the need of a firm communication to Nehru.²²⁹

The omens looked bad on both sides, for in India, given his role on the Trusteeship Council and the Japanese Peace Treaty, Dulles was looked upon as a rigid, religious and self-righteous man who 'thinks that he has a monopoly of divine guidance and wisdom'.²³⁰

Bowles' departing fears of the American position on Kashmir and MEDO adversely affecting Indo-US relations were to be amply fulfilled over the next few years. Nehru had told him that Kashmir and MEDO were tied together as would Kashmir and SEATO/CENTO be. Bowles

²²⁵ 2 December 1952, Washington to FO, 2314/405/52, DO 35/6650, TNA

²²⁶ 6 and 12 November 1952, Nehru to Pandit, Subject File Serial No. 47, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

²²⁷ 25 November 1952, Nehru to Pandit, Subject File Serial No. 48, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

²²⁸ CDF (1950-54) Box 1372 (357.AB) RG 59, NARA-II

²²⁹ 19 January 1953, Canberra to CRO, No. 46, DO 35/6605, TNA

²³⁰ 1 September 1950 and 24 October 1951, Bajpai to Pandit, 392-SG/50 and 431-SG/51, Subject File Serial No. 56, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

himself could not understand the omission of other Middle-Eastern states and extension of MEDO to only Pakistan which geographically was separate from the Arab states.²³¹ But with the UK hemmed in from giving support to Pakistan at the cost of Indian goodwill, America had to take the lead.²³² The ‘official mind’ was made up by 1952; the change in political leadership would accomplish it in 1953-54.

Getting ready to welcome its new Secretary with a ‘feeling of frustration’ on Kashmir,²³³ the State Department was pleased to see that London, despite their tactical disagreements and inability to put pressure on Nehru,²³⁴ was at one on the most important point regarding Kashmir: strengthening of the Middle-East and the Far-East with Pakistan’s participation against Communism.²³⁵ As the CIA declared in January 1953, there were no Communists in any government in this entire area, ‘with the possible exception of Kashmir’.²³⁶

Lord Halifax, perhaps the oldest India hand still politically active, visited the country, of which he was the Viceroy twenty years before, in January 1953. He was urged to emphasise upon Nehru that ‘India cannot shut her eyes to the fact that a stiffening of defence of the Middle-East is necessary and that Pakistan inevitably has a close and intimate relationship with the area’.²³⁷ With the Republicans in power in Washington, Bowles reported, in his last days in India, an increased friendliness on the part of Soviet diplomats towards Indians. Pandit had told him that this was becoming noticeable in many countries.²³⁸

Conclusion

Called the ‘travelling salesman for democracy who “soft-pedalled” aspects of American foreign policy unpopular in India’,²³⁹ i.e. Kashmir, the ‘unorthodox and unprecedented’ Chester Bowles was replaced by a hardened career diplomat George Allen who had served in

²³¹ 2 December 1952, Bowles to Acheson, No. 2257, CDF (1950-54) Box 4041 (780.5) RG 59, NARA-II

²³² 3 December 1952, London to Washington, No. 3109, DO 35/6605, TNA

²³³ 2 January 1953, Washington to CRO, 1081/2/53, DO 35/6605, TNA

²³⁴ 21-22 January 1953, CRO’s note, DO 35/6605, TNA

²³⁵ January 1953, CRO note’s, DO 35/6605, TNA

²³⁶ ‘Communism in the Free World’, IR-6165, January 1953, CIA-CREST (accessed on 26 August 2013)

²³⁷ 22 January 1953, Pritchard’s note for Halifax before the latter’s visit to India, DO 35/6577, TNA

²³⁸ February 1953, (Box 104, Folder Bowles’ Memo of Conversations) (Series II), Part III: 1951-53, India and Nepal Correspondences, Bowles Papers

²³⁹ March 1953, Harold Milks (AP) on Chester Bowles (Box 101, Folder 3/3, 4/3 Harold Milks and Moraes, Frank - 1951-53) (Series II), Part III: 1951-53, India and Nepal Correspondences, Bowles Papers

the Division of Middle-Eastern Affairs for eight years, been envoy in Iran (1946-48) and was coming from Yugoslavia (1949-53). Nehru may have regretted deeply this 'friend of India's' departure after his brief, 'fresh' stay,²⁴⁰ but Bowles' parting shot to Nehru was a memo in which he stressed that India's aloofness to Moscow's and Peking's shadow over the Middle-east and the South-east, respectively, was self-defeating and akin to the American isolationism of the 19th century. He urged Nehru to embark on an Indian Monroe Doctrine for South Asia and let Pakistan, by a reduction of their enmity on Kashmir, to contribute in the Middle-East under a clear and direct American umbrella.²⁴¹

It was a prescient submission. On 23 March 1953, Pandit met Dulles, Walter Bedell-Smith, the newly-appointed Under-Secretary of State, and Sherman Adams, Eisenhower's Chief of Staff, in New York. Bedell-Smith told her that while all he heard was about India's friendship for the Commonwealth, why did India look upon the US with 'suspicion'? Pandit replied with Indian complaints on non-alignment, bloc politics, China and colonialism. Bedell-Smith made it clear that the recognition of China was 'quite impossible'. Communism had to be met and not just there. To this exchange, Dulles added that India and the US 'must come together' given their basic similarities and said that if only Kashmir got settled, Washington would feel happy and secure in Asia. He could 'reconcile' himself to India's 'neutrality' but hoped for closer cooperation on strategic matters.²⁴²

In 1949-53, London and Washington tried hard to resolve Kashmir, but to no avail, while the Indo-Soviet relations, widening steadily in cultural and economic directions, got a fillip by, first, India's 'neutral' position on China, 1950-51 and, second, India's 'active' mediation on Korea, 1952-53. After these 'turning points',²⁴³ for the Kremlin, India was the 'lesser evil' and Kashmir got Moscow's attention as a 'Western ideological and strategic gateway to the subcontinent as well as to strategic weak spots of the USSR'.²⁴⁴

²⁴⁰ 6 February 1953, Nehru to Bowles (Box 98, Folder 9/19 GOI Nehru, Jawaharlal - 1951-53) (Series II), Part III: 1951-53, India and Nepal Correspondences, Bowles Papers

²⁴¹ 22 March 1953 (Box 98, Folder 9/19 GOI Nehru, Jawaharlal - 1951-53) (Series II), Part III: 1951-53, India and Nepal Correspondences, Bowles Papers

²⁴² Note dated 3 April 1953, Subject File Serial No. 4, Pandit Papers (II Instalment)

²⁴³ 8 April 1953, N Roshin to I Koslov, Report on 'Position of India at UN General Assembly' in 1952, Fond 5, Opis 28, No. 94 (Reel 22, 5094) and 28 May 1955, 512/IOBA, Note on Indo-Soviet Relations, Fond 5, Opis 28, No. 344 (Reel 83, 5154), RGANI, Moscow

²⁴⁴ Hilger, 'The Soviet Union and India: the Years of Late Stalinism', p. 7

In the following five years, the Kashmir dispute got further entrenched within this international binary and Pakistan's and India's response to it, which were formalised through pacts and aligned through associations, respectively. India and Pakistan diverged dramatically in their foreign policy courses and hopes for any initiative on Kashmir would fall in this unbridgeable chasm. It would be another decade before another opportunity to settle the dispute under an international cloud would emerge. By then, however, the major powers would be differently aligned making the possibilities more difficult.

Kashmir, 1953-61: From ‘Pact Politics’ to ‘Package Proposal’

Introduction

The Eisenhower years in America (1953-61) and their Conservative counterpart in Britain were a time of international crises, summits and, above all, military pacts.¹ Anglo-American jousts with the Soviet Union for influence in Asia and Africa saw the Cold War go global in this period.² This also impacted upon the Indian subcontinent’s relations with the power blocs.³ As the Kashmir dispute was an important hinge in these relations, so the latter too, as existing accounts agree, became ‘a pawn between the power blocs’,⁴ especially as America, with its military pacts with Pakistan, became ‘a part of the problem’ in India.⁵

However, as we saw earlier, Kashmir had become a Korbellian ‘plaything of power politics’, as early as 1948. In the eyes of key contemporary observers, there was not much difference between the attitudes of Truman-Acheson and Eisenhower-Dulles combines towards the dispute, despite the differences in their broader outlook towards India and Pakistan.⁶ This chapter, instead, traces Kashmir’s evolution through the changing context of the Cold War in the 1950s i.e. from the vicissitudes of an international ‘pact politics’ in 1954-55, directed chiefly against the Soviet Union, to the vagaries of a subcontinental ‘package proposal’ in 1958-59, produced with an eye on China.

Beginning with a closer look at London’s and Washington’s position on Kashmir in the period 1953-57 than hitherto attempted,⁷ it shows the transition in the way Kashmir was subsequently understood. Kashmir began the 1950s as being ‘primarily important’ for the

¹ See Uri Bar-Noi, *The Cold War and Soviet Mistrust of Churchill’s Pursuit of Détente, 1951-55* (Sussex: Academic Press, 2008), Victor Rothwell, *Anthony Eden: A Political Biography 1931-57* (Manchester: MUP, 1992), DR Thorpe, *Supermac: The Life of Harold Macmillan* (London: Pimlico, 2011) and Richard Immerman (ed.), *John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War* (Princeton: PUP, 1992) and *John Foster Dulles: Piety, Pragmatism and Power in US Foreign Policy* (Delaware: SR Books, 1999).

² See Westad, *The Global Cold War* and Barrett, *The Greater Middle-East and the Cold War*

³ See Singh, *The Limits of British Influence*, Chapters 4-6; McGarr, *The Cold War in South Asia*, Chapters 1-2

⁴ 19 August 1953, No. 122, Karachi to Washington, CDF (1950-54) Box 3000 (690 D.91) RG 59, NARA-II; see Schaffer, *The Limits of Influence*, Chapters 2-3 and Chadha-Behera, *Demystifying Kashmir*, Chapter 7.

⁵ Schaffer, *The Limits of Influence*, p. 48; see the chapter ‘Impact of the Alliance with Pakistan’, pp. 36-51

⁶ Oral History Collection (MCO 17), GL Mehta (173), Dulles Papers, Mudd Library, Princeton University

⁷ The period 1957 to 1965 has seen greater research. See McGarr, *The Cold War in South Asia*

Middle-East's defence against the USSR and ended it as being seen 'within the complex of [West's] relation with Communist China'.⁸ In 1953, the danger in Kashmir was believed to be a Russian intervention. In 1961 it was expected to be a Chinese incursion.⁹ This transition, with global echoes,¹⁰ was also accompanied by America's replacement of Britain in the lead international role on Kashmir.

India and the West, 1953-55: Discontent, Distrust and Divergence

Eisenhower and Dulles assumed office with a feeling that America had neglected Asia since 1945.¹¹ While Eisenhower was concerned about its effect on Nehru,¹² Dulles had a rather 'low opinion' of India.¹³ Six years earlier, in January 1947, he had spoken about the 'strong influence' that the Soviet Government exercised on the 'interim Hindu Government'.¹⁴ When told by the State Department that Nehru's interim government was actually 'moderate and even conservatively-minded',¹⁵ Dulles had preferred to rely on his personal experience of the Indian delegation to the UN in 1946, especially the 'confirmed Marxist' Krishna Menon.

It had seemed to him then that 'on practically all matters they worked very closely' with the Soviets. It appeared to him now that being 'an independent government, it lends a willing ear' to the Soviets.¹⁶ Bajpai, then India's Consul in Washington, had cautioned Nehru that Dulles' statement was not 'an example of individual ignorance' but an 'evidence of state of mind of an important section of American people'.¹⁷ Then in 1950, while preparing the Japanese Peace Treaty, Dulles did not visit India and gave ground for the impression that he was not sensitive to the 'deeper currents, conditions and aspirations' of this region.¹⁸

⁸ 25 April 1953, JJS Garner (Delhi) to CRO and 11 May 1953, Roger Makins to Dulles, DO 35/6607, TNA

⁹ 28 August, 19 September 1953, Allen to Stevenson, Box 2, Folder 13, (MC 124), Stevenson Papers, Princeton

¹⁰ See William Taubman, *Khrushchev: The Man and His Era* (New York: WW Norton, 2003) and Lorenz Luthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World* (Princeton: PUP, 2008)

¹¹ 14 November 1952, Dulles to Eisenhower, Box 62, Reel 22, Correspondences (MCO 16), Dulles Papers

¹² 15 November 1952, Eisenhower to Dulles, Box 62, Reel 22, Correspondences, Dulles Papers

¹³ 28 March 1953, Telephone conversation with Henry Cabot Lodge (Jr.), Box 1, Folder 1 (Telephone memoranda, January-April 1953), Telephone Conversations (Series 2, Subseries 2A), (MCO 18) Dulles Papers

¹⁴ Speech at the National Publishers' Association, Box 32, Reel 8, Correspondences, Dulles Papers

¹⁵ 23 January 1947, Henry Villard to Dulles, Box 32, Reel 8, Correspondences, Dulles Papers

¹⁶ 27 January 1947, Dulles to Villard, Box 32, Reel 8, Correspondences, Dulles Papers

¹⁷ 2 February 1947, Bajpai to Delhi, No. 138, File No. 470-FEA/47 (GOI, MEA and CR, FEA Branch), NAI

¹⁸ Oral History Collection, GL Mehta (173), Dulles Papers and 10 September 1952, Bowles to Stevenson, Box 14, Folder 1, Stevenson Papers

Conscious of this baggage, Dulles invited Vijayalakshmi Pandit to Washington soon after Eisenhower's election and expressed the hope that Nehru 'would give the new administration a chance'.¹⁹ This was important because the State Department soon came up with a proposal of a private mission on Kashmir by a special emissary. Championed by Dulles and blessed by Eisenhower, it resulted in the Paul Hoffman Mission of April 1953.²⁰

Hoffman, the Marshall Plan administrator (1948-50) and president of Ford Foundation (1950-53), told Nehru and his Pakistani counterpart Mohammad Ali Bogra that settling Kashmir was a 'necessity' as it was in the neighbourhood of the Soviet Union and the 'new' China.²¹ His failure strengthened the State Department's suspicions that Moscow 'will use the dispute'.²² London had been unimpressed by the Hoffman Mission. Keener on the 'defence aspect' involving Kashmir and concerned about India's 'increasingly hostile' foreign policy, the FO wondered, whether Washington had 'considered the situation from this point'.²³

In May 1953, Dulles himself came to South Asia and, as a junior official remembered, 'got off in Pakistan with a tear in his eye...a Northern Tier'.²⁴ Much ink has been spilled on his 'pacto-mania' and the calculations vis-à-vis India and Pakistan.²⁵ With respect to Kashmir, however, the historical record is thinner.²⁶ Here, there were two thoughts. Firstly, Pakistan's military association with America might have a salutary effect on the 'opportunist and pro-communist' Abdullah,²⁷ and, then, it might even 'render India more ready to negotiate'.²⁸

¹⁹ 14 November 1952, Correspondence File, GL Mehta Papers (III and IV Instalments), NMML

²⁰ 14 March 1953, Byroade's memo and 24 March 1953, Dulles to Eisenhower, CDF (1950-54) Box 3000 (690 D.91) RG 59, NARA-II; 25 March 1953, Eisenhower to Dulles (White House Correspondence), Box 1, Folder 5 (1953 [5]), Series 3: White House Memoranda (Subseries 3A: Correspondence and Meetings), Dulles Papers

²¹ 26 February 1953, Bureau of Near-Eastern and South-Asian Affairs Records relating to Kashmir, 1952-64, RG 59; 26 and 28 April 1953, Hoffman to Dulles, CDF (1950-54) Box 3000 (690 D.91) RG 59, NARA-II

²² 19 January 1953, Memo on 'The Kashmir Question' (Box 38, Folder India 1953-54), US Mission to UNO, Central Subject Files (1946-1963), RG 84, NARA-II

²³ 16 April 1953, Swinton (FO) to Liesching (CRO), FO 371/106927, TNA

²⁴ Oral History Interview of Nicholas Thacher (Box 78, 487), p. 54, Independence

²⁵ India would remain non-aligned 'so long as its own interests are not directly threatened'. Pakistan would be 'willing to enter into military assistance agreement', which though resented by India 'would not result either in war between India and Pakistan or in a break between India and West' because India needed substantial economic aid. 1 July 1953, NIE-79, Armstrong (Jr.) to Dulles, CDF (1950-54) Box 3000 (690 D.91) RG 59; 24 September 1953, UNP memo to UNA, Office of UN Political and Security Affairs, 1945-57 Subject Files (Lot 58D742 and 59D237) RG 59; 23 June 1953, CIA-CREST Records (accessed on 26 August 2013), NARA-II

²⁶ See Singh, *The Limits of British Influence*, Chapter 4 and McGarr, *The Cold War in South Asia*, Chapter 1

²⁷ 26 March, 7 July 1953, Intelligence Estimate, CIA-CREST Records (accessed on 26 August 2013), NARA-II

²⁸ 6 January 1953, Fowler to Hyde (Box 38, Folder India 1953-54), US Mission to UNO, Central Subject Files (1946-1963) RG 84 and 6 February 1954, JJ to Nehru, Correspondence File, Singh Papers (I and II Instalments)

The British, who had tried and failed with their MEDO in 1951-52 over principally Kashmir, were not so sanguine and gave an aide memoire to Dulles before his trip. It laid bare their feelings about the implications of this ‘private difficulty’ between India and Pakistan for the West’s diplomatic and military challenge in the Arab-Asian world.²⁹ However, the ‘fur did not fly’ between Dulles and Nehru on Kashmir.³⁰ Instead, there was more strain on Korea and China, issues on which they were ‘never a moment on the same wavelength’.³¹ This left the CRO in a mini-dilemma. On the one hand, it wanted to turn the heat on Kashmir at a time when India was ‘leading the attack on apartheid and colonial questions’, on the other, India was also playing an important role in the Korean settlement and any pressure on Kashmir could be ‘particularly untimely’.³²

If the summer of 1953 was one of deliberation in Washington and London, it was one of discontent in Kashmir and led to Sheikh Abdullah’s dismissal and arrest in August. This infamous episode, a much-discussed watershed in India’s relations with Kashmir,³³ was actually the climax of a period of double distrust and it was the American Democrat Adlai Stevenson’s meeting with Abdullah in May that symbolised it. Stevenson, who was on a world tour after losing the presidential election to Eisenhower, came to India with quite a comprehensive brief from the State Department that probed India’s neutrality, Nehru’s character and the fate of Kashmir.³⁴ Stevenson and Abdullah met on 2 May 1953, first alone and then with aides. While Abdullah’s papers remain inaccessible, Stevenson’s handwritten notes shed some light on their much-speculated upon talks:

Sheikh [feels] pulled from both directions...also “aware of north”...feels Kashmir can only live on goodwill of [both] neighbours...impatient with UN, explains alternatives – plebiscite, partition on ceasefire line, plebiscite [in] Kashmir valley and adjacent areas only and independence guaranteed by both – “Little Switzerland”.³⁵

²⁹ 20 May 1953, UK aide memoire to US on Kashmir (Box 38, Folder India 1953-54), US Mission to UNO, Central Subject Files (1946-1963), RG 84, NARA-II and 1 May 1953, CRO to Delhi (660) and Karachi (521) and 7 May 1953, New York to CRO, DO 35/6607, TNA

³⁰ 4 May 1953, New Delhi to CRO, No. 519, DO 35/6607, TNA

³¹ Oral History Collection, VL Pandit (195), Dulles Papers

³² July 1953, RWD Fowler (CRO) on Nehru-Mohammad Ali talks, DO 35/6645, TNA

³³ See Srinath Raghavan, *War and Peace in Modern India*, Chapter ‘Kashmir-1951 and After’, pp. 188-226

³⁴ Brief for Stevenson before his India trip, 1953, Box 437, Folder 8, Stevenson Papers

³⁵ 2 May 1953, Stevenson’s diary of India trip of 1953, Box 437, Folder 8, Stevenson Papers

Two days later, Stevenson and his aides had lunch with Abdullah and his cabinet where they discussed ‘Communism in Kashmir’.³⁶ Abdullah asked Stevenson for ‘American money’ to build Kashmir.³⁷ As Stevenson left Kashmir for Pakistan,³⁸ the Indian Press led by the Socialist *National Herald* and the Communist *Blitz* accused him of having ‘won Sheikh Abdullah over to the supposed American policy of an independent Kashmir’.³⁹ This set the tone for Abdullah’s eventual dismissal and arrest in which other examples of improper American conduct in Kashmir were also given.⁴⁰

The US Ambassador George Allen may have felt that Nehru had used Stevenson and others ‘as an excuse’ to warn other powers from intervening,⁴¹ but in Washington many wondered alongside the influential editor of *Foreign Affairs* Hamilton Fish Armstrong, ‘why India left the Communists [Bakshi and Sadiq] in when they threw Abdullah out?’⁴² The CIA, for instance, believed that ‘proof’ against Americans had been provided by the Communists.⁴³ In London, the FO looked upon the whole episode as ‘in USSR’s interests’.⁴⁴ In the CRO, Viscount Swinton, the Secretary, compared Kashmir to Czechoslovakia and condemned Nehru’s intransigence; as galling as his interference in Africa.⁴⁵

On his part, Stevenson was astonished by the whole thing. He had done very little talking and ‘reported most of what Abdullah had said’ to Nehru. There were three ironies here: one, to Stevenson, Abdullah had ‘sounded entirely too partial to India’,⁴⁶ two, as Ambassador GL Mehta said, ‘no responsible person in the Government believed’ that Stevenson had encouraged Abdullah,⁴⁷ and, three the Indian Intelligence Bureau had become convinced by

³⁶ 2-4 May 1953, Box 441, Folder 5 (Walter Johnson Tape Transcripts), Stevenson Papers

³⁷ 25 April 1961, Pandit to Kaul, Correspondence File, Pandit Papers

³⁸ 26 May 1953, Stevenson to George Allen, Box 2, Folder 13, Stevenson Papers

³⁹ 4 and 21 August 1953, Allen to Adlai, Box 2, Folder 13, Stevenson Papers

⁴⁰ 13 August 1953, T. No. 311, Delhi to Washington, CDF (1950-54) Box 3000 (690 D.91) RG 59; NR Pillai’s list to Allen comprised the activities of the US members of UN Observer’s Group, Sargent Dean, Leach and Adams of US embassy in Delhi and some other American citizens. J Wesley Adams, Advisor to Huddle on the UNCIP in 1948 and second secretary, Delhi (1952-55) and wife Frances were the American couple in Srinagar when Abdullah was arrested and along with Stevenson and Leach bore the brunt of Indian propaganda of a US encouragement to Abdullah, Oral History Interviews (Box 29, 155), Independence

⁴¹ 4 August 1953, Allen to Adlai, Box 2, Folder 13, Stevenson Papers and 10 August 1953, No. 283, Allen to Dulles, CDF (1950-54) Box 3000 (690 D.91) RG 59, NARA-II

⁴² 18 June 1956, Box 122, Folder 1 (India, Travel Notes), Armstrong Papers (MC 002), Mudd Library, Princeton

⁴³ 11 August 1953, OCI No. 8441, CIA-CREST Records (accessed on 26 August 2013), NARA-II

⁴⁴ 8 September 1953, FO’s note on Moscow’s line post-Abdullah dismissal, FY1041/163, FO 371/106929, TNA

⁴⁵ 10 December 1953, Secretary of State (CRO) to Under-Secretaries (CRO), DO 35/6647, TNA

⁴⁶ 23 August 1953, Stevenson to Allen, Box 2, Folder 13, Stevenson Papers

⁴⁷ 28 June 1954, Mehta to Nehru, No. 93-A/54, Subject File Serial No. 1, Mehta Papers (III and IV Instalments)

March 1953 that Abdullah's National Conference party was 'in cooperation with the Communists'.⁴⁸ After Abdullah's dismissal, it kept an eye on communism in Kashmir, conducted enquiries in the education and information and broadcasting departments of the State Government and was satisfied that the trends were no longer such as under Abdullah.⁴⁹

It is now clear that Moscow had known that Abdullah's position was 'under threat' for some time. BPL Bedi had told so to the *TASS* correspondent in India, N Pastukhov whose report had reached Molotov in April. Bedi had also discussed the challenges of implementing agrarian reforms in Kashmir and warned about the religious chauvinism of the Jan Sangh, Hindu Mahasabha and Praja Parishad in Jammu, parties he called 'inspired by US imperialism'. Nehru, he averred, may or may not go with the Soviet Union but he will not openly go with the Anglo-US bloc, which is why the American involvement in India was based on these conservative parties. Finally, Bedi had made it clear that Communists in Kashmir should no longer connect with the Sheikh. Instead, they should 'use Abdullah for exposing Anglo-US game in Kashmir'. Reactionary elements had prevailed around him and the Communists in Kashmir were in a bad shape in every way. They were numerically small, politically untrained and, under GM Sadiq, tactically error-prone.⁵⁰ This report helps to understand why Moscow did not bat an eyelid on Abdullah's removal.

Nevertheless, given the Indian campaign against 'American interference', the attitude in Washington on Kashmir was 'hardening'. Its most visible manifestation would be the military association with Pakistan. As Horace Hildreth, the newly appointed American Ambassador to Pakistan argued, 'while India would not be pleased, result on Kashmir might in the end be beneficial'.⁵¹ George Allen did question linking military aid to Pakistan, a bilateral military commitment, with pressure on India on Kashmir, a multilateral diplomatic affair, in the name of 'national interest',⁵² but, his simultaneous reportage about Communist 'machinations' in Kashmir weakened this questioning.⁵³ In his despatches, he would often

⁴⁸ 6 March 1953, IB report D1507-K/53, File No. 8/15-K/51 (MOS, Kashmir), NAI

⁴⁹ File Nos. F 8 (9)-K/54 and 18 (7)-K/54 (GOI, MOS, Kashmir), NAI

⁵⁰ 25 February 1953, BPL Bedi's talk with N Pastukhov, report of the talk was sent to Moscow on 16 March and was forwarded to Molotov and Grigoriyan on 7 April, Fond 5, Opis 28, No. 94 (Reel 22, 5094), RGANI

⁵¹ 26 August 1953, No. 172, Karachi to Washington, CDF (1950-54) Box 3000 (690 D.91) RG 59, NARA-II

⁵² 27 August 1953, No. 399, Delhi to Washington, CDF (1950-54) Box 3000 (690 D.91) RG 59, NARA-II

⁵³ 21 December 1953, T. No. 1071, Delhi to Washington, CDF (1950-54) Box 3000 (690 D.91) RG 59

compare Kashmir with the Maoist stronghold of Yenan,⁵⁴ hardly calculated to assure a State Department that was always wary about Kashmir's proximity to Sinkiang and Kashgar.⁵⁵ American intelligence gathering on Communism in Kashmir could be remarkably alarming as can be seen from an early-1954 report, which claimed that the

Communists were stronger in the [present] Government than under Sheikh Abdullah...Government in Kashmir was impossible without Communist support and Nehru would risk Communist take-over in Kashmir compared to the risk of loss of moral and political basis of India's claim to the state.⁵⁶

In the summer of 1953, the State Department was also hopeful that, if not to internal Communism, then as the Chairman of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea and an aspirant for the post of President of the UN General Assembly, India might be 'sensitive to international opinion' on Kashmir.⁵⁷ Therefore, Dulles 'questioned the political wisdom' of Eisenhower's pro-Vijayalakshmi Pandit stance. He told the President that neither the US Congress nor the UK/Commonwealth was supporting Pandit's candidature.⁵⁸ Pandit, however, won and Eisenhower called her personally to express his confidence in India's 'integrity and impartiality' on Korea.⁵⁹ When told of this, Nehru agreed with his sister that Eisenhower was 'full of good intentions', but appeared 'out of touch' on Kashmir.⁶⁰

Meanwhile, London was becoming concerned about the impact of American military aid to Pakistan on Kashmir and its implications for the British military facilities in South Asia.⁶¹ Since 1951, American Ambassadors in India and Pakistan had found their British counterparts unenthusiastic on these two counts.⁶² There was also a little jealousy that the 'US might succeed where [HMG] had failed'.⁶³ London was also keen to demonstrate to New

⁵⁴ 18 March 1954, No. 1490, Delhi to Washington, CDF (1950-54) Box 3000 (690 D.91) RG 59, NARA-II

⁵⁵ 18 November 1953 and 12 January 1954, Nos. 170 and 57, Lahore to Washington, CDF (1950-54) Box 3001 (690 D.93) RG 59, NARA-II

⁵⁶ 26 February 1954, Intelligence Brief, No. 1564, US Information Agency (P 265, Records relating to India, 1952-56) (Box 3, Folder Kashmir, 1954) RG 306, NARA-II

⁵⁷ 19 August 1953, Eric Stein to US Del UN, Bureau of Near-Eastern and South-Asian Affairs Records relating to Kashmir, 1952-64 RG 59, NARA-II

⁵⁸ 1 August 1953, Dulles-Eisenhower, Box 10, Folder 3 (May-December 1953 [2]), Telephone Conversations (Series 2, Subseries 2B-White House), Dulles Papers

⁵⁹ 12 October 1953, Pandit to New Delhi, Subject File Serial No. 51, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

⁶⁰ 28 October 1953, Nehru to Pandit, Subject File Serial No. 51, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

⁶¹ 16 October 1953, Memo of Conversation, CDF 1950-54) Box 4156 (790.5-MSP) RG 59, NARA-II

⁶² Oral History Collection, Loy Henderson (119), Dulles Papers

⁶³ 29 March 1954, Mehta to Nehru, No. 40/A/54, Subject File Serial No. 1, Mehta Papers (III and IV Instalments)

Delhi that it was ‘nonsense’ to insist that the UK was ‘entirely in the hands of the US’.⁶⁴ The developing US-Pakistan alignment in opposition to the existing UK-India association was assuming ‘awkward’ proportions for any joint effort on Kashmir.⁶⁵

Moscow too noted this ‘Anglo-American conflict/contradiction’ in India-Pakistan.⁶⁶ However, on the question of Communism in Kashmir, there was no conflict between them. In early-1954, the UK High-Commission in India counted five ministers in the Kashmir government as Communists and took seriously press reports of a so-called, non-existent, *Padak* corridor at the junction of Sinkiang, Afghanistan and Kashmir being given to the USSR by China.⁶⁷

By January 1954, Dulles and Vice-President Richard Nixon had persuaded Eisenhower that the advantages of winning an open alignment with Pakistan outweighed the disadvantages with India.⁶⁸ Eisenhower, wary of unnecessary antagonism,⁶⁹ was assured that while it was difficult to help one in South Asia ‘without making an enemy of the other’;⁷⁰ there would not be any ‘fatal effect’ on India-US relations.⁷¹ The Middle-Eastern aspect of US-Pakistan military association was stressed, as recommended by Allen,⁷² to better justify it,⁷³ and to minimise the expected Indian susceptibility to Moscow.⁷⁴

Hildreth summed up Washington’s calculations thus: the Soviet opposition and India’s disapproval was expected,⁷⁵ but it was possible ‘to avoid possible overplay’ on Kashmir.⁷⁶ It would be difficult. In February 1954, when Ghulam Mohammad, Pakistan’s Governor-General (1951-55), reminded Dulles that he hoped Nehru would not be allowed ‘to throw

⁶⁴ 15 February 1954, Selwyn Lloyd to Krishna Menon, SELO 5/20, Selwyn-Lloyd Papers, CAC

⁶⁵ 16 May 1954, Paper on ‘Specific Problems with the UK’, Box 8, Folder 4 (General Foreign Policy [2]), Series 3: White House Memoranda (Subseries 3A: Correspondence and Meetings), Dulles Papers

⁶⁶ 28 June 1952, V Grigoriyan to Molotov, Fond 82, Opis 2, No. 1196, Molotov Papers, RGASPI

⁶⁷ 19 January and 13 April 1954, Delhi to CRO on Margaret Godley’s article in *Truth*, FO 371/112195, TNA

⁶⁸ 11 December 1953, State Department Memo, CDF (1950-54) Box 4156 (790.5-MSP) RG 59, NARA-II

⁶⁹ 16 November 1953, Eisenhower to Dulles, Box 1, Folder 12, Ann Whitman Papers on John Foster Dulles: 1952-59; Eisenhower Presidential Papers, Dulles-Herter Series (MC 172), Mudd Library, Princeton

⁷⁰ 16 November 1953, Dulles to Eisenhower, Box 1, Folder 12, Ann Whitman Papers on John Foster Dulles: 1952-59; Eisenhower Presidential Papers, Dulles-Herter Series

⁷¹ 4 January 1954, State Department memo for Eisenhower and 14 January 1954, Dulles to Eisenhower, CDF (1950-54) Box 4155 (790.5-MSP) RG 59, NARA-II

⁷² Oral History Collection, George V Allen (5), Dulles Papers

⁷³ 8 January 1954, No. 1067, Delhi to Washington, CDF (1950-54) Box 4155 (790.5-MSP) RG 59, NARA-II

⁷⁴ 18 January 1954, Intelligence Advisory Committee report, CDF (1950-54) Box 4155 (790.5-MSP) RG 59

⁷⁵ 25 May 1954, No. 589, Washington to New York and 27 September 1954, No. 381, Washington to Karachi, CDF (1950-54) Box 3000 (690 D.91) RG 59, NARA-II

⁷⁶ 19 June 1954, No. 860, Karachi to Washington, CDF (1950-54) Box 3000 (690 D.91) RG 59, NARA-II

dust in the eyes of the world over Kashmir on the exercise of American aid [to Pakistan]’,⁷⁷ it was made clear to him that ‘military aid does not mean any undue support and commitment [on Kashmir]’.⁷⁸ The pro-India Bowles captured better the Kashmir tangle for military aid than the pro-Pakistan Hildreth:

India is morally wrong in Kashmir and has handled it clumsily and arrogantly [but] the US-Pakistan military agreement will draw the Soviet Union into Afghanistan and India, eliminate the possibility of Pakistan-India or Pakistan-Afghan rapprochement, increase the wave of anti-Americanism throughout India [and] open up new opportunities for Soviet Union.⁷⁹

The immediate impact on Kashmir of the US-Pakistan military pact was more symbolic than substantial as by then the Indian attitude towards Kashmir was ‘pretty well set’.⁸⁰ On 1 March 1954, Nehru demanded withdrawal of American officers on the UN Observers’ team in Kashmir to the chagrin of the UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld. The State Department advised Dulles that while this might impair the UN observer system, the issue was between Hammarskjöld and Nehru.⁸¹

Churchill was visiting Washington at this time and, highlighting this latest ‘pin-prick’ by India, reiterated to his hosts his bitterness at the ‘give-away’ of India.⁸² Ironically, New Delhi at this stage had no objection to a UK military presence in Kashmir.⁸³ Krishna Menon complained to Selwyn Lloyd, more in sorrow than anger that ‘the UK threw us overboard under US pressure against its own reasoning and judgement and views of right and wrong’.⁸⁴

Later, the impact would be more sweeping and substantial. In May 1955, Nehru would declare that Kashmir was deadlocked less because of their bilateral relations but more due to

⁷⁷ 27 February 1954, Reel No. 38, State Department Reels (MCO 74), Dulles Papers

⁷⁸ 16 March 1954, Henry Byroade to Dulles and 22 March 1954, Byroade to Hildreth, Reel No. 38, State Department Reels, Dulles Papers

⁷⁹ 30 December 1953, Bowles to Dulles (Box 326, Folder 2/7 Ball, George), Part VII: Correspondence July 1963 - May 1969 (Series I), Bowles Papers

⁸⁰ Oral History Collection, Fraser Wilkins (275), Dulles Papers

⁸¹ 25 March 1954, CDF (1950-54) Box 1372 (357.AB) RG 59; it could hardly be said that any American national interests were being served by keeping US observers in Kashmir and if they could be replaced by observers of other nationalities thereby not impairing whole the observation system, it was quite enough.

⁸² 12 April 1954, Dulles to Eisenhower, Box 1, Folder 14 (1954 [4]) (Meetings with the President), Series 3: White House Memoranda (Subseries 3A: Correspondence and Meetings), Dulles Papers; He reminded them that while the ‘Labour Government had given India away to the accompaniment of US plaudits, the result was something we would have to live with painfully for a long time’.

⁸³ 20 May 1954, Note by Subimal Dutt, File No. 7.10 (21)-K/54 (GOI, MOS, Kashmir), NAI

⁸⁴ 1 February 1954, Krishna Menon to Lloyd, SELO 5/20, Selwyn Lloyd Papers

the ‘changes in India’s and Pakistan’s international relations’.⁸⁵ This was something of an axiom with the Indians. CC Desai, India’s envoy in Pakistan from 1955 to 1958, interacted with five Prime Ministers and found four of them ‘friendly and anxious’ for good relations, but for the Anglo-American concerns about the Soviet spectre.⁸⁶

Thus, by 1954-55, Indo-US relations had ‘levelled off at a fairly low level’.⁸⁷ On the other hand, the insertion of US arms and capital in Pakistan had distanced it from Moscow.⁸⁸ This combination led to all sorts of musings in America on Kashmir. Well established as a ‘situation likely to be exploited by the Soviets’,⁸⁹ some fantasised that ‘a Pakistan with Kashmir and without Bengal would be a much more cohesive unit in the defence line against the USSR’.⁹⁰

For Dulles, it was enough that his old ‘confirmed Marxist’ friend Krishna Menon was handling Kashmir.⁹¹ In turn, Nehru told Mao in October 1954 that Dulles, a ‘narrow-minded bigot’ was ‘a great menace’.⁹² One’s abhorrence of Communism was being matched by the other’s allergy to ‘collective security’.⁹³ Kashmir fell within this widening gap.⁹⁴ It was not mentioned even once in the eighteen letters sent by Mehta to Nehru from Washington, between April 1954 and March 1955.⁹⁵ Mehta’s appointment as Ambassador, and his long tenure, itself was symbolic of a shift away from political to economic matters in Indo-US relations. Intimately associated with planning but lacking ‘knowledge of international political problems’,⁹⁶ Mehta would, ‘greatly disappoint’ NR Pillai,⁹⁷ and ‘particularly distress’ Chester Bowles by being ‘least known’.⁹⁸

⁸⁵ 14-16 May 1955, Notes of Nehru-Muhammad Ali talks, Subject File 3, Subimal Dutt Papers, NMML

⁸⁶ Oral History Transcripts, CC Desai, Acc. No. 106, pp. 98-103, NMML; therefore Desai favoured a generous ‘Big Brother’ approach to Pakistan. The men were Bogra, II Chundrigar, HS Suhrawardy, Firoze Khan Noon and Ghulam Mohammad; the exception Chaudhury Muhammad Ali.

⁸⁷ 19 January 1955, From Washington to New Delhi, CA-4679, State Department Files, CSAS

⁸⁸ March 1955, Report by A Koslov and V Dubinin, Fond 5, Opis 28, No. 242 (Reel 58, 7959), RGANI

⁸⁹ 29 July 1955, No. 115, Delhi to Washington, CDF (1955-59) Box 2711 (690D.91) RG 59, NARA-II

⁹⁰ 18 January 1955, Frederic Smedley to Dulles, CDF (1955-59) Box 2711 (690D.91) RG 59, NARA-II

⁹¹ 14 March 1955, Dulles to Eisenhower, Box 4, Folder 1, Ann Whitman Papers on John Foster Dulles: 1952-59; Eisenhower Presidential Papers, Dulles-Herter Series

⁹² 23 October 1954, Nehru-Mao meeting, Subject File Serial No. 35, Mathai Papers

⁹³ 13 July 1954, From Washington to New Delhi, CA-300, State Department Files, CSAS

⁹⁴ 14 July 1955, Allen to McGhee, CDF (1955-59) Box 2559 (611.90) RG 59 and 4 November 1954, Seligman to Dulles, Box 3 (Q-S [2]), Series 5: Subseries 5B (Confidential Correspondences), Dulles Papers and 7 June 1954, Nehru to Mehta, No. 105-PMO/54, Subject File S. No. 1, Mehta Papers (III and IV Instalments)

⁹⁵ See Subject File Serial No. 1, Mehta Papers (III and IV Instalments)

⁹⁶ 22 June 1952, Bajpai to Bowles, (Box 97, Folder 15/12 Bajpai, Girja), (Series II) Part III: 1951-53, India and Nepal Correspondences, Bowles Papers

In the meantime, like Dulles, the CRO too remained ‘convinced’ that Communism, if not the Soviet now then perhaps the Chinese variant later, might induce Nehru to be responsive on Kashmir.⁹⁹ Unlike Dulles, however, it had its own worries in the wake of Pakistan’s military association with America. Diplomatically, it expected the Russian influence to grow in India and openly use Kashmir to embarrass Britain within the Commonwealth.¹⁰⁰ Militarily, it was ‘surprised at the extent to which US influence had developed’ in Pakistan.¹⁰¹

1955-57: ‘Prejudice, Petulance and Pique...’

In the summer of 1955, the CRO was looking for a suitably dynamic successor to Alexander Clutterbuck as High-Commissioner to India. The Conservative Commonwealth Secretary Alec Douglas-Home and Foreign Secretary Harold Macmillan wanted to send the Labour politician-minister turned diplomat Malcolm MacDonald. Macmillan felt that MacDonald, given his political background and his vast diplomatic experience would have ‘continuous access to Nehru [to whom he] could speak with authority’.¹⁰²

New Delhi was, by now, the most ‘tricky, complicated and demanding’ Commonwealth post, not the least important aspect of which was ‘relations with the US Ambassador’.¹⁰³ It was in India, more than anywhere else, that London wanted ‘to be certain that its views and intentions [were] fully understood’.¹⁰⁴ This was especially so in the light of, as Macmillan put it to Olaf Caroe in October 1955, ‘how much we have lost and how very precariously we hold on to what we have left’.¹⁰⁵ South Asia was thus important, so was Kashmir and there, as the CIA never stopped asserting, existed ‘strong communist influence’.¹⁰⁶

⁹⁷ 24 October 1953, NR Pillai to Pandit, Subject File Serial No. 50, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

⁹⁸ 23 September 1953, Pandit to Nehru, Subject File Serial No. 50, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

⁹⁹ 25 January 1955, CRO’s note, DO 35/8876, TNA

¹⁰⁰ 18 October 1954, From CRO to Delhi (1710) and Karachi (1421), DO 35/6647, TNA

¹⁰¹ 10 December 1954, CIGS Field Marshal Sir John Harding’s report, DO 35/6530; in March 1955, General Mosley Mayne reported that the ‘present Pakistan PM likes the Americans’, DO 35/6531, TNA

¹⁰² 18, 19, and 22 April 1955, PM 55/36, FS/55/6, FO 800/675, TNA; Eden incredibly recommended Radcliffe.

¹⁰³ 14 May 1955, Canadian HC (UK) to MacDonald, MAC 42/1/1-26, MacDonald Papers, Palace Green Library, Durham University

¹⁰⁴ 1 June 1955, UK Chief Secretary (Kuala Lumpur) to MacDonald, MAC 42/1/1-26, MacDonald Papers

¹⁰⁵ 17 October 1955, Macmillan to Caroe, MSS Macmillan dep C 300, Macmillan Papers, Bodleian Library

¹⁰⁶ 13 October 1955, Intelligence Summary, CIA-CREST Records (accessed on 26 August 2013), NARA-II

MacDonald's American counterpart was the Republican Senator from Kentucky John Sherman Cooper, who had been 'widely welcomed' in India.¹⁰⁷ It was Cooper, well-versed with the deep divergence between India and America on Colonialism and Communism,¹⁰⁸ who would start to explain India's reluctance to talk Kashmir within India's security concerns against China.¹⁰⁹ He would try to assure Washington that Nehru's government was, if anything, 'tougher on domestic Communists than our own Government' and was 'fully aware of the dangers posed by Red China and the Soviet Union'.¹¹⁰

However, in the summer and autumn of 1955, the Near-East and South-Asia Bureau of the State Department, now helmed by Cooper's predecessor Allen, drew its own conclusions from Nehru's June 1955 visit to the Soviet Union and the forthcoming return trip by Bulganin and Khrushchev to India, Burma and Afghanistan in December.¹¹¹ So much so that Allen felt that 'Nehru was now working for Soviet interests in Kashmir'.¹¹²

How seriously their trip was being taken in Washington can be seen from a letter Nelson Rockefeller wrote to Eisenhower. Rockefeller warned that 'the danger in the Middle-East and in Asia may be as critical for the free world today as that which Europe faced in 1948'.¹¹³ It was taken as the keystone of the Soviet diplomatic drive from Burma to Afghanistan via Kashmir,¹¹⁴ and heralded a phase in Indo-US relations that can be called diplomacy by 'prejudice, petulance, pique and exasperation' from both sides. India's Anglophile Vice-President Radhakrishnan lamented that it helped the 'game of Russia'.¹¹⁵

Dulles himself saw the Soviet leaders' visit to and subsequent support on Kashmir to India as 'reflective of the new tactic they have deployed to find the historic area of difference which exist in the Northwest [Pakistan] and Southeast [India] Asia and to take one side against the

¹⁰⁷ 20 June 1955, From Washington to New Delhi, 611.91/6-2155, State Department Files, CSAS

¹⁰⁸ 30 July 1955, John Sherman Cooper to Dulles, Box 2, Folder 5 (C-D [1]), Series 5: Subseries 5B (Confidential Correspondences), Dulles Papers

¹⁰⁹ Robert Schulman, *John Sherman Cooper: The Global Kentuckian* (University Press, Kentucky, 1976), p. 74

¹¹⁰ 27 October 1955, Weil (Delhi) to Withers (Washington), 611.91/10-2755, State Department Files, CSAS

¹¹¹ 28 and 29 July 1955, Dulles-Allen conversations, Box 4, Folder 3 (May-August 1955 [3]), Telephone Conversations (Series 2, Subseries 2A), Dulles Papers

¹¹² 17 December 1955, George Allen to Mohammad Ali (Box 38, Folder India 1955-56), US Mission to UNO, Central Subject Files (1946-1963), RG 84, NARA-II

¹¹³ 7 November 1955, Rockefeller to Eisenhower, CDF (1955-59) Box 196 (033.6182) RG 59, NARA-II

¹¹⁴ 2 December 1955, No. 610, Delhi to Washington, CDF (1955-59) Box 196 (033.6182) RG 59, NARA-II

¹¹⁵ 12 December 1955, EG Mathews to TE Weil, CDF (1955-59) Box 2562 (611.90D93) RG 59, NARA-II; 4 December 1955, From New Delhi to Washington, Despatch No. 637, State Department Files, CSAS

other'.¹¹⁶ Dulles felt that India and the USSR, now, were 'openly aligned in opposition to the known policies of the US' and was not impressed by Cooper's assurance that while 'upon issues which we believe are vital to our security, India takes positions which oppose our views and, when expressed in conjunction with the Soviets or Communist Chinese, it appears to support them, [Nehru] does not intend to depart from a position of non-alignment'.¹¹⁷

Khrushchev's unqualified support for India's Kashmir stance in 1955 has been called 'one of his relatively spontaneous and autonomous, yet calculated, decisions'. It broadened the 1952 Stalinist denunciation of the Anglo-US plans in Kashmir, under the cloak of the UN, to include Khrushchev's 'aversion to Karachi's membership in Western-sponsored defence alliances'. Further, it 'complemented Moscow's developing fondness for Nehru'.¹¹⁸

In London, the CRO was initially confident that it was quite 'unnecessary' to get worried about the Soviet visit. It was 'inconceivable' for them that Nehru, who 'set great store in the Commonwealth', 'will trust them as he does us'.¹¹⁹ As the trip progressed, Clement Attlee charmingly wrote to MacDonald that he did not think that 'Indians who are very punctilious as to what is due from guests to hosts and vice-versa would have been favourably impressed'.¹²⁰ The Indian, who mattered, though, was quite 'grateful' for the Soviet support.¹²¹ Reflecting upon the Soviet visit, Nehru later wrote:

Their references to Goa and Kashmir were made without any previous hints to us. So far as we are concerned, these references were welcome and we have no complaint in regard to them. I do not understand why it has been said by some people that we are put out by these...¹²²

This forced MacDonald to conclude that, 'the honeymoon period of extreme goodwill after the transfer of power is over'.¹²³ Subsequently, Eden, Douglas-Home and Macmillan

¹¹⁶ 19 December 1955, Dulles to Cooper, Box 2, Folder 5 (C-D [1]), Series 5: Subseries 5B (Confidential Correspondences), Dulles Papers

¹¹⁷ 28 December 1955, Cooper to Dulles (in reply), Box 2, Folder 5 (C-D [1]), Series 5: Subseries 5B (Confidential Correspondences), Dulles Papers

¹¹⁸ A Hilger, 'The Soviet Union and India: the Khrushchev era and its aftermath until 1966', Introduction, *Indo-Soviet Relations Collection: the Khrushchev Years* edited by Hilger et al, Feb 2009, www.php.isn.ethz.ch p. 2

¹¹⁹ 22 November 1955, AH Joyce's note, DO 35/6578, TNA

¹²⁰ 28 December 1955, Attlee to MacDonald, MAC 42/12/1-72, MacDonald Papers

¹²¹ 12-13 December 1955, Notes of Nehru-Khrushchev Talks, Subject File 17, Subimal Dutt Papers

¹²² 20 December 1955, Nehru's note, Subject File Serial No. 17, Subimal Dutt Papers; what did put Nehru off somewhat was 'Mr Khrushchev's denunciation of England or the USA', which he felt were 'unnecessary'.

¹²³ 17 December 1955, No. 167, MacDonald to CRO, DO 35/6649, TNA

summoned the Indian High-Commissioner Vijayalakshmi Pandit and, complaining about the Soviet statements, told her that it was for India to make some 'gesture' on Kashmir.¹²⁴ This enraged Nehru and he told Pandit to remind Macmillan that the UK stock in Asia was low and it was India that had 'helped to keep it up'.¹²⁵ He was especially angry at Douglas-Home:

Lord Home has yet to learn the kind of language that has to be used in speaking to India... [They] still live in a past age and imagine that they can treat India as some casual third-rate country... What Bulganin and Khrushchev have said about Kashmir was none of our seeking but the fact remains that the Soviet Union has gained the goodwill of people in India.¹²⁶

Macmillan outlined the immediate implication of the Bulganin-Khrushchev statements on Kashmir on the UK's relations with its 'ally' Pakistan and 'crucial friend' India for Eden. The dilemma was whether to issue statements supporting Pakistan and thereby further 'confirm Indian suspicions' or to be silent and thereby support 'the growing belief in Pakistan and elsewhere in the Middle-East that "neutral" countries such as Egypt and India are getting the best of both worlds'.¹²⁷

Douglas-Home's CRO was in a similar bind between the importance of India and entitlement of Pakistan.¹²⁸ It went without saying that the 'Soviet attitude will make solution more difficult'.¹²⁹ The CRO and the FO officials conveyed their 'acute' dilemma to their American counterparts in January 1956: 'wish to support Pakistan [yet] avoid action [to alienate] India'.¹³⁰ It was precisely this dilemma that the latter had sought to side-step by their pact-politics, which, in their view, prevented countries from being played off against each other by Moscow on regional disputes like Kashmir.¹³¹

It was against this backdrop that, in March 1956, Dulles and the new UK Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd attended a SEATO meeting in Karachi. Afterwards, as widely noted, Kashmir

¹²⁴ 1 December 1955, Pandit to Nehru, 22-PS/55, and 12 December 1955, Pandit to Nehru, 24-PS/55, Subject File Serial No. 62, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

¹²⁵ 5 December 1955, Nehru to Pandit, No. 2271, Subject File Serial No. 61, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

¹²⁶ 15 December 1955, Nehru to Pandit, No. 2333, Subject File Serial No. 61, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

¹²⁷ 16 December 1955, Harold Macmillan to Anthony Eden, 57/55, DO 35/6649, TNA

¹²⁸ 3 January 1956, Gilbert Laithwaite's comments, DO 35/6649, TNA

¹²⁹ 17 January 1956, Delhi to CRO, Despatch No. 6 and 24 January 1956, Moscow to FO, 1051/6/56, DO 35/6578, TNA; KPS Menon told the UK Embassy that Maharaja Karan Singh of Kashmir invited the Soviet leaders in Delhi to visit Kashmir. Prime Minister Bakshi had already invited them and so Nehru agreed.

¹³⁰ 23 January 1956, Garner to ACB Symon (Karachi), SA24/78/1, DO 35/6649, TNA

¹³¹ Oral History Collection, Loy Henderson (119), Dulles Papers

and Pakhtoonistan were mentioned in the press communique raising Indian heckles.¹³² CC Desai called Dulles ‘master of the show’, while exonerating Lloyd as ‘reluctant, anxious and subordinate’.¹³³ Dulles’ lead reflected the growing conviction among his diplomats that notwithstanding the Commonwealth ties in South Asia, America ‘must realise that the burden of maintaining the prestige of the Western democracies [there] now falls on our shoulders’.¹³⁴

While this conviction and its implications for Kashmir remain the dominant historical understanding, the despatches Dulles sent to Eisenhower from Karachi and later New Delhi, his next stop, have been overlooked.¹³⁵ Firstly, it was a brave decision for Dulles to go to India given the ‘high feeling’ there against the US and him, personally.¹³⁶ Cooper’s relative popularity was only a slight silver lining.¹³⁷ Secondly, and more importantly, it is in these despatches that one finds the first changes in Dulles’ attitude towards India.

Though remaining convinced that Pakistan ‘undoubtedly face[d] a serious threat from USSR’ and America ought not to ‘alter’ that association,¹³⁸ Dulles, after a ‘most interesting and significant’ two days of ‘frank talks’ with Nehru, for the first time appreciated ‘the full depth’ of Indian feelings of ‘encirclement’ on US-Pakistan military relations and once again remarked on the ‘unhappy resemblance to the Israeli-Egyptian situation’.¹³⁹ Admitting his dislike of the Baghdad Pact and misgivings about Pakistan’s membership to SEATO,¹⁴⁰ he came away convinced that Washington ‘must give maximum assurance to India’, chiefly in

¹³² Schaffer, *The Limits of Influence*, p. 50

¹³³ 19 March 1956, CC Desai to CS Jha, No. 7.108 (1)/56-Gen (C), NAI; Indian diplomatic reporting from Karachi between January and April 1956 regularly presented the British as ‘defensive, velvet glove’ and the Americans as ‘interventionist, clenched fist’, 2, 7 March and 20 April 1956, File No. 4 (8)/56-PAK I (GOI, MEA-Pak-I Section) and File No. 4-23/56-PAK I (GOI, MEA-Pak-I Section), NAI

¹³⁴ 6 March 1956, Weil to Cooper, 611.91/3-656, State Department Files, CSAS

¹³⁵ There is no mention of Dulles’ talks with Nehru in March 1956 in Schaffer, *The Limits of Influence*, p. 51 or in McGarr, *The Cold War in South Asia*, pp. 50-4

¹³⁶ 11 February 1956, Mary Lord to John Hanes (Jr.), Box 4, Folder 5 (19 December ’55-12 February ’56), Subseries 5C: Miscellaneous Correspondence, Dulles Papers

¹³⁷ Diverse figures as J Jain, Krishna Menon and JJ Singh praised Cooper to Oswald and Mary Lord over 1955-56, Box 4, Folder 2 (14-22 August 1955) and Box 4, Folder 6 (14-29 February 1956), Subseries 5C: Miscellaneous Correspondence, Dulles Papers

¹³⁸ 8 March 1956, Dulles to Eisenhower, Box 5, Folder 7, Ann Whitman Papers on John Foster Dulles: 1952-59; Eisenhower Presidential Papers, Dulles-Herter Series

¹³⁹ 11 March 1956, Dulles to Eisenhower, Box 5, Folder 7, Ann Whitman Papers on John Foster Dulles: 1952-59; Eisenhower Presidential Papers, Dulles-Herter Series and 21 March 1956, Nehru to Krishna Menon, PRIMIN-21564, Subject File Serial No. 28 (XVIII), Mathai Papers

¹⁴⁰ 9-10 March 1956, Notes of Nehru-Dulles Talk, Subject File Serial No. 87, Subimal Dutt Papers

terms of economic aid.¹⁴¹ He resolved not ‘to write off India as a bad risk...Nothing would please Moscow and Peking more’.¹⁴²

Indeed, First Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan followed Dulles to New Delhi and, affirming Moscow’s support, asked Nehru to be wary against a ‘rigid’ Dulles and a ‘doubtful’ Selwyn Lloyd.¹⁴³ Simultaneously, Chou En-Lai was telling the Indian Ambassador that the Karachi meeting showed up American strength, British weakness and their plans ‘even at the risk of worsening relations with India’.¹⁴⁴ On Kashmir, this ‘development in [Dulles’] thinking’, as Raymond Hare of the US Foreign Service, called it,¹⁴⁵ joined the old British conviction to keep it ‘away, as far and as long as possible’ from Russia/China.¹⁴⁶ He might not have considered India neutral or an ally, let alone a friend, but over 1956-59, Dulles’ focus shifted to ‘deny[ing] India to our enemies’.¹⁴⁷

Ironically, while Dulles was softening, the CRO was stiffening. It held that the UK ‘ought not to be put into a wholly defensive position’ and meet ‘the provocation offered by the Soviets [on Kashmir]’.¹⁴⁸ Agreeing with Hildreth that one ‘should support proven friends’,¹⁴⁹ it averred that Kashmir was important ‘not on its own account but [for] the wider issues involved’.¹⁵⁰ It was a liability for Pakistan’s alliance with the West,¹⁵¹ while being an asset for Moscow’s relations with India.¹⁵² This new-found resolve in London made the summer of 1956 so ‘alarming’ for India-UK relations on Kashmir that MacDonald was eager for a goodwill gesture, like handing over the India Office Library to India.¹⁵³

¹⁴¹ 4 February 1956, John Cowles (Sr.) to Eisenhower, Box 5, Folder 6, Ann Whitman Papers on John Foster Dulles: 1952-59; Eisenhower Presidential Papers, Dulles-Herter Series

¹⁴² 30 March 1956, Despatch No. 1064, State Department Files, CSAS

¹⁴³ 26-28 March 1956, Notes of Nehru-Mikoyan Talks, Subject File Serial No. 19, Subimal Dutt Papers

¹⁴⁴ 16 March 1956, D 1448/56-Pak I, File No. 4 (8)/56-PAK I (GOI, MEA-Pak-I Section), NAI

¹⁴⁵ Oral History Collection, Raymond Hare (108); from now, Indian aid never met any serious objections from Dulles. It was not very large in the 1950s but even then Dulles neither withheld it nor made it conditional, Oral History Collection, VL Pandit (195) and GL Mehta (173), Dulles Papers

¹⁴⁶ 25 April 1956, Note on Kashmir by MacDonald, POL 5/6/11, MAC 42/3/1-36, MacDonald Papers and 2 May 1956, No. 2386, FO to New York, DO 35/6608, TNA

¹⁴⁷ Oral History Collection, John Vorys (265) and Frederick Nolting Jr. (189), Dulles Papers

¹⁴⁸ 15 March 1956, No. 762, CRO to UK HC, DO 35/6618, TNA

¹⁴⁹ 29 March 1956, Hildreth to Radford, Box 14, Folder 091 (Pakistan, 1956) - RG 218 - Records of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman's File, Admiral Arthur Radford, 1953-57, NARA-II

¹⁵⁰ 18 May 1956, Saville Garner to AW Snelling, DO 35/6608, TNA

¹⁵¹ 14 June 1956, NSC Briefing, CIA-CREST Records (accessed on 26 August 2013) and 29 May 1956, USUN Memo (Box 38, Folder India 1955-56), US Mission to UNO, Central Subject Files (1946-1963) RG 84

¹⁵² Note dated 28 April 1956, sent on 2 May from Delhi to CRO, POL 34/106/1, DO 35/6608, TNA

¹⁵³ 19 June 1956, MacDonald to Home, POL 36/5, MAC 42/3/1-36, MacDonald Papers

In July, Nehru visited London for the Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference. Like past years, Pakistan wanted a discussion on Kashmir and the British Government, unlike the Attlee years, was not chary of agreeing to this request. Douglas-Home asked both MacDonald and Mountbatten to approach Nehru.¹⁵⁴ Both warned against the step and Mountbatten elaborated in personal terms about 'Nehru's personal affection for Britain and belief in the Commonwealth'.¹⁵⁵

By the time Nehru came to London, however, the world's attention had diverted to Egypt. Between July and November 1956, the worsening crisis in the Suez Canal zone became an irritant between India and Britain. Connecting Kashmir and Suez in the broader matrix of anti-colonialism and anti-communism, MacDonald wrote that Nehru, striving for Middle-Eastern friends for India's forty million Muslims, stood together with Nasser against the pro-West Shah in Persia, Nuri Pasha in Iraq and King Saud.¹⁵⁶ He found 'all the sabre-rattling going on in England and France as foolish in the extreme'.¹⁵⁷

This was, by itself, alright, for London knew Nehru's sympathies well and did not expect any support or endorsement. It became complicated and controversial later when coupled with, what was described by Pandit as, India's 'half-hearted condemnation' of Soviet action in Hungary.¹⁵⁸ This much-discussed affair, and its impact on Britain's relations with its former colonies as well as the US,¹⁵⁹ impacted on Kashmir too in a subterranean way. As an FO note analysed the connections:

It is clear that the Indian and Pakistani attitudes over Hungary and Suez have been much coloured by thoughts of Kashmir... We may be able to use Kashmir to drive a wedge between India and the Arab States. Israel's argument on Negev is much the same as India's on Kashmir... If we can come down on the side of the Arab states over Negev; we shall win favour with them and make it difficult for India to oppose our line without appearing to support Israel.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁴ 28 April 1956, Nehru to Pandit, No. 913-PMH/56, Subject File Serial No. 61, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

¹⁵⁵ 2 July 1956, Mountbatten to Alec-Douglas Home, MB1/I225 (Folder 1), Mountbatten Papers

¹⁵⁶ 27 July 1956, No. 53 (POL 282/33/4), MacDonald to Home, MAC 42/3/1-36, MacDonald Papers

¹⁵⁷ 4 August 1956, Nehru to Pandit, No. 1697-PMH/56, Subject File Serial No. 61, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

¹⁵⁸ 26 November 1956, Pandit to Nehru, Subject File Serial No. 62, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

¹⁵⁹ See Roger Louis and Roger Owen, *Suez 1956* (Oxford: OUP, 1991)

¹⁶⁰ See DO 35/6640, TNA

Meanwhile, in Washington Eisenhower had started to feel strongly about hosting Nehru sooner than later.¹⁶¹ In the wake of the Bulganin-Khrushchev visit and connecting the three issues of arms to Pakistan, Kashmir and aid to India, Cooper had impressed upon him its urgency.¹⁶² In August, Norman Cousins urged Eisenhower to be friendly with Nehru, as much to erase the memories of his disappointing 1949 visit as to encourage his growing recognition of ‘the nature of the rivalry between China and India’.¹⁶³ In October, after the events in Hungary and Suez, Eisenhower himself wondered ‘whether the present situations might not be creating in Nehru the feeling that he might begin to strengthen his ties with the West’ and wanted ‘to nurture and promote’ them.¹⁶⁴

The Ford Foundation economist Clair Wilcox told him that America’s bigger challenge lay neither in Eastern Europe nor in the Middle-East but in the Far-East where, in the wake of the Dutch and French withdrawals, India offered the ‘only real alternative’ to China.¹⁶⁵ Wilcox was supported by Hamilton Fish Armstrong who had just returned from a trip to Pakistan and wondered shrewdly if Pakistan had a ‘different attitude towards Communist China from Soviet Union’.¹⁶⁶ Soon former Vice-President Henry Wallace wrote to Eisenhower sympathetically about the ‘Swedish Socialist’ Nehru and his ‘difficult burdens’. Terming India as ‘the key to Asia’, Wallace urged ‘warm-hearted understanding and sympathy’ for Nehru’s ‘blind spot – Kashmir’.¹⁶⁷ In early November, even Nixon asked Eisenhower ‘if Nehru’s visit to the US could be expedited’.¹⁶⁸

Finally, when Nehru and Eisenhower came face to face on 18 December 1956, they had wide-ranging talks for fourteen hours over two days covering the Arab-Israeli situation, the

¹⁶¹ 20 June 1956, Dulles-Adams, Box 11, Folder 3 (January-August 1956 [2]), Telephone Conversations (Series 2, Subseries 2B-White House), Dulles Papers

¹⁶² 1 February 1956, Dulles-Adams, Box 11, Folder 6 (January-August 1956 [5]), Telephone Conversations (Series 2, Subseries 2B-White House), Dulles Papers

¹⁶³ 30 August 1956, Box 3, Folder 13 (1956 [2]) (White House Correspondence), Series 3: White House Memoranda (Subseries 3A: Correspondence and Meetings), Dulles Papers

¹⁶⁴ 29 October 1956, Eisenhower to Dulles, Box 3, Folder 12 (1956 [1]) (White House Correspondence), Series 3: White House Memoranda (Subseries 3A: Correspondence and Meetings), Dulles Papers; Ironically, at this time, New Delhi had been without an American Ambassador for six months, 5 September 1956, Bowles to Adlai Stevenson, Box 14, Folder 3, Stevenson Papers

¹⁶⁵ 13 October 1956, Wilcox to Bowles, Box 6, Folder 5, George F Kennan Papers (MC0 76), Princeton

¹⁶⁶ Box 123, Folder 5 (Pakistan, Travel Notes: 1956), Hamilton Fish Armstrong Papers (MC 002), Princeton

¹⁶⁷ 26 November 1956, Wallace to Eisenhower, Box 3, Folder 12 (1956 [1]) (White House Correspondence), Series 3: White House Memoranda (Subseries 3A: Correspondence and Meetings), Dulles Papers

¹⁶⁸ 5 November 1956, Box 4, Folder 12 (August-December 1956 [3]) (Meetings with the President), Series 3: White House Memoranda (Subseries 3A: Correspondence and Meetings), Dulles Papers

German question, five-year plans and the Indian electoral system. They talked Kashmir, along with Goa, next day and not ‘marginally’ as is usually understood.¹⁶⁹ A probing Eisenhower was left disappointed that Nehru did not ask him ‘to be an intermediary’ in either.¹⁷⁰ Nehru, though, was ‘pleased’ with the discussions.¹⁷¹ He respected Eisenhower and had a keen interest in the ‘principal subjects’ under discussion – Egypt, Hungary and China. He was touched that the ‘USG went out of their way in showing [him] honour’,¹⁷² and left more hopeful about the India-US relations than the India-UK rift.¹⁷³ Even Dulles appeared more reasonable than the ‘precipitous’ British.¹⁷⁴ Unlike 1949, this time he had intended ‘to see the President rather than the United States’ and felt he had done that.¹⁷⁵ The Soviet Foreign Ministry too noted the ‘concrete’ nature of Nehru-Eisenhower talks.¹⁷⁶

While Eisenhower and Nehru were getting along with each other in Washington, Winthrop Aldrich, the US Ambassador in London, was indicating an upcoming Security Council showdown with India. He learnt from the CRO that an ‘extremely serious crisis [was] inevitable on Kashmir, possibly as dangerous as the Middle-East and likely to result in India leaving the Commonwealth’.

Noting that the UK had ‘irretrievably lost its moral influence with India’ on Suez, Aldrich pointed to the feeling in London that Suez had revealed who the UK’s friends were in the Middle-East. These could be ‘counted on fingers of one hand’ but among them was Pakistan. Aldrich concluded that the CRO wanted to ‘abandon previous policy of maintaining broad balance between Pakistan and India in Kashmir’.¹⁷⁷

¹⁶⁹ Schaffer, *The Limits of Influence*, p. 53

¹⁷⁰ 18-19 December 1956, Dulles-Eisenhower, Box 11, Folder 7 (September-December 1956 [1]), Telephone Conversations (Series 2, Subseries 2B-White House), Dulles Papers; 19 December 1956, Knowland to Dulles, Box 2, Folder 12 (I-K [2]), Series 5: Subseries 5B (Confidential Correspondences), Dulles Papers

¹⁷¹ 19 December 1956, Nehru-Governor Stassen-Ambassador Mehta, Box 4, Folder 1 (Disarmament, 1955-56 [1]), Series 4: Subseries 4A, Dulles Papers

¹⁷² 8 January 1957, Nehru’s notes of his talks with Eisenhower, Subject File Serial No. 91, Subimal Dutt Papers

¹⁷³ 7 December 1956, Livingstone T Merchant (US Ambassador, Canada) to Dulles, Box 5, Folder 2 (5 November-28 December 1956), Subseries 5C: Miscellaneous Correspondence, Dulles Papers and 6 December 1956, Nehru to Pandit, No. 2818-PMH/56, Subject File Serial No. 61, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

¹⁷⁴ 16 December 1956, Notes of Nehru-Dulles Talk, Subject File Serial No. 95, Subimal Dutt Papers

¹⁷⁵ 19 June 1956, Krishna Menon to Henry Cabot Lodge (Jr.) (Box 38, Folder India 1955-56), US Mission to UNO, Central Subject Files (1946-1963), RG 84, NARA-II

¹⁷⁶ 30 January and 8 February 1957, Note by A Yepishev, Fond 5, Opis 28, No. 499 (Reel 125, 5199), RGANI

¹⁷⁷ 21 December 1956, No. 3450, London to Washington, CDF (1955-59) Box 2713 (690D.91), RG 59

The crisis Aldrich warned about came in January 1957. The Security Council debate on Kashmir in that month is a much-commented watershed in the UN history of the dispute.¹⁷⁸ It was perhaps the most fraught month in Nehru's relationship with the British on Kashmir. The immediate cause was the UK-sponsored resolution at the UN Security Council supporting Pakistan's attempt to bring the dispute back at the international stage and leading to the establishment of the Gunnar Jarring Mission later in the year.¹⁷⁹

Among the Americans, Dulles, Henry Cabot Lodge (Jr.), Ambassador to the UN, and William Rountree, head of the Near-East and South-Asia Bureau, thought that they 'could help [Pakistan] more'.¹⁸⁰ Rountree, who would go as Ambassador to Pakistan in 1959, candidly told Waskom Pickett, a Methodist minister and missionary in India from 1911 to 1956, that 'our policy towards Kashmir was related to...our relations with the Muslim countries of the world [and] US policy to attempt to hold all countries in collective security against further Communist encroachment'.¹⁸¹ However, there was also unease at being associated with the British while India thought that the latter were 'motivated by revenge and spite [post-Suez]'.¹⁸² The international dimensions of the January debate were summarised for the Joint Chiefs of Staff as under:

The US position throughout has been one of cautious support of Pakistan. It is dictated by the fear of damaging US-Indian relations which were somewhat improved after Nehru's visit and by the desire to support Pakistan with whom we are allied. The UK position has been somewhat stronger in support of Pakistan...Soviet Russia will continue to support India...Chou En-Lai may be able to appear as a peacemaker. Communist China possesses fundamental interests in South Asia, not shared by the USSR...¹⁸³

¹⁷⁸ On the American position see RJ McMahon, Dennis Kux and Howard Schaffer; on the British, Paul McGarr; on India, Sisir Gupta and Navnita Chadha-Behera and on Pakistan, Alastair Lamb and Shuja Nawaz.

¹⁷⁹ Edwina Mountbatten was visiting Nehru at this time and wrote to her husband that the Indians believed that 'the resolution was actually drafted before Menon had started to put India's case and passed before he had finished', 25 January 1957, Edwina to Mountbatten, MB1/I225 (Folder 1), Mountbatten Papers

¹⁸⁰ 21 January 1957, Dulles-Herbert Hoover (Jr.), Box 6, Folder 4 (January-February 1957 [4]), Telephone Conversations and 22 January 1957, Dulles-Rountree, Box 6, Folder 4 (January-February 1957 [4]), Telephone Conversations (Series 2, Subseries 2A), Dulles Papers

¹⁸¹ 8 July 1957, Rountree to Pickett, Bureau of Near-Eastern and South-Asian Affairs Records relating to Kashmir, 1952-64, RG 59, NARA-II

¹⁸² 21 March-15 April 1957, Maffitt-Jones correspondence, Bureau of Near-Eastern and South-Asian Affairs Records relating to Kashmir, 1952-64, RG 59, NARA-II

¹⁸³ 11 February 1957 (Memo on 'Emerging Pattern - Kashmir' by Brigadier Richard Collins (Brig-Gen, DD for Intelligence, The Joint Staff) to Secretary Defence) Box 9, Folder 091 (India) - RG 218 - Records of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman's File, Admiral Arthur Radford, 1953-57, NARA-II

Unlike his diplomatic and military advisors, Eisenhower had wanted to ‘keep hands off’ Kashmir entirely.¹⁸⁴ From India, his new Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker had been warning that ‘primary US interest will suffer’ otherwise.¹⁸⁵ Bunker, a Democrat and veteran diplomat, would contribute a great deal in restoring Indo-US relations over the next four years.¹⁸⁶ An essential part of this would be tempering Washington’s initiatives on Kashmir and re-orienting its international dimensions from the Soviet Union, towards which Bunker himself was conciliatory, to China, against which he was hawkish.¹⁸⁷ MacDonald was reporting similarly to the CRO,¹⁸⁸ but as the FO insisted, the UK attitude was determined by India’s position on Suez and Pakistan’s potential in re-establishing stability there.¹⁸⁹

Looking back at its January position, the CRO justified it by arguing that, notwithstanding Britain’s economic stakes in India, it was difficult to accept that ‘a member of the Commonwealth should regard herself as uncommitted between the Communist powers and the West’.¹⁹⁰ This anguish about the Commonwealth apart, Kashmir had become a ‘moral issue’ for the UK, as Macmillan called it.¹⁹¹ MacDonald tried his best to counter the rising tide against India in London by repeatedly emphasising India’s ‘self-evident’ importance.¹⁹² Over 18 and 19 February 1957, he sent telegrams ‘about the risk that India will withdraw from the Commonwealth’ on Kashmir:

British position in southern Asia was shaken by Suez. The disagreement over Kashmir threatens to destroy it. If India leaves the Commonwealth – Ceylon, Malaya, [even] Canada [might follow]. Our present Kashmir policy [will also lead to] Russia supporting India over Kashmir, thus greatly stimulating the influence of Communism here...¹⁹³

¹⁸⁴ 22 January 1957, Dulles-Eisenhower, Box 11, Folder 11 (January-February 1957 [3]), Telephone Conversations (Series 2, Subseries 2B-White House), Dulles Papers

¹⁸⁵ 6 February 1957, No. 2196, Delhi to Washington, CDF (1955-59) Box 2713 (690D.91) RG 59, NARA-II and 23 January 1957, No. 83, MacDonald to CRO, DO 35/6610, TNA

¹⁸⁶ Cooper’s and Bunker’s efforts were acknowledged, appreciated and reciprocated by Nehru and Indian officials too. See Dutt, *With Nehru in the Foreign Office*, p. 241

¹⁸⁷ See Howard Schaffer, *Ellsworth Bunker: Global Troubleshooter, Vietnam Hawk* (University of North Carolina Press, 2003), pp. 51-74

¹⁸⁸ 23 January 1957, No. 83, MacDonald to CRO, DO 35/6610, TNA

¹⁸⁹ 22 January 1957, No. 15, FO to its missions and 24 January 1957, No. 98, Karachi to CRO, DO 35/6610

¹⁹⁰ 8 March 1957, Memorandum by Secretary of State (CRO) on Kashmir, C (57) 59, PREM 11/1880, TNA

¹⁹¹ 11 February 1957, Nehru retorted, ‘we cannot be bullied...the British in the UN have not behaved decently at all’, 6 February 1957, Nehru to Pandit, Subject File Serial No. 61, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

¹⁹² 13 April 1957, No. 25, MacDonald to CRO, PREM 11/1880, TNA

¹⁹³ 19 February 1957, MacDonald to Home, MAC 42/4/1-102, MacDonald Papers

Nehru wrote multiple letters to his sister and Mountbatten in February 1957 and each was more combative than the previous.¹⁹⁴ Mountbatten's reply is revealing for the light it throws on his role as a 'friend of India', notwithstanding his ability to exaggerate his importance:

In the days of Anthony Eden it was very easy to see him at any time and he was always very happy to listen to my views on India...I hardly know Macmillan and so it is not very easy for me to be as helpful (perhaps this is why our relations with India are not as good as they used to be).¹⁹⁵

MacDonald rushed to London and addressed the Commonwealth Affairs Committee on 28 February 1957. He targeted those Tory MPs who were inclined to say that 'if India leaves the Commonwealth, perhaps it is just as well'. They, in turn, felt that he saw 'problems too much through Asiatic and too little through British eyes'.¹⁹⁶ Nonetheless, calling his visit 'a turning point', Mountbatten wrote to Nehru that, 'none of us who love India are out of the wood yet, but things really are better'.¹⁹⁷ Pandit also reported a changed approach among the Conservatives since MacDonald's visit. Aneurin Bevan had also helped though, as Hugh Gaitskell was opposed to the Indian stand on Kashmir, the Labour Party was divided. With Labour divided, Conservatives opposed and the press hostile, it was tough to be the Indian High-Commissioner in the UK in 1957.¹⁹⁸

In April, surveying Indo-UK relations within the matrix of the 'old vicissitudes' of Suez, Hungary and Kashmir, MacDonald concluded that the UK 'may never recover the warmth of 1947-49'. But already some silver linings could be seen in this dark cloud. India's 'double disillusionment' with the UK on Suez and the USSR on Hungary combined with its increasing fear of China was producing, if as yet invisibly, a 'common ground' with the USA.¹⁹⁹ Nehru's disillusionment with the British, however, was especially deep, as he confessed to the Swedish envoy Alva Myrdal.²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁴ 11 and 19 February 1957, Nehru to Pandit, No. 207-PMH/57 and No. 226-PMH/57, Subject File Serial No. 61, Pandit Papers (I Instalment) and 11 February 1957, Nehru to Mountbatten, No. 206-PMH/57, MB1/I225 (Folder 1), Mountbatten Papers

¹⁹⁵ 28 February 1957, Mountbatten to Nehru, MB1/I225 (Folder 2), Mountbatten Papers

¹⁹⁶ See MAC 42/4/1-102, MacDonald Papers

¹⁹⁷ 15 March 1957, Mountbatten to Nehru, MB1/I225 (Folder 2), Mountbatten Papers

¹⁹⁸ 28 March 1957, Pandit to Nehru, No. 14-HC/57, Subject File Serial No. 62, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

¹⁹⁹ 29 April 1957, POL 5/122/2, Despatch No. 29, MacDonald to Home, MAC 42/4/1-102, MacDonald Papers

²⁰⁰ Oral History Transcripts, Alva Myrdal, Acc. No. 192, NMML, pp. 21-22

For the first time since the London Declaration of April 1949, he told his sister, there was ‘a fairly widespread feeling’ in India that the Commonwealth connection was ‘hardly worthwhile’.²⁰¹ A lot depended now on how he got along with the new Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and MacDonald urged Mountbatten to help in this endeavour.²⁰² Mountbatten obliged and, at the 1957 Commonwealth Prime Minister’s Conference, Nehru had amiable if general meetings with Macmillan and Douglas-Home. Nevertheless, the Indian Prime Minister cut an isolated figure at the conference and came to visit his friend ‘disillusioned and sad’.²⁰³

In the meantime, the India-US ‘common ground’ that MacDonald had been prophesying was being actively contested. On the one hand, Anderson, the Treasury Secretary, warned Dulles in July 1957, that boosting India was not popular on the Capitol Hill,²⁰⁴ as it was hard ‘to justify giving aid to a country whose head never missed a chance to take a shot’ at the US.²⁰⁵ Dulles’s State Department too remained Soviet-centric and convinced that Moscow was ‘pro-India’.²⁰⁶ On the other hand, symbolising the new context of the Cold War, Henry Cabot Lodge (Jr.), was highlighting India’s ‘increasing importance’ vis-à-vis China.²⁰⁷

1957-59: ‘New Look’

Kashmir, never out of the ‘broader background of its effect on the position of the free world versus the communist threat’, was slowly acquiring a double setting and ‘becoming involved in the Cold War in yet another way’.²⁰⁸ Pakistan’s old importance in the Middle-East against the Soviet Union in the Anglo-American minds was now being joined by India’s increasing significance against China.²⁰⁹ The shenanigans of January 1957 had convinced Eisenhower

²⁰¹ 9 March 1957, Nehru to Pandit, Subject File Serial No. 61, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

²⁰² 11 June 1957, Malcolm MacDonald to Mountbatten, MB1/I225 (Folder 1), Mountbatten Papers

²⁰³ 3 July 1957, Mountbatten to McDonald (in reply), 3 July 1957, MB1/I225 (Folder 1), Mountbatten Papers

²⁰⁴ 25 July 1957, Dulles-Anderson, Box 7, Folder 3 (July-August 1957 [3]), Telephone Conversations (Series 2, Subseries 2A), Dulles Papers

²⁰⁵ 5 January 1956, Dulles-Judd, Box 5, Folder 4 (January-April 1956 [8]), Telephone Conversations (Series 2, Subseries 2A), Dulles Papers

²⁰⁶ 7 September 1957, No. 499, Karachi to Washington, CDF (1955-59) Box 2713 (690D.91) RG 59, NARA-II and 1 October 1957, Dulles-Eisenhower, Box 5, Folder 13 (1957 [3]) (Meetings with the President), Series 3: White House Memoranda (Subseries 3A: Correspondence and Meetings), Dulles Papers

²⁰⁷ 31 May 1957, Lodge to Dulles (Box 38, Folder India 1957), US Mission to UNO, Central Subject Files (1946-1963) RG 84, NARA-II

²⁰⁸ Lamb, *Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy 1846-1990*, p. 233

²⁰⁹ 10 October 1957, No. 2057, UK Delegation to UN to FO, DO 35/6136, TNA

that this joint hinged on ‘the knotty problem of Kashmir’.²¹⁰ From later that year he became keen to personally tackle the issue. He also started thinking about a trip to India and Pakistan, another aspect of what has recently been called his ‘new look’ at South Asia.²¹¹

The same was true of Macmillan who visited India in January 1958. Unlike their earlier fraught encounters, which have led scholars to conclude negatively about their personal equations,²¹² his talks with Nehru this time were ‘long, private and friendly [if] vague’. A ‘relaxed, reflective and discursive’ Nehru discussed the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Indian relations.²¹³ Crucially Macmillan went back, apart from being ‘tremendously pleased, quite overcome’ with the welcome he received, inclined to agree with MacDonald that India’s non-alignment was not slanted towards China as it had appeared towards the Soviet Union.²¹⁴ Nehru had also arranged a meeting between the Indonesian President Soekarno and Macmillan with ‘some good effect’.²¹⁵ Almost exactly a year on from the meltdown of January 1957, Macmillan’s trip ‘went a little beyond’ even Nehru’s expectations. After all, they ‘did not discuss at all the Kashmir issue or in fact any issue relating to Pakistan’.²¹⁶

With Macmillan’s visit and Eisenhower’s desire to visit, their governments were steering clear of any discussion on Kashmir by April 1958, given the Indian disapproval and the Soviet veto. For Pakistan, the pendulum, as Shuja Nawaz has written, ‘was swinging from blind friendship toward a more pragmatic relationship’.²¹⁷ In a State Department ‘Talking Paper’ prepared that month, Rountree reflected upon the new four-dimensional nature of the implications of Kashmir dispute. It was diverting the Anglo-American military aid to Pakistan intended against the USSR to India and their economic aid to India intended to help against China to Pakistan.²¹⁸

²¹⁰ 12 November 1957, Eisenhower to Aneurin Bevan, Box 7, Folder 9, Ann Whitman Papers on John Foster Dulles: 1952-59; Eisenhower Presidential Papers, Dulles-Herter Series

²¹¹ See McGarr, *The Cold War in South Asia*, chapter 2

²¹² See McGarr, *The Cold War in South Asia*, pp. 101-02 and chapter 3

²¹³ 11 January 1958, Nehru-Macmillan talks, 11 January 1958, DO 35/8876, TNA

²¹⁴ See MAC 42/4/99, MacDonald Papers

²¹⁵ 12 January 1958, Nehru to Pandit, Subject File Serial No. 61, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

²¹⁶ 28 January 1958, Nehru to Mountbatten, MB1/I225 (Folder 2), Mountbatten Papers

²¹⁷ Shuja Nawaz, *Crossed Swords*, p. 136

²¹⁸ 16 April 1958, Rountree’s Talking Paper (Lot 62D43, Box 2 of 3-23, Folder US-UK Talks, 1958), Office of South Asian Affairs, 1939-59 (Files relating to India, 1945-52) (Lot 57D259, 54D341 and 62D43) RG 59

This composite understanding called for a comprehensive approach. It soon emerged in a 'package proposal for settlement of India-Pakistan differences'. Its essence was 'to consider the Indus, Kashmir and arms questions as closely related so that a wider field for compromise will exist'.²¹⁹ It bore the personal imprimatur of an enthusiastic President.²²⁰ It was not uniformly welcomed though. General Nathan Twining, Radford's successor as the Chairman of the US JCS, considered it undesirable 'from the military point of view'.²²¹

Similarly, among the British, Morrice James, the influential diplomat with unparalleled experience in both Pakistan and India, wondered 'whether adding 0 to 0 to 0' made much sense.²²² To the CRO, Eisenhower's 'package proposal' was also a painful and previously unthinkable illustration that the US could or should 'take the lead in dealing with problems [within] the Commonwealth'. But 1958 was not 1948; that year for the first time UK's share in foreign investment in India fell below that of the US.²²³ As for Pakistan, America had supplanted Britain as chief aider from 1954 onwards and so the CRO accepted that by now the US was 'very directly implicated' in the Indian subcontinent.²²⁴

The FO consoled it that Washington was becoming 'more conscious than before' of India's importance. Earlier, it had been 'all too apt to judge Kashmir from a narrow Cold War standpoint',²²⁵ but now, as Ambassador Harold Caccia reported, the Cold War standpoint had not been so much substituted as broadened in that the US 'package approach' on Kashmir kept in mind 'security requirements' of both Pakistan and India against both Russia and China.²²⁶ Kashmir was getting a second context to 'the old factor Soviet Union', i.e. 'the new factor – China'.²²⁷ Attention was shifting from the 'all quiet' Afghan border of Kashmir to

²¹⁹ 17 April 1958, Dulles to Eisenhower, Box 8, Folder 1, Whitman Papers on Foster Dulles: 1952-59;

Eisenhower Presidential Papers, Dulles-Herter Series; (690D.91/17-458) CDF (1955-59) Box 2714 (690D.91)

²²⁰ 21 April 1958, Eisenhower to Dulles, Box 8, Folder 1, Ann Whitman Papers on John Foster Dulles: 1952-59; Eisenhower Presidential Papers, Dulles-Herter Series; Eisenhower was so enthusiastic that he was 'ready to welcome and entertain the PMs simultaneously' and ready 'to even go out there'.

²²¹ 8 January 1958, Twining to Secretary, Defence, Box 8, Geographic File 1958; Folder 092 (India) - RG 218 - Records of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman's File, General Nathan Twining, 1957-60, NARA-II

²²² 4 June 1958, Edwin Martin (London) to Fred Bartlett (Washington) (Lot 62D43, Box 2 of 3-23, Folder US-UK Talks, 1958) (Folder Package 2 of 2), Office of South Asian Affairs, 1939-59 (Files relating to India, 1945-52) (Lot 57D259, 54D341 and 62D43) RG 59, NARA-II

²²³ 4 March 1960, MacDonald to CRO, Despatch No. 5, TC 85/5/3, 42/9, MacDonald Papers

²²⁴ 28 April 1958, CS Pickard's note, DO 35/8986, TNA

²²⁵ See FO's note on arguments for supporting US approach to India and Pakistan, DO 35/8986, TNA

²²⁶ 25 April 1958, No. 996, Harold Caccia (Washington) to FO, DO 35/8986, TNA

²²⁷ 18 April 1958, Record of meeting at State Department, DO 35/8986 and 23-24 April 1958, US-UK-Canada discussions, Note prepared on 5 May 1958, DO 35/8881, TNA

the ‘activity’ on its China border.²²⁸ MC Chagla, India’s new Ambassador to America, was finding Dulles ‘extremely patient and cordial’ and keen on ‘Indo-US friendship [against China] despite differences [on Pakistan]’.²²⁹

Unfortunately, Eisenhower’s ‘package deal’ came to a swift end in June 1958 when Nehru rejected it. While the arguably more important Indus Waters issue was, at least, being pursued by the World Bank, this rejection left Kashmir once again ‘intractable’.²³⁰ The State Department took it badly. Winthrop Brown angrily asked Bunker how could Nehru reject it when he was ‘seeking further aid?’²³¹ In October, with Pakistan joining six other countries in getting infected with the coup rash in that year of coups,²³² any remaining expectations from the ‘package proposal’ died.²³³ The only hope was that the Chinese threat to India might raise possibilities of change in India foreign policy.²³⁴ Bunker definitely found the Indians a changed lot on that matter and hoped that Kashmir too would get settled in that light.²³⁵

It was against this background that Eisenhower visited the Indian subcontinent in December 1959. His goodwill trip saw him spend 4 days in the leading non-aligned country after 1 ½ days on the soil of a stalwart ally. The US-Pakistan relations were well and truly on a ‘downward trajectory’.²³⁶ On the other hand, as it coincided with the Chinese threats on the Indian border, amidst their worsening relationship, the trip was a big success in India.²³⁷

Eisenhower made no attempt to persuade Nehru to adopt any particular solution for Kashmir.²³⁸ The Indians knew that Eisenhower admired Nehru and was ‘not likely to get involved in detailed talks about any matter’. They also felt that Dulles’ death in April 1959 had been ‘a contributory factor’ in changing the American attitude towards India for the better,²³⁹ although towards the end, Dulles had acknowledged the advantages of Nehru’s non-

²²⁸ 4 June 1958, Visit to Gilgit by Brigadier Kingzett (UK Military Advisor, Karachi), FO 371/133389, TNA

²²⁹ 25 November 1958, Chagla to Nehru, No. 184-A/58, Subject File Serial No. 56, Subimal Dutt Papers

²³⁰ 17 January 1959, HSH Stanley to H Lintott, DO 35/8988, TNA

²³¹ 11 June 1958, CDF (1955-59) Box 2714 (690D.91) RG 59, NARA-II

²³² Shuja Nawaz, *Crossed Swords*, p. 139; see chapters ‘The First Coup’ and ‘Martial Law...’

²³³ 14 January 1959, Lintott to Laithwaite, DO 35/8988, TNA

²³⁴ 31 August 1959, Lewis Jones-Sir Roger Stevens, DO 35/8989, TNA

²³⁵ Oral History Collection, Ellsworth Bunker (33), Dulles Papers

²³⁶ Shuja Nawaz, *Crossed Swords*, p. 183

²³⁷ See N Maxwell, *India’s China War* (London: Penguin, 1972) and Raghavan, *War and Peace*, pp. 227-310

²³⁸ 28 December 1959, JMC James (Delhi) to CRO, POL5/6/11, DO 35/8989, TNA

²³⁹ Oral History Collection, VL Pandit (195) and GL Mehta (173), Dulles Papers

alignment.²⁴⁰ They accepted that America would not ‘come out openly supporting India because the Russians have not come out openly supporting China’.²⁴¹

Nevertheless, Eisenhower was inclined to help and threw hints about military aid. Nehru had earlier refused Pakistan’s President General Ayub Khan’s offer for a military association as he did not want to fall out with the Russians,²⁴² and demurred now because he did not want America to regard India as a balancing factor against the Chinese.²⁴³ His cousin RK Nehru, Pillai’s successor as Secretary-General in the MEA, explained the refusal thus: first, China and Russia would draw together and second, the US would ask for a price on Kashmir.²⁴⁴ As Nehru himself told Alva Myrdal, he had to ‘weigh what to take from [all] four powers’.²⁴⁵

Notwithstanding this, the trip brought great goodwill for America in India and Chester Bowles congratulated Eisenhower on approaching India in light of the recognition that it was the ‘only conceivable balance to’ China.²⁴⁶ Soon, American officials met their CRO counterparts and confirmed to them that Washington ‘recognised Nehru as a member of good standing of the Free World and, despite neutrality, no longer took him to be a fellow-traveller or crypto-communist’.²⁴⁷ The US viewed the defence of India-Pakistan very much as Viceroy Curzon had seen in 1899; except now as much against China as against Russia.

Before Eisenhower, Averell Harriman had visited New Delhi in February-March 1959 and been pleased to register the rising US stock there thanks to Cooper and Bunker, as well as the events in Hungary and Tibet. He concluded that Dulles’ pact-politics had hindered more than helped in South Asia.²⁴⁸ Later in the year, Robert Macy (Chief, International Division-Bureau of the Budget) visited the subcontinent and reported to the State Department upon his return that while Nehru remained ‘officially neutral’, ‘popular reaction against Chinese’ in India

²⁴⁰ Oral History Collection, Ellsworth Bunker (33), Dulles Papers

²⁴¹ 30 November 1959, DN Chatterjee (Washington) to VH Coelho (JS, MEA), No. 215-A/59, File F 52(45)-AMS/59-Pt. II (GOI, MEA), NAI

²⁴² This was brought up by Ayub in their first meeting in Palam in September 1959 and repeated at their Murree meeting in September 1960. See AG Noorani, ‘Lessons of Murree’, *Frontline*, Volume 27, Issue 13, June 19-July 02, 2010; <http://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl2713/stories/20100702271308100.htm>

²⁴³ 29-31 March 1960, Notes of Nehru-Nasser Talks, Subject File 111, Subimal Dutt Papers

²⁴⁴ Oral History Transcripts, RK Nehru, Acc. No. 324, NMML, p. 13

²⁴⁵ Oral History Transcripts, Alva Myrdal, Acc. No. 192, NMML, p. 18

²⁴⁶ 28 December 1959, Bowles to Eisenhower, Box 14, Folder 1, Stevenson Papers

²⁴⁷ 19 January 1959, (Lot 62D43, Box 3 of 3-24), Office of South Asian Affairs, 1939-59 (Files relating to India, 1945-52) (Lot 57D259, 54D341 and 62D43) RG 59, NARA-II; Curzon, *Russia in Central Asia* (1899)

²⁴⁸ Box 416, Folder India-Pakistan trip, February-March 1959, Averell Harriman Papers (MSS 61911), LoC

was on the rise.²⁴⁹ Clarence Randall, Chairman of Eisenhower's Commission of Foreign Economic Policy and a noted supporter of Ayub, too acknowledged the 'improving' relations with India in this light during his December 1959 visit.²⁵⁰

While much has been written about the feeling in London and Washington at this time that if the Indus waters problem is settled, then Kashmir should follow suit, not enough has been made of the simultaneous hope that both Pakistan and India ought to become more aware of their 'common interests [against China]'.²⁵¹ Bunker was highlighting the 'new and improved Indian attitude' given the 'China factor'.²⁵² Gunnar Jarring, the Swedish Ambassador in India, also told the Americans that he expected Kashmir to ease somewhat in the Chinese light.²⁵³

Alongside these visible trends, something subterranean was also happening. Since March 1957, there had come a 'perceptible coolness' in Indo-USSR relations. Events in Hungary had, if belatedly, produced 'disillusionment' in India and Moscow had started to reciprocate. Kashmir was right in the middle, as the British Embassy in Moscow had reported:

Since their intervention in Hungary, there can be no pretence that the Soviet leaders are inspired by the same lofty principles which Nehru is so fond of proclaiming. Indian practice too is not always as lofty as her principles, as is shown over Kashmir. It looks as if the two governments have tacitly agreed that these two deviations may be allowed to cancel each other out. Soviets publicly suppress Pakistan on Kashmir; India wilfully blurs the issue over Hungary.²⁵⁴

Then in the December 1958 issue of the *World Marxist Review*, Pavel Yudin wrote a long, forthright criticism of Nehru.²⁵⁵ This ideological 'break' foreshadowed the differences of 1959 on Tibet and Kerala. It would be followed by Marshal Zhukov's trip 'to remind India of its need to tread carefully'.²⁵⁶ Simultaneously, over October-November 1959, more signs of the 'Chinese menace' to India emerged. All this could only help on Kashmir.²⁵⁷

²⁴⁹ 30 November 1959, Macy to Under-Secretary Robert Murphy (Lot 62D43, Box 3 of 3-24), Office of South Asian Affairs, 1939-59 (Files relating to India, 1945-52) (Lot 57D259, 54D341 and 62D43) RG 59, NARA-II

²⁵⁰ Box 12 titled 'Nepal' – December 1959 Trip to Middle-East and Asia, Randall Papers (MC 109), Princeton

²⁵¹ 21 September 1959, No. 264, Karachi to Washington, CDF (1955-59) Box 2561 (611.90D) RG 59, NARA-II

²⁵² 17 August 1959, No. 530, Delhi to Washington, CDF (1955-59) Box 2716 (690D.91332) RG 59, NARA-II

²⁵³ 29 September 1959, Jarring to Wilcox, CDF (1955-59) Box 2715 (690D.91) RG 59, NARA-II

²⁵⁴ 11 February and 28 March 1957, Cecil Parrott to Selwyn Lloyd, FO 371/129032, TNA

²⁵⁵ Pavel Yudin (1899-1968), Soviet author and diplomat was Ambassador to China from 1953 to 1959.

²⁵⁶ 17 February 1959, Morrice James to CRO, FO 371/143449, TNA

²⁵⁷ 7 October 1959, Bartlett (State Department) to Clark (CRO), DO 35/8989, TNA

MacDonald energetically reported about the ‘main recent influence’ in Indian thinking, the ‘sudden emergence of Communist China as a potential threat’.²⁵⁸ But the CRO was also conscious ‘to tread carefully’ and not take advantage of India’s difficulties with China ‘to extract concessions’ on Kashmir.²⁵⁹ Moreover, the ‘very doubtful’ FO was yet to be persuaded to back India.²⁶⁰ After all, notwithstanding the Sino-Indian dispute, Nehru remained cool to Ayub’s regime, the Kashmir problem persisted despite the Indus waters being tackled and India’s nonalignment continued.²⁶¹ Nevertheless, both Bunker and MacDonald felt that ‘it had not escaped the notice of Indians that the Chinese had singled out non-aligned India for aggressive action’.²⁶²

1959-61: The March of Time

In February 1960, Nikita Khrushchev made his second trip to India. Remembering the tumultuous welcome of November 1955, the UK High-Commission felt confident enough to report that ‘time has marched on since 1955...Indo-Soviet relations at the moment depend on the Sino-Indian dispute’.²⁶³ They were right. Khrushchev wanted Nehru to appreciate his difficulties in this ‘embarrassing’ situation where Moscow did not want its relations with either state to cool off.²⁶⁴ Next month, his friend Nasser warned Nehru that ‘where China bites, the USSR smiles’.²⁶⁵

The CRO was convinced in the summer of 1960 that it was essential ‘to strengthen India now that she was facing a real threat’.²⁶⁶ In one of his last despatches, before being succeeded by Paul Gore-Booth, MacDonald noted with satisfaction that thanks to the ‘perfidious Chinese’, India’s relations with the West had ‘steadily recovered’ from the ‘grave depression’ of 1956-

²⁵⁸ 31 October and 19 November 1959, No. 40, POL 5/6/11, MacDonald to CRO, 42/8, MacDonald Papers

²⁵⁹ 20 November 1959, CRO’s note, DO 35/8989, TNA

²⁶⁰ 4 January 1960, Keeble to Clark (CRO), DO 35/8989, TNA

²⁶¹ 8 January 1960, MacDonald to Clutterbuck, DO 35/8989, TNA

²⁶² 14 January 1960, Malcolm MacDonald to Alexander Clutterbuck (CRO), DO 35/8999, TNA

²⁶³ 4 March 1960, Delhi to CRO, POL AG/3, DO 35/8846, TNA

²⁶⁴ 12 February 1960, Notes of Nehru-Khrushchev Talks, Subject File Serial No. 24, Subimal Dutt Papers

²⁶⁵ 29-31 March 1960, Notes of Nehru-Nasser Talks, Subject File 111, Subimal Dutt Papers

²⁶⁶ 20 June 1960, CRO to Karachi, 12/5/7, DO 35/8999, TNA

57. Explaining Nehru's 'modified neutralism', he wrote, 'India will remain non-aligned between West and East so that Russia may remain non-aligned between India and China'.²⁶⁷

From now on, the British government and press remained restrained in their criticism of India. A feeling emerged that even though Nehru was now standing alone with his back to the wall he was 'too proud to seek assistance from the West'.²⁶⁸ When he came to the Commonwealth Conference in London in May, Menzies surprised him by seeking a discussion on Kashmir in the light of Communism, but of 'the Chinese variety'.²⁶⁹ Douglas-Home, who had succeeded Selwyn Lloyd as Foreign Secretary in 1960, also made clear his 'goodwill' but Pandit, to her credit, identified the new Commonwealth Relations Secretary Duncan Sandys as a 'problem'. Describing Churchill's son-in-law as 'very able but full of conceit and overwhelming ambition', she anticipated correctly that he 'will not be easy to work with'.²⁷⁰

John Kennedy's victory in the American presidential elections of December 1960 further boosted this shifting of the US-UK sentiments toward India. Rightly termed recently as India's 'new best friend',²⁷¹ Senator Kennedy had done a lot of work on aid to India in the last years of the Eisenhower administration. So much and so visibly that it had prompted questions as to why a man going for Presidency would involve himself so deeply in trying to get aid for an unpopular 'neutral' country. The answer was not only that Kennedy was a liberal and creative politician, but also that his apparent care for India masked his real concern about China.²⁷²

Right from the beginning, Kennedy and his National Security advisors looked upon India as the 'successful alternative to communism' in Asia. But the success of this strategy depended on reducing confrontation on Kashmir.²⁷³ There was also 'a history to the US's move towards India', namely, Ayub's carefully crafted new foreign policy, urged by his then Minister of Commerce, Communications and Industry Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and foreign policy advisor,

²⁶⁷ 13 July 1960, MacDonald to CRO, No. 21, POL 5/122/2, MAC 42/11/1-25, MacDonald Papers

²⁶⁸ 26 October 1959, Pandit to Nehru, Subject File Serial No. 62, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

²⁶⁹ 4 May 1960, Entry in JN Notebook-CWPM Conference, Acc. No. 1473, Special Collections, NMML

²⁷⁰ 30 July 1960, Pandit to Nehru, No. 49-HC/60, Subject File Serial No. 62, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

²⁷¹ See 'The Best of Friends: Kennedy, Macmillan and Jawaharlal Nehru', McGarr, *The Cold War in South Asia*

²⁷² Oral History Interviews of Walter Rostow and David Bell, Kennedy Library; Oliver Franks, UK Ambassador to US (1948-52), had asked thus to Walter Rostow.

²⁷³ 19 January 1961, NSC No. 6105, (Box 148 - Folder Ayub Briefing Book, July 1961), National Security Files (NSC), Kennedy Papers, John F Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston

Aziz Ahmed.²⁷⁴ This was based on a more realistic appraisal of Pakistan's strategic location and considerations especially vis-à-vis Afghanistan, China and the USSR.²⁷⁵

In his inaugural speech, Kennedy drew a line under the Dulles era and made encouraging statements towards the so-called 'neutrals'. He might not have been an 'India-lover' but, as Phillips Talbot, chief of the Near-East and South-Asia Bureau, remembered, 'our India policy was Kennedy's policy'.²⁷⁶ Much is made in the literature about Kennedy's excellent personal equations with Ayub.²⁷⁷ It is not equally appreciated that Kennedy saw the strategic significance of the subcontinent against China and was irritated that Kashmir corroded that significance. As Chester Bowles remembered, Kennedy saw India, much like the Soviets would do in the mid-1960s, 'as a counter-weight to an unpredictable China'.²⁷⁸ Thus, this new Washington's advice to John Kenneth Galbraith, its flamboyant Ambassador to India, on Kashmir was 'silence, discretion and waiting policy'.²⁷⁹

Within two months of assuming office, Kennedy sent Averell Harriman to India and Pakistan as his special representative. Harriman, to whom Nehru was 'as strong an ally as anyone in the ideological struggle',²⁸⁰ unsurprisingly, came across to Ayub as 'much too sympathetic to India'. When Ayub confirmed to Harriman that he was trying to 'normalise' relations with Peking and Moscow,²⁸¹ it lend weight to the British urgings to understand Kashmir within the emerging triangle of China's bad relations with India, better relations with Pakistan and worsening relations with the Soviet Union.²⁸² As early as March 1961, the FO was noting that Ayub, prodded by Bhutto, had 'opened the door a chink to the Russians and Chinese'.²⁸³

Shortly thereafter when Vice-President Lyndon Johnson, as advised by Galbraith,²⁸⁴ avoided mentioning Kashmir during his 'hand-shake' visit to South Asia, it enhanced Ayub's

²⁷⁴ They would later become the Foreign Minister and Foreign Secretary, respectively, from 1963-66.

²⁷⁵ Shuja Nawaz, *Crossed Swords*, p. 195

²⁷⁶ Oral History Interview, Phillips Talbot, Kennedy Library

²⁷⁷ See Kux, *The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000* and Barrett, *The Great Middle East and the Cold War*

²⁷⁸ Chester Bowles, *Promises to Keep: My Years in Public Life, 1941-1969* (New York: Harper, 1971), p. 544

²⁷⁹ 10 February 1961, JK Galbraith, *Ambassador's Journal* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1969), p. 29

²⁸⁰ 22-23 March 1961, (Box 526, Folder New Delhi and Folder Impressions), Harriman Papers

²⁸¹ 20 March 1961, (Box 526, Folder Pakistan) Harriman Papers

²⁸² 10 February 1961, Michael Stewart to FO, 10322/2/61G, DO 196/130; 7 March 1961, Gore-Booth to Clutterbuck and Caccia, DO 196/137 and 5 April 1961, Karachi to CRO, DO 196/132, TNA

²⁸³ 10 March 1961, FO 371/159703, TNA

²⁸⁴ Galbraith Papers (Series 3: General Correspondence, 1948-64, Box 201), Kennedy Library

‘dissatisfaction’ with the new administration.²⁸⁵ Six months into the Kennedy administration, the UK High-Commission in Karachi was reporting that the

Pakistanis are full of doubts and misgivings about the new American administration...There is a nostalgia for Dulles and Eisenhower and a feeling that Americans are doing nothing to influence Nehru but placate him [on Kashmir], and promote Indian leadership in Asia.²⁸⁶

The CRO was wary of this ‘serious deterioration’ of US-Pakistan relations,²⁸⁷ as well as Washington’s inclination to not push India on Kashmir given its hopes from India as ‘counter-poise to China’.²⁸⁸ But Kennedy could not simply turn his back on Ayub and preponed his visit to Washington to July 1961.²⁸⁹ Ayub had, as well-remarked, a personally successful trip,²⁹⁰ but, he could not make much headway in affecting the new US ‘tendency to pay too much court to the neutrals’.²⁹¹ If anything, he came away confirmed that both his troublesome neighbours, India and Afghanistan, were in the list of ‘neutrals’ towards which the American attitude was changing for the better.²⁹²

Consequently, on Kashmir, Ayub got little from Kennedy more than an assurance that the latter would raise the issue when Nehru visited later in the year. Kennedy refused to link aid to India ‘with strings or lever’ to force a solution on a matter,²⁹³ which to Galbraith had ‘no solution in sight’ but only ‘political posturing’.²⁹⁴ It would take him five months to have his first talk on Kashmir with Nehru.²⁹⁵ It was already an axiom in the Kennedy team that ‘we are just not going to get anywhere on Kashmir with Nehru’.²⁹⁶

Upon his return, Ayub confided his disappointment to the UK High-Commissioner ACB Symon, who reported to the CRO his apprehensions of a ‘flexible foreign policy’ of Pakistan

²⁸⁵ 2 June 1961, ACB Symon (Karachi) to CRO, No. 5, DO 196/132, TNA

²⁸⁶ 15 June 1961, Karachi to CRO, DO 196/132, TNA

²⁸⁷ 30 June 1961, CRO’s note, DO 196/137, TNA

²⁸⁸ 30 June 1961, Komer to Rostow and Kennedy, (Box 441) NSC Files, Robert Komer Series, Kennedy Library

²⁸⁹ 22 June 1961, Washington to FO, DO 196/132, TNA

²⁹⁰ 14 July 1961, Washington to FO, T. No. 1722, DO 196/132, TNA

²⁹¹ 9 August 1961, Karachi to CRO, DO 196/132, TNA

²⁹² July 1961, (Box 148 - Folder Ayub Briefing Book) NSC Files, Kennedy Library

²⁹³ 4 August 1961, UK delegation to NATO (Paris) to FO, DO 196/132, TNA

²⁹⁴ 11 July 1961, Galbraith to Kennedy, Galbraith, *Ambassador’s Journal*, p. 154

²⁹⁵ 20 September 1961, Galbraith, *Ambassador’s Journal*, p. 213

²⁹⁶ 1 August 1961, Komer to Rostow (Box 429, Folder 2) NSC Files, Komer Series, Kennedy Library

especially towards China.²⁹⁷ The first visible manifestation of this came soon thereafter in the border talks between the two countries on the north-western and north-eastern fringes of India-claimed areas of Kashmir. The CRO was not bothered about the north-western territories, Chitral, Hunza, Gilgit and Baltistan, which were under the effective control of Pakistan but Ladakh, given its proximity to China, was another matter.²⁹⁸ However, at this time, the CRO was busy battling the ‘unhappy effect of the Congo business’ on India-UK relations and tied down with Nehru’s ‘intemperate remarks’ on that issue more than his intransigence on Kashmir.²⁹⁹

While the China-Pakistan talks were on, Nehru visited Washington in November 1961. This, his third and last visit to America, has been usually recounted as a difficult, disastrous encounter between a young, energetic and probing Kennedy and an ageing, ailing and implacable Nehru.³⁰⁰ Kennedy did keep his promise to Ayub by raising Kashmir but he did so in the light of Soviet-Chinese ‘record of war’,³⁰¹ and faced with an unresponsive Nehru, sought to convey it to Pakistan that Washington was ‘not giving up’.³⁰²

What remains under-appreciated is that Nehru’s frailties actually enhanced Kennedy’s sympathies for India and its ‘three momentous problems of Communist China, Soviet Russia and Pakistan’.³⁰³ These sympathies, as noted, suffered slightly from India’s military take-over of Goa in December.³⁰⁴ The widespread feeling in London and Washington was captured well by Gore-Booth’s remarks ‘*Et tu Brute*’.³⁰⁵ From Mountbatten to Malcolm MacDonald and Isaiah Berlin, friends and admirers of Nehru were left feeling sorry.³⁰⁶

²⁹⁷ 27 September 1961, Karachi to CRO, No. 19, DO 196/132, TNA

²⁹⁸ 2 November 1961, CRO’s note on Sino-Pakistan border talks, DO 196/130, TNA

²⁹⁹ 26 September 1961, Sandys to Mountbatten, DSND 8/10, Duncan Sandys Papers, CAC

³⁰⁰ Schaffer, *The Limits of Influence*, p. 69 and McGarr, *The Cold War in South Asia*, p. 189; the adjective ‘disaster’ comes from Arthur Schlesinger Jr.’s *A Thousand Days* (Boston: Houghton, 1965), p. 526

³⁰¹ Harlan Cleveland Papers (Personal Papers, Box 85), Kennedy Library

³⁰² 29 November 1961, Washington to FO, T. No. 219, 1054/40/61, DO 196/138, TNA; the State Department declared Kashmir ‘detrimental’ to US friendship in Pakistan and thus favourable to Karachi’s attitude towards China, President’s Office Files (Series: Countries, Box 118 A, Folder 11), Kennedy Library

³⁰³ 8 November 1961, Krock-JFK, Box 1, Page 344, Series 1 – Works; Subseries 1A – Memoranda of conversations, Arthur Krock Papers (MCO 79), Princeton

³⁰⁴ See ‘Upsetting the apple cart: India’s “liberation” of Goa’ in McGarr, *The Cold War in South Asia*

³⁰⁵ 18 December 1961, Gore-Booth to Sandys, DSND 8/10, Sandys Papers

³⁰⁶ 20 December 1961, Mountbatten to Gore-Booth, 30 December 1961, Gore-Booth to Berlin, MSS Gore-Booth 85 and 21 February 1962, MacDonald to Gore-Booth, MS Eng C 4561, Gore-Booth Papers, Oxford

Action in Goa, however, also had a ripple effect on Kashmir that has not been analysed as much.³⁰⁷ Vijayalakshmi Pandit reported from New York that Goa had ‘disturbed’ people more than she could have imagined.³⁰⁸ The British and American diplomats in Karachi led by Morrice James became more receptive to Pakistan’s concerns about an Indian aggression in Azad Kashmir.³⁰⁹ Gore-Booth and Galbraith sought to calm the waters by pointing that Goa was a ‘small nut’ compared to Kashmir and, if anything, India was ‘trying to minimise damage’ with London and Washington. Equally though they were clear that there was ‘no hope of coercing the immobile Nehru over Kashmir’ and, if the West tried anything, New Delhi would ‘suspect it of being motivated by a desire to get back on Goa’.³¹⁰ Macmillan personally wrote to Ayub in January 1962 that he found it ‘hard to believe’ that India was planning any adventure in Kashmir.³¹¹

Pakistan and the West, 1962: Discontent, Distrust and Divergence

In January 1962, Ambassador BK Nehru felt confident to report that the ‘doubting Thomases’ in the press, public and the Congress notwithstanding, the Kennedy Administration was ‘never too emotionally upset at Goa’ and was ‘returning to the status quo ante’.³¹² Side-stepping either bilateral talks or a UN debate,³¹³ and alert to the ‘new conditions of 1960s’, Pakistan’s drift to China and India’s return to dependence on the Soviet Union, Kennedy decided to send the World Bank President Eugene Black as a mediator on Kashmir.³¹⁴

However, in spite of BK Nehru’s suggestion of a ‘non-committal stalling’ reply in view of the ‘super-sensitive’ Kennedy,³¹⁵ his uncle decided to reject the Black proposal, because of the ‘vitiating prestige and publicity issues’,³¹⁶ leaving the President disappointed, as much for personal as policy reasons.³¹⁷ Indian rejection and Washington’s acceptance of it further fed

³⁰⁷ See McGarr, *The Cold War in South Asia*, pp. 144-48

³⁰⁸ 8 February 1962, Pandit-Kaul Correspondence, Pandit Papers (I Instalment)

³⁰⁹ 29 December 1961, Delhi to CRO, T. No. 2351, DO 196/138, TNA

³¹⁰ 12 January 1962, Paul Gore-Booth to GP Hampshire (CRO), SEA 48/5/1(B), DO 196/139, TNA

³¹¹ 4 January 1962, Macmillan to Ayub, T/3/62, MSS Macmillan dep c 345, Macmillan Papers

³¹² 3 January 1962, MJ Desai to BK Nehru, No FS 6/62 and 8 January 1962, Nehru to Desai, No. 15, Subject File Serial No. 17, BK Nehru Papers (V Instalment), NMML

³¹³ 10 January 1962, Desai to BK Nehru, No. 24313, Subject File Serial No. 17, Nehru Papers (V Instalment)

³¹⁴ 15 January 1962, From Washington to Karachi (1399) and Delhi (2385), (Box 145 A), NSC Files, Kennedy Papers; Black had successfully overseen the Indus waters negotiations between India and Pakistan earlier.

³¹⁵ 26 January 1962, BK to Desai, S. No. 44, No. 52, Subject File Serial No. 17, Nehru Papers (V Instalment)

³¹⁶ 19 January 1962, Desai to BK, S. No. 63, No. 24337, Subject File Serial No. 17, Nehru Papers (V Instalment)

³¹⁷ 31 January 1962, Washington to FO, T. No. 286, DO 196/139, TNA

into Karachi's desire for a 'more independent foreign policy'.³¹⁸ William Rountree, the outgoing US Ambassador in Karachi, was depressed at the 'increasing neutralist sentiment' in Pakistan.³¹⁹ A 'strong and effective supporter of the Dulles line',³²⁰ Rountree looked favourably upon Ayub and underlined in his last cable to the State Department that 'following Nehru's rejection of Black proposal...Pakistanis now tend to measure value of their alliance with US in terms of support on Kashmir'.³²¹

Rountree's bitterness was matched by that of his hosts who had felt since April 1961 that the 'super Ambassador' Galbraith enjoyed better access to Kennedy than the career-diplomat Rountree.³²² Ayub desired somebody with Galbraith's 'glamour' and the British felt that this contributed to him being 'extra tough...in order to offset Galbraith's better access to Kennedy'.³²³ To his disappointment, he got another career-man Walter McConaughy as Rountree's successor.³²⁴ McConaughy assumed his post in mid-March 1962 when Chester Bowles was making his trip to South Asia as Kennedy's Special Representative.

Bowles, who understood Kashmir as sandwiched between the Soviets in the west (Afghanistan) and the Chinese (Sinkiang/Tibet) in the east,³²⁵ told Nehru and Ayub that Kennedy was interested in developing an 'alternative power structure in Asia' containing Pakistan, India, Indonesia and Japan.³²⁶ To that extent Kashmir was one of the bricks of the structure. This had yet more disillusioning effect in Karachi and the UK High-Commission there found itself as the target of this growing disillusionment.³²⁷ Unfortunately for it, as a CRO note of April 1962 lamented, 'at present America is in a better position to influence both'³²⁸ and their attitude towards India seemed 'mellower'. They were therefore inclined to

³¹⁸ 30 January 1962, Karachi to CRO, 6/24/1, DO 196/139 and 2 February 1962, POL 119/2, FO 371/166358

³¹⁹ 8 February 1962, Rountree-Galbraith-JJS Garner talks, DO 196/139, TNA

³²⁰ Galbraith, *Ambassador's Journal*, p. 184

³²¹ 31 January 1962, Rountree to Washington, No. 1303, (Box 145 A), NSC Files, Kennedy Papers; for a reverse argument, see the entry for 28 February 1962, Galbraith, *Ambassador's Journal*, p. 309

³²² Oral History Interview of Phillips Talbot, Kennedy Library

³²³ 10 February 1962, Morris James to JJS Garner, DO 196/132, TNA

³²⁴ McConaughy had been envoy in South Korea (1959-61) and Burma (1957-59) and Consul-General in Hong Kong (1950-52) and Shanghai (1947-49). Galbraith had recommended Bill Blair instead. Galbraith to Kennedy, 12 January 1962, (Box 145 A), NSC Files, Kennedy Papers

³²⁵ 4 and 6 March 1962, Karachi to Washington, T. Nos. 1518, 1520, 1525 and A-359, (Box 145 A), NSC Files, Kennedy Papers; through 1961, Washington was more concerned about Pakistan-Afghanistan relations and Ayub-Daub equations with respect to the USSR involvement than India-Pakistan, see Box 145, NSC Files

³²⁶ 6 March 1962, Karachi to Washington, A-357 and A-358, (Box 145 A), NSC Files, Kennedy Papers

³²⁷ 14 February 1962, RG Britten (Karachi) to CRO, 6/24/1, DO 196/133, TNA

³²⁸ April 1962, CRO's brief on India and West, DO 196/140, TNA

agree with Galbraith and leave Kashmir in a 'low key'.³²⁹ Ironically, at the same time, the US Delegation to UN was urging the State Department to 'keep the UK in forefront'.³³⁰

Morrice James, the new UK High-Commissioner in Karachi, continued to receive the bulk of Pakistan's emerging disappointment with the West in the spring of 1962 that Shuja Nawaz has called the 'spring of discontent'.³³¹ In May, he was told that while Pakistan's Western allies had been much less forthright in their support to Pakistan on Kashmir since 1957, Russia was 'clearly in support of India' as well as Afghanistan. In these circumstances, Pakistan was grateful for China's open support on Kashmir.³³²

Reflecting the gap between Karachi and Washington on Kashmir, Under-Secretary George McGhee wondered how to seek Ayub's assurance to steer clear of Kashmir and China both, as it was in everybody's interest that 'China's depredations be halted'. Even if India did not push back the Chinese, McGhee saw 'some virtue in their trying... a greater awareness all-around of the [Chinese] peril and a greater willingness to do something about it'. Moreover, it would divert Peking's attention from 'other ventures, more dangerous to US'.³³³

In the first half of 1962, Kashmir was discussed at the UN on several occasions. India's rejection of the Black offer and London's desire not to let Pakistan down overrode Washington's reluctance and regret.³³⁴ The Soviets 'fully appreciated' the Indian position and vetoed a draft resolution.³³⁵ This was the hundredth veto exercised by Moscow since 1945. Adlai Stevenson, now America's Ambassador to the UN, criticised it in his '100th veto speech' and dramatised India's USSR association.³³⁶ However, when the dust settled, the UK Delegation to the UN felt that the only losers of the whole drama had been the US and UK who had 'offended India and not fully satisfied Pakistan'.³³⁷ In Washington, Bowles too felt

³²⁹ Galbraith, *Ambassador's Journal*, p. 341

³³⁰ 20 April 1962, US Delegation to Rusk, No. 3471, (White House Files, Box 37), Schlesinger Papers

³³¹ Shuja Nawaz, *Crossed Swords*, p. 198

³³² 6 May 1962, James-Dehlavi talk and 12 May 1962, Karachi to CRO, T. No. 563, DO 196/130, TNA

³³³ 14 May 1962, McGhee to Talbot, George McGhee Papers (Office Files of Under-Secretary for Political Affairs, 1961-63) (Box 3) RG 59, NARA-II

³³⁴ 28 January 1962, LK Jha to Desai, S. No. 52, No. 55; 29 January 1962, BK to Desai, S. No. 59, No. 56 and 29 January 1962, Jha to Desai, No. 57, Subject File Serial No. 17, Nehru Papers (V Instalment)

³³⁵ See Schaffer, *The Limits of Influence*, pp. 71-73 and McGarr, *The Cold War in South Asia*, pp. 191-92

³³⁶ 22 June 1962, Harlan Cleveland to Schlesinger (Jr.) (Box 429 Folder 2) NSC Files, Komer Series, Kennedy Library; the Indians were not entirely happy either. Chagla felt that the UNSC proceedings 'had played once again into Russian hands', 25 June 1962, Gore-Booth-Chagla talks, MS Eng C 4524, Gore-Booth Papers

³³⁷ 10 July 1962, New York to FO, F 1041/69, DO 196/141, TNA

that any UN debate only benefitted the Communists by, among other things, diverting attention from the worsening India-China relations.³³⁸ Among the Commonwealth, once again the Australians had been vocally concerned about the ‘worsening relations between India and Pakistan and the ability of Soviet Union and China to exploit these’.³³⁹

In the summer of 1962, London and Washington had also been fighting a losing battle to stop India from buying the Soviet MIG fighter planes and after multiple, futile representations by Gore-Booth and Galbraith to Nehru,³⁴⁰ Mountbatten to Chagla,³⁴¹ and BK Nehru from Washington,³⁴² the CRO and the State Department had agreed on the UN action partly to show their displeasure and partly in hope of a ‘salutary effect’.³⁴³

Sandys also piloted a decision to curtail aid to India by £ 5 million and told Fowler Hamilton (Director, US Agency for International Development) that ‘there was a great deal to be said for making the Indians aware that, if they adopted policies hostile to the West, they would suffer in some material way’.³⁴⁴ Gore-Booth summed up the prevailing attitude of London towards India in the ‘double context of politics and aid’ in the summer of 1962 well:

There is a general feeling of exasperation with the Indians, asking for unending aid on the one hand and being thoroughly tiresome [on Kashmir, Rhodesia] on the other... There is also a pretty ding-dong business going on about MIGs. The PM confessed that he found dealing with Mr Nehru rather baffling... A feeling of chill might have good results provided it does not develop into total frost.³⁴⁵

BK Nehru cautioned New Delhi that India ‘should not only be non-aligned but should also appear to be non-aligned’ and referred to repercussions on Kashmir.³⁴⁶ He wrote to his uncle

³³⁸ 5 January 1962, Bowles to Rusk, (Box 301, Folder 1/28 Rusk, Dean), Part VI: January 1961 - June 1963, Series I: Correspondence), Bowles Papers

³³⁹ 31 August 1962, EV Vines (Canberra) to JM Dutton (CRO), POL 194/1, DO 196/141, TNA

³⁴⁰ 17 and 18 June 1962, Nos. 26 and 29, Delhi to CRO; 21 June 1962, No. 942, Delhi to CRO, DSND 8/1, Sandys Papers

³⁴¹ See Ziegler, *Mountbatten* for this episode. Unlike 1956, Mountbatten failed this time.

³⁴² 14 May 1962, BK to Desai, S. No. 314, No. 287, Subject File Serial No. 17, Nehru Papers (V Instalment)

³⁴³ 22 June 1962, Karachi to CRO, No. 46, DSND 8/1, Sandys Papers

³⁴⁴ 8 October 1962, Sandys to Fowler Hamilton, DSND 8/20, Sandys Papers; Sandys told Gore-Booth that India could not be allowed ‘to take our goodwill for granted, while all the time currying favour at our expense with the Russians and the Africans’, 12 April and 25 June 1962, MSS Gore-Booth 85, Gore-Booth Papers

³⁴⁵ 25 June 1962, Gore-Booth to RH Belcher, MSS Gore-Booth 85, Gore-Booth Papers

³⁴⁶ 19 May 1962, BK to Desai, S. No. 341, No. 313 and 23 May 1962, Desai to BK, S. No. 409, No. 24418, Subject File Serial No. 17, Nehru Papers (V Instalment)

conveying a message from Senator Hubert Humphrey that the MIGs affair would ‘greatly complicate’ foreign relations. The Prime Minister replied evasively about this ‘purely commercial’ matter, citing ‘parliamentary approval’ and opinion of the Indian Air Force.³⁴⁷

This linkage of arms and Kashmir would rear its head spectacularly later in the year, when the India-China border war broke out, and would remain one of the pivots of the Western attempts to ‘realign’ India through the first half of the 1960s.³⁴⁸ Ayub would repeatedly intervene with Washington linking Kashmir, arms and Afghanistan,³⁴⁹ and would be told by the British to not ‘do anything foolish for short-term gains’ on Kashmir while India battled China.³⁵⁰ Some among the Americans would weigh in with the corollary, as McGhee wrote to Harriman, that efforts should begin ‘to use the Indo-China conflict to resolve Kashmir’,³⁵¹ but, as has been shown recently, the Indians found ‘a cooperative partner in Kennedy’ as they ‘negotiated their need for arms while avoiding any entanglement’ on Kashmir.³⁵²

Conclusion

In November 1962, surveying the Sino-Pakistan and Sino-Indian relations, the CRO noted that these appeared ‘governed by practical considerations and not sentiment’.³⁵³ Gore-Booth had sent a cryptic despatch at the end of October that was apt for the coming times:

We shall in any case have an irritating time, despite the goodwill earned by the prompt response on the arms front...the object of policy will have to be to avert both war with business as usual (and the wrong friends who are not really friends at all) [on the part on India on Kashmir] and enthusiasm leading to disillusionment [Pakistan on Kashmir]...Our part is a minor one...³⁵⁴

³⁴⁷ 8 June 1962, BK to Jawaharlal Nehru, S. No. 431, No. 397 and 15 June 1962, Jawaharlal Nehru to BK, S. No. 501, No. 4981, Subject File Serial No. 17, Nehru papers (V Instalment)

³⁴⁸ See the chapter ‘Realigning India: Western Military Aid and the Threat from the North’ in McGarr, *The Cold War in South Asia*

³⁴⁹ 18 August 1962, S. No. 18, No. 570; 19 September 1962, CS Jha to Nehru, S. No. 753, No. 24742 and 29 September 1962, BK to Desai, S. No. 729, No. 678, Subject File Serial No. 17, Nehru Papers (V Instalment)

³⁵⁰ 27 October 1962, Gore-Booth-Hilaly talks and 31 October 1962, Karachi to CRO, T. No. 1358, DO 196/141

³⁵¹ 3 November 1962, McGhee’s memo for Harriman, (Box 3), George McGhee Papers (Office Files of Under-Secretary for Political Affairs, 1961-63), NARA-II

³⁵² Chaudhuri, *Forged in Crisis*, pp. 83-4

³⁵³ 14 November 1962, 3/12/54, DO 196/130, TNA

³⁵⁴ 28 October 1962, Gore-Booth to London, MSS Gore-Booth 86, Gore-Booth Papers

With the outbreak of the India-China War on 20 October 1962, the Kashmir Dispute entered an unlikely four-square that completed its transition begun in the wake of the Korean War. Having emerged in the early Cold War against the Soviet Union (1947-53), it had evolved through pact and summit politics (1954-55), weathered the post-Suez storm (1956-57) and now appeared within the new, China context of the Cold War (1958-62).

While the early years saw the Anglo-American attitude(s) toward it being fashioned by the defence imperatives in the Middle-East and the Far-East against the Soviet Union thus appearing to favour Pakistan, the latter half saw it being understood in terms of facing the Chinese threat in South and South-east Asia therefore favouring India. In the view from Pakistan, Washington had started to 'let down' its ally and China had to be 'brought into the strategic balance' thereby providing a new context for Kashmir.³⁵⁵

The possibility of a settlement though, as a CIA report of November 1962 prophesied, remained unlikely.³⁵⁶ That, however, would not be for lack of trying on the part of the West, for the India-China conflict set the scene for their last major involvement in Kashmir.

³⁵⁵ Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History*, p. 370

³⁵⁶ 9 November 1962, CIA Memo on 'The Disputed Frontiers of Kashmir', CIA/RRGM 62-9, CIA-CREST Records (accessed on 26 August 2013), NARA-II

Kashmir, 1962-63: The Last Interventions

Introduction

Between November 1962 and November 1963, the Kennedy administration and the Macmillan government were involved in Kashmir in a manner and to an extent that Gore-Booth called the ‘most unusual episode in the history of relations between India and Britain and India and the West generally’.¹ Since then, this involvement has been usually understood as an attempt made by Washington and London to ‘exploit’ *India’s China War* as a mechanism for ‘tilting’ Nehru towards the West and making him ‘more accommodating’ on Kashmir.² As the latest account on India-US relations puts it, in this period, ‘Indian representatives were left to figure how best to get military assistance while remaining firm on Kashmir’ from ‘a demanding Washington bureaucracy’.³

Having said this, the initiative for this involvement is usually attributed to the British. It has been argued that distracted by Cuba, Washington’s ‘immediate goal’ was no more than ‘damage control’.⁴ Its course is usually cut short in May 1963 with the end of six rounds of bilateral talks between India and Pakistan on ‘Kashmir and related matters’ or August 1963 with the failure of the US-UK mediation proposal.⁵ That failure is attributed to ‘Indian equivocation, inflated Pakistani expectation and Anglo-American discord’ and its consequences have been summed up in the phrase: ‘plague on both your houses’.⁶

This chapter seeks to test this understanding that India was at the receiving end of an Anglo-American push to pay the price in Kashmir for aid against China. By covering a larger period in greater detail i.e. going beyond May/August 1963, and continuing with the theme of a

¹ 10 June 1963, Gore-Booth to Sandys, DO 196/122, TNA

² See McGarr, *The Cold War in South Asia*, Chapters 5, 6 and 7; Schaffer, *The Limits of Influence*, p. 78; Guha, *India After Gandhi*, pp. 346-7; Raghavan, *War and Peace in Modern India*, p. 226; for participants’ accounts see Galbraith, *A Life in our Times* (London: Corgi Books, 1981), p. 458, James, *Pakistan Chronicles* and Gore-Booth, *With Truth and Great Respect*.

³ Chaudhuri, *Forged in Crisis*, pp. 116-7

⁴ McGarr, *The Cold War in South Asia*, pp. 192-96 and Schaffer, *The Limits of Influence*, p. 75

⁵ McGarr, *The Cold War in South Asia*, pp. 214-15 and Schaffer, *The Limits of Influence*, pp. 94-5

⁶ McGarr, *The Cold War in South Asia*, p. 184 and Schaffer, *The Limits of Influence*, pp. 97-118; the phrase comes from Komer’s memo to Harriman, 6 March 1964, (Box 481, Folder Robert Komer), Harriman Papers

changing global context, it, instead, argues that at this time it was India's turn to benefit from the understandings held in London and Washington about the international dimensions of Kashmir. These were now dominated by their concerns regarding China and the new Washington-Delhi axis in this regard over-shadowed the old Washington/London-Pindi alliance and proved the determining factor of the Anglo-American attitude to Kashmir.⁷

Indeed, while the first analyses on the implications of the India-China conflict in Washington and London, undertaken by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research headed by Roger Hilsman and a joint UK-US group of officials, argued that the 'fear of China might force a settlement',⁸ drawing support from the Far-East Bureau that aid to India must be accompanied by efforts 'to use the conflict to resolve [Kashmir]',⁹ and the CRO that Kashmir must be settled 'in light of the defence of the subcontinent';¹⁰ there quickly emerged in Washington a sense in favour of 'the absolute urgency of keeping Kashmir out' of arms aid.¹¹ This urgency had come from Galbraith who, supported by Gore-Booth, told the visiting *Washington Post* journalist Robert Estabrook in the first week of November that they had no hopes for any settlement on Kashmir even though they were 'pressing it very strongly'.¹² Galbraith wanted Washington to avoid any commitment to Pakistan on Kashmir if the latter 'would assure Nehru as regards China', as suggested by McConaughy.¹³

Secondly, the accounts of this period have a tendency to start from the visits to the subcontinent by Harriman and Sandys in the last week of November, stop at the Nassau Summit of Macmillan and Kennedy in mid-December, move to the internationalisation versus partition debate of early 1963, take in the April 'bazaar bargain and elements initiative' and end with the May mediation episode with sometimes adding an August postscript.¹⁴ However, a lot happened before the Harriman-Sandys trip, within the intervening periods and after August till the end of 1963. In his first communication to Ayub on 27

⁷ 15 December 1962, Delhi to Washington, No. 2396 (Box 536, Ind-Pak Nov-Dec 1962), Harriman Papers

⁸ 30 October 1962, Hilsman to Rusk, (White House Files, Box 37), Schlesinger Jr. Papers, Kennedy Library

⁹ 3 November 1962, Memo on US policy, Hilsman Papers (Series 1, Box 1), Kennedy Library

¹⁰ 2 November 1962, DSND 8/20, Sandys Papers; 14 November 1962, London to Washington, No. 1865, (White House Files, Box 37), Schlesinger Jr. Papers; (Box 536, Ind-Pak Nov-Dec 1962), Harriman Papers

¹¹ 28 October 1962, Galbraith to Rusk, No. 1427, Box 107 A, NSC Files, Kennedy Papers

¹² 8 and 14 November 1962, New Delhi Diary (Part I), Estabrook Papers (Memo: Box 1), Kennedy Library

¹³ Galbraith, *Ambassador's Journal*, p. 441

¹⁴ McGarr, *The Cold War in South Asia*, p. 172-80, 196, 201-13 and Chaudhuri, *Forged in Crisis*, pp. 115-48

October, a month before the Harriman-Sandys trip, Kennedy had made it clear that he considered the ‘threat from north more important than any regional quarrels’.¹⁵

Thirdly, it is generally accepted that it was the McGeorge Bundy led-National Security Apparatus in Washington, where Galbraith’s views found support, especially by Robert Komer,¹⁶ unlike Dean Rusk’s State Department, where Galbraith’s immediate superior, Phillips Talbot, the Assistant Secretary of State for Near-East and South-Asian Affairs, was a ‘believer among Dulles acolytes’.¹⁷ This overlooks that it was Talbot who reminded the Pakistani envoy Aziz Ahmed when he complained about America’s ‘failure to consult’ on aid to India that India had raised similar concerns in 1954. In a ‘mirror image’, just as India was assured then, Ahmed was told now that these weapons were for use only against a Cold War rival.¹⁸ Indeed, the prevailing image of a rigid and monolithic London and Washington bureaucracy does not hold in the light of new and diverse sources, as will be seen here.

November-December 1962: The Five-Fold Dilemma

In the first days of November 1962, as the State Department started to set down its position on Kashmir within the larger decision to assist India against China, the initial impulse was that presently it would be ‘self-defeating to attempt [to] force a settlement on India’. Instead, it resolved to ‘make an early start on [the] long and difficult process of getting Ayub to face up [to] realities of a changed situation’.¹⁹ When McConaughy protested,²⁰ Rusk asked Galbraith whether Nehru could be ‘induced’ to take some action.²¹ Galbraith acknowledged McConaughy’s difficulties but reiterated that America’s position in India would only be strengthened ‘so long as Kashmir is kept out’.²² Even if India be asked to talk Kashmir, it

¹⁵ 27 October 1962, Washington to Karachi, No. 680, (Kennedy to Ayub, 28 October 1962), (Box 148, Folder Sino-Indian Border War), NSC Files, Kennedy Papers

¹⁶ Komer warned that stressing Kashmir ‘would remind Indians at just the wrong time why they should not move toward’ America. 2 November 1962, Komer to Kayson, Box 441, NSC Files, Komer Series

¹⁷ Galbraith, *A Life in Our Times*, p. 417-19; *Ambassador’s Journal*, p. xx; he also mentions Rusk’s ‘strongly dichotomous view of the world’ in which China was ‘a Soviet Manchukuo’.

¹⁸ 30-31 October 1962, State Department to Karachi (690, 697) and Delhi (1710, 1752), (Box 148 - Folder Sino-Indian Border War), NSC Files, Kennedy Papers; also see James, *Pakistan Chronicle*, p. 81

¹⁹ 2 November 1962, State Department to Karachi (715) and Delhi (1834), (Box 148, Folder Sino-Indian Border War), NSC Files, Kennedy Papers

²⁰ 2 November 1962, McConaughy to Rusk, No. 804, (Box 148, Sino-Indian War), NSC Files, Kennedy Papers

²¹ 2 November 1962, Rusk to Galbraith, No. 1787, (Box 148, Sino-Indian War), NSC Files, Kennedy Papers

²² 4 November 1962, Galbraith to Rusk, No. 1584, (Box 148, Sino-Indian War), NSC Files, Kennedy Papers

should be ‘eventually but not too soon’.²³ These early exchanges were summed up for Kennedy thus: ‘we are now beginning to confront [Pakistanis] with the fact that we are really not able to support their demand [on Kashmir]. This will be a painful process but we must push through’.²⁴

As the India-China war continued, Hilsman produced an influential memo, conspicuous by its absence in most books, titled ‘The Five-Fold Dilemma: The Implications of the Sino-Indian Conflict’, on 17 November 1962. These were the Chinese objectives, the Soviet position, Pakistan’s priorities, India’s non-alignment and, in the light of these, Kashmir.²⁵ Three days later, as news came of the ceasefire, Hilsman wrote another, even less perused, memo on the ‘Implications of the Chinese Communists’ ceasefire proposal’. In it, he noted:

In many ways, the continuation of the conflict would realistically be to the US’s advantage. It would give leverage to solve India-Pakistan problems, keep Chinese aggression in its least favourable context, obtain Indian support in Asian matters, manage a historic international political re-orientation and keep the Soviets on the horns of their dilemma.²⁶

The reverse was equally possible, what Harriman would term as ‘the worst of all possible situations’, namely that the unilateral ceasefire and the Chinese withdrawal left the US-UK with a ‘phony war’, without an India-Pakistan accommodation on Kashmir and assistance to India thereby guaranteeing friction with Pakistan.²⁷

It was against this unpromising background that Kennedy sanctioned the Harriman-Nitze fact-finding mission to the subcontinent. While much has been written about Harriman’s ‘difficult exchanges’ with Nehru,²⁸ more interesting is the communication that Harriman carried from Kennedy for Ayub. The President wanted Harriman to ‘show Ayub how radically the Sino-Indian confrontation’ had ‘altered the situation’. It was ‘imperative’ that Ayub be under no illusion and Kennedy wanted Harriman to tell him that:

²³ 13 November 1962, Galbraith, *Ambassador’s Journal*, p. 476

²⁴ 3 November 1962, (Box 148, Folder Sino-Indian Border War), NSC Files, Kennedy Papers

²⁵ 17 November 1962, Hilsman Papers (Series 1, Box 1); according to Komer, Hilsman’s was the ‘best job, bar none... we got it right to the President’.

²⁶ 21 November 1962, Hilsman’s memo for Kennedy, RSB-1184, Hilsman Papers (Series 1, Box 1)

²⁷ 26 November 1962, Harriman-WH Sullivan-Chester Ronning talks, (Box 536, Folder India-Pakistan November-December 1962), Harriman Papers

²⁸ Schaffer, *The Limits of Influence*, p. 80 and McGarr, *The Cold War in South Asia*, p. 175

Whatever India's past follies, the [Chinese] attack and India's response to it create a basically new situation [which] we regard as far more than a mere border squabble... We intend to provide help to India [to] meet Communist threat. Our ties with Pakistan were for the express purpose of Communist threat. Thus we regard such aid to India fully consistent with our ties to Pakistan... Were Pakistan to move closer to the Chinese at [this] time... it would cut across the free world... Should Ayub be forthcoming, we are prepared to tell Nehru that if we give him major military aid, he should agree to negotiate at a suitable point on Kashmir. Ayub cannot ask more of us and we are unable to [do] more.²⁹

Paul Nitze, Harriman's companion, who is either omitted from accounts of this mission or referred retrospectively and whose unused diary on the trip is a valuable source,³⁰ too was of the opinion that 'to make Kashmir a condition would be disastrous'. While the degree of arms assistance could be related to development on Kashmir, Nitze sympathised with what he called India's 'good neighbour problem', agreed that 'to make a bargain would cause Nehru to lose his job', accepted that 'Indians must be given a little time' and felt that the British be 'put out in front politically'.³¹

The Harriman-Nitze mission recommended emergency and intermediate aid to India, alongside ministerial talks on Kashmir 'to be nurtured' by London and Washington. It expected India's non-alignment to 'undergo considerable substantive interpretation favourable to our interests', but rejected the UK 'attempts to change [it] to any more specific association with us'.³² For Kashmir, it discussed a 'Subcontinental Federation' with a common defence pact backed by the US, common administration in the Valley with both India and Pakistan having access and the creation of a common market.³³

Harriman and Nitze had been joined on their trip by Duncan Sandys who, worried about 'the strain' on relations with Pakistan caused by aid to India, wanted to prod Nehru on Kashmir.³⁴ Macmillan, 'puzzled' by Chinese objectives and in agreement about helping India, was similarly hopeful that the current circumstances might provide 'new and propitious

²⁹ 25 November 1962, Kennedy to Harriman, (Series: Countries, Box 118 A, Folder 8), President's Office Files, Kennedy Library

³⁰ See Schaffer, *The Limits of Influence*, pp. 79-81 and McGarr, *The Cold War in South Asia*, pp. 172-78; Chaudhuri uses Nitze's 1989 memoirs.

³¹ I: 113 Folder 10 (India, 1962), Paul H Nitze Papers (MSS 802281), LoC; 22 November 1962, Hilsman's memo of Nehru-Harriman meeting, Hilsman Papers (Series 1, Box 1)

³² Hilsman Papers (Series 1, Box 2); (Box 536, India-Pakistan November-December 1962), Harriman Papers

³³ I: 113 Folder 10 (India, 1962), Nitze Papers; put forward by MJ Desai, SK Patil and Galbraith, respectively.

³⁴ 13 November 1962, Sandys to Macmillan, 41/62, DSND 8/12, Sandys Paper

opportunities' for Kashmir.³⁵ It is well-established that it was Sandys who pressed upon Nehru the connections between Kashmir and military support.³⁶

This caused Galbraith quite a few difficult 'moments' with Sandys, but Harriman felt that the way to get to Nehru was perhaps 'to barge in and annoy him as Sandys does'.³⁷ It has gone under-appreciated, however, that Sandys was also initially forthright to Ayub that the latter would have to hold his hand on China.³⁸ Alongside Macmillan, he had been anxious about the rumours of Pakistan signing a non-aggression pact and boundary settlement with China. Sandys was not amused when Foreign Minister Mohammad Ali told him that Pakistan's overtures to China were a 'deliberate' attempt to build up its 'nuisance value'.³⁹

In early December, the Near-East Bureau responded to the recommendations of the Harriman-Nitze mission. Phillips Talbot felt that America's 'first order of business' was to help India against China and understood progress on Kashmir 'within this context'.⁴⁰ With respect to long-term military aid, there was definitely 'a sense of an inescapable relationship' with Kashmir.⁴¹ However, as Hilsman argued, the US was 'concerned primarily with checking the growth of Communist influence in Asia...the success of any Kashmir settlement reached would therefore be measured'.⁴²

While various positions were being stacked out in Washington, even absurd ones like McGhee's proposal of converting the Kashmir Valley into a 'world recreational park',⁴³ McConaughy and Galbraith kept up their respective reportage. Their common theme was China, with one sending Ayub's threats about rethinking Pakistan's participation in the

³⁵ 13 November 1962, Macmillan to Ayub, MSS Macmillan C 334, Macmillan Papers; 20 November 1962, Macmillan to Kennedy, (Box 433 Folder MAP India 1962-63), NSC Files, Komer Papers and 22 November 1962, Macmillan to Sandys, DO 196/169, TNA

³⁶ 27 November 1962, Delhi to CRO, T. No. 62, DO 196/146; see Gore-Booth, p. 299 and McGarr, pp. 172-80

³⁷ 1 December 1962, Harriman to Galbraith (Box 537, Folder 9); in his personal report to Kennedy, Harriman termed Ayub more reasonable than Nehru and Galbraith better than McConaughy, adding that the former 'should be brought home' and 'de-Hindu-ized' while the latter 'should be encouraged to take a more vigorous attitude', 6 December 1962, Harriman-Kennedy talks (Box 479, Folder Kennedy, JF 1962), Harriman Papers

³⁸ 29 November 1962, From Delhi to CRO, T. No. 71, DO 196/146, TNA

³⁹ 28 November 1962, Macmillan to Wyndham, MS Macmillan dep C 353, Macmillan Papers and 30 November 1962, James/Sandys-Ali talks, DO 196/130, TNA

⁴⁰ 6 December 1962, Talbot to NSC and 12 December 1962, Talbot to Rusk, Bureau of Near-Eastern and South-Asian Affairs Records relating to Kashmir, 1952-64, RG 59, NARA-II

⁴¹ 27 December 1962, NEA to Rusk, Bureau of Near-Eastern and South-Asian Affairs Records relating to Kashmir, 1952-64, RG 59, NARA-II

⁴² 7 December 1962, Memo to Rusk on 'The Kashmir Dispute', RNA-46, Hilsman Papers (Series 1, Box 1)

⁴³ 14 December 1962, McGhee's memo (Box 537, Folder 7), Harriman Papers

SEATO and the other forwarding Nehru's arguments that if pushed on Kashmir, India would lose its ability to defend Ladakh against China.⁴⁴ Galbraith had little hopes from the 'quite disastrous' Duncan Sandys on this issue.⁴⁵ This common spectre of China was hanging in the defence circles in Washington too. In fact, the US JCS was even hoping that the UK's support for India against China 'could result in change in the UK attitude toward continued trade with Communist China' – a little-known facet.⁴⁶

These various official positions were tied together in a policy knot at the mid-December Nassau summit meeting between Kennedy and Macmillan. This is a well-discussed episode with respect to military aid and air defence for India.⁴⁷ But on Kashmir there was more than mere 'disagreements' as the principal political figures in Nassau approached each other from very different vantages. Macmillan began by stressing 'the disillusionment of Pakistan', if India was not pressed hard. Kennedy responded by worrying about the disappointment in India that might see it make peace with China, if pressed too hard.⁴⁸ Basically, the mood in Washington was that the Sino-Indian dispute was a 'great strategic opportunity', while that in London the talk was about the 'tactical leverage on Kashmir' it brought.⁴⁹

Macmillan believed that 'any sensible defence of the subcontinent involved the political problem of Kashmir'. Further, he wanted to use India's dependence on the West for military aid to get India and Pakistan 'to agree on joint defence and then perhaps to get them into one of the regional military pacts'.⁵⁰ The CRO was already moving towards an 'international force and economic aid for [the Kashmir Valley] with trade and cultural contacts with both countries'.⁵¹ Macmillan would write to Kennedy in soaring terms after the talks, 'At every point and on every issue it is the contest between Communism and the Free World', especially when it came to 'cynical, unaligned nations' like India.⁵²

⁴⁴ 9 December 1962, Karachi to CRO (1597) and 11 December 1962, Delhi to CRO, (2276), DO 196/146

⁴⁵ 10 December 1962, Galbraith, *Ambassador's Journal*, p. 517

⁴⁶ 14 December 1962, Memo on air defence for India, Subject Files, Box 50, Sorenson Papers

⁴⁷ See for instance McGarr, 'The Nassau Summit', pp. 180-82 in his *The Cold War in South Asia*

⁴⁸ 21 December 1962, From Nassau to CRO, T. No. 1, DO 196/146, TNA

⁴⁹ 17 December 1962, (Box 536, Folder India-Pakistan November-December 1962), Harriman Papers

⁵⁰ 13 December 1962, Macmillan to Kennedy, No. 143, DSND 8/1, Sandys Papers

⁵¹ 11 December 1962, London to Washington, No. 2184 (Box 536, Folder India-Pakistan November-December 1962), Harriman Papers

⁵² Macmillan to Kennedy, (after Bermuda talks), MS Macmillan dep C 357, Macmillan Papers

Kennedy, on the other hand, had been reading from his pro-India aides like Bowles and Komer about the dangers of pushing ‘too quickly a Kashmir solution’ or making US’s relations with South Asia ‘contingent upon Kashmir’. They felt that Macmillan’s government, ‘lineal descendant’ of previous Tory governments, had a ‘rather pro-Pakistan attitude on Kashmir’. They did not ‘want to get India so worked up about Kashmir as to divert its attention from China’, as it was a ‘political opportunity of historic importance’ for the US. They wanted Kennedy ‘to press Macmillan not to push Kashmir harder than we think sensible. Our pressure should be on Ayub to ensure his ideas are realistic [and] does not overestimate his bargaining leverage with us’.⁵³ Galbraith had been stressing that the defence of India against China had ‘its own justification’ and ‘military assistance should not be so directly tied to [either] settlement of Kashmir [or] British thinking’.⁵⁴

It has gone overlooked that Washington had been a divided house leading up to the Nassau talks. There was a ‘clear split’ between the Defence Department and Harriman on the one hand and Phillips Talbot and Galbraith on the other. The former felt that any aid to India ‘over and above’ the emergency \$ 120 million and air defence should hinge ‘distinctly and directly’ on the progress on Kashmir and the British should be kept ‘out in the front’ of this aid.⁵⁵ The latter argued that such potential explicit linkage was causing furore and already pushing aside the Chinese dispute. In this situation, Komer wrote to McGeorge Bundy only half-jokingly, ‘What would really do the trick is another [Chinese] attack’.

There was also an emerging feeling in the State Department, articulated most strongly by Harriman that Galbraith would not work hard on Nehru, unless Kennedy told him to. It appeared to him that Galbraith seemed more interested in ‘signing Nehru’ to help the US in South-east Asia. Harriman thought this an ‘impracticable nonsense’. He worried that this might encourage Nehru to think that he might bargain with the US for arms aid on terms other than Kashmir. To this, Galbraith’s allies in Washington, Komer and Hilsman, would reply that India’s new anti-China and pro-West, especially pro-US, turn ought to be harnessed and ‘while a Kashmir settlement [was] important, defence of the subcontinent [was]

⁵³ 14 and 17 December 1962, Komer to Kennedy, Box 429, (White House Memoranda), Kennedy Papers and 17 December 1962, Bowles to Kennedy, (Box 297, Folder 0/19 Kennedy, JF 1962 July-December), Part VI: January 1961 - June 1963 (Series I: Correspondence), Bowles Papers

⁵⁴ 18 December 1962, Galbraith to Rusk, No. 2419 (Box 536, Ind-Pak Nov-Dec 1962), Harriman Papers

⁵⁵ 14 December 1962, Howard Wriggins to Talbot (Box 537, Folder 7) and 18 December 1962, Harriman memo for Rusk (Box 536, Folder India-Pakistan November-December 1962), Harriman Papers

more [so]'.⁵⁶ Simultaneously, they also felt that, bolstered by the British and McConaughy, Ayub was 'dangerously over-confident' that America would not give any further aid to India unless it settled Kashmir. They, instead, wanted Kennedy to give 'a real charge' to McConaughy to 'talk tough' or else to 'weigh in personally with Ayub'.⁵⁷

Having taken the decision in principle that initial, emergency aid to India including air defence up until the spring of 1963 would not 'be conditioned' on developments on Kashmir,⁵⁸ the question for London and Washington now was when to convey this to the two parties. It was decided to do so after the conclusion of the first round of talks which were to begin on 26 December irrespective of what happened in them. This was done over the protests of Morrice James who had warned the CRO not to do so 'unless talks produce some progress on Kashmir'.⁵⁹ From New Delhi, Gore-Booth too was reporting a 'deteriorated position' after the ceasefire, and consequently, a lessened urgency about an agreement with Pakistan and an enhanced realisation of the 'unwelcome price' to be paid.⁶⁰ To ensure a soft reception of the decision, Macmillan decided to write personally to Nehru and Ayub. To the former, he made it clear that while immediate military aid was not conditional, it would be difficult for him and Kennedy to 'help on the scale we would like without gravely damaging our relations with Pakistan', without Kashmir.⁶¹ The letter to Ayub explained that aid to India was 'tailored to the precise requirements to meet the Chinese threat'.⁶²

December 1962-March 1963: Bilateral Talks, India-Pakistan, US-UK

Against this unpromising background, when Bhutto and Swaran Singh, Nehru's Minister for Railways, finally met with their respective delegations on 26 December to begin their 'contest in silence',⁶³ their meeting was overshadowed by the announcement of the Pakistan-China agreement on alignment of their 'common border' in the northern territory of Pakistan-

⁵⁶ 17 December 1962, Roger Hilsman's memo (INR-110), (Box 537, Folder 7), Harriman Papers

⁵⁷ 19 December 1962, Komer to McGeorge Bundy, (Box 429 Folder 2), NSC Files, Komer Series

⁵⁸ 19 December 1962, South Asian and Near-East Affairs memo (Box 536, Folder India-Pakistan November-December 1962), Harriman Papers; though 'the progress of the talks can't avoid affecting US assistance...'

⁵⁹ 22 December 1962, Karachi to CRO, T. No. 1685 and Bhutto to Sandys, DO M (I&NR) -632/62, DO 196/146

⁶⁰ 24 December 1962, From Delhi to CRO, T. No. 2414, DO 196/147; Delhi seemed divided to Gore-Booth between the camps of Swaran Singh and TT Krishnamachari, in favour of settling with Pakistan and Morarji Desai (nationalist right) and KD Malaviya (left) who were leading the reaction against any US-UK intervention.

⁶¹ 23 December 1962, Macmillan to Nehru, T. No. 3142, DO 196/146, TNA

⁶² 23 December 1962, Macmillan to Ayub, T. No. 2503, DO 196/146, TNA

⁶³ 18 December 1962, Karachi to Washington, No. 1097, G Parthasarathi to Hull (Box 536, Folder India-Pakistan November-December 1962), Harriman Papers

administered Kashmir.⁶⁴ As is well-known, this left the Indian delegation ‘sore and suspicious’, but, what is under-appreciated is that it also left the Americans unimpressed. It disappointed McConaughy who met Ayub to convey to him the decision on India’s aid programme.⁶⁵ In Washington, Phillips Talbot wondered ‘whether Ayub was embarrassed to have been so transparently used by the Chinese’.⁶⁶ Galbraith was livid: ‘History can be idiotic. A staunch American ally against Communism is negotiating with the Chinese Communists to the discontent of an erstwhile neutral’.⁶⁷

Ayub’s explanation that the timing was ‘fortuitous’ and the agreement ‘provisional’ found only one taker, Morrice James. The UK High-Commissioner believed Ayub’s account to be ‘honest and genuine’ and blamed the Chinese.⁶⁸ The CRO concluded that Pakistan was ‘outmanoeuvred’.⁶⁹ The interventionist James was also pointing out possibilities of mistrust and misunderstandings with the Americans: ‘Sometimes what the Pakistanis ask us to do will be what we mean to do anyway and it will be misconceived [by the Americans]’.⁷⁰ His enthusiasm, added to Sandys’ excitement and Douglas-Home’s encouragement, fed fat to the fire of a ‘Western Plan’ for Kashmir that the FO was forced to deny on 8 January 1963.⁷¹

Washington had other worries. Galbraith was urging an easing off on Kashmir and, in its stead, driving a ‘quid pro quo’ with India on Burma and South-east Asia in lieu of the arms aid. This, as we saw, came across as an over-estimation of India’s potential as well as willingness. Even Komer warned that Washington should not ‘let Ken or Indians think [that] we can be diverted from Kashmir by siren songs about South-east Asia’.⁷² On the other side, McConaughy was getting little more than platitudes in his meetings with Ayub and Bhutto about the ‘unfortunate impressions of Pakistan consorting with the Communists’.⁷³ An ‘old

⁶⁴ See Christopher Tang, *Beyond India: The Utility of Sino-Pakistani Relations in Chinese Foreign Policy, 1962-65*, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper #64 (November 2012), www.wilsoncenter.org

⁶⁵ 27 December 1962, Peshawar to CRO, T. No. 84, DO 196/147, TNA

⁶⁶ 29 December 1962, Talbot to McConaughy, Bureau of Near-Eastern and South-Asian Affairs Records relating to Kashmir, 1952-64, RG 59, NARA-II

⁶⁷ 4 January 1963, Galbraith, *Ambassador’s Journal*, p. 524

⁶⁸ 31 December 1962, FO to its missions, T. No. 523, DO 196/147, TNA; see James, *Pakistan Chronicles*, p. 90

⁶⁹ 4 January 1963, CS Pickard (CRO) to AW Snelling (FO), DO 196/147, TNA

⁷⁰ 4 January 1963, Morris James to Arthur Snelling, DO 196/147, TNA

⁷¹ 8 January 1963, FO to its missions, T. No. 3 and Dehlavi-Home talks, DO 196/147; the FO assured allies such as Turkey that aid to India would not be used against Pakistan, 10 January 1963, FO 371/170638, TNA

⁷² 7 January 1963, Komer to McGeorge Bundy, White House Memoranda - Box 429, Komer Series

⁷³ 15 January 1963, Karachi to CRO, T. No. 70, DO 196/130, TNA

Chinese fighter’, McConaughy found himself in a peculiar position of being ‘nice to a government which [wanted] to be nice to the Chinese’.⁷⁴

If the timing of conveying the decision of aid coincided with the first round of talks then the arrival of a UK Air Defence Mission in India happened alongside the second round. Paul Gore-Booth urged the CRO to handle with great care ‘the interrelationship of Air Defence and Kashmir’. Like Galbraith, Gore-Booth too looked beyond Kashmir to a future when, ‘while not giving up non-alignment or joining existing pacts, India would be geared into the Western Defence system to a degree inconceivable six months ago’. While he did not want long-term defence arrangements to get ahead of the progress on Kashmir, he felt that ‘anything in the nature of “nagging” would work against our interest’.⁷⁵ Ayub, naturally, protested against this Air Defence Mission as Bhutto and his team left for Delhi for the second round of talks,⁷⁶ but the die had been cast.

Galbraith’s argument that America’s first task was ‘to keep the Indians firm in their dealings with the Chinese’ was holding ground in Washington. It meant, with respect to Kashmir, that any settlement that weakened India against China in Ladakh was unacceptable. Galbraith knew that London would not agree because first they held ‘a sanguine view of Chinese intentions’ and second they had their ‘economic relation with China’, including Hong Kong, to think about. Above all, ‘not carrying the responsibility’ the Americans had in Asia, they did not see India as a major plinth in the ‘containment of China’. Given these factors, Galbraith strongly urged air defence arrangements in India, notwithstanding the British and the Pakistani dragging on China and the Indian dragging on Kashmir.⁷⁷ Kennedy agreed with Galbraith and wrote to Macmillan that ‘the more the Indians focus on the Chinese, the more likely they are to be reasonable on Kashmir’.⁷⁸

The Americans and the British continued to stay on the sideline in the second round, although with increasing hints that if the talks, which had started to resemble ‘badminton’,⁷⁹ showed

⁷⁴ 9 January 1963, Galbraith, *Ambassador’s Journal*, p. 529

⁷⁵ 14 January 1963, Delhi to CRO, T. No. 149, DO 196/147, TNA

⁷⁶ 15 January 1963, Karachi to CRO, T. No. 71, DO 196/147, TNA

⁷⁷ 14 January 1963, Galbraith to Rusk, No. 2743, (White House Files, Box 37), Schlesinger Jr. Papers

⁷⁸ 16 January 1963, Kennedy to Macmillan, (Box 433 Folder MAP India 1962-63), NSC Files, Komer Series

⁷⁹ 19 January 1963, Galbraith, *Ambassador’s Journal*, p. 536

signs of failing, they would intervene.⁸⁰ Once it became clear that no progress was made in Delhi, the CRO informed Gore-Booth and Morrice James that it had been considering the possibility of the ‘internationalisation’ of Kashmir Valley i.e. an international administration with a joint India-Pakistan defence force for ten years, to be followed by a referendum.

The CRO believed that a solution of this kind might not be altogether unacceptable to Pakistan. India could be induced for it by aid and a joint US-UK undertaking for defence of Kashmir, along with a scheme of air defence for Indian cities against China, and a promise of military assistance in the event of an attack on Ladakh.⁸¹ Even Morrice James had to admit that this was a highly optimistic reading of the price Nehru might be prepared to pay for aid against China.⁸² Meanwhile, displeasure was mounting in Washington with what Kennedy called ‘Pakistan’s rather transparent flirtation with Peiping’.⁸³ However, before the ‘internationalisation’ solution could get there, it met with an unexpected resistance next-door that is missing from the existing scholarship.⁸⁴ The FO cautioned the CRO that

We should not assume that China would sit back quietly and allow internationalisation to happen...The greater the US involvement the more the Chinese would object...Chinese – though resigned to some American military presence in India – are most sensitive about American presence on their borders (e.g. Korea) and Kashmir/Ladakh would be a similar case.⁸⁵

To this the American Ambassador in the UK added, on 29 January 1963, the State Department’s wish ‘to consider possibility of partition and steer away from internationalisation’. The British and the Americans were working on different lines. The State Department, while admitting to the CRO that chances of partition were slender, were more in agreement with the FO that the disadvantages of internationalisation were greater.⁸⁶

There now followed ten days of hectic US-UK parlays before Bhutto and Swaran Singh met for their third joust on 9-10 February at Karachi. First, Galbraith informed Gore-Booth that he saw the defence of Ladakh as the nub of the question and a settlement in Kashmir must be

⁸⁰ 17 January 1963, Washington to FO, T. No. 146; 18 January 1963, Delhi to CRO, T. No. 211, DO 196/147

⁸¹ 20 January 1963, CRO to Delhi, T. No. 235 and Karachi, T. No. 176, DO 196/148, TNA

⁸² 22 January 1963, Karachi to CRO, T. No. 115 and 24 January 1963, T. No. 132, DO 196/148, TNA

⁸³ 21 January 1963, Kennedy to Macmillan, (Box 429 Folder 2), NSC Files, Komer Series; in reply, Macmillan conceded the ‘dangers in Ayub’s policy of flirting with the Chinese’, 22 January 1963, DO 196/130, TNA

⁸⁴ See McGarr, *The Cold War in South Asia*, pp. 196-201

⁸⁵ 24 January 1963, FO to CRO, DO 196/148, TNA

⁸⁶ 29 January 1963, Washington to FO, T. No. 318, DO 196/148, TNA

related to the Indian need against China, i.e. partition leaving Srinagar in India's hands to act as a base to defend Ladakh.⁸⁷ Then the visiting Phillips Talbot huddled together with Gore-Booth and McConaughy in New Delhi on 31 January and lent his support to Galbraith even as he privately conveyed Harriman's message to Galbraith, 'Tell Ken that "we are not at war with the British"'.⁸⁸ Three days later, in Karachi, Talbot and McConaughy tried to impress upon Morrice James that partition was the lesser evil. When James retorted that 'collapse would be better than this', Talbot emphasised the importance of closing ranks.⁸⁹

Talbot flew next to London where the CRO told him that it was extremely unlikely that Pakistan would accept any partition that gave them less than Srinagar and would favour internationalisation because they would assume that after a period the Valley would revert to them. Internationalisation was more viable as it was easier to apply pressure on India, through arms supplies, than on Pakistan, where the US arms supply was already in its final stage.⁹⁰ Talbot replied that he regarded internationalisation as administratively difficult and was very doubtful whether the US Congress would want to participate in it in any significant way.⁹¹ He also met Sandys separately and, bringing him up-to-date with the 'reduced sense of urgency about Kashmir' in India, told him that while the Indians were prepared to give up something, they were not prepared to give much of the Valley.⁹²

Before the British hosted the visiting American, they had conferred amongst themselves. In a meeting held at the CRO on 29 January 1963, another missing moment from the existing literature, Arthur Snelling had briefed officials from the Treasury, the FO, the Air Ministry and the War Office. The FO repeated its observation that the Chinese would object strongly to any internationalisation, which introduced an American presence in Kashmir. The Treasury was non-committal and the War Office lukewarm.⁹³ Thus stalled by lack of support on the political vision, economic basis and strategic sense of internationalisation, the CRO now instructed Gore-Booth and Morrice James that, while alternative forms of

⁸⁷ 25 January 1963 and 1 February 1963, Delhi to CRO, T. No. 349, DO 196/148, TNA

⁸⁸ 31 January 1963, Notes of a meeting in the High-Commission (New Delhi), DO 196/148, TNA; 28 January 1963, Harriman to Talbot (Box 463, Folder Galbraith, JK), Harriman Papers

⁸⁹ 3 February 1963, Karachi to CRO, T. No. 161, DO 196/148, TNA

⁹⁰ 4 February 1963, Notes of meeting held in the CRO, DO 196/148, TNA

⁹¹ 5 February 1963, CRO to Delhi, T. No. 409 and Karachi, T. No. 282, DO 196/148, TNA

⁹² 5 February 1963, London to Washington, No. 2968, Talbot-Sandys-Snelling-Jones talks, (Box 3933, Folder POL 32-1 IND-PAK), Central Foreign Policy Files (1960-63) RG 59, NARA-II

⁹³ 29 January 1963, Notes of meeting held in the CRO, DO 196/148, TNA

internationalisation continued to be studied, there should be no hint about it, particularly with Pakistan, until the possibility of partition was exhausted.⁹⁴

Lest the CRO continue to harbour any illusions, Talbot soon telegraphed from Washington re-confirming that the Congress was most reluctant to accept any overall obligations in Kashmir. It felt that an internationalised Valley could be easily subverted in defence and external affairs. Moreover, it would be difficult to find any powers acceptable to both India and Pakistan to participate in any interim UN regime. If Sandys and the CRO suffered from any sense of go-alone grandeur, they were quickly sobered by a report from the CoS, which categorically laid out that in the event of a Chinese attack on Ladakh, British assistance would be restricted to 'logistic support and air defence'. With present resources, the UK could not provide the proposed military guarantee that was the CRO's inducement to India.⁹⁵

Instead, the Americans now went ahead with their favoured partition plan. Galbraith met Nehru on 6 February 1963 and stressed with some effect that as the Valley could not go exclusively to either India or Pakistan, a division seemed inevitable. Pakistan had a position in the Valley and while Nehru may deplore partition, he had to keep an open mind that did not look for the 'ideal solution' so much as for 'is there a better one'.⁹⁶ Kennedy followed it up with a letter urging a 'public gesture' placing Kashmir in the context of the subcontinent's long-term security. After all, the greater country gave greater concessions.⁹⁷

As these behind-the-scenes activities were going on, so continued the bilateral talk-show. On 10 February, a rather reluctant Bhutto and Swaran Singh agreed, after persuasion from Morrice James and McConaughy, to have a fourth round of talks in Calcutta starting on 9 March.⁹⁸ While the differences between India and Pakistan were proving insurmountable, the CRO took a further step towards meeting their disagreement with the State Department and instructed the New Delhi and Karachi High-Commissions to 'explore' the American choice

⁹⁴ 5 February 1963, CRO to Delhi, T. No. 410 and Karachi, T. No. 283, DO 196/148, TNA

⁹⁵ 6 February 1963, The CoS to the CRO, T. No. 4/63, DO 196/148, TNA; to provide an effective guarantee, fourteen brigades with air support were required and it could not be found by the UK.

⁹⁶ 7 February 1963, Delhi to CRO, T. No. 403, DO 196/148, TNA; 4 February 1963, Galbraith to Harriman (Box 463, Folder Galbraith, JK), Harriman Papers

⁹⁷ 7 February 1963, Delhi to CRO, T. No. 414, DO 196/148, TNA

⁹⁸ 11 February 1963, Karachi to CRO, T. No. 201, DO 196/149, TNA

of partition with both sides.⁹⁹ Sensing this as a drift towards partition, Morrice James mounted a spirited defence of internationalisation. He argued that internationalisation was the only course left as ‘the Pakistanis explicitly rejected partition and the Indians presented a line reserving the whole Vale for themselves i.e. implicitly rejected [it]’.¹⁰⁰

The Americans too were putting their heads together to find a way past a ‘rigid Pakistan’ and a ‘reluctant India’. Harriman urged Galbraith to emphasise to New Delhi that its choice was ‘defence of India requiring a compromise on Kashmir Valley or continued exposure to successful Chinese aggression’.¹⁰¹ Alongside Talbot, he told Kennedy that the stakes were ‘high enough to justify an increase’ in their involvement in the talks. The President agreed,¹⁰² and, as Rusk’s note of 20 February put it, decided that his officials needed ‘to get in up to [their] knees’ now.¹⁰³ Before that could happen, the spectre of China reared its head rather pronouncedly when Bhutto went to Peking in the last week of February to sign the frontier agreement. A worried CRO asked James,

Is Bhutto’s Peking visit to be interpreted as meaning that Pakistanis will regard themselves as having improved their relations with China to [an] extent that they can be tougher with Indians? Are we now in position to press Pakistanis?¹⁰⁴

The Americans were tougher on Bhutto, though not everyone thought that India was without guile in the evolving Pakistan-China axis.¹⁰⁵ Galbraith had been warning Washington that any Indian concessions to Pakistan could not and must not be ‘surrogate concessions to China’.¹⁰⁶ McConaughy was instructed to warn the flamboyant Minister that ‘if Pakistan proved too unreasonable, US might not in future pay much attention to Pakistan’s susceptibilities’.¹⁰⁷ The State Department held that Bhutto’s action had ‘jeopardised’ the talks and ‘diminished’ US obligations to Pakistan.¹⁰⁸

⁹⁹ 15 February 1963, Outward telegram from CRO, No. 58, DO 196/149, TNA

¹⁰⁰ 15 February 1963, Morrice James to Arthur Snelling, T. No. 22/9, DO 196/149, TNA

¹⁰¹ 15 February 1963, Harriman to Galbraith (Box 463, Folder Galbraith, JK), Harriman Papers

¹⁰² 21 February 1963, Kennedy-Rusk-Harriman-Talbot-Komer (Box 429 Folder 1), NSC Files, Komer Series

¹⁰³ 20 February 1963, White House Memoranda - Box 429, Komer Series

¹⁰⁴ 25 February 1963, CRO to Karachi, T. No. 392, DO 196/149, TNA

¹⁰⁵ 22 February 1963, Rankin to Harriman, Box 10, Folder 3, Correspondence, Rankin Papers, Princeton

¹⁰⁶ 22 February 1963, Galbraith to Rusk and Kennedy, No. 3280, (Box 3933, Folder POL 32-1 IND-PAK), Central Foreign Policy Files (1960-63) RG 59, NARA-II

¹⁰⁷ 26 February 1963, Karachi to CRO, T. No. 267, DO 196/149, TNA

¹⁰⁸ 22 February 1963, Washington to Karachi (1282) and Delhi (3246), (Box 3932, Folder POL 32-1), Central Foreign Policy Files (1960-63) RG 59, NARA-II

The result was yet another round of US-UK talks on 26-27 February that to Bowles was indicative of the prevailing ‘rather wobbly atmosphere’.¹⁰⁹ The Americans argued that Bhutto’s trip to Peking had ‘thrown a spanner into the works’, as it was harder now to apply pressure on the Indians.¹¹⁰ This American toughness rubbed itself on the CRO as well and soon it was instructing Morrice James to inform Ayub that Bhutto’s visit to Peking shifted the responsibilities for breakdown of talks primarily on Pakistani shoulders unless it was more forthcoming in Calcutta. This was followed by a threat. If talks failed because of Pakistan, HMG’s obligations to Pakistan vis-à-vis India would ‘regrettably but necessarily diminish’ and London ‘would not be inclined to support any other Pakistan initiative on Kashmir’.¹¹¹

The Americans also turned around and told the British that it was their ‘insistence on internationalisation’ that had produced this Pakistani ‘intransigence’ leading to everybody losing the one big chance for settlement.¹¹² Chastened, the CRO agreed to a combined US-UK riot act to Pakistan, which was read to Bhutto by McConaughy and Morrice James.¹¹³

March-April 1963: Bargaining internationalisation and partition

When the party assembled in Calcutta over 12-14 March 1963, it was remarkable not because of what was discussed but because of who attended it. Galbraith and Gore-Booth camped for almost a week in Calcutta and Dacca.¹¹⁴ One of the things they did in this span of time was to debate with each other the relative merits of partition and internationalisation. Drawing parallels with Berlin of 1948-61, Galbraith averred that internationalisation would be difficult to control. Gore-Booth simply held that the prospects of partition were so uncertain that it was essential to give internationalisation a chance.¹¹⁵

¹⁰⁹ 4 March 1963, Bowles to Galbraith (Box 299, Folder 26/22 Galbraith, JK 1961-63), Part VI: January 1961 - June 1963 (Series I: Correspondence), Bowles Papers

¹¹⁰ 26 February 1963, Galbraith to Harriman (Box 463, Folder Galbraith, JK), Harriman Papers and 26-27 February 1963, Notes of talks with US officials at CRO, DO 196/149, TNA

¹¹¹ 28 February 1963, CRO to Karachi, T. No. 410, DO 196/149, TNA

¹¹² 2 and 6 March 1963, Komer to Kennedy and Talbot, White House Memoranda - Box 429, Komer Series

¹¹³ 7 March 1963, Karachi to CRO, T. No. 307, DO 196/149, TNA

¹¹⁴ Bhutto took this opportunity to mend bridges with his Western interlocutors on China and offered a window into the Chinese foreign policy: ‘hate against India’, ‘reasonableness towards US’ and continued relationship with the USSR – foreshadowing the role that Yahya Khan was to play for the Nixon administration. 12 March 1963, Calcutta to CRO, T. No. 43, DO 196/149 and 16 March 1963, Gore-Booth to Morrice James, DO 196/131

¹¹⁵ 13 March 1963, Calcutta to CRO, T. No. 45, DO 196/150, TNA

Galbraith sneered that the West could not ask India to defend Ladakh against China with a Kashmir 'under UN or a consortium of Ghana, Ceylon and Congo or Canada and Australia'. He could be scathing on Sandys and, more than anybody else on either side, his remarks highlighted the nub of the difference between the Americans and the British. While Kashmir was an issue in its own right for London, Washington sought 'in the main to resist the Chinese' and Kashmir was a means to that end. Galbraith called it 'the sort of truth that cannot penetrate the mind of Duncan Sandys'.¹¹⁶ Later, when McConaughy seemed to support internationalisation, Galbraith argued that it played 'into the hands of the Chinese as susceptible Asian and African powers would become involved, upon whom the Chinese could work', and got Selig Harrison of the *Washington Post* to 'kill' it.¹¹⁷

Their side-show could not hide the fact that there was little progress in the main spectacle, which now bordered on the 'ridiculous'.¹¹⁸ An impatient Ayub complained to McConaughy about Rusk's recent statement that arms aid to India was not tied to results in negotiations. Senior Pakistan army officers spoke in a similar vein to Morrice James.¹¹⁹ For the moment though, Bhutto and Swaran Singh agreed for a fifth round of talks to start in Karachi from 22 April. London now wanted to consider 'what action on our part will be necessary to keep up the momentum or influence the direction of the talks'.¹²⁰ The FO was worried that 'failure could be the turning point in Pakistan's increasing disillusionment with the West; in India's case, it could result in popular pressure for a more conciliatory policy towards China'.¹²¹ Galbraith and Gore-Booth too were suggesting stronger, more concrete US-UK initiatives that ought to be taken at higher and multiple levels.¹²² This was because, as Gore-Booth reported, 'the presence of US Ambassador and UK High-Commissioner in Calcutta [had] attracted criticism'.¹²³

In Washington, added to the absolute lack of any advance in talks, this multiple-level, multiple-front action that Galbraith was proposing, continued to appear as diluting the focus on Kashmir. It quickly became known as the Galbraith All-Purpose Treaty Organisation

¹¹⁶ 10 March 1963, Galbraith to Rusk (3501), (Box 3932, Folder POL 32-1), CFP Files (1960-63) RG 59

¹¹⁷ Galbraith, *Ambassador's Journal*, p. 556

¹¹⁸ 15 March 1963, Galbraith, *Ambassador's Journal*, p. 556

¹¹⁹ 14 March 1963, Dacca to CRO, T. No. 48, DO 196/150, TNA

¹²⁰ 18 March 1963, FO to its missions, T. No. 122, DO 196/150, TNA

¹²¹ 15 March 1963, FO's note for Edward Heath, FO 371/170638, TNA

¹²² 19 March 1963, Delhi to CRO, T. No. 769, DO 196/150, TNA

¹²³ 19 March 1963, Gore-Booth to CRO, No. 13/SEA 52/7E, DO 196/150, TNA

(GATO), ‘based on an equal concern over China’, one in which the Indians were ‘backing off on Kashmir’.¹²⁴ For many like Komer, Kashmir was ‘a test of whether Indians are really serious about girding up for long-term contest with [China]’.¹²⁵ Kennedy had to shake Galbraith up a bit:

You are still my Ambassador until August or so at which time you can become a critic rather than executor of our policy. Let GATO go by the boards. Instead, let us settle for a Kashmir solution as the crowing monument to Galbraith in India.¹²⁶

At the same time, however, Harriman assured Nehru’s emissary Sudhir Ghosh that Kennedy would not push for any settlement that did not put Nehru ‘in the right’ and would be prepared to do some ‘arm-twisting’ with Ayub.¹²⁷ Nevertheless, it was decided to send Walt Rostow, then heading the Policy Planning Council, to help Galbraith get the Indians moving on Kashmir ‘[keeping in mind] big picture – [Chinese] threat’.¹²⁸ Welcoming this initiative, the FO requested talks to discuss how ‘to take a more active part’. It had started thinking in terms of offering mediation.¹²⁹

After all, time was approaching for decisions about future military and civil aid policies towards India, which were ‘bound to be affected’ by the negotiations on Kashmir. With no progress in these, a real possibility might develop of ‘fairly serious difference’ between the US and the UK on the question of aid to India. The British position and particularly Sandys’ position was that any further aid was contingent on Kashmir. The US view appeared to be that ‘India should be given further aid even if there is no progress on Kashmir’.¹³⁰ Phillips Talbot welcomed the idea and suggested 27-29 March 1963.¹³¹

CS Pickard, Assistant Under-Secretary at the CRO and later High-Commissioner to Pakistan (1966-71), went to Washington and met Talbot and Harriman. They discussed Chinese

¹²⁴ 22 March 1963, Komer to Kennedy, White House Memoranda - Box 429, Komer Series and 12 January 1963, Galbraith, *Ambassador’s Journal*, p. 531

¹²⁵ 21 March 1963, Komer to Carl Kayson, (Box 433 Folder MAP India 1962-63), NSC Files, Komer Series

¹²⁶ 22 March 1963, Kennedy to Galbraith, White House Memoranda - Box 429, Komer Series

¹²⁷ 15 March 1963, Sudhir Ghosh to Nehru, TT Krishnamachari Papers, Subject File Serial No. 37, NMML

¹²⁸ 25 March 1963, Komer to McGeorge Bundy, White House Memoranda - Box 429, Komer Series

¹²⁹ 19 March 1963, FO to Washington, T. No. 2779, DO 196/150, TNA

¹³⁰ 29 March 1963, London to Near-Eastern and South-Asian Affairs Bureau, Bureau of Near-Eastern and South-Asian Affairs Records relating to Kashmir, 1952-64, RG 59, NARA-II

¹³¹ 20 March 1963, Washington to FO, T. No. 858, DO 196/150, TNA

intentions, political developments in India and Pakistan, tactics to be adopted before the fifth round in Karachi and the relationship of Kashmir discussions to decisions on aid to India. While they had no evidence of a Chinese build-up in Tibet or any change in the Chinese intentions in Ladakh, reports were coming from the UK Embassy in Peking that Pakistan was becoming 'dangerously amenable to Chinese blandishments'. Bhutto's trip had enhanced the British sense that 'Pakistan's flirtation with China' was coming close to 'damaging the present basis of her foreign policy'.¹³²

Washington had been anyway highlighting Pakistan's 'minority mentality' for a while.¹³³ A new element was that it was becoming clear that military plans presupposing aid on a vast scale were being prepared in New Delhi. It was therefore necessary to make it clear to the Indians the importance of an advance in the fifth round. It was decided that no indications about future aid should be given the Indians until after the fifth round.¹³⁴

Pickard was also informed that Walt Rostow and Komer would be leaving for India and Pakistan on 30 March to discuss the relationship of national defence to economic development.¹³⁵ More than that though, just as the visiting Indian Ministers had been reminded about the link between future aid and Kashmir, they were to make it clear to the Indians that America was keen to press on with this after the fifth round regardless of results. Pickard could not agree more with these decisions.¹³⁶

Morrice James had been constantly telling London, 'to listen attentively to Ayub's fears...if Kashmir talks fail and India is nevertheless armed on a large-scale by the West'.¹³⁷ And that was exactly what Galbraith was proposing from India. Calling it a 'crude bazaar level' political bargain, a major milestone in the existing literature,¹³⁸ Galbraith envisioned America offering defence production assistance, air support and long-term aid; India responding with a substantial portion in the Kashmir Valley for Pakistan and iron-clad guarantees on the rivers.

¹³² 20 March 1963, Peking to FO, FC 1062/12, DO 196/131, TNA

¹³³ 1 April 1963, Washington to Karachi (1489) and Delhi (3553) about Pickard-Talbot talks, (Box 3933, Folder POL 32-1 IND-PAK), Central Foreign Policy Files (1960-63) RG 59, NARA-II

¹³⁴ 28 March 1963, Washington to FO, T. No. 983, DO 196/150, TNA

¹³⁵ 29 March 1963, Washington to FO, T. No. 984, DO 196/150, TNA

¹³⁶ Notes of Pickard's talks in Washington, 28-29 March 1963, DO 196/150, TNA

¹³⁷ 22 March 1963, Morrice James to Arthur Snelling, 6/134/3, DO 196/131, TNA

¹³⁸ See McGarr, *The Cold War in South Asia*, p. 201

Rusk was worried too. He called this open-ended military commitment as ‘just the thing, Pakistanis fear most’.¹³⁹

Walt Rostow and Komer met Nehru, TT Krishnamachari (Minister of Economic and Defence Co-ordination) and YB Chavan (Defence Minister) in the backdrop of increasing indications that the Indian Government regarded large-scale US military assistance as virtually assured. Rostow lost no time in setting the record straight. But, and this has gone un-remarked, the American line was still not so much ‘no settlement, no US aid at all’, as ‘if you do reach a settlement, immense possibilities of aid’. Indeed, Rostow told Gore-Booth that he expected talks in Pakistan to be more difficult, since he would have to bring the Pakistanis to face the fact that in the last resort the US could not afford to see India overwhelmed by China. It was thus up to Pakistan to seize the present opportunity for a settlement.¹⁴⁰ Gore-Booth had been agreeably privy to Rostow’s thoughts and actions in New Delhi and reminded the CRO yet again of the bigger picture beyond Kashmir, beyond even Nehru:

By favour of the Chinese, we are in the privileged position of being able to influence the transition from Nehru to post-Nehru period...The Rostow visit has been excellent...It would now be very hard indeed for India to backtrack over China but the drift westward has not yet reached the point of no return...The theory that *Codlin* (Russia) is the friend and not *Short* (the West) dies hard...¹⁴¹

Rostow met Ayub in Dacca on 5 April and began by telling Ayub that change in Indian thinking towards China was important for America’s firm intention to contain China. Progress on Kashmir was certainly desirable but Pakistan should not over-estimate the ‘transient and limited’ leverage on India available to the US and must settle quickly while it still existed. Secondly, Rostow clarified that some further US military aid to India was inevitable regardless of the Kashmir talks. When he came to know of this, Morrice James duly protested inviting the disappointing reply from Rostow that the Kennedy administration regarded Pakistan as a pretty unsatisfactory ally. He later remembered it as a ‘near-presidential pep-talk in stark terms on containing Red China’.¹⁴²

¹³⁹ 31 March 1963, Rusk to Kennedy, President’s Office Files (Series: Countries, Box 118 A, Folder 9), Kennedy Papers

¹⁴⁰ 4 April 1963, Delhi to CRO, T. No. 74, DO 196/150, TNA

¹⁴¹ 5 April 1963, Paul Gore-Booth to Cyril Pickard, DO 196/150, TNA

¹⁴² James, *Pakistan Chronicles*, p. 98

This had been prompted by, among other things, the voting record of India and Pakistan in the UN General Assembly over 1960-62, which makes for a surprising reading:¹⁴³

15th session (1960) - **with US** not USSR, **India (2) - Pakistan (18)**; with USSR not US, India (15) - Pakistan (5); with neither, India (14) - Pakistan (9); with both, India (6) - Pakistan (6)

16th session (1961) - **with US** not USSR, **India (6) - Pakistan (16)**; with USSR not US, India (18) - Pakistan (11); with neither, India (13) - Pakistan (10); with both, India (6) - Pakistan (6)

17th session (1962) - **with US** not USSR, **India (12) - Pakistan (10)**; with USSR not US, India (6) - Pakistan (8); with neither, India (4) - Pakistan (4); with both, India (7) - Pakistan (7)

Reflecting upon his talks, Rostow sent a negative report to Kennedy: ‘Right now there was no one in the subcontinent who could see a workable track [on Kashmir]’.¹⁴⁴ His visit was followed by letters from Macmillan to Nehru and Ayub. While to Nehru was dangled the old carrot of aid, it was Ayub who was shown the new stick for negotiating with the Chinese.¹⁴⁵

April-June 1963: The Last Interventions

On 7 April 1963, Sandys and Rusk met and agreed to freshly persuade both sides. The situation was plainly crying out for some new initiative. Next day, Kennedy stepped into the continuing UK-US breach and the stuck India-Pakistan situation. He called a meeting that was attended by Rusk, Harriman, Talbot, McNamara, Maxwell Taylor and McGeorge Bundy. Before it, Kennedy had asked Talbot wide-ranging questions regarding Anglo-American divergence, Indian-Pakistani disagreements and even, ‘can India do anything about Burma?’ The answers were that British worries about Hong Kong and trade with China made them view the US-UK air defence for India with extreme caution. The State Department was willing ‘to give India some assistance against [Chinese] pressure, tailoring this as best as possible to maintain our security interests in Pakistan’, regardless of Kashmir. Finally, India could do little to help in Burma.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴³ See Box 441, NSC Files, Komer Series

¹⁴⁴ 8 April 1963, Rostow to Kennedy, (Box 429 Folder 1), NSC Files, Komer Series

¹⁴⁵ See DO 196/150, TNA

¹⁴⁶ 8 and 19 April 1963, Near-Eastern and South-Asian Bureau, Records relating to Kashmir, 1952-64, RG 59

Rusk started the meeting with a discussion of Galbraith's 'crude, bazaar level bargain',¹⁴⁷ calling it an 'unreasonable attempt to move faster than [the] situation warranted'. Kennedy followed by asking how far the Indians had been made aware of the link between aid and Kashmir. Talbot replied that they had 'told it to every Indian visitor'. Kennedy then asked 'why not proceed along Galbraith's lines?' To this, Rusk, Talbot and Bundy replied that first Galbraith's proposal was 'unrealistic', second, there was 'no point in putting Pakistanis in the wrong' and third, the 'UK was not prepared to go further' unless Kashmir was settled.

When Kennedy pointed that the \$ 24 million initial assistance and \$ 30 million per year, figures that Galbraith had proposed, were rather do-able amounts, McNamara and Taylor persisted that it was 'undesirable to go ahead' before the UK.¹⁴⁸ Talbot reminded the President that while they 'had not tried to make a hard tie to a specific package of aid and air defence and Kashmir', there was undeniably a 'general connection'. Kennedy was unimpressed and felt that the 'real problem [was] Pakistan's attitude'. He asked 'what levers of pressure [were there] on Pakistan?' Talbot replied, 'consortium and congressional aid'. Harriman countered this by saying that Indian requests were quite 'open-ended'.¹⁴⁹ He also reminded everyone that the Capitol Hill did not see the difficulties on Kashmir.¹⁵⁰

Out of all these deliberations, there emerged the much-discussed memorandum of 'elements' for a Kashmir solution.¹⁵¹ Jointly prepared by London and Washington, it was given to the two sides in the hope that they would find it useful for discussion in the fifth round at Karachi. The 'elements' suggested a 'substantial portion' for both India and Pakistan in the Kashmir Valley for the defence of their respective positions in the west and north-west (Pakistan) and east and north-east (India). They also recognised the economic and strategic interests of both outside the Valley. They urged clearly defined arrangements for sovereignty and law and order, political freedom and some measure of local self-rule for the inhabitants in the Valley. Finally, they recommended free movement to other parts of the state and to India and Pakistan and economic investment by both in Kashmir.

¹⁴⁷ 25 March 1963, T. No. 3693, (Box 429 Folder 1), NSC Files, Komer Series

¹⁴⁸ 10 April 1963, Sandys, Mountbatten, McNamara, Maxwell Taylor meeting, DSND 8/20, Sandys Papers

¹⁴⁹ 8 April 1963, (Box 429 Folder 1), NSC Files, Komer Series

¹⁵⁰ 12 April 1963, Australian HC, India to Krishnamachari, Subject File Serial No. 37, TTK Papers

¹⁵¹ See McGarr, *The Cold War*, pp. 201-04 and Chaudhuri, *Forged in Crisis*, pp. 144-5

Indians bristled at this ‘pro-Pakistani’ intervention,¹⁵² and the ‘elements’ melted in their ‘fervent heat’.¹⁵³ Even as the Indian team left for Karachi for the fifth round of talks, Gore-Booth hoped that any future expression of views about alternative solutions would be in ‘pretty general-broad terms’.¹⁵⁴ To stem Pakistan’s disappointment, Sandys wrote to Ayub affirming the sympathy and support for Pakistan’s case existing in the UK and hoping that Pakistan would not break off talks. He offered his and Rusk’s upcoming CENTO meeting trip to Karachi as an opportunity to consider what could be done to break the deadlock.¹⁵⁵

In Washington, on the other hand, this deadlock was fostering a feeling, especially in McGeorge Bundy’s National Security team, that the administration was ‘out for bigger game’. Settling Kashmir was important, but if America hinged its policy ‘too explicitly to this long shot’, it might end up not only ‘sans settlement but with considerable Indian backsliding towards neutralism thus undoing much of what Mao has done for us’.¹⁵⁶ The growing chorus was that ‘we should keep trying on Kashmir but not let it become a roadblock to pursuit of larger interests’ and also ‘keep pressing the UK to come along with us’.¹⁵⁷ Bowles, now Kennedy’s Special Representative on Asian affairs, had been bombarding him with memos stressing that Kashmir must be ‘de-linked’ from defence against China else the ‘Soviets would step into the breach’.¹⁵⁸

Kennedy called another meeting on 25 April 1963 that was attended by Rusk, Ball, Bowles, McNamara, Nitze, McGeorge Bundy and Komer. Once again, there is little in the existing literature about this. Rusk again opened the proceedings; this time, by stating that if Washington backed India against China, it might ‘drive the Pakistanis off the dead end’ and if it ‘abandoned the Indians, they might move towards the USSR’. The shape of settlement on the merits of Kashmir was ‘irrelevant’ and Rusk was ready to ‘buy anything they could agree on’. McNamara reminded everyone that aid to India must bear on Kashmir. This invited the expected response from Bowles that India was the ‘only realistic Asian power against China’.

¹⁵² See YD Gundevia, *Outside the Archives* (Hyderabad: Sangam Books, 1984), p. 290

¹⁵³ Gore-Booth to Cyril Pickard, 23 April 1963, DO 196/151, TNA

¹⁵⁴ 24 April 1963, Delhi to CRO, PL 44/1, DO 196/197, TNA

¹⁵⁵ 25 April 1963, CRO to Karachi, T. No. 780, DO 196/151, TNA

¹⁵⁶ 22 April 1963, Komer to Kennedy, White House Memoranda - Box 429, Komer Series

¹⁵⁷ 25 April 1963, Komer to Kennedy, White House Memoranda - Box 429, Komer Series

¹⁵⁸ 7 April, 4 May and 18 May 1963, Bowles to Kennedy (Box 297, Folder 0/19 Kennedy, JF 1962 July-December) and 12 March 1963 and 26 April 1963, Bowles to Rusk (Box 301, Folder 1/28 Rusk, Dean), Part VI: January 1961 - June 1963 (Series I: Correspondence), Bowles Papers

Kennedy too asked ‘how could we stop China without India?’ He continued that he did not want to be ‘penny-wise about India’. He did not want a situation where India felt pressurised by both China and Pakistan. Accepting the British worries about Hong Kong, Kennedy decided to go ahead with air defence for India because otherwise ‘Congress [would be] madder if India went Communist’.¹⁵⁹

Away from all this, after the fifth round in Karachi, Galbraith was telling Gore-Booth that he was convinced that in their representation of ‘elements’, they had exerted all the pressure they could and was beginning to wonder whether ‘time had not come to “plan for failure”’.¹⁶⁰ He was worried that the US-UK had ‘succeeded in bringing the Indians and Pakistanis into a new opposition to ourselves’.¹⁶¹ Gore-Booth himself was discouraging the CRO from ‘risking the prestige of the HMG and the USG on active mediation in which the chances of success are very dim’ while recommending ‘keeping some, strictly controlled, aid’ for India.¹⁶² His worries were towards Washington as well as New Delhi:

Despite Mr Nehru, there is a drift here towards the West...It is of outstanding importance that there should be no split in the Anglo-American front. If we disagree, it will be the US view which will be regarded as decisive here – if only because US furnishes five times the aid that we do...¹⁶³

Taking this as a challenge rather than a caution, Duncan Sandys decided to visit New Delhi after the CENTO meeting in Pakistan. This is a celebrated episode in the existing literature.¹⁶⁴ Dean Rusk too was to join him to explore the prospects of partition, internationalisation and mediation, before the sixth round of talks started in Delhi on 15 May. A Sandys’ visit had been Galbraith’s nightmare since March. He had been horrified to contemplate ‘the glint in Sandys’ eye’ and had been long convinced that if and when any agreement would be close, Sandys ‘will be back with the hope of propping up his admirably unpromising career’.¹⁶⁵

¹⁵⁹ 25 April 1963, White House Memoranda - Box 429, Komer Series

¹⁶⁰ 26 April 1963, Delhi to CRO, T. No. 1191, DO 196/151, TNA

¹⁶¹ 22 April 1963, Galbraith, *Ambassador’s Journal*, p. 564

¹⁶² 28 April 1963, Delhi to CRO, T. No. 1220, DO 196/151, TNA

¹⁶³ 28 April 1963, Gore-Booth to CRO, T. No. 1221, DO 133/163, TNA

¹⁶⁴ See McGarr, *The Cold War in South Asia*, pp. 208-10

¹⁶⁵ 25 March 1963, Galbraith to Rusk, (3693), (Box 3933, Folder POL 32-1 IND-PAK), Central Foreign Policy Files (1960-63), RG 59, NARA-II

Galbraith had been insisting upon Rusk to get a direct appeal from Kennedy to Macmillan against Sandys. Now, to compound his disappointment, Rusk too was coming. Rusk rebuked him that in his deep disapproval of the British, he had ‘embarked on an all or nothing approach’.¹⁶⁶ Notwithstanding this brave face, Rusk’s own Department now believed that it had ‘lost [the] ability to press India’ and conceded that ‘no progress’ was ‘likely’. It continued to fear Sandys’ pressure for internationalisation and hoped that Rusk might turn it towards mediation, while it decided to go ahead with air defence because of the ‘long-term interest in improving Indian military capability’.¹⁶⁷ A background paper prepared on 2-3 May 1963, before Rusk’s trip to India listed the difficulties in considering internationalisation; from the USSR, China and Afghanistan to Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim and Tibet.¹⁶⁸ Next day, Bowles produced a memo pronouncing the ‘diplomatic dead-end’ on Kashmir.¹⁶⁹

At Karachi, Rusk told Sandys that he could not state categorically to the Indians that further aid was dependent on progress on Kashmir. Personally, Rusk had no wish to embroil himself in Kashmir and was content to let Sandys take the initiative.¹⁷⁰ This renewed effort under a revived British leadership was, as the FO explained, a response to the Indian reaction against ‘elements’.¹⁷¹ Rusk also met Douglas-Home at Karachi, who was convinced that ‘there would be no solution unless the US threatened to withdraw aid’. Rusk was neither as gung-ho nor as sanguine about India as his British counterparts and called it a ‘pity’ that Pakistan had not offered cooperation to India during the China war.¹⁷² Douglas-Home remained unpersuaded. He wrote to Macmillan that ‘the Indians will not move on Kashmir unless we and the US say we will not supply them with military aid...I hope I am wrong and if anyone can wear down their resistance it is Duncan’.¹⁷³ Americans shared this faith in Sandys’ abilities. Harriman had called him a ‘good medicine in small and well-spaced doses’.¹⁷⁴

Before Sandys could get a shot at India’s resistance, he was urging Ayub and Bhutto to take China seriously. Rusk had been blunter. He had told Bhutto that Pakistan had damaged its

¹⁶⁶ 18 April 1963, Rusk to Galbraith, No. 3736, (Box 3933, Folder POL 32-1 IND-PAK), Central Foreign Policy Files (1960-63) RG 59, NARA-II

¹⁶⁷ 23 April 1963, Near-Eastern and South-Asian Affairs Records relating to Kashmir, 1952-64, RG 59

¹⁶⁸ Bureau of Near-Eastern and South-Asian Affairs Records relating to Kashmir, 1952-64, RG 59, NARA-II

¹⁶⁹ 4 May 1963, Bowles memo (Box 438, Folder Bowles, Chester), Harriman Papers

¹⁷⁰ 30 April 1963, Karachi to Delhi, T. No. 326, DO 133/163, TNA

¹⁷¹ 30 April 1963, FO to its missions, T. No. 233, DO 196/151, TNA

¹⁷² 30 April 1963, Home-Rusk talks, DO 196/151, TNA

¹⁷³ 4 May 1963, Home to Macmillan, PM/63/65, DO 196/151, TNA

¹⁷⁴ 8 April 1963, (Box 429 Folder 1), NSC Files, Komer Series

case on Kashmir by flirting with China.¹⁷⁵ Sandys also chalked out tactics with key British and American officials in Karachi and stressed upon the Americans that the Indians must not be left under an illusion that any aid was ‘in the bag’. It was important that the US and the UK remained in step on this in New Delhi.¹⁷⁶ While Sandys was thus readying himself and the Americans, Gore-Booth was working out anxiously ‘what the various great men should do when they arrive’.¹⁷⁷ Sending his worries to the CRO, he wrote:

We are really *en pleine crise* about Kashmir. The Indians remain furious about the ‘elements’. We are furious at them for being furious...For goodness sake, give some aid, carefully controlled, do not tie yourselves with a commitment to the Paks [and] whatever you do, do not get out of step with the Americans...¹⁷⁸

But Macmillan felt otherwise. Ruing Nehru’s ‘emotional fixation’ with Kashmir, he told his Canadian counterpart, Lester Pearson, that he did not think the Chinese would attack India again and therefore there was no need for further arms aid.¹⁷⁹ While Macmillan was ruing Nehru’s ‘emotional fixation’, one of his envoys was working on it. Louis Mountbatten was paying the Indians his first official visit since his departure as Governor-General. As is well-known, over three days, from 30 April to 2 May, he prepared the ground for Sandys’ discussions with Nehru.¹⁸⁰ Together, Mountbatten and Sandys prevailed upon the Indian Prime Minister, despite opposition from his Ministers (Swaran Singh) and officials (Gundevia and Desai), to accept in principle an ‘international mediator’ for Kashmir.¹⁸¹

Mountbatten raised the possibility on the afternoon of 1 May, Sandys took it up the next day and Rusk completed the three-pronged pressure on the morning of 3 May.¹⁸² Despite having a ‘ticklish time’ with his colleagues and an intense dislike for the ‘patronising’ Sandys, Nehru acceded and Gore-Booth made the formal presentation on the morning of 4 May.¹⁸³ Sandys had also taken care to take into confidence Radhakrishnan, the Anglophile President of India,

¹⁷⁵ 30 April 1963, Karachi to CRO, T. No. 326, DO 133/163, TNA

¹⁷⁶ 29-30 April 1963, Notes of US-UK talks in Karachi, DO 196/152, TNA

¹⁷⁷ 23 April 1963, Gore-Booth to Cyril Pickard, DO 196/151, TNA

¹⁷⁸ 29 April 1963, Gore-Booth to CRO, MSS Gore-Booth 86, Gore-Booth Papers

¹⁷⁹ 2 May 1963, Macmillan-Pearson talks, WES 58/15/17, DO 196/152, TNA

¹⁸⁰ See Gundevia, *Outside the Archives*, p. 296, 299

¹⁸¹ 4 May 1963, Desai to BK Nehru, Nos. 24413 and 24414, Subject File Serial No. 37, TTK Papers

¹⁸² 4 May 1963, Rusk to Kennedy, Nos. 2878 and 4276, (Box 3934, Folder POL 32-IND-PAK), Central Foreign Policy Files (1960-63) RG 59, NARA-II

¹⁸³ 5 May 1963, Gore-Booth to Pickard, MSS Gore-Booth 86, Gore-Booth Papers

who was an increasingly articulate and ambitious critic of Nehru. He readily lamented the 'Indian negligence, misjudgement and failure in South-east Asia and Indo-China' that ought to be replaced by a 'thought-out policy' of standing together with Australia and Malaysia.¹⁸⁴

4 May 1963 was also the day when the US-UK combine threatened to come apart. At the centre of this 'misunderstanding' was the 'bad faith' between Galbraith and Sandys. That it was all about a piece of paper containing but a single sentence highlighted the gulf between two individuals, who themselves were on the extremes of their respective government's positions. In the tactics agreed upon between the British and the Americans in Karachi, it had been left unclear how exactly the mediation idea would be formalised or given greater precision, once Nehru had been prevailed upon to accept it.

After Nehru's consent, Sandys produced a piece of paper containing a sentence, the purport of which was that, at the suggestion of the British and American governments, Indian and Pakistani governments would accept a mediator to help in the solution of Kashmir and other related problems between them. As its wording was worked upon, Gundevia objected to Kashmir's mention and Gore-Booth fought for its inclusion. Somewhat surprisingly, Sandys took the Indian's side, believing that he could persuade Ayub, whatever the formula. The meeting broke up without having agreed upon the exact words. The only thing Sandys was clear on was that it would be presented as a 'UK-US formula' to the Pakistanis. Gore-Booth and Sandys drafted messages to Karachi in the afternoon and at about five pm, Sandys asked Gore-Booth to consult Galbraith. After some delay, the American Ambassador barged in and, in Gore-Booth's words, 'there then occurred two hours which Messrs MGM with all their resources could not have bettered'.

Galbraith came 'raging' and said that this 'dilettante operation' was in total bad faith towards Rusk. There followed a slanging match in which Gore-Booth hit back that if Galbraith did not think much of Sandys, the feeling was mutual. At this point Sandys entered and, though he kept his temper, saw red at Galbraith's accusation of 'bad faith'. Gore-Booth suggested to him to delete the formula from the letter to Ayub. Sandys agreed that they 'could not have a major Anglo-American row'. They met the Americans again at 7.30 pm and Sandys said that he was prepared to talk business, but not until the accusation of 'bad faith' was withdrawn.

¹⁸⁴ 3 May 1963, Radhakrishnan-Sandys talks, DO 196/152, TNA

Galbraith was willing to substitute it with ‘misunderstanding’. However, he made it clear that he stood by his impression of what had happened namely that it had been understood between Mr Rusk and Mr Sandys that there would be no document. Sandys replied, ‘It was only a sentence’, which was withdrawn in the re-worked draft produced by Gore-Booth.¹⁸⁵ Galbraith resumed his cordiality towards Gore-Booth and Sandys later admitted that, while he had resented Galbraith’s language, in the light of advice from Karachi, Galbraith had been right.

On 5 May, Morrice James and McConaughy presented this re-worked version to Ayub. Three days later, a draft statement was prepared for Nehru and Ayub to adjourn ministerial level talks and accept the services of a mutually accepted mediator. A first rough list of possible mediators was ready.¹⁸⁶ Looking back at the hectic and unusual 24 hours during which Sandys, Rusk, Mountbatten and Lord Selkirk were in Delhi and striking an optimistic note, Gore-Booth wrote to Sandys that ‘the deadlock had been lifted and goodwill recreated’.¹⁸⁷ For the officials at the CRO, he painted a vivid picture of the proceedings:

How can I give you an idea of last week? Mountbatten came in with a gale of dynamic emolliance which was just what the situation demanded and by the time he had talked for a day about military requirements and plans and for a couple of hours with Nehru about Kashmir, we were in a different India. Duncan Sandys then slid tactfully into Kashmir discussion and MB slid tactfully out. There followed ‘Rusk Day’ which confirmed the progress of the earlier days and finally ‘Sandys Day’ which started with a good interview with Nehru, passed through a desperate row with Galbraith and drew to a perfectly reasonable conclusion.¹⁸⁸

His American counterpart’s mood was completely the opposite. Galbraith wanted ‘to keep the American hand decently concealed’ on mediation and was in fact leaving Delhi for a couple of days ‘partly with a view to eliminating the impression that we have taken over the MEA’.¹⁸⁹ Rusk too looked back at his attempt at mediation as a ‘final step of despair’. He

¹⁸⁵ 5 May 1963, Gore-Booth to Cyril Pickard, MSS Gore-Booth 86, Gore-Booth Papers

¹⁸⁶ 6 May 1963, From Karachi to Washington (2185), (Box 3934, Folder POL 32-IND-PAK), Central Foreign Policy Files (1960-63) RG 59; it had Bunker, Black, John Cowles, John Dickey, Roswell Gilpatric, Jessup, Clark-Kerr, Wilson Wyatt and Llewellyn Thompson as America’s nominees and Oliver Franks, Lord Evershed, Lord Amory, Norman Brooke, PH Griffiths and Lord Kilmuir as London’s favourites.

¹⁸⁷ 15 May 1963, Gore-Booth to Sandys, PL AD/68, DO 196/153, TNA

¹⁸⁸ 8 May 1963, Gore-Booth to RH Belcher, MSS Gore-Booth 86, Gore-Booth Papers

¹⁸⁹ 10 May 1963, Galbraith to Rusk (4371), (Box 3934, Folder POL 32-IND-PAK), Central Foreign Policy Files (1960-63) RG 59, NARA-II

told the Australian Ambassador that Pakistan was ‘siding with China’, India was ‘throwing in its lot with the USSR’ and, by itself, no formula on Kashmir was satisfactory.¹⁹⁰

In his report to Kennedy, he felt that neither country wanted reconciliation. Insofar as American interests were concerned, they wanted India as a ‘de facto’ ally against China, but ran into opposition of their ‘de jure’ ally Pakistan. Moreover, Rusk was not sanguine about India ‘while Nehru is PM’.¹⁹¹ Rusk, in effect, was saying that America should ‘play for time till Nehru died’. The great danger there, as Komer pointed out to Kennedy, was a possibility of total failure. Kashmir would not be solved and a small aid would not give America any real leverage on India, but would be enough to annoy Pakistan. Moreover, the major goal of bringing India into the Western fold would not be achieved.¹⁹² This scenario was serious and real enough for Kennedy to write to Macmillan on 13 May 1963 thus:

With a Kashmir settlement now a long way off, I believe it would be a mistake to let the Indians conclude that there is little prospect of any further military help in the absence of a Kashmir settlement. Indian support is essential to a satisfactory non-nuclear balance of power in Asia. They still think they have other options and if we push Nehru too hard it is by no means inconceivable that he would harden his attitude. Our problem is how to forestall jeopardising our new relation with India, without putting too much strain on our relations with Pakistan and still retaining some leverage on Kashmir. It seems to me that to signify willingness to go ahead on air defence would best meet this dilemma. I am quite aware of your hesitations... These we share [but] I am strongly persuaded [about] a viable US-UK-Commonwealth ‘commitment’ to the air defence of India.¹⁹³

Macmillan meanwhile was reading from a sobered Sandys about ‘the effect of [Kashmir] on our relations with the Americans’, the corresponding need to ‘carefully concert plans’ and ‘keep in step on aid’, the necessity of keeping ‘differences’ about the UK attitude to and trade with China from affecting US-UK policies on India and Pakistan and, finally, about ‘the dangers of Indo-Pakistan relations becoming a [domestic] political football’.¹⁹⁴ Next day, just as feeling in Washington ‘reached the point of diminishing returns on Kashmir’,¹⁹⁵ India accepted the mediation proposal.

¹⁹⁰ 9 May 1963, (Box 3934, Folder POL 32-IND-PAK), Central Foreign Policy Files (1960-63) RG 59

¹⁹¹ 7 May 1963, Rusk’s report, (Box 429 Folder 1), NSC Files, Komer Series

¹⁹² 7 May 1963, Komer to McGeorge Bundy, White House Memoranda - Box 429, Komer Series

¹⁹³ 13 May 1963, Kennedy to Macmillan, President’s Office Files (Series: Countries, Box 118 A, Folder 9)

¹⁹⁴ 7 May 1963, Cyril Pickard to Gore-Booth, MSS Gore-Booth 86, Gore-Booth Papers

¹⁹⁵ 14 May 1963, Komer to McGeorge Bundy, (Box 429 Folder 1), NSC Files, Komer Series

Simultaneously, the sixth and final round of talks began. Pakistan, however, had still not taken a decision. The CRO asked Morrice James to press Bhutto.¹⁹⁶ Galbraith also saw Bhutto on 15 May in New Delhi and emphasised acceptance. Next day, the talks broke down and Bhutto left for Karachi. Not just Bhutto, Ayub too was proving hesitant on mediation, calling it a ‘time-wasting manoeuvre’.¹⁹⁷

Macmillan wrote to him reminding of his support and the latter’s responsibilities.¹⁹⁸ On 17 May, Pakistan ‘accepted’ mediation but with the ‘safeguard’ of a freeze on long-term military aid to India.¹⁹⁹ Gore-Booth correctly concluded that this ‘safeguard’ had vitiated the atmosphere.²⁰⁰ Galbraith, ‘conscious of dangers of seeming to argue for a client’, was drawing similar conclusions. Contrasting America’s ‘strengthened position with the stubborn Indians’ against the Chinese with the ‘British resistance and State Department’s duck-peckling’, he wrote:

We have now milked everything there is to be had on Kashmir from the arms prospect...and through disenchantment and disappointment we will also lose the gains vis-à-vis the Chinese. The Department and DOD are still working within the constraints of Kashmir...The British are pursuing their own different and limited goals and are not concerned with what could be costly and disastrous for the US.²⁰¹

He had an ally in Komer in Washington who asked Kennedy and Harriman, ‘do not our larger interests dictate a clear signal to India at this point?’ and reiterated that ‘if we keep looking over our shoulders at Kashmir, we risk losing the gains of these past months against China’. Charging the Defence and State Departments of thinking like London, i.e. ‘using Kashmir as an excuse for their reluctance to face up to the major investment required if we are to pull India into our grand strategy in Asia’,²⁰² he argued in Galbraith’s vein that this ignored the ‘lesson of the last six months that Kashmir would not come that easily...if we keep pressing too hard, we may lose India without getting Kashmir’.

¹⁹⁶ 14 May 1963, CRO to Karachi, T. No. 1717, DO 196/152, TNA

¹⁹⁷ 16 May 1963, CS Pickard to TJ Bligh, DO 196/152, TNA

¹⁹⁸ 17 May 1963, Macmillan to Ayub (1021), MSS Macmillan dep C 346, Macmillan Papers

¹⁹⁹ 18 May and 4 June 1963, Karachi to CRO, T. Nos. 740 and 815, DO 196/152 and DO 196/153, TNA

²⁰⁰ 18 May 1963, Delhi to CRO, T. No. 1469, DO 196/152, TNA

²⁰¹ 16 May 1963, Galbraith to Rusk and Kennedy (4453), (Box 3934, Folder POL 32-IND-PAK), Central Foreign Policy Files (1960-63) RG 59 and President’s Office Files (Series: Countries, Box 118 A, Folder 9)

²⁰² 16 May 1963, Komer to Harriman (Box 481, Folder Robert Komer), Harriman Papers

Komer also felt that money was ‘as powerful a motive for stalling as Kashmir’. The UK’s reluctance to get heavily involved was clear, but the Defence Department too had allocated to India for 1964 a sum of \$ 50 million, after South Korea (\$ 205 million), Turkey (\$ 183 million), Taiwan (\$ 134 million), Greece (\$ 103 million) and Thailand (\$ 67 million). Komer wondered whether it made any ‘sense to give India one half what we give Greece?’ He wanted Kennedy to plainly tell Macmillan that America was ‘going ahead’ and Britain ‘cannot go *pari passu* with us’.²⁰³

Bowles too supported Komer by pointing out that in 1959 Eisenhower gave India in excess of \$ 500 million and America ‘cannot tie its efforts to establish balance against China in Asia any longer’ to Kashmir.²⁰⁴ Macmillan too had an ally in Washington though, Averell Harriman, who agreed with him that no defence of India was possible except that of the subcontinent as a whole and that justified persistent efforts to settle Kashmir. Therefore, ‘before taking more than limited steps forward in helping India’s defence...full consideration must be given to relations with Pakistan’.²⁰⁵

June-August 1963: A shot at mediation

The period from June 1963, in which this straddling of contradictory impulses was attempted by London and Washington has not previously been examined in detail.²⁰⁶ To soften the blow to Pakistan, Galbraith and Gore-Booth suggested that as arms aid to India involved many decisions over years, the persistence of the Kashmir dispute was bound to affect these decisions as they arose.²⁰⁷ London and Washington further sweetened the pill by assuring Karachi that it would be kept fully informed about any arms supplied.²⁰⁸ Karachi however wanted an authoritative, quotable statement on this, which the British were willing to provide,²⁰⁹ but the Americans were not. Despite McConaughy’s repeated requests in the last ten days of May that it was ‘necessary to link mediation effectively if not formally to military

²⁰³ 17 May 1963, Komer to Kennedy, President’s Office Files (Series: Countries, Box 118 A, Folder 9)

²⁰⁴ 16 May 1963, Bowles to Harriman (Box 438, Folder Bowles, Chester), Harriman Papers

²⁰⁵ 17 May 1963, Harriman to Ball (Box 434, Folder Ball, George), Harriman Papers

²⁰⁶ Schaffer ends his chapter ‘Kennedy Strikes Out’ with the sixth round of talks and then begins from early 1964. McGarr’s and Chaudhuri’s, more detailed and nuanced accounts, shift focus from Kashmir to ‘military aid’ for the second half of 1963 and then to Nehru’s succession.

²⁰⁷ 23 May 1963, Delhi to CRO, T. No. 1521, DO 196/153, TNA

²⁰⁸ 25 May 1963, CRO to Delhi (T. No. 1870) and Karachi (T. No. 1078) and 26 May 1963, CRO to Delhi (T. No. 1888) and Karachi (T. No. 1085), DO 196/153, TNA

²⁰⁹ 27 May 1963, Morrice James to CRO, T. No. 773, DO 196/153, TNA

aid',²¹⁰ the State Department held that it would not 'subordinate strategic interest to Kashmir' and 'cannot accept explicit linking of arms aid to mediation'.²¹¹

Later, in the face of persistence from McConaughy,²¹² it diluted its line only slightly: '[not] prepared to freeze arms aid but recognise progress on Kashmir would have important bearing on [its] nature and extent'.²¹³ The visiting TT Krishnamachari was being assured by Kennedy, Rusk and Harriman about help in case of a Chinese attack 'regardless of differences'.²¹⁴ BK Nehru reported the 'very friendly' general attitude, wide-ranging talks, and financial difficulties and, above all, that Kashmir was mentioned 'but in a much lower key than experienced so far'.²¹⁵ On 20 May, Kennedy personally assured Krishnamachari that 'Kashmir was not the price for arms aid', even if 'the US could not afford wholly to alienate Pakistan'.²¹⁶ James Grant, the Deputy Assistant Secretary in the State Department, expressed the official line in his testimony to the House Committee on Foreign Relations:

We have made clear that there is some relationship between the progress made on settlement of Kashmir and the pace and quantity of military assistance. Obviously this is one of the factors. If the Chinese Communists were to resume their attack, we would not refuse assistance....Sofar we have moved ahead with the military assistance programme required to enable India to be ready in case the fighting starts again tomorrow or this summer.²¹⁷

The British position was more categorical. There was 'no question of long-term aid to India' without resolving Kashmir. This carrot to Karachi came with a stick though. If, however, Pakistan blocked mediation 'unreasonably', then the CRO 'would not consider her views in determining the scale of future UK aid to India'.²¹⁸ Therefore, disregarding the 'gloomy' Galbraith and a pessimistic Gore-Booth,²¹⁹ the CRO started finalising names for the role of mediator.²²⁰ The UK High-Commission in Delhi was surprised. It had informed the CRO that

²¹⁰ 21 May 1963, Karachi to State Department, No. 2321, (Box 430), NSC Files, Komer Series

²¹¹ 25 May 1963, State Department to Karachi (in reply), No. 1817, (Box 430), NSC Files, Komer Series

²¹² 25 May 1963, (2358), (Box 430), NSC Files, Komer Series

²¹³ 31 May 1963, (Box 430), NSC Files, Komer Series

²¹⁴ Washington to FO, T. No. 1570, DO 196/153, TNA

²¹⁵ 17 May 1963, PM from Ambassador, No. 500, Subject File Serial No. 37, TTK Papers

²¹⁶ 21 May 1963, PM from Ambassador, No. 517, Subject File Serial No. 37, TTK Papers

²¹⁷ 28 May 1963, Rusk to Karachi (1842) and Delhi (4171), (Box 3934, Folder POL 32-IND-PAK), Central Foreign Policy Files (1960-63) RG 59, NARA-II; Washington to FO, T. No. 1574, DO 196/153, TNA

²¹⁸ 28 May 1963, CS Pickard to Morrice James, DO 196/153, TNA

²¹⁹ 25 May 1963, Gore-Booth to Pickard, PL 44/1, DO 196/153, TNA

²²⁰ 28 May 1963, CRO to Washington, DO 196/153, TNA; Amory, Oliver Franks, Percival Griffiths, Howick, Kilmuir, Norman Brook and James Robertson.

the Indians would prefer an American mediator.²²¹ In fact, the Indians had told Galbraith that they would actively 'refuse' a British mediator.²²² These were some of the 'difficulties' with the CRO that Krishnamachari told Macmillan in talks – 'frank to the point of being blunt', while returning from Washington.²²³ His report to Nehru lauded 'sympathy and support' from Canada, termed Kennedy, Pentagon and the State Department as 'friendly' but up against a 'powerful lobby for Pakistan in the Congress and amongst the Press Lords' and denounced the CRO as 'obstructive' and Sandys as 'not particularly helpful'.²²⁴

While this search for mediation continued, the State Department asked McConaughy to strongly register its disapproval at Pakistan's continuing gestures towards China, especially the recently concluded Civil Aviation Agreement.²²⁵ A CRO note of mid-June conceded the unfavourable impression that Pakistan's continued flirtation with China was creating.²²⁶ Meanwhile, London was hosting the Indian President. Radhakrishnan was 'rather critical of Nehru' on a range of issues in his meeting with Macmillan.²²⁷ Macmillan's next guest was Robert Menzies who expressed his renewed interest in Kashmir. For once, Macmillan was annoyed. He told Menzies that he was getting tired of managing Pakistan, a difficult country that was 'only held together by a common religion and a common fear of India'.²²⁸

Earlier, the Americans had also told the Australians that they could not 'subordinate strategic interests in Asia by making further military assistance to India conditional on Kashmir'.²²⁹ In June 1963, during his trip to the UK, Kennedy once again emphasised to Macmillan that Washington could not subordinate global interests to a local dispute. Rusk spoke similarly to Sandys and Douglas-Home.²³⁰ At this meeting, Sandys requested Eugene Black as a mediator,²³¹ but Kashmir by now had a reputation of being a 'jawbreaker' in Washington and Rusk refused. More incredibly, Harriman suggested Eisenhower as a mediator. Everybody

²²¹ 6 June 1963, Mark Allen to EJ Emery, DO 196/153, TNA

²²² 4 May 1963, Desai to BK Nehru, Nos. 24413 and 24414, Subject File Serial No. 37, TTK Papers; 13 May 1963, Komer to McGeorge Bundy, White House Memoranda - Box 429, Komer Series

²²³ 31 May 1963, PM from Chagla, No. 361, Subject File Serial No. 37, TTK Papers

²²⁴ 22 June 1963, TTK to Nehru, Subject File Serial No. 37, TTK Papers

²²⁵ 9 June 1963, McConaughy to the State Department, SEA 52/7, DO 196/153, TNA; It made Pakistan the only country apart from Burma to have civil air links with China in the region.

²²⁶ 19 June 1963, CRO's note, DO 196/153, TNA

²²⁷ 12 June 1963, Notes of Macmillan-Radhakrishnan meeting, DO 196/153, TNA

²²⁸ 24 June 1963, Notes of Macmillan-Menzies-Sandys meeting, DO 196/153, TNA

²²⁹ 5-6 June 1963, (POL 32-1), Near-East and South-Asia Bureau Records relating to Kashmir, 1952-64, RG 59

²³⁰ 18 June 1963, (PET-B/B-5), Near-East and South-Asia Bureau Records relating to Kashmir, 1952-64, RG 59

²³¹ 28 June 1963, Sandys-Rusk meeting, DSND 8/20, Sandys Papers

from Talbot, Komer and Bundy to Galbraith rounded upon him for a ‘less hyper-thyroid’ approach. Such a ‘big-league’ mediator would turn Kashmir into a partisan issue.²³²

As if China, Pakistan and Kashmir were not enough, June 1963 also saw the re-entry of the Soviet Union in the matrix of worries in London and Washington, as Moscow renewed its offer of arms aid to India that had been suspended by the China war. This development was plainly related to the sharpening Sino-Soviet dispute.²³³ If this re-activated old Anglo-American concerns, soon McConaughy and James were also warning about a new USSR campaign ‘to split off Pakistan from Western alliances’. Soviet activities in Pakistan, air link with Karachi, trade and cultural exchanges, seemed on an upswing and Zafrulla was going to Moscow. All this contributed to an air of ‘futility’. If the US-UK were unable to settle Kashmir in November-December 1962 when they were united and the Soviet Union was away, then they were hardly likely to succeed in June-July 1963 when they were divided and the Soviet Union was back.²³⁴ They could only ask for and get the assurance that India would not be ‘non-aligned as far as China was concerned’.²³⁵

Sure enough, Gundevia told Galbraith and Gore-Booth on 1 July that mediation was ‘off’. Galbraith, on the verge of leaving his Ambassadorship, lost his patience and gave an elaborate vent to his feelings. Calling the Indian foreign policy ‘a highly erratic thing’, likening the MEA to a ‘bordello’ and hitting out against an ‘official mind’, which was ‘incapable’ of any political understanding, Galbraith had harsh words for Nehru:

[He] moves off into a cloud-cuckoo land in which he is the towering and righteous figure passing upon the iniquities of others and immune to any political concerns except his own...Having been forced to dispense first with Menon and now with Malaviya, he is inclined to take it out on the Pakistanis and to show that he is no more beholden than ever to the Americans or the British.²³⁶

Nehru’s lassitude and irritation on Kashmir, added to Gundevia’s intransigence had thoroughly frustrated Gore-Booth and Galbraith.²³⁷ It reduced mediation into a ‘disastrous

²³² 18 June 1963, Komer to McGeorge Bundy, (Box 429 Folder 1), NSC Files, Komer Series

²³³ 27 June 1963, CRO’s noted, DO 196/153, TNA

²³⁴ 10 June 1963, Karachi to State Department (2476), (Box 3934, Folder POL 32-IND-PAK), Central Foreign Policy Files (1960-63) RG 59, NARA-II

²³⁵ 20 June 1963, MJ Desai-Galbraith talks, Subject File Serial No. 37, TTK Papers

²³⁶ 3 July 1963, Galbraith to Gore-Booth, DO 133/166, TNA

²³⁷ 2 July 1963, Delhi to CRO, T. No. 1932, DO 196/154, TNA

bungle'.²³⁸ The CRO, though, was not giving up yet. When it came to know of this encounter, it 'determined to proceed as planned' with mediation.²³⁹ Kewal Singh, India's Deputy High-Commissioner in London, was summoned and told that Gundevia's remark was dismaying and would have consequences.²⁴⁰

Having fathered the 'mediation' proposal, helped by the mid-wife Mountbatten, Sandys would not let it go rejected off-hand. He was also irked by now that the UK had committed most of the £ 19 million to India under the Nassau agreement despite little change on Kashmir. He met Macmillan with Douglas-Home on 29 July 1963. They agreed that the only hope to stop Pakistan from making common cause with China was to stop aid to India until it settled Kashmir.²⁴¹ However, when Sandys brought up internationalisation, Douglas-Home repeated the FO understanding that it was unfavourable given the Chinese and Russian presence in the area.²⁴² The FO drew the line on internationalisation because it rightly reckoned that in the ultimate analysis, first India would prefer Kashmir to aid and second, 'even an emotional Pakistan can see that China cannot give them a free hand in Kashmir'.²⁴³

Meanwhile, within the CRO, Gore-Booth was losing the argument on mediation to Morrice James. His position that 'nothing we can do' will help,²⁴⁴ was successfully challenged by James' stand that mediation remained 'a framework for continuing Western influence...without it China will have a free hand'.²⁴⁵ The CRO instructed Gore-Booth to go ahead urgently with mediation.²⁴⁶ This resolve of the CRO was rewarded with a fresh impetus from Washington to their reluctant new-old Ambassador in India, Chester Bowles. Returning to India after ten years, Bowles had added Chinese glasses to his Soviet frames,²⁴⁷ and, since arriving in mid-July, had been following Galbraith's line in arguing that America should drop mediation in the interest of 'political balance in Asia'.²⁴⁸

²³⁸ 1 July 1963, Galbraith, *Ambassador's Journal*, p. 581

²³⁹ 3 July 1963, CRO to Delhi, T. No. 2422 and Karachi, T. No. 1346, DO 196/154, TNA

²⁴⁰ 3 July 1963, CRO to Delhi, T. No. 2423, DO 196/154, TNA

²⁴¹ Despite the Birch Grove agreement, UK's total help to India was only £ 6 million.

²⁴² 29 July 1963, Notes of Macmillan-Home-Sandys talks, DO 133/167, TNA

²⁴³ 20 August 1963, Mark Allen's note, DO 133/167, TNA

²⁴⁴ 30 July 1963, Delhi to CRO, PL/5/6/1, DO 196/154, TNA

²⁴⁵ 30 July 1963, Karachi to CRO, T. No. 1135, DO 196/154, TNA

²⁴⁶ 31 July 1963, CRO to Delhi, T. No. 2792 and Karachi, T. No. 1533, DO 196/154, TNA

²⁴⁷ Chester Bowles, *Promises to Keep*, p. 457

²⁴⁸ 27 July 1963, Bowles to Galbraith: 'I find myself precisely where you were on every substantial question', (Box 330, Folder 28/31 Galbraith, JK 1963-65), Part VII: Correspondence July 1963 - May 1969 (Series I), Bowles Papers and 5 August 1963, Bowles to Harriman (Box 438, Folder Bowles, Chester), Harriman Papers

The State Department took it as Bowles 'over-reacting to his first days in Delhi'. While it did not want to 'push Nehru too hard', it felt that 'too much low posturing' could be self-defeating. Komer gave voice to the widely-held worry in Washington about Bowles that 'we are going to have problems keeping him our Ambassador rather than theirs'. A Kashmir settlement remained 'an important [if] not essential' part of America's South Asia policy and Bowles was told that a low-key mediation was preferable to quitting.²⁴⁹ Dean Rusk himself exhorted Bowles to compliment the British lead in Karachi thus:

I do not under-estimate the difficulties you face since I too had somewhat less than pleasant baptism. Nevertheless, I think it is a matter of over-riding US interest to move ahead...Increasing India-Pakistan embitterment within the context of Sino-Soviet developments lends itself to serious exploitation...Kashmir is the central issue...This does not mean that we are seeking to 'force' a Kashmir settlement...But we do consider it our responsibility and within our power...Our main choice lies between closing the gap between these countries or a disastrous withdrawal.²⁵⁰

Accordingly on 7 August, Morrice James and McConaughy met Ayub while Gore-Booth and Bowles had to satisfy themselves with a meeting of 'painful rectitude' with Foreign Secretary MJ Desai, in Nehru's absence from Delhi.²⁵¹ To further bolster mediation, Kennedy decided to send Under-Secretary George Ball.²⁵² Informing Ayub about it, McConaughy stressed that Ball's key concern was the persisting Pakistan-China axis and hoped that Pakistan would not force the US 'to choose between supporting Pakistan and discharging global responsibilities against China'. Ayub countered by pointing to the US's continuing need for Pakistan against the USSR given India's pro-USSR non-alignment and, in turn, hoped that the US would not 'drive Pakistan to the Chinese wall under "force of circumstances"'.²⁵³

Neither McConaughy nor Ayub was to know yet that, even as Ball prepared for his trip, Kennedy had started to feel that while Washington 'should not "disengage" on Kashmir', it should start distancing itself.²⁵⁴ Harriman too agreed that they were in an 'unenviable,

²⁴⁹ 31 July 1963, Komer to McGeorge Bundy, (Box 429 Folder 1), NSC Files, Komer Series

²⁵⁰ 1 August 1963, Rusk to Karachi (199) and Bowles (275), (Box 3934, Folder POL 32-IND-PAK), Central Foreign Policy Files (1960-63) RG 59, NARA-II

²⁵¹ 9 August 1963, Gore-Booth to RH Belcher, MSS Gore-Booth 86, Gore-Booth Papers

²⁵² 6 and 8 August 1963, Delhi to CRO, T. No. 2865 and T. No. 2887, DO 196/154, TNA

²⁵³ 9 August 1963, Karachi to CRO, T. No. 1186, DO 196/154, TNA

²⁵⁴ 12 August 1963, (Box 441 A - Ball Mission), NSC Files, Komer Series

intolerable' position and Ball 'should be authorized to talk very bluntly with Ayub and tell him we cannot continue to help Pakistan if she plays the [China] game'.²⁵⁵ This feeling at the top soon percolated down to Karachi, from where PJ Griffiths, former ICS, returned to tell the CRO that Pakistan was very bitter towards the US.²⁵⁶ Morrice James saw an opportunity here and assured Ayub that 'the British understood conditions much better than the US'.²⁵⁷

By the middle of August, the Indians were telling to whoever would listen that mediation was now 'totally inopportune'.²⁵⁸ Bowles, though not credited for it, had not given up the ghost, however. He told Nehru that he was willing to wait but the latter must consider mediation,²⁵⁹ and prepared a list of US names for mediator.²⁶⁰ The chief impulse driving him was a conviction that Moscow would give India 'very high priority' in the coming years 'as a balance to China'.²⁶¹

Assessing Indo-UK relations in the midst of all this, Gore-Booth warned the CRO that not only was there no hope of mediation, the Americans had stolen a march over them in India with less pressure on Kashmir and more focus on aid.²⁶² Pakistan rejected mediation on 23 August 1963, Bhutto having ignored Sandys' personal appeal to him.²⁶³ Nehru, having earlier made an intemperate speech against mediation in the Indian Parliament on 13 August, sent a letter to Macmillan a week later confirming India's rejection; chiefly blaming the Pakistan-China combine for it.²⁶⁴

Remarkably the State Department was in agreement with the Indian Prime Minister. It too was of the 'firm view' that, so long as Pakistan continued to move towards China, India would have a 'strong and understandable reason' to not discuss Kashmir.²⁶⁵

²⁵⁵ 5 August 1963, Memo on Pakistan (Box 495, Folder Pakistan), Harriman Papers

²⁵⁶ 8 August 1963, PJ Griffiths-JJS Garner talks, DO 196/154, TNA

²⁵⁷ 11 August 1963, Karachi to CRO, T. No. 1187, DO 196/154, TNA

²⁵⁸ 13 August 1963, Karachi to CRO, T. No. 1212, DO 196/154, TNA

²⁵⁹ 19 August 1963, Delhi to CRO, T. No. 2418, DO 196/154, TNA

²⁶⁰ 9 August 1963, Snelling to Sandys, DO 196/154; Bunker, John Dickey, Wyatt, John Cowles, RL Gilpatric

²⁶¹ 19 August 1963, Bowles to Louis Fischer (Box 329, Folder 4/4 Fischer, Louis 1963, 1966-68), Part VII: Correspondence July 1963 - May 1969 (Series I), Bowles Papers

²⁶² 9 and 21 August 1963, Gore-Booth to CRO, DO 196/154, TNA

²⁶³ 13 August 1963, No. 1628, CRO to Karachi, DSND 8/3, Sandys Papers

²⁶⁴ 30 August 1963, Nehru to Macmillan, MSS Macmillan dep C 346, Macmillan Papers

²⁶⁵ 31 August 1963, State Department to Karachi (386) and Delhi (510), (Box 3935, Folder POL 32-1 IND-PAK), Central Foreign Policy Files (1960-63) RG 59, NARA-II

August-December 1963: Moving on from Kashmir

The State Department's view was amply reflected in George Ball's visit, the India leg of which had been cancelled. Ball himself believed that 'progress' on Kashmir was one of the factors for US aid to India but 'our most important enemy here are the [Chinese] and we must never let that out of sight'.²⁶⁶ He went to repair relations with Pakistan by '[restating] the basis on which' America had 'intervened in Kashmir – [China]'.²⁶⁷ A Background Paper for his mission was bullish in its conclusions: 'we have no apologies to make to Pakistan on this score'.²⁶⁸ As Komer put it to Kennedy, 'Ball ought frankly to tell Ayub that cosying up to China is the best way not to get Kashmir'.²⁶⁹

Ayub assured Ball that he would not take 'normalisation' with China to essential matters. On Kashmir, however, he could see no future in mediation. The US could try but Nehru, assured on both arms aid and Chinese front, had no compulsions to settle now.²⁷⁰ Ball, in turn, told him that Washington would not stop aid 'until India can defend itself against China', whether or not Pakistan agrees on the potential, imminence and level of the Chinese threat and whether or not India gives in on Kashmir. Pakistan had contributed little of substance to the pacts,²⁷¹ and while it can be 'compensated', it cannot be allowed to determine the US policy towards India.²⁷²

Even on 'compensation', Bowles asked that as 'no one would seriously argue that Russia is about to attack Pakistan and the Pakistanis themselves say they have not the slightest fear of the Chinese' then why arm them?²⁷³ Even Hamilton Fish Armstrong wrote to Ayub, while urging an article for the *Foreign Affairs*, 'Pakistan was not attacked by Russia or China whereas India has been attacked'.²⁷⁴

²⁶⁶ Personal Papers, Box 5, George Ball Papers, Kennedy Library

²⁶⁷ 26 August 1963, State Department to Karachi (349) and Delhi (477), (Box 3934, Folder POL 32-IND-PAK), Central Foreign Policy Files (1960-63) RG 59, NARA-II

²⁶⁸ 17 August 1963, BMP-B/25, Lot File Nos. 67D538 and 70D165 (Folder, India-Military, 1964-66) RG 59

²⁶⁹ 29 August 1963, Komer to Kennedy, (Box 429 Folder 1), NSC Files, Komer Series

²⁷⁰ 6 September 1963, Karachi to CRO, T. No. 1330 and T. No. 1331, DO 196/154, TNA

²⁷¹ 23 September 1963, Ball to Australian Ambassador in Pakistan, (Box 3932, Folder POL IND-PAK), Central Foreign Policy Files (1960-63) RG 59, NARA-II

²⁷² 7 September 1963, Komer to Kennedy, (Box 441 A - Ball Mission), NSC Files, Komer Series

²⁷³ 9 September 1963, Bowles to Chayes, Lot File Nos. 67D538 and 70D165 (Folder, India-Military, 1964-66) RG 59, NARA-II; 4 October 1963, Galbraith to Bowles (Box 330, Folder 28/31 Galbraith, JK 1963-65), Part VII: Correspondence July 1963 - May 1969 (Series I), Bowles Papers

²⁷⁴ 5 September 1963, Armstrong to Ayub, Box 6, Folder 14, Correspondence, Armstrong Papers

Meanwhile, reports were coming in of Russian assurances to India in the wake of Vijayalakshmi Pandit's meeting with Andrei Gromyko on the sidelines of the UN session in New York. Once again, there was more to it than met the eye. Pandit noted disapprovingly that 'in the large Russian map of the world hanging on Gromyko's wall, Kashmir was shown in a colour different to that of rest of India as well as Pakistan. Additionally the map showed the Kashmir frontier in the east as delineated by China'.²⁷⁵ The same day she reported to New Delhi disappointingly, 'Gone are the days when India ruled the waves of the UN...Hostility of the Afro-Asians [on Kashmir] is quite apparent. They resent our past attitude and are suspicious of the future'.²⁷⁶ Rusk and Adlai Stevenson did assure Pandit of the genuine American desire to help India militarily, suggesting a 'non-official' or a 'non-political' approach for negotiations on Kashmir.²⁷⁷ Pandit rejected both.

By the first week of October 1963, Bowles was urging action on steel and arms for India and inaction on Kashmir as the three 'assists' to take advantage of the Sino-Soviet split and the Sino-Indian conflict;²⁷⁸ while, the only possibility for Gore-Booth was 'to watch and see which happens first, Mr Nehru's disappearance from the scene or some change of circumstances or personalities in Kashmir'.²⁷⁹ The UK High-Commission in Karachi, though, continued with its warnings against 'the danger of prolonged inaction'.²⁸⁰

As it surveyed the past twelve months, a sympathetic CRO asked Morrice James to tell Ayub that the only criticism it had of Pakistan's border-barter-aviation agreements with China was of 'their timing'. The FO too, by now, had come around to a then-radical conclusion on the China-India-Pakistan triangle. In its revised view, 'the real cause of [Sino-Indian] hostilities was the Indian military preparations and moves from 1959 onwards'; a view that would find its greatest proponent in Neville Maxwell a decade on.²⁸¹ To the CRO, Washington appeared to have forced Ayub to decide between his attempt 'to get at India by friendliness towards

²⁷⁵ 21 September 1963, Pandit-Gromyko talks, Subject File Serial No. 5, Pandit Papers (II Instalment)

²⁷⁶ 21 September 1963, Pandit to MJ Desai, Subject File Serial No. 5, Pandit Papers (II Instalment)

²⁷⁷ 25 September 1963, Pandit-Rusk talks, Subject File Serial No. 5, Pandit Papers (II Instalment)

²⁷⁸ 4 October 1963, Bowles to Harriman (Box 438, Folder Bowles, Chester), Harriman Papers

²⁷⁹ 7 October 1963, Gore-Booth to CS Pickard, DO 196/155, TNA

²⁸⁰ 15 October 1963, RC Hunt (Karachi) to Pickard, Ext 22/9, DO 196/155, TNA

²⁸¹ 27 June 1963, Gore-Booth to Saville Garner, MSS Gore-Booth 86, Gore-Booth Papers

China' and his 'desire not to lose US aid'.²⁸² The State Department's own assessment of Pakistan-West relations at this time admitted to a 'less cosy [and] less psychologically satisfying relationship'.²⁸³ Rusk, Ball and Bundy all agreed that the 'real gain' made in India had brought along the problem of how to 'jolly Pakistanis into living with this'.²⁸⁴

As for Kashmir, it was all over bar the shouting. Phillips Talbot told officials at the CRO on 10 October 1963 that 'no solution on Kashmir could be imposed' in the wake of Pakistan's 'ill-considered policies', America's lessening influence and Britain's total lack of leverage. Against this, once again the USSR was more active in India.²⁸⁵ This is what a 'difficult, unpersuaded and disgruntled' Bhutto heard in Washington and, as for arms aid, he was reminded when he reached London that as an ally, even since November 1962, Pakistan had received more than the Indians had.²⁸⁶

For the rest of the year, the Americans probed both sides more about China. Averell Harriman met BK Nehru on 18 October 1963.²⁸⁷ McConaughy saw Ayub three days later to complain that despite the 'unqualified assurance' to Ball, he continued to move towards China.²⁸⁸ Bowles and Gore-Booth turned their thoughts towards secondary items of discord between India and Pakistan as well as checking Communist influence – Moscow's in India, Peking's in Pakistan.²⁸⁹ This was the nightmare scenario for Washington: the West losing ground in both countries.²⁹⁰ Out of the 'old-time polemics', they were wary of new ones.²⁹¹

Towards the end of November 1963, Washington and London finally admitted defeat. Bowles was now not even mentioning Kashmir in his despatches, which were all about a long-term five-year package if India proved 'reasonable to Pakistan, helpful about China [and]

²⁸² 15 October 1963, CRO's note on Pakistan's relations with the West, DO 196/131, TNA

²⁸³ 7 October 1963, (Box 3932, Folder POL IND-PAK), Central Foreign Policy Files (1960-63) RG 59

²⁸⁴ 14 October 1963, Komer to Bundy, (Box 433 Folder Ind-Pak Taylor Mission), NSC Files, Komer Series

²⁸⁵ 16 October 1963, Notes of Talbot's talks, DO 196/155, TNA

²⁸⁶ 3 October 1962, CRO's note on Bhutto visit, DO 196/133, TNA; see Chaudhuri, *Forged in Crisis*, p. 147

²⁸⁷ 22 October 1963, Washington to FO, T. No. 3260, DO 196/155, TNA

²⁸⁸ 23 October 1963, Karachi to CRO, T. No. 1548, DO 196/155, TNA

²⁸⁹ 23 October 1963, Paul Gore-Booth to CS Pickard, DO 196/155, TNA

²⁹⁰ 22 October 1963, Komer to Bundy, (Box 433 India-Pakistan Taylor Mission), NSC Files, Komer Series

²⁹¹ 28 October 1963, Ball to Delhi (929) and Karachi (637), (Box 3935, Folder POL 32-1 IND-PAK), Central Foreign Policy Files (1960-63) RG 59; 13 November 1963, Bowles' papers in May, September and November 1963 on "US policy towards India", "US policy initiatives towards India" and "US: Towards a balance of political and military forces in South Asia", (Box 3935, Folder POL 32-1 IND-PAK), Central Foreign Policy Files (1960-63) RG 59, NARA-II

distant from Russia'.²⁹² Kennedy wanted to 'get on' with it, supported by McGeorge Bundy,²⁹³ but his death put a brake and, after that, the sense was that Lyndon Johnson would be 'more pro-Pakistan'.²⁹⁴ His well-chronicled minimum interactions with Bowles and BK Nehru in the coming months reinforced this feeling.²⁹⁵ The State Department conveyed to the CRO on 26 November that 'there was nothing we could do now' on Kashmir.²⁹⁶

Meanwhile, events had moved on in Kashmir. In October, India announced certain constitutional changes aimed at integrating Kashmir more closely to the Indian Union. It was clear that India was not 'going to give away even an inch'.²⁹⁷ The inevitable Pakistani protest went unsupported in the two Western capitals. The CRO did not regard Indian constitutional changes as prejudicing previous UN resolutions and took them comparatively lightly. The State Department was more 'distressed' but not much beyond that. Rusk did write to Bowles that India was behaving as though China and Pakistan were 'combined'.²⁹⁸

As if to confirm this, Bhutto announced that the Chinese Premier Chou En-Lai and Marshal Chen Yi would be paying a visit to Pakistan in February 1964. A regretful CRO could not see 'just where Pakistan's present tactics' were leading to.²⁹⁹ The situation was receiving a renewed 'Cold War fillip'.³⁰⁰ The State Department too could not help feeling that 'the Pakistanis seemed to have reverted to their historic "all or nothing" policy on Kashmir'.³⁰¹ The Near-East and South-Asia Bureau concluded:

Aid to India is necessary to meet the demonstrated Communist threat. It is also related to our strategic interest and is based on the same reasons as our relationship with Pakistan in 1954 except that the actual threat is more real now... What must be realised is that we do not have the power to impose a Kashmir settlement on India. Our relations with Pakistan cannot be expected to remain

²⁹² 13 November 1963 (Box 481, Folder Robert Komer), Harriman Papers and 19 November 1963, Bowles to Rusk, (Box 433 Folder MAP India-Pakistan 1963), NSC Files, Komer Series

²⁹³ 22 November 1963, Komer's comments (Box 481, Folder Robert Komer), Harriman Papers

²⁹⁴ 22-23 November 1963, Komer to Bundy, (Box 433 India 1962-63 WH memo), NSC Files, Komer Series

²⁹⁵ See McGarr, *The Cold War in South Asia*, 'Lyndon Johnson and South Asia', pp. 279-84

²⁹⁶ 28 November 1963, EJ Emery (CRO) to TJO Brien (Delhi), DO 196/155, TNA

²⁹⁷ Chaudhuri, *Forged in Crisis*, p. 117

²⁹⁸ 8 October 1963, Rusk to Delhi (795) and Karachi (549), (Box 3935, Folder POL 32-1 IND-PAK), Central Foreign Policy Files (1960-63), RG 59; 2 December 1963, CRO to its missions, W. No. 342, DO 196/155

²⁹⁹ 7 December 1963, CRO to Karachi, T. No. 2438, DO 196/155, TNA

³⁰⁰ 10 December 1963, CRO to Canberra, SEA 52/7 (K), DO 196/155, TNA

³⁰¹ 6 December 1963, Duncan Grant (State Department) to RCC Hunt (Acting HC, Karachi), DO 196/155

on the same exclusive plane that they were in 1954-59. We can live with a limited Pakistan relationship with China just as we have to live with a limited USSR-India relationship.³⁰²

This was just the conclusion Bowles wanted. He was now arguing that the ‘chief problem was not Kashmir but China’ and the American ability to address that depended on their ‘pre-empting the Soviets’ in aiding India.³⁰³ As Gore-Booth remembered ‘if American policy towards India in the late-1950s and early-1960s did not give total satisfaction’ to Indians, it was not the fault of the efforts of the remarkable trio of Bunker, Galbraith and Bowles.³⁰⁴

Next, General Maxwell Taylor visited India and Pakistan in mid-December. Kashmir was conspicuously absent from his brief, which was to assure the Indians of the US intention of support against China in the longer-term military assistance, thus ensuring limited procurements from the Soviet Union. In Pakistan, he was to argue that aid to India was tailored to meet the Chinese threat and give details, assure US aid in the eventuality of an Indian attack, offer joint US-Pakistan military exercises and finally express anxiety about Pakistan’s relations with China.³⁰⁵

Meeting Nehru on 17 December, Taylor began with a discussion of the implications of the Sino-Soviet rift, admitted that Washington had to ‘think more and more about China which may one day be a nuclear power’,³⁰⁶ and offered a package of \$ 60 million.³⁰⁷ Upon his return, submitting his report on 23 December, Taylor proposed a five-year military programme for both India and Pakistan. It was in line with Bowles’ urgings to Vice-President Hubert Humphrey to ‘be generous but firm with Pakistan that we use our judgement in bolstering India against China and not letting USSR have a vacuum to move in’.³⁰⁸ Gore-Booth termed Taylor’s trip ‘pleasant and useful’ and the proposal ‘reasonable’, one that the CRO had not

³⁰² 10 December 1963, ‘Next Steps in India and Pakistan’, Bureau of Near-Eastern and South-Asian Affairs Records relating to Kashmir, 1952-64, RG 59, NARA-II

³⁰³ 25 November 1963, Bowles to Ball (Box 326, Folder 2/7 Ball, George), Part VII: Correspondence July 1963 - May 1969 (Series I), Bowles Papers; 10 December 1963, Bowles to Rusk, No. 1822, (Box 433 Folder MAP India-Pakistan 1963), NSC Files, Komer Series

³⁰⁴ Gore-Booth, *With Great Truth and Respect*, pp. 274-75

³⁰⁵ 12 December 1963, Washington to FO, T. No. 3900, DO 196/155, TNA

³⁰⁶ 17 December 1963, Gundevia to BK, Subject File Serial No. 17, Nehru Papers (V Instalment)

³⁰⁷ 17 December 1963, Delhi to CRO, T. No. 3571 and T. No. 3572, DO 196/155; 24 December 1963, Karachi to CRO, T. No. 1864, DO 196/155, TNA

³⁰⁸ 27 December 1963, Bowles to Humphrey (Box 331, Folder 8/18 Humphrey, Hubert), Part VII: Correspondence July 1963 - May 1969 (Series I), Bowles Papers

much alternative but to follow. The CRO had, by now, accepted that ‘the US pressure, whatever that is, will largely determine our “policy”’.³⁰⁹

Conclusion

The events from November 1962 to November 1963 had, in the words of Galbraith, ‘a curious, almost nightmarish quality’ to them.³¹⁰ They represented the last major involvement of the US and the UK in Kashmir. But it must be remembered that their ‘status was that of friends in need rather than participants or possessors of any authority’, and therefore they could not push India and Pakistan as they would have liked.³¹¹ Secondly, as Dean Rusk admitted to BK Nehru, ‘what US did with India-Pakistan was and would be related to their view of global strategy from time to time. It had nothing to do with keeping a balance between India and Pakistan’.³¹² Yet, the latest scholarship continues to delineate ‘the kind of pressures India faced towards the end of 1962’: Sino-Pakistani and Anglo-American, and insist that Washington’s ‘approach to India was tied to its approach to Pakistan’.³¹³ As seen above, it had, arguably, more to do with China.

The consequences of this last major Anglo-American intervention in Kashmir were mixed. Relations, all-around, stalled. Much was promised but little was delivered from the US to India and from the UK to Pakistan and yet the accompanying ‘pressure for change’ by the US on India continues to be written about.³¹⁴ International situations went on changing. 1962-63 was vastly different from 1952-53 while the attention in 1964 would shift everywhere. The US was becoming embroiled in Vietnam with the UK trying hard not to follow suit. Pakistan focused more on China and India turned to Moscow while contesting for influence within the Afro-Asians for support on Kashmir. Never again would an initiative or an individual on Kashmir emerge from the West.

³⁰⁹ 21 December 1963, RH Belcher to Gore-Booth and 29 December 1963, Gore-Booth to RH Belcher, MSS Gore-Booth 87, Gore-Booth Papers

³¹⁰ 12 February 1964, Galbraith to Gore-Booth, MS Eng C 4559, Gore-Booth Papers

³¹¹ Gore-Booth, *With Great Truth and Respect*, pp. 303-04

³¹² 14 November 1963, BK to Delhi, No. 1122, Subject File Serial No. 17, Nehru Papers (V Instalment)

³¹³ Chaudhuri, *Forged in Crisis*, p. 148

³¹⁴ Chaudhuri, *Forged in Crisis*, p. 117

Kashmir's career as an international dispute would end, for all practical purposes, after the January 1966 Tashkent Summit, but for the Anglo-Americans it ceased to be a quagmire earlier as the internal situation in Kashmir moved to the centre-stage. On 27 December 1963, it was reported that a hair of the Prophet Mohammed had been stolen from the Hazratbal Mosque in Srinagar. Its aftermath demonstrated once again, in the words of MC Chagla, 'the close connection between Kashmir's political health, the blood-pressure of Indian national life and the well-being of Indian Muslims'.³¹⁵ After a tense January, New Delhi effected a change of command in Srinagar and two months later, in April, Nehru released Abdullah and took 'a last shot at solving [Kashmir] before he was gone'. This well-discussed initiative died with him on 27 May 1964.³¹⁶

The Anglo-American approaches to and their handling of Kashmir was often different because while America's agenda was global, the British thought in regional terms. It was precisely this difference that would see Moscow emerge as a potential 'ally' of Washington against China on the subcontinent in 1965-66. America tried, more often to be the honest broker than the swinging London. This difference was enhanced by the institutional divides within them, which cut across each other. So the British FO and the American NSC often found themselves together against the CRO and the State Department.

Given this scenario, Pakistan and India would turn to new friends and take to arms to resolve Kashmir. After some diplomatic skirmishes in 1964, Kashmir would reappear in London and Washington in a major way in August 1965. This time there would be war and this time Washington would indeed do 'damage-control' and no more; instead, letting Moscow pull the Kashmiri chestnut out of fire, an unthinkable proposition not long ago and an unimaginable one when it all began.

³¹⁵ 15 January 1964, Note by Chagla on 'Kashmir Realities', Subject File Serial No. 38, Chagla Papers

³¹⁶ Guha, *India After Gandhi*, pp. 347-61

Kashmir, 1964-66: ‘Soviets, CHICOMS, neutralists and West are kibitzers and, to some extent, actors in...Kashmir’¹

Introduction

The literature on Kashmir for the period January 1964 to January 1966 has usually focussed on developments inside the Indian Kashmir and the deterioration in relations between India and Pakistan leading to their war of 1965.² In terms of international interest, there is a consensus that there was none until London and Washington were forced to reckon with the India-Pakistan war and its consequences.³

This consensus does not quite show the full circle that Kashmir came to as a regional dispute within a changed Cold War context i.e. from the prism of Moscow in 1947-48 to that of Peking in 1965-66. This epilogue completes this transition, which saw an eager Washington and a reluctant London count upon Moscow as a ‘countervailing force’ to China in India, Pakistan and Kashmir.⁴ The convergence of their perceptions on China saw them agree to let it pull their chestnuts out of fire in Kashmir.

1964-65: Shifting Sands

At the beginning of 1964, the State Department, wary of the Chinese ‘whittling at Afro-Asian support of India’ on Kashmir in a way that was ‘detrimental’ to US interests,⁵ was still relying on Pakistan to ‘resist Chinese tactics designed to weaken the defence of the free world’.⁶ In London, the CRO was practicing ‘restraint’ with Pakistan,⁷ and talking tough with

¹ 25 March 1964, Jones to Rusk (4705) (Box 2293, Folder POL-IND-PAK), CFP Files (1964-66) RG 59

² See Chadha-Behera, *Demystifying Kashmir* and Snedden, *The Unwritten History*. On the 1965 war, see Nawaz, *Crossed Swords* and Bajwa, *From Kutch to Tashkent*

³ See McGarr, *The Cold War in South Asia* and Schaffer, *The Limits of Influence*

⁴ Schaffer, *The Limits of Influence*, p. 117

⁵ 30 January 1964, Washington to Delhi (1541) and Karachi (1002) (Box 2298, Folder POL 32-1 IND-PAK), CFP Files (1964-66) RG 59, NARA-II

⁶ 8 February 1964, Talbot to Rusk, Bureau of Near-Eastern and South-Asian Affairs Records relating to Kashmir, 1952-64, RG 59, NARA-II

⁷ 10 January 1964, CRO’s note, DO 196/340, TNA

India.⁸ In a rather ‘out of date’ vein, which disconcerted Gore-Booth, Sandys told the Indian High-Commissioner Jivraj Mehta that he felt that ‘in general HMG were much more helpful’ to India on Kashmir than the Indians were to London on ‘colonial matters’.⁹ The FO began 1964 with the conclusion that there were ‘no prospects’ for any initiative.¹⁰

Simultaneously, London and Washington were urging each other to take the lead ‘if Pakistan acted in collusion with Peking’ on Kashmir.¹¹ The FO wanted to leave ‘this nettle to be grasped by the next British government’.¹² The State Department was displeased by Chou En-Lai’s visit to Pakistan in February 1964.¹³ Neither the British nor the Americans, and as it turned out, not even the Soviets wanted a UN debate on Kashmir and their reasons were same, namely, the Peking-Pakistan closeness.¹⁴ Seeing this Russian reluctance, CS Jha, India’s Commonwealth Secretary, noted:

The Russians would like to see Pakistan get away from its alliances and wish to encourage this process by not alienating them too much on Kashmir...USSR has perhaps not been very happy with what must appear to them our leanings towards the West. Soviet Union’s position on Kashmir will depend on their relations with China, Chinese-Pakistan relations and their own assessment of the importance of upholding India’s position.¹⁵

Nevertheless, Chester Bowles believed that any UN proceedings ‘damaged’ the US-UK in India, moved China ‘off the front pages’ and ‘forcefully reminded’ the Indians of the Soviet contribution to their position on Kashmir.¹⁶ Washington, however, was less worried about the Moscow-Delhi association than the Pindi-Peking axis. President Johnson sent Phillips Talbot in March 1964 to ‘explicitly’ tell Ayub that he was ‘close to the limits’ of tolerance on the growing Pakistan-China cooperation on Kashmir at a time when he was ‘seeking halt’ to

⁸ 23 and 27 February 1964, Gore-Booth-JJS Garner exchange, MS Eng C 4559 and 4562, Gore-Booth Papers

⁹ 11 February 1964, DSND 8/21, Sandys Papers; 14 February 1964, Mehta to Sandys, Subject File Serial No. 38, Chagla Papers

¹⁰ 4 February 1964, FO’s note, FO 371/175896, TNA

¹¹ 12 February 1964, Rusk-Butler talks, FO 371/175896 and 14 February 1964, officials talk, DO 196/340

¹² 21 February 1964, FO to its missions, No. 25 and 26 February 1964, JA Molyneux’s note titled ‘Indo-Pakistan Relations’, DO 196/339, TNA

¹³ Harlan Cleveland Papers (Personal Papers, Box 88), Kennedy Library

¹⁴ 14 March 1964, Washington to Karachi (1222) and Delhi (1872) (Box 2304, Political and Defence, Folder 32/1), CFP Files (1964-66) RG 59; 23 March 1964, New York to FO, T. No. 61, DO 196/341; 20 April 1964, Gore-Booth to CRO, T. No. 1004, 23 April 1964, Washington to FO, T. No. 1518 and 27 April 1964, Belcher to Brian, DO 133/169; the Yugoslav Ambassador illuminated Belcher on Kremlin’s mind.

¹⁵ 1 March 1964, CS Jha’s note, No. 100/T/CS/64, Subject File Serial No. 38, Chagla Papers

¹⁶ 20 February 1964, (Box 357, Folder Kashmir), (Series I), Part VII: July 1963 - May 1969, Bowles Papers

China in Vietnam.¹⁷ Stopping in London enroute, Talbot told his British counterparts that America was less worried about India's rejuvenated relations with the USSR than about Pakistan's renewed interactions with China.¹⁸ It was 'not sure what part [it] could play in Kashmir, in view of Pakistan's improving relations with China'.¹⁹

At this time, a bipartisan group of Senators and officials was in favour of a US-Soviet joint effort on Kashmir so that India 'would be in a position to deal effectively with China'.²⁰ Trouble was that in the British eyes, it was Kashmir on which hinged the American 'cooperation with Paks against Soviets and with Indians against [Chinese]'.²¹ They yearned for the 1950s when Kashmir 'had been a happy hunting ground for the Americans, ourselves, the Russians',²² and feared a 'projection' of the Sino-Soviet split there.²³

One silver lining, as Gore-Booth was suggesting, was that Moscow might be anxious not to antagonise the Afro-Asians and Pakistan 'too much', now that they were moving closer to China, and therefore might not 'be willing, at present, to go the whole hog in helping India'.²⁴ Adlai Stevenson agreed that the Afro-Asians, treated for years by Krishna Menon as 'a bunch of school children', did not like the Indian intransigence on Kashmir and pressurised the Kremlin, with Chou En-lai and Bhutto taking advantage of this.²⁵ However, in March 1964, the Soviet Union reiterated its support for India. This led the Near-East and South-Asia Bureau to become concerned once again, after four quiet years, about Moscow's re-involvement in Kashmir.²⁶ With Sheikh Abdullah's release in early April, the CIA too was back on this old trail.²⁷

¹⁷ 7 March 1964, Washington to Karachi, No. 1174, (Box 2554, Folder 7 PAK-US), CFP Files (1964-66) RG 59;

9 March 1964, Washington to Karachi, (Box 2553, Political and Religious Affairs), CFP Files (1964-66) RG 59

¹⁸ 28 February 1964, Talbot-Rumbold-Garner talks, DO 196/340; 13 March 1964, Bowles-Gore-Booth-Morrice James talks, DO 133/169, TNA; Bowles called this 'nightmare scenario'

¹⁹ 16 March 1964, Harriman to Ghulam Ahmed; 31 March 1964, Karachi to Washington, No. 1838 and 9 April 1964, Karachi to Washington, No. 1921 (Box 495, Folder Pakistan), Harriman Papers

²⁰ 30 April 1964, Sudhir Ghosh to Nehru, Correspondence File, TN Kaul Papers (I, II and III Instalments), NMML; it included Stevenson, Rusk, Talbot, Fulbright, Sherman Cooper, Mundt, Hickenlooper and Symington.

²¹ 25 March 1964, Jones to Rusk (4705) (Box 2293, Folder POL-IND-PAK), CFP Files (1964-66) RG 59

²² 16 March 1964, Paul Gore-Booth's note on Kashmir, DO 133/169, TNA

²³ 31 March 1964, Gore-Booth to CRO, No. 10, DO 196/341; 13 April 1964, Gore-Booth's note, DO 133/169

²⁴ 27 April 1964, Delhi to CRO, 27 April 1964, DO 133/169, TNA; the Yugoslav Ambassador had said so.

²⁵ 21 April 1964, Sudhir Ghosh to Nehru, Subject File Serial No. 38, Chagla Papers

²⁶ 22 March 1964, Chakravarty to Jha, D.15/PR and 31 March 1964, Jha to Chakravarty, No 109-CS/64, Subject File Serial No. 38, Chagla Papers

²⁷ 25 April 1964, Talbot to Fulbright, Bureau of Near-Eastern and South-Asian Affairs Records relating to Kashmir, 1952-64, RG 59 and 22 April 1964, Special Report on 'Sheikh Abdullah and the Kashmir Issue', OCI No. 0328/64 B, CIA-CREST Records (accessed on 26 August 2013), NARA-II

The 'aim' in 1964, therefore, was 'to contain Moscow in Delhi',²⁸ and 'Peiping in Pindi'.²⁹ This double 'tug of war' meant that Kashmir was to be protected from becoming a 'political by-product' of the Sino-Soviet split.³⁰ As the pro-American Indian journalist B Shiva Rao noted, Russia and China would not necessarily want a settlement in Kashmir so that India remained dependent on the former and Pakistan on the latter.³¹ McConaughy inevitably warned that this 'de-emphasis' on Kashmir would only accelerate Pakistan's 'reorientation' towards Afro-Asia and China, but the State Department lacked an alternative.³²

Even the more 'pro-Pakistan' CRO,³³ reluctantly agreed and Morrice James' ingenious presentation stressing China's 'Pakistan card' instead of Pakistan's 'China card' failed to budge it to action.³⁴ It did little as Bundy and Komer rounded on Pakistan's Finance Minister Muhammad Shoaib in Washington in September 1964 and told him that 'making noises toward China would not change [America's] determination to help India against China' and Kashmir would have to wait.³⁵

An emerging impulse for this was the 'shifting' position of the Soviet Union on Pakistan. The backdrop to this, as noted, was 'the rift between the Soviet Union and China...Pakistan-China closeness, the Sino-Indian war of 1962'.³⁶ In July 1964, Bowles reported possibilities of a 'tactical parallel-ing of interests between US-USSR in Asia'.³⁷ In September, the State Department was wondering if this might not 'lead toward Soviets assuming more neutral role' on Kashmir.³⁸ It would have been welcome at a time when the Indians were alleging

²⁸ 19 April 1964, Gore-Booth to Belcher, MSS Gore-Booth 87, Gore-Booth Papers

²⁹ 5 May 1964, (Box 46, Folder Policy toward India and Pakistan); (Box 47, Folder Pakistan), Policy Planning Council (1961-69) Subject Files, 1963-73 (Lots 70D199, 72D124 and 73D363) (Entry A1 5041) RG 59

³⁰ 25 April 1964, Bowles to Rusk, (Box 336, Folder 15/33 Rusk, Dean 1963-68), (Series I), Part VII: Correspondence July 1963 - May 1969, Bowles Papers and 19 May 1964, State Department to Karachi, No. 1548 (POL 15-1 PAK, Box 2548), CFP Files (1964-66) RG 59, NARA-II

³¹ 12 May 1964, Shiva Rao to Rajaji, Subject File Serial No. 92, Rajagopalachari Papers (IV Instalment)

³² 5 June 1964, Karachi to Washington, A-319 (Box 2294, Folder POL1-General Policy: Background), CFP Files (1964-66) RG 59, NARA-II; Bowles on 11 April 1964 had suggested this.

³³ 27 April 1964, Gore-Booth to Belcher, MSS Gore-Booth 87, Gore-Booth Papers

³⁴ 11 June 1964, Morrice James to CRO, No 6, DO 133/170, TNA

³⁵ 24 September 1964, Bundy-Komer-Shoaib talks, (Box 481, Folder Robert Komer), Harriman Papers

³⁶ Raghavan, *1971*, p. 3; Nawaz, McGarr and Bajwa date this shift from end-1962 itself.

³⁷ 18 July 1964, Bowles to Bundy, (Box 327, Folder 15/25 Bundy, McGeorge 1963-69), (Series I), Part VII: Correspondence July 1963 - May 1969, Bowles Papers

³⁸ 29 September 1964, Washington to Moscow/Delhi/Karachi/London (Political and Defence, POL 17-PAK-US to POL 32, Box 2555), CFP Files (1964-66) RG 59; The Soviets soon disappointed their Western counterparts by reinforcing their political support for India on Kashmir with an arms programme, 2 October 1964, Hunt

that London desired to develop relations with China at their expense,³⁹ and the Pakistanis were charging Washington of ‘pivoting’ every question on Kashmir around China.⁴⁰

Led by Gore-Booth and Bowles, London and Washington felt that if the Afro-Asian and Middle-Eastern countries pressurised India then the Soviet Union might reconsider its position for fear of losing its own support base in the Third World.⁴¹ The Soviets however disappointed their Western counterparts by reinforcing their political support for India on Kashmir with an arms programme that Mikoyan promised to Chagla in October 1964.⁴²

Nevertheless, the CRO sensed a small opening on Kashmir after the Chinese nuclear tests in October 1964 and before the advent of Pakistan’s ‘New Foreign Policy’ in early 1965.⁴³ Gordon-Walker met Rusk and Pickard told William Handley that the Russians would not give Ayub anything on Kashmir, while the Indians ought to be nervous after the Chinese nuclear explosion.⁴⁴ The Americans were wary. Bowles kept up the argument that America ‘should not attempt to solve Kashmir any more than Cambodia, Vietnam, UAR and Israel’.⁴⁵ Bowles believed that Moscow would ‘prefer rapprochement with China to friendship with India’ and would ‘drop India if it did not help in its relationship with China’.⁴⁶ He wanted Washington to be ready to move in when this happened. In March 1965, when Harriman visited India, Bowles told him to talk everything but Kashmir. The South-Asian Bureau too made it clear to Talbot that

While we tend to view the subcontinent primarily in terms of meeting a threat from Communist China, we sense that UK tends to focus more on India-Pakistan accommodation...If we used our leverage in any new initiative [on Kashmir] we might weaken our relationships...⁴⁷

(Karachi) to Martin (CRO), DO 133/170, TNA; S Gopal had shared with Petrie earlier that Mikoyan had assured Chagla of continued Russian support for a strong Indian line on Kashmir.

³⁹ 19 October 1964, Sudhir Ghosh to Arthur Bottomley, DO 196/557, TNA

⁴⁰ 24 December 1964, Talbot to Ahmed, (Box 2300, Folder POL 32-1), CFP Files (1964-66) RG 59, NARA-II

⁴¹ 28 January 1965, Gore-Booth-Bowles talks, DO 133/171, TNA

⁴² 2 October 1964, Hunt (Karachi) to Martin (CRO), DO 133/170, TNA

⁴³ A reference to Ayub’s visits to China and the USSR; see Bajwa, *From Kutch to Tashkent*, pp. 52-64

⁴⁴ 26 October 1964, Rusk-Gordon-Walker meeting, PREM 13/390 and 4 February 1965, Pickard, Freeman and Handley talks at CRO (Box 11, Folder POL-UK-INDIA-1965), Bureau of Near-Eastern and South-Asian Affairs Records relating to Indian Political Affairs, 1964-66, RG 59, NARA-II

⁴⁵ 22 December 1964, Bowles to Harriman, (Box 438, Folder Bowles, Chester), Harriman Papers

⁴⁶ 28 January, 18 February 1965, Chavan-Bowles talks, Subject File Serial No. 18, Nehru Papers (IV Instalment)

⁴⁷ 5 March 1965, SOA to Talbot (Box 10, Folder POL-KASHMIR A-32-1), Bureau of Near-Eastern and South-Asian Affairs Records relating to Indian Political Affairs, 1964-66, RG 59; 30 March 1965, State Department to Karachi, No. 1072, (POL 15-1 PAK, Box 2548) CFP Files (1964-66) RG 59, NARA-II

The State Department was, thus, determined to stick to a ‘policy pause’ on Kashmir. Both India and Pakistan were now ‘troublesome friends...close with one of our Communist antagonists’.⁴⁸ With Pakistan, the 1954-62 relationship was now a ‘closed option’; with India, the US was playing for long-term gains against China and so were the Russians.

To regulate them with Kashmir was considered ‘self-defeating’. American interest in the subcontinent transcended Kashmir,⁴⁹ and it would not do to put all their chips on this issue.⁵⁰ By the time of Ayub’s China and Russia visits in March-April 1965, even the best gloss in Washington was that ‘he gave more than we wanted him to and he need not entertain any misapprehension in this respect’.⁵¹ The CIA reported that Ayub was ‘successfully charting new foreign relationships’ and warned that Pakistan-US ties were being reduced to ‘bare essentials’.⁵²

There was something here to worry the Indians too. Shastri had felt at the Non-Aligned meeting in Cairo in October 1964 that the attitude of Sukarno was ‘somewhat different and sometimes opposed’. It would worsen a year later in the aftermath of the India-Pakistan War and was, perhaps, a response to India’s support to Malaysia in its dispute with Indonesia.⁵³ Apart from Nasser, Shastri did not discuss India’s relations with China and Pakistan with anyone. In July 1965, in Algiers, even Nasser would urge him to meet Chou En-Lai.⁵⁴ Shastri’s meetings with Wilson in December 1964 had also left him less than satisfied. He felt that the Labour Government was ‘reluctant to discontinue her trade with China’ and ‘there was not much change’ in London’s attitude towards Kashmir ‘with this end in view’.⁵⁵

Khrushchev’s downfall in Moscow had also raised apprehensions. Following Ayub, Shastri too made his maiden visit to the Soviet Union in May 1965. After his frank and cordial talks with Brezhnev and Kosygin, he returned confident about ‘the Soviet attitude to the basic

⁴⁸ 20 May 1965, Bowles to Rusk and Ball (Box 2294, POL 27) CFP Files (1964-66) RG 59, NARA-II

⁴⁹ Roedad Khan (ed), *The American Papers: Secret and Confidential – India-Pakistan-Bangladesh Documents, 1965-73* (Oxford: OUP, 1999), pp. 12-4; 21 May 1965, Bowles to Ball and 2 June 1965, Talbot to Rusk

⁵⁰ 5 May, 28 July and 6 August 1965, (Box 2, Political Affairs 1965), Bureau of NEA/SOA Affairs, RG 59

⁵¹ 25 March 1965, Whiting to Harriman, (Box 433, Folder Ayub Khan, Mohd.), Harriman Papers

⁵² 2 April 1965, ‘India and Pakistan remain at Impasse’, OCI No. 0283/65 A; and 16 April 1965, Note on Pakistan’s foreign policy under Ayub and Bhutto, CIA-CREST Records (accessed on 26 August 2013)

⁵³ 2 November 1965, Subject File Serial No. 7, Lal Bahadur Shastri Papers (I and II Instalments), NMML

⁵⁴ 12 July 1965, Subject File Serial No. 7, Shastri Papers (I and II Instalments)

⁵⁵ 10 December 1964, Subject File Serial No. 7, Shastri Papers (I and II Instalments)

issues facing India'. He, however, accepted that 'there was a perceptible change in the attitude of Pakistan towards the Soviet Union',⁵⁶ and TN Kaul, his Ambassador in Moscow, wanted to re-orient Indo-Soviet relations around China.⁵⁷

Spring-Summer 1965: Near-war and war

In spring-summer 1965, London's 'inclination, interest and ability' to intervene in South Asian affairs was boosted by the Rann of Kutch incident.⁵⁸ It was the last time that the UK could command 'acceptability in India [and] stock with Pakistan', while mustering 'persistence and ingenuity in playing the mediator role'.⁵⁹ The British role in pulling India and Pakistan back from the brink of a certain war was welcomed by Washington and further strengthened its resolve to remain in the background.⁶⁰ This British success, especially with Pakistan, was a far cry from the mutual 'disappointment' between Pakistan and the US.⁶¹

In July 1965, this saw the CIA warn that Pakistan might 'miscalculate' American tolerance and give opportunities to Communists from the Middle-East to the Far-East.⁶² In India, this was aided by apprehensions about both China and the Soviet Union.⁶³ Thus, in August 1965, when war clouds loomed over Kashmir, the CIA wanted the British to dispel them.⁶⁴ Bowles and the State Department not only agreed but also wanted to 'leave the ball in Moscow's court in view of Vietnam and the Sino-Soviet conflict'.⁶⁵

Early British reading of the events in Kashmir since 5 August, i.e. Operation Gibraltar,⁶⁶ accepted Pakistan's involvement in them, but did not 'fully understand the reasons for its

⁵⁶ 14 November 1964, Subject File Serial No. 7, 25 May 1965, Shastri to Mikoyan and Brezhnev, Subject File Serial No. 6 and 6 June 1965, Subject File Serial No. 7, Shastri Papers (I and II Instalments)

⁵⁷ 1 June 1965, Kaul to Mehta, AMB/120/65, Subject File Serial No 15, Apa Pant Papers (I Instalment), NMML

⁵⁸ McGarr, *The Cold War in South Asia*, pp. 301-11 and Bajwa, *From Kutch to Tashkent*, pp. 80-93

⁵⁹ James, *Pakistan Chronicle*, p. 126

⁶⁰ 11 June 1965, Washington to Karachi and Delhi (Box 2301, Folder POL 32-1), CFP Files (1964-66) RG 59

⁶¹ 21 July 1965, Thomas Hughes, Director of Intelligence and Research (State Department) to WF Raborn, Director, CIA, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 114, 5 March 2004 (CREST - www.gwu.edu – accessed on 22 August 2013), NARA-II

⁶² 15 July 1965, NIE (10-2-65), CIA-CREST Records (accessed on 26 August 2013), NARA-II

⁶³ 7 May 1965, Subject File Serial No. 7, Shastri Papers (I and II Instalments)

⁶⁴ 27 August 1965, Weekly summary, OCI No. 0304/65, CIA-CREST Records (accessed on 26 August 2013)

⁶⁵ 19 August 1965, State Department to Delhi (248) and Karachi (208), (Box 2301, Folder POL 32-1), CFP Files (1964-66) RG 59; Schaffer, *The Limits of Influence*, p. 109

⁶⁶ McGarr, *The Cold War in South Asia*, pp. 312-18

present timing'.⁶⁷ By the end of the month, there was a full-scale war that has been called an act of a Pakistan 'running out of time if it was to affect a military-induced solution'.⁶⁸ India's decision to cross the international frontier in Punjab transformed the hitherto limited skirmish in Kashmir to a full-fledged war and brought about international pressure for a ceasefire.⁶⁹

In its aftermath, relations between the UK and India, on the one hand, and between the US and Pakistan, on the other, suffered such a downturn that the CIA was calling them both 'essentially non-aligned'.⁷⁰ Western interests in South Asia received a 'serious setback',⁷¹ firstly because of the position of the Chinese, termed 'an ace in the hole' by the CIA.⁷² Marshal Chen Yi's stopover at Karachi in the first days of September raised eyebrows, though the State Department, if not the Department of Defence,⁷³ was confident that China would be 'unwilling to be militarily engaged because of Vietnam'.⁷⁴ The US Consul in Hong Kong reported that while Peking 'welcomed' the India-Pakistan dispute, it was limited to 'political and propaganda warfare'. Its 'marriage of convenience' with Pakistan was a 'psychological ploy' and it was 'leery of creating pressures' that might draw the US in.⁷⁵

On 6 September, Rusk informed Patrick Dean that the UN thrust of American policy was because of 'external considerations' of Chinese moves as well as the fact that Moscow seemed 'to be adopting much the same attitude as the US'.⁷⁶ London agreed and described the Chinese position as 'watchful waiting',⁷⁷ though Wilson warned the Pakistani envoy Hilaly on 7 September that 'it would be very grave if Kashmir became a hunting ground for China'.⁷⁸

⁶⁷ 25 August 1965, FO and CRO to missions, Guidance No. 354, DO 133/176, TNA

⁶⁸ Nawaz, *Crossed Swords*, p. 201; see the chapter 'Wars and Consequences'

⁶⁹ See Bajwa, *From Kutch to Tashkent*, pp. 219-49 and 281-312

⁷⁰ 31 August 1965, OPD (65) 37th meeting, CAB 148/18, TNA; 3 September 1965, Memo for the CIA Director on Pakistan-China, USSR-India axis, McGarr, *The Cold War in South Asia*, pp. 319-26

⁷¹ Schaffer, *The Limits of Influence*, p. 114

⁷² CIA Intelligence Memorandum of 6 September 1965, McGarr, *The Cold War in South Asia*, p. 327

⁷³ 10 September 1965, Townsend Hoopes (Deputy/ISA-Asst. Secretary of Defence) told Komer that he thought that a materialised Chinese threat to India would afford another opportunity to demand that India 'give something substantial in the interest of Kashmir solution', Lot File No. 68D117 (Folder India-Pakistan) RG 59

⁷⁴ 4 September 1965, Sisco to Goldberg (394), (Box 2294, POL 27) CFP Files (1964-66) RG 59, NARA-II

⁷⁵ 8 September 1965, Hong Kong to Washington (360), (Box 2294, POL 27) CFP Files (1964-66) RG 59

⁷⁶ 6 September 1965, Washington to FO, No. 2227, Roedad Khan (ed.), *The British Papers: Secret and Confidential – India-Pakistan-Bangladesh Documents 1958-69* (Oxford: OUP, 2002), pp. 276-7

⁷⁷ 6 September 1965, CRO to Delhi, T. No. 2996, DO 133/178, TNA and 8 September 1965, Stewart-Pickard-Ball meeting at the FO (Box 2294, POL 27), CFP Files (1964-66) RG 59, NARA-II

⁷⁸ 8 September 1965, CRO to Karachi, No 1907, Roedad Khan (ed.), *The British Papers*, pp. 320-1

With respect to the similarly ‘frustrated’ Moscow,⁷⁹ an aspect rather less probed in the existing accounts, there were hopes for a ‘joint collaboration’.⁸⁰ The Bureau of Intelligence and Research was arguing that Moscow was assuming a ‘more balanced’ posture and not making a ‘clear-cut choice in favour of India’.⁸¹ It was right, for at this stage in India there prevailed strong criticism of the restraining remarks of Brezhnev on ceasefire.⁸²

The more cynical State Department also accepted that ‘interests [were] coinciding with USSR [on] US’ great concern – China’.⁸³ The FO too instructed its Embassy in Moscow to exchange views with the Kremlin as ‘we have a strong common interest in this matter and indeed look at the dangers in very much the same way’.⁸⁴ On 9 September 1965, with the war a fortnight old, Rusk contextualised Kashmir for Johnson in rather breathless terms:

If Kashmir were the only issue, the US could reasonably hope to stand aside. However, the whole western position in Asia may shortly be at stake...Iran-Turkey will see how US responds, Indonesian drift towards Communist hostility, latent Japanese neutralist tendencies, Vietnam-Kashmir-same basic problem’s two parts: Pakistan to [China], India to USSR...shifting Soviet position holds possibilities.⁸⁵

The US Embassy in Moscow agreed that the ‘Soviet policy toward Kashmir was essentially similar to our own’, but it also cautioned that the ‘Soviets would avoid bilateral collaboration with the US’ unless submerged in broad UN or Third World action ‘thus making it hard for [Chinese] to charge a US-USSR conspiracy’.⁸⁶ Sure enough, in the first fortnight of September, the Americans received one indirect feeler after another from the Kremlin via Canberra, Belgrade, Dar-es-Salaam and Geneva for a joint approach in their ‘common interest’ in the Indian subcontinent against ‘certain, external, immature forces’.⁸⁷

⁷⁹ 9 September 1965, CIA-RDP79-00927A005000050001-3, CIA-CREST (accessed on 26 August 2013)

⁸⁰ 8 September 1965, Wilson-Ball meeting (Box 2294, POL 27), CFP Files (1964-66) RG 59, NARA-II

⁸¹ 2 September 1965, INR Research memo RSB-88, (Box 2302, POL 32-1 Ind-Pak), CFP Files (1964-66) RG 59

⁸² 11 September 1965, Subject File Serial No. 7, Shastri Papers (I and II Instalments)

⁸³ 7 September 1965, Washington to worldwide (Box 2294, POL 27), CFP Files (1964-66) RG 59

⁸⁴ 8 September 1965, London to Moscow, T. No. 2833, DO 133/178, TNA; though for the moment, the FO was keener on UN and then Commonwealth initiatives, Roedad Khan (ed.), *The British Papers*, p. 296

⁸⁵ 9 September 1965, Rusk to Johnson (Box 2294, POL 27 MIL-OP), CFP Files (1964-66) RG 59, NARA-II

⁸⁶ 10 September 1965, Moscow to Washington (No. 797), (Box 2302) CFP Files (1964-66) RG 59, NARA-II

⁸⁷ 9 September 1965, Moscow to Washington (763); 10 September 1965, Moscow to Washington (801); 10 September 1965, Belgrade to Washington (517); 11 September 1965, Moscow to Washington (817); 11 September 1965, Dar-es-Salaam to Washington (500), (Box 2294, POL 27 MIL-OP), CFP (1964-66) RG 59; 16 September 1965, Geneva to Washington; 16 September 1965, Moscow to Washington (895); 18 September 1965, Moscow to Washington (926), (Box 2295, Folder POL MIL-OP), CFP (1964-66), RG 59

Thus, with the ‘one-sided’ Chinese confined to ‘psychological’ war and the ‘less partisan’ Russians willing to coordinate,⁸⁸ Talbot advised Rusk that notwithstanding American support for Pakistan’s ‘integrity and intensity of feeling on Kashmir’, Washington ought not to ‘support any military solution of Kashmir or its obligations vis-à-vis India’.⁸⁹

While Chen Yi’s visit to Pakistan and Chou En-Lai’s statements against India in the first week of September amounted to nothing, their ‘ultimatum’ of 16 September to India on Sikkim introduced a new seriousness in the situation.⁹⁰ John Freeman, Gore-Booth’s successor as the UK High-Commissioner in India, reported gloomily to the CRO.⁹¹ In Washington, the CIA produced a bleak prognosis.⁹² The ultimatum strengthened the Chinese spectre ‘at the back of both Vietnam and Kashmir’,⁹³ even as Morrice James fought notions of any collusion between Ayub and China.⁹⁴ That he was successful can be seen from the fact that India deplored London’s ‘indifferent’ attitude to the ‘Pak-Chinese unholy alliance’.⁹⁵

Bowles, though, immediately sought an affirmation of the US determination to oppose China for, above all, the ‘real possibility that US-USSR policies can now be made to come together here in a way that will have important impact on our relations with USSR elsewhere’.⁹⁶ On the other hand, the US Consul in Hong Kong continued to counsel restraint.⁹⁷ So although Arthur Goldberg and Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. warned the Chinese envoy at the UN against attacking India, Johnson and Rusk decided to confront the Chinese indirectly.

Making it clear to Bowles that they wanted ‘to avoid any commitment’,⁹⁸ Rusk instructed McConaughy to tell Bhutto that any ‘Chinese intervention will alienate Pakistan from West’.⁹⁹ Secondly, they decided to back the UN firmly to ‘shake down’ the Chinese.¹⁰⁰

⁸⁸ 12 September 1965, Washington to worldwide and 13 September 1965, Hong Kong to Washington (390), (Box 2294, POL 27 MIL-OP), CFP (1964-66) RG 59, NARA-II

⁸⁹ 13 September 1965, Talbot to Rusk (Box 2294, POL 27 MIL-OP), CFP (1964-66) RG 59, NARA-II

⁹⁰ See McGarr, *The Cold War in South Asia*, pp. 327-33

⁹¹ 16 September 1965, Freeman to CRO, No. 3274, Roedad Khan (ed.), *The British Papers*, p. 372

⁹² 18 September 1965, OCI No. 2008/65, ‘Situation report 49’ CIA-CREST (accessed on 26 August 2013)

⁹³ 17 September 1965, Rusk-Dean-Stewart talks, (Box 2302), CFP (1964-66) RG 59, NARA-II

⁹⁴ 17 September 1965, Morrice James to CRO, WL 201, Roedad Khan (ed.), *The British Papers*, p. 372

⁹⁵ 20 September 1965, Subject File Serial No. 7, Shastri Papers (I and II Instalments)

⁹⁶ 18 September 1965, Bowles to Rusk (699), (Box 2295, Folder POL MIL-OP), CFP (1964-66) RG 59

⁹⁷ 18 September 1965, Hong Kong to Washington (440) (Box 2295, Folder POL MIL-OP), CFP (64-66) RG 59

⁹⁸ 18 September 1965, Rusk to Bowles (513) (Box 2295, Folder POL MIL-OP), CFP (64-66) RG 59

⁹⁹ 18 September 1965, Rusk to Rawalpindi (83) (Box 2295, Folder POL MIL-OP), CFP (1964-66) RG 59

Finally, they wondered about Moscow's response to Peking's ultimatum and correctly anticipated 'moves which will preserve their peacemaker image, but bring support more heavily than hitherto in favour of India'.¹⁰¹ In the event, Moscow reacted to the Chinese ultimatum in the form of letters from Kosygin to Ayub and Shastri offering his 'good offices' for mediation. It had a double aim: 'to forestall America [and] to prevent China'.¹⁰²

The US Embassy in Moscow analysed this as the end of Soviet neutrality, made difficult by a renewed threat of Chinese involvement.¹⁰³ *Izvestiya* of 18 September and *Pravda* of 23 September carried pro-India and anti-China accounts. Kashmir was now within a 'new order of threat'. Stana Tomasevic, the Yugoslav Ambassador in Norway, told APA Pant, the Indian envoy, that Tito believed that China's position was a part of Peking's 'overall strategy to push Russia out of the Communist Movement'.¹⁰⁴ Kazimeriz Dorosz, the Polish envoy added that Moscow had also been 'worried' about 'the effect of China-Pakistan collaboration on the Muslim Sinkiang'. The 'final solution of this tension in this area' thus had to be 'achieved in a larger perspective'.¹⁰⁵

In Washington, Rostow and Komer believed that the most promising course was to avoid 'making failure on Kashmir tie our hands'.¹⁰⁶ The Soviet peace propaganda and the Chinese ultimatum ploy merged with the Anglo-American concerns.¹⁰⁷ The CIA warned that any UN/Four-Power commission efforts would founder without the USSR.¹⁰⁸ In London, the FO agreed that Moscow's attitude was 'critical',¹⁰⁹ even as the UK Embassy in Washington reported that American thinking on Kashmir was dominated by a fear of Russian 'gain' in India and Chinese 'collusion' in Pakistan.¹¹⁰

At a Cabinet meeting on 22 September 1965, Prime Minister Harold Wilson, Foreign Minister Michael Stewart and Commonwealth Relations Minister Arthur Bottomley decided

¹⁰⁰ 17 September 1965, Washington to FO, No 2359, Roedad Khan (ed.), *The British Papers*, p. 372

¹⁰¹ 17 September 1965, Summary of Intelligence Note for Rusk (Box 2302), CFP (1964-66) RG 59

¹⁰² Raghavan, 1971, p. 4

¹⁰³ 21 September 1965, Moscow to Washington (948), (Box 2296, Folder POL 27) CFP (1964-66) RG 59

¹⁰⁴ 21 September 1965, Pant to CS Jha, No OSL/101/2/65, Subject File Serial No. 15, Pant Papers (I Instalment)

¹⁰⁵ 22 September 1965, Pant to CS Jha, No OSL/101/2/65, Subject File Serial No. 15, Pant Papers (I Instalment)

¹⁰⁶ 19 September 1965, Rostow-McNaughton-Komer's memo for Rusk-McNamara-McGeorge Bundy on 'The Indo-Pak War and US Policy in Asia', (Box 2295, Folder POL MIL-OP), CFP (1964-66) RG 59, NARA-II

¹⁰⁷ Roedad Khan (ed.), *The British Papers*, p. 404

¹⁰⁸ 20 September 1965, OCI No. 2323-65, CIA-CREST Records (accessed on 26 August 2013), NARA-II

¹⁰⁹ 16 September 1965, FO brief for the SoS in view of failure of U Thant's mission, FO 371/180963, TNA

¹¹⁰ 24 September 1965, Washington to CRO, DO 133/179, TNA

that the USSR's mediation, even though it would offend British *amour propre* and increase the Soviet influence in India, had 'the advantage that it might heighten the differences between the USSR and the PRC and would involve the USSR in this intractable problem'.¹¹¹

September-December 1965: The road to Tashkent

However, London and Washington had second thoughts starting from the last week of September as ceasefire was achieved and China was confirmed as the 'odd man out'.¹¹² They were also being told by their military allies like Turkey and Iran to move beyond 'wait and watch'.¹¹³ Continued cooperation with Moscow was now seen as a 'mixed blessing', an aspect overlooked in favour of drawing the military and diplomatic lessons of the war.¹¹⁴

Bowles set the ball rolling by calling the Soviets an 'unreliable partner'.¹¹⁵ He was 'worried' that Moscow had 'played the situation with great skill' improving its position in the subcontinent.¹¹⁶ The State Department agreed that a further Soviet role would be 'deeply disturbing'. It remembered that the 'basic Soviet objectives' in India were 'different from [the] West's in every respect'.¹¹⁷ Rostow imagined India as a 'radical, nationalist state associated with Moscow' and Pakistan as a 'rabid Indonesia associated with Peiping'.¹¹⁸ The State Department decided that there was now 'little to gain and much to lose by associating with the USSR'.¹¹⁹ The CIA was stressing the unpromising change in the framework of great power relations in the subcontinent.¹²⁰ On 12 October 1965, the US Embassy in Moscow declared the Soviet 'good offices' offer to be a 'dead issue'.¹²¹

¹¹¹ 22 September 1965, OPD (65) 40th meeting, CAB 148/18, TNA

¹¹² 10 October 1965, Rusk to Galbraith, (Series 3: General Correspondence, 1948-64, Box 140), Galbraith Papers and 29 September 1965, Peking to FO, 275, FO 371/180963, TNA

¹¹³ See FO 371/180702, TNA

¹¹⁴ Even detailed narratives like McGarr's and Bajwa's skip this. For military assessment see Bajwa and Nawaz; for diplomatic conclusions see McGarr, pp. 334-40; 5 October 1965, State Department memorandum, FO 371/180964, TNA; the hope was that the Soviets suffer on Kashmir, the fear that they might gain prestige.

¹¹⁵ 24 September 1965, Bowles to Rusk (760), (Box 2296, Folder POL 27), CFP (1964-66) RG 59; 25 September 1965, Delhi to Washington (796), (Box 2295, POL 27), CFP (1964-66) RG 59, NARA-II

¹¹⁶ 20 October 1965, Bowles to Galbraith, (Box 330, Folder 28/31 Galbraith, JK 1963-65), Part VII: Correspondence July 1963 - May 1969, Bowles Papers

¹¹⁷ 28 September 1965, Washington to Moscow (851), Delhi (574) and Karachi (532), (Box 2295, POL 27), CFP (1964-66) RG 59 and 30 September 1965, UK delegation to NATO to FO, T. No. 56, DO 133/179

¹¹⁸ 1 October 1965, Rostow's memo to Johnson, Lot File No. 68D117 (Folder India-Pakistan) RG 59

¹¹⁹ 30 September 1965, Washington to Delhi (598), (Box 2295, POL 27), CFP (1964-66) RG 59, NARA-II

¹²⁰ 25 September 1965, OCI No. 2325/65, CIA-CREST Records (accessed on 26 August 2013), NARA-II

¹²¹ 12 October 1965, Moscow to Washington, No. 1267, (Box 2296, Folder POL 27), CFP (1964-66) RG 59

The CRO too had been questioning continued Soviet cooperation.¹²² John Freeman had to point out that ‘the Indians will not take it from us or the Americans diplomatically any more than they did militarily from Pakistan’.¹²³ The UK Embassy in Moscow was arguing that the original Soviet proposal, spurred on by China’s ultimatum to India, was designed to achieve a ceasefire and, now that the guns had fallen silent, the Kremlin was back on ‘the side of Indians’.¹²⁴ The FO did not forget that, the Sino-Soviet split notwithstanding, the Russian offer to mediate was ‘also against Western influence in subcontinent’ and resolved to pursue a solution through the UN and the Four-Power commission.¹²⁵

The CRO too supported the UN Four-Power commission, curtailed Commonwealth initiatives,¹²⁶ and saw the Soviet ‘good offices’ offer as a ‘spanner in [the] works’.¹²⁷ It was naturally worried that Moscow would achieve a ‘cheap diplomatic victory’.¹²⁸ Unperturbed by its poor stock in India, the CRO felt that London and Washington could achieve common aims in Pakistan and India, respectively.¹²⁹ It was only Freeman who constantly argued that the UK should do nothing to frustrate Soviet mediation for whoever attempted, ‘will get their fingers burnt on Kashmir’. He hoped that after Pakistan’s rejection of Moscow and India’s of UN under US, they would return to their ‘oldest friend’ for advice.¹³⁰

It was only from mid-October that Bowles started urging Washington that if the Soviets thought that they could settle Kashmir; they should be encouraged to try. Unless they were successful, he could not see how they could emerge ‘as heroes in both countries’. He could not see them succeeding for he doubted that ‘[Pakistan] would trust the Soviets’.¹³¹ In a moment of rare agreement between the two, McConaughy concurred.¹³² This strengthened

¹²² 27 September 1965, London to Washington, No. 1342, (Box 2304, Folder Political Affairs-US/India), CFP (1964-66) RG 59, NARA-II

¹²³ 22 September 1965, Delhi to CRO, T. No. 3428, in reply to CRO’s T. No. 3301, DO 133/179, TNA

¹²⁴ 24 September 1965, CRO to Delhi, T. No. 3453, [Moscow to FO, T. No. 2000, 24/09/65], DO 133/179

¹²⁵ 27 September 1965, FO and CRO to missions, Guidance No. 3886, DO 133/179, TNA

¹²⁶ 27 September 1965, Menzies-Johnston talk and 7 October 1965, CRO to Canberra, T. No. 2619, DO 133/179

¹²⁷ 24 September 1965, New York to FO, T. No. 2245, 28 September 1965, CRO to Delhi, T. No. 3510, 30 September 1965, New York to FO, T. No. 2324, 30 September 1965, CRO to Delhi, T. No. 3546, DO 133/179 and 13 October 1965, (1620) Pickard to US Embassy, (Box 2296, Folder POL 27), CFP (1964-66) RG 59

¹²⁸ 14 October 1965, Washington to Moscow (1019), Delhi (687) and Karachi (659), (Box 2296, Folder POL 27), CFP (1964-66) RG 59, NARA-II

¹²⁹ 21 October 1965, Wriggins to William (Box 2297, Folder POL 27-2 IND-PAK), CFP (1964-66) RG 59

¹³⁰ 24 September 1965, Delhi to CRO, T. No 3464, DO 133/179, TNA

¹³¹ 14 October 1965, Bowles to Washington (973), (Box 2296, Folder POL 27), CFP (1964-66) RG 59

¹³² 14 October 1965, McConaughy to Washington, (Box 2554, Folder POL 1 General Policy Background PAK-US), CFP (1964-66) RG 59, NARA-II

the State Department's resolve that it could not 'hitch its whole policy' towards the subcontinent to Kashmir.¹³³

Nevertheless, the State Department wanted Bowles to remind the Indians that they could not be assured of Soviet help against China,¹³⁴ and wanted McConaughy to remind the Pakistanis not to use Tashkent to put undue pressure on Washington. With the Soviets dragging their feet on the Four-Power Commission, the State Department hoped that Moscow would press the Tashkent initiative forcefully.¹³⁵ The NSC apparatus too declared, in a reversal from the late-1940s and mid-1950s, that Kashmir had to be understood in light of the fact that in the 'great arc from Pakistan to Japan, it was Pakistan that was the "ambivalent" partner to contain China' while 'the USSR could be expected to join in this emphasis'.¹³⁶

The FO, however, was still weighing short-term pros with long-term cons. The UK Embassy in Moscow argued that while the Soviet policy, 'in a negative and limited sense, coincided with that of the West'; its objective was an 'eventual Moscow-Delhi-Rawalpindi axis'.¹³⁷ The British remained steadfast in their support of the Four-Power commission and hoped that Pakistan would oppose the Soviet initiative.¹³⁸ They however agreed with the Americans that Moscow shared with them a desire 'to keep the Chinese out'.¹³⁹ Whether or not Tashkent materialised, 'there was continuing advantage in trying to keep the Russians in on the search for a solution of Kashmir'.¹⁴⁰ By the end of the month, this 'conflicted' attitude was forced to conclude that with any UN-UK/Commonwealth initiative ruled out in India, the US being unwilling to take the lead to the disillusionment of Pakistan and the subcontinent inclined to turn eastwards, 'the USSR can achieve peace in the subcontinent'.¹⁴¹

In the first week of November, as preparations began for Tashkent, George Ball evaluated the various options that Washington had on Kashmir assuming that China did not attack India,

¹³³ 13 October 1965, Washington to Delhi, Karachi, (Box 422 Folder India-Pakistan), NSC Files, Komer Series

¹³⁴ 14 October 1965, State Department to Delhi (724), (Box 2296, Folder 27 MIL-OP) CFP (1964-66) RG 59

¹³⁵ 16 October 1965, Washington to Karachi (679) and New Delhi (707), (Box 2296, Folder 27 MIL-OP) CFP (1964-66) RG 59, NARA-II

¹³⁶ 14 October 1965, NSC Paper (Box 2), Bureau of NEA/SOA Affairs (Political Affairs, 1965) RG 59

¹³⁷ 19 October 1965, Moscow to London (FO), No. 2183 (Box 10, Folder 1965 October-December), Bureau of Near-Eastern and South-Asian Affairs Records relating to Indian Political Affairs, 1964-66, RG 59, NARA-II

¹³⁸ 2 October 1965, CRO to Rawalpindi, T. No. 607, DO 133/179, TNA

¹³⁹ 8 October 1965, Memo on 'The Kashmir Crisis, implications for British Foreign Policy', FO 371/180964

¹⁴⁰ 11 October 1965, Michael Stewart-Dean Rusk and officials talks, DO 133/180, TNA

¹⁴¹ 28 October 1965, DO 133/180; 30 October 1965, Delhi to FO, PL44/9, FO 371/180964; 11 November 1965, Accra to CRO, T. No. 1093, DO 133/180; 5 November 1965, OPD (65) 48th meeting, CAB 148/18, TNA

the USSR remained neutral, but basically pro-India and the ceasefire endured. It appeared that with a categorical support for either India or Pakistan ruled out as well as a withdrawal from South Asia being out of the question, there were two realistic choices: either Washington sought a compromise on Kashmir through the UN and/or bilateral negotiations leaving its India and Pakistan relations intact, or it took no part in Kashmir henceforth while ensuring that aid to both Pakistan and India precluded their total turning to Communist Powers.¹⁴² Washington's acquiescence in Tashkent should be seen in this light.

Rusk wrote as much to McConaughy. He wanted Ayub to be reasonable to the Indians and the Soviets while foreclosing his 'cozying up to China'.¹⁴³ From India, Bowles was firing one memo after another with the central point that with a little help, 'India will go at least 60% of the way' in helping the US achieve a balance against China.¹⁴⁴ Accordingly, in mid-November, Rusk's officials met their CRO counterparts to thrash out common objectives even if their approaches and emphases were different: 'put Kashmir on backburner [and] get Pakistan to pull back from [its China] drift'.¹⁴⁵ London and Washington now began to crystal-gaze how the Soviets would proceed. It was imperative that the 'Soviet and US-UK objectives be reconciled at Tashkent'.¹⁴⁶

They were also starting to get worried at reports coming from Kashmir about the pro-Moscow Communists gaining ground in various State agencies, the visits of CPI leaders SA Dange, PC Joshi and ZA Ahmed and, above all, the leadership of GM Sadiq.¹⁴⁷ The Near-East and South-Asia Bureau instructed Raymond Hare to mince no words on his trip to India and Pakistan.¹⁴⁸ Ayub responded by telling McConaughy that with the UK and France devoid of any influence in India and the US not desirous to take a lead, he was sending Bhutto to Moscow to probe the Soviet mind,¹⁴⁹ for he felt that on Kashmir 'Russia was the one to fear most'.¹⁵⁰ In India, LK Jha, Shastri's Principal Secretary, told Bowles and Freeman that 'he

¹⁴² 2 November 1965, Ball to Fraborn (CIA), (Box 2296, Folder POL 27 IND-PAK), CFP (1964-66) RG 59

¹⁴³ 10 November 1965, Rusk to McConaughy, No. 808, (Box 2554, Folder POL PAK-US), CFP (64-66) RG 59

¹⁴⁴ 12 November 1965, Bowles to Hare, (Box 2304, Folder Political Affairs-US/India), CFP (1964-66) RG 59

¹⁴⁵ 16 November 1965, Rusk-Ball-Pickard-Belcher meeting, (Box 2296, Folder POL 27 IND-PAK), CFP (1964-66) RG 59 and FO 371/180964; 17 November 1965, Pickard-Belcher-Hare-Macomber meeting, DO 133/181

¹⁴⁶ 22 November 1965, Greene to Handley, (Box 2554, Folder POL PAK-US), CFP (1964-66) RG 59, NARA-II

¹⁴⁷ 12-15 November 1965, Subject File Serial No. 40, Rajagopalachari Papers (V Instalment)

¹⁴⁸ 23 November 1965, NE-SA Bureau memo for Hare, (POL 15-1 PAK, Box 2548), CFP (1964-66) RG 59

¹⁴⁹ 20 November 1965, Rawalpindi to CRO, T. No. 443, DO 133/180, TNA

¹⁵⁰ 25 November 1965, Conversation between Morrice James and Ayub, DO 133/181, TNA

feared that Britain and US were in grave danger of putting themselves out of court as far as influencing Indian policy was concerned'.¹⁵¹

December 1965 was spent 'fishing' for a possible solution on Kashmir with the 'estranged' Pakistanis and the 'hardened' Indians by the Soviets, the British, the Americans and even Tito.¹⁵² London was in a dilemma. On the one hand, it was 'conscious of desirability of limiting propaganda success Russians may gain if any agreements of substance are reached [at Tashkent]'; on the other, it also felt that to be a desirable end. Like Freeman, many Britons were hopeful that 'nothing very constructive' would come out of Tashkent and they should 'keep powder dry for a new attempt'. Above all, London wanted 'to avoid any association with Tashkent...If Russians succeed, well and good; if they fail...we stand to secure both propaganda advantage and subsequent clear diplomatic field'.¹⁵³

In Washington, the visiting Ayub Khan was bluntly told by a distracted Lyndon Johnson to get Kashmir 'out of his system'.¹⁵⁴ Quite apart from Vietnam, as the State Department outlined, there was a larger context, in which Tashkent was to be approached:

Soviets seek via Tashkent to acquire 'more neutrality and manoeuvrability' in the subcontinent...concerned about the right-wing shift in the Congress, decline of India's prestige in Afro-Asian world, [recognise] Pakistan's growing 'independent' foreign policy, ensure no CHICOM or West intervention in the subcontinent...enhance Moscow's prestige as a 'disinterested peacemaker'... [Finally] strengthen left forces in India and encourage [their] unification for 1967 elections...¹⁵⁵

Conclusion

The proceedings of Tashkent have been well-mined recently.¹⁵⁶ The upshot, as the US Embassy in Moscow reported, was that it was a 'diplomatic triumph for the Soviet Union and

¹⁵¹ 23 November 1965, Delhi to CRO, T. No 4362, DO 133/180, TNA

¹⁵² 9 December 1965, Sudhir Ghosh to Arthur Bottomley, DO 196/557; 10 December 1965, Bowles to Rusk and 23 December 1965, Dobrynin-Lelewyllyn Thomson-Rostow meeting, (Box 2302, POL 32-1 Ind-Pak), CFP (1964-66) RG 59 and OCI No. 2949/65, 3 December 1965, CIA-CREST Records (accessed on 26 August 2013)

¹⁵³ 23 December 1965, Delhi to CRO, T. No 4737, DO 133/181, TNA

¹⁵⁴ James, *Pakistan Chronicle*, pp. 154-5

¹⁵⁵ 30 December 1965, Washington to Moscow (1590), Karachi (1023) and Delhi (1153), (Box 2302, POL 32-1 Ind-Pak), CFP (1964-66) RG 59

¹⁵⁶ See Bajwa, *From Kutch to Tashkent*

for Kosygin personally. Tashkent accomplished what the UNSC did not. Soviets have thus pulled a rabbit out of hat and they will play it for all it is worth'.¹⁵⁷ The CIA agreed that only Kosygin 'can be satisfied' with Tashkent, having isolated China.¹⁵⁸

London accepted that Tashkent 'stabilised an explosive situation and lessened the opportunities for Chinese mischief-making',¹⁵⁹ with hopefully only 'short-term' gains for Moscow.¹⁶⁰ As the FO explained, it did not 'underestimate' the Soviet aims; did not 'discount' their enhanced prestige but Moscow had a 'legitimate interest' in excluding China, an interest that coincided with the West's.¹⁶¹ However, with the US unwilling and the UK unable, Freeman and James added that 'the Russians were now the only power with sufficient leverage and it [is] desirable that they should continue to be involved'.¹⁶²

The overall assessment was that Tashkent achieved peace and pushed back the Chinese. As Stewart, Rusk and McNamara agreed, 'in this respect, US-UK-India-Pakistan-USSR interests marched together'.¹⁶³ As for the increased prestige of the Soviet Union, it was the 'price' the West had to pay.¹⁶⁴ Even Walter Lippmann saw Tashkent as a way to 'peaceably contain' China, a task that in his opinion the US could not do through a unilateral military presence in Asia, the way Dulles had gone about containing the Soviet Union.¹⁶⁵

As the American involvement in South-east Asia increased, its interest in South Asia decreased. It sought a Pakistan 'reasonable' in its relations with China and the USSR and an India 'reasonable' to its own role in South-east Asia.¹⁶⁶ The 'spirit of Tashkent' notwithstanding, it also sought to counter the Soviet success by denying any 'concert in South Asia'.¹⁶⁷ For Britain, it was an end to the era of 'informal influence' in India as

¹⁵⁷ 10 January 1966, Moscow to Washington, No. 2151, (Box 2302, POL 32-1 Ind-Pak), CFP (1964-66) RG 59; 11 January 1966, Washington to Karachi (1075) and Delhi (13) and 12 January 1966, Washington to Karachi (1081), (Box 2302, POL 32-1 Ind-Pak), CFP (1964-66) RG 59, NARA-II

¹⁵⁸ 14 January 1966, OCI No. 0272/66, CIA-CREST Records (accessed on 26 August 2013), NARA-II

¹⁵⁹ 11 January 1966, Washington to FO, T. No. 128, DO 133/181 and PREM 13/972, TNA

¹⁶⁰ 13 January 1966, UK mission to UN, New York to FO, No. 69, PREM 13/972, TNA

¹⁶¹ 22 December 1965, Morris to Wiggin, FO 371/180702, TNA

¹⁶² John Freeman-Morrice James talks, post-Tashkent, DO 196/467, TNA

¹⁶³ 27 January 1966, Stewart-Rusk-McNamara talks, PREM 13/972, TNA

¹⁶⁴ 21 January 1966, Washington to worldwide, (Box 2302, POL 32-1 Ind-Pak), CFP (1964-66) RG 59

¹⁶⁵ 31 January 1966, Lippmann to Bowles, (Box 333, Folder 5/12 Lippmann, Walter 1963-66), (Series I), Part VII: Correspondence July 1963 - May 1969, Bowles Papers

¹⁶⁶ 1 February 1966, Benjamin Reed to Bundy, (Box 2302, Folder Political and Defence), CFP (1964-66) RG 59

¹⁶⁷ 2, 19 and 21 February 1966, Washington to worldwide, Karachi (1284) and Delhi (1566), (Box 2302, Folder Political and Defence), CFP (1964-66) RG 59, NARA-II

considerable Soviet goodwill emerged in New Delhi.¹⁶⁸ Pakistan continued with being an ‘intermediary’ between the US and China;¹⁶⁹ India with its ‘balancing act’ between the US and the USSR.¹⁷⁰

Overall, South Asia became the scene of a triangular contest with India turning to the USSR and the West holding on in Pakistan.¹⁷¹ As AJP Taylor observed in 1966, ‘the prizes in Asia [during the Cold War] were considerably less [than Europe] although it would be wrong to say that they did not matter at all’.¹⁷² Kashmir was one such – first against Russia and then against China. In London, a forgotten lament emerged once in a while:

The blame lies with the British Government and not with Pakistan nor with India. The latter is legally right (our law was in error) and Pakistan is morally right (our morals were sadly astray)...Divide and rule seemed to be carried on into divide at any cost...¹⁷³

¹⁶⁸ 26 March 1966, Delhi to London, No. 9, DO 196/355; Roedad Khan (ed.), *The British Papers*, pp. 469-71

¹⁶⁹ 4 May 1966, Cyril Pickard to CRO, No. 2, MAC 74/6/1-29, MacDonald Papers

¹⁷⁰ See Gore-Booth, *With Great Truth and Respect*, pp. 305-20

¹⁷¹ 22 November 1968, CIA note on ‘Soviet Policy in South Asia’, CIA-CREST Records (accessed on 26 August 2013) and Oral History Interview of Henry Byroade, Assistant Secretary Near-East, South-Asia and African Affairs (1952-55) and Ambassador, Pakistan (1973-77), (Box 72, 447), p. 153, Truman Library

¹⁷² AJP Taylor, *From the Boer War to the Cold War* (London: Penguin, 1996), p. 400

¹⁷³ 13 October 1965, Ben Thomas to MacDonald, MAC 42/15/1-54, MacDonald Papers

Conclusion: ‘A Footnote to History’¹

This thesis has attempted a study of the international dimensions of the Kashmir dispute between October 1947 and January 1966, within a dual setting of Decolonisation and the Cold War. Starting from Viceroy Wavell’s visit in October 1945 to the ceasefire twenty years later, Kashmir flickered brightly against this background. Without this global context, it is unlikely that it would have been looked upon as anything other than an ‘unfinished business of partition’. Be it Nehru’s non-alignment, Pakistan’s western orientation and Sheikh Abdullah’s socialism in 1947-53 or the Soviet initiatives from 1955 and the Chinese involvement from 1959, it was the global context that affected any understanding of the implications of an autonomous, unsettled or independent Kashmir.

The emotional attachment with Kashmir continues to perpetuate myths, suffuse memory and subvert scholarship. In particular, events in Indian Kashmir since 1989 have firmly entrenched its narrative in a regional, even local milieu. In their glare, understanding of the early days of the dispute too remains largely limited within the India-Pakistan or India-Kashmir binaries, barring recent exceptions.² In fact, as was shown here, there was little local or regional about the dispute once it broke out and after it reached the UN. From shaking off colonial control to stirring the Cold War calculations and from intervening in the name of identity and self-determination to insisting on principles of law and sovereignty, the two disputants too alternatively sought and prevented international involvement in Kashmir.

As a study of the international dimensions of the Kashmir dispute, this thesis has, firstly, sought to contribute to the literature on the application of larger calculations to local crises in the post-1945 period.³ Through new and diverse primary material in four countries, it has sought to provide some perspectives on the place of Kashmir in the troublesome transition from Empire to the Cold War in South Asia (1945-55) and, then, in the changing context of the Cold War there (1955-65). In doing so, it has differed from the existing understandings of the international dimensions of the dispute, as well as of India’s early international identity,⁴ in the following ways.

¹ Agha Shahid Ali, *The Country Without a Post Office* (New Delhi: Penguin, 2013), p. 59, 73

² C Dasgupta (2002), N Sarila (2005), N Chadha-Behera (2006), H Schaffer (2008) and S Sundarajan (2010)

³ Greece (1947), Palestine (1948), Indonesia (1949), Korea (1950) and Vietnam (1954)

⁴ A Inder Singh (1993), R McMahon (1994), P McGarr (2013) and R Chaudhuri (2014)

Limited Influence, Unlimited Interest

To begin with, it has demonstrated Kashmir's presence in the international calculus of London and Washington from the outset of the conflict. The first three chapters, covering the period 1945-49, have challenged the widespread understanding that until the events of 1952-54 Kashmir remained on the 'periphery' of the-then prevailing international climate.⁵ They have shown that London, from even before 1947, and Washington, from that year onwards, saw events in Kashmir through an international lens. With the former, the institutional memory of the 19th century *Great Game* presented an element of continuity, to which the latter added its post-1945 hopes from India and fears for Pakistan. For them, 'limits of influence' did not mean a lack of interest.⁶

Second, the thesis has shown that from within their shared international calculus, London and Washington approached Kashmir rather differently. For the former, Kashmir was a hurdle in its efforts to make the New Commonwealth; for the latter, it proved a sticking point in its efforts at collective security. Chapters two, three and four, covering the period 1947-53, have shown how, there was, often, no one 'Anglo-American' position on Kashmir, let alone an 'unholy' nexus.⁷ More than that, there was, almost always, more than one 'official mind' within the two capitals. In London, the CRO, the FO, the CoS and the CO were usually on different pages while in Washington, the many bureaus within the State Department, the NSC and the CIA often ventured separately.

Above all, the thesis has attempted to demonstrate the recasting of Kashmir within a changed Cold War context from the late-1950s in the light of the 'China Factor'.⁸ Chapters five and six, covering the period 1953-63, have shown how from 1958 onwards, Kashmir began to be looked upon within the context of India's new importance against China, alongside Pakistan's old value against the Soviet Union. The US-USSR détente, Sino-Soviet split, India-China conflict and Pakistan-China closeness provided a new setting for an eager Washington and a reluctant London to approach Kashmir from these vantages. Consequently,

⁵ See McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery* and McGarr, *The Cold War in South Asia*

⁶ Schaffer, *The Limits of Influence*

⁷ See Sundarajan, *The Kashmir Crisis* and Dasgupta, *War and Diplomacy in Kashmir*

⁸ See Tanvi Madan, *'The China Factor and the US-India Relationship'*, PhD Diss., (University of Texas, 2012)

in the period 1964-66, as the epilogue has shown, they let the Soviet Union take a leading role to help contain India-Pakistan relations in order to keep China out of them.

This shifting of focus from the subcontinental disputants to the retreating and emerging international powers has shown how they tried not so much to resolve the crisis as to contain it. In 1947-49, the British led with the 'Russian bogey', the Middle-East imperatives and the creation of the New Commonwealth. They were also concerned with India-Pakistan polemics on Kashmir influencing their attitudes towards Afghanistan (1950-51) and Egypt (1951-52).⁹ While the British succeeded in making the New Commonwealth with a Republic India inside it, they were unable to create a MEDO with Pakistan in it at the altar of Indian resistance on Kashmir. From 1953, the Americans took the baton in framing Kashmir within greater contexts and the next five years saw an expansion of American patronage driven by Cold War calculations in the Middle-East, South Asia and South-east Asia enveloping Pakistan and entrenching Kashmir in its wake.

At the other end, the Soviet leadership first viewed the crisis as an imperial residue, then as another theatre of the ideological battle in which internal Communism in India fought with the Nehru Government but from mid-1949, as chapter two showed, Moscow was alive to the larger geopolitical interests in Kashmir. The intensifying East-West conflict was leading to an interpretation of Nehru's non-alignment 'through a Cold War lens', notwithstanding his deep disavowals, and the Kremlin 'applied its bipolar conception' to Kashmir earlier than it is assumed.¹⁰ In his last years, Stalin judged the dispute in the context of its "'present" usefulness in the East-West conflict'.¹¹ From 1953-54, as Washington pursued collective security in the Third World, involving Pakistan, Moscow responded to it with Khrushchev's and Bulganin's trip to India, Afghanistan, Burma and Kashmir.

However, from 1958-59, the changing context of the Cold War blurred the east-west divide in South Asia. The US-USSR détente, Sino-Soviet split and, above all, the Sino-Indian dispute weakened America's alliance with Pakistan as it saw Washington adopt positions closer to India on Kashmir, a sentiment that has gone unappreciated,¹² for the latter was now

⁹ See FO 371/90159 and FO 371/92099, TNA

¹⁰ See Kux, *Estranged Democracies, The United States and Pakistan* and Behera, *Demystifying Kashmir*

¹¹ Hilger, 'The Soviet Union and India: the Years of Late Stalinism', p. 1, 7

¹² See Chaudhuri, *Forged in Crisis*.

approached in the light of China 'flexing its regional muscle'. In 1960-62, these developments also impacted adversely upon India-USSR relations and positively upon Pakistan-China equations. The West's forays into South Asia now started to tilt towards India's real defence against China rather than Pakistan's imaginary defence against the Soviet Union and Kashmir's north-eastern frontier became more important than its north-western boundary. In 1963-65, it was Washington that led with the 'Chinese bogey' and 'gave priority to the overriding Cold War objectives', which in this period was 'to build up India'.¹³

These wider historical shifts help us understand the trajectory that the Kashmir dispute took between January 1962 and January 1966. If the India-China War (October 1962) and its aftermath was the zenith of Anglo-American ventures into Kashmir, then the India-Pakistan war (September 1965) saw an eclipse of their interest and influence, UK's in India and US's in Pakistan, ushering in a Soviet mediation on Kashmir. To what extent can be gauged by the fact that after the Tashkent Summit, the Indian and Pakistani Ambassadors in Moscow were emphasising upon the Soviet leadership in virtually identical words the continuing 'big/huge role' of the USSR in India-Pakistan relations as an 'essential guarantee' of peace.¹⁴ The consolation for the West was that both it and the Soviet Union wanted an India that could resist China and a Pakistan that would not drift too close to it.¹⁵

The Soviet involvement in Kashmir in 1965-66 too has to be seen 'in the context of the Sino-Soviet dispute' and 'as the direct result of the growing ties between Karachi and Peking'.¹⁶ Pakistan's drift from its Western allies as well as its growing influence among the Afro-Asian world represented for the Kremlin both an opportunity and a danger, as Kashmir complicated Moscow's attempt to cultivate good relations with Pakistan to the exclusion of China. Therefore, it had to be reckoned with more positively now unlike the early-mid 1950s, when it had provided an opportunity to cultivate India in a simpler, bi-polar world. Now, Pakistan too was valuable and Kashmir thus became a liability for Moscow from being an asset. Soviet mediation in 1965 was partly a 'defensive move' against the West and partly an aggressive counter to China.¹⁷

¹³ James, *Pakistan Chronicle*, p. 102

¹⁴ 14 June and 19 August 1966, Anastas Mikoyan's talks with TN Kaul and Iqbal Akhtar, respectively, Fond 84, Opis 3, No. 58, Mikoyan Papers, RGASPI

¹⁵ James, *Pakistan Chronicle*, p. 155

¹⁶ 30 September 1965, FO's note, FO 371/182772, TNA

¹⁷ Hilger, 'The Soviet Union and India: the Khrushchev era and its aftermath until 1966', pp. 2-3

If this transition from the Soviet Union to China as the ‘shadow from the north’ was one key aspect of Kashmir’s international story from 1946-47 to 1965-66, then the second was a shift from the UK to the US as the paramount power in South Asia. Starting with its military alliances with Pakistan in the mid-1950s and ending with its economic investments in India a decade later, American involvement grew in both to a degree that allowed Washington to become the prime mover on Kashmir in every diplomatic initiative between 1957 and 1965. Conversely, London became restrained despite pressure from allies like Turkey (1961-63), Iran and Australia (1963-65).¹⁸ In 1965, as the US and the USSR worked ‘quite openly together to end the war and less openly to bring the peace’, the UK was overshadowed; neither willing to see India as a victim of Communist expansionism nor sanguine about its readiness as a Western ally.¹⁹ 1965 was more than a ‘turning point’ in Britain’s relation with India;²⁰ it represented the wider generational end of an era of ‘informal influence’.

A third thread running through this period was the flow of India’s and Pakistan’s foreign policy orientations, which appear as mirror-images of each other. India began with non-alignment in the late-1940s, burnished its neutral position during the Korean War and became the leader of the Third World by the mid-1950s. At this time, Moscow inevitably ‘regarded New Delhi as a link to emerging international forces that were to be prevented from embarking on an anti-Soviet cause’.²¹ This, coupled with Pakistan’s eagerness to work within the military systems of first London and then Washington entrenched Kashmir in the four-square of Indian intransigence, Western interests, Soviet aims and Pakistan’s desires. So much so that even the break between India and Sheikh Abdullah in 1953 did not translate into the West’s confidence in Nehru’s foreign policy orientation.

In the early-1960s, however, Pakistan’s ‘new foreign policy’ evolved as India’s relations with China deteriorated, its ardour for the Soviet Union cooled and its reputation in the Afro-Asian world declined because of its stance against Kashmiri self-determination. Apart from Kashmir, Congo and India’s disapproval of Indonesia too were ‘unwelcome to Moscow’ at

¹⁸ See FO 371/169524 and FO 371/152225, TNA; also 5 July 1949, EG Mathews to Henderson, (Box 1, Folder Duplicate Declassified Copies), Office Files of Ambassador Loy W Henderson, 1948-59 (Lot 67D44) RG 59

¹⁹ James, *Pakistan Chronicle*, p. 103, 155

²⁰ Kaul, *Reminiscences*, p. 211

²¹ Hilger, ‘The Soviet Union and India: the Khrushchev era and its aftermath until 1966’, p. 1

this time.²² On the other hand, Pakistan befriended China, took its relations with the USSR to a new level and became active among the Third World. In January 1956, Mohammad Ali had sought to assure a visiting Anastas Mikoyan that ‘SEATO and Baghdad Pact were against India and Afghanistan. Pakistan had no animosity towards the USSR’.²³ By 1965, Bhutto was promising to leave the pacts, if Moscow would provide for a ‘worthy resolution’ of Kashmir,²⁴ and, Ayub was boasting that ‘he knew how to live among lions...by setting one against another’.²⁵

Thus, ten years from the end of the Korean War, it was Pakistan who could command support and sympathy on Kashmir among the Afro-Asians and the Middle-Eastern countries, while positioning itself successfully as a bridge between the West and its new antagonist – China, which was its new friend. This attempt by Pakistan to have their cake and eat it too i.e. remaining in Western military pacts while improving relations with Moscow and Beijing was no bad thing for London and Washington.²⁶ For Kashmir, this meant, ‘cold war manoeuvres ripening [twice] into hot war’.²⁷

The ‘crisis of India’s international identity in 1940s’

Six and a half decades on, as Jammu and Kashmir continues to resonate in the social and political chambers of the Indian subcontinent, it is forgotten that the first twenty years of the Kashmir dispute had a resonance beyond South Asia. Conflicts in Greece and Palestine, Malaya and Korea, Indonesia and Vietnam, Iran and Egypt shared many characteristic features with Kashmir: the twilight between Colonial and Post-Colonial worlds, the transition between Imperial Strategy and Cold War calculations, the tension between legal principles and political permutations, competing claims of culture and religion, contrasting considerations of interests and ideas, limits of unilateralism, bilateralism and multilateralism, changing contexts of international politics and the importance of geographical continuities amidst historical changes.

²² Hilger, ‘The Soviet Union and India: the Khrushchev era and its aftermath until 1966’, p. 1

²³ 26-28 March 1956, Notes of Nehru-Mikoyan Talks, Subject File Serial No. 19, Subimal Dutt Papers

²⁴ Hilger, ‘The Soviet Union and India: the Khrushchev era and its aftermath until 1966’, p. 2

²⁵ James, *Pakistan Chronicle*, p. 114

²⁶ 12 March 1965, FO’s note, FO 371/180701, TNA

²⁷ 16 October 1968, SA Dange to JP, Subject File Serial No. 93, JP Papers (III Instalment), NMML

This analysis of new and diverse sources has enabled these themes to be discerned in a more sustained and nuanced manner than existing interpretations, while an understanding of longer term historical legacies has enhanced the ability to discern the pattern of evolving perceptions and interests of all concerned. Partaking in the recent ‘historical turn’ on India’s early international relations,²⁸ this thesis has sought to ‘lay bare’ a pivotal historical period of early independent India’s biggest ‘crisis of international identity’. Along the way, it has sought to challenge some of the assumptions around this crisis and fallacies of this identity.

First, neither was an aloof India at a passive, receiving end of the Cold War imperatives, nor was it ignored in them. It was as aware of its possibilities and limitations as it was wooed. From the late-1940s itself, it was no longer on the periphery of the Cold War. Second, there was no chronological movement from an estrangement with the West in the 1940s and 50s to engagement in 1960s and beyond. Instead there were periods of overlapping interests and ideas. The old understanding of India and the USSR against Pakistan and the UK-US on Kashmir, and otherwise, no longer holds true. Quite apart from anything else, there was the Chinese wedge in it from 1958-59 onwards. Indeed, the late-1950s was a complicated period of reconciliation and re-orientation in multiple relationships and perspectives. Finally, the role played by key personalities was more complicated and contested than hitherto credited.

More, however, remains to be said about the emergent international identity that was being cultivated by India and Pakistan and its impact on the nature of their disputes like Kashmir. In the following areas, the larger period 1942-52 can be still more fruitfully dredged. This is especially so considering the ever-increasing access to government archives and personal papers of that period in Britain, India, Pakistan, America, Russia, China, Commonwealth countries like Canada and Australia and former Eastern bloc nations. In Russia especially, the possibilities to set the record straight on South Asia are endless with the available documents at the Foreign Ministry and other relevant archives.²⁹

First, the elements of continuity and change between the foreign relations of the Government of British India over June 1945 to August 1947 and the foreign relations of India and Pakistan

²⁸ Kanti Bajpai, ‘The Making of Bangladesh’, Review Article of Raghavan, 1971 in *Economic & Political Weekly* (March 29, 2014), Vol XLIX No. 13, p. 26

²⁹ For example see Jonathan Haslam, *Russia’s Cold War: From the October Revolution to the Fall of the Wall* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011)

over August 1947 to June 1950 i.e. till Liaquat's visit to the United States following Nehru's, can be profitably mined. Our understanding of the period of Nehru's Interim Government in India and that of Jinnah's and Liaquat's presence in Pakistan contains more assumptions than answers with respect to their approach to international relations. More work can be done on India's insecurities and Pakistan's fragilities, emerging from British India's last years and evolving into crises like Kashmir, Hyderabad, Bengal, India's North-East (Nagaland) and Pakistan's South-West frontiers (Baluchistan).

Second, the inherent ambiguity in America's approach to India and Pakistan in this decade, under Roosevelt's and Truman's administrations, and its impact on their disputes, once again not only Kashmir, can be linked better and deeper to show how this fed into their foreign policy orientations. This has its inevitable Communist counterpart and here the research field is ripe for a detailed investigation of the extent of internal and external Communist 'threat' to the Indian subcontinent, as perceived by the British and the Americans. A study of the three years from the Telangana revolt in 1948 to the Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case in 1951, based on the Soviet sources, would be especially fascinating in this context. Indeed, the history of the early attitudes of India and Pakistan to the Soviet Union and then Communist China and vice-versa is yet to be 'formally constituted' given the archival challenges.

Third, there continues to be a tendency to interpret Indian and Pakistani thinking on Cold War strategy, the Commonwealth and superpower relations, as collective and uncontested. 'Nehru's India' and, after Liaquat's assassination, 'Army's Pakistan' continue to be spoken about. Instead, their responses to international affairs were a good deal more conflicted. To give just two examples: in India, till his death in December 1950, Vallabhbhai Patel remained an influential, alternative voice to the Nehruvian foreign policy while in Pakistan, the period from Liaquat's assassination in October 1951 to Ayub's coup in October 1958, saw a complex collaboration between the civil service and the army. Later, in the early-1960s, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was his own man.

Finally, perhaps the richest future research possibility could be a study of the nature of the Interim Government (1946-51) of Jawaharlal Nehru, whose biggest foreign policy challenge the Kashmir dispute was. The multiplicity of political exigencies, the continuing influences of the colonial state co-existing uneasily with the ambitions and fears of mutually antagonistic

India and Pakistan, the overlapping personalities and transitional policies in foreign and defence affairs, which the early years of the dispute present, can be amply seen in that 1946-51 government. Especially, as the first chapter, covering the period 1945-47 and presenting the three-part 'back-story' to the reception of Kashmir dispute at the UN, has shown, it was in the Interim Government's maiden forays onto the international stage that one observes the tussle between the continuing 'official mind' and the floating politicals of the change anticipated by 1947, in New York, London and Moscow, alike.

The build-up and outbreak of conflict in Kashmir in 1946-47, responses to it by India, Pakistan, Britain and subsequently others, and the twists and turns in its phased early existence as a Commonwealth crisis (1947), a UN dispute (1948) and beyond offers a window into India's transition from being a British Dominion in 1946-47 to becoming a Commonwealth Republic in 1950-51, a process worthy of studying on its own terms. The fascinating flux in Kashmir over 1948-49 is superbly mirrored in the web of state-structures, policies and personalities that endured through the divide of 1947 in India and Pakistan. Kashmir came to a boil inside that complex collaborative framework of politics between October 1946 and October 1947, when Nehru headed a coalition that included five Muslim League and three non-Congress, non-League members, was served by British civil and military officials and in turn served two British Viceroys, notwithstanding the rhetoric of ideological incompatibility between them.

Kashmir offers an exceptional vantage to probe the linkages across 1947 in princely, British and independent India. It showcases, more than other similar crises of accession like Hyderabad and Junagadh, the slow transmission, not so much transfer, of power that took place over 1947-49 between a colonial state and post-colonial polity. It was *the* internal-turned-international crisis, which hastened this transmission over 1949-51, alongside others like the internal Communist challenge, food shortage, currency devaluation and a near-war with Pakistan on Bengal. Finally, Kashmir was that one topic on which Nehru's government, otherwise enjoying striking ideological parallels and harmonious relations with the Attlee Government (1945-51), did not see eye to eye with London.

In the transition period from the end of Empire to the beginning of the Cold War in South Asia, the Kashmir dispute represented a unique challenge to London, Washington and the

'new' New Delhi. Continuing British institutions, individuals and interests, competing Indians and Pakistanis and challenging Cold War imperatives came together to convert this 'Valley of Dreams' into a 'Territory of Desire'. In this time, Kashmir became not only a contest between two conflicting nations but also a clash between two different approaches to international relations. It was an old interest caught in a new clash of vision, ideology and culture. To go back to the beginning, i.e. the 1940s in this case offers a chance to attempt an 'alternative genealogy' of independent India's international identity and its greatest crisis.

That period and this crisis deserve reconsideration for highlighting the troublesome transition of a colonial regime to a post-colonial entity and the intractable internationalisation of an internal crisis. They stand for the hubris of imperialism, the follies of nationalisms, incomplete identity assertions and the perils of international interventions. While not all the problems of Kashmir today can be traced back to 1947, it remains the spring-well of the myths, memories and histories of this dispute. With time, myths and memories have overtaken the early political realities, which were neither a single act nor a play. As this thesis has shown, they were a complex of ideology, interests, principles and conveniences.

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