Efficient voting with penalties
Efficient voting with penalties
Simple majority does not reflect the intensity of voters’ preferences. This paper presents an efficient collective choice mechanism when the choice is binary and the designer may use non-trasferable punishments to persuade agents to reveal their private information. The designer faces a dilemma – a punishment may induce a more correct choice, but its cost is socially wasteful. The efficient mechanism is a weighted majority. Weight of each individual is known ex ante and no punishments applied if preferences are relatively homogenous. Eliciting types through punishments in order to construct type-specific weights should occur if preference intensity is relatively heterogeneous, or if voters preferences represent a larger population.
University of Southampton
Kwiek, Maksymilian
84ba7dab-b54b-4d22-8cf3-817b2a2077cf
2014
Kwiek, Maksymilian
84ba7dab-b54b-4d22-8cf3-817b2a2077cf
Kwiek, Maksymilian
(2014)
Efficient voting with penalties
(Discussion Papers in Economics and Econometrics, 1419)
Southampton, GB.
University of Southampton
30pp.
Record type:
Monograph
(Working Paper)
Abstract
Simple majority does not reflect the intensity of voters’ preferences. This paper presents an efficient collective choice mechanism when the choice is binary and the designer may use non-trasferable punishments to persuade agents to reveal their private information. The designer faces a dilemma – a punishment may induce a more correct choice, but its cost is socially wasteful. The efficient mechanism is a weighted majority. Weight of each individual is known ex ante and no punishments applied if preferences are relatively homogenous. Eliciting types through punishments in order to construct type-specific weights should occur if preference intensity is relatively heterogeneous, or if voters preferences represent a larger population.
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Published date: 2014
Organisations:
Economics
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Local EPrints ID: 376856
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/376856
ISSN: 0966-4246
PURE UUID: ac281a0b-6a08-4857-bca6-bc0683c7460d
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Date deposited: 08 May 2015 15:35
Last modified: 14 Mar 2024 19:51
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