Accepting optimally in automated negotiation with incomplete information
Accepting optimally in automated negotiation with incomplete information
When a negotiating agent is presented with an offer by its opponent, it is faced with a decision: it can accept the offer that is currently on the table, or it can reject it and continue the negotiation. Both options involve an inherent risk: continuing the negotiation carries the risk of forgoing a possibly optimal offer, whereas accepting runs the risk of missing out on an even better future offer. We approach the decision of whether to accept as a sequential decision problem, by modeling the bids received as a stochastic process. We argue that this is a natural choice in the context of a negotiation with incomplete information, where the future behavior of the opponent is uncertain. We determine the optimal acceptance policies for particular opponent classes and we present an approach to estimate the expected range of offers when the type of opponent is unknown. We apply our method against a wide range of opponents, and compare its performance with acceptance mechanisms of state-of-the-art negotiation strategies. The experiments show that the proposed approach is able to find the optimal time to accept, and improves upon widely used existing acceptance mechanisms
Baarslag, Tim
a7c541d8-8141-467b-a08c-7a81cd69920e
2013
Baarslag, Tim
a7c541d8-8141-467b-a08c-7a81cd69920e
Baarslag, Tim
(2013)
Accepting optimally in automated negotiation with incomplete information.
Proceedings of the 25th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Delft, Netherlands.
07 - 08 Nov 2013.
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Conference or Workshop Item
(Paper)
Abstract
When a negotiating agent is presented with an offer by its opponent, it is faced with a decision: it can accept the offer that is currently on the table, or it can reject it and continue the negotiation. Both options involve an inherent risk: continuing the negotiation carries the risk of forgoing a possibly optimal offer, whereas accepting runs the risk of missing out on an even better future offer. We approach the decision of whether to accept as a sequential decision problem, by modeling the bids received as a stochastic process. We argue that this is a natural choice in the context of a negotiation with incomplete information, where the future behavior of the opponent is uncertain. We determine the optimal acceptance policies for particular opponent classes and we present an approach to estimate the expected range of offers when the type of opponent is unknown. We apply our method against a wide range of opponents, and compare its performance with acceptance mechanisms of state-of-the-art negotiation strategies. The experiments show that the proposed approach is able to find the optimal time to accept, and improves upon widely used existing acceptance mechanisms
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Accepting Optimally in Automated Negotiation with Incomplete Information BNAIC 2013.pdf
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Published date: 2013
Venue - Dates:
Proceedings of the 25th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Delft, Netherlands, 2013-11-07 - 2013-11-08
Organisations:
Agents, Interactions & Complexity
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Local EPrints ID: 374688
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/374688
PURE UUID: 51497688-271f-4edb-b9a4-a159590f7b41
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Date deposited: 26 Feb 2015 13:48
Last modified: 14 Mar 2024 19:11
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Author:
Tim Baarslag
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