Truth is (still) the norm for assertion: a reply to Littlejohn
Truth is (still) the norm for assertion: a reply to Littlejohn
In a paper in this journal (Erkenntnis 78: 847–867, 2013), I defend the view that truth is the fundamental norm for assertion and, in doing so, reject the view that knowledge is the fundamental norm for assertion. In a recent response, Littlejohn (Erkenntnis 79: 1355–1365, 2014) raises a number of objections against my arguments. In this reply, I argue that Littlejohn’s objections are unsuccessful.
Whiting, Daniel
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Whiting, Daniel
c0847bb4-963e-470d-92a2-5c8aae5d5aef
Whiting, Daniel
(2015)
Truth is (still) the norm for assertion: a reply to Littlejohn.
Erkenntnis.
(In Press)
Abstract
In a paper in this journal (Erkenntnis 78: 847–867, 2013), I defend the view that truth is the fundamental norm for assertion and, in doing so, reject the view that knowledge is the fundamental norm for assertion. In a recent response, Littlejohn (Erkenntnis 79: 1355–1365, 2014) raises a number of objections against my arguments. In this reply, I argue that Littlejohn’s objections are unsuccessful.
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TruthIsStilltheNormForAssertion - Daniel Whiting - Erkenntnis 2015.pdf
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Accepted/In Press date: January 2015
Organisations:
Philosophy
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Local EPrints ID: 373660
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/373660
ISSN: 0165-0106
PURE UUID: 34c75039-8812-4051-95ca-1d46fbc629bd
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Date deposited: 27 Jan 2015 16:09
Last modified: 14 Mar 2024 18:55
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