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Advancing comparison of democratic Innovations: A medium-N fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis of participatory budgeting.

by

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<u>ABSTRACT</u>

SOCIAL AND HUMAN SCIENCES

<u>Politics</u>

Thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

ADVANCING COMPARISON OF DEMOCRATIC INNOVATIONS: A MEDIUM-N FUZZY-SET QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING.

Matthew George Ryan

This thesis asks when and how ordinary citizens gain substantial control over important collective decisions. In particular I highlight conditions that explain citizen control of decision-making in participatory budgeting programmes worldwide. The thesis further sets out to test the value of new tools in comparative political science for answering such a question. I apply Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) in an attempt to cumulate existing knowledge and engage in logical systematic comparison across cases.

It is shown that the QCA approach is an underutilised complement to existing research strategies in the social sciences. Despite some important challenges and limitations outlined in the thesis, QCA is shown to be an effective tool for cumulating and systematically reviewing evidence in order to contribute to the development of knowledge about social phenomena in a coherent way. QCA can effectively inform researcher's choices about the requisite degrees of parsimony and complexity to use in explaining social phenomena.

Contrary to previous findings based on single-case or small-N analysis I find that there are no single necessary conditions for achieving or negating strong democratic outcomes in participatory programmes. The meaningful involvement of citizens in governing collectively occurs when both political and administrative leaders have the will and capacity to implement programmes and this is combined with either fiscal freedom to spend money on programmes or active demand for involvement from civil society actors. I show however considerable equifinality in causation as bureaucratic and political support can contribute to failure where both civil society support and finance are absent.

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DECLARATION OF AUTHORSHIP

I, Matthew Ryan

declare that this thesis and the work presented in it are my own and has been generated by me as the result of my own original research.

Advancing comparison of democratic Innovations: A medium-N fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis of participatory budgeting.

I confirm that:

1. This work was done wholly or mainly while in candidature for a research degree at this University;
2. Where any part of this thesis has previously been submitted for a degree or any other qualification at this University or any other institution, this has been clearly stated;
3. Where I have consulted the published work of others, this is always clearly attributed;
4. Where I have quoted from the work of others, the source is always given. With the exception of such quotations, this thesis is entirely my own work;
5. I have acknowledged all main sources of help;
6. Where the thesis is based on work done by myself jointly with others, I have made clear exactly what was done by others and what I have contributed myself;
7. Parts of this work have been published as:

   Ryan M. and Smith G. (2012) 'Towards a Comparative Analysis of Democratic Innovations: Lessons from a small-N fsQCA of Participatory Budgeting', *Revista Internacional de Sociología,* Vol. 70, extra 2, pp. 89-120.

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All remaining errors and omissions in the thesis are of course my responsibility alone.

Definitions and Abbreviations

PB   Participatory Budgeting

PT   Partido dos Trabalhadores

CSO   Civil Society Organisation

DI   Democratic Innovation(s)

HDI   Human Development Index

IGO   Inter-governmental Organisation

INUS   Insufficient Necessary part of an Unnecessary but Sufficient factor

MDSO   Most-different-similar-outcome

MSDO   Most-similar-different-outcome

N   Number

NGO   Non-governmental Organisation

QCA   Qualitative Comparative Analysis

fsQCA   fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis

SUIN   Sufficient but Unnecessary part of an Insufficient but Necessary factor

TQCA   Temporal Qualitative Comparative Analysis

UAMPA   Porto Alegre Union of Neighbourhood Associations

UN   United Nations

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1   Participatory Budgeting: Why and how we would we study it?

When and how do ordinary citizens gain substantial control over important collective decisions? The key aim of this thesis is to shed more systematic light on the drivers of success or failure in participatory budgeting (PB) programmes. This is an important objective. PB has been lauded by academics, activists, Intergovernmental Organisations (IGOs), Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) and many other governing bodies and agencies worldwide. It is almost certainly the most rapidly diffusing democratic innovation of the last two and a half decades. Where PB has been successful it has given succour to democracy; reengaging the disengaged; improving capacities and political skills through participation; redistributing public funds to those most in need; counteracting clientelism and encouraging effective governance. Where it fails it risks increasing disengagement; strengthening clientelist or malevolent elite rule and increasing anti-politics by diminishing any hope that ordinary people can make valuable contributions to collective decision-making.

PB can be defined '*a minima* as the involvement of citizens in the budgetary decisions of a public body and labelled as such by the actors' (Talpin 2011: 32). However most definitions would set a higher set of requirements to distinguish PB as a democratic innovation distinct from traditional budget consultations. Sintomer et al., who have done more than most to try to bring some order to a concept that has diffused rapidly around the globe provide the following minimal criteria

[The process]…allows the participation of non-elected citizens in the conception and/or allocation of public finances and…

1) The financial and/or budgetary dimension must be discussed; participatory budgeting deals with scarce resources.

2) The municipal level must be involved or a (decentralised) district with an elected body and some power over administration (the neighbourhood level is not enough).

3) It must be a repeated process (one meeting or one referendum on financial issues are not examples of participatory budgeting).

4) The process must include some form of public deliberation within the framework of specific meetings/forums (the opening up of administrative meetings or traditional representative instances to 'ordinary' citizens is not participatory budgeting).

5) Some accountability with regard to output is required.

<div align="right">Sintomer et al. (2008: 168; 2014: 3).</div>

The difficulties in defining PB are returned to within the thesis and PB is not only of interest here such that the thesis may provide clear evidence of what works when for those motivated by concerns for participatory governance. It also provides the opportunity to ask important questions as to how comparativists should seek to make sense of seemingly new, innovative and emerging forms of policy. Governance-driven policy-making increases both the pressures and opportunities to innovate. This requires vigilance among political scientists interested in classifying phenomena and providing causal explanations of classes of phenomena. Where social scientists are attracted to understand cases because of the seemingly unique stories they tell it begs the question as to how we can build on this in-depth knowledge to provide systematic evidence for causal theories. The thesis therefore also seeks to address practically the important issues raised when political reforms are recognised for their exceptional characteristics and political scientists wish to move beyond the lessons of one or two strong exemplars.

1.2   Participation and governance

As governing mass societies becomes increasingly more complex, the democratic legitimacy of collective decisions comes further under threat. Increases in external constraints, especially financial, on representative

government's capacities to govern both national and locally, are well-documented. The great bulwark that democracy promised against decisions which would not work in the interest of citizens was meaningful citizen involvement in and access to decision-making. While support for the principles of democracy continues to rise worldwide, participation in the traditional institutions of government in democratic states (elections and political parties) is at an all-time low (Stoker 2006).

Citizens of traditional democracies increasingly react with a mixture of anger and despair when they feel the blunt consequences of decisions that were made without their explicit consent and often without much regard for their collective benefit or cost. Perhaps the most glaring example of this in modern times is manifest in the continuing fallout to the global financial meltdown of 2008. Notwithstanding the long history of direct democratic practices, particularly where town meetings or referenda are part and parcel of political culture, Mark Warren has identified an increasing worldwide trend towards 'governance-driven democratisation' (2009). In response to crises of legitimacy, democratic rulers have actively begun to invite citizens to take a more direct and on-going role in political decision-making. Although they may take their inspiration from as far back as ancient Athens, many of these initiatives introduce a novel take on the appropriate architecture for democratic government. These are what Smith calls 'democratic innovations' - "institutions that have been specifically designed to increase and deepen citizen participation in the political decision-making process" (Smith, 2009: 2).

In the last number of years the democratic innovation that has excited governors, civil society activists and academics more than any other is participatory budgeting. Perhaps not since the acceleration of the cooperative movement in the last century has a participatory innovation seen such rapid diffusion. PB has been taken up in waves by a wide number of governments, as well as other public and semi-private decision-making bodies in Latin America, Europe, North America, Asia and Africa, and even in non-democratic states (Sintomer et al. 2008, 2010, 2013). PB has had a long affinity with the World Social Forum and been promoted throughout its networks of committed activists who recognise its potential to democratise spending decisions. It is lauded by the World Bank as a model of 'good governance' and actively promoted by a

small unit within the bank (Goldfrank 2013). It has also been promoted and supported by the United Nations through its HABITAT programme.

It is not surprising then that there has been growing academic interest in PB. Scholars from a range of disciplinary backgrounds have sought to understand its potential and analyse its successes and failures. Despite this, Goldfrank summarises the state of the art thus:

> With some exceptions, scholars have either provided long lists of potentially relevant variables or attempted to extract lessons from one or more successful cases, making general conclusions difficult...recent research offers some clues as to why [PB] experiments are increasingly successful, yet a compelling framework that integrates actors, preconditions, and institutional design remains elusive (2011: 24 - 25).

The vast majority of scholarly work on PB has taken the form of single-case studies or small-N comparisons of a handful of cases. There are a number of reasons scholars may have been reluctant to do more than this. For one thing the rapid diffusion and adaptation of PB can make it seem somewhat a moving target, disincentivising those who prefer to work with more neatly defined populations. To move beyond the impasse will require a degree of methodological innovation. Nevertheless previous work provides us as a research community with two invaluable assets; 1) a lot of skilfully generated data describing cases and their conditions and 2) a number of competing hypotheses on the necessary and sufficient conditions for success and failure in participatory governance.

The second important aim of this thesis is to assess the merits of qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) as an approach for cultivating insights in an emerging field of research.

Much like statistical modelling, QCA is a method which can provide parsimonious summaries of complex relationships which may signal cause and effect across large numbers of cases. Unlike statistical modelling QCA is designed to expose set-theoretic causation (for example relationships of necessity and sufficiency) among variables (Wagemann and Schneider: 2012). Moreover proponents of the method would claim that it can commendably harmonise theory, qualitative data and quantitative data (Ragin 2000), and is a

particularly apt approach when a researcher is faced with a medium-N[1] population of cases (Berg-Schlosser and Cronqvist: 2005).

Turning back to PB, we have at our disposal rich data on a medium-N of cases (cumulating existing studies), and a number of competing causal claims, the majority of which are set-theoretic rather than correlational. The PB phenomenon seems fertile ground for QCA research. Despite its exponential-like growth in use among social scientists as well as other disciplines (see Thiem and Dusa: 2013; also Rihoux et al. 2013), the QCA method is still maturing. In this thesis the method is applied to an emerging population of cases and its effectiveness in providing interesting insights in such a scenario is assessed.

1.3   Wider debates

There are a number of important debates to which evidence from a more systematic comparison of PBs could speak. All relate to the proper place (if there is any) for participatory democratic innovation and the extent of a role for the 'ordinary citizen'[2] in the governance of modern societies.

1) The first debate sets a standard for democratic innovation that centres on whether participatory innovation can be a useful contributor to representative democracy and effective public administration. For some, democracy is justified by its ends, and good decisions that truly benefit the collective can only be made by an elite few (Schumpeter 1949). Minimal safeguards in the form of regular(ish) elections can ensure competition among elites and negate reactionary mob rule. Contra such supporters of elite rule, we might argue that opportunities for participation, even in between elections, can often be beneficial. If we assume that the standard for democratic decisions is that they approach as much as

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[1] It is difficult if not foolish to try to pinpoint in the abstract a range in the number of cases that defines a medium-N. What we have in mind are opportunities for research where there exist more than a handful of cases and less than enough cases to avail of powerful statistical techniques for analysing correlations when controlling for confounding factors. Of course any decision about research strategies will always require the weighing of a number of factors including the availability of data and the structure of types and kinds of cases.

[2] 'Ordinary citizens' are taken to be citizens that do not take an established part in state decision making as elected representatives or public administrators. In some cases this distinction is not always easy to make.

possible the benefit of all, well-designed opportunities to gather information from citizens and allow them to respond to one another could improve the quality of collective decisions. Although authors take the concept of 'deliberative' in a variety of directions this is its most recurring contribution to democratic theory.

Even if we believe that there are good reasons (e.g. grounds of competence) for restricting elements of decision-making to experts and elected representatives, it may be that we would like to provide decision-makers with complimentary institutions that harness what we might call 'proximal expertise'. By proximal expertise I mean the innate expertise of the citizen who knows best how decisions currently and potentially affect her/him and others close to them. One intriguing finding from the first PBs in Porto Alegre was that citizen's expressed priorities for expenditure on public works that differed from what their representatives thought their priorities were (Abers 2000, Santos 1998, Baiocchi 2005). If it can be shown that, at least some of the time, democratic innovations which are tried in traditional settings but in different contexts were recognised as effective modes of governing with positive outcomes for citizens, then it suggests that those who see elections and parties as the *only* effective institutions for democratic governance need to think again.

2) Financial decisions are often considered the 'black box' of government; a realm of decision-making restricted on grounds of necessary competence to technocrats and seasoned professional politicians skilled in bargaining. For Carole Pateman, PB as practised in Porto Alegre provides an example of "how central components of participatory democracy can be institutionalized successfully in what is conventionally seen as an expert, technical area," (2012: 10). And 'ordinary citizens' with little formal education have shown capacities to increase their budget literacy through participation in PB (Abers: 2000). The second debate then, which speaks to a higher standard for democratic innovations, starts out by asking what the conditions for successful democratic innovation might be. Ideal PB enables increased popular control over elements of budgets by *institutionalising* citizens' participation in making spending decisions. The second question which the research presented here can aim to answer is under what conditions more transformative and sustained effects of political participation might occur (and under what conditions they are negated).

3) The third debate to which we might want to speak to is whether participatory designs can be enablers for change at a more systemic level. There is much debate among deliberative democrats about the conditions for a 'deliberative system' (Mansbridge et al. 2012); and what role different institutions might play in that system. Gret and Sintomer, for instance, argue that participants in successful PBs can act as a type of 'social vanguard' providing a positive example that can organically grow to involve those across the spectrum interested in reconnecting with democracy (2005: 92-96). For democratic innovations to have a systemic effect is a higher standard still; and one for which we may only be able to produce indicative evidence at this juncture. But by highlighting the systemic effect of successful outcomes across cases we may be able to pinpoint the cases and types which require closer scrutiny and fresh examination via process-tracing or other appropriate methodological tools.

4) A fourth important debate revolves around what the appropriate methodological tools are for comparative political scientists wishing to cumulate rich, in-depth qualitative pieces of research that combine both common and disparate elements. Some of QCA's ambitions lie in providing at least modest solutions to the challenge of combining the essential knowledge of micro-processes that tell the rich stories of interesting cases with analysis that builds on this knowledge by providing robust systematic cross-case comparison. Yet only a few QCA studies have set out explicitly to cumulate existing and diverse qualitative pieces and almost none have attempted to look at emerging sub-fields using fuzzy-set QCA. The thesis therefore also looks to speak to wider debates about what value developments in set-theoretic analysis can add for comparative politics and provide a test of the use of QCA where interesting questions are not easily answered using traditional methods of inquiry.

1.4   Historical context: Democracy and participation

Democracy is seen as desirable by vast swathes of the world's population (at least as far as a common understanding of the concept can be assumed) (Stoker, 2006: 23). Ideology, social movements and revolution have variously been responsible for shifting vast populations from subjects of leviathan rulers to sovereign citizens of democratic states. Yet despite the many definite historical

accounts of progressive instances, the sense remains that this is an ongoing, contingent and precarious venture. Any teleological understanding of a democratic project has been challenged in contemporary times. The expansion of civil liberties, political and social rights was crucial to advancing the democratic project in previous eras (Marshall 1950). However, with increasing retrenchment of liberties and decreasing participation in formal politics this expansion can be seen to be at best in the responsive phase of a dialectical progression, or worse still in permanent decline (O' Tuama, 2009: 142, see also Stoker 2006).

Democracy is a complex and contested concept. In significant contexts 'democracy' can be taken to mean everything from an abstract ideal type of governance where sovereignty is located with the people as a whole, to a formula of institutional arrangements which denotes a type of political regime, to a placeholder for a perpetual struggle with imbalances of power. Schumpeter, famously defined democracy in very minimal terms as an institutional method by which elites compete for votes so as to rule over relatively uneducated masses (1942: 269). For long periods during the 20th century this wisdom was accepted by political theorists and those working within the emerging discipline of empirical political science. Nevertheless within the last fifty years, developments within empirical social science have shown that participation by citizens in the governing of their collective affairs, beyond voting for representatives is possible (Dahl 1961, Mansbridge 1983, Bryan 2004). Moreover, Pateman (1970) has documented a long and rich history within democratic theory which does not withstand normative assertions that 'too much' democracy is undesirable. With these empirical and theoretical accounts, democracy is imbued with far more potential. Yet, visions of what political equality could or should look like, and how it may or would be achieved, continue to be debated. And it remains an empirical question (with some competing evidence) as to whether 'another world is possible' (if desirable), (c.f. Michels 2001, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002, de Souza Santos 2005, Pateman 2012).

What is often missing from these debates is systematic analysis of a range of cases. That is what this thesis sets out to contribute. We continue to cumulate more nuanced knowledge on processes and their context. Still few scholars have examined the contextual and structural features of political systems which could provide a better understanding of success and failures in empowered democratic

innovation. If we desire to manipulate the world for the better we need information on the context in which democratic devices are most likely to succeed or fail.

1.5   Malaise and innovation

'*It often works in theory but does it work in practice?*' is not an unfamiliar refrain for supporters of democracy to contend with. For those who wish to deepen democracy there is a tension between grand republican ideas of citizens 'forced to be free' and 'acting in concert' as Rousseau and Arendt would have, and the praxis of engaging those who are otherwise decided for in many hard collective decisions.

Even for those who retain faith in existing democratic institutions there is much evidence of a 'democratic malaise'. Levels of traditional political participation have fallen, in terms of both party membership and turnout at elections (Stoker 2006). In the UK alone membership of the main political parties has fallen from over 5% of the electorate in 1964 to just 1% in 2010 (McGuiness, 2012: 5). Evidence from the Hansard Society's Audit of Political Engagement[3] has shown numbers responding who say they would be certain to vote in an immediate general election falling from 51% to 41% since 2003. In the same period respondents who claimed to be either very or fairly interested in politics reduced from 50% to 42%. It is certainly not the Britain of citizens imbued with a strong belief in their political efficacy that Almond and Verba encountered in their seminal comparative study of 1963. The British case is used here as an illustration but there is plenty of evidence that the trend is replicated across the world (Dalton 2004, Stoker 2006, Norris 2011, Mair 2013).

Not even the most radical participatory democrat would look to turn citizens of democracies into obsessed political anoraks. Some people have better things to do with their time. The trouble is that we are approaching a tipping point where disengagement begins to undermine the legitimacy of democracy. Anti-politics;

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[3] The Hansard Society's annual reports which began in 2003 are available at http://www.hansardsociety.org.uk/research/public-attitudes/audit-of-political-engagement/.

"an amalgam of behaviours and attitudes that sometimes finds expression in alienated inaction with respect to politics or support for populist interventions into politics," is reaching a worrying prevalence (Stoker 2014). It is perhaps most interesting that in the same Hansard surveys referred to above that respondents who believed the system of government does not work well and could be improved a lot or a great deal rose from 60% to 69%. There appears a strengthening majority view that the institutions of government do not produce the democracy citizen's would recognise.

In 1996 Arend Lijphart reminded the American Political Science Association in his presidential address of what he labelled democracy's remaining 'unresolved dilemma' - participation in these traditional institutional mechanisms of decision-making remains "systematically biased against less well-to-do-citizens," (1997: 1). It is likely that growing trends in anti-politics since then see these groups even further marginalised. So are the institutions themselves the root cause of the malaise? And can we design new institutions to compliment the traditional ones; to overcome their failings, expose viable devices for reform of those institutions or replace them altogether?

In the recent past, forthright critiques of existing democratic decision-making systems have come from a broad church of participatory and deliberative democratic theorists (e.g. Pateman 1970, Gutmann and Thompson 1996, Bohman 1997, Young: 2000). At the superficial level at least these criticisms share a common problematisation of existing liberal representative democracy. The focus on traditional forms of participation, such as voting, has been challenged because they do not engender significant and long-term engagement (Pateman 1970) and only aggregate what are often relatively uninformed preferences (Bohman 1997). From this broad mix of tensions and critiques emerges a growing interest in democratic innovations that recast the relationship between political elites and citizens. Can we design institutions that engage the disengaged and give political efficacy to those who have never known it? And if so when and how would they work?

1.6   Democratic legitimacy meets governing societies

While changes in the role government's play in governing has had an impact on accountability to citizens, in turn, citizens have grown more educated and more

critical (see also Beck 1992, Inglehart 1997, Stoker 2006). Faced with a series of legitimacy crises governors have been driven to respond. What is most interesting about the trend that has followed is that rulers have actively begun to create more direct roles for citizens in political decision-making (Warren 2009).

Although the trend has accelerated more recently we can trace it at least as far back as the 1960s in the U.S. context. But as soon as that new wave of 'consultations' were first implemented they drew criticism. This time the criticism of democratic reconstruction came not from traditional elitists anxious of engaging 'the great unwashed'. It was founded on a scepticism that pointed to the dangers of superficial increases in participation and, therefore, called for full citizen control of decisions (Arnstein 1969). Arnstein's fear was that much of what passed for citizen consultation was an empty ritual aimed at consolidating elite rule. Consultations of this type can at worst be seen as a mollifying 'incumbent democracy' that tranquilises the genuine critical collective socialisation which lies at the heart of ingenuity in free societies (Blaug 2002). For Blaug, this engineering of participation by government must be met with a degree of scepticism as it may fundamentally be interpreted as a Bismarckian bid to protect the 'representative core' of the system. It is in response to some of these criticisms of derogatorily branded 'manipulatory' institutions that a new breed of institutions can be said to have emerged; "institutions that have been specifically designed to increase *and deepen* citizen participation in the political decision-making process" (Smith, 2009: 2, my italics). These are what Smith refers to as 'democratic innovations' (idem).

The relationship between design and observation of these democratic innovations, and the critical democratic theory highlighted above is less straightforward than it may seem. Dalton (2004) has spoken of 'an unhelpful gap' in the literature between democratic theory and practice. Although the aforementioned critiques surely have had some influence on invention, the emerging field of academic study surrounding democratic innovations is more often characterised by a handful of determined democratic theorists catching up with practice than by experimentalists trialling their own grand designs (with some notable exceptions that attempt both, e.g. James Fishkin's Deliberative Opinion Polls). In a now seminal article Fung recognized that "political theorists and scientists would do well to learn from the emerging practice of mini-publics

that are 'creating instances of more perfect public spheres'" (2003: 338). Does what seems to work in practice work in theory and how can empirical political science improve and refine democratic theories?

As innovative programmes of participatory politics have emerged and diffused over time, interested scholars have turned to fieldwork, and in the first instance to the construction of detailed case-studies of particular types of innovation. Examples can be drawn across very different institutional designs from popular assemblies such as town meetings (Mansbridge 1983[4]), and community policing beat meetings and school boards (Fung 2004), to participatory budgets (Abers 2000, Baiocchi 2005), and randomly-selected citizen's assemblies (Davies et al., 2006, Warren and Pearce 2008). These authors have broadly concerned themselves with recognising interesting innovations that on the face of it warrant investigation because of their perceived or acknowledged exceptional potential for increasing democratic legitimacy; what case-study researchers might call information-oriented selection of extreme cases (Flyvbjerg 2006).

Beyond and because of this pioneering work a more systematic comparative turn in the process of understanding these phenomena becomes possible. Following Fung's rally-cry we might ask what it is that allows some cases of innovation to seem to deliver democratic goods (and what negates such an outcome). What can they teach us about democratic theory and achieving democracy in practice? It is these questions and the potential of new methods to provide new and important answers to them that lie at the heart of this thesis.

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[4] Mansbridge's methodology in this celebrated research in fact involves a cross-type comparison between the town meeting case and a case of workplace democracy.

Chapter 2:   PB Beyond Exceptionalism: A case for systematic comparative analysis.

2.1   Why focus on PB?

> Today, dozens of regular forums and councils discuss nearly every area of local decisionmaking. Seminars, conferences, and community meetings in which state officials and citizens discuss and decide together on issues ranging from street lighting to economic development policy are an everyday occurrence. Civic groups outside the state-sponsored participatory structure – ranging from innumerable neighbourhood associations to a powerful Urban Reform Movement – have bloomed in the context of political opportunity, (Abers, 2000:217).

So said Rebecca Abers in the first book-length scholarly account of participatory budgeting (PB) in Porto Alegre to be published in the English language: *Inventing Local Democracy,* (2000). More than 14 years on a distinct yet diverse body of work has emerged analysing the various effects of PB in Porto Alegre, the diffusion of this innovation across the world and lately the different outcomes in different cases of its implementation. But why has this phenomenon that began in this city captured the imagination of so many? What is it, and what is really unique about it? What or how much do we know about it? And why are broader comparative analyses so rare? This chapter aims to provide some answers to these questions.

Talpin suggests we can define participatory budgeting '*a minima* as the involvement of citizens in the budgetary decisions of a public body and labelled as such by the actors' (2011: 32). But this says nothing of levels of citizen control. PB is a renowned democratic innovation because in its ideal type it promises a tangible increase in democratic legitimacy. Ideal PB enables increased popular control over elements of budgets by *institutionalising* citizens' participation in making spending decisions. It exemplifies a successful materialisation of participatory political theory into institutional design by encouraging open and diverse participation, and allowing 'ordinary citizens' to create, shape and renew institutions and rule-structures themselves. Much of the

design of PB has common tenets with Athenian democratic practices and principles in realising democratic goods (Smith, 2009). In an ideal PB this exceptional scale of deep, public participation is combined with structured deliberation and design-rules that limit the threat of co-option and capture by powerful vested interest and also resist the evolution of new elites. PB is a relatively young phenomenon, its inception generally traced to the late 1980s in the Brazilian municipalities of Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte. In practice, what does PB look like?

Defining PB, even in one city, is no easy task. Take Porto Alegre: A concise definition would need to negotiate the emphases that different observers place on different aspects of the case. Like many things, the procedures and the success of PB in Porto Alegre are the product of a mixture of design, hard work and accident. Even so, it remains the template on which the Worker's Party (*Partido dos Trabalhadores or* PT) has introduced PB in several Brazilian municipalities[5]. Unlike almost all other ideas of the same generation which show similar democratic potential[6], this innovation has become institutionalised in many diverse locations and has diffused rapidly across municipal and national borders. Diffusion has come through a number of channels with many significant IGOs and NGOs advocating for PB in various forms. The experiences and results of its adaptation to other decision-making venues have been highly differentiated (Sintomer et al., 2008, 2010).

Wampler attempts to summarise the key components of PB based on the Brazilian model as concisely as possible. He notes that the 'guiding tenets' are: a municipality divided into regions; the provision of budget information by the government and the facilitation of regular meetings at various stages of the budget cycle for deliberation and election of delegates; a 'quality of life' index based on technical criteria used to redistribute resources based on need; a "bus caravan of priorities", in which elected delegates visit all project sites; a municipal council made up of two councilors per region, a right to veto the

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[5] Governing parties from across the political spectrum have now introduced PB in various Brazilian municipalities. Nevertheless, the program is indelibly linked to the PT and its instigation, promotion and facilitation continues to be one of their flagship policies.
[6] For a list see Warren (2009).

budget for the municipal legislature; and regional committees elected to monitor implementation of projects (2007a: 26). Avritzer, even more succinctly emphasises four characteristics: the delegation of sovereignty to regional assemblies; the combination of direct and representative participation; self-regulation; and 'inversion' of priorities by technical criteria (2006: 623-624). Other factors that could be added to definitions might include outreach to disadvantaged groups by government and reorganisation of bureaucracies to name a few.

There is some consensus then on where PB has come from and what it is. Though the Porto Alegre model may be the inspiration for programmes, PB has necessarily been implemented in different ways in different contexts. Although PB has changed and adapted, this presents researchers aiming to explain a phenomenon with an important resource – a number of cases and explanations that vary. As George and Bennett have it, "When explanations for the outcome of individual cases vary, the results can be cumulated and contribute to the development of a rich differentiated theory about that phenomenon" (2005: 216). It is within the study of participatory budgeting that the most interesting examples of comparative work on democratic innovations have begun to emerge. Before contributing to a rich and differentiated theory I want to trace the developments in PB scholarship on which I aim to build.

2.2   Existing Studies in PB – A new phenomenon? Starting from a single case.

Our understanding of a class of phenomena called democratic innovations and/or PB has grown over time. The natural starting point for any phenomenon that appears to observers new or different in comparison to known phenomena is to begin with an ethnographic case study. So it began with in depth studies of Porto Alegre. As Abers says of her approach

On the first trip I discovered that Porto Alegre was the only PT administration at the time around which there was widespread consensus that participatory policy had been successful at mobilizing people and at actually giving participants real deliberative power. This consensus led me to choose that city as an "exemplary" case of a successful participatory policy (200: 230).

For Baiocchi, "the case study of a relevant or unique case can allow for theoretical innovation because of its attention to process and anomaly…as an instance of state-civil society relations, [Porto Alegre] forces us to *rethink theory*", (2005: 165, italics in original). He is of course correct and we will return to the prospect for harnessing the methodological wisdom wrought from studying a distinctive case beyond one or a small few cases. These first observers identified Porto Alegre as an extreme or unique case of 'participatory policy' or 'state-civil society relations'.

The extensive observations and interviews carried out by both Baiocchi and Abers rely on mixed methods approaches to collecting data with a focus on the advantages of ethnography in exposing in   detail conditions underlying unusual phenomena. Gret and Sintomer take a slightly more top-down, deductive case-study approach, focusing on how the innovative practices developed in Porto Alegre relate to existing political, social and critical theories. Still, this allows them to make a number of important observations about the theoretical relationship between direct and representative democracy in the light of the case e.g. lot and referenda are as yet unfamiliar as devices for guaranteeing democratic equality in Porto Alegre (2005: 133). The idea of adapting and combining democratic innovations and devices is later picked up on by Smith (2009: 190). We will return our attention to a discussion of sequencing democratic innovations and devices in the concluding parts of this thesis. Along with detailed articles based on their own first-hand research by Santos (2005)[7] and Goldfrank (2003) these three book-length studies represent the first academic treatments of PB in Porto Alegre to appear in the English language (one translated from French).

Focusing on the treatments with a detailed data-generating motivation; Baiocchi and Abers accounts are important because to put it in Baiocchi's own words they "sought to contribute to the already extensive discussion of democratic theory through an actual examination of instances of popular participation in

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[7] A version of this paper was originally published in *Politics and Society* (1998) 26 (4) pp.461-510.

government decision making" (2005: 142). These actual examinations of cases of democratic innovation perhaps have been all too rare – with some notable exceptions - examples include Bryan (2004) and Mansbridge (1983) on Town Meetings, Davies et al. (2006) looking at a Citizen's Council, Warren and Pearse (2008) on the Citizen's Assembly in British Columbia that took place in 2006 and Fishkin's (1996) and Dienel's (1989) accounts of their separate personal inventions). This paucity may also have been a problem of exposure. Laterally accumulation of case studies of participatory processes has been aided by networks inspired by growing knowledge of the variety of cases and projects such as www.participedia.net.

2.3   The complex story of Porto Alegre: How is it exceptional?

Ethnography is not often suited to parsimonious accounts which distinguish and index variables. Rich complexity is its strength. The attention to detail of these early accounts highlights numerous conditions and processes which ostensibly have made the key contributions to the exceptional outcomes in this case. How did these field-researchers interpret this Porto Alegre exception?

Both Baiocchi and Abers focus on change in the state-civil society relation as a key condition of interest (in writing up at least, if they may have begun with a more grounded approach). This interest speaks to theories that focus on the necessity of organised combative civil society organisation for functioning democratic polities. Baiocchi suggests that under specific conditions combative civil society can be bolstered and even incarnated by state action (2005: 145). For Baiocchi what was interesting about the Porto Alegre experiment was that for the first time demands from civil society were decoupled from political allegiance (2005: 138). For PB to succeed it was of utmost importance that the PT administration helped create an institutional space where both social movements and unorganised citizens participate on an equal footing (2005: 150; see also Ganuza and Baiocchi 2012). Although the party, in this case the PT, may have had an instrumental goal of creating a strong grassroots support, it gambled on achieving this through a long-term commitment to a participatory ideology and institutionalising the devolution of power. This involved significant commitment to change in the face of potential political barriers including

complete reorganisation of the planning bureaucracy and increasing the municipal tax-take (Santos, 2005: 328). Goldfrank gives a vivid account of the very uncertain beginnings and many failures and troubles that greeted the PT's participatory agenda in the early years (2003). Perhaps the most important lesson for us from this study, along with Abers' analysis and Santos' detailed description of PB's evolution is that of the longevity of commitment needed for institutionalisation of participatory innovations.

Abers explains that over time the introduction of PB in Porto Alegre resulted in a virtuous cycle whereby increased mobilisation and the reduction of inequalities gradually augmented one another, benefiting from a political commitment to support meaningful participation and execute the decided upon priorities laid out in the participatory budget (2000: 218). Mobilisation of groups that had not previously been organised is of central importance in her account. She also suggests that these groups flourished and were not co-opted. She provides a degree of empirical evidence to refute the considerable scepticism in the literature towards forms of top-down mobilisation. In Porto Alegre the state acted as an 'external agent' in the same way as NGOs have traditionally done to mobilize movements. What is more, by implementing decisions of participants, mobilisation was increased almost exponentially in the first few years via these 'demonstration effects', (idem: 138). As Goldfrank explains "participants could point out to their neighbours and friends the very projects that they had prioritised the year before...compared with 1990, participation in the 1991 budget assemblies more than tripled," (2003: 39).

Porto Alegre possessed a distinctively vibrant civil society during the last years of the military dictatorship (Santos, 2005: 313). When the PB struggled in its first two years, the willingness and capacity of civil society activists to defend the process but challenge the execution of it at the expense of the mayoral administration's public reputation was a key factor in stimulating the structural changes described above, (Goldfrank, 2003: 35-37). Of particular interest in the case is the role played by an autonomous umbrella group representing civil society across neighbourhoods in the city. The Porto Alegre Union of Neighbourhood Associations (UAMPA) is where the idea and impetus for community control over municipal finances can be first recognised (Avritzer, 2005: 386; Ganuza and Baiocchi, 2012: 3). Both Baiocchi and Abers stress that UAMPA later declined and was in effect replaced by the PB. Baiocchi's

comparison of districts within Porto Alegre's PB structure allows him to conclude that "pre-existing civic networks were not found necessary to ensure the routinazation of the process, and in fact, very strong associations proved a stumbling block," e.g. in the Norte region (2005: 138). Nevertheless urban associations are still the primary sources of information on matters participatory budgeting (Gret and Sintomer, 2005: 84). Later comparativists have taken up and identified the history of organised combative civil society activism to which this nods in their accounts of other PB successes (e.g. Wampler 2008). I will have more to say about the degree to which certain conditions can combine with their contexts to produce results that differ substantially in their quality later on.

A further important contribution to the successful appeal of the case comes in the development of rules that allow for participants to behave and think in a way that encourages them to put themselves in other's shoes. Rules matter and as Smith and Wales succinctly put it, "preferences are not exogenous to institutional setting," (2000: 52, see also Fung and Wright 2000). In Porto Alegre the rules successfully balanced different logics; e.g. majoritarian democracy, distribution according to need and technical knowledge; at various levels of decision-making (Gret and Sintomer, 2005: 44-52). The act of creating such rules can have a functional overspill which allows participants to take ownership of, and advance, even more innovative solutions to democratic dilemmas. Abers shows that in the districts that she observed, over time, citizens took ownership of developing rules that fostered and institutionalised solidarity and democratic norm formation, (2000: 179). The separation of rule-making from the application of those rules emulated some original liberal democratic practices that have been lamentably lost in modern legislatures.

PB's appeal has not been limited to those obsessed only with how a process might achieve a relatively narrow conception of deliberative empowerment: For instance Santos remarks on five different observable changes including bureaucratic organisation; methods of distribution; representative accountability; autonomy of participatory institutions and competing legitimacies (2005). We will have more to say ahead about identifying and separating relevant independent variables for relevant dependent variables and hypothesising directions of causation when comparing PBs. Many observers have been attracted to PB in the first instance because it achieves distributional justice (more-so than democracy per se). Certainly this aim was embedded from the

beginning in PT objectives and in the PB rules (idem: 325). The relationship between democracy and equality of outcome is a complex one and (although I simplify) Leftist sympathisers have traditionally been associated with schools of thought that see the latter as preceding the former and not the other way round. While a detailed discussion of democracy and justice is beyond the scope of this thesis, the important point about PB in Porto Alegre is that although rules for yearly spending decisions obliged distribution towards poorer regions, these rules were formed and reformed through public deliberation across various levels of the PB (see Santos, 2005: 325-329; Abers 200: 180).[8]

Of course deliberation in Porto Alegre is not ideal and is accompanied by other forms of political arbitration (Baiocchi: 78). Moreover,

> Often people who organised in the effort to resolve immediate needs demobilised once the needs were fulfilled. It took many years for the regional budget forums to initiate serious discussions of broader- based issues such as economic development and city planning, and only a small number of regional budget participants went on to join broader policymaking groups such as the thematic forums (Abers: 221).

Although the prerogatives of deliberative theorists may be to narrow the conception of democracy to one that draws its legitimacy from ideal publicity and justification, for many, deliberation is a necessary but not sufficient condition for democracy (Pateman, 2012: 8). PB does not achieve all democratic goods ideally and transform all participants. Nevertheless, when compared to the inertia and clientelism all too pervasive in modern societies it seems to provide some image of what the 'school of democracy' theorists (Pateman, Dewey etc.) might have had in mind. It is not a 'rosy picture' but it is an improved alternative (see Smith 2008 and Ryan and Smith 2013 with deference to Fishkin et al. 2010).

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[8] It is interesting that Marquetti et al. report that during the period 1990-2000 in Porto Alegre some measures show relative inequality rising, despite the improvement in absolute condition of the poor (2012: 79). As they point out it is likely that this is a result of a number of external factors but it puts the overall redistributive potential of strong local economic democracy in perspective.

The book-length narratives to which I refer provide a far greater description of events in this case than it would be right for me to reproduce here (both Santos, 2005 and Smith 2008 provide clear and full explanations of the entire PB process in Porto Alegre, see also Smith, 2008 for a fuller summary of these early contributions). I could have included even more articles and essays on Porto Alegre as some have laterally appeared as a result of translations but a review of the literature on that case would become saturated at this point. What matters for our purposes is to get a sense of how trained, first-hand observers have done the hard work to communicate a simple story of how exceptional outcomes relevant to desires for a deepened democracy occurred there. They did this by simplifying and translating into a communicable narrative *an identification of conditions* which were *non-trivial* in relation to the outcome and which *differed in degree of quality* to accepted or previous norms.

2.4   Diffuse - Compare

At this point in the story of the evolution of PB scholarship all we have is one exceptional case. The worth of the cases discussed in this chapter should not be valued solely or their potential contribution to developing more general theories and as a stepping stone to large-N research. In and of themselves they are inherently valuable and our attempts to move towards larger-N research can only create a supplementary rather than a comparatively better form of knowledge. We must inevitably move up the ladder of abstraction without stretching concepts (Sartori: 1970), and lose some of the detail and understanding of process that can only be garnered by direct observation and intensive treatment of a single case. Nevertheless "each case is only a case, and it is difficult to build any theoretical generalizations from the individual cases," (Peters 2013: 167). This is especially true when it is not made clear what the case is a case of – or at least when the focus is on how a case departs from a class of cases. In what follows we will discuss new ways of increasing the N with the aim of harnessing rather than replacing case-based knowledge. Ethnographies can open up doors for a number of academic/research endeavours.

The foundation of scientific research is comparison. Both Abers and Baiocchi in actuality have a comparative element to their study at the city-district level - Abers chose to focus her investigation in the Glória and Extremo do sul district,

with Baiocchi similarly comparing three districts. Both utilise a most-different strategy comparing districts with varying degrees of clientelistic practices to assess systematically any differences in PB experiences where civil society activism was in a more positive or negative frame of health at the introduction of the programme. At a broader level, well-read case researchers are always aware of comparisons in drawing lessons from their observations as well as choosing research sites and strategies. Abers for instance makes a suggestion that the failure of similar early efforts at participatory budgeting in Brasília were probably down to the PT neglecting to make participation a central element of their political strategy – thus the beginnings of musings on some general theories based on induction are evident here. As Mill more eloquently puts it "For, as the general conception is itself obtained by a comparison of particular phenomena, so, when obtained, the mode in which we apply it to other phenomena is again by comparison (1950: 298)."

There is no getting away from it that Porto Alegre does seem exceptional and there may be an argument that it cannot be meaningfully compared with other cases in abstract as its conditions are extreme. Baiocchi at one point describes it as 'the Mecca of the Left' (2005: 157). Further to this many accounts are quick to highlight the unique circumstances within Brazil. These include the effect of rapid urbanisation as unprecedented swathes of rural poor moved to cities leading to large unplanned settlements (favelas); an extraordinarily patrimonial political culture where votes are exchanged for the most basic of material promises, and a new set of political institutions and opportunities in the wake of the 'abertura' democratic transition with the opening up of the political opportunity structure following the demise of the military regime (see Santos, 2005: 208-209; Abers, 2000: 26-28; Pont, 2004: 115; Gret and Sintomer, 2005 14-15). In many ways Porto Alegre is an archetype for subsequent cases of democratic innovation within and without Brazil and we will have more to say about the methodological implications of this for comparison. The important point though is that "if the study is conducted outside a comparative framework, it is easy for the researcher to make a number of assumptions about the exceptionalism of the case," (Peters, 2013: 4). Without a comparative framework the exceptionalism and its degree in Porto Alegre is more assumed than analysed and understood.

The news of this case certainly inspired others to think about how it related to other institutional innovations; notably as mentioned, those interested in real-world applications of democratic theory e.g. Fung (2003), Fung and Wright (2003) and Smith (2008). Their work looks at some exceptional innovative, but very different, institutional designs and they draw parallels as to how different democratic institutions can realise important abstract democratic goods in different ways. The cases that Fung and also Smith discuss in their work tend to be of this variety – they focus on path-breaking institutional innovation. And their emphasis is on making connections between how these practical examples of innovative participatory institution-building can embody diverse theoretical principles of democracy.

This work broadens our knowledge in further directions but is not without its limitations and problems. If the first cases brought to attention are all those with exceptional outcomes we might expect that in reality the typical case cannot be so, and we cannot be sure of what the typical case looks like and how it differs from our exceptional ones. We would expect much like in Galton's original that the child would regress from the exceptional parent (say the Porto Alegre archetype) towards the mean. The problem here is that we don't have a good sense of a population and we don't know what the mean might look like. If we took a sample of participatory processes over time we would probably expect that the results in Porto Alegre were atypical. Without looking carefully to uncover complex causality in such a sample we do not know that the factors identified as crucial to explaining the cases' successes in these early accounts, having effect if removed, would be identified to some extent as artefacts of regression towards the mean or something else. This does not take away from the strides made by pioneering work here but it warns us to continue down the road of cumulation before getting too excited.

Perhaps more quickly than analysts could publish their (mostly positive) reviews of Porto Alegre's experiences, PB was diffusing and being taken up by other governments at an encouraging rate. This was thanks in no small part to committed activists in various fora and networks. Their efforts were boosted by Porto Alegre's relationship with the World Social Forum, and in another way by endorsements from the World Bank and the UN (See Goldfrank, 2012 for a recent discussion of the World Bank's role in disseminating PB). Many writers speak of waves of diffusion as PB spread first across Brazil, then Latin America, later to

Europe and North America and further East, even to non-democracies (Cabannes 2004, Sintomer et al. 2013). Recent developments have seen increasing uptake in the U.S.A.

PB diffusion is more often than not characterised by adaptation of the model to local conditions with individual actors often playing a strong influential role (Röcke, 2009: 63-65). One of Röcke's unique contributions to the literature is to show how PB is diffused through different channels and actors who then adapt PB to both local conditions and national 'frames' of political participation in implementation (2009). This is food for thought for those interested in scoping a population of worldwide participatory budgets for comparison and generalisations (see Ch.4 below). There have been notable attempts to track and index the 'who, what, why, and where' of diffusion of PB around the world (See variously Cabannes 2004; Shah 2007; Röcke 2009, 2014; Herzberg 2011; Goldfrank 2012; Wampler 2012; Sintomer et al. 2005, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2013; Dias 2014). Building on some of that work, the primary aim of this thesis is to ascertain what effects important differences in implementation and context have had on the empowerment of citizens, and whether and what causal inference we can engage in using advanced tools for logical induction and deduction. I also later contend that this process leads to unique insights which can aid the ongoing debates about how innovation diffuses.

2.5 Recognising woods and trees: Moving from an exceptional case to a set of cases of an emerging phenomenon.

As trained social scientists we are well aware that any general conclusions drawn from a single case are limited. In fact the existence of knowledge only of a single case of any phenomena may have an enduring limiting effect on the analysis of those who encounter it first. Human researchers are unfortunately bound to be afflicted by an availability bias which anchors their understanding of what kinds of cases are possible to what kinds of cases they are aware of at any point in time. And despite all best intentions and training in scientific methods there are many mixed incentives that can guide case selection:

Scholarly reputations are made by claiming a case is unique or at least unusual, and that makes cumulation difficult. Claims of uniqueness, however, are sometimes overstated, and if cases are examined together then there is the capacity to create some generalisations out of apparently disparate cases... even with all the potential problems, cumulation of case materials is preferable to no cumulation ... (Peters: 2013: 170).

Good social science can and has identified, accepted and attempted to develop ways of dealing with these considerations.

In the development of our understanding of participatory budgeting as a successful democratic innovation, first steps towards examining cases together came in the form of early comparisons of carefully selected cases of PB. While studies of individual cases in Brazil and beyond continue to dominate the literature, cross-case comparative analysis has begun to contribute to our knowledge. William Nylen's (2003b) important contribution to the development of comparative work on PB, was to show that the vast majority of publications focused on the paradigmatic 'successful' case of Porto Alegre or other cases with similarly positive outcomes. He argued that it was just as important for researchers to attend to 'failed' cases. Thus he points the way towards information-based sampling of comparable cases which vary on the outcome as well as key influencing conditions.

Specifically he chooses two cases (Betim and João Monlevade) where the PT has been voted out of office after initiating PB to ascertain whether introducing PB in alternative contexts would create a similar legacy of deepened democratic consciousness as it seemed to have done in Porto Alegre. He found that in both cases the "patrimonial, clientelistic and elitists politics" that characterised these cities before the PT government had returned. He also goes some way to showing equivalent qualities in potentially important explanatory variables such as the nature and origins of PT administrations in his cases compared with Porto Alegre, i.e. there is an implicit most-similar systems element to the research design and case selection that is aimed in the direction of uncovering necessary and sufficient causation. The key explanatory variable which differs between these two cases taken together and Porto Alegre is that the PB only mobilised

partisan PB sympathisers without attracting non-partisan participants in the same way as highlighted in descriptions of Porto Alegre above.

There is also a different systems element to the design aimed at identifying irrelevant variation. Nylen shows that despite active efforts in Betim in contrast somewhat to João Monlevade to avoid politicisation of the process and a strong association of PB with PT, the result of a change of government was no different. Some of this was down to a strong opposition who in both cases were able to reorganise, form alliances, attack and in some ways shape the (il-) legitimacy of the PB. Thus it seems on this evidence that we can discard active efforts to avoid partisanship by a ruling party instigating PB as a sufficient condition for enduring change. An all too often ignored strength of comparative research is the potential to reject or eliminate causal factors and reduce problems of overdetermination. Uncovering 'hidden' overdetermination is a particularly undersold value of QCA approaches and the findings of my systematic comparisons below emphasise this point.

Moreover, we can combine Nylen's finding with evidence of weak opposition highlighted in the description that Goldfrank gives of PBs inception in Porto Alegre (cumulating knowledge from case studies). Thus we might surmise that when a weak opposition is combined with a PT initiated PB programme, a partisan PB which is susceptible to a lack of buy-in from those outside the PT is avoided. In other words on the evidence of these cases taken together a weak opposition is an independent necessary part of a combination of conditions which is sufficient to produce deepened participatory democracy (an INUS condition, c.f. Mackie 1988). This is a small insight into the logical thinking of case-based comparative methods. But it is usually too difficult to transfer these comparisons beyond a small number of cases as it becomes too difficult to consider all potential combinations of causal factors in one researcher's head (see chapter 3 and 4)!

2.6   Design varies and context matters

As with Nylen, Marcelo K. Silva (2003) compares two Brazilian cases; this time in in close proximity to Porto Alegre in the state of Rio Grande do Sul (Alvorada and Gravataí). His focus is on the effect of PB on civil society and his key question is whether a policy innovation from a nearby metropolis works in a similar way

in cities with different 'associative environments' (2003: 114). He describes a complex relationship between associations and the PB in both cases. In spite of dense networks of neighbourhood associations, these were often characterised by clientelism and the support for popular participation characterised by some accounts of the organisations in Porto Alegre was absent or opposed to a certain degree. The important contribution here is to illustrate that the character of civil society in a municipality cannot easily be dichotomised as supportive or unsupportive of participation in an absolute sense. Civil society organisation (CSO) support for participation is not indeterminate but it ranges in value where organisation can be both supportive and not supportive to various degrees. That is, civil society has fuzzy membership in the set of support for participation.

Another excellent contributor to the development of comparative analysis of democratic innovation is Leonardo Avritzer (2005). Avritzer has described participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre in conjunction with the process in Belo Horizonte. He is able to show that PB rules can be effectively adapted to new settings and 'invention' is often conditioned by pre-existing arrangements and cultures of participation and politics (2005: 391). Then by contrasting trends using individual-level data for the number of participants in Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte he expands our understanding of incentives for participation. When a new administration was elected in the Belo Horizonte case, participation waned, before waxing again the following year when it had been demonstrated that this new administration was committed to implementing the PB.

Avritzer's earlier work (2002) also compares two 'participatory publics'; PB in Porto Alegre with another participatory innovation in Mexico. This is one of many examples of comparisons across types of democratic innovation. As we have explained this study focuses only on PB as a test case for medium-N comparisons within types of democratic innovation. I discuss the implications and potential for medium-N comparison across types of innovations at greater length in Chapter 7. In a later work as part of a wider comparison of 'participatory institutions' (2009) (somewhat similar conceived to democratic innovations, see chapter 7 and discussion in Ryan and Smith 2013), Avritzer compares three participatory budgets adding the case of Sao Paulo. Of interest here for scholars of democratic innovations is a critique of what he calls Fung and Wright's 'static model' of institutional design for deepening participatory democracy (idem: 63-64). Avritzer points out (as I have done above) the methodological disadvantages

in early research that considered only the most successful cases (although as I have explained this can also be a function of the stage of phenomenological development where the understanding of what a case is a case of, and hence what constitutes an exceptional or average case, are not self-evident to a scattered, nascent research community). Avritzer chooses not exceptional or failed cases, but cases whose redistributive and deliberative outcomes are successful *to a matter of degree*. He shows that redistributive and deliberative successes in Sao Paulo, an 'almost unsuccessful case' (idem:115), were tempered by a context in which the potential for a powerful opposing coalition to form was greater, leading the administration to provide alternative avenues for public politics which emasculated the PB (idem: 113).

His second claim against the 'static' model rounds on cultural factors; what Fung and Wright overlook is that "moving away from very basic variables, we may see the presence of other variables, such as clientelism or party interest. Those more specific variables may hinder local participation, even when broad enabling conditions are present," (idem). I will argue below that attention to the importance of cultural idiosyncrasies in causal explanation can be as dangerous as it is advantageous and that the measure of any piece of research should be transparency and accuracy in abstraction. However, Avritzer highlights a more fundamental aspect of comparative logic often overlooked by the preferred methods in social science: The presence or absence of a single condition in any logical case[9] can alter the effect of all other causal combinations on an outcome. Moreover his comparison leads him to strongly avow that it is "interaction between civil and political society" where voluntary associations develop participatory mechanisms AND political actors choose to embed participation in their way of governing that clearly explains successful participatory design (idem). In other words, as is almost always the case in social science, key causes are contingent and causation is combinatorial/conjunctrual.

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[9] Each possible combination of presence or absence of relevant causal conditions represents a unique *logical case*. Any number of substantive emprical cases may be the same logical case, i.e. display the same values of presence or absence of conditions. In social sciences there are almost always logical cases for which we have no empirical examples. These are known as logical remainders, or sometimes counterfactuals. This is further explained in Ch.3.

These comparisons of two or three cases develop the literature and make important discoveries, hinting at the relevance and irrelevance of potential causal factors. Still we cannot rely on unconnected small-N comparative designs alone to be certain about these causes. It is very difficult, if not impossible, for even well-designed comparisons of two to three cases to allow enough variation across key factors. This is even more obvious if we do accept that the degree of presence of one causal factor may alter the effect of another. So small-N comparisons also should be cumulated where possible.

A significant and welcome recent development has seen large-N comparisons of cases of Brazilian PB. Avritzer and Wampler (2005) use descriptive statistics to illustrate the diffusion of PB through Brazil, paying particular attention to the ideological hue of parties, relative wealth and development, and the size and location of municipalities adopting programmes. They show that there was a general trend to PB adoption by governments further to the right and in less wealthy municipalities over time. They also provide some figures for the number of civil society organisations across PB cities in the state of Minas Gerais.

Spada uses sophisticated econometric modelling techniques to compare the effect of introducing PB on city finances and separately on the re-election of the incumbent political party to the mayoral administration (2010). He is one of the first to give a good indication of the effect of implementing PB over time; whether there are lags in its effects. He is able to show that there is no clear evidence for claims for the improvement in municipal finances in the medium-to-long term across Brazilian municipalities adopting PB. His second model is equally salutary in that it reorients us towards the realpolitik, and potential gains at play for parties adopting and discontinuing participatory policies. There is a general trend towards short-term gains for both these actions (with some differences based on size of municipality and ideological hue of party). This work is a serious advancement. As above, the acknowledged disadvantage with this method is that it requires significant abstraction and an 'additive' understanding of contributions to the outcome i.e. it bears all the advantages and disadvantages of stepping back from the complexity of the case. It certainly forces us to go back to the cases though and think again about the mechanisms that seemed to suggest, in particular, financial reward for municipalities with PB programmes.

2.7   A cultural trap?

One of the strengths of the comparative studies discussed so far is that they compare only Brazilian cases. Comparative politics was built on the assumption that states vary in numerous important respects. Using the logic of area studies the above mentioned authors control for the idiosyncrasies of Brazilian culture, political history and institutions of government. Nevertheless at this stage, as we have seen, PB had diffused outside Brazil, in particular across Latin America. This turns our attention to the question of whether this innovation is indeed an innovation that can be taken up in other cross-national contexts.

Benjamin Goldfrank has done more than most to advance the cause of cumulating comparative knowledge of PB. He writes that 'the recent boom of studies on participatory local democracy in Latin America has yet to produce compelling cross-national comparative analysis to provide an answer' (2011: 2) and 'causal analysis of why some fail while others succeed remains underdeveloped' (idem: 24). Goldfrank compares budget participation in three cities in different countries; Porto Alegre, Montevideo, and the Libertador municipality in Caracas. Left-wing parties promising participatory reform arrived in power in these cases at similar moments but with varying results. Goldfrank's question parallels the one I wish to answer using a larger N; 'why [and when] do participatory experiments aid in deepening democracies in some cities but not in others?' (idem: 2).   By comparing across countries here Goldfrank can conclude that it is through a combination of a relatively decentralised national system of municipal government and weak institutionalisation of opposition parties that participatory democracy thrives (idem: 7). In his conclusion he turns to discuss some further examples of what he says are surprisingly successful examples of PB in other contexts in Latin America (idem: 258-260), showing that different cases of PB have been characterised by equifinality[10]. This is later confirmed by further cross-case analysis in this thesis.

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[10] Equifinilaty is assumed where the same outcome is reached by different paths. For an explanation of the assumptions on finality in set-theoretic methods see pp.44-49.

We need not focus only on the concern of improving democratic governance in Latin America. As outlined in the introduction, democratic deficits are a concern throughout the 'democratic' world (Stoker, 2006; Pateman: 2012). In what Giovanni Allegretti calls a 'return of the caravels' the particular innovation in democratic development of concern here was introduced from the 'new' world back to the 'old' one. There are a few early attempts to take stock of the diffusion of PB across Latin America and then further afield, and in particular first to Europe, then beyond (Cabannes 2004; Allegretti and Herzberg 2004; Sintomer et al, 2005; Shah (ed.) 2007). While relatively more descriptive than systematic in their comparative focus these works both describe a larger number of cases than before and try and give a first sense of comparing emerging cases across countries with vastly varying political and cultural histories. Both draw together many threads of investigation of participatory budgets and usefully set the parameters for the kinds of questions we might want to ask in a more systematic way, looking at causal combinations. They give us a sense of the rich complexity of the social and political contexts of PB experiments. As our understanding of the field develops we will want to search for a useful balance between parsimony and complexity in our explanations.

Similar to Goldfrank's systematic small-N comparison of budget participation in cities in Latin America, Talpin (2011) and Röcke (2009) have compared PB across cities in different national contexts within Europe. Talpin's ethnographic comparative approach allows him to understand how individuals' experiences of participation in budget decisions was shaped and reshaped by different environments. His engulfment in participant observation in Morsang-sur-Orge brings us vividly the salutary reminder that behind the scenes of participatory experiments lies politics; 'several actors are involved in the process, with different motives and dispositions, a complex decision-making process is created, where power is shared by different groups fighting insidiously for it, while pretending to be allied for the common good', (2011: 199). His inductive comparative approach shows that even in three relatively radical participatory experiments (in their national contexts) the opportunities for participation are conditioned by national and local political norms. He is one of an increasing number of scholars making important contributions to our understanding of the effects of PB on the individual and in particular longitudinal effects of different styles and 'grammars' of participation.

Röcke for her part finds similarly that national frames have a bearing on how participation is institutionalised. Her methods of data collection are very similar to Talpin's. She takes her case selection in a slightly different direction, choosing a most-different strategy involving the selection of an atypically weak case in one national context, an atypically strong case in another and a typical PB case in a third. This allows her to provide answers to questions about how country-specific contexts and frames shape the diffusion of PB controlling for positive and negative cases (in terms of typicality and success). Her case-based inductive-comparative approach identifies "the political will to introduce a new procedure and to support it against administrative and political opposition; administrative support for developing and implementing this procedure; financial means to publicise and organise the procedure; and the type of diffusion," as important factors explaining divergences in processes of implementation of PB (2009: 250). We will return to discuss the key causal variants and theories in explanations of PB outcomes in Ch. 4-6.

Within-country analysis outside of Brazil has been less visible. More recently Matteo Bassoli's three-case comparison of PB governance in Italy has provided an interesting subnational comparison in a European country where PB has been widespread and often more radical than elsewhere (2012). Bassoli takes seriously questions around the definition of PB which we will again return to in discussions of operationalisation and selection of explanatory conditions for cumulation below. His main focus is considering PB as a type of local governance arrangement. He provides a fresh note of caution against biases that would restrict PB to an epiphenomenon of a particular theoretical tradition (2012: 1185). If PB is of any worth it will need to be compared to other similar and different modes of innovation and of democratic governance (see further discussion Ch. 7). Within a most-different selection of consolidated Italian cases (based on geography, population, and the role of the global justice system), Bassoli shows that democratic outcomes, both good and bad, were generally similar across the cases, thus eliminating some of the conditions of selection as causal. One interesting observation is that in all three cases a role for the opposition within the PB was not excessively supported by either the government or opposition leading to familiar problems for the PB itself.

An important lesson to take from this review of literature is that the kinds of questions that are asked by small-N comparativists and the variables they favour

investigating seem to differ depending on the cases they select to compare. Of course it makes sense when doing in-depth research on a handful of cases to select carefully those cases best positioned to answer a researcher's question of interest. But it is also clear that the choice of cases tends again to constrain the potential for testing the conclusions of one set of cases with another set in favour of the potential for 'new' findings.

2.8   Towards a medium-N Systematic Comparison of Participatory Budgeting

Before moving to introduce the potential of qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to contribute to the goals of systematic comparison of a larger number of cases for moderate but valuable generalisations, I must discuss three bodies of work which have already begun to take us in this direction. Brian Wampler's comparison of eight PB's in Brazil was the first to show the significant possibilities (and challenging considerations) in moving beyond two or three cases while retaining virtues of holistic case-based complexity in explanations. His systematic approach to case selection and specification and selection of causal conditions, allow him to deduce what conditions of top-down and bottom-up incentives, and institutional design rules are necessary and/or sufficient to cause qualitative variation in the level of citizen decision-making in different PB cases. Chapter 4 of this thesis deals in far more detail with Wampler's work, including the details of its contribution, while simultaneously showing the added value of applying QCA to existing comparisons. Suffice it to say that it was a significant path-breaker for my contributions.

A more recent sophisticated approach to medium-N comparison comes from Baiocchi, Heller and Silva (2011). They recognise from the outset that the case for participatory democracy despite much spilt ink still rests on "rather fragmented and thin empirical grounds" (idem: 1). While the study design again relies on some rich and demonstrably well-executed fieldwork, perhaps most exciting is the scientific approach to case selection. The researchers apply a matched –pair approach to the selection of eight cases to increase relevant control and isolate conditions of interest. Their outcome of interest is centred on the changes in civil society and its interactions with the state where PB is implemented. Most comparisons discussed up to now have focused on a

population of cases where a participatory innovation has already been introduced and based the case-selection decision on variation on outcomes and key causal conditions. Baoicchi et al.'s design allows them to also ascertain the differences between cases where PB is introduced and similar cases where it was never; controlling for scale, geography and civil society support for the PT. Further important contributions relevant to comparison of instances of innovation and non-instances beyond Brazil continue to emerge (c.f. Galais et al. 2012, Lopes Alves and Allegretti 2012). In Chapter 3 I make the case that the turn in considered attention to the bounds of counterfactual analysis is one that we should not lose sight of.

Baiocchi et al. are also able to give us some insight into the variation in democratic mobilisation of civil society across their 4 cases of PB, renewing discussion of a common theme that variation in the capacity of civil society to act autonomously and contentiously results in different forms of participatory democracies. They find co-optation is a danger where weak civil society meets (can be observed in combination with) an organised top-down process. These findings bring some nuance to those mentioned earlier. A weak or strong civil society may contribute towards one outcome or its negation depending on the degree to which other key explanatory conditions are present and how they interact. This multifinality[11] is a common logical occurrence in the social world and one commonly overlooked by social scientists trained to think in 'additive' terms as we shall see. Moreover, it is food for thought that due to selecting a control of cases where the PT had a small winning or losing margin in the 1996 election (some ten years after democratisation of Brazil), at least some of the cases discussed by Baiocchi et al. might be assumed to have relatively strongly institutionalised opposition, bringing nuance to Goldfrank's conclusions above. Goldfrank might counter that the cross-national nature of his research can show a relative difference in party institutionalisation not present in a subnational comparison. And we should not forget that the structure of PBs in Brazil has been mostly less formal and less regulated and hence restricted (Goldfrank 2011: 256). All in all this points to the necessity of cumulating findings across

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[11] Multifinality, meaning that the same condition can lead to different outcomes (depending on its context).

smaller-N comparisons as at least any attempt will begin to uncover what comparisons at what levels of abstraction are robust and relevant.

Finally, Yves Sintomer has worked with an amalgam of colleagues, many mentioned above, over the years to move in the direction of worldwide comparison and categorisation of the PB landscape. This is an important body of work. Subnational comparisons and comparative designs that are drawn from an area studies background in Latin America and Europe have a sound methodological basis but they need to be complemented by cumulative findings for an even more ecumenical understanding of the phenomenon at hand. How else can we know and discuss the proper levels to which we can generalise? Carole Pateman considers that given the empirical evidence "the problem is no longer whether participatory democracy is feasible," and leaves us with the question as to whether "in the rich countries, there is any longer either the political culture or the political will to pursue genuine democratization?" (2012: 15). Is Pateman too quick to draw a line between the desired 'genuine democratisation' as it might manifest itself in the so-called developed world and elsewhere? Perhaps conditions for participatory democracy may need to be different in these contexts. Only through comparison can we answer these questions.

Much like some of the previous work outlined above, Sintomer et al. focus on delivering an overview and providing some organising principles for understanding PB. PB is a quickly-diffusing 'moving target' (Baiocchi et al., 2011: 60), but this kind of work helps us to think about what the scope of PB is and what the potential for comparison within the scope might be (what PB is and is not). The most interesting analytical contribution of this work so far has been to provide a typology of PBs using the logic of Weberian ideal types (see Herzberg 2011 for a detailed discussion). Their types are based on differences in design, often based on the origins of adoption of the innovation, that lead to differing conditions of deliberation and the role of civil society. These can offer useful visual aids (e.g. Sintomer et al. 2008: 170). At points they suggest that there is still too much contrast for systematic comparison and analysis of many different PB types (2013: 11; 20). Below I show that careful analysis of the property space and movements towards a fully specified typological theory can aid judgements on comparability.

What these researchers are catalysing is the process of maturation of a new and significant sub-field in political studies. The established fields in political studies have always benefited from early conceptual work in organising their scope and principles (Lijphart 1971). We are still at a relatively early stage of phenomenological development with democratic innovations. Yet iteration among theory-led concept refinement and comparative political science is enabling self-actualisation of a field of research. Simply, as Mill's methodological doctrine would have it, "We compare phenomena with each other to get the conception, and we then compare those and other phenomena with the conception...the conception becomes a type of comparison, (Mill 1950: 298).

Let us return then to Goldfrank's summation of the state of research on participatory democratic processes as it is far better than I could reinvent. He contends that "a compelling framework that integrates actors, preconditions, and institutional design remains elusive (2011: 24 - 25)." My approach in this thesis is to try and provide a response to this that is grounded in systematic comparative analysis.

Chapter 3:   Developments in comparison and case-based methods: Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)

> Good social science is problem driven and not methodology driven in the sense that it employs those methods that for a given problematic, best help answer the research questions at hand, Flyvbjerg (2006: 242).

3.1   Why QCA and why now?

Designing social research involves trade-offs between complexity and generality. There remains an often overblown and unhelpful distinction in social sciences between strategies that standardly prioritise one over the other. For Ragin "it is easy to exaggerate their differences and to caricature the two approaches, for example, by portraying quantitative work on general patterns as scientific but sterile and oppressive and qualitative research on small Ns as rich and emancipatory but soft and subjective", (2000: 22). Qualitative Comparative Analysis sets itself up as a method that provides an avenue for assuaging some of the unhelpful tensions in this distinction.

The attractiveness of QCA as both a critical methodological approach and a novel set of techniques has led to its application across an ever-expanding group of diverse disciplines and subdiscplines in the social sciences (Thiem and Dusa, 2013: 2). It has been one of the few approaches in recent times to come from outside the methodological orthodoxy that has not soon been quickly lost again to dark corners of the methodological lexicon. The number of peer-reviewed articles per year using QCA has grown gradually since the first in 1984; up to fifteen in 2005, to thirty-five in 2011, and then more quickly to forty-five in 2012 and ninety-nine in 2013 (idem[12]). Of those ninety-nine articles sixteen were

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[12] Figures for 2012 and 2013 were kindly provided by Alrik Thiem in personal communication (Jan 2014) and were published in the COMPASSS newsletter of January 2014 http://www.compasss.org/newsletter/33.pdf. COMPASSS (COMPArative Methods for

agenda-setting articles introducing QCA to new sub-disciplines (among them Ryan and Smith 2012). QCA has not yet been employed extensively or sophisticatedly in the field of political participation and deliberative democratic innovation. My work attempts to investigate the usefulness of the method while introducing it to that field.

The following chapters aim to 1) Introduce advanced applications of QCA to the field of political participation, providing exemplars with substantive outcomes 2) discuss how QCA's formal logic can provide a tool for researchers that enables them to make more transparent and improved decisions on the requisite parsimony and complexity in explanations of the social world, 3) discuss new opportunities for cumulating scholarly knowledge and systematically reviewing existing evidence using QCA and 4) investigate whether information gleaned from qualitative comparative analyses provides a new, robust and interactive means by which policymakers can engage with research evidence.

3.2   How do we know what we know and how should we find things out in social sciences? Big-N, Small-N and the forgotten middle child.

Arguments about the correct approach to political research are still anchored by deference to a hierarchy of methods (most succinctly summarised by Lijphart, 1971). This well-known hierarchy descends from experiments, through statistics to the comparative method and on to the case-study. For some time now there has been a paradigmatic consensus[13] that has developed around this hierarchy. Of course much of the more recent railing against this seeming consensus manifests itself vividly in work associated with the 'Perestroika movement' (c.f. Flybjerg 2001, Schram and Caterino 2006); and there are arguments that there is an on-going process of paradigm shift accommodating a position for a more 'critical realism' (c.f. Marsh and Stoker 2006, Moses and Knutsen 2012).

Systematic cross-caSe analySis) is a worldwide network for scholars interested in systematic cross-case comparative approaches to research www.compasss.org.

[13] I take consensus here in its loose sense, not meaning complete agreement.

Nevertheless with large-N surveys of individuals becoming easier to perform in the middle of the last century, the 'behavioural revolution' in political science, had a profound and lasting effect in shaping the current paradigm. Leaving aside the not insignificant increase in experimental work (Morton and Williams 2010, Green and Gerber 2012), leaping advances in technology, and practises of surveying and parametric statistical analysis made it easier to answer the questions social scientists wanted to answer using statistical methods. As these methods, with their position in the hierarchy above small-N comparisons, became more common, they became a yardstick for methodological rigour in both the mind of the profession and end-users of political research (i.e. policymakers and all other agents who would wish to use social research to effect social change). The result was that one approach to addressing questions of causation dominated - the variable-oriented approach (c.f. Ragin 1988, 2000).

King, Keohane and Verba's (1994) contribution here has been inordinately influential. Although they provide a plethora of thoughtful discussions on the scientific process in social enquiry, it has become popular to caricature their approach as boiling down to a simple pithy piece of advice to small-N researchers; 'try to increase your N'. To give them fair dues, they further note that;

> combine(d) evidence from many observations...is always at least as good and usually better than the analogy...As long as these additional observations have some features that are similar in some way, however small, to the event we are predicting and we are using this additional information in a reasonable way, they will help make for a more accurate and efficient prediction, (1994: 212-213).

This reasoning has some resonance with QCA's promise to develop a method that makes feasible medium-N research strategies. Ragin's (2000: 25) plot of the relative number of studies against the number of cases per study in the discipline is worth reproducing here (see Fig 3.1 below). On face value, the U-shaped pattern suggests that small-N researchers are indeed quite averse to accepting King, Keohane and Verba's advice to look for any way to increase the number of observations unless N can be radically improved (which would probably require a significant change of research question).

Figure 1.1 Plot of Relative Number of Studies against *N* of Cases in Each Study

Figure 3-1 Number of cases per study reproduced from Ragin (2000: 25).

While some like King, Keohane and Verba have been able to show us the common scientific norms undergirding social research strategies; others have been able to clarify the distinct advantages and disadvantages of random-selection and information-oriented selection of cases (Flyvbjerg 2006). Lijphart enumerates many strategies for both single-case and comparative research. Even his list is far from exhaustive. To Lijphart's list can for example be added 'critical case' and 'maximum variation' strategies (see Flyvbjerg idem). I need not discuss them at length here as the important point is that there are many well-thought out strategies for logical contributions to knowledge accumulation in small-N research.

Traditional statistical methods focus on isolating the net-effects of a small number of variables over a large number of cases (Ragin, 2007: 177). They will struggle to adequately deal with the increasing number of potential configurations of explanatory variables acting in distinct directions. Despite

advances in Large-N research applications, to answer many of the question students of social phenomena would like to answer a large-N is often hard to come by (Lijphart 1970) or perhaps undesirable (Flyvbjerg 2006). This can be particularly true of public policy innovation, where diffusion is common but rarely universal and intricate exemplars are valued by end-users of research. Small-N case-based research can be attentive to the complexity of phenomena allowing researchers to reflectively refine definitions of their elemental qualities within the process of undertaking research. However, the trade-off is a lack of generalizability which decreases the potential for social research to justify actions and make an impact.

There may be good arguments for avoiding small-N research strategies. Lieberson (1994) is quick to point out that Mill himself, on whose lucidity the comparative method is grounded[14], was sceptical of using such method in the social sciences. Thoughtful critiques from this school have shot difficult charges at case-based research strategies; perhaps most convincingly when rounding on their perceived inability to distinguish random from real data and adequately consider measurement error. In a following section I will discuss Lieberson's related but specific criticisms of QCA. I wish to show that such critiques of case-based research have helped improve our understanding of their value immensely but that their dismissal of small-N strategies is based on misplaced focus on technique over approach. The lasting criticism of King, Keohane and Verba's work is that it tries to impose variable-oriented thinking on case-based research strategies. Theirs is not an ignoble goal and their lessons provide a useful check on unreflective 'small' thinking. The contributions of Ragin, Flyvbjerg and others have however helped to clarify and elucidate the intrinsic value of case-based research strategies.

That is not to say either that the approach itself is favourable or immune from critique. Certainly the approach can incentivise an over-reliance on no-variance designs and restrict itself quickly to claims of exceptionalism. Both 'no-variance' designs and case studies that highlight exceptionality are not *necessarily*

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[14] For a simple explanation of Mills methods see Savolainen (1994); for a connection to Boolean logic see Caramani (2009).

problematic and can be quite powerful; however they should not be the norm. The true explanation for avoidance of medium-N strategies is not difficult to imagine. Small-N approaches rely on a high quality of information about and familiarity with cases in a study. And it is simply very difficult for a researcher, possessed with only one brain to have a deep understanding of a large number of cases (see discussion next chapter).

In any event, even if "the comparative method is not the equivalent of the experimental method but only a very imperfect substitute..," (Lijphart, 1970: 685); still most of those committed to a hierarchical heuristic for thinking about values in methodological approaches might say that "...awareness of the limitations of the comparative method is necessary but need not be disabling" (idem). The question then becomes one of developing coping/enhancement strategies for small-N research; or at least applying the comparative method in a way that has potential to contribute to generalisation.

Berg-Schlosser and Cronqvist suggest that Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) may offer a solution to this problem:

> Between the extremes of over-generalizing and "universalizing" macro-quantitative approaches, on the one hand, and purely individualizing case-oriented approaches, on the other, a meaningful "medium-range" social science can be built which, at the same time, has a higher explanatory power and a greater social and political relevance, (2005: 172).

PB appears ripe for a medium-N study which aims to advance the goals of both functional population definition (of what PB is) and robust causal analyses (of the combinations of effects that produce more or less successful cases). The following sections further elaborate the distinctiveness of case-based approaches and consider the application of the lessons of recent methodological debates to substantive investigations of democratic innovations.

3.3   Contributing to knowledge on participation in public policymaking using QCA

In the previous chapter I merely chronicled the development of a scientific sub-discipline around a newly discovered phenomenon of investigation. I wanted to

elucidate the constraints and incentives that have led those interested in finding out about the phenomenon to particular research tactics and tools. It is always useful to review the literature to establish trajectories of scholarly developments thoroughly before contributing to it. However, I also aim to contribute substantively; but how?

Many researchers working together and apart can be part of an informal accumulation of knowledge and draw on one another's communicated understandings of related phenomena. This is the express purpose of academic journals, conferences and collaboration. Yet especially in an emerging field, each individual research study must deal with the enduring analytical problem of many potential explanatory variables and few cases.

Often, as we have seen, the primary remedy to this dilemma is to increase the number of observations as much as possible (Lijphart 1971: 686, King, Keohane and Verba, 1994). This tactic in the circumstances of PB research raises some significant but not insurmountable problems. Yet, in the build-up of rich case study literature and the development of a number of causal explanations for outcomes of a democratic innovation like PB, an opportunity now arises. There is potential for moderate generalisations in a larger-N systematic cross-case comparison of processes that have been institutionalised to differing degrees in different parts of the world. Even if we take the classical hierarchical approach to selecting methods, at this juncture, a comparison based on conventional statistical analysis is difficult to conceive for a number of reasons. First, it is not clear, should we aim to use 'mainstream' methods, that we have enough cases on which to draw statistical significance — and for those cases that are available, it is not yet clear that they should all be classified as forms of PB (see discussion of casing and scope below). Second, case-work and existing small-N comparisons suggest that causation is likely to be complex. Wampler, for example, suggests, "successful PB cases depend on a series of factors converging to support the delegation of authority" (2007a: 159). Moreover, Peruzzotti has claimed that, "Democratic innovation is more likely to take place in a relatively grey area, where neither all of the significant variables promote change nor do all of them conspire against it" (2009: 58). A configurative comparative analyst on assessing the lie of the land might put it thus: The existing literature tells us that causation is likely to be *conjunctural, asymmetrical, multifinal* and *equifinal.*

3.4　Configurative comparative and set-theoretic, case-based methods: Explaining the mouthfuls and unpacking the potential[15]

As Ragin is often at pains to point out in his writing, the distinction between variable-oriented and case-based research is itself a matter of degree and variable-oriented methods will continue to be immensely powerful tools for social science. This is not least because "QCA has not yet received the sustained evaluation of its inferential strengths and weaknesses that other techniques, such as regression analysis and comparative case study research, have benefited from," (Seawright 2004: 14, see also 2005: 41).

If we agree to discount some relatively marginal technical distinctions, then 'case-based' (Byrne and Ragin 2009), 'set-theoretic' (Schneider and Wagemann 2012) and 'configurative comparative' (Rihoux and Ragin 2009) methods can be seen as emerging placeholders for an expansive but palpable methodological approach that can be distinguished from the paradigmatic 'variable-oriented' approach. It should be neither seen as a replacement for, nor incompatible with, its variable-oriented cousin, and it has supporters in both those who would challenge and strongly uphold the aforementioned hierarchy (Byrne 2009). It is more appropriate to place it at the forefront of a wave of methodological reasoning which moves beyond unhelpful distinctions between, on the one hand qualitative and quantitative and the other theory and its practical application, which have hindered the advancement of social research. The worth of the approach is that it has provided fresh markets for valuable old ideas, and with resulting innovation, some new and useful tools that help investigations that are too easily disregarded when one approach dominates.

There are at least two important distinctions that characterise the approach. The first is the fuzzier of the two but no less important, as case-based methods are,

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[15] This following sections introduce QCA and draw heavily on the work of Ragin (1988, 2000, 2008) and Schneider and Wagemann (2012) in particular. For book-length treatments of fsQCA methodology see Ragin (2000, 2008) Smithson and Verkuilen (2006), Rihoux and Ragin (2007) and Schneider and Wagemann (2011). Introducing vast new terminology to their audience is a particular dilemma for those writing on fuzzy sets.

put simply, a lot more disposed than their variable-oriented cousin to giving serious thought to problems of boundaries of cases (c.f. Ragin and Becker 1992, Byrne 2009). Case-based methods vary in the tools they employ and the number of cases they compare, but they hold in common an understanding of social research that is sensitive to the complexity of the case and the scope of generalisations. To allow for generalisations within a designated scope QCA requires sound theoretical specification of the population of cases and selection of key conditions for comparison. This means that case-based methods are characterised by constant iteration between inductive and deductive strategies[16] (between evidence and theory), and by on-going problematisation of the scope of populations, causes and outcomes in a piece of comparative research (Ragin 2000, Rihoux and Lobe 2009). This will become clearer as I describe the process of research I undertook using this approach.

The second is the neater of the two distinctions; that configurative methods ascribe to an understanding of causality in the social world, in which outcomes are explained by configurations of conditions (conjunctions). This is not the same as assuming interaction effects (c.f. Wagemann and Schneider 2012: 86-87). Causal effects are not deemed to be 'additive' where each potential cause is assumed to have a meaningful relationship with the outcome that is independent of the presence and absence of the other causal conditions (Ragin 1988 2000: 95). Rather, causes in different contexts are seen to have effects that do not 'average out' in a very meaningful way. As we shall see there are two contrasting base approaches to logic that we can distinguish; one formed on the operators of Boolean algebra and the other on the operators of elementary algebra.

Logically if we take it that causation is conjunctural then causal explanations may be multifinal: i.e. the same conditions can contribute to different and opposing outcomes depending on the different degrees of presence and absence of other conditions. This has further implications for the practical

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[16] I take induction and deduction here as common placeholders for strategies towards knowledge accumulation that prioritise hypotheses generated from empirical investigation and from theory respectively. For a more sophisticated discussion of the role of induction and deduction in scientific inference see Cohen and Nagel (1934: 273-277).

consequences of implementing our findings in the real world as causation is neither assumed to be unifinal nor 'linear'. The importance of context decrees that to manipulate an outcome it will not do to merely reduce or increase the presence or absence of a 'strong, significant' explanatory variable. Rather causation is asymmetric in that the conditions that explain the presence of an outcome do not necessarily by their absence explain that outcome's absence.

Another way of putting this is that the logic underlying the way we try to understand the social world is often set-theoretic (c.f. Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 5-6). This suggests first and foremost that social scientists tend to make causal statements that invoke relations of necessity and sufficiency. Theorists and case-researchers are particularly fond of claims of the nature 'X is sufficient but not necessary for Y'. Sufficient conditions (or more likely sufficient conjunctions) are usually what most of us have in mind when we say out loud 'x leads to y'. These kinds of relationships among conditions can be identified analytically in subset-superset relations among conditions compared across cases.

Take the following abbreviated passage from Gret and Sintomer's book on PB in Porto Alegre,

> A combination of a strong political culture in civil society and a strong political will in government represents the best context for initiating such an experiment. The process also requires a level of pragmatism in its implementation... formal political equality is not sufficient... true political will is required founded upon alternative action mechanisms... municipal action alone cannot hope to modify the relationship between social classes, (2005: 134).

In the space of one half-page the authors suggest at least four hypotheses that are set-theoretic in nature. The hypotheses they are conceiving are based on combinatorial causation and notions of necessary (or 'required') and sufficient or insufficient ('not alone') conditions. The use of set-theoretic reasoning is ubiquitous in the social sciences and statements about necessity and sufficiency are rife within the PB literature. I will highlight further the set-theoretic nature of many of the causal claims made by PB scholars in Chapter 5.

3.5 The advantages of set-oriented thinking for social research: What to do with a medium-N?

Case-based comparative approaches assume that there is an extent to which complex phenomena can be observed and described in terms of both their elemental *qualities* and quantitative variations of the presence of these qualities. Then qualitative descriptions when compared to idealisations and to other phenomena using the insights of theory can be usefully measured and mapped in terms of their set membership across cases. This lends itself to some new analytic techniques, in particular the use of Boolean algebraic operations and fuzzy logic, to provide parsimonious descriptions of causal relationships.

Configurative comparative methods have been advocated as stand-alone approaches to selection for case-studies and typological theorising (George and Bennett 2005: 233-262) and for the initial selection of relevant pairs of cases for in-depth comparison (see De Meur and other's work on MDSO-MSDO designs, e.g. De Meur and Gottcheiner 2009). Nevertheless it has been variants of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) aimed at substantive causal interpretation that have popularised the use of configurative methods. A qualitative comparative analysis can be particularly useful in subfields of political research which have benefited from early and constant conceptual work in organising their scope. Therefore QCA has made a key contribution, for instance, to comparative welfare-state research (c.f. Skaaning et al, 2012). It is interesting to see then how it applies to work on democratic innovations that gradually approaches a more firm conceptual footing.

Most introductions to using QCA in the social sciences are careful to point out the case-oriented nature of the method and emphasise its advantages for small-to-medium N comparison (Ragin 1987, Berg-Schlosser et al 2009, Rihoux and Lobe 2009). Set-oriented thinking can help highlight relationships of necessary and sufficient causation in comparative case studies by observing subset-superset relationships. Necessary conditions are no less interesting but less common (in their non-trivial form) than sufficient conditions. Necessary conditions, by virtue of their presence being required in every instance of the outcome, impose more restrictions on where we might expect to observe an outcome in a way sufficient conditions do not. Any number of conditions or combinations of conditions may be sufficient for a given outcome in different

contexts. And it is so that causation can be equifinal; the same outcome can be reached in a number of different ways and although some of these conditions can be more or less likely to occur, none of them is any 'better' at predicting the outcome when they do[17].

Both questions of correlational relationships and set-theoretic relationships among variables are important for social scientists. While statistical analysis can measure the effect of having more or less of one variable on another, configurational analysis investigates what combinations of conditions are necessary or sufficient to produce an outcome. For necessity to be established the set of cases containing the outcome must be a subset of the set of cases displaying the cause. Similarly, for sufficiency to be established the set of cases containing the causal condition must be a subset of the cases displaying the outcome (c.f. Ragin, 2000: 214-217). These types of set-theoretic relations are often masked by correlation-focused analyses as patterns of subset-superset relations often appear to signal heteroscedasticity and may suggest associated error in model specification (Ragin 2007; 2008). Correlational-focused regression methods are not good tools for testing relationships of necessity and sufficiency.

Conversely, Boolean algebra can be applied to set-theoretic statements in order to highlight conjunctural, alternative and asymmetric relationships. This is done by testing alternative combinations of conditions for relationships of necessity and sufficiency (supersets and subsets) using Boolean logical operations such as logical 'AND' (the intersection of sets), and logical 'OR' (the union of sets). It also allows us to use simple Boolean negation operations (logical 'NOT') to show whether and when the absence of a condition contributes to outcomes.

From a practical point of view this opens up causal analysis to the tools and possibilities of Boolean logic. Savolainen has argued that the value of Mill's methods of comparison is "in their capacity to eliminate a limited set of alternative causal statements," (1994: 1218; see also Peters 2013). This element

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[17] There are however arguments from QCA scholars that some sufficient conditions may be 'empirically more important' than others on the basis that we have more evidence of their occurrence. I will return to this debate below.

of comparative research is undervalued, but I think systematic case-based comparison can have an even more subtle crucial advantage that is often overlooked. That is that it can reduce overdetermination and underdetermination in an apposite manner. A set-theoretic approach avoids seeing hypothesis as being in strict competition but as alternative cloudy solutions which require distillation. Applications of Boolean logic to causal analysis can be used to discard irrelevant conditions and identify and provide parsimonious yet robust descriptions of causal relations over more than a handful of cases. Using QCA we can test the types of causal claims and intuitions of the researchers whose case-studies and small-n comparisons have paved the way in studying democratic innovations.

These are not issues that have been ignored by the methodologists of 'mainstream' social science. All of the issues highlighted have vexed concerned statisticians who have come up with many ingenious ways of handling these problems. However, the qualitative comparative analysis I disclose here will provide a good exemplar for an approach that incorporates these concerns in a coherent and holistic manner that has much to recommend itself.

3.6   How could QCA be applied to PB?

Pratchett et al (2009) offer a first attempt at using crisp-set QCA (csQCA) — this is where membership in a set can be either 0 (out) or 1 (in) but no other value — to try and uncover patterns of causation in PB outcomes. It represents a first attempt to use QCA as part of a systematic review of evidence on PB, in particular, comparison of existing case materials. The strengths and weaknesses of crisp-set QCA lie in its simplicity and transparency. Where a case is a member of a set defined by the causal condition it is given the value 1 and where it is a non-member it is ascribed the value 0. An illustrative example of a crisp set truth table is shown below using imaginary data for four cases. Membership of cases (Porto Alegre, Rome, Belo Horizonte, Sevilla) in the sets of causal conditions (A,B,C,D) and outcome condition (Y) can be read easily. Moreover each row of the truth table can be read as a *logical case* (potential combination of causal conditions) for which we have an empirical case example. A full truth table would

include all possible combinations so that logical remainders (logical cases without empirical examples) can be dealt with transparently.[18]

Cases	Causal conditions				Outcome
	A	B	C	D	Y
Porto Alegre	1	0	0	1	1
Rome	0	1	0	1	0
Belo Horizonte	1	0	1	0	1
Sevilla	1	0	1	1	1

Table 3-1 Indicative truth table showing crisp membership in sets.

Truth tables are useful not only as a visual aid but as the first step in collating data which can then be minimised to provide parsimonious explanations of relationships across the data. Minimisation allows us to systematically interrogate the explanatory conditions, reducing them to the simplest combinations possible. Let us take the last two cases (Belo Horizonte and Sevilla) in our truth table above. Here we have a positive outcome with two different combinations of variables. We adopt the notation utilised by the fsQCA software programme[19] used later in this study for the sake of consistency, where the tilde '~' preceding the letter denotes absence of a condition and the asterisk '*' denotes intersection of sets (conjunction of conditions).[20]

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[18] Logical remainders are combinations of variables for which we do not have an empirical case, (we could call them counterfactuals). Even in large-N studies that take interaction of conditions into account we can expect many of the logical cases not to display any empirical examples. Large-N studies until relatively recently have paid little attention to the simplifying assumptions they make about these cases in their conclusions. QCA makes these assumptions transparent. See below.

[19] fsQCA 2.5 available as a freeware download from
http://www.u.arizona.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/software.shtml

[20] Alternative notation used by Tosmana software which was a popular programme and useful for crisp-set analysis and in some cases the R QCA package denotes presence of a condition by a capital letter; absence by lower case.

A*~B*C*~D (Belo Horizonte)

A*~B*C*D (Sevilla)

If two cases produce the same outcome, but differ only in one explanatory variable, then the variable that distinguishes the two cases can be considered irrelevant and removed (Caramani 2009: 72). This produces a simpler explanatory combination, namely:

A*~B*C (solution 1)

We also see that the Porto Alegre case produces the outcome by the causal combination:

A*~B*~C*D

Given that we know the Sevilla case (A*~B*C*D) also produces the outcome we can minimise to the simple combination

A*~B*D (solution 2)

It is unnecessary to introduce too much Boolean notation here (for more see Ragin 1987; Caramani 2009). However, if these were to be the only two combinations of variables that produced the particular outcome (Y), then we can state that

A*~B*C + A*~B*D →Y

or alternatively:

   [A*~B](C + D) →Y

(where + denotes logical OR)

We can then state here that Boolean minimisation has uncovered that A*~B (the *presence* of cause A and the *absence* of cause B in combination) is an insufficient but necessary part of an unnecessary but sufficient combination of conditions

(an INUS condition[21]) for the given outcome Y. It is present in both combinations, but on its own, not sufficient for Y: it requires the presence of either C or D.

3.7 Introducing Fuzzy Sets

CsQCA has been criticised for using a crude dichotomous measurement. Dichotomisation of a variable is reasonable when there is a clear threshold of distinction between a score, which indicates the observation of an occurrence, and one that indicates its absence. But, PB is no different to many concepts in social sciences, in that although potential causes or outcomes can be observed in many cases of a given phenomenon, the degree to which they occur varies[22]. Fuzzy sets[23] suggest a more sophisticated analysis is possible.

In a fuzzy set a case can be ascribed a value between 1 and 0 depending on its degree of membership in a set. This allows comparative researchers to describe degrees of variation. Fuzzy sets are in some ways simply an expansion in sophistication of the crisp dichotomisation. Each case will still display a membership score either side of the crossover point (0.5) which is closest to its crisp set membership. Table 3-2 represents the conditions from our earlier example in the form of an imaginary fsQCA data matrix.

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[21] For more on INUS conditions, see Mackie (1988) and Wagemann and Schneider (2007: 6). This conjunction is an INUS conjunction and both the conditions A and ~B are themselves INUS conditions.
[22] The criticisms of dichotomisation are often lazy or overblown. It can be an advantage to require that research define the presence or absence of a phenomenon and can be useful for thinking through logical contradictions (where two cases appear to contain the same configuration of relevant causes but a different outcome) in a property space of cases. For an applied discussion see Olsen and Nomura (2009). In chapter 6 I show that the crisp truth table is of indispensable value even to a fuzzy analysis.
[23] Fuzzy sets were adapted to social sciences by Smithson (1988) and Ragin (2000). They were previously developed for use in computer sciences by Zadeh (1965).

Cases	Causal conditions				Outcome
	A	B	C	D	Y
Porto Alegre	0.8	0.4	0.3	0.6	0.7
Rome	0.3	0.9	0.2	1	0.2
Belo Horizonte	0.6	0.1	0.9	0	0.6
Sevilla	0.7	0.1	0.7	0.7	0.8

Table 3-2 Indicative data matrix showing fuzzy membership in sets.

Fuzzy-set scores begin to bridge the divide between qualitative and quantitative data. They allow variation in membership of a set but add qualitatively defined breakpoints that give conceptual meaning to set membership. This begins to bridge the gap between formal and verbal logic (Ragin, 2000: 160). So, for example, if the outcome condition is understood as 'citizen control in participatory decision making', fuzzy-set scores allow us to represent the degree of control. Using Arnstein's seminal article on the 'ladder of participation' (1969) for illustrative purposes we can see how fsQCA analysis conceptualises a *set of cases* of 'citizen control in participatory decision-making'. Cases that display full citizen control have full membership of the set, manipulatory designs are located fully out of the set, and a number of cases ranging up from consultation to partnership display partial membership in the set (see fig. 3-2 below).

Figure 3-2 Mapping a fuzzy set based on Arnstein's 'ladder of participation'.

This represents a considerable advance for those who would wish to compare variation across cases, potentially offering one way of bridging the aforementioned 'unhelpful divide' between theory and practice in the study of democratic institutions (Smith 2009).

There is no conceptual difference in the way the Boolean operation (e.g. minimisation) described for crisp sets above are applied to fuzzy sets (Ragin 2009: 88). But it does mean that more meaningful consistency and coverage scores can be calculated which give more nuanced explanations of the manner in which each causal formula explains the outcome and measures degrees of contradiction. These scores are roughly similar to measures of fit as understood in traditional research methods and will be explained further in the analysis that follows.

3.8 The QCA approach as discipline: Making transparent choices

The process of conducting a QCA involves both construction and deduction, allowing constant reflexive iteration between theoretical assumptions and measurements. The method has an inimitable way of constituting clarity about

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theoretical assumptions involved in measurement, selections of cases, choices made between parsimony and complexity in description of empirical regularities, and interpretations of results (c.f. Rihoux and Lobe, 2009: 237). These are drawn out more vividly in their application in chapters 5 and 6. Much of the procedure I illustrate will seem familiar to practised small-N researchers. So what is the big deal they might ask? I want to show that applying the logic of case-based research beyond conventional boundaries in the number of cases that can be compared in one go can lead to unique insights. The value of a medium-range social science is that it retains the transparent conscientious reflexivity of the case-researcher (Flyvbjerg 2006: 235) and applies this contemporaneously with the expansive lessons derived from testing relationships across several accumulated instances of phenomena or a phenomenon.

In case-based research, the addition of new cases one by one is challenging. This is intensified when dealing with a larger-N. New cases may have consequences for both population/sample definition and variable definition. They may present a variation in the unit of analysis significant enough to force the researcher to reconsider the population. In other words they may require re-evaluation of distinctions between scope conditions and influencing conditions (See Walker and Cohen: 1985).[24] On the other hand the understanding of how conditions are observed in new contexts may force the researcher to re-evaluate the operationalisation of variables. While this iteration is time-intensive, its transparency in construction of the research is a key methodological advantage of fsQCA.

3.9   Scope and population

Ideally the first step of research involves defining a domain or population of cases. How do we recognise the phenomenon we are interested in explaining and perhaps predicting? There can be pressure to consider a relatively homogenous population, especially where observations are limited. After all

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[24] Scope conditions might also be considered as control variables.

"universal propositions may be safely applied to an actual subject matter only in so far as we are thoroughly familiar with the *type of object* of which the actual case is a *sample*," (Cohen and Nagel, 1934: 280-281, italics in original). For the purposes of this thesis that involves defining what a case of participatory budgeting is (and what it is not). A number of challenges present themselves at first departure. PB is a relatively young concept. It may be that it has not successfully distinguished itself from other democratic innovations or indeed traditional or ongoing methods of participation and/or governance.

A variety of definitions of PB are to be found in the literature. Many of these list a number of features; e.g. the facilitation of regular meetings, the provision of information, direct participation, self-regulation etc.[25], and suggest the presence of all in combination is necessary for a case to be distinguished as participatory budgeting. Many others either explicitly or implicitly use a much lower number of conditions or take the simple line that any participation in budget matters by 'ordinary citizens' constitutes participatory budgeting.

The first approach is favoured in the main by Latin American scholars and those inspired by the design of the Porto Alegre case. Many activists-come-researchers may not wish to concede any ground on the attractiveness of what 'Participatory Budgeting' was before the concept migrated and developed. But the position of the Porto Alegre case as not just a poster case, but moreover the archetype of PB is a challenge in many aspects for a comparative research agenda. What value is there in defining the population based on the best or first case? PB has necessarily been implemented in different ways as it has been adapted to different contexts. . Rocke holds that PB,

> …is but one example next to many others that underlines that the transfer or diffusion of institutions, ideas or practices does always necessitate a minimal work of re-interpretation with regard to characteristics of the new context and to the background of the 'transporting' actors (Rocke, 2009: 65).

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[25] For examples of these see Wampler (2007b) or Avritzer (2005).

The question is whether this re-interpretation should represent variation in measurement or is such a variation in quality that the phenomenon is no longer recognisable.

Moreover the success of PB has led to political opportunism and promotion of the concept but not necessarily any single model. It is difficult to know whether the adaptation of PB in new locations is a case of well thought out revision of a concept incorporating local knowledge or the muddled end product of a worldwide Chinese whisper. On the other end of the scale it could be equally foolish to define cases based on minimal criteria. The plethora of programmes now called PB may be PB in name only, based on the fame of the original case and the perceived desirability of being seen to implement it. This discussion highlights the challenge within such a comparative study of distinguishing variations in quality from variations in kinds of phenomena. It also begs the question as to whether QCA is a good approach given the emerging nature of the phenomenon. But if the approach can help identify and separate differences in kind and in quality it should provide a development on previous efforts at cross national comparison (e.g. Sintomer et al. 2013). The approach to population definition is discussed further in chapter 5.

3.10 Casing, conditioning, calibrating

If/once a population can be defined the selection of cases is the next logical step. While early monographs on QCA were keen to stress that populations could never be taken as 'given', they had a lot less to say about case selection. The unspoken assumption seemed to be that QCA was a home for medium-N research which involved analysis of 'full' populations rather than samples of that population. This was to be the method for analysing populations of phenomena that were too small for analysis based on criteria of probability. In reality sampling is inherent in every piece of research and samples derive from a combination of population definition and case selection. The response that populations are normally 'full' was one I received when I first broached some extremely helpful experienced QCA practitioners with my sampling problems early on in my research. This is not to say that those responses were undermining the idea that populations were not 'given' and should be problematised. The suggestion was that the work involved in problematizing,

scoping and redefining the population meant that moderate generalisations over that well-scoped universe could be made based on the findings from a medium-N. This made sense when looking at populations such as advanced industrial welfare states or regional conflicts. However it remains that there is not much written to my knowledge about the decisions involved in information-oriented sampling from a much larger population and use of QCA as I attempt it in this thesis.

Retaining some further acumens of case-based reasoning QCA generally employs information-oriented sampling. With a medium-N some familiarity with cases is important, especially for interpreting causal processes. It is normal though in comparative research to have dissimilar magnitudes of evidence on each case. Fuzzy-set measurement can be useful here by allowing different levels of measurement depending on a researcher's knowledge of cases (Ragin 2009:90). A greater knowledge about a particular condition can allow for finer-grained measurements across cases.

In fsQCA, case selection is inextricably intertwined with condition selection and calibration of sets. In mainstream social scientific language conditions and calibration might be referred to as variables and measurement respectively. However, although related, they are quite different concepts. A condition, similar to how we understand a variable, is an outcome explained by a factor or a factor used to explain an outcome. Although variation is important at some level quantitative variation alone is not the defining characteristic of both influencing and outcome conditions in set-theoretic analysis. Conditions are demarcated phenomena with meaningful maxima and minima for set membership. Where the phenomenon is observed the case can be said to be a member of the set of that phenomenon. Cases can have degrees of membership in a set depending on the degree to which the condition is observed.

Calibration is the scientific process of standardising a measurement against a known quality. This gives us the opportunity to connect theory and measurement in a constructive manner as the example of the ladder of participation above shows. As Ragin puts it we connect formal and verbal logic (2000: 160). A condition set is formulated by clearly defining full membership, full non-membership and other degrees of membership. In Ragin's words, "fuzzy logic offers a mathematical system that makes allowances for the pliable nature

of verbal concepts" (2000: 160). It is important to note that calibrated set scores are not a ranking. Each score is 'pinpointing a qualitative state' (Ragin 2009:90) that can be verbally described.

3.11   QCA is an approach not a set of techniques

Decisions on populations, cases, conditions and calibration are interwoven in QCA in a way that enforces discipline and transparency. QCA is very open to confronting the challenge of limited diversity of empirical instances of a phenomenon. That is researchers must be clear about the assumptions they make about counterfactuals. As we shall see an awareness of limited diversity can allow the researcher to make good transparent decisions about what key variables should be tested for causal relationships across cases. QCA researchers cannot hide that adding an extra condition exponentially increases the number of logical cases and almost certainly increases the proportion of logical remainders. And yet knowledge of new cases may bring with it new ideas about influencing conditions. When should the researcher combine conditions and move up the ladder of abstraction? I will show how this decision can be approached logically and transparently.

A related dilemma for fsQCA is that the incorporation of conditions in the definition of the domain or universe limits the scope of the research and influences the selection of variables or conditions. Should different circumstances be treated as conditions affecting outcomes or do they in fact signify that some cases are examples of different phenomena? This is essentially the fsQCA version of the difficult question common to all comparative research as to whether and when cases can be meaningfully compared.

The discipline of calibration ensures the researcher still cannot escape tough decisions and theoretical justification of what is fully relevant, partially relevant or completely irrelevant variation. This will in turn be dictated by the richness of data and the number of cases. . QCA poses challenges and takes the analytical brain in a reflective direction.

3.12 It's not all rosy in the garden - Critiques of QCA

A recurring criticism of QCA is that it is too static. In a case study, researchers can trace a process, providing a mechanistic definition of causation where time and sequence are important conditions influencing outcomes. However fsQCA has little to say about the difference in time between conditions observed in cases. Its analytical moment focuses on conjunction and disjunction. There are some suggestions for remedying this. In particular TQCA as developed by Caren and Panofsky (2005), and later by Ragin and Strand (2008) introduces a sequence as a causal condition in the analysis. In the case of PB for example we might have a hypothesis that when strong bureaucratic capacity precedes a participatory governing party coming to power, citizen power in PB is difficult to achieve because the bureaucracy is strong enough to resist change. However when a participatory governing party improves bureaucratic capacity it may be able to inculcate the government ideology and bureaucratic capacity may combine to produce good PB programmes. TQCA is useful as it allows a test for the outcome produced when one cause precedes another and vice-versa. The sequence can then be seen as an important part of the causal combination. However there is a pitfall in that we are adding a condition and thus increasing limits to diversity of logical case examples[26].

Much work continues to be done in an attempt to improve the treatment of time in QCA (e.g. time-series QCA, see Hino 2009). However, QCA is still unfortunately rather unable to provide sophisticated understandings of causation that trace process and feedback. This might be seen to be a particular problem for the research of young, burgeoning phenomena such as democratic innovations where it is often still unclear what direction causality is taking between conditions themselves and conditions and outcomes. I was very worried about this in the early part of my research journey as I felt the method would struggle to model path dependency of innovation. I later realised that this was not what my research was about. As I show in the practical examples of QCA in the next three chapters I learned that the static comparison was a strength of QCA,

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[26] Adding k sequence conditions will increase the number of logical cases by $2^k * k$.

especially once seen as part of a symbiotic relationship with case knowledge in a process of cumulation. Looking at what conditions consistently occur in combinations can force a researcher to re-problematise 'accepted' sequential inferences.

The most prevalent critiques of QCA until very recently had not come from the 'smaller' side of the argument however but from some who have favoured large-N or 'mainstream' statistical approaches. There has been an increasing trend among QCA enthusiasts to apply the method to large-N datasets in an attempt to clearly show the differences between set-theoretic and correlational claims (for a vivid example see Vis 2012). This is a welcome development and it is no doubt true that the decision on whether to apply set-theoretic or other methods should hinge on the hypothesised nature of causal complexity and not be based on the number of cases (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 318).

While in places the agenda has moved on, some pertinent debates are outlined in a now well-forgotten issue of the Newsletter of the American Political Science Association Organized Section on Qualitative Methods (2004, Vo. 2(2)) that QCA enthusiasts might do well to return to. Lieberson's (2004) critiques mirror his critiques of small-N research elsewhere (1994). He suggests that QCA is unable to distinguish random from real data and that it is not useful for producing general accounts. Seawright's (2004) criticism is that causality derived from QCA requires the same problematic assumptions about omitted variables and association as do regression analyses and the latter are better equipped with more established procedures for estimating error. Further expansions on these critiques have appeared in the years since (most recently Hug 2013) but they are more often than not nuanced variations on these two critiques.

QCA researchers have in the meantime responded by introducing and improving measures of consistency and coverage of sets[27] (Ragin 2008, Thiem 2010). But some of the rebuttals that were produced ten years are worth repeating as they still seem pertinent now. The overriding issue is that critiques tend to compare technique with technique within the mainstream approach rather than

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[27] These measures are somewhat similar to measures of fit in correlational research and are explained in more depth below.

considering the case-based approach to social science. Mahoney is worth quoting at length here:

> Too much work has been concerned with employing the technical apparatus of fs/QCA without clearly linking variable measurement and model specification to detailed case knowledge…, the problem of correctly specifying a causal model, including the issue of omitted variable bias, can be mitigated if the researcher engages in the close qualitative analysis of cases. Analysts are simply much less likely to exclude key variables if they know a great deal about the cases and phenomena under investigation… Insofar as the overall methodology of fs/QCA is designed to encompass precisely this kind of qualitative appraisal, whereas regression analysis is not, fs/QCA would seem to be much better equipped to identify causation. However, capitalizing on this advantage requires employing the case-oriented side of fs/ QCA as much as its technical side, (2004: 20).

And for Ragin and Rihoux "QCA was developed as a way to formalize case-oriented analysis and thereby provide tools to help case-oriented researchers improve their research. In the end, the goal of the application of QCA proper (i.e., the truth table algorithm) is to help researchers represent what they have learned about their cases," (2004: 22).

There is rebuttal here to critiques but also stern and good advice that enthusiasts would do well to heed. If QCA is applied unreflectively to large-N datasets it serves us no better than unreflective correlational analysis of similar data. In the next chapter I wish to show that QCA as an approach and a tool has value even for small-N researchers.

Chapter 4: Comparing Participatory Budgeting in Urban Brazil: Wampler's 8-case comparison

The incessant use of "it is a matter of degree" phraseology and of the "continuum" image leave us with qualitative-impressionistic statements which do not advance us by a hair's breadth toward quantification. In a similar vein we speak more and more of "variables" which are not variables in any proper sense, for they are not attributes permitting gradations and implying measurability, Sartori (1970: 1036).

4.1 Small-N sampling and replication

Scoping the population of cases and conditions of interest is not an easy task in emerging subfields of research. Yet by its nature, a newly-emerging phenomenon will be limited in its scope for comparison to a small to medium-N. This is certainly true of participatory democratic innovations such as participatory budgeting which I compare across countries (Ryan and Smith 2012[28], see also Chapter 6 of this thesis). The field is (over)loaded with good case-studies and small-N comparisons which rely on in-depth ethnography-based methodologies. This has led to a call for more systematic cross-case comparisons (Smith 2009). Despite this the rapid diffusion of participatory budgeting has led to increased problematisation and contestation of its core conditions. How then can a researcher adequately scope their population of cases for a valuable systematic comparison enabling modest generalisation?

One obvious strategy employed in small-N case-comparative research is to limit cases by keeping key variables constant to control extraneous variance. This logic is often applied in the area studies approach or by limiting comparative

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[28] That article presents a pilot-QCA of participatory budgeting in anticipation of a larger-N QCA to come in this thesis. It discusses some of the issues involved in performing QCA with emerging phenomena. Other innovative attempts to handle comparison of participatory budgets have involved the use of Weberian ideal types (c.f. Herzberg, 2011).

designs within one country or system of government (Lijphart 1971: 688). Brian Wampler applies this approach in his distinguished comparison of eight cases of participatory budgeting in Urban Brazil (2007a). Yet such small-N research based on researchers' in depth case-studies is often criticised still because of its subjective bias. Moreover cumulation of small-N research for comparison across studies can be difficult because of researchers' particular and differing intentions. In Peters' words sometimes it is argued that 'the researcher is the major independent variable' (2013: 169, see also 153, 171).

Notwithstanding Flyvbjerg's assertion that admonitions on subjectivity essentially misunderstand the reflexive nature of case-based research (2006), in this chapter I wish to replicate Wampler's comparative case selection (a replication controlling even for the researcher's case choices) but testing the added value of a QCA approach. Developing on increasing calls for transparency of data sources for replicability from case-researchers (Moravscik 2010, Lieberman 2010)[29], I implore that a QCA approach can also recover transparency for replicability at the analytic moment of smaller-N research. I try to show that fsQCA can at the very least provide clarity when selecting the best trade-off between parsimony and explanatory power in small to medium-N case comparisons. The chapter therefore directly addresses some of the possibilities of QCA as a deductive tool that aids interpretation where the case-researcher may have his/her eyes too close to the field or data. In the next section I introduce Wampler's analysis and provide a fuzzy-set QCA analysis of the most parsimonious typology he presents in summarising his work.

4.2   Applying QCA to examine existing comparisons

Brian Wampler's analysis of eight participatory budgets in urban Brazil has been a particularly useful contribution for scholars who wish to explain the emergence of emancipatory participatory governance through democratic innovation. It has been commended not only for its attentive and detailed narrative of processes

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[29] In the following chapter and in the appendices I show how I have sought to implement and make modest improvements to best-practices in transparent qualitative data interpretation and calibration in QCA.

within cases but also its comparative design which moved beyond best-case examples to include variations in outcome and explanatory conditions to explain causation more systematically. Yet, in common with other examples in the emerging field of research on participatory democratic innovations, comparative work up to now has relied on first-hand ethnographic methods of data collection combined with more traditional small-N comparative designs[30].

The researcher's task in presenting research is to distil excessive complexity and explain social phenomena with appropriate levels of parsimony. To this end researchers will often construct typologies, and make claims about necessary and sufficient conditions based on their observations. It is important to note that Wampler's arguments are set-theoretic: "To produce a strong PB programme, it is necessary to have high levels of mayoral support, a civil society that can engage in both cooperation and contestation, and rules that delegate specific types of direct authority to citizens," (2007a: 35)[31]. To test these claims in Wampler's work, I apply QCA's systematic approach, calibrating conditions based on the same qualitative descriptions used in the existing comparative study and the same population of cases.

The table on the next page is adapted from Wampler's concluding chapter (2007a: 258). It is typical of the kinds of parsimonious typological tables often presented in the findings of small-N comparative work. These tables are often used (imperfectly) as methodological heuristics to make set-theoretic claims of necessity and sufficiency.

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[30] Wampler's work does include some surveys and quantitative data analysis at the individual level within cases in order to inform some of his key explanatory conditions.

[31] Note also that Wampler follows this quote directly with a correlational claim - "as Mayoral support drops, as CSOs are unable to engage in both forms of political behaviour, and as the rules fail to delegate authority, PB outcomes will weaken" (ibid). These two claims are not necessarily incompatible; what is important is that they require a different test as explained in the previous chapter.

Analysis[32]

	CSO's willingness to use contentious politics	
	High	Low
High	Porto Alegre97-2004, Ipatinga	No case
Mayoral support for delegation of authority to citizens — Medium	Recife, Belo Horizonte, Porto Alegre 89-96, Porto Alegre 2004-	Santo Andre, Sao Paulo 2001-4
Low	No case	Blumenau, Rio Claro

Table 4-1 Types and causes adapted from Wampler 2007a p. 258.

Wampler here, in his concluding chapter, places particular emphasis on two explanatory conditions and suggests that Mayoral support interacts with civil society organisations' (CSO) willingness to use contentious politics to give four very different types of outcomes: institutionalised participatory democracy (green), informal and contested participatory democracy (yellow), co-opted participatory democracy (blue) and emasculated participatory democracy (red). This type of diagram will be familiar to small-N case researchers. This is because the major advantage of small-N research is underlying familiarity with cases. This allows Wampler to verbally define (what we might call labelling a set) each box in the diagram where we have an empirical example of a case (a member of the

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[32] There are in fact ten cases in this table as Wampler suggests a qualitative distinction between cases in Porto Alegre over time. He does not include the cases representing the earlier and latter PBs in his table that I have adapted but I include them here as he suggests elsewhere in the book that they would fit the informal and contested category.

set). This is a useful process that adds plausibility and clarity to the argument: For example it makes intuitive sense that co-optation in participatory programmes can be traced back to low use of contentious politics by CSOs as in the 2x3 table above. The researcher here has helped the reader to comprehend, and prima facie, it would seem fair to conclude that the institutionalisation of deep democracy can only occur where both these conditions are high and that both are necessary conditions for this outcome. A simple correlation between each variable and the outcome deep democracy would be positive.

So what can fsQCA add?

In the table immediately below high presence of a condition according to Wampler's description is coded as full membership in the set (fuzzy set membership score of 1), low as full nonmbership (set score of 0) and medium as 0.51. Readers familiar with fsQCA will be aware of the logical mathematical property of fuzzy sets whereby 0.5 memberships create analytical difficulties. This is because it places the case in a logical limbo where verbal and formal logic are difficult to reconcile – the case is at the point of 'maximum ambiguity' and 'neither more in nor more out of the set'. One might in any case observe that the use of the word 'medium' by Wampler does not necessarily indicate halfway. Equally the word 'low' is hardly commensurate with the idea of complete non-membership of a set. However for the purposes of this example we can say that the researcher has made a qualitative distinction of an ordinal kind which can be represented by a fuzzy set[33]. Therefore small changes in the membership value will not fundamentally affect the subset/superset relations in QCA analysis. As a robustness test marginal changes in value can be tested and will be found to have an insubstantial effect on the outcome.

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[33] Fuzzy sets should not be confused with ordinal variables – see discussion of Arnstein's ladder in preceding chapter and also infra note 55. In order to undertake set-theoretic analysis however an ordinal variable needs to be converted to a fuzzy set.

Table 4-2a

Case	Mayoral Support	Citizen willingness to Support Contentious Politics	Deepened democracy A	Deepened democracy B	Deepened democracy C
Belo Horizonte	0.51	1	0.51	0.33	0.67
Blumeanau	0	0	0	0	0
Ipatinga	1	1	1	1	1
Porto Alegre i	0.51	1	0.51	0.33	0.67
Porto Alegre ii	1	1	1	1	1
Porto Alegre iii	0.51	1	0.51	0.33	0.67
Recife	0.51	1	0.51	0.33	0.67
Rio Claro	0	0	0	0	0
Santo Andre	0.51	0	0.51	0.67	0.33
Sao Paulo	0.51	0	0.51	0.67	0.33

Table 4-2 10-case fuzzy set membership scores.

I now show the effect of more significant differences in interpretation by applying fuzzy calibration and logic in the discussion of this table. In table 4.2 the outcome condition 'deepened democracy A' is coded as 1 for institutionalised participatory democracy (green), 0.51 for informal and contested participatory democracy (yellow) and co-opted participatory democracy (blue), and 0 for emasculated participatory democracy (red). It is important to note that for the outcome at least I am calibrating a set score that Wampler has not explicitly derived. Wampler is clear that Porto Alegre 97-2004 and Ipatinga achieve the quality of empowered participatory democracy and that there is no empowerment of note in Rio Claro and Blumenau (emasculated participatory democracy). He never quite makes a distinction as to whether his two qualitative descriptions of 'informal and contested' and 'co-opted' participatory democracy display measurable differences as to how far they achieve the outcome of empowered participatory democracy - only to say that the cases form a "wide spectrum of outcomes" (2007a: 257). The above matrix table 4-2 shows potential calibration of both as more or less halfway in the set

of 'deepened democracy A'; 'Deepened democracy B' shows co-opted as more in while informal and contested is 'more out'; and for 'Deepened democracy C' informal and contested is 'more in' while co-opted is more out. We might also include a model where all are fully out but I do not here. In this chapter I am focused on pointing out what is at stake in measurement moreso than accurately measuring outcomes, and showing that QCA can be used iteratively and transparently to elucidate and match measurement and theory.

As before Ragin has shown that relationships of necessity and sufficiency between causal conditions and outcomes are set-theoretic. For necessity to be established the set of cases containing the outcome must be a subset of the set of cases displaying the cause. Similarly, for sufficiency to be established the set of cases containing the causal condition must be a subset of the cases displaying the outcome (c.f. Ragin, 2000: 214-217).When we run an analysis for necessary conditions on the cases as coded in 4.2 with the outcome 'Deepened democracy A' we get the output contained in table 4-3 below.

We see that in a necessity analysis of these 10 cases so operationalised, mayoral support is fully consistent with the necessity super/sub-set relation across the cases, indicating that it is a necessary condition for deepening democracy. Moreover the negation of mayoral support would seem equally necessary to negate the deepening of democracy (this result is logical because their values are equal in every case). Nevertheless CSO willingness to use contentious politics does not seem to be necessary for deepened democracy. When we examine the cases we see that this is because in both Santo Andre and Sao Paulo there is some degree of deepening democracy (Wampler acknowledges this when he makes the qualitative distinction between co-opted and emasculated democracy) yet low or no evidence of CSO willingness to use contentious politics.

Analysis of Necessary Conditions		
Outcome variable: Deepened Democracy		
Conditions tested	Consistency[34]	Coverage
Mayoral Support	1.000000	1.000000
~mayoral support	0.581028	0.595142
Citizen willingness to use contentious politics	0.798418	0.673333
~ Citizen willingness to use contentious politics	0.201581	0.255000

Analysis of Necessary Conditions		
Outcome variable: ~deepened democracy		
Conditions tested	Consistency	Coverage
Mayoral Support	0.595142	0.581028
~mayoral support	1.000000	1.000000
Citizen willingness to use contentious politics	0.396761	0.326667
~ Citizen willingness to use contentious politics	0.603239	0.745000

Table 4-3 Analysis of necessary conditions for 10 cases.

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[34] Consistency is a measure of how constant the subset-superset relationship which indicates logical necessity (or in the case of sufficiency analysis logical sufficiency) is across the cases observed. See Ryan and Smith 2012 for further explanation.

It is important to note that the result is to a certain extent a consequence of the levels of measurement Wampler sees as appropriate for distinguishing variance across his cases. A QCA approach and analytic test can provide a useful logical check on the congruence between evidence, intuition and measurement. Wampler's approach, and most approaches in social science, are not content with stopping at the level of describing categories – their goal is to infer. If concepts (descriptions of qualities) are sets of which empirical cases have degrees of observed membership (fuzzy membership or quantitative variation), the relative degree of membership matters greatly if we want to engage in causal analysis of necessity and sufficiency. QCA maps the distance between the theory and the evidence and allows transparent iteration and re-evaluation as we shall see.

When we analyse for sufficiency again for (A) we get the result contained in Table 4-4 below[35].

Mayoral support alone and no other combination of conditions is sufficient to produce deepened democracy. In other words here the QCA analysis highlights that given the measures Wampler employs and the evidence he presents, the argument he could or perhaps should be making is that mayoral support alone is both necessary and sufficient for deepening democracy through participatory democracy.

The absence of mayoral support is necessary for the absence of deep democracy as we saw but no conditions tested can yet be deemed sufficient to negate deep democracy. The absence of contentious politics turns up in the solution because when combined with both presence and absence of mayoral support it appears consistent, but when we try to eliminate mayoral support by Boolean minimisation on this basis, acting alone contentious politics is not highly consistent with a sufficiency subset relationship for ten cases at 0.745. Logically any increase in the number of conditions making up a sufficient conjunction will increase its sufficiency consistency. This makes sense as the more conditions

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[35] The solutions presented in this section are 'complex solutions' where I do not take into account logical remainders (i.e. make assumptions about counterfactuals and add them to the model). This will be explained further in later sections.

we add to any explanation (the more complexity we introduce), the more likely it is to be a sufficient conjunction. What this suggests is that we do not have enough conditions in the model to accurately explain the absence of deepened democracy. There is something in this hunch but there is a missing part to the story and we will return to this momentarily. We may conclude though that QCA has added some value to the analysis in the first instance and forces us to think about what substantive conclusions on causation of the phenomena are suitable.

Outcome tested	Causal conditions	Raw Coverage	Unique Coverage	Consistency	Solution
Deepened democracy	Mayoral support	1.000000	1.000000	1.000000	1.000 (Cov.) 1.000 (Con.)

Outcome tested	Causal conditions	Raw Coverage	Unique Coverage	Consistency	Solution
~deepened democracy	~citizen willingness to support contentious politics	0.603239	0.603239	0.745000	0.603 (Cov.) 0.745 (Con.)

Table 4-4 Analysis of sufficient conditions for the outcome and its negation across 10 cases[36].

What about alternative calibrations of the outcome? If we want to try to explain deepened democracy using the calibration for 'Deepened democracy B' we would

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[36] There is no difference in this analysis between parsimonious and complex solutions. Consistency threshold is 1 for the outcome and 0.96 for the negation.

find a less clear picture if we are looking for a single necessary condition. Mayoral support now has consistency score of 0.93. This is because the cases of Santo Andre and Sao Paolo have medium degrees of mayoral support as outlined by Wampler - and if they are more in the set of deep democracy as they are in (B) this challenges to a certain extent the finding that mayoral support is necessary for deep democracy ($0.51 \leq 0.67$). Again a social scientist might be happy with a relatively low level of inconsistency (0.07) across all the cases and make generalisations with transparent reflection on this interval of confidence.

We also would find in the B analysis that the intersection (conjunction) of mayoral support and citizen willingness to support contentious politics is entirely consistent with sufficiency super/sub-set relation across the cases. Even if neither is necessary or alone sufficient, across the cases their combination is sufficient to produce deepened democracy. Armed with this knowledge the case-researcher may want to revisit their raw data and think whether it is justifiable conceptually and based on evidence to add this more nuanced measurement on the outcome to their parsimonious presentation of results and make this argument about sufficiency transparently.

What if, as is for 'Deepened democracy C', contested democracy is more in and co-opted democracy more out of the set of deep democracy? Here the argument for any necessary conditions becomes less plausible. We see that for both conditions we have cases that contradict the necessity relationship (consistency for mayoral support = 0.88, citizen willingness to support contentious politics = 0.88). As Ragin has argued, necessary conditions set a particularly high standard for causal explanation and 0.9 may be seen as a minimum consistency threshold for claims to necessary causation (Mendel and Ragin 2011). Nevertheless, on this reading, the conjunction of the two explanatory conditions in the parsimonious model remains consistently sufficient to produce deepened democracy. Neither is alone necessary but both together are sufficient. Both are INUS conditions.

It is crucial to note that the result is a function of the measurement Wampler chooses. If he had observed that some of the cases were medium rather than merely low or high in terms of the observance of contentious politics the result would be much different. However, he may have been confident that the degree of difference could be captured parsimoniously in terms of a simple high or low

distinction; otherwise one imagines he would have offered a greater range in describing the variance in the condition.

A variable-oriented critic might now observe that this only goes to show the perils of inferring with a small-N, but as I have previously argued, this misunderstands the approach which rests on exploiting the advantages of intense engagement with conceptual clarity and closeness to the cases. Transparency about what is at stake can be liberating rather than debilatiting. At another extreme, with all this method and math, should we now expect to have lost the sympathies of Sartori who would pour scorn on the overconscious thinker "who refuses to discuss heat unless he is given a thermometer" and is paralysed by "logical perfectionism," (1970: 1033). I hope not. Sartori famously champions the 'conscious thinker' who "manages to say a great deal simply by saying hot and cold, warmer and cooler" (idem). I wish to argue that despite the value of numerical reasoning to QCA it is more a tool for the latter than the former. A QCA approach can highlight in a relatively transparent way what is at stake in comparisons of the hotter, more hot and cooler or more cool nature.

One might contend that the measures taken here for the outcome set are simplistic. The point I want to make though is that it may only be the undertaking of this analysis which highlights this state of affairs. Rihoux and Lobe have shown that a stepwise QCA approach properly applied allows an iteration between maximal parsimony and complexity which arrives at a greater explanatory power (2008: 238). What this analysis of Wampler's typology shows is that applying QCA tools to existing research and its conclusions can highlight an overly parsimonious conclusion.

4.3   Part 2: Extending the analysis - Bringing complexity back in.

The above discussion is based on analysing Wampler's most parsimonious conclusions only and not explicitly delving fully into his richer descriptions of the cases. While small-N research may often conclude by extracting what the researcher feels are the two or three most important explanatory conditions, it can also claim advantage in its rich case description; elucidating the trail of relations and processes involving other or secondary conditions. In some large-N statistical analysis these details of interactions may be overlooked as the

compound variable represented by the interaction term is often unrecognisable from its elemental beginnings. Wampler details any number of potential influencing conditions or variables from which other hypothesis may be formed and tested to investigate causal chains relating to deepening democracy. These include population size, social backgrounds of PB delegates, higher human development index (HDI) scores, etc. (at one point he actually suggests cities with greater HDI are more likely to be left-leaning, have broad-based CSO activity and a firmer financial base on which to administer PB, advising that it may play a role as a result of mediating variables). In his chapters describing each case however he highlights and details, in particular, mayor-legislative relations, the financial basis for implementation of the programme, and the rules of the game as influential in determining the depth of democracy coming out of PB processes. He, in fact, affords rules of the game the same primacy as CSO activity and Mayoral support, although as we shall see operationalising it as a variable in comparative analysis is a little trickier than the others, which is possibly why he does not highlight it as much as the latter two in the table we have discussed above. In short though, although he rightly searches for an appropriate parsimony he takes the likely complexity of causality seriously.

The key strength of traditional qualitative small-N research approaches vis-a-vis cross-sections or QCA is that it is not bound by a 'static' analytic moment and allows fluidity in causal tracing - though surely this is also at once its weakness. A case-researcher submerged in subjective determination of causal processes is in some important ways *less* well-placed to make hands-off, 'deductive' judgements about how variables combine. While Wampler in his fine study of PBs may suggest that based on his case-knowledge the other three conditions are important but secondary in the story to the two first discussed in the previous section, in a QCA we can transparently analyse all possible combinations of the five conditions (including logical remainders) on an equal footing and examine the causal paths sufficient for the outcome based on logical combinations of set relations across cases. The rest of the chapter is dedicated to this task.

4.4   Defining conditions and calibrating sets.

In this section I briefly explain Wampler's conditions and provide details of how sets of conditions are calibrated for the ensuing analysis. The section draws heavily on his theoretical justifications for highlighting these conditions. For set-theoretic analysis of necessary and sufficient causation, sets require proper names. Therefore we can speak firstly of the outcome, the set of empowered participatory governance or 'Deepened democracy'. Deep democracy is seen where PB programmes result in open, equal and meaningful participation of large numbers of 'ordinary citizens', and where the PB overtakes previous clientelistic practices as the main method for citizens and civil society to negotiate and realise budget priorities.

In explaining how PB programmes can achieve deep democracy Wampler puts forward five key causal conditions. The first is 'High Mayoral support for PB'. Mayoral support is vital because decision-makers "must be willing to spend scarce resources" (Wampler, 2007a: 36). There may be instrumental reasons for high mayoral support of PB programmes (as a signalling device to gauge citizen preferences, or as a political party support-building measure) as well as ideological. In the Brazilian context mayoral support is taken to be key to outcomes because strong mayoral support can lead to implementation of projects allowing demonstration effects (c.f. Abers 1998; Gret and Sintomer, 2005: 87). The argument goes that when governments are seen to be taking the process seriously by implementing the decisions of the participants in a participatory process (in particular building capital infrastructure projects), the institutionalisation of PB increases and it can give greater scope to governments to reorganise the bureaucracy to administer PB constructively.

The second explanatory condition set is that of 'Strong civil society'. Strong civil society can cooperate with other actors in deliberative forums but contest information and vigorously defend their rights using contentious forms of political action where required (Wampler, 2007a: 38). The types of activities CSOs are willing to engage in can often be explained by the historical density of CSO organisations in a municipality (idem). Note: this condition is in reality itself a conjunction; a 'logical AND' combination of contentious politics *and* cooperative politics in CSOs. The condition representing the combination could be constructed by calibrating separately both conditions and calculating the

intersection of both sets but here I do this implicitly (i.e. in calibrating I do not compromise high contentious politics for low cooperation and vice-versa).

For various situational and political reasons rules vary from one PB programme to another. We can talk of the set of 'Rules that delegate authority' where rules allow citizens accountable and direct decision-making which can incentivise greater and more meaningful participation. According to Wampler "the unintended consequence of unclear rules is a limited delegation of authority" (idem: 39). Combining rules in an explanatory model with the role of actors using QCA (which explicitly investigates conjunctural causation) is important if we believe that institutions influence actors and actors influence institutions.

Wampler emphasises throughout his book the combinatorial effects of conditions and how one condition may limit the degree to which any combination can be effective in deepening democracy through participation. This is another reason why the analysis may suit itself to QCA and fuzzy sets. One example is the extent to which a Mayor's strategy is conditioned by the existence of a 'Positive legislative environment'. The legislative environment is less favourable to an outcome of deeply democratic PB when the mayor implementing the programme does not have a broad base of support and must spend political capital shoring this up (idem: 40). Wampler suggests that this positive environment is a necessary but not sufficient condition for deeply democratic PB - the mayor may still not wish to delegate authority even with legislative support but will find it difficult to delegate without. Wampler's descriptions also suggest that this condition could highlight asymmetric causation and multifinality[37] when he outlines that in the case of Santo Andre, a highly supportive legislature can actually incentivise the Mayor to engage in many other projects, undermining the importance of PB (idem: 209).

Finally, the 'financial basis for spending' i.e. the availability of significant funds for new capital investment is also, he holds, necessary but not sufficient for PB

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[37] As explained above asymmetric causation (the negation of an outcome must be explained independently and cannot be explained by a decrease in the independent variable that explains that outcome) and multifinality (that the same condition can lead to alternative and sometimes contradictory outcomes) are causal assumptions in QCA. These assumptions can often be restricted or removed by the tools employed in traditional large-N correlational studies (c.f. Wagemann and Schneider 2012).

to work effectively. This is because limited spending ability limits the power of programmes where authority is delegated to citizens.

After enumerating these conditions Wampler contends that his explanations of cases will show that "it is *necessary* for a PB program to have positive results in *each* area to produce a successful PB program" (idem: 41, my emphasis). Note that these claims differ quite markedly from the parsimonious claims that make up the typology discussed earlier. I aim to test Wampler's more complex claim, basing our calibration of conditions on the narrative he provides, and using fsQCA.

First we need to calibrate sets and ascribe case membership in each case. A good starting point is to outline the verbal meanings we ascribe to set membership. In this case the following 7-value fuzzy set is used.

1.0   - 'Fully in' (the set)

0.83 - 'mostly but not fully in'

0.67 - 'more or less in'

0.52 - 'marginally more in'

0.48 - 'marginally more out'

0.33 - 'more or less out'

0.17 - 'mostly but not fully out'

0   - 'fully out'

This seems a feasible level of nuance to justifiably extract from the qualitative information in Wampler's book. He provides at least a few hundred words (and often a lot more) of descriptive information on each condition for each case. This rich description is necessary for an epistemologically sound QCA. Wampler's evidence is particularly useful because he often triangulates evidence from interviews (i.e. subjective determinations of say, mayoral support) with symptomatic indicators of degrees to which a condition is observed (e.g. in the case of mayoral support, implementation rates of PB projects and their prioritisation vis-à-vis projects decided on through other channels).

The following data matrix provides a picture of my efforts to calibrate these conditions as rigorously and objectively as possible given my reading of the evidence presented in Wampler's book[38].

The abbreviated conditions contained in the table below are mayoral support (ms), civil society using contentious and cooperative politics (ccp), a positive legislative environment (ple), the financial basis for spending (fbs) rules that encourage participation (rep) and deepened democracy (deepd).

Case	ms	ccp	ple	fbs	rep	deepd
Belo Horizonte	0.33	1	0.52	0.83	0.48	0.52
Blumenau	0.17	0.33	0.17	0.67	0.67	0
Ipatinga	0.83	0.33	0.67	1	0.52	1
Porto Alegre i	1	1	0.52	0.33	1	0.52
Porto Alegre ii	1	1	0.83	1	1	1
Porto Alegre iii	0.48	1	0.67	1	1	0.52
Recife	0.67	1	0.52	0.17	0.33	0.52
Rio Claro	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.67	0.17	0
Santo Andre	0.67	0.52	0.83	0.33	0.33	0.48
Sao Paulo	0.33	0.67	0.33	0.33	0.48	0.48

Table 4-5 Fuzzy membership as calibrated for more complex analysis of ten cases.

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[38] At this point I should make clear that while I claim to 'control for the researcher' in my application of QCA to Wampler's cases as selected and not others, I cannot make any exceptional claims to being able to control the ever-present problems for researchers interpreting one another's descriptions and findings.

I make some changes (which can be openly debated) from the earlier calibration based on my reading of the 'thicker' case descriptions. For instance, Sao Paulo and Ipatinga's ccp scores are on opposite sides of the crossover point to the truth table in the first analysis (4.2) described above. In calibrating the outcome, deep participatory democracy (deepd) I argue that it is conceptually sound that Wampler's 'co-opted PB' is marginally more out of the set of deep democracy while 'contested PB', which at least has democratic inputs if the outcomes are not always implemented, is marginally more in the set. This leads these cases to fall either side of the crossover point in the outcome set based on their correspondence with the verbal logical statements outlined above. Building on the first part of the chapter which aimed to show what is at stake in different calibrations and selecting levels of measurement, this latter part aims to investigate what is at stake in more parsimonious or complex causal modelling when employing case-based comparative logic.

The first thing we notice is that cases do not group together in the same logical combinations of presence and absence of conditions as they do in Wampler's more parsimonious table, so we will expect a more nuanced explanation involving alternative causal paths.

As these measures are based on my interpretation of text and not on a ranking systematised by Wampler as in the earlier analysis, it is also pertinent to make some comments on the difficulties involved in calibrating conditions to allow for transparency for those wishing to repeat the analysis. The rules-based condition was particularly difficult to calibrate because it requires some subjective interpretation of how even small changes in basic rules may affect participant strategies. This is often tricky to separate from outcomes in the process of PB. As rules are, in the Brazilian case, often set by the mayor, they may be better conceived of as a symptom of that support. The financial basis condition also requires decisions on how to weigh absolute and relative financial strength which could be open to challenge. By presenting these as a data matrix in this way they can be opened up to scrutiny by others with knowledge of the case. Approaches to including this kind of knowledge are discussed further in chapters 5 and 6.

4.5   Analysis

The penultimate section of the chapter now presents the analysis of necessity and sufficiency and discusses some of the implications of using QCA where case selection is limited by other researchers' comparative design. An interesting consequence of the high controls involved in a case-researcher's comparative design can be high levels of necessity consistency which can lead to a variety of difficult questions surrounding the interpretation of necessary conditions and their consequent impact on sufficiency analysis. With notable exceptions (c.f., Goertz: 2003, Mendel and Ragin: 2011, Bol and Luppi: 2013), QCA scholars have been less keen to provide guidance for others on how to interpret some of these issues.

We are particularly interested in Wampler's claim that all five conditions identified are necessary for the outcome and that a positive legislative environment and financial basis for support of PB are necessary but not sufficient. This implies that he believes the other three causal conditions are both sufficient and necessary. On my reading this kind of conclusion would set alarm bells ringing for researchers trained in QCA, because if all five conditions are necessary the idea that two or three could be of themselves sufficient seems illogical. Without any tool to analyse the consistency of this claim, case-researchers are disincentivised from problematising the combinatorial relationships between variables. Moreover, the analysis shows QCA approaches can at the very least force researchers to think of the consequences of such conclusions and the combinatorial logic of necessary and sufficient claims. Following this discussion, I conclude by drawing attention to issues surrounding the use of traditional case-selection logic to limit populations in QCA.

4.6   Interpreting Necessity

I begin with the analysis of necessity as is best practice. The output of the analysis of single necessary conditions based on the fuzzy truth table is presented in table 4-6 below

As no condition in the analysis of the negation of the outcome (absence of deepened democracy) is highly consistent with a necessity subset/superset

relation, I only discuss the analysis of the outcome (deepened democracy) in this section.

Analysis of Necessary Conditions Outcome variable: Deepened democracy		
Conditions tested	Consistency	Coverage
Mayoral Support	0.890873	0.794690
~mayoral Support	0.466270	0.540230
Civil society using contentious and cooperative politics	0.867063	0.622507
~civil society using contentious and cooperative politics	0.293651	0.496644
A positive legislative environment	0.871032	0.839388
~ a positive legislative environment	0.579365	0.612159
The financial basis to spend	0.833333	0.663507
~the financial basis to spend	0.430556	0.591281
Rules encouraging participation	0.829365	0.698997
~rules encouraging participation	0.492063	0.616915

Analysis of Necessary Conditions Outcome variable: ~deepened democracy		
Conditions tested	Consistency	Coverage
Mayoral Support	0.596774	0.523894
~mayoral Support	0.766129	0.873563
Civil society using contentious and cooperative politics	0.697581	0.492877
~civil society using contentious and cooperative politics	0.465726	0.775168
A positive legislative environment	0.627016	0.594646
~a positive legislative environment	0.830645	0.863732
The financial basis to spend	0.697581	0.546603
~the financial basis to spend	0.570565	0.771117
Rules encouraging participation	0.689516	0.571906
~rules encouraging participation	0.637097	0.786070

Table 4-6 Ten-case Analysis of single necessary conditions in more complex model.

Necessary consistency for each individual condition ranges in value for each of the five causal conditions from 0.83 to 0.89. In other words each of these conditions comes close to the criteria for construing causal necessity (an almost

always necessary condition) but all suffer from some inconsistencies. With only ten cases a high threshold of consistency to make claims about necessity is advisable (at least 0.9). However, as Ragin among others repeatedly stresses, the most important test is whether it 'makes sense' as a necessary condition (Mendel and Ragin 2011, Ragin 2000). There are a number of strategies the researcher now has open, the consequences of which s/he chooses will affect the interpretations not just of necessity but also of sufficient conditions.

As any of these conditions could be seen as 'almost' necessary it is best practice to revisit each condition and investigate how the subset relationship is contravened. One contravening fuzzy membership value in a case may require reconsideration. For example, the condition relating to civil society only contravenes the necessity super/sub-set relationship in Ipatinga. The case might be argued to be unique in this population of cases as it is a mid-sized city which is not a provincial capital and this is likely to affect the nature of civil society in the case. Therefore, one could make the argument, revisiting the case-data, that for the purposes of modest generalisation we could drop the case and re-condition the population as defined by 'large provincial capitals'. That is we can limit the scope of the research and then make a claim of necessity within those parameters.

The trade off to this is that it would require removing the case from the analysis. In other words one narrows the scope of the argument. This is challenging for two reasons. Firstly it incentivises the researcher to move away from the logic of the initial case selection strategy which sought to select most different cases within established area controls. Secondly, there is a question as to what to do with this case, jettisoned from the necessity analysis, in the sufficiency analysis? Any necessary condition must logically be a part of any combination of conditions that are sufficient to produce and outcome. Can we make this claim and then continue with a 'lopsided' sufficiency analysis including once again the case that we remove from the analysis of necessity?[39] I return to discuss this

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[39] In essence this would involve testing two separate models one with and without the case, but the question remains as to which one should be emphasised.

question in the conclusion to this chapter. Again using QCA we bring these debates to the foreground.

A second option would be to use a procedure similar to that put forward by Bol and Luppi (2013) which they call 'maximisation'. This is a considerable advance for analysis of necessary conditions. With fuzzy membership data of the kind we have above, this is likely to at least reveal something about substitutability of necessary conditions. This requires asking which unions of two or more sets (disjunctions) are consistent with a necessity subset/superset relation. The table below shows that for all the unions of two conditions necessity consistency ranges from 0.905 to 1. So for example, we can deduce from the table below that either a civil society willing to engage in both contentious and cooperative politics OR a secure financial basis for spending are present when we observe deepened democracy in PB programmes (consistency of 1). Either one or the other is necessary. These are often called SUIN conditions; a sufficient but unnecessary part of a factor that is insufficient but necessary for an outcome (Mahoney, Kimball, & Koivu 2009).

Key: ms – mayoral support, ccp – citizens using contentious and cooperative politics, ple – a positive legislative environment, fbs – a financial basis to spend, rep – rules encouraging participation.

Boolean Expression	Necessity consistency	Necessity Coverage
ms + ccp	.96	.635
ms + ple	.937	.763
ms + fbs	.97	.624
ms + rep	.985	.693
ccp + ple	.935	.614
ccp + fbs	1	.591
ccp + rep	.905	.604
ple + fbs	.97	.664
ple +rep	.935	.687
fbs + rep	.933	.643

Table 4-7 Ten-case necessity consistency for Boolean sum expressions.[40].

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[40] In QCA notation '+' signifies logical OR (the substitutability of two conditions) while '*' signifies logical AND (the combination of two conditions).

In the table above '+' denotes logical 'OR' Although 0.9 is of course an arbitrary cut-off for consistency it is fair to say that a number of these expressions recount disjunctions that are necessary or almost always necessary for deep democracy. One could and possibly should also go on to calculate consistency of further Boolean sums. Table 4-7 shows only SUIN conditions that combine presence and not absence of conditions in our model. There are in fact 18 disjunctions that are consistent at the 0.9 consistency level when we include these.

If we wanted to restrict the analysis to a consistency threshold of 1 (all fully consistent subsets) we still have a number of disjunctions that would require interpretation as seen in table 4-8 below.

Key: ms – mayoral support, ccp – citizens using contentious and cooperative politics, ple – a positive legislative environment, fbs – a financial basis to spend, rep – rules encouraging participation.

Boolean Expression	Necessity consistency	Necessity Coverage
ccp+fbs	1	.591
ple + fbs + ~rep	1	.640
ple + fbs + rep	1	.630
~ms + ple + fbs	1	.628
ms + fbs + ~rep	1	.615
ms + fbs + rep	1	.631
ms + ~ple + fbs	1	.593

Table 4-8 Necessity consistency for Boolean sum expressions with a consistency threshold of 1.

I will not discuss this further here as an in-depth analysis of interpreting set-union to uncover necessary causation is beyond the scope of this thesis. The crucial point for now is that there are a plethora of potential interpretations of necessity and the trade-offs in choices are not immediately precise or clear.

A third, and essential procedure, is to analyse the data to check if the results are a consequence of its peculiarities and to assess triviality and relevance of necessary conditions. In particular in a small-N study of ten cases or less, results may be dependent on a low mean fuzzy membership in the outcome (Mendel and Ragin 2011: 24) or collinearity of influencing condition and outcome, for example. The former would suggest we have too many negative cases and not enough clear examples of the outcome we aim to explain in our dataset (the outcome is closer to a constant than a variable). The latter would suggest that

one of the independent variables may not be very independent of the dependent variable ('lurking' variable problem). Using truth tables/data matrices in this way can be a useful way to check if variables are in fact constants in small-to-medium-N research that is theory-led. This can be used to disregard variables as important to the outcome or see them as trivial[41] necessary conditions.

It is essential to calculate coverage scores of any potential necessary condition to evaluate its relevance or triviality (Ragin 2008, see also Goertz 2003). Necessity coverage is an expression of how much smaller the outcome set is in relation to the conditions set (how much of Y covers X). Low necessity coverage can indicate trivialness of necessary conditions (X is quite big relative to Y) and high coverage can indicate a relevant necessary condition, provided X is not a constant (see Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 232-237). In the data used for this study only the possibility of relatively low mean fuzzy membership in the outcome may raise concern about the findings. Yet even then it is not clear-cut with six out of ten cases more in than out of the outcome set, and coverage scores for the expressions with high consistency suggest that they are non-trivial.

Once again it might be suggested that embarking on such exhaustive analysis may introduce unnecessary complexity, and is a terrific example of the dangers of over-conscious thinking and methodological fetishism. But my goal here is to show just what is at stake in the underlying assumptions when researchers state that x is a necessary condition for y, and as has been shown, where there are many necessary conditions this will have strong implications for the interpretation of the sufficiency analysis.

Holding these issues aside, in terms of added-value, we can at the very least say that the necessity analysis here has cast some doubt over Wampler's general contention (within the scope of his population) that all five conditions are necessary for deep democracy. However it is clear that many can in combination be considered substitutable necessary conditions. This adds nuance to the general claim. A researcher can say with a greater degree of certainty based on

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[41] To use an example often called upon, air to breathe is a necessary condition for humans to engage in war but it is a trivial one in the context of explaining the conditions that cause or negate wars.

the QCA necessity analysis above that deep democracy cannot be achieved in PB programmes without at the very least a financial basis to spend OR civil society willingness to both struggle and cooperate with government.

4.7 Sufficiency

Results for the analysis of sufficiency are summarised below. For the intermediate solution[42] we assume that the presence of all conditions in counterfactual cases with the exception of the positive legislative environment (for which we make no directional assumptions), are causally linked with the outcome (deepd).

Key: ms – mayoral support, ccp – citizens using contentious and cooperative politics, ple – a positive legislative environment, fbs – a financial basis to spend, rep – rules encouraging participation, cov – coverage, con - consistency.

	Causal Paths	Raw Coverage	Unique Coverage	Consistency	Solution
Complex	~ms*ccp*ple*fbs	0.404762	0.045635	0.857143	0.736 (Cov) 0.916 (Con)
	ms*ccp*ple*rep	0.690476	0.331349	0.910995	
Parsimonious	ccp*fbs	0.700397	0.007936	0.732365	0.78 (Cov) 0.695 (Con)
	ccp*rep	0.791667	0.099206	0.732110	
Intermediate	fbs*ple*ccp	0.666667	0.045635	0.872727	0.736 (Cov) 0.883 (Con)
	rep*ple*ccp*ms	0.690476	0.069444	0.910995	

Table 4-9 Results of sufficiency analysis for outcome (deepened democracy).

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[42] In QCA the complex solution makes no assumptions about logical combinations of conditions for which we have no empirical assumptions (counterfactual cases). The parsimonious solution makes whatever assumptions lead to the most parsimonious solution. In the Intermediate solution the researcher holds some theoretical expectations constant in the counterfactual analyses.

We take a consistency threshold of 0.81 in this analysis. A lower consistency threshold can be seen as acceptable for sufficiency analysis especially where a large number of cases are present (Mendel and Ragin 2011). Essentially we are making the claim that these conditions are 'almost always' sufficient for the outcome. The complex solution will be a logical subset of the intermediate, in turn a subset of the parsimonious solution. The parsimonious solution is interesting as it is often said to contain the 'core' conditions (Ragin 2007; Fiss 2011). While not on their own necessary conditions, these conditions cannot be absent from any sufficient combination based on our empirical evidence. They cannot be eliminated and dismissed as irrelevant by applying the Quine-Mccluskey algorithm as explained in the previous chapter, even taking into account counterfactual analysis. However we cannot be as confident that they are sufficient as we can with the complex solution. The complex solution takes into account only logical cases for which we have empirical evidence (real cases). It is important to note the logical property that more INUS conditions in any one 'path' to the outcome will tend to increase consistency by lowering the value of case membership in a conjunction (lowering the value of x). The intermediate solution makes transparent our simplifying assumptions based on consulting theories about how counterfactuals would play out.

Each of the three solutions, more complex, more parsimonious and intermediate, has two different paths to the outcome. These can be factored. The intermediate solution, for example, can be written as follows to allow a (fairly) parsimonious statement which is consistent at the 0.88 level with the sufficiency superset/subset relationship.

$$ple*ccp* \begin{Bmatrix} fbs+ \\ rep*ms \end{Bmatrix} \rightarrow deepd$$

In words, when a positive legislative environment AND civil society willing to use contentious and cooperative politics combine; this conjunction when combined further with either a financial basis for spending on projects OR the combination of mayoral support AND rules that enable participation is sufficient to produce deepening of democracy. That sentence is somewhat a mouthful but the short formula contains an accessible parsimonious description of the analysis of conjunctions sufficient for the outcome.

Envisage the case researcher re-examining their conclusions in light of this QCA analysis. The first interesting result, reading from the most complex solution, is that in a couple of cases the absence of mayoral support has been an INUS condition for deep democracy. This is counterintuitive. If we look at the cases having strong membership in this solution (Belo Horizonte and Porto Alegre iii) we see that these were key cases in the type of 'informal and contested participatory democracy' that Wampler intuitively conceived, represented in table 4-1 earlier. Perhaps this type he assumed does indeed exist; however, it required the use of a more complex QCA to identify or describe its key combinatorial components. This may be too much of a jump to make, but it points at the way in which QCA at least can aid a more systematic articulation of the key conditions where a case researcher has already identified important similarities. This suggests that QCA can make a valuable contribution to small-N research and that equally, case researchers could better specify their models by engaging with QCA.

The intermediate solution also can provide both comfort and food for thought for Wampler. One of the causal paths, rep*ple*ccp*ms →deepd, which displays strong values of consistency and raw coverage (0.91, 0.69), contains all three of the conditions he desired to say were sufficient for the outcome. Importantly though these are only sufficient in combination when combined with one another, and the positive legislative environment. So QCA adds some nuance to the case-researcher's conclusion.

Finally, we see that the willingness of CSOs to use cooperative and contentious politics is present in all solutions. This is commensurate with the idea that it is at the very least a substitutable necessary condition.

4.8   Negation of the outcome

One straightforward piece of added-value that QCA can provide to most previous analyses in the social sciences is its ability to test for causal relationships with the negation of the outcome. This is rarely considered in small-N comparative research. Given our data, what may be seen as necessary and/or sufficient combinations of conditions to negate deepening of democracy?

For the intermediate sufficiency analysis solution of the negation we assume that the absence of all conditions will be linked causally with the outcome (~deepd). The parsimonious and intermediate solutions are then the same.

Key: ms – mayoral support, ccp – citizens using contentious and cooperative politics, ple – a positive legislative environment, fbs – a financial basis to spend, rep – rules encouraging participation, cov – coverage, con/consist – consistency, sol - solution.

	Causal Paths	Raw Cov.	Unique Cov.	Consist.	Sol.
Complex	~ms*~ccp*~ple*fbs	0.37098	0.16935	0.915423	0.867 (Cov) 0.929 (Con)
	ms*ccp*ple*~fbs	0.46772	0.16533	0.966667	
	~ms*ccp*ple*fbs	0.42945	0.15924	0.894958	
	~ms*ccp*~ple*~fbs*~rep	0.34076	0.03836	1.000000	
Parsimonious /Intermediate	~ms	0.76619	0.36087	0.873563	0.931 (Cov)
	~fbs	0.57055	0.16533	0.771117	0.79 (Con)

Table 4-10 Results of sufficiency analysis for negation of outcome (~deepd).[43]

In this analysis the consistency threshold is 0 .88. The finding, based on the intermediate solution, is that the absence of mayoral support for participatory budgeting OR the absence of a firm financial base to spend on projects alone are core conditions in any sufficient conjunction to negate deep democracy. This could be of great importance for policymakers or political strategists interested in understanding the conditions which can undermine participatory democracy. If the absence of mayoral support at municipal level, a core element of sufficient conjunctions for the absence of deep democracy in participatory programmes, sponsoring organisations such as NGOs and the World Bank may want to combine their focus on civil society capacity with greater attention to local politicians and/or raising revenue. Perhaps this is why donor organisations have moved in the direction of identifying investment areas where they have local 'participatory champions'[44]. It also stands to reason that even when the best

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[43] Consistency is explained in more depth in section 6.5 below.
[44] Thanks to Brian Wampler for this suggestion (personal correspondence).

designs combine with the best will of many actors; inability to raise or re-direct funds for capital infrastructure projects will undermine the success of any governance process, as it will struggle to achieve demonstrable results. These insights are sometimes not possible without the mindset and procedure of QCA, and elsewhere it can help confirm the grounds on which a certain level of parsimony or complexity can be assumed when drawing conclusions in small-to-medium-N studies.

It would appear then that fsQCA has added some value. We might argue that 10 cases is a medium-N and in such a scenario, the researcher may have their face too close to the data to be able to systematically consider all permutations and summarise them effectively. There may be just too much complexity for one researcher to hold all comparative information in their head. Researchers like Wampler could have gained an advantage by using QCA – a tool for more complex, larger-than-small-N analysis. We could suggest QCA is an indispensable complimentary tool to in-depth qualitative case comparison. We should not forget one of the advantages of traditional qualitative research which compliments QCA is the ability to make reference to case-specific causal explanations which can qualify results and point to the need for further cross-case analysis including other variables. For example, we could turn to investigate now, the combination of HDI and financial situation conditions in a more sophisticated analysis across cases. Or based on the evidence of the necessity analysis we might wish to investigate the impact of alternative participatory forums on PB such as Future City in Santo Andre which Wampler mentions as having influential effects within his richer case descriptions. What comes out of a QCA on that reading is a clearer indication of where one needs to make more detailed explanatory arguments. Carsten Schneider and Ingo Rohlfing have made recent contributions that detail exactly how researchers can use QCA to make decisions about which cases should be selected for within-case analysis and where QCA is best combined with process-tracing (2013, 2014).

4.9   Small-N QCA: On replication and cumulation

I wish to make some observations and pose some questions at this juncture. To be sure, I do not claim to be the first to revisit previously used data using QCA! Nevertheless, the relationships between QCA and small-N case-comparison are

often assumed to be simple, and less often teased out. While many textbooks are keen to position QCA in its context as a medium-N strategy and by comparing and contrasting with Large-N strategies (Ragin 2000, Schneider and Wagemann 2012), the differences/ similarities with small-N research are less often discussed and I have only begun to touch on them here.

Therefore it is a worthwhile endeavour to stop and ask what the added-value of applying QCA to small-N is by providing a good exemplar. The approach outlined above was not to replicate an analysis in a scientifically positivistic sense but to apply the QCA approach and tools to a good and well-respected example of small-to-medium-N case-comparison and investigate the added-value. I was able to show that QCA confirmed the interpretations of the case-researcher in some instances and added caveats in others.

The first observation is that an fsQCA approach can complement more traditional small-N methods for typology construction and uncovering causal relationships. The chapter shows that QCA can often and effectively uncover relationships overlooked by researchers trained in traditional methods of small-N comparison. This makes it a particularly useful tool in an emerging field where ethnographic methods and single-case studies tend to dominate, populations are not easily delineated and theory is often playing catch up to practice.

Yet we should also ask when and where in the process of systematising tests for relationships of necessity and sufficiency, we lose out in terms of the strength in the interpretive narrative efforts of the ethnographer. Despite retaining a case-based foundation, these variants on ontologically familial methods have trade-offs and the selection of one method over another is not a zero-sum game. Each tells us something interesting about the phenomenon under investigation and their simultaneous employment can lead to a more fruitful and open discussion about populations, condition selection and measurement as well as opening up the black box between theory and methods in explaining social phenomena.

We have seen that the employment of QCA tools can improve understanding of what degree of parsimony or complexity is warranted in explanation. In particular I can caution against the unsystematic derivation of the kinds of parsimonious tables used in the first analysis above. I am not trying to suggest that QCA can be used as a magic formula to precisely pinpoint the place where parsimony and complexity meet. This will always require theoretical justification

and the benefits of cumulation within and across fields of research. What it may provide is a transparent account of what is at stake in these decisions which can encourage discussion across and within these fields.

A second observation refers to case selection. The issue of case selection in QCA is sometimes treated vaguely, because authors wish to emphasise the advantages of iteration and adding and subtracting cases throughout the process rather than the crucial question of defining a population and relating a sample to it in the first instance. It is also often implicitly assumed that a population of cases in QCA is a 'full' one, carefully scoped, and not based on sampling (even information-oriented). This poses a particular difficulty in emerging fields of research where populations are hard to pin down, like for instance democratic innovation. And yet as we have seen QCA can be most beneficial at these moments for various reasons. One strategy to address problems of population definition is to rely more explicitly on the information-oriented sampling of small-N researchers, applying QCA to their samples.

However this approach brings its own problems. In particular using another researcher's population and cases can lead to high levels of necessity consistency. The field researcher may have spent a lot of time looking for these relationships already and eliminated superfluous information, or, their subjective interpretations may skew data in the direction of uncovering many 'almost' necessary conditions. Without being able to make clear decisions about what the necessary analysis of a QCA has revealed it makes interpreting the sufficiency analysis more difficult. The analysis in the latter part of this chapter suggests that the relationship between interpreting necessary and sufficient conditions when there are a number of potentially valid necessary conditions and combinations has not been adequately theorised by QCA scholars. As much as systematic comparisons of participatory and deliberative democratic institutions are in the 'emerging' stage so is QCA.

Notwithstanding this a QCA mind-set can be invaluable for the development of theory and research in a field such as ours. While established but far from matured, it is an exciting and yet precarious time for the subfield of research on participatory and deliberative democracy. It is encouraging that new theories and critique continue to emerge, often questioning our most basic assumptions. These theories require testing by means of systematic comparison of cases. QCA

may not quite allow bold assertions of which emperors of theory and hypotheses have no clothes, but application of even the most basic set-theoretic methods and Boolean logic to existing knowledge could more modestly provide the necessary nuance to the scope of our theories.

So what about cumulation of the work of many different researchers? This is the task I laid out for myself at the beginning of this thesis. Cumulating research using QCA is difficult and requires more time. Let us now turn to the process of cumulating, coding and calibrating qualitative data from a range of sources in anticipation of a more ecumenical larger-N analysis.

Chapter 5: FsQCA of PB worldwide: Scoping the population and calibrating conditions

… we seem to embark more and more in comparative endeavours without comparative method, i.e., with inadequate methodological awareness and less than adequate logical skills. That is to say, we seem to be particularly naive vis-a-vis the logical requirements of a world-wide comparative treatment of political science issues," Sartori (1970: 1052).

Chapters 5 and 6 present further empirical contributions and a first attempt to cumulate findings of world-wide case-based research in the field of PB using QCA. This Chapter will deal mostly with the process of case-selection, population definition, condition selection & definition and calibration. The next chapter will deal with the analysis procedure and discuss the results. In reality, as we have seen, these processes are not separable. QCA is a fundamentally iterative method. QCA remains a part of the family of case-based methods and in many ways the logic we apply here to case-selection and condition specification is that wrought from years of scholarship on appropriate approaches to case-based comparisons. However QCA holds some promise to bring these approaches into new unexplored territory. In the next sections I will show how I used QCA to harness the knowledge provided by existing ethnographies and small-N comparative work to cumulate knowledge of causes and outcomes in PB programmes worldwide in a systematic but case-sensitive way.

5.1 Constituting the research

In the second part of chapter 4 I hinted at some of the intertwined decisions that form the constructive element of the QCA approach. One of the advantages of QCA is that it is an iterative process and one that allows for additions and subtractions from a population of cases as part of a transparent journey of model specification. As Ragin likes to put it populations are not 'given'. He alleges that many variable-oriented researchers fail to problematise their populations (see especially 2000: Ch.2). Ragin also reminds us that this process of boundary revision and (re)-constitution of populations as researchers compare the quality of potential cases is common in small-N comparative work, (idem: 58). What is

not common is expanding this careful, time-consuming approach with the ultimate goal of finally comparing more than a handful of cases. The danger is that a first-time buyer can approach the QCA with little guidance on how to carry out this process. This becomes even more difficult when the field under investigation itself is quickly evolving as described of democratic innovations in chapter 2 of this thesis. Despite the perceived advantages that have been outlined, the rapid diffusion of democratic innovations, especially PB, and the rapid increase and refinement in QCA techniques both provide moving targets for a research project of the kind undertaken here.

To draw out the implications of this novel methodological approach for understanding the conditions for effective institutionalisation of democratic innovations, I began by applying fsQCA to a small sample of contrasting cases of participatory budgeting (PB) across different continents and gradually increased my dataset of cases using criteria that I expand on below. Over the course of this study iteration between analysis, population refinement and conceptualisation was regularity. This can be seen, for example, in an earlier comparison of six cases (Ryan and Smith 2012). While six is a relatively small number of cases for even modest worldwide generalisation, the primary aim of that study was to ascertain whether QCA could be applied effectively to the analysis of democratic innovations. In particular, it allowed me to explore important elements of fsQCA, including population definition, calibration of conditions and presentation and interpretation of outputs. In this way, that study can be understood as laying the groundwork for the larger medium-N analysis of PB that I present here.

If we take fsQCA to be a promising method for a "medium-range" social science programme of research on PB, we are faced with a number of questions. First, what counts as a case of PB? Second, can we adequately define conditions – both causal and outcome? And third (and more practically), is the case material available suitable to provide enough insight to describe these conditions qualitatively and quantitatively?

5.2   Defining a universe

For this study, defining a universe of cases involves defining what a case of participatory budgeting is – and what it is not. A number of challenges present

themselves at this point. The diffusion of PB beyond Porto Alegre and Brazil has been a highly differentiated process (Sintomer et al. 2008, 2010; Rocke 2014). Moreover there is plenty of debate as to whether programmes which call themselves PB in fact are PB, and whether analogous processes which prefer not to use the label are equally comparable. Sintomer et al. who have been to the forefront in reviewing the field explain things thus,

> …Once invented in a very specific context, participatory budgeting has subsequently been hybridised in contrasting ways. This makes it clear that a one-size-fits-all approach is not appropriate… [PB's] make-up depends to a considerable extent on the national context. There is not yet a generally recognised definition, be it political or scientific, concerning what minimum criteria they must satisfy. Certain procedures are listed in some places as participatory budgets even though they would not be called that in other countries. For that very reason, the attempt to lay down such minimum criteria is absolutely necessary for classification and evaluation (2013: 2).

When contrasting Asia and Europe they go on to say that "there is no uniform model in either continent to which the others could be compared," (idem: 20). This is probably why these researchers have been more engaged for the time being in compiling rough descriptions of similarities and differences among cases; aiming to begin with inductive categorisation, rather than aiming towards more systematic, methodical cumulation of causal analyses. This approach is similarly seen in the work of Cabannes (2004), Allegretti and Herzberg (2004) and contributors to Shah's edited collection (2007).

As outlined previously work in the field has very gradually tended towards more systematic forms of comparison. Earlier work by Sintomer et al. involving a slight variation in collaborators (2009, 2010) tried to map PBs in Europe by plotting their distance to six differentiated, Weberian ideal types of PB. Here the types were categorised according to different features of respectively; origin, organisation, deliberation and the role of civil society. This is an important contribution but it cannot alone achieve everything we would want for a systematic research agenda on PB. The touchstone for these comparisons remains the ideal type. Beginning from those ideals relative distances from the types can be roughly approximated and conveniently visualised. But the method

doesn't allow for systematic or transparent robustness checking of measurement and is difficult to replicate. And cases tend to cluster near these types according to their national context, so there is a danger that typecasting of cases according to their national backgrounds occurs using such an approach. To my knowledge no one has yet expanded on a full typological theory based on evaluation of a property space in the manner suggested by George and Bennett (2005: 257).

We can also see that where comparisons have been more systematic they have tended to stay within continental bounds. Remembering Peters, despite unquestionably useful contributions, most comparative work on PB has found ways to find solace in the unique and unusual. This can come in the form of stressing the uniqueness of the Brazilian spoils system (Wampler), warning against the 'cultural trap' (Avritzer), focusing on national framing in cross-national comparisons (Rocke) or employing methods that are more likely to uncover subtle differences than uncover similarities (Herzberg/Sintomer et al.). I contend that the field can benefit from making fewer assumptions about the differences in PBs that take place in different macro-comparative units of political organisation (or at least testing these assumptions systematically across cases). Remembering also Mill, to be clear on what is at stake in defining PB for comparative research – and this is very important if actors capable of having political impact will understand the scope of research findings – we must systematically compare the key elements of phenomena in order to define the concept in the first instance. Only by seriously attempting systematic cross-continental comparisons will greater insight be gained into what specificity is lost in abstraction for comparability. As we shall see we can also challenge the assumption that processes in one part of the world are different to another (at least in terms of key causal characteristics).

In any case some definition is an important starting point in conceiving of a universe of cases. We saw earlier that definitions of PB tend to round on a list of key fundamental characteristics. Those provided by Wampler and Avritzer (listed on p.14 above) are good and evoke some of the key design features that have contributed to distinguishing PB as an innovation in participatory governance; but the latter's are slightly abstract and the former's tend to favour the conditions of Brazilian designs. Not surprisingly the best version for worldwide

comparison comes from Sintomer et al. who consider the following criteria minimal in order to recognise a process as PB:

> [The process]…allows the participation of non-elected citizens in the conception and/or allocation of public finances and…

> 6) The financial and/or budgetary dimension must be discussed; participatory budgeting deals with scarce resources.
> 7) The municipal level must be involved or a (decentralised) district with an elected body and some power over administration (the neighbourhood level is not enough).
> 8) It must be a repeated process (one meeting or one referendum on financial issues are not examples of participatory budgeting).
> 9) The process must include some form of public deliberation within the framework of specific meetings/forums (the opening up of administrative meetings or traditional representative instances to 'ordinary' citizens is not participatory budgeting).
> 10) Some accountability with regard to output is required.
>
> Sintomer et al. (2008: 168; 2014: 3).

Of course we might debate with our 'fuzzy' hats on whether these conditions are more or less crisp dichotomies but I believe these are very sensible criteria for distinguishing a process as PB - differentiating it from more common, 'traditional' participatory consultations.

5.3   Differentiating Participatory Budgeting from Participatory Grant-making processes – what PB is not

These criteria would work to exclude from the population many of the cases named 'participatory budgeting' in the UK[45], and similar examples elsewhere, which tend to involve participation in the distribution of ad hoc small grants over

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[45] For a more in-depth discussion of PB in the UK see Hall and Rocke (2013).

administrative jurisdictions which are not governed by a specific representative political body (e.g. neighbourhoods, highways).

To give an illustration, Thornhill, a suburb of Southampton has held a 'PB' process since 2008. Thornhill was identified in 1999 as one of 39 exceptionally deprived areas of the UK granted approximately 50 million GBP worth of government investment each, over a ten-year period as part of New Labour's New Deal for Communities (NDC) regeneration programme (Fordham 2010: 12). As part of a deal struck with the board controlling NDC funding allocation (Thornhill Plus You), the local Primary Care Trust agreed to make a recurring financial contribution to the area distributed via a PB process (Bonaduce de Negris 2010: 4). Support for the process is also provided by the City Council. The process involves local residents creating projects and bidding for money from a single pot of some tens but no more than one hundred thousand pounds. These projects are presented at a public meeting in the local school and residents vote on which ones they would like to receive funding. Their votes are tallied and project funding is allocated accordingly. This is typical of many small projects inspired by PB in the UK (PB Unit 2009) and is similar to many described in other parts of the world (see for example Shah 2007)[46].

I do not wish to suggest that these processes do not have value. From my observations the process in Thornhill incentivised creative community-led projects, improved community cohesion, gave some decision-making control to residents, and gave participants some sense of the trade-offs involved in making decisions to allocate scarce resources. But when we try to compare this process with PB in Porto Alegre we are comparing apples with peanuts rather than apples with apples. The process in Thornhill fails to reach at least 4 of Sintomer et al.'s criteria above. The process is based on a small suburb of roughly 10,000 inhabitants; it is no more than a portion of a local city council ward. The amount of money was set by funding schemes that ordinary citizens had no control over. Projects were limited to those aimed at improving health and wellbeing, so the agenda was set narrowly elsewhere (by the constraints of the funding stream).

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[46] A short, previously unpublished review of PB in the UK prepared by the author for a related research project in late 2009 is provided in Appendices.

There was no public deliberation – in fact officers felt that "Q&A sessions would be difficult to manage, especially as contentious questions might be asked and issues of fairness might arise," (Bonaduce de Negris 2010: 17). There is only one public meeting a year and the continuation of the programme is completely dependent on the goodwill and fiscal priorities of funders.

5.4   Casing: What is a non-case and what is a negative case?

Other processes come closer to satisfying the criteria but still fall short. For example in the London borough of Tower Hamlets in 2009 and 2010 a 'PB' process allocated 5.04 million GBP of council services by asking local residents to come together, deliberate and vote on priorities in their neighbourhoods (U-decide 2009). Despite constraining its agenda to bids for 'additional public services' it opens up a far more significant amount of public funds to local decisions than the grant-making process described above. However the process was discontinued after 2010 on grounds that such funds were no longer available in a meaningful way in a financial downturn. Although Tower Hamlets PB spend was drawn from a mainstream budget not based on ad-hoc 'funny-money' as is often the case in UK PBs (see Rocke and Hall 2013: 195), its foundation was still insecure. This also invokes another important criterion for definition of the PB universe I use in this study. I am interested in explaining how citizen control becomes *institutionalised* in a participatory budgeting process. In the case of Tower Hamlets a key reason why control could not become institutionalised was that the programme was discontinued after two years. Is this a negative case - a case of the phenomenon where the outcome is absent, or a non-case of PB? Should a threshold of continuous years in operation be a scope condition or is it a potential necessary condition that we would want to test for? Open discussion of these questions and decisions is a key feature of case-based research.

Of course one way out of this would be to test membership in a set calibrated from such a variable against our outcome. If cases that took place over, say, at least four years were 1) a consistent superset of cases of citizen control of PB, and 2) that outcome 'covered' the cause (x is more or less equal to Y), it would suggest that X (in this case a regular and repeated process) is a trivial necessary

condition for Y. But it would be a time-consuming process to do this kind of analytical test for every potential condition. This is why a good command of theory and knowledge of the nature of cases in the field is a key tool in case-based research. In any event there are other reasons why the Tower Hamlets case would be excluded from the cases for comparison here. The institutional design of this process might mean that it is better defined as a 21st Century Town Meeting with a focus on local budgeting. Meetings were not regular and continuous over a year-long period and the process did not allow in its structure the development of vertical and horizontal accountability across budget delegates at neighbourhood, region and city/borough level. I will return to discussing categorisation of, and comparison across and within different types of democratic innovation (PB, 21st Century Town Meetings, Citizen's Assemblies etc.) in the concluding chapters. For this analysis I present here I scope the population of the research to include only cases where PB took place for at least three years.

5.5   Cases for a worldwide medium-N comparison of PB

The task at the outset was to build a dataset with enough cases to make meaningful comparisons beyond a small-N incorporating substantial variety. I also wanted to apply fsQCA which meant I needed to be confident that I could obtain a requisite quality of data on important conditions I wanted to test and explain for each case. When I first approached this project with some knowledge of the rapidly emerging literature I had a sense that the field was just ripening for such a task. As participatory budgeting began in Latin America and has taken hold in all corners of the globe much of the literature appears in a variety of languages. I was limited practically to English language sources and the research was undertaken with the premise that this 'ripening' was occurring as a certain quantity and quality of knowledge on PB was becoming available across English language sources. Peters has warned of the consequences for generalisation given the tendency for Americans or Britons to select cases for ease of language use (2013: 171). Bearing this in mind some important questions are raised - where exactly are the cases I need, how can I access the data, and what does it represent?

For an innovation which is not a mere technical fix or upgrade, the diffusion and increase in the number of cases of PB across the globe has been staggering.

There are at time of writing nearly 2800 cases of PB around the world (see Oliveira 2014). It has been recognised that it is close to impossible for a group of even coordinated academics using traditional means of data-gathering, to keep so much as a rough track of all the cases of democratic innovations as they diffuse and diversify throughout the world (Smith 2009). For a start classification of something as an innovation by definition requires ignorance on the part of many toward it and I will return to debates about whether a field of study can be sustainable when organised around 'innovation' in the concluding chapter. Projects like participedia.net[47] have attempted to modernise data gathering in response to these problems by crowd-sourcing cases online and systematically recording data uploaded by users familiar with cases. Despite the help of such tools it is difficult to imagine a 'full' population of PBs in a way that had been common in earlier QCAs.

Deciding which potential cases to include and exclude, and collecting the necessary data to perform calibration and analysis then, is difficult for a number of reasons. First, it is extremely time-intensive. Retaining the virtues of intimacy with cases in a medium-N comparative study is the qualitative strength of QCA. However, it could take a lifetime of work for any researcher to do in-depth qualitative research with a medium-N (see Bryan 2004 for the effort involved in a 'lighter' large-N study of town meetings). As a matter of course, in order to find cases I repeatedly scoured online sources at regular intervals and gradually built up contacts across networks of PB scholarship and activism to access new information, recording sources and data as I went along. The quality of information available about cases runs the gamut from in-depth sophisticated pieces of social science through variances of more grey literature. Types of potential sources of secondary data range from book-length treatments pf PB, including PhD theses, by social scientists (e.g. Abers 2000, Baiocchi 2005; Wampler 2007a), peer-reviewed journal articles (e.g. Rodgers 2010; Bassoli 2012) and many single book chapters (e.g. Blakely 2010, Uran 2010); through reports or parts of reports by academics for Governments, IGOs, or NGOs/Think-

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[47] Participedia.net (PP) is an ongoing collaboration involving academics and practitioners across the world in an attempt to crowd-source, share and systematically compare participatory practices. The author has been a project collaborator with PP since 2011.

tanks (e.g. Allegretti and Herzberg 2004; Sintomer et al; 2010, Pratchett et al. 2009); unpublished working papers and MA theses (e.g. Nieuwland 2003; Droualt 2006); books by activists/journalists (e.g. Bruce 2004) and self-evaluations of processes by organisers and stakeholders (e.g. Lent 2006; Brennan 2009).

If that axis is an indicator of quality or scientific robustness across sources, a further axis would organise cases with reference to how much information was available about the particular case – contributions ranged from treatments of a single case (e.g. Abers 2000) or a handful of cases in comparison (e.g. Talpin 2011; Rocke 2014) to snapshots. Time is not infinite and I would want to compare as many cases as possible, while retaining some level of familiarity with the cases in my dataset. Therefore it does not make sense to make an attempt to add new cases by gathering primary data on new or understudied cases. That is not the remit of this thesis. Therefore I rely mostly on secondary sources in an fsQCA of this type. The difficulty here is that the literature will often, for reasons of space or intentions of a study, document the quirks of a particular case and not all its basic elements. This makes a simple review of case materials for the necessary information on all the conditions for an fsQCA difficult. Therefore I have sought to complement existing secondary material with interviews with field researchers who carried out studies. This has three advantages for cumulative research of this type. First, it enables us to access information on the specific conditions of interest when they are not in the original literature. Second, we can check our interpretation of the nature of conditions with a researcher familiar with the case – and with some knowledge of how it compares with other cases. Third, we are able to engage the field researcher in the iterative process of refining our causal and outcome conditions – as well as the scope and population.

Much of what was written on PB may allude to many cases at once and give some details of broad similarities and differences among cases, (e.g. Alegretti and Herzberg 2004; Goldfrank 2007; Shall 2007; Folscher 2007a, 2007b; Sintomer et al. 2010). Many cases appear in these articles as cameos more-so than in-depth case-studies. One might be able to glean good information on a couple of their characteristics but not several at once. I began (and continue) to record and categorise all evidence that contains some description of a particular quality of a particular condition for any case I came across. This means that the list of

cases and conditions of interest grew quickly but also the empty cells in my dataset grew even more rapidly. As a result a long process ensued of identification of key conditions of interest (see discussion below) and identification of cases which would have the required quality, or close to the required quality of information to be able to reliably measure membership in sets representing these conditions. Essentially the property space was narrowed to provide a full typological theory as well as empirical cases without missing data or non-robust data on key variables[48]. I discuss the key features of this process in a QCA approach in the sections on conditions and calibration below. For the task of identifying cases for the study, the cameo accounts on their own even when compiled across a number of different sources, do not give enough depth to be able to make meaningful comparisons based on an analysis of data from a secondary position. While these sources are useful for confirmation of research and robustness checks, I chose to limit my analysis to cases which had been treated at length (at least a dedicated article or chapter) by a trained social scientist that had identified the case for analytic value.

Some cases could not be included in my analysis for reasons already outlined earlier; PB was abandoned too soon. There is a welcome new departure in PB studies that tries to explain the 'death'/abandonment and/or reincarnation of PBs (Lopez Alves and Allegretti 2012; Spada forthcoming). Paolo Spada has shown that PB is unusual as an innovation in that, in Brazil, rates of adoption have not always outstripped rates of abandonment (idem). Explaining that particular phenomenon is beyond the scope of this thesis. In my study, cases that are abandoned after a short number of years are considered non-cases. I am more interested in explaining how citizen control comes to be institutionalised vis-à-vis the institutionalisation or continuation of a more negative arrangement in ostensibly participatory processes – what Wampler might call 'emasculated' participatory democracy or Arnstein might call degrees of 'nonparticipation' and 'tokenism'.

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[48] A small snapshot of data being collected and categorised for one of the conditions mid-way through the collection process is reproduced in Appendices in order to give a visual appreciation of the raw data extraction and categorisation procedure.

Still, the 18 cases selected for this study represent some of the sheer variety of cases and sources that any comparative study of this type must work with[49]. Although I am limited in the main to English language sources, the cases are not biased towards the English-speaking world. The data contains 10 Brazilian cases where the innovation was strongest in its early waves but these cases are compared with 2 in France, and 1 each from Argentina, Canada, Italy, Germany, Spain and Uruguay. The cases and some of the main sources from which information was garnered are:

- Belo Horizonte (Wampler 2007a, Avritzer 2009, interview with Wampler 16/03/2011).

- Betim (Nylen 2003a, 2003b).

- Blumenau (Wampler 2007a).

- Berlin-Lichtenberg (Rocke 2009, 2014, Herzberg 2013, interview with Rocke 13/12/2010).

- Buenos Aires (Peruzzotti 2009, Rodgers 2010, interview with Rodgers 08/06/2012).

- Ipatinga (Wampler 2007a).

- João Monlevade (Nylen 2003a, Baiocchi, Heller and Silva 2011)

- Montevideo (Goldfrank 2011).

- Morsang-Sur-Orge (Talpin, 2007, 2011, interview with Talpin 26/01/2011).

- Poitou-Charentes (Rocke 2009, 2014, interview with Rocke 13/12/2010).

- Porto Alegre (Abers 2000, Baiocchi 2005, Santos 2005, Gret and Sintomer 2005, Wampler 2007a, Avritzer 2009, Goldfrank 2011).

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[49] Two recent publications at time of writing which provide some in-depth treatments of potential cases include Sintomer et al. (2013) and Dias (2014). Unfortunately as outlined PB provides a moving target and these pieces appeared too late for cases to be included on that basis alone in systematic comparisons at this stage.

- Recife (Wampler 2007a).

- Rio Claro (Wampler 2007a).

- Rome municipio XI (Talpin, 2007, 2011, interview with Talpin 26/01/2011).

- Santo André (Wampler 2007a).

- São Paulo (Wampler 2007a, Avritzer 2009).

- Sevilla (Talpin, 2007, 2011, interview with Talpin 26/01/2011).

- Toronto Community Housing (Lerner and Van Wagner 2006, interview with Lerner 18/01/2011).

The references above far from exhaust the sources used to glean information on these cases but I want to provide a snapshot of the main sources for each case. Where there was missing information among the case material I tried where possible to interview the case-researcher to get this information. A copy of the interview schedule used and an example of a partially transcribed interview can be found in appendix A. Interviews were not possible in all cases and in some, but not all cases, I was able to receive clarifications and information by email. The cases selected vary in the quality of information available but they all pass the minimum requirements set out previously. In any case, uneven amounts of knowledge relating to each case is an accepted (if not desirable) characteristic of case-based comparative research (Newton 2006: 851).

Two cases are notable in that the affected population is not only constituted by geographic jurisdictional borders - i.e. social housing tenants in the case of Toronto Community Housing and stakeholders in high schools in the case of Poitou-Charentes. However, these sub-populations are larger in number than populations in many other cases. Also two of the cases (Lichtenberg and Rome Municipio XI) are subdivisions of a larger city. All cases satisfy the criteria for our study and the importance of, as well as potential disadvantages of, comparing across different political arrangements are discussed later in this chapter and in the next. A number of cases just fell short of being included due to missing information on one or a few important conditions. One of the advantages of QCA is it allows addition of cases in such a way that analysis can be revisited over time in a transparent manner. That is a new case will not carry the fear of a

potential 'outlier' in the way a traditional analysis might assume but will allow more nuanced findings and or prompt discussion about whether it is a different 'type' or 'kind' of case. Therefore a group of researchers working together or apart may contribute and refine such an analysis.

5.6 Comparing Porto Alegre – 'Necessary good or necessary evil'

I have already discussed some of the considerations involved in the unusual case of Porto Alegre with respect to this data in chapter 3. As the archetype of PB it has been seen to have much influence on other cases and models of PB and is still often seen as a yardstick for many other programmes to aspire to. In many ways the success of Porto Alegre is a necessary condition for all the successes of other cases in the dataset. The question we must keep in mind here is whether this influence is an enduring significant factor affecting outcomes that does vary across cases. Using QCA we can try to evaluate to what extent Porto Alegre compares with other cases – whether other cases are similar in key characteristics; and in the end we can return to the case and examine whether it differs to similar cases on the outcome and whether the findings make sense in light of our knowledge about it and other cases.

5.7 Problematising 'success' and specifying the outcome(s) I want to explain.

Policymakers, activists, participants and citizens are all desperate to know what makes political participation 'successful'. Where are the 'good' examples of participation? What do we need in order to do successful participation? How and when do we do what? When do we know that it won't work? This thesis cannot answer all these questions but it would like to help by identifying the drivers of success and failure in participatory budgets. Yet, success and failure are contested concepts. If we are interested in identifying combinations of drivers for success then what defines success? While most actors have some vague common notions of what makes a PB successful they emphasise different elements according to their concerns. How can we operationalise and test this so we can return useful information for end-users of political research? There are age-old concerns in this undertaking also – how can we be sure that our

causal/explanatory conditions (independent variables) are independent of the outcome (dependant variable). How the outcome is defined will significantly affect the casual hypotheses we would like to, and can investigate.

Many scholars have been attracted to PB to help them try to understand its potential to achieve a number of outcomes. These include the redistribution of wealth, increases in education, efficiency of government spending and increasing vote share for the parties implementing PB to name a few. While many of these goals may be complimentary or even conditional on one another, this study is primarily concerned with PB as a *democratic* innovation that effectively institutionalises democratic participation. The aim of the comparative research in this thesis is to explain how ownership of budget decisions by masses of 'ordinary people' becomes a convention and what leads to this being negated. The key research question outlined in the first breath of this thesis is 'when and how do ordinary citizens gain substantial control over important collective decisions?' Is this the most noteworthy contribution we can hope for in PB or is something more important being overlooked? Alternative interpretations of success in PB worth considering include the following:

<u>Reduction in clientelist or corrupt practices:</u> For some PB can be seen primarily as having been introduced in Brazil as a specific measure whose primary aim was to reduce patronage and shady practices in allocation of capital spending in the city. An inherited culture of clientelism has plagued (and in some places continues to plague) Brazilian politics since the foundation of the state. In this context PB can be seen as emblematic of the institutional turn taken by civil society and social movements striking back against military authoritarianism in the late nineteen-seventies and nineteen-eighties (c.f. Wampler and Avritzer 2004: 292). Abers paints a very vivid picture of the ways in which the big patrons in some of Porto Alegre's neighbourhoods were supplanted by cooperation among citizens through the first years of PB (1998b). Is this what PB is about and is it comparable across cases?

Certainly PB varied in its successes in this regard with sustained presence of 'cabo eletoiras' (electoral ward bosses) at meetings in some PBs (Wampler 2007a: 250), and prevalence of 'inchaco'-type practices whereby a patron's supporters who do not participate regularly would 'swell' assemblies to game outcomes elsewhere (Abers 1998b). Clientelism is not unique to Brazilian politics

and even in traditionally non-clientelist representative systems citizens and activists have called for more control over, or transparency in, budget spending. A number of newer cases of PB cite responses to some fiscal management scandals as an influence in their initiation especially in the fallout from global economic contractions. If many of these programmes consider fighting corruption and making budgets transparent a key aim of PB perhaps the outcome we should be most interested in testing requires some measure of a reduction in corruption indicators and patronage.

Nevertheless, PB is more than just a tool for budget transparency and openness. Budget regulation and transparency has been shown to be successful in reducing incentives for politicians to benefit from information asymmetry in traditional representative political systems too (Benito and Bastida 2009). PB sets a somewhat higher standard than this. Abers shows that as citizens over time began to deliberate with one another they moved from attending PB meetings in order to campaign for narrow localised goals, to organising collectively to gain more control over shared concerns (1998b). Reductions in clientelism may be a symptom of and a good indicator for successful PB. But for many, PB aims not just for a better relationship between decision-makers and those affected by decisions but for a fundamental change in the nature of who decisions are made by and for.

Substantive Learning and Education: One lauded outcome of PB in Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte that has been picked upon by the World Bank and others seeking to diffuse the process has been its apparent ability to increase the 'budget literacy' of ordinary citizens. Budgets, despite being arguably the legislative act with most effect on an average citizen's day-to-day lives have traditionally been less open to considered debate among ordinary citizens than, for example, moral or constitutional issues. Budgets are often referred to as the 'black box' of government; best understood and administered by economists, planners, other technocrats and - perhaps only if necessary - professional politicians. A level of budget literacy among members of an active society can be an important component of good governance. By familiarising themselves with the jargon and technical procedures of public budgeting citizens can come to understand the constraints and procedures faced in political decision-making with limited resources. This, it is argued, can lead them to make more rational demands from the state. Similarly, when citizens can communicate with

technocrats in a language they both recognise, those operating within the black box can overcome information deficits in regard to citizen's needs and wants. They may find that citizen's priorities are different to what they believed they were as in Porto Alegre (Abers 2000), or they may gain information to be able to anticipate policy failures before they are implemented.

Again good governance is often an aim of PB and one that is desirable of any arrangement involving collective-decision making, but this only captures some of what PB sets out to achieve. Improvements in cognition, individual or collective, seen in adaptive preferences and public reason-giving are only one good that democratic theorists hope for from participation in democratic politics (Talpin 2011: 15; see also Smith 2009). Practices of making public arguments and changing preferences can be important in their own right but could be far more powerful as part of a broader process of taking control of making collective decisions and even collectively (re-)shaping institutions of governance (c.f. Talpin 2007, see also Pateman 1970).

Representation of Presence and Voice: Critiques of the inclusion concept within democratic theory have developed to specify in particular the need to be sensitive to the role of presence (Phillips 1995) and voice (Young 2000) where important affected constituencies may be underrepresented. We might want to evaluate the success of PB by simply looking at the diversity and representativeness of participants or discourses that are brought to the fore by the process. If unequal representation remains democracies unresolved dilemma (Lijphart 1997) then a political process that achieves more equal representation involving more than just the 'usual suspects' is a successful one.

Also we may want to measure the extent to which inclusive deliberation takes place or ask whether we can measure some shared sense of identity that results from the process. The latter kinds of outcomes have been of particular interest to deliberative democratic theorists and sophisticated, innovative attempts to measure such outcomes resulting from participation in new institutional designs can be seen in the work of Fishkin (2009; 1996) and Niemeyer (2011). Those analyses have mainly focused on specific institutions designed for more narrow purposes (mini-publics) than participatory budgets. And even where these outcomes have been measured outside of mini-publics (e.g., Bryan 2004; Steiner

et al. 2004) the focus tends to be on the collection of individual actions rather than collective outcomes as a whole.

Following Smith (2009) different institutions may achieve these goods in different ways but they are only elements of successful democratic innovation, which also requires degrees of popular control over decisions, as well as accountability and effective implementation of such decisions. It makes more sense therefore at this stage of scholarship on PB to test whether inclusion and voice are associated with successful outcomes, data-permitting, than to assume that they constitute those outcomes.

Redistribution ('Inversion of priorities') – PB has not only interested those whose primary concern is the minutiae of democratic procedures or those who intrinsically value a vibrancy of political participation. Its popularity has often been driven by its promise of a more just distribution of collective resources. In the context of Brazil with its exceptionally rapid urbanisation and consequential plethora of unplanned settlements, PB was very much envisioned as an instrument for 'inverting priorities'. Capital infrastructure spending was refocused away from the haves in gentrified suburbs and gated communities to the have-nots in the favelas. It is no accident that Porto Alegre became a beacon for the alter-globalisation movement, the cradle for the World Social Forum, and a 'Mecca of the Left'. In Europe too, early cases were initiated by Leftist and often Communist parties. As Julien Talpin explains, these parties, reeling from the ideological consequences of the fall of the Soviet empire, saw in participatory democracy a modern idea with which to build a new positive identity and reconnect with their constituents (2011: 35).

Some recent studies have compared PB and non-PB cities to show that PBs in general lead to improvements in the circumstances of vulnerable citizens over time. Gonçalves (2014) shows that PB cities prioritised health and sanitation spending leading to significant reduction in infant-mortality rates; and Touchton and Wampler confirm that PB increases health-care spending and decreases infant-mortality rates in a similar study (2013).

Looking at cases where PB has occurred only (as in my population) the level of redistribution and transformative justice achieved certainly could be expected to vary across cases. There may be many variables which could explain these outcomes worthy of an empirical test. For example the motives of initiators may

differ - as PB has diffused it has been accepted and implemented by parties and actors from different political backgrounds. In the UK a strong localism agenda among conservatives saw PB amalgamated into the new coalition government's 'Big Society' initiative in 2010 - however the overall initiative was ill-received and PB was marginalised and allowed to fall off the central government's policy-map. In Brazil many non-PT and even non-Leftist parties may have taken up PB in order to try and mimic the electoral rewards it saw the PT acquiring. However Spada (forthcoming) shows that despite abandonment of PB by PT parties after Lula's presidential victory, the number of non-PT-led PBs has remained stable.

I chose not to attempt to explain redistributive outcomes in this thesis. A causal hypothesis that might explain high levels of redistributions seems difficult to test using QCA with the data at our disposal. The redistributive effect of PB is likely to be influenced by channels of diffusion and may require tracing of diffusion processes to understand better whether models that emphasise such outcomes are universal. It would also require sophisticated controls to ensure spending decisions were comparable across cases. When such data becomes available we may be able to engage in set-theoretic causal analysis and modelling to this end.

But there is a second more important reason that redistributive outcomes are not the primary concern here. Even if the creators of PB had the ultimate goal of redistributing wealth, what makes them stand out from others who tried to achieve that goal through various means is that they trusted in an innovation in democratic institutional design. Dissecting the relationship between democracy and equality of outcomes is far beyond the scope of this thesis, but democratic institutions should not be judged on their ability to realise substantive outcomes that are defined as desirable a priori to the democratic decision-making process. We should be more interested in what conditions lead to procedures that as Invernizzi Accetti puts it "… [enable] citizens to govern themselves equally and freely within a context of normative indeterminacy," (2013: 1).

The outcome condition - Citizen Control of Popular Decisions: The ultimate aim of this study is to draw on a range of cases to explain the conditions under which citizen control of budget spending decision is effectively institutionalised: That is where democratic participation and ownership of budget decisions by 'ordinary people' becomes a convention. The outcome condition (or in

traditional statistical language – the dependent variable) we are aiming to evaluate is *citizen control of budgetary decision making*. This takes place when both agenda-setting and decision-making power in budget decisions is directed by, and open to, all citizens. I separately collected data on citizens ability to set agendas and ability to make decisions and combined them as explained in the section on calibration below (in Boolean terms, the set of citizen control is created by the conjunction – logical 'AND' - of these two conditions).

There are different factors that can contribute to check decision-making and/or agenda-setting power. On the surface these powers were easy to code by looking at the rules of the process – e.g. citizen control may be affected by whether de jure vetoes are in place. I was interested in measuring de facto citizen control, however. This meant collecting and synthesising a variety of qualitative information that signalled different degrees of power. For example, asking what level of co-optation took place in both setting-agendas and making final decisions. Wampler shows for instance that despite the strong rhetoric of co-governance in Santo André, government officials and the mayor's office benefited in controlling the process by having far more access to important information and the apparatus of the state. Despite a de jure veto for both sides according to the rules the only de facto veto was exercised by the administration (2007a: 178-179). Also decisions need to be made with the knowledge that they will be accounted for and enforced. Some system of monitoring of outcomes was more or less a constant rather than a variable across cases but in reality implementation of projects differs across cases. More details on operationalisation and measurement is provided in the section on calibration below.

I continue to collect relevant data on other potential outcomes including redistribution of wealth, individual and group inclusion, education and budget literacy, and in time may have means to create more complex outcome conditions that incorporates these conditions – or run separate analyses focused on these particular outcome conditions. However for this study attention is focused on how de facto citizen control of budgetary decision-making is established, institutionalised and sustained.

5.8   Influencing Conditions

As previously explained QCA is an excellent method for testing the combinations of a number of conditions (independent variables) that are associated by set-theoretic relationships with an outcome. QCA analysis can examine complexity, and uncover and describe multiple conjunctural causation. It can be a more useful method than traditional interaction models when used with a medium-N, for interpreting such relationships of association across cases (See further discussion in Braumoller 2003; also Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 88-89). However although QCA may be able to handle one or two more conditions than a regression to answer these kinds of questions, it is no magic bullet that allows independent variables to be thrown at a causal model like leftovers to a stew. Careful and skilful recourse to political theory and hypothesis-formation is more important than ever here and in fact QCA provides a method for dealing transparently with logical remainders.

QCA is transparent about the empirical relevance of the data in the property space that has been created by the conditions to be tested. For each k number of conditions tested in any QCA model there will be 2^k logical cases (combinations of conditions that are logically possible – see Ragin 2007: 24). Thus an increase in one explanatory condition will increase the logical cases exponentially and also increase the number of empty cells in the property space. With a small-to-medium number of cases, the number of logical remainders (logical cases for which we do not have empirical examples) will usually begin to outweigh the number of logical cases for which we have empirical cases as soon as there are more than 3 or 4 conditions in the model. Therefore a robust medium-N QCA requires the theoretical skills to select and define three to five key explanatory conditions to be examined with the outcome condition conceptualised above. What follows in this section will discuss and describe this process.

As outlined in the comprehensive review in chapter 2, the growing literature on PB provides ample candidates for key conditions that could explain successful outcomes. Many of the types of claims that Wampler (2007a); Avritzer (2008); Talpin (2011); Baiocchi, Heller and Silva (2011); Goldfrank (2011) and others make about causal processes in PB are in fact either explicitly or implicitly claims about set-theoretic relationships of necessity and sufficiency. For example, as

we saw in the previous chapter, Wampler suggests that the explanatory conditions, *strong mayoral support* combined with *an active civil society* is necessary for the achievement of most successful participatory budgeting programmes (2007a: 258). A myriad of the conditions that are suggested to explain a deepening of democracy as a result of PB imply necessity and/or sufficiency. Plausible hypotheses include combinations of, the fiscal independence of a polity, the governing ideology of the political leadership, the health of civil society, the quality of deliberation at meetings, the role of the bureaucracy, the degree of partisanship across the political spectrum, constitutional provisions for participatory governance etc. Remember with 18 cases the analysis needs optimise the number of conditions we can examine across cases but take into account the limited diversity of social phenomena. Therefore in the analysis produced here we consider four important conditions which have been considered key to explaining citizen control of budgetary decision-making in the literature:

The set of government leaders committed to a participatory governing philosophy

People who have power rarely give it away. Debates about the role of citizens in governance or the state have raged for centuries and are the staple of much political theory. We standardly indoctrinate undergraduate students by exposing them to a canon that reads from Plato through Aristotle, Machiavelli, the modern social contract theorists, Madison and laterally Schumpeter, Pateman, Dahl and many more in between to try to comprehend what the ideal role of the individual is in making collective decisions. In some case they have inspired or guided revolution but throughout that history what has been rare is for a state or other locus of power to decide to give up that power without a fight. Even where leaders talk of decentralising power this is often met with cynicism as very few 'walk the walk'. Yet it seems that cynicism would be misplaced taking into account some cases of PB. Why?

If there is one issue that unites concern among political scholars of many methodological and ideological hues it is that we seem to be experiencing a legitimacy crisis in established representative democracies (Stoker 2006, Saward 2010, Mair 2013). As explained in the introduction what is most interesting about the participatory fora and innovative institutional designs that have

emerged in the last thirty to forty year is that democratisation in these instance is governance-driven (Warren 2009). Both studies in Latin America and Europe (see especially Röcke 2014) emphasise the importance of the *leadership strategy* in putting PB on the agenda in the first instance and then influencing the model/rules of PB and its success in practice.

This condition connects concerns about the extent to which participation is ideologically central to governing parties, the degree of support for participation across the party and political spectrum, and the instrumental incentives for government to engage citizens in decision-making. All those three elements and others might be operationalised separately and then combined or operationalised together as discussed in the next section but it is important to be clear that in this analysis we are interested in the higher-order construct which takes all into account.

In some cases commitment to participatory ideals can be signalled in the rhetoric of speeches and policy programmes promoted publicly. In the case of Poitou-Charentes, Ségelène Royal followed a fairly radical discourse in her defence of and promise for participatory democracy, at least prior to her selection as presidential candidate in 2006/2007 (Röcke 2014: 66-67). However, despite being influenced by the World Social Forum, it was also clear that Royal recognised the strategic benefits of participation and tempered her rhetoric in national campaigns (idem: 24). Therefore this condition takes into account commitment to participation across political society as a whole. High set membership values on this condition can be seen where participatory measures were sustained by leaders in the face of challenges from opposition leaders; but also where challenges were not forthcoming because there was broad support across the political spectrum and challenges were not strong or publicised[50]. A further important indicator is whether leaders actively attempted to improve the circumstances for participation. Though circumstances such as financial security of a municipality and bureaucratic capacity themselves have independent effects

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[50] Descriptions of the verbal logic that defines membership in the set for each condition is more clearly elaborated in the section on calibration that follows.

on the outcome ideological commitment to participation can be observed when leaders took political risks to try and channel funds and/or human resources or other state capital to advantage participatory budgeting[51].

Bureaucratic Support for PB

The inclusion of this condition recognises a further source of the exercise of power that can act as a brake or catalyst for participatory reforms. Bureaucrats or other contracted staff play an important role in guaranteeing or negating the outcomes of policies. This role is conditioned by but not explained only by their physical capacities and competences to do the work (Lipsky 1980). For example, their actions both direct and indirect can be key to mobilising participants. As we shall see in some cases bureaucrats exercised discretion in ways that benefited PB.

There are important differences across polities in the extent to which political leaders are able to restructure the administration (including the appointment of senior bureaucrats) to enable PB (Abers 2000; Baiocchi 2005). It is a little ironic that in some cases leaders were able to take advantage of the 'spoils systems' of patronage to reorganise bureaucracies such that key strategic positions as well as street-level ones were held by those who were committed to participation. As Abers points out in the case of Porto Alegre two organisations, GAPLAN[52] (a reorganised planning department) and CRC[53] (community relations department) were initiated in this way in order to support the PB (2000: 77-78). Bureaucrats were brought close to ordinary citizens, working with them towards common aims. In other cases sympathetic bureaucrats may have been removed where leaders lost interest in participation. Rodgers gives a good account of this in his description of the latter years of the Buenos Aires case (2010). Therefore this

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[51] When I first approached this research with the mind-set of a classically trained social scientist I was concerned that these relations between explanatory conditions question the independence of the variables. QCA however is built for uncovering conjunctural causation rather than additive aggregate correlations. Therefore it is important to consider the independence of variables as usual to anticipate endogeneity and explain any collinearity. However it is perhaps most important to return to the cases after the analysis and if necessary employ process-tracing techniques in order to investigate causal interdependence among influencing condition or the possibility of feedback loops etc. These concerns are further elaborated on in the closing chapters.
[52] Gabinete de Planejamento.
[53] Coordenação de Relações com a Comunidade.

condition takes into account the freedom that bureaucrats have to support PB as well as their intentions and actions.

In other cases bureaucratic support varied where politicians had either little control or little influence over which staff were involved in the project and even what they did. Lerner and Van Wagner (2006) show that in Toronto it was committed staff in the social housing sector that had been made aware of PB through diffusion channels which bypassed politicians, who, recognising they had the capacity, took it upon themselves to implement a PB process. Given that support also varied where such reorganisation as had been taken in South America was not possible at the municipal level, we can see this condition suggests a number of combinatorial hypotheses which may alternate in their effect on the outcome depending on the presence of other conditions. It will be interesting to see in the final analysis whether a combination of support from both politicians and bureaucrats is sufficient on its own to produce real democratic outcomes in a PB process; or perhaps whether one without the other is sufficient across cases in conjunction with, for example, the work of civil society actors.

Active Civil Society Demand for PB

Claims to the necessity of an active civil-society for truly democratic outcomes in PB are common to much of the literature (see especially Wampler 2007, Avritzer 2009). Many PB scholars are sceptical of the ability of a PB to become institutionalised and flourish where it is implemented only from the top-down. There remains a tension within democratic theory between radical democrats and participatory institutionalists as to whether democracy can be governance-driven (Warren 2009, Smith 2009), or whether this only reifies existing relations of dominance and pacifies the resistance to hegemony that is necessary for democracy (Blaug 2002). Both Baiocchi (2005) and Wampler (2007a) elaborate mechanisms whereby a vibrancy and activism within civil society can generate organised pressure for PB from the bottom-up. In Porto Alegre, civil society activists lobbied successfully not to have the participatory budgeting procedures enshrined legally precisely because they wanted the space to remain vibrant and contested. So is this bottom-up demand necessary for citizen control of PB outcomes or are there alternative paths?

Raw data collected for this condition include details on whether civil society was able to make organised and consistently strong demands invoking their rights to participation as a source of legitimating democratic decisions. This condition also takes into account not just demand but capacity of civil society within a municipality or region. It tries to capture information on the extent to which CSOs were able to organise independent of government across cases. We have already seen in the previous chapter that across Brazilian cases it was CSOs willingness and ability to use contentious politics to hold government to account on implementing PB projects that stood out for Wampler in ensuring the relative success of programmes.

A Financial Basis to Spend

What spending freedom does the body organising and implementing PB have and is it steered or constrained by external forces beyond its control? Where diffusion has occurred across vastly different political units with different capacities and functions, the question of the degree of fiscal independence available to the instigators of participatory processes arises. The fourth and final condition tested for the model presented in this thesis, assesses whether PB programmes have or can raise sufficient funds to administer the project and implement outcomes of PB decisions. Where politicians, bureaucrats and/or civil society are committed to political reform financial constraints may negate their ability to achieve their goals.

The PBs in our dataset take place in different countries with different levels of decentralisation and tax-raising powers among local governments and other subsidiary regulatory bodies. These bodies may also have different roles and freedoms with different welfare state models across the population of cases. In the early work on Brazilian cases, the fiscal autonomy of municipal mayors, including especially their relative power to vary taxation, was frequently part of the explanation of successful implementation (Abers 2000, Goldrank 2012). However formal powers do not tell the whole story here. In some cases actors are constrained by historical or macro-economic problems e.g. in the Brazilian context Recife suffered from a lack of infrastructure and resources such that it struggled to implement infrastructure projects decided on by the budget (Wampler 2007a: 238-239). Where governments have to constantly commit funding to firefighting emergencies they are likely to suffer more pressure to

avoid rowing in with participatory decisions that are seen as risky; or they may be simply unable altogether to fund the demands of citizens. In other cases subsidiary bodies may have a relatively greater ability to negotiate changes in these circumstances. As will be explained this condition was carefully calibrated to allow comparison across units of different size and competence.

5.9   Why favour these conditions over others?

As we have seen above different researchers choose and approach cases with different purposes in mind. While this gives us a rich and diverse set of findings it can make coherent cumulation difficult but no less important. What very few researchers on PB have yet come close to producing is a fully specified typological theory for any combination of conditions of interest. That is very few writers discuss all of the logical combinations of their selected key conditions that influence or shape a PB. As I have pointed out comparison is an eternally ongoing process which aids conceptualisation. At this stage of development of scholarship on PB a transparently constructed, communicated and analysed property space, I suggest, can be very useful in aiding debates about what PB is, and when PBs are comparable.

When comparing rich data across a larger number of cases some level of abstraction from the conditions used in small-N research is often (though not always) required. This is why larger-N research can never replace small-N research. Nevertheless, cumulation has been undervalued. Guided by the literature, I have specified key conditions which have been cited across studies as particularly important in explaining citizen control or its absence in participatory budgets. I am confident that the four conditions selected represent the most significant causal claims made within the general literature on PB and reflect field knowledge from the cases we include in the analysis. We also limit the analysis to four conditions to reduce logical remainders as much as is possible for a medium-N study.

There are many other conditions which were considered and might be included in future iterations or other studies that try to cumulate knowledge to explain successful participatory processes. The inclusion of further cases in the population would no doubt lead to further revisions and addition of conditions. For the sake of a vivid sense of other candidates I list some: Size of a

municipality, weakness of opposition, relative poverty in a municipality, democratic performance, level of decentralisation in design, presence/absence of other avenues of participation, rules on monitoring of projects, partisanship (left or right-leaning municipality/civil society), and variances in privileges of organised interests.

In at least three instances quite convincing arguments have been made in the case literature that suggest these variables play an important role in explaining PB cases but either data is currently unavailable across a range of cases or conditions were not included to avoid the problem of limited diversity. First, Avritzer makes the case that in São Paulo, PB suffered because its decisions sometimes overlapped with decisions made in other power-sharing bodies such as Health Councils (2009: 100). While no scholar explicitly looks at the effect of other decision-making fora in a municipality on the success of PB other than perhaps Avritzer, many hint at it in different ways. Unfortunately discussion of this phenomenon is not rich and data on the way different bodies involved in governance work in practice is difficult to collect and verify without conducting many interviews with people on the ground. This condition also may be a good example of alternative causation - the existence of other participatory institutions may signal experiential learning of how to do participation ('schools of democracy') in municipalities that increases the chances that PB will be successful.

Secondly, my construction of the participatory leadership condition takes into account the support for participation across the political spectrum. An important finding for Goldfrank was that the participatory programme in Porto Alegre was more successful where opposition was weakly institutionalised vis-à-vis his other two cases because "community organisation in Caracas and Montevideo were linked to either the opposition or incumbent parties, and they did not push for power in the new participation programmes," (2012: 7). Nylen also considers partisanship within a municipality as an important barrier to PB's success (2003b) and Wampler similarly includes the condition of 'mayor-legislative relations' as central to his comparisons. Nylen shows that even in Betim where the PT tried to reach out across political divides the result was relatively unsuccessful.

Opposition and partisanship on their own may be important conditions that explain success of PBs. These conditions come close to satisfying data availability requirements across cases. It would not be difficult to construct a proxy measure by investigating the historical and contemporary strength of opposition parties in each municipality, which even without rich description of how this operates in practice could be powerful as a predictor of outcomes. Nevertheless, these conditions are not operationalised separately and considered in this analysis. Including a fifth condition overcomplicates and will induce further problems of limited diversity, and the four conditions we include are slightly more prevalent as explanations of outcomes across cases, especially outside South America. It is sometimes difficult to distinguish the separate effects of opposition, partisanship and participatory leadership in qualitative accounts as the leader can adapt messages to circumstances. This is why overall support for participation across political society is included in the calibration of the participatory leadership condition here. Essentially I do not conduct a strong test for weakness of opposition but include it as part of a higher-order construct. It is important to keep these factors in mind when interpreting the results of comparative analysis

Thirdly and relatedly some might argue that size of a municipality and/or overall levels of development/poverty could mediate results of PB. In particular Pateman has thrown doubt over whether there is an appetite for participatory reform in wealthy established democracies (2012: 15). This is an important question and such conditions could provide 'easy wins' in terms of data availability given quantitative measures available. However, as before these are not the key concerns in the literature and may be more appropriately looked it in a larger-N study.

In the end we have to cut our cloth. Avenues for expanding this analysis as a mode of cumulation to enable an enlarged research agenda are discussed in the conclusion to this thesis.

5.10   A note on Comparison and Time

The final important factor in casing and hypothesis-formation I have yet to discuss is time. It is important to be clear about the time range for each case. PB is still an evolving phenomenon. The earliest cases began in 1989. The cases in

the dataset generally represent older, more established cases of PB (at least where they have remained established). They are cases that were selected by researchers for in-depth investigation because they recognised their analytic value. In this dataset the time-range for each case is set by the source material. Some of these accounts were written some years ago, others are more recent. On the whole they provide enough information for a robust comparison and we may want to make some modest generalisations from our findings in the direction of younger cases for which information is emerging. In some cases we have accounts that cover fifteen years of a practice and in others the accounts may cover as little as 4 years of a PB programme. Are such cases comparable in this format and is time a confounding factor?

We saw in the previous chapter that Wampler highlights differences in the case of Porto Alegre over time. Baierle considers PB to be a very different beast after the 2004 elections which left the city without a PT mayor (2008). We might also note that in Recife, for example PB has been governed by a number of different mayors from different parties over the years. Not only might there be both adverse and positive effects of change but also continuity may affect PB either positively or negatively. For instance, it might be argued that participatory learning takes place over time allowing improvements in outcomes.

One way to test for this effect would be to include a condition that measures whether a significant change in the PB took place or not. This can be interesting but runs into the same problems of increasing the number of conditions in the model we have seen before. One might also consider separating cases into different time periods for sake of comparability, perhaps by length of government terms. This is similar to the approach taken by Benoit Rihoux in comparing Green parties in Europe (2006). This second approach is also attractive of course because it would increase the number of cases in our database. The trade-off here is that casing in this way involves building in some prior assumption that important changes take place only at these times of electoral change. It would be silly to say that the electoral cycle does not often play a role in change of, for example, political leader's strategies but those changes might be equally incentivised or constrained by other forces. As we shall see in any case, using QCA we can return to the cases with these considerations in mind to assess whether we are missing a crucial condition from the explanation and an alternative reading of individual cases is desirable.

A final alternative would be to look only at the first few years of each case (e.g. not to consider data on influencing conditions outside the first four years). The question at that point becomes more one of what are the initial conditions that lead to successful outcomes in PBs. In reality the kinds of changes described in the literature are too gradual and vary in their character to allow for such strict cut off points. In any case many of these influencing conditions do not change very much over time and their initial value is sustained. However in some cases there can be a relative change of values over time which affects outcomes (e.g. leadership changes, bureaucrats becoming more sympathetic to participatory practices, civil society focusing its energies elsewhere). Where there are significant changes over time this can lower or raise a cases membership value in a set. Thus it is important to take a longer-term measure of a programme where possible. I now go on to discuss the process of calibration that decides how membership values in sets are allocated.

5.11 Calibration

These conditions were selected because they are some of those most often invoked as having an important causal relationship with the outcome in previous casework. Many of these conditions can be considered higher-order constructs of a group of less abstract conditions which are logically combined. Using fuzzy logic, fuzzy set memberships of higher-order constructs can be calculated with reference to the relationship between their base memberships – see discussion of calibrating 'fiscal basis for spending' condition below. The presence/absence of conditions in each case was evaluated by the researcher first by coding following examination of case descriptions and where possible by interviews with the field researcher(s) who carried out the analysis to provide robustness checks on the quality of the coding. Of course concepts in the social world are rarely crisp, they are in fact fuzzy (while they can be observed to be present or absent, they can also be not fully present but present to a degree). Following the survey of the PB literature, interviews with experienced field researchers, and an iterative process of reflection on populations and existing theories of participatory governance, conditions are operationalised. In fsQCA this involves calibration. To create a measure for comparison that is conceptually valid we need to link the quantitative values of membership in a set with the qualitative standard we have of what membership of a case in that set means.

Calibration involves relating verbal and numerical data. Ideally calibration should be done after cases and conditions are selected. Calibration naturally follows condition selection in particular and is linked to the definition of sets. There are different approaches to calibration and the approach taken for calibrating each set will depend on the nature of data and the confidence the researcher has of being accurately able to attribute qualitative changes in states to recognise different levels of set membership. Nevertheless in each case we define the degrees of membership within the set in particular in relation to three key breakpoints: full membership in the set (score of 1), non-membership of the set (score of 0) and neither more in nor more out of the set (score of 0.5, also known as the 'crossover point'). Depending on how confident we are that we have detailed enough knowledge to recognise different degrees of membership we can define other breakpoints for calibration which are linked to verbal statements, e.g. 'more out than in' (0.25) and 'more in than out' of a set (0.75) (Ragin 2000: 156).

Three broad approaches to calibration are typically used in fsQCA. In many recent studies, conditions are defined by converting a continuous variable into a fuzzy set. This has become more common as quantitative researchers have become familiar with fsQCA techniques. The most commonly used technique for this is known as the 'direct' method of calibration. None of the four conditions selected in this analysis use this form of calibrating directly from an indicator variable but it is useful to elaborate on to understand how a fuzzy set relates to a variable. We might imagine also the use of this method were a future analysis of this data to incorporate poverty and/or democratic performance measurements as we would have readymade indicator variables for such a conversion.

To give an example[54], if we had preferred to look at whether PB successes or failures could be explained in different ways in big or small cities we might have wanted to include the set of 'Large municipalities' as an influencing condition in our analysis. In this case it would make sense to take the raw ratio variable

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[54] Ragin (2008: 89) provides a more in-depth introduction to this method of calibration than the example I provide here.

'population' and choose three qualitative breakpoints to convert this variable into a set that describes qualities of 'large' and 'small' rather than population figures.

The lower threshold we choose (say population of 100,000) would signify non-membership in the set of large cities - variation in populations below this number of citizens is deemed irrelevant and no case with any total population of citizens lower than this number could be considered in any way a large municipality. All such cases have a set membership of 0. The higher threshold (let's say population of 500,000) indicates full membership in the set. All populations of this number and above are large municipalities (set membership score of 1). Variation above the line is irrelevant to the concept we are measuring. Finally we would define the point of maximum ambiguity (set score of 0.5) in increasing population as to when a population indicates more of a small city or a large city (let's say 200,000). The set membership scores for the cases whose population lies between the three breakpoints can then be calculated by various mathematical conversion techniques. Ragin for instance uses estimates of log odds of full membership as an in intermediate step in converting raw values to fine-grained fuzzy membership (2007: 87). However, other functional forms could be used for this purpose and there is no clear reason why logistic ones are best despite their prevalence in QCA programmes (Thiem 2010). Yet the effect of changes of functional transformation mechanisms while measurable remains marginal in most scenarios – it is the qualitative definition of breakpoints that matters substantively (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 37). These authors also point to an important critique in this approach to calibration, in that it leads to "very fine-grained fuzzy scales, thus suggesting a level of precision that usually goes well beyond the available empirical information and the conceptual level of differentiation that is possible," (idem).

In contrast the method of calibration I employ, and most straightforward in terms of understanding and conceptual clarity (but not necessarily implementation), involves drawing candidly on rich qualitative descriptions in already existing casework. Data is assessed and cases are ascribed fuzzy membership values in the sets 'by hand' (membership in each set represents observed degree of presence of a condition). In my analysis, membership in sets

takes one of only eight values corresponding to the following logical verbal statements[55]:

1.0   - 'Fully in' the set

0.83 - ' mostly but not fully in'

0.67 - 'more or less in'

0.52 - 'marginally more in'

0.48 - 'marginally more out'

0.33 - 'more or less out'

0.17 - 'mostly but not fully out'

0   - 'fully out'

Calibrating (coding) cases is an informative, inductive process. There is constant interplay here between case-knowledge and theoretical understanding. On assessing the data and engaging in iterations of calibration it became clear that this 8-value set was an appropriate level of nuance in measurement given the data available. As I will shortly elaborate, I also devised ways of engaging field researchers in checking the robustness of my data.

The first and most critical step is to define what constitutes full membership in the set, full non-membership, and the point of maximum ambiguity in membership[56]. What does this process look like? Let us take the example of a set 'participatory leadership strategy'. We can start off with the concept that full membership in this set is observed where *the instigator/overseer of PB is*

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[55] It is a tempting mistake to consider this as the same process as constructing an ordinal variable. An ordinal variable is a ranking and not the same as a fuzzy set which is tied explicitly to at least three detailed statements of set membership (Ragin 2009: 126). A clear example of the difference between a fuzzy set and an ordinal variable is seen in the discussion of the ladder of participation in Chapter 2 of this thesis.

[56] There are in fact nine gradations in each set, but the crossover point (value 0.5) is the point of maximum ambiguity of membership in a set. A tempting error would be to assume for convenience that a 'hard' case could have a membership score 'halfway' in the set. The verbal logic which ascribes to a membership of 0.5 in a set would be that a case is 'neither more in nor more out' of the set. Ascribing a case such a score places it in a logical limbo and removes it from the analysis. As a solution to this I have included the two 'marginal' conditions (0.48 and 0.52) to create the 7-value set, c.f. Ragin (2000: 156).

ideologically committed to participatory politics and to implementing PB. Thus full non-membership is where *the instigator/overseer of PB is not ideologically committed to participatory politics AND is actively trying to derail or revoke participatory practices.* We have a number of cases which we know lie somewhere in between these points – when does a case look more like a committed participatory leader and when does it look more like an uncommitted one? We might say to the best of our ability that the point of maximum ambiguity (or crossover point) is represented when *the instigator/overseer of PB is committed to participatory politics only to the extent that it fits in with other ideological or material goals - Support for PB is present but limited and extremely fragmented across the governing ranks.* Cases closer to the maximum from this point are more in and cases closer to the minimum are more out of the set. We can then evaluate gradations of more in or more out where appropriate given our knowledge of cases and data available. We might feel that there is enough evidence in the secondary literature and from interviews with field researchers to warrant relatively fine-grained fuzzy sets for the purposes of a more nuanced analysis or we might make do with say a 4-value set. It is important to note that sets may have different levels of gradation in the same analysis. For example we may have enough information to make relatively fine-grained distinctions between financial constraints by looking at spending available, but only be able to make a crisp dichotomous distinction (set membership value of 1 or 0) between, for example, existence or non-existence of alternative participatory institutions if we had chosen to include that condition in our analysis. This has no conceptual bearing on relationships of inclusion between sets. Conjunctions and disjunctions are arithmetically calculated using min and max functions to ascertain their set membership values.

We then calibrate our case knowledge to the comparison we have defined conceptually. We can say that Porto Alegre would achieve a fuzzy membership of 1 in this set as PB was the flagship of an explicit participatory philosophy of the instigating party. The PT proposed a programme specifically designed to involve lower socio-economic groups in public policy-making venues (Wampler, 2007a: 5); to give civil society organisations an input in making the rules of PB; and to increase budget transparency (idem: 126). In comparison, we know that in Berlin we have a mayor committed to participation at the district level but there is a question as to whether this justifies similar membership given that the

district mayor is not the only driving force in such a federal system (Rocke: 2009). In Buenos Aires there was brief enthusiasm from those in power but this was linked to the political opportunity structure and the contingent circumstances of the Argentine economy rather than participatory ideals only (Peruzotti 2009 Rodgers: 2010). Can we measure these cases using the measurement device we have constructed?

For the purpose I found it useful to visualise the cases on what I term fuzzy-maps (see fig. 5-1 below).

Participatory Leadership Strategy

1 | Porto Alegre

Montevideo, Morsang
Ipatinga, Sevilla

Belo Horizonte, Betim
Lichtenberg
Santo Andre

Joao Monlevade

0.5 |

Sao Paulo

Buenos Aires

Blumenau, Rio claro

0 | Toronto

Code: 1 = The instigator/overseer of PB is ideologically committed to participatory politics and implementing PB. They are willing to take risky decisions and can build or manoeuvre support across the political spectrum.

0.5 = The instigator/overseer of PB is committed to participatory politics only to the extent that it fits with other policy goals and support is fragmented across political society in a way that makes ongoing support for the PB precarious.

0 = The instigator/overseer of PB is has little interest or is actively hostile to the PB and/or participatory politics. The PB is taking place in spite of them.

Figure 5-1 An example of a 'fuzzy-map' for case membership in the condition 'participatory leadership strategy'.

Researchers can be presented with the above information and asked to comment and critique it. This helps in the direction of confident judgements that the numerical values we ascribe cases make sense both in relation to the verbal definitions of key breakpoints in set membership, and more tacit knowledge of the cases themselves and how they relate. Interplay then takes place where the researcher must refine the definitions of the contours of the set in light of the information thrown up by the cases as the difficult process of coding takes place. Where cases known to have important differences on the degree to which they display the condition are found to have proximate fuzzy membership scores, this may signal a need to consider redefining membership. In our example, we could do this, for instance, by adding the caveat that for full membership *the instigator/overseer of PB is ideologically committed to participatory politics AND to implementing PB AND is willing to take risky political decisions to uphold this commitment;* then recode cases like Berlin and Buenos Aires accordingly. What we seek is that the definitions of membership values will eventually make sense such that membership in the set is clearly calibrated to the theoretical meaning of the condition which we wish to test.

I have found that these fuzzy-maps and similarly truth tables are particularly useful for guiding discussions with field researchers in attempting to clarify the conditions of particular cases with which they are familiar. These relatively simple tools hold particular promise for aiding cumulation of knowledge from small-N case research. Case researchers will not of course have knowledge of all cases that exist, and will have varying partial knowledge of some cases outside of their own field-research. For example most researchers who work on PB are au fait with the history and nuances of the Porto Alegre case. By looking at the cases for which they have degrees of knowledge in relation to one another and in relation to an operationalization of a concept itself they can engage in a dialogue with other researchers, bringing together theory and comparative knowledge at once. They can be stimulated to provide further information to help improve and refine the definitions that delineate the condition-set[57], and

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[57] I was worried initially that case-researchers might react guardedly to this invitation, but I need not have been. It was clear that in almost all cases they saw an opportunity for their research to be extended in an important way. On occasions field-researchers contacted me unprompted to recommend changes, and

where they think there are errors with coding they can make arguments for change.

This process of calibration highlights the extent to which iteration is central to QCA in seeking both theoretical clarity and robust measurement for comparison. Measurements, scales and populations are not 'given' as they are often seen to be in traditional quantitative research strategies (Ragin 2000). Yet measures can still be constructed which are comparable across cases and conditions, allowing the use of Boolean algebraic operations to uncover relationships of necessity and sufficiency between conditions and outcomes across cases. And as new cases are added, we are often forced into reassessing the nature of membership for particular sets. This is nothing new as quantitative scholars have for years been looking at how concepts travel and can be meaningfully quantified across contexts. Nevertheless, by allowing these considerations at the level of medium-N, QCA seems to provide an alternative location for robust research along the spectrum of trade-offs between complexity and generalisability in social and political research. It is not clear, therefore, that the epistemological authority of QCA should be any less than that of more established methods (see Rihoux and Lobe: 2007).

There is a third approach to calibration I use which is merely an expansion of the first two. It uses algebraic combinations– the logical 'AND' (focusing on case membership of the intersection of two or more sets) and logical 'OR' (focusing on case membership in the union of two or more sets) that were introduced earlier - to combine sets of conditions to create more nuanced conditions. As such, various combinations of multiple sets can be combined to form a single more complex set using simple algebraic logic.

For example, I calculate the set 'financial basis to spend' from two other sets, namely 'independent spending capacity' and 'independent fundraising capacity' using fuzzy 'AND'. In verbal language what we are theorising is that for a municipality to be fiscally independent it must have both independence in its spending decisions and its ability to raise funds. The theory is that a municipality

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on other occasions I was surprised to find them defending my own methods and approach against critique before I had a chance.

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may have relative legal independence to vary taxation or service charges but may have little discretion to implement PB projects because, for example, it needs to pay back high-interest loans. Correspondingly a municipality or borough may have relatively more expenditure available but the nature of expenditure can be mandated externally, e.g. by another level of government. We need the theory to be reflected in our measures and what we are interested in is calculating cases membership in the intersection of these two sets. Table 5-1 below shows how this calibration using the intersection of sets (logical 'AND') plays out for a sample of six cases. We calculate the target set (financial basis to spend) by taking the minimum membership value in the two lower-order sets (Independent spending capacity) and (Independent funding capacity).

Case	Independent spending capacity	Independent fundraising capacity	Financial basis to spend
Porto Alegre	0.83	0.83	0.83
Berlin-Lichtenberg	0.48	0.17	0.17
Morsang-Sur-Orge	0.33	0.17	0.17
Toronto Community Housing Corporation	1	0.33	0.33
Buenos Aires	0.83	0.17	0.17
Belo Horizonte	0.83	0.83	0.83

Table 5-1 shows Calibration of set membership of financial basis for spending - (fbs).

5.12 Defining sets: Minimum membership, Maximum membership and the Crossover Point.

In the analysis provided in the next chapter sets have been calibrated according to the following criteria:

Full membership in the set of *government leaders committed to a participatory governing philosophy* (later abbreviated to 'pl') requires that the leaders initiating the PB have committed to participation in manifestos and speeches AND that their commitment is not conditional on bargaining with non-committed parties. Leaders make decisions to support participatory projects irrespective of other political actors OR supported by them. Full non-membership requires that the instigator/overseer of PB is not ideologically committed to participatory politics; shows little interest in participation AND is actively trying to derail or revoke participatory practices. At the crossover point the instigator/overseer of PB is ideologically committed to participatory politics only to the extent that it fits with other policy goals. Support is fragmented across political society in a way that makes ongoing support for PB precarious.

Full membership of the set of *bureaucratic support for PB* (bsp) requires that bureaucracy actively supports and engages with participatory processes AND those obstructing advances in participation are easily removed. Full non-membership is observed where bureaucrats actively attempt to derail the process, lobby for reform towards other practices and concentrate resources on other projects. At the point of maximum ambiguity bureaucratic support for participation is fragmented. Some departments may support participation while others oppose it. There is contestation over programmes within the bureaucracy and support is contingent on important bureaucratic leader's abilities to remain in position.

Full membership in the set of *Active Civil Society Demand for PB* (csd), requires that civil society is robust in numbers in the municipality AND CSOs are actively making demands for participation AND are willing to use contentious politics to secure their demands. Full non-membership denotes absence of civil society activism OR an active civil society which is tied to more traditional relations between government and the public sphere. At the point of maximum ambiguity there is some demand to allow civil society a greater role in governance of

budgets but the institutional designs that civil society are interested in are not necessarily radically participatory ones OR civil society is extremely fragmented and closely tied to partisan politics and this is mirrored in disjointed support for PB.

Full membership in the set of *A Financial Basis for Spending* (fbs) requires that the government unit undertaking the PB has independent control over significant sums of money. There is no interference from other tiers of government in the spending of the relevant budget AND the municipality is not overwhelmed by debt or other pressing financial concerns. Full non-membership is observed where funds made available for PB are paltry. This may be because the governing unit is overwhelmed by debt or unable to raise any funds e.g. through tax, charges, sales of assets. At the crossover point some money is available for PB processes and projects but preferences over that spending is constrained by decisions taken elsewhere OR PB competes for funds with closely related projects/institutions.

In the next chapter we analyse cases' membership in these sets in relation to their membership in the outcome: The set of *citizen control of participatory budgeting* (ccpb). Full membership of this set requires a logical combination of sustained control over decision-making AND control over agenda-setting, including absence of co-optation in practice and opportunities for monitoring and accountability. Full non-membership denotes clear co-optation and a return to clientelism, leading to disappointment and participation fatigue among citizens. The agenda for participatory decisions is set elsewhere and decisions of the PB are only acted on where they suit governments. At the crossover point important PB decisions are implemented even when they are not clearly in line with government aims but this takes place on a seemingly ad hoc basis - perhaps agendas are constrained at government level. Citizens have to act regularly to take action outside of PB institutions (e.g. by protesting) in order to see decisions implemented and hold governments to account.

5.13 To the analytic moment (with a return ticket)

In summary, as we have seen, there are multiple (and potentially overlapping) conditions that are conceptualised and operationalized by field researchers and employed in different ways to explain PB outcomes. Beyond negotiating the

causal milieu, although most researchers are interested in explaining an outcome broadly understood as empowered participatory democracy, different emphases are placed on redistributive justice, changes in the role of civil society and transparency in governance. Definition and careful scoping of research is crucial for accurate measurement and to lessen impacts of 'travelling' problems. The advantage of a QCA fully-worked through and presented as it is here is that it allows a transparent evaluation of the level of precision available in cumulating case-research.

Of course it is nothing new for researchers to have to explain their own understandings of key concepts and operationalize them but we are interested in the potential for cumulation. We should remember that the challenge for the social scientist is to provide parsimonious explanations of the real world but to make the correct choices as to what elements of that explanation are essential. The question is, are we using the right tools to do this and what does it tell us about the substantive outcomes of participatory processes? The next chapter provides answers to those questions.

Chapter 6: FsQCA of PB worldwide part II: Truth tables, Boolean reduction and causal analysis.

6.1   Systematic Comparison with Truth Tables

We have seen that when connecting causes to outcomes in case-based research, researchers have tended to invoke the language of set-theoretic understandings of the social world. That is they (often unaware of the subtle differences) tend to speak in terms of necessary and sufficient causation rather than correlational causation, and in terms of conjunctural and alternative causation rather than additive causation (see also Wagemann and Schneider 2012). Statements of the kind 'y requires x'; 'x is effective only in the context of a and b'; and 'the presence of a and the absence of b are sufficient conditions for y' are common. As I implied previously, these claims are often absent of the logical counterfactual analysis desirable to make them. To verify these kinds of claims set-theoretic analysis is required.

In this chapter I wish to provide a first attempt to systematically cumulate the lessons of some of the most well-known previous work on PB using the insights and tools of Qualitative Comparative analysis (QCA). The data presentation techniques used in QCA take centre stage.

QCA analysis centres on the truth table, a device which serves a number of useful functions. Firstly it can show which empirical cases are logically identical (in terms of their properties) and which are not. This can improve the logical formation of typological construction and require researchers to think hard about how comparable cases really are. Are these cases that share a truth table row really the same *kinds* of cases or are they different? Secondly it can tell us which types of PB (combinations of conditions) we have empirical examples of and which we do not. To make strong general claims about necessity and sufficiency we should engage in counterfactual analysis of these unobserved combinations. Thirdly when we add the outcome condition we can begin to understand which types of PB produce the outcome of interest.

To begin a data matrix is constructed connecting verbal understandings with formal logic in the form of set membership (c.f. Ragin 2000). Scores for each case's membership are carefully assembled by mapping the evidence onto the concept as defined in the preceding chapter.

Coding produces a fuzzy data matrix (Table 6-1) where the following verbal logical statements correspond to membership of the case within the set of observations of the condition.

1.0   - 'Fully in' the set

0.83 - 'mostly but not fully in'

0.67 - 'more or less in'

0.52 - 'marginally more in'

0.48 - 'marginally more out'

0.33 - 'more or less out'

0.17 - 'mostly but not fully out'

0   - 'fully out'

Like the fuzzy maps presented above a key advantage of this data matrix and the truth table (Table 6-2) is that case researchers can transparently investigate, contribute to and challenge the construction of a medium-N comparison.

6.2   From the Data Matrix to the Truth Table: Direct Correspondence of Fuzzy and Crisp Sets[58]

A truth table differs from a data matrix in that each row in a truth table corresponds to a logical case rather than a data record. Before looking at our truth table it is important to reiterate and expound on the logical correspondence between fuzzy and crisp sets.

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[58] The explanation of the correspondence of crisp and fuzzy sets here draws heavily on Ragin (2009).

Following Zadeh (1965) and Ragin (2009: 94-103) fuzzy sets directly correspond to crisp-set dichotomies. In crisp dichotomies where A is present (set membership = 1) the negation of A is logically absent (set membership in ~A = 0). That is ~A = 1 – A. This formula holds for fuzzy sets. A case holds degrees of membership of the negation of any set to the degree that it is not a member of the original set. For example the case of Morsang in the data matrix below has a membership value of 0.33 in the set of Active Civil Society Demand for Participatory Politics (csd). Therefore its membership value in the set representing the absence of this civil society demand (~csd), is [1 - 0.33] = 0.67.

Again, with crisp sets, when two sets intersect a case is a member of that intersection if it is an element of each one of the two sets that intersect. That is, a case is present in a conjunction A*B if its set membership value for set A = 1 and value for set B = 1. If its membership in either A or B is 0, i.e. less than 1, then it is not a member of A*B (where either A = 0, or B = 0, then A*B = 0). The value a cases membership takes in a conjunction of two or more sets is the minimum value that it takes in each of the individual sets that make up the conjunction. That is A*B = min(A,B). Again this formula holds for fuzzy sets. Continuing with the fuzzy-set example of the Morsang case from the data matrix in Table 6-1 below we see that the case's membership value in the set of Participatory Leadership (pl) is 0.83 and in the set of Bureaucratic Support (bsp) is 0.52. Therefore its membership in the conjunction of both conditions, Participatory Leadership AND Bureaucratic Support (pl*bsp) is 0.52 (the minimum of the two values). If we wanted to know the case's value in the conjunction of the absence of Participatory Leadership AND the Presence of Bureaucratic Support (~pl*bsp) we would need to calculate the negation of the former set and the minimum value of both, i.e. min[(1-0.83),0.52] = 0.17.

Case	Participatory Leadership (pl)	Bureaucratic Support (bsp)	Active Civil Society Demand (csd)	Finanancial Basis to Spend (fbs)	Citizen Control of PB (ccpb)
Porto Alegre	1	1	1	0.83	1
Betim	0.67	0.52	0.33	0.52	0.67
Jao Monlevade	0.52	0.52	0.48	0.67	0.52
Sevilla	0.67	0.48	0.48	0.67	0.48
Poitou-Charentes	1	0.17	0	0.83	0.83
Toronto	0	0.52	0.33	0.33	0.83
Recife	0.67	0.83	1	0.33	0.83
Sao Paulo	0.48	0.33	0.67	0.33	0.48
Montevideo	0.83	0.17	0.48	0.83	0.48
Buenos Aires	0.33	0.83	0.48	0.17	0.48
Rome	0.83	0.48	0.52	0.48	0.52
Ipatinga	0.83	1	0.33	1	1
Blumeau	0.17	0.17	0.33	0.67	0
Rio Claro	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.67	0.17
Santo Andre	0.67	0.48	0.52	0.33	0.48
Berlin Lichtenberg	0.83	0.17	0.33	0.17	0.48
Belo Horizonte	0.67	0.17	0.83	0.83	0.52
Morsang-Sur-Orge	0.83	0.52	0.33	0.17	0.33

Table 6-1Shows a data matrix of case membership in conditions as calibrated.

In a crisp-set QCA each case can only be a member of one logical conjunction of all the conditions under observation because a condition cannot be observed to be both present and absent at the same time – this would be a logical contradiction. Each row in a truth table represents one of these possible combinations of presence or absence of each of the observed explanatory conditions in an analysis. In the analysis presented here we have 16 possible logical combinations (4^2) and 16 rows in the truth table. Schneider and Wagemann highlight that "Each row denotes a *qualitatively different* combination of conditions, i.e. the difference in cases in different rows is a difference in kind rather than a difference in degree" (2012: 92, emphasis in original). We may therefore look at the truth table and establish what kinds of cases our cases are and what kinds of cases we have no empirical examples of (logical remainders). This of course is incredibly useful information as I will again show, and the systematic approach to revealing and classifying types it is overlooked by most work in comparative social science.

The corresponding important logical property of fuzzy-sets is that each case can only have greater than a 0.5 membership value in one of these logical combinations of conditions representing a truth table row. Another way of saying this is that each case is a good example of only one of the ideal types represented by each truth table row. Fuzzy-sets allow that each case can, and often will, have partial membership in each of our 16 possible logical combinations. 1 and 0 as we know represent the extreme values of full membership and full non-membership in the set representing presence or absence of a condition. It can be understood that the various crisp logical combinations of these extreme values that we see in the truth table represent ideal types (Wagemann and Schneider idem: 98). In the four-dimensional property-space created by four conditions, each case can only be found closest to the vertex representing one of these ideal types. Empirical cases have partial membership in all kinds of logical cases but they have strong membership only in one. This highlights that cruciality of the conceptual definition of the crossover point in calibration cannot be undersold. In calibrating, the researcher

makes an important decision as to whether a case is more in or more out of the set[59].

In the truth table below (Table 6-2) we can consider conditions to be present or absent depending on whether they are 'more in' or 'more out' of the sets calibrated above. Excluding the row number which is used for reference purposes only, each of the first four columns from the left represent one of the explanatory conditions. The cells read 'yes' where a condition is present, while 'no' signifies absence of a condition. Each one of the sixteen rows represents an ideal type of PB. The second column from the right indicates which cases lie closer to the particular ideal type of PB represented in that row than any other (i.e. the case has greater than 0.5 membership in that combination of conditions). The final column represents the outcome condition. The cells in this column tell us whether cases of this type lead to the outcome, Citizen Control of PB (Yes), or its negation (No). Where no empirical case has greater than a 0.5 membership value in the combination we have a logical remainder - this type's relationship with the outcome is unknown. Where we have more than one case in a row these cases may 'contradict' on whether they are more in or more out of the set of Citizen Control of PB.

6.3   Dissecting the Truth Table

QCA analysis has moved in the last number of years to be dominated more and more by larger-N and predominantly fuzzy-set analyses. While there is not necessarily a problem with this, there has been an increasing trend to skip straight from truth tables (where they are still produced) directly to the minimisation procedure in a mechanistic fashion. Of course publication constraints may have a bearing on this. As we shall see consistency scores provide an important advance in dealing with logical contradictions but they are often interpreted mechanically without much explicit recourse to theory. There are many bones to be picked before moving on to minimisation.

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[59] This also is why a set-membership value of 0.5 is undesirable, see supra note 56.

#	Participatory Leadership	Bureaucratic Support	Active Civil Society Demand	Financial Basis to Spend	Cases	Citizen Control of PB
1	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Porto Alegre	Yes
2	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Recife	Yes
3	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Betim, Jao Monlevade, Ipatinga	Yes
4	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Belo Horizonte	No
5	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No cases	
6	Yes	Yes	No	No	Morsang-Sur-Orge	No
7	Yes	No	No	Yes	Sevilla, Poitou-Charentes, Montevideo	Contradiction
8	No	No	Yes	Yes	No cases	Unknown
9	No	Yes	Yes	No	No cases	Unknown
10	No	Yes	No	Yes	No cases	Unknown
11	Yes	No	Yes	No	Rome, Santo Andre	Contradiction
12	Yes	No	No	No	Berlin-Lichtenberg	No
13	No	Yes	No	No	Toronto Community Housing, Buenos Aires	Contradiction
14	No	No	Yes	No	Sao Paulo	No
15	No	No	No	Yes	Blumenau, Rio Claro	No
16	No	No	No	No	No cases	Unknown

Table 6-2Truth Table showing the property space - Yes = present, No = absent. Each row can be considered a logical case or a type of participatory budgeting.

The Truth table is a really useful device for cumulation, both when working alone and in collaboration with other researchers in any field. It is useful in the first instance to look at the truth table without reference to the outcome and assess how empirical cases fall in relation to key factors. The truth table is not accidently named. It lays bare the consequences of assumptions and coding in

constructing comparative research. The point of looking at the truth table is to engineer a useful dialogue between cases in a population and the concepts we are trying to understand; in other words between theory and evidence.

The first point of interest is to look at the logical remainders. In the truth table above these correspond to five rows - 5, 8, 9, 10 and 16, respectively. It is valuable to ask why we do not have empirical examples of these types of cases in our population. It may be that we have defined our population too narrowly. Are we missing something or are there good reasons why such cases do not (yet) exist in reality - or at least have not been studied in depth? If we take row 16 we might say that this is a relatively easy counterfactual to explain. It is highly unlikely that any unit of government would even initiate PB without at least one of the 4 conditions we are trying to use to explain successful PB programmes.

Taking a more difficult counterfactual, it is interesting to note that according to row 5 there are no cases in our population that are strong examples of an absence of participatory leadership, where civil society is actively pushing for PB, bureaucracy is supportive, and finance is available. On the face of it we might explain this by saying that it is often easy for politicians when they hold the purse-strings to ignore CSO pressure, and unlikely that bureaucracy would support participation in the absence of political leadership. However we do see that some of these conditions are present in the absence of participatory leadership in other cases. This suggests that it would be very fruitful to see if we could find a case that represents this row 5 type of PB - it becomes a very good candidate for identifying a case for a follow-up study.

Secondly, it can sometimes be useful to look at rows with single cases. If we look at the first row we see that no case is similar in kind to Porto Alegre in displaying all four key conditions of interest. This may draw us to contemplate whether we suffer from a bias in comparisons in a way that constructs Porto Alegre as unique. It may well be unique, but then if we take some of Wampler's cases from earlier we also see that the cases do not line up in couples in the same way as he imagines them in his analysis (e.g. Ipatinga and Porto Alegre). Remember the codes are drawn from evidence provided from original researchers so it is worth revisiting the cases in this scenario to ascertain if such differences in coding were warranted. In the end though, this difference most probably points to the

advantages of comparing across a wider range of cases, which requires reinterpretation of concepts to allow comparability in the light of new evidence.

The final important point of interest in a truth table takes us to rows with more than one empirical case. Rows 3,7,11 and 15 stand out here. Taking row 7, we see that three PBs that take place in ostensibly very different circumstances actually are similar in type according to the key characteristics of PB in this model. This is interesting because it challenges the idea that cultural or country factors are key determinants of PB (an idea that has been common elsewhere). It is a useful prompt for case-researchers to think more ecumenically than perhaps they are comfortable with and consider their cases as similar to those looked at by other researchers with slightly different research strategies. But it is only a challenge rather than a knockout blow to assumptions about the diversity of these cases. This may indeed be a warning signal of a coding error and may warrant a second look at cases. Taken in tandem with the outcome, the truth table can show us logical contradictions in our models. It is logically impossible for the same combination of conditions (in isolation to all others) to produce a different outcome. This can inform the researcher that there is a problem with their model (usually that they are attempting to achieve too much parsimony too quickly) or that further in-depth case research is required. A contradiction can indicate the absence of a key causal condition from the model or ask the researcher to return to the cases to ask if they are all that different in outcome and if so how so. While fuzzy sets allow more nuanced strategies for dealing with such contradictions (see below discussion on consistency thresholds), it can be all too tempting to move quickly to these without considering the potential consequences of contradictions and it may be worth revisiting the cases.

The advantage and also disadvantage of a truth table is that it requires a 'forced choice' between the presence and absence of a condition. While this can be instructive, it can also be limiting. Presence and absence of phenomena in the social world is almost always a matter of degree. Thankfully fuzzy-set QCA provides another way of coping with this in its use of consistency scores as a parameter of fit. Fuzzy-set memberships allow a fine-grained analysis such that we can look beyond small contradictions in the subset-superset relationship that establishes necessity and sufficiency across our cases.

6.4   Boolean reduction and analysis

At this point we can use the algorithms developed for Boolean reduction to assess based on the cumulated evidence presented what conditions may be necessary, or what combinations of conditions may be sufficient to produce our outcome or negate it. Explaining logically the absence of the outcome is one of the most undervalued and underemphasised strengths of case-based research designs.

As a reminder, for necessity to be established the set of cases containing the outcome must be a subset of the set of cases displaying the cause. Similarly, for sufficiency to be established the set of cases containing the causal condition must be a subset of the cases displaying the outcome (c.f. Ragin, 2000: 214-217). Logically for one condition or combination of conditions to be a subset of another condition its membership value (the extent to which it is observed) should be less than or equal to the membership value of the superset across all cases. As we have said in social sciences finding such a perfect relationship sets a very high standard. There are likely to be some inconsistencies in such a relationship across a number of cases. A social scientist would normally be willing to accept some minor inconsistencies in a relationship armed with a transparent measure of fit. We can provide a measure of the extent to which all rows in our data matrix confirm the subset relation with an outcome and this is known as consistency.

6.5   Explaining consistency[60]

To give an example, the Venn diagrams in figure 6-1 below show two tests for necessary conditions. We can treat each of the two Venn diagrams within the figure as separate tests for necessary conditions for Y. On the left the condition X1 is a consistent superset of Y. Whenever we see Y we see X. On the right we see that although Y is almost always covered by X2, there is some inconsistency

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[60] It is important to briefly introduce consistency to the reader here to aid understanding of the output. This explanation draws on Wagemann and Schneider (2012, chapter 5) and a much more detailed explanation and discussion of the concept can be read there.

in the necessity relation as elements may be present in Y but not X2. A social scientist might however be happy to say that X2 is 'almost always necessary for Y'. As outlined, it is generally more difficult to accept substantial inconsistency in the case of necessary than sufficient conditions.


Figure 6-1 Shows two tests for necessary conditions.

Consistency is calculated using the formulae $\Sigma(\min(X,Y))/\Sigma(Y)$ for necessity and $\Sigma(\min(Xi,Y))/\Sigma(X)$ for sufficiency. Consistency scores shown here are always calculated across all cases. The standard minimum consistency thresholds within the QCA literature are 0.9/0.95 for necessary conditions and 0.75 for sufficient conditions. When assessing contradictory sufficient relations for crisp sets we can only take into account the cases in that row (often 2 or a handful), but fsQCA allows a much larger evidentiary base by including all the partial memberships of each case in a truth table row in calculating sufficiency before coding sufficient truth table rows. Consistency thresholds effectively serve to avoid dismissing super-subset relations where we have 'very few near misses' across cases (Ragin 2009: 108). However appropriate thresholds will depend on the nature of the inquiry (theory-testing work may require a higher threshold than exploratory work), the number of cases, and the nature of the data.

6.6   Necessary conditions

In the analysis in this chapter a consistency threshold of 0.95 is used which is recommended given the number of cases we are dealing with (Ragin 2007). We also take this as a cut off for our sufficiency analysis, where it is an unusually high standard, but reflects the nature of data generation which has been constructive and methodical.   This means that we report conditions or combinations of conditions as necessary/sufficient if the consistency of their

subset relation is above this threshold for that particular analysis. A coverage threshold of 0.5 is taken to guard against examining trivial conditions. On the basis of the data we have produced we can say the following[61]:

Contrary to claims in the literature there appear to be no single conditions that we can confidently say are necessary to produce or to negate citizen control of participatory budgets. No condition achieves a consistency of greater than 0.95. Although participatory leadership comes closest the evidence is that it is not always present where we see citizen control of participatory budgets.

Condition	Necessity consistency	Necessity Coverage
Financial basis to spend	.758	.779
~financial basis to spend	.604	.747
Civil society demand	.750	.879
~Civil society demand	.717	.771
Bureaucratic Support	.774	.917
~bureaucratic support	.649	.692
Participatory leadership	.870	.787
~participatory leadership	.489	.732

Table 6-3 Test for single necessary conditions for the outcome citizen control of PB.

We can however test for disjunctions to uncover SUIN conditions, also known as substitutable necessary conditions. These correspond to statements of the kind 'either A OR B is necessary for Y'. Logically the more alternate conditions we include in any one test the more likely they are to reach the consistency threshold – the more conditions, the more likely we are to find cases where one or the other may be substituted to allow the outcome to be caused. Mathematically we allow new opportunities to increase the maximum

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[61] Analysis is performed using Dusa, Adrian, and Alrik Thiem. 2014. QCA: A Package for Qualitative Comparative Analysis. R Package Version 1.1-3.2. URL: http://cran.r-project.org/package=QCA. Code is reproduced in appendices.

membership score of any case in the disjunction. Table 6-4 below reports three such disjunctions of two conditions that reach the threshold for consistency.

Boolean Expression	Necessity consistency	Necessity Coverage
Participatory leadership + ~financial basis to spend	.951	.748
Participatory leadership + ~civil society demand	.951	.729
Participatory leadership + bureaucratic support	.951	.782

Table 6-4 Test for necessary disjunctions with two SUIN conditions across 18 cases.

Participatory leadership on its own is not a necessary condition for citizen control in PB but it is present in all of these disjunctions. That is, in some circumstances where citizen control of PB is produced, bureaucratic support, the absence of financial spending opportunities, or absence of civil society demand may provide the necessary substitute for participatory leadership. This suggests that although participatory leadership is not alone a necessary condition for citizen control, the instances where it is unnecessary are relatively specific.

6.7   Sufficiency

What combinations of conditions are sufficient to produce sustained citizen control of PB? The table below provides the answers based on comparison across 18 cases.

Key: pl – participatory leadership, csd – civil society demand, bsp – bureaucratic support, fbs – a financial basis to spend, cov – coverage, con/consist – consistency.

	Causal Conjunciton	Raw Coverage	Unique Coverage	Consistency	Solution
Complex/	pl*bsp*csd	0.586	0.097	0.972	0.675(Cov)
Intermediate	pl*bsp*fbs	0.578	0.089	0.972	0.976 (Con)
Parsimonious	bsp*csd	0.65	0.128	0.975	

	bsp*fbs	0.628	0.106	0.974	0.755(Cov) 0.978 (Con)

Table 6-5 Sufficient conditions for the presence of the outcome citizen control of PB (ccpb).

No condition on its own is sufficient to produce the outcome, confirming that causation is conjunctural. We can also confirm equifinality. The above table shows two potential paths to the outcome. The first 'complex' solution involves no assumptions about logical remainders (the logical cases with no empirical examples in table 6-2 above) and is therefore more complex, including more conditions. It can be represented as follows:

$$pl*bsp \begin{Bmatrix} csd+ \\ fbs \end{Bmatrix} \rightarrow ccpb$$

Citizen control occurs in two distinct contexts:

1) Where a participatory leadership is combined with bureaucratic support and civil society demand for participation citizens are empowered to control political budgets. The fiscal situation is irrelevant when these conditions are present. This solution is consistent across cases (consistency = 0.972). Recife and Porto Alegre provide strong examples of this type of case. The solution suggests that regardless of fiscal limits, either due to constant bargaining with other tiers of government or a pressing need to firefight dire poverty, participatory democracy can still be successful when committed PB leaders work together with civil society and have bureaucratic support. This is interesting because it rebuts claims that within successful cases the ability to spend freely is a necessary part of the explanation of good PB outcomes. As discussed earlier the excuse of 'scarce resources' has often been used to wind up successful participatory practices. It can be surmised here that where finances were tight, participatory leaders, administrators and civil society were keenly aware of the need for coordinated action and this was sufficient to allow the institutionalisation of programmes with high levels of citizen control.

2) Where participatory leadership is combined with initial bureaucratic support and financial independence citizens are empowered to control political budgets. Again this finding is 97% consistent across cases and Ipatinga, Betim and Joao Monlevade have strong membership in this solution. The path itself tallies with a number of accounts based in Brazil and Europe and so confirms previous findings. But civil society demand for participation is irrelevant to the solution. This analysis bucks a clear trend in the literature – active civil society demand 'from the bottom-up' is almost universally lauded and often claimed to be a necessary condition or a trigger for good PB outcomes. Perhaps then we should treat the finding with caution - all findings that challenge the literature are due some - but I would prefer to say that this finding shows the advantages of a more ecumenical cross-case comparison. We might find here succour for those who believe in the possibility of governance-driven democratisation and the possibility for emancipatory outcomes where participation is initiated from the top down (in specific circumstances). It does highlight an interesting counterfactual question; given the relative fiscal independence and control of the bureaucracy the PB had in Porto Alegre, would the PB have flourished if the idea had come from within the party itself decoupled from civil society? Perhaps the problem here is that in some of the cases the PB ended up being quite partisan. Addition of 'partisanship/weakness of opposition' condition (as proposed by Nylen, Goldfrank) in a future analysis might clarify this.

The 'intermediate' solution attempts further reduction by including assumptions about logical remainders based on directional expectation. That is, where the solution can be reduced by coding the outcome of logical cases for which we have no empirical examples; and there is a good theoretical basis for this; we may achieve a more parsimonious solution. Although we may have alternate expectations about some of the conditions, I assumed for this analysis that high membership in political leadership contributed to the outcome. However no reduction was possible on these grounds. In fact any reduction would require assumptions that absence of conditions contributes to the outcome here. This takes us to a discussion of the 'parsimonious' solution.

The (most) 'parsimonious' solution makes assumptions about cases for which we have no empirical examples in order to achieve more parsimony in causal descriptions. It does not favour any conditions and makes the calculation purely based on the possibilities allowed by the mathematical algorithm. As outlined in

chapter 4, the conditions in the parsimonious solution are often known as the 'core' conditions of solution formulae – they are conditions that will not be removed from the formula regardless of future observations of new empirical cases where we had logical remainders. In reality it tells us that if we are willing to countenance it, there is no empirical reason why we cannot discard political leadership as a necessary part of these sufficient causal recipes. Remember it holds from our necessity analysis that this leadership can be substituted in certain circumstances. This might be worth considering in light of the Toronto case. In Toronto, a relatively wealthy city amongst our population, the account by Lerner and van Wagner (2006) suggests that the absence of participatory leadership was indeed an important contributor to successful outcomes. They say that in general "participatory budgeting emerged when staff were passionate and prepared" and "politicians were looking the other way," (2006: 15). The Toronto case would be an empirical example of the second parsimonious type [bsp*fbs] but for its slightly low score on financial advantage (the process is hampered in achieving high membership in the set as it was conceived by the fact that their funding stream is controlled by another level of government). We may want to go back to the case and re-examine this in future.

This section then has shown again how Boolean analysis can cumulate findings in a way that points the researcher in the relevant direction of cases he or she needs to re-examine. The method at the very least provides the channel factors for the important dialogue between cumulation of studies for cross-case comparison and knowledge of processes within cases.

6.8   What negates citizen control of Participatory Budgets?

It is worth reiterating again that QCA allows for asymmetric causation – a key piece of added value is that it can provide analysis of the negation of the outcome. Are any conditions necessary for the absence of citizen control in PBs? Table 6-6 below shows that once again there is no single necessary condition that negates citizen control of participatory budgets. The absence of bureaucratic support comes closest but still shows 9% inconsistency with the necessity super-subset relation across all cases.

Condition	Necessity consistency	Necessity Coverage
Financial basis to spend	.738	.593
~financial basis to spend	.725	.701
Civil society demand	.728	.668
~civil society demand	.868	.731
Bureaucratic support	.630	.584
~bureaucratic support	.910	.759
Participatory leadership	.761	.538
~participatory leadership	.699	.808

Table 6-6 Analysis of single necessary conditions for the outcome absence of citizen control of participatory budgets.

There are six disjunctions of two conditions which are necessary at the 95% level. These are represented in table 6-7. Where citizen control is negated within the ostensibly empowering PB programmes that make up our sample, one or the other alternate (SUIN) conditions per row is also observed. As we have seen the absence of bureaucratic support to implement participation and deliver participatory policies is not alone necessary; the alternate absence of one or other of the conditions that have been seen in our first analysis to support citizen control can often be equivalent to negate citizen control of PB.

Key: pl – participatory leadership, csd – civil society demand, bsp – bureaucratic support, fbs – a financial basis to spend.

Boolean Expression	Necessity consistency	Necessity Coverage
~bsp + ~fbs	.978	.673
~bsp + ~csd	.978	.686
~pl + ~csd	.954	.704
~pl + ~bsp	.954	.697
pl + ~csd	.953	.571
pl + ~bsp	.954	.556

Table 6-7 Necessary disjunctions with two SUIN conditions for negation of the outcome citizen control of PB (ccpb).

The final two rows in the list are of interest. Here participatory leadership seems to act as a SUIN condition. This makes some intuitive sense and seems to confirm that in some cases strong ideological commitment by leaders to the PB can be an important part of the story of failure (e.g. because the PB becomes recognised as partisan or politicians make promises that they simply can't keep leading to

participatory fatigue and demobilisation in the long run). The sufficiency analysis may shed further light on this.

6.9 Recipes to negate citizen control? What dangerous combinations can we recognise?

The analysis of sufficient combinations for the negation is interesting because it can help highlight which combinations of presence/absence of conditions can signal particular dangers for those trying to design and implement ambitious participatory projects in different contexts. Table 6-8 provides details of these.

Key: pl – participatory leadership, csd – civil society demand, bsp – bureaucratic support, fbs – a financial basis to spend, cov – coverage, con/consist – consistency.

	Causal Conjunction	Raw Coverage	Unique Coverage	Consistency	Solution
Complex/ Intermediate	~bsp*csd*~fbs	0.572	0.005	0.928	0.861(Cov) 0.908 (Con)
	pl*~bsp*csd	0.642	0.097	0.957	
	~pl*~bsp*~csd*fbs	0.548	0.106	0.964	
	pl*bsp*~csd*~fbs	0.525	0.066	0.965	
Parsimonious[62]	~bsp*csd	0.689	0.103	0.886	0.901(Cov) 0.877 (Con)
	~pl*~bsp	0.654	0.147	0.943	
	pl*bsp*~csd*~fbs	0.525	0.066	0.965	

Table 6-8 Sufficient conditions for the negation (absence) of the outcome citizen control of PB (ccpb).

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[62] Dominated prime implicants were eliminated from these solutions (see Thiem and Dusa 2013: 43).

The directional expectations used to obtain the intermediate solution here were to assume for all logical remainders that the absence of bureaucratic support, absence of civil society demand, and absence of financial basis to spend would contribute towards negation but no assumptions were made for political leadership. The intermediate solution will always be a superset of the complex solution and the parsimonious solution will always be a superset of both. Once again the complex and intermediate solutions are no different.

The first thing of note here is that the solution coverage is requisitely high. This signals that we have been able to explain a lot of the outcome (the coverage score is somewhat analogous to the R^2 measure of fit in correlational analysis). Solution coverage measures how much of the outcome is explained by all of the causal conjunctions together. Raw coverage indicates how much of the outcome is covered (explained) by that particular causal recipe. Unique coverage measures the extent to which the outcome set is uniquely covered by a solution formula, i.e. the extent to which cases explained are not overlapped by another explanatory set.

The complex solution can be factored and written as follows:

$$\sim bsp*(csd*\sim fbs + pl*csd + \sim pl*\sim csd*fbs) + pl*bsp*\sim csd*\sim fbs \rightarrow \sim ccpb$$

And the parsimonious solution:

$$\sim bsp*(csd + \sim pl) + pl*bsp*\sim csd*\sim fbs \rightarrow \sim ccpb$$

Perhaps most interestingly, strong participatory leadership and bureaucratic support can contribute to negate participatory outcomes where they are combined with a lack of financial basis for spending, and low civil society activism (blue section of solution formula). This multifinality of political and bureaucratic support may seem odd to begin with but we might imagine that committed participatory leaderships which encounter tough financial times with little civil society demand may be heightening expectations and promising projects they cannot deliver. Morsang-sur-Orge has high membership in this

conjunction and is a particularly good example of this. While the municipality committed its resources relatively strongly to the participatory institution, a lack of organised civil society activism and a relative lack of freedom to spend money on really substantial projects provided conditions that incentivised co-optation. Consensus could be easily "constructed...by excluding all alternative proposals and by framing the debate in such a way that only a minimalist solution, decided beforehand by the organising board, could be agreed upon," (Talpin, 2011: 51).

This complex path cannot be reduced by including logical remainders. It holds in the parsimonious solution. In other words we can be relatively sure that none of these conditions may be found to be irrelevant to this conjunctural explanation of the absence of citizen control in the light of empirical studies of new kinds of cases. The finding is not affected by the limited diversity of our empirical evidence. However, this is not to say that we could not come across further cases that disputed this finding directly. A case that is a strong example of the property type represented by row 6 in the truth table (table 6-2 above), and involves citizen control, now becomes an excellent candidate for a deviant case study. This exemplifies one of a number of ways in which QCA can implicate a fruitful return trip to cases.

As can be seen in the factored solution formulae, that conjunction is the only occasion where the absence of bureaucratic support does not appear as an INUS condition for the absence of citizen control of participatory budgets. This lack of bureaucratic support interacts with three separate conjunctions to ensure that citizen control is negated. Two of these solutions have relatively high unique coverage suggesting the added empirical weight of being good unique explanations of more than one case. The most complex of these; the third complex causal conjunction from the top in table 6-8 above; tells us that where real participatory leadership from politicians, bureaucratic buy-in and active civil society demand for participation are all absent, *and* participatory budgeting programmes still have relatively high amounts of money to spend, then citizen control is negated.

Remember this finding holds across all the partial memberships in these conditions for all our cases but there are cases which are particularly good examples of the ideal type. The two cases that are good examples of this causal recipe are Blumenau and Rio Claro – recalling Wampler's cases of 'emasculated

participatory democracy' described in chapter 4. In fact, as long as we allow for the slight differences in calibration and some conditions between the two analyses, this causal recipe is quite close to the one that was found to have the highest unique coverage when we looked at Wampler's five conditions over ten cases (see first row of table 4-8). At that time we could only be sure that the absence of mayoral support was a core condition of that sufficient conjunction. However with the benefit of more cases the parsimonious solution that is congruent with that complex solution [~pl*~bsp], shows that we cannot eliminate the absence of bureaucratic support from this explanation any longer. Much of this is down to having been able to populate row 7 of the truth table (table 6-2) above with cases (Sevilla, Poitou-Charentes and Montevideo) which have diverging outcomes. This again shows the advantages of cumulation to reduce underdetermination. Whether this more parsimonious combination alone suffices to explain the 'emasculated' cases or whether relative wealth and absence of CSO contributions are important elements of the story remains a question for theoretically-informed counterfactual analysis.

We further see two complex conjunctions whose parsimonious root is the absence of bureaucratic support combined with the presence of civil society demand for participation [~bsp*csd]. Of the two, the extension of this conjunction to include again the presence of participatory political leaders as an INUS condition displays by far the higher coverage. It suggests that when an initially unconvinced bureaucracy runs up against a demanding civil and political society, entrenchment may occur spoiling the chances of participatory gain. Belo Horizonte has a relatively strong membership in this solution and this seems to tally in particular with Brian Wampler's description of the case; although there was some success in the case, full citizen control was negated (2007). The best examples of these conjunctions are Rome and Santo Andre where the parsimonious conjunction is combined with participatory leadership but also a relative absence of financial freedom. We cannot yet discount the importance of financial constraint in explaining this entrenchment without careful counterfactual hypotheses.

6.10 What does this tell us about participatory budgets?

We will return to the implications for wider debates in the closing chapter but there are some salutary lessons in the output generated from cross-case comparison for scholars of participatory budgets. The analysis here makes no hegemonic claims and attempts to caution some of the stronger claims outlined in previous literature. There are no single necessary or sufficient key conditions that explain or negate citizen control in participatory budgets. There is in fact clear and considerable equifinality and multifinality to be observed in the relationships between conditions and outcomes across cases.

That is not to say that we have not made some advancements to explaining what exactly may cause citizens to play meaningful, empowered roles in innovative participatory institutions. Across our cases citizen have meaningful control of the participatory process where bureaucratic support is combined with either the financial conditions to implement the programme *or* active civil society demand for participation. The empirical evidence suggests that only in highly unusual cases would political leadership be unnecessary in conjunction.

There is however one unusual but extremely clear circumstance where established support among political leaders and bureaucrats for participatory democracy will lead to a failure of citizen control – that is where finance cannot be raised or released to implement the programme properly *and* active civil society demand for a proper process is absent. So while we have shown that top-down democratisation seems possible in certain circumstances even without civil society's strong hand in the process, we would be foolish to rely only on committed elites if we wish for real democratic outcomes in institutions of participatory governance. However in most cases where participation becomes manipulatory or tokenistic the absence of bureaucratic support for the process plays a role. Manipulation seems certain where this is combined with either the absence of strong support from the political echelons overseeing the process *or* the presence of active demand for radical participatory reform from civil society. The empirical evidence again suggests that in the latter case the presence of demand from politicians, combined with demand from CSOs when the bureaucracy is not able to come on board is sufficient to produce negative outcomes. It is possible that the demand here outstrips capacity leading to policy failure but it would require going back to good examples of this type such as

Rome and Santo Andre to see if a process that links these conditions can be untangled and such a relationship established. This once more highlights the importance of a dialogue between cumulative and logical cross-case analysis, theory-dependent reasoning and in-depth case studies.

All in all we see that we can uncover parsimonious explanations of participatory processes in a relatively transparent manner which would be difficult for any researcher working alone with a few of their own case-studies to parse out. This can result in some useful, moderate generalisations based on cumulated evidence. The next chapter discusses finally the implications for practical application of these findings by actors interested in improving democratic innovations in the real world, and implications for future research.

Chapter 7: Systematic Comparison of Democratic innovations: Prospects and Conclusions

7.1 Looking back before looking forward

In this thesis I have focused on Participatory Budgeting, a well-known type of democratic innovation, and tried to trace the development of comparative work on PB as the innovation has diffused and as knowledge of the field has developed. I was motivated by interest in trying to help figure out under what circumstances citizens involved in programmes designed to engage them in governance gain meaningful control of important collective decisions. I have shown that as the field of democratic innovation and in particular participatory budgeting matures, significant steps have been take in the direction of a more systematic comparison. More fundamentally I wanted to know if there were new improved ways comparative political scientists could understand innovative public policies in an era of rapid diffusion and adaptation and build on small-N case-based research.

The second half of the thesis presented and discussed practical issues involved in undertaking advanced qualitative comparative analysis allowing an assessment of the value and potential of cumulating existing knowledge using systematic formal logic. My aim was never to undercut other approaches. Neither do I wish to engage in methodological fetishism. The value of robust and general findings is that they can allow relevant actors – civil society activists, political leaders and even academics to plan their actions with a degree of confidence in the lessons of evidence. I provide some modest but notable findings and employ a complementary tool of analysis that should be of use to those interested in furthering our knowledge of participatory budgeting.

I conclude here by outlining four key findings. The first is I show that (fs)QCA is a relatively effective tool for cumulating and systematically reviewing the evidence of previous research. QCA can be used to remove redundant elements of causal claims or identify oversimplification. The second is that contrary to what is implied by much of the previous literature on the topic of PB, there is no

single necessary causal condition which explains successful citizen control. Instead cross-case comparison provides some specific combinations which may alternatively produce good outcomes. Instigators and adopters of participatory programmes should think about the contexts in which they innovate and what we know works in such contexts. The third is that QCA can be used to identify the best candidates for future/further in-depth case-studies. QCA is a particularly useful tool for aiding further development of a field of study and outlining what is at stake when scoping concepts. Finally I claim that QCA can be usefully combined with Large-N correlational research strategies.

7.2   Comparison and Cumulation

The question of comparability of cases is one that constantly troubles researchers in the emerging field of democratic innovations. That inquisition is a good sign. We do not want to compare apples with oranges unless we are talking about fruit. Lijphart notes that comparative politics makes progress "as a result of the efforts of the field's innovators to fashion universally applicable vocabularies of basic politically relevant concepts," (1971: 686), and as Mill put it the "general conception is itself obtained by a comparison of particular phenomena," (1950: 298). The most transparent way to know the relevant level of abstraction at which phenomena are comparable without resorting to conceptual stretching is to examine and list their key properties and compare them. This basic method of identifying the intension and extension of a concept should be no different for social or physical scientific research. What is different in social research is that the observation of these characteristics is more usually a matter of degree or uncertainty in the social world. This difference in certainties should not hamper efforts unduly. When it is more difficult to pin down and clearly observe these characteristics, especially in the early stages of phenomenological development, in order to progress our understanding we need to cumulate knowledge systematically by comparison. A cumulative comparison can be conscious of the accuracy of conceptual delineation. In other words we require a research agenda that marries sensitivity to theory and conceptual clarity, with sensitivity to accuracy in observations of practices, and with sensitivity to appropriate methods of inferential comparison. My work here suggests that a QCA approach can plug some gaps in such a research agenda.

I attempted to harness the strength of previous casework and cumulate that knowledge to try to provide a more parsimonious statement about what causal processes are at work in a sample of some of the most well-known and well-studied cases of PB. My analysis suggests that there are no clear necessary conditions for empowered governance by citizens in PB. Under specific circumstances the participatory leadership and civil society demand often lauded as necessary can be irrelevant to explanations of empowered participation. Moreover, a political commitment to participatory politics is only a sufficient condition for good outcomes in combination with bureaucratic capacities and either civil society support or financial freedom. Designers and adopters may note that it is either of these combinations that have been consistently successful. Later I showed that where programmes have failed to empower, explanations have hinged on the absence of bureaucratic support combined with either the absence of political leadership committed to participation or active civil society leads. However, causation is multifinal. Again designers/adopters should beware that political leadership and bureaucratic support can be the foundation of undesirable outcomes where civil society participation is absent and funds are lacking. The next sections will discuss the consequences of these findings for methodological approaches in the social sciences and for the prospects of putting a more democratic politics into practice.

7.3 QCA and the middle road

As expressed by Ragin, "The problem is not to show which methodology is best but to explore alternative ways of establishing a meaningful dialogue between ideas and evidence," (1987: viii). In first half of this thesis I outlined that a qualitative comparative medium-N analysis is only one of a number of complimentary research strategies. It is not a middle-road that gives 'the best of both worlds'. But it is a middle-road less travelled by. A QCA approach can encourage researchers not to be afraid of interplay between induction and deduction united with a theoretical framework that is sufficiently anchored but comfortable with floating. The discipline of the QCA approach is that it incentives *real* concern with problematisation of concepts and qualitative variation, at the same time as concerns about replicability, logical calculation and extrapolation.

QCA on its own can only ever be a useful part of a broader research agenda. It is particularly good as I have shown in both chapters 4 and 6 at highlighting overly parsimonious or complex claims and highlighting areas of remaining uncertainty across cases. Using QCA we can highlight cases that need further ethnography or highlight conditions which need to be tested across a larger-N, perhaps through systematic correlation using more accessible proxies.

I have shown that a procedure that uses systematic Boolean logic when constructing research design can be useful to derive typologies similar to the method which was envisaged by George and Bennett (2005: 257) – using key characteristics and logical cases as the building blocks to identify types of a phenomenon rather than focusing on theory and ideal types before working back to empirical cases. Of course this juxtaposition is one of degrees and not absolutes as one never operates in a theoretical or empirical vacuum. Mapping a property space using a truth table as in table 6-2 is the first step in prompting investigation of strategies for further research. The truth table instantly allows observation of what cases we have examples of and which we do not. I identified that there were no empirical examples of a combination of an absence of participatory leadership, where civil society is actively pushing for PB, bureaucracy is supportive, and finance available in my sample. Future empirical research could then be guided in the direction of finding an instance of such a case (given that 2800 cases of PB have been identified and few of these have been studied closely). The finding also prompts thought experiments and theoretical work which can try to explain why we do not have empirical instances of such a combination and of other combinations of key factors. For instance explanations might involve assessing whether the absence of these instances may be a symptom of underlying power structures or biases in conceptual approaches.

Armed with the truth table and further with Boolean comparative analysis we can identify more useful strategies for further case-level research. In our analysis of the negation we found one conjunction which could not be minimised by Boolean reduction even using logical remainders. Cases that would depart from that finding can now be highlighted as excellent candidates for a deviant case-study.

My identification of avenues for the most appropriate 'new' case-sudies supplements Schneider and Rohlfing (2013, 2014) who have documented a

number of sophisticated ways of highlighting cases within a QCA analysis which require further attention and can improve claims of causal inference. I show that as a phenomenon develops QCA can provide an effective method for efficiently channelling future research in fruitful directions. I also highlight cases which may be fruitfully revisited as a result of findings here. Armed with complex and parsimonious solutions a researcher or group of researchers may engage in efficient and effective iteration between concepts and measurement. I asked whether the findings in chapter 6 suggest that I placed too much emphasis on formal financial freedoms and if this emphasis resulted in coding the Toronto case in the wrong type. We may want to go back to the case to find out. Similarly we might ask whether the findings in chapter 4 suggest that a researcher like Wampler could go back to the cases and think again about whether participatory leadership was really a necessary part of every sufficient combination for good outcomes?

Finally I have also highlighted that QCA can provide insights into which correlational, large-N analyses could improve our understanding of processes at case level. In chapter 4 we saw that it might be useful to ask whether certain kinds of cases are more likely to occur where cities have higher HDI and fewer participatory institutions. It may be that these variables are better predictors of certain types of PB and/or outcomes. In both cases it might be easier than in those of the conditions we have looked at above to create relevant and easily-accessible proxies or gather data for large-N comparison – but this only provides an opportunity rather than a justification for undertaking such work. Wampler's claim that cities with higher HDI will have a firmer financial base, broader CSO activity and be more left-leaning, if confirmed by correlational analysis may suggests that certain types of successful PB are more likely to occur than others. Such a finding may force re-evaluation of the empirical weight of some of our claims across 18 cases here. Similarly we might also test the importance of Avritzer's claims regarding multiple venues for civil society interaction with government by looking at how the number and type of participatory institutions are related across municipalities. This might tell us whether the nature of alternative venues matters for future conjunctural analysis.

Perhaps though the key methodological contribution to the problems of comparing innovative practices is that of cumulating knowledge in a way that is systematic yet sensitive to qualitative case-research. This has not been tried

before in the field of participatory innovation. QCA seems a good method for systematically reviewing the best evidence we have on a given phenomenon. The approach I take is transparent in its construction but the analysis is replicable and can be added to by future research. I have even shown that the logical approach that QCA provides could be effectively utilised by researchers studying a small number of cases in order to check whether their conclusions rely too much on intuition.

Yet many things remain unclear. There may be a worry that constructing research in the way I have done still falls foul of subjectivity – an unsympathetic critic might say it tries to mask uncertainty and subjectivity behind a veneer of unfamiliar language and mathematical operations. I think that would go too far; I certainly thought hard about whether I was sterilising qualitative research, but I cannot make any special claims to have interpreted raw materials any more objectively than another capable social scientist might. Moreover, I always rearranged case's memberships according to the requests made by case-researchers. There is a danger that case-researchers are already biased by the paradigms of the field and therefore that their considered judgements are less reliable than raw data. Building on the fuzzy maps, I would in future like to develop tools which may allow crowd-interaction among researchers while sorting and discussing case-calibration with swift recourse to the evidence. In the end it will require further engagement with QCA among researchers to answer to some of these questions.

The thesis would seem to recommend then much greater use of QCA in the future. QCA delivers insights – it gives us robust results that are of a different quality to results otherwise obtained. The catch is that it needs to be applied with an awareness of its limitations and an appreciation for signals that prompt future research using complementary strategies and tools. QCA researchers would not want to fall into trap of bending questions to fit the method.

7.4   Expanding Comparison across Democratic Innovations

At one point the idea for this thesis was to compare a number of different types of democratic innovation to see if they were capable of achieving similar democratic outcomes in different ways. I was interested in testing hegemonic

claims about what kinds of democratic innovation best achieve democratic outcomes (e.g. Fishkin 2009) with claims that plural approaches to democracy may achieve comparable combinations of democratic goods (Smith 2009). In the end I narrowed the scope of comparison to look only at participatory budgets. My analysis of key factors that have been used to explain democratic PB outcomes suggests that they are characterised by multifinality and equifinality. The successful cases here can in some instances confirm or deny a number of 'competing' theories of democracy and governance all at once. Yet as I have detailed above, even a 'within-type-of-innovation' comparative design ran up against dilemmas in achieving relevant comparability across cases. If the question 'Would this work over more dissimilar designs?' were posed my unequivocal answer though would be yes. If anything we seem to be biased as a social research community to lay the burden of proof such that the comparativist must prove that two or more cases are comparable rather than incomparable. For comparativists there is a certain pressure not to compare 'the incomparable'; to narrow the scope of their research and to favour case-based research on most-similar systems. While there is much rationale in these ideas they should not dominate at the expense of more ecumenical or abstract comparisons that seek answers to interesting questions. It is by regularly comparing across cases we actually find out how far apart things are (and challenge received wisdom in a changing world).

There has been a little ink spilt over questions of what is or is not a minipublic (Fishkin 2009, Ryan and Smith 2014) and Warren speaks of possibly over 100 named processes of governance-driven democratisation (2009). The pressure to innovate can lead so-called innovators to be keen to distinguish this or that invention. There is a worry that incentives for action in such a direction come at the expense of replication of best practice across cases. It is essential that when we build a field of research as social scientists we too are aware of biases that work to privilege methods that highlight the uniqueness of events. For this we need methods that cumulate research in a way that is sensitive to holistic case-research and ideally involves bringing case researchers together efficiently to produce robust research. QCA approaches are at least relatively transparent in their operationalisation of concepts and the ways in which they are seen to transverse. We should look for methods that can supplement such an approach.

There are also opportunities now to build on the knowledge provided by this thesis and see if the findings that hold for PB also hold across DIs. Further work might also be able to apply some of the time-sensitive QCA methods above to test sequencing of democratic innovations and/or the use of technology in DIs. There may also be interesting opportunities to cumulate holistic case-research to explain death and resurrection of participatory projects.

7.5   Making participation work

Democratic theorists have been prone to hegemonic claims about whether mass participation can or can't work in this or that context. I have shown that successful participation is not a matter of absolutes but a matter of context. This is not to introduce 'matter of degree phraseology'. It may be that 'competing' theories of democratic empowerment are in fact not really competing but explaining different *specific* contexts without the adequate description of their key conditions. Only through comparative analysis can we iterate between these claims effectively.

PB can't fix everything even at a local level and as explained in the first chapter it is somewhat beyond the scope of this thesis to consider whether transformatory outcomes towards a participatory public culture may be possible as a result of such innovation. However it is a significant innovation and does drive us further in that direction. Many participatory experiments will fail. What I have tried to do is show the contexts in which important conditions will combine to explain this failure or to explain success.

Policy-makers will want to take note of the evidence. Even where implementers have strong support within their government and their executive agencies for participatory programmes without the support of civil society or with finance tied up in other agencies/levels of government, the evidence suggests they will fail. However if they overturn one of those conditions that should be sufficient to ensure success.

7.6   Conclusion

This thesis does two things that are not fashionable but are really important. Rather than search for further 'unique' examples of public policy innovations in

the field it tries to bring together existing research and in the end provides unique insights that can only be found through such a procedure. Secondly it produces research in a way that it can be added to transparently and easily replicated. In fact it tries to replicate some previous analyses testing them with a new method. I would welcome wholeheartedly on-going critique from case-researchers and others as the point of this work is to prompt it.

Democratic theorists have been prone to hegemonic claims. And we have an ever-increasing bank of case-material on democratic innovation but with few attempts to cumulate or even relate some of that work systematically. Disagreements about the role of theory, approaches to classification and inference and appropriate levels of measurement/abstraction are not going away anytime soon, but approaches that are sensitive to the nature of these disagreements are very fruitful. This thesis should push the scholarly community in the direction of basing future conversations about how we can gain holistic knowledge of when participatory politics can be institutionalised on cumulated comparative evidence.

Appendix A – Interview Transcript

Appendix A provides an example of an interview transcript taken from an interview with Anja Rocke 13/12/2010. The interview schedule has been used to interview field researchers in the first instance. The questions can also be sent in the form of a survey. Ethics approval for this research was received, Ref: SOC201011-18/25th November 2010.

The Case: Poitou-Charentes

Now are trying to establish second-round for representatives to come together to establish priorities across high schools – meetings only in single high schools at the moment.

EXPLANTORY CONDITIONS

1. Role of civil society

1.1. Was civil society particularly vibrant prior to PB?
    - Was there a history of activism within CS in the municipality?
    - Were civil society actors involved in organised protest?
    - could mention radicalism or strength of a union
A: Special case. High school. 'No' civil society ...high school community...formal bodies of representation that exist within every school that make other decisions...2006 student movement in France against a reform proposal by the national government...but no direct link to this... I wouldn't think that it is related... young between 13 and 17, some active in little sport clubs...but this question a bit difficult to answer...clear top-down institutionalisation...small group in regional administration had to convince the directors of high schools...over the years more active students already representatives went to the evaluation meetings organised by regional staff but no original bottom-up pressure.
1.2 Did the pressure for PB come from within civil society?

2. Governing strategy

2.1 to what extent was PB central to the governing strategy of political leaders?

    - i.e. was it central to manifestos, speeches, policy documents, etc...think of examples

A: Yes definitely (was) probably a case in Europe Comparative/relative where this point is really strong. They really had the conviction that they wanted to implement this participatory democracy idea, strong. Evidence in electoral program and speeches.

- was the strategy instrumental or ideological

A: Too hard to say/separate it is both may leave out

2.2 To what extent was PB supported across the governing party or coalition?

2.3 To what extent was PB supported across the other political parties in the locality?

- did you see active hostility from other parties to PB and/or participation generally

A: Initially big scepticism among many politicians and regional staff. Members of governing party had to be convinced because people power not mainstream in France. From what I heard, yes bargaining and persuasion were used.

But Segolene was present so could do what she wanted with her majority…not an idea to set up a process that would run against al kinds of political enemies from the outset tried to convince all of goods

2.4 Were other agencies (e.g. national government, World Bank) involved in promoting PB in the locality?

3. Fiscal independence

3.1 To what extent did political leaders have fiscal independence?

– i.e. how much control did they have over their own budgets;

- were they able to direct revenue towards PB without the interference of other actors and/or raise local revenue (taxation)?

A: Regional level- Quite a new territorial entity in France - decentralisation since 80s. 2004 new law with further competences for regions including high schools. No specific budgetary constraints. Pot of money region can spend on high school. Responsible for maintenance of buildings, infrastructure but not salaries of teachers.

4. Bureaucracy

4.1 How did the bureaucracy react to the introduction of PB?

A: Many problems for a couple of years. Used to former system. Majority didn't understand why they needed this new system, ordinary citizens without expertise ...lots of scepticism...leading figures that she mentions in thesis organised this and a little group just dealing with this process along with the civil servants working out costs. A lot of internal meetings organised to work through problems. Dialogue.

4.2 Were political leaders able to reorganise the bureaucracy to better support PB

A: Administration became more transparent having to explain technical choices...one technical member had to be present to explain how a project would stand...took more than a year to realise projects because of decisions at the start about who was aware or accountable for decisions (e.g. architecture dept.) etc. In a later phase two departments were merged into one with a key supporter becoming director of these with a strong impact on administration. Organisational restructuring for effectiveness a by-product of the initial intentions

4.3 Did the attitude of the bureaucracy change over time?

A: Yes it is partially a question of hiring new people see above. A former director left for unofficial reasons because he was anti and couldn't establish his reasoning so more convinced and partial adherents of a participatory strategy/idea replaced them. Others change via convincing, deal with their remaining scepticisms and cope

Capacity to organise?

5. Broader participatory initiatives

5.1 Was PB the first major participatory initiative in the locality?

5.2 Were other participatory initiatives running at the same time as PB and what was their relation to the PB?

    - avenues...

A: Ateliers. Royale sole instigator of new style...during the election she organised public meetings - not sophisticated participation but...in her election mentioned citizen juries but started with PB no others...but then once this was done other initiatives, some citizen juries. European deliberative poll project with Tuscany and Spain. New officer dealing with participatory initiatives and establish policy orientation...

No crossover. Parallel processes no common participatory strategy across instructions.

OUTCOMES

1. Finances

1.1 How significant were the sums of money that went through PB? What proportion of the budget?

    - relative terms

A: This was in thesis clearly enough so I didn't push on it.

2. Democratic engagement

2.1 To what extent was there democratic control over resource allocation by participants in the PB?

A: They could decide about this 10% of the overall budget. 10 million per year for all high schools. Main message in the beginning practically this meant that each school could finance top 3 priorities. 150000 limit per project. People decided directly about these projects. Had informal accountability they could ask in meetings about unrealised projects. Every year evaluation through questionnaire and informal influence. Some

projects couldn't be financed but got them on agenda so regional parliament decided in some cases e.g. something too expensive for PB project they would take this up for the budget.

- was there evidence of cooption?

A: In some cases teachers were trying to influence or director but it is a public meeting with regional admin rep and politician so reasonable standards meant there couldn't be open manipulation. One man one vote. Students have more votes than professor or director so needed good arguments … some meetings smaller more teachers than students.

2.2 Was PB organised to engage all citizens or was it more partisan (i.e. only towards groups supportive of the governing party)?

A: Numbers in text quite high 7% or so usually less than 1% in an institutionally organised participation but context of high school can send invitation to every parent etc. and sometimes students were obliged and controlled by signing in if this was held during school hours but not everywhere.

2.3 Did PB aim to engage citizens or organised interests (or both)?

2.4 To what extent do citizens have oversight of the implementation of PB projects?

And finally…

Are there any other factors we haven't discussed which you think helps explain the emergence of PB?

A: Political initiative and wanting to start something new with regards to previous right wing government. Luck to have two experienced advisors. Strong political will key. Didn't

set up second level because Royale became presidential candidate so seen as two dangerous but focus changes back when she was not elected

Appendix B – Data collection and sorting

Appendix C shows an example of the kind and quality of information typically available for calibration of a condition in the pilot analysis.

Cases	participatory leadership strategy/orientation
Porto Alegre (1989-2004)	Specifically designed to get lower socio-economic groups into public policy-making venues (Wampler: 5); PT was a minority party and may have needed to support PB as a way of consolidating their support. Mayors were ideologically committed to Participatory democracy. Increasing budget transparency allowed the government to show the people the difficulties they faced (Wampler: 126). (information also available from Abers 2000, Baiocchi 2005, Gret and Sintomer 2005)
Berlin-Lichtenberg	District mayor here Kristina Emerich was working as an activist also in the nineties she started some participatory initiatives. At Berlin level there were civil society activists who wanted to place the process on agenda which meant it was taken up by left-party. Didn't have the same ideological underpinnings as other reforms (-based on NPM reform), It was the mayor who put this on the agenda as a policy, ...they want Lichtenberg to be a citizen's town with people involved. There was a criticism that politicians weren't active in supporting process and is probably more supported within the Left parties than conservative ones -, leader was convinced and also here the 2 main figures in policy civil servants who brought forward the process were really crucial figures for the success and for the district it has been a success story until now because it has been important for the image... Role of FIPE agency, 2001 new red-red government in Senate. For Emrich a democratising strategy not an NPM tool, '68' activists who maintain radical ideology... ideological wrangling and accusations with Bertelsmann foundation 212- attempt to rebrand from this here, some sense of decentralising and self-determining strategy in the citizen's commune frame... "Emmrich's political will has been the decisive factor" (Rocke: 218), suggestion (Rocke: 229/230) that officials did not trust citizens., citizen's community (burgergemeinde). (Information from Rocke 2009 and interview with Anja Rocke 13/12/2010)
Morsang-	Municipal Communist party had a 'participatory democracy secretary'. Left list winning in 1997 election (Talpin, 2007) – need to ask in interview.

Sur-Orge	
Toronto community housing	Idea originally came from a few staff people, in particular some staff who were from Latin America and so had heard about PB from their networks back in Latin America, in Argentina and Chile in particular. So they....decided to try it in Toronto and had enough power to set up an initial process so it was staff driven it wasn't driven by political leaders or even the executive at the housing agency who just went along but driven by staff, , a couple of city councillors are on the board of the housing authority by law...so they heard about it but more awareness than support (Lerner and Van Wagner 2006, also interview with Josh Lerner 18/01/2011)
Buenos Aires	Mayor initially interested in a bid to reincorporate civil society in mainstream governance for legitimacy but not in as strong a position as in Brazil because of need to bargain with rivals. Mayor later ignored PB when he fell out with the rival who had been his ally, FREPASO party became fragmented when PB came to be seen as a spent bullet in terms of party gains. Lack of enthusiasm for legalising constitutional provision over a number of years until crisis, D1 no-one ascribed to radical participatory ideal in gov but contingent space of contradictory goals, even only a minority ideologically committed within FREPASO D11, PB an explicit response to argentinazo (13), Schifrin wanted PB for pacifying instrumental reasons and convinced Ibarra., Ibarra later gave minimal funding to process to control Schifrin. Eventually manoeuvring from higher levels as in SP brought its downfall - showing a lack of political freedom from higher levels. (Peruzzotti 2009, Rodgers 2010).
Belo Horizonte	There is some unwillingness to devolve authority. Delegates cannot block government proposals (suggested in survey evidence by Wampler). Despite being PT, One argument is that the mayor and governing coalition intending to reform basic state-society relations and that "The willingness to alter the rules demonstrates an intense government commitment to identifying a new rule set that will best achieve its goals",(Wampler 241) Despite original words government preferred centralised reform clearly. (Wampler 2007, Avritzer 2009, also interview with Brian Wampler 16/03/2011)

Appendix C – R code

Appendix D provides details of code used to produce output in chapter 6.

library ("QCA") #call up QCA package library

phd<- read.csv("phdanalysis.csv", header = TRUE, row.names = "caseid") #import data matrix from file

phd #call up data matrix

phdnr #call up necessary relations

phdnr<- superSubset (phd, outcome = "ccpb", incl.cut = 0.95, cov.cut = 0.5) # perform necessary analysis

phdTT # call up truth table

phdTT<- truthTable (phd, outcome = "ccpb", neg.out = TRUE, complete = TRUE, incl.cut1 = 0.95, show.cases = TRUE) # code truth table for negative outcome

phdSP # call up parsimonious solution

phdSP<- eqmcc (phdTT, include = "?", rowdom = FALSE, details = TRUE, show.cases = TRUE) # perform reduction for parsimonious solution.

phdSC # call up complex sufficient conditions

phdSC<- eqmcc (phdTT, details = TRUE, show.cases = TRUE)# perform complex sufficiency tests

phdSI # call up intermediate solution

phdSI<- eqmcc (phdTT, include = "?", direxp = c(1,"-","-","-"), details = TRUE, show.cases = TRUE) # conduct Intermediate analysis with directional expectations for pl

Appendix D – PB in the UK

Appendix E is a short briefing note on PB in the UK prepared in 2009 which shows the difference in processes called PB in the UK to PB processes as understood elsewhere

Having reached the UK from Brazil through international networking among NGOs, the implementation of Participatory Budgeting (PB) has uniquely (in the context of the northern hemisphere) come to be endorsed as a stated goal of the national government. Rocke (2008) points to a number of reasons explaining how the growth of PB practice here over the last decade has led to a distinctive style and understanding of the goals and uses of PB in the UK. Rather than being forced on the agenda by Left-wing parties, as was the case elsewhere, the idea has worked its way up through the echelons of the state bureaucracy, starting form a community perspective. Rocke also points to the influence of Third Way politics on the opportunities that have presented themselves for PB. The rhetoric of empowerment in the UK is often used in New Labour discourse primarily as a means by which other goals such as 'community solidarity and pride to stop anti-social behaviour' (CLG: 23) can be achieved. Moreover, PB must exist in a culture of performance targets and other central control mechanisms such as 'ring-fencing' unlike in Porto Alegre where it has been most successful.

With the Leftist Worker's Party (PT) in power, government backing in Porto Alegre meant full support of PB as a marquee initiative, taking on service providers and changing tax regimes to facilitate the new democratic process. In the UK support has been less partisan. Nevertheless the Labour government, particularly through Hazel Blears in her time as CLG secretary has endorsed PB albeit in a different guise. Rather than seeking to transform state-society relations they have preferred to present PB using somewhat watered down terms like 'community kitties'. All the same, despite the nomenclature much of what has gone on may represent part of a process of starting small with many pilots now having taken place. One extremely positive aspect of PB in the UK has been the extent of networking and learning that is taking place among processes. What follows is a review evidence provided to date in order to compare and critique the purposes and outcomes of PB projects that have taken place in the UK.

Participatory grant-making as Participatory Budgeting

Much PB that has taken place in the UK falls into the sub-category of participatory grant-making. These are processes usually involving *relatively* small pots of money, where groups (usually statutory service providers and/or Voluntary and Community Service (VCS) groups) bid for a sum of money on the basis of an idea for a project which they themselves will implement. These funds are usually drawn form existing government programmes earmarked for spending in specific geographic and policy areas by central government, e.g. community safety in priority crime areas and neighbourhood renewal in disadvantaged neighbourhoods. As we shall see much of the criticism of the potential of these processes lies in the lack of pure agenda-setting power and improved budget

literacy afforded participants, which perhaps leaves them in a grey area between PB and 'ordinary' consultation. However, as well as considerable variation among these processes there are other interesting models of PB that will be outlined and discussed in course. I will now proceed to discuss the most important factors in PB, highlighting qualitative differences among models.

Who is invited to apply for funding?

One of the key differences between the 'Participatory grant-making' processes which have become common in the UK and the more traditional Participatory Budgeting based on the Brazilian model (which is less common in the UK) is that grant-making relies on bidding organisations themselves to implement proposed projects once they are sanctioned. While this has a positive effect in that it motivates bidders from the CVS in particular to be clear and organised in planning the implementation of their projects, it does not empower any one unaffiliated person to come to an event and challenge governments by saying 'this needs to be done and you need to find out how'. In the UK people generally bring fully polished solutions to PB events. Therefore, the space for new ideas to be brought forward involves a dialogue between bidding organisations and a steering group and not necessarily among PB participants.

Key to the success of PB in Brazil is its ability to provide opportunities to allow new civil-society groups to form around issues and have their case for investment in services heard. In the UK applications were mostly invited from not-for-profit organisations and community groups (at least in processes where information on who was allowed to apply was made available). A template of an invitation for bids in the PB toolkit (produced by the PB Unit) states that if you are "confident you can deliver it you can put forward a proposal". While the requirement to be able to carry out a project is important to be sure funds are not wasted, this may put many individuals and unorganized groups off making a bid. Some projects identified the need to make support available to groups not used to bidding for money. In the young people's 'U-decide' in Newcastle groups of youngsters worked with a council officer for design advice. The recent processes run by the Manchester Metropolitan Police (GMP 2009) in Stockport and Tameside went a step furthering, ensuring inclusivity by supporting smaller or less-established groups to put governance structures in place, such as opening bank accounts and setting up log books (GMP: 4). It is of course a positive aspect of PB in the UK that it allows opportunities for community groups to be involved in implementing processes themselves when they can.

However, there were some other processes which took the more traditional PB form. These processes also were more likely to involve portions of mainstream funding. In Claremont and Weaste (Salford) where the PB focused on a portion of mainstream funding for roads and highway improvements, ideas were first proposed and an independent costing agency was used to cost project ideas. In Coedpoeth residents could initiate ideas on pre-selected themes that again, were subsequently worked up and costed. This example also benefited from being funded by precept funds, raised locally and not redistributed from a government pot, giving residents even greater ownership of the process. The Coedpoeth PB probably benefited from this freedom to innovate leading to local people, when the idea of introducing a pelican crossing was raised, to build a relationship with

the local Co-op Supermarket and persuade them to put money into the scheme. The Coedpoeth PB also involved a prioritisation process held with the primary school children who fed in their ideas for project proposals. Children were able to propose projects but not vote. In the various PB projects minimum voting ages ranged from 11 to 16.

What can they bid for?

In the context of those processes that fall into the category of Participatory grant-making, many chose to place a maximum and minimum to the amount that could be bid for any one project. This is now recommended as best practice by the PB Unit (see toolkit). In the most recent Blackburn and Darwen PB, the evaluation also recommended limiting the number of successful bids per organisation to one. These mechanisms can help alleviate to some extent any concerns raised over swamping of events with mobilised support to try and 'steal' the pot of money. However, there is a concern that limiting an organisation's number of bids (particularly a large one which is capable of implementing more than one good project) is unfair and undesirable. In any case it might be better solution to apply higher thresholds to gain subsequent grants as is done for electing PB delegates in Brazil.

Setting a maximum and minimum bid will have a great influence on many of the outcomes of a PB. It has a significant effect on deciding the proportion of bids that will be successful. It is interesting to note that unsuccessful applicants were generally less disappointed with the process when they were in the majority i.e. when a small number of expensive projects won the money. In North Lincolnshire applicants were simply asked to bid for 4 different awards to the value of £5000 and had to implement their project within a given 'event week'. In most pilots, applicants were given about six to eight weeks to produce bids, however in North Lincolnshire and other community safety pilots this had to be reduced[63]. Interestingly residents seemed to have responded positively to the simplicity afforded by this. The short timeframe for implementation meant that 'demonstration effects' were felt almost immediately and implementation was easily monitored by residents. Nevertheless, although this process required voters to discuss the opportunity costs of selecting one project over another, it is a bit of a stretch to say it provided any great improvements in budget literacy. Also, implementing the projects all in one week may have an adverse effect on the sustainability of the project(s).

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[63] North Lincolnshire was among 24 community safety PB pilots initiated by the Home Office in early 2009. While the Home Office should be commended for this they required the projects to be completed within 8 weeks of being awarded funding, which while unsatisfactory produced some interesting findings as projects were forced to innovate.

How is the PB run who decides a bid is selected to be presented at a 'Decision Day'?

PB projects are planned and implemented from the beginning by a steering group usually consisting of stakeholder bodies and those with expert knowledge. In some cases, such as Salford and Tameside, resident representatives have been included, although in both cases these residents had already been recruited through involvement in previous participatory processes. Lavan (2007: 7) found little evidence of community participation in strategic planning as of yet. This may also be a consequence of the pilot nature of projects where it is uncertain whether processes will be repeated. It might be argued that where processes are repeated it would provide the opportunity for community delegates to be elected to strategic steering groups on a yearly cycle. In cases where repeat processes have occurred and are planned, however, the feeling seems to be that it would be adequate to engage citizens in a more traditional type of consultation on planning the process than involve them directly. While some projects such as Thornhill reported great benefits in terms of organisation in producing effective team working among stakeholder groups and harnessing their institutional support, this also has an opportunity cost of pulling time and human resources away from mobilisation of residents (TPY 2008).

As most funding is made available under conditions for which policy arenas it may be spent in, it is important that projects fall within these remits. They also must be both legal and feasible. Therefore a scrutiny panel (usually different from the steering group) can be set up to assess whether buds meet requirements. The scrutiny panel often takes the opportunity to allow local councillors and expert bureaucrats to have an input in the process. Most projects stress that the scrutiny panel may only advise on the merits of a project and that final decision-making must rest with neighbourhood resident participants. Despite the 'no veto' practice an accusation may still be levelled that scrutiny boards give an independent voice to the powerful local groups. Some have used scrutiny panels to narrow the range of projects to make the decision day event more manageable. For example in North Lincolnshire a shortlisting panel was established to identify the ten strongest proposals, which met the criteria and which could be put to a public vote.

Role of Councillors

Is it necessarily a bad thing to give a voice to councillors in the process? It is a difficult question. The PB Unit suggest that it is best for them to play the role of PB advocate: "When elected councillors seek citizen input in budget matters, their legitimacy increased," (toolkit: 5). They have, in projects to date, participated in scrutiny panels, in presenting the Decision Day and in the evaluation and assessment processes. It is difficult to know whether councillors should be allowed participate in PB given that they may be able to capture support using their political skills. Some will be antipathetic towards PB in any case because they take a Schumpeterian view that they are elected to shape their communities in their own way.

How are participants mobilised/engaged?

Participants were generally engaged and invited using news releases, posters and leaflets, while word of mouth is also significant in almost all cases. Cases where the event was publicized through schools were successful in drawing greater participants. In Stockport and Tameside letters/flyers were hand-delivered by members of the local neighbourhood policing teams. In traditional forms of PB, voters are mobilized most clearly by 'demonstration effects' and by civil society organization and community groups themselves who need their vote. In Tameside, which had one of the highest turnouts of any process so far, mobilization by bidding organization was shown to be the key reason for the high attendance. This was also seen in Keighley.

Other projects focused on achieving representation of diversity and engaging traditional hard-to- reach groups. The Open Budget process in Harrow managed to engage a high proportion of young people by targeting diverse groups with its advertising. The Harrow process was much different to the grant-making processes.
300 residents turned out for a six-hour Assembly on a Sunday in Harrow to discuss the borough budget and set priorities. This process also went on to vote a budget monitoring group from among its representatives, which included a high number of young people.

To ensure fairness processes generally required that participants had to stay all the way through and vote for all projects. However there were other examples that allowed online (Finsbury Park) or postal voting to increase participation. In North Lincolnshire instead of a one off decision day a postal ballot was conducted over a week. While the idea of a postal ballot raises questions over fairness and secrecy (in fact just about every process raises this to an extent), it allowed for a very high proportional turnout. It also allowed for an innovative approach to engendering deliberation. Staff conducted nearly 40 "consultation station" events during the voting period to bring PB to the people. This allowed for "speaking to young mothers at places they meet, and talking to people with addiction issues who were visiting the pharmacy at Westcliff Co-op." (Brennan, p.6) They also identified males aged 25 – 60 as a particularly hard to reach group. "These residents were engaged by the Acorns team entering into environments where this target audience would be, such as local public houses," (idem). In addition, they conducted consultations at the post office, which enabled them to speak with people collecting their benefits. Moreover despite the high turnout, they found to their surprise, that the incentive of being entered into a free prize draw to win £100 in shopping vouchers was cited by only 5% of questionnaire respondents as a mobilizing factor.

Providing disability support and childcare increased turnout where it was available. However this had implications for costs, venues and running length available to the process. In Bolton a local mosque was targeted to reach Muslim females, a traditional hard-to-reach group. However this resulted in fewer white people attending as they had only been targeted using leaflets (PB unit, 2009: 11). In Tower Hamlets the focus was on getting a spread of cleavages across a number of wards and this was achieved in terms of ethnic diversity and geography, although no data was made available on wealth. The Tower Hamlets

PB is unique and is the closest process to the Brazilian model in terms of the magnitude of decisions at least. Here participants were involved in a number of parallel events across the borough, in deliberations over presentations from service providers on mainstream services and chose what they wished to spend much of the Council non-fixed expenditure budget on.

While some projects sought to maximize turnout, others were keen to limit numbers. Sometimes this was for practical (space or management) reasons. This was the case in Tower Hamlets where participants registered and participation was limited to 100 per meeting in order to allow for effective facilitation of deliberation and training. Elsewhere numbers were limited to avoid vote swamping and increase fairness. In Salford groups were limited to 5 voters per group and in Bradford it was just 2. In the young person's PB in Newcastle youth groups were asked to send 4 delegates each.

The event

Many events were keen to place emphasis on the smooth and seamless running of the event day. There is no doubt that events that achieved this emphasised time spent on prebriefings with volunteers, and collaboratively planning and revising information leaflets and voting sheet templates etc. Groups also elected to spend time training presenters to ensure fairness. Again, the opportunity cost of putting this time into the event is taking resources away from reaching out to potential participants.

While emphasizing the fun factor improved attendance, there is a concern that the fear of 'not having fun' leads to a detrimental removal of all possible confrontation from the process. In Thornhill it was felt that "Q&A sessions would be difficult to manage, especially as contentious questions might be asked and issues of fairness might arise" (TPY: 17). This however led to a jettisoning of any deliberation at all on proposals, resulting in a very individualized process. A related problem is a fear of telling people what PB is and 'what it is all about'. The term "community kitties" is sometimes used as a catchier and voter-friendly term and almost all processes have been encouraged by the PB unit to brand their processes differently. It has somewhere along the line been decided that Participatory Budgeting is an 'inhibiting' term.

Voting

In most grant-making processes, voters were asked to rank projects on a scale of one to ten. These votes are then counted and projects with the most votes are awarded funding in order until the pot has run out. However there are a number of notable exceptions. In Salford a two-round system was used with the top ten projects from the first round going through to the final round. This system could be seen to encourage deliberation and bargaining and the formation of coalitions. In Stockport a proportional system was used so that everyone got some money. Participants were asked: "How much money would you like to give to this project?" You should select your answer by circling either:
□□**ALL of the amount requested**

☐☐MOST of the amount requested
☐☐SOME of the amount requested
☐☐NONE of the amount requested,
There was a set floor of votes received below which a group would not receive any money. However, all other groups were awarded some of the requested funding. This could be criticised for not involving citizens in realistic budget-setting. Of course innovation is welcomed, however this would require that a process is able to defend this decision if projects were then subsequently not implemented.

The Tower Hamlets process was not a grant giving process and involved residents voting for money for their preferred service. Tower Hamlets in their evaluation believe that their process allowed for "what has been termed 'shifting coalitions' where different groups of people vote together at different times to secure different 'items'"(Udecide p.8). However the point was later made that the voting system then allowed organized groups to dominate and a more proportional system would have been favoured.

The mainstream budget events in Harrow and Tower Hamlets used e-voting machines and Big Screen instant relay. These events were clearly influenced by 21st century town meetings using a similar roundtable facilitated deliberation. E-voting was also used successfully to increase interest and engage younger groups in Stockport, Rochdale, Rotherham and Newcastle, although it became a problem where high turnout led to insufficient number of handsets. There is a tradeoff to be made where the use of technology "is too "techy" it may alienate older people, however this might engage younger people" (PB toolkit 16).

Costs and Funding

Almost all the literature is quick to make the claim that the setup costs associated with pilot schemes are high but should diminish as processes recur. Thus it is particularly frustrating to see instances where this opportunity has gone to waste, eg. Harrow. In some cases it was suggested that commercial sponsorship might be garnered to offset the promotion cost. In any case in order to ensure continuing growth PB processes should try to secure as much money as possible to put into outreach projects. Some projects have been successful in topping up government grants with flexible funds from other parts of mainstream budgets.

Evaluation

Most evaluation reports have been based on a similar methodology. In-depth interviews tend to be with staff/organisers and questionnaires with participants. Unfortunately this does not provide in depth information on levels of coercion felt by participants, motivations for voting etc. It would also be interesting to study whether ideological or community concerns or self-interest are foremost in voter's minds. Much evaluation will naturally focus on the delivery impacts of projects. Independent evaluations would be preferable as evaluations by those involved are open to claims of adverse subjectivity

Whose role is the scrutiny and monitoring of the process and implementation?

Monitoring of implementation was very important factor in the success of PB in Brazil where government was responsible for implementation and citizens held them to account. The UK case is a bit more complex because it may be that citizens can defer to government and steering organisations more easily as it is contractors that are responsible more often than not for implementing projects. Election of a monitoring group has been the exception not the rule. In the case of Harrow where a monitoring group was elected from the Assembly, there was a failure to maintain contact between the monitoring group and the participants. Furthermore, the terms of reference of the group were made such that it was impossible for the monitoring group to effectively challenge the Council when they deviated form PB priorities.

Facilitation

Best practice occurred where professional facilitation was used. Facilitators are not only able to encourage groups to deliberate but also can guide the reaction to presentations and avoid mob rule (Lavan: 41). GMP reported that in Stockport presentations from outsiders were met with boos and programmes which aimed to help people with criminal convictions were not received well.

Conclusion

In many of the grant-making processes deliberation is almost completely absent form the decision day (not even questions to presenters, given time constraints). Need this necessarily be the case? One problem is that although most feedback is positive there are large minorities in many processes who have doubts about the fairness of the process and want to have a greater say in how it should be run. Also the disappointments of those that do not get money in grant-making processes is greater without deliberation because they are not given reasons for their rejection.

In the transfer of Participatory Budgeting to the Northern Hemisphere, deliberation seems to have lost out to an emphasis for reaching set targets for community cohesion and urban renewal. This critique is not to belittle the importance of those goals but only to say that without them being reached through deliberation they are at best being reached in a hollow fashion or at worst not being reached at all. Moreover, positive efforts to improve this were seen in some of the recent Policing related PBs. The U-decide Process in Newcastle which has been repeated has recognised the need to work more time for deliberation into its process. Too many seem PB projects seem to have misunderstood deliberation as a complete abandonment of confrontation.

In UK culture there seems to be a tension in the strong bond with representative democracy and more direct forms of voting. In Tower Hamlets some would seem to have preferred a referendum without any deliberation (Udecide p. 12). Both Lavan (2007: 74) and Blakely(2008a: 62) point to emerging dangers that non-

deliberative aggregative PB will lead to individualistic consumerist associations with PB in the UK. The further value of PB in Brazil was the fusion of representative and deliberative and participatory forms of democracy in one related recurring cycle. More effort could be put into delivering processes with the scope and imagination to implement such. Rocke (2008) comes to the conclusion that grant-making can only be a stepping stone to a real PB. Therefore much of the above should be seen in their context as pilots and the better mechanisms should be brought forward and greater innovation and experimentation should be encouraged. Moreover, many processes have suffered from the not being able to rely on money that will be raised year in year out and therefore fear that taking risks will raise expectations too high.

A further consideration is whether a full participatory consciousness can occur if politicians are not willing to take less qualified political risks in devolving power.The recent process undertaken in Tower Hamlets provides some hope for progression with the Council entrusting highly technical information to participants in order to allow learning and improved budget literacy. It is important to allow these processes grow over time. Many people will instinctively allow others to explore new forms of participation and it is not until it is demonstrated to them that participation is worthwhile that they will begin to consider engaging.

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