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Strategic Candidacy Games with Lazy Candidates

Strategic Candidacy Games with Lazy Candidates
Strategic Candidacy Games with Lazy Candidates
In strategic candidacy games, both voters and candidates have preferences over the set of candidates, and candidates may strategically withdraw from the election in order to manipulate the outcome according to their preferences. In this work, we extend the standard model of strategic candidacy games by observing that candidates may find it costly to run an electoral campaign and may therefore prefer to withdraw if their presence has no effect on the election outcome. We study the Nash equilibria and outcomes of natural best-response dynamics in the resulting class of games, both from a normative and from a computational perspective, and compare them with the Nash equilibria of the standard model.
Obraztsova, Svetlana
5a201770-908c-44a8-8e22-62cb16d92bf6
Elkind, Edith
7a013473-5cd0-4e41-b907-66b30a04a400
Polukarov, Maria
bd2f0623-9e8a-465f-8b29-851387a64740
Rabinovich, Zinovi
573422bf-523d-466b-a047-7a92917102e7
Obraztsova, Svetlana
5a201770-908c-44a8-8e22-62cb16d92bf6
Elkind, Edith
7a013473-5cd0-4e41-b907-66b30a04a400
Polukarov, Maria
bd2f0623-9e8a-465f-8b29-851387a64740
Rabinovich, Zinovi
573422bf-523d-466b-a047-7a92917102e7

Obraztsova, Svetlana, Elkind, Edith, Polukarov, Maria and Rabinovich, Zinovi (2015) Strategic Candidacy Games with Lazy Candidates. International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. 25 - 31 Jul 2015.

Record type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)

Abstract

In strategic candidacy games, both voters and candidates have preferences over the set of candidates, and candidates may strategically withdraw from the election in order to manipulate the outcome according to their preferences. In this work, we extend the standard model of strategic candidacy games by observing that candidates may find it costly to run an electoral campaign and may therefore prefer to withdraw if their presence has no effect on the election outcome. We study the Nash equilibria and outcomes of natural best-response dynamics in the resulting class of games, both from a normative and from a computational perspective, and compare them with the Nash equilibria of the standard model.

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Accepted/In Press date: 16 April 2015
Published date: 31 July 2015
Venue - Dates: International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2015-07-25 - 2015-07-31
Organisations: Agents, Interactions & Complexity

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Local EPrints ID: 376945
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/376945
PURE UUID: ef6e1745-c721-41a7-b398-4aecb2517048

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Date deposited: 11 May 2015 20:16
Last modified: 18 Nov 2019 20:24

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