McHugh, Conor (2014) VIII - Fitting belief. [in special issue: Meeting of the Aristotelian Society held at Senate House, University of London, on 10 February 2014 at 5:30 p.m] Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 114 (2), part 2, 167-187. (doi:10.1111/j.1467-9264.2014.00369.x).
Abstract
Beliefs can be correct or incorrect, and this standard of correctness is widely thought to be fundamental to epistemic normativity. But how should this standard be understood, and in what way is it so fundamental? I argue that we should resist understanding correctness for belief as either a prescriptive or an evaluative norm. Rather, we should understand it as an instance of the distinct normative category of fittingness for attitudes. This yields an attractive account of epistemic reasons.
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