Europeanization and Policy Networks in the EU’s Southern Neighbourhood: The European Commission’s Relations with Morocco and Algeria on Climate Change Policy

by

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THESIS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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ABSTRACT

FACULTY OF SOCIAL AND HUMAN SCIENCES
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Thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

EUROPEANIZATION AND POLICY NETWORKS IN THE EU’S SOUTHERN NEIGHBOURHOOD: THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S RELATIONS WITH MOROCCO AND ALGERIA ON CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY

Angelos Katsaris

This research investigates how adjustment to EU rules is advanced outside Europe in the absence of membership incentive. Three waves of Europeanization are identified, which explore the role of incentives, mechanisms and actors inside and outside Europe: a ‘membership’ wave among current EU members, an ‘enlargement’ wave for candidate European countries and a ‘neighbourhood’ wave outside Europe for the EU’s southern neighbourhood. EU membership plays key role inside Europe because it carries various trade and growth incentives and decision-making benefits. It also secures domestic adjustment to EU rules. However, EU membership cannot be available as an incentive for non-European countries. It can be granted only to European countries.

This thesis argues that, in the absence of the membership incentive, Europeanization requires policy networks to advance domestic adjustment in non-European countries. Policy networks are expected to bridge any conflicting agendas through collaborative relations and to develop a consensus over EU rules. Stable network relations and network management at an ‘arm’s length’ can build trust, and persuade non-European actors to advance EU policies and rules in their domestic regulatory framework.

This study tests how the European Commission advances Europeanization with Morocco and Algeria through climate change policy. Climate change is a policy field with differing priorities in the Mediterranean. While climate change mitigation is the main priority for the Commission, climate change adaptation is the core need for Morocco and Algeria. However, Europeanization is advanced only in the Moroccan case, where policy networks succeed in developing consensus over climate change mitigation. In Algeria, politics and past conflicts impede network relations leading to stagnant cooperation. Network insulation is upset and network actors fail to progress consensus. So, policy networks may not be able to secure stability in all circumstances and deliver expected results. In other words, the Commission finds neighbourhood Europeanization strategy difficult to pursue when conflict interferes with policy networks.

This analytical and empirical research contributes to studying the European Union, Europeanization and international public policy in four ways. It compensates for the gaps in the Europeanization literature and EU studies outside Europe, which overlook the role of network actors and network management. It accords a prominent role to agency, with its focus on actor-centred policy networks, even in such challenging policy settings as climate change. It provides lessons for scholars in understanding the challenges in the diffusion of EU rules among network actors and network management outside Europe, and the role of politics and conflict during that process. Finally, it demonstrates to public administrators, politicians and supranational institutions the importance of network actors and stability in their networks for consensus building in situations where there are weak incentives and soft mechanisms of integration.
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DECLARATION OF AUTHORSHIP

I, ANGELOS KATSARIS, declare that this thesis titled ‘Europeanization and Policy Networks in the EU’s Southern Neighbourhood: The European Commission’s Relations with Morocco and Algeria on Climate Change Policy’, and the work presented in it are my own and has been generated by me as the result of my own original research.

I confirm that:

1. This work was done wholly while in candidature for a research degree at this University;

2. Where any part of this thesis has previously been submitted for a degree or any other qualification at this University or any other institution, this has been clearly stated;

3. Where I have consulted the published work of others, this is always clearly attributed;

4. Where I have quoted from the work of others, the source is always given. With the exception of such quotations, this thesis is entirely my own work;

5. I have acknowledged all main sources of help;

6. Where the thesis is based on work done by myself jointly with others, I have made clear exactly what was done by others and what I have contributed myself;

7. Parts of this work have been published as:


Signed:

Date: 29th September 2014
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AA</td>
<td>Association Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADEREE</td>
<td>Agency for the Development of Renewable Energies and Energy Efficiency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AERT</td>
<td>European Agency for Road Transport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP</td>
<td>Action Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APRUE</td>
<td>Agency for the Rationalization and Utilization of Energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Common Agriculture Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEEs</td>
<td>Countries of Central and Eastern Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CELAC</td>
<td>Community of Latin American and Caribbean States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLIMA</td>
<td>Directorate-General for Climate Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COREPER</td>
<td>Committee of Permanent Representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CREG</td>
<td>Commission on the Regulation of Electricity and Gas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTEU</td>
<td>Consolidated Treaty of the European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEVCO</td>
<td>Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EA</td>
<td>Europe Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EBRD</td>
<td>European Bank for Reconstruction and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission, or Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECJ</td>
<td>European Court of Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECSC</td>
<td>European Coal and Steel Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>ecu</td>
<td>European currency unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
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</table>
EEC  European Economic Community
EIB  European Investment Bank
EMP  Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
ENER  Directorate-General for Energy
ENP  European Neighbourhood Policy
ENPI  European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument
EP  European Parliament
EU  European Union
EURATOM  European Atomic Energy Community
€ euro  Name of the single currency for European Monetary Union
FTA  Free Trade Area
GDP  Gross Domestic Product
GIZ  German Agency for International Cooperation
Horizon 2020  Environmental component of EMP for depollution of the Mediterranean
IMF  International Monetary Fund
IPCC  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
MAE  Algerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MAEC  Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation
MATE  Algerian Ministry of Territorial Management and Environment
MATEV  Algerian Ministry of Territorial Management, Environment and the City
MATUHE  Moroccan Ministry of Territorial Management, Urbanism, Habitat and Environment
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MEM</td>
<td>Algerian Ministry of Energy and Mines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEMEE</td>
<td>Moroccan Ministry of Energy, Water and Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MICENT</td>
<td>Ministère de l'Industrie, du Commerce et des Nouvelles Technologies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRE</td>
<td>Algerian Ministry of Water Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NES</td>
<td>National Energy Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIF</td>
<td>Neighbourhood Investment Facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMC</td>
<td>Open Method of Coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONE</td>
<td>Moroccan National Office of Electricity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P3A</td>
<td>Programme d'Appui à la mise en œuvre de l'Accord d'Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHARE</td>
<td>Poland-Hungary: Aid for Restructuring of the Economies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEREE</td>
<td>Algerian Programme for Renewable Energies and Energy Efficiency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNAE-DD</td>
<td>Algerian Action Plan on Environment and Sustainable Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC-TEE</td>
<td>Sub-Committee for Transport, Energy and Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEA</td>
<td>Single European Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMCs</td>
<td>South Mediterranean countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAIEX</td>
<td>Technical Assistance and Information Exchange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEC</td>
<td>Treaty of the European Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFEU</td>
<td>Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UfM</td>
<td>Union for the Mediterranean</td>
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</table>

xxiii
UfMS  Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean
UK FCO  UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office
UNFCCC  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
WB  World Bank
WTO  World Trade Organisation
'The Mediterranean climate and the Mediterranean region are like a model for the whole world' (UNEP MAP official, August 2012)

'The national strategies and efforts of almost eighty per cent of [south Mediterranean] countries are mainly interested in climate change adaptation. There is, though, an oxymoron: because international treaties refer to climate change mitigation respectively, the officially declared and written policies in these countries are on climate change mitigation. However, they remain non-implemented. In particular, their policies are mainly guided by European policies and neighbourhood policies. In other words, there is policy diffusion from the European Commission from its programmes and its incentives that are given for the progress of related strategies and technologies' (President of Mediterranean environmental NGO, July 2012)

'Things are slower in Algeria, like in any African country. We are a bit lazy in embarking on global issues. It is seen like we can sit back and watch the others’ story and if it goes well we may embark on that, if not we will not. But we are sovereign; we are sovereign as a state’ (Algerian official, November 2012)
Introduction:
Europeanization and Policy Networks in the EU’s Southern Neighbourhood: The European Commission’s Relations with Morocco and Algeria on Climate Change Policy

This study explores the process of Europeanization outside Europe in the absence of European Union (EU) membership as an incentive. Europeanization is identified as a process of domestic adjustment to EU rules and regulations by EU members and candidate European countries (Graziano and Vink, 2007). EU membership plays a significant role in Europeanization discussions. It carries various trade and growth benefits, which require common regulation for the effective functioning of the single market. Moreover, it operates as a condition for candidate European countries, which secures their adjustment to EU rules.

However, EU membership cannot be used as an incentive outside Europe in order to advance adjustment to EU rules. Membership is only available for European countries, and cannot be granted in non-European countries (Copenhagen Council, 1993). Therefore, countries outside Europe are not eligible for this incentive. In the absence of membership, Europeanization is expected to trigger limited, or have no, influence in non-European countries. So, how can Europeanization advance adjustment to EU rules outside Europe?

In order to explore Europeanization outside Europe, this research focuses on the policy field of climate change in the European Commission’s relations with two North African countries, Morocco and Algeria. Climate change refers to a policy field with significant energy opportunities for the EU and each of the case studies, which can advance Europeanization to these non-European neighbouring countries. More specifically, climate change plays significant role for the Commission, as energy constitutes an inexorable element of the effective functioning of the single market. However, the EU is mainly reliant on conventional energy resources, and its energy reserves are constantly depleting (European Commission, 2006c). Renewable sources of energy can reduce its
increasing energy demand and diversify the EU’s energy mix. They can also reduce its dependence on energy importations from volatile energy suppliers, such as Russia (Adelle et al., 2009; European Commission, 2010; European Commission, 2006c). Finally, mitigation of CO2 emissions can equally support its efforts in combating global warming and achieve its international climate objectives (European Commission, 2014; 2008).

The case studies of Morocco and Algeria used in this research are clear illustrations of, and guidelines to, enhancing the understanding of Europeanization outside Europe. Both countries have excellent solar radiation levels, as they are geographically part of the Sahara desert and have strong potential to develop green electricity from renewable sources of energy (OME, 2007). In addition, climate change mitigation can offer functional interest for both sides to collaborate with the Commission. For Morocco, electricity from renewable energies can contribute to less reliance on external energy imports and can enhance the diversification of its energy mix (see chapter five). Equally, for Algeria, renewable energies can diversify the country’s economy from its almost absolute reliance on exportation of conventional energy resources, and mitigate the impact on its economy from volatile international oil and gas prices (see chapter six). Therefore, common regulation based on EU rules could facilitate the exportation of green electricity to the EU and progress the Europeanization of Moroccan and Algerian energy sectors. The geographical proximity to Europe via Spain could play a key role in this process, as the electricity infrastructure is already in place (Dawson, 2009).

However, both Morocco and Algeria have different priorities from the European Commission regarding climate change policy. They are significantly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, as is the case for all south Mediterranean countries (SMCs) (Tolba and Saab, 2009). Climate impacts, such as desertification, water salinisation and soil erosion, are expected to negatively influence the socio-economic situation of both countries and threaten their highly urbanised populations (MATUHE, 2010; MATE, 2010). In addition, both countries are not urged to mitigate their CO2 emissions, as they are both developing countries and contribute only marginally to global warming. Whilst the Commission’s interest is to mitigate energy emissions and collaborate over renewable energies with these countries, the immediate need for Morocco and Algeria is to adapt to climate change. In this case, Europeanization has to deal with the conflicting interests of each side, which can impede collaboration. Is it then possible for Europeanization to take place in Morocco and Algeria on climate
change policy? By what means can the Commission manage to advance Europeanization in these two cases?

The core argument of this thesis is that, in the absence of the membership incentive, Europeanization requires policy networks (Rhodes, 2006; Rhodes, 2000; Marsh and Rhodes, 1992) to advance domestic adjustment in non-European countries. As membership incentive is absent and cannot be used as condition, interaction amongst network actors is necessary. Certain arguments about EU studies outside Europe (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2009; Freyburg et al., 2009; Börzel and Hackenesch, 2013) tend to overlook the role of policy networks and network actors in the whole process, how they operate and what their impact is (see part 2.4 for full analysis). They claim that broader interdependencies, functional interests and broader financial and regulatory motivations can progress EU rules and adjustment outside Europe. However, stable network relations amongst bureaucrats and experts from each side can build trust, in order for the Commission to persuade non-European actors to be engaged in the reforms and follow EU policies and rules. Dialogue in policy networks is expected to bridge any conflicting agendas and advance consensus over domestic adjustment to EU rules.

The Commission is highly interested in investing in the stability of networks and network autonomy. Network theory argues that stability and routines favour service delivery and can advance the reform process (Rhodes, 2007; Jordan and Schout, 2006). Funds and expertise can enable networks to operate at an ‘arm’s length’ (Rhodes, 2000; 2013) and be utilised as a tool for the Commission, that will trigger socialisation amongst network actors. Autonomy can also be reinforced by mutual expertise and bureaucratic practices, which further develop the network’s insulation, extend ‘shadow of hierarchy’ (Scharpf, 1997; Börzel, 2010; 1997) for the central agency and enhance the mutuality of network operations.

However, policy networks, management and network actors do not always succeed in advancing Europeanization outside Europe, as is shown by the varied results of each case study of this research. In the Moroccan case, policy networks managed to transform Morocco’s needs over climate change adaptation and advance adjustment to EU rules over renewable energies and climate change mitigation. The Moroccan network actors were willing to explore collaboration opportunities in renewable energies with Commission agents (see part 5.4). The prospect of green energy exportations to Europe could reduce Morocco’s total reliance on energy imports and forge strong links with the region’s largest market. Also, expertise programmes funded by the Commission trigger Morocco’s interest in liberalising its institutional and
regulatory system according to EU rules, in order to establish a similar regulatory framework to that of the EU.

In contrast, policy networks showed a limited capacity to transform Algeria’s needs over climate change adaptation and failed to advance EU rules over climate change mitigation. Unlike the Moroccan case, there were different dynamics of engagement by the Algerian side and Europeanization faced serious obstacles (see parts 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5). Broader politics in energy relations and mistrust from past EU-Algerian relations interfered in network relations and caused stagnant relations amongst network actors, clearly illustrated in the network discussions. Even the Commission’s financial and expertise assistance resulted in limited motivation from Algerian officials. In addition to that, unlike the Moroccan case, collaboration was advanced in climate change adaptation, whereby network actors developed a mutual understanding of Algeria’s climate needs. Algeria was also motivated by Commission’s offers of funds and expertise, and was interested in adjusting its legislation to EU rules. Finally, unlike the Moroccan case, network actors developed trust and a common understanding and established several cooperation programmes, with joint ownership inside the policy networks.

Therefore, the study concludes with the argument that policy networks can have significant impact outside Europe, even in the absence of EU membership, when consensus-building and mutual understanding are achieved on both sides in a specific policy area. Mutual understanding, co-ownership and reciprocity can develop conditions for domestic adjustment, which can be supported by regulatory incentives and financial and expertise offers from the Commission. In that case, stability and effective network management can lead to successful results and service delivery.

Instead, policy networks are not expected to advance Europeanization in all settings, as they are not capable of handling conflict situations. When politics interfere within network stability, or even when there is top-down manipulation, policy networks become affected, leading to stagnant cooperation. As a result, network insulation is upset by conflict, whilst network actors fail to progress consensus and hands-off network management is incapable of substituting dispute into trust. Therefore, policy networks and network autonomy can successfully operate as Europeanization mechanisms only to a certain extent. Politicisation and hierarchies can disrupt network relations, inhibiting prospects of Europeanization progressing outside Europe, as is demonstrated in the Algerian case.
The Research Problem

The EU is highly dependent on external energy imports. Today more than half of its total energy needs are covered by energy imports, mainly from its immediate eastern and southern neighbourhood (European Commission, 2011b). Growing levels of energy importation from abroad are combined with increasing domestic energy demand and depleting energy production throughout the EU (DG Energy, 2012). Furthermore, oil and gas imports dominate in EU energy imports (European Commission, 2011a).

In order to respond to this situation, a diversified EU energy market, based on secure energy supplies, could mitigate the vulnerability of the single market (Buchan, 2013). Since 2005, the Russian-Ukraine dispute fuelled fears over insecure energy supplies and transit pricing through Ukrainian pipelines to Europe (Adelle et al., 2009). Energy diversification could reduce its growing external energy dependence, especially on Russian energy resources. Moreover, combating climate change offered another opportunity for the Commission to promote mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions and limit EU’s depleting energy resources (Jordan et al., 2010; Oberthür and Kelly, 2008).

Table 1: Energy indicators for Morocco, Algeria and the EU (1970-2010) (World Bank, 2014b)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Energy production (in thousands ktoe)</th>
<th>Energy use (in Mktoe)</th>
<th>Energy imports (% of total energy use)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MOR</td>
<td>ALG</td>
<td>EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>624.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>854.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>100.1</td>
<td>950.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>142.2</td>
<td>949.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>150.5</td>
<td>840.6</td>
</tr>
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</table>

1 This thesis ends in December 2013.
Regulated policy frameworks in North Africa, based on EU rules, could establish a friendly framework for new energy markets for the EU and the importation of green electricity, in order to cover its growing energy demand and diversify its energy mix. SMCs host significant hydrocarbon resources (Algeria, Libya, Egypt) and are transit countries for energy from Central Asia and the Persian Gulf (Escribano, 2010, p.211). Energy supplies from several SMCs are stable and uninterrupted (see part 4.4). Furthermore, SMCs have significant potential to develop green electricity from solar and wind power (OME, 2007). The exportation of green electricity to Europe can contribute to the EU’s energy goals and address EU’s climate change objectives of energy mitigation and reduction of greenhouse gas emissions (European Commission, 2008; 2013).

However, there are several problems that are related to the domestic adjustment to EU rules in non-European countries. The Europeanization literature argues that the prospect of EU membership plays key role for candidate European countries and triggers domestic adjustment (Schimmelfennig, 2009; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005). While EU membership is exclusive to EU members and can be granted as a prospective reward to candidate European countries, it is not available as a future reward for countries that do not geographically belong to the European continent (Copenhagen European Council, 1993). This means that even if non-European countries fully comply with EU legislation (or EU acquis in EU jargon; see Glossary) EU membership would still not be a possible option.

The Commission is the main EU institution that manages the advancement of EU rules and regulation in non-European countries, based on bilateral agreements with each country under the framework of European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) (for full analysis, see parts 1.5 and 4.5). The main goal for these agreements is a stake in the EU’s single market via similar regulatory frameworks with the EU. In order for these countries to be granted access to the single market and enjoy close cooperation with the EU, they can adjust to EU standards and regulations in order to qualify for such rewards (Magen, 2006; Whitman and Wolff, 2010). The Commission offers funds and expertise that encourage each country to narrow down the regulatory and administrative gaps and facilitate their transition to the single market’s regulatory and institutional requirements (Rhein, 2007).

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2The so called Association Agreements and Action Plans.
Meanwhile, Europeanization literature argues that the absence of EU membership as a future reward will significantly restrict the expansive power of EU policies and rules outside Europe (Varwick and Lang, 2007; Schimmelfennig, 2009; Casier, 2011). The long-term incentive of a stake in the single market refers to an unclear and highly costly reward for non-European countries (Escribano, 2006). It is also uncertain whether and when EU rewards would be granted to these countries, given the unspecified character of such rewards. The cost of integrating parts, or even the whole, of the EU acquis is not expected to be supported by the benefits of full EU membership as in the case of candidate European countries (Ugur and Tovias, 2005). Other incentives, such as visa facilitation or participation in EU agencies, cannot be compared with the significance of the finality of full accession (Gebhard, 2010; Varwick and Lang, 2007). Moreover, the voluntary nature of the bilateral agreements is projected to reduce the scope of Europeanization’s influence and limit the scope of adjustment only in policies of specific interest (Rhein, 2007; Bicchi, 2006).

Additionally, in relation to climate change policy, Morocco and Algeria prioritise climate change adaptation over climate change mitigation. Climate change effects are expected to cause several problems for their agricultural sector and influence their socio-economic systems (MATE, 2010; MATUHE, 2010). Also, because of their marginal contribution to climate change, they are not obliged to implement energy mitigation rules in their climate change policies, unlike developed countries (see below Table 2). Therefore, the different climate preferences of each side pose a significant impediment to the Commission’s preferences over climate change mitigation. In this case, there is conflict of interest on each side.

Therefore, since EU membership bars non-European countries from membership of the club and is expected to reduce the impact of EU policies and rules outside Europe, why would non-European countries approximate to the EU and adjust to the requirements of its regulations? How does the European Commission advance EU policies and rules towards non-European countries in the absence of EU membership? What are the Commission’s incentives and mechanisms towards non-European neighbouring countries over climate change policy? To what extent can policy networks advance Europeanization over climate change mitigation towards Morocco and Algeria?
Table 2: Moroccan, Algerian and EU CO2 emissions (in tons and as percentage) (1960-2009) (World Bank, 2014a)

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<thead>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>3,641</td>
<td>7,294</td>
<td>15,944</td>
<td>23,542</td>
<td>33,905</td>
<td>48,815</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.039%)</td>
<td>(0.049%)</td>
<td>(0.082%)</td>
<td>(0.11%)</td>
<td>(0.14%)</td>
<td>(0.15%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>6,161</td>
<td>15,075</td>
<td>66,519</td>
<td>78,896</td>
<td>87,931</td>
<td>121,312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.066%)</td>
<td>(0.10%)</td>
<td>(0.34%)</td>
<td>(0.35%)</td>
<td>(0.35%)</td>
<td>(0.38%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>2,331,532</td>
<td>3,708,800</td>
<td>4,464,395</td>
<td>4,096,881</td>
<td>3,892,700</td>
<td>3,615,579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(24.8%)</td>
<td>(25.07%)</td>
<td>(23.05%)</td>
<td>(18.40%)</td>
<td>(15.69%)</td>
<td>(11.29%)</td>
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**The Central Thesis**

The thesis argues that, in the absence of EU membership, Europeanization outside Europe advances policy networks based on socialisation (Johnston, 2001) processes, in order to build consensus on EU rules with local elites from SMCs. Network relations (Rhodes, 2006; Rhodes, 2000; Börzel, 2011) are necessary in order to persuade experts and bureaucrats from non-European countries to engage in reforms according to EU policies and rules. Furthermore, interaction amongst network actors intends to build incentives with domestic bureaucrats and experts in order to europeanise domestic institutional and regulatory systems according to EU rules. Network discussions are enabled via the Commission’s offers of funds and expertise. These offers establish a dialogue tool of engagement amongst the specific bureaucrats and experts from each side. They also encourage local administrations to cover administrative deficiencies and align their regulatory systems to that of the EU.

This study was initially triggered by the theoretical gaps in Europeanization literature over how domestic adjustment takes place both inside and outside Europe. Europeanization has several gaps as a theory. It pays strong attention to the domestic adjustment of European countries to EU rules, but it brushes aside how EU rules are specifically formed (Bolukbasi *et al.*, 2010). It has no cohesive understanding of the interaction between EU rule formation and domestic adjustment. Also, it is mainly Euro-centric (Lehmkuhl, 2007) and, to a significant extent, it is monolithic, exploring only rarely other theories.
Furthermore, the literature of Europeanization inside Europe claims that EU membership assumes central role both among EU members and in candidate European countries. EU membership carries various financial and commercial incentives, such as trade in the single market and common rules with the trading bloc. Moreover, EU membership grants decision-making benefits and participation in the development of common rules. In this regard, EU members are willing to sustain and secure the gains of EU membership that they enjoy by formulating new rules, where they will all integrate at their domestic level (Radaelli, 2003; Jordan et al., 2004; Jordan and Schout, 2006; see also Graziano and Vink, 2007). Supranational and intergovernmental actors socialise (Johnston, 2001; Checkel, 2005) in order to correct trade flows and improve the operation of the single market. However, supranational EU actors make sure – even via the use of coercion (Falkner et al., 2005; Tallberg, 2002) – that rules benefit the effective functioning of the market and are then domestically implemented. In that case, supranational ‘shadows of hierarchy’ (Börzel, 2010; Héritier and Lehmkuhl, 2008) overcast intergovernmental meetings.

The incentive of EU membership is also utilised outside the EU members for candidate European countries (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2007). EU membership carries significant market and political incentives for non-EU European countries. Market incentives are related to trade with the biggest and widest-regulated market in Europe and financial and expertise assistance available. Moreover, the prospect of membership can guide them to secure their democratic transition and establish a stable political system. In order to be granted EU membership, they need to regulate themselves according to the club’s rules and needs. The Commission undertakes the main responsibility for this task (Grabbe, 2001; 2003; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005). Unlike among EU members, candidate European countries have less scope to socialise EU rules, as they are obliged to integrate all EU legislation in order to be granted full EU membership. The conditional reward of EU membership – or conditionality by reward (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004; 2005) – leaves little leeway for the Commission but to impose strict hierarchies upon local elites, to incorporate and adjust domestic regulation to EU membership rules and standards.

However, Europeanization outside Europe faces significant obstacles. EU membership cannot be offered as incentive to non-European countries, as they do not geographically belong to Europe. The literature argues that the absence of EU membership will fail to trigger domestic adjustment, as there are no robust rewards to support hierarchies and supranational imposition by the Commission (Rhein, 2007; Gebhard, 2010). As EU membership is ruled out as an incentive outside Europe, Europeanization has limited
chances to utilise hierarchies and membership conditionality (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005). Unlike candidate European countries, the most possible – yet distant – reward the Commission can offer is a stake in the single market (European Commission, 2004). Though, a stake in the market’s pie will incur costly reforms in the absence of a robust EU membership reward (Escribano, 2006; Vincentz, 2007). After all, agreements outside Europe are of a voluntary nature and can only rest upon the country’s willingness to concur.

Certain academics (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2009; Knill and Tosun, 2009) argue that cooperation in functional policy sectors will give the opportunity for the EU to ‘externalise its internal process of integration’ and ‘export’ Europeanization to the EU’s immediate neighbourhood. In particular, the sectors of energy and environment can ‘connect’ EU’s relations with its immediate neighbourhood and ‘facilitate convergence towards EU standards’ (Lavenex and Stulberg, 2007, p.134). Cooperation may be promoted via informal communication and coordinative interactions in ‘functional policy-making organisations’ between the EU and each SMC (Lavenex, 2008, p.945).

However, these arguments do not explain how policy-making takes place in these networks. It is only implied that once networks are set in place, Europeanization will be pushed forward outside Europe. Yet, network actors seem to be absent inside these policy networks. Also, while they claim that they are interested in exploring the EU’s influence in its immediate neighbourhood, they prefer to focus more on the ‘causes which drive the EU to expand its boundaries of order’ outside Europe rather than explore its ‘actual influence’ (Lavenex, 2004, p.684). In other words, their main interest is more to explore how the EU ‘depicts’ itself outside its regulatory and institutional borders than to understand the mere process of this adjustment.

Other arguments over EU studies outside Europe (Börzel and Risse, 2009; Börzel and Hackenesch, 2013; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2011) support the idea that the expansion of EU rules is mainly determined by functional interests, administrative capacities and cost adoption calculations by the non-European countries. Policy networks are identified as the main channel of domestic adjustment outside Europe. However, they disregard the role of network actors inside policy networks. To put it differently, these arguments acknowledge the importance of policy networks as necessary reform channels, but they tend to overlook them in the process and how they operate. As a result, they seem to assume that the mere presence of policy networks will manage to ‘export’ EU rules outside Europe in all situations.
This thesis argues that policy networks and network autonomy play a significant role in the course of advancing EU rules outside Europe. Sectoral interdependencies and the Commission’s incentives have an impact on the process. However, relations among network actors can be crucial to develop the necessary consensus over certain policy agendas and substantiate joint cooperation over Commission’s incentives. Network actors debate and communicate on each other’s motivations and interests with a willingness to ‘sit in the other person’s shoes’. In this way, rules need to be discussed first so that domestic adjustment can take place at the domestic level of the SMC. After all, non-European countries may have different priorities in a given sector, which need to be co-agreed with the Commission.

The Commission is interested in utilizing bilateral policy networks amongst ministerial officials, bureaucrats and experts from each SMC and Brussels bureaucrats and project managers. This option is deliberate by the Commission. The policy framework of European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) favours bilateral relations with non-European neighbours, which can offer direct and ‘differentiated’ (Del Sarto and Schumacher, 2005) relations with the Commission (see parts 1.5, 4.4 and 4.5). In addition, bilateral differentiated relations with each SMC can surpass high politics in the region, because of Arab-Israeli tensions, and give the opportunity for each SMC to engage with the Commission in flexible relations inside policy networks.

In that instance, policy networks are important as mechanisms of Europeanization. They refer to policy environments that favour stable and standardised relations among interdependent actors based on trust, reciprocity and diplomacy (Rhodes, 2006; Agranoff and McGuire, 2004; Ansell and Gash, 2007). Network autonomy can support the Commission’s interest to allow bureaucratic expertise and standard routines to encourage actors in socialisation, which can lead to persuasion and social influence. After all, EU acquis refers to a highly technical body of rules and regulations, which could be expanded via routinised interaction between experts from each side.

Furthermore, autonomy and network operations can be supported by funds and expertise offers by the Commission. Funds and expertise operate as discussions ‘tools’ of the Commission which allow network actors to operate at ‘an arm’s length’ (Rhodes, 2000; Scharpf, 1997) (see chapters two and four). The Commission, as the central agency, is not willing to intervene in network activities. Rather, offering funds and expertise it wishes to reinforce network autonomy and invest in their potential to deliver services through stability and routines. In addition, bureaucratic beliefs and professional expertise among network actors further insulate network operations at
arm’s length from the central agency, further enhancing network autonomy (Scharpf, 1997; Börzel, 2010).

The thesis tests these claims and explores whether the Commission’s network strategy for autonomous policy networks with Morocco and Algeria manages to advance Europeanization through climate change policy (see chapters five and six). Policy networks are established with bureaucrats and experts in each country, supported by expertise programmes funded by the Commission. However, policy networks managed to advance Europeanization in climate change mitigation only in Morocco. Instead, in the Algerian case, policy networks have had the opposite effect, as Europeanization was advanced in climate change adaptation.

The Moroccan network case verifies the claims of policy network theory, whereby stability and network autonomy can advance service delivery (Rhodes, 2006; Ansell and Gash, 2007). Domestic regulatory structures of Morocco adjust to EU rules, where Europeanization is advanced in the non-European neighbouring country. Moreover, the Moroccan case shows that broader interdependencies, incentives and other cost-benefit calculations are present inside policy networks and can affect the Europeanization process (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2011; Börzel and Hackenesch, 2013). In particular, Morocco has insignificant conventional resources and is almost exclusively dependent on energy imports from abroad. Renewable sources of energy can diversify its energy mix and reduce its external dependence. Also, European expertise and funds in that sector triggered Morocco’s interest to engage in discussions. Administrative and regulatory assistance can develop similar structures to that of the EU and promote the establishment of the domestic energy market, in order to export green electricity to Europe (article nine of the 2009/28/EC Directive).

However, policy networks and network engagement did not manage to advance climate change mitigation rules in Algeria. Despite the Commission’s offers of funds and expertise programmes and the functional potential in renewable energies, politics interfered within policy networks and interrupted network activities. Algerian network actors were suspicious of the EU’s intentions towards Algerian conventional energy resources and discussions failed to develop consensus for collaboration over renewable energies. The Commission offered expertise programmes to the Algerian actors, but Algeria believed that Europe wishes to ‘steal’ Algeria’s energy resources. Instead, the policy networks managed to advance Europeanization over climate change adaptation, but not the Commission’s interests in renewable energies.
Therefore, the Algerian case shows that policy networks cannot always advance Europeanization outside Europe. Policy networks failed to handle conflicting relations, where stability gave way to mistrust and stagnant relations. Hence, Europeanization via policy networks cannot be considered as a process with guaranteed results, whereby networks will manage to advance cooperation in all settings. Most of the time, network autonomy among network actors will manage to promote Europeanization, but it may equally be disrupted, when politics and top-down manipulation interfere with network operations. This is a key limitation in the networks’ lifespan, which this study highlights in relation to Europeanization outside Europe.

Methodology and Empirical Research

A number of similarities and differences led this research to choose Morocco and Algeria as case studies in their relationship with the European Commission. Morocco and Algeria are both North African neighbouring countries in the EU’s southern neighbourhood and they cannot be eligible for EU membership. Each country has distinct energy resources. Algeria is energy self-sufficient and exporter of conventional energy resources to Europe, whereas Morocco has insignificant conventional energy resources and is highly dependent on energy imports. Furthermore, both countries have different attitudes towards the EU. Morocco is willing to integrate in the EU market and liberalise its rules, whereas Algeria is sceptical and reluctant towards such an option. In addition, both countries have conflictual history over territorial matters in the Maghreb region – as is the case for all SMCs.

Despite their differences, both countries share various similarities. They have significant potential to produce energy from renewable sources, such as solar and wind power. Their main policy priority is to adapt to climate change, as the adverse effects of desertification and soil erosion are expected to affect severely their socio-economic environment. Also, they have limited institutional and regulatory capacities to respond not only to climate change mitigation but also to climate change adaptation. Furthermore, they are both developing countries and without any obligations to mitigate their greenhouse gas emissions. Also, they have limited institutional and regulatory capacities to respond not only to climate change mitigation but also to climate change adaptation. Finally, they have bilateral agreements and cooperation with the Commission since 1970s.

The study of the Commission’s relations with Morocco and Algeria was supported by the inclusion of two specific units of analysis: climate change mitigation and climate change adaptation. These two policy areas have contrasting added value for the whole
case study design of the research. While the Commission’s preferences are mostly focused on renewable energies and climate change mitigation, both SMCs’ priority is to adapt to climate change. In this regard, the research intends to explore, on one hand, how domestic adjustment is advanced in conflicting policies and in different case studies. Furthermore, the aim is also to examine the challenges in actor-centred policy networks in the process of Europeanization outside Europe through the variety of similarities and differences from each case study and each policy area.

This research draws on three main methods that encompass the broad methodological framework of qualitative analysis: (i) qualitative interviewing, via snowballing sampling, ii) documentary analysis of primary and secondary data, and, iii) analysis of academic literature (see chapter three). The research initially focused on extensive academic literature and documentary analysis. In particular, academic literature review included the historical analysis of Euro-Mediterranean relations, the role of EU members in the region, the Commission’s relations with each case study and the broader theoretical literature on Europeanization, EU studies and policy networks (see chapters one, two, four, five and six). In addition, documentary analysis involved primary and secondary data from EU-Moroccan and EU-Algerian bilateral agreements, official Commission documentation, official speeches from elite Commission officials and other declaratory conclusions. EU, Moroccan and Algerian governmental reports (UNFCCC reports, National Action Plans) and Moroccan and Algerian secondary legislation (energy and environmental laws) were also collected and analysed as part of data collection.

Field research was the next step. In total, forty-four semi-structured interviews were conducted with forty-eight practitioners, academics and representatives from civil society, involved in climate change policy in Euro-Mediterranean, EU-Moroccan and EU-Algerian relations, over a period of thirteen months (May 2012 – June 2013). Because of considerable data scarcity in the literature, snowball sampling was considered necessary for field research technique (see part 3.5 for full analysis). Initially, pilot interviews were crucial in order to build networks in the region and establish interpersonal relations with significant regional and international organisations and academics before the main interviews take place with particular European, Moroccan and Algerian actors.

Afterwards, interviews were conducted with European Commission and External Action Service (EEAS) officials, such as heads of unit for the Mediterranean, in horizontal policy sectors (i.e. on environment, energy etc.), and with desk officers and task managers for Morocco and Algeria, from various directorate-generals (DGs), such
as DG Energy, DG Climate Action, DG DEVCO (Development and Cooperation) and DG Research. Regarding each case study, interviews were mainly conducted with heads of units, directors and communication and task managers from Moroccan and Algerian ministries and governmental agencies of environment and energy, but also with (senior) officials at the Moroccan and Algerian Embassies in London. Interviews were also organised with task managers and policy advisors in the EU Delegations in Hay Riad, Rabat and in Algiers. Finally, interviews were also conducted with representatives of the Moroccan and Algerian civil society (i.e. NGOs, academics, journalists).

**Contribution to Knowledge**

This study offers several significant contributions to the literature of Europeanization, EU studies outside Europe and international public policy, both in theory and in practice. Firstly, the approach developed in this study elaborates an analytical framework that widens our understanding on how adjustment to EU rules is advanced outside Europe in the absence of EU membership (chapters one and two). It compensates for the gaps of Europeanization literature and EU studies outside Europe, which tend to overlook the role of network actors and network management. The study departs from current studies of Europeanization and EU studies outside Europe, which mostly emphasise the role of functional interdependencies, financial incentives and other strategic motivations. It does so by exploring the process of policy-making inside and outside Europe. Also, it restores the neglected character of network actors and policy networks to related academic discussions and explores their role in the process of convincing and persuading non-European actors in the absence of EU membership. More specifically, it explores how actor-based policy networks and network autonomy advance mutual understanding and collaboration in challenging policy settings, as is the case of climate change policy in the Commission’s relations with non-European countries.

Furthermore, the study does not merely explore the merits of modality of engagement through policy networks in the Moroccan case (see chapter five), but it also identifies the challenges during this network management process from the Commission, and its limitations. It does so by exploring the case of Algeria (see chapter six). As is shown in the Algerian case, policy networks and network management do not always lead to similar results in all policy settings, as conflict in the form of politicisation interferes in network operations and disrupt network processes. This is a significant contribution to the literatures of Europeanization, EU studies and international public policy, as it explores the challenges in the diffusion of EU rules amongst network actors outside Europe and the role of politics, motivations and mechanisms during that process.
In addition, the interest of this research is in the role of European Commission as the main EU institution promoting EU preferences outside Europe. In particular, this study identifies the mechanism and the network strategy the Commission has developed, in order to advance Europeanization in its immediate southern neighbourhood. Moreover, it sheds light on the role of financial and expertise incentives, which operate as a dialogue tool for the Commission in order to advance knowledge amongst bureaucrats and experts. This is a significant contribution, since the role of the Commission outside Europe and the means through which it attempts to diffuse EU rules and domestic adjustment in non-European countries have received only minimal attention in the literatures of EU studies and European public policy. Moreover, it sets an analytical standing point for other policy settings, which can be applied beyond the policy field of climate change in order to understand EU governance outside Europe.

In addition, the Commission’s engagement on climate change in the Mediterranean region can operate as an example for other international and regional organisations in international climate politics. The Mediterranean region is one of the four most vulnerable regions on the planet, and South Mediterranean countries are mainly expected to be severely affected by the adverse effects of climate change (IPCC, 2007; UNEP Blue Plan, 2008). As a region, it includes on one hand developed, industrialised countries in the north (EU members) emitting significant greenhouse gas emissions and, on the other, developing or under-developed countries in the south (south Mediterranean countries in the Middle East and North Africa (SMCs)) with a relatively low contribution to global warming and mostly threatened from the adverse effects of climate change. These different positions vis-à-vis climate change generate different priorities: while the main priority for SMCs tends to be adaptation to climate change, the EU’s main priority is the mitigation of greenhouse gases. In this regard, the Mediterranean presents the importance that international organisations play in advancing rules in competitive political settings. Furthermore, it provides lessons to policy practitioners and bureaucrats to understand in what ways and in which cases a supranational actor can sustain network management in a developing country in modern public administration and international relations.

Also, this research fills a significant gap in the current literature on the role of the EU as an actor in international relations. International climate policy is of key interest for the EU as a whole. The Commission also claims international leadership in the fight against climate change (European Commission, 2014; 2013b; 2008). Although there is a growing literature describing the EU as an international actor or as a (climate) leader (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006; Wurzel and Connelly, 2011), there is yet to be developed
a coherent understanding of the Commission’s – or even the EU as a whole – impact in this policy field. It is unclear what the role of the European Commission is in advancing EU climate preferences in its relations with developing countries on a day-to-day basis. The focus on policy networks and network management in Morocco and Algeria covers this gap in the specific literature and explores how to deal with climate reforms and advancement of policy preferences in developing countries.

Moreover, as little other work has done, this research produces empirical evidence in the unexplored policy field of climate change in Euro-Mediterranean relations and, specifically, in the bilateral relations between the Commission and two North African countries over climate change mitigation and climate change adaptation. The academic literature of Euro-Mediterranean relations is almost exclusively interested in political, security and, lately, migration issues in relation to Arab-Israeli relations and pays marginal attention to other policy areas. Empirical evidence is highly absent from academic discussions in several academic journals and books about Europe’s engagement with SMCs on climate change policy. Thus, this research fills this research gap, illustrates it with empirical findings from two North African countries, and contributes to the development of the academic field of energy and climate change in Euro-Mediterranean studies.

Structure of the Thesis

This thesis is organised in seven chapters. Chapter one explores the analytical framework of Europeanization and how EU policies and rules are formed and transferred inside and outside Europe, examining their influence. Initially, there is a conceptualisation of the defining elements and the pitfalls of Europeanization literature. Three waves of Europeanization are established: a ‘membership’ wave among current EU members, an ‘enlargement’ wave for candidate European countries and a ‘neighbourhood’ wave outside Europe for the EU’s southern neighbourhood. This wave structure tries to capture the various incentives, mechanisms of compliance, actors and outcomes that make up the whole analysis of Europeanization inside Europe. It also compares and contrasts with the neighbourhood wave of Europeanization in the EU’s southern neighbourhood. This is a crucial part of the analysis, as it links the discussion between policy networks and Europeanization in chapter two.

Chapter two develops the main theoretical arguments of this research and elaborates an analytical framework, focusing on actor-centred policy networks, network management and Europeanization, in order to explain how Europeanization has advanced outside
Europe in Morocco and Algeria through climate change policy. The chapter initially theorises policy networks and links networks’ autonomy and network operations, in order to show the relationship between central agencies and network management; it also critically appraises them in light of the broader critique on the network approach. Then, the analysis highlights the role of policy networks in the EU in order to contrast with the next part on Europeanization outside Europe. There is a critique on current Europeanization and EU studies outside Europe on how they perceive policy networks, and a presentation of the main theoretical argument of the thesis. Finally, there is a summary of the main concepts and arguments of the thesis that operationalises theory as opposed to the thesis’ empirical chapters.

Chapter three presents the methodological framework of the analysis and explains the various methods and techniques that were used throughout the research. More specifically, it focuses on the importance of the qualitative approach and considers how these methods and techniques were used in the pilot and core field research. Finally, there is a presentation of the ethics of the process and the problems which occurred during data collection.

Chapter four offers a contextual analysis of the preferences of the European Commission and its network strategy towards SMCs over climate change policy. The objective of the chapter is to present the importance of the policy agenda of climate change mitigation for the Commission and the modality of its engagement via bilateral relations with each SMC. More specifically, this chapter presents the role of the Commission inside Europe and its main responsibilities in the EU’s external relations towards the Mediterranean. It then explores the EU’s energy dependence and the Commission’s motivation in expanding its energy cooperation towards the Mediterranean. The chapter also explores the factors behind that motivation. Finally, the chapter focuses on the importance of bilateral differentiated relations with each SMC under the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy, and the role of several regulatory incentives and financial and expertise tools as means of incitement and creating dialogue.

Chapter five focuses on the Commission’s relations with Morocco over climate change policy. The chapter shows that the policy network strategy finds an easy pathway to adjust Morocco’s regulatory and institutional framework according to EU rules. Although Morocco’s climate priority is to adapt to the adverse effects of climate change, the development of renewable energies and exportation of green electricity to the EU can cover the growing energy needs of the country and offer energy diversification. Policy networks play a core role in that process. Regulatory incentives from the
Commission, based on article nine of Directive 2009/28/EC and supporting financial and expertise offers, bring together specific actors from each side and trigger Morocco’s interest. Actors from each side negotiate over the utility of renewable energies and manage to prioritise energy mitigation over any other related sector. Instead, network actors show limited interest in climate change adaptation and cooperation is stagnant.

Chapter six deals with the Commission’s relations with Algeria over climate change policy. Unlike Morocco, Europeanization faces several obstacles in order to advance EU rules over climate change mitigation and the development of renewable energies. Broader politicisation of the energy sector and mistrust from Algeria in the Commission’s offers of regulatory alignment to EU rules put at stake its interests and touch upon core sovereignty matters. While renewable energies could offer the chance to the country to diversify its economy and rely less on volatile international energy prices, the introduction of a renewable energies market into the country could jeopardise its national energy resources and reduce the strength of the comparative advantage of the country in the region, but also towards the EU. On the other hand, climate change adaptation refers to a key climate priority for the country and a policy area with limited political implications. The Algerian case shows that policy networks advance Europeanization outside Europe, but this time in a different policy area from the Commission’s agenda. In other words, Europeanization does not lead to a pre-determined outcome, as was shown in the Moroccan case. The politicisation and broader high politics can impede networks to develop stable relations and disrupt network autonomy.

Chapter seven concludes with an overview of the main conceptual, theoretical and empirical findings of the study. It analyses the limitations of the approach taken in this thesis and stresses the strengths and weaknesses of the thesis. Moreover, it identifies the main contributions for the study of Europeanization and mentions several policy implications for the European Commission. Finally, it outlines the future research agenda for the development of the current analytical framework.
Chapter 1:
The Three Waves of Europeanization

1.1 Introduction

The concept of Europeanization has become a widespread phenomenon since the 1990s. It has mostly been used to describe the EU’s impact on EU members and, to a lesser extent, on candidate European countries. Research into Europeanization has only recently started focusing on the newer EU members and even towards its neighbouring non-EU countries (Sedelmeier, 2008; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2009; Cirtautas and Schimmelfennig, 2010; Casier, 2011). Nevertheless, Europeanization still remains a concept with no integrated theoretical framework and with an unclear research agenda. Efforts towards a systematic theorization and empirical observation of Europeanization have only recently been started in order to provide broad conceptualisation and to avoid confusion amongst researchers (Graziano and Vink, 2007; Exadaktylos and Radaelli, 2009; Bolukbasi et al., 2010). However, Europeanization is one of only a few conceptual frameworks that attempts to explore how domestic adjustment to EU rules takes place mainly inside Europe.

Three waves of Europeanization have been used to explore how EU policies and rules are formed and transferred both inside and outside Europe: a ‘membership’ wave among current EU members, an ‘enlargement’ wave for candidate European countries and a ‘neighbourhood’ wave outside Europe, for EU’s southern neighbourhood. Each wave has distinctive incentives and mechanisms, which are utilised by several intergovernmental and supranational actors, leading to several policy outcomes. In the membership wave, EU membership and its supporting incentives of trade benefits, growth, political stability and cooperation sustain the ‘constant’ (Radaelli, 2000; 2003; Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004) process of forming and transferring EU policies and rules. Various intergovernmental and supranational actors negotiate over these new rules and attempt to persuade and influence their final substance (Johnston, 2001; Checkel, 2005). They can equally rely on other mechanisms, such as coercion (Falkner et al., 2005; Tallberg, 2002). For example, supranational actors, mainly the European Commission and the European Court of Justice (ECJ), cast a supranational ‘shadow of hierarchy’ (Börzel, 2010; Héritier and Lehmkuhl, 2008) which monitors the implementation of agreed rules, mainly at the domestic level.
In the enlargement wave of Europeanization, EU incentives are offered as conditional rewards to candidate European countries. In this wave, hierarchies and supranational conditions take the lead, where the European Commission transfer EU policies and rules in a top-down manner in its engagement with each candidate country. Membership conditionality – or ‘reinforcement by reward’ (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005) – refers to a coercive mechanism whereby rewards (i.e. EU membership, trade, funding) promised by the supranational institution are offered on the condition that candidate states fulfil one or more conditions (Checkel, 2005; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004; 2005). In this wave, socialisation plays a lesser important role than in the membership wave (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2007; Kelley, 2004). Domestic adjustment to the whole body of EU rules is a necessary condition, so that EU rewards are fully paid to the candidate (Grabbe, 2003; Schimmelfennig, 2001; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005).

In the neighbourhood wave, EU membership cannot be used as a conditional reward. Only European countries are eligible for this reward (Copenhagen European Council, 1993). Non-European countries are not eligible for full membership. Membership conditionality cannot then be applied outside Europe, as it cannot be followed by the prospect of full EU membership (Schimmelfennig, 2009; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2007). Incentives, such as a stake in EU’s single market, trade and financial and technical assistance, are also not expected to have significant domestic impact in the immediate southern neighbourhood (Noutcheva and Emerson, 2007; Whitman and Wolff, 2010). In addition, a prospective stake in the single market will trigger costly reforms and it is unclear whether and when, it will be attributed (Vincentz, 2007; Ugur and Tovias, 2005). As a result, domestic adjustment to EU rules will face several challenges in the immediate southern neighbourhood.

The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) (European Commission, 2004) offers, though, the opportunity to the Commission to engage in more flexible cooperation with each south Mediterranean country. ENP offers bilateral agreements with each neighbouring country based on jointly-agreed commitments. Mutual cooperation – rather than hierarchies – can favour the use of technical discussions, which can negotiate over specific EU rules and preferences with these countries. Therefore, dialogue in policy networks with bureaucratic actors from each side can develop consensus in common reforms and build consensus for the Europeanization of domestic regulatory structures in each SMC.

This chapter is organised into four parts. The first part offers a conceptualisation of the main defining elements of Europeanization and presents its main pitfalls. The second
part focuses on the membership wave of Europeanization among EU members and presents how rule formation and domestic adjustment take place at the domestic level of EU members. It also outlines the incentives that sustain Europeanization and the mechanisms that actors utilise in order to sustain this continuous process. The third part examines how domestic adjustment to EU policies and rules take place in candidate European countries, mainly focusing on Central and Eastern European countries (CEEs). The last part analyses the neighbourhood wave of Europeanization in south Mediterranean countries (SMCs). Its aim is to compare and contrast with the previous two waves on the basis of incentives and mechanisms and speculate about the role of policy networks as Europeanization mechanisms in the Commission’s engagement with local elites from SMCs. The chapter closes by summarizing the main elements of the three waves of Europeanization.

1.2 The Concept of Europeanization and its Limits

Defining Europeanization is always a difficult task in modern EU studies. In several instances, Europeanization is mistakenly considered to be a synonym for European integration. Radaelli (2000) was first to argue that European integration refers to the ‘ontological’ stage of research, that is, the understanding of a process in which countries pool sovereignty to supranational actors in the EU. Instead, Europeanization is ‘post-ontological’, being mainly concerned with what happens once EU institutions are in place and produce their effects (Radaelli, 2000, p.5). Moreover, European integration comprises two inter-related processes: the delegation of policy competences to the supranational level to achieve particular policy outcomes, and the establishment of a new set of political institutions with executive, legislative and judicial powers (Hix and Goetz, 2000, p.3). In contrast, Europeanization deals with the role of domestic actors and institutions once delegation of policy competences to supranational actors has taken place, and also refers to how this pooling of sovereignty to the EU level affects policy outcomes in the domestic arena (Hix and Goetz, 2000, p.4).

So far, however, there is not an ‘all-encompassing theory’ that summarises the main points of this concept (Jordan et al., 2004, p.131). The whole project of attributing theory characteristics to this concept is at its embryonic stages, as there are still several competing research suggestions and proposals about when it is most suitable to develop a systematic research observation and analysis of this concept (Exadaktylos and Radaelli, 2009; Bolukbasi et al., 2010). For some (Radaelli and Pasquier, 2007, p.35), Europeanization cannot be ‘pigeonholed into one aseptic definition’, as it represents the ‘domestic adaptation of European regional integration’ (Vink and
Graziano, 2007, p.3). For some others, Europeanization is criticised as being a mere ‘attention-directing device’ with restricted explanatory value in the process of European integration (Olsen, 2002). Also, for some others Europeanization seems to bring more added value to the understanding of the horizontal and vertical dimensions of influence of European integration – i.e. the pooling of competences at the EU level – rather merely exploring the penetration of EU rules and policies in the domestic environment (Lehmkuhl, 2007, p.340). From another perspective, Europeanization seems to evolve an understanding of European integration at the levels of polity (legislation, regulation, state executives and judiciary power), politics (parliamentary scrutiny, political parties and interest groups) and policies (environment, transport, foreign policy, identity, immigration, cohesion, social policy etc.) (Graziano and Vink, 2007; Börzel and Risse, 2003; Bulmer and Burch, 2000).

Four dynamics in the early 1990s redirected the intellectual debate about EU studies towards the study of Europeanization: a) the institutionalisation of the single market in the EU, b) the advent of the Economic and Monetary Union, c) market-driven issues based on the evolution of negative integration in the EU (i.e. removal of tariff barriers among EU members) and d) the prospect of EU’s enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe countries (CEEs) after the fall of Soviet Union (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004, pp.1–2). These developments in Europe led to research interest in the impact of EU regulation inside Europe in EU members, and towards European countries wishing to become part of the EU. Moreover, there was interest in the level of impact such developments could have on the course of European integration.

The literature initially focused on ‘institutions-building at the European level’ (Risse et al., 2001, p.3) and ‘inter-state relations [leaving] intra-state politics relatively untouched’ (Jordan, 2002, p.7). Ladrech (1994) considered Europeanization ‘an incremental process’ whereby EU’s organisational and political arrangements become integral parts of the domestic political structures in EU members. Europeanization was identified as a process whereby organisational and political arrangements at the EU level could influence regulatory conditions and alter the domestic procedures already taking place – or, as Radaelli puts it, the ‘ways of doing things’ (Radaelli, 2000; 2003). Building on Ladrech’s definition, Risse et al. referred to the importance of the construction of EU norms, rules and policies at the EU level, arguing that Europeanization refers to ‘the emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of governance’ (Risse et al., 2001, p.3). Although this definition seems to share many attributes with the process of European integration (Jordan et al., 2004, p.132), Risse et al. also discussed the interactive and interchangeable process of
policy and rule formation between domestic and EU levels. In other words, domestic and EU policy processes develop a new European policy-making process, which is expected to influence policy transposition (see Glossary) – or, in more simple terms, EU legislation is put into national legislation (Sverdrup, 2007, p.200) at the domestic level. Key elements in this process would be the relationship between members, EU institutions and other non-state actors. Europeanization argued that the expected outcome of the penetration of EU policies and rules, once domestically diffused, would lead to new European structures.

Other scholars (Bomberg and Peterson, 2000; Radaelli, 2001; 2003; Börzel, 2001; Börzel and Risse, 2003) intended to explore further the constant nature of Europeanization and move away from the monolithic top-down approach of Europeanization. For them, Europeanization does not merely try to understand the impact of European integration on EU members, but also needs to explore how EU members interact in this process of adjustment in the ‘up-loading’ process (see Glossary), that is to say, in the construction of new rules (Radaelli and Bulmer, 2004). In simple terms, they attempted to stress the interactive relationship between domestic adjustment and initial policy and rule formation. More specifically, Börzel argued that Europeanization refers to a ‘two-way’ process which entails a ‘bottom-up’ – or up-loading – and a ‘top-down’ – or down-loading (see Glossary) – dimension. In this case, it is not only the EU that influences EU members, but equally EU members can have significant impact on the process of adjustment to European integration (Jordan et al., 2004, p.132; Jordan and Liefferink, 2004). Börzel simply describes it as a ‘process whereby domestic policy areas become increasingly subject to European policy making’ (Börzel, 2002, p. 6). Moreover, Radaelli offered a similar definition that attempted to capture Europeanization as a ‘reciprocal’ (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004, p.3) policy process including both up-loading and down-loading of norms, rules, policies and ‘ways of doing things’. Radaelli intended to describe the continuity in formation and implementation of EU policies, norms and rules at the domestic level of each EU member.

However, even up to the present time the literature on Europeanization has paid limited empirical attention to the actual process of how up-loading EU policies and rules takes place at the EU level (Flockhart, 2010; Jordan et al., 2004). The bottom-up aspect of Europeanization is not well situated in the whole concept. Bolukbasi et al. (2010) found that none of the research units in their Europeanization sample literature employed an up-loading research design, reflecting a dominant preference for the search for ‘effects of causes’ rather than a search for ‘causes of effects’ (Bolukbasi et al.,
Moreover, identifying how up-loading takes place is significantly disregarded in the Europeanization literature and no concrete research agenda has been set forward. It is yet to be defined what ‘down-loading’ and ‘up-loading’ signify and through which processes they specifically operate.

Moreover, Europeanization is significantly EU-centric and shows limited interest in explaining whether and how Europeanization may take place beyond Europe. Only recently have such considerations started to be introduced into its explanatory framework, with the 2004 and 2007 EU enlargements to non-EU European members (see part 1.4). According to Lehmkuhl (2007, p.349), ‘we are lacking systematic efforts accounting for the way in which European regional integration impacts upon non-member states and other actors and organisations’. Lehmkuhl also argues that Europeanization outside EU members could only be measured based on the ‘magnetic dimension of economic attraction of the European market’ (Lehmkuhl 2007, p.349).

In addition, it is unclear which incentives and mechanisms comprise the constant process of Europeanization. They are only presented in a fragmented manner in the literature and are not systematically embedded in analyses (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2002; Olsen, 2002; Börzel and Risse, 2003; De Flers and Müller, 2012). Also, Europeanization outcomes are the least explored in the literature. One of the main interests of Europeanization is to explore to what extent regulatory, legislative and organisational structures converge or diverge in the EU, in other words, how similar or differential domestic legislative, regulatory and organisational structures are in each EU member (Holzinger and Knill, 2005, p.776). Despite a few such research initiatives (Jordan and Liefferink, 2004; Graziano and Vink, 2007; Héritier, 2001), there is limited understanding of how domestic adjustment to EU policies and rules takes place in several countries.

Furthermore, Europeanization does not explain why there is only adjustment at the domestic level. Despite initial attempts to link Europeanization with governance and interest intermediation literatures, such as policy networks (Bomberg and Peterson, 2000; Jachtenfuchs, 2001; Bache, 2003), Europeanization is accused of being overly interested in domestic adjustment, presenting the EU as ‘ingeniously superior’ at influencing its members (Flockhart, 2010, p.790). Its continuous focus on domestic impact diminishes its impact in exploring the reciprocal ‘two-way’ (Börzel, 2001) process of Europeanization in the EU. One possible explanation is its limited interaction with other theoretical debates (Lehmkuhl, 2007, p.350).
To sum up, Europeanization in its current form is incomplete for the following reasons. It is nothing but ‘reciprocal’ (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004) in its analysis, as it shows limited understanding in the process that leads to up-loading and down-loading. Instead, it is highly focused on the domestic adjustment, neglecting final outcomes and disregarding incentives and compliance mechanisms. Moreover, its (empirical) application is highly absent in non-European settings.

This thesis is considering whether applying the concept of Europeanization outside Europe in the EU’s southern neighbourhood can improve the conceptual framework of Europeanization and correct several of its pitfalls. Firstly, incentives and compliance mechanisms inside Europe are expected to have a different role and influence outside Europe. EU membership will not be available outside Europe. This core difference will probably alter the dynamic of the Europeanization mechanisms and the flow of Europeanization in the up-loading and down-loading of EU rules.

Secondly, Europeanization processes outside Europe will unfold the reciprocity of up-loading and down-loading processes in situations of weakened incentives and softened compliance mechanisms. Inside Europe, softer compliance mechanisms, such as socialisation, persuasion and social influence, have a rather unclear role (see part 1.3 for full analysis). Also, the more Europeanization expands inside Europe, the more hierarchies are in use (see part 1.4). Instead, outside Europe the absence of strong incentives – EU membership – and its consequent weakened conditional power will require more horizontal processes for Europeanization (Whitman and Wolff, 2010; Lavenex, 2008). Co-owned processes of communication and reciprocal relations are expected to show how soft compliance mechanisms can operate in the reciprocal processes of Europeanization.

Thirdly, externalizing Europeanization outside Europe will allow measurement of the extent to which the magnetic power of the EU’s economic market (Lehmkuhl, 2007) can produce domestic adjustment pressures outside Europe. In this way, it will be explored through which means up-loading and down-loading can take place, and how they both differ in relation to Europeanization inside Europe.

Therefore, this research recognises Europeanization in three waves: the membership wave among current EU members, the enlargement wave for candidate European countries and the neighbourhood wave for countries in the EU’s southern neighbourhood. Each wave presents distinct differences in terms of incentives, mechanisms, actors and related outcomes (see Table 3). The wave format attempts to explore both how EU policies and rules are formed and what their influence is at the
domestic level of countries. Moreover, it has an expansive view in relation to the adjustment in non-EU and non-European countries. This is drawn from Lehmkuhl’s recommendation about the need to explore ‘European regional integration upon non-member states and other actors and organisations’ (Lehmkuhl, 2007, p.349).

Table 3: The Three Waves of Europeanization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Membership wave</th>
<th>Enlargement wave</th>
<th>Neighbourhood wave</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Incentives</strong></td>
<td>EU Membership</td>
<td>Membership incentive</td>
<td>Stake in Internal Market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EU Internal Market</td>
<td>EU Internal Market</td>
<td>Liberalisation and FTA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trade and growth benefits</td>
<td>Trade liberalisation and growth benefits</td>
<td>Financial and technical assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Financial and time compensations</td>
<td>Financial and technical assistance</td>
<td>Visa facilitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democratic stability and security</td>
<td>Democratic stability and security (i.e. NATO)</td>
<td>Visa facilitation (in the long run)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mechanisms</strong></td>
<td>Coercion</td>
<td>Strict conditionality</td>
<td>Socialisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Socialisation</td>
<td>Limited, or no, socialisation</td>
<td>Weak conditionality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Policy networks?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actors</strong></td>
<td>EU institutions, EU members, interest groups and non-state actors</td>
<td>Experts and bureaucrats from Commission and candidate countries</td>
<td>Experts and bureaucrats from Commission and non-European countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome</strong></td>
<td>Adjustment</td>
<td>Integration</td>
<td>Adjustment and integration?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hybrid outcomes?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.3 Europeanization among EU members: The Membership Wave

Formation and implementation of EU policies and rules incorporate various incentives and mechanisms that trigger and ensure Europeanization among EU members. EU membership is at the core of EU incentives and is a shared asset among EU members. EU membership is accompanied by several other incentives which are related to the actual membership in the single trade bloc. The single market is among the core constitutive parts of EU membership and provided strong motivation for the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957. The entry into force of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986 and the Programme 1992 set the pace for the final completion of the single market in 1992 with the Maastricht Treaty. SEA was a package deal with over 300 legislative acts, which all EU members had to adopt for the final completion of the single market. The single market would be established upon four fundamental freedoms: the free movement of people, goods, services and capital. EU citizens would have the right to move, work and retire to every EU member state; it would also eliminate all tariff and non-tariff barriers in trade and liberalise the capital and services sectors. More flexible legislative arrangements (EU Directives; see Glossary) had to be introduced in order to eliminate any trade externalities in certain new policy fields, for example, environmental and social policies.

With a single market, EU members can benefit from intra-EU trade, not only because trade barriers are lifted but also because of the size of the European market (almost 500 million people) and the proximity of each EU member to the other. Such factors can also signify increased growth levels, specialised labour, new jobs, and increased competitiveness of EU originated products in the markets across the globe (Bomberg and Peterson, 1999; Hix, 2005).

Other incentives that accompany EU membership and support the sustainability of the single market are democratic rules and political stability across the European continent. It is characteristic that, since its establishment in 1957, no war has taken place among EU members. For all EU members, democracy is necessary for the continuity and sustainability of their single market. In the 1980s the precondition of democracy secured the transition to political stability in south European countries such as Greece, Spain and Portugal, especially following short- and long-term dictatorships (Lijphart, 1990). Anchoring to a group of developed democratic European countries was significant motivation for them to remain focused on a democratic track and to
stimulate democratisation in order to reduce the power of communist and other antidemocratic forces (Cunha, 2012, p.6).

Finally, there are also financial and time concessions from ‘pace-setting’ EU members to ‘foot-dragging’ – or cohesion countries – EU members (Börzel, 2001) via cohesion funds and extended adoption time frameworks for certain demanding EU rules, which may potentially cause implementation problems. ‘Cohesion’ countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) were the main recipients of EU funds in order to converge with the average European standard in various policies. Regional cohesion funds were believed to be the key for such gradual cohesion objectives in social, economic and regional terms. Funds and concessions are also used in policy areas such as climate change. For instance, the ‘bubble’ agreement after the signature of the Kyoto Protocol gave the chance for less developed EU members to have emission increases, as more developed EU members could undertake strong emission reductions. Significant temporal concessions were attributed to less developed EU members to respond to climate change in a more gradual way than the more advanced EU members (Jordan and Liefferink, 2004; Jordan et al., 2004).

Apart from several incentives, mechanisms of Europeanization constitute a key element of policy formation and domestic adjustment among EU members, but are not well-established in the whole literature of Europeanization (Haverland, 2007, p.68; Bolukbasi et al., 2010, p.469). Coercion is one main mechanism of Europeanization among EU members and it is highly connected with the enforcement of EU policies and rules, whereby compliance constitutes its main objective (Falkner et al., 2005). Coercion is linked with the element of threat and pressure, which is mainly exercised by EU institutions upon EU members during the down-loading of EU policies and rules. For some scholars (Börzel, 2010), supranational actors cast their ‘shadow of hierarchy’ (Börzel, 2010, pp.198-200) upon EU members when monitoring the transfer and implementation of EU policies and rules at the domestic level. EU Directives as legislative EU acts, compel each EU member to introduce regulatory arrangements in a specified period of time. Although each member has the option of introducing EU rules at the domestic level without specifying a concrete way of transposition, non-compliance is not an option because it is followed by financial sanctions.

In the case of continuous non-compliance by an EU member, the Commission has the right to initiate the infringement procedure (article 258 of the Lisbon Treaty (TFEU)) which may end up with a European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruling (Tallberg, 2002). In this case, the Commission operates as prosecutor and the ECJ as judge (Tallberg, 2002, p.615). An ECJ ruling imposes strict financial penalties on the non-compliant EU
member. In this way, the supranational shadow of hierarchy via financial sanctions intends to operate as an instrument of deterrence in cases of non-compliance, and limit the possibilities of legal breach (Tallberg, 2002, p.619). Most of the time the Commission prefers to settle the difference with the non-compliant member, as this may expose the Commission’s limited problem-solving capacities and may incur shaming effects, both for the Commission and for the non-compliant EU member. However, the Commission does not hesitate to push forward significant non-compliant cases and cast its coercive shadow.

Moreover, shadows of hierarchy are even present during the ‘up-loading’ of new EU rules among ‘inter- and trans-governmental actors that come to an agreement’ (Börzel, 2010, p.200). The Commission operates as a centralised ‘hub of policy networks’ (Peterson, 2003) (for full analysis on policy networks, see chapter two) for various interest groups, trade unions, NGOs and governmental actors inside the EU, and it is a catalyst for effective agenda-setting (Pollack, 1997) of new EU policies and rules in EU policy-making structures (Laffan, 2007; Mazey and Richardson, 2001; see also Cini, 2002). Although new EU rules undergo monitoring via several intergovernmental committees – in EU jargon, they are called the ‘comitology’ system (see Glossary) – and, in some cases, voting by representatives from EU members, the supranational hierarchy casts its shadow in decision-making. As Börzel argues, the threat of intergovernmental voting and scrutiny from the Commission significantly influence actors in drafting and deciding new EU rules through ‘supranational joint decision-making’ (Börzel, 2010, p.200). However, although non-state actors lobby and intend to influence agendas and decisions by lobbying the Commission and EU members, ‘economic and social partners still have a marginal role compared to national, regional and local governments’ (Börzel, 2010, p.208; Bomberg and Peterson, 1999). Non-state actors are part of the whole process, but decision-making is mainly dominated and promoted by supranational and national actors (Börzel, 2011; Héritier and Rhodes 2011).

Socialisation, via persuasion and social influence, can equally take place in Europeanization processes among EU members. Socialisation refers to the ‘inculcation’ (Shore, 2000, p.41) or ‘induction’ (Checkel, 2005, p.804) of the rules, values and beliefs of a given community. It also refers to a continuous practice of routinised and standardised ways of doing things, which can lead to value and belief changes (Shore, 2000, p.148). The impact of socialisation is the establishment of rules for ‘appropriate behaviour’ (March and Olsen, 1989, p.164) among the members, a progressive increase in the level of trust, common aspirations, shared language of common norms and
concepts. By ‘talking the talk’ and ‘practising the practices’, the repetition of social communication leads to change in actors’ reciprocal disposition (Bicchi, 2006, p.291). For Johnston, ‘socialisation is aimed at creating membership in a society where intersubjective understandings of the society become taken for granted’ (Johnston, 2001, p.494).

Persuasion and social influence are integral elements of socialisation. Persuasion involves changing minds, opinions and attitudes in the absence of overtly material or mental coercion (Johnston, 2001). Communication and argumentation in routinised fora can progressively influence actors’ beliefs and build shared sets of understanding among the socialised actors (Manners, 2010, p.40). In addition, social influence relates to distribution of rewards and punishments and is a tool of socialisation for public appraisal or opprobrium. Social influence exerts ‘cognitive discomfort to the self-esteem’ to the one that suffers social influence (Johnston, 2001). In cases of public appraisal, it generates reputational effects and raises the prestige of an actor.

Socialisation seems to take the form of an open learning process among EU members whereby actors can learn from each other (Radaelli, 2004; Jordan and Schout, 2006). The introduction of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) in 2000 gave way to bottom-up arguments in policies such as social inclusion, higher education, employment and the environmental integration, broadening the collaboration between supranational actors, civil society and state actors. Under OMC, strategies and action plans are jointly set up among all participants, whereby guidelines and timetables are set to monitor the progress of specific goals (Radaelli, 2008). Benchmarking and exchange of best practices give the opportunity for actors to learn from each other, exchange information and experience coordination based on non-binding rules (Jordan and Schout, 2006, pp.210-211). Socialisation via persuasion and social influence also takes place in various other EU policies, such as foreign policy (de Flers and Müller, 2012), railways (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 1999), and so on, but also in exchanges among Commission officials, state actors and interest groups in Brussels (Laffan, 2007). However, there are no systematic studies that analyse the mechanism of socialisation among EU members and their level of contestation at the domestic level (Börzel and Risse, 2009, p.11).

The outcome of Europeanization at the domestic level differs in relation to policies and EU members and is related to the role of various mediating actors. State executives and interest groups constitute the main actors involved in the transposition of EU policies and rules (Milio, 2010, p.9). Europeanization argues that most of the time there are ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ from domestic adjustment (Laffan, 2007). Interest actors exert
pressures on central governments or national bureaucracies in order to secure benefits, delay or even inhibit the institutionalisation of an EU policy process. For example, in the case of Italy, domestic road hauliers formed institutional veto points (Tsebelis, 1995) in the process of implementation of liberalisation of road haulage promoted by EU Directives (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 1999, p.9). On the other hand in Germany, despite domestic opposition, EU policy was decisively in favour of the pro-liberalisation coalition’ offering more opportunities, rather than the older interventionist system.

The existence of necessary administrative and human resources can also determine the transposition of new EU legislation. A good example is the case of Greece, where the reactive logic of public administration and limited parliamentary debates to translate into national terms the content of an EU Directive restrict the effectiveness of new EU norms, rules and policies (Falkner et al., 2005, p.275). Moreover, in the case of the Packaging Waste Directive, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK had different responses, which were all related to the role of willingness or unwillingness of the central government (Haverland, 2003). In some other cases, the adversarial policy-making structures of an EU member (for example, Spain) can lead to a limited transposition response, while more cooperative policy-making structures (for example, Germany) can lead to better adjustment.

In general terms, existing approaches exploring Europeanization outcomes among EU members have ‘weak explanatory power’, as they are ‘context-sensitive’ (Graziano and Vink, 2013, pp.42-43). There are varying outcomes, and only a limited number of empirical studies systematically explore the impact of Europeanization. As Jordan argues, ‘no single state can hope to be perfectly and consistently aligned with EU requirements, because EU policy is really a complex amalgam of different national approaches’ (Jordan, 2002, p.5). In one among a few studies exploring the compliance of EU members to EU rules in the social and employment policies, Falkner et al. (2005) argue that, despite various responses and different levels of compliance, in the long run all EU members seem to comply with EU requirements. However, the need for further analysis of the outcomes of Europeanization is stressed by various scholars (for instance, Graziano and Vink, 2007; Exadaktylos and Radaelli, 2009; Bolukbasi et al., 2010).
1.4 Europeanization in Central and Eastern European Countries: The Enlargement Wave

Unlike the first wave, the enlargement wave focuses on European countries that wish to become EU members. Membership conditionality and supranational hierarchies are at the core of this wave. Incentives are similar to the first wave, yet the willingness of European non-members to enter the EU strengthens the power of the hierarchical compliance mechanisms of Europeanization, and exerts strong domestic adjustment pressures to the candidates. The desire for full EU membership equally results in limited negotiating power on the part of candidate European countries and increased hierarchical imposition from supranational EU actors, mainly the European Commission.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall, countries from Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe declared their independence and their strong wish to become full EU members (Papadimitriou, 2002; Schimmelfennig, 2001). Accession to the EU symbolised their much-needed ‘return to Europe’ (Schimmelfennig, 2001, p.55). Moreover, the prospect of EU membership was the only available option for them in that period in order to make sure they broke away from their communist past. This limited availability of options resulted in restricted margins of manoeuvre for CEEs and anchorage to the EU by any means. In addition, the neo-liberal agenda of EU’s single market offered the only alternative option to former communist states and a gateway to the emerging Washington Consensus of market economy rules (Grabbe, 1999).

Similar to the first wave, EU membership is at the centre of Europeanization incentives and symbolises democratisation, transition to market economy and political stability. The EU was a grouping of developed countries with long-term political stability, democratic traditions and the successful integration of former dictatorships (Greece, Portugal and Spain) to a democratic way of life. Therefore, joining the EU would first secure their democratic transition and then enhance their political stability. Political stability and international credibility as members of a regional liberal democratic group of states would also raise their political prestige and bring them closer to the international community (Kelley, 2004).

Moreover, EU membership could offer common trading rules and participation in the biggest regional market in the world, which was the only available option for them geographically. After a long period of strict communist rule, CEEs were highly willing to establish trading partnerships with their neo-liberal neighbours. Open trading routes
with the fifteen EU members could contribute to development and growth, especially with the largest and richest ones, such as Germany, the UK, France and Italy (Schimmelfennig, 2001, p.51). Apart from economic benefits, EU membership would offer migration and labour opportunities. The free movement of people could offer them the chance to travel, live and work in any EU country. It needs to be remembered that such freedoms were strictly prohibited in the previous communist regime. Finally, another incentive was financial and technical assistance from the Commission in the process of domestic adjustment to EU policies and rules at their domestic level (Bailey and de Propris, 2004).

The EU members had an equally significant interest in giving the opportunity to non-EU European countries to enter their club. For EU members, the expansion of EU policies and rules outside the EU would relate to the expansion of the single market outside its borders. Possibilities for investment in the new and under-developed markets of CEEs presented significant trade opportunities for EU members (mainly Germany and Italy) and their businesses that could enhance the scope of the single market abroad, multiplying prospects for further growth inside the EU (Schimmelfennig, 2001). Moreover, the democratic transition of former communist countries could also stabilise the EU itself and its immediate neighbourhood, as the threat of unstable countries at the EU’s doorstep could threaten the effective functioning of the market and jeopardise the project of an open and liberalised EU (Schimmelfennig, 2001; Grabbe, 2003).

Mechanisms have a different role to play in this Europeanization wave. Hierarchies, strict conditions and supranational coercion take the lead, leaving limited room for soft compliance mechanisms. The asymmetrical ‘gate-keeping’ (Grabbe, 2003) position of current members towards candidates stressed from the outset the hierarchical relationship between the former and the latter ones, and the limited margin of manoeuvre of non-members (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005). Conditions were set in order to secure that the whole body of EU acquis would be implemented in full and to reassure current members that the effective functioning of the EU would continue even after their accession (Barnes and Barnes, 2010, p.427). In other words, future newcomers needed to prove that they could assume the responsibilities of a club member and successfully integrate the rules of the game domestically (Grabbe, 1999; Papadimitriou, 2002).

At the Copenhagen European Council in 1993, EU members established three main conditions – known as the Copenhagen criteria – for any European country that aspires to become full EU member:
The key mechanism that secures domestic adjustment to EU rules at the domestic level of CEEs is the application of (membership) conditionality. According to Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, conditionality ‘is a bargaining strategy of reinforcement by reward, under which the EU provides external incentives for a target government to comply with its conditions’ (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004, p.670). With the use of membership conditionality as ‘reinforcement by reward’, the EU sets conditions in order to trigger compliance by the candidate countries and secure their implementation. The importance of membership conditionality focuses mainly on the ‘payoffs’ provided by the EU – in this case EU membership. Kelley argues that the benefits of compliance surpass the possible costs and lead candidate countries to adopt policies and rules that would not be adopted without conditionality (Kelley, 2004, p.431). EU conditions upset the domestic equilibrium of the candidate country by introducing (additional) incentives for domestic state actors to comply with EU rules (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004, p.672).

Along with conditionality, strict monitoring from the Commission and the threat of potential suspension of EU membership put added value on membership conditionality. Monitoring is undertaken by the European Commission through annual progress reports and benchmarking among CEEs, which set out the progress of EU acquis implementation at the domestic level of CEEs and offer ‘prescriptions’ in specific policy areas and sectors (Grabbe, 2001, p.1022). Progress reports refer to a strong coercive tool from the part of the Commission. If a candidate country does not respect the Copenhagen criteria (as was the case with Slovakia and Romania) and does not comply with the EU acquis in its entirety, this offers the chance to the Commission to give a negative opinion in its monitoring report for the country, and create uncertainty over the final accession date, cause delay or even suspension from the entire enlargement process. Uncertainty is an integral element of conditionality and is related to the timing and the size of rewards (Grabbe, 2003, pp.318-323; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004). The faster the implementation process, the sooner rewards are delivered.
Strict EU conditions and close monitoring by the Commission offered little room for socialisation and other soft compliance mechanisms to CEEs (Sedelmeier, 2011, p.11; Kelley, 2004). Socialisation would mainly take place in annual bilateral meetings (i.e. Association Councils) and also through several capacity-building programmes that offered a means to narrow administrative and regulatory gaps with EU rules and prepare CEEs’ administrations (Grabbe, 2001, p.315). However, in general terms, socialisation could only be considered as a ‘framing’ (Kelley, 2004) factor in the Europeanization process in CEEs (Sedelmeier, 2011, p.11). The limited impact of socialisation is related to the restricted margins of manoeuvre on the part of candidate countries to negotiate EU rules. CEEs had limited power to influence European Commission experts, as conditions were already unilaterally set by the EU, and EU rules were non-negotiable under Accession Agreements (Papadimitriou, 2002, p.42). Whilst a few CEEs (i.e. Poland) could achieve certain time concessions for rule implementation, all CEEs had to adjust to the whole EU regulatory body at their domestic level.

The process of domestic adjustment is highly technocratic, whereby experts and bureaucrats from each side are engaged in top-down relations. The Commission is the main EU actor that manages the day-to-day reform process with the elite members of each candidate country’s administration. Up-loading is highly absent, as conditions cannot be altered and regulations need to form part of domestic legislation. In addition, unlike the membership wave, domestic actors from non-members have limited capacity to be in a position to play the role of a veto point, or even exert strong influence on the government (Kelley, 2004). The roles of interest groups and other non-state actors are considerably less significant than those of inside EU members (Bulmer and Lequesne, 2013, p.440). In fact, it is even argued that the strong focus of conditionality upon civil servants and bureaucratic elites significantly empowered them to have a countervailing impact upon civil society. In other words, conditionality strengthened the state more than the civil society (Börzel 2010, pp.1-2).

Despite fears that candidate countries could not manage to enforce EU acquis at their domestic level after they become full EU members, certain studies show that CEEs’ compliance records during the first four years of accession are generally better than the old EU members’, with fewer infringement procedures and faster settlement behaviour, and with significant respect for the internal market rules (Sedelmeier, 2008; Pridham, 2008; Steunenberg and Toshkov, 2009). However, other post-accession Europeanization studies speculate that deeply embedded (communist) practices will resurface and traditional political and social institutions and structures, as well as
geopolitical realities, will reassert themselves (Cirtautas and Schimmelfennig, 2010, p.434). Another study (Hille and Knill, 2006) pays attention to the weaknesses of domestic administrative structures and the lack of dense societal representation of interests. Hille and Knill argue that administrative deficiencies might cause serious implementation issues in the future transposition and implementation of EU rules and policies. However, as is the case in the membership wave, there is limited assessment of the rate of implementation in the new EU members and only a few studies (Vachudova, 2008) compare mediating factors before and after the accession.

In general terms, CEEs’ eagerness to anchor to the EU and obtain the goal of full EU membership gave way to a strong gate-keeping position of the Commission. Supranational shadows of hierarchy (Héritier and Rhodes, 2011; Börzel, 2010) defined this asymmetrical position between the Commission and each candidate, and left limited margins of manoeuvre for CEEs (Grabbe, 2001; 2003). CEEs’ willingness to converge even with minimal non-binding EU legislation (i.e. social policy) – which was not necessary as part of EU conditions – showed that their need to convince current EU members outscored their already limited negotiating position in the post-communist European environment. In addition, the Commission’s power to threaten suspension of the accession in the case of violation of EU conditions by the candidate country, or even delaying attributing accession, enhanced the already highly asymmetrical relationship between the EU and each candidate country.

But what would happen in the absence of EU membership as an incentive? Could Europeanization continue taking place in such situations? Non-European countries lack any membership prospects, as, according to the Copenhagen criteria, EU membership is only oriented towards countries of the European continent. In particular, southern Mediterranean countries (SMCs) have different perspectives in terms of political systems, economic structures and willingness to implement all EU acquis. To what extent will the lack of membership conditionality limit the ability of the Commission to influence domestic institutional and regulatory structures to adopt EU policies and rules in the EU’s southern neighbourhood? In addition, how could Europeanization advance domestic adjustment when incentives are weakened and mechanisms of compliance are softened? This thesis argues that a neighbourhood wave of Europeanization is necessary to respond to these questions in order to tackle the theoretical challenges posed by the first two waves of Europeanization.
1.5 The Neighbourhood Wave: Interests, Challenges and Impact of Europeanization in South Mediterranean Countries

The EU’s enlargement policy has been characterised as the most ‘successful EU foreign policy instrument’ (European Commission, 2003, p.5). With the 2004 (CEEs plus Cyprus and Malta), 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania) and recently 2013 (Croatia) accessions, the EU has significantly increased in terms of geography, population and size of economy, incurring the challenge of absorbing these new members. The possibility for further EU enlargement seems only to be available to a small number of candidate\(^3\) and potential candidate\(^4\) European countries (see Glossary) willing to transpose EU *acquis* and ready to comply with EU conditions. An ever-enlarging EU is expected to cause serious challenges to the functioning of the single market, and to potentially incur destabilizing effects (Steunenberg and Dimitrova, 2007).

It is also argued that the scope for the EU’s enlargement, with EU membership as a prospective incentive, may be exhausted. Enlargement may lose its power because of ‘enlargement fatigue’ (Schimmelfennig, 2008). The decreasing confidence of the success of EU membership as an effective incentive for future candidate European countries has been put into question by Brussels and several EU members, suggesting that new modes of governance are needed to support the effective transposition of EU policies and rules outside the EU and abroad (Schimmelfennig, 2008, p.919; Börzel, 2011, pp.55-56). Moreover, it is even more doubtful that the EU can influence its new neighbouring countries that stretch from Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus, not to mention the south Mediterranean countries (SMCs) of North Africa and the Middle East. The lack of EU membership as an incentive in the short and medium run, and the subsequent loss of power from membership conditionality as a compliance mechanism, seem to offer limited opportunities for the expansion of EU *acquis* outside its borders and reduce its scope of influence.

The Commission responded to these challenges with the establishment of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2004. Several debates took place mainly among EU members with limited input from the countries ENP addresses. In 1998, Poland was the first,

\(^3\) Current candidate countries are: fYROM, Iceland, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey.

\(^4\) Current potential candidate countries are: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo.
then candidate, European country that called upon the EU to begin thinking of a new strategy in Eastern Europe (Tonra, 2010, p.61). Mostly motivated by immigration and cross-border crime fears, in 2002 Britain similarly expressed its interest in a European policy towards Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova (Johansson-Noguès, 2007, p.24). Sweden went one step further and argued for an economic and social partnership that would extend from Russia and Ukraine to all SMCs. The November 2002 General Affairs and External Relations Council agreed with the joint policy memo from the High Representative Javier Solana and the External Relations Commissioner Lord Patten that only Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus should initially be included in this new policy, but with future considerations for the inclusion of SMCs and Russia (Solana and Patten, 2002).

In a speech in December 2002, Romano Prodi, then President of the European Commission, referred to the necessity for the EU to develop a neighbourhood policy with its eastern and southern neighbourhood, creating a ‘ring of friends’ as a response to the enlarged EU and its extended borders (Prodi, 2002a, p.3). The new policy would be based on the concept of ‘sharing everything with the Union but institutions’ (Prodi, 2002a, p.6) as an ultimate objective, whereby the quality of the EU’s relations with its new neighbours will depend on their performance and their political will to collaborate with the EU (Prodi, 2001; Prodi, 2002a; European Commission, 2003).

On 11 March 2003, a ‘Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours’ communication was launched by the Commission. It stated (European Commission, 2003, p. 4) that ‘the EU aims to develop a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood through close, peaceful and cooperative relations’. The main incentive of this policy is a stake in the EU’s single market and further integration and liberalisation for the long-term establishment of the four freedoms. It was also argued that ENP would be supplementary and build on existing policies and arrangements, while at a later stage ‘EU’s relations with these countries will resemble the close political and economic links currently enjoyed with the European Economic Area’ (European Commission, 2003, p.15).

Several reactions took place from EU members and southern neighbouring countries. Southern EU members, mainly France and Spain, argued that SMCs should also be introduced to this new policy, as continuous EU focus on the East seems to neglect EU’s interests in the Mediterranean (Cardwell, 2011). In addition, certain Arab Mediterranean countries, such as Morocco and Tunisia, raised concerns over the EU’s southern periphery. For other SMCs the new policy did not seem sufficiently convincing (Driss, 2009, p.2). Furthermore, Eastern European countries, such as Ukraine and
Moldova, reaffirmed their disappointment in the absence of future membership opportunities, at least in the short and medium term (Johansson-Noguès, 2007, p.28). Finally, in 2004 with the Rose revolution in Georgia, the Southern Caucasus states of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia were also included in the European Neighbourhood Policy, along with all SMCs from North Africa and Middle East and the three Eastern European countries of Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus. Although it was initially proposed that Russia would participate, President Putin did not allow Russia to be included in this policy and asked for a different framework of co-operation (Partnership and Co-operation Agreement).

In May 2004, a ‘European Neighbourhood Policy – Strategy Paper’ was launched by the Commission (European Commission, 2004). Compared to the ‘Wider Europe’ communication, the ENP Strategy Paper outlines in more detail the general guidelines that have been set out in the Wider Europe communication. More emphasis is given to the objectives and the priorities for action the bilateral agreements – the so called Action Plans (APs) – may produce. The main areas of objectives for co-operation in the APs are as follows:

- Political dialogue and reform;
- Trade and measures preparing partners for gradually obtaining a stake in the EU’s Internal Market;
- Justice and Home Affairs;
- Energy, transport, information society, environment, research and innovation, and
- Social policy and people-to-people contact.

Flexible bilateral relations are a central concept of this policy. As the new policy cannot offer full EU membership, differentiated relations offer the chance for a reform-willing neighbouring country to obtain short-term rewards, such as increased financial and technical assistance, visa facilitations, and long-term opportunities, such as a stake in the single market. The more Europeanization takes place at their domestic level and the more a neighbouring country complies with jointly-agreed priorities, the closer rewards can be paid to this country. In other words, ENP partners will be offered incentives on the basis of how far each of them is prepared to comply with EU policies and rules in order to be granted a stake in the single market and close political and economic links (Vincentz, 2007; Gebhard, 2010).

However, the expansion of Europeanization to these countries faces serious challenges in terms of incentives and mechanisms, mostly in the case of SMCs. The main challenge
refers to the absence of EU membership as an incentive, and it constitutes a core
difference from the previous waves. While the prospect of membership is not
mentioned in official documents, eastern neighbourhood countries⁵ (see Map 1) can
still be eligible for EU membership (under the Copenhagen criteria), as they are all
European countries and belong geographically to the European continent. In other
words, membership is still an option, in the long run (Emerson et al., 2007; Baun,
2007).

Map 1: Eastern neighbours under European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) (DG
Environment, 2014a)

On the other hand, south Mediterranean countries⁶ (SMCs) (see Map 2 below) cannot
have such an option. SMCs are not part of geographical Europe and are automatically
excluded from any membership prospect. Therefore, membership conditionality and
hierarchical imposition from the Commission are not expected to be used towards

⁵According to the European Neighbourhood Policy (2004), eastern neighbours are: Belarus, Moldova and
Ukraine (Eastern Europe) and Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia (Southern Caucasus).

⁶Southern neighbours (or SMCs) are: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Occupied
Palestinian Territories, Syria and Tunisia.
SMCs. This absence is also expected to reduce the power of the Commission to operate as gate-keeper. SMCs cannot be eligible for membership and, consequently, the Commission cannot decide about the candidate’s accession (Johansson-Noguès, 2007; Whitman and Wolff, 2010).

Map 2: Southern neighbours under European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) (DG Environment, 2014b)

Another challenge is whether SMCs will domestically adjust their regulatory and institutional structures to EU rules. Action Plans between the Commission and each SMC do not require full adoption of the EU acquis, as was the case in the second wave of Europeanization. Instead, they offer them the opportunity to prioritise policy areas and rules of common interest with the EU (Magen, 2006). Moreover, unlike in the membership wave, there is no prediction for any financial sanctions or even cooperation suspension in non-compliance cases (Emerson et al., 2007). Policies and rules that are of lesser importance, or of limited interest, may be avoided, or even not implemented. Selective compliance can incur downgraded domestic adjustment and ‘patchy’ regulatory structures (Casier, 2011). In addition, the Commission’s funding is not expected to trigger increased compliance or even adoption of the EU acquis. The size of grants for each SMC accounts for only a slight percentage of each SMC’s GDP, with no major impact on domestic financial activity as foreign direct investment (FDI),
or even as a generator of reforms towards the market economy (see chapters five and six). Also, problems in administrative structures and limited capacities to dispatch available funds will worsen any possibilities for conditional funding (Ugur and Tovias, 2005).

Furthermore, the EU’s model of market economy presents several difficulties and challenges for SMCs. The long-term reward of a stake in the single market, trade opportunities, growth and economic benefits could be seen as significant incentives for rule adoption and domestic adjustment with EU policies and rules. Yet, ‘single market’ conditionality is expected to have limited results, as the mere reforms toward trade liberalisation are expected to incur costly reforms for the (semi-) autocratic SMCs (Vincentz, 2007). As most of these countries have strong state monopolies and centralised governmental structures, the possible shift to a different economic model may jeopardise the whole regime and incur instability and privilege losses for state actors (Börzel and Risse, 2012, pp.200-201). Studies of the market economy reforms based on International Monetary Fund (IMF) programmes show that privatisation had been unable to deliver growth, increased investment, productivity and competitiveness (Comelli and Paciello, 2009, p.62). Some studies also argue that in several cases the costs of complying with parts of EU legislation are much higher than any prospective gains of possible integration in the single market (Ugur and Tovias, 2005; Cardwell, 2011).

In the neighbourhood wave of Europeanization a stake in the single market is also a rather unclear and non-credible incentive (Whitman and Wolff, 2010; Varwick and Lang, 2007; Gebhard, 2010). In the official ENP documents, no clear end date is offered for reform-willing countries in terms of granting final rewards. Similarly, drawing from the CEEs enlargement experience, the Commission is not expected to specify threshold levels and clearly indicate when benchmarks are achieved in the adjustment process (Noutcheva and Emerson, 2007, p.83; see also Grabbe, 2003). Uncertainty and unclear time horizons are expected to be part of the Commission’s tactics, even in this wave. Moreover, short-term incentives, such as visa facilitation and participation in EU agencies, cannot be considered as robust EU rewards that will compensate for the transposition of costly reforms in (semi-) authoritarian regimes (Bicchi, 2011; Kelley, 2006; Ugur and Tovias, 2005). Finally, the outburst of the Arab Spring and the global financial crisis have exacerbated further instability in their domestic economies, reducing the level and the speed of reforms and even causing negative socio-economic impacts, i.e. youth unemployment (Comelli and Paciello, 2009).
In addition to this, another major challenge for the neighbourhood wave of Europeanization towards SMCs is the absence of democratic regimes, limited respect for the rule of law and human rights. The majority of SMCs have no democratic past and have poor records in the rule of law and human rights areas (Freedom House, 2011). There are limited political freedoms granted to the civil society and poor records of free and fair democratic elections. At the same time, there is a distant relationship between the state and society (Comelli and Paciello, 2009, pp.67-71; Entelis, 2011). Europeanization presupposes democratic societies and rules in target countries. Drawing lessons from the case of the enlargement process with Slovakia, Europeanization was not able to be advanced when a nationalist leadership was in place (Kelley, 2004). Only when the pro-democratic opposition came into power, was reform applied at the domestic level. In the case of SMCs, autocratic state actors mainly determine the political, economic and social life. Hence, it will be unlikely for them to put at risk stability and privileges (Youngs, 2004; Cavatorta et al., 2009; Fröhlich, 2010).

It is equally difficult to argue that SMCs will comply because of the democratic conditionality of the EU. Even after EU initiatives towards SMCs, such as the 1995 Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (see parts 4.4 and 4.5 for full analysis), democratic rules and values such as respect of human rights and rule of law were not respected and conditions kept worsening in most of these countries (Youngs, 2004). Although agreements between the EU and each SMC mention these rules and stress their importance for the continuation of bilateral relations, at no point has the EU postponed relations with any of these countries. Instead, it is even more surprising that bilateral relations between the EU with certain of these countries (for example, Morocco, Jordan, Tunisia) are deepening and progressing, whilst no progress has been shown in democracy. Despite the outburst of the Arab Spring in many SMCs, few would argue that the EU determined these revolutions. Instead, the EU was promoting the stabilisation of its relations with the previous autocratic regimes (Börzel and Risse, 2012).

7One exception was with Libya in late 1990s. Because of UN sanctions at the time for the Lockerbie case, Libya had no contractual relations with the EU and has not been invited to EMP. It was only in 1999 that an observer status was attributed to Libya, after the UN sanctions had been lifted with the surrender of two Libyan suspects. Moreover, in relation to the suspension of EU-Syrian relations in 2011, this resulted only after the outburst of the Arab Spring in Tunisia, Egypt and in other Arab countries. Before the Arab Spring, EU relations with all other SMCs were never interrupted.
From the analysis so far, the neighbourhood wave of Europeanization for the EU’s southern neighbourhood can be characterised by distant and uncertain incentives, costly reforms and weakened conditionality strength (Tocci, 2005, p.32; Vincentz, 2007, p.127; see also Escribano, 2006). The absence of EU membership hampers opportunities for domestic adjustment to EU rules. Although bilateral relations may intend to reinforce bilateral relations and prioritise reforms, the lack of coercion and the voluntary character of agreements diminish the EU’s impact on domestic structures (Manners, 2010, p.40).

How then can Europeanization advance domestic adjustment when incentives are weakened? The flexibility of ENP framework offers broader margins of manoeuvre for SMCs to negotiate with the Commission on domestic adjustment, as they are not required to fully align with EU requirements and prioritise certain policy areas over others. How can Europeanization surpass selective compliance and achieve domestic adjustment? What could be the role of softer compliance mechanisms, such as socialisation, in this process? In addition, to what extent could more ‘horizontal’ mechanisms (Radaelli, 2003) expand Europeanization pressures towards SMCs?

The literature claims that ENP offers an ‘open-ended process’, which encourages routinised policy processes, dialogue and variable levels of contractual engagement (Manners, 2010). One of the key ENP elements is the development of a shared partnership between the Commission and each partner, based on joint ownership. Joint ownership implies a long-term cooperation which is intended to build trust and mutual understanding over common interest goals. Joint ownership also signifies that ENP refers to a unified effort from both sides to deliver on commonly identified policy areas, whereby the Commission will support the commitment of the other party. In other words, the Commission does not intend to be the main actor that imposes and monitors, as was the case in the enlargement wave, but the other side will have to be strongly engaged and motivated so that this ‘shared partnership’ produces fruitful outcomes (Manners, 2010, p.42).

Therefore, a shared partnership based on joint ownership is expected to engage both sides in honest and reciprocal debate on future priorities over a long list of policy areas. Dialogue, therefore, is at the centre of this process, whereby each side will aim to ‘listen’ to each other in order to find common grounds of communication. Joint ownership also aims to show to each neighbour that ENP is not a ‘hub-and-spoke’ policy framework, where the Commission dictates and the candidates adjust. It attempts to tone down former conditionality practices and create rather a co-owned, shared environment, where trust and reciprocity will guide bilateral relations (Gebhard, 2010, p.99).
The Commission also intends to show that SMCs are free to determine the level of commitment and ambition of their engagement. It is up to them to decide to what extent they intend to have a stake of the EU’s incentives (Rhein, 2007; Noutcheva and Emerson, 2007). Thus, the Commission is not there to impose or set the pace of the relationship. Instead, SMCs are those that set the pace of ambition and the Commission supports the ambitions of the partner (EEAS official, May 2013). As relations are predominantly intergovernmental between the Commission and the elite actors and bureaucracies of each SMC, this will give the chance for SMC actors to negotiate specific preferences in the adoption of certain aspects of the EU acquis with the Commission’s officials (Noutcheva and Emerson, 2007, p.93).

In this process, socialisation seems to acquire significant role for the Commission that may influence SMCs. Socialisation refers to the continuous practice of standardised dialogue and communication, which can lead to value and belief changes in an actor’s mind-set (Checkel, 2005; Johnston, 2001) (for analysis on socialisation, persuasion and social influence, see pp.31-32). Argumentation, communication and institutionalised engagement in routinised fora contribute to socialisation among actors. ENP offers several socialisation settings and other capacity-building incentives, which are drawn from the enlargement process (Kelley, 2006).

However, socialisation by itself cannot fully explore how domestic adjustment in non-European countries can take place in the process of Europeanization. Interaction in network settings can explore how actors’ perspectives and motivations are unfolded in socialisation processes. Policy networks favour socialisation in jointly-owned processes and can promote participatory engagement. Cooperation can be induced by gradual trust-building in technical matters and mutual accommodation of costs and benefits among network participants in the decision-making process (Rhodes, 1997; Klijn, 2008; Mayntz, 2002; Börzel, 1997). Such policy networks can also encapsulate the element of long-term relations and planning (Rhodes, 2013, p.5; Rhodes, 2006). Since ENP is a ‘long-term process of socialisation’ (Manners, 2010, p.42), policy networks may operate as Europeanization mechanisms in the long run and problem-solving fora in the short term, where network actors develop consensus on reforms based on EU rules.

Furthermore, policy networks can operate as decision-making fora, which debate upon the continuity of this ‘shared partnership’ (European Commission, 2004), manage common goals and mutually develop bilateral cooperation. Decision-making via policy networks can equally limit confrontational relations among participants by introducing a politically neutral framework of cooperation (Rhodes, 1997; 2006). Funds and
expertise by the Commission can also surpass the absence of coercive routes and the lack of EU membership incentive, and enhance socialisation among specialised agents from each side. Since most SMCs refer to (semi-) autocratic regimes with poor democratic records, the non-confrontational and technical atmosphere of policy networks on jointly-agreed cooperation may give the opportunity for the Commission to advance its preferences and parts of EU acquis in a gradual manner. Finally, functional cooperation in policy areas of mutual interest, such as climate change, may build relations among network members and build domestic adjustment to EU rules.

1.6 Conclusion

This chapter conceptualised the main defining elements of Europeanization and described how Europeanization takes place in the membership and enlargement waves. It also explored the challenges and the potential influence of a neighbourhood wave of Europeanization in SMCs. It was firstly argued that, although Europeanization shares several overlapping elements with European integration, an integrated theory which encompasses all key characteristics of this concept has yet to be defined (Graziano and Vink, 2007; Exadaktylos and Radaelli, 2009; Bolukbasi et al., 2010). Definitions of Europeanization mainly stress its top-down (or ‘down-loading’) orientation and explore the ‘domestic adjustment of European regional integration’ (Vink and Graziano, 2007; 2013). Europeanization, though, is also considered as a ‘two-way’ (Börzel, 2001) process whereby the formation – or ‘up-loading’ – of new EU policies and rules is also integral element in this ‘constant’ process (Radaelli, 2000; 2003) of adjustment. The main analytical framework of Europeanization is based on the ‘three-step’ model (Caporaso, 2007; Risse et al., 2001) which pays attention to the compatibility of domestic structures and the role of mediating factors as key elements of domestic adjustment (‘fit’) or mal-adjustment (or ‘misfit’) (see Part 1.2).

Europeanization has several pitfalls as a concept. There is limited focus on the ‘up-loading’ process of Europeanization. The focus of the literature is almost exclusively at the top-down level and the transfer of EU policies and rules at the domestic level (Bolukbasi et al., 2010). Although Europeanization explores how adjustment takes place at the domestic level, it does not explain whether, and to what extent, adjustment equally occurs at the EU level. Finally, it is significantly EU-centric as a concept (Lehmkuhl, 2007) and has limited interaction with other theories.

Despite the limited clarification of several elements of Europeanization and its unclear theoretical framework, this research identifies three waves: Europeanization among EU
members (membership wave), Europeanization for candidate European countries (enlargement wave), and Europeanization outside Europe for the EU’s southern neighbourhood (neighbourhood wave). Each wave is characterised by various incentives, mechanisms and actors engaged in the formation and implementation of EU rules. EU membership and the effective functioning of the single market constitute the main incentives in the membership and enlargement waves of Europeanization. EU membership sustains continuous up-loading and down-loading of EU policies and rules among EU members. In the case of the enlargement wave of Europeanization, the incentive of future accession to the EU constitutes a central role for this uni-directional Europeanization policy process.

The main difference between the membership and enlargement waves is on the level of mechanisms. Coercion and socialisation are the main mechanisms that secure compliance and negotiation among supranational, national and non-state actors among EU members. The supranational shadow of hierarchy from EU institutions plays a key role in the formation and implementation of EU policies and rules (Börzel, 2010) in the up-loading process. On the other hand, membership conditionality (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004; 2005) is a key mechanism used by the Commission in the transposition of the EU acquis at the domestic level of CEEs. Socialisation is significantly absent, as networks and open dialogue are substituted for by vertical relationships of direct transfer of EU preferences in each country (Grabbe, 2003; Papadimitriou, 2002). Domestic adjustment is achieved in both waves, despite certain differentiations among EU members.

Europeanization in non-European neighbouring countries faces several challenges. EU membership is totally absent as an incentive outside Europe. Other EU incentives, such as a stake in the single market, are expected to trigger less interest for compliance and rule adoption. Neighbouring countries are not expected to be triggered by the unclear final reward of a stake in the single market and aim to push forward costly and high-quality reforms (Noutcheva and Emerson, 2007; Vincentz, 2007; Whitman and Wolff, 2010). Moreover, the lack of EU membership is accompanied by voluntary agreements focusing on a broad range of policies. Hence, there is a limited enforcement link between a final reward and the EU acquis as a whole. After all, non-compliance is acceptable in ENP, as neighbouring countries can take advantage of the joint ownership principle and push forward reforms in policies of their interest (Casier, 2011).

Socialisation based on coordination and trust-building may trigger sustainable cooperation in policy networks between the Commission and SMC experts and bureaucrats. By using the functional and trust-building environment of policy networks
as mechanism for compliance, the Commission may find a pathway to prioritise its own agendas, offering funds and expertise incentives and supporting expertise interactions with SMCs. As hierarchies are absent, policy networks will also tone down top-down culture in Europeanization inside Europe, where network actors will advance consensus on reforms based on EU rules.

The next chapter builds on the concept of Europeanization and its three waves, and explores the role of policy networks in the expansion of Europeanization without membership incentive in the EU’s southern neighbourhood. It also elaborates an analytical framework that explores how the Commission utilises policy networks as mechanisms of Europeanization, in order to advance reforms regarding climate change mitigation in the two case studies of Morocco and Algeria.
Chapter 2:
Policy Networks, Network Management and Europeanization in the EU’s Southern Neighbourhood: A Framework of Analysis

2.1 Introduction

In chapter one, it was argued that EU membership and market opportunities are the core incentives that trigger domestic adjustment to EU rules in Europeanization inside Europe. Amongst EU members, supranational shadows, command-and-control and socialisation mechanisms secure the formation and transfer of EU legislation at the domestic level of current EU members (Börzel, 2010; Héritier and Lehmkuhl, 2008). The more Europeanization flows outside EU members, the more hierarchical imposition and membership conditionality take on central roles in the process of domestic adjustment in the candidate European countries (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2007).

In recent years, Europeanization has attempted to expand outside Europe to the EU’s southern ‘near abroad’, but it faces several challenges. Membership conditions cannot be imposed outside Europe, as only European countries can have such aspirations (Copenhagen European Council, 1993). While market incentives can be available as future motivation, such aspirations are expected to incur costly reforms, as they are not followed by robust conditions and hierarchical impositions (Whitman and Wolff, 2010; Varwick and Lang, 2007; Vincentz, 2007). So, what allows Europeanization to occur in non-European neighbouring countries? How does Europeanization advance domestic adjustment outside Europe in the south Mediterranean countries (SMCs) in the absence of EU membership and membership conditionality? Can it be assumed that more coordinating and co-owned reform processes will substitute for the hierarchies?

In light of these questions, climate change presents several opportunities that can trigger cooperation between the EU and neighbouring non-European countries. Regulated policy frameworks in North Africa, based on EU rules, could establish a friendly framework for new energy markets for the EU and the importation of green electricity, in order to cover its growing energy demand and diversify its energy mix. However, the two North African case studies of this research, Morocco and Algeria, hold different perspectives on this matter. Climate change adaptation is highly
prioritised over climate change mitigation. Both countries are highly vulnerable to climate change, which is expected to cause serious damage to their socio-economic development (MATE, 2010; MATUHE, 2010). However, both countries have significant natural potential to produce green electricity from renewable energies (IRENA, 2013; Fritzche et al., 2011). So, how can it be presumed that the European Commission will anchor both countries to the Europeanization processes and generate domestic adjustment? By what means can the Commission create the incentives in order to convince each country to adjust to EU rules?

The thesis argues that, in the absence of the membership incentive, Europeanization outside Europe will establish policy network relations based on socialisation processes in order to build incentives with local elites from SMCs. Policy networks emphasise the informal relationship in the process of policy-making, which is based upon privileged relations, a stable environment and interdependent resources (Rhodes, 1997; Rhodes, 2000; Marsh, 1998). As conditions are toned down in the European Neighbourhood Policy, relations via policy networks (Rhodes, 2006; Börzel, 2011) are necessary for the Commission to persuade experts and bureaucrats from non-European countries to engage in reforms that are in accordance with EU policies and rules. Also, the conflicting policy preferences of each side over climate change require politically insulated networks that can build consensus over mitigation issues.

Arguments about Europeanization and EU studies outside Europe assume that interdependencies, EU incentives and domestic administrative capacities play the main roles in the process of domestic adjustment in non-European countries (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2011; Börzel and Hackenesch, 2013). It is also stated that increased socialisation via policy networks can enhance the integration of good, or democratic, rules and values in the domestic regulatory systems of non-European countries. However, such arguments tend to overlook the role of policy networks as reform channel and as Europeanization mechanism. They do little to explain how socialisation takes place in conflicting policy fields, such as climate change, and whether policy networks sustain change in all situations.

This chapter argues instead that policy communities have a significant role to play in Europeanization processes outside Europe when supported by network management at an ‘arm’s length’ (Rhodes, 2000). Although network actors can be motivated by broader incentives, consensus among network actors is critical for establishing co-ownership, which will ensure that regulatory, expertise and financial incentives are fully utilised on the ground. Both Morocco and Algeria have antithetical policy agendas and priorities from the European Commission concerning climate change and
consensus will be required, so that domestic adjustment can take place in each country. Trust and mutual understanding amongst the network actors from each side can significantly contribute to develop the necessary framework of collaboration which will enhance co-ownership of jointly agreed reforms. Stable network relations and hands-off network management can contribute to service delivery. Furthermore, policy networks can be bound by common bureaucratic beliefs and technical expertise, and by network autonomy from the Commission through financial and technical assistance (Scharpf, 1997).

However, this thesis stresses that, despite incentive creation amongst network actors and insulated network relations from central agencies, policy networks are not able to advance Europeanization in all settings, nor can they always deal with conflict. In the Algerian case, EU market economy rules and renewable energies require the liberalisation of the Algerian market rules, which are expected to jeopardise the country’s monopoly of conventional energy resources (see chapter six). Also, past conflicting relations with the EU and France have developed mistrust amongst the Algerian actors towards Europe, which interferes with the politically neutral setting that the Commission wishes to develop in the policy area of climate change mitigation. Although policy networks are mainly meant to advance service delivery of stability and routines, they fail to manage, or even deter, conflictual situations in network relations. Therefore, this thesis stresses the argument that policy networks and highly interdependent network actors can advance adjustment to EU rules outside Europe; however, the policy network approach needs to incorporate the argument that conflict can challenge their stability and lead to failure when advancing Europeanization outside Europe.

The chapter is organised in four parts. The first part reviews the literature on policy networks, theorising the whole concept based on its merits and its limits. The second part discusses the role of policy networks in European governance. The third part engages in a dialogue about arguments of Europeanization outside Europe regarding the role of policy networks and speculates upon their role in the neighbourhood wave of Europeanization in the EU’s southern neighbourhood. The fourth part summarises the main concepts and arguments of the theoretical framework and it closes with some concluding remarks.
2.2 Theorizing Policy Networks: Merits and Limits

Policy networks are a ubiquitous concept in the multiple domains of the political and social sciences (Rhodes, 2000; 2006; Börzel, 2011; 1997). The concept of a policy network refers to a ‘cluster of concepts’ that describes various intra- and inter-governmental interactions with several non-governmental actors and interests, and may range from iron triangles and epistemic communities to policy communities and issue networks (Rhodes, 2006, p.1; Börzel, 2011). Policy networks emerged in the 1960s and 1970s as a response to the monolithic focus of the pluralism-(neo) corporatism tradition to illustrate how interest intermediation took place between public and private interactions (Börzel, 2011; Marsh and Rhodes, 1992). In an influential study, Heclo (1978) criticised the way terms such as ‘iron triangles’ and ‘subsystems’ illustrate the way policymaking was taking place in a given policy field in US politics. Rather than clustered and stable iron triangles, policy networks comprise flexible ad hoc issue networks which include various actors from the government, committees and other interest groups (Enroth, 2011, p.21).

Rhodes’ seminal work about the British government (Rhodes, 1988; 1990; 1997) was instrumental in developing policy networks into a typology of interest intermediation (Börzel, 2011, p.50; Börzel, 1997). In his classic study of the British government in the 1980s, Rhodes observed that the state was decreasingly the point of reference in its service delivery to society. Instead, policy networks constituted of governmental actors, interest groups, businesses and other non-state actors took part in national policymaking in order to deliver state policies (Rhodes, 1988; 1990). His work captured the developments of Thatcher’s government, which was gradually out-sourcing the state and engaging in structural relationships between resource-interdependent actors when policy-making (Rhodes, 2007, p.1248; Rhodes, 1990; 1988).

There are several definitions that strive to capture the uniqueness of policy networks. Policy networks could be described as ‘sets of formal institutional and informal linkages between governmental and other actors structured around shared if endlessly negotiated beliefs and interests in public policymaking and implementation’ (Rhodes, 2006, p.2). Also, they could be termed as ‘clusters of actors in a given policy sector who are linked together in political, social or economic life that could bring policy success or policy failure’ (Peterson, 2009, p.195; Bomberg and Peterson, 1999).

Furthermore, several attempts had been made to summarise the main characteristics of policy networks. Van Waarden (1992) argued that policy networks refer to an inter-organisational form between markets and hierarchies, based on institutionalised
exchange relations between the state and civil society. He also argued that there were several dimensions that define the concept of policy networks (Van Waarden, 1992, pp.33-38). For Van Waarden, policy network functions ranged from actors, functions, structures and institutionalisation to rules, power relations and strategies. Actors were not independent from the structure of policy networks, but they were seen as representing the organisations that they were coming from. Networks assume various functions that bridge the structure of the network and the actors’ perspectives. Moreover, the structures of policy networks play a significant role, as they not only specify the number of actors and their relations, but can also determine the degree of stability and institutionalisation (Van Waarden, 1992, pp.34-35). Other elements refer to the rules of the game that govern actor exchanges within the network, the relative power of the network and its actors amongst themselves and in relation to their principals and, finally, the strategies that actors develop in order to manage their relations amongst themselves and in relation to the previous dimensions (Van Waarden, 1992, pp.37-38).

Similarly, in another study, Jordan and Schubert (1992) intended to provide various conceptual elements that define policy networks. They mainly focused on the level of institutionalisation (stable/unstable), the scope of the policy-making arrangement (sectoral/trans-sectoral), and the number of participants (restricted/open) (Börzel, 1997, p.3). Peterson argued (2003, pp.7-8) that Jordan and Schubert played a significant role in advancing the idea that issue networks were one variant of networks which existed on a continuum, varying from being loose to tightly insulated.

The most prominent and most-cited typology of policy networks is the one introduced by Marsh and Rhodes (1992) which placed policy networks on a continuum with a policy community at one end and issue networks at the other (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992, p.250). They argued that there is great variety in policy network typologies and that no policy area will conform exactly to either list of characteristics. In this continuum, there are several features that define the typology of a network, which can range from concise, cohesive, symmetrical and continuous policy communities to expanded, diverse, asymmetrical and disrupting issue networks (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992, p.250).

Membership, network integration and resource distribution are core elements of this continuum that characterise policy networks and are, even nowadays, a point of reference in policy network literature (Börzel, 2011). Membership of policy communities is stable and often fixed, whereas it is often unstable and quite fluid in issue networks. In policy communities, the number of participants is limited and involves more than one department or an agency, and a limited number of a few
interest groups (Smith, 1993). There may be other peripheral members attempting to alter the high level of insularity of a policy community. However, their access will be consciously denied by those who are already members of the network, either through lack of influence, or because of limited resources (Ansell and Gash, 2007).

The format of policy communities relates to a restraining behaviour framework whereby actors manipulate the rules of the game in order to maximise their interests and constrain change. Actors in policy communities are engaged in continuous and consistent interaction, whereby actors’ interests incrementally sustain and reinforce the networks, favouring long-term stability and the current status quo (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992; Enroth, 2011). They also hold certain policy preferences and a significant resource volume, based upon common perceptions of a problem or an issue. Resource dependencies connect the actors to each other, by using specific strategies within the understood rules of the game (Rhodes, 1997; 2006; cf. Benson, 1982). In contrast, in an issue network, network insulation is loose, as the members have few resources to influence the government and the privileged members of a policy community, because they are ‘at the periphery rather than at the core of the policy agenda’ (Marsh and Rhodes 1992, p.254). Interest groups, such as private non-governmental network members, are allowed to have privileged access to the network, as they have tradable resources, such as information, legitimacy and implementation, which can be exchanged for some control over policy.

Trust, reciprocity and diplomacy in frameworks of interaction sustain and increase the interdependence of their members, which enhances the stability of the interactions and supports confidence-building (Rhodes, 2013). Trust is a significant element in the life of policy networks and for its actors, as it is dependent on collaborative interaction, long-term commitment and devotion to a shared goal (Rhodes, 2000; Ansell and Gash, 2007). As Rhodes argues

shared values and norms are the glue which holds the complex set of relationships together; trust is essential for cooperative behaviour and, therefore, the existence of the network (Rhodes, 2013, p.4).

Collaborative face-to-face dialogue gives the opportunity for policy network actors to deliberate and communicate over common gains, or even reduce any (historical) mistrust, while long-term commitment and focus on the shared goals and interests sustain the cooperation and provide joint ownership of the whole process. Of course, trust is not something that can be established in a short period of time; it is a long-term, iterative and reciprocal task on both sides that is cultivated and embedded in the
network, thus reinforcing routines and sustaining behaviours (Kickert et al., 1997; Hoffman, 2002).

Reciprocity refers to another key characteristic that characterises policy network interactions and is commonly shared among network participants. Reciprocity is an element that is progressively built as network trust develops, enhancing stability and routine cooperation. It also facilitates interaction and communication amongst the actors and strengthens loyalty and the achievement of common goals (Rhodes, 2000). Reciprocal practices are shared by network actors as day-to-day engagement reinforces mutuality and joint ownership. Because of their insulated environment, away from party politics, networks operate as distinct policy fora, whereby the focus is more on how to manage the interests of the actors in these policy networks in order to provide a cost-effective and consensus-built solution for all network participants (Rhodes, 2006; Klijn, 2008). In general terms, trust-building, increasing interaction and routine communication between the actors leads to institutionalised coordination and joint ownership (Klijn, 2008; Börzel, 2011).

Finally, diplomacy is another integral part of policy networks. Diplomacy – or management by negotiation – refers to a key skill that lies at the heart of inter-organisational networks, and network management in general. It is mainly related to an actor’s ability to ‘sit where the other person sits’ and learn about the other actor’s situation (Rhodes, 2007, p.1248; Rhodes, 2013). In cases of exchanges between several actors from several cross-functional bureaucracies, collaborative understanding and negotiation is crucial for successful continuity of the policy process. Diplomacy is not only present amongst network actors, but also between networks and their central agencies.

Policy networks stretch their conceptual characteristics and associate with discussions of governance and public administration, regarding the state as an interdependent web of networks (Rhodes, 1997). Policy networks, as a new mode of governance (Börzel, 1997; cf. Rhodes, 1997), seek to capture the growing difficulties of traditional government and project themselves as the emerging form of governance that will offer an alternative paradigm in inter-organisational relations (Blanco et al., 2011, p.299). Focusing on the Westminster reforms, Rhodes examined the role of self-organising, interlinked networks that make up the whole state (Rhodes, 1997). In this sense, networks are the constituent element of this new way of governance, and the state is considered as a network of self-organising resource-dependent networks (Rhodes, 1996; 2007). In addition, Rhodes argued that the British political system had shifted towards a ‘differentiated polity’, whereby state functions had got lost ‘upwards to the
European Union, downwards to special purpose bodies and outward to agencies’ (Rhodes, 1997; 2007). Put briefly, the state had become institutionally fragmented into specialised areas of competence, where hierarchies and markets could not capture this shift ‘from government to governance’ (Rhodes, 1997; Stoker, 1998). Commands and vertical imposition were decreasing points of reference in policymaking because of the segmented organisational landscape, but also because of public disenchantment with that form of governance (Blanco et al., 2011, p.299).

Furthermore, by the 1990s, governments were no longer considered to be unitary hierarchical actors, and can no longer exclusively control and activate their hierarchical role in society (Kooiman, 1993). The scope and the width of public policies and the incapacity of public administration to handle new information and needs in a fast-growing and interdependent world led governments to new forms of governance (Jordan and Schout, 2006). Responsibilities and policymaking structures were expanded towards the broader society, promoting inclusive society-wide policymaking and public–private cooperation for service delivery (Kooiman, 1993; Stoker, 1998; Hafner-Burton et al., 2009). Several intermediate actors, such as private companies, civil society and other non-state actors, interdependently interact with the state and governmental actors in several governmental arenas, where policymaking powers are shared in a resource-dependent context (Rhodes, 2006). The focus is no longer on the perspective of the governors and the governed, as the role of the state is questioned in these ‘new’ (Rhodes, 1996) and ‘modern’ (Kooiman, 1993) horizontal governance situations.

In addition, the emergence of ‘messy’ (Rhodes, 1997) – or ‘wicked’ (Rittel and Webber, 1973) – socio-economic problems (for instance, climate change, terrorism) limit the potential of hierarchical or market control (Blanco et al., 2011, p.300). Markets seem unable to control the production of negative externalities (market failures) (Börzel, 1997, p.7). They also understand the coordinating and managerial environment of networks as contracts that mainly emerge from the self-coordination of autonomous actors (Rhodes, 2006, p.446; Börzel, 2011, p.52). In contrast, network governance operates as an alternative governing mode in public administration issues that brings closer dispersed actors from several sectors, territories and countries, prioritises certain policy areas, remains insulated from public arenas and pushes forward solutions based on professional expertise and ethics (Rhodes, 2007). Since networks best operate in non-confrontational relations based on shared trust and mutual gains amongst inter-organisational actors, they create a distinct form of policymaking that significantly differs from hierarchies and markets and adapts to the challenges of today’s public
administration needs. Coordination, trust-building and increasing interaction and communication between the actors establishes a new form of governance that surpasses the state, in that it does not attempt to ‘hollow out’ its core, but instead substitutes it, via institutionalised coordination and joint ownership (Klijn, 2008; Börzel, 2011).

However, the policy networks approach is not short of criticism. Firstly, there are certain arguments in the literature claiming that, while policy networks are useful as a metaphor, they lack the necessary capacity to develop a cohesive theory (Kassim, 1994). Part of the criticism is mainly drawn from Marsh and Rhodes (1992) statement that networks refer to a ‘meso-level’ concept, which stresses the importance of organisational interactions amongst interdependent actors. Certain arguments (Kassim, 1994; Peters, 1998; Dowding, 1995) have stated that the policy networks approach cannot stand on its own, as it is dependent on macro- and micro-theories for it to unfold its potential. In other words, while the policy networks approach may be useful in explaining ‘the cracks or crevices’ (Peterson, 2009, p.116) in modern governance or the inter-organisational process of policy-making in state settings, it requires the existence of a macro-theory in order to verify its explanatory presence.

Another criticism is related to the relationship between the broader context and the structure of policy networks (Dowding, 1995; Dowding, 2001; Evans, 2002; Marsh and Smith, 2000). According to Marsh and Smith, a network structure creates ‘dialectical’ relations, whose influence is to restrain actors’ behaviour, define roles and delineate the rules of the game (Marsh and Smith, 2000, p.5). Marsh and Smith argue that this dialectical relationship between policy networks and policy outcomes should be explored in relation to three key elements: the relationship between the structure and the agency, the network and its context and the network and its outcome (Marsh and Smith, 2000). The structure of policy networks builds routine and repeated behaviour amongst actors and sustains cooperation amongst interdependent and resource-dependent actors. Although actors are politically motivated and interact with the external environment, the network structure constitutes a pattern of cooperation that simplifies actions, coordination and problem-solving.

However, ‘dialectical’ relations seem to over-emphasise the network structure and appear to limit actors’ roles (Dowding, 2001). Dowding stresses the role of actors in a network and their centrality, irrespective of the network’s structure (Dowding, 1995; 2001). Evans (2002) shares the view that there are several webs of networks that interact with governance and broader forms and structures, but his main criticism refers to the unclear dialectical relationship that Marsh and Smith intended to unravel. Evans points out that ‘past acts of social and political construction’ should be integral
parts of any dialectical analysis of networks, actors and their external environment (Evans, 2002, p.545). From another point of view, Hay and Richards (2000) argue that actors utilise certain ‘strategies’ in order to become engaged in a mutual resource exchange relationship. Policy actors participate if ‘they think they can get something out of it’ (Compston, 2009, p.8; Hay and Richards, 2000). Actors’ strategic interests lead them to forge strategic alliances, whereby resource exchange and network stability sustain their cooperation.

From a different point of view, James (2010) argues that network actors are not disconnected from their broader political context. James considers that network actors still have distinct political considerations and certain policy interests and they can be influenced by international, regional or domestic developments. The structure and the actors in policy networks are only abstract notions and they do not directly signify the creation of network incentives. Politics are not disentangled, even inside the policy network environment. Whether actors continue to participate or not in highly enclosed or loosely insulated policy networks, relates to the broader political, economic, or even social, context in which they belong.

Other debates have also questioned the extent to which network management advances stability and collaboration inside policy networks. The policy network approach states that network actors are mainly willing to participate in networks in order to maximise their benefits, and that they enter into bargaining with their interrelated counterparts to develop the rules of the game (Peters, 1998, p.25). Resources are one key element of policy networks which sustain the whole cooperation and lock in actors’ interdependence. Once resources are pooled at the network level, actors are increasingly dependent on each other. Network management by central agencies can reinforce the insularity of network operations and enhance a de-politicised environment that will allow network actors to deliver anticipated services (Bevir and Rhodes, 2006, p.81). As Burnham states, ‘depoliticisation is the process of placing at one remove the political character of decision-making’ (Burnham, 2001, p.128). In this way, central agencies instrumentally utilise networks in order to reduce transaction costs and develop depoliticised opportunities among inter-organisational actors that will build joint consensus (Scharpf, 1997). The costs of network management can discourage network actors from developing a common understanding over a specific sector. In this regard, the higher the costs, the less network actors will be encouraged to deliver required outcomes (Kickert et al., 1997, pp.56-57).
As central agencies form networks to reduce transaction costs, there is the risk of top-down manipulation, which may alter horizontal processes amongst networks, leading to vertical relations with the central ‘hegemon’ (Agranoff and McGuire, 2004; Rhodes, 2007). Central agencies provide particular resources during network operations, in order to avoid such situations and, in parallel, to insulate the autonomy of networks from external influences. Such resources may be funds, expertise and technical assistance in order to assist network actors to achieve their appointed goals. In this way, central agencies aim to achieve three main elements. Firstly, funds and technical assistance aim to enhance the ‘organisational glue’ (Rhodes, 2000) amongst network experts. Organisational glue refers to an advanced administrative culture of bureaucratic habits and other elements of a technocratic lifestyle. Secondly, such resources can start-up network activities and operationalise resource exchanges amongst interdependent actors. Thirdly, central agencies can leave networks uninterrupted in order to attain their objectives. As Rhodes argues, networks can then operate at an ‘arm’s length’ from the central agencies (Rhodes, 2000).

Once network autonomy is secured from central agencies, routine and trust-building relations become resistant to change amongst interdependent members. Expertise and common professional beliefs reinforce the actors’ relationships, which engage them into dialogue about interdependent resources and to ‘tailor services to clients’ (Rhodes, 2011, p.49). All these beliefs, routines and regularly exercised practices become the social capital that characterises bureaucracies and their actors. As Bevir and Rhodes argue, culture, narratives and traditions are able to explain actions by referring to the specific beliefs and preferences of network actors (Bevir and Rhodes, 2002, p. 133).

After all, policy networks are about ‘stability, privilege and continuity’ (Rhodes, 2007, p.1251). The format of policy networks is that of a collaborative and co-ordinating setting which is intended to restrain change and foster trust and routine, conventional interaction amongst resource-dependent actors (Rhodes, 2007). Relationships are rooted in trust and sustained by reciprocal behaviour and diplomatic relations, based on a shared feeling that actors should understand the other actor’s situation in order to push forward their common interests (Rhodes, 2007). Actors become engaged in a continuous and consistent interaction of ‘network closure’ (Berardo and Scholz, 2010), where ‘incremental changes are fostered favouring the status quo or the existing balance of interests in the networks’ (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992, p.263).

However, there are certain questions with regards to the capacity of policy networks to maintain stability and consensus and avoid conflicts (Peters, 1998). As was previously mentioned, hierarchical manipulation by central agencies is expected to alter the
horizontal, consensus-building setting of policy networks and to introduce covert vertical relationships, which will alter the consensus-building environment amongst network actors (Rhodes, 2013, p.14). When a hierarchy is substituted for networks, interdependences are altered amongst network actors and exit-options may be activated (Scharpf, 1997). As the policy networks will no longer be operating ‘at an arm’s length’ (Rhodes, 2000; 2013) from the central agencies, then autonomy is lost and the rules of the game are altered.

Furthermore, it is uncertain whether network autonomy from the central agencies, and internal autonomy among network actors, can be secured in all contexts. The interference of broader politics in network policymaking may disrupt the everyday operation of policy networks (Burnham, 2001; Buller and Flinders, 2005). The politicisation of policy networks may pose serious impediments to the managerial environment of technical policy networks. Altering the horizontal nature of network policy-making will reinforce mistrust and put on hold a collaborative environment. Therefore, it is necessary to conceptualise not only how policy networks operate in situations of stability and network autonomy, but also to what extent policy networks are resistant to conflict in order to assess their role in service delivery in public policy literature. The case of the Commission’s relations with Morocco and Algeria offered such opportunity, as the policy preferences of each side were antithetical and, to a certain extent, conflictual over climate change policy, as climate change mitigation is not their main priority.

Whatever the case, policy networks constitute a point of reference in modern public policy. In fact, there is significant consensus in the literature about their ‘ubiquity’ (Börzel, 2011; Rhodes, 2006), as they can capture the fragmented role of modern state and the increased specialisation of informal interactions. As will be presented in the following part, the policy network approach is highly relevant in various settings, even outside the modern state, in the complex policy environment of the EU (Jordan and Schout, 2006).

2.3 Understanding the Role of Policy Networks in EU Governance

The concept of policy networks is not merely explaining policymaking in state-society relations, but it expands its understanding in the context of Europe. The EU as ‘differentiated polity’ (Rhodes, 1997; 2007), with no government (but member-states as constituent parts), no clear opposition and policy-making structures and a mix of
supranational, national and sub-national levels, appeared to be a form of multi-level network governance (Marks et al., 1996; Kohler-Koch, 2002; Marks and Hooghe, 2003). Being more than an international organisation, and less than a federal state, it offered significant scope for policy networks to be deployed in order to provide understanding of the EU’s ‘sub-systemic’ level of policymaking (Bomberg and Peterson, 1999, pp.21-27).

The approach to EU governance unpacks Rosenau’s definition, understanding it as an ‘all-encompassing trend of authority being relocated in multiple directions’ (Hewson and Sinclair, 1999, p.7). The Westphalian nation-state gave way to shared governance competences, with other constituent parts of international relations leading to a more expanded and holistic view of global order. This order does not have one main centre of decision-making, as this takes place at various levels and through various networks which communicate with each other. Governments and state structures are not the only actors in the whole cooperative framework, since other supranational entities, such as the European Commission and the European Court of Justice, sub-national and local actors, interact horizontally and vertically in a multi-dimensional and multi-sectoral set of governing conditions.

This shift to ‘governance without government’ surpasses the argument of the EU as a political system (Hix, 2005), as it attempts to understand how EU members and their sub-national, regional and local levels interact with EU supranational actors. With governance, informal interactions and interests form part of the analysis together with the formal structures. The increased level of competences to the supranational institutions of the EU in several policy areas, and the significance of policy networks and epistemic communities at EU policy-making, stress the meaning of governance as a broader analytical framework.

As Peterson argues (2009, p.108), ‘policy network analysis is never more powerful an analytical tool than when it is deployed at the EU level’. Policy network analysis of the EU argues that various interest groups, business interests and other non-governmental organisations and groupings are integral parts of EU policy-making, mobilizing the highly technical nature of EU regulations (Bomberg and Peterson, 1999, p.23; Moravcsik, 1998). Policy networks focus on the role of ‘interested specialists’ who possess resources such as expertise, legitimacy and funding (Bomberg and Peterson, 2000; Jordan, 2002). These actors interact in policy ‘arenas’ and test their competing ideas (Kohler-Koch, 2002). The more they have access to several of these policy networks, the better their chances of influencing the adoption of EU rules at the domestic level.
In addition to the various levels in network governance, epistemic communities have lately attempted to explain EU policy-making. Epistemic communities are ‘networks of knowledge-based experts’ (Haas, 1992, p.2) that have shared values, beliefs and understanding of a specific policy area. With their expertise in a given area, policy-makers and domestic actors can focus their decision-making and implementation agenda on the scientific knowledge of these expert groups. High levels of knowledge, expertise and prestige about a given issue area increases the legitimacy and the strength of their arguments to certain advisory and regulatory bodies. This gives them the opportunity to have access to the political system and, in part, influence decision-making procedures and policy coordination. In the case of the EU, Stone Sweet and Sandholtz (1997) argue that transnational society is significantly engaged in intra-EU exchanges and, thereby, influences, directly or indirectly, policy-making processes and outcomes at the European level.

The European Commission’s White Paper on Governance in 2001 also contributed to the study of network governance in the EU (Jordan and Schout, 2006). Open Method of Coordination (OMC) was introduced as an alternative, all-inclusive framework of coordination amongst the various stakeholders in policy areas less- or non-regulated at the EU level, such as social and health policies, education, employment etc. (see part 1.3). The OMC was considered to be an innovative policy framework for the command-and-control practices of the decision-making practices in the EU. The aim of OMC was to spread best practice, co-ownership amongst actors in the EU and jointly-set benchmarks (Radaelli, 2008). This experiment towards more open governance terms focused on the need for collaborative and coordinating governance patterns based on networks (Börzel, 2011, p.53). Policy networks could offer a broader understanding of the decision-making and reform process in the EU amongst the various stakeholders, and capture the interconnectedness between the actors and the policies of the European project. Moreover, this inclusive network policy-making system of governance could better connect Europe with its citizens […] opening up the policy-making process to get more people and organisations involved in shaping and delivering EU policy (European Commission, 2001, p.3).

However, there are several arguments that seem to contest the role of networks inside the EU. As Börzel argues, policy networks have not evolved as the key reference point which explains how the EU is governed (Börzel, 2011). The main environment for such interactions is still at the national level. Negotiations and decision-making at the EU level are not based on self-regulated or voluntary network settings. Supranational
actors cast their shadow of hierarchy (Hérïtier and Lehmkühl, 2008) on intergovernmental decision-making negotiations. While in certain cases self-coordinated network governance succeeds in advancing coordination amongst interested stakeholders, for instance in the case of education and training (Warleigh-Lack and Drachenberg, 2011), the ‘threat of legislation’ (Hérïtier and Lehmkühl, 2008) and hierarchies are still required for the flow of Europeanization to be achieved.

Moreover, sectoral coordination in various policy areas in the EU’s internal market still requires central regulation by the Commission and intergovernmental committees in order to ensure an effective flow of new rules and regulation across the EU. Negotiations in policy areas based on qualified majority voting mainly require hierarchically centralised policy networks which prioritise supranational monitoring over voluntary, self-coordinating processes. There are several examples in several core policy areas of the EU’s internal market, such as in environment and energy policies (Schout and Jordan, 2008; Hérïtier and Lehmkühl, 2008). Moreover, as was mentioned in chapter one, the transposition of EU policies and rules at the domestic level of EU members is realised via significant use of hierarchies (i.e. environment), markets (i.e. telecommunications), and, to a lesser extent, via networks of supranational, national, sub-national actors and other non-state actors (Börzel, 2011; Haverland, 2000; Cowles et al., 2001; Thatcher, 2004; Jordan et al., 2004).

Supranational shadows of hierarchy reach down to the domestic level, as regulatory infringements can incur sanctions from the Commission and ECJ (Börzel, 2010).

Furthermore, there are other arguments suggesting that policy networks cannot easily be measured within the complex institutional framework of the EU (Kassim, 1994; Peterson, 2009). Unlike the thin layer of institutions at the state level, policy-making at the EU level is constituted of several entry points into this complex multi-layered structure, which can make it difficult to measure the influence of networks (Kassim, 1994, pp.22-23). Kassim also assumes that in this ‘fluid’ framework policy networks will have a short lifespan and will not manage to sustain themselves for a long period. However, even loosely organised networks can equally lead to policy outcomes and overcome their fluidity, as was the case with the Cardiff process in 1998 regarding the integration of environmental considerations across EU policies (Jordan and Schout, 2006).

Drawing upon these arguments, policy networks still appear to play an integral role in the process of European governance, alongside hierarchies and markets. However, outside Europe there are several questions that need to be answered. For example,
outside Europe market incentives are not followed by robust incentives, as is the case for EU membership (Whitman and Wolff, 2010). Membership conditionality can no longer be applied; as such a prospect is only available within the borders of the European continent. To what extent can policy networks advance Europeanization outside Europe? What is the role of the Commission in managing policy networks outside Europe? More importantly, to what extent can policy networks maintain stability and develop incentives and joint consensus in order to develop EU rules? Are they able to avoid conflict, given the fact that incentives are weakened and hierarchies are lifted outside Europe?

2.4 Policy Networks and the Neighbourhood Wave of Europeanization

Europeanization mainly refers to the regulatory adjustment of domestic structures in accordance with EU regulations (see chapter one). In other words, Europeanization explores whether, and to what extent, the continuous flow of EU rules and regulations influences the domestic level of EU and candidate countries in terms of rules, practices or even organisation. The flow of rules and regulations differs according to each wave. The transposition of EU policies and rules at the domestic level of EU members is realised through significant use of supranational shadows of hierarchies, market incentives and, to a lesser extent, through networks of supranational, national, sub-national actors and other non-state actors (Börzel, 2011).

Command-and-control practices are even further exacerbated in the case of candidate European countries. Elite actors from candidate European countries are willing to internalise EU rules and regulations in a timely and effective manner in order to ‘claim’ the offered incentives, with EU membership being the ‘golden carrot’ (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005). Policy networks do not assume the role of decision-making fora, since EU acquis is a non-negotiable set of rules. They are mainly utilised to transfer technical assistance and develop state capacities in order to achieve EU standards (Bailey and de Propris, 2004). Therefore, policy networks are merely groups of regulatory experts that intend to ensure that rules are correctly exported into the domestic structures of candidate European countries.

Policy networks are rather neglected in Europeanization and EU studies outside Europe. There are two main trends in the literature that try to capture the role of policy networks in the EU’s neighbouring countries and in sub-Saharan Africa. The first set of authors (Freyburg et al., 2009; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2011; Lavenex, 2008)
argue that membership aspirations and geography play limited roles in the expansion of democratic rules across the neighbourhood (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2011, p.885). In contrast, interdependencies, functional cooperation among public administrations and calculations of cost adoption appear to give increased understanding to the framework of the EU’s neighbourhood policy. As Freyburg et al. argue, in the promotion of democratic rules the frequency of institutionalised sector-oriented cooperation can specify whether socialisation processes will have an impact on the transfer of democratic values and principles (Freyburg et al., 2011, p.1031). Once there are highly institutionalised relations in transnational cooperation, democratic values codified in certain policy sectors (for example, access to information in the environment policy) are easier to be transposed to the target country. But their adoption should equally be considered as part of the cost calculations from the target government and the level of interdependence with the EU.

Therefore, these arguments maintain that the broader context influences the substance and the performance of policy networks for the exportation of Europeanization. Functional interdependencies and other cost-effective calculations will incite the development of networks between the EU and each country, irrespective of their substance or their autonomy (Lavenex, 2008, p.943). However, Lavenex and Schimmelfennig maintain that the emergence of network governance inside Europe has opened up the opportunity for organisational integration in the European neighbourhood (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2009, p.796). Networks can spillover EU integration processes outside Europe, as collective responses (i.e. ENP), close proximity and even involuntary threats (i.e. environment, energy) would require the ‘externalisation’ (Niemann, 1998) of EU rules.8

There is also another trend in the literature that focuses on the nexus ‘democracy-statehood’ (Börzel et al., 2008; Börzel and Risse, 2009; Börzel and Hackenesch, 2013). These arguments claim that the capacity and the willingness of the target country to be engaged in reforms are critical elements for the expansion of democratic or good

8Schmitter (1969) was the one that coined the term ‘externalisation’ of spillover effect – or ‘induced’ spillover according to Niemann (1998). He held that ‘once a regional integration project has got under way and developed common policies participants will find themselves compelled – regardless of their original intentions – to adopt common policies vis-à-vis nonparticipant third parties. Members will be forced to hammer out a collective external position (and in the process are likely to rely increasingly on the new central institutions to do it)’ (Niemann 1998, p.431). For further analysis on the externalisation of spillover effect, see Schmitter (2004), Niemann and Schmitter (2009) and Tranholm-Mikkelsen (1991).
governance rules by the EU (Börzel et al., 2008, p.12; Börzel and Hackenesch, 2013). Statehood is the capacity that state actors and institutions maintain in order to secure order and stability. State capacities and reform willingness are immediately related to the instruments the EU makes use of in order to expand its rules. These instruments are mainly capacity-building and technical assistance, conditionality and dialogue in the form of socialisation. Interdependence and geostrategic interests also play a significant role in the expansion of democratic and good governance rules, as necessary factors for the promotion of EU rules and governance practices (Börzel and Risse, 2009).

There are several problems with each approach. In the first body of literature, it is argued that the more institutionalised the relations, the more rules may be transferred in neighbouring countries. Also, domestic calculation costs play a significant role in the final adoption of EU rules. It is then assumed that EU rules can be diffused through high levels of socialisation, as long as cost adoption is not high for the local administrations. However, in the neighbourhood wave of Europeanization, it was argued that EU rules would impose significant costs on the domestic regulatory environments of the neighbouring countries (Vincentz, 2007; Noutcheva and Emerson, 2007). EU rules are not followed by strict conditions in order to enhance compliance rates (Whitman and Wolff, 2010). Moreover, such arguments claim that only in non-politicised areas cooperation via policy networks would be advanced. As will be shown in the Moroccan case (see chapter five), policy networks managed to advance Europeanization through climate change mitigation despite the country’s needs to adapt to climate change.

Similar problems are present even in the second strand of the literature. The combination of dialogue, conditionality and capacity-building programmes should be sufficient in order for networks to progress rules in each country. However, it is unclear in which settings state capacities, EU incentives and asymmetric interdependencies can be identified. The literature claims that the EU strengthens its cooperation via intergovernmental and transnational channels of governance, either with public administrations (output legitimacy) or with civil society (input legitimacy) (Börzel et al., 2008, p.9). However, how does dialogue and socialisation take place amongst actors from each side? Also, how do these networks manage to develop common incentives that convince non-European administrations about the need to integrate good governance or democratic rules into their regulatory systems? How do policy networks overcome differences and disputes?
In general terms, both bodies of literature seem to claim that only the broader context of interdependencies, EU incentives and domestic administrative competencies determine how EU rules are advanced outside Europe. In particular, they seem to assume that network relations will have a standard result, which will be determined by broader factors. Policy networks and network actors appear to have no practical role in this process, even though they are the main channels through which the rules and regulations will be advanced in the non-European domestic structures. In other words, it is presumed that the role of policy networks is overlooked, because broader factors will determine their outcomes, and because they appear to assume a pre-determined pathway that will lead to the standard outcome of EU rule adoption.

This thesis intends to build upon these arguments and clarify the processes through which Europeanization takes place between the Commission and the local bureaucracies and experts from SMCs. It is necessary to understand how policy networks operate, how network actors bargain, collaborate and explore common opportunities inside these policy networks and in which ways network stability is achieved. In addition, an inside view of network activities can disclose how policy networks and socialisation amongst network actors create common incentives and develop trust-building and consensus upon which actors can enhance the reform processes and reform agendas.

In order to support these claims, this study focuses on the European Commission’s relationship with Morocco and Algeria over climate change policy and explores the network strategy the Commission developed in order to form networks that would advance EU rules about climate change mitigation and renewable energies. Adjusting to EU climate change rules shares several similarities with democratic and good governance rules. In particular, climate change mitigation requires non-European countries to adjust to market economy rules, reduce state monopolies and, more broadly, open the economy to the external world and develop common rules with the EU single market. Similarly, it requires accountability of the country’s finances, rule of law and transparent financial processes, especially in the case of a renewable energies market in the country. At the time of the research both countries were semi-authoritarian regimes with different policy needs from the Commission’s climate change policy. Network management was necessary by the Commission, in order to facilitate network activities and the needs of each side, in order to persuade these actors to develop consensus over the Commission’s priorities. The Commission’s offers of funds and expertise were expected to strengthen network autonomy and develop the
necessary environment for network interaction. The funds and expertise were not tied up by strict conditions, as was the case in the enlargement wave of Europeanization.

In this way, the analysis intends to address these gaps in the literature of EU studies outside Europe. Such arguments currently seem to maintain that policy networks can always manage to maintain stability and trust-building in all settings. However, they fail to explore and analyse the role of network management, the means that are used, and the extent to which policy networks can finally produce expected outcomes. Consensus is critical for establishing co-ownership that will ensure funds and expertise to be fully applied on the ground. In this case, Commission’s offers can prove to be an ‘empty letter’ if they are not supported by mutual understanding and co-ownership of the process.

Also, arguments of EU studies outside Europe claim that the broader context of functional interdependences and EU incentives determines how adjustment takes place in non-European countries. Policy networks appear to be dependent on the external environment. However, differences in policy preferences require network deliberation, which will be facilitated by distanced network management that will enhance network autonomy. Therefore, it will also be attempted to understand whether policy networks are influenced by external factors and to what extent network autonomy advances EU rules.

2.5 A Summary of the Main Concepts and Arguments: Europeanization and Policy Networks in South Mediterranean Countries relating to Climate Change Policy

The purpose of this part is to present the overview of the theoretical framework that has been outlined in the previous parts and chapters and provide specific research questions that this thesis aims to respond. In Europeanization studies there is limited understanding of how EU rules are advanced outside Europe in the absence of an EU membership incentive. The membership incentive secures domestic adjustment amongst current EU members and triggers full rule adoption, through the use of membership conditionality (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2007). However, EU membership is a privilege exclusive to European countries and is not available as a future (conditional) reward for countries that do not geographically belong to the European continent (Copenhagen criteria). So, how can adjustment to EU rules...
concerning climate change policy take place in non-European countries without the incentive of membership?

The literature claims that because of the absence of hierarchies and membership conditionality, socialisation and the horizontal processes of communication are expected to assume a distinct role in the expansion of EU policies and rules toward non-European countries (Whitman and Wolff, 2010; Schimmelfennig, 2009; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2009). The European Neighbourhood Policy offers an ‘open-ended process’ that encourages dialogue, routine policy processes and variable levels of contractual engagement (Manners, 2010). The flexibility of bilateral agreements between the EU and each SMC allow for such differentiated engagement, favouring socialisation and discarding hierarchies and coercion (Johansson-Noguès, 2007).

The recent literature on Europeanization outside Europe claims that broader interdependencies, EU incentives and domestic administrative competencies and capacities play major roles in the introduction of democratic rules and values to non-European neighbouring and sub-Saharan African countries (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2011; Börzel and Hackenesch, 2013). While these arguments recognise policy networks as the main reform channels, and identify the role of socialisation in persuading local actors, they brush aside the actual role of policy network actors and the extent to which network relations advance reforms and EU rules.

However, at the time of the research, the large majority of sub-Saharan African countries were (semi-)authoritarian regimes with significantly concentrated powers at the state level and with limited interest in opening access to civil society. Therefore, in order to advance EU rules in these countries in an opposite policy field of their interest, negotiations in policy communities could develop a common understanding amongst bureaucrats and experts from all perspectives. Cost-benefit calculations and interdependences would still play a role in the process, but policy networks and network actors would attempt to balance the different policy preferences and build consensus on climate change mitigation.

This thesis argues that policy networks and network actors play a key role in the process of Europeanization outside Europe, in order to advance reforms and rules in policy areas such as climate change mitigation. Policy networks are not a channel that simply advances rules at the domestic level of non-European countries influenced by broader incentives. Network actors strive to understand each other’s motivations and interests with a willingness to sit in the other person’s shoes. After all, prospects of EU
membership are ruled out outside Europe and market incentives may even imply costly reforms (Whitman and Wolff, 2010).

Shared beliefs in bureaucratic ways-of-doing-things, common expertise understanding and professionalism favour stable, routine and trust-building relations amongst the network actors (Rhodes, 2000). Also, networks are resistant to change and constant day-to-day interaction can enhance co-optation amongst network actors (Rhodes, 2006). Networks are established through the shared professional social capital of interdependent actors, although trust- and confidence-building may be damaged by top-down manipulation or politicised policymaking (Rhodes, 2000).

In this process, stability and network autonomy are crucial in order to develop the necessary conditions for mutual understanding and shared consensus over EU rules. The policy network approach has shown that stability can build the necessary framework of collaboration, in order to develop joint ownership and trust over commonly agreed reforms. The Commission’s incentives can reduce transaction costs and enhance network autonomy (Scharpf, 1997). Network autonomy needs to ensure that consensus and common understanding are built through agreed reforms and EU rules, in order to generate the flow of Europeanization outside Europe and that the rules that are transferred, prioritised and jointly agreed.

Such policy networks are even more important to the Commission’s relations with Morocco and Algeria in relation to climate change policy. Morocco and Algeria play significant role for the analytical scope of this research. Both countries had different policy agendas about climate change (see chapters five and six). Climate change adaptation was their immediate policy need because of pressures from extreme weather events, desertification and other climate phenomena (MATUHE, 2010; MATE, 2010). Moreover, they both have significant administrative deficiencies on climate change mitigation and climate change adaptation, where the Commission’s assistance could have an impact in policy networks. They also have excellent potential to produce renewable sources of energy from solar and wind power, because of their geographical position in the Sahara desert. In addition, exports of green electricity to Europe could develop functional cooperation in both sides, given the close geographic proximity of both countries.

However, this research stresses the point that policy networks may not be able to secure stability in all contexts. Although network autonomy may favour to advance EU rules outside Europe and the policy networks may operate as mechanism of Europeanization, it should not be expected that this will happen in every instance. Although the
Commission aims at neutralizing politics and enhancing common understanding amongst similar-minded bureaucrats as a means of advancing certain reforms based on EU rules, different policy priorities and broader politics may alter network stability. Policy networks can be affected by conflict, causing stagnation of the Europeanization processes in a given policy area.

More broadly, this framework compensates for the gaps of the Europeanization literature, which under-explores the role of policy networks in the process of domestic regulatory adjustment inside and outside Europe. Moreover, it compensates for the limited interest of Europeanization to identify where up-loading and down-loading are connected in this continuous flow of Europeanization. While Europeanization inside Europe claims that Europeanization is a two-way process (Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003; Börzel and Risse, 2003), the focus on policy networks attempts to remedy Europeanization’s monolithic understanding of top-down processes, and to explore how rules and regulations are not merely a product of hierarchies and shadows of hierarchy, but equally are a consensus-driven outcome.

In addition, this framework compensates for the gaps in the literature about the promotion of Europeanization outside Europe. Europeanization outside Europe should not overemphasise administrative incapacities, interdependencies and external incentives as the main characteristics in the process of democratic rules. Policy networks play a critical role in advancing policy consensus, and actors are significant drivers that can build consensus and enable incentives to be implemented on the ground, in order to lead to rule adoption and implementation. Policy networks are not mechanisms that merely channel reforms and rules at the domestic level of non-European countries and automatically enable the Commission’s funds and expertise to be operational during domestic adjustment. Policy networks determine to a significant extent the process of EU rules outside Europe. In this way, it restores the neglected character in Europeanization and EU studies literatures outside Europe.

However, it is also stressed that policy networks, network actors and network management cannot always achieve the advancement of EU rules and Europeanization outside Europe. Even when they are highly insulated internally by network actors and externally by hands-off central management, policy networks are still not able to handle conflicting situations. Conflict upsets network routines and trust-building, and causes stagnation. This element is important not only for literatures of Europeanization and EU studies outside Europe, but also for policy network approach itself, since conflict is not a well-integrated element in the literature.
2.6 Conclusion

This chapter has elaborated a cohesive theoretical framework of analysis about the use of policy networks as Europeization mechanisms that attempt to advance EU rules outside Europe regarding climate change policy in Morocco and Algeria. Hierarchies and EU membership conditionality can no longer be utilised in non-European countries as membership conditions and market incentives will trigger limited domestic adjustment to Europeization.

Trust, consensus-building and diplomacy are integral elements in network relations amongst actors. The policy networks approach argues that in situations of undisturbed network autonomy and stability, trust is gradually built up amongst network experts, and mutual collaborative ties are reinforced, thus paving the way for service delivery. Network autonomy plays an equally significant role, as shared beliefs in bureaucratic ways-of-doing-things, common expertise understanding and professionalism favour stable, routine and trust-building relations amongst network actors. Moreover, hands-off management by central agencies, supported with funds and expertise, reduce transactional costs and enable networks to operate at an arm’s length, without being hierarchically manipulated (Scharpf, 1997; Rhodes, 2000). However, policy networks are criticised in terms of network structure, the broader context, and also with regards to network stability and conflict management. Also, analysis about them has been limited in the literature on Europeization and EU studies outside Europe.

There are certain arguments that refer to the importance of policy networks outside Europe. However, although they place a central role on networks as the main channels for the promotion of rules outside Europe, they over-emphasise the importance of EU incentives, domestic calculation costs, administrative capacities and broader interdependences in adjustment outside Europe (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2011; Börzel and Hackenesch, 2013). Moreover, they take for granted that policy networks will always manage to advance rules in all situations.

In contrast, the argument developed in this thesis is that policy networks and network actors can significantly affect the progress of Europeization outside Europe. Network actors are not insignificant agents regarding incentives, interdependencies or other interests. As incentives are weakened and compliance mechanisms are softened, non-European actors have a broader scope for manoeuvre, unlike what was the case for candidate European countries. As both Morocco and Algeria had different policy agendas on climate change, policy networks were necessary in order to co-agree and find the necessary consensus that would allow domestic adjustment and reforms based
on EU rules. In this regard, policy networks can develop stable and technical relations amongst specialised experts under the ‘arm’s length’ support of the Commission.

However, policy networks, network actors and management are not expected to avoid disruption of stability in the presence of conflict. Policy networks cannot handle conflict situations, even with high insulation amongst network actors and ‘arm’s length’ network management by the Commission. Conflict and the interference of politics should not be disregarded in the framework of Europeanization outside Europe, especially between the Commission and two North African countries with different priorities over climate change policy.

Chapter three will continue with the analysis of the methodological framework of the whole research. Furthermore, chapter four will explore the Commission’s agenda for the climate change policy in its engagement with SMCs, its preferences on climate change mitigation and the offers through which it promoted policy network relations with each SMC. Then, there will be two empirical chapters about Morocco and Algeria to which the theoretical framework will be applied. The focus is on policy networks in the policy areas of climate change mitigation and climate change adaptation. In each chapter, there will be an historical analysis of the Commission’s relations with each country, the motivations and challenges of each country with regard to the EU’s incentives, the role that policy networks assumed in each climate policy area and the extent to which advancement of Europeanization is achieved in each climate policy area. The thesis will conclude with a summary of its main arguments and findings, the contributions and implications of this study and an outline for a future research agenda.
Chapter 3: Methodology

3.1 Introduction

This chapter outlines the methodological framework of this research and justifies decisions made in terms of methodology, methods and techniques in the process of designing, conducting and analysing the qualitative data of this study. This chapter is divided into five parts. The first part focuses on the choice of the qualitative approach as the main research strategy and its added value for this research. The second part presents the comparative case study method, its relevance to this research, and the criteria for selecting each case study. The third part briefly describes the ethical considerations that arise from this research. The fourth part pays attention to the main research techniques used in the analysis, with a specific focus on snowball sampling. Finally, the fifth part identifies the main obstacles during data collection and the means by which the author dealt with them.

3.2 The Importance of Qualitative Methodology for this Research

Qualitative methodology focuses on how we understand and interpret the world. It stresses the significance of the process by exploring the causes of a social phenomenon rather than its final effects (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005). Qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005, p.3). Several methods are offered to social scientists to conduct their research. Some of them are the use of case studies, interviewing, discourse analysis, participant observation, ethnography and so on. Each of these methods can be used as an individual scientific tool or in a multi-method approach (Flick, 2011; Yin, 2009). Through these methods, the researcher has the potential to understand the interactions that take place in society in order to understand and explore social interactions. The social world is not only developed and represented via theory-driven perspectives which identify key variables, but also by face-to-face interaction and social observation, which will give the opportunity to the researcher to understand the reflections of each participant in the specific time framework of the study. In this way, there is an attempt to view things
through the eyes of the people that are observed and/or interviewed (Bryman, 2012, p.399).

Qualitative data is described as ‘rich and deep’ because of its contextual approach, its detailed information and its ‘prolonged involvement in a setting that engenders rich data’ (Bryman, 2012, p.408). Words capture everyday interactions and give insight to real issues. In addition, day-to-day collaboration cannot be captured by quantitative research, as on-the-field engagement with real life processes can only be achieved by interviews, participant observation and interaction. The proximity of the researcher enhances the understanding of the everyday reality of the research subjects and brings to light aspects of reality that are impossible to trace by statistical data and other quantitative methods. The qualitative focus on micro-perspectives of everyday life and the nature of progressive observation generate different interpretations of meaning and social reality.

For all the above reasons, qualitative methodology has been selected as the most appropriate for this research. The study of everyday technical interactions via policy networks can only be explored through interviews in the field with specific policy-makers, bureaucrats and task managers from each side. Interaction with network actors provides a significant source of information, through which the technicalities of engagement, the atmosphere of the groupings and the day-to-day trust-building processes can be unfolded. Mere documentary analysis and a broader understanding of the historical, political and socio-economic context of bilateral engagement in EU-Mediterranean relations can offer only partial understanding, and cannot explore the challenges and the consensus within the policy networks.

### 3.3 Case Study Selection

Before understanding the reasons that led this research to the selection of these case studies, it is important to mention what comparative case study methodology brought to this research. Case studies are preferred because the researcher intends to investigate ‘how’ and ‘why’ a certain contemporary phenomenon happened in a real-life context and when the researcher has no control over the unfolding of the events under study (Yin, 2009, pp.17-18). In this case, this research intended to explore how policy networks can surpass the impediment of the absence of EU membership for rule transfer, and explore their role as Europeanization mechanisms that can advance EU rules towards Morocco and Algeria regarding climate change mitigation. In addition, there was no control over the topic under examination, as this was the first time such
research had taken place in the unexplored area of Euro-Mediterranean climate relations. This study ‘copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there are many more variables of interest than data points’ (Yin, 2009, p.18), relying on several sources of data in order to link them and offer an understanding of the complexity of the research puzzle. Therefore, case-study methodology was the best means of analysis of this phenomenon.

The choice for this research was a multiple case study design, whereby the European Commission’s relations with two SMCs would be under examination. Exploring the relationship between the Commission and two heuristic case studies was considered ideal for untangling all comparisons and lessons (see part 7.1 for a full justification of the case study selection). Heuristic case studies use case studies for ‘discerning important general problems and possible theoretical solutions’ (Eckstein, 1975, p.109). Moreover, as heuristic case studies are directly concerned with theory-building, two case studies were conducted seriatim, in order to unfold increasingly better theoretical constructs (Eckstein, 1975). A single case study would have limited ability to produce significant results, as it is risky to rely on the most representative case among ten available south Mediterranean countries (Yin, 2009, p.50). Furthermore, it would be hard to assume that one case represents the majority of the characteristics of a typical SMC.

This mix of similarities and differences led this research to choose Morocco and Algeria as case studies in their relationship with the European Commission. Morocco and Algeria have key energy differences and also a conflictual relationship, as is the case for most SMCs amongst themselves. The conflictual history of relations between SMCs is often summed up by the following phrase: ‘my neighbour is my enemy and my neighbour’s enemy is my best friend’ (Calleya, 2005, p.33). They also have different attitudes towards the EU. Although the research strove for equal geographical representation from North Africa and the Middle East, this was not feasible, mainly because of safety reasons and broader political changes in the region (the outburst of the Arab Spring at the time of the research and the broader, unstable, political climate in Middle Eastern countries).

The multiple case study design of the Commission’s relations with Morocco and Algeria is supported by the inclusion of two specific units of analysis: climate change mitigation and climate change adaptation. These two policy sectors have contrasting added value for the whole case study design of the research. While the Commission’s preferences on climate change highly supports mitigation of energy use, reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and green electricity from renewable energies, both SMCs’ priority is to
adapt to the changing climate. This difference at the unit level of the analysis reinforces the difference between the Commission’s and each SMC’s preferences, enhances generalization throughout the region and discloses similarities in relation to the engagement with the Commission and between the two cases (Seawright and Gerring, 2008, p.298). I return in this question on case study selection in chapter seven.

3.4 Ethical Considerations

For the development of this thesis there were no contentious ethical considerations in connection with the empirical data. Following regulations from the Ethics and Research Governance committee of the University of Southampton, full anonymity and confidentiality for all interviewees was respected throughout the research. Participants were first contacted via e-mail, which outlined the general purposes of the research, the key research questions and the contribution of the interview to this study. A participation information sheet was also attached, containing all the above information, including contact details from the Ethics and Research Governance committee of the University of Southampton and the main supervisor. An indicative list of questions was also included so that interviewees could familiarise themselves with the context of the interview. Once the participant agreed to participate in this study, the researcher jointly agreed with the interviewee a suitable place, time and means (face-to-face, telephone or Skype) of the interview.

The interviewees were reassured that the researcher had taken all necessary measures for safe data storage, both during field research and throughout the completion of the study. They were also reassured that once the interview was finished, in due time the researcher would send them, via e-mail, their scanned consent form and a copy of the transcribed interview. All interviewees had no objections in terms of safe data storage and raised no issues at any point over the integrity of the research and their recruitment for the interview. Anonymity and confidentiality were key elements of this research and operated as an advantage by enabling the researcher to get closer to elites.

3.5 Research Techniques and Data Collection

The research draws on three main methods that encompass the broad methodological framework of qualitative analysis. These refer to extensive fieldwork based on documentary analysis of primary and secondary data, analysis of academic literature, and qualitative semi-structured interviews. Triangulation informed the variety of these techniques. Triangulation refers to the use of multiple sources in order to ensure the
validity of qualitative research in terms of accuracy and the trustworthiness of data supported by evidence (Mason, 2006, p.10). In order to gain a full picture of the social phenomenon under study, the focus was on the combination of variable sources of information and techniques. Fieldwork was at the centre of the researcher’s techniques, mainly via face-to-face engagement in semi-structured interviews with individuals, but also with group interviews. In some instances, this was by telephone or even by Skype (see below on problems during data collection). The clarity and accuracy of the research objectives and questions, the researcher’s high level of professionalism when contacting and approaching interviewees, and flexibility in arranging interviews led to strong interpersonal relations with a great number of interviewees from several countries; it was thus possible to organise second- and third-wave interviews.

The first step of this research was to collect and analyse books and articles from academic journals relating to Euro-Mediterranean relations, the broader political and socioeconomic situation in the Mediterranean between the EU and SMCs and the role of climate change, energy mitigation, and climate change adaptation in the region. The literature review gave the opportunity to understand the broader political and socioeconomic context of the research. However, the strong focus of the Euro-Mediterranean literature on the Arab-Israeli conflict and on security issues overshadowed any significant research on other policy areas. Climate change, environment and energy issues were only a small portion of this literature. In the early stages of the research, the researcher was able to present his work at conferences and attend related events in order to establish academic networks with colleagues in the field and obtain the latest articles or books on the issue. The literature reviews of the region, each case study and Euro-Mediterranean relations were continually enriched at all stages of the research.

In addition to the literature review, the research included documentary analysis, based on primary and secondary data of the region. Bilateral EU-SMC agreements (i.e. Cooperation Agreements, Association Agreements, Action Plans, advanced status partnerships), official European Commission documentation (i.e. communications, progress reports, strategy papers, declaratory conclusions) and other Moroccan and Algerian governmental reports and secondary legislation were consulted prior to the fieldwork, and afterwards. Access to these documents was easy because most of them are available on the internet. Moreover, websites and other Internet sources with related information about Euro-Mediterranean relations were also part of the broader preparation by the researcher and offered valuable information.
During the fieldwork primary documents were also collected, which contributed to specific understanding of policy network interactions. Despite the restricted access to minutes from Association subcommittee meetings for protocol reasons, the researcher managed to obtain copies of minutes from the 2007, 2008, 2010 and 2012 EU-Moroccan Association subcommittees for Transport, Energy and the Environment, and from the 2007 and 2009 EU-Algerian Association subcommittee meetings about Transport, Energy and the Environment. Trust-building with certain desk officers at the Commission in Brussels played a significant role in this process, as they were willing to provide the specific documents. The researcher was asked to provide a brief summary of the research and explain the importance of these documents. Once the gatekeepers were convinced, they were able to push forward requests to the Moroccan and Algerian authorities. As internal EU processes necessitate the approval of the other party’s administration (i.e. Morocco, Algeria) in order to agree to send certain documentation to any ‘external’ party, their personal relations with officials in the Moroccan and Algerian Embassies in Brussels accelerated the process. However, it took more than three months in each case until the researcher finally receives documentation for both case studies.

Also, during the fieldwork the researcher managed to obtain a copy of the first EU-Moroccan agreement on an EU Budget support programme in the energy sector, and a copy of a list of projects in Morocco and in other SMCs. The researcher was also provided with a draft copy of the first EU Budget support programme for the environment in Algeria, which was under the final stages of the negotiation. There was also the opportunity to obtain a copy from the new EU-Moroccan Action Plan 2013-2017 concerning energy and climate change cooperation, which was under negotiation. The researcher was also allowed to take notes from capacity-building agreements on water, forest and coastal zone management, as access was not allowed to ‘externals’. Other documents, such as Moroccan and Algerian secondary legislation on energy and environment, were also offered from Moroccan and Algerian interviewees.

The documentary analysis also included the collection of political speeches by Commission senior officials in order to identify the inner preferences of the Commission in the Mediterranean (see chapter four). There was a collection of forty Commission communications, strategies and package documents about energy, climate change, the environment and external relations (mainly with the Mediterranean) launched by the Commission, and one hundred and thirty-nine public speeches by Commission Presidents, vice-Presidents, Commissioners of External Relations, European Neighbourhood Policy, Enlargement, Energy, Climate Action and
Environment. The majority of the speeches were available from the official website of the EU Press Releases Rapid. The research criteria were based on keywords, such as the name of the respective Commissioner, President or vice-President of the Commission during the period 1992-2013, but also on other keywords, such as energy, climate change, Mediterranean, neighbourhood and environment. There were also cases whereby the author had to find certain speeches from the personal webpage of the respective Commission senior official.

**Snowball Sampling**

In total, forty-four semi-structured interviews were conducted with forty-eight practitioners, academics and representatives from civil society, involved in climate change policy in Euro-Mediterranean, EU-Moroccan and EU-Algerian relations, over a period of thirteen months (May 2012 – June 2013). For the recruitment of interviewees, the main technique that was used during fieldwork was snowball sampling. According to Bryman, snowball sampling is a sampling technique in which the researcher samples initially a small group of people relevant to the research questions, and these sampled participants propose other participants who have had the experience or characteristics relevant to the research (Bryman, 2012, p.424).

The choice of snowball sampling was for two core reasons. Firstly, this was the first time such research on Commission-SMC policy network relations about climate change mitigation and climate change adaptation in Euro-Mediterranean relations had taken place, and no information was available in terms of specific actors in the region. The researcher needed to identify and build networks with well-identified people in the region, in order to be brought in contact with specialised officials, politicians, academics and NGOs, not only from the Commission, but also for each case study. As on several other occasions, the Mediterranean is a region whereby being referred from someone else – especially elder and highly experienced – is of high importance. It confers respect in other people’s eyes. If good acquaintances are set in place with well-known academics in the region and with officials from other international organisations, this shows that the researcher has ‘done his homework’ on how the whole region operates and he can show he is well networked with experienced people on his research and, more generally, in the region.

Secondly, snowball sampling was considered ideal for this research, as it gave the opportunity to pilot the research questions and the interview skills of the researcher prior to the main interviews with key network actors. Interviews with regional organisations, NGOs and academia could indicate the key actors, not only in Brussels,
but, more importantly, to each SMC. These would include Moroccan or Algerian academics, NGOs or even several focal points in the Ministry in each country that manage climate change related issues.

Pilot Interviews – Building Networks in the Region

The researcher initially conducted pilot face-to-face and, in certain cases Skype, interviews with several actors in the region. Such interviews took place in Barcelona at the headquarters of the Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean, a regional secretariat mainly funded by the EU and other international organisations that organises the funding of various regional programmes (including energy, climate change and the environment) between Europe and SMCs. Following this, interviews were conducted with officials at the Secretariat of the UN Environment Programme – Mediterranean Action Plan (UNEP MAP) in Athens and with NGO representatives from regional and international organisations. In addition there were face-to-face and Skype interviews with Moroccan and Algerian officials in the Moroccan and Algerian Embassies in London, with regional energy experts in Oxford, and with well-experienced and eminent academics who specialise in the region’s climate and political problems, who were highly familiar with regional networks and EU-SMC programmes.

During this process, the researcher was able to test, and adjust, the interview questions that would be utilised at later stages and get information about the role of the European Commission regarding climate change and its engagement with SMCs from an external point of view. These interviews were also useful in exploring the role of SMCs in the engagement with the Commission, and their broader interests in climate change policy and, more generally, towards Europe.

These interviews also offered the opportunity to identify certain officials in Brussels that were engaged in Mediterranean issues, other potential interviewees from academia and environmental NGOs in Morocco and Algeria. The snowball effect took place in the later stages, with the recruitment of new interviewees. Acquaintances with officials from other regional secretariats and eminent academics managing EU programmes provided validity and integrity to the researcher’s intentions. This resulted in contact details for officials from specific departments inside ministries in each SMC who allowed the researcher to utilise their name and their e-mail as referees when contacting the recommended actors. This also included selective e-mail contact with actors in Morocco and Algeria.

Before proceeding with the key interviews with the Commission, Moroccan and Algerian officials and other actors, the researcher summarised the main findings of the
pilot research stage, in order to reflect upon them before proceeding to the main stage of the fieldwork.

*Interviews in Brussels – the ‘Headquarters’ Point of View*

After the end of pilot interviews, the researcher conducted interviews in Brussels with a great number of European Commission, European External Action Service (EEAS) and EU Council officials (see Appendix). Interviews were mainly conducted in DG Development and Cooperation, DG Energy, DG Climate Action, DG Research and Innovation with desk officers for Morocco and Algeria, heads of unit with Mediterranean focus, but also with other officials in horizontal issues (i.e. on environment, energy etc.).

Interviews with European Commission officials were able to offer information about the managerial and financial aspects of the Commission’s relations with each case study, but also provided information about the Commission’s intentions towards the Mediterranean. They were also useful in terms of the Commission’s engagement in policy networks with each case study and the role of the Commission as the central agency in this process. They equally offered information about the personalities involved in these networks whereby their role is highly unavailable in the literature and in the broader public.

Moreover, insight was gained into how the whole system of financial cooperation operates with non-European neighbouring countries, the role of each DG in this process and how the Commission in total promotes climate change issues with SMCs and, more specifically, towards Morocco and Algeria. The interviews increased understanding of the complex bureaucratic procedures of certain capacity-building programmes of the Commission, and the role of EU Delegation and related officials in this process, as the literature provides only sparse understanding of that issue (with exception of, for example, Bruter, 1999; Bailey and de Propris, 2004).

The interviews with EEAS officials also offered an overview of the broader political considerations of the EU in the region and for each case study, and cross-examined information from the Commission. As EEAS was only established in 2011, most EEAS officials had drawn from the former DG External Relations (DG RELEX) of the Commission (Vanhoonacker and Pomorska, 2013). These officials had long experience of the former DG RELEX of the Commission and provided valuable information about the evolution of the EU’s initiatives towards the Mediterranean (Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, European Neighbourhood Policy) (see chapter four) and about the EU’s
relations with each SMC. The researcher also interviewed an official inside the Secretariat of EU Council and gained information from the Member States’ perspective of EU-SMC relations. This provided an idea of who participates in policy networks, their role on Association sub-committees and the Council’s relations with the Commission in its cooperation with SMCs. Although the researcher attempted to conduct more than one interviews with EU Council officials, access was highly restricted.

Field Research in Morocco and Algeria

The next step was field research in Morocco and Algeria. In contrast to the previous fieldwork, fieldwork in both case studies faced several challenges. Several interviewees during the pilot stage stressed that, because of the highly bureaucratic culture in SMCs, the researcher had to plan far in advance of the actual visit to each country in order to establish contact links with specific actors. It was also advised from previous interviewees that it would be better to allocate more time for Algeria, as well as taking into consideration the frequency of religious celebrations and differences in the working and weekend days in each country. It was also pointed out that accessibility to governmental bureaucracies was limited, e-mail responses face guaranteed delays or no reply, and that the best means of contact was direct phone calls to the ministry.

Face-to-face, telephone and Skype interviews were mainly conducted with Moroccan and Algerian governmental officials, such as head of units, directors and civil servants, in the energy and environment Moroccan and Algerian ministries and in governmental agencies. Interviews were also conducted with task managers and advisors in the EU Delegations in Rabat and in Algiers. The impact of interpersonal networking and the snowball effect was not always successful, and varied from one case to the next. For example, in certain cases younger officials, who were involved in several international projects in their department, would be much more willing to arrange a meeting or even direct the researcher to other colleagues that they knew. There were other cases where, even though the researcher had multiple acquaintances in the field, meetings were almost impossible to organise, and which were followed by non-responses. For example, there was one case whereby despite introductory e-mails both from an EU Delegation official in Algeria and an Algerian official in daily contact with each other,

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9Algeria follows the Arab weekend and working days structure, which means Friday-Saturday weekend and Sunday-Thursday working days. Instead, Morocco follows the same weekend and working days structure of Western societies (Saturday-Sunday weekend, Monday-Friday working days).
the interview did not take place, even though the official confirmed his availability for a telephone interview.

Local academics and representatives from local NGOs were more accessible and much more open in their responses. In Morocco, there were several interviews with the Moroccan civil society, such as presidents of NGOs, Moroccan academics and Moroccan journalists in Rabat and in Casablanca. Also, there were several Skype interviews with Algerian academics, Algerian NGO representatives and a UNDP representative in Algeria. They were all significantly interested in providing as much information as possible to the research.

After all the data had been collected and transcribed, an update report for the whole field research was written, outlining the main findings and stressing the extent to which they were related to the objectives of the research. This led to specific questions forming in relation to policy networks that required further clarification from the interviewees. As there were already established links with the interviewees, the researcher could request follow-up interviews. Most follow-up interviews were with Moroccan and Algerian officials and task managers in the EU Delegation in Morocco and Algeria, together with a few more interviews with newly recruited Commission and EEAS officials in Brussels.

3.6 Limits in Data Collection and Problem-Solving

The main problems faced throughout the fieldwork were mainly related to lack of access to bilateral network meetings for empirical observation, denied access for fieldwork in Algeria, and limited use of a voice recorder in interviews with Algerian and Moroccan officials.

Initially, the researcher intended to make use of participant observation in order to explore in-depth how Commission and SMC officials engage in Association council meetings, or even during negotiating and managing Commission-funded expertise programmes (i.e. Technical Assistance and Information Exchange seminars, study visits in Brussels). However, participant observation of policy networks between the European Commission and each SMC was highly restricted for ‘outsiders’, and denied several times. Several interviewees were contacted in each SMC and in Brussels, but access was denied on the grounds of strict protocol rules and confidentiality. Even minutes from such project meetings are strictly available between the Commission and the partner country for the same reasons. Another access point attempted was the EU
Delegation in each country. However, even in that case rules are strict and access was again denied on the same grounds.

In order to overcome this obstacle, from the early stages of the fieldwork the researcher tried to build trust and confidence with the interviewees via personal relations and acquaintances in order to access elites. Acquaintances always had to be accompanied by a thorough understanding of the topic and networking with related people in the field such as key scientists, academics and officials from other regional and international organisation. The importance of this element was crucial throughout the research and was stressed by several contacts from the UK and Greek Embassies in the respective countries, and also stressed by various actors in the early stages of my fieldwork.

Furthermore, the researcher’s fluent knowledge of French and Spanish and the basic knowledge of Arabic cultivated stronger links with actors in order to convince them about potential participation in these meetings. Speaking French was crucial in North Africa, as English is not widely spoken in these countries, despite several exemptions. On several occasions, officials from SMCs were not familiar with English and speaking only in English would seriously have impeded communication with the respective interviewees. Speaking French was equally significant for recruiting new participants, while certain interviewees were more comfortable speaking in Spanish. Finally, the researcher’s basic knowledge of Arabic was also significantly useful as Arabic is the everyday language in these countries. Several interviewees were interested in knowing more about the researcher’s interest in Arabic, which resulted in getting closer to the interviewees and obtaining contact details for prospective participants.

Another significant problem during the field research was the rejection of the visa application by the Algerian authorities. The researcher repeatedly visited the Algerian Consulate in London to provide necessary documents and further clarify the intention of the trip to the country. The researcher even managed to obtain an invitation letter from the first advisor of the EU Ambassador in the EU Delegation in Algeria along with supporting letters from supervisors and the Faculty. Throughout this long and highly-bureaucratic process, no visa was finally granted. The main reason was that acting as a ‘journalist’ in the country and interviewing governmental officials or even the civil society would incur problems during the stay, even leading to detainment.

Nevertheless, this did not jeopardise the sample representation or the significance of the Algerian field research and data. The researcher managed to conduct multiple Skype and telephone interviews in order to narrow down the empirical gap. Being familiar with the difficulty of granting visas from the Algerian authorities, Commission
officials in Algiers and several Algerian interviewees were willing to offer follow-up interviews and recommend potential interviewees for the research. Moreover, the researcher stressed out his fluency in French in order to trigger French-speaking officials from the European Commission and from Algeria to conduct interviews. Furthermore, the acquaintances from the pilot stage facilitated the researcher to obtain contact details and arrange interviews with significant officials. Flexibility in interview means (Skype, telephone) and time was also significant in certain cases. In order to further enhance the accuracy of the interviewees’ statements, there was also cross-examination of several Algerian newspapers and news websites (i.e. El Watan, Tout sur l’Algérie) in connection with the EU Neighbourhood Info Centre.

Finally, another problem was the use of voice recorder. Although academics and NGO representatives were happy to be recorded, the great majority of Algerian and Moroccan officials and diplomats would not allow the use of voice recorder in interviews. Therefore the researcher mainly had to use note-taking to record the interview. The problem with note-taking is that the researcher is not in a position to capture all details from the interviewee irrespective of how fast he can write. This means that there is the danger that information and other observational notes may be missed out. In order to deal with this issue, the interviewees were asked to speak in their native language as the researcher could make use of his fluent knowledge of French and Spanish and his basic knowledge in Arabic. Speaking in French made it easier for Algerian and Moroccan interviewees to express themselves, as this provided a convenient way of communication for them. It also developed better trust with, and confidence in, the researcher, which, in some cases, led to the recruitment of other interviewees and the acquisition of further primary data.
Chapter 4:
European Commission’s Strategy regarding Climate Change Policy in the Mediterranean

4.1 Introduction

This chapter offers a contextual analysis of the preferences of the European Commission on climate change mitigation and its network strategy in the Mediterranean. Stability, security and sustainability of relations are at the centre of the Commission’s considerations, both in political and energy terms with these countries. As the EU is significantly dependent on energy imports from its immediate neighbourhood, safe and sustainable relations can secure energy supplies for Europe. Moreover, increasing energy importations from certain oil countries, mainly Russia, increases the EU’s dependence and exposes its vulnerability in the case of energy disputes (Adelle et al., 2009). The Commission is interested in reducing the EU’s external reliance on energy imports and enhancing the diversification of the single market.

Responding to climate change offers several opportunities towards this goal. Energy mitigation can reduce the EU’s energy supplies of carbon-intensive fuels and explore diversification of its energy mix, focusing on renewable sources of energy such as solar and wind energy. Moreover, the establishment of a low-carbon energy market (European Commission, 2011a; 2011b) can contribute to the EU’s efforts towards mitigated greenhouse gas emissions and further enhance the prospect of an integrated EU energy market, in order to reduce its external reliance.

South Mediterranean countries play a key role in this process for several reasons. They host significant conventional resources of oil and gas that support the EU’s energy supplies (Escribano, 2010). They can also contribute to a diversified energy route for the EU, in order to reduce its growing dependence on Russia and avoid further disruptions in energy supplies, as was the case with the Russian-Ukrainian gas disputes in 2005, 2007 and 2009. In addition, SMCs can play an important role in relation to the achievement of the EU’s international commitments regarding climate change. SMCs have significant natural potential to develop and produce green electricity from renewable energies because of their proximity to the Sahara desert and their geographical proximity to Europe. Furthermore, climate change mitigation can offer a
functional interest for both sides to cooperate with each other. More specifically, for Morocco, electricity from renewable energies can contribute to less reliance of the country on external energy imports and can enhance the diversification of its energy mix (chapter five). Equally, for Algeria, renewable energies can diversify the country’s economy from its almost absolute reliance on exportations of conventional energy resources and mitigate the impact on its economy by volatile international oil and gas prices (chapter six).

However, the Commission faces certain challenges in the Mediterranean in relation to its climate mitigation agenda. SMCs mainly prioritise climate change adaptation over mitigation because of their vulnerability to the adverse effects of climate change. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2007), the Mediterranean is characterised as one of the four most vulnerable regions on the planet, as its southern rim is expected to be severely affected by climate change. Moreover, SMCs contribute only a small percentage to global greenhouse gases and this is not an urgent priority for them, as other more pressing problems, such as poverty and youth unemployment, constitute central socioeconomic problems.

The Commission initially intended to develop regional cooperation structures through the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. However, the politicisation of regional relations, because of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the political instability in SMCs, provided insignificant results regarding economic development and stability in the region (Cardwell, 2011; Bicchi, 2011). In order to develop more comprehensive relations, the Commission developed bilateral flexible relations with each SMC as its new modality of engagement with the Mediterranean. Bilateral differentiation (Del Sarto and Schumacher, 2005) could offer perspectives for more flexible relations between the two sides and an insulated policy framework from regional politicisation. It could also offer the opportunity to any ‘willing’ SMC looking for flexible and close relations to specify its needs in certain policy areas to collaborate with the Commission.

The Commission could better utilise its expertise and capacity-building incentives via bilateral relations in order to reduce transaction costs of network operations, enhance collaborative network activities, and strengthen relations upon concrete priorities upon jointly-agreed reforms with each SMC. Actors from each side could be given the chance to discuss their intentions and their expertise needs in each policy area of mutual interest inside bilateral policy networks and co-decide reforms and programmes based on EU rules. In this way, network activities could build common understanding over domestic adjustment to a policy area of mutual interest and advance Europeanization outside Europe.
This chapter is organised into four parts. The first part introduces the role for the European Commission in representing Europe in its external relations and presents the limitations of its relation with the EU Council. The second part focuses on EU energy challenges and the Commission’s agenda of climate change mitigation, focusing on the importance and the challenges of cooperation with SMCs. This is critical to the analysis in order to understand why the Commission is interested in climate change mitigation in the Mediterranean. The third part provides an analysis of the main factors that contributed to the Commission’s interest in climate change mitigation. The last part offers a brief historical overview of Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the Commission’s interest in more bilateral relations and the launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy. It also explores the importance of differentiated bilateral relations under ENP and presents the financial and expertise assistance offered under this bilateral framework. The chapter closes with some concluding remarks.

4.2 The Role of the European Commission in the EU’s External Relations with the Mediterranean

The European Commission is a significant EU institution inside and outside Europe. It combines several characteristics of an international secretariat and a governmental civil service, although it undertakes many more responsibilities and tasks that need to be delivered in a timely and effective manner. Since its establishment, it has been given increasing duties and competences by EU members, as a continuation of the early success of the European Coal and Steel Community (Buchan, 2013, p.359). Its core duties inside Europe are to oversee the smooth functioning of the EU market, to act as the ‘guardian’ of EU Treaties and to enforce EU rules and regulations (Shore, 2000, pp.142-143). Policy initiation, agenda-setting and policy formulation constitute core Commission functions with regard to the fulfilment of its delegated duties (Pollack, 1997). Moreover, the aim of the completion of the single market and the technical requirements of the elimination of trade barriers gives a significant role to the Commission, increasing its scope into new policies, such as environment, research and transport.

The Commission also performs other functions inside the EU. It is the main holder of the EU Budget, manages the finances of various EU programmes and monitors their implementation. During legislative procedures, it strives to broker a win-win solution with other EU institutions, such as the European Parliament and the EU Council (Egeberg, 2010). It also operates as a hub for various policy networks and multiple stakeholders from EU governments, the business world and civil society, in order to
facilitate interaction and generate consensus over the common interests that will eventually be agreed by the EU Council (see chapters one and two).

The Commission is not merely a key actor inside the EU, but has also acquired increased responsibilities outside Europe in the EU’s external relations. One of its first functions was – and still is – to act on behalf of EU members as the EU’s main negotiator for trade matters in the World Trade Organisation (WTO). This function is one of the defining elements of the Commission outside Europe, as it is the sole manager of the EU’s single market and holds significant experience and responsibility for its undistorted functioning. Moreover, the high-level of technicality in trade matters gives a privileged role to the Commission to negotiate improved EU positions.

Another core external function which resulted from a European Court of Justice ruling extending the powers of the then European Community in the 1970s – and the Commission as a consequence – was the establishment of bilateral and multilateral agreements with non-European countries and international organisations. With regard to the European Agency for Road Transport (AERT), the decision states that

> The Community enjoys the capacity to establish contractual links with third countries over the whole field of objectives defined by the Treaty. [...]With regard to the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty, the system of internal Community measures may not be separated from that of external relations (ECJ, 1971, p.264, par 1).

In other words, once new competences are developed at the EU level, they can also secure the capacity for the Commission to be externally involved in contractual agreements at an international level (Jordan et al., 2010). This evolution was of great significance, since it enabled the Commission to get involved in agreements with EU members and expand its role, not only inside the EU, but also beyond its geographical and regulatory scope. Such a role was crucial for the Commission in order to negotiate in future trade agreements with the Mediterranean countries, and even accession agreements with candidate European countries.

The Commission is also manager of EU funds outside Europe relating to development and humanitarian aid. With the end of the Cold War, the Commission assumed responsibility to coordinate western funds in the post-Soviet Eastern Europe. Given its successful role to guide CEEs towards effective EU rule adoption, stable democratic transition and successful full EU membership throughout 1990s to 2004, it has become the sole budget holder in EU activities outside Europe in relation to the single market policies (Nugent and Saurugger, 2002). Of course, the Commission manages a wide spectrum of contractual relations and preferential agreements with developing and
least developed countries from all over the world. Such relations mainly involve the elimination of trade barriers, capacity-building and concessional funding. Great part in this process plays the large number of delegations and offices abroad. The Commission is represented in more than 140 countries worldwide, whereby the majority of advisers and officials in these offices are mainly staffed by European Commission headquarters (EU officials, March-May 2013; Bruter, 1999).

The Commission does not have an entrepreneurial role in its external activities. A policy entrepreneur refers to an agent ‘committed to finding new ways forward’, who is innovative and, in several cases, a ‘risk taker’ (Williams, 2010, pp.14—15). Instead, the Commission is financially dependent on EU members. EU members fund the Commission’s operations, as a result of which they expect certain service delivery. They also require regular reporting on its activities in order to ensure that their support is efficiently used and tasks are fulfilled. In the case of any malfunctioning of the EU Budget, the Commission is obligatorily forced to resign, as was the case with the Santer Commission in late 1990s.

Moreover, the Commission operates under a specific mandate from EU members. In its external relations, the Commission represents EU interests and negotiates bilateral agreements with partner countries on several policies in relation to the single market. However, the Commission has no absolute freedom over the process of negotiation of a bilateral agreement with a non-EU country. As such it has only limited freedom of manoeuvre within the negotiating process and needs to report back to EU members through the comitology system (Cini, 2002, p.55). Furthermore, the Commission is an unelected EU institution. Because of its democratic deficit, it is in need of legitimacy for its actions (Hix, 2005). Close relations with EU members and the European Parliament, as a source of legitimacy, and the focus on globally benign objectives, such as combating climate change and developmental aid in third-world countries, raises its profile as a legitimate actor in the eyes of Europeans and abroad (Shore, 2000, p.150).

However, it would be misleading to argue that the Commission is fully dependent on EU members. With regards to the Mediterranean, EU members are equally dependent on the Commission, for several reasons. Firstly, EU acquis refers to a set of highly technical rules and regulations that cannot be exported based on mere political decisions. The Commission is at the centre of policy initiation, policy formulation and policy implementation, and has significant knowledge of the challenges of adjustment within domestic structures. It would require significant amounts of time, expertise and funds for the twenty-seven EU members to coordinate their positions and their core preferences. In this way, outsourcing service delivery to the main pro-integration
institution of the EU can best develop EU preferences, even towards the Mediterranean.

Secondly, being positioned at the centre of the integrationist process in Europe, the Commission operates as a facilitator in functional cooperation among interest-driven actors, such as businesses, political parties, governments and other interest groups. It seeks to find consensus and move negotiations from the ‘lowest common denominator’ to shared benefits, ‘splitting the difference’ and ‘upgrading common interests’ (Niemann and Schmitter, 2009, p.50; Haas, 1958). Drawing upon its EU experience, the Commission can facilitate actors to agree to consensual positions, whereby each feels that by conceding something it has gained something else (Niemann, 1998, p.431).

Thirdly, the Commission’s experience of the EU’s enlargement towards CEEs can be utilised in the Mediterranean in order to manage domestic adjustment in these countries. Managing reforms and rule transfer requires significant skills, which are highly developed inside the Commission. Its experience with day-to-day interaction with candidate European countries with elites from authoritarian regimes – i.e. Slovakia’s Mečiar regime (Kelley, 2004) – gives a preferential position to the Commission to engage with the (semi-) authoritarian realities of SMCs in adjustment to EU rules. In addition, its institutional memory and hands-on experience via daily management of cooperation can reinforce the effectiveness of its engagement with elites from each SMC.

Regarding climate change policy, certain preferences and agendas have motivated the Commission to engage in agreements with the Mediterranean countries in order to expand Europeanization. Why is the Commission motivated to collaborate with SMCs over climate change policy? What are the ‘push’ factors for such engagement? Also, how is the Commission expected to trigger SMCs to collaborate over climate policy in order to europeanise their domestic structures?

### 4.3 The Commission’s Motivations and Agenda on Climate Change Policy in the Mediterranean

The EU is significantly dependent on external energy imports. Its reliance on energy imports from abroad has been steadily growing over the years. Today more than half of its total energy needs are covered by energy imports (see Table 4 below). This external reliance is combined with increasing energy use levels and decreasing energy production throughout the EU. The problem of depleting energy resources is also coupled with significant differences in the energy basis of each EU member. According
to Figure 1 (see below), there is high variability in the energy import dependence in several EU members. For example, Denmark is the only EU member that is not energy reliant on energy importations of all fuels, whilst Romania, Czech Republic, Poland and the UK have low external energy dependencies, ranging from 21 to 36 per cent. Another group of EU members, such as France, Slovenia, Hungary, Germany and Greece, has significant energy dependency ranging from 48 to 65 per cent. And finally, there is another group of EU members, such as Ireland, Spain, Lithuania, Cyprus and Malta, whose external energy reliance reaches up to 100 per cent.

Table 4: EU energy data (in thousands tonnes of oil equivalent (ktoe)) (1960-2010) (World Bank, 2014b)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Energy production (in thousand tonnes of oil equivalent) (ktoe)</th>
<th>Energy use (in ktoe)</th>
<th>Energy imports (% of total energy use)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>510,441</td>
<td>619,818</td>
<td>29.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>612,264</td>
<td>1,264,269</td>
<td>53.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>849,928</td>
<td>1,555,359</td>
<td>44.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>945,773</td>
<td>1,636,090</td>
<td>42.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>961,480</td>
<td>1,637,192</td>
<td>41.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>946,701</td>
<td>1,684,918</td>
<td>43.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>901,715</td>
<td>1,779,698</td>
<td>49.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>817,830</td>
<td>1,653,930</td>
<td>50.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>835,528</td>
<td>1,714,282</td>
<td>51.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
External energy importations are not only inhomogeneous among different parts of the EU, but also in relation to the various types of energy resources. For example, oil import dependence in 2009 was more than eighty per cent in at least twenty-two out of the twenty-seven EU members. Only Denmark is energy independent in oil among all EU members, with more than fifty per cent of oil exportations (European Commission, 2011b, p.16). Furthermore, gas import dependence in 2009 was more than eighty per cent in twenty EU members, with only the Netherlands and Denmark being net gas exporters, with sixty and ninety per cent respectively (European Commission, 2011b, p.16). Moreover, according to Figure 2, the EU’s energy consumption is even nowadays based on coal and oil, despite a clear reduction of twelve per cent since 1990 in its energy consumption being based on ‘dirty’ energy resources.

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10 Malta, Sweden, Bulgaria, Luxembourg, Cyprus, Latvia, Ireland, Spain, Finland, Slovenia, Portugal, Poland, France, Netherlands, Greece, Czech Republic, Germany, Belgium, Italy, Lithuania, Slovakia.
Countries in the EU’s neighbourhood account for the majority of the EU’s energy imports in oil and gas (European Commission, 2011a, p.3). Russia constitutes a key energy importer of hard coal and crude oil into the EU, representing 42.3 per cent in 2002 and 61.6 per cent in 2010 (see below Table 5). In addition, Russia, Norway and Algeria constitute the EU’s main importing partners of natural gas, with dependence reaching up to 92.4 per cent in 2002 and 74.4 per cent in 2010. Furthermore, countries such as Libya, Egypt, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan and others in the broader perimeter of EU’s neighbourhood, such as Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia, also have a fair share of exportations of coal, oil and natural gas to the EU.

Although Russia is a significant holder and provider of energy resources to the EU, energy supplies are characterised as being volatile and insecure (Brussels European Council, 2003). The EU has experienced several energy disruptions from Russia on several occasions, in 2005-2006, in 2007 and 2009, because of the energy dispute over gas transit pricing for Russian gas via Ukraine gas pipelines into Europe. These Russian energy disruptions exposed the vulnerability and the insecurity of EU energy supplies to several EU members, through energy shocks, and indicated the need for the emergence of an EU-wide strategy that would mitigate similar shocks in the future (Buchan, 2013; Jordan and Rayner, 2010).
Table 5: Main origin of primary energy imports, EU-27 (2002-2010) (Eurostat, 2014c)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Energy Source</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
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<td>Russia</td>
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<td>21.1</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>19.1</td>
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<tr>
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<td>14.9</td>
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<td>12.9</td>
<td>11.9</td>
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<td>United States</td>
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<td>Australia</td>
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<td>Norway</td>
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<tr>
<td>Others</td>
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<tr>
<td>Natural gas</td>
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<td>Russia</td>
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<td>Nigeria</td>
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<td>Libya</td>
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<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
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<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
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<tr>
<td>Others</td>
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</table>

The Mediterranean presents several opportunities for the Commission to diversify the EU’s energy mix and reduce its growing dependency on Russian energy resources. Energy supplies from several SMCs are stable and sustainable, and could significantly contribute to the Commission’s interest in diversified and undisrupted energy supplies for the EU (see part 4.4). SMCs host significant hydrocarbon resources (Algeria, Libya, Egypt) and they are transit countries for energy from Central Asia and the Persian Gulf (Escribano, 2010, p.211). Oil and gas supplies from certain SMCs (i.e. Algeria) are stable, without any disruptions, and can protect the EU’s energy security against possible energy disruptions by Russia and contribute to the diversification of the EU’s energy routes.

Moreover, SMCs such as Algeria are physically interconnected through gas and electricity pipelines, either directly or through transit countries (Morocco, Tunisia). Meanwhile, other SMCs in the Middle East, such as Egypt, have strong potential to develop infrastructures towards south-eastern Europe via Turkey. Furthermore, SMCs have significant potential to develop and export green electricity via renewable energies (see chapters five and six). The geographical position of North African and Middle Eastern countries favours increased radiation and they have strong
wind potential because of their proximity to the Sahara Desert and the Mediterranean Sea (OME, 2007).

### 4.4 Factors behind the Commission’s Motivations to collaborate with the Mediterranean over Climate Change Mitigation

Two main factors significantly contributed to the Commission’s interest in cooperation with the Mediterranean over climate change mitigation. These factors were:

- The elevation of energy and climate change to the top of the EU’s agenda and in its external relations in the 2000s, and

- Geopolitical changes after the end of the Cold War.

Climate change was not a prominent issue in 1980s, as ‘climate change was still being framed mainly as an atmospheric environmental problem, not an energy security one’ and the Commission’s role in international issues was limited only to trade issues (Jordan and Rayner, 2010, p.53). The entry into force of the Single European Act in 1987 – a forerunner EU treaty about measures for the establishment of the single market – gave higher status to environmental objectives to the EU in general (TEC, Article 74), and vested the Commission with competences to negotiate international environmental agreements. In addition, energy matters used to be under the exclusive jurisdiction of EU members, with a limited role for the Commission (Jordan *et al.*, 2010). Energy relations with the Mediterranean countries were mainly conducted by EU members on a bilateral basis.

The Commission started borrowing legal competence from the environmental and economic parts of the treaties and from its international trade competences to justify energy measures in conjunction with climate considerations (Buchan, 2013, p.359-361; Jordan *et al.*, 2010). In 1988, it launched its first ever climate-related communication, *The Greenhouse Effect and the Community* (European Commission, 1988). From the beginning of the communication, climate change and energy were linked, as the burning of fossil fuels and man-made CO2 emissions worsened the impact of the greenhouse effect, and EU members were indirectly urged to enhance the role of the Community in these related issues. Two years later, in March 1990, the Commission published a communication suggesting a strategy of how a collective ‘1990 by 2000’ stabilisation target of CO2 emissions could be achieved. In several paragraphs of the communication (par. 7-11), the Commission was once again interested in linking energy
with climate change considerations. Fiscal measures for a carbon tax were suggested as part of the Commission’s package. However, Energy and Environment Ministers rejected such proposals. Energy and taxation were policies of the exclusive competence of EU members and any pooling of competences with the Commission was not considered to be an option (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006, p.95; Jordan et al., 2010, p.200).

The Commission attempted to further address this problem in the mid-1990s through several advisory reports and loose legislative packages on electricity and gas. After the signing of the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), in 1995 the Commission published a Green Paper for a European Union Energy Policy, aiming at providing the European Institutions with the basis for evaluating whether or not the Community had a greater role to play in energy. The Commission introduced three main objectives for an EU energy policy: a) security of energy supplies, b) sustainability of energy supplies and c) competitiveness of the energy market, whereby environmental protection and the EU’s international role in energy issues were supporting elements of this suggested framework (Adelle et al., 2009). In parallel, several flagship projects attempted to develop a common understanding of the mutual benefits of diversification and liberalisation. Such projects were the Trans-European Networks (TENs), focusing on the physical and regulatory interconnections amongst EU members, the ‘Energy efficiency and rational use of energy resources’ (SAVE) project on energy mitigation and the ‘New and renewable energy resources’ (ALTENER) project, focusing on energy efficiency and renewable energies. The outcomes were, though, unsatisfactory, as targets were non-binding and not significantly ambitious (Adelle et al., 2009, p.27).

Despite several attempts by the Commission to push forward energy and climate change issues in the EU after the agreement of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, it was only in the period 2005-2006 that both energy and climate change were at the core of the EU’s considerations. Several events at the European and international levels contributed to the realisation of energy and climate change as highly interlinked policy areas, both inside the EU and abroad. The issue of energy disruptions from Russia to Ukraine and the soaring oil prices internationally constituted key moments that brought energy to the centre of EU’s agenda (Adelle et al., 2009). Various EU members faced energy problems after the Russian energy disruption and the increased prices in the international oil markets, which exposed the vulnerability of the energy market at the EU level, and stressed the importance of an integrated EU energy policy.
Moreover, the EU’s leadership in international climate governance, especially after the Johannesburg Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002 and its success in persuading Russia to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, gave an opportunity for the ‘European institutions to grasp this opportunity to enhance their legitimacy, by moving climate change into the centre of the European integration process’ (Oberthür and Kelly, 2008, p.43). Also, after the ‘no’ referenda of France and the Netherlands for the 2004 EU Constitutional Treaty, the European Commission had to reinforce the climate policy rhetoric in order to put back on track the process of European integration. As Jordan et al. argue

unlike Jacques Delors in early 1990s, climate change was prominently championed by the Commission President Barroso as a policy priority that would allow the EU to restore its somewhat shaky legitimacy (Jordan et al., 2010, p.191).

At the Hampton Court informal Summit during the UK Presidency of the EU Council in 2005, after a Commission’s proposal it was recognised that

[...] in respect of energy, there was an agreement to take forward work in the energy sector, including how we try to establish a common European grid. Obviously there are already on a bilateral basis certain interconnections. There is a lot more we can do however, and it is important too that energy policy is something that we work on together as a European Union, given the fact that according to the European Commission, over the next few years we will start to import round about ninety percent of our oil and gas needs in Europe (Blair, 2005).

Following this summit, in 2006 a Green Paper for A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy put forward the issue of energy security and climate change describing the need for the EU to respond to the challenges of a new era, for investments in the energy sector, increasing energy dependence, insecure neighbourhood, rising oil and gas prices and a need to combat climate change (European Commission, 2006d, p.3). In addition, in June 2006 in a communication from the Commission (European Commission, 2006c), Europe in the world — Some Practical Proposals for Greater Coherence, Effectiveness and Visibility, climate change was recognised as one of the key issues for the leadership of the EU in its international relations. At another point, the communication stated that

more attention is required in particular to the role of internal policies in external relations, for example in the environment, justice and security issues, transport or energy where the EU has unparalleled experience and influence, including in the Commission’s management of Community policies (European Commission, 2006, p.6).

The turning point for the interdependent nexus between energy and climate change was confirmed at the Presidency Conclusions of the German Presidency in March 2007,
following the Commission’s proposal for an integrated energy and climate change package in January 2007. It stated that

The European Council underlines the vital importance of achieving the strategic objective of limiting the global average temperature increase to not more than 2°C above pre-industrial levels. [...] Given that energy production and use are the main sources for greenhouse gas emissions, an integrated approach to climate and energy policy is needed to realise this objective. Integration should be achieved in a mutually supportive way (Council of the EU, 2007, pp.10-11).

According to the Council’s decisions, the reasons for such a climate and energy policy were: a) the upcoming negotiations for a post-Kyoto international climate agreement in Copenhagen, b) the leading role of the EU in international climate protection, and c) because global warming, together with the need to ensure security of supply and enhance business competitiveness, made it ever more vital and pressing for the EU to put in place a common policy on energy, combining action at the European and the Member States’ level.

After the EU’s leading role in the negotiations for a future scheme of cuts in greenhouse gas emissions in Bali in 2007, in January 2008, the Commission launched the 20-20-20 – Europe’s climate change opportunity, bringing together concrete measures for a European Emission Trading System, tightening national reduction targets for GHG, a new Directive on renewable energies (2009/28/EC) with differentiated national targets, a legislative framework for electricity and natural gas, and amended guidelines for state aid for environmental measures. As is mentioned in the communication

the package of measures proposed by the European Commission [...] offers the right way to maintain the momentum and deliver on Europe's ambitions for climate change, energy security and competitiveness (European Commission, 2008, p.3).

It stated that two key targets were set by the European Council

• A reduction of at least 20% in greenhouse gases (GHG) by 2020 – rising to 30% if there is an international agreement committing other developed countries to ‘comparable emission reductions and economically more advanced developing countries to contributing adequately according to their responsibilities and respective capabilities’.

• A 20% share of renewable energies in EU energy consumption by 2020 (European Commission 2008, p.2).

A further boost was given by the Commission, with communications and other strategies, such as the 2050 de-carbonisation strategy towards a low-carbon economy and the aspiration for the reduction by 80-95 per cent of CO2 in the European economy. Through these legislative packages, the Commission aimed to push forward the diversification of the EU’s energy mix and provide the opportunity for third parties
to become part of this liberalisation process of the EU’s energy market. For example, the directive 2009/28/EC on renewable energies gives the opportunity for non-European countries to engage in green electricity transfers to Europe, and to become regulated, in order to have a share in the emerging liberalised energy market.

Apart from the evolution of energy and climate change as significant parts in the agenda of the EU’s external relations, broader geopolitical and geostrategic changes took place in the broader European neighbourhood, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, which stressed the need for collaboration with the Mediterranean. The end of the Cold War signified several alterations in the EU’s geographic perimeter. Firstly, a large number of former communist Eastern European countries were willing to anchor to the EU, all of whom aspired for full EU membership (Schimmelfennig, 2001; see also part 1.4). Also, since 1987 the EU had been in a process of establishing its single market, which required significant regulatory efforts both from EU members and the Commission. The EU was not well prepared for a large enlargement to include unstable and post-communist countries, and it hardly had the capacity to operate with one voice in its external relations (Hix, 2005; Wallace, 2005).

Secondly, the late 1980s and early 1990s carried strong significance in the EU’s engagement with the Mediterranean. Several Mediterranean Arab countries faced a serious debt crisis caused by the liberalisation of their economies as part of their obligations under IMF Structural Funds (Aghrout, 2009; Kheladi, 2012; see also chapters five and six). As a result, the process of liberalisation resulted in the worsening of the political situation in several SMCs (i.e. Algeria, Middle East) and caused a widespread climate of insecurity in the Maghreb region (see Glossary). Maghreb leaders viewed the accession of southern European countries to the Community as the ‘harbinger’ of North Africa’s further economic marginalisation, leading for instance Morocco’s King Hassan to apply for membership to the European Community in 1987 (Calabrese, 1997, p.96) (for a detailed analysis see part 5.3). Also, the broader instability in the Middle East, with the 1991 Gulf War and the continuous unrest in southern Mediterranean countries, could have had a serious impact at the European level because of the dispersion of nuclear weapons, the potential emergence of failed states, the issue of illegal migration and potential insecurity in energy supplies.

Thirdly, the increased focus on Eastern European countries and their integration into the EU raised several fears in certain EU members, that the EU’s interest in the Mediterranean would be reduced. In order to balance the increased focus in EU politics on Eastern Europe, southern EU members (mainly Spain, but also France and Italy) attempted to introduce the Mediterranean as an equally important region for the EU,
so that they secure their Mediterranean interests (Cardwell, 2008). Because of the climate of insecurity in North Africa, with potential repercussions on its trade with Morocco, Spain started to promote the idea of pan-Mediterranean cooperation (Galduf, 1997). Also, because of the uncontrollable dissolution of Yugoslavia and the general unrest in the Balkans, ‘Italian officials campaigned to extend Community policy to the eastern Mediterranean’ (Calabrese, 1997, p.101). In addition, for SMCs the fall of the Soviet Union and the fear of unipolarity in the region, with only the US as a military hegemony, led them (mainly Egypt) to push forward their interest in Euro-Mediterranean cooperation (Gillespie, 1997). Euro-Mediterranean cooperation was seen as the only means whereby Egypt could increase and diversify its options; otherwise it would risk marginalisation (El-Sayed Selim, 1997). Also, other factors, such as the escalating tension in the relations between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus, the expansionist politics of Turkey against Greece in the Aegean Sea, and the unstable situation in the Middle East, required an EU policy regarding the Mediterranean.

In order to respond to this changing situation, the Commission launched the communication, *Strengthening the Mediterranean Policy of the European Union: Establishing a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership* (European Commission, 1994). Peace, stability and security were seen as the cornerstones of this future partnership. Inspired by the Copenhagen criteria towards CEEs (see part 1.4), the Commission equally suggested that any SMCs wishing to participate in this upcoming Euro-Mediterranean Partnership should pay increased attention to political reform, respect of human rights, freedom of expression and economic reforms. Moreover, the proposal expressed the hope that an expanded free trade area could be established covering the EU, any Central and Eastern European countries, and all Mediterranean non-Member countries (par. 7). The Commission also identified interdependences in policy areas such as energy, environment and migration as possible areas of cooperation between the Community and the Mediterranean countries, which need ‘to be defined jointly with them’ (point 8). In the Co-operation section, development of solar energy resources and the intensification of efforts for the preservation of renewable resources formed part of the possibilities for closer co-operation (par. 20, third priority in the list).

On 27-28 November 1995, the Barcelona Declaration – or Euro-Mediterranean Partnership – was signed between the already enlarged EU of fifteen EU members (accession of Sweden, Austria and Finland in 1995), the European Commission and then twelve SMCs: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, Cyprus and Malta. This was the first time that the EU
and SMCs agreed to promote collective cooperation on such a wide range of issues (Bicchi, 2011). According to Gillespie (1997), this new system of cooperation was based on commitments both in the economic sector (Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area by 2010) and in two other sectors (security and cultural baskets) that sought to shape the nature of Euro-Mediterranean relations well into the twenty-first century. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership would be based on annual multilateral Euro-Mediterranean meetings of senior officials, ministerial meetings every two years, and ad hoc meetings on other issues, such as trade, transport, industry, agriculture, environment, energy and culture.

The EMP was also complemented by bilateral relations (the so called Association Agreements) between the Commission and each SMC. The Commission would assume a significant role in this process, as it would be responsible for managing the conclusion of bilateral agreements with each of these countries, based on each country’s needs. Moreover, it had to support the implementation of the agreement through technical programmes, and monitor their progress, in the light of progressive accomplishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area by 2010, over a period of twelve years.

Furthermore, following similar logic with the enlargement process of CEEs, EU members gave the Commission the right to handle the budget of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership under the so-called MEDA programme, which gave a significant boost to the financial support of this partnership. This programme provided a financial package of €4.6 billion, from which €3,424.5 million were successfully committed for the period 1995-99. MEDA introduced political and economic conditionality into financial relations between the Commission and each SMC (Philipaart, 2002). In particular, funding could be suspended in the case of violation of the fundamental principles of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, namely democratic principles and the rule of law as well as human rights and fundamental freedoms (Article 3 of MEDA Regulation). This meant that the Commission could withdraw or even delay payments in the event of serious default over political commitments (Emerson and Noutcheva, 2007, p.7). However, such power was never exercised, despite the fact that several cases (i.e. Israel’s policy toward Palestine after Netanyahu had been elected in 1996; Egypt’s violation of human rights in certain occasions from President Mubarak) could justify such an option.

However, EMP had to face several challenges which hampered its initial intentions for regional integration, the establishment of a free trade area by 2010 and economic growth on both sides of the Mediterranean (De Vasconcelos, 2002; Cardwell, 2008).
The slow progress in the ratification and implementation of the Association Agreements left limited scope for the implementation of several reforms. Administrative difficulties in dispatching EU funds produced limited potential for the Commission to expand any integrated cooperation efforts with SMCs (Cardwell, 2011; Gomez, 2003).

Apart from the long list of reforms related to liberalisation of SMCs’ economies, the most difficult part for the EMP was to trigger co-operation amongst SMCs. Regional instability put a significant obstacle in the way of process. The growing tension in Israeli-Palestinian relations and the abandonment of any effort on both sides to find a compromise further deteriorated regional instability. Also, other political issues in the region with significant implications, such as the terrorist attack in Lockerbie and the focus on terrorism in the international agenda after 9/11, limited the potential of Euro-Mediterranean Partnership to incur any significant effect on SMCs. Therefore, regional cooperation was hampered by political tensions and cooperation was mainly stagnant.

4.5 The European Neighbourhood Policy and the Commission’s Incentives and Challenges in the Mediterranean over Climate Change Mitigation

Because of stagnant relations at the regional level, the Commission started prioritizing bilateral relations with each SMC in order to surpass the regional stalemate. Bilateral relations could offer a framework of cooperation based on flexibility and differentiation in the engagement with each SMC. Moreover, they could offer insulated relations from the highly politicised regional framework caused by the Arab-Israeli conflict, and progress targeted implementation of reforms (Bicchi, 2011). A renewed approach was then needed to enhance Euro-Mediterranean relations in order to reinvigorate the whole cooperation process. A tailor-made approach was initially mentioned by the EU Commissioner for External Relations, Lord Chris Patten, in a debate on Morocco in front of a Moroccan Colloque in European Parliament, stating that

[…] perhaps it is time to think about developing deeper sub-regional integration under the overall umbrella of the Barcelona conference [Euro-Mediterranean Partnership]. Given the wide diversity in the relations between the different countries concerned, we should not be reluctant to tailor our relationship to the specific needs that countries in the various sub-regions confront together (Patten, 1999, p.3) (emphasis added by the author).
This introduction of flexibility and a tailored relationship in the Commission’s engagement with each SMC provided an initial understanding of the increased potential of bilateral relations in the EU’s external relations with the Mediterranean. Based on the difficulties in the regional structures, the Commission proposed a ‘cluster’ approach in financing regional programmes of immediate interest for both sides, such as water, energy, environment and business investments. As is stated in the *Reinvigorating the Barcelona Process* communication

 [...] The emphasis on regional co-operation is one of the key features of the Barcelona process. However, in the early stages it has been difficult to overcome the political and technical obstacles to co-operation. Regional cooperation focuses on the following key areas: industry, water, energy, environment, transport and the information society. While it is important to maintain the principle that all regional programmes are open to all partners it also makes sense to provide for smaller groups of partners to move ahead together without waiting until all are ready to participate. Thus certain regional co-operation projects could be developed on a sub-regional basis such as bilateral or trilateral projects (European Commission, 2000b, p.10).

Apart from regional instability in Euro-Mediterranean relations, there are several other reasons that justify this bilateral focus by the Commission. One of the main reasons is related to the upcoming enlargement of the EU to include Eastern European countries, and the ongoing process of amending EU Treaties Existing EU Treaties had to adapt new decision-making structures in the enlarged Union. Furthermore, the accession of CEEs would bring new bordering countries on the EU’s eastern and southern flanks, and the European Commission had to establish a new framework policy for the countries being on its immediate borders.

Moreover, it had to be clarified that EU membership would not be available for other European countries in the foreseeable future. As the then Commission President Prodi stated, although the enlargement to include CEEs proved to be successful, ‘we cannot water down the European political project and turn the European Union into just a free trade area on a continental scale’ (Prodi, 2002b, p.3). Multilateralism and persuasion – rather than unilateralism and coercion – would be the watchwords of the EU’s actions in international affairs and, specifically, in the Mediterranean. Bilateral cooperation has a significant role to play, as it can offer fresh incentives and greater flexibility, dependent on the special needs of each partner, in order to achieve common regional goals (Prodi, 2002b, p.4).

As Prodi stated in his keynote speech, *A Wider Europe – A Proximity Policy as the Key to Stability*, during the Sixth ECSA-World Conference in December 2002, this new
policy was based on the concept of ‘sharing everything with the Union but (EU) institutions’, whereby the quality of the EU, with this ‘ring of friends’, would depend on their performance and their political will on either side. As an EEAS official argued about the core of European Neighbourhood Policy

The idea of the European Neighbourhood Policy is basically to make an offer to these countries and suggest that we can go in our bilateral relations with each of them as far as they want in all sectors – political dialogue and cooperation, trade and integration, integration of the markets, approximation of the legislation and many other areas. What they cannot have as a final objective is the accession in the European Union, but at the end of the process if the European Neighbourhood Policy was exploited completely, they might find themselves in a position which is very close economically, commercially and politically in the European Union. And in doing that they would also strengthen their regional links because of approximating their legislation [to that of the EU] (EEAS official, May 2013).

However, the absence of membership conditionality towards non-European neighbouring countries was expected to trigger several implementation challenges and have a limited impact on each SMC (Escribano, 2006; Whitman and Wolff, 2010). The lack of robust rewards, requiring costly reforms in challenging regulatory and political environments, would require close relations with the Commission given the absence of hierarchies, as was the case in the enlargement wave of Europeanization. Tailor-made agreements could focus on the special needs of each country and offer targeted engagement by the Commission, via dialogue and mutual understanding in policy areas of common interest. After all, better use of the EU’s policies in the EU’s external relations, ranging from the single currency to environment and energy, could produce better results in order to encourage regional integration and mitigate security risks (Prodi, 2002a; Prodi, 2002b).

After a long process of reinvigorating a new policy for the EU’s neighbourhood and with limited consultation with ENP countries (see part 1.5), in March 2003 the Commission finally launched the proposal for a Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours (European Commission, 2003; see also part 1.5). In May 2004, it became fully operational with the European Neighbourhood Policy – Strategy Paper (European Commission, 2004). The 2003 communication stated (European Commission, 2003, p.4) that ‘the EU aims to develop a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood through close, peaceful and co-operative relations’. The European Neighbourhood Policy was supplementary to, and built on, existing (regional) policies and arrangements, while at a later stage ‘EU’s relations with these countries [would] resemble the close political and economic links
currently enjoyed with the European Economic Area’ (European Commission, 2003, p.15). The main reward of this policy was a stake in the EU’s Internal Market and further integration and liberalisation for the long-term establishment of the four freedoms. The EU’s relations with the neighbourhood would be managed by the Commission.

Differentiation amongst SMCs holds a key role in this policy, as it can provide ‘tailor-made’ solutions to each neighbour’s needs and capacities separately (Commission official, September 2012; EEAS official, May 2012). The Wider Europe communication stated that

in return for concrete progress in political, economic and institutional reforms, including in aligning legislation with the EU acquis (or EU legislation), the EU’s neighbourhood should benefit from the prospect of closer economic integration with the EU (European Commission, 2003, p.4).

In other words, those willing neighbours that wished to reform according to the legislative framework of the EU’s single market would be rewarded by more aid and technical assistance and closer political and economic ties with EU members; those who lagged behind would not be given such rewards (Pace, 2007, p.669). The ENP Strategy Paper outlines in a more detail the general guidelines that were set out in the Wider Europe communication and built on the promise of more support for more regulatory rapprochement.

Cooperation and differentiated relations were established by bilateral agreements (the so called Action Plans) that focused on each SMC’s willingness to further implement certain policies included in the Association Agreement (Bicchi, 2006). The main legal framework of this bilateral cooperation was the EMP Association Agreements, but the ENP Action Plans built on AAs and set out specific priorities jointly agreed between the EU, the Commission and each SMC. As Emerson and Noutcheva argue, ‘the APs will be layered on top of the existing AAs, rather than replacing them’ (Emerson and Noutcheva, 2005, p.9). Progress would be determined by the neighbour’s willingness to fulfil the aims and provisions of the Action Plan (Kelley, 2006). As both the Association Agreement and the Action Plans have no legally binding commitments for SMCs, it is up to the SMC’s own willingness to be engaged in reforms leading to closer approximation to EU rules (see part 1.5).

Furthermore, bilateral network relations could operate as a channel for the Commission to persuade each SMC towards the mitigation agenda and offer concrete incentives towards that direction (Weber et al., 2007). Expertise and capacity-building via EU grants could encourage cooperation. Technical expertise
would refer to administrative secondment projects from a European administration (twinning), exchange of best practices seminars from the public or private sector (Technical Assistance Information Exchange), and other institutional and regulatory capacity-building.

In particular, twinning projects involve a long-term (up to twenty-four months) secondment from a small team of civil servants from a European public administration to a beneficiary department of an SMC. Advice, expertise and regulatory consultation are mostly offered in order to assist civil servants from an SMC to implement co-agreed reforms following EU rules and regulations. In other words, twinning refers to a tool of familiarisation and knowledge dissemination to the partner country about how best transcription of EU policies and rules can take place at the domestic level. Twinning also provides bureaucratic experience and advice from an EU member and intends to disseminate best practices that could be implemented in dealing with (regulatory) issues in their respective fields (focus group interview with Commission and EEAS officials, September 2012; EU official, October 2012).

Another tool refers to short-term expertise assistance (TAIEX). TAIEX also comes from the Commission’s experience of the 2004 EU enlargement to CEEs. Both twinning and TAIEX aimed to strengthen regulatory transfer of the EU’s legislation at the domestic level of each SMC (Bailey and de Propris, 2004). TAIEX mainly refers to short-term expertise sessions, such as seminars, workshops and conferences, whereby European Commission officials, or hired experts from the private sector, are invited to the country to express their opinions and to provide the participants with their best practices in the field. It refers to another knowledge tool, whereby local administrative and expertise actors can clarify issues in relation to EU rules, and receive advice and consultation in order to deal with the new EU legislation that needs to be transcribed into their national legislation.

Furthermore, another Commission’s incentive refers to grants for the implementation of capacity-building programmes. Capacity-building can take the form of institutional and regulatory technical assistance. There are two main capacity-building programmes: the EU Budget support programmes and the technical assistance programmes. Both programmes are borrowed from the EU’s development policy toward African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries that was launched in the 2000s, after the establishment of the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (focus group with Commission and EEAS officials, September 2012). The EU Budget Support programmes are long-term programmes of up to forty-eight months, including
expertise activities such as twinning and TAIEX, but also financial assistance for technical equipment and other institutional capacity-building needs. Results, sub-results and detailed activities are negotiated and clearly determined after discussions between the Commission and the beneficiary department of an SMC Ministry. The Commission directly funds the national budget of the beneficiary country once the end result of the programme is achieved and all pre-agreed activities are fully implemented (focus group of Commission and EEAS officials, September 2012).

In technical assistance projects the focus is on a step-by-step process of tracking down the implementation of pre-agreed targets and objectives. The EU payment is unlocked following the successful implementation of each activity. Moreover, for an EU Budget support programme, the EU deposits its financial assistance to the national Treasury of each country, not to the department or the agency that is responsible for the implementation of the project, as is the case for technical assistance programmes. From that point on the EU has no control over the use of that money in the country, as it is the country’s responsibility how it will make use of that financial assistance once the payment is made (EU official, October 2012).

Another difference between these two capacity-building programmes is in the nature of the intervention. EU Budget programmes finance technical assistance, expertise and developmental projects between public administrations from an EU member and the SMC (public-to-public). Instead, technical assistance projects mainly finance technical assistance, expertise and developmental projects between private companies and the SMC’s public administration (private-to-public) (focus group with Commission and EEAS officials, September 2012).

However, there are several differences between the Commission and each SMC in the policy field of climate change. The core climate priority for all SMCs is to adapt to climate change, whereas for the Commission its core agenda is climate change mitigation. The most vulnerable areas of the Mediterranean are North African regions bordering desert zones, the Nile delta, coastal zones both to the north and to the south of the basin, as well as those areas undergoing strong demographic growth (the southern and eastern shores, which have densely populated towns, and suburbs) (UNEP Blue Plan, 2008, p.2). The significantly arid climate, their proximity to the Sahara desert and the limited wetlands in each country are expected to combine with increased mean surface temperatures and prolonged droughts in future years, leading to increased soil erosion, the expansion of desertification and water shortages (Verner, 2012). Furthermore, as
developing countries, SMCs have no emission reduction commitments and contribute only marginally to global warming (see parts 5.2 and 6.2).

Climate change adaptation as a policy area is largely under-developed in EU legislation compared to that of climate change mitigation. It is characteristic that the first White Paper on climate change adaptation was launched by the Commission only in 2009, but with no significant interest in the EU’s southern neighbourhood and abroad. It merely mentions that

Adaptation should be mainstreamed in all of the EU’s external policies. In trade policy adaptation should be incorporated, notably through the liberalisation of trade in environmental goods and services and in the elaboration of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). There is a huge potential for green trade which can contribute to enhancing growth and creating jobs (European Commission, 2009, p.15).

Also, only in April 2013, the Commission launched its first ever strategy for climate change adaptation (European Commission, 2013). However, the external aspect of adaptation to climate change is not an integral part of the strategy. Despite the fact that the Mediterranean is characterised as being particularly vulnerable in relation to its exposure to climate change impacts, there is no concrete action that explains how adaptation will be introduced into the EU’s external policies. The communication merely states that

The EU’s dialogue and cooperation with neighbouring countries and developing countries on adaptation issues is channelled through the Enlargement and European Neighbourhood policies and EU development cooperation policy (European Commission, 2013, p.5).

No further understanding is provided about the substance of dialogue and cooperation via European Neighbourhood Policy channels. Adaptation to climate change is not well integrated into bilateral or regional dialogue between the Commission and each SMC, as climate change mitigation seems to have a stronger stance. Because of this limited interest and restricted regulatory focus on climate change adaptation, the Commission is expected to neglect it as a topic of interest. A focus group with DEVCO and EEAS officials has argued that

There is certain demand for regional programmes on climate change related issues. Climate change of course is not at the top of the agenda, but it comes in several issues. We intend to create platforms with the stakeholders and try to identify win-win solutions so that business is becoming more open in order to increase investments. However, we need to do something about the issue of adaptation (Focus group, September 2012; emphasis added by the author).
Therefore, how can the Commission persuade Moroccan and Algerian actors to shift their adaptation priorities to the Commission’s agenda for climate change mitigation? Bilateral policy networks can reduce sectoral differences between each side and operate as a channel for the Commission to promote its agenda in relation to climate change mitigation. Policy networks among experts and bureaucrats from each side can assume leading roles in the joint agreement of the reforms following EU rules and regulations. As bilateral agreements are not legally binding and are based on political commitment, policy networks representing each side could prioritise certain interests and policy areas over others from the long list of APs. Through such networks, reforms could be better explained and discussed by the specialists in each field and offer more time for consideration of particular reforms.

Furthermore, the Commission can utilise its financial, expertise and regulatory incentives in order to spark each SMC’s interest in the promotion of renewable energies. The Commission regulatory framework for energy mitigation is much more advanced than that of climate adaptation. Broad targets for CO2 emissions reduction and concrete legislative acts, such as article nine of the 2009/28/EC Directive on cooperation on green electricity imports from third countries, offer concrete incentives for the non-European neighbouring countries to be engaged in such discussions, by reducing the transaction costs of network operations (Scharpf, 1997). Moreover, the Commission’s grants for seminars, administrative training and capacity-building programmes can offer significant incentives for local actors from each country to favour technical interaction with Commission actors over mitigation issues.

Morocco may be encouraged by Commission’s incentives to enter into network interaction (see chapter five). Although its climate priority is to adapt to climate change, Morocco is highly interested in the development of renewable energies, because of its strong energy dependency from abroad. The potential of green electricity exports to the EU can also offer certain financial and energy incentive for Morocco in order to shift its climate priorities towards climate mitigation and energy diversification. Moreover, the development of a renewable energies market in Morocco, based on EU standards, could support this aspiration, as it would be followed by funds and expertise offers from the Commission. Therefore, bilateral network relations may lead both sides to prioritise collaboration in renewable energies and advance domestic adjustment to EU rules.
Unlike the Moroccan case, domestic adjustment may have certain difficulties for Algeria. The promotion of renewable energies could offer Algeria the opportunity to reduce the vulnerability of its economy caused by fluctuating international oil prices. However, Algeria is a self-sufficient country in terms of energy because of its vast conventional energy resources in gas and oil, which covers a significant part of the EU needs in terms of energy supplies (see part 6.2). Also, its economy is almost entirely dependent on energy exportations. The EU market rules and the liberalisation of the Algerian energy market are expected to jeopardise the country’s economy and cause privilege losses for state actors. Moreover, climate change mitigation and the development of renewable energies are not ‘urgent’ matters for Algeria (Algerian official, May 2013). Renewable energies refer to a rather new market in Algeria, which cannot be compared to the strong monopoly of conventional resources. Therefore, it can be speculated that the Commission will have a limited margin of manoeuvre to convince Algeria to shift its preferences towards renewable energies. Even the Commission incentives of funds and expertise may not trigger any network interaction that might persuade the Algerian actors.

### 4.6 Conclusion

The Commission’s agenda and preferences over climate change policy in the Mediterranean were the main focus of this chapter. One of the arguments was that the EU is significantly energy dependent on unstable countries in its immediate neighbourhood. The disruption in energy supplies to various EU members in 2006 from Gazprom, and the soaring prices in the energy sector gave rise to serious concerns about the EU’s energy policy. This dependence caused serious energy supply problems for the EU which could threaten the effective functioning of the single market. Responding to climate change offered several opportunities for the EU to diversify its energy mix and mitigate its energy use. Following these challenges, the Commission suggested the establishment of an integrated energy market based on a low-carbon trajectory (European Commission, 2008; 2011a).

SMCs have a significant role to play with the Commission and the EU as a whole in this policy area, for several reasons. They hold significant hydrocarbon resources and are transit countries for energy from other countries. Their important energy resources can support the Commission’s efforts over the diversification of the EU’s energy routes against growing dependence on Russian energy resources. Moreover, their significant geographical position favours the production and development of green electricity from renewable energies, which can then be exported to the EU. This can contribute to the
EU’s efforts towards CO2 emission reductions and the achievement of its international climate change commitments. Moreover, the EU’s significant experience and expertise in renewable energies can be exported to SMCs in order to assist them in their efforts towards energy independence (Morocco) and diversification of their economy (Algeria).

However, the Commission faces several challenges that inhibit its intentions for cooperation over climate change mitigation with SMCs. In relation to climate change, both Morocco and Algeria are significantly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, as the southern coast of the Mediterranean is expected to be severely affected by climate change by 2030 (IPCC, 2007; UNEP Blue Plan, 2008; Verner, 2012). These two SMCs face almost similar climate problems, such as desertification, coastal erosion, water shortages, deforestation, severe floods and so on. On the other hand, the Commission has limited regulatory incentives for climate change adaptation, as its main regulatory bulk is concentrated on renewable energies directives (2009/28/EC), greenhouse gas mitigation (2008 energy and climate change package) and the decarbonisation of the single market.

The Commission attempted to promote its agenda via regional cooperation through the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The EMP would combine regional meetings and bilateral agreements, whereby the centre of these relations would be the achievement of the goal of a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area by 2010. However, regional instability, the continuous politicisation of the Arab-Israeli dispute and the lack of tangible results in the first five years of the EMP led the Commission to shift its focus towards a purely bilateral track in EU-SMC relations.

Bilateral relations with each SMC appeared to offer a better engagement modality for the Commission in order to promote its climate mitigation agenda. Bilateral relations are insulated from regional instability and high politics, and can specify the needs of each SMC, offering differentiated and flexible relations with the Commission. Moreover, differentiated bilateral relations (Del Sarto and Schumacher, 2005; Barbé and Surallés, 2010) can prioritise concrete needs and specify certain activities between the Commission and each SMC. The bilateral initiative of the European Neighbourhood Policy could also offer a routinis ed framework of cooperation, which appeared necessary to the Commission.

Moreover, the need for closer bilateral relations based on differentiation seems more appropriate for the Commission, for the expansion of shared benefits and co-ownership with each SMC via policy networks. Bureaucrats and experts in insulated policy networks can better decide common reforms based on EU rules, and equally utilise the
Commission’s assistance of each SMC’s needs. Expertise and grants from the Commission can contribute to the SMC’s regulatory rapprochement towards the single market and the progressive implementation of their commitments.

The following two chapters will analyse whether, and to what extent, Europeanization is taking place in Morocco and Algeria through the climate change policy. They will also explore the role of policy networks as Europeanization mechanisms that attempt to advance domestic adjustment to climate change mitigation.
Chapter 5: Morocco, the European Commission and Policy Networks in Climate Change Policy

5.1 Introduction

Morocco faces serious energy, economic and political challenges that affect its development. It is a country with up to ninety-five per cent dependence on energy from abroad. It has insignificant conventional energy resources (i.e. oil, natural gas) and its energy demand is growing, especially over the last decade (MATUHE, 2010). Morocco spends significant amounts of its national budget on coal and natural gas imports in order to support the growth of its economy and the needs of its fast-growing population. In addition, the vulnerable nature of its economy from external shocks, such as fluctuating energy prices, limits the potential of policy sectors, such as agriculture and tourism, to take over a significant role in the development of its economy. Also, regional tensions with Algeria over Western Sahara and the limited trade opportunities with its Maghreb neighbours limit Morocco’s opportunities for development (Zoubir, 2004).

The development of renewable energies and the production of electricity from non-conventional sources, such as solar and wind power, offer significant opportunities for Morocco. Morocco has favourable geographical and climatological conditions for the development of such resources because of its proximity to the Sahara desert and its Atlantic and Mediterranean coastlines (OME, 2007). Renewable energies can progressively reduce Morocco’s external reliance on energy imports, fund part of its adaptation needs, and even lead to green electricity exports. Moreover, they may enhance the country’s energy mix and reduce the volatility of the Moroccan economy.

However, Morocco has a different climate change agenda from the Commission. Morocco is highly vulnerable to climate change and is expected to face serious impact from droughts, floods, desertification and water stress (MEMEE, 2010; Verner, 2012; IPCC, 2007). Its immediate need is to adapt to climate change in order to deal with the adverse effects of this phenomenon, as it is expected to have a negative impact on several sectors of its economy and on its population. However, adaptation to climate change requires significant amounts of investment and funds that are not available in Morocco. Similarly, even though it has developed an energy strategy (Renewed Energy
Strategy, 2010) and a legislative framework (Loi 13-09 on renewable energies) for renewable energies, it lacks necessary funds for, and experience in, developing renewable energies.

As was described in chapter four, the Commission prioritises climate change mitigation over adaptation in the Mediterranean countries. It offers regulatory, financial and expertise incentives, mainly in the policy area of renewable energies and shows limited interest in climate change adaptation. Article nine of the 2009/28/EC Directive gives the opportunity to third countries to join in partnership with the EU in order to export electricity from renewable energies. Additionally, the transfer of expertise and exchange of best practices can give Morocco the opportunity to integrate into the EU’s energy market and adjust its renewable energies regulatory and institutional framework to that of the EU. Also, a common regulatory framework with the EU could equally signify access to the European energy market and electricity exports to its biggest partner in the region.

Network actors from the Commission and Morocco have engaged in network relations, in order to decide how to deal with climate change policy and prioritise certain policy agenda. While climate change adaptation is an immediate need for Morocco, network actors have jointly agreed to push forward the policy area of climate change mitigation. Regulatory, financial and expertise incentives in the policy area of renewable energies have triggered Morocco’s interest in engaging with the liberalizing reforms following EU regulation. In this case, Europeanization has found an easy channel to shift Morocco’s adaptation needs and prioritise the Commission’s mitigation agenda. Policy networks have advanced Europeanization without an EU membership incentive into the Commission’s prioritised policy area.

On the other hand, Europeanization has failed to advance into the policy area of climate change adaptation. As the Commission’s incentives are mainly focused on climate change mitigation, the Moroccan authorities have shown limited interest in progressing cooperation over climate change adaptation. Similarly, network actors have shown limited interest in establishing a common understanding of climate adaptation issues. Dialogue was highly limited and there were no expertise and capacity-building programmes to enhance network relations.

This chapter is organised into four main parts. The first part presents Morocco’s energy and financial challenges and its core dilemmas concerning climate change policy. The second part offers an overview of EU-Moroccan relations and explores the Commission’s incentives and Morocco’s motivations in the agenda of climate change
policy and renewable energies. The third part analyses the policy networks amongst Commission and Moroccan officials and illustrates how relations unfold amongst network actors. The fourth part assesses the role of policy networks in each climate policy area and portrays the lessons for Europeanization outside Europe without the membership incentive. The chapter closes with certain concluding remarks.

5.2 Energy Challenges, Financial Needs and Climate Change Dilemmas in Morocco

Morocco is a country situated in the western corner of North Africa with Atlantic and Mediterranean coastlines in the west and the north respectively. It neighbours Algeria on its eastern borders and Mauritania on its southern borders, and shares many religious and historical characteristics with both countries and with the rest of the Maghreb (see Glossary). It also exercises de facto administrative control in the disputed territory of Western Sahara (see below for further analysis). Also, Morocco was under French and Spanish colonial rule as a Protectorate (1912-1956), until it gained its independence in 1956. It neighbours Spain in the north and is only separated from it by the Straits of Gibraltar, whose distance from the continental Europe is only fourteen kilometres (or almost nine miles) (MEMEE, 2010, p.14) (see Map 3).

Map 3: Map of Morocco (Fotolia, 2014)
Morocco is a country with significant energy challenges and financial needs that affect its development and growth prospects (Benkhadra, 2010). Morocco is not favoured with rich natural reserves, as is its eastern neighbour, Algeria. It has no conventional resources to support the growing needs of its economy and its highly urbanizing population. As most of its significant economic sectors are energy intensive, the absence of energy resources inhibits its developmental aspirations and necessitates significant spending on energy importations. It is characteristic that Morocco’s dependence on external energy resources accounted for up to eighty-two per cent in the 1980s, and, since the 1990s, its reliance is steadily increasing.

Today's external energy dependence amounts to ninety-five per cent of its total energy needs. This situation is not expected to alter in the future. Even by 2030 the national energy production will remain weak – biomass excluded – and Morocco will remain ‘strongly dependent’ ('fortement dépendant') on oil, natural gas and coal imports and, to a lesser extent, on electricity imports from Spain and Algeria (MATUHE, 2010, p.133). Its most significant mining resource is phosphate, ‘which represents almost twenty-one per cent of income from exportations and almost 2.2 per cent of the GDP’ (MATUHE, 2010, pp.37-38). Morocco is the largest exporter of phosphate and phosphate products and the third largest producing country worldwide. However, reserves in phosphate do not constitute a conventional natural resource similar to oil and gas that can cover its growing energy gap, and it cannot cover the financial needs of the country.

Table 6: Moroccan energy data (in thousand tonnes of oil equivalent (ktoe)) (1960-2010) (World Bank, 2014b)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Energy production (ktoe)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>878</td>
<td>773</td>
<td>831</td>
<td>571</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>894</td>
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<tr>
<td>Energy use (ktoe)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4,780</td>
<td>6,941</td>
<td>8,593</td>
<td>10,238</td>
<td>13,069</td>
<td>16,508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy imports (% of total energy use)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>95</td>
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In addition, Morocco faces serious problems in terms of its growing energy demands and urbanisation. While its domestic energy production is almost unchanged, energy use has constantly increased since the 1980s and it is almost quadrupled nowadays (see Table 6). In 1980 energy use was 4,780 ktoe, while by 2010 it was up to 16,508 ktoe.
The problem of increasing energy demands and external energy dependence is also coupled with its growing birth rate and the urbanisation of Morocco’s young population (see Table 7; see also MATUHE, 2001, p.25; MATUHE, 2010, pp.24-25). Furthermore, Morocco is vulnerable to the fluctuating prices of conventional energies. The 2007 energy crisis and the 2008 global economic crisis widened even further the country’s deficit and limited the country’s capabilities to deal with other social challenges, such as poverty and unemployment (Aghrout, 2009; Martín, 2004).

Table 7: Population, urbanization, urbanization growth in Morocco (in million and %) (1960-2012) (World Bank, 2014c)

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<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban pop</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Pop. (% of Total)</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban pop. growth (annual %)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
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</table>

Morocco is not only vulnerable in the energy sector, but also in other sectors of its economy. Morocco has traditionally been an economy based on the exportation of agricultural products and textiles, mainly to France (Damis, 1998) (see part 5.3). Agricultural products and textiles constituted a significant part of its productive output and contributed strongly to the country’s revenue from exportations to European markets (for further analysis, see part 5.3). They accounted for up to sixty per cent of the total Moroccan exports in the 1960s and 1970s. However, the agricultural focus of the Moroccan economy exposed its significant vulnerability to external shocks, as was the case with the global economic crisis between the 1970s and 1980s and the deteriorating economic situation in North Africa.

Over recent decades, Morocco has engaged in the development of various other sectors that are expected to reduce its vulnerability and enhance the country’s revenue. The focus is on the industrial sector and the exportation of several mineral, metallurgical and other chemical products, mainly from its phosphate resources (Ministère de l’Industrie, du Commerce et des Nouvelles Technologies, 2013, p.43). Morocco also
shows increasing interest in electronic products and aims to reduce its reliance on agricultural products (sixteen per cent in 2000 to eight per cent in 2012) and textiles (thirty-seven per cent in 2000 to nineteen per cent in 2012) (Ministère de l’Industrie, du Commerce et des Nouvelles Technologies, 2013, p.42). However, the growing recession in several European countries has negatively affected its revenue from exportations and led to limited demand for electric products (i.e. electric cables) or even other chemical products. Moreover, Morocco intends to invest in tourist services. Tourism has a growing importance in the modern Moroccan economy, with a share reaching up to eight per cent of GDP (UNEP MAP, 2009, pp.315-316). Yet, tourism is highly sensitive to economic shocks, as was the case with the global financial crisis. Also, tourism refers to an energy-intensive sector, which has led to an increasing public deficit in late years (Ministère de l’Industrie, du Commerce et des Nouvelles Technologies, 2013, pp.16-19).

Limited economic development and poor trade opportunities with its continental neighbours have further exacerbated Morocco’s financial instability (Aghrout, 2009). Table 8 demonstrates that Maghreb countries show limited interest in trade cooperation amongst them. Instead, they have a significant preference for trading with other parts of the world, mainly Europe. Only 1.8 per cent of total trade referred to intra-Maghreb trade in 1996, and it had not appeared to have improved ten years later, as it had reduced to only 1.5 per cent. Although in absolute values intra-Maghreb trade has developed from $846 million in 1996 to $2.1 billion in 2006, total intra-Maghreb trade toward the rest of the world has tripled from $47 billion to $145 billion.

Table 8: Trade balance between Maghreb countries ($million and %) (1996-2006) (Aghrout, 2009, p.361)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1996</th>
<th>2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>World Total</td>
<td>Maghreb (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>20,205</td>
<td>329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>14,298</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>13,268</td>
<td>319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maghreb</td>
<td>47,771</td>
<td>846</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Morocco has the lowest percentage amongst Maghreb countries of intra-Maghreb trade, only accounting for $198 million in 1996, $709 in 2006, less than two per cent of its total export balance (Table 8; see also DG Trade 2012). Low intra-Maghreb trade is contrasted with significant trade opportunities that the EU market offers to Morocco for its economic development, as opposed to its immediate neighbours and the rest of Maghreb. The EU market is the biggest regional market in the world, with a population of 500 million inhabitants and with significant share in total world trade (see part 5.3). Compared to Maghreb, the difference is immense, as Maghreb’s share of total exports and imports is only 0.74 and 0.65 per cent respectively. The comparison is almost chaotic when compared with Morocco’s immediate continental neighbours, such as Mauritania (0.02 and 0.01 per cent), or even with Algeria (0.40 and 0.26 per cent) (see Table 9).

Table 9: Morocco, Mauritania, Algeria, Maghreb and EU statistics (2011) (WTO, 2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Mauritania</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Maghreb</th>
<th>EU-27</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>32,273</td>
<td>3,542</td>
<td>35,980</td>
<td>88,892</td>
<td>502,369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (in million)</td>
<td>100,221</td>
<td>4,076</td>
<td>188,681</td>
<td>401,202</td>
<td>17,598,847</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share (%) in</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>15.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>world total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>exports</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share (%) in</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>16.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>world total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>imports</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merchandise</td>
<td>21,519</td>
<td>2,769</td>
<td>73,489</td>
<td>133,624</td>
<td>2,170,024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>exports</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merchandise</td>
<td>44,295</td>
<td>2,464</td>
<td>47,247</td>
<td>125,958</td>
<td>2,396,536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>imports</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This limited interest for regional trade cooperation mainly stems from the unstable relations between Morocco and Algeria. Significant parts of modern-day Algeria’s south-western territories and modern-day Morocco’s south-eastern parts (including Western Sahara) (see above Map 3) had no clear status during the colonial years. They remained highly unidentified by Spanish and French colonisers, until the advent of the decolonisation period. Morocco claimed part of Algeria’s western territories in the late
1950s together with its ‘Southern province’ of Western Sahara, according to ethnic, religious and other map data from the pre-colonial period (Mundy, 2010). These territories were of great value for the newly independent Kingdom for two reasons: they were rich in phosphate reserves and could partly contribute to the energy needs of the country. Also, they would strengthen Morocco’s geographical role in the Maghreb (Zoubir, 2000, pp.46-48).

The dispute over Western Sahara plays a core role in the antagonistic relationship between Morocco and Algeria and fuels mistrust and instability in the broader Maghreb region (Boukhars and Omar, 2011; see also Zoubir, 2000). For some, the Western Sahara dispute refers to a ‘frozen’ (Mundi, 2010) or even ‘forgotten’ (Bergh, 2007) conflict from the Cold War era. After Spanish colonisers withdrew from that territory, King Hassan II of Morocco annexed Western Sahara, on the grounds of ‘restoring its territorial integrity disrupted by French and Spanish colonialism’ and occupied the territory after the ‘Green march’ of Moroccan troops in Western Sahara in 1975 (Joffé, 2010, p.375; Benabdallah, 2009, p.419).

The developments of 1976 caused significant tension between Morocco, the indigenous Sahrawi people under the leadership of Polisario front, and Algeria. Once Spain withdrew from Western Sahara in 1976, the Polisario front declared the creation of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). Algeria supported the demands of the Sahrawi people for self-determination. Algeria supported – and still supports – financially and logistically\textsuperscript{11} the Polisario front, while at the same time it offered military equipment for its war against Moroccan security forces. Despite a final ceasefire in 1991, and the promise of a referendum for self-determination from the United Nations, the situation remains unchanged even today between Morocco, the Polisario front and Algeria (Joffé, 2010, p.376). Differences are still strong over the exact number of the population that has the right to participate in the referendum.

To sum up, Morocco faces several energy challenges because of its external energy dependence and growing domestic energy demands. Also, it lacks significant conventional energy resources and a great part of the economy is highly energy-intensive. Moreover, the need for energy importations limits the country’s developmental efforts to invest in other policy sectors, along with limited trade opportunities with its Maghreb neighbours.

\textsuperscript{11}Polisario’s headquarters were and still are in the south-western side of Algeria in Tindouf.
The development of renewable energies and the production of green electricity from solar and wind power is among the few options Morocco can have for its energy diversification, its goal of progressive energy independence and development of the country. Several studies have shown the strong solar and wind potential of the country to develop renewable energies. Morocco is characterised by intensive solar radiation (Fritzsche et al., 2011). The annual average solar radiation of the country ranges from about 2800 hours to 3400 hours, respectively in the northern and southern parts of the country. Solar radiation reaches between 4.7 and 5.6 kWh/day (OME, 2007, p.99; Benkhadra, 2010). Moreover, wind is abundant in almost all coastal areas, both in intensity and in constancy (Fritzsche, 2011, p.4499). The wind energy potential is estimated to be close to a capacity of 25,000MW for the whole Moroccan territory, notably in the areas around Tangiers-Tétouan (northern Morocco close to the Mediterranean and Atlantic coastlines), where wind velocity ranges between 9.5 and 11 m/s (Benkhadra, 2010). The evaluation of the Tétouan region near Tangiers places them among the best wind locations in the world (OME, 2007, p. 100).

However, Morocco’s immediate priority is to adapt to climate change. It is indicative that the 2001 UNFCCC communication urged the Moroccan government to ‘implement adaptation programmes in the shortest possible time especially in the most vulnerable sectors’ (such as water, agriculture and social issues) (MATUHE, 2001, p. 11). The water and agriculture sectors are the ones that will suffer most from future increased temperatures, reduced rainfalls and increased evapotranspiration putting surface and underground water reserves under pressure (MEMEE, 2010, pp. 87-103). In the water sector, surface and underground water reserves are expected to have losses up to fifteen per cent by 2020, and rainfall to be limited to certain short periods during the winter, thus decreasing the reserves of current dams. These measurements are expected to put the agricultural sector under serious pressure, as it utilises up to eighty per cent of total water resources in the country. It will therefore be affected by significant droughts, soil erosion and desertification, but these may also have indirect effects on the tourist sector.

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\[12^{\text{In the original text, it is mentioned as follows:‘Les impacts des changements climatiques sur la société et l’économie marocaines pourront être atténués si des programmes d’adaptation sont mis en œuvre dans les plus brefs délais, notamment dans les secteurs les plus vulnérables’}}\]
Furthermore, being a developing country Morocco has no international commitments or obligations to mitigate its greenhouse gas emissions. As is shown in Table 10, Morocco’s CO2 emissions have increased over the years, but they still remain at low levels, as they were only 0.15 per cent of global CO2 emissions in 2009.

On the other hand, the agenda of energy mitigation could assist developed countries to mitigate and reduce their greenhouse gas emissions and contribute to the growing challenge of global warming. The renewable energies agenda could even support Morocco’s growing trend of increased energy use and cover its needs of the energy-intensive sectors of its economy. As a Moroccan interviewee argued:

Renewable energy is very important because it will cover most of our electricity needs and because we are committed to protect the environment. Combating climate change is a strategic choice for Morocco (Moroccan official, June 2012).

The EU is among the leading actors combating climate change at the international level with whom Morocco has close geographic proximity and electricity interconnections. Morocco and the EU have a long history of collaboration. The functional policy sector of renewable energies could enhance cooperation between the two sides over climate change mitigation and contribute to the transfer of green electricity from Morocco to the European single market. Moreover, the Commission’s regulatory, financial and expertise incentives can bring together actors from each side to advance further collaboration.

### Table 10: Moroccan, EU and World CO2 emissions (in thousand tons and as percentage) (1960-2009) (World Bank, 2014a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MOR</td>
<td>3.6 (0.04%)</td>
<td>7.3 (0.05%)</td>
<td>15.9 (0.08%)</td>
<td>23.5 (0.11%)</td>
<td>33.9 (0.14%)</td>
<td>48.8 (0.15%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-27</td>
<td>2,331 (24.8%)</td>
<td>3,708 (25.07%)</td>
<td>4,464 (23.05%)</td>
<td>4,096 (18.40%)</td>
<td>3,892 (15.69%)</td>
<td>3,615,579 (11.29%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>9,369 (100%)</td>
<td>14,788 (100%)</td>
<td>19,368 (100%)</td>
<td>22,274 (100%)</td>
<td>24,810 (100%)</td>
<td>32,042 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.3 EU-Moroccan Relations, Moroccan Motivation and the Commission’s Incentives over Climate Change Policy

It was in 1980s when they asked for [EU] membership. It was refused, but since then they said “Ok, if we [Morocco] cannot become a member, then we will enter into the single market”. So everything they [Morocco] do is trying to adapt the European legislation to their home. It is a totally conscious choice. It is amazing. It is really amazing...For them having close ties with the EU it’s like a way to ensure their economic development. They say “Look, we are trying to do our best to become like a Western country” (Commission official, September 2012).

Morocco traditionally took a pro-active and willing stance towards the EU, favouring close and ‘privileged’ relations (Jaidi and Martín, 2010; Emerson et al., 2007). Because of its restricted geographical position in north-western Africa and the lack of trade opportunities with its continental neighbours, access to the European market has always been of critical importance, even from its early engagement with the then European Economic Community (EEC) in 1970s. The EU is the only actor that can secure to a large extent Morocco’s development and growth of its economy, as it offers the biggest market in the region, whereby Morocco can export its (agricultural) products (Dawson, 2009). Moreover, the Commission can offer significant expertise, technical knowledge and financial assistance in order to assist Morocco to bring its regulatory structure closer to EU rules and access the European market.

Morocco’s interest in access to the EU market has been evidenced several times. EU-Moroccan relations officially started in 1976 with the signing of a Cooperation Agreement. Enhanced trade relations between the two parties and EEC financial assistance offered the main means for achieving the agreement’s goal, which was the economic and social development of Morocco. Exports of agricultural goods to the EEC were of critical importance to Morocco, as they would contribute to a great part of its GDP. Almost sixty per cent of its exports were to the EU, while almost half of its imports originated from the EEC (Dawson, 2009, p.52).

However, the EEC offered free access only to Moroccan industrial goods, and partial access to certain Moroccan agricultural goods, through varied custom duties and tariff quotas (European Commission, 1980). The presence of a strong Mediterranean bloc of EEC members (France, Italy) with significant interests in the agricultural sector inside the EU reduced Morocco’s negotiating power in this field. The EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) secured preferential access for EU members’ agricultural
products in the EEC’s market and provided them with financial assistance for their farmers (Damis, 1998).


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financial Protocol (Year)</th>
<th>EU Budget</th>
<th>European Investment Bank</th>
<th>Total Allocations (1978-1996)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total (1978-1996)</td>
<td>€130 million</td>
<td>€199 million</td>
<td>€1,035 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite limited access for the Moroccan agricultural products, the Commission established financial protocols based on grants and preferential EIB loans in order to assist Morocco with its economic and social development, through technical assistance projects and expertise transfer. The financial aid from these four financial protocols for the period 1978-1996 was in total €1.035 billion, or approximately €55 million per year (see Table 11). Despite the establishment of financial and technical assistance from the EU since 1976, liberalisation had only limited impact in Morocco, as EU funds and expertise offered limited opportunities for the economic and social development of Morocco towards its trade liberalisation (Damis, 1998; Joffé, 2009). As Dawson argues the composition of the aid had begun to swing sharply away from grants in favour of loans in 1980s, while the aid had also been criticised for often being delivered via European businesses and consultancies and thus not encouraging capacity building in the Maghreb (Dawson, 2009, p.25).

Furthermore, the deteriorating economic situation since the 1973 oil crisis, stagnant economic activity in Europe in the 1970s and 1980s, and continuous accessions of southern European countries to the EU (Greece in 1981; Spain and Portugal in 1986) had serious negative impact in Morocco. This led King Hassan II of Morocco to send an official letter to the European Community asking for full EU membership (Dawson, 2009). As Morocco was not part of the EU and its main agricultural competitor, Spain, was then EU member, Moroccan agricultural products were found to be in a
disadvantageous position in relation to southern EU members.\(^3\) Morocco’s application was turned down by the European Commission for geographical reasons, as only European countries are eligible for full EU membership (EEC Treaty of Rome, article 236). This had, however, served the purpose of highlighting the status and ambitions of the kingdom (Bahaijoub, 2009, pp. 239-240). Since then, Morocco has always intended to obtain status as the most favoured country among SMCs.

With the establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) (see part 4.4), Morocco had the opportunity to bring its legislation as close as possible to that of the EU and progressively share common trading rules, mostly with the EU and with the rest of SMCs. The main promise was a liberalised Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area by 2010 and the rapprochement of SMCs’ rules to that of the EU’s single market. As is mentioned in its 2000 Association Agreement with the EU, the main aim of both sides was to bring Morocco’s legislation closer to that of the EU (Article 52 of the EU-Moroccan Association Agreement). In this way, Morocco would be in a position to share similar regulations and rules with its European counterparts (Damis, 1998). Moreover, integrating EU rules domestically, with increased financial and technical assistance from the Commission, could create a similar regulatory environment to that of the EU single market and attract foreign investment.

The EU-Moroccan Association Agreement established a general framework of cooperation in several policy fields that ranged from political dialogue and security issues to trade liberalisation in policy fields such as trade, justice and immigration, transport, environment, energy, research, agriculture and fisheries. In order to assist Morocco to achieve the liberalisation of its economy and a future EU-Moroccan Free Trade Area, the Commission increased financial commitments to Morocco by introducing institutionalised funding. The total commitments to Morocco under MEDA rose to €1.472 billion for the period 1995-2006, and €1.234 billion for the period 2007-2013 under ENPI (see Table 12 below); EIB loans for the period 1995-2013 reached up to €5.22 billion. It was also ahead of other SMCs in terms of disbursement, with a rate of sixty-five per cent over the period 2000-2004 (Bicchi, 2010, p.209).

Four years after the launch of the Association Agreement, Morocco was again one of the first SMCs to ask for enhanced bilateral relations with the EU under the newly established European Neighbourhood Policy in 2004 (see part 4.5). Differentiation via bilateral relations seemed to be more compatible with Moroccan interests for stronger relations and deeper dialogue and engagement with the EU (Del Sarto and Schumacher, 2005; Haddadi, 2003). The incentive of a stake in the EU’s single market was the core motivation for Morocco to bring itself closer to the EU’s regulatory framework in exchange for its compliance with EU rules. Moreover, the Moroccan ENP Action Plan gave the opportunity for Morocco to benefit from advanced opportunities from the Commission in technical assistance and expertise via twinning projects, capacity-building programmes and exchange of officials from an EU member to Morocco. The Commission’s funding was also increased in order to cover the increasing needs of the liberalisation process of the Moroccan economy (see Table 12 above).

Similar opportunities are also offered in climate-related sectors. Moroccan action plan included the possibility for both sides to cooperate over renewable energies (point 69), the adjustment of Moroccan organisational, regulatory, institutional and technical conditions in the electricity sector (point 67) and in the environment (point 73), but also on exchange of best practices and expertise. The production of green electricity and its exportation to the EU offers several incentives to Morocco. Firstly, the adjustment of Moroccan legislation to EU energy acquis and the liberalisation of its energy market are expected to offer a similar regulatory framework for exportation of green electricity to the EU and facilitate energy investments by European companies. As a Moroccan official argued

### Table 12: EU financial commitments to Morocco (1995-2013) (ENPI, 2007, p.17; Bremberg, 2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Funding Instrument</th>
<th>Total amount (million €)</th>
<th>Amount per year (million €)</th>
<th>Amount per capita per year (€)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MEDA II (2000-2006)</td>
<td>982</td>
<td>140.3</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENPI (2007-2010)</td>
<td>654</td>
<td>163.5</td>
<td>5.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENPI (2011-2013)</td>
<td>580.5</td>
<td>193.3</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Article nine of the European Directive is a framework for us that allows the enrichment of our cooperation and gives us opportunity for exportations (Moroccan official, October 2012). Also, it gives the chance for Morocco to integrate into the EU energy market, as it will share common regulations and rules with the EU. Its geographical proximity with Europe and its already physical electric interconnection with Spain further stimulate its interest. Green electricity can start feeding into the current flow towards Europe without the need to build new infrastructure. Furthermore, such an opportunity can equally offer the opportunity for Morocco to ‘upgrade its present transmission system and connection capacity with Spain’ and even, with European assistance, build a strong electricity and regulatory grid (Fritzche et al., 2011, p.4500).

With respect to climate change adaptation there are no clear regulatory incentives that can trigger Morocco’s interest in accessing the EU’s market. As was mentioned in chapter four, the EU’s approach to climate change adaptation is at its early stages of development and its focus on adaptation is rather limited in its external relations (see part 4.5). In this case, even if Morocco intended to prioritise climate change adaptation in its engagement with the Commission, there are limited incentives that can enhance its aspiration to have access to the EU market.

On the other hand, climate change mitigation is at the top of the Commission’s agenda towards SMCs and offers significant opportunities for non-European countries. Morocco’s interest in reducing its dependence on external energy imports, diversify its domestic energy mix and progressively build a self-sustained domestic energy market coincides with the Commission’s incentives in the climate change mitigation agenda. Responding to this motivation, Morocco launched the new National Energy Strategy (NES) (or nouvelle Stratégie Enérgétique Nationale) and the National Priority Action Plan (NPAP) (or Plan d’Action des Actions Prioritaires). Renewable energies are identified as a significant element of the development of independent electricity production for Morocco. Moreover, there are significant opportunities toward its implementation because of the proximity to Europe, and the existence of several interconnections, both with Spain and Algeria (MEMEE, 2010, pp.8-11; Moroccan official, June 2012; Regional energy expert, June 2012).

14The original interview in French mentions: “L’article n. 9 de la Directive Européenne c’est un cadre pour nous qui permet l’enrichissement de notre coopération et donne des opportunités des exports.”
Morocco also set a target to meet ten to twelve per cent of the country’s primary energy demands by 2020 and fifteen to twenty per cent by 2030, through the development of renewable energy sources (Fritzsche et al., 2011, p.4499). With the launch of the Moroccan Solar Plan in 2010, Morocco has established a goal of producing forty-two per cent of its total renewable energy production by 2020 from solar power, mainly via its solar park in Ouarzazate, which is among the first in the region. Furthermore, the legislative framework was reinforced by the introduction of the 13-09 law of June 2010 on renewable energies, which supports the production, management and exportation of green electricity from renewable energies (Loi 13-09, 2009, pp.3, 5, 10 and 11).

The importance of renewable energies is also presented in the National Plan to the Combat against Climate Change (NPCCC) published in November 2009 (or Plan National de Lutte contre le Réchauffement Climatique). The core interest of the document links Moroccan economic growth with the decoupling of the economy from greenhouse gases (p.7) and provides concrete steps for mitigation (pp.13-22) and robust renewable energy targets (development of 15-20% of electricity from RE by 2020). The development of the new National Energy Strategy and the enactment of the Law 19-04 on renewable energies were central to Moroccan consideration of progressive integration into the EU’s energy market. As a Moroccan interviewee argued:

Our willingness is expressed via our New Energy Strategy. We have 1) the willingness, 2) the Strategy and 3) our [energy] laws and this is the legal framework to encourage cooperation with external actors (Moroccan official, October 2012; Moroccan official, June 2012).

However, Morocco faces several challenges related to the development of renewable energies. Firstly, there is limited experience and funds to respond to the development of renewable energies and the establishment of a domestic renewable energy market. The sector is underdeveloped in Morocco and it requires significant institution-building and knowledge-sharing for the implementation of the new National Energy Strategy. Secondly, a great part of Moroccan energy needs are mainly covered by conventional energy resources (see Figure 3 below). Oil (‘produits pétroliers’) and coal (‘charbon’) constituted up to eighty-three per cent of total energy use in the Moroccan economy in 2009. Morocco is also a transit country for gas and electricity from Algeria to Spain and is interested in exploring opportunities with regards to conventional resources. Wind

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15The original text in French mentions: ‘Cette volonté est exprimée à travers de la Stratégie Energétique. On a 1) la volonté, 2) la Stratégie et 3) nos lois et c’est le cadre légal pour encourager la coopération avec ces acteurs’. 

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(‘éolien’) and hydro energy (‘hydraulique’) usage was only 5.2 per cent in 2009, whilst solar power and energy efficiency are yet to be introduced into the country’s energy mix. Renewable energy resources constitute only a small part of Morocco’s energy mix and are in a disadvantageous position in relation to conventional energy resources in the Moroccan market.

**Figure 3: Energy mix of Morocco’s energy consumption (2002-2009)** (MEMEE, 2010, p.5)

The Commission intends to convince Morocco to bring its legislation closer to that of the EU and implement NES in order to develop renewable energies and green electricity in Morocco’s market. The Commission will offer several financial and expertise incentives in specific networks in order to bring together relevant experts and bureaucrats on that matter. Network relations will give the opportunity to each side to understand each other’s thoughts, concerns and interests in order to create common understanding and consensus over a specific reform option. Moreover, network relations will clarify any misunderstandings or misinterpretation of each other’s policy agenda.
5.4 **Policy Networks between Morocco and the Commission over Climate Change Policy**

Policy networks between Morocco and the European Commission refer to strictly closed policy communities in the field of climate change policy (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992), with restricted access for external actors. Membership of those networks is exclusively specific to Moroccan and Commission officials. Moroccan officials are mainly governmental bureaucrats and experts of a particular department or division of the Moroccan administration. More specifically, they refer to directors (‘directeurs’) and/or heads of unit (‘chefs de service’) together with their respective cabinets in the department of energy or environment of the Moroccan ministry, i.e. of Energy, Mines, Water and Environment, or from a governmental agency, i.e. the Agency for the Development of Renewable Energies and Energy Efficiency – ADEREE. Commission officials are mainly task managers and cooperation officers from the Commission that are established in the EU Delegation in the suburb of Hay Riad in Rabat.

Moroccan network members are officials with well-known expertise and experience (normally a minimum of ten years) in managing their department or division in the Moroccan administration and hold significant qualifications. They also have significant access to, and influence on, their respective Minister and are responsible for the development of new regulations in their policy area (EU official, October 2012). Commission network actors refer to Brussels bureaucrats who have chosen to work outside Europe mostly for a four-year term. They are experienced in managing everyday collaboration with their Moroccan counterparts in terms of implementation of jointly agreed programmes and they can also negotiate concrete expected results, principal activities and performance indicators jointly with country officials.

Access to these policy communities is not open to everybody, apart from certain advisory companies that assess the progress and the final outcomes of capacity-building programmes (EU official, October 2012). Mostly they refer to independent advisory and consulting companies with long experience and expertise in the respective field. Other actors are significantly excluded from network membership and may be called upon on an ad hoc basis, offering ‘validation’ and legitimacy in certain network processes (Moroccan academic, 02 October 2012). A typical case is civil society. Its marginal presence is mainly in seminars or conferences on specific issues. When represented, certain NGOs closely associated to the royal palace will be able to attend such meetings (Moroccan environmental NGO representatives and EU officials, October 2012). On other occasions, they are notably absent.
There are two main policy network processes organised by the Commission through which network actors are engaged in dialogue. The first refers to annual meetings between elite experts from each side. These annual meetings have a ‘stock-taking’ character (EEAS official, May 2013), which summarise the latest legislative and institutional developments of the previous year, both at the political and technical level of cooperation between the EU and Morocco. They are specifically called sub-committees for Transport, Energy and Environment (SC-TEEs) as part of the Association Council of EU-Moroccan relations. These meetings bring together ‘mostly directors or ‘chef de division’, head of units and actors of a similar level from the EU side from each sector, i.e. transport, energy and environment’ (EU official, 04 October 2012). Experts from each side, such as engineers or similar professions, can also participate, as part of the technical teams of each side. The first SC-TEE meeting took place in 2004. Between then and 2012 there have been eight such meetings uninterruptedly and alternately in Brussels and Rabat (Commission official, May 2013; EU Council official, September 2012).

Climate change mitigation and the development of renewable energies were introduced into network relations during the fourth SC-TEE in Brussels in December 2007. Until 2007, subcommittee meetings about energy simply mentioned Morocco’s potential for the development of renewable energies (Commission Européenne, 2006, pp.12-13), but no concrete plans or programmes had been decided or set in place by either side.

Significant interest in renewable energies was mainly assumed because of legislative and regulatory developments in the EU with regards to renewable energies and energy security (Moroccan official, 25 June 2012). Commission officials stressed the adoption of a legislative package with regards to the progressive development of an EU energy market. New directives on renewable energies and energy efficiency were also mentioned after the EU’s priority of the security of energy supplies (EEAS official, May 2013). Moroccan officials stressed Morocco’s intentions to develop an energy strategy in order to improve the security of Morocco’s energy supplies. It was pointed out that

The rising energy demand that saw an increase of thirty per cent in the last five years imposes on Morocco the orientation towards renewable energies and energy efficiency\(^\text{16}\) (Accord d’Association UE-Maroc, 2007, p.3).

\(^{16}\) The original text in French states: ‘La demande énergétique croissante qui voit un augmentation de 30% dans 5 ans impose au Maroc une orientation vers les renouvelables et l’efficacité énergétique’.
However, Moroccan officials ‘expressed their concerns because of the fact that, instead, in Europe there is not adequate attention on such sources of energy’ (Accord d’Association UE-Maroc, 2007, p.3). Moreover, the high oil prices opened up all kinds of alternative possibilities for energy supply to become competitive as solar or shale in Morocco (Accord d’Association UE-Maroc, 2007, p.3)\textsuperscript{17}.

Although both sides expressed a common interest in the agenda for renewable energies, it was only in the following year’s subcommittee meeting in 2008, when consensus was reached by both sides. The network was mainly focused on Morocco’s new National Energy Strategy and its priority actions for the period 2008-2012. The Moroccan side placed more emphasis on conventional energy resources than on sustainable resources (‘énergie durable’) and renewable energies (Accord d’Association UE-Maroc, 2008, p.1). More specifically, the Moroccan side argued that the government had expressed its intention to dedicate a great part of its budget in investments in hydrocarbons because of the rising domestic energy demand, but it was still committed to renewable energies (Accord d’Association UE-Maroc, 2008, p.2).

The Commission attempted to clarify Morocco’s intentions in the energy sector. As is stated in the subcommittee minutes

*The Commission indicated its regret that Morocco did not subscribe on top of its list the renewable energies, an option that becomes much more interesting than coal if the environmental cost is included and which corresponds a strategy that is much praised by the EU*\textsuperscript{18} (Accord d’Association UE-Maroc, 2008, p.2).

Moroccan network actors argued that renewable energies still remained a priority, and that there was good potential for development. However, they raised the issue of technical constraints (‘contraintes techniques’) in the development of renewable energies, with regard to the level of stability and access to electricity grids. The Commission responded to this request and committed to ‘offer its assistance’ in order to examine the financial impact of the introduction of renewable energies on Morocco,

\textsuperscript{17} The original text in French states: ‘Le haut prix du pétrole et la perspective qu’il se maintienne à ce niveau pendant très longtemps ont ouvert toutes sortes de possibilités alternatives d’approvisionnement énergie qui deviennent compétitives comme le solaire ou les schistes bitumineux’.

\textsuperscript{18} The original text in French states: ‘La Commission a indiqué regretter que le Maroc n’ait pas inscrit en tête de liste de son bouquet l’énergie renouvelable, option qui devient nettement plus intéressante que le charbon si l’on inclut les couts environnementaux, et qui correspond à la stratégie prônée par l’UE’.
and also examine with Morocco the state of play of renewable energies at the legislative level (Accord d'Association UE-Maroc, 2008, p.2).

Afterwards, network actors from each side assumed the main role in order to implement the subcommittee commitments ‘on the ground’ (EU official, 04 October 2012). This process included day-to-day collaboration among network actors from each side. The Commission allocated certain funds from the EU Budget for a period of seven years (2007-2013), whereby a great part of the funds are managed by the EU Delegation in Rabat. The Delegation manages the auditing of the funds together with their colleagues in DG DEVCO in Brussels (EU official, 04 October 2012; Moroccan official, 04 October 2012). In this way, the Commission ensures that it does not intervene in the policy network, delegating financial responsibilities to the EU Delegation for ‘decentralised’ programmes, as is widely used in the Commission’s daily jargon. In other words, the Commission prefers to operate at an ‘arm’s length’ and enhance network autonomy (Rhodes, 2000).

The cooperation is activated by the development of several programmes that aim to build institutional and regulatory capacities, improve technical skills and administrative control mechanisms and exchange best experience (Moroccan official, October 2012). Budget Support programmes are of central importance. Budget support programmes mainly refer to four-year programmes with a sectoral focus and their aim is to prepare, or even implement, a national strategy (focus group, September 2012) (see part 4.5). They include various tasks, whose activities, results and sub-results are specified after negotiations by network actors. Network actors also specify which institutions will be included, and when financial instalments will be allocated (focus group, September 2012).

The core motivation behind Budget Support programmes is the means of payment. According to international practice, in typical technical assistance programmes, once a task is fulfilled, the respective payment is allocated to the fund of the specific ministry. In contrast, in a Budget Support programme it is the fulfilment of a pre-agreed outcome based on certain activities that unlocks the payment. Payment is allocated to the national Treasury of the Ministry of Economy and Finances, not to the Ministry’s fund, whereby it supports the country’s budget (focus group, 18 September 2012).

Normally, task managers from the Delegation communicate with their Moroccan counterparts in the respective department of the Ministry to ask them for a meeting in order to discuss the possibility of engaging in a Budget Support programme. Most of the time it is task managers that initiate the process, but nothing prevents their
Moroccan counterparts from making an enquiry (EU official, 04 October 2012; Commission official, 27 May 2013). Network actors are engaged in negotiations once a common interest is established or capacity-building needs are identified by a department or division inside a Ministry or an agency. Task managers may utilise parts from the bilateral framework (i.e. Action Plan or roadmap for an advanced status partnership) or even extracts from annual Association sub-committee meetings (see below) as means to engage their Moroccan counterparts in dialogue (EU Council official, 19 September 2012).

Network actors are engaged in several rounds of negotiations for the specification of all necessary elements of the programme. Results, sub-results, exact time frameworks, concrete activities, risks, institutions involved and specific payment procedure are only some of the key elements that take a significant amount of time until they are finalised. There is an exhaustive, highly-detailed and technical list of definitions of expected results and sub-results, concrete activities and indicators of impact for each result displayed on the matrix of the financial convention of the agreement. ‘Some of them are very specific like “updating that specific decree about the quality of oil products”’ (EU official, 04 October 2012). According to an EU official we call it technical fiche, technical note, where we explain how the indicator will be evaluated to make sure there is no misunderstanding. So it’s very precise. It also explains what the purpose of the indicator is, the interest of the country etc. (EU official, 18 September 2012).

In the energy sector, there is an advanced level of co-ownership and mutual understanding in the process by all network actors. It is characteristic that Moroccan officials initially expressed their interest in a Budget Support programme in order to define the details of the programme with their Commission counterparts (Moroccan official, 05 October 2012; EU official, 04 October 2012). Negotiations brought together the task managers from the Delegation, the director and head of units from the division for observation and programming (DOP) from the Ministry of Energy, as the main beneficiary of the programme, representatives from the Ministry of Economy and Finance and officials from the direction for the European Union and Mediterranean processes, with the Ministry of External Affairs and Cooperation chairing the process.

Negotiation took a long time to be concluded, but with a significant level of collaboration by each side, which continued in their everyday relations for the implementation of the projects. There were constant day-to-day communication via emails and phone calls. An EU task manager in the Delegation in Morocco characteristically stated
We met and we agreed – and it took *a long time* (my emphasis) to agree, it’s not just we meet and we agree – we negotiate and we agree some results, which are in general results of policy reform and legal regulatory framework reforms. The objective is to harmonise rules and laws in Morocco with the European ones to allow a more/ an easier exchange of energy in the future. And actually the programme explicitly aims at integration of the energy market of EU and Morocco (EU official, 04 October 2012).

Also, there were rotating presentations and meetings in the EU Delegation and in the beneficiary ministry, which aimed to clarify any issues about the programme. As Commission officials argued, Moroccan bureaucrats and experts were not mere recipients of what the Commission asked. Instead, ‘they knew very well what they wanted from us and they expressed it clearly from the start’ (Commission official, 18 September 2012). Network actors were in close collaboration, with continuous negotiation over the exact wording of the whole financial programme, and the exact periods of each instalment once objectives were achieved (Moroccan official, 02 October 2012).

The programme was finally adopted in 2010 and budgeted for up to €76 million for four years (2010-2014). This Budget Support programme is among the first that was established in Morocco and shows the increased level of commitment by, and trust from, the Commission (Commission official, 17 September 2012; Commission official, 18 September 2012; focus group, 18 September 2012). It includes several secondment tasks, of which the most important are twinning projects. Twinning projects were mainly asked for by Moroccan network actors. These projects intend to build better monitoring and control mechanisms and improve programming capacities and technical skills in the respective division or in a governmental agency (Moroccan official, 05 October 2012). For example, in the energy sector two twinning projects were of significant value for Morocco in terms of institution-building: 1) capacity-building of programming and political evaluation in the Direction of Observation and Programming of the Ministry of Energy for the period 2010-2012, and 2) institutional and technical capacity-building in the National Agency for the Development of Renewable Energies and Energy Efficiency (ADEREE) for the period 2011-2013.

The twinning programmes play a significant role in network relations and in the bilateral cooperation over energy issues. The key element is that permanent advisors from the administration of an EU member visit the country for two years and second their Moroccan colleagues in a respective division of a Ministry or agency, explaining any everyday problems in terms of regulatory application and legislative or other improvements with regards to EU rules (Moroccan official, 05 October 2012). Network members negotiate the exact content of this agreement and sign a ‘financial
convention’. ‘Long and hard’ negotiations take place amongst network participants in relation to the specification of the core elements of the convention (EU official, 04 October 2012). These refer to the expected outcomes of the project – which are mentioned in the agreement as ‘compulsory results’ (‘résultats obligatoires’) – the specific activities in the whole process, and the profile of the representative required. Moreover, they decide on the durability of the project, its funding, the time required for expertise, depending on each activity, and the team that monitors its overall implementation (P3A Maroc-UE, 2010).

Once the whole programme is agreed, a call for tenders is processed in Europe and proposals are received from several EU members. Network members jointly assess these proposals and proceed with the most suitable (Commission official, 17 September 2012). The permanent twinning representative is expected to support the country’s officials on a daily basis for a maximum stay of two years. The EU expert is located inside the administrative structures of the beneficiary department or division and cooperates with their Moroccan colleagues.

It is even characteristic that, because of its success as an expertise tool, it is in significant demand in Morocco. The EU Delegation receives several requests even in relation to other policy areas in the broader energy sector. For example, it is mentioned that

> It’s a tool that is very well known in Morocco. So administration comes directly to say ‘we want a twinning, we want to do this and that, we want to prepare a new draft law on competition and we want it to be very similar to the European one so that we can exchange’, because some twinnings have very strong effect. Imagine a twinning on/ they call it “Sanitary and phytosanitary requirements”. Like this sounds like very technical, very weird, but actually it helps Moroccans to set all the laws and rules which apply to the control of health issues of exports. And this facilitates trading in an amazing way. Now, not all twinnings have the same very tangible and concrete effect, but this is an example of how powerful it can be (EU official, 04 October 2012).

Trust-building and mutual understanding is not only established during the negotiation and finalisation of project contracts and broader capacity-building programmes. Monitoring is a key process which reinforces mutuality in the implementation process of jointly agreed objectives and tasks. Moreover, it brings all the network actors together and strengthens the links between this policy community. Monitoring takes place every three months via monitoring committees (‘comités de pilotage’). Monitoring committees are constituted by the task manager of the Delegation, the head of unit or director of the beneficiary department, and certain advisors along with representatives from Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Finance. These
committee meetings look at the plan for the three past months, whether the programme has been following the objectives and ‘what will be done in the next three months’ (EU official, 04 October 2012; Moroccan official, 04 October 2012).

Monitoring also manages the viability of the financial convention agreed, as auditing is necessary in order for these actors to justify the progress to the Commission that pays the funds (Commission official, 17 June 2013). Interaction from both sides is sincere. More specifically

In the monitoring committees here the discussions among the two parties are frank. We collaborate in frank discussions. For example, the discussions are like “here we do this and this, but we have to improve that”. We work together, we talk, sometimes there is a presentation. Everyone intervenes in the discussion and we try to solve any problems together, but we can’t be of the logic “everything goes well” if something doesn’t go very well (author’s translation) (EU official, 17 June 2013).

Monitoring is not only at the twinning level, but also is used within the whole budget support programme. It can take place every three months, but also at least once a year. Annual monitoring takes place after the Commission hires certain external advisors to assess the process of the whole programme and discuss with relevant stakeholders the implementation process. As an EU official argues

We monitor during the year the progress and once a year we have consultation from external experts. For example, in this case we have one expert in general energy policies, another expert in fossil fuels and another expert in renewable energy and energy efficiency. So they come for about two-three-four weeks according to the complexities of the issues to be analysed, they meet all the stakeholders and they make two kinds of work: the first is to give a general appreciation of the progress reforms and the [new National Energy Strategy] strategy and the other one is to check for each of these results to certify that it is done. The experts analyse it and then they prepare a report. On the basis of this report, we prepare our own report which is based on theirs, but it doesn’t completely follow it. Then we send this document to Brussels to the headquarters and then again it is analysed and restudied by the services of DEVCO who talk to DG Energy and then a decision to the final amount to be paid is done (EU official, 04 October 2012).

19 In the original version in French: ‘Au niveau de pilotage, ici les discussions entre les deux parties sont francs. On collabore des discussions franques. Par exemple, les discussions seront comme “voici on fait ça et ça, mais faut améliorer ça”. On collabore, on discute, parfois il y a un expose. Chaque un intervient et on essaye de résoudre des problèmes mais on ne peut pas être de la logique “tout va bien” quand quelque chose ne marche pas bien’.
Network actors from the Delegation arrange meetings and visits on several occasions before the next monitoring meeting with their respective Moroccan counterparts in their premises, and so there is constant updating of the whole implementation by each side (EU official, 04 October 2012). They discuss about the progress of the cooperation, any problems involved, and any extra funding or expertise needed in the process. The environment in these policy networks is ‘cooperative’ as there is a lot of dialogue and motivation from Commission network actors (Moroccan officials, 02-05 October 2012; EU official, 04 October 2012).

However, there may be cases when problems arise with respect to certain time frameworks for the implementation of certain results in a programme. Even in that case, Commission task managers demonstrate a supportive stance towards Morocco, in order to provide the necessary time for Morocco to adapt to the difficulties of the programme. The approach that is mostly preferred is to extend the programme’s implementation period or that for a specific result (focus group, 18 September 2012). Such implementation problems mostly result from poor coordination between the sectoral ministry and the Ministry of Economy and Finance regarding the planning of the following year’s budget.

Even when there are problems in the national budget planning, there is on-going progress supported by certain small-scale technical projects. Such projects support the efforts of the Moroccan administration to build coherent databases of energy data that can be used in several other Ministries when national planning takes place (EU official, 02 October 2012). Such assistance is increasingly common, as it clarifies specific aspects of an EU ruling to Moroccan bureaucrats, and also provides clearer information for the exact wording of a legislative act. As a Moroccan official said

TAIEX is very much utilised and we ask a lot of that instrument from the Delegation. There is a lot of support and they [Delegation] facilitate the whole procedure20 (Moroccan official, 05 October 2012).

20In the original version in French: ‘TAIEX est trop utilisé et on demande beaucoup de cet instrument par la délégation. Il y a beaucoup d’assistance et ils facilitent la procédure dans son ensemble’.
5.5 Assessing the Effect of Europeanization and Policy Networks over Climate Change Policy in Morocco

Europeanization finds an easy way to advance in Morocco through the policy area for renewable energies. Morocco is highly dependent on energy resources from abroad and is willing to enter the EU single market and comply with its rules. Such a prospect offers the opportunity for Morocco to export its green electricity to Europe and establish similar regulatory framework to the European market. Financial and expertise incentives from the Commission can reduce the institutional, administrative and regulatory gaps between the two sides, and link Morocco with European energy market regulations. Policy networks facilitate the energy mitigation agenda being applied at Morocco’s domestic level and shift its adaptation needs towards Commission’s mitigation priorities.

Cooperation with the EU offers several development possibilities, such as access to the biggest regional market and possible exportation of green electricity to Europe via Spain. Morocco is willing to integrate in the EU’s energy market and bring its regulatory standards closer to that of the EU. Article nine of the EU Directive on renewable energies for third countries constitutes a key ‘motivation’ (Moroccan official, 04 October 2012) for Morocco. Morocco is building a Renewed Energy Strategy and a legislative framework in order to establish a link that would be the main setting of cooperation between Moroccan and Commission officials.

Furthermore, the Commission funds any needs for technical assistance and capacity-building programmes that will support the regulatory alignment of Morocco’s legal framework to European standards. Financial incentives and expertise programmes based on training and exchange of best practices offered by the Commission play a significant role in engaging Morocco in policy network interactions. These financial incentives and offers of expertise programmes cover the operational costs of the networks and produce continuous collaboration and co-optation among actors.

However, renewable energies are not the only option for Morocco. Its pressing need to meet its growing energy needs in its market requires an immediate solution. Renewable energies are still prioritised in the new National Energy Strategy, but investments in oil and gas could offer another alternative option. As characterised by the 2008 subcommittee meeting, network relations amongst related actors from each side were critical in order to clarify which energy resources Morocco wished to promote, both domestically and in its engagement with the Commission. When the Commission
promised to assist Morocco in its effort to integrate a renewable energy market in Morocco with certain funds and expertise, Moroccan network actors became interested and motivated to explore cooperation with the Commission. Otherwise, if no such network dialogue had taken place, Morocco would have shown less interest in renewable energy resources and probably would have invested in conventional energy resources in response to the pressing domestic energy demand.

Moreover, network relations amongst network actors specified the exact nature of the collaboration, by focusing on the implementation of the National Energy Strategy and developing constant understanding. Capacity-building programmes and twinning projects triggered Morocco’s interest and encouraged technical collaboration amongst expert actors within the networks. Commission officials and their Moroccan counterparts collaborate on the definition of these programmes and monitor their progress through several calendar meetings and day-to-day cooperation. Trust is at a significant level, as programmes are steadily developing with limited problems and there is stability and continuity in the interactions.

In general terms, Europeanization significantly influenced Morocco in the policy area of climate change mitigation and, specifically, in renewable energies. Morocco is progressing towards integration into EU rules and norms. As a Commission interviewee argued

Morocco is much integrated to EU norms. In the area of energy, there is important progress; we have reforms in renewable energy with the [Renewed Energy] Strategy in 2009, there is consistent strategy to reform and to have opening of the market. The Ministry of Energy has a very clear energy strategy and is committed to energy reforms (Commission official, 17 September 2012).

Also, there has been progressive improvement even in the quality of texts (i.e. secondary legislation) and in other legislative documents, mainly through the use of technical assistance projects and other expertise programmes (EU official, 04 October 2012). With the finalisation of the twinning programme in the Department of Observation and Programming of the Energy Ministry, Morocco benefited from

how to collect information, treat it and then disseminate it so that it is useful for policy-makers, so that you monitor if you are doing what you planned and then you use it again to plan what you will do in the future (EU official, 04 October 2012).

On the other hand, Europeanization was not advanced in climate change adaptation in Morocco. Policy networks have failed to develop mutual understanding, as there was limited interaction, collaboration or even interest in this policy area. There are several
reasons that explain this outcome. Network actors argued that climate change adaptation issues, such as desertification, water and coastal zone management, require ‘enormous amounts of money’ (EU official, 04 October 2012). The reduction in the external energy dependence constitutes a key short-term need for the country in order to face climate change in the future (Moroccan official, 26 June 2012). As a key Moroccan environmental official stated:

The priority is definitely to adapt (with emphasis). Morocco has a special geographic context with much drought and with regions close to the desert and to the Mediterranean. Hence, adaptation is the priority for us, however at the same time we are putting in place the strategy of renewable energies. This is a grand orientation and it has a significant role for the country (author’s translation) (Moroccan official, 05 October 2012).

Moreover, network relations have shown less interest in implementing concrete programmes following commitments by the subcommittee meetings. Several subcommittee meetings have declared a common interest in reinforcing and deepening the cooperation over climate change adaptation. During all subcommittee meetings from 2007 to 2012 both sides urged that information-sharing and exchange of experience should take place for the implementation of strategies and actions in relation to climate change. However, unlike the renewable energies sector, the frequency of programmes for adaptation-related issues and their financial incentives on offer are comparatively low. No adaptation programmes are arranged for future years (EU official, 04 October 2012; EU official, 17 June 2013). There had been some small-scale programmes from the UN Development Programme concerning water management, financially supported by the Commission (€6-10 million), but such programmes have limited continuity after their completion (EU official, 04 October 2012). The lack of strong funding opportunities seems to limit the potential of Europeanization in Morocco.

Commission officials equally argue that Morocco does not seem to be interested in exploring such opportunities, as it is focused on the implementation of renewable energies (EU official, 04 October 2012). Moroccan civil society also criticises both the Moroccan government and the EU, since the EU is not interested in raising those issues in their cooperation with Moroccan officials (Moroccan academic and NGO

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21 The original transcription in French states: ‘La priorité est définitivement l’adaptation (emphasis). Le Maroc a un contexte spécial géographique avec beaucoup de sècheresse et des régions près de la déserte et à la Méditerranée. Alors, l’adaptation est notre priorité mais en même temps on est en train de mettre en place la stratégie pour les renouvelables. C’est un grande orientation et il a de rôle significiant pour le pays’.
representatives, 02 and 05 October 2012). Similarly, it is claimed that the Moroccan government is not sensible to the possible impact of climate change, despite the outburst of extreme weather events in the country since 2005 (Moroccan academics and NGO representatives, 02, 04 and 05 October 2012).

Therefore, the Moroccan case shows that Europeanization can take place outside Europe, even in the absence of EU membership, and shift the domestic priorities of a neighbouring non-European country. Broader energy needs from Morocco and the limited opportunities in the region reduce any other policy option and confirm literature claims about broader interdependences (Börzel and Hackenesch, 2013). Moroccan network actors are aware that the Commission offers the best cost-benefit option for Morocco’s energy needs, whilst domestic energy demand grows and energy insecurity is further exacerbated (Börzel and Risse, 2009; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2011). In this case, Morocco has a limited margin of manoeuvre, which reduces its bargaining power with the Commission. Moreover, adjusting to EU rules in relation to renewable energies refers to a policy area with multiple complementarities on both sides.

In this process, network socialisation among actors from each side play a crucial role and policy networks channel mutual interest to advance Europeanization in the policy area of renewable energies. Socialisation and cooperation based on trust and mutual understanding have advanced concrete policy areas with strong interest from the Commission. Hierarchies have been substituted by actors interaction based on joint ownership and trust-building. Network actors have developed consensus over a policy area, explored possibilities over certain incentives and advanced particular reforms.

### 5.6 Conclusion

This chapter offered an analysis of the case study of Morocco regarding climate change policy and the engagement of Moroccan and Commission officials in policy networks in each policy area. The key problem for Morocco is its strong dependence on external energy resources, combined with rising domestic energy demands and limited financial resources. In addition, Morocco is not rich in conventional resources and external dependence on energy supplies incurs significant costs for the country, which limits its flexibility to deal with other problems, such as unemployment and a growing population. Moreover, sub-regional cooperation with its continental neighbours offers limited opportunities because of regional instability, poor economic performance and limited trade opportunities.
Among its few options, renewable energies could cover part of its energy needs and contribute towards the diversification of its energy mix. Morocco has significant natural potential to produce green electricity from solar and wind resources, but the country has limited funds and expertise to develop an integrated renewable energy market. After all, its priority over climate change policy is to adapt from the adverse effects of climate effects (MATUHE, 2010).

On the other hand, the EU is the only option that Morocco has in the broader region. The EU offers several opportunities to Morocco, such as trade and market incentives for its agricultural products and other expertise and financial incentives. The EU can offer the chance for Morocco to have access into the EU market and its regulatory framework in exchange for regulatory adjustment to EU rules and standards. Furthermore, the Commission can fund several technical assistance and capacity-building programmes, which could support the regulatory alignment of Morocco’s legal framework to European standards.

Despite its priority on climate change adaptation, Morocco has shifted its policy priority towards renewable energies and climate change mitigation. Collaboration over renewable energies with the Commission offers several opportunities, such as green electricity exports to the EU and the development of a domestic renewable energies market, based on Commission expertise. This expectation constitutes a key ‘motivation’ (Moroccan official, 05 October 2012) for Morocco. Morocco has built a National Energy Strategy, which stresses its need to deal with its growing energy demands and its external energy reliance.

Policy networks among actors from each side have assumed a central role in order to promote cooperation in the policy area of renewable energies. Morocco considers renewable energies to be an important solution for its energy needs, yet conventional energy resources are still an alternative option. Network actors have clarified policy agendas from each side and built necessary consensus over renewable energies. Expertise and financial incentives have also triggered Morocco’s attention, together with the broader incentive of progressive regulatory integration to EU energy rules.

Cooperation is strongly co-owned by both sides. Capacity-building and technical assistance programmes support interaction among network experts and enhance the implementation of concrete reforms. In contrast, in the policy area of climate change adaptation, cooperation is stagnant and Europeanization has not advanced. There are no capacity-building or technical assistance programmes that can grow mutual understanding between each side. Despite Moroccan and Commission network actors
mentioning that climate change adaptation is a key need for the country, the implementation of the National Energy Strategy is at the centre of the policy network, putting on hold any other climate-related issues.

In the following chapter, Europeanization faces several challenges. Policy networks fail to develop consensus on renewable energies cooperation. The politicisation of energy relations between the EU and Algeria influences policy networks and impedes the process of Europeanization. As a consequence, network cooperation has led to stagnant relations in the whole process and has failed to establish a consensus over the development of renewable energies and the agenda of climate change mitigation. Instead, Europeanization has been advanced in the area of climate change adaptation, where networks actors have developed trust and mutual understanding. Expertise programmes favour sustained network relations, which has led Algeria to integrate EU standards into its regulatory framework with regards to climate change adaptation.
Chapter 6:
Algeria, the European Commission and Policy Networks in Climate Change Policy

6.1 Introduction

Unlike Morocco, Algeria is a self-sufficient country with abundant natural resources in gas and oil. Its energy reserves are enough to support domestic energy use, whilst a great part of its energy resources are used for exporting to several parts of the world. Hydrocarbons account for up to ninety-eight per cent of total Algerian exports in 2011 (African Economic Outlook, 2012, p.2). Moreover, Algeria constitutes one of the most significant energy suppliers of natural gas to the EU, covering up to fifteen per cent of its energy needs through its pipelines to Spain via Morocco, and to Italy via Tunisia (Dawson, 2009).

Despite its abundant energy resources, it is strongly reliant on international oil prices, as its economy is highly undiversified. The Algerian economy is mainly focused on the production and exploitation of its natural energy resources and shows limited interest in other sectors. This challenge is mainly recognised in the agricultural sector, whereby Algeria’s food needs are mainly covered by imports funded by exportation of the country’s energy resources. Growing population levels, heavy urbanisation and fragmented arable land further exacerbate the country’s problems (Zaimeche and Sutton, 1997; MATE, 2010). Climate change is another factor that puts the country’s economy and development under serious pressure. Climate change is expected to cause serious problems in terms of significant water shortages and reduction of potable water resources, which are immediately related to the growing phenomenon of desertification and increased temperatures (MATE, 2010; MATE, 2001).

The development of renewable energies could offer the chance for Algeria to diversify its economy and mitigate the impact of fluctuating international oil prices. Moreover, Algeria has strong potential to produce clean electricity from renewable energy resources, because of its geographical proximity to the Sahara Desert and the Mediterranean Sea (OME, 2007). However, renewable energy is not an urgent issue for Algeria. Climate change adaptation is the most pressing matter in terms of its climate change policy. Adapting to climate change could enable it to respond to its challenges and solve pressing issues such as desertification and water shortages (MATE, 2010;
African Union, 2009). However, Algeria lacks an integrated institutional and regulatory framework to deal with climate change and is in need of expertise and exchange of best practices to develop its framework. The EU is a significant actor in the Mediterranean which could support Algeria with expertise in climate change policy.

Similar to the Moroccan case, both sides have different agendas over climate change policy. The Commission’s agenda is mainly focused on climate change mitigation and renewable energies. Algeria’s natural potential for renewable energies could support the Commission’s diversification agenda and energy mitigation priorities. On the other hand, Algeria’s agenda is mainly about climate change adaptation, in order to respond to the adverse effects of the phenomenon. Although renewable energies form part of the country’s programme (MEM, 2011), they are of lesser importance in the national agenda. Algeria mainly prioritises its hydrocarbon sector and the protection of its conventional energy resources (Escribano, 2010). So, is there any potential for Europeanization to be expanded in Algeria with regard to climate change mitigation? Could the Commission’s incentives trigger domestic adjustment?

Algeria is not expected to be enticed by EU market access and financial assistance from the Commission. The Commission’s requirements for increased liberalisation of the energy sector are expected to deprive Algeria’s monopoly of its conventional energy resources (Kheladi and Arhab, 2012). Free market rules may threaten the country’s socioeconomic stability and affect broader economic interests. Furthermore, unlike Morocco, Algeria holds an interdependent relationship with the EU. Algerian energy exports to the EU cover a certain part of EU energy needs and support EU’s energy security. Moreover, they equally support the Algerian economy and development. Also, Algerian energy exportations are not monopolised by the European market, as Algeria has diversified energy routes in its exportations. Furthermore, Algeria is highly suspicious of committing to the Commission’s liberalisation intentions. Algeria believes that the EU wishes to ‘steal’ Algeria’s energy resources for its own benefit. Part of this suspicion is caused by ‘poisonous’ Franco-Algerian relations, mainly because of past harsh colonial relations and other issues in relation to the 1990s Algerian civil war (EEAS officials, 20 September 2012; 27 May 2013; Akacem, 2004, p.153).

Europeanization has more opportunities to advance domestic adjustment to climate change adaptation in Algeria. Algeria lacks the necessary institutional and regulatory capacities to respond to climate change. It is in need of the experience and expertise that will support the country’s public administration in dealing with the adverse effects of climate change. European expertise, best experience and information exchange could initiate Algerian interest in collaborating with the Commission. However, climate
change adaptation is not the Commission’s main climate policy agenda and is underdeveloped even inside the EU. So, can the Commission advance its mitigation agenda in Algeria? Through which means can Europeanization take place in Algeria in such contrasting policy fields on both sides?

Policy networks between Commission and Algerian officials were required in order to negotiate the various priorities and needs of each side. Network actors from each side had the chance to develop a common understanding to cooperate in a policy area of mutual interest and understand each other’s motives. The Commission attempted to convince Algeria about the utility of renewable energies in its domestic energy mix, and grow consensus on its mitigation agenda. It also offered expertise incentives in order to assist the country to build its administrative capacities. However, policy networks were challenged by broader politicisation of EU-Algerian relations. Algeria was not convinced by the Commission’s interest in liberalisation and market economy rules in climate change mitigation. In this way, network actors were not able to build consensus over climate change mitigation and failed to advance Europeanization.

This chapter is organised into four parts. The first part presents the important role of Algeria’s natural energy resources, the diversification needs of its economy and the challenges of climate change. The second part offers an overview of EU-Algerian relations and how EU incentives may incite (or not) Algeria’s interest. The third part engages in the analysis of policy networks between the Commission and Algerian officials in each climate policy area, their function and the day-to-day relations, based on empirical research in Algeria. The fourth part assesses the extent to which Europeanization has taken place, the problems and the reasons for these challenges. The chapter concludes with its final remarks.

6.2 Energy Resources, Diversification Needs and Climate Change Challenges in Algeria

Algeria is an African and Mediterranean country, which spreads over an area of 2,381,741 km² with 1,200 km of coastline and a population of thirty-five million inhabitants (MATE, 2010, p.14). Geographically, it is the largest country in Africa and the tenth largest country in the world. Algeria is located at the centre of the geographical Maghreb region and neighbours Morocco on its western borders, Mali, Mauritania and Niger on its southern borders and Libya and Tunisia to the east (see Map 4 below). Almost ninety per cent of its vast territory is covered by the Sahara Desert and large mountain-ranges. Its arid landscape is only disrupted by oases and its
remaining territory – only between two to three per cent – can be considered suitable for cultivation (Entelis, 1986, p.134). The largest part of the population is situated in the north and mainly in the Mediterranean coastal cities.

Map 4: Map of Algeria (CIA, 2014)

French colonisation (1830-1962) had a significant impact on Algeria. Unlike in the Moroccan case, Algeria experienced harsh colonisation by France. France imposed strict colonial rule since early 1830, because of the resistance of the nomadic Arab-Berber populations (Entelis, 1986). The discovery of important natural resources in the southern and western parts of Algeria exacerbated colonial rule even stronger in the 1950s and significant confrontation by the Algerians (Zoubir, 2000, pp.44-45). The passion for sovereignty and the fight for freedom against the ‘long and bloody’ (Akacem, 2004, p.153) French colonial ruling has played a significant role in Algeria’s post-independence mentality up to the present day, creating a culture of ‘revolutionary legitimacy’ (Joffé, 2010, p.377). This revolutionary legitimacy refers to Algeria’s resistance to any externally imposed threat (mainly from the West) aiming at
intervening in domestic affairs – or ‘main mise’\textsuperscript{22} in French – and its support for the weakest and least favoured countries in international politics.

Conventional energy resources in natural gas and oil are of core significance for Algeria. In post-independent Algeria, hydrocarbons were used by President Houari Boumedienne for the country’s growth, mainly to secure the self-sufficiency and independence of the state. Revenue from hydrocarbons provided food imports and other technological devices for the modernisation of Algeria’s energy infrastructure in the 1960s and 1970s. Modernisation and industrialisation of the country’s economy was crucial for the Algerian colonels after its independence, as being the best option for Algeria’s self-sufficiency. The Algerian state pushed forward wide-scale nationalisation of all petroleum exploration and production facilities, natural gas concessions, gas and oil pipelines, and other transport facilities. More specifically, in 1971 the Algerian state regained fifty-one per cent of all French oil companies operating in the country and one hundred per cent of all gas concessions (Entelis, 1986, p.117). Moreover, hydrocarbons supported – and still support – several social policies of the state, such as free education, social housing and health.

Table 13: Algerian energy data (1960-2010) (World Bank, 2014b; IEA, 2014a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Energy production (in thousand tonnes of oil equivalent) (ktoe)</th>
<th>Energy use (in ktoe)</th>
<th>Energy imports (% of total energy use)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>65,739</td>
<td>11,209</td>
<td>-487.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>100,114</td>
<td>22,192</td>
<td>-351.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>106,734</td>
<td>24,105</td>
<td>-342.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>142,245</td>
<td>27,020</td>
<td>-426.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>166,693</td>
<td>32,365</td>
<td>-415.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>152,735</td>
<td>40,745</td>
<td>-274.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>150,519</td>
<td>40,372</td>
<td>-272.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{22}In French, it means ‘any attempt from an external party to seize control and domination’.
Algeria has significant energy abundance (see Table 13 above). In 2007 Algeria accounted for over two per cent of the world’s output of oil and almost three per cent of natural gas, while its share in global oil and natural gas exports amounts to over three per cent and almost nine per cent, respectively. As of January 2008, Algeria’s oil reserves accounted for one per cent of the world total, while its gas accounted for two and a half per cent (OME, 2008, p.265). According to SONATRACH, of the 135 billion barrels of oil equivalent (Gboe) of hydrocarbons in place in 2008, some 38 Gboe are still in reserve, assuming about a 28 per cent of average recovery rate. More than half (56 per cent) is natural gas, 29 per cent crude oil, 9 per cent condensate, and 6 per cent liquefied petrol gas (OME, 2008, p.272).

Figure 4: Distribution of Algerian Exports by Region (MEM, 2011, p.28)

Unlike its neighbours (with the exception of Libya), Algeria is a significant energy-exporting country. Its hydrocarbons are oriented towards several destinations, such as European countries, the US and China (see Figure 4 above). A great part of these energy exportations are to European countries and, more specifically, to North Mediterranean countries (France, Italy and Spain) via two main gas pipelines to Spain.

23 It refers to the largest Algerian state-owned energy company since its independence.

24 ‘Brut’: crude oil; ‘condensate’: condensed oil; ‘produits raffinés’: oil-refined products; ‘GPL’: liquefied petrol gas; ‘GNL’: liquefied natural gas; and ‘GN’: natural gas.
and Italy (Dawson, 2009). The Algeria–Morocco–Spain Gas Pipeline (or ‘Maghreb–Europe’) offers more than fifteen billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas per annum to Europe, while the Algeria–Tunisia–Italy ‘Trans–Med’ pipeline has an actual capacity of twenty-five bcm per annum (MATE, 2001, p.11; Dawson, 2009, p.44). Furthermore, there are plans for expansion of its gas grid to Spain via a new pipeline (‘Medgaz’), with a total annual capacity of eight bcm (MEM, 2011, p.19).

Table 14: Algerian Foreign Trade by Leading Countries (2011) (DG Trade, 2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Total Trade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>EU(27): 52.2 %</td>
<td>EU(27): 50.8 %</td>
<td>EU(27): 51.3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>China: 10.1 %</td>
<td>United States: 20.6 %</td>
<td>United States: 14.4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>United States: 4.6 %</td>
<td>Canada: 6.1 %</td>
<td>China: 5.7 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Argentina: 3.8 %</td>
<td>Brazil: 4.4 %</td>
<td>Brazil: 4.1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Brazil: 3.7 %</td>
<td>Turkey: 3.4 %</td>
<td>Canada: 3.9 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100% (or €35.5 bil.)</td>
<td>100% (or €55.4 bil.)</td>
<td>100 % (or €90.9 bil)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Algeria is a major importing partner of the EU in the energy sector, as almost fifteen per cent of the EU’s needs are covered by Algerian energy resources. More specifically, the energy dependence of several north Mediterranean countries on Algerian oil and gas ranges from 30 to 57 per cent for Italy, Greece and, more significantly, Spain (Dawson, 2009, p.44). In 2006 Algeria exports of natural gas alone were up to 96.7 per cent of the total Algerian exports to the EU (Algerian Ministry of Finance – Customs DG, 2013). This growing trend in exports of its natural resources to the EU is also apparent in the following years, whereby Algerian mineral fuels exports were 98.4 per cent and 98.5 per cent in 2009 and 2011, respectively (DG Trade, 2012). Furthermore, at least half of its total exports (50.8 per cent) and imports (52.2 per cent) are with the EU, while at the same time other countries, such as China and the United States (second in the list), have a significantly less important role in the Algerian foreign trade balance (i.e. 14.4 per cent for the United States and 5.7 per cent for China) (see Table 14 above). Other OECD non-EU countries have an increasing stable role in Algerian exportations with 26.4 per cent in 2000, 24.4 in 2002, 32.5 in 2005 and 35.5 in 2010 (Ministère des Finances – Direction General des Douanes, 2013). However, energy
resources of oil and natural gas for the EU still hold the main bulk of its total exportations to Europe.

Energy exports support the country’s finances and play a significant role in its growth. Today, revenues from oil and natural gas account for nearly forty per cent of Algeria’s GDP, ninety-five per cent of its foreign currency inflows and sixty per cent of government revenues (Darbouche, 2009, p.376; OME, 2008, p.265). Energy exports constitute the largest exporting asset of the country, which amounts to almost ninety-seven per cent of the total exported products. In 2010 alone, hydrocarbon exports reached up to fifty-six billion dollars, with seventy-two billion dollars in 2011, with a further increasing tendency (MEM, 2011, pp.27-28; MATE, 2010, pp.50-52). Energy revenues also assist the state to cover its basic need for food imports and, to a certain extent, support the modernisation of existing gas fields across the country.

However, Algeria’s over-reliance on its conventional energy resources exposes the vulnerability of its economic model. As an energy-centred economy, Algeria is highly dependent on international oil barrel prices. When international oil prices are increasing, Algeria’s economy is positively influenced. In other words, revenues support national budget, support the modernisation of its energy infrastructure and partly cover the country’s food needs. Since 2003, international oil prices have increased consistently – mainly above hundred dollars per barrel – with a significant effect on the country’s GDP (Darbouche, 2009). In contrast, when international oil prices fall, Algeria’s economy can be significantly influenced, affecting its overall socio-economic performance. With limited revenues from energy exportation, Algeria may not be in a position to support increased wages and public housing, with possible negative implications for its social peace (Cavatorta, 2002). This was the case in 1986 with the fall in global oil prices. The state was unable to hide the deficit of its state enterprises and import large amounts of food to cover the population’s needs (Addi, 2006, p.209).

Furthermore, Algeria is significantly dependent on food importation. It is characteristic that in 1962 Algeria could support its own alimentation needs up to seventy-five per cent. However, since its independence food production has declined, dropping to thirty-five per cent in 1985 (Entelis, 1986, pp.132-133). Today, Algeria produces only twenty-five per cent of its total food needs. Heavy reliance on industrialisation and overgrazing have contributed to continued degradation of the environment and resulted in significant food imports (Henry, 2004). Moreover, a great part of Algeria’s surface is covered by desert and mountains, leaving only a small percentage of arable land – almost three per cent – available for any socioeconomic activity (World Bank,
Algeria’s arid climate also puts several limitations on the progressive development of its agricultural sector, as it is affected by its Mediterranean climate and the Sahara desert. Desertification has caused soil erosion and influenced Algeria’s limited water resources, with negative implications for the agricultural sector. Also, there is reduced and unstable rainfall, putting further pressure on potable water and irrigation needs, which are coupled with unsustainable cultivation methods, such as overgrazing and over-cultivation. For all these reasons, Algeria is obliged to spend large amounts of its revenue on food imports, specifically for wheat, milk, butter and vegetable oil (Kheladi and Arhab, 2012, p.302). Other sectors offer limited support in the Algerian economy and exacerbate its over-reliance on the energy sector. Despite Algeria’s strong potential for the development of tourism, the degradation of its coastal environment and its lacking – but improving – wastewater management leave limited space for sustainable coastal tourism development, which needs to be reinforced with strong legislative framework and integrated tourism management (UNEP MAP, 2009, p.107).

The development of the renewable energies sector and the production of green electricity could offer a solution to Algeria’s over-reliance on conventional energy resources and reduce its vulnerability from fluctuating international oil prices. Algeria has significant solar potential, since the majority of its territory is part of the Sahara desert (OME, 2007). The average solar radiation of the country ranges from 2,650 to 3,500 hours of radiation, equivalent to 2,650 kWatt per m² per year. Moreover, wind farms in the north of the country could equally be an option. Because of the mix of its Mediterranean moderate climate in the North and its arid land in the rest of the country, it has significant wind potential in the areas of Tindouf (south-western Algeria) and Djelfa (northern Algeria) (OME, 2007, pp.34-36; MEM, 2011).

In May 2011, Algeria introduced a programme for renewable energies and energy efficiency (PEREE). This programme states

the vision of the Algerian government that relies on a strategy focused on the development of inexhaustible resources such as solar and their utilisation for the
diversification of energy resources in order to prepare the Algeria of tomorrow\textsuperscript{25} (MEM, 2011, p.4).

The main objective of the programme is the development of forty per cent of Algeria’s domestic electricity production by 2030 from solar, wind and other renewable sources (i.e. biomass, hydro). However, the programme offers unclear and unspecified measures or steps towards its implementation (Algerian official, November 2012). Legislative and institutional gaps further impede its progressive implementation because of Algeria’s fluctuating viewpoint between liberalisation, and protectionism of its domestic economy (Kheladi and Arhab, 2012; Addi, 2006). For example, while in 2004 the energy minister Chakib Khelil promoted new legislation on liberalizing renewable energies (Loi 04-09 of August 2004), in 2005 the state substituted its general intention towards integration into market economy rules for protectionism and re-nationalisation of the entire energy sector (Escribano, 2010; Darbouche, 2009).

In addition, renewable energies and energy mitigation are not urgent issues close to Algerian core interests. Reducing energy use in an energy-abundant country is a difficult issue to be understood by the Algerian society, and it is not a key priority for the state (Algerian official, May 2013). Conventional energy resources are highly prioritised by the Algerian state, as opposed to the new market of renewable energies. Specifically, the state shows limited willingness to subsidise green energy producers (Escribano, 2010, p.225; Commission official, 17 September 2012). Moreover, in 2009, renewable energies only accounted for 0.05 per cent of the total Algerian energy production (IEA, 2013)\textsuperscript{26}.

Instead, adaptation is a key priority for Algeria regarding climate change policy (Algerian senior official, June 2012; MATE, 2010; MATE, 2001). According to the second UNFCCC Algerian communication, there has been a constant increase in mean temperatures in the whole country since the 1970s because of global warming, which is contributing to continued soil erosion and desertification (MATE, 2010, p.114). Desertification, droughts and the continuous expansion of arid land in the whole

\textsuperscript{25}The original text in French states: ‘L’Algérie amorce une dynamique d’énergie verte en lançant un programme ambitieux de développement des énergies renouvelables (EnR) et d’efficacité énergétique. Cette vision du gouvernement algérien s’appuie sur une stratégie axée sur la mise en valeur des ressources inépuisables comme le solaire et leur utilisation pour diversifier les sources d’énergie et préparer l’Algérie de demain. Grâce à la combinaison des initiatives et des intelligences, l’Algérie s’engage dans une nouvelle ère énergétique durable’.

\textsuperscript{26}Hydro: 29 ktoe; Biomass and waste: 57 ktoe out of total 152,292 ktoe (2009).
country are expected to suppress the already limited food production of the country, causing more problems in the diversification of the economy, and with potential negative effects for its rapidly-growing population in urban centres. Furthermore, desertification and soil erosion threaten the country’s water resources; Algeria is among the poorest countries for available water resources amongst several SMCs (UNEP MAP, 2009). There is measurement of the decline in rainfall by at least thirty per cent in the last thirty years, which will exacerbate its need for potable water in the industrial and agricultural sectors (MATE, 2010, p.49).

Algeria’s interest in climate change adaptation is equally related to the preservation of its reserves of the conventional energy resources of natural gas and oil. ‘As a semi-arid country and threatened by serious desertification, Algeria’s interests should be safeguarded based on its significant gas resources’ (Algerian senior official, 02 July 2012). As desertification and soil erosion are progressing throughout the country, there may be implications for its reserves from future climate change.

Climate change adaptation is significantly prioritised even at the international level. Algeria mainly pushes for strong emission reduction commitments from developed countries because of their historical responsibility for this phenomenon (Algerian senior official June 2012). An Algerian senior official argued that

Mitigation is not obligatory under the framework of international relations for us. We do not exclude mitigation, but we will cooperate on the condition that it is funded by our partners (Algerian official, October 2012).

Algeria contributes only marginally to the phenomenon of climate change, with its share being only 0.38 per cent of global CO2 emissions in 2009 (see Table 15 below). Moreover, it stresses the necessity for Western countries to offer robust technological, financial and expertise transfers to the developing South, to deal with the adverse effects of climate change (Algerian senior official, June 2012; EEAS official, December 2012). As chair of the African group in the 2009 Copenhagen Summit, Algeria argued that

Africa’s priorities are to implement climate change programmes with a focus on adaptation in such a way as to achieve sustainable development, alleviate poverty and attain the Millennium Development Goals, with emphasis on the most vulnerable groups (African Union, 2009) (emphasis added by the author).

Table 15: Algerian, EU and World CO2 emissions (in tons and as percentage) (1960-2009) (World Bank, 2014a)
However, Algeria lacks a cohesive institutional and regulatory framework to deal with climate change adaptation. Despite the ratification of several international protocols (i.e. Kyoto Protocol) and regional agreements (i.e. Mediterranean integrated coastal zone management protocol), there is no official national strategy, action plan or even an integrated legislative framework to combat climate change (Algerian NGO representative, 31 October 2012; Algerian academic, 02 December 2012; UNDP official, 04 December 2012). The present legislative framework is guided by the 2002 National Action Plan for the Environment and the Sustainable Development (PNAE-DD). PNAE-DD does not introduce the issue of climate change (UNDP official, December 2012). Climate change is only sporadically mentioned in the document (Title M on Global Issues) and there are no measures given as to how to deal with the whole phenomenon (MATE, 2002, p.57). Instead, its main focus is on the role of Algerian natural gas as clean fuel and the importance of funding opportunities from the international community (MATE, 2002, p.112). There are, however, no suggested and concrete steps whatsoever in the entire document in relation to the way the Algerian state will deal with the problem.

Certain national laws have attempted to deal with the issue of environmental protection and planning in relation to sustainable development (Loi 03-10 of 19 July 2003), the management, protection and development of green spaces (Loi 07-06 of 13 May 2007), the initial pro-strategies supported by UNDP on water resources (UNDP 2009) and UNEP for the development of a coastal zone management programme (UNEP PAC-ZCA, 2006). However, these legislative initiatives do not offer a holistic plan for Algeria in order to develop its approach to climate change policy (Algerian academic December 2012). Moreover, there is limited experience in the country’s public administration of
how to deal with the complexity of the problem. The Ministry of Territorial Management, Environment and the City (MATEV)

is very young and it is not covering only environment, but [the environment] is one of the three big pillars of the Ministry. It has first the territorial management, environment and urban organisation. Inside the Department of Environment, there is also the issue of climate change. And on the other side, it’s not the responsibility of one ministry or one person and he will do this. It is so interconnected with whatever happens in the country; it is complicated to develop it. So if you put this intersectoriality, multi-stakeholders let’s say, you add the social priorities – social peace, youth unemployment, poverty – that exist in Algeria, then you will have a problem (EU official, 25 November 2012).

The EU is a significant actor in the Mediterranean that encourages collaboration with developing Mediterranean countries regarding climate change. Algeria holds a certain level of cooperation with the EU, which can support its efforts to deal with climate challenges. Moreover, it could explore EU opportunities for capacity-building and exchange of best practices, as was the case with Morocco.

6.3 EU-Algerian Relations, the Commission’s Incentives and Algeria’s Motivation on Climate Change Policy

Algeria’s relations with the EU have been historically distinct (Darbouche, 2008, p.373). It refers to a ‘reluctant’ (Emerson et al., 2007) or, for some others, even ‘ugly’ (Bicchi, 2010, p.217) relationship, especially when compared to other Maghreb countries. While Morocco wishes to have deep and strong relations with the EU and is willing to integrate into the single market, Algeria always had a rather ‘sceptical’ or even ‘suspicious’ mind-set towards the EU (various Algerian, Commission and EEAS interviewees, September-December 2012). One general reason could be that Algeria has limited understanding of the potential of its engagement with EU institutions (Commission official, 17 September 2012). According to an energy expert

the central problem is that Algeria does not understand what the EU is and what the EU offers. They don’t really know what it is. In general, Algeria never understood what the EU is about and what Algeria can get out of this. For example, a friend of mine at the Foreign Ministry asked me prior to an energy council in Brussels “what should we ask from the Europeans?”. He did not seem to know what Algeria wants from that co-operation with the Europeans (Mediterranean energy expert, 02 July 2012).

However, there are different agendas and motivations that have guided each side in their collaboration from their early engagement from the 1970s until the present day. The EU’s agenda with Algeria and the rest of SMCs was to incite export-led trade to the then European Community, through liberalisation and market economy rules
(Darbouche, 2009). In this way, a free trade area could be developed progressively between the two sides in industrial and, to a lesser extent, in agricultural products. In this way, it was believed that exports of Algerian products and their access to the largest market in the region could promote their socio-economic development and enhance their growth prospects. Several provisions of technology transfer, technical and financial assistance with the progressive cooperation in labour issues would equally support Algeria’s administrative structures and reduce regulatory gaps (Tsoukalis, 1977; Darbouche, 2008).

However, Algeria was mainly interested in protecting its independence and ensuring its self-sustainability. The long period of French colonisation of the country and the early independence days were crucial factors in Algeria not wishing to have any relations with a grouping of states where France was an EEC leading member. After all, hydrocarbons would fund all investments towards heavy industrialisation of the Algerian economy and constitute a key element for President Boumediène’s self-sufficiency aspirations, which would secure sustainable development and growth for the country. Moreover, an agreement with the Community was not urgent, as the vast majority of Algerian exports were in natural gas, unlike in the Moroccan case and in other SMCs, whose interest was mainly to export their agricultural products.

It was only on 1st November 1978 that an agreement between Algeria and the Community finally entered into force. The EEC-Algerian cooperation agreement was almost similar to other EEC agreements with other Maghreb countries (Darbouche, 2008). It offered preferential access for Algerian industrial products to the EEC market, with a few exceptions of so-called sensitive products, namely refined petroleum and cork products. The agreement also offered significant concessions for agricultural products, such as citrus fruit, fresh fruit and vegetables and also other temporal and tariff concessions for olive oil and wine, despite the over-supplied European market (European Commission, 1980, pp.2-11).

However, several factors led Algeria to sign a cooperation agreement with the Commission. Algeria’s development plan for hydrocarbons failed to produce the expected results. It resulted in a large number of state enterprises with significant deficits (Entelis, 2011; 1986). The mismanagement of public revenue and the undiversified nature of the Algerian economy led to significant structural reforms that could bring Algeria’s development back on track (Addi, 2006). Also, Arab-Israeli conflicts in the late-1960s and 1970s led to continuous oil crises and fluctuating international oil prices, with a negative effect in Algeria. In addition, Algeria had to face prices which had skyrocketed for its food imports in order to support its growing,
urbanizing and highly unemployed population (Entelis, 2011, p.654). The entry into force of the agreement coincided with structural changes that were set to take place in Algeria in the late 1970s, caused by the election of the more reform-minded President Chadli Bendjedid. His main focus was to diversify the Algerian economy, introduce market economy rules and restructure state enterprises into smaller – but hundreds and scattered – units (Addi, 2006, p.209).

Cooperation agreement with the Commission offered several financial and technical incentives that could assist Algeria in its effort towards structural adjustments in its economy. For the period 1978-1995, the total of EU grants and loans accounted up to €949 million, or €53 million per year (see Table 16 below). Expertise and capacity-building were supposed to be used for public administration needs in the modernisation of Algeria’s agricultural sector, for feasibility studies and project-linked technical cooperation, or even for staff training to devise and implement projects (European Commission, 1980, p.17). The support of small- and medium-sized industrial firms, the conversion of vineyards and the diversification of wine exports, and the financing of technical and teaching equipment for several vocational centres had been identified as the first technical assistance funded by the Commission (European Commission, 1980, pp.18-20).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of assistance</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Annual estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU Budget</td>
<td>€309 million</td>
<td>€17.6 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(€214 million + €95 million</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>from structural adjustment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>basket)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Investment Bank</td>
<td>€640 million</td>
<td>€35.5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>€949 million</td>
<td>€52.7 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nevertheless, the country’s dependence on international oil and gas prices was not able to disguise its limited capacity to respond to international oil shocks and cover its food dependencies from abroad. The revenues from oil and gas had fallen sharply by the end of the 1980s, from $13.9 billion in 1985 to $9.6 billion in 1986 and 1987 (Cavatorta, 2002, p.30). Benjedid’s reforms had limited impact in the whole process as they
coincided with broad social unrest and IMF structural adjustment. In addition, despite the continuous update of the financial protocols of the EEC agreement, the impact was rather ‘disappointing’ and with limited effect in terms of trade (Aghrout, 2009, pp.354-355). Also, technical assistance and access to the EEC market hardly influenced Algeria’s efforts towards structural adjustment.

In addition, Algeria’s first experience of liberalisation resulted in significant unrest and a bloody civil war in the 1990s, with devastating effects on the country, both domestically and in its international relations, including with the EU. Increasing unemployment and unrest amongst the population over food issues resulted in riots in several main Algerian cities (Constantine, Algiers, Oran) in 1986, and in October 1988. Public unrest was growing against the colonels’ regime, which was depicted in the 1991 elections with the victory of the Islamic party – FIS. Responding to this result and out of fear for instability in the country, the Algerian army cancelled the electoral victory of the Islamic party. Civil war between the state’s army and Islamists erupted in the country for almost eight years until 1999, whereby over 200,000 people would die in serious bloodshed (Entelis, 2011, p.659). International isolation and serious violence were the main elements of Algeria’s political life until the late 1990s (Darbouche, 2009).

In the meantime, the EU had developed a new initiative towards the Mediterranean, with the establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, responding to growing instability amongst SMCs and their need to deal with structural adjustments to their national economies (see part 4.4). The liberalisation agenda, market economy rules, privatisation and ‘less’ public sector were at the centre of the Commission’s agenda towards Algeria, as was the case for all SMCs. A Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area was again the remedy for the SMCs’ economies, which would operate as an anchor for regional development through bilateral agreements with each SMC (Pace, 2007; see also Gillespie, 1997).

For Algeria, liberalisation was not one of its core intentions, but was considered as a ‘necessary evil’ and as a measure of last resort (Darbouche, 2009, p.377). The country was in the middle of a harsh civil war which had devastating effects both on its economic development, but also for the country’s external deficit. In 1993 Algeria was ‘on the verge of stopping payments’ because of deteriorating oil prices at the

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27The so-called ‘évènements’ (or events in English).
international level, the outburst of the civil war and the growing external deficit (Addi, 2006, p.210). Algeria had to sign up to a loan from IMF and continue the re-structuring of its economy. The programme aimed to re-schedule Algeria’s external debt and gradually open its economy (Kheladi and Arhab, 2012, p.303).

Algeria’s collaboration with the EU would support its efforts for the implementation of the IMF programme and the integration of market economy rules in its economic structure. The Commission’s financial assistance with expertise and technical support would operate as ‘the most realistic economic dividend’ of an Association Agreement (AA) with the EU (Darbouche, 2009, p.377). Moreover, participating in a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area would offer an extra resource to Algeria via foreign direct investment, since large numbers of European, African and Arab companies had relocated outside the country (Algerian official, November 2012). Also, participating in the EMP would provide a ‘diplomatic window of opportunity’ (Darbouche, 2008, p.375). Its isolated position in international relations could give way to engagement at a regional level and push forward the problem of its war against terrorism.

Algeria and the Commission entered into preparatory negotiations in 1996 for the Association Agreement. The establishment of a free trade area with the EU and with the rest of SMCs required reciprocal opening of markets and the introduction of similar regulations and standards in a variety of policies. The European Commission was mainly interested in promoting the liberalisation of Algeria’s economy as a necessary part of any future relations (Darbouche, 2009, p.378). Instead, Algerian negotiators were hoping that cooperation with the EU would specifically raise the issue of its war against the Islamists and, in general, its fight against terrorism, which was considered as the number one threat for the country. As the Commission insisted on trade liberalisation and economic reform, Algerian negotiators decided to walk out of any agreement talks, blaming EU policy as being rigid, since it was understood that EU’s position would trigger little or no political results (Darbouche, 2009, pp.377-378).

It was only in 2000 when Algeria, under the leadership of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, decided to engage in negotiations with the Commission and voluntarily follow liberalisation and market economy rules. Bouteflika’s main motivation was to bring Algeria back into the international scene and reconcile the country after eight years of bloody civil war (Darbouche, 2009, p.378). Intense negotiations took place between the Commission and Algerian diplomats, which resulted in the signature of the Association Agreement in 22 April 2002. The agreement finally entered into force on 1 September 2005. As an Algerian official argues
they were excessive and very offensive regarding Algeria and they cruelly benefited from our weakness and we don’t forget. Our main problem is that we do not forget. We can say we are friends and we can go for cooperation. But we do not forget. We were in a very bad situation. The Moroccans and the Tunisians have also discussed their AA with the Commission, but I do not know if it was like that. The challenges are not the same, but regarding Algeria they were very cruel ( Algerian official, November 2012).

The liberalisation agenda was finally introduced as part of bilateral relations, where Algeria was required to integrate market economy rules and ‘bring its legislation closer to EU rules’ (article 56 of AA, p.15) with the prospect of intensified trade and the achievement of the EU-Algerian Free Trade Area after twelve years (Kheladi, 2007). Part of the liberalisation agenda was the Commission’s financial and technical assistance in order to support Algeria towards the implementation of the specific reforms. For the period 1995-2005, EU commitments reached up to €436.8 million, while EIB loans assumed the main bulk of the assistance, reaching up to €1.4 billion (see Table 17).

Table 17: EU grants and European Investment Bank (EIB) loans to Algeria under MEDA I and II (1995-2005) (ENPI, 2007, pp.13-14)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>EU commitment (million €)</th>
<th>EU payment (million €)</th>
<th>Payment: commitment (%)</th>
<th>EIB loans (million €)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>115.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>335.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>95.0</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>143.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>225.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>227.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>230.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>82.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>98.5</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>436.8</td>
<td>144.3</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>1,405.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As is seen in Table 17, before the signing of the Association Agreement, Algeria showed limited interest in exploiting financial opportunities from Commission grants, while in 2004 and 2005 its absorption rate had increased, benefiting from almost the total amount of EU commitments. The most likely explanation for this late engagement in EU funding can be linked to the end of the civil war, the much-needed stability of the Algerian economy and the progressive liberalisation process Algeria promoted in order to attract foreign investment in the country (Algerian official, 25 November 2012). With the entry into of the Association Agreement in 2005, EU commitments were increased, as the annual estimate for the period 2007-2013 is €56 million compared to the period 1995-2005 (€43 million) (see Table 18 below). The continuous commitment of the EU was also sustained by significant EIB loans, which mainly focus on the development of gas pipeline projects (MEDGAZ pipeline)\(^{28}\).

Table 18: EU grants and EIB loans to Algeria (2007-2013) (ENPI, 2007; IEVP, 2011; EIB, 2014a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EU commitment (million €)</th>
<th>EU commitment per year (million €)</th>
<th>EIB loans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ENPI (2007-2010)</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>503.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENPI (2011-2013)</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>503.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Exports to the EU (in billion €)</th>
<th>EU Share of total exports (%)</th>
<th>Imports from the EU (in billion €)</th>
<th>EU Share of total imports (%)</th>
<th>Balance (in billion €)</th>
<th>Total Trade (in billion €)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+2.5</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+10.4</td>
<td>22.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+6.1</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+10.4</td>
<td>31.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{28}\)Construction and operation of sub-sea natural gas transmission pipeline between BeniSaf in Algeria and landfall near Almeria in Spain (EIB, 2014c).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Export</th>
<th>Import</th>
<th>Trade Balance</th>
<th>Growth</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>+14.2</td>
<td>34.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>+9.4</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>+12.9</td>
<td>43.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>+2.6</td>
<td>32.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>+5.5</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>+10.4</td>
<td>45.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Apart from financial assistance, trade also appears to be growing between the two sides, with strong benefits for Algeria. The volume of Algeria’s total exports to the EU had almost quadrupled since 1999, with the end of the civil war, reaching up to €27.7 billion in 2011, in contrast to only €7.9 billion in 1999 (see Table 19 above). Moreover, its trade balance with the EU has always been positive and, despite temporal fluctuations, there has been increasing profit for the Algerian side. Therefore, the figures show that the Association Agreement has had positive effects in terms of trade exchanges and financial support.

However, the positive EU-Algerian trading relations are not significantly related to the implementation of the Association Agreement. Increased oil prices at the international level since 2003 had a positive effect on the country’s revenues. Algeria managed to pay off a significant part of its external deficit and reinforce the country’s economic stability. More specifically, the improvement in the trade surplus, coupled with a significant increase in current account surpluses since 2000 has greatly contributed to the increase in foreign exchange reserves, which rose from $4.4 billion in 1999 to $143 billion in 2008 (MATE, 2010, p.51). Moreover, EU’s energy in-security gave way to an increasing role for Algeria’s energy resources. As an energy expert argued:

> In 2006, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and the energy disruptions to Europe gave significant role to Algeria. Algeria wanted to show that is not like Russia. It sent a strong message to Europe (Mediterranean energy expert, 02 July 2012).

Unlike Russia, Algeria’s sustainable supplies to Europe could offer stable energy relations. Algeria has been a reliable energy partner, even in 1990s during the civil war (Algerian official, November 2012).

However, the mere implementation of AA faces several challenges. For Algeria market economy rules, access to the EU market and the Commission’s financial assistance are of limited importance, as its energy resources play the central role in its relations with...
Europe. The most characteristic example of this is Algeria’s fluctuating position in its hydrocarbon policy since the 2000s. While in 2000, President Bouteflika and his Energy Minister, Chakib Khelil, managed to push forward a liberalisation programme for the opening of the energy sector in the country, in subsequent years (mainly in 2005), after the second presidential term, and despite becoming a law of the country, a presidential decree cancelled the previous commitments to liberalisation (Darbouche, 2009, p. 380). The potential de-nationalisation of the energy sector and a threat for SONATRACH – a pillar of national pride and source of significant revenues for the country – seemed impossible for several elite actors, despite the parallel entry into force of the AA with the EU. As an EEAS official argues:

In 2009 and 2010 they have changed completely their policy in relation to the 2000s which was more opening, more liberal economy and then in 2009 they changed it completely and they said “the liberalisation of economy does not work and now we are going to close it again” (EEAS official, December 2012).

Despite its contradictory stance in terms of market economy rules and liberalisation commitments, in December 2011 the Algerian Prime Minister asked for an ENP Action Plan with the Commission from then Commissioner, Štefan Füle, in an EU–Algerian Association Council (EEAS official, 20 September 2012). An Action Plan requires stronger liberalisation commitments from an ENP country and significant efforts for the opening of the market, coupled with deeper rapprochement to EU rules.

There are certain opinions about this issue that explain such a move by Algeria. Most of them are not related to Algeria’s interest in a market economy, but are triggered by broader political issues. Most of them are related to the outburst of the Arab Spring. More specifically, Algeria understood ‘what happened around them [in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt] and they saw they cannot continue like that’, since several protests were taking place in the country (EEAS official, May 2013; EEAS official, September 2012; Commission official, September 2012). Algeria intended to ‘launch the message’ to the outside world that ‘we are negotiating an Action Plan with the EU and we are strongly linked with the EU’ (EEAS official, May 2013; EEAS official, December 2012). In this way, an agreement with the EU can operate as an argument for Algerian elites that Algeria is committed to collaborating with a democratic and economically significant actor in the region.

However, Algeria is little motivated to collaborate with the Commission based on the liberalisation agenda. Commission incentives, such as free trade area or integration into the EU’s single market, seem to offer limited incentives to Algeria, unlike Morocco.
For Algeria, integration into EU market rules in the long run may harm Algeria’s interests in its hydrocarbon policy. Opening the state’s monopoly to external private competition will also jeopardise privileges at the senior level of the state apparatus and lead to loss of stability (Kheladi and Arhab, 2012; Aghrout, 2009). Even Algeria’s positive trade balance with the EU is of limited importance in relation to its hydrocarbon policy. In the Moroccan case the trade balance with the EU was constantly, and increasingly, negative since the entry into force of bilateral agreements. However, the EU single market offered significant opportunities for Morocco in terms of green electricity exportations and a similar regulatory framework with the largest market in the region.

Moreover, the Commission’s funding seems to be of the least interest in Algeria, since it accounts only for an insignificant percentage of country’s needs in order to shift Algeria towards the market economy rules. In addition, high international oil prices have combined with increased energy exportations in the last decade, providing Algeria with significant state revenues. Revenues from energy exportations have contributed to service the country’s external debt, support socio-economic measures (increased salaries, health policy) and assist the country’s needs for infrastructure investments. In contrast, for Morocco, the Commission’s funding can cover certain needs in the green infrastructure through EIB loans and support certain activities of public administration. So, what kind of incentive could induce Algeria to collaborate with the Commission? How could the Commission advance Europeanization in Algeria through climate change policy?

Algeria lacks the regulatory, administrative and institutional capacities to deal with climate change policy as a whole. There is no integrated framework for climate change policy that deals with the whole issue. Moreover, Algeria lacks the specific expertise and experience to respond to the specific needs of each policy area. The Commission could support Algeria in this process by offering expertise and technical assistance for the organisation and implementation of regulatory and legislative frameworks for each climate policy area. The Commission can allocate the necessary funds for such programmes, in order to allow the activation of expert groups from each side to specify the needs and priorities in each sector. Capacity-building programmes can take the form of twinning projects, offering administrative and regulatory assistance from civil servants and experts and drafting of reports, new laws or even strategies, based on knowledge-sharing, exchange of best practices and study visits to Europe and EU institutions (EU official, November 2012).
However, each side holds contrasting policy agendas and priorities for climate change policy. The Commission’s climate priority is to promote climate change mitigation and the development of renewable energies in its cooperation with Algeria. On the other hand, climate change adaptation is Algeria’s core climate priority. Despite divergent policy agendas, Commission network actors will attempt to convince their Algerian counterparts to shift their policy priorities towards renewable energies. Offers of expertise and regulatory assistance could assist Algeria to surpass any technical problems in the transfer of EU rules and build necessary administrative capacities.

6.4 Policy Networks between Algeria and the Commission over Climate Change Policy

Similar to Morocco, policy networks between Algeria and the Commission refer to highly-insulated policy communities with restricted access to external actors (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992). Membership of those networks is exclusively specific to governmental and supranational officials and access is only shared amongst those network actors. All network actors share significant resources, which are related to significant expertise and professional status, but also playing an influential role in their respective positions.

Algerian network members are mainly high- and middle-ranked governmental officials of a division or department inside the Algerian administration and, in several cases, technical experts. More specifically, they are directors and heads of unit of the Directorate General in charge of the cooperation with the European Union and its Institutions, the General Direction of Economic Relations and International Cooperation, and of the Direction of Environment and Sustainable Development inside the Algerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MAE) (Algerian official, 29 March 2013). They are also directors and head of units together with their technical and advisory cabinets from the Directorate of Bilateral Cooperation with the EU and the Direction on Climate Change inside the Algerian Ministry of Territorial Management, Environment and the City (MATEV). Algerian network members also include directors from respective directorate generals of the Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEM) and the Ministry of Water Resources, and from several governmental agencies (CREG, APRUE) (Algerian official, 29 March 2013; EU official, April 2013). The Ministry of Finances is also involved in the whole process and cooperates with related beneficiary ministries in order to define the necessary budget planning and auditing.
Similar to the Moroccan case, the Commission network actors are Brussels bureaucrats, whose main role is task management and collaboration with their Algerian colleagues. They are experienced in managing everyday collaboration in terms of implementing jointly agreed programmes. They also jointly negotiate concrete expected results, principal activities and performance indicators with country officials, and discuss about the general process of the cooperation (EU official, 25 December 2012; EU official, 18 April 2013).

Access to these policy communities is only granted in certain cases, and only for a short period of time, mainly to independent advisory and consulting companies, so that they can periodically assess the progress of undertaken projects. Other actors such as the civil society, are largely excluded from these networks. In fact, an Algerian academic argues:

The folder ‘environment’ is closed in general. It is restricted from everybody else and limited only between one or two ministries; the civil society is very far from these discussions. No information. This is the total ‘blackout’. It is locked. It is closed to everybody. That is called ‘black-out’, everything is closed. So they do things internally with the foreign experts, but no information, no news29 (Algerian academic, December 2012) (author’s translation).

As was the case with Morocco, subcommittee meetings engage network actors in annual dialogue. Climate change was introduced in 27 February 2007 in Brussels in the preparatory activities for setting up an EU-Algerian Association sub-committee meeting on transport, energy and environment (SC-TEE). The meeting took place in a ‘real climate of partnership between the two parties’ (Commission official, 25 May 2012). Commission officials stressed the agenda of energy mitigation and the institution’s aim to achieve secure, competitive and sustainable energy resources for Europe, because of increasing volatility in international oil and gas markets. In that relationship, Algeria’s role, stressed in the Commission’s intentions, was to develop a pan-European market of energy (Accord d’Association UE-Algérie, 2007, p.2).

However, in that meeting Algeria criticised the lack of mutual benefits and complained about the unbalanced nature of the current cooperation under the Association

Agreement. It strongly declared its interest in a much more equitable relationship in its relations with the EU. As Algerian network actors stated:

Algeria equally insisted on the need to evaluate the current results of the Association Agreement in order to search for concrete actions towards a balanced partnership that is mutually beneficial for both parties\(^{30}\) (Accord d’Association UE-Algérie, 2007, p.1) (author’s translation; emphasis added).

Moreover, Algeria was more interested in stressing the importance of its gas pipelines to Europe and its role in the EU’s energy security. It was equally interested in electricity exportations to Europe and declared an objective of six per cent production from renewable energies by 2015. However, Algerian officials asked for further clarifications of certain Commission’s comments with regards to electricity interconnections to Europe. Responding to that, Commission officials attempted to provide funding and expertise opportunities that could facilitate further interaction about electricity interconnection matters. Specifically, they presented possibilities of cooperation, stressing the role of twinning and exchange of best practices via the TAIEX mechanism. Algerian counterparts showed interest in this process, clarifying that they would participate only if funding was based on ‘grants rather than on credits’ (‘dons et non de crédits’) (Accord d’Association UE-Algérie, 2007, p.3). Also, other investment opportunities were included in the Neighbourhood Investment Facility.

Similar exchanges took place with regards to environmental matters, but with more interest in cooperation from the Algerian side. Algerian network actors argued that there were ‘numerous convergences with the Commission’s environmental policy’ (Accord d’Association UE-Algérie, 2007, p.7) and outlined several policy areas where cooperation could be enacted with the Commission with regards to territorial management and sustainable development. In return, Commission officials stressed the importance of climate change in environmental issues, as it was mentioned first in its list. However, no further encouragement was offered with regards to capacity-building and expertise opportunities from the Commission, as had happened in energy matters (Accord d’Association UE-Algérie, 2007, pp.6-7).

Differences in each side’s agendas were also depicted during the first official sub-committee meeting two years later, on 17 February 2009 in Algiers. From the outset,

\(^{30}\) The official text states: ‘Elle a également insisté sur la nécessité d’évaluer les résultats actuels de l’Accord d’Association pour rechercher des actions concrètes visant à se diriger un partenariat équilibre qui soit mutuellement bénéfique pour les deux parties’.
both sides attributed increased significance to energy, the environment and transport as ‘core themes for the Association Agreement’ and mentioned ‘the necessity to follow a pragmatic approach, for the purpose of exploring opportunities’ (Accord d’Association UE-Algérie, 2009, p.1). This time a debate on environment opened the subcommittee meeting. Algeria stressed that there was significant convergence between the two sides in terms of ideas and objectives and that climate change was an integral part of these considerations. Algerian officials reiterated their interest in the ‘impacts rather than the causes’ of climate change, showing its preference for adaptation rather than mitigation to the Commission. Also, they expressed their wish that both sides would show more interest in this area, as climate change adaptation was considered to be the ‘poor relative’ (‘parent pauvre’) of their bilateral cooperation (Accord d’Association UE-Algérie, 2009, p.2). Commission officials invited Algeria to collaborate over expertise and exchange of best practice in the following year and register related programmes (Accord d’Association UE-Algérie, 2009, p.2).

Instead, discussions about energy were highly inelastic from the Algerian side. Commission officials presented the last regulatory packages on energy mitigation and climate change (‘20-20-20’ by 2020, see part 4.4) and the Commission’s agenda on renewable energies and energy efficiency. However, Algerian officials were not triggered in developing further understanding and showed no motivation to participate. Algeria reiterated its ‘aspiration to correct the overall imbalance in the implementation of the Association Agreement, in the area of energy cooperation’ (Accord d’Association UE-Algérie, 2009, p.6). Minutes from subcommittee state that

Algeria questioned the extraterritorial character that the EU attempts to grant its legislation in the energy field, including the 3rd package above31 (Accord d’Association UE-Algérie, 2009, p.6).

In return, the Commission officials stressed the ‘highly technical’ character of these meetings. However, because they understood that the Algerian side was not willing to continue further discussions, they suggested that dialogue could be undertaken in future sessions (Commission official, 27 May 2013).

This interest in cooperation over adaptation-related issues and, more broadly, in the environment is also depicted in day-to-day relations amongst experts from each side. The central interest in day-to-day network relations among network actors is the

31 The text mentions: ‘L’Algérie s’est interrogée sur le cachet extraterritorial que l’UE tente d’octroyer à sa législation en matière énergétique, notamment le 3ème paquet précité’.
establishment of certain programmes and tasks. Such programmes may focus on various provisions of the Association Agreement and “assist the country to benefit from that provision for institutional capacity reinforcement and to develop their technical expertise” (EU official, 06 May 2013). As an Algerian official argues

> We are interested in viewing the experience of Europe when it was extended in the countries of Eastern Europe. These programmes were created to help the countries integrate the EU. They use them now to integrate somehow the Mediterranean countries under the Neighbourhood Policy (Algerian official, November 2012).

Commission officials acknowledge that engagement in cooperation programmes can develop common understanding over a certain policy area and increase the building of trust. In this process, technical expertise and the technical nature of the engagement operates as a lubricant (Rhodes 2011). This is verified by an Algerian interviewee

> When it is about technical cooperation, it works. Maybe because we talk the same language. When it is technical, it works. When it is about something else, there are some other configurations (Algerian official, November 2012).

Personal relations have also a significant role to play in this process. For example, an EU task manager in Algeria argues

> In Algeria personal relations are very important. If you have personal relations and confidence with them. These are things that you build on time. That makes it much easier but it takes time. The day-to-day relations take a bit longer but when it is done, it is done with very good relations (EU official, April 2013).

However, with regards to climate change mitigation and the development of renewable energies, network actors did not arrange any cooperation programmes. As a result, it was difficult to develop relationships amongst network members in the absence of such programmes. As an EU task manager argues

> The situation is rather different from the environment sector because there, there is a big environmental programme. I don’t [strong emphasis from the interviewee] have day-to-day relationship with the Ministry of Energy and I have very few [strong emphasis from the interviewee] relations in fact with people from energy. I would say our phone call communication is no more than every two months; our e-mail exchanges are not very often. I met them some time when there was a workshop or a seminar but we do not have real day-to-day relation or discussion. They are very reluctant to have formal contact outside an EU cooperation programme (Commission official, May 2013).

Commission task managers attempted to incite their Algerian contact points in energy agencies or at the cabinet level about the potential opportunities for expertise and
funding in renewable energies. There were several examples whereby the Delegation visited and informed several departments or agencies and suggested certain programmes, such as twinning in energy efficiency, or even in the promotion of renewable energies in Algeria. However, Algerian officials seemed unwilling to engage in such projects and were not triggered from such requests. As an Algerian governmental official argues

[...] We do not ask about anything here [laughter]. I have never seen a document in my direction asking help from the Europeans. For us, we do not ask. They propose and after we see. “This is what we want”, “this is what we do not want”. For me it seems that it makes no sense (Algerian official, November 2012).

Nevertheless, certain offers for short-term seminars provided some initial opportunities for collaboration. They mainly referred to TAIEX seminars and presentations by each party based on issues of a technical nature in relation to regulatory aspects of a draft law, strategy or of a broader institutional issue (Algerian official, May 2013). One example was the case of the four-day seminar session between three Belgian experts and Algerian experts from the Algerian Commission for the Regulation of Electricity and Gas (CREG) (EU official, May 2013). The specific focus of the seminars was on technical matters about the technicalities of electricity certificates and the criteria and other methods for the measurement of electricity.

However, in certain cases, Algerian officials claimed that the European experts seemed to neglect Algerian needs in certain EU projects in Algeria, and argued that ‘what works in Europe does not mean it will work in Algeria’ (Algerian official, November 2012). They argued that Europe was not considerate of the background of the Algerian population and the country’s mentality when they engaged in negotiations on certain projects. In certain cases it was argued that this resulted in a limited effect, even in TAIEX projects. One Algerian interviewee argues that

There is technical assistance whereby seminars and conferences are organised by the EU and EU members, but [with strong emphasis] the impact is not visible on the ground and also not much relevant to our needs32 (Algerian official, October 2012) (author’s translation; emphasis added by the author).

32 The original quotation in French states: ‘Il y a d’assistance technique où l’UE et autres Membres Etats organisent des séminaires et des conférences. Mais l’impact n’est pas visible au terrain et aussi pas très pertinent pour nos besoins’.
High politicisation of the energy sector and broader political problems negatively influenced energy relations between the two sides. There was significant network breakdown and cooperation was highly disrupted by broader political considerations. For example, Algeria was highly sceptical about engaging in relations on renewable energies with the EU, or even with Commission network counterparts. Algerian officials were reluctant to engage with the European officials. The key argument was related to the fact that ‘Algeria’s sovereignty matters are very important’ (Algerian official; May 2013) and the national energy resources may have been at stake. As an Algerian official states:

> I am going to tell you something that maybe it will shock you. The EU and everything are very hypocrites. Everybody is interested in our oil. And they want the natural resources of the country, mainly oil and natural gas and they try to show us how to deal with those issues. The Algerians tell them “Oh yes, please show us how to do the energy consumption or energy use stable over a decade”. I asked this “please show us how you can keep your energy consumption stable with all the use of computers, i-phones etc stable”. Bear in mind that a British citizen is very much equipped with these electronic gadgets. They use three or four times more energy than an Algerian. So they are trying to have their hands on us. We are free. We have gas for fifty years now. It's not an old thing (Algerian official, October 2012).

National pride and the strong sense of sovereignty and independence of the country were also at the core of this reluctant position. These elements were mentioned in almost all interviews with European and Algerian officials. For example, an EEAS official states that:

> The sense of independence is much stronger than in other countries, and preserving that independence is a very strong feeling. They are very suspicious of any foreign country going there and want to do business, because they say always the same, they are trying to steal something and they are disguised as they are trying to do something that it is against the benefit of the country (EEAS official, December 2012).

Furthermore, the promotion of renewable energies may have had opposite results for Algeria’s economy and cause problems in the current economic structure of the country. As an Algerian official argues:

> We started talking about this [renewable energies and energy efficiency] and he [European expert] was comparing between Tunisia and Morocco. He said that “we do not see this engagement in Algeria, as in the case of Tunisia and Morocco”. I said “you have the solution and you want me to create a problem for your solution”. This is what the Europeans want from us. They have solutions and they want us to create problems for their solutions (Algerian official, November 2012).
This suspicious thinking about its energy relations with the EU partly resulted from ‘poisonous’ Franco-Algerian relations and broader differences with the EU during Algeria’s civil war in 1990s. Algeria blames the EU for its ‘indifferent’ stance during Algeria’s fight against terrorism in 1990s and the limited support they received at that time. More specifically, it was argued that

Algeria is very angry with the EU. Franco-Algerian relations poison our relations with Algeria. There are several problems in France with the Algerian community, with their visas in France and with their properties. But in general they don’t like the EU. In meetings with them, we can see that even when we express the EU position, they respond like “all what you say is very nice, but where have you been when we needed you in the past?” (EEAS official, September 2012).

On the other hand, climate change adaptation offered more opportunities for both sides to cooperate than energy mitigation and more broadly in the energy sector. Despite cooperation being in its early stages, there were several programmes that had been progressively introduced into the bilateral cooperation agenda. These referred to the water sector, coastal zone management and programmes for climate strategies. In 2013, a new Budget support programme would be finalised in relation to climate change adaptation (ENPI/2012/023-474). According to a Commission official this is the first climate programme that will be put in place in relation to the environment, which focuses on the application of a sectorial budget system and with a focus on coastal zone management and wastewater treatment, but mainly on the development of the ‘Mid-Term Budget Planning’ tool (CDMT), which is a more technical tool on how to plan the budget in the environmental sector in order for them to rationalise their budgetary planning (Commission official, September 2012).

Its main objectives referred to the reinforcement of the Algerian Programme for Coastal Zone Management (PAC-ZCA) in order to respond to capacity-building needs and to organise the transfer of technical knowledge, mainly at the institutional level, with regards to Algeria’s adaptation to floods and extreme weather events (ENPI, 2012, p.8).

This Budget Support programme was equally expected to support the development of the first Algerian National Climate Plan through training and the exchange of expertise with the EU. As an EU task manager in Algeria argues

We are going to finance the National Climate Plan and for environment and sustainable development. So it will be all the support to the Ministry (MATEV). The Germans had already started this year (2012) and the Plan is not yet finished but they envisage to close it down and present it to the government. The idea is, by the time our programme will be kicking off, the Climate Strategy will be engaged and the Budget support instrument will be used to define with the Algerian side some indicators in order to accompany
the implementation of the National Climate Plan (EU official, November 2012).

Furthermore, the Commission supported Algeria’s water sector with the use of capacity-building programmes and technical assistance for the drafting and implementation of the Algerian Water Strategy through training programmes. For example, in the water sector in 2011 a twinning programme (‘jumelage’) on the ‘improvement of the quality of distributed water’ brought together the beneficiary governmental agency Algerienne des Eaux and a European counterpart (‘homologue’) Société Wallonne des Eaux (SWDE), a Wallonian public agency from Belgium. Twinning included a secondment of eighteen months and offered capacity-building and technical assistance at the administrative level, but also in the laboratories and in other formation centres of the agency, for the improvement of the quality of data on water resources. Both the Commission and the Algerian network actors assessed that the programme was beneficial and co-decided its expansion for three more years until 2014 (Délégation de l’UE en Algérie, 2011, pp.41-44).

In general, there was greater mutual understanding and growing co-ownership of the adaptation-related projects amongst network actors than on climate change mitigation. The frequency of exchanges through everyday communication based on calendar meetings certified the increasing interest on both sides to accomplish certain objectives. An EU task manager in Algeria argued

We discuss, we exchange e-mails. Let’s say we have contact once a week at least OK? It depends on which stage of preparation or implementation of the programme we are. At this time we are negotiating the financial agreement, therefore we have set a certain type of system. We organise seminars with all the structure with the Ministry of Environment. We discuss the different actions of the intervention of the programme. So the first seminar in March and the second next week and then another one in May [2013]. So in between these, there are regular seminars, to organise the context of the follow-up, exchanges that we build by e-mail or by meeting (EU official, April 2013).

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6.5 Assessing the Effect of Europeanization and Policy Networks over Climate Change Policy in Algeria

Europeanization seems to have found significant resistance in the Algerian case in the policy area of climate change mitigation. Algeria has a strong interest in its natural resources and is not willing to be engaged in complying with market economy rules and shift its policy preferences towards the development of renewable energies. There is a serious lack of such engagement in cooperation programmes, despite the willingness from Algeria to explore expertise from the EU. Instead, in the adaptation sector, there are more opportunities for domestic adjustment as cooperation via policy networks is established in several cooperation programmes that aim to transfer expertise and share experiences with the Algerian administration. In several cases, Algeria’s sceptical stance towards the EU and the politicisation of the energy sector leads to, on one hand, the rejection of any offers from the Commission concerning issues outside its interest, while, on the other hand, benefitting from programmes of its immediate interest in adaptation-related issues.

The Algerian case offers useful lessons outside Europe, which are different from the Moroccan case. In the Moroccan case, Europeanization via policy networks managed to advance the Commission’s agenda over energy mitigation and renewable energies, despite Morocco’s priority of climate change adaptation. Market incentives, funding and expertise together with regulatory convergence were significantly used by Commission officials in order to convince their Moroccan counterparts. Morocco was ultimately convinced about the importance of renewable energies. Of course, the EU and its single market played a critical role for Morocco’s future economic growth as being one of its few available development options. Although Morocco was not offered any membership incentives, similar regulatory rules and progressive connection with the European energy market offered strong incentives to the country.

On the other hand, Algeria managed to advance its agenda for climate change adaptation and reduce the importance of renewable energies in its relations with Commission officials. Algerian officials were not enthused by progressive electricity exports to the European market and by other financial offers from the Commission. Commission officials expected to convince Algeria to prioritise energy mitigation and green electricity production over conventional energy resources. Moreover, given Algeria’s limited regulatory and institutional capacities in that field, the Commission considered that it could trigger Algeria’s interest in collaborating by offering expertise and capacity-building programmes that would reduce gaps and operate at an arm’s
length (Rhodes, 2000; 2013). As a default option, based on the Moroccan case, the Commission suggested the development of institutionalised relations amongst experts and bureaucrats that would try to stark cooperation in that policy area.

However, Algeria was aware that shifting the national focus to renewable energies would incur certain challenges for its conventional energy resources. Renewable energies were a risky option for its economy, as the greatest focus of the country was on gas and oil. Moreover, green electricity from renewables to export to Europe would require the integration of several EU rules in order to bring regulatory frameworks closer to each other and facilitate electricity transfers. Also, progressive development of a renewable energy market in the country might reduce exportations of conventional energy resources, which were the strongest assets and products of the country (DG Trade, 2012).

In this case, the network autonomy was highly disrupted by broader politicisation, which reduced the role of Commission’s incentives and limited their importance. Even though Commission officials tried to convince their Algerian counterparts about the technical nature of energy and climate change policies (Accord d’Association UE-Algérie, 2009, p.6), policy networks were still upset by broader politics. Network stability was not able to be developed amongst network actors, even though the Commission strived for network autonomy and hands-off network management. Of course, interdependence in the energy sector gave Algerian officials a broad margin of manoeuvre and favoured their bargaining position vis-à-vis the Commission’s officials. Similarly, the Commission acknowledged the importance of Algerian energy resources and the sustainable level of cooperation, especially after 2006, with continuous energy disruptions from Russia.

However, it is broader politics and the disruption of network relations among network actors that failed to deliver several results. This shows that Europeanization cannot be advanced outside Europe, no matter how strong the Commission incentives are or how broad the administrative gaps exist between the two sides. In fact, in this case, administrative gaps or even broader interdependencies played a minimal role. Past political relations and broader suspicion and mistrust from the Algerian side eliminated the Commission’s efforts for ‘arm’s length’ management and showed that policy networks cannot always succeed in Europeanization outside Europe.

Another important lesson from the Algerian case is the importance of the Commission’s expertise and capacity-building programmes in Europeanization outside Europe. Expertise programmes play a significant role in network collaboration and co-
ownership of certain reforms and fulfil certain functions in everyday network cooperation. During subcommittee meetings, Commission officials urged Algeria to make use of these opportunities in both policy areas, with certain interest in climate change mitigation. Algeria, though, was highly motivated to explore these opportunities only in adaptation-related issues, such as coastal zone management, water resources and in national climate strategies.

Once network experts decided to specify targets, objectives and results, Algerian officials became involved in adjusting to EU rules and standards. Moreover, periodical monitoring built co-ownership and mutual understanding amongst the network experts, based on day-to-day interaction and problem-solving. Algeria participates in several of these programmes, and certain of them are renewed because of successful results and trust. This is similar to the experience from the Moroccan case. Once Moroccan officials became involved in several programmes, other processes, such as monitoring with their Commission partners, financial auditing and general project management, enhanced co-ownership of the reform process and developed a mutual understanding of each other’s needs.

In contrast, when no cooperation programmes are activated in network relations, there is no space for interaction on a day-to-day basis. Equally, absence of long-term cooperation programmes limits the potential for mutual understanding and co-ownership. Short-term programmes, such as TAIEX seminars and study visits, cannot significantly influence network relations, as they cannot be compared with long-term capacity-building programmes, which include multiple tasks and several expertise projects based upon joint monitoring of objectives, results and sub-results. TAIEX projects have a restricted horizon of a maximum five days of intervention in the country. Furthermore, it is highly interesting that Algeria mainly preferred to benefit from TAIEX in energy cooperation with the Commission. Instead, no long-term capacity-building programme had been agreed, despite Algeria’s interest in exploring European expertise and technical assistance. For example, during the last subcommittee meeting in Algiers in February 2013 a Commission official argued that

The Algerian officials argued that “What we need from you is technical assistance and training, and in particular concerning renewables”. I heard it more than one time in the last meeting. They made that point that they would like to have a support from the European Union perhaps to create some kind of a training centre focusing on renewables. So what they are looking for is transfer or knowledge, best practice and training. Then if they have to build a bigger plant, they can finance it with their own funds (Commission official, May 2013).
However, while the outcome of this political dialogue could be used for future cooperation between the two parties that would lead to a concrete project, the Algerians were reluctant to be engaged in such projects. Furthermore, TAIEX seminars and other short-term projects cannot offer a broad scope for dialogue and their trust-building capacity is limited among network actors.

In general terms, the Algerian case shows that Europeanization can still take place outside Europe, even in the absence of EU membership, but it does not necessarily follow the Commission’s agenda. Algerian network actors were not convinced about the utility of renewable energies and were highly sceptical in engaging further with expertise and other assistance from the Commission. Broader politics and past conflictual relations intervened in network relations and upset the trust-building efforts of Commission network actors. In addition, the Commission’s expertise and financial incentives triggered Algeria’s interest to engage only in adaptation capacity-building programmes. Socialisation and day-to-day interaction built common understanding amongst network actors from each side and facilitated Algeria’s domestic adjustment to EU rules. On the other hand, politicisation and top-down manipulation were absent and technical experts advanced the negotiation and implementation of co-agreed programmes, leading to joint ownership and trust-building.

### 6.6 Conclusion

This chapter offered an analysis of the case study of Algeria in the policy field of climate change policy. Sceptical behaviour and suspicious mentality from Algeria towards the Commission’s intentions as regards renewable energies influenced policy networks and failed to promote network relations in the policy area of climate change mitigation. At the centre of this limited engagement among networks actors were the politicisation of cooperation in energy relations. For Algeria, conventional energy resources in natural gas and oil are significant sources of revenue for the country but also a pillar of national pride. Possible liberalisation and the opening of the energy market may hamper the country’s monopoly and limit its benefits gained from its exportations abroad. Also, the investment in the market of renewable energy may cause instability in the country’s economy and threaten the hydrocarbon policy area. Although Algeria has significant geographical position and investment potential to develop renewable energies and green electricity on its soil, it prefers to benefit from its national energy resources and to avoid creating problems that may harm its national assets (Algerian official, May 2013).
On the other hand, adaptation is Algeria’s immediate priority and its main national agenda regarding climate change policy. Effects from climate change threaten, to a certain extent, its natural energy resources and are expected to have a serious impact on its social and economic development. Desertification, soil erosion and growing urban populations are projected to be distressed by climate change, and influence its limited arable land and food production levels (MATE, 2010; 2001).

Policy networks between Algerian and Commission officials depicted this reluctance by Algeria to engage in cooperative programmes that might relate to Algeria’s conventional energy resources, or even the development of renewable energies. Algeria was reluctant to bring forward expertise from the Commission, as scepticism and accusations of limited understanding from the EU operated as serious impediments to relations in mitigation policy networks between the two sides. There was sporadic cooperation over technical assistance projects and there was a lack of capacity-building programmes. Network actors had limited interaction with each other and networks operated more on an ad hoc basis. This gave limited opportunity for Europeanization to be geographically advanced and failed to cause domestic adjustment to EU standards and rules. The politicisation of network relations infringed the stability and bureaucratic routines of the policy networks and failed to advance Europeanization.

Instead, network actors operated on a more constant and continuous basis concerning climate change adaptation, exploring any possibilities for technical assistance and capacity-building programmes offered by the Commission. There was continuous engagement in water programmes, but also in the prospective engagement of the first Budget support programme on the environment. Cooperation on training programmes was constant and offered increasing potential for the geographical expansion of EU rules in the country. Network actors were motivated to engage in trust-building relations and explore the progressive integration of EU standards into the Algerian regulatory framework.

Therefore, the Algerian case shows that Europeanization can equally be advanced outside Europe without the EU membership incentive. However, Europeanization did not manage to promote the Commission’s agenda on climate change mitigation, but followed the needs and priorities of the non-European country. This confirms that broader interdependences, administrative gaps and the Commission’s incentives cannot simply determine the transfer of EU rules to non-European countries, either neighbouring or not. Socialisation amongst actors within policy networks will decide, prioritise or even put on hold, certain policy agendas, since mutual consensus is required amongst network actors for the progression of expected reforms. Moreover,
the Algerian case also shows that if network autonomy is substituted for politicisation and hierarchical manipulation, trust-building is hard to be recovered and networks fail to deliver expected tasks.
Chapter 7:
Conclusions

This thesis has explored whether, and how, Europeanization takes place in the EU’s southern neighbourhood in the absence of the EU membership incentive. The study argued that Europeanization requires actor-centred policy network relations to advance EU acquis regarding climate change mitigation outside Europe in the absence of the membership incentive. Stable network relations and arm’s length management from the European Commission can convince non-European state actors to advance EU rules into their domestic regulatory systems. However, it was also argued that policy networks cannot secure this stability in every instance because they are vulnerable to politicisation. Whenever domestic politics challenge network operations, network actors can only partially insulate themselves against such pressure and sometimes not at all. The Commission is powerless and it is hard for Europeanization to be advanced outside Europe.

Policy network analyses are rather neglected in studies of the EU and Europeanization outside Europe. Europeanization scholarship seems to assume that network relations will have a standard result outside Europe, which will mainly be determined by broader factors, such as functional interdependencies, cost-benefit calculations and administrative (in)capacities (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2011; Lavenex, 2008; Börzel and Hackenesch, 2013). As a result, policy networks and network actors appear to have a pre-determined role in Europeanization processes outside Europe. Even though they are considered to be the main reform channels, at the same time they are portrayed as facing no difficulty ‘exporting’ EU rules outside Europe. In addition, processes of Europeanization have a rather Euro-centric, unidirectional character in the current literature (see parts 1.2-1.4). EU institutions seem to assume an ‘ingeniously superior’ (Flockhart, 2010, p.790) role influencing EU members and candidate countries through hierarchical shadows and coercive mechanisms (Börzel, 2010).

In light of this, this study opted for an actor-centred network approach, researching amongst professionals and bureaucrats operating between the Commission and two North African countries, Morocco and Algeria, over climate change policy. The research offers three particularly important contributions: Firstly, a close analytical focus of network relations between the Commission and two non-European countries gives insight into the day-to-day environment of network relations. This proximity to network life and the distance from the broader environment was a necessary trade-off
for the research design because of the limited attention Europeanization outside Europe has paid so far to network operations. Politicisation of policy networks only entered into the analysis when it was seen to be important by network actors. They have choice over which exogenous factors they will respond to, and how they will respond.

Secondly, it redresses a research gap in that no similar research has previously been carried out in the context of the EU’s southern neighbourhood or, more specifically, on climate change policy. Climate change is a policy field with differing priorities in the Mediterranean, making it an appropriate topic for exploring Europeanization outside of Europe. While climate change mitigation is the main priority for the Commission, climate change adaptation is the core priority for Morocco and Algeria (Buchan, 2003; Tolba and Saab, 2009; see also chapter 4, and parts 5.2 and 6.2). At the same time, Morocco and Algeria have excellent natural potential to produce green electricity and close geographic proximity to transfer it to Europe. Therefore, the different climate preferences of each side could pose a significant impediment to the Commission’s preferences advancing climate change mitigation.

Finally, this analytical and empirical research not only explores the merits, but also the challenges in the diffusion of EU rules amongst network actors and network management outside Europe, and the potential role of politicisation during that process. As a result, it demonstrates to public administrators, politicians and supranational institutions the importance of network actors and stability in their networks for consensus building, in situations where there are weak incentives and soft mechanisms of integration.

This concluding chapter is divided into six parts. The first part reviews the selection of case studies and summarises the main empirical findings of the research. It also offers a systematic comparison of the main features of each case study. The second part reviews the main conceptual and theoretical findings of the study, covering Europeanization, the idea of three waves and the actor-centred network approach. The third part analyses the limits of the analytical framework, stressing the effects of politicisation and other exogenous factors. The fourth part outlines the strengths of, and the opportunities presented by, the research design and the empirical evidence. The fifth part summarises the contributions of the study and its implications for the study of international institutions. Finally, the sixth part sketches an agenda for future research.
7.1 Overview of Case Study Selection and Summary of the Main Empirical Findings

Overview of Case Study Selection
As was mentioned in part 3.3, this research opted for a case study research design in order to investigate 'how' and 'why' a certain contemporary phenomenon happened in a real-life context (Yin, 2009, pp. 17-18). It was the first time such research had taken place in the unexplored area of Euro-Mediterranean relations over climate change policy. The character of the European Commission’s relations with SMCs is mainly through technical, bureaucratic networks concerned with advancing EU rules. Hence, only an actor-centred network emphasis could demonstrate the environment of network relations, the internal insulation of discussions and explore the challenges of network management from the Commission in Euro-Mediterranean climate relations. In this way, the study opted for an intensive, rather than an extensive, research design. Intensive empirical understanding of these network relations could shed light on the day-to-day relations amongst network actors and gain close insight of the unfolding of network operations (Gerring, 2007, pp. 20 and 29; see also parts 7.4 and 7.6).

As regards the selection of the European Commission, it was an obvious choice, because it is the main manager not only of the European Neighbourhood Policy but also of the whole legislative framework of the single market (see more in part 4.2). The EU acquis is highly centralised in its implementation, as the Commission with the assistance of ECJ ensures its incorporation and implementation at the membership wave, and its enforcement at the enlargement wave. ENP agreements with SMCs include parts of the EU acquis and allow for selective regulatory and institutional approximation according to EU rules, because of their voluntary nature. Secondly, the Commission is responsible for the management of funds and expertise programmes with enlargement countries and also in the neighbourhood. Since 1990s, the Commission was appointed by EU members to manage the financial portfolio of administrative and financial assistance for CEEs in their process of full EU membership. Agreements with CEEs included the need for institutional building and regulatory capacity development in order to prepare them for the pressures of full membership. The Commission successfully led CEEs to full membership with the 2004 enlargement. Drawing from this experience, EU members extended the Commission’s competences even to ENP countries. In this way, the Commission could follow the same pathway (Kelley, 2004) of the enlargement experience and, similarly, attempt to bring SMCs’ regulatory and institutional structures closer to that of the EU. Thirdly, the Commission is the main EU actor that engages with state administrators with regards
to EU *acquis*, as part of the implementation of the bilateral agreements between the two sides. Although the EU Council and the Commission have to agree about the content of the bilateral agreements with neighbouring countries, it is the Commission that is solely responsible for the continuation and management of the contractual relationship with these countries (for a full analysis, see part 4.1).

Other EU institutions were left in the shadow of the analysis for several reasons. The European Parliament (EP) mainly engages with SMCs on the political elements of the collaboration on the basis of the Association Agreements and Action Plans regarding democracy, human rights and rule of law. Instead, the scope of this research was to explore how Europeanization mainly advances EU *acquis*, leaving aside issues of democratic conditionality and accountability. Furthermore, no members of the European Parliament are included in the network relations or in the day-to-day management of the collaboration in relation to EU rules. Therefore, the EP's position could only give a broader understanding of the political climate of Euro-Mediterranean relations. The researcher attempted to conduct interviews with MEPs and the EP's secretariat officials, yet there was limited interest in the field and no interviews were arranged. Other EU institutions, such as the European Court of Justice (ECJ), were similarly excluded from the research. EU-SMC agreements are of a voluntary nature (see part 1.5). As a result, the ECJ was not expected to have the role of a judge and the Commission that of a prosecutor, as is the case with non-compliant EU members over EU rules in the membership wave of Europeanization (see part 1.3).

Moreover, EU members were not included in the analysis. EU members have limited participation in technical meetings in the process of implementing the bilateral agreements between the EU and an SMC (see parts 5.4 and 5.5). The Commission and, lately, EEAS officials mainly represent the EU in subcommittee meetings with these countries. EU members are mostly present in political meetings with these countries at the plenary annual meetings of the Association Council and hardly engage in the technicalities of the Association Agreements, as this is mainly part of the Commission’s role (EU Council official, September 2012; EEAS official, May 2013).

In addition, as the research focus was to explore the Commission’s engagement with network actors in the EU’s southern neighbourhood, bilateral energy interests between an EU member and SMCs were excluded for certain reasons. Firstly, the research trade-off was more to investigate the network environment and day-to-day processes of network collaboration rather than to examine the broader factors of network change (see more in part 7.3). In this way, the research would gain an ‘up, close and personal’ (Rhodes *et al.*, 2007) insight of these ‘reform channels’ (Börzel and Hackenesch, 2013;
Börzel and Risse, 2009) and understand the processes of network stability. Secondly, from a practical point of view, the researcher would have to travel to several EU members (France, Germany, Italy and Spain) to explore their specific positions, which would be beyond the financial and time limits of the initially planned research framework. Thirdly, contractual relations between the Commission and SMCs are different from bilateral agreements between an EU member and an SMC. The latter are beyond the regulatory framework of EU rules and cannot illustrate the specificities and technicalities of the EU *acquis*, even on energy and climate change matters.

With regards to the case studies of Morocco and Algeria, a research design of two heuristic case studies (Eckstein, 1975) was considered as most suitable to explore the unfolding technical processes of Europeanization outside Europe through the prism of the European Commission’s relations with its southern neighbourhood. Eckstein distinguishes five ‘species’ of case study (Eckstein, 1975, pp.92-123). Configurative-idiographic studies are the conventional case studies of political science which provide comprehensive descriptions of specific subjects: for example, political parties and bureaucracies. Disciplined-configurative studies base their interpretations of cases on explicit theories; that is to say, general laws or statements of probability are applied to particular cases. Heuristic case studies do not take the existence of general laws for granted, but use case studies for ‘discerning important general problems and possible theoretical solutions’. Such case studies are directly concerned with theory building and ‘can be conducted seriatim, by the so-called building-block technique, in order to construct increasingly plausible and less fortuitous regularity statements’ (Eckstein, 1975, p.104). Furthermore, plausibility probes are case studies conducted as preliminary tests, or trials, of the validity of hypotheses. Crucial case studies test theories and are virtually equivalent to ‘decisive experiments’.

This was the first time such research has been undertaken in Euro-Mediterranean relations, and ‘painstaking costs’ were high for the empirical ‘horserace’ (Eckstein, 1975, p.108). The research initially aimed at exploring all ten case studies in order to offer an all-encompassing analysis for the European Commission’s engagement with its southern neighbourhood. However, as the research has been mostly self-funded, the researcher would not have been able to cover the financial burden of transportation and subsistence costs in all ten countries. Moreover, an extended research design throughout the region would require a significant amount of time for networking and data collection. In addition, at the time of the research (2012), the outburst of the Arab Spring fuelled instability in the region, affecting almost all Middle East and North African countries. Although the research strove for equal geographical representation,
this was not feasible, mainly because of personal safety reasons, as several UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK FCO) reports strongly recommended for SMCs.

Morocco and Algeria were finally considered to be the most suitable case studies for several reasons (see below Table 20). From a practical point of view, the Arab Spring had less impact in both countries and the level of safety was considered satisfactory for the researcher to travel to both countries. Secondly, French is official language in both countries, unlike the other SMCs (except for Tunisia and Lebanon). In this way, the researcher could benefit from his fluent knowledge of French and engage with local actors in their mother tongue. Moreover, networking could be better obtained in two case studies and empirical analysis fitted into the temporal constraints of the doctoral programme.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Features</th>
<th>Case study: Morocco</th>
<th>Case study: Algeria</th>
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<tr>
<td>Climate change</td>
<td>Adaptation</td>
<td>Adaptation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy resources</td>
<td>Insignificant energy resources – dependence on external energy imports</td>
<td>Abundant energy resources – dependence on international oil prices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade with the EU</td>
<td>Negative – growing disparity</td>
<td>Constantly positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political/civil freedoms</td>
<td>Partly Free</td>
<td>Not free</td>
</tr>
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Source: adapted from chapters five and six

Furthermore, the case studies of Morocco and Algeria did not intend to ‘probe the “plausibility” of candidate-theories’ (Eckstein, 1975, p.111). Both case studies served to find out general statements about Europeanization outside Europe, building on the experience of the two waves inside Europe. In this way, the research intended to combine the two cases in order to ‘seek the gradual unfolding of increasingly better theoretical constructs through the study of individuals’ (Eckstein, 1975, p.108). In addition, two case studies could achieve better case representation of the research topic.
(Eckstein, 1974). A single case study construct would ‘constitute more than a slim clue to a valid general model’ (Eckstein, 1975). It would have limited the ability to produce significant results (Yin, 2009, p.50), as it would be risky to rely on the most representative case among ten available south Mediterranean countries. Therefore, two case studies could combine the merits of intensive research through the actor-centred network approach. In this way, the research could gain deeper causal insight, and empirical proximity in exploring the process of Europeanization outside Europe in the EU’s southern neighbourhood (Gerring, 2007, pp.44–49).

From an empirical point of view, both countries are representative cases of the majority of SMCs, not only in relation to climate change, but also regarding different energy resources, institutional and trade ties with the EU and different political regimes from Europe. Morocco and Algeria have similar climate change priorities, as is the case for all SMCs (see pages 5–8; see also parts 5.2 and 6.2). They are highly vulnerable to climate change and they are expected to be severely affected by the adverse effects of desertification, water scarcity, water salinisation and floods (IPCC, 2007). In addition, they have no obligation to mitigate their greenhouse gas emissions, but they are in an excellent natural position to produce green energy (OME, 2007).

These two policy sectors had contrasting added value for the whole case study design of the research. They were expected to unfold the differences in the policy priorities of each side. They would also disclose empirical lessons from the Commission’s network management in each case (Seawright and Gerring, 2008, p.298). Moreover, they would showcase the challenges of establishing arm’s length relations with professional networks outside Europe in the case of core and loose EU acquis, as opposed to the membership and enlargement waves of Europeanization.

Apart from these considerations, the researcher acknowledged that comparing and contrasting between climate change mitigation and climate change adaptation would advance the analytical level of the research, as each policy sector has distinct policy characteristics. Climate change mitigation is mainly vertically managed in the membership wave of Europeanization (Rayner and Jordan, 2010). Mitigation rules are established amongst supranational and intergovernmental actors under the Commission’s shadow of hierarchy (see part 1.3; Börzel, 2010). Instead, EU adaptation policy refers to a loose regulatory framework in the EU. It is mainly developed through horizontal policy coordination based on information sharing, benchmarking and peer reviewing (Rayner and Jordan, 2010, p.156) (see also part 4.5).
It was initially assumed that network discussions about EU mitigation rules would face significant opposition in both cases, as they are part of the core EU *acquis*, which requires hierarchical management from the Commission. It would also require increased insulation from the Commission in order to develop arm’s length relations with the established policy networks, given the fixed character of renewable energies rules (Benson and Jordan, 2011, p.373). Instead, actor-centred policy networks for adaptation rules would be expected to encourage the development of dialogue outside Europe. The soft regulatory structure of EU adaptation rules would favour consensus-building amongst network actors, especially in a policy area of key priority for both cases.

In addition, both countries have key energy differences, as is the case for the majority of SMCs. Morocco has insignificant conventional energy resources and is highly dependent on external energy imports (see part 5.2).\(^35\) Instead, Algeria has abundant energy resources in petroleum and natural gas and is a significant exporter of conventional energies to the EU (see parts 6.2 and 6.3).\(^36\) This difference in the energy basis of each country gave the researcher the chance to examine the extent to which functional interdependence in the energy sector influences the network operations and interests amongst network actors, since this factor is of central importance in the Europeanization outside Europe literature (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2011; Börzel and Hackenesch, 2013; see also part 2.4). In other words, key broad lessons could be drawn from whether there is correlation between the level of energy resources and the nature of policy communities.

Similarly, both countries have different characteristics in terms of trade relations and institutional ties with the EU, similar to many SMCs (see parts 5.2, 5.3, 6.2 and 6.3). Although Morocco is always interested in closer institutional ties with the EU, its trade balance is deteriorating in favour of EU exports to Morocco. Unlike Morocco, Algeria is reluctant to engage in deeper contractual collaboration with the EU. In addition, the trade balance between Algeria and the EU is constantly positive in favour of Algeria.

Furthermore, democratic rules are equally important at the comparative level of analysis in order to explore the extent to which Europeanization can be advanced in

\(^{35}\)SMCs with low conventional energy resources: Morocco, Tunisia, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel and the Palestinian Territories.

\(^{36}\)SMCs with significant conventional energy resources: Algeria, Egypt, Libya and Syria (OME, 2007; UNEP MAP Blue Plan, 2008).
countries with opposite political regimes. As was mentioned in part 1.4, Europeanization could be advanced in candidate European countries, only when pro-democratic parties came into power (Kelley, 2004). However, both Morocco and Algeria have poor records of democratic governance and respect for human rights (Freedom House, 2012; see also part 1.5). It was important to understand the extent to which actor-centred policy networks can advance EU rules, not only in countries with opposite policy priorities, but also with different political structures than that of the EU, which is based on liberal democracies. Also, since the Commission wishes to advance EU renewable energies rules outside Europe, it was interesting to explain which lessons can be learnt from two developing countries with political systems – authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes.

Summary of the Main Empirical Findings
There were several important empirical findings of this research (see below Table 21). Firstly, when Europeanization was advanced in the two case studies, stable, conventional network relations were established based on professional routines and significant insulation from domestic politics. Such integrated networks were evident in the Moroccan case in the EU acquis rules of renewable energies. The Moroccan policy network was highly integrated at the domestic level, near to the policy community end of Marsh and Rhodes’ continuum (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992, p.251). Relations were stable amongst network actors with established routines through the continuous financial and technical support from the Commission (see below). In that case, the Commission had established arm’s length relations with network actors and effectively cast its shadow of hierarchy upon network operations. Moreover, in the Algerian case, policy networks about adaptation rules had less thick insulation than in the Moroccan case on renewable energies rules. However, network relations were stable and conventional routines were increasingly established through the ongoing monitoring and implementation of capacity-building programmes, operating at an arm’s length relationship with the Commission.
Table 21: Summarised empirical findings from Morocco and Algerian on climate change policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor-centred policy networks</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mitigation</td>
<td>Adaptation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of policy networks</td>
<td>Policy community</td>
<td>Professional network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transaction costs</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commission’s incentives</td>
<td>Article nine of 2009/28/EC Directive</td>
<td>Funding, advice, sharing of expertise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offered benefits</td>
<td>Capacity development (EU Budget), training (twinning), technical advice (TAIEX), funding (€75m)</td>
<td>Funding (€6-10m)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of interaction</td>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>Stagnant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routines</td>
<td>Established, persistent</td>
<td>Interrupted</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In all cases, the policy networks had an enclosed, exclusive character from other domestic non-state actors and were mainly located at the administrative level of each country’s bureaucracy from their initial set-up in both countries. External actors were excluded from the network operations in both case studies and in both policy areas, and there was limited scope for open governance practices. Membership in these networks was persistent and network actors were sharing similar administrative and bureaucratic levels of experience. The main actors in that process were mainly middle-ranked state administrators (ministries of energy, foreign affairs, trade and finances) along with respective governmental agencies, and task managers from the EU Delegations and cooperation offices in Brussels. In short, policy networks assumed the form of professional networks (Rhodes, 1990, p.304; see also part 2.2), where network actors expressed the interests of their bureaucratic, managerial profession.

Three key points need to be stressed with regards to the temporality of policy networks and the prior conditions in each country and in each policy area. Firstly, in the enlargement wave of Europeanization in CEEs, the Commission was mainly interested
in exporting EU _acquis_ through tight, stable, professionalised policy networks, in order to make sure that rules were integrated into the local regulatory framework of future EU members. Similarly, the Commission maintained the same process of regulatory engagement through technical, enclosed policy communities supported by expertise programmes in the southern neighbourhood. Therefore, the ‘shadow of enlargement’ (Magen, 2006) determined its approach towards the southern neighbourhood.

Secondly, the upgrade of the bilateral framework of cooperation with SMCs contributed to the development of enhanced technical cooperation and changed the prior nature of the networks. The previous framework of Cooperation Agreements was merely based on ad hoc technical assistance projects mainly focusing on trade issues (see parts 5.3 and 6.3). Environmental concerns and mitigation aspects were disregarded, as the regulatory framework of the agreements paid marginal attention to these matters. As a result, network links amongst bureaucrats and experts were lacking for climate change, and capacity building programmes were not set in place. Apart from that, climate change and energy issues did not form part of the EU’s agenda until 2007 with the climate change and energy packages inside the EU (see chapter four).

Unlike the previous 1970s-1990s Cooperation Agreements, the entry into force of the Association Agreements in 2000 in Morocco and in 2005 in Algeria provided the Commission with the necessary regulatory framework to promote technical integration from each side. Despite their voluntary nature, Association Agreements introduced the aim of legislative integration from each side (see chapter four). As is stated in the Moroccan AA, ‘cooperation shall be aimed at helping Morocco to bring its legislation closer to that of the Community in the areas covered by the agreement’ (article 52; see also article 56 of EU-Algerian AA). Both agreements include specific articles in relation to renewable energies, energy efficiency and environmental protection. This opened the way to the Commission to promote technical collaboration, even on climate change rules, and justify the setting up of professional, bureaucratic networks at the bureaucratic level of SMCs.

Thirdly, the setting-up of institutionalised, technical subcommittees for transport, energy and environment (the so-called SC-TEEs) assisted the Commission to advance this closed character of the collaboration and managed to bring closer discussions amongst experts over climate change rules. Building upon its experience from the eastern enlargement, the Commission discussed the potential of setting up SC-TEEs. SC-TEEs were finally established in 2004 with Morocco and in 2009 with Algeria. Technical discussions became more institutionalised based on the contractual environment of the agreements. They also brought together bureaucrats and experts
from each side to develop common understanding over the nature of the cooperation and benefit from capacity-building programmes, regulatory assistance and exchange of best practices. In this regard, SC-TEEs gave way to exclusive, conventional and privileged network operations, in sharp contrast to the loose regulatory and institutional framework of Cooperation Agreements.

Another empirical finding refers to the successful arm’s length network management strategy of the Commission to advance mitigation rules in Morocco. Initially, the research had to assess the transactional costs of setting up policy networks in Morocco and Algeria in each policy area. Transaction costs were high in both policy areas in both case studies. With regards to mitigation rules, both countries had limited regulatory similarities to that of the EU, as neither of them had a developed national strategy or an advanced regulatory market with a thorough focus on renewable energies, energy efficiency or even green electricity exports compared to that of the EU (see parts 5.3 and 6.3). National administrations had only recently (since 2010) started engaging with these issues and were in search for best practices and technical advice (see parts 5.2-5.4 and 6.2-6.4). For climate change adaptation, both countries similarly had underdeveloped regulatory structures, mainly in areas such as water scarcity, desertification, floods and coastal management (Moroccan academic, 02 October 2012; Algerian energy expert, 02 December 2012). Both countries had no national adaptation strategies and the specific units inside the environment ministries had limited influence in the governmental structures. In Algeria, the department of environment was relatively ‘young’ with regards to climate change matters (EU official, 25 November 2012) and the climate change committee was rather marginal in decision-making processes (Algerian official, 31 October 2012). Even in Morocco, the Green Plan for Morocco (*Plan Vert Maroc*) disregarded adaptation matters (Moroccan academics and NGO representatives, 02-05 October 2012).

The Commission had to offer a great range of incentives to both countries: market access (article nine of 2009/29/EC Directive), long-term training by European administrators, advice, knowledge-sharing and capacity development (see part 4.5). All these incentives were financially covered by the Commission, with the aim of reducing transaction costs and to convince each country of its willingness to support technical discussions under its arm’s length network management. Market benefits were clearer in the case of renewable energies, with the possible exportation of green electricity to Europe. Market benefits were less apparent in adaptation issues, as the main focus was on capacity development and training.
In this regard the Commission aimed at organising policy networks which would initially discuss the possibility of regulatory anchorage to EU mitigation rules according to the potential offered from the 2009/28/EC Directive. In this way, the Commission intended to explore its potential to gradually develop arm’s length relations with the network actors. In the Moroccan case, its challenge was Morocco’s growing interest in conventional energy resources and the absence of technical discussions about renewable energies rules until the fourth SC-TEE (see parts 5.3 and 5.4). The Commission praised renewable energies over any other policy option and promised to assist Morocco to deal with the ‘technical constraints’ in the development of renewable energies, with regard to the level of stability and access to electricity grids (Accord d’Association UE-Maroc, 2008, pp.1-4).

The proffered benefits encouraged Morocco to explore the possibilities of collaboration over mitigation rules. Expertise and capacity development programmes played a significant role in network operations and enhanced network insulation. These programmes operated as tools to start up dialogue inside policy networks between the Commission and Moroccan bureaucrats and experts. Day-to-day co-ownership of programmes developed a thick ‘organisational glue’ (Rhodes, 2000) amongst network actors and activated trust-building processes. Moreover, the long-term expertise programmes and ongoing monitoring enhanced the mutual understanding of each other’s difficulties and favoured a highly insulated policy community amongst network actors. The more the network actors were engaged in such programmes, the more they developed constant relations, collaboration and ownership over multiple expected outcomes, targets and tasks (see part 5.5). The policy network became highly integrated, started bringing Moroccan legislation closer to the requirements of the 2009/28/EC Directive on renewable energies, and allowed for operation under the Commission’s shadow of hierarchy.

Network insulation was not possible in the area of climate change adaptation. Adaptation as a policy area required significant amounts of funding. The Commission showed less interest in reducing transaction costs for network operations, as its main priority was to advance consensus over mitigation and renewable energies. Moreover, the absence of market incentives and expertise benefits reduced the potential of network discussions. Funding opportunities for local administrators were more enticing from international institutions, such as UNEP and World Bank. In addition, even Moroccan officials from environmental units were much more concerned over the implementation of the new National Energy Strategy than with adaptation cooperation with the Commission (EU official, 04 October 2012).
Therefore, market access incentives and expertise benefits encouraged Morocco to accept technical discussions over EU mitigation rules. Morocco was convinced by the Commission’s intentions to support the country in its pressing matters of energy scarcity. Also, Moroccan network actors were confident about the suitability of the Commission’s experience and expertise in renewable energies, as it would support their departments in developing a domestic renewable energies market, by using the lessons learnt from its earlier experiences (Richardson, 2000, p.1020). For the Commission, continuous interaction over offered benefits and the sharing of best practices generated sufficient trust levels to permit problem-solving and neutralise any conflicts of interest than would otherwise be possible (Peters, 1998, pp.299-300). As a result, the growing interest in further expertise programmes from Morocco allowed for arm’s length network relations and established its shadow of hierarchy upon network discussions.

Instead, the adaptation agenda was mainly disregarded at the expense of growing trust and consensus-building over mitigation cooperation. As the domestic administration was mainly focused on implementing the targets of NES and the Moroccan Solar Plan, adaptation had less to offer towards these goals. High transaction costs further reduced any chances for arm’s length network management and even the policy community setting could not develop any organisational glue amongst themselves.

Another key empirical finding was the Commission’s unsuccessful efforts to set up a technical network in Algeria concerning renewable energies. The Commission did not manage to set up an effective network and extend its bureaucratic remit, so it failed to advance Europeanization despite its continuous interest in covering the transaction costs of the cooperation. The Commission faced several difficulties from the beginning of setting up policy communities in Algeria. Technical relations between Algerian and Commission officials were mainly included as part of the bilateral discussions after the entry into force of the Association Agreement in 2005. Until then, the Commission had mainly offered technical assistance, but with no concrete interest in advancing EU rules. Also, Algeria had limited interest in European financial assistance (see part 6.3).

The situation was even more challenging in the energy sector. The Commission attempted to establish institutionalised dialogue between the two parties for several years (Darbouche, 2009; Mediterranean energy expert, 02 July 2012; see part 6.3). However, discussions were hardly routinised, especially after the entry into force of the Association Agreement. Problems in the actual implementation of the AA, such as the issue of tariff dismantling in EU-Algerian trade relations, caused serious deadlock in the broader cooperation over AA.
In relation to transaction costs, the Commission stressed its intention to fully cover the expenses of this cooperation by offering market incentives and expertise benefits, as in the Moroccan case. However, it was unable to reverse Algeria’s scepticism even after several offers of funds and expertise to Algerian actors in the energy sector (Accord d’Association UE-Algérie, 2009; see also part 6.4). Mistrust and reluctance operated against the Commission’s intentions to trigger the Algerian interest in expertise-funded projects, as the Algerian network actors were unwilling to accept funds from the Commission. In this way, Algerian network actors were unwilling to operate at an arm’s length from the Commission, or even allow for network operations under the Commission’s shadow of hierarchy. In particular, the Algerian networks actors did not agree to legitimise the Commission’s efforts towards that goal (see part 6.4; see also Magen, 2006, pp.421-422). As was clearly stated during the 2009 subcommittee meeting

Algeria questioned the extraterritorial character that the EU attempts to grant its legislation in the energy field, including the third (energy) package (Accord d’Association UE-Algérie, 2009, p.6).

Even the Commission’s interest in enclosed, technical communities had limited effect in reassuring Algeria about the Commission’s intentions for technical discussions about EU rules in renewable energies. Algeria was merely interested in short-term projects, such as TAIEX seminars. For Algeria, such projects of best practice exchanges were aimed at limiting the Commission’s relations with Algeria and restraining its efforts to develop routinised technical relations and mutual interaction.

Scepticism was partly fuelled by the nature of the EU mitigation rules. For Algeria, EU mitigation rules were highly connected to market economy rules and the opening of the country’s economy to market forces. The opening of the domestic economy in market rules was against Algeria’s core interests, as energy and natural gas refer to the core monopoly of the state (Entelis, 2011; Kheladi and Arhab, 2012). Hydrocarbons are a core pillar of the Algerian economy and symbolise the independence and the pride of the country. The introduction of an antagonistic market in the country would jeopardise the interests of the Algerian state élite (Dudley and Richardson 1996; see below part 7.3). Furthermore, the closed character of EU mitigation rules could leave little room for Algeria to better clarify or influence the core nature of its regulatory collaboration with the Commission.

Moreover, Algeria showed limited trust of the European institutions. Algeria believed that the EU wished to ‘steal’ Algeria’s energy resources for its own benefit (Commission
offical, 27 May 2013; Algerian official, 31 October 2012). Algerian network actors were reluctant to engage in technical energy networks, as they ‘were afraid that by signing something they may commit themselves to something else’ (EU official, 06 May 2013). Moreover, Algerian network actors constantly complained about the ‘unfair’ regulatory basis of the Association Agreement, which is based on market economy rules (Algerian official, 11 November 2012). As a result, the politicisation of policy networks interfered in network discussions and upset network autonomy. Unlike the Moroccan case, policy networks led to stagnant co-operation outcomes and Commission network actors were unable to organise co-operation programmes and progressively develop arm’s length relations with the network.

Instead, the loose character of the adaptation agenda was closer to Algerian interests, as was mentioned several times in SC-TEEs and in day-to-day discussions (see parts 6.4 and 6.5). Expertise and advice from the Commission could more easily facilitate technical discussions given the Commission’s willingness to cover the costs of network operations. Moreover, information over adaptation issues was not related to the unchanged character of mitigation policy and EU renewable energies rules, which would cause stagnant relations. Algerian actors became interested in participating in a technical policy network, through which they could benefit from continuous stability and routines. Algeria was also interested in offered benefits, such as capacity development projects, expertise and advice, in order to strengthen the cooperation in adaptation issues. In this way, it intended to shift the focus of the collaboration beyond the Commission’s interests in mitigation rules. It did so by strengthening routines and exclusivity on adaptation, taking advantage of the loose character of adaptation rules. In other words, Algeria was willing to depoliticise (Epstein, 1997; Burnham, 2000) its climate change cooperation with the Commission only in a policy area outside the scope of conventional energy resources. Therefore, policy networks operated as a mechanism for Algeria to shift the Commission’s attention away from renewable energies and upgrade discussions over the ‘poor relative’ (parent pauvre) of their collaboration, which was adaptation to climate change and environmental protection (Accord d’Association UE-Algérie, 2009, p.2).

Finally, another significant finding refers to the role of long-term and short-term capacity development programmes in the process of network management from the Commission and in building stability and trust amongst network actors. Long-term expertise and capacity-building programmes did not merely refer to a set of funded projects aimed at enhancing domestic capacities. Also, they did not simply offer the
prospect of narrowing down possible administrative gaps, which could improve the
domestic administration’s response to the complexity and technicality of the EU rules
(see part 4.5). They operated as tools for the Commission to start up dialogue inside
policy networks between the Commission and Moroccan bureaucrats and experts, and
engage them in socialisation processes. Furthermore, they intended to develop day-to-
day co-ownership amongst the network actors. Once the network actors built sectoral
consensus, expertise programmes were necessary in order to implement ‘on the
ground’ (Commission official, 04 October 2012) the particular commitments.

In that process, the long-term expertise programmes created more possibilities for both
sides to develop monitoring routines and advance domestic adjustment in a given
policy area. In the Moroccan case, the EU Budget Support programme in the energy
sector and its set of activities reinforced co-ownership of the process, through the
negotiation and agreement of several side projects, whereby twinning from a European
administration played a core role in the enhancement of the day-to-day engagement
with Moroccan experts. Similarly, in the Algerian case, twinning programmes
supported specialised units in the Algerian administration of water issues and the
environment to develop a common understanding over the specific nature of the
international and EU regulatory structures.

Thus, the more network actors were engaged in such programmes, the more they
developed constant relations, collaboration and ownership over multiple expected
outcomes, targets and tasks (see part 5.5). Moreover, programme monitoring enhanced
the mutual understanding of each other’s difficulties and created conditions for each
network actor to ‘sit in the other person’s shoes’. Monitoring was a key process which
reinforced mutuality in the implementation process and strengthened the links of the
network community.

Instead, short-term projects, such as TAIEX seminars, offered limited scope for
Europeanization to stark routines and programme monitoring. Engagement in short-
term programmes could leave limited space for the establishment of network routines
and insulation. In Algeria, there was limited scope for Commission network managers
to establish strong day-to-day co-ownership, as such projects lasted no more than five
days and they were sporadic in their use. Similarly, monitoring processes could not be
activated and lead to growing interpersonal relations and trust. To put it differently,
short-term projects cannot be compared to the strong potential of the Budget support
programmes and twinning projects. When combined with politicised network
operations and sporadic frequency of interaction, they had even less impact through the
process of Europeanization.
7.2 Summary of the Main Conceptual and Theoretical Findings

This research attempted to address several limitations of the Europeanization literature in order to offer conceptual and theoretical treatment to this growing phenomenon (Vink and Graziano, 2007, p.12). These limitations refer to the Euro-centric character of Europeanization (Flockhart, 2010), its unidirectional understanding of rule and policy transfer, focusing on the domestic adjustment to EU rules (Exadaktylos and Radaelli, 2009), and the limited focus on process-oriented interaction of the Europeanization literature with other concepts (Lehmkuhl, 2007), such as policy networks.

As was mentioned in part 1.2, a common conceptual limitation of Europeanization is its Euro-centric character. Inside Europe, EU institutions seem to assume an ‘ingeniously superior’ role in influencing EU members and candidate countries (Lehmkuhl, 2007; Flockhart, 2010). The Commission plays a significant role not only in the construction of new EU rules, but also in their transposition and accommodation at the domestic level of EU members (Börzel, 2010; Héritier and Lehmkuhl, 2008; see part 1.3). It assumes even more coercive dynamics in the enlargement wave of Europeanization (see part 1.4). The conditional reward of EU membership binds European countries into regulatory adjustment to the whole EU _acquis_. This ‘reinforcement by reward’ (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005) gives a superior role to the European Commission, operating as the ‘gatekeeper’ of the neighbourhood wave of Europeanization.

As Flockhart states, ‘by accepting a Euro-centric interpretation of history, Europeanization [...] mainly focus[es] on explaining domestic adaptation to European integration through the EU’ (Flockhart, 2010, p.790). In this way, Europeanization appears to follow a pre-determined pathway, where there are direct hierarchical processes from the exporting to the importing countries (Stone, 2004, p.549). Rules are seemingly ‘exported’ mechanically from the powerful centre to importing target countries. Moreover, this unidirectional character of rule transfer also seems irreversible, which cannot be changed.

This monolithic Euro-centric, top-down perspective also deprives the concept of its core explanatory capacity, which is its constant flow of rules, policies, but also norms and ways of doing things (Radaelli, 2000; Börzel and Risse, 2003; Radaelli, 2004; see also part 1.2). Since 2007, there has been wide consensus amongst Europeanization studies that Europeanization refers to the ‘domestic adjustment to European regional
integration’ (Graziano and Vink, 2007, p.3; Bulmer and Lequesne, 2013). According to Caporaso (2007, p.28), the Europeanization concept mainly follows three steps. Rules are initially tested domestically, whether they ‘fit’ or ‘misfit’ with domestic structures. Their utility is then assessed by various domestic mediating factors, where they create various ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ (Laffan, 2007; Thatcher, 2004) during the adjustment process. Finally, Europeanization leads to variable structural outcomes and changes (Olsen, 2002). This continuous focus on top-down processes contradicts with early Europeanization definitions. Europeanization has originally being branded as a concept characterised by a ‘two-way’ process (Börzel and Risse, 2003; Radaelli, 2000). Instead, the current consensus offers an analytical focus on domestic adjustment.

The research used the idea of the three waves of Europeanization in order to structure the analysis of Europeanization inside Europe and towards the EU’s southern neighbourhood. Europeanization is mainly focused on adjustment to EU rules inside Europe and leaves limited space to rule adjustment outside Europe. However, this research has shown that Europeanization does not maintain this Euro-centric perspective outside Europe with supranational actors relying upon hierarchies. Rules need to be ‘advanced’ outside Europe, instead of being ‘exported’ inside Europe.

In the neighbourhood wave, Europeanization does not follow the three pre-determined ‘steps’, as Caporaso has described in Graziano and Vink’s book on Europeanization and domestic change (Caporaso, 2007, p.28) (see Figure 5 below). Moreover, Europeanization does not refer to a monolithic concept in all circumstances, where ‘target’ countries have to respond to adaptational pressures from EU rules. Supranational actors do not determine the process of flow of rules, by utilising hierarchies and conditional rewards, as was the case in the enlargement wave (see part 1.3). Also, actors employ various mechanisms – beyond the current scope of coercion, hierarchies, and conditionality – and incentives in order to achieve this day-to-day interaction.

In this way, the idea of the three waves of Europeanization attempts to correct the Euro-centric, top-down understanding of Europeanization as a concept, and show that Europeanization can be advanced – not ‘exported’ – outside Europe. Actors, incentives and mechanisms assume the central role in a process-based model of Europeanization, as opposed to the more structural ‘top-down’ model of conceptualisation. The focus on the three elements of incentives, mechanisms and actors seek to develop a more bi-directional character to the concept, stressing its process-based analytical potential, rather than its current outcome-oriented understanding.
Furthermore, the idea of the three waves along with the model of incentives-mechanisms-actors stresses that ‘Europeaization is a process, not an outcome’ (Exadaktylos and Radaelli, 2009, p.510). It changes over time and responds to variable structural and agent conditions and identities (Buller and Gamble, 2002). In particular, Europeanization as a concept should be understood as an ‘interactive process, rather than a mechanism of unidirectional reaction to Europe’ (Radaelli and Pasquier, 2007, p.37). The emphasis on actor-centred policy networks enabled the analysis to develop the ‘two-way’ characteristics of the concept by attributing the central role to actors and how they employ incentives and mechanisms in order to advance common understanding and build trust over jointly agreed processes of interaction.

Actor-centred network discussions played a significant role not only for the analysis of the neighbourhood wave of Europeanization, but also for the Europeanization literature per se. Europeaization hardly interacts with other theoretical debates (Lehmkuhl, 2007, p.350). Analysing the sub-systemic level of the policy process, an inside view into the network actors’ environment better illustrates how EU rules are advanced outside Europe in the absence of the membership incentive. In this way,
insulated technical networks initiated by the Commission showed the mechanism through which Europeanization can be built. Depoliticised policy fora attempted to build long-term trust, routines and professional understanding, which could facilitate problem identification and problem-solving (Mazey and Richardson, 2001, pp.91-92).

In addition, Europeanization through policy networks showed that it could take place outside Europe, even in situations of weak incentives and soft mechanisms of compliance. The actor-centred network approach stressed the importance of currently overlooked non-coercive mechanisms of compliance inside Europe. Although a socialisation mechanism is mainly part of Europeanization discussions through the Open Method of Coordination (Radaelli, 2008), the role of ‘supranational shadows of hierarchy’ (Börzel, 2010) and hierarchical management of EU rules assume the central role in the membership and enlargement waves. Socialisation through persuasion and social influence seems to play a secondary role in Europeanization discussions inside Europe (Jordan and Schout, 2006). The actor-centred networks approach in the neighbourhood wave of Europeanization brought horizontal mechanisms of compliance to the centre of discussions, and explored the merits and the challenges of such engagement in the absence of the membership incentive. In this regard, it corrected the over-emphasised role of supranational hierarchies (Börzel, 2010) in the process of Europeanization inside Europe.

Moreover, from a theoretical point of view, Europeanization outside Europe does not mainly depend on functional interdependencies (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2011), cost-benefit calculations and administrative (in-)capacities (Börzel and Hackenesch, 2013; Börzel and Risse, 2009). The empirical focus on Morocco and Algeria has shown that once the Commission successfully convinces the non-European country to set up network relations under its arm’s length network management, EU rules can be advanced irrespective of their strict or loose character. Once Morocco was convinced about the importance of renewable energies over conventional energy resources, network actors took over the responsibility to advance core EU acquis on renewable energies in the domestic regulatory framework. Also, Algeria was willing to discuss its closer collaboration with the Commission based on the loose, international character of EU climate change adaptation rules.

Common bureaucratic beliefs and technical expertise can insulate the network operations, as was the case in Morocco over renewable energies and in Algeria over adaptation cooperation. Once a degree of network autonomy is established, trust is the main resource of these policy networks, so that the reforms were part of capacity-building agreements. Stability and routinised processes of monitoring favoured service
delivery and accommodated any differences and interests. Therefore, one key theoretical finding is that once network stability and professional routines are set in place amongst network actors, and relations are established at arm’s length distance from the Commission, core and even loose EU rules can be advanced in non-European countries even in the absence of strong compliance mechanisms.

Furthermore, the role of the Commission as the central network manager is another core finding in terms of the ‘ingenious superior’ role of supranational institutions in Europeanization discussions. The Commission intends to cast its shadow of hierarchy over network discussions, in order to extend its bureaucratic remit outside Europe and enhance the uninterrupted operation of network activities (see more in part 7.1). In other words, it intends to accommodate its presence in the governmental bureaucracy of the non-European country by developing and maintaining hands-off relations with network actors. Once technical discussions are launched and organisational glue is strong amongst network actors, stability and trust-building processes give the way for the Commission to develop arm’s length relations with the networks and gradually cast its shadow of hierarchy, advancing EU rules through actor-centred networks. Also, expertise and financial incentives do not merely intend to develop administrative capacities as a supporting measure towards future members. Capacity-building and other expertise programmes funded by the Commission operate as discussion tools that aim to trigger network socialisation and interaction amongst actors from each SMC about the reforms following EU rules (Bailey and de Propris, 2004).

Nevertheless, the politicised case of energy relations amongst the Commission and Algeria demonstrated that actor-centred policy networks and the Commission’s network management do not always succeed to advance Europeanization outside Europe. In this way, policy networks do not refer to an undisturbed ‘reform channel’ (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2011), where the Commission will manage to establish insulated network relations outside Europe. Central network management and policy networks are prone to disruption by broader political factors despite their level of insulation, either internally among network actors or externally by the central agency. Drawing upon the Algerian case, politicisation of the broader political relationship between the EU and central state actors from the non-European country caused stagnant network relations and impeded consensus-building among network actors, offering limited scope for advancing Europeanization outside Europe (see part 7.1).

At this point, it needs to be stressed that the actor-centred network approach taken in this research deliberately aimed to shed light on the sub-systemic, technical environment of discussions and to investigate the network management efforts of the
central agency to maintain stability and routinised network relations. The
Europeanization outside Europe literature pays limited attention to the technical
environment of these ‘reform channels’ (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2011; Börzel
and Hackenesch, 2013). Subsequently, the analytical trade-off of this study was more to
investigate the day-to-day bilateral network relations amongst bureaucrats and experts
from the central agency and two non-European countries than to explore the reasons
for politicisation of policy networks.

7.3 The Limits of the Analytical Framework

Although the case studies indicate that professional insulation and arm’s length
network management can advance Europeanization outside Europe, the research paid
limited attention to the broader factors that may cause the politicisation of policy
networks. Network actors are not disconnected from their broader political context
(James, 2010). Whether actors continue to participate or not in highly enclosed or
loosely insulated policy networks, relates to the broader political, economic, or even
social, context in which they belong (Marsh and Smith, 2000). Therefore, the research
does not dismiss the importance of external factors (Smith, 1993), such as functional
interdependencies, rational calculations and other structural incapacities. As was
apparent in the Moroccan case, article nine of the 2009/28/EC Directive operated as a
key motivation for Moroccan officials to participate in regulatory approximation
discussions with the Commission. The development of a domestic renewable energies
market in Morocco and green electricity transfers to Europe could cover the country’s
growing energy needs. In this regard, Morocco could benefit from a harmonised
regulatory environment with Europe, given its close geographic proximity and EU’s
market attractiveness.

Furthermore, policy networks operate in the shadow of hierarchy and government can
reset the parameters to network actions. In other words, the core executive can set
policy frameworks that can substantially affect networks and reset their operational
setting (Smith, 1993; 1999). Therefore, this part will point to the role of the state in
policy networks and its ability to unilaterally rewrite the rules of the game governing
networks. The notion of state autonomy can prove useful in the development of the
theoretical framework, because it stresses the interests and the role of core executive in
the meso-level of domestic policy-making and link them to the stability – or instability –
of network operations.
Subsystems are only partially autonomous (Sabatier, 1988, p.137). In the modern welfare state, the core executive still retains significant resources in service delivery, and holds blurred relations with non-state actors (Rhodes, 1997; Marsh et al., 2001; Smith, 1999). The state has become smaller, decentralised and subject to multiple relations with ‘external’ groups and actors. Modern complex issues, such as climate change, security and regional (economic) integration, have given way to extended relations with non-state actors. The state establishes networks in order to respond to these issues. For some (Atkinson and Coleman, 1989), network relationships between states and non-state groups limit state autonomy because groups dominate the policy process. For some others (Smith, 1993), a close relationship with non-state group actors can increase state autonomy, as it gives the chance for the state to develop a holistic understanding in conducting governance, include – rather than exclude – societal actors and gain legitimacy over its future policies.

In either case, it is state actors who determine the rules of the game and constrain non-state actors’ actions (Smith, 1999, pp.245-246). The existence of networks in most cases is dependent on government (Smith, 1993). The distribution of resources between government and non-state actors is an asymmetric one. Government has authority and can make law. It also controls important financial resources which non-state groups need. Where non-state groups control implementation and have high legitimacy, government is heavily dependent on those networks (Marsh et al., 2001, p.198). Yet, even in such situations, state agencies have greater control over the issues that are raised and the response to them. Integrated policy communities are a medium for the state to exclude certain policy options by making the option unacceptable to the policy community. Also, the establishment of a policy community creates a particular structure which privileges certain interests in the policy process.

Furthermore, state leaders and high-level government elites can choose to ignore policy communities and impose policy against the wishes of the network (Smith, 1993, p.68). Drawing from studies of the British government, Marsh et al. found that all PMs can by-pass, on occasions, networks (Marsh et al., 2001, p.119). In this way, political leaders and senior state actors may try to interfere in an existing policy community and ‘attempt to break it up, insert new members, change the policy agenda, or bypass it completely’ (Smith, 1993, p.69). As was shown in chapter five, through network discussions Morocco was motivated by regulatory alignment to EU rules for renewable energies and future benefits from green electricity exports to the EU. Instead, technical discussions were highly disrupted in terms of climate change adaptation. The implementation of the Renewed Energy Strategy was instead put forward in Morocco’s
collaboration with the Commission, unlike the highly pressing nature of desertification and the potential of technical engagement with the Commission (various Moroccan and Commission officials, September-October 2012).

Hence, policy networks still operate under the shadow of hierarchy and the core executive can intervene in order to alter network rules. Of course, such political action is expected to incur certain costs, be it organisational or in terms of legitimacy and accountability. The government or a specific department of the state will have to ensure that policy development can proceed if a network is undermined (Epstein, 1997, p.368). In this regard, state officials will have to strike a balanced response between both state/departmental preferences and network development.

Much of this authoritative action by the state results from the ability of a state to act autonomously in terms of capacities. In other words, it depends on the extent to which it can achieve its goals without the support of actors beyond its immediate executive core and implement certain actions to this regard (Smith, 1993; 1999). Its capacities are defined to a great extent by the various resources (Rhodes, 1981) of its elected or appointed officials. Actors do not have power, but they do have resources. The use of resources depends on context and the choices of strategies and tactics. In certain contexts, state actors have more freedom to use resources than others. Depending on the sectoral focus, the executive can be more dependent on external actors (Smith, 1999) and opt for collaboration with domestic interest groups or even external actors.

The level of resources can determine to a significant extent the interests and the autonomy of the state. Yet, the state does not have distinct interests (Smith, 1993, p.50). States involve numerous changing institutions, and agencies with unclear boundaries. As Smith argues, ‘state actors/agencies do not have distinct interests’ (Smith, 1993, p.50). Interests are not predetermined, but develop within the context of social and economic arrangements and relationships between state and non-state actors. Thus, the concept of state autonomy is meaningless unless it is disaggregated to the policy level and particular relationships are examined (Smith, 1993, p.70). The interests of state actors are, to some extent, determined by the organisations of the state, and the type of relationships that state organisations have with societal groups affects the nature of policy outcomes. ‘Policy is made within institutions that structure the interests of the state and pressure groups’ (Smith, 1993, p.70).

As was evident in the Algerian case, the introduction of network relations with non-state actors would threaten the resources of certain Algerian departments, or even the ministries of energy and foreign affairs. According to Dudley and Richardson, ‘although
a quiescent subsystem may be dominated by a single coalition, the emergence of a rival coalition may threaten former’s dominance’ (Dudley and Richardson, 1996, p.70).

Algerian actors from the Ministry of Energy and Mines, but also even from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, could have felt threatened by the possible introduction of another policy network that could jeopardise their interests for two main reasons. Firstly, renewable energies would develop an antagonistic market to the one for gas which was already established domestically. Secondly, opening up Algeria’s closed energy market would jeopardise the country’s monopoly in natural gas. As a result, the Commission was unable to instigate technical discussions amongst bureaucrats and experts from each side, especially in an almost sovereign ministry of the Algerian government, given its key role in funding the regime (Entelis, 2011, p.670).

Furthermore, drawing from Sabatier (1988, pp.155-156), an apolitical, technical forum with experts and bureaucrats from each side would be expected to create conflicting relations with the Algerian core executive for energy resources. Knowledge offered by the Commission could take many forms. Knowledge-sharing through capacity development and twinning programmes could operate as a ‘political weapon’ against the already established policy priority of conventional energy resources (Richardson, 2000, p.1020; Stone, 2008). Such knowledge programmes could further develop the potential amongst experts to explore the possibilities of regulatory alignment with EU rules and integrate into domestic core executive structures.

As a result, Algerian state actors were opposed to the development not only of such depoliticised discussions, but also to exploring the opportunities for long-term capacity development programmes, such as Budget Support and twinning. Such programmes require joint engagement at domestic bureaucratic premises with the potential of interfering in departments’ technical lifecycle. Instead, the Algerian authorities were only interested in short-term advice and knowledge-sharing, and declined any offers of financial assistance. As several Algerian and European officials claimed several times, Algeria was not interested in European funds, as ‘Algeria has already enough money to develop both the energy and the renewable energies sector’ (Mediterranean energy expert, 02 July 2012; Commission official, 17 September 2012; Algerian official, 06 May 2013).

Furthermore, apart from the state’s hierarchy, the impact of broader exogenous factors has been left aside from the current discussions about actor-centred relations and network politicisation (Smith, 1993; Marsh and Smith, 2000). As Stone argues, actor-centred approaches do not dismiss structural forces, but suggest that in varying degrees, states and organisations can mitigate these dynamics (Stone, 2004, p.548).
Introducing the relationship of key EU members, such as Germany, France, Italy and Spain, with the state networks could have added value to the analytical framework for several reasons.

In particular, more light needs to be shed in regards to bilateral relations between Morocco and Germany, or even Spain. Throughout North Africa, Germany is one of the leading EU members with a significant presence in developmental programmes, led by the German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ). Bilateral relations at the top levels of exchange between Germany and Morocco could have influenced the Moroccan leadership to shift its interest from conventional to sustainable energy resources. As Richardson argues, ‘new ideas have a virus-like quality and have an ability to disrupt existing policy systems, power relationship and policies’ (Richardson, 2000, p.1018). Germany is highly interested in collaborating with North African countries over renewable energies through the DESERTEC project. The project holds financial commitments of €400bn by 2040 for all SMCs. Promises of financial investment and technical expertise could have a significant role in that process at the Moroccan elite level.

Another reason that could explain the politicisation of network relations could be drawn from the inconsistency of policy goals between two network organisations. As Peters argues, collaboration amongst policy networks may fail when two organisations have different goals and requirements (incoherence) (Peters, 1998, p.303). In the Algerian case, a Commission official stated

Algeria’s case is a completely different one. There is a strong partnership at a companies’ level (smile). There are many joint bilateral projects between SONELGAZ with energy companies from Italy, France, Germany, UK etc. mainly in the upstream and midstream. We [the Commission] tried to develop some institutional discussions. At the moment, though, it is ineffective. The main reason is that there is misperception from both sides. Algerians thought that the EU wants this partnership in order to obtain guarantees from Algeria and its hydrocarbons for its own security of supplies. They think we are really demanders. They thought that this would be a precondition for any co-operation in the future (Commission official, 17 September 2012).

A technical relationship with the Commission would be antagonistic to Algeria’s already well-established bilateral energy contracts with individual EU members, such as Germany, Italy, the UK, France and Spain. Different goals and requirements could oppose the Commission’s offers for a regulatory, depoliticised engagement in EU rules.
Furthermore, bilateral relations with individual EU members could offer better contractual terms (extraction of natural gas and oil), and less requirements for EU rule compliance, as bilateral relations are governed by bilateral agreements which do not necessarily depict EU law. As a result, the Commission’s requirements were not able to be legitimised domestically and transcend the regulatory borders of Algeria. The Commission failed to convince Algeria over the utility of EU rules and did not manage to extend its bureaucratic remit through routinised, undisturbed technical discussions over the strict rules on renewable energies.

7.4 The Strengths and Opportunities of the Research Design and the Empirical Evidence

As was already mentioned in parts 7.1-7.3, the research design mainly aimed to explore how policy networks between the Commission and each SMC’s bureaucrats and experts decided on the terms of domestic adjustment and what the challenges were in the process of network management. In other words, the research aimed to develop an ‘up, close and personal’ (Rhodes et al., 2007) understanding of the network atmosphere, without diminishing at the same time the importance of broader functional interdependence, cost-benefit calculations and administrative (in-) capacities that the literature seems to claim as key factors in Europeanization outside Europe. This proximity to network life and the distance from the exogenous environment was a necessary analytical compromise because of the limited attention the Europeanization outside Europe literature has paid to this area so far. However, as will be mentioned in part 7.6, future research should aim to expand its research scope and opt for an extensive research agenda. In other words, unlike the current intensive study of technical policy networks, future research should broaden its view by shedding light on the causes of the politicisation of policy networks, and pay increased attention to the role of state autonomy and the senior bureaucratic environments and the effects from other international actors that may challenge network insularity and routines.

Secondly, no similar research has previously been carried out in the framework of the EU’s southern neighbourhood and, more specifically, on climate change policy. Europeanization of two North African countries with different climate priorities to that of the Commission offered the necessary empirical setting for this research. A closer view of network operations could explore the unfolding of a phenomenon in its real-life context. In addition to this, while arguments outside Europe (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2011; 2009; Börzel and Hackenesch, 2009) recognise policy networks as the main reform channels of Europeanization, they pay limited attention to the role
of network actors and the technical environment of these discussions. Instead, they seemed to argue that policy networks will face no difficulty ‘exporting’ EU rules outside Europe.

Another strong research point is the choice of qualitative interviews through snowball sampling with bureaucrats and experts from the Commission, from each case but also from international and regional institutions. Snowball sampling significantly assisted the researcher to achieve the necessary networks in the region, since literature review and documentary analysis could only frame its analytical scope. In addition, semi-structured interviews allowed the researcher to assess the personal views of network actors and achieve a direct understanding of the opportunities and the challenges of network management and network operations. Moreover, interviews were not only conducted with middle- and high-ranked officials from each country, but they were also cross-matched with actors from civil society, such as NGO representatives and academics.

However, the study of these technical networks between an international institution – the Commission – and governmental actors from semi-authoritarian regimes had to face certain methodological challenges over access to elites in both Morocco and Algeria. Access to elites is a common problem in most Mediterranean countries, especially on the southern shores. Elites from both countries have not been exposed to social sciences research. Moreover, there was no sense of urgency and there were delays in responses to e-mails and phone calls. The experience acquired from this research showed that speaking French in that region plays significant role, as they are mainly French- and Arab-speaking societies. English is not widely used and may impede interpersonal relations with the interviewee. A fluent knowledge of French can mitigate any communication barriers between the researcher and the interviewee and broaden the scope of the information obtained.

The mere knowledge of French is not enough for elite access. It is imperative to establish networks in the region, both in international organisations and with the academic community in the region and in the respective country. Networks with international and regional organisations can provide the researcher with better opportunities to identify the ‘correct’ interviewees for the research and obtain knowledge from certain people that are engaged in related projects. Networks with the academic world and civil society in the region operate as a ‘legitimacy’ tool, when contacting people or during interviews, as it shows that the interviewee ‘has done his homework’ about the region. In addition, flexibility in the means of contact (i.e. e-mail,
telephone, Skype) and in time can also increase the chances of connecting with ‘key’ officials that can guide the researcher to the particular officials.

Furthermore, in both case studies, participation in policy network meetings was denied on the grounds of protocol rules. A means to mitigate such limitations is a high level of professionalism, consistent trust-building with the interviewees and significant interpersonal skills. All three elements can raise the profile of the researcher and ‘pass the message’ to the interviewees and to possible gatekeepers about the benign intentions of the researcher (Rhodes et al., 2007, pp.217-218). Another means is to communicate with the Embassy of the respective country and gain more legitimacy for the importance of the research. For example, for this study, the researcher organised meetings with senior officials in the Embassies of both countries in London in early stages during the pilot phase. Although the researcher was reassured that specific meetings would be organised in the country in respective ministries, no such interviews took place. The results were similar when contacting the representatives of each country in Brussels. Therefore, it is uncertain whether the researcher will manage to get access to such meetings or to senior environments. The researcher can benefit from in-depth documentary analysis of cooperation programmes (i.e. Budget support, twinning), discourse analysis of officials’ speeches and electronic newspapers, as a means of cross-examination and validation of the research data.

Furthermore, the researcher suggests that the potential of this research design and of the empirical framework could be further untangled by allowing a time framework of more than four years for field research for countries in the EU’s southern neighbourhood. Access in these countries is more difficult than in Europe. As a result, networks require higher levels of trust and extended time frameworks that will allow them to be developed and well forged. Visiting the country will also be expected to have added value for a similar research plan. Probably, a funded research project from a well-respected state organisation under the leadership of a group of well-established senior academics from Europe and from the Arab world could open up access routes and reduce gatekeepers’ resistance. In addition, more intensive collaboration with local epistemic communities and civil society could have a significant added value in a future project, as several academics are also advisors in certain agencies of the Algerian administration and have better access to bureaucratic cycles inside the rather secretive Algerian public sector. Therefore, ethnographic studies would be expected to offer crucial assistance in that regard.

Finally, as will be mentioned in part 7.6, an intensive research design needs to be combined with an extensive research framework, which will capture the causes of
network politicisation. Such a focus provides a key opportunity for this study to complement its targeted research on the meso-level of policy networks with broader aspects of macro-level policy-making. Closer ties with government departments and/or with international organisations operating in each country could reveal hidden aspects of Commission-led networks and indirectly gain access into network discussions.

7.5 Contributions and Implications of this Study

This study of Europeanization and policy networks in the EU’s southern neighbourhood contributes to the literatures of Europeanization, EU studies outside Europe and international public policy. Drawing from the policy areas of climate change mitigation and climate change adaptation in the Commission’s relations with Morocco and Algeria, this study offers evidence of the modality of engagement in adjusting to EU rules in the EU’s southern neighbourhood, and the challenges to network management outside Europe by the European Commission. Based on the policy network theory, the analysis demonstrated that policy networks and network actors can have significant roles to play when stability and autonomy are secured, both internally amongst network actors and externally by the Commission, supported by financial and expertise offers. However, it also showed that policy networks do not always manage to advance Europeanization outside Europe. Once politicisation interferes with network operations, it distorts networks’ autonomy and leads them to stagnant network relations.

The first contribution of this study is related to the theoretical framework of this thesis. This study develops a theoretical framework that combines the literature of Europeanization and actor-centred policy networks in order to explore how adjustment to EU rules is advanced outside Europe in the absence of EU membership. By exploring the process of Europeanization in the southern neighbourhood, adjustment to EU rules can still take place outside Europe even in the absence of membership. Membership as incentive, or even membership conditionality, is not the only mechanism that can advance Europeanization in the Commission’s engagement with non-EU members. Socialisation and joint ownership amongst experts and bureaucrats can expand regulatory adjustment, even to non-European countries, and enhance mutual understanding over co-agreed reforms. Policy networks play a key role as a necessary mechanism to promote EU rules outside Europe.

In addition, this framework compensates for the limited understanding Europeanization literature offers outside Europe. This is achieved through the three
waves of Europeanization, whereby there is a distinction between how domestic adjustment takes place inside Europe and the means by which it is advanced outside Europe, specifically in the EU’s southern neighbourhood. Focusing on incentives and mechanisms compares and contrasts how domestic adjustment has a different manifestation inside and outside Europe. In addition, it values the presence of policy networks, socialisation and mutual understanding in situations of weakened incentives and soft mechanisms of compliance. In this way, it develops a coherent link between Europeanization inside and outside Europe, surpasses the Euro-centric impasse of Europeanization literature (Lehmkuhl, 2007, p.349) and covers a significant gap in the literature.

Furthermore, the focus on incentives, mechanisms and actors aims to attribute a more bi-directional character to the concept of Europeanization, stressing its process-based analytical potential, rather than its current outcome-oriented understanding. The research also stresses that Europeanization is a process concept and should maintain its interest into the policy dynamics. Moreover, through the idea of waves and the actor-centred network approach, it highlights the need for Europeanization literature to move away from the top-down consensus of current discussions and to shed light on its initial two-way, reciprocal considerations.

Another contribution of this analytical framework is related to EU studies outside Europe. As was mentioned in chapter two, although such studies recognise the role of networks as reform channels abroad, they over-emphasise the role of functional interdependencies, financial incentives from the EU, cost-benefit calculations (Freyburg et al., 2009; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2011), and also domestic administrative deficiencies and broader geostrategic interests (Börzel and Risse, 2009; Börzel and Hackenesch, 2013). Instead, this research argues that in the neighbourhood wave of Europeanization, actor-centred policy networks play a significant role in advancing Europeanization outside Europe. Although this study values the explanatory importance of external factors outside the network environment, an inside view of network operations is critical in order to identify the characteristics of these reform channels and assess the extent to which they manage to advance EU acquis rules outside Europe. In this way, the study explores whether policy networks can remain undisturbed throughout the process of Europeanization and in which cases stability and expertise routines can be upset.

A further significant contribution is related to the role of the financial and expertise tools offered inside network activities as part of the Commission’s network strategy to insulate network autonomy. Funded expertise programmes can initially trigger interest
from the non-European country, as these offers refer to ‘grants, not credits’ (Accord d’Association UE-Algérie, 2007, p.3). Offered European expertise can give the local administrations the opportunity to benefit from European experience and exchange best practices in the implementation of EU rules. Furthermore, the expertise programmes provided network actors with several tasks, based on several interventions, negotiation of expected outcomes and objectives for each task and constant monitoring. All these processes engaged network actors in day-to-day discussions and enhanced mutual understanding of certain reforms based on EU rules. Moreover, long-term programmes, such as Budget support programmes and twinning projects, enhanced network dialogue and further engaged network actors in advancing domestic adjustment.

However, this thesis does not merely explore the merits of policy networks and the Commission’s network management strategy. It significantly contributes to the study of international public policy in presenting the challenges to international organisations in network management of ‘wicked’ (Rittel and Webber, 1973) international problems such as climate change. As the Algerian case shows, policy networks should not be expected to deliver similar results in all policy settings. Network autonomy and interdependent relations amongst network actors can be disrupted by broader factors. In other words, broader politics may inhibit network autonomy and damage any functional interdependencies and strategic interests. Similarly, as policy networks cannot handle conflict, they are prone to external factors, despite any insulation efforts by the Commission through its financial and expertise offers. Hence, conflict impedes the processes of trust and consensus building amongst network actors and leads to stagnant cooperation.

Furthermore, the differences in Europeanization outcomes in the cases of climate change mitigation and climate change adaptation in Morocco and Algeria suggest that policy networks should be analysed in the light of the broader political and economic environment of advancing EU rules in its engagement with non-European countries. This element can be of great value for the Commission, as broader politics, power and historical relations may affect the process of Europeanization and cause stagnant service delivery, as was shown in the Algerian case. This research outcome is particularly relevant for the European Commission in its relations outside Europe over climate change policy. Climate change mitigation has a prominent role in its international relations, since it has developed bilateral relations with a long set of developing and developed countries. It promotes its role in international climate
negotiations because day-to-day engagement and advancement of reforms based on EU rules shows the EU’s value of engaging with.

Moreover, in order for the Commission to deal with such problems in such politically sensitive policy areas, it could possibly be useful to change the format of its engagement from policy communities to issue networks in bilateral relations. In this way, the Commission can ‘pass the message’ that more fluid network relations can equally be an option in the neighbourhood and abroad, whereby TAIEX seminars can involve governmental actors and civil society in short-term exchange processes. In other words, the more politicised policy areas are in its collaboration with non-European countries, the more the Commission can invest in fluid network relations in order to build mutual trust. Of course, trust is a long-term currency (Ansell and Gash, 2007; Bachman, 2001). Engaging in governance patterns within state-society actors could mitigate any network hindrances and could better develop the necessary framework for highly hierarchical EU rules, as is the case of renewable energies. Regional processes in fluid networks could equally further enhance the potential of domestic network processes; however, such elements need to be examined in future research projects (see part 7.6).

7.6 Future Research Avenues

There are certain research avenues that are identified below to establish a broader understanding of the existing theoretical framework and enrich it by testing other case studies. The actor-centred network approach of this research mainly focused on the operations of professional network actors and explored issues of network insulation and central management outside Europe. However, as was mentioned in part 7.3, the research offered limited explanation on the politicisation of policy networks. On a future research agenda the issue of politicisation should have a central role in the study of Europeanization outside Europe. Two key questions can summarise this agenda:

- What are the causes of politicisation?
- When and how do network actors respond to exogenous factors?

The view from senior officials, governmental departments and the broader civil service will better capture external influences over actor-centred policy networks managed by the Commission. In this way, the study will combine the enclosed environment of policy networks that the Commission intends to develop and shed light on how the core executive can influence network actors and their operations under the state’s hierarchy. In addition, the research will be able to assess the level of insulation of policy networks and their integration into governmental structures. They will also assess the extent to
which network management can sustain network insulation from antagonistic state departments and trace the ways through which the central agency can deter – or not – conflict intrusion and stagnant outcomes.

Furthermore, the role of EU members and other international actors and organizations could offer added value. Several organisations, such the World Bank, IMF, UNEP, offer various programmes outside Europe with the intention of building close links with the state apparatus of each country and increase their influence in governmental decisions over international issues. In this regard, their experience will enable the study to understand the challenges of Commission-led initiatives in network creation and network insulation in an antagonistic environment with several of the external actors that compete for network accommodation within state structures. This is a crucial element that has not been incorporated into current analyses in EU’s studies outside Europe, and it is expected to provide the analysis with the broader factors of the politicisation of network operations outside Europe.

From a methodological perspective, future research projects should combine the intensive methodological format of the current study with an extensive research agenda. Such option will bring together the meso-level of network operations with the macro-level perspectives of policy-making. It will also balance up the asymmetric focus of the research on actor-centred networks and link the perspectives of network actors with their broader governmental and societal environments. Moreover, the case studies of Morocco and Algeria demonstrated that heuristic case studies can ‘gradually unfold increasingly better theoretical constructs through the study of individuals’ (Eckstein, 1975, p.108). Therefore, more case studies should be conducted ‘seriatim in order to construct increasingly plausible and less fortuitous regularity systems’ (Eckstein, 1975, p.104) on Europeanization and policy networks outside Europe.

In addition, combatting climate change is a flagship policy for the Commission, and has assumed a significant position in the EU’s external relations (see part 4.4). Comparison between core EU rules about renewable energies and loose EU rules about climate change adaptation can stress the challenges of advancing EU rules in the EU’s neighbourhoods in a network setting. It will also show how renewable energies rules can threaten state autonomy, as in the case of Algeria, and draw lessons of how network actors and/or the Commission deter – or not – network disruption.

The comparison between the EU’s southern and eastern neighbourhood could offer the necessary empirical venue for this research agenda. It is necessary to understand how actor-centred policy networks operate in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood (i.e. Ukraine,
South Caucasus), in other words, in European countries with limited membership prospects in the foreseeable future. Drawing upon the literature of Europeanization in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2009; Knill and Tosun, 2009), it remains unclear how each neighbourhood reacts to Europeanization, as both neighbourhoods are taken as similar research cases. While EU membership is not an option for non-European neighbouring countries, an aspiration of EU membership is still an option – though distant – for European countries in the eastern neighbourhood.

An empirical focus could be offered in the cases of Moldova and Azerbaijan. These two cases share several similarities with Morocco and Algeria respectively. Moldova has limited energy resources and is interested in closer relations with the EU, whereas Azerbaijan has significant energy resources, holds a key energy role for the EU’s diversification of energy suppliers and maintains a reluctant position in relation to the EU. Research could focus on both the Commission’s efforts for network creation and insulation, and on the perspective of EU members and the core executive of each country. Lessons could be drawn from the cases of Morocco and Algeria.

Another research avenue could be to expand the focus of the research beyond bilateral actor-centred policy networks and to explore multilateral policy networks. The Commission’s role in the Mediterranean is not limited to bilateral networks. It develops in parallel policy networks at regional and sub-regional levels. The Mediterranean area is particularly interesting in this regard. The Commission participates in the processes of other regional institutions, such as the UN Environment Programme for the Mediterranean (UNEP MAP), for environmental monitoring and climate change with the rest of SMCs and tries to build collaborative links through projects. One such case refers to the *Horizon 2020* project, which mainly offers capacity-building region-wide to SMCs for environment, water management and climate change adaptation. The Commission also funds and co-manages regional organisations with SMCs, such as the Union for the Mediterranean, for purely technical projects both on climate change mitigation (i.e. Mediterranean Solar Plan) and on climate change adaptation (i.e. Depollution of the Mediterranean). Moreover, it intends to build its own regional networks as part of its 1995 Euro-Mediterranean Partnership with willing SMCs regarding energy regulation. Such an example is the case of the *MEDREG* programme – Mediterranean Energy Regulators. The aim of the programme is to regulate the electricity and gas markets in the Mediterranean, and develop a common regulatory framework for energy between Europe and SMCs.
Key questions arise from these regional patterns. Firstly, to what extent can the Commission advance EU rules in multilateral policy networks? What are the challenges to this attempt? Furthermore, it needs to be noted that the Mediterranean area is highly prone to destabilization because of the Arab-Israeli conflicts, and lately, because of the Arab Spring. To what extent can regional professional networks remain insulated from such situations? In which cases could the Commission deter politicisation in its efforts towards network-building and network development, and in which policy area? What is the role of state autonomy in that process? Moreover, could more depoliticised institutions, such as the epistemic communities of UNEP MAP, assist the Commission to advance EU rules, and with what effect?

Finally, another empirical focus would be to investigate actor-centred policy networks in countries beyond the immediate neighbourhood and compare the immediate neighbourhood with countries beyond Europe. In this way, the research will explore the challenges of network-building and network development beyond the EU’s geographical proximity and the magnetic forces of the single market. More countries and international organisations will be engaged in network-building through capacity development programmes in order to develop closer ties with the core executive and government departments. In such situations, the Commission may find it harder to accommodate undisturbed network operations at the governmental level of authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes and ensure integrated interaction and frequency of collaboration, as in the Moroccan case.

Likewise, network insulation will have more challenges to face. Variable means of politicisation and the Commission’s efforts to deter – if possible – such outcomes will have significant added value to the study of Europeanization outside Europe. In this way, the study will draw significant lessons on central network management, and whether there are cases where policy networks and network actors have managed to avoid conflict, taking into account broader factors. Case studies from Southern Africa and South America could best demonstrate the potential of this research venture. Research could shed light on regional processes in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) and complement its focus on bilateral network-building processes in four case studies, two from each region respectively.
Appendix - List of interviews

Individual interviews

Algerian energy expert, University of Oran. Skype interview: 02 December 2012.


Algerian representative of environmental NGO. Skype interview: 18 November 2012.


Moroccan environmental journalist. Personal communication: 28 September 2012.

Moroccan academic (Professor). Casablanca, Morocco. Interview: 02 October 2012.


Moroccan academic (Professor). Interview: 04 October 2012; Personal communication: 30 October 2012.

Moroccan academic (Professor). Interview: 04 October 2012.

Moroccan academic (Professor). Interview: 04 October 2012.

Official of Mediterranean environmental NGO. Interview: 24 July 2012.

Official of international environmental NGO (Mediterranean). Skype interview: 26 June 2012.


President of Moroccan environmental NGO. Rabat, Morocco. Interview: 05 October 2012; personal communication: 13 November 2012.


Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) official (Energy).Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfMS), Barcelona. Interview: 11 July 2012.

UfM official (Environment). Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfMS), Barcelona. Interview: 11 July 2012.

UfM senior official. Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfMS), Barcelona. Interview: 11 July 2012.


UN official (Environment and Energy), UN Development Programme, Algeria. Telephone interview: 04 December 2012.

Focus group interviews

DG Development and Cooperation (DG DEVCO), Brussels, 18 September 2012

- Commission official (Regional Programmes – South). DG DEVCO, European Commission, Brussels.

Hay Riad, Rabat, Morocco, 04 October 2012.

- Moroccan academic. Professor at a Rabat-based university.
- Moroccan academic. Professor at a Rabat-based university.
- Moroccan academic. Professor at a Rabat-based university.
**Glossary of Terms**

**Acquis communautaire (or EU ‘acquis’)** French term referring to the dynamic and cumulative body of all EU primary and secondary legislation and case law. This includes all EU Treaties, Regulations, Directives, as well as ECJ judgements.

**Candidate country** A European country that has applied for EU membership, respects EU conditions and is in the process of integrating EU acquis at the domestic level.

**Comitology** A complex system of committees by permanent representatives from EU member representatives (COREPER) and, lately, members of the European Parliament chaired by the Commission that monitor the Commission’s policy initiatives. Committees offer advice and can accept, reject or even send new rules for final approval or rejection at Ministerial meetings of EU Council. Almost ninety per cent of Commission proposals are approved via consensus at the committees level, while only ten per cent at the EU Council (Blom-Hansen 2011, pp.107-111).

**Conditionality** A policy through which international organisations promise rewards to target states on the condition that the states fulfil one or more conditions set by international organisations.

**EU Regulation** EU legislative act with general application across the EU. EU Regulation substitutes national law with EU law and is entirely binding in its effect upon each EU member State to which it is addressed.

**Fit/misfit** The level of compatibility of domestic administrative or regulatory structures with an EU norm depends on whether low (‘fit’) or high (‘misfit’) adaptational pressures are exerted at the domestic level.

**Harmonisation** Compliance of a national government with uniform legal obligations defined in international or supranational law.

**Institutionalisation** refers to the development of standard, routinised operating procedures and shared codes of meaning in a legislative and/or regulatory environment.

**Maghreb** The Maghreb region refers to all North African Arab countries in the western part of Egypt. It includes Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania and Western Sahara.

**Potential candidate country** A European country that has not yet applied for EU membership, but is recognised by the EU as having the possibility to apply for membership once certain criteria are
**Convergence** The growing similarity of policies, rules, norms and habits over time.

**Down-loading** Incorporation of an already agreed EU policy/rule into domestic structures.

**EU Directive** EU legislative act that lays down certain end results based on a specific time framework that must be achieved in every Member State. National authorities have to adapt their laws to meet these goals, but are free to decide how to do so.

fulfilled in order to obtain the status of a ’candidate country’.

**Transposition** Transfer of agreed EU rules from the EU level at the domestic level. There is significant similarity with ’down-loading’ (see above) and these terms are used interchangeably in the Europeanization literature.

**Socialisation** A process of engaging in regular communication and interaction with actors of a given community and gradually co-opting with its norms and rules.

**Up-loading** Negotiation and formation of a new EU policy/rule at the EU level over national and supranational preferences.
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