The University of Southampton
University of Southampton Institutional Repository

Balanced trade reduction for dual-role exchange markets

Balanced trade reduction for dual-role exchange markets
Balanced trade reduction for dual-role exchange markets
We consider dual-role exchange markets, where traders can offer to both buy and sell the same commodity in the exchange but, if they transact, they can only be either a buyer or a seller, which is determined by the market mechanism. To design desirable mechanisms for such exchanges, we show that existing solutions may not be incentive compatible, and more importantly, cause the market maker to suffer a significant deficit. Hence, to combat this problem, following McAfee's trade reduction approach, we propose a new trade reduction mechanism, called balanced trade reduction, that is incentive compatible and also provides flexible trade-offs between efficiency and deficit
1064-1070
Zhao, Dengji
731b17f8-df94-49cb-b45d-8edf05c59edf
Ramchurn, Sarvapali D.
1d62ae2a-a498-444e-912d-a6082d3aaea3
Gerding, Enrico H.
d9e92ee5-1a8c-4467-a689-8363e7743362
Jennings, Nicholas R.
ab3d94cc-247c-4545-9d1e-65873d6cdb30
Zhao, Dengji
731b17f8-df94-49cb-b45d-8edf05c59edf
Ramchurn, Sarvapali D.
1d62ae2a-a498-444e-912d-a6082d3aaea3
Gerding, Enrico H.
d9e92ee5-1a8c-4467-a689-8363e7743362
Jennings, Nicholas R.
ab3d94cc-247c-4545-9d1e-65873d6cdb30

Zhao, Dengji, Ramchurn, Sarvapali D., Gerding, Enrico H. and Jennings, Nicholas R. (2015) Balanced trade reduction for dual-role exchange markets. At The Twenty-Ninth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence The Twenty-Ninth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, United States. 25 - 30 Jan 2015. pp. 1064-1070.

Record type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)

Abstract

We consider dual-role exchange markets, where traders can offer to both buy and sell the same commodity in the exchange but, if they transact, they can only be either a buyer or a seller, which is determined by the market mechanism. To design desirable mechanisms for such exchanges, we show that existing solutions may not be incentive compatible, and more importantly, cause the market maker to suffer a significant deficit. Hence, to combat this problem, following McAfee's trade reduction approach, we propose a new trade reduction mechanism, called balanced trade reduction, that is incentive compatible and also provides flexible trade-offs between efficiency and deficit

PDF AAAI15-Zhao.pdf - Other
Download (287kB)

More information

Published date: January 2015
Venue - Dates: The Twenty-Ninth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, United States, 2015-01-25 - 2015-01-30
Organisations: Agents, Interactions & Complexity

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 372050
URI: https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/372050
PURE UUID: 88ccd4d8-2344-4e15-a402-420b72c56d7c
ORCID for Sarvapali D. Ramchurn: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0001-9686-4302

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 24 Nov 2014 14:21
Last modified: 06 Jun 2018 12:42

Export record

Download statistics

Downloads from ePrints over the past year. Other digital versions may also be available to download e.g. from the publisher's website.

View more statistics

Atom RSS 1.0 RSS 2.0

Contact ePrints Soton: eprints@soton.ac.uk

ePrints Soton supports OAI 2.0 with a base URL of https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/cgi/oai2

This repository has been built using EPrints software, developed at the University of Southampton, but available to everyone to use.

We use cookies to ensure that we give you the best experience on our website. If you continue without changing your settings, we will assume that you are happy to receive cookies on the University of Southampton website.

×