

'Albania: €1' or the story of 'big policies, small outcomes' How Albania constructs and engages its diaspora

Julie Vullnetari

For most of the twentieth century not much was known about Albania outside its territory. Emerging as the last new state from the crumbling Ottoman Empire in 1912, it was also the poorest and most economically backward country in Europe (Logoreci, 1977). Its territorial integrity was not fully established until the end of World War Two (WWII), which saw the communists as the victorious political force in the country. Albania was ruled with a tight fist for nearly half a century, during which there were some significant improvements in health and education, but also some of the worst human rights atrocities in the world. Emerging as the last country from behind the 'Iron Curtain' in the early 1990s, Albania was on the brink of bankruptcy, with a third of its population below 15 years of age, a high rate of unemployment and long-suppressed freedom of movement. Its borders – tightly controlled until then even by death penalty for those who attempted escape – suddenly fell, and the tide of large-scale exodus became one of Europe's key concern. Especially in the 1990s Albania experienced one of the most significant emigration flows in Europe as a share of its total population. By 2010 almost half of its resident population was estimated to have emigrated and living abroad – primarily in neighbouring Greece and Italy, but also in the UK and North America (World Bank, 2011, p.54). Internal movements were also significant, especially from the highlands of the north and the deep south towards the coastal plains of the west. A World Bank team estimated that nearly 20 per cent of Albania's population had moved internally between 1990 and 2005, and if movers since birth were counted this figure would rise to a third of the total (World Bank, 2007, pp.33–4). By 2005 the Tirana-Durrës conurbation in the littoral west was home to an estimated third of the resident population. It was as if the entire country was on the move (cf. Carletto *et al.*, 2006). Yet migration policies of consecutive governments have lagged behind these rapid transformations despite an acute need for forward looking action.

This chapter seeks to document, map and analyse some of the key features of Albania's international migration and diasporisation, focusing primarily on the post-communist movements, but without losing sight of the historical dimension. It further seeks to extend this exercise to Albania's policymaking on migration and diaspora and its

key institutions responsible for implementing this policy. Finally, a brief section will discuss the key debates in the country on diaspora and its mobilisation.

History and Geography of Emigration

Development of the emigrant community

Labour migration has for centuries played a central role for Albanians, as it has for all Mediterranean peoples (Psimmenos and Georgoulas, 2001, p.9). Equally, forced migrations have accompanied internal and external wars and fighting which have tormented the Balkans for centuries. The earliest Albanian settlements abroad concern the two neighbouring countries of Italy and Greece (Myres *et al.*, 1945, p.182). Albanian settlements formed during the fifteenth century, could be found in Sicily and the south of present-day Italy (Myres *et al.*, 1945, p.182), peopled by soldiers who had settled there after having fought for the House of Aragon from around 1430 (Vickers, 1995, p.9). These were later joined by Albanians fleeing the Ottoman conquest, especially after resistance was crushed in Krujë (Figure 1) following the death of Albania's national hero Skanderbeg in 1467; his family was given protection by the King of Naples. These early migrants in Italy became known as the Arbëresh and their descendants have been able to preserve the Albanian language and traditions through the centuries.¹ It is estimated that around 200,000 Albanians fled their homes during 1468–1506 (Tirta, 1999, p.97), settling in Italy, the Dalmatian coast and Greece.

Before this wave, Albanians are thought to have arrived in Greece in the thirteenth and fourteenth century as mercenaries for the Venetians, but may have settled in Attica as early as the ninth century (Magliveras, 2009, p.15). Known as Arvanites, they have maintained their language and culture through the centuries. Albanian-speaking shepherds, peasants and seamen were living in Aetolia, Attica and the Morea, as well as the adjacent islands of Euboea, Andros, Hydra and the Spetzes (Myres *et al.*, 1945, p.182). In addition, Greece was an important destination for labour migrants, especially within the Ottoman Empire; many of these movements were circular in nature. Tirta (1999, p.139) estimates that in the 1930s there were around 400,000 Albanians in Greece, whereas according to Magliveras' (2009, p.22) analysis of historians' texts they constituted as much as half of the Greek population prior to the 1923 population exchange between Greece and Turkey.

While the various wars in the Balkans, as well as blood vendettas, exploitation and feuds between local chieftains and lords forced many to leave their lands and settle

elsewhere, labour migration was particularly important during the Ottoman Empire.² Albanians, thus, emigrated far and wide throughout the Ottoman territory, especially craftsmen such as masons, road-builders, carpenters, ironsmiths and goldsmiths (Tirta, 1999). Others left to study in key centres of learning such as Cairo or Constantinople, while many professional men settled in the bigger cities of the Empire intending a career in the administration, army, or in professions such as medicine and the law.³ During this time present-day Turkey became especially an important destination, where an Albanian presence is noted from the beginning of the fifteenth century (de Rapper, 2000, p.3). Conservative estimates suggest that in 1928 some 250,000–300,000 Albanians lived in Turkey, 60,000 in Istanbul alone (Pollo and Puto ,1981, p.108; Tirta, 1999, p.139).⁴ Other countries, such as Romania, Egypt, Bulgaria and Russia (in that descending order), received Albanian labour migrants and refugees, although settlements here were not as significant as in the other countries mentioned earlier.⁵

Emigrations intensified by late nineteenth and early twentieth century, influenced by the global political and socio-economic developments, the creation of nation-states in the Balkans, as well as the Balkan Wars and the two World Wars. With progress in transport and technology, emigration to more distant lands became feasible for some Albanians too. They migrated as far from their country as Russia, Africa, China, and especially to the Americas and Australia. In the latter two they were part of the larger inter-continental flows from South-Eastern Europe (Federal Writers' Project, 1939; Price, 1963). Indeed, some of the Albanians who had earlier settled in Italy migrated to the Americas as part of the Italian migratory flows at the beginning of the twentieth century (Hall, 1994, p.50; Tirta, 1999, p.141). Settlements formed in Argentina, Brazil and Canada, but USA became by far the most important destination. By 1945 an estimated 60,000 Albanians lived in that country (Myres *et al.*, 1945, p.131, pp.182–3).

These migrations had a mixed impact on areas and communities of origin, but among the positive effects were much-needed financial, as well as technological, social and political remittances. Albanian individuals and migrant associations in Bucharest, Sofia, Istanbul, Cairo and Boston to name but a few, became key vehicles in the struggle for independence. Transnational ties amongst these communities, and with Albania itself, were maintained by a core of renowned men and a handful of prominent women who championed Albania's cause to foreign Powers. Hometown associations contributed to the development of their villages and cities of origin by investing in education, building schools, roads, communal water taps, cemeteries, printing and distributing books and

Accepted Manuscript (AM) of Vullnetari, J. (2013) 'Albania: €1' or the story of 'big policies, small outcomes': How Albania constructs and engages its diaspora. In Collyer, M. (ed.) *Emigration Nations: Policies and Ideologies of Emigrant Engagement*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 25-49 [accepted February 2013; published September 2013].

helping the poor (Federal Writers' Project, 1939, pp.82–4; Ragaru, 2002; Tirta, 1999; UNDP-Albania, 2000, p.35).

While migratory waves resulted in the creation of Albania's 'global diaspora', the geo-politics at the heart of the Balkan Wars were key to the formation of Albania's 'regional diaspora'. The country's declaration of independence in 1912 was recognised by the Great Powers at a conference of ambassadors in London in 1913, which also decided on Albania's territorial boundaries. In the final settlement areas with large Albanian majority populations – most significantly Kosovo – were allocated to neighbouring countries. The result was that nearly half the Albanian population was left outside of the new Albanian state (Krasniqi, 2010, p.4). By the end of WWII Albanians in the Balkans found themselves separated into three different nation-state entities: the People's Socialist Republic (PSR) of Albania, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (especially in today's Kosovo, Montenegro and Macedonia), and the Republic of Greece. Following a strict Stalinist doctrine, the PSR of Albania became quite unique in building socialism through self-reliance and isolation. Isolation was exemplified, among others, in the militarisation of the borders, jamming foreign television and radio waves from reaching Albanian households, and more crucially through banning emigration. During the 45 years of communist rule (1945–1990) emigration was considered as an act of high treason against the 'fatherland'. There was a 'shoot-to-kill' policy at the border, and anyone caught trying to escape was punished by lengthy imprisonment (of up to 10 years), while their family was internally exiled. As a result, those who managed to leave formed only but a trickle. Settling mostly in North America and some key European countries, these refugees became prominent actors in the US-led and then backed struggle to overthrow the communist rule in Europe (Dravis, 1992).

Meanwhile, Albanians from Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro were more free – indeed were 'encouraged' and even coerced – to emigrate abroad. They were part of the guest-worker flows to countries such as Germany, Austria and Switzerland, where they later formed significant communities (Haxhikadrija, 2009). Others were forced to leave for Turkey, from where some of them later joined the Turkish guest-workers to these very same destinations (Blumi, 2003). Some emigrated to the USA and Canada, and fewer to Australia, where they joined the larger Albanian communities which were becoming well-established in these countries.

Thus, the Albanian diaspora which was forming abroad was quite diverse in terms of its historical and political background, a feature that was reflected in its political stance

towards the origin-country governments. The government of Albania also recognised these differences and used them in its policy towards the diaspora. Thus, during the communist years, the pre-war emigrants were considered as labour migrants and were accorded recognition along with some benefits such as freer communication with their families in Albania, return visits and so on. Some were even allowed to return to Albania upon retirement, provided their official story about life abroad was one of suffering and exploitation as manual labourers working for merciless capitalists. Such returns benefited the country's coffers as the returnees brought much-needed dollars with them, or received regular pensions from abroad.

In contrast to this group, those who had fled during the communist years – whether for fear of political and religious persecution or because of personal vendettas and blood feuds – were regarded by the state as traitors, often condemned as spies working for intelligence agencies of governments that wanted to overthrow Albania's communist rulers. Article 14 of the 1946 citizenship law specifically referred to these individuals when stipulating cases in which removal of Albanian citizenship could be enacted. These migrants in turn, also built a strong anti-communist resistance, which was especially politically and financially powerful in the USA (Nazi, 2000, p.150; Ragaru, 2002).

Although no studies have focused specifically on the role of diaspora in the fall of communism in Albania, some commentators suggest that this role was quite important in the crucial years of 1989–1991. During this time diaspora money, skills and information helped the first opposition party campaign more effectively during the first multi-party elections, and then eventually retain it in power for some years to come (Vickers, 1995).

The current situation

The rupture that 45 years of communist rule brought to the emigration history and tradition of Albania came to an end in 1990. The movement that subsequently took place was one of the most significant modern global migrations, both in terms of its share of population and typologies.

As communism collapsed, Albania's borders fell with it. Many will remember the old ships impossibly loaded with people sailing from Albania's coast to southern Italy in the spring and summer of 1991; they became the symbol of the so-called global migration crisis (see the cover of Weiner, 1995). Many more walked in droves across the country and over the mountains to reach Greece. Most of these migrations were irregular and of a to-and-fro nature, and thus very difficult to quantify. Table 1 provides a snapshot of

numbers and destination countries compiled from data made available by the Albanian Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities (MOLSAEO) and the Ministry of Interior (MoI), at three key moments of the past two decades.

Table 1. Estimates of Albanians living abroad: 1999, 2005 and 2010

Country	1999	%	2005	%	2010	%
Greece	500,000	67.3	600,000	54.9	750,000	44.0
Italy	200,000	27.0	250,000	22.9	450,000	26.4
US	12,000	1.6	150,000	13.7	400,000	23.5
UK	5,000	0.7	50,000	4.6	50,000	2.9
Germany	12,000	1.6	15,000	1.4	15,000	0.9
Canada	5,000	0.7	11,500	1.0	15,500	0.9
Belgium	2,500	<0.3	5,000	0.5	5,000	0.3
Turkey	2,000	>0.3	5,000	0.5	5,000	0.3
France	2,000	>0.3	2,000	0.2	10,000	0.6
Austria	2,000	>0.3	2,000	0.2	2,500	0.2
Switzerland	1,000	<0.1	1,500	<0.1	1,500	<0.1
Netherlands	n.a.	n.a.	1,000	<0.1	1,000	<0.1
TOTAL	743,500	100	1,093,000	100	1,705,500	100

Sources: 1999: Barjaba (2000); 2005: GoA (2005b, p.36); 2010: NID (2010, pp.7-8)

The table speaks for itself, but I highlight a few important features here. First, connecting this picture to the historical migration we saw earlier, it is clear that geography matters. Both then and now, the earliest settlements and the most important destinations for migrants have been Greece and Italy in that order. It is interesting at this point to consider the relations between the historical and the new diaspora, especially since a break of some centuries exists between the two. A few studies which have looked at this topic have found how the new arrivals have been treated as 'others' by the settled Arbëresh and Arvanites. These two communities have tended to emphasise their roots, but identify more with local belonging (Italian and Greek respectively), at the same time adopting local society's imagery and stereotypes of the new Albanian migrants (for Italy see Derhemi, 2003; and for Greece, Magliveras, 2009).

The second point is that although both of these countries remain important, the USA and the UK have been gaining ground, especially in the second post-communist decade.⁶ The historical diaspora in the USA is boosted by new arrivals, while that in the UK has developed from almost zero, so to speak, having had practically no previous own ethnic community to rely on.

The third remark concerns the total volume of migrants, which by 2005 represents a third of the country's total resident population. Indeed, we see a progressive increase in

numbers of emigrants which almost double between 1999 and 2010, even if we consider a more conservative total for 2010. For example, the corresponding figure from the World Bank data is 1.44 million, equivalent to almost half (45.4 per cent) of Albania's resident population of 3.2 million (World Bank, 2011, p.54). Results of the 2011 census suggest a continuation of this trend, noting an 8 per cent population decrease in the 2001–2011 inter-censal period, due primarily to emigration (INSTAT, 2012).

Besides these variations in destination places, post-1990 migrations also display a strong regional character in terms of migrants' areas of origin (refer back to Figure 1). Once again, geography is very important here. The areas to the west of the country, especially along the Adriatic coast, have been the primary source regions for migrations to Italy. Migrants to Greece come from all over Albania, but there is a clear dominance of those who lived in the south and south-east of the country, bordering Greece (King, 2005). In fact, some migratory flows have taken on a rather regional character, re-establishing transnational ties which had existed before the Cold War. One example is the transnational space created between the area of Korçë, south-east Albania, and that of Greater Thessaloniki, in Northern Greece (Hatziprokopiou, 2006; Vullnetari, 2012).

Similarly, historical ties have been important particularly in the case of migration to the USA, most of which originated then (late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries) and now (post-1990) in southern Albania. Migrations spurred by historical ties have also facilitated recent moves from southern Albania to Australia and Canada.

An additional, but important, factor in the flows to the USA and Canada has been these governments' immigration policies. For instance, between 1990 and 2011 a stock of over 80,000 Albania-born migrants had obtained legal permanent residence in the US.⁷ The majority of them had entered through the annual Diversity Visa Lottery.⁸ In the case of Canada, the most important drive has been the Federal Skilled Worker programme, which has attracted flows of highly skilled in particular. Finally, the importance of policy in acting as a channelling force for migrant flows can be seen also in settlements of Albanians to a few other West European countries, where no prior significant diaspora or historical links existed. Two examples here. The first is the bi-lateral labour agreement with Germany signed in 1991, according to which 1000 Albanians went there to work and train for a year; none of them returned and the agreement was not renewed (GoA, 2005b). The second example comes from the 'embassy migrants' of 1990 who became the nuclei for further chain migration in the years to come.⁹

Coming back to our geography of origin, it is worth noting that the vast majority of those who settled in the UK originate from the north and north-east of Albania. These were also the areas that received the first and overwhelming share of refugees from neighbouring Kosovo during the 1998–2000 war there. As Kosovars used Albania to transit to other asylum destination countries, many Albanians from this area (and some from other parts of the country), mixed themselves in with them (Barjaba and King, 2005). The Albanian diaspora in the UK, is therefore quite heterogeneous, including migrants from all Albanian-inhabited areas in the Balkans (Kostovicova and Prestreshi, 2003).

Institutions and Policies

By the end of the 1990s a joke ran in the local dailies in Albania which went like this: when the minister of labour affairs was asked how he planned to resolve the unemployment crisis in the country, he had replied that the motor boats in Vlorë (used to smuggle migrants across the Adriatic to Italy) were working to full capacity (de Waal, 2005). The joke illustrates the lack of migration policies, or at least of their effectiveness, during the 1990s.

Policymaking on migration in Albania in the last decade has been framed within the wider discourse of EU membership, thus highly influenced by EU bodies (see Dedja 2012). In addition, host-country governments, especially those of Italy and Greece, have played a key role in 'managing' Albanian migration. Some of this influence has been channelled through their development agencies which are an essential part of the so-called 'donor community' in the country, and powerful influencers of inter-governmental organisations such as the IOM.

Institutional framework

At a national level, the key governmental institutions related to migration and diaspora issues are as follows:

- The *Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities (MOLSAEO)*¹⁰ is the authority that develops and coordinates migration policies and the implementation of these and other related legislation. This includes the National Strategy on Migration (NSM) and its accompanying National Action Plan (NAP) on Migration and the NAP on Remittances, following a Council of Ministers Decision.¹¹ It implements its work mainly through the Directorate of Migration,

Return and Reintegration Policies, which has two separate departments on Emigration and Immigration; the latter handles work visas for non-citizens. MOLSAEO is also the authority that negotiates seasonal labour migration agreements with host countries. Other institutions relevant to migration and accountable to the MOLSAEO are the National Employment Services, State Social Services and the Institute of Social Insurance.

- The *Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA)* covers issues of consular services for Albanian citizens abroad, as well as visas for non-citizens through its Directorate of Consular Affairs, which itself is a sub-entity of the General Directorate of International Law and Consular Affairs. It is a key participant in *signing* treaties ratified by Albania, such as the re-admission agreements and associated protocols with the EU. In addition, the MoFA housed the National Institute of Diaspora (NID), which I will elaborate on shortly.

- The *Ministry of Interior (MoI)* handles matters of immigration and asylum through its Citizenship and Refugees Directorate, and of border control through its Border and Migration Department which is part of the General Directorate of State Police. The MoI works closely with the UNHCR, OSCE and IOM, especially regarding asylum seekers and the readmission of Third Country Nationals (TCNs). It is also the authority that *implements* re-admission agreements with other countries. The National Coordinator against Trafficking in Human Beings at this ministry directs and monitors the National Referral Mechanism for Victims of Trafficking and unaccompanied minors. Meanwhile, the Directorate of Local Government and Decentralization is responsible for the registration of the population in the civil registry, including children born abroad of emigrant parents. These registers are in turn used to compile electoral rolls. The MoI together with the MoFA, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Finance and the Office of the President of the Republic have joint jurisdiction over legislation regarding the acquisition and loss of citizenship (Krasniqi, 2010, pp.13–15).

- The *Ministry of Integration* is the authority responsible for monitoring of the progress regarding the requirements Albania needs to meet within the framework

of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU, where migration takes centre stage.

- The *Albanian National Institute of Statistics (INSTAT)* is responsible for collecting and analysing data on emigration through periodic (ten-year) censuses, surveys and population registers.
- A number of other ministries such as the *Ministry of Education and Science*, are involved in separate activities, e.g. in the programme on 'Brain Gain'.

'Brain Gain' Programme Unit

Run between 2006 and 2010, this programme was jointly financed by the Albanian government and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and was attached to the Prime Minister's office. The unit employed three individuals (two men and a woman) operating from the offices of the UNDP. The programme aimed to facilitate the government's efforts to draw back to the country the highly skilled individuals from the diaspora. It believed that it could achieve this through fostering an enabling administrative and legislative climate, as well as offering an incentives' package to potential returnees. Its activities included the creation of a database of highly skilled Albanians abroad; the provision of information and mediation for traineeships and work placements in various Albanian universities, public administration offices, and private companies; and the organisation of relevant conferences. The programme also aimed to facilitate the activities of the NID, specifically related to the highly skilled section of the diaspora. No independent evaluation or monitoring report has been made public to date (if one such exists) in order to ascertain the effectiveness of its million plus dollars budget. The last annual project report available stated that less than 80 individuals had received 'incentive packages' and work placements in Albanian institutions by the end of 2009, and that 450 registered user-profiles were counted on its website database (BGP, 2009). By 2013 the website is non-responsive while a question mark hangs over the programme's legacy and its wider impact.

National Institute for Diaspora

The NID was established in January 1996 as an entity under the Prime Minister's office, but moved to the MoFA in September of that year. While its activity was quite obscure

well until the 2000s, it received a boost when it was specifically included in the National Strategy on Migration. In fact, this proposed the creation of a Migration Agency attached to the Prime Minister's Office, which would be a body to coordinate action amongst the various relevant ministries and other institutions (such as INSTAT). It would have financial autonomy and extensive policymaking powers in the field of migration and diaspora (GoA 2005b, p.88). However, this did not materialise and the NID was reinstated in its place.

The NID was given a special place in the NSM where it was tasked with (GoA, 2005b, pp.36–7):

- mapping the Albanian diaspora abroad, including university students;
- compiling a geographical and demographic atlas of this diaspora;
- promoting contacts and relations between diaspora members and Albania;
- promoting the image of Albania abroad, as well as drawing investment in Albania from the diaspora.

The main activities of the institute so far have been of a rather artistic and cultural character, and seem to have focus overwhelmingly on the historical diaspora. First, there are the visits around the world to meet Albanian individuals and organisations, from Arbëresh in Italy and Arvanites in Greece to historical communities in Croatia, Ukraine and the USA. Second, the institute has also received visits from representatives of Albanian migrant and diaspora organisations, as well as Albanian celebrities living abroad. Third, it has organised, or supported the organisation of, various cultural and artistic events such as concerts, exhibitions, book promotions, television programmes about migrant communities and the diaspora. Fourth, it has distributed symbolic materials to diaspora organisations such as flags, souvenirs and leaflets with information to promote Albania as a business and tourist destination. Fifth, it has organised or supported efforts for the teaching of Albanian language to migrant children abroad. This was also one of the key tasks of the institute according to the NSM. As mentioned earlier, the NID facilitated curricula and Albanian language school texts, as well as other books on Albanian culture and folklore. It also supported joint yearly training seminars of Albanian language teachers of the diaspora. Meanwhile, consular staff of relevant Albanian embassies participated in end-of-school year festivities, organised by migrant NGOs for diaspora children who attend supplementary language and culture schools.

A sixth aim of the NID was to set up five cultural centres in Athens, Rome, New York, London and Toronto, which would serve as mobilisation nodes of the large diaspora/migrant communities in the countries with the largest numbers, as well as act as promoter of Albanian's image abroad. Promoting Albania for diaspora investment has been pursued also through the director's visits abroad, and by encouraging visits of diaspora members and their non-Albanian friends to the country. The target was the historical diaspora, especially in the USA, but also that from Kosovo, Montenegro and Macedonia residing in European countries such as Germany and Switzerland, which are generally considered as possessing established and significant wealth.

Finally, the NID was tasked to organise a World Congress of the Albanian diaspora. In a participative manner, this Congress would ensure sharing of views amongst participants, which would in turn inform the further elaboration of diaspora policies (GoA, 2005a). A group of selected migrant organisations and individuals were invited to attend the two-day meeting organised for the launching of the NSM in February 2005, where a Diaspora Declaration was also adopted (IOM, 2005). However, the initiative was not followed up. Yet, parallel to this and with no involvement of the NID or any other state functionary, a number of diaspora/migrant organisations held what they called the 'First Congress of the Albanian Diaspora', in Rimini, Italy in 2005. The event was hailed as a success by some, but seen as coloured by political affiliations by others (especially from migrants in Greece). The second Congress was held in Tirana in November 2007, but once again no government representatives participated in it.

Between 1996 and 2010 a total of 17 employees had worked for the NID, only two of whom were women (NID, 2010). By 2010 the staff had been reduced to three and then gradually two individuals. The NID ceased to exist at the end of 2012, when a Council of Ministers' Decision announced the establishment of a brand-new National Committee on Diaspora, details of which are yet to emerge.¹² Throughout its life the institute never had the necessary financial and human resource capacity, not to speak of decision-making powers, to become a veritable voice for the diaspora in the government and abroad. It never had a web presence, using email lists and Albanian media outlets for distributing its information bulletins. Its presence within the website of the MoF was also quite obscure.

The decision on the new committee signals increasing importance for the issue of diaspora as linked to populist nationalism. Indeed, 'nationalistic' rhetoric characterised

the political scene of 2012 as the centenary year of Albania's independence and has emerged as a strong rally point in the run-up to the June 2013 parliamentary elections.

Diaspora and migrant organisations

Albania does not have any officially sponsored organisations, but there are hundreds of diaspora and migrant organisations based in destination countries. Generally, they do not receive regular funds from the state, but support is symbolic, e.g. the presence of embassy staff in events organised by these organisations, often to celebrate national Flag Day, the end of year for supplementary language and culture schools and so on. Amongst these various organisations, there are a number which are large, well-organised and sometimes transnational in character. Here follow a number of examples. The first, the *National Albanian-American Council*, is based in the USA and run by Albanian-American members of the historical diaspora, with a mission to 'advocate for Albanians and promote peace and economic development in the Balkans'. It is mainly funded through a three-tier membership fee, but only those who pay the highest tier of \$1,000 have voting rights. The organisation is a splinter grouping of the previously established *Albanian-American Civic League*, run by a former US congressman of Albanian-Arbëresh origin. Membership fees for this organisation are significantly lower and do not exceed \$100.

A different example is *Alb-Shkenca*, which started as an internet forum and was later formally registered as an Institute with its headquarters in Tirana. This is a truly transnational network with a membership spanning countries and continents and its management residing in Europe and North America. Its membership is based on education levels and skills, regardless of place of residence – a candidate is required to be at least enrolled for a Master's degree – and retained through an annual fee. The network organises annual scientific conferences with presentations of members' work across all science disciplines, rotating amongst Tirana, Pristina (Kosovo), and Tetovo (Macedonia). In September 2010 its fifth conference was held in Tirana, under the motto: 'Integration of the Diaspora in the Albanian Science, Economy and Culture'. The institute publishes members' works in its Annals, which it has symbolically called 'ANASH' (in Albanian meaning 'aside'). Besides being an abbreviation, the institute explains the title as signifying the neglect of Albanian politicians towards this 'scientific diaspora', which nonetheless is making every effort to be involved in improving the lives of Albanians wherever they might be (Alb-Shkenca, 2009).

A similar organisation is *AlbStudent* – the International Network of Albanian Student Associations – also transnational in character, but with a slight reliance on its members in Italy. Not surprisingly, as the majority of undergraduate students abroad study in neighbouring Italy, partly because of the lower cost compared to other countries, and partly because the Italian language is widely spoken amongst the young generation in Albania. In fact, a quarter of all foreign students in Italy are Albanians (Chaloff, 2008). *AlbStudent* has initiated a web-based project to map all the Albanian diaspora organisations around the world, although it is unclear when the end-product might be finalised.¹³

The last two organisations have received some government support for programmes related to the 'brain gain' initiative I discussed earlier.

The final examples are large umbrella-like migrant organisations operating in Greece and the UK, which consist of several smaller – generally cultural or literary organisations – and which aim to be 'the voice of the Albanian community'¹⁴ in these countries. In Greece these are: *The Albanian Migrants' League* and *The Federation of Albanian Associations*, each of which is constituted of 25 migrant associations; in the UK *The Forum of Albanian Associations* is an umbrella for 16 smaller organisations.

Policies

During the communist rule, the state theoretically guaranteed its care and protection to *all* Albanian citizens abroad (article 64 of the 1976 Constitution). However, in practice it held a different stance towards those whom it considered labour migrants and those it labelled traitors, as explained earlier.

Migration internally and abroad was officially declared a human right only in 1993; article 22 of Law Nr.7692 guaranteed the right of every Albanian citizen to choose his/her own place of residence and to move freely within the country, as well as to freely leave the country and return (Kuvendi Popullor i RSH, 31.3.1993). These rights were further reinstated in the current Constitution of the Republic of Albania which was approved by parliament and voted in a referendum in 1998 (Kuvendi i RSH, 2003). The Constitution was supplemented by a string of laws and decrees (see Appendix), the most important of which is the law on emigration for employment purposes passed in 2006 (Kuvendi i RSH, 18.12.2006).

The key to all current legislation is freedom of movement within the country's territory and going abroad. The body of legislation is often of a descriptive character

making enforcement a difficult task. Moreover, a number of laws and regulations are in contradiction with each-other, resulting thus not only in lack of clarity but also difficulty in implementation (see several examples in Ikonimi, 2009). In the remainder of this section I discuss the position of the state vis-a-vis a number of aspects important for diaspora and emigration matters.

Citizenship

Unlike previously, the post-1990 legislation on citizenship is quite progressive and addresses a number of concerns from migrants. First, it provides for unconditional dual citizenship thus facilitating the position of those migrants who have acquired the citizenship of their host country, or aim to do so in the future. Second, it makes provisions for reducing statelessness by enabling individuals who have lost Albanian citizenship to re-acquire it (although in practice the process is quite cumbersome). This stipulation was passed to address the needs of Albanians who emigrated in the 1990s before proper legislation was put in place, and who renounced their Albanian citizenship in the hope of acquiring that of the host country, but were unsuccessful in doing so. Third, migrants' children born abroad are able to acquire Albanian citizenship through birth if at least one parent is an Albanian citizen. This can be done also via consular services abroad, although in practice the process is rather costly and bureaucratic. Finally, foreign spouses of migrants who wish to gain Albanian citizenship may do so through acquisition by facilitated naturalisation, subject to meeting relevant requirements, two of which are a marriage of at least three years and continuous legal stay in Albania of at least one year. Overall, citizenship legislation lacks ethno-centric formulations and is gender balanced in relation to citizenship acquisition by spouses and children (for a detailed study see Krasniqi, 2010).

Voting regime for migrants

The legislation ensures equal freedoms and rights for non-resident citizens as for those who reside in the country. This includes the right to vote and be voted in the host country, according to the electoral code and legislation of this host country (Kuvendi i RSH, 18.12.2006). As for the right to vote in Albania migrants can vote in their home district provided they are registered in time in the electoral rolls (Collyer and Vathi, 2007). In practice, however, numerous groups of migrants are disenfranchised as they cannot travel to Albania either because of work and family obligations, geographical distance, ill

health, or irregular status in the host country. Political participation is, nonetheless, considerable from migrants in Greece (although the degree is relative and subject to speculation in the absence of systematic research). It is also here that more intensive political campaigning by candidates takes place. Indeed, branches of the three main political parties – Socialist Party (SP), Democratic Party (DP) and the Socialist Movement for Integration (LSI) – have been created in Greece, and are often used as vehicles for garnering migrants' support during electoral campaigns back home.

The issue of migrant voting has often come up in electoral campaigns in recent years, yet the status quo has been retained. In preparation for the 2009 parliamentary elections, a public debate ensued in Albania the previous year in order to revise the electoral code so as to ensure free and fair elections. Emigrant voting took a prominent place in this debate, not least due to the active role played by G99 – initially a civil movement which developed into a centre-left political party shortly before the elections. G99's staff consists of professionals in their twenties and thirties, trained in top universities abroad and who have returned to work in Albania. The movement mobilised to garner public support for, and pressure relevant authorities to, include external voting in the revision of the electoral code, proposing a special system of direct postal voting by special courier as the best option for the Albanian context.¹⁵ Although two of the major political parties (SP and LSI) half-promised reform during this intense period of debate, especially during their campaigning in Greece, nothing materialised. This was all the more disappointing given that various political actors and civil society members had previously agreed to amend the electoral code to enable distant voting, as part of the actions stipulated in the NAP on Migration (GoA, 2005a, p.86, measure 58, activity 3).

Other policies for emigrants with recognised status

While Albanian migrants have been providing a life-line for their households and the country's economy throughout these post-communist years, it was only recently that their key role in the country's development was recognised (see de Zwager *et al.*, 2005). This acknowledgment was reflected in the first and only National Migration Strategy to date, which specifically linked migration to development. Inaugurated in 2006 with much pomp and ceremony, the strategy was followed by a set of Action Plans on Migration and Remittances, the Law on Emigration for Employment Purposes, the launching of the Brain-Gain programme discussed earlier and other pieces of legislation and programmes to combat irregular migration and facilitate return. The latter was particularly singled out

for intervention in the hope of attracting migrants' financial capital and skills through taxation and financial incentives. For example, according to article 9 of the 2006 law on emigration for employment purposes, returning migrants are exempt from customs duties and taxes on personal items they bring with them upon return, as well as a limited number of work tools. However, in order to benefit from this provision, they must have acquired the status of 'emigrant' and that of 'returnee'. Both of these are obtained by registering in the relevant register held at local employment offices which report to MOLSAEO, and amending their records at this register upon return. Another example is the provision of tax breaks promised by the government in its political programme in 2005. In February 2006 a draft law was proposed according to which returnees who started businesses in Albania could claim tax exemption for the first three to five years (Chaloff, 2008). Furthermore, the campaign included the much-publicised 'Albania: €1' which offered emigrants, the diaspora and foreigners land for only €1, in order to boost investment in poor areas with high unemployment rates (Sulka, 2006). Both initiatives were either watered down or followed by requirements that made them inaccessible for most emigrants; the last of the two in particular because of the sheer threshold of capital investment required – in the millions of euros. As other specialists have observed, having progressive legislation is not enough if adequate implementation does not follow (Ikonomi, 2009).

Regional diaspora and kin-state policies

As mentioned earlier, nearly half of the Albanian population in the Balkans was left outside of Albania's newly-drawn borders by 1913, a territorial outline that was retained pretty much intact at the end of WWII. Significant Albanian populations thus live in present-day Kosovo, south Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia, despite large-scale migration from these areas to North America and Western Europe, as noted earlier. The story of Albanian populations who lived in territories that became part of Greece is somewhat different. A group of them was sent to Turkey as part of the 1923 population exchange between Greece and Turkey given that they were considered Turkish by the Greek administration because of their Muslim religion. Others who remained in Greece, notably the Cham population, were expelled from their homes by the Greek National Army and forced to flee in the aftermath of the Greek civil war. Most ended up in Albania where in 1953 they were given Albanian citizenship as a group, but who would rather return to their homes and reclaim their property and Greek citizenship (Krasniqi, 2010,

pp.8-9). This, together with issues of the Greek minority in Albania and Albanian emigration to Greece, have strained relations between the two countries several times in the past.

The presence of these large Albanian minorities in the near abroad has been a challenge to various Albanian governments and certainly an important influencing factor in the country's foreign policy. Overall it can be said that kin-minority policy takes the form of a 'national responsibility' as reflected in the constitution of Albania.¹⁶ Thus, Article 8(1) states that '[T]he Republic of Albania defends the national rights of Albanians residing outside its state borders'. Such 'responsibility' is expressed principally in terms of maintaining linguistic and cultural ties which is generally the most commonly accepted policy. For example, several places are reserved at Albanian universities each year for ethnic Albanian students of former Yugoslavia, which together with other social and cultural rights amount to quasi-citizenship (Krasniqi, 2010, p.21). Full citizenship is also granted since legislation makes provision for its acquisition through descent, i.e. for individuals of Albanian origin up to the second degree. Demand for Albanian passports has been on the rise especially from Kosovo following the European Union decision to grant Albanian passport-holders visa-free travel to the Schengen area from December 2010. In other cases citizenship has been granted in a symbolic act to recognise the contribution of politicians, artists and sportsmen to a scientific, economic, cultural or national interest for Albania.

The complex way in which kin-state minority policies are interwoven with emigration policies are not always without contradictions. For example, the NID whose task has been to handle matters of the diaspora on behalf of the Albanian state, has worked closely with the Ministries of Education both in Albania and Kosovo in order to prepare 'harmonised' textbooks and curricula for teaching the Albanian language and culture in the diaspora (Greca, 2008). In the same framework joint language and training conferences for teachers of Albanian in the diaspora are organised each year. Indeed, the NID has used a broad definition of 'Albanian diaspora' in its discourse, to include historical communities as well as the more recent migrants, emphasising identity as *Albanians* rather than *of Albania* (see the various Information Bulletins of the NID). This is in contrast to NSM's statement that the state's '[migration] policy on Albanian communities abroad is intended to include migrants of Albanian nationality in host countries and not minorities in the neighbouring countries...' (GoA, 2005b, p.37).

Interesting to note that recent debates among Albanian state and non-state actors in the region seem to display a similar approach to diaspora, as explained next.

Debates on the Role of Emigrants

Throughout the two post-communist decades the focus of the public discourse has understandably been on contemporary migrants. The intensity of migration has meant that most Albanians have either emigrated themselves or have been closely involved in migration networks through their relatives and friends, thus being personally concerned about migrants' welfare and their struggles at home and abroad. In addition, since the mid-2000s there has been increased public awareness and debate related to migrants' socio-economic impact on Albania itself. The focus has been squarely on remittances, which increased year-on-year from a baseline of \$150 million in 1992 reaching their peak at \$1.3 billion in 2007. In the early 1990s remittances covered almost the entire trade deficit and constituted as much as 22% of the country's GDP (Vullnetari, 2012). Following Orozco's (2003, p.3) five T's, besides remittances Albanian migrants are contributors also through their large-scale participation in Tourism, especially during the summer months and in particular those who reside in Greece, Italy and the UK; Transportation, as they travel between host and origin countries during visits and holidays; Telecommunication, as family members separated across countries retain links through phone calls and the internet; and less so in terms of nostalgic Trade related to ethnic foodstuff imports. Following the decline of financial remittances since 2008 it appears that the chance to utilise their developmental potential may have been lost. Some have turned their attention to migrants' social and political contribution instead. Emerging from younger political elites, themselves returnees with high-flying professional careers, such initiatives result from combined public good and personal agendas. Elite migrants such as students and professionals are co-opted into existing political structures 'at home', giving renewed energy to tired agendas and a lease of life to older figures, while also deflecting any overarching image of the diaspora as a potential arena for dissent. In turn, returnees benefit from career opportunities perhaps not available to them elsewhere. Others opt for autonomous initiatives yet within overall existing frameworks. It is within such interpretation that I see both the 'external voting' debate discussed earlier and the 'integrated diaspora' that I come to next. The former was aimed to directly engage everyday migrants in the political process by asking them to cast their vote during elections, as well as lobby for migrants' representatives in parliament, thus effectuating

their position as Albania's 'shareholders' deserving to part-take in power (Totozani, 2008).

The latter concept of an integrated diaspora is developed within a discourse that seeks to integrate all Albanian-inhabited areas in the Balkans into what is labelled as an Albanian space or 'Albanosphere'.¹⁷ The diaspora is seen as a platform that can facilitate such integration considering its self-identification abroad as 'belonging to the Albanian ethno-cultural nation, which encompasses persons with different citizenships living in different states' (Pichler, 2009: 215). A vision for joint structures and institutions amongst the different states recognises the need to move the debate from the management of migratory flows to the management of diaspora's capitals – financial, human and socio-cultural. While diaspora's developmental potential is recognised, with the new elite succeed where the old one failed?

Conclusion

This chapter has mapped and discussed the Albanian diaspora, by focusing on the role of the state and its political elite in promoting and instrumentalising the country's global diaspora. One of the key conclusions is that Albanian diaspora is very diverse in terms of its historical background, its geographical roots, and not least its involvement with Albania itself. This heterogeneity is in turn recognised and instrumentalised by Albanian governments to serve political goals. For example, the anti-communist layer of diaspora was demonised as anti-national by the communist rulers. Yet, it was soon considered as a platform of dissent and financial muscle by those who ascended to power once the regime fell. Moreover, the Albanian diaspora is also an ethno-cultural one, relating more to this ethnicity than its origin state. This makes the concept of an integrated diaspora, as a platform shared amongst these states, even more feasible.

Although the political programmes of various post-1990 Albanian governments have proposed policies to defend migrants' rights abroad, negotiate their regularisation and strengthen consular services, these have been tainted by a less than inspiring record in practice (ACPS, 2002, p.10). In reality, migrants have been generally treated with institutionalised contempt, although their emigration helped ease off the pressure from unemployment, and balance the distorted trade deficit through remittances. The debate around external voting for emigrants has brought to light some fundamental views about the role of migrants in the country's development and society more generally. While some consider them as 'shareholders without voting power', others contest that decisions they

influence through their vote do not affect them personally as residents abroad. The jury on this is still out. The silent consensus amongst the old political class in Albania is to impede migrants' voting as much as possible, considering their vote would seriously punish the kleptocratic and inefficient system which has been governing Albania for the last decades. Yet, in a game of power and self-preservation the old and new elites interact and cooperate, bringing about increased awareness and action in the process. The hopes are pinned on the new elite, although the future will tell of their success. For the slow and painful EU membership process is showing that not many want Albania in this state, even for €1!

Notes

1. The Arbëresh live in 49 towns and villages, dispersed among seven regions and nine provinces extending from the Abruzzi Apennines to the South of Italy and to Sicily, situated mainly in mountainous or semi-mountainous areas; around 200,000 Arbëresh are thought to be living in this area (Bartl, 2011; Hall, 1994, p.50; Tirta, 1999, p.141). For an in-depth study of one of these 'Albanian' towns, Piana degli Albanesi in Sicily, see Derhemi (2003).
2. However, the boundaries between 'forced' and 'voluntary or labour' migration become blurred when one considers the grinding poverty, famine, health epidemics, exploitation and misery in which most Albanians, especially peasants, lived in their areas of origin. Migration within the Ottoman Empire – as nowadays within the territory of the European Union – blurs another boundary, that between internal and international migration.
3. At least 30 Grand Viziers (prime ministers) were of Albanian origin, ruling in different corners of the Empire. Mehmet Ali Pasha, the founder of modern Egypt, ruled as governor of Egypt for almost half a century. His dynasty came to a close with the abdication of King Farouk I in 1952, who was reportedly of Albanian ancestry (Hall, 1994, p.49; Logoreci, 1977, p.34).
4. These statistics include Albanian refugees from Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, as well as Florina, Kastoria, Chameria and other Albanian-inhabited territories which became part of Greece.
5. Tirta (1999, p.140) estimates that Romania was home to about 20,000 Albanians in 1920, Egypt to about 10,000 towards the same time, whereas the numbers for the other countries are only a few thousands.

Accepted Manuscript (AM) of Vullnetari, J. (2013) 'Albania: €1' or the story of 'big policies, small outcomes': How Albania constructs and engages its diaspora. In Collyer, M. (ed.) *Emigration Nations: Policies and Ideologies of Emigrant Engagement*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 25-49 [accepted February 2013; published September 2013].

6. It is not clear, however, if the figure for the USA includes all waves of migrants, i.e. historical, new and second and third generation Albanian migrants, or just the post-1990 ones. The figure for the UK is most likely an estimate as there are no specific studies that have made a systematic collection of the existing statistical data. Furthermore, both figures most likely include Albanians from Albania, Kosovo, Montenegro and Macedonia.

7. My calculation of data by country of birth. Data sources: US Census Bureau; from: www.census.gov. US Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics; from: www.dhs.gov/files/statistics/data; [both last accessed: February 2013].

8. Known in Albanian parlance as the US Lottery, this programme run by the US government gives out 55,000 green cards every year for citizens of countries with low emigration rates in America. The first selection takes place in a lottery-like manner, whereby applicants' names are randomly picked by a computerised system. Qualification for an immigration visa in the second stage, however, is only possible for individuals who possess a minimum level of 12 years of schooling or the equivalent of work experience. The programme enables family members of the principal applicant (spouse and children), to emigrate together.

9. In July 1990 around 5,000 Albanians stormed the walls of Western countries' embassies in Tirana and requested asylum there. This is considered as the first act of mass defiance against the totalitarian isolation. The Albanian government threatened siege, but eventually relented and the refugees were transferred to the respective countries. Most went to Germany, France and Italy. Albania had no diplomatic relations with the US and the UK at the time.

10. Its role as the principal high-level administrative entity related to emigration matters over the years, is reflected to some degree also in its name. From 1991 until 1996, the versions of the ministry's name carried the word 'Emigration' in it: Ministry of Labour and Emigration in 1991; Ministry of Labour, Emigration, Social Assistance and Former Political Prisoners in 1992–1996; Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs in 1997–2005; MOLSAEO since 2005.

11. Decision no. 425, date 11.7.2007.

12. Personal communication with Mr Ylli Polovina, one of the last NID staff, January 2013.

13. By 2013 the web was non-responsive and there was only a Facebook presence of the network.

Accepted Manuscript (AM) of Vullnetari, J. (2013) 'Albania: €1' or the story of 'big policies, small outcomes': How Albania constructs and engages its diaspora. In Collyer, M. (ed.) *Emigration Nations: Policies and Ideologies of Emigrant Engagement*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 25-49 [accepted February 2013; published September 2013].

14. A notion generally contested within the wider migrant organisations and by individual immigrants.

15. Several policy briefs and platforms were available on G99's website, accessed: 25 June 2010, but non-responsive by 2013; www.g99.org/index2.php?pg=details&id=30&nid. See especially G99 (2008) and Totozani (2008).

16. However, as Krasniqi (2010) notes, in recent years Tirana has lost somewhat its position as the hub of the 'Albanian space' in the Balkans, with the emergence of Pristina as a powerful player.

17. Funded by western donors, the 'Forum of Albanosphere' is perhaps partly an attempt to allay neighbours' fears resulting from nationalistic pre-electoral rhetoric espoused by key senior political players in Albania, including the premiere Berisha himself.

References

ACPS (2002) *An Annotated Compendium Relating to the Albanian Legislation, State Structure, and Policy on Emigration Since 1990* (Tirana: Albanian Centre for Parliamentary Studies).

Alb-Shkenca (2009) Alb-Shkenca 2010: Towards new challenges, *ANASH (Annals of Alb-Shkenca)*, 4(6) [in Albanian].

K. Barjaba (2000) 'Contemporary patterns in Albanian emigration', *South-East Europe Review*, 3(2), 57-64.

K. Barjaba and R. King (2005) 'Introducing and theorising Albanian migration', in R. King, N. Mai and S. Schwandner-Sievers (eds) *The New Albanian Migration* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press), pp. 1-28.

P. Bartl (2011) 'Albanian settlers in Italy since the early modern period', in K.J. Bade, P.C. Emmer, L. Lucassen and J. Oltmer (eds.) *The Encyclopaedia of Migration and Minorities in Europe: From the 17th Century to the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 220-21.

BGP (2009) Annual programme/project report 2009. From: www.undp.org.al/index.php?page=projects/project&id=101; (last accessed: February 2013).

I. Blumi (2003) 'Defining social spaces by way of deletion: The untold story of Albanian migration in the postwar period', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 29(6), 949-65.

Accepted Manuscript (AM) of Vullnetari, J. (2013) 'Albania: €1' or the story of 'big policies, small outcomes': How Albania constructs and engages its diaspora. In Collyer, M. (ed.) *Emigration Nations: Policies and Ideologies of Emigrant Engagement*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 25-49 [accepted February 2013; published September 2013].

G. Carletto, B. Davis, M. Stampini and A. Zezza (2006) 'A country on the move: International migration in post-communist Albania', *International Migration Review*, 40(4), 767–85.

J. Chaloff (2008) *Albania and Italy Migration Policies and their Development Relevance: A Survey of Innovative and 'Development-Friendly' Practices in Albania and Italy*, Working Paper 51 (Rome: CeSPI)

M. Collyer and Z. Vathi (2007) *Patterns of Extra-Territorial Voting*, Working Paper T22 (Brighton: University of Sussex Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty).

G. de Rapper (2000) *Les Albanais à Istanbul*, les dossiers de l'IFEA, n° 3 (Istanbul: Institut Français d'Études Anatoliennes).

C. de Waal (2005) *Albania Today: A Portrait of Post-Communist Turbulence* (London: I.B.Tauris).

N. de Zwager, I. Gedeshi, E. Germenji and C. Nikas (2005) *Competing for Remittances* (Tirana: IOM Tirana).

S. Dedja (2012) 'The working of EU conditionality in the area of migration policy: The case of readmission of irregular migrants to Albania', *East European Politics and Societies*, 26(11), 115–34.

E. Derhemi (2003) 'New Albanian immigrants in the old Albanian diaspora: Piana degli Albanesi', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 29(6), 1015–32.

M. W. Dravis (1992) 'Storming fortress Albania: American covert operations in microcosm, 1949–54', *Intelligence and National Security*, 7(4), 425–42.

Federal Writers' Project (1939) *The Albanian Struggle in the Old World and New* (New York: AMS Press).

G99 (2008) G99's alternative to enable external voting [in Albanian]. From: www.g99.org/index2.php?pg=details&id=25&nid; [last accessed: 16 July 2010].

GoA (2005a) *National Action Plan on Migration* (Tirana: Government of Albania (GoA) and IOM).

GoA (2005b) *National Strategy on Migration* (Tirana: Government of Albania (GoA) and IOM).

D. Greca (2008) The nation is proud of the Albanian diaspora in America, interview with Mr Flamur Gashi, director of the NID, *Illyria*. 16/12/2008 [in Albanian].

D. Hall (1994) *Albania and the Albanians* (London: Pinter).

Accepted Manuscript (AM) of Vullnetari, J. (2013) 'Albania: €1' or the story of 'big policies, small outcomes': How Albania constructs and engages its diaspora. In Collyer, M. (ed.) *Emigration Nations: Policies and Ideologies of Emigrant Engagement*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 25-49 [accepted February 2013; published September 2013].

P. Hatziprokopiou (2006) *Globalisation, Migration and Socio-Economic Change in Contemporary Greece: Processes of Social Incorporation of Balkan Immigrants in Thessaloniki* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press).

A. Haxhikadrija (2009) *Diaspora as a Driving Force for Development in Kosovo: Myth or Reality?* (Gjakovë: Forum for Democratic Initiatives).

L. Ikonomi (2009) *Migration Law: A Training Manual* (Tirana: IOM) [in Albanian].

INSTAT (2012) *Population and Housing Census in Albania 2011: Main Results* (Tirana: Instituti i Statistikës).

IOM (2005) Declaration for the mobilisation of the Albanian diaspora (Tirana: The Government of Albania in collaboration with IOM) [in Albanian].

R. King (2005) 'Albania as a laboratory for the study of migration and development', *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*, 7(2), 133–56.

R. King and J. Vullnetari (2003) *Migration and Development in Albania*, Working Paper C5 (Brighton: University of Sussex, Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty).

D. Kostovicova and A. Prestreshi (2003) 'Education, gender and religion: Identity transformations among Kosovo Albanians in London', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 29(6), 1079–96.

G. Krasniqi (2010) *Citizenship in an emigrant nation-state: The case of Albania*. CITSEE (The Europeanisation of Citizenship in the Successor States of the Former Yugoslavia) Working Paper 13. Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh, School of Law.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1914412>.

Kuvendi i RSH (18.12.2006) On the Migration of Albanian Citizens for Labour Purposes, Law nr. 9668 (Tirana: Qendra e Publikimeve Zyrtare) [in Albanian].

Kuvendi i RSH (2003) Constitution of the Republic of Albania, Official Gazette nr. 26 (Tirana: Qendra e Publikimeve Zyrtare) [in Albanian].

Kuvendi Popullor i RSH (31.3.1993) Amendment to Law Nr. 7491, date 29.4.1991 'On the main constitutional dispositions', Law nr.7692 (Tirana: Qendra e Publikimeve Zyrtare) [in Albanian].

A. Logoreci (1977) *The Albanians. Europe's Forgotten Survivors* (London: Victor Gollancz).

S. Magliveras (2009) *The Ontology of Difference: Nationalism, Localism and Ethnicity in a Greek Arvanite Village*, PhD in Anthropology (Durham: University of Durham).

Accepted Manuscript (AM) of Vullnetari, J. (2013) 'Albania: €1' or the story of 'big policies, small outcomes': How Albania constructs and engages its diaspora. In Collyer, M. (ed.) *Emigration Nations: Policies and Ideologies of Emigrant Engagement*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 25-49 [accepted February 2013; published September 2013].

J. Myres, H. S. Winterbotham and F. Longland (1945) *Albania* (Oxford: University Press, for the UK Naval Intelligence Division).

F. Nazi (2000) 'Balkan diaspora I: The Albanian-American community', in J. B. William, (ed.) *Kosovo: Contending Voices on Balkan Interventions* (Grand Rapids, MI and Cambridge: William, B. Eerdemans Publishing Company), pp. 132–35.

NID (2010) The activity of NID during 1996–2010 (Tirana: National Institute of Diaspora, Albanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs) [in Albanian].

M. Orozco (2003) *The Impact of Migration in the Caribbean and Central American Region*, FOCAL Policy Paper (FPP–03–03) (Ottawa: Canadian Foundation For the Americas).

R. Pichler (2009) 'Migration, architecture and the imagination of home(land): An Albanian-Macedonian case study', in U. Brunnbauer (ed.) *Transnational Societies, Transterritorial Politics: Migrations in the (Post-) Yugoslav Region 19th – 20th Century* (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag), pp. 213–35.

S. Pollo and A. Puto (1981) *The History of Albania: From its Origins to the Present Day* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul).

C. A. Price (1963) *Southern Europeans in Australia* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press).

I. Psimmenos and S. Georgoulas (2001) 'Migration pathways: A historic, demographic and policy review of the Greek case', in A. Triandafyllidou (ed.) *Migration Pathways: A Historic, Demographic and Policy Review of Four European Countries*, IAPASIS Project Report (Brussels: European Commission), pp. 38–62.

N. Ragaru (2002) The Albanian-American community in the United States: The story of a Diaspora. Paper presented to the conference on 'Albanian Migration and New Transnationalisms', University of Sussex, Brighton, UK, September 2002.

K. Sulka (2006) *Statement by Deputy Minister of MOLSAEO at the High Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development, held 14–15 September 2006, New York*.

M. Tirta (1999) Internal and international migration of Albanians: 1840s–1940s, *Etnografia Shqiptare*, 18 [in Albanian].

I. Totozani (2008) Emigrants, shareholders without power. From: www.g99.org/blog/?p=5; [last accessed: 16 July 2010] [in Albanian].

UNDP-Albania (2000) *Albanian Human Development Report 2000* (Tirana: UNDP Albania).

M. Vickers (1995) *The Albanians: A Modern History* (London: I.B. Tauris).

Accepted Manuscript (AM) of Vullnetari, J. (2013) 'Albania: €1' or the story of 'big policies, small outcomes': How Albania constructs and engages its diaspora. In Collyer, M. (ed.) *Emigration Nations: Policies and Ideologies of Emigrant Engagement*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 25-49 [accepted February 2013; published September 2013].

J. Vullnetari (2012) *Albania on the Move: Links between Internal and International Migration* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press).

M. Weiner (1995) *The Global Migration Crisis* (New York: Harper Collins).

World Bank (2011) *Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011* (Washington DC: World Bank).

World Bank (2007) *Albania Urban Growth, Migration and Poverty Reduction: A Poverty Assessment*. World Bank Working Paper no. 40071-AL, Washington, DC.