Attitudinal control
Attitudinal control
Beliefs are held to norms in a way that seems to require control over what we believe. Yet we don’t control our beliefs at will, in the way we control our actions. I argue that this problem can be solved by recognising a different form of control, which we exercise when we revise our beliefs directly for reasons. We enjoy this form of attitudinal control not only over our beliefs, but also over other attitudes, including intentions—that is, over the will itself. Closely tied to our capacity for reasoning, attitudinal control is in important respects more fundamental than the voluntary control that we exercise over our actions. In the course of developing this account I respond to two objections recently raised against an earlier version of it by Booth (Synthese 191:1867–1880, 2014).
responsibility, doxastic agency, control, reasoning, doxastic voluntarism, epistemic normativity
2745-2762
McHugh, Conor
0b73a7bf-51bf-4883-b62e-f6071f25194d
1 August 2017
McHugh, Conor
0b73a7bf-51bf-4883-b62e-f6071f25194d
Abstract
Beliefs are held to norms in a way that seems to require control over what we believe. Yet we don’t control our beliefs at will, in the way we control our actions. I argue that this problem can be solved by recognising a different form of control, which we exercise when we revise our beliefs directly for reasons. We enjoy this form of attitudinal control not only over our beliefs, but also over other attitudes, including intentions—that is, over the will itself. Closely tied to our capacity for reasoning, attitudinal control is in important respects more fundamental than the voluntary control that we exercise over our actions. In the course of developing this account I respond to two objections recently raised against an earlier version of it by Booth (Synthese 191:1867–1880, 2014).
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Attitudinal Control - pre-proof version.pdf
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Accepted/In Press date: 18 December 2014
e-pub ahead of print date: 15 January 2015
Published date: 1 August 2017
Keywords:
responsibility, doxastic agency, control, reasoning, doxastic voluntarism, epistemic normativity
Organisations:
Philosophy
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 374091
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/374091
ISSN: 0039-7857
PURE UUID: 2c688010-6a31-4b02-a785-af9f8079bd9f
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Date deposited: 05 Feb 2015 11:41
Last modified: 14 Mar 2024 19:02
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