Kritikerdämmerung: Heinrich Schenker and Music Journalism

by

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Thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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Despite the steady amount of research that has gone into the life and mind of Viennese music theorist Heinrich Schenker (1868-1935) in recent decades, certain facets of his thinking continue to puzzle scholars. These include the question of how a thinker nowadays highly regarded for his considerable powers of insight into the music of Bach, Mozart, and Beethoven came to hold views that were bigoted, odious, and militantly German-nationalist. This thesis confronts the issue by recapturing Schenker’s hitherto uncharted engagement with one of the phenomena of modern life that he vocally rejected: music journalism. Although a profession that is today considered as duly coexisting with the musical academy that Schenker’s analytical practice helped to shape, he was far less tolerant of what was written about music in the only mass medium of its day.

This study offers a close reading of a variety of archival sources that include an unpublished essay on music criticism by the theorist as well as his diary and correspondence, most of which is newly accessible through Schenker Documents Online. In order to situate his thinking within the cultural hothouse of his day, my research also draws on a selection of newspaper articles, mostly on the subject of criticism, that Schenker deemed significant enough to file with his own papers.

As a result of this procedure, this study establishes Schenker’s trepidations about music journalism and assesses their context. It reveals his critical view of journalism as a manifestation of individualism and democracy escalating alongside the rapid social and artistic transformations that he witnessed after the turn of the twentieth century. It also illustrates his increasingly agitated perception of music journalism as directly damaging his career. Finally, this thesis demonstrates how, in the course of the 1910s, Schenker came to conflate his antagonism towards one particular journalist, German critic Paul Bekker, with his embrace of German nationalism. By engaging not only with Schenker’s writings but also his reading materials, this study locates his thinking within that of his contemporaries and, as a result, helps us make sense of some of his often opaque assertions about art, society, and criticism.
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DECLARATION OF AUTHORSHIP

I, Georg Burgstaller, declare that this thesis and the work presented in it are my own and has been generated by me as the result of my own original research.

Title of thesis: ‘Kritikerdämmerung: Heinrich Schenker and Music Journalism’

I confirm that:

1. This work was done wholly or mainly while in candidature for a research degree at this University;

2. Where any part of this thesis has previously been submitted for a degree or any other qualification at this University or any other institution, this has been clearly stated;

3. Where I have consulted the published work of others, this is always clearly attributed;

4. Where I have quoted from the work of others, the source is always given. With the exception of such quotations, this thesis is entirely my own work;

5. I have acknowledged all main sources of help;

6. Where the thesis is based on work done by myself jointly with others, I have made clear exactly what was done by others and what I have contributed myself;

7. Either none of this work has been published before submission, or parts of this work have been published as: n/a

Signed:

Date: 13 September 2014
I would like to thank my supervisor Dr. Andrea Reiter for her generous encouragement, support, and discernment, as well as my advisor Prof. William Drabkin for his guidance and advice on translating my primary sources into English. I would also like to acknowledge the input of the other members of the Schenker Documents Online research team, Prof. Ian Bent, Dr. David Bretherton, and Kirstie Hewlett, as well as the help of Bob Kosovsky at the New York Public Library for the Performing Arts, Music Division, and Sara Allison at University of California at Riverside Special Collections & Archives. I am grateful to Prof. Nicholas Cook and Prof. Neil Gregor for their advice and would like to thank Michael Wynne for reading the final draft. Attached to the Schenker Documents Online research project, this study has been funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council.
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<table>
<thead>
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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>ANNO</td>
<td><em>Austrian Newspapers Online</em>, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek (ANNO). Referenced by ANNO, author, title, publication, and date.</td>
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<tr>
<td>DLA</td>
<td>Cotta-Archiv, Schiller Nationalmuseum/Deutsches Literaturarchiv, Marbach. Referenced by DLA item number.</td>
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<tr>
<td>OC</td>
<td>The Oster Collection, Music Division, The New York Public Library for the Performing Arts. Referenced by OC file/item number.</td>
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<td>OJ</td>
<td>Oswald Jonas Memorial Collection, Special Collections, University of California, Riverside Libraries. Referenced by OJ box/item number.</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDO</td>
<td><em>Schenker Documents Online</em>. Referenced by SDO, source, document identifier, date, transcriber, and translator.</td>
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<tr>
<td>WSLB</td>
<td>Wiener Stadt- und Landesbibliothek, Vienna. Referenced by WSLB item number.</td>
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A NOTE ON TRANSLATIONS AND IMPORTS FROM SDO

Where possible I have sought out published English translations of the German literature quoted. Most of the primary sources presented in this thesis have not previously been translated into English, and the renderings of it are my own. In these instances the original German text is included in the footnote, with the exception of those sources for which I provide a side-by-side transcription and translation in the Appendix. In the latter case, I give reference to the page number of the Appendix on which the German text can be found. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations are my own.

*Schenker Documents Online* is a critical edition that seeks to present documents as faithfully as is possible within a digital environment: the German text is presented as close to a diplomatic transcription as achievable, resulting in a plethora of orthographical idiosyncrasies that are mirrored in the English translations provided. Although features such as deleted words and phrases, corrections, and interlinear and inline additions are deemed by the contributing scholars to grant insight into the thought processes involved in the creation of the documents, I do not consider the emendations to the documents that I quote as significant enough to warrant their inclusion. Although I have omitted deleted (crossed-out) words and assimilated corrections and additions, the quotations are otherwise faithful to the texts and orthographical conventions favoured on *SDO*, and have not been brought in line with my own.
INTRODUCTION

The present study is attached to Schenker Documents Online, an AHRC-funded project that seeks to add to our understanding of the life and mind of Heinrich Schenker (1868-1935), widely regarded as one of the most influential music theorists of the twentieth century.¹ A relatively obscure figure outside the realm of music theory, his achievements in the field of analysing eighteenth- and nineteenth-century music have been compared with those of eminent thinkers of his age in other areas, such as his Viennese compatriot Sigmund Freud in psychology, and Ferdinand de Saussure in linguistics. Articulated through a series of theoretical treatises, monographs, and journals, Schenker’s theory has been associated with the structuralist approaches of a variety of early twentieth-century thinkers, including that of French sociologist Émile Durkheim, the Russian Formalists of the Moscow and St Petersburg Schools, the Gestalt movement, and the New Vienna School of art history around Hans Sedlmayr and Otto Pächt.² In the second half of the twentieth century, American musicologists – predominantly Schenker’s émigré students – established ‘Schenkerian analysis’ as the prime vehicle for the ‘scientific’ study of tonal music,³ a status that it has largely retained in American and, to a lesser degree, British music academia to this day.

Schenker Documents Online seeks to complement the relatively sparse literature on Schenker the historical figure by making available sources that have so far been difficult to access for scholars, namely the majority of his diary entries and correspondence, as well as his lesson books. By stimulating biographical, historical, and socio-cultural study of the theorist, the project seeks to ‘foster a fuller understanding of his career, works, and the intellectual

³ Korsyn 2009, 153.
development that they represent’. I was from the outset motivated to exploit this cache of newly accessible sources, with the view to restore some as yet underexplored cultural context within which Schenker operated and developed his theory. The methodological challenges arising from the overabundance of data had a significant impact on the very nature of this study, and its conceptualisation therefore warrants a brief outline.

As a starting point for surveying relevant ‘cultural’ themes, my advisor suggested primary sources that may be described as peripheral: Schenker’s bulky collection of hundreds of newspaper clippings dating predominantly from the 1920s and 30s. The idea that discovering what Schenker read about in the press may provide a key to viewing his ideas in the broader cultural milieu of his day had in fact already been cautiously suggested by one of the archivists of Schenker’s papers. However, confronted with an array of clippings on multifarious subjects, this idea seemed less feasible. The sheer breadth and diversity of items, which include articles on topics ranging from Martin Buber’s translation of the Hebrew Bible to Einstein’s field theory, serialised essays by Stefan Zweig and Sigmund Freud, and reviews of modern operas, theatre pieces, and Charlie Chaplin films, may come as little surprise to those familiar with Schenker the thinker. German conductor Wilhelm Furtwängler, his nowadays best-known personal acquaintance, described the theorist as ‘a person who not only took an active interest in everything possible, but [...] one who knew personal, productive answers to a thousand questions which on the surface had nothing to do with music theory.’ Schenker’s wide-ranging interests transpire not only in his diary and correspondence with his friends, publishers, and other acquaintances, but also in his music-theoretical publications of the 1920s and 1930s, often in the form of appended aphorisms and maxims. However, even if Schenker’s musings could be matched with what he had read in the newspapers – and they often can be – the brevity of his manifold comments and what has been described as their ‘scattergun-style’ deployment

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5 Kosovsky 1999, p. 5.
6 Ibid., p. 10.
seem to resist any meaningful conclusions beyond the fact that he was an outspoken observer of the turbulent times that he lived in.⁷

Concealed halfway through the clippings, a seemingly misplaced folder interrupts the broadly chronological order of the rest of the collection: it contains newspaper clippings dating from between circa 1906 and 1913, on a single subject: criticism. More significantly, it includes a polemical draft essay on the topic of music criticism by Schenker, titled ‘Kunst und Kritik’ (‘Art and Criticism’) and written in 1911. Although the existence of this essay has been known for almost thirty years,⁸ the document itself had remained undiscovered. It quickly occurred to me that based on these sources, journalism itself – as reflected in Schenker’s views on it – could become the cultural context that I was in pursuit of. Music journalism is an area that Schenker is not particularly associated with nowadays; it is known that he wrote for newspapers in his early career and that he entertained contacts with some journalists during that period, including one of the most famous music critics to date, Eduard Hanslick. After 1900 Schenker gave up journalism to devote himself to what he is today best known for, his theoretical and analytical work, along with editing music. Broadly speaking, this is where modern association between Schenker and journalism generally ends, yet his 1911 essay on criticism as well as other as yet unexplored sources in his archive would suggest that he had not quite relinquished the profession. As a group, these sources provide us with an opportunity to map out a new narrative of Schenker’s thinking on music, society, and politics after 1900.

What developed from my initial survey of sources was a more pronounced sense that Schenker’s reading materials, particularly – and, given Schenker’s outspoken rejection of journalism,⁹ paradoxically – those published in newspapers, could yield an insight into how he responded to the ideas of his contemporaries. Another remnant of my initial brief of exploring the socio-cultural (as opposed to the music-theoretical) context of his activities manifested itself in my interest in music criticism as a medium that serves as a conduit for studying cultural mentalities rather than music. The clearest endorsement for this is the fact that Schenker’s own writings on the profession reveal concerns

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⁷ Cook 2007, p. 254.
that can be almost detached from music altogether. These include his view of journalism as a fundamentally democratic – even left-wing – manifestation, and the jaded critical reception of his own work. Schenker’s integration of these extra-musical considerations into his discourse about music could be described as irrational: although he is likely to have conceived them as an organic component of his arguments, they are not intrinsic to the works of art in question, and neither is what might be termed as Schenker’s ‘civilised hate’ in his attacks against other writers.\(^\text{10}\) His deliberations do, however, aid our understanding of the times in which he lived. Schenker was not alone amongst his contemporaries to act in a way that the modern-day reader might find irrational. The rapid stylistic changes in post-Romantic Western art music reached a crisis point in the early decades of the twentieth century,\(^\text{11}\) and eroded perceptions and assumptions of what function music should inhabit in society, and, as a result, stimulated debates about how music should best be analysed, described, criticised. These artistic transformations were – and still are – perceived as a reflection on wider issues of social and political disintegration.\(^\text{12}\) Not surprisingly, public debates about how to write about music (including that of the past) and, more specifically, debates about music journalism took on the vehemence of political resolve.

Writing about music, in whatever form, was embedded within larger ideological currents that had attached themselves to specific genres and composers whose music was considered either modernist or normative, particularly, in the latter case, that of the Viennese classical composers, especially Beethoven. At the same time, the work of Schenker – along with that of other prominent writers on music of the period such as Hanslick and the music historian Guido Adler – represents a significant development in the history of musicology and music theory, given the immense influence it exercised on modern conceptions of the field. Both these developments, which have already received a certain amount of scholarly attention particularly in recent years,\(^\text{13}\)

\(^{10}\) Keller 1987, p. 91.
\(^{11}\) Stuckenschmidt 1952, 203.
\(^{12}\) Schorske 1981, pp. 3-5.
constitute an important background to my study. What I am focussing on, however, has been far less explored. It encompasses Schenker’s often conflated views of the role of music criticism as a symptom of spiralling cultural decline, its impact on his career, as well as the catalyst for his own condescending assessment of his peers, his urge to criticize, to ‘loathe, hate, reject’.\(^{14}\) Music journalism was omnipresent in Schenker’s adult life; after giving up writing for newspapers he retained a keen interest in what his contemporaries published in the broadsheets. Even so, the height of his engagement with it on a theoretical and polemical level can be chronologically delimited to the period between shortly after 1900 and the tumultuous aftermath of the First World War. Although I will consider sources from outside this period, my research is centred on these two decades.

My thesis derives its title, *Kritikerdämmerung* (Twilight of the Critic(s)), from the concluding part of Hans Keller’s posthumously published monograph *Criticism* (1987). Keller was an Austrian-born émigré critic and broadcaster who commented prominently on musical life in Britain throughout much of the second half of the twentieth century. A characteristically mercurial jest, Keller perhaps chose the appellation *Kritikerdämmerung* with the knowledge that the book would be his last. The term itself is a play on the title of Wagner’s music drama *Götterdämmerung*, the final part of his tetralogy *Der Ring des Nibelungen*. It is likely that Schenker, himself prone to rather portentous neologisms such as ‘Meisterdämmerung’ and even ‘Wagnerdämmerung’,\(^{15}\) would have appreciated Keller’s allusion to the critics’ god-like sway over public opinion. Yet he came to share Keller’s fatalistic recognition of criticism as ‘sociologically inevitable without being artistically necessary’ only relatively late in his career.\(^{16}\) During the 1910s, a decade of turmoil that might be described as Schenker’s *Sturm und Drang* period, his crusade against music journalists was incited by an altogether more Machiavellian vision of the ‘Twilight of the Critics’:

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\(^{14}\) Keller 1987, p. 90.
\(^{16}\) Keller 1987, p. 162.
By undermining the great artist and, consequently, great art with the force of a devastating plague, [the critics] saw off the branch on which they themselves are sitting and thereby destroy the source from which they and their ilk could nourish themselves with such little effort. The day will dawn on which there will be no more art and no more artists, and they will have to reach for another trade or branch of employment, which, however, will yield less glory and honour!17

The chapters of my thesis represent three distinct ways of shedding light on the same composite of problems that arises from this quite representative quote: why did Schenker reject music journalism, how did he form his opinions, and in what ways did he respond to it in his writings? Chapter 3 will consider Schenker’s rejection of journalism as part of his wider views on society as documented in ‘Kunst und Kritik’ and other documents from around 1910. In Chapter 4 I will reflect on two contemporaneous historical developments taking place during the years in which Schenker formed his theory of criticism, namely the critical reception of his early works and the emerging wider public debate about journalism. Finally, in chapter 5, I will examine Schenker’s preoccupation with one particular writer that he deemed his ‘opponent’,18 German music critic Paul Bekker, with a view to demonstrate how he came to internalise the pandemonium of the First World War by consolidating his theory of music with his increasingly radical German nationalism. All three chapters share a similar methodological approach: a close reading of hitherto mostly unexplored writings by Schenker alongside that of a selection of newspaper articles that he read during that period. By doing so I aim to establish how, despite his antagonism towards ‘scribblers’,19 he developed his ideas by engaging with those of his contemporaries, some of whom did not write about music at all. My approach inevitably yields a fragmentary picture of this process: it favours items retained in the archive over those Schenker may have read but did not wish to keep, as well as those that he disposed of later in his life. Nevertheless, the remaining sources do shed light on his creative process, and help recover a part of his experience of life in early twentieth-century Vienna. Some of the ‘noise of the

17 ‘Kunst und Kritik’, C/411; see Appendix, pp. 264-5.
18 Schenker 1915, p. 29.
world’, as he referred to the public debates that surrounded him, may be considered relatively mundane and ephemeral, yet its manifestation in newspaper print does amount to a significant piece of historical evidence, as the shrill counterpoint of Schenker’s own polemics documents.

CHAPTER 1

Context

Historical Context

Vienna between the years of the foundation of the Austrian-Hungarian empire in 1867 and the Anschluss in 1938, i.e. roughly Schenker’s lifetime, has received an extraordinary amount of scholarly attention. Considered a cultural backwater during the mid-twentieth century, it has, by the end of that century, become ‘talked about as if everything we do and think somehow originated in that one city’.¹ The fascination that Vienna has exerted on the Western world encompasses, according to Hans Keller, 'all emotional and intellectual levels – Johann Strauss’s as well as Arnold Schoenberg’s, the Schnitze’s as well as Arthur Schnitzler’s'.² The modernist achievements by Viennese or Vienna-based artists and writers include the architecture of Otto Wagner, Josef Hoffmann, and Adolf Loos; Sigmund Freud’s and Arthur Schnitzler’s divergent but contemporaneous explorations of sexuality, the psyche, and society; Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophical theories; the secessionists’ departure from traditional art; the novels of Robert Musil, and – perhaps less ‘modernist’ but no less of its time – Stefan Zweig's and Joseph Roth’s prose, to name but a few. In music, modern perceptions of fin-de-siècle Vienna are often dominated by Gustav Mahler’s variably visionary and fraught symphonies and the musical expressionism and dissolution of tonality implemented by the composers of the Second Viennese School. In addition, the turn of the century also witnessed lasting achievements in medicine and political, legal, and social theory. Many of these artists, writers and scientists had shared a particular social background that has, as a result, become a focus of scholarly enquiry in itself, i.e. the nineteenth-century liberal grande bourgeoisie and, in the work of Steven Beller, Marsha Rozenblit, Michael Pollack, and others, the Jewish bourgeoisie. It should

¹ Beller 1989, p. 2.
² Keller 1980, 8.
be said from the outset that Heinrich Schenker, although Jewish, did not share this background with his more affluent contemporaries such as Karl Kraus or Schnitzler. Hailing from a professional yet impoverished family in Eastern Galicia, Schenker (like Roth several decades later) entered Viennese society in his late teens in order to study at the university. However, his cultural environs – and the arts in particular – were suffused with the vestige of Liberalism, and his sharply rising scepticism towards that legacy lies at the heart of this study.

In the broadest socio-political terms, the reign of Franz Joseph in the years between the 1848 revolution and his death amid the turmoil of the First World War witnessed the political rise and fall of the middle classes. They achieved political representation after a period of neo-absolutism that commenced with the failure of the 1848 revolution and ended with the expulsion of Austria from the German Confederation in 1866. The latter event, which was precipitated by a number of Austro-Prussian military failures, weakened the emperor's influence abroad as well as his stance within the Habsburg monarchy, which, in turn, led to the so-called Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, i.e. the re-establishment of the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Hungary. In the same year, the Imperial Council passed a liberal constitution for the Northern and Western parts of Austria-Hungary, unofficially referred to as Cisleithania. The electorate was determined by census suffrage and encompassed civil servants, men with academic titles, teachers, officers, and priests. Liberalism was borne out of an anti-authoritarian ideology. In the nineteenth-century Austrian context, it chiefly aimed to challenge the representatives of the ancien régime, namely the aristocracy and the Church. The Liberals represented a wide variety of political interests, yet, in their effort to demarcate their social as well as political status against that of the lower classes, remained ignorant of the plight of the uneducated masses during their reign. Despite growing ideological divisions, the public representatives of the middle classes were self-assertive, habitually overstating bourgeois activities both in politics and in culture. The Liberals' 'latter-day Voltairism' was increasingly overshadowed by political and social

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5 Habermas 1989, p. 125.
tensions that were borne out of class inequalities and frictions amongst the nationalities of the empire. Rapid economic growth throughout the *Gründerzeit*, a period of industrialisation lasting from the 1840s to the stock market crash in 1873, came to an abrupt halt with the latter event, which fuelled sentiments on the right that pooled anti-capitalism, anti-Liberalism and anti-Semitism. National tensions within the empire, contingent on factors such as language, religion, and race, rather than generated by a partisan commitment to nation states, flared up persistently. The Imperial Council was politically overwhelmed by the pressure of provinces and national groups – including Bohemia, the Poles and the Slovenes – seeking autonomy akin to that of Hungary. In each case, they looked towards alternative supranational solutions, such as pan-Slavonic and Yugoslavonic communities of interests. Poland alone achieved autonomy of the provincial administration of Galicia in 1873. In the 1879 and 1897 elections, the Liberals were respectively forced into opposition and suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of the new mass parties that represented the burgeoning proletariat and *petite bourgeoisie*. They were superseded in parliament by several ideologically devoid coalitions made up by German-Clericals, Conservatives, and Nationals. The German-speaking part of the empire, which made up roughly one third of the population of Cisleithania in 1910, expressed national identity predominantly in the governmentally inert terms of loyalty to the dynasty and the Roman Catholic Church, and the national problem immobilised successive governments between 1879 and 1916. Extreme anti-monarchism, which increasingly conceived Austria-Hungary as an occupying force, led to the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914, an event that acted as the catalyst for the First World War. The political vacuum following the demise of Liberalism gave rise to two ideologically charged movements that made significant inroads in local Viennese politics around the turn of the century, Socialism and German Nationalism. The universal male suffrage was introduced in Cisleithania at the 1907 *Reichstagswahlen*, and female suffrage with the proclamation of the First Republic in 1918.

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9 Ibid., p. 233.
10 Ibid., p. 235.
Despite its failure on the political front, the ethos of Liberalism continued to permeate Viennese bourgeois life for decades to come. The arts held a special place within this ethos. Artistic patronage, particularly of the performing arts, had opened up an avenue to aristocratic culture,\textsuperscript{11} and came to act as a surrogate for the middle classes’ disenchantment with politics and new nostalgia for a cultural past ostensibly usurped by the machinations of capitalist society. By the time Schenker entered Viennese society, ‘the heroes of the upper middle class’, in cultural historian Carl Schorske’s words, ‘were no longer political leaders but actors, artists, and critics’.\textsuperscript{12} Austro-American philosopher and historian Allan Janik suggests that ‘Viennese of the generation that reached maturity at the turn of the century were raised, indeed, in an atmosphere so saturated with, and devoted to, “aesthetic” values that they were scarcely able to comprehend that any other values existed at all.’\textsuperscript{13} The rise of the bourgeoisie was inextricably linked with that of public opinion in the modern sense. The latter became institutionalised in Vienna in the newspapers \textit{Die Presse} and the \textit{Neue Freie Presse}, the latter of which Schenker read on a daily basis. Facilitated by nineteenth-century inventions such as the rotary printing press and the telegraph, newspapers and journals became the first and only mass medium until the emergence of the radio in the mid-1920s. In the ‘Age of the Feuilleton’,\textsuperscript{14} journalism manifested itself not only as a quintessentially liberal profession, but also a Jewish one. Almost all Viennese newspapers were owned or edited by Jews, and many of the most prominent music and theatre critics were of Jewish descent as well. The predominance of Jews in journalism can be attributed to the fact that unlike in other middle-class professions such as medicine or the law, matters of religion did not stand in the way of a career.\textsuperscript{15}

Jews, who made up fewer than nine percent of Vienna’s population around 1900,\textsuperscript{16} were exposed to a range of popular perceptions and prejudices. Only a few wealthy Jews had been permitted to live in Vienna prior to the 1848 revolution. After it, restrictions were lifted and Jewish private bankers played a

\textsuperscript{11} Schorske 1981, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., p. 45.
\textsuperscript{14} Hesse [1943] 2002, p. 18.
\textsuperscript{15} Beller 1989, pp. 37-40.
\textsuperscript{16} Rozenblit 1983, p. 17.
crucial role in the industrialisation in Austria-Hungary by utilising their international connections with relatives and business associates.\textsuperscript{17} Jews became emancipated in 1867, after which there was a substantial influx in Vienna of Jewish immigrants escaping prosecution and agrarian depressions in Eastern Europe. Education had helped define the middle classes, and Jews – being denied admission to the catholic petite bourgeoisie and the aristocracy – readily embraced self-cultivation in order to complete the process of assimilation into that stratum. As a result, they were deeply invested in new artistic movements, both as producers and as an educated audience.\textsuperscript{18} Throughout the late nineteenth century, Vienna’s self-designed image as the capital of music meant that engaging with its musical culture was at the forefront of facilitating the process of acculturation, particularly for newcomers to the city.\textsuperscript{19} At the turn of the century, Vienna witnessed an increased arrival of poor and traditionalist Ostjuden from the eastern parts of the empire, particularly Galicia; perceived as unproductive and asocial by the majority of the population, traditional Judaic communities were either denied or did not seek entry into modern secular society.\textsuperscript{20} They thereby opened up a social gap that, along with the sharp rise of anti-Semitism, exerted pressure on assimilated Jews to define their cultural status. This commonly involved conversion to Christianity, by then an already well-established process seen as facilitating social integration.\textsuperscript{21} In the build-up to the First World War, enlightenment ideals surrounding education narrowed. A highly cultivated, progressive circle – including many artists and writers now associated with Viennese modernism – aimed to dissociate itself from the bourgeoisie’s mere veneration and consumption of German art and ideals. For this elite, which Schenker despite his rejection of modernity was arguably part of, self-cultivation was no longer a vehicle for affirming social belonging but

\textsuperscript{17} Oxaal 1987, p. 24.
\textsuperscript{18} Rozenblit 1983, pp. 1-2.
\textsuperscript{19} Botstein 1997, p. 15.
\textsuperscript{20} See Steven E. Ashheim, Brothers and Strangers: The East European Jew in German and German Jewish Consciousness, 1800 – 1923 (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1982).
\textsuperscript{21} Timms 1986, p. 43.
rather a means of preserving their position at the top of what they considered to be the best of German culture, namely its artistic and intellectual life.\textsuperscript{22}

\textbf{Heinrich Schenker's Life and Work}

Scholarly understanding of Schenker's biography is chiefly based on the work of Austrian musicologist Hellmut Federhofer, who, in the mid-1980s, was the first researcher to gain access to a considerable part of Schenker's diary and correspondence. His research resulted in a documentary monograph published in 1985, which has been described variably as semi- and proto-biographical.\textsuperscript{23}

The following biographical sketch derives its information from Federhofer's account.

Schenker was born in 1868 in the Galician village of Wisniowczyk, on the Eastern fringes of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in what is today Ukraine. In 1884 he moved to Vienna to study law at the university, as well as take lessons in music theory and piano at the Vienna Konservatorium, a music college where his theory teacher was Anton Bruckner. His legal studies (supported by a government scholarship) were most likely the result of his father's insistence that he gain a marketable qualification, though he quickly became bored with the law and instead dedicated himself to a career in music. After graduating from the university, he started giving private piano lessons and worked as a composer, performer, and freelance music critic for various Austrian and German newspapers and journals. While he remained a private piano teacher and music pedagogue for the rest of his life, he gave up music criticism entirely in 1901. This date coincided with the founding of a new music-publishing house in Vienna, Universal Edition, for which Schenker went on to produce new editions of keyboard works by Handel, Carl Philip Emanuel Bach, and Johann Sebastian Bach. Schenker's first monograph was \textit{Ein Beitrag zur Ornamentik}, which functioned as an introduction to Schenker's edition of a selection of keyboard works by early classical composer C. P. E. Bach, first published in two volumes in 1903. \textit{Ein Beitrag zur Ornamentik} arguably 'set the stage' for Schenker's

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\textsuperscript{22} Volkov 1996, p. 96.
\textsuperscript{23} Cook 2007, p. 40, and Drabkin 2005, 4.
further published work. Apart from displaying his early analytical procedures, the volume indicated his intent to infiltrate critical editions with essay-length analytical commentary. Accordingly, his subsequent editions for Universal Edition – notably those of four late piano sonatas by Beethoven published between 1913 and 1921 – appeared augmented with Erläuterungen (elucidations), an editorial apparatus in which Schenker provided musical analyses, noted on performance practice, and reviewed previous literature on the works in question. These ‘elucidations’ were increasingly supplemented by polemical commentary on cultural and political matters. The format of edited score and commentary within the same volume was by 1913 embodied in the composite term Erläuterungsausgabe (elucidatory edition).  

Already by 1903 Schenker had turned his attention to his first large-scale music-theoretical treatise, Harmonielehre (Harmony, 1906), the first volume of his tripartite Neue Musikalische Theorien und Fantasien (New Musical Theories and Fantasies). Over the decades to follow he worked on the remaining volumes, Kontrapunkt (Counterpoint), which came out in two half-volumes in 1910 and 1922, and Der freie Satz (Free Composition), published posthumously in 1935. He also wrote a monograph on Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony, Beethovens Neunte Sinfonie (1912), which for the first time features his ‘elucidations’ format (that is, analysis – performance practice – literature review), and he returned to the same layout in the studies of individual works in his two subsequent sets of periodicals: Der Tonwille, published in ten issues between 1921 and 1924, and Das Meisterwerk in der Musik (The Masterwork in Music), a yearbook published in three volumes between 1925 and 1930. These two periodicals and Der freie Satz were augmented by ‘miscellaneous’ aphorisms, in

25 See Ibid., 77-81.
27 Schenker’s publications, with the exception of his composition Syrian Dances, are referred to by their original German title throughout. The majority of these have been translated into English after his death, and the English titles and subtitles (if they have been translated) are included in parenthesis upon first mention throughout this chapter.
which Schenker situated his own work and its principal concern, what he considered the German Masterworks in music, in a broader cultural context.

Schenker’s attempts to secure an official teaching position at the University of Vienna in 1898 and the Konservatorium in 1908 were unsuccessful, and a prospective appointment in Berlin in 1930 did not come to be realised either. However, by the early 1930s his theories had received numerous critical appraisals, written predominantly by his students and other associates, and gradually became disseminated elsewhere in Europe. In 1927, his enduring interest in autograph scores prompted him to establish, together with his student Anthony von Hoboken, the Archiv für Photogramme musikalischer Meisterhandschriften (Archive for Photographic Images of Musical Master Manuscripts), a collection of Photostat copies of musical scores located in the Austrian National Library. Schenker remained in Vienna throughout his life; he married Jeanette Kornfeld in 1919, after her lengthy petition for separation from her first husband. Jeanette, who Heinrich considered his intellectual equal, became instrumental in supporting her husband’s work during his lifetime and after his death, related to diabetes, in 1935.

Figure 1. Heinrich Schenker, circa 1919.

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Schenker developed his theory of music over several decades. According to his mature publications of the 1920s and 30s, the musical surface (i.e. the written and heard text) of certain compositions can be reduced to a simple underlying pattern, the *Ursatz* (fundamental structure), a construct inspired by rules of musical composition articulated in treatises by Johann Joseph Fux, Bach, and C. P. E. Bach.29 The melodic element of the *Ursatz* is the *Urlinie* (fundamental line). The *Urlinie* is a simple descending line that outlines one of the intervals of the tonic triad, the most basic harmonic construct in tonal music. British musicologist Christopher Wintle describes the *Urlinie* as ‘Schenker’s startling idea of the golden thread that leads us through the confusing labyrinth of notes and rhythms’.30 By the early 1920s, Schenker had devised a method of reductive graphic illustration, adapted from musical notation, to show the structure of sometimes hundreds of bars of music as derived from the *Urlinie*, on a single page. The graph is to be read horizontally from left to right as well as vertically, and reveals a number of hierarchical horizontal layers that direct the attention of the reader/listener to the large-scale structure of the piece. The simplest horizontal layer is the ‘background’, a formula based upon which a network of increasingly free layers (the ‘middleground’ and the ‘foreground’) reveal how the theorist goes through the process of generating – or ‘composing-out’ – the audible superstructure, but only after it has been reduced to the *Ursatz*. Rather than articulating the constituent parts of a piece of music, i.e. how it may be divided up, Schenker aimed to show how musical structures ‘held together’.31 British musicologist Nicholas Cook describes Schenker’s aims in the following way:

A Schenkerian analysis is not primarily a description of how a piece is, in fact, heard; it is rather a prescription for imagining it in a certain manner, or hearing it imaginatively. More specifically, it encourages a manner of experiencing the music which emphasizes its organic wholeness, and so helps to counteract the excessively foreground-oriented approach that Schenker condemned in the theory, composition, and performance of his own time. In this way, the point of Schenkerian analysis is to bring about a new, and more adequate, manner of listening to music.32

30 Wintle 2013, 140.
32 Cook 1989, 436.
Schenker’s stipulation that seemingly irrational musical manifestations can be explained by a simple, rational underlying framework lends his analyses an axiomatic character. Despite admitting for an irrational element in music, his analytical method concerns itself with showing how a complex surface may be understood as an elaboration of something less complex, and how that less complex design may itself be understood as an elaboration of something still less complex, until one arrives at an irreducible construct, the *Ursatz*. Schenker’s theory can, in this way, be used as an instrument for analysis.\(^{34}\)

Conversely, if music could not be reduced to the *Ursatz*, he judged it incoherent and ungrammatical.\(^{35}\) According to music theorists David Neumeyer and Susan Tepping, ‘Schenker believed that the genius could grasp and control all the levels simultaneously, but the non-genius was condemned to flounder about in the foreground, creating pastiches rather than organically coherent musical artworks.’\(^{36}\) Schenker’s concept of genius was embedded in the nineteenth-century *bourgeois* enthralment with the notion of the perfect human being, an ideal that had replaced that of the politically dethroned aristocracy.\(^{37}\) Schopenhauer was likely to have been a direct influence in this regard, and in his later work in particular Schenker adopted the philosopher’s emphasis on the genius’s ‘most perfect objectivity’ that manifests itself in the organic formation and expression of ideas.\(^{38}\) He restricted the canon of musical geniuses to that of a lineage of eighteenth and nineteenth-century German composers – ‘Handel, Bach, Carl Philipp Emanuel Bach, Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven, Schubert, Schumann, Mendelssohn, and Brahms’\(^{39}\) – as well as Polish composer Frederic Chopin and the Italian Domenico Scarlatti. As such, after Brahms’ death in 1897

\(^{34}\) See Dahlhaus 1982, p. 8, and Cook 2007, pp. 294-5.

\(^{35}\) Rosen 1998, p. 185.


\(^{37}\) Federhofer 1985, p. 348.

\(^{38}\) Reiter 2003, p. 139, and Federhofer 1985, p. 305.

\(^{39}\) Schenker 2005a, 34. Schenker allowed for exceptions to that rule to include Czech composer Bedřich Smetana, a composer that he expressed admiration for throughout his life.
Schenker was entirely preoccupied with composers from the past. In the years after the turn of the century his position hardened to an outright rejection of modern composers who, as he saw it, sacrificed the structural integrity of music for other means of expression. His earliest claims for the Urlinie almost two decades later indicate his reactionary reading of music history. As music theorist Robert Morgan puts it, ‘in the very act of bringing the Urlinie into existence, Schenker declares it to be irrevocably destroyed by modern music’,^40 a claim that inarguably leaves his theory vulnerable to criticism. As music theorist Leslie Blasius notes, Schenker did not specify an anthropology that could apply to music other than his chosen canon of Masterworks, and he disallowed any perception of music that would manifest a hierarchy of musical materials different from the one that he dictated.^41

Schenker’s idealist precept of a pantheon of composers against whose music all new works must be judged was matched by an ultra-conservative social and political consciousness: rather than stasis, he promoted retrogression. Literary scholar Andrea Reiter has compared his stance to the aesthetic fundamentalism of German poet Stefan George.^42 Schenker’s advocacy of social, economic, and political regression was combined with a quasi-religious veneration of German genius, leading critics such as Theodor Adorno to describe his claims as striving to ‘establish for a reactionary aesthetics a solid foundation in musical logic which tallied all too well with his loathsome political views.’^43 In his broadly political writings, Schenker departed from Schopenhauer’s concept of genius that was grounded in the realm of art and instead approached an ideal akin to Nietzsche’s Übermensch – a notion that he, like Nietzsche, often contrasted with that of the Durchschnittsmensch (average person, philistine).^44 Schenker’s cultural politics, and his anti-democratic elitism in particular, increasingly jarred with life in early twentieth century Vienna. The cultural commentary of the discursive texts mixed in with his theoretical publications provided an outlet for his socially exclusive

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^41 Blasius 1996, p. 100.
^44 See, for instance, Federhofer 1985, p. 306.
worldview: ‘Only the genius is connected with God, not the people. For this reason it is necessary to strip the masses of their halo.’

Despite an anecdotal description of the theorist as ‘a funny little man who haunted the back streets [of Vienna] exposing his analytical graphs, which no one understood’ by one of his contemporaries, Schenker could register certain recognition in Viennese musical life in his later years. In proportion, his theory had a considerably more substantial impact on American music academia after the Second World War. The implementation of Schenker’s theory within the American academy was chiefly based on the efforts the so-called first – and second – generation ‘Schenkerians’, principally Hans Weisse, Oswald Jonas, Felix Salzer, and Ernst Oster, scholars who had also saved Schenker’s substantial Nachlass (his papers, correspondence, diaries, etc.) by removing it from wartime Vienna. By determining fields of research and creating a canon of procedures, they succeeded in establishing Schenkerian analysis as a dominant branch of studying music and, in cohort, as a ‘reflective, pre-compositional activity’ in the new academic field of musical composition. In the process, Schenker’s theory became detached from its original ideological context. Music historian and conductor Leon Botstein compares the early reception of Schenker’s theory in the United States with the canonisation of the work of German sociologist Max Weber, whose ideas and approaches, Botstein argues, were similarly ‘rendered as normative, more structural, and less evidently philosophical and intuitive’. This transformation was achieved in part by translations into English that ‘calcified Schenker’s lively rhetoric, choosing technical sounding, Latinate words to render densely resonant German terms’. Transplanted into a new ideological context, Schenker’s theory has been pivotal to the ascent of an abstract formalism in musicology that followed a historical curve comparable to the rise of analytical philosophy, particularly its branch of

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46 The person in question was Austrian pianist and composer Eduard Steuermann, who conveyed his impression of Schenker to American composer Milton Babbitt after emigrating to the United States in 1938; Babbitt 1999, p. 44.
logical positivism associated with Ernst Mach.\textsuperscript{50} ‘Music as a mode of mathematics’, as cultural historian Michael Steinberg points out, became an ideologically anodyne alternative to a reading of music steeped in nineteenth-century German philosophy, a practice that had helped build a national and ultimately fascist ideology.\textsuperscript{51} Steinberg writes: ‘Logical and musicological positivism both reacted strongly – perhaps too strongly – to the historically evident (but not historically inevitable) tendencies of culturally based arguments to evolve into blueprints of cultural exceptionalism and ideology.\textsuperscript{52}

Scholarly endeavours in undoing this historical revision of Schenker’s theory came only towards the end of the twentieth century. Music-theoretical scholarship of Schenker’s work blossomed in the United States in the second half of the twentieth century, and Schenkerian analysis gradually made its way back to Europe and beyond. Akin to the inflation of the role of culture within post-colonial, Eurocentric academia,\textsuperscript{53} music theorists adapted the Schenkerian method for analysing non-Western musics, in addition to Western jazz, popular and folk genres, and pre- and non-tonal music. Although transcending Schenker’s own fixation on a canon of Masterworks, proponents of such practice implicitly reaffirmed the worthiness of his theory. Even so, there had been limited interest in an inquiry into ‘the man behind the \textit{Urlinie}’ until relatively recently.\textsuperscript{54} After the war, such undertaking would at any rate have been hampered by a lack of access to Schenker’s original publications and archival sources. Whereas the National Socialists had largely destroyed Schenker’s publications after the \textit{Anschluss}, subsequent editions of his theoretical works were ‘cleansed’ from Schenker’s polemics, which were deemed unassimilable to the post-war ethos.\textsuperscript{55} These revisions were largely performed by Schenker’s student Oswald Jonas. Carl Schachter, an eminent Schenkerian scholar who was acquainted with Oster, describes the reasons behind Oster’s revisions as borne out of fear that ‘the passages in question would so alienate people that Schenker’s musical

\begin{itemize}
\item[50] Steinberg 2004, p. 2.
\item[51] Ibid.
\item[52] Ibid.
\item[53] See Eagleton 2004, pp. 12-3.
\item[54] Drabkin 1987, 279.
\item[55] ‘Säuberung’, Schenker 1972, p. 1. Alternatively, as is the case in \textit{Free Composition} (1979), edited by Oster, Schenker’s polemics were relegated into appendices.
\end{itemize}
ideas would not receive a fair hearing'.\textsuperscript{56} As musicologist William Drabkin observes, ‘Schenker’s outspoken observations on aesthetic, cultural and political matters were thought best undisturbed, and in consequence went largely unexplored’.\textsuperscript{57} Cultural historians, on the other hand, were either simply unaware of Schenker or judged music theory too formal a subject for cultural contextualisation by non-specialists.\textsuperscript{58} As a result, the theorist remained absent from large-scale critical studies of \textit{fin-de-siècle} Vienna by writers such as William Johnston, Carl Schorske, and Edward Timms. Schenker’s polemical output would, at any rate, have provided excellent testimony to what these studies set out to do. Their achievement was to challenge post-war historical memory, which was based, especially in Austria, on two contrasting yet equally glorified narratives: the city as centre of The Occident during the Ottoman Wars and the Austrian Baroque on the one hand, and the socialist accomplishments culminating in the era of Red Vienna (1918-34) on the other.\textsuperscript{59} Both narratives emphasised harmony above the social, political, and artistic fragmentation that tends to be at the heart of modern readings of the decades leading up to the outbreak of the First World War.

Gaining access to a considerable part of Schenker’s \textit{Nachlass} during the 1980s, Austrian musicologist Hellmut Federhofer, a pupil of Jonas, published two significant additions to the sparse literature on Schenker in 1985 and 1990:\textsuperscript{60} the aforementioned semi-biography based on Schenker’s diaries and correspondence preserved in the Oswald Jonas Memorial Collection at Riverside, California (which had become accessible upon Jonas’ death in 1978), and an anthology of Schenker’s articles written for newspapers and journals between 1891 and 1901. These publications sparked renewed interest in

\textsuperscript{56} Schachter 2001, 2. Music theorist William Rothstein, a student of Ernst Oster, lists these ‘unassimilable elements’ in Schenker’s original publications as ‘[his] pan-German nationalism, his sometimes explicit identification of the laws of God with the “laws” of art [as well as] his unbending absolutism, which necessarily sees any deviation from revealed musical law as a symptom of cultural and even moral degeneracy.’ He adds: ‘Less horrifying, but still unacceptable to the American ethos, is his shamelessly aristocratic attitude in artistic matters – and, incidentally, in political matters as well.’ Rothstein 1990, p. 195.

\textsuperscript{57} Drabkin 2005, 3.

\textsuperscript{58} Steinberg 2004, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{59} Uhl 2012, pp. 40-1.

\textsuperscript{60} Federhofer 1985, p. ix.
Schenker’s life and his early activities as a music critic.\textsuperscript{61} They coincided with the onset of a new movement within musicology coined ‘New Musicology’ circa 1990, which – having developed alongside the emerging branches of ethnomusicology and popular music studies – all but rejected the constrained positivist approach to music that Schenkerian analysis had come to represent, and argued for a wider interpretive framework along the lines of Marxist literary criticism.\textsuperscript{62} This, inevitably, meant that interest in Schenker’s cultural background in Vienna grew at a time when the prevailing dominance of his theory within music academia became a matter of debate.\textsuperscript{63} The 1990s and the first decade of the twenty-first century saw the publication of critical editions of Schenker’s periodicals in an English translation. These projects were fuelled by a research ethos that Drabkin has described in this way: ‘Rather than merely poring over the stems and slurs of [Schenker’s] wordless, politics-free graphs, we are just as likely to scrutinise his writings for clues to the aesthetic and philosophical background underlying his approach.’\textsuperscript{64} Yet perhaps the most significant recent development for scholars of both Schenkerian analysis and the historical figure was the making accessible of a substantial part of Schenker’s Nachlass, now housed in the Oster Collection, New York City Public Library, in 1990.

\textsuperscript{61} Some of Schenker’s early writings had been the focus of scholarly inquiry already before the publication of Federhofer’s anthology, particularly in the work of William Pastille. Pastille’s interpretation of Schenker’s article ‘Der Geist der musikalischen Technik’ (‘The Spirit of Musical Technique’), originally published in 1895, sparked an amount of controversy amongst Schenker scholars, to which I shall return later in this chapter.

\textsuperscript{62} This movement was set off almost singlehandedly by the late American musicologist Joseph Kerman; see Joseph Kerman \textit{Contemplating Music: Challenges to Musicology} (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985).


\textsuperscript{64} Drabkin 2005, 3.
Sources

Schenker’s Archive, its History, and its Organisation

My research is largely based on unpublished materials found in Schenker’s archive. His papers are preserved in three large depositories: the Oswald Jonas Memorial Collection, comprising about 75,000 documents, including the papers of his pupil Oswald Jonas, and those of Schenker’s closest friend Moriz Violin; the Oster Collection, which holds circa 18,000 documents; and, in the same library, the Felix Salzer papers, the most recent to become publicly accessible. The Oswald Jonas Memorial Collection contains Schenker’s diary (which he kept between 1896 and 1935), his correspondence with Jonas and Violin, his published works, manuscripts, and biographical material. The Oster Collection, which represents the greatest part of Schenker’s Nachlass, contains most of the rest of his correspondence, the ‘scrapbook’ that preserves clippings from newspapers and journals pertaining to his work (dating from between 1902 and 1935), musical analyses and graphs, and hand-written and typed materials for publication supplemented by further notes, fragments, and newspaper articles on various topics. In addition, it includes many scores from Schenker’s library, as well as early editions of some of his work. The Felix Salzer papers contain only a relatively small portion of Schenker’s papers, along with Salzer’s own scholarly works, manuscripts, and materials bequeathed to him by the Wittgenstein family – Salzer was a nephew of Ludwig Wittgenstein – including original manuscripts by Mozart and Beethoven. Of these three archives, the Oster Collection is the most relevant for the present study because it contains Schenker’s largely unexplored writings on music criticism, including the first edition of the last major work by Schenker yet to appear in English translation, his Erläuterungsausgabe of Beethoven’s late piano sonatas. Given the complexity of Schenker’s archive and the diverse locations of sources relevant to my investigation, I will provide a brief overview of the history Schenker’s Nachlass, based on the research of Robert Kosovsky, curator of the Oster Collection.

Shortly after Heinrich’s death in 1935, Jeanette moved from their apartment in Vienna’s Landstrasse district to the outer district of Währing. During this move his papers fell into disarray, and Jeanette – according to her postscript to the Nachlass – was confronted with a disorganised mass of materials. Unable to restore the original order, she instituted a new arrangement encompassing eighty-three files and including an inventory (Verzeichnis). Jeanette purposely undertook her reorganisation with Schenker’s students in mind, so that they could effortlessly identify clean copies of analytical work for future publication. Kosovsky compares her desire to keep her late husband’s work ‘alive’ by passing his papers on in an organised fashion to that of Constanze Mozart.66

![Jeanette Schenker, 1925.](image)

Jeanette sold portions of the newly organised and labelled Nachlass (including Schenker’s book collection of circa 400 titles) in stages over the years following her husband’s death in order to financially support herself; buyers included book dealer Heinrich Hinterberger, Wilhelm Furtwängler, and Felix

66 Kosovsky 1999, p. 4.
Salzer. Apparently unable or unwilling to leave Vienna, Jeanette entrusted the greater part of her late husband’s working papers to Ernst Oster – a German music theorist with an interest in Schenker’s work who had moved to the city in the early 1930s – while holding on to his correspondence and items of a more personal nature.\(^{67}\) Perhaps after realising the increasing danger she was in, she gave those remaining items to Erwin Ratz, a student of Schoenberg who was still in Vienna at the beginning of the Second World War. Jeanette was deported to the Theresienstadt concentration camp in 1942, where she died in 1945.\(^ {68}\) Sometime in the 1950s, Ratz passed on the papers to Oswald Jonas, who became a significant first-generation Schenkerian teacher. After Jonas’ death in 1978 his own estate, including Schenker’s papers, was deposited in the Special Collections Library at Riverside, California. After Ernst Oster’s death in 1977, meanwhile, the part of Schenker’s Nachlass held by him was deposited at the New York City Public Library, where it was found in a state of disorder that made it practically unusable. As Schenker’s original arrangement, according to Kosovsky, seemed impossible to reconstruct, it was catalogued following Jeanette’s Verzeichnis, and made public in 1990.\(^ {69}\) Lastly, Felix Salzer’s papers, which include the part of Schenker’s archive that he had purchased from Jeanette in 1936 (mostly analytical sketches), were bequeathed to the New York City Public Library upon the death of his widow Hedwig in 2000, catalogued, and made public in 2007.

Unpublished Sources Relating to Music Criticism and Journalism

Schenker’s three essays on music criticism found in the Oster Collection epitomise the various stages of completion in which the majority of items entered his Nachlass. The two later ones, a nine-column polemic against German music critic Paul Bekker intended for the secondary literature survey of the Erläuterungsausgabe op. 101 (1921), and ‘Musikkritik’, a modified and

\(^ {67}\) Ibid.
\(^ {68}\) Jeanette’s death certificate has been made public on the website <http://www.holocaust.cz/en/document/DOCUMENT.ITI.20095> (21 September 2012).
\(^ {69}\) Kosovsky 1999, p. 5.
extended version of the same text intended for inclusion in the Miscellanea of Der Tonwille 2 (1922) became part of the squarely titled File 39, ‘Deleted Passages from Published Works’. (Universal Edition’s principal editor Emil Hertzka had rejected both essays for publication.) Despite the similarities between the two texts, there are also considerable differences, and the part of Schenker’s first version that he did not reuse in ‘Musikkritik’, which was published in 2005 as part of the English edition of Der Tonwille, has so far remained untouched by scholars.

The same is true for Schenker’s essay on music criticism ‘Kunst und Kritik’ (‘Art and Criticism’). Written in 1911, it is located in File C, which holds a collection of newspaper clippings dating from the 1920s and 1930s that had been partially inventoried by Jeanette after Heinrich’s death. Unidentified as such by the archivists, ‘Kunst und Kritik’ is a first draft in her hand with corrections by Heinrich. It is incomplete, missing not only its concluding chapter, for which only the heading ‘Epilog’ (‘Epilogue’) exists, but also two brief quotations from other works (including one by Eduard Hanslick) that Schenker had presumably intended to insert at a later stage. The penultimate chapter, ‘Ein Beispiel sachlicher Kritik’ (‘An Example of Factual Criticism’), is also missing. In its unfinished state, ‘Kunst und Kritik’ is approximately six thousand three hundred words long. Although the comprehensive fragment structured into six chapters is coherent, the manuscript exhibits Schenker’s practice of cutting up longer texts with the view of distributing the smaller fragments to different locations of his archive. Kosovsky considers this practice as propaedeutic to Schenker’s associative thinking: he suggests that ‘virtually every item in the [Oster Collection] can be found to have some kind of association with several other disparate ones’. Even so, ‘Kunst und Kritik’ offers a new perspective on his thinking that helps unlock not only his other essays on music criticism but also his many disparaging references to the profession in his diary and correspondence.

70 Kosovsky 1990, p. 326.
71 The items are marked as ‘text in an unidentified hand’; see Kosovsky 1990, p. 348.
72 Kosovsky 1999, p. 10.
Schenker deposited ‘Kunst und Kritik’ in a folder together with other material, which in all probability served him as source material for the essay.\textsuperscript{73} This untitled folder – which I will refer to as the ‘criticism folder’ – contains newspaper clippings of characteristically polemical articles on music, literary, and art criticism of the period. (Being acidic not only in tone but also in chemical composition, these newsprints account for the fragile and deteriorating condition of the folder’s contents due to acid migration).\textsuperscript{74} This collection of clippings not only offers a window into Schenker’s reading habits and preferences but also suitably demarcates the overwhelming amount of self-reflective journalistic

\textsuperscript{73} Schenker appears to have collated source material for his other works in a similar fashion. See, for instance, OC 24, ‘Materials Relating to Der Tonwille’; Kosovsky 1990, pp. 80-4.

\textsuperscript{74} See Robert Kosovsky, ‘The Oster/Schenker Collection in the Music Division of the New York Public Library’, p. 9, included with Kosovsky 1990.
writing of the period, an overabundance of data that according to American musicologist Karen Painter has resulted in a ‘tendency to study individuals more than ideas’.\textsuperscript{75} Furthermore, the folder holds notes and an outline relating to the structure of Schenker’s draft. Both notes and outline contain references to literary works such as Herder’s series of critical essays \textit{Kritische Wälder} (1796) and Friedrich Hebbel’s play \textit{Michel Angelo} (1851), as well as works by Kant, Jean Paul, and Georg Christoph Lichtenberg, amongst others. The items in the folder date from between 1906 and 1913, an indication that Schenker remained engaged with the issue until a couple years after completing the first draft, coinciding with the commencement of his work on the first Beethoven \textit{Erläuterungsausgabe}, that of the piano sonata op. 109.\textsuperscript{76} As I will demonstrate, ‘Kunst und Kritik’ and its paper trail contained in the ‘criticism folder’ is intimately related to Schenker’s rendering of particular writers throughout the secondary literature surveys of all four volumes of the \textit{Erläuterungsausgabe}.

\textsuperscript{75} Painter 2008, pp. 7.

‘Kunst und Kritik’ was in all likelihood conceived as part of a larger project, titled ‘Kunst und die Teilnehmenden’ (‘Art and the Participants’), in which Schenker intended to address broader considerations relating to the relationship between art and society. Material for this project was deposited at a different location within the Oster Collection, in File B (‘Miscellaneous Material’). This folder includes a draft, ‘Kunst und das Volk’ (‘Art and the Volk’), with two addenda (altogether circa three thousand words). It also holds several newspaper articles published between 1907 and 1911, and notes labelled ‘Kunst

\[^{77}\text{OC 12/406-432.}\]
und Publikum’ (‘Art and the Public’). The first item in the folder appears to be an outline for the ‘Kunst und die Teilnehmenden’ project, the title of which is written at the top of the ‘Kunst und das Volk’ draft:

Figure 5.

This outline reveals that Schenker perceived the public solely in terms of laypersons and critics.\(^78\) If Schenker ever drafted an essay titled ‘Kunst und Laie’ (‘Art and the Layperson’) in this context, as the outline would indicate, it has either not been preserved in the Oster Collection, or it is still awaiting identification. (Confusingly, Jeanette’s Verzeichnis contains a reference to ‘a small study titled “Der Laie”’,\(^79\) which has not been found by the archivists, while not mentioning the two essays that have been found but not identified.) It is also possible that Schenker amalgamated his ideas on the public with those on the critics; several of his views on the relationship between art and the public are in fact expressed in ‘Kunst und Kritik’. Elsewhere, the archive contains a number of notes on ‘Kunst und Laie[n]’ (‘Art and Laypersons’) in File 31 (‘Alphabetically Arranged Files of Musical Topics’). It is likely that these notes are related to the ‘Kunst und die Teilnehmenden’ project, as, according to a note by Kosovsky, the ‘Kunst und das Volk’ folder had been originally situated in File 31 before it was moved to File B.\(^80\) Some of these notes – as well as several in the ‘criticism folder’ – are marked ‘III’, potentially indicating Schenker’s plans to include essays based on this material in the at the time projected third volume of his

\(^78\) OC B/406.
\(^80\) Kosovsky 1990, p. 324.
Neue Musikalische Theorien und Fantasien, now conceived as a separate text, 'Über den Niedergang der Kompositions kunst' ('The Decline in the Art of Composition'), written during 1905-9. Both remaining drafts associated with the 'Kunst und die Teilnehmenden' project feature the organisational section markers (§) that he used in his published theoretical works.\textsuperscript{81}

Although both ‘Kunst und das Volk’ and ‘Kunst und Kritik’ were finished in the summer of 1911,\textsuperscript{82} while Heinrich and Jeanette were holidaying in Sulden, South Tyrol, it is likely that the essay on criticism became divorced from the overall project shortly after it was completed. In a letter to his publisher Emil Hertzka on 23 July 1911 Schenker refers to it as an autonomous text, perhaps to be published separately in the near future; Schenker confides to Hertzka similar plans relating to his essay ‘Die Kunst des Vortrags’ (\textit{The Art of Performance}), which was written at the same time as ‘Kunst und Kritik’ and also remained unpublished during his lifetime.\textsuperscript{83}

\textbf{Published Sources}

One reason why Schenker may not have drafted a separate essay about \textit{Laien} together with the other ‘Kunst und die Teilnehmenden’ drafts is that he had already written and published on the subject in the years leading up to 1911. The practice of dispersing ideas on one and the same topic among several different texts was not unusual for Schenker, as, for instance, the genetic development of ‘Die Kunst des Vortrags’ demonstrates.\textsuperscript{84} The term \textit{Laie} entered Schenker’s polemics around the time he wrote \textit{Kontrapunkt} 1 (1910) and the

\textsuperscript{81} Drabkin 2005, 4.
\textsuperscript{83} \textit{SDO} WSLB 78 (23 July 1911), transcr. and transl. by Ian Bent (2006) <http://mt.ccnml.columbia.edu/schenker/correspondence/letter/wslb_78_72311.html> (9 September 2012). Embarked upon on 1 July 1911 and dictated in full four weeks later, the essay was posthumously published in English translation – \textit{The Art of Performance} – in 2000.
\textsuperscript{84} See Schenker 2000, pp. xi-xxi.
Ninth Symphony monograph (published in 1912, but completed in May 1911), both of which contain passages about his views on the musical public, as does his posthumously published *Niedergang* essay.

In the Ninth Symphony monograph, Schenker for the first time charts a ‘running commentary’ on previous literature on the work in question. Schenker’s engagement with such literature took shape in at times extraordinarily acerbic criticism of other writers. He directs his attacks mainly towards the analytical methods of hermeneutics and formalism, as represented by Hermann Kretzschmar and Hugo Riemann. Yet it is Schenker’s *Erläuterungsausgabe* of Beethoven’s piano sonatas op. 109, 110, 111, and 101 that is of particular interest for this study due to his continuing engagement with the work of a journalist, Paul Bekker. Bekker was the chief music critic for the *Frankfurter Zeitung* and author of, amongst other books, a hugely popular monograph on Beethoven that came out only months before Schenker’s own on the Ninth Symphony. Schenker attacked Bekker and his work in all four secondary literature surveys of the *Erläuterungsausgabe*, and intended to bring out a large-scale review of Bekker’s book in 1921, a project which, however, remained unrealised. In many ways, Schenker’s ‘feud’ with Bekker was only in the former’s mind: the two men never met, there is no record of any correspondence, and there were no grand polemical debates between them. Bekker in fact barely acknowledged Schenker’s provocations, the most visceral of which remained unpublished during their lifetime.

There are three noteworthy archival sources associated with the *Erläuterungsausgabe*. The first is the aforementioned inflammatory passage about music criticism removed from *Erläuterungsausgabe* op. 101, the second a number of aphorisms (‘Aphoristisches’, in Jeanette’s words) about music criticism and the press headed with the numbers 109, 110, 111, and 101 – the opus numbers of Beethoven’s sonatas – now housed in File 12 of the Oster

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87 Federhofer 1985, p. 34.
Collection (‘Writings and Observations on Various Subjects’). The latter reveal Schenker’s at times satirical, at other times sarcastic remarks about journalism and criticism, and may have been intended for inclusion in the Erläuterungsausgabe (Schenker integrated similar adages in his subsequent periodicals and in Der Freie Satz). Akin to his diary entries, these aphorisms reveal Schenker at his most personal, and Jeanette considered them as significant enough to arrange and copy them in fair hand after Heinrich’s death.\(^89\) The third source, besides the polemic against Paul Bekker and the aphorisms, is a collection of several dozen clippings of newspaper articles by Bekker. The first two, dating from 1913, were added to the ‘criticism folder’ after ‘Kunst und Kritik’ had been drafted, and most of the remaining clippings were found in a folder marked ‘Bekkerei’. The suffix ‘-ei’ to Bekker’s name in the title of the folder expresses a derogatory – or at least belittling – attitude on Schenker’s part, in addition to associating the collection with the German word for ‘bakery’ (Bäckerei). It is noteworthy that these latter items were kept in a separate folder, a practice that is more or less unique in Schenker’s archive, and which is noted as such in Jeanette’s Verzeichnis.\(^90\) (Newspaper articles in the Nachlass tend to be filed together by theme or chronology rather than by individual writers.) One further article by Bekker was found in File 38 of the Oster Collection (‘Draft Material for Der freie Satz’), and four more, dating from 1922 and 1925 – by which time Bekker had eventually responded to Schenker’s needling – in the scrapbook. It is Schenker’s observance of all these articles that open up his writings on Bekker to broader study, as these demonstrate not only that he continued to take an interest in Bekker’s ideas, but also how some of these articles acted as a catalyst for his most personal and more or less final attack on the critic, ‘Musikkritik’.

Additional sources considered in this thesis include Schenker’s diary and his correspondence with his editor Emil Hertzka, a long-term witness to Schenker’s opinions not only about music journalism but also about wider political and cultural issues. Hertzka’s refusal to publish Schenker’s polemics against Bekker – Hertzka’s ‘terroristic’ censorship,\(^91\) as Schenker viewed it –

\(^89\) Ibid., p. 1. 
\(^90\) Ibid., p. 6. 
\(^91\) ‘terroristisch’, OC 52/574.
played a notable part in the demise of their professional relationship in the early 1920s. Many of these sources have in recent years been made available for the first time on Schenker Documents Online.

**Literature Review**

Schenker’s theory of music has received an extraordinary amount of scholarly attention over the last few decades. This attention was not limited to matters of execution and analysis: the Schenkerian approach to music and its place in post-war musicology has played a significant part in more recent critical enquiries into the epistemology and cultural history of music theory, as well as the philosophy of music.\(^92\) This has strengthened interest in Schenker’s biography and the intellectual influences on him, a development that has in the last two decades prompted a number of documentary publications, of which the Schenker Documents Online project is the most ambitious. The improved access to Schenker’s diaries, correspondence, and lesson books, and their translation into English effected by Schenker Documents Online (and its antecedent Schenker Correspondence Project)\(^93\) has benefited writers who did not wish to undertake the time-consuming task of exploring Schenker’s vast archive even in its reproduction on microfilm, or who did not read German.

Given the relative obscurity of Schenker’s work outside the realm of music theory, it has fallen to musicologists to engage in the cultural study of Schenker’s life and work, including his political views. Not all have savoured that prospect: musicologist Suzannah Clark notes that the translators of Schenker’s journals (and contributors to Schenker Documents Online) Ian Bent and William Drabkin ‘clearly believe that modern Schenkerians have a duty to think about this context, although they do not give any indication of what they imagine might

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\(^93\) For further details of the history of Schenker Documents Online see Schenker Documents Online, ‘Project History’ <http://www.schenkerdocumentsonline.org/project_information/project_history.html> (10 September 2012).
arise from it’. At any rate, the resulting literature is informed by an ethos that Nicholas Cook, author of a recent major addition to literature on Schenker, *The Schenker Project* (2007), has condensed in a single rhetorical question: ‘If Schenker’s theory was the solution, what was the problem?’ In his review of *The Schenker Project*, American music theorist Kevin Korsyn explains:

If the ‘Americanization’ of Schenker […] had detached the theory from its origins in the interest of an emerging academic discipline eager for ‘scientific’ status, the historical movement [borne by scholars such as Cook] seeks to reverse that process by connecting the theory to a specific time and place, as if to establish that even if you take the theory out of Vienna, you can’t take Vienna out of the theory.

Cook ventures even further in associating Schenker’s theory with its cultural ambience:

My claim in [*The Schenker Project*] is that what might be described in the broad sense as the political is deeply thought into Schenker’s theory. And in saying this I mean not that Schenker’s theory was determined in any direct, cause-and-effect manner by the social and political circumstances within which he found himself – that is how to misconstrue the relationship between theory and context – but that Schenker’s theory may be profitably understood as a discourse on the social and political at the same time that it is a discourse on the musical, and that in order to understand this discourse we need to place it in context.

Cook’s effort at contextualising Schenker’s theory follows a series of discrete themes that have first been identified as central to Schenker’s thinking by Hellmut Federhofer in his 1985 monograph. My literature review is structured according to a similar, reduced thematisation (Jewish identity; politics, society, and music; journalism and music criticism), and I will consider additional literature by tying it to one or more of these rubrics. I will review the considerable amount of music-theoretical literature only as far as it is relevant to the present study.

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94 Clark 2007, 144.
95 Cook 2007, p. 3.
96 Korsyn 2009, 153.
97 Cook 2007, p. 9.
Jewish Identity

As historian Michael Steinberg asserts, ‘the role of Jewish identity in the lives of intellectuals and in the culture in general is [...] both crucial and ambiguous’, and Schenker’s experience was, by all accounts, no exception. Although Federhofer views Schenker’s attitudes towards his fellow Jews, the Jewish faith, and his own Jewish identity as coherent, the accompanying documentation reveals a fair amount of inconsistency and arbitrariness on Schenker’s part. While acknowledging that the theorist’s views were captured only ‘unsystematically’ in his diaries and correspondence, Federhofer argues that they can be viewed as consistent if the distinct areas of his Jewish identity are granted a certain degree of autonomy. He considers Schenker’s often harsh criticisms of Jews as guided by ulterior ethical principles that did not distinguish between personality, nation, or race. This position, which spectacularly clashes with instances in Schenker’s writings that suggest a highly intolerant personality, allows Federhofer to develop a narrative in which Schenker’s Jewish faith more or less compelled him to be forthright in his assessments. Even so, individual diary entries remain contradictory; Federhofer develops a line arguing that Schenker was sympathetic towards the Ostjuden flocking Vienna, yet denounced the refined manners of the assimilated Jewish bourgeoisie, which he considered as exploiters. However, this discussion unapologetically segues to excerpts from Schenker’s diaries in which he airs his dislike for ‘the penetratingly Galician-Jewish type’. Federhofer here does not reconcile his chosen sources with the wider issues of the Jewish Question. Elsewhere, his selection reveals Schenker’s at times profound contemplation of the Diaspora, Jewish migration, and notions of nationhood. Often stimulated by some of the numerous public debates about Jewish assimilation published in newspapers, Schenker’s writings reveal an increasing preoccupation with the relationship between Jewish and German identity.

In his analysis of the same sources, Leon Botstein reads Schenker’s stance as one that views Jews as ‘ideal’ Germans, as he considered ‘both

98 Steinberg 1990, p. 173.
100 Ibid., p. 311.
101 Diary entry, 24 June 1914; Federhofer 1985, p. 313.
traditions superior as cultures’.\(^{102}\) Moreover, Botstein argues, ‘Schenker’s own lifelong project of maintaining cultural standards [...] against a rising tide of middle-class philistinism and an unschooled and irresponsible avant-garde was a tacit expression of the complementary cultural affinities between the Jewish and the German’.\(^{103}\) However, since the middle classes as well as the foremost exponents of modernism in music, art, and architecture were to a large degree Jewish as well, this argument requires further consideration. Schenker was highly critical of westernised, baptised Jews who, as he saw it, debased German culture in favour of ‘the international’.\(^{104}\) Federhofer plays down Schenker’s disapproval, arguing that it ought not to be considered as a blanket judgement, but a critique arising from ethical principles. His choice of extracts from Schenker’s later diaries reveals the theorist’s engagement with Zionism (an endeavour Schenker considered unpromising)\(^{105}\) and views on anti-Semitism. By the 1930s there are increasing instances of Schenker speaking warmly about Jewish culture, including an enthusiastic review of the work of novelist Schalom Ash. He also came to draw parallels between monotheism and his musical theories: ‘parallel: in the cosmos the single cause is God – in music the only cause is the \textit{Ursatz}!’\(^{106}\)

Federhofer’s volume is an invaluable resource for scholars, providing a well-researched selection of archival material from the Oswald Jonas Memorial Library. However, intent not to compromise the complexities contained in Schenker’s thought on Jewish identity, Federhofer’s selection of documents at times raises more questions than it answers. Thirty years on, Cook’s \textit{The Schenker Project} represents the first large-scale endeavour to unlock Schenker’s writings, including those on Jewish identity. Cook sets out to demonstrate links between Schenker’s project and traditional Jewish thinking, as well as the relationship between German cultural conservatism and anti-Semitism, ‘together with the options this created for Viennese Jews’.\(^{107}\) To portray Schenker’s Jewish heritage, Cook investigates the religious traditions in

\(^{102}\) Botstein 2002, 244.
\(^{103}\) Ibid.
\(^{104}\) Diary entry, 30 September 1925; Federhofer 1985, p. 317.
\(^{105}\) Diary entry, 1 November 1925; Ibid., p. 318.
\(^{106}\) Diary entry, 17-21 May 1933; Ibid., p. 320; transl. in Ringer 1990, p. 20.
\(^{107}\) Cook 2007, p. 199.
Podhajce, a shtetl near Schenker’s birthplace Wisniowczyk where his father worked as a general practitioner. In order to interpret the sparse information about Schenker’s early life (he did not keep a diary until he was in his late twenties), Cook draws on research by historians Robert Wistrich and Marsha Rozenblit, amongst others. Schenker’s attendance of the Lvov Gymnasium represented access to the Galician ‘centre of education for enlightened Jews’, and Cook refers to Rozenblit to illustrate the kind of opportunity that an education at the Lvov Gymnasium provided. Cook deals with matters of Schenker’s assimilation into Viennese society, including his choice not to convert to Christianity, by consulting some of the most authoritative historical research into Viennese Jewry during the fin-de-siècle, including that of Peter Gay and Stephen Beller. Beller argues that the ‘radical ethical individualism of Kraus or Wittgenstein owed the great weight of its influence to a radically transformed Judaism, all the more powerful for being a hidden, perhaps unconscious factor’.

In his pursuit to trace traits deriving from Jewish tradition in Schenker’s thinking, Cook points towards its ethical dimension, and compares it to that of Kraus and Wittgenstein. He had done so already, with respect to Kraus, in an earlier article, ‘Schenker’s Theory of Music as Ethics’ (1989), where he draws parallels between Kraus’s ‘essentially ethical rather than aesthetic view of art’ and instances in Schenker’s writings. Analogies between Kraus’s and Schenker’s critical agendas had been suggested before, and Cook illustrates the two men’s respective arguments in relation to language and musical notation on the basis of an article from Das Meisterwerk in der Musik 3 (1930), ‘Weg mit dem Phrasierungsbogen!’ (‘Let’s do away with the Phrasing Slur!’). In order to investigate to what degree ethical considerations can possibly be due to a ‘Jewish influence’, Cook refers to Beller’s claim that Jewish stoicism and its focus on ethical responsibility continued to permeate Jewish life even after the transition from the religious culture of the shtetl to that of the secular metropolis. This claim is well supported by Schenker’s often-doctrinaire views, and Cook shores up his argument with a particularly pertinent

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112 Cook 2007, p. 206.
quote from a letter dating from 1933, in which Schenker writes: ‘it would be better to present the Germanic people with my monotheistic music-teaching as the Old Testament was presented to the whole world’.113

Cook explores the notion of a Jewish influence on Schenker’s thought by accentuating similarities with Sigmund Freud, whose grandfather had been a Hasidic rabbi in Galicia. He compares the scope of Schenker’s project to Freud’s motivations and ideals (as viewed by Wistrich), pointing out the semblance of commanding a quasi-religious – and predominantly Jewish – following by their students. However, Wistrich’s case for Freud’s choice of students that shared his Talmudic way of life is considerably stronger than Cook’s reading of Schenker’s routinely enigmatic references to the Talmud. The same is true of references to the ‘Talmudic method’, which Beller describes as ‘the emphasis on the multi-level interpretation of a small text’.114 Elsewhere, Cook does not go far enough in developing the notion of Schenker’s ‘transference of a Jewish practice of close reading from the Word to the musical text’, an idea derived from a Biblical reference in the Ninth Symphony monograph.115 Cook’s examination of analogies between Freudian and Schenkerian ideas of surface, depth, and concealment – a submission that would appear to warrant extensive investigation – feels rushed, and its suggested linkage with Jewish tradition vague. Indeed, Cook is acutely aware of the problems with imposing onto Schenker’s writings a fixed set of properties associated with Jewish patterns of intellectual production:

A basic problem is that [the contextualisation] is prone to rely on pocket characterisations of Jewish traits that can come uncomfortably close to essentialism, or that are simply too loose to support any kind of rigorous thought. [...] In short, any attempt to determine the extent to which Schenker’s thinking drew on Jewish tradition can be no more than speculative, though we can say with confidence that important aspects of his thought – wherever he may have drawn them from – resonate strongly with that tradition.116

113 Ibid., p. 208.
115 See Cook 2007, pp. 210-211. See also Snarrenberg 1997, pp. 1-3.
Cook considers an inquiry into Schenker’s identity as an immigrant Ostjude as offering a more promising set of insights.\textsuperscript{117} Again primarily drawing on Wistrich and Beller, Cook depicts Viennese Jewry as fractured into rich and poor, assimilated and unassimilated, as well as Zionists and those who still held out hope for assimilation. He explores the issue of Jewish self-hatred in the context of Otto Weininger’s notorious \textit{Sex and Character} (1903), and cites the infiltration of anti-Semitism into music criticism in the context of the critical reception of Mahler, with reference to studies by American musicologists Karen Painter and the late K. M. Knittel. Both scholars published further research into early twentieth-century music criticism in recent years, of which Knittel’s much-disliked monograph on Mahler demonstrates, according to some critics, the pitfalls of organising an anthropological enquiry into the reception of music primarily around race.\textsuperscript{118} Schenker rarely wrote about Mahler (a composer notably absent in his discussion of modern music in the \textit{Niedergang} essay) yet it would have been beneficial for Cook to seek out the instances in which he did and, as a result, locate Schenker’s own thinking in response to these undoubtedly influential debates taking place around him. Elsewhere, Cook addresses occurrences of Schenker’s antipathy against Ostjuden by consolidating them with similar accounts of acculturated Jews in the work of Gay and Wistrich, thereby demonstrating that Schenker’s ambiguity was not exceptional, but indeed shared by a large section of the Jewish middle classes.

\textbf{Politics, Society, and Music}

Cook views Schenker’s political outlook as fundamentally permeated by German conservative thought, a tradition that, he suggests, originated in the nineteenth century and ‘the point of culmination’ of which was National Socialism.\textsuperscript{119} Evading the colossal body of nineteenth-century German thought, Cook

\textsuperscript{117} Ibid., p. 217.
\textsuperscript{118} K. M. Knittel’s \textit{Seeing Mahler: Music and the Language of Antisemitism in fin-de-siècle Vienna} (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010) was unfavourably received by musicologists and historians alike. Rozenblit suggests that ‘not a historian, Knittel profoundly misunderstands the nature of anti-Semitism in Vienna’. Rozenblit 2012, 358.
\textsuperscript{119} Cook 2007, p. 140.
describes this development as ‘conservatism with a small c, political thought in the broader sense of cultural politics rather than the narrower sense of party politics’. Based on musicologist Kevin Karnes’ research into Schenker’s early writings from the 1890s, Cook observes that these are almost free of political ideology, and locates a fundamental shift towards political exegesis in the preface of Kontrapunkt 2 (1922). However, considering Cook’s emphasis on the significant transformation in Schenker’s polemics taking place between Kontrapunkt 1 (1910) and Kontrapunkt 2 published twelve years later, his passing over Schenker’s publications from the intervening years, namely the Erläuterungsausgabe, seems peculiar. The prefaces of Kontrapunkt 1 and 2 have also attracted a reading by British musicologist Ian Biddle, who places them into the context of the ‘fascination for decline, fragmentation and degeneration’ and the ‘obsession with the beguiling “inner self”’ associated with fin-de-siècle Vienna. Placing Schenker’s anti-democratic invective in a theoretical framework that includes Freud’s psychoanalytic theory as well as the post-Freudian theories of Lacan, Derrida, and Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek, Biddle not only ties Schenker to several other writers of his day that expressed hostility towards the ‘rabble’, but also isolates the extraordinariness of Schenker’s ‘consistent attempt to silence the vernacular, without end, without let up, without mercy’. He locates the roots of Schenker’s vitriol in nineteenth-century gender regimes and a perceived waning of male hegemonic power during the turn of the century. In fact, Biddle’s research is embedded within a polemic against previous readings of Schenker’s invective (including Cook’s) that, in his view, seek to defend Schenker’s misogyny by referring to the ubiquity of his views in his cultural milieu: ‘what entices, amuses, delights and brings frisson in Schenker for these commentators is probably precisely the thing which they seek to apologize for, that which is precisely and systematically worked for in Schenker, the denigration of both the feminine and the vernacular.’

Like Schenker’s misogyny and elitism, his nationalist polemics in response to the outcome of the First World War have been something of an

\[120\] Ibid.
\[121\] Biddle 2011, p. 154.
\[122\] Ibid., p. 111.
\[123\] Ibid., p. 116.
embarrassment even to the staunchest supporters of his musical theories. Cook sets Schenker’s jingoism into context by arguing that his discussion of the antagonism between the West and Germany was essentially an ideological one, perhaps even predominantly directed towards ‘the enemy within’, rather than against the victorious powers.\textsuperscript{124} He again refers to Rozenblit in order to explain the war from the viewpoint of Viennese Jewry, a subject matter absent in Schenker’s post-war writings. More broadly, Cook puts Schenker’s views in perspective by relating them to those of Schoenberg, Oswald Spengler, Thomas Mann, and other thinkers of his time.

Andrea Reiter’s contextualisation of Schenker’s post-war political outlook draws attention to the analogies with writers such as Stefan George and Hugo von Hofmannsthal. Her reading of their aesthetic fundamentalism chimes with Schenker’s elitism, which developed gradually during the first two decades of the twentieth century; Reiter explains: ‘Aesthetic, like religious, fundamentalism is a reaction to epochal structural changes leading to rationalization and depersonalization of social spheres. […] The target of its criticism is not the world as such but its modern phenomena.’\textsuperscript{125} Like Cook, Reiter addresses Schenker’s blurring of lines between art and politics, including the metaphorical use of his own music-theoretical vocabulary. Following her analysis of Schenker’s rhetoric and style in a single, if prolonged, sentence taken from his essay ‘Die Sendung des Deutschen Genies’ (‘The Mission of German Genius’, 1921), Reiter discusses Schenker’s deliberate appropriation of rather ostentatious, if not pretentious linguistic means in order, like George, to propagate a conservativist agenda.

At the heart of Schenker’s critique of society lay a perceived mismatch between a meaningful national cultural heritage and an ignorant contemporary public, or, as he saw it, his contemporaries’ betrayal of German culture by turning their backs on the geniuses of the past. Robert Snarrenberg, in his study \textit{Schenker’s Interpretive Practice} (1997), argues that Schenker may have derived his views from narrower principles of the reception of music. Based on his writings in \textit{Kontrapunkt} 1, \textit{Der Tonwille} 3 (1922), and his early essay ‘Das Hören in der Musik’ (‘Hearing in Music’, 1894), amongst others, Snarrenberg infers that

\textsuperscript{124} Cook 2007, p. 232.
\textsuperscript{125} Reiter 2003, p. 150.
Schenker ‘divided the world into two groups of people: those who, for the want of time, energy or spirit, have no ear for music, and those who do’. Within the second group, Snarrenberg continues, Schenker distinguished between creative and re-creative musicians, further dividing the latter into renderers (Vortragende) and receivers (Aufnehmende). For Schenker, re-creative listeners and performers had to possess the same rule book as the composer if they were to understand or perform the composer’s works. Snarrenberg continues: ‘What made a practice such as his necessary, in his mind, was a serious breakdown in the process of cultural transmission. Those who were now teachers and so-called masters of the art were, in his eyes, bunglers and traitors.’ This is a significant aspect of Schenker’s argument. However, Snarrenberg’s analysis draws on diverse sources that were published over a period of decades; although Schenker is known to have been categorical in his outlook, such synchronous reading of varied sources presupposes perhaps too monolithic a position. In contrast, a close reading of the unpublished 1911 ‘Kunst und die Teilnehmenden’ drafts, in which Schenker addresses precisely the issue of the relationships between the productive artist, reproduction, mediation, and reception, allow a more balanced interpretation of his views, based on one single source.

This is particularly vital as Schenker gradually came to regard his ideas of the Urlinie and other music-theoretical concepts as relevant beyond music. Music theorist Leslie Blasius applies two theoretical concepts to Schenker’s approach in this respect: synthesis and closure. By synthesis Blasius means Schenker’s ideological binding together of different discursive strands (society, technology, genius, education, politics etc.), and by closure Schenker’s proscription of any perception of music or society alike that differs from the one that he lays out. Blasius writes:

[What is interesting here is the question of ordering. We may accept, for the sake of argument, the assertion that the meaning of a musical text is political or social. But we would expect this meaning to be argued as a product of such extra-textual consideration. Schenker, by contrast,

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126 Snarrenberg 1997, p. 141.
127 Ibid.
128 Ibid., p. 144.
129 Blasius 1996, p. 100.
ventures the reverse, rhetorically situating his examination of music anterior to his ideology, arguing, as he would have it, his political agenda as a product of his analyses of music [...] Whatever the motivation, this move entails the isolation or closure of his analysis.\textsuperscript{130}

Blasius’ argument involves the displacement of Schenker’s mature theory onto the field of criticism: ‘We might say that replacement of traditional criticism by Schenker’s analysis mirrors his historical narrative, which takes the turn from vocal composition to instrumental composition as a decisive liberation from the enslavement of tones to the word.’\textsuperscript{131} British musicologist Matthew Pritchard echoes this idea, arguing that ‘one of the \textit{Urlinie}’s earliest aesthetic functions is to render the products of pure hermeneutic criticism superfluous or irrelevant.’\textsuperscript{132}

\textbf{Journalism and Music Criticism}

Schenker’s writings on journalism have been all but ignored by researchers, an oversight all the more surprising as Federhofer does dedicate an entire – admittedly short – sub-chapter to the theme. Schenker’s criticism of the press suddenly erupted, Federhofer suggests, in the early 1910s. It is curious that he would refer to a diary entry dating from 1911, when Schenker was aged 43, as an ‘early’ occurrence, yet it is perhaps even more peculiar that Schenker’s hard stance against journalism appears to have come out of nowhere. Federhofer does not provide any explanation. His selection of diary entries, all dating from between 1911 and 1916, reveal Schenker’s emergent association of the (moral) ‘crimes’ of journalism with those, as he saw it, perpetrated in the field of music criticism.\textsuperscript{133} His principal charge against the latter is in fact its manifestation as a journalistic genre: instead of doing justice to those structural aspects of music into which he by 1911 claimed singular insight, it debased works of art by presenting them in a way that was the most accessible or agreeable to a wide readership, and, as a result, the most profitable for the writer.

\textsuperscript{130} Blasuis 1996, p. 107.
\textsuperscript{131} Ibid., p. 106.
\textsuperscript{132} Pritchard 2013, 165.
\textsuperscript{133} Diary entries, 23 September 1915 and 26 January 1916, Federhofer 1985, pp. 309-310.
A study of Schenker’s attitude towards music criticism requires taking into account his own articles written for newspapers and journals between 1891 and 1900. These 101 items have been published in an anthology edited by Federhofer in 1990, although some of them (particularly Schenker’s discursive essays as opposed to his reviews) had come out in English translation already during the late 1980s.\(^{134}\) Even so, Schenker’s reviews have received little scholarly attention, with the exception of in the work of Kevin Karnes. Karnes’ aim is to evaluate Schenker’s writings in the wider context of a formative period in the history of musicology, framed by the works of Eduard Hanslick and Guido Adler, the latter of which is generally accepted as the father of modern musicology. (The inception of musicology is commonly dated from Adler’s 1885 essay ‘Umfang, Ziel und Methode der Musikhissenschaft’ (‘Scope, Method, and Goal of Musicology’).)\(^{135}\) Karnes argues that Schenker’s disapproval of music criticism at the time was related to his suspicions towards historical musicology, ‘a branch of music study to which all others aspired methodologically’.\(^{136}\) He goes so far as to consider Schenker’s criticisms to have been closely directed towards the ideals outlined in Adler’s Umfang essay. This marks Schenker’s position as representing a stance distinctly distant from his later thought; Karnes writes: ‘[Adler’s essay] valorised theorizing about stylistic development and relegated to the sidelines or dismissed entirely the kinds of subjective engagement with musical works that Schenker held most dear.’\(^{137}\)

One of Karnes’ novel insights into Schenker’s early ideas about music analysis is his short-lived embrace of hermeneutics, an analytical tool that represents the centre of attention of his later critiques of other writers. In the early 1890s, conversely, Schenker sought to distance himself from Adler’s ‘scientific’ method in order to account for the emotional impact of a musical work upon the listener. By drawing on British musicologist Ian Bent’s research into hermeneutic modes of analysis in the nineteenth century, Karnes identifies Schenker’s role model for his approach in the theoretical writings of Richard


\(^{135}\) Nettl 1999, p. 288.

\(^{136}\) Karnes 2008, p. 81.

\(^{137}\) Ibid., p. 82.
Wagner.\textsuperscript{138} The concept of hermeneutics itself can be traced to 1800, and the work of German philosopher Friedrich Schleiermacher in particular. Whereas, according to Bent, ‘objective’ description could essentially be reconciled with Adler’s ideas of the scientific study of music, ‘subjective’ interpretation was concerned with ‘the inner life of the music rather than its outward, audible form.’\textsuperscript{139} Karnes argues that, given the pervasiveness of hermeneutics in nineteenth-century critical discourse, Schenker too was ‘deeply indebted to this methodological trend’, and that his later attacks on Hermann Kretzschmar (a notable champion of hermeneutics in the early 1900s) have obscured this fact from the view of most commentators.\textsuperscript{140} Karnes traces Schenker’s use of hermeneutics to two reviews of music by Brahms; the first, of his songs op. 107, dates from 1891, and the second, of Brahms choral pieces op. 104, was published in the following year. In both instances Schenker, like many critics of the time, supplies dramatic narratives about the works, yet, Karnes suggests, ‘Schenker’s analytical inquiry […] was not the construction of elucidatory narratives but the uncovering of narratives that he posited to have inspired, whether consciously or not, Brahms’ own creative work’.\textsuperscript{141} By encouraging the listener also to uncover such narratives, he argues, Schenker’s claims exhibit a Wagnerian sensibility, quite possibly derived from the composer’s widely read \textit{Oper und Drama} (\textit{Opera and Drama}, 1851), a book-length polemical essay that Schenker would aim to refute over a decade later in his \textit{Niedergang} essay.

Karnes offers a close reading of Schenker’s two Brahms reviews, convincingly placing Schenker’s interpretive practice within the nineteenth-century German hermeneutic tradition. Schenker’s embrace of Wagnerian aesthetics, according to Karnes, may have been stimulated by Nietzsche’s attempts to debunk the cult of genius in \textit{Menschliches, allzu Menschliches} (\textit{Human, All Too Human}, 1878). The ensuing debate of Nietzsche’s ideas coincided with nineteenth-century musicologist Gustav Nottebohm’s provocative reading of Beethoven’s sketchbooks, suggesting a tireless worker, rather than a genius, at work. Staunchly believing in the idea of genius, Schenker later

\textsuperscript{138} Ibid., p. 83.
\textsuperscript{140} Karnes 2008, p. 84.
\textsuperscript{141} Ibid., p. 85. Emphases in original.
returned to the work of Nottebohm, reviewing his work in the Ninth Symphony monograph and consulting it for the *Erläuterungsausgabe*. Karnes argues that given the trend emerging in some quarters to reject the very idea of genius (which Adler also did in his *Umfang* essay, with reference to both Nietzsche and Nottebohm), it is of little surprise that Schenker would turn to Wagnerian aesthetics, as Wagner himself displayed a fascination with the notion of genius.

Karnes supports his conclusions with observations on other aspects of Schenker’s critical discourse that suggest that he was not entirely opposed to the positivist movement, and went on to further explore other critical traditions. At the same time, Schenker’s writings reveal scepticism about Wagner’s theory. Karnes summarises Schenker’s dilemma as one between the ‘unconscious’ creative act of composition on the one hand,¹⁴² and the composer’s conscious sensibilities to shape the musical materials into a coherent whole on the other. These deliberations prepare the context for Schenker’s most extensive and systematic essay written in the 1890s, and one that has received correspondingly extensive scholarly attention, ‘Der Geist der musikalischen Technik’ (‘The Spirit of Musical Technique’), delivered as part of a lecture to the University of Vienna’s Philosophical Society in 1895. At the heart of the matter here is Schenker’s acknowledgement of the organic, natural creative process of composition, as well as the inorganic (or ‘anti-organic’, as William Pastille, the first modern commentator on this essay would have it), conscious organisation of musical materials by the composer.¹⁴³ Given that Schenker’s mature theories place considerable weight on organicism, the ‘unfolding of Nature’,¹⁴⁴ Pastille’s discovery of this essay in 1984 caused something of a stir (and markedly contradictory readings) amongst Schenkerians. Nicholas Cook also attributes considerable significance to this essay; indeed, it underpins much of his argument in *The Schenker Project*. Whereas a review of the music-theoretical articles associated with the debate on the *Geist* essay may not be particularly relevant in the current context of music criticism,¹⁴⁵ I want to address Cook’s

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¹⁴² Karnes 2008, p. 111.
¹⁴³ Pastille 1984, 32.
reading of close affinities between Hanslick’s and Schenker’s views on the compositional process expressed in the essay, as Hanslick posthumously reappears in Schenker’s writings on music criticism in the 1910s.

Hanslick’s notion of formalism is laid out in his highly influential aesthetic treatise *Vom Musikalisch-Schönen (On the Musically Beautiful)*, first published in 1854 and repeatedly revised in its nine subsequent editions. He urged for a reasoned, dispassionate discussion of music, in which the listener should not focus on the feelings that a given piece of music evokes, but – in his famous phrase – its ‘tonally moving forms’, the formal parameters of the composition.\(^{146}\)

Whereas Allan Keiler, in his article on Schenker’s *Geist* essay, views the document as ‘a vigorous attack on the formalism of Eduard Hanslick’,\(^ {147}\) Cook takes the opposite stance. Like Karnes, who dedicates an entire chapter to Hanslick in his book, Cook is wary of viewing Hanslick’s output too reductively. Drawing on Botstein’s research into *fin-de-siècle* listening habits of Viennese concert audiences and the role of music criticism in relation to these habits, Cook deems Schenker’s handling of the conscious and unconscious (or, in Cook words, the objective and the subjective) in his *Geist* essay as an extension of Hanslick’s critical agenda. Cook’s reading has come under some criticism by Kevin Korsyn, in his substantial review (2009) of *The Schenker Project*. Korsyn questions Cook’s ‘almost exclusive focus on Hanslick as the inspiration for Schenker’s early psychology’, and provides the historical background for the lecture during which the essay was first delivered – pointing out, amongst other things, Schenker’s association with Ernst Mach during the mid-1890s.\(^ {148}\) Yet both Cook and Korsyn fail to address the discrepancy involving the ‘obvious enough’ connection between Hanslick’s and Schenker’s thinking about music

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\(^{147}\) Keiler 1989, 286; cited in Cook 2007, p. 48.

\(^{148}\) Korsyn 2009, 165. Federhofer also mentions this (probably loose) association, which can be deduced from a postcard that Mach sent to Schenker in 1886; see Federhofer 1985, pp. 14-5.
and Schenker’s own writings on Hanslick.\textsuperscript{149} Both scholars neglect the \textit{Erläuterungsausgabe}, in which Schenker repeatedly dismisses Hanslick’s writings. An earlier instance of this occurs in Schenker’s unpublished ‘Kunst und Kritik’, yet the most remarkable attack on Hanslick is contained in a polemic against music critic Paul Bekker, deleted from the \textit{Erläuterungsausgabe} op. 101 (1921), in which Schenker’s compares Hanslick unfavourably to Wagner.

It could, of course, be argued that Schenker’s work on the \textit{Erläuterungsausgabe} in the 1910s represents a markedly different setting to that of his formative years in the 1890s, during which Schenker was evidently receptive to influences by other writers on music. Some correspondence between Hanslick and Schenker dating from 1894-9 survives in Schenker’s \textit{Nachlass}, which suggests an altogether courteous relationship. However, as Federhofer points out, these sources are in stark contrast to Schenker’s oblique article on Hanslick on the occasion of the latter’s seventieth birthday in 1895. In it, Schenker quotes at length from German physicist Hermann Helmholtz’s \textit{Lehre von den Tonempfindungen als physiologische Grundlage für die Theorie der Musik} (\textit{On the Sensations of Tone as a Physiological Basis for the Theory of Music}, 1863), in which Helmholtz is altogether dismissive of Hanslick’s ‘ice-cold negation’ of the impact of feelings in music. Schenker’s assurance that even once ‘the glacier of Hanslick’s negation’ is shattered, the critic’s name will live on engraved on ‘a sheet of floating ice’ seems less than celebratory.\textsuperscript{150}

More palpable than Hanslick’s direct influence on Schenker is the latter’s deliberate alignment with a liberal tradition of which Hanslick (and Brahms) were representatives. This self-alignment took place against the backdrop of a paradigm that pervaded much of Viennese music criticism in the late nineteenth century, in which Brahms represented a new conservatism that was in opposition to the extremes of political Wagnerianism.\textsuperscript{151} Even so, Kevin Karnes observes a substantive turn in Schenker’s position signalled in his articles dating from the late 1890s. In these, Schenker appears to recognise the promise of empirical study (as promoted by Guido Adler and Gustav Nottebohm) to

\textsuperscript{149} Korsyn 2009, 165.
\textsuperscript{151} McColl 1996, p. 165; cited in Cook 2007, p. 53.
demystify the process of composition.\(^{152}\) Karnes explains the significance of this shift in the following terms:

And if [Schenker] went on to abandon his empiricist convictions within a decade after he first espoused them, that fact does not detract from the significance of this early shift in his thinking. For it signalled not only his early attraction to positivist scholarship and its promise but also his first substantive break from the critical mainstream of his time.\(^{153}\)

(Karnes’ reference to Schenker’s abandonment of his empiricist convictions may refer to Schenker’s idealistic formula of the ‘interior lives of tones’ in *Harmonielehre* (1906), which, as Blasius writes, offsets the object of study ‘from the human mentality and renders any notion of a fixed agenda suspect’.\(^{154}\) Schenker came to view the study of music as an essentially artistic rather than scientific undertaking, as his anonymous attribution of *Harmonielehre*, ‘by an artist’, intimates.) Schenker entertained a friendly relationship with Adler in the early 1900s, as Federhofer demonstrates in his selection of diary entries dating from that period.\(^{155}\) An estrangement occurred in 1913, probably triggered by Adler’s alleged proscription of Schenker’s publications from the library of his seminars at the University of Vienna.\(^{156}\) Schenker went on to savagely attack Adler’s music-historical work in his *Erläuterungsausgabe* op. 111 (1915), although without mentioning Adler’s name.\(^{157}\)

Schenker’s *Erläuterungsausgabe* of Beethoven’s late piano sonatas, together with his Ninth Symphony monograph, and, as Cook points out,\(^{158}\) his *Beitrag zur Ornamentik*, are all concerned with the contributions of other writers regarding the respective works of music. In the case of *Ein Beitrag zur Ornamentik*, Schenker’s ‘sparring partner’ is the previous editor of the same pieces of music,\(^{159}\) German conductor Hans von Bülow, who had also previously edited Beethoven’s late piano sonatas. Cook examines Schenker’s charges

\(^{152}\) Karnes 2008, p. 117.
\(^{153}\) Ibid., p. 129.
\(^{154}\) Blasius 1996, p. 97.
\(^{155}\) Federhofer 1985, pp. 49-50.
\(^{156}\) Diary entry, 29 May 1914; Ibid., pp. 50-1.
\(^{157}\) Ibid., p. 53.
\(^{158}\) Cook 2007, p. 91.
\(^{159}\) Ibid.
against Bülow and condenses them to Bülow’s inability to distinguish between ‘the ideal, enduring content of the music’ on the one hand, and ‘the mechanical means of its representation’ on the other.\footnote{Ibid., p. 92.} Crucially, Schenker argues that Bülow’s failure to understand the relationship between spirit and technique is a symptom of the modern world, despite the fact that Bülow had been almost forty years his senior.

Although Cook persuasively portrays Schenker’s \textit{Ornamentik}, the Ninth Symphony monograph, and the Beethoven \textit{Erläuterungsausgabe} as a group, he does not, in \textit{The Schenker Project}, particularly engage with any of these publications apart from \textit{Ornamentik}. However, he published an article on the Ninth Symphony monograph twelve years earlier, in the wake of its first publication in English (1992). Here Cook demonstrates that Schenker’s ‘fussiness and lack of generosity’ towards other writers was by no means the result of clear-cut epistemological differences.\footnote{Cook 1995, p. 89.} Cook writes: ‘for Schenker, the opposed but equally false approaches of hermeneutics and formalism represented the Scylla and Charybdis of analysis, and in the Ninth Symphony monograph they are represented by the figures of Hermann Kretzschmar and Hugo Riemann respectively’.\footnote{Ibid.} Even so, Cook argues that Schenker’s own writings on Beethoven’s music are at times hardly distinguishable from Kretzschmar’s hermeneutics. Although acknowledging Schenker’s seemingly deliberate misunderstanding of his ‘opponents’,\footnote{Ibid.} Cook’s analysis is somewhat uncritical of Schenker’s representations of other writers’ work. In the case of Kretzschmar, for instance, American music theorist Lee Rothfarb’s research suggests that his agenda of going beyond syntactic analysis was not the result of limited technical insights combined with verbosity, as Schenker would have it, but an attempt to stimulate a new dynamic in the listener’s engagement with works of art.\footnote{Rothfarb 1992, 68.} Cook does not, on this occasion, explore these matters of ideology and their historical context. The same applies to his reading – in \textit{The Schenker Project} – of Schenker’s essay ‘Musikkritik’, which lay dormant in the Censored Items File of the Oster Collection until it was published in 2005. In his
fleeting discussion, Cook takes note of Schenker’s ‘relapses into more or less personal abuse’, yet his interest in what brought about this confrontation does not appear to have been piqued, and Bekker only makes one other passing appearance in *The Schenker Project*. Cook concludes that ‘as seen from the perspective of [his] epistemology, Schenker’s exasperation with Bekker is easy enough to understand’.  

Matthew Pritchard has revisited ‘Musikkritik’, employing Schenker’s polemics against Bekker as part of a more extensive discussion on Austro-German debates over musical meaning in the early twentieth century. One of these ‘debates’ – it in fact included very little to and fro – revolved around the German theologian, music critic, and composer August Halm’s refutation of Bekker’s *Beethoven* (and his interpretation of Beethoven’s *Tempest* sonata in particular), published in Halm’s monograph *Von Zwei Kulturen der Musik* (1914). Pritchard’s perhaps most important contribution to the matter is to further illustrate the fragility of any absolute distinctions between technical and poetic conceptualisations of music: the two are not outright opposites, and were considered even less so a hundred years ago. By portraying his method as revealing an already given musical content – as opposed to interpreting it – Schenker strongly suggests the incompatibility of two analytical approaches that are today considered as complementary, even in the context of Schenkerian analysis. Moreover, as Pritchard points out, Schenker himself often places his music-theoretical work within an explicitly poetic framework. He does so partly by locating his methodological agenda within an artistic rather than scientific domain and partly by employing poetic colour when referring to his analytical work in his prose writings, a practice often signalled by an expression associated with his supposed antagonist Hugo Riemann, namely ‘gleichsam’

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165 Cook 2007, p. 299.  
166 Ibid.  
167 Notwithstanding the similarities between Schenker’s and Halm’s arguments against Bekker, Schenker thought very little of *Von Zwei Kulturen der Musik*, writing in his diary in 1914: ‘There is nothing as curious as Bekker’s execution, and the physiognomy of the analysis, which Halm puts up in opposition to those of Bekker. Even in Halm, it mostly ultimately boils down to empty aesthetics.’ SDO OJ 2/12, pp. 540–541 (19 March 1914), transcr. by Ian Bent, transl. by Ian Bent and Lee Rothfarb (2006)  
Seen in this light, Schenker’s elitist arguments against Bekker seem even more unjustified and petulant. Unlike Cook, Pritchard quotes some of the invective from ‘Musikkritik’, but offers little in terms of elucidating the reasons behind Schenker’s venomous, overtly political language. Bekker’s impression upon Schenker was far less fleeting than either Cook or Pritchard suggest, and it is against the background of Schenker’s arguments against music journalism espoused in the Erläuterungsausgabe and elsewhere that ‘Musikkritik’ needs to be read.\(^\text{169}\)

Having said all this, Cook is sensitive to the extra-musical, political dimensions that invaded music criticism in fin-de-siècle Vienna. As a matter of fact, he places substantial weight on the linguistic dichotomies that pervaded the genre. Drawing on Karen Painter’s research into critical responses to Mahler, he offers a brief gendered reading of Schenker’s Brahms obituary (1897). He adds another layer to his discourse by consolidating Leon Botstein’s study of values attached – by music critics – to the Viennese piano manufacturer Bösendorfer (as opposed to those associated with the American maker Steinway) with biographical data from Federhofer’s volume. Yet Cook’s portrayal of Schenker’s cultural environs, including music criticism, as ruled by a set of all-pervasive dichotomies does not always chime with Schenker’s own observations. While he can be firmly situated in the conservative-nationalist camp of writers on music, he did on occasion shift his position, such as in, to pick up two examples that I will discuss in this thesis, his rejection of Hanslick and his public support for Mahler. Both Botstein and Painter have cautioned, in recent publications, against reading fin-de-siècle music criticism too reductively.\(^\text{170}\) Painter writes:

Music, or at least musical listening, was politicized through characteristic metaphors. At the same time, of course, meaning is determined in large part by context, whether the surrounding text, the author’s reputation, or

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\(^\text{169}\) Cook acknowledges having barely explored File 12 (which holds the ‘Bekkerei’ folder) and File C (which holds the ‘criticism folder’) of the Oster Collection. Cook 2007, p. 41.

\(^\text{170}\) See Painter 2007, pp. 14-17, and Botstein 2011, 3.
even the venue of publication. [...] Aesthetics – and, in most cases, music itself – cannot be reduced to ideology.\footnote{Painter 2007, pp. 14-15.}

In conclusion, certain areas of Schenker’s thinking have received copious amounts of scholarly attention, most of all, as might be expected, that in relation to his mature music-theoretical and analytical work. Other areas are still somewhat vague, including the formative years of his university studies and his early career, in relation to which there is relatively little documentary evidence concerning his biography or intellectual biography. Cook has consolidated the sparse sources with secondary literature that demonstrates what intellectual currents Schenker would have been exposed to during this time. Schenker went through an evidently rapid process of assimilation into Viennese society that, it would seem, included an immersion in German idealist philosophers and was subject to late nineteenth-century cultural movements and trends. Reasonably deemed to have had some impact on Schenker’s thinking on music both at the time and later in his life, scholars including Cook have searched for tangible philosophical influences in Schenker’s early as well as later publications. Some of these explorations have thrown open the question to what extent Schenker, who never claimed any professional philosophical insights, actually understood the works by Kant, Hegel, Lessing, and the many other writers that he recurrently cites in his own publications.\footnote{Cook 2007, p. 45-6.} This issue, along with the conclusions that various scholars have drawn from Schenker’s writings, remains a matter of debate, as Korsyn’s argumentative review of \textit{The Schenker Project} demonstrates.\footnote{See Korsyn, 154-72.} My thesis will not enter this crowded field, nor will it erect Schenker’s polemics against certain music critics of his time into a discourse on the wider issues of the role of analysis in criticism and the role of criticism in analysis. Rather, this study will investigate what Schenker perceived as his role within the public discourse on music, and explore how this perception and its manifestation in his polemics add to our understanding of the theorist in relation to the themes set out above (Jewish identity; politics, society, and music; journalism and music criticism). Although considerable research has been undertaken within these areas, as outlined above, the sheer wealth of so far
unexplored archival material provides an opportunity to more fully situate him within the often alluded-to ‘everyday rough and tumble in the music criticism of [his] milieu’ and, as a result, add to the existent literature.

174 Biddle 2011, p. 115.
In the preface to his book *The Function of Criticism*, British literary theorist Terry Eagleton invites the reader to imagine ‘the moment in which a critic, sitting down to begin a study of some theme or author, is suddenly arrested by a set of disturbing questions’, including: ‘What is the point of such a study? Who is it intended to reach, influence, impress? What functions are ascribed to such a critical act by society as a whole?’¹ Schenker’s uncompromising attacks on journalists, music scholars, historians, editors, and the musical public alike was certainly problematical: he addressed in his invective the same imagined audience of readers that he criticised for their empty consumerism and vanity, and threw into question the same institution from which he sought acknowledgement. His pronouncements from the vantage point of an ‘exemplary outsider’,² which at least in part followed local conventions of discourse, were embedded within a variety of outwardly disparate cultural contexts, forms of valuation, ideologies, and prejudices. Some of these Schenker systematically integrated into his discourse on music journalism, some appear as tangents, and others remain largely unexpressed or emerge the more forcefully in the writings of his contemporaries. In this chapter I will introduce and broadly describe some of the concepts and approaches that underpin my enquiry into the sources identified in Chapter 1.

**German Aesthetics, the Public Sphere**

Schenker’s arguments about (music) journalism as both the cause and a symptom of cultural decline in late-imperial Vienna were, in the broadest sense, rooted in eighteenth- and nineteenth century German aesthetics. Philosopher

¹ Eagleton 1984, p. [7]. Emphasis in original.
² Biddle 2011, pp. 125 and 119.
Raymond Geuss observes that, in German, three words are used to denote the English term ‘culture’, namely *Kultur*, *Bildung*, and *Geist*, all of which Schenker employs in his critical observations. Geuss argues that *Kultur* and *Bildung* have ‘shadows’ that are semantically closely related to the terms, yet were increasingly distinguished from them throughout the nineteenth century and arose as contrasts to them by the beginning of the twentieth century. The ‘shadow’ of *Bildung* is *Erziehung*. Both terms relate to processes of training, education, or formation, but whereas *Erziehung* predominantly refers to education, *Bildung* can mean either the process of formation, or the form imparted in such a process. While *Erziehung* implies a process that is imposed from one person or group onto another, *Bildung* came to be viewed as a process of self-cultivation. In the case of *Kultur*, its ‘shadow’ is *Zivilisation*. Geuss writes: ‘*Zivilisation* has a mildly pejorative connotation and was used to refer to the external trappings, artifacts, and amenities of an industrially highly advanced society and also to the overly formalistic and calculating habits and attitudes that were thought to be characteristic of such societies.’

Schenker, amongst others, discriminated between what Geuss identifies as the ‘French’ form of *Zivilisation* (concerned with the ‘courtly’ virtues of appearance, indirectness and diplomacy) and its ‘British’ form (concerned with the commercial virtues of calculation, egoism, and sobriety). *Kultur*, on the other hand, was commonly held to indicate ‘positively valorized habits, attitudes, and properties’. It was shortly before and during the First World War that *Kultur* and *Zivilisation* became considered to be opposites: ‘The French and British have *Zivilisation*, Germans have *Kultur*.’ The view that *Kultur* was ‘stereotypically German’ was held by right-wing ideologues in particular, but was also common currency amongst non-political commentators and the wider public.

Geuss delineates three historical developments that dominate the notion of *Kultur* in Germany during the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. All

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3 Geuss 1999, p. 31.  
4 Ibid., p. 32.  
5 Ibid.  
6 Ibid.  
7 Ibid.  
8 Eagleton 2000, p. 11.
three are rooted in Kant’s views on the general phenomenon of culture, which ‘represent a kind of common European-Enlightenment baseline’. For Geuss, Kant’s distinction between Kultur and what he calls Zivilisierung is one between the asocial process of cultivating one’s faculties and the social process of taking pleasure in an object and sharing one’s pleasure with others. As such, Kultur and Zivilisierung are, in Kant’s view, neither mutually exclusive nor opposed to each other. The first historical development away from this Kantian position, according to Geuss, involves Herder’s claim of a plurality of different, nationally specific ways of living. Unlike Kant, Herder did not employ technical vocabulary (such as ‘Kultur’ as opposed to ‘Zivilisierung’) to differentiate between these ways of living, yet he retained Kant’s sense of the term Kultur, meaning the ‘general state or level of cultivation of human faculties’. Herder’s arguments came to be widely deployed to identify and articulate facets of German culture in the wake of the French Revolution. The differentiation between French and German ways of doing things (such as local German legal codes as opposed to the Code Napoléon, the French civil code) turned, in the interpretations of some commentators, into claims of German national supremacy. Schenker’s own belief in the centrality of German culture in Europe, underscored by the pre-eminence of German composers, has been identified as one of his most consistently expressed ideological stances.

The second historical development of the idea of Kultur identified by Geuss revolves around the notion of Bildung, and is generally associated with Wilhelm von Humboldt and Goethe. Humboldt claimed that the goal of humanity is the full development of each human individual, an act that could be achieved through the fullest possible process of Bildung. At about the same time as Humboldt made this claim, during the mid-1790s, Goethe wrote Wilhelm Meister’s Lehrjahre (Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship), a novel that became the first exemplar of a new literary sub-genre, the Bildungsroman. This work (and Goethe’s writings in general, which Schenker read throughout his life) held special meaning for Schenker, who devoted his probably most substantial essay

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10 Ibid., p. 34.
on a non-musical topic – as yet unexplored – to the novel in 1916. In *Wilhelm Meister*, Geuss sees three elements of *Bildung*: ‘development of one’s powers, discovery of one’s true wants, and realistic acceptance of the world as it is’.\(^ {13}\)

The early Romantics enthusiastically embraced the first two ideas, while quietly rejecting the third, a behaviour that for Geuss exhibits political nuances:

> In the political realm emphasis on self-development and self-discovery might be thought to point in the direction of some form of liberalism; emphasis on realistic adjustment to the world as it is might on the other hand be thought to have rather more politically quietist consequences.\(^ {14}\)

The third historical course identified by Geuss places aesthetic experience and judgement at the centre of discussion. The main impetus for this development was the work of Schiller. Geuss defines aesthetic experience, in Kantian terms, as ‘a certain state of harmony between different parts of our mind or different components of our cognitive faculties’.\(^ {15}\) He elaborates: ‘[A]n action has positive moral value if it accords with what reason demands and is performed by the agent *because* it is known to be what reason demands.’\(^ {16}\)

Although Schiller basically accepted this Kantian view, he argued that it was not rigorous enough in determining the moral quality of that action. For Schiller, ‘reasonable’ actions did not necessarily and unavoidably conform to reason, but developed through various processes of education, so that ‘a human might arrive at a state in which he or she “could” […] act against the demands of reason, but would have to act against their inclinations to act in a way that reason would not finally endorse’.\(^ {17}\) In this sense, the task of culture, read as *Erziehung*, is to hone a person’s sense of aesthetics, to produce a kind of harmony among the human faculties propaedeutic to morality. Aesthetic judgment on the other hand, i.e. as opposed to aesthetic experience, is, like art, a ‘realm of shared, self-regulating subjectivity’.\(^ {18}\) Unlike ethical judgement it does not necessarily demand assent, but invites agreement; aesthetic judgement is, therefore, an essentially social action in which matters of taste are

\(^ {13}\) Ibid., p. 38.
\(^ {14}\) Ibid., pp. 38-9.
\(^ {15}\) Ibid., p. 39.
\(^ {16}\) Ibid., pp. 39-40. Emphasis in original.
\(^ {17}\) Ibid., p. 40.
\(^ {18}\) Ibid., p. 41.
claimed and shared with others who do the same. Historically, the decisive factor here was the move from eighteenth-century patronage to a more or less free market. The early commercialisation of music – rather than dictating some kind of homogenous and accessible style – led to an emphasis on originality, uniqueness and personality, including that of the listener. ¹⁹ In concert with the embrace of Goethe’s and Humboldt’s concepts of edification through art, the educated middle classes (Bildungsbürgertum) seized upon the new commercial opportunities of attending public events that displayed prestigious works of art. In the process, Geuss argues, Schiller’s distinct notions of aesthetic experience and aesthetic judgment became amalgamated:

The concrete socio-political embodiment of the idea of a self-regulating aesthetic society was the so-called Bildungsbürgertum, the ‘educated middle classes’, who […] used their purported possession of a cultivated faculty of aesthetic judgement, their taste, to legitimize the retention of a certain privileged position. […] The Bildungsbürgertum was a self-coopting group whose collective good taste was a warrant (almost) of moral superiority. ²⁰

As implied here, the middle classes’ self-proclaimed status as the carriers of culture was a chimera. The concept of such a self-regulating aesthetic society is inextricably linked to that of the public sphere, which also originated (like both the German words Publikum and Musikkritik) ²¹ in the Age of Enlightenment, and developed in a range of European capitals at different times throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Theories of the public sphere are at the heart of a variety of disciplines, ranging from medieval scholasticism to modern philosophy and sociology, as well as politics and the law. Enquiries into the nature of the public sphere developed alongside the ascent of modern academic

²⁰ Geuss 1999, p. 42.
²¹ Early references to ‘Publicum’ include German author and literary critic Johann Christoph Gottsched’s quip ‘in Berlin this thing is now called the Publicum’ (in Berlin heißt das Ding jetzt Publicum) in 1760 in order to describe the educated bourgeois, and thereby the onset of the very development that Geuss refers to (Kammerer 2012, p. 8). Although the idea of the music critic can be traced to the sixteenth century, early German music criticism is often associated with journals published by two eighteenth-century German composers, namely Johann Matheson’s ‘Musica critica’ (1722-5) and Johann Adolf Scheibe’s ‘Der Critische Musikus’ (1737-40, rpt. and rev. in 1745). See Braun 1972, p. 27-8, and Drauschke 2011, 11.
sociology, which includes the work of Karl Marx, Émile Durkheim, and Max Weber, amongst others. German sociologist Jürgen Habermas represents the emergence of *bourgeois* society as a series of events in which old social orders such as the feudal state were increasingly challenged by what developed into the idea of the public sphere. As such, the public sphere consistently and emphatically came to occupy realms from which it had in previously excluded, most importantly politics. Habermas places the development of the public sphere squarely within a political context, anti-authoritarian liberalism. Partially in response to the work of Karl Marx, he contends that the idea of holding to account the authority of the state by the power of public opinion was – notwithstanding its achievements – essentially a fiction. Habermas writes:

> [T]he dissolution of feudal relations of domination in the medium of the public engaged in rational-critical debate did not amount to the purported dissolution of political domination in general but only to its perpetuation in different guise. The bourgeois constitutional state, along with the public sphere as the central principle of its organisation, was mere ideology.\(^{22}\)

This ideology, first unmasked by Marx, was fuelled by a utopian principle of universal accessibility unbridled by capital valorisation. Borne out of the same principles, music came to occupy a distinctive place in Viennese society during the second half of the nineteenth century; the ideology of the public sphere forged conceptions of the audience as arbiter of taste, as well as of the universal accessibility of music. Even informal concerts (as well as theatre and sporting events) were seen as offering a platform to live out fictions of conviviality, thereby bridging political and racial tensions.\(^{23}\) For the same reasons, Liberalism despite its failure to achieve political hegemony continued to hold power over the arts, and, in cohort, the *grande bourgeoisie* in particular remained committed to its ideals.\(^{24}\) If cultivating the arts was ‘essentially the ornamentation of (business) life’ for the *Gründer*,\(^ {25}\) it became a focus in its own right for the younger generation, which rejected their parents’ ideals of ‘reason, order and progress, perseverance, self-reliance and disciplined conformity to the

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\(^{22}\) Habermas 1989, p. 125.

\(^{23}\) Johnston 1972, p. 131.

\(^{24}\) Notley 2007, pp. 156-60.

\(^{25}\) Janik 1973, p. 45.
standards of good taste and action’. Habermas contends that during the course of the nineteenth century the notion of the public sphere became increasingly distorted, as active rational-critical debate gave way to mere consumerism. He views the commercialising mass press as being the precipitator of this disintegration:

The integration of the once separate domains of journalism and literature, that is to say, of information and rational-critical argument on the one side and of belles lettres on the other, brings about a peculiar shifting of reality – even a conflation of different levels of reality. Under the common denominator of so-called human interest emerges the mixtum compositum of the pleasant and at the same time convenient subject for entertainment that, instead of doing justice to reality, has a tendency to present a substitute more palatable for consumption.

It was against the same commodification of art that Schenker came to focus his critique of journalism as well as his broader critique of society. His valorisation of the German Masters as the carriers of culture – as well as, in cohort, what he considered rational-critical argument itself, i.e. his own explications of ‘musical truth’ – was embedded within a reactionary aesthetic, for, as Eagleton observes, if Zivilisation means an all-encompassing development of a society, then the idea of Kultur is forced into a critical attitude: ‘once culture comes to mean learning and the arts, activities confined to a tiny proportion of men and women, the idea is at once impoverished and intensified.’

**Jewish Identity**

Schenker’s critique of culture from the vantage point of an acculturated yet non-baptised Ostjude locates him in the centre of debates about the accomplishments and limits of German-Jewish assimilation taking place during the fin-de-siècle, particularly in the context of scholarship and journalism. These were stimulated by widely read essays such as Kraus’s ‘Heine und die Folgen’

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26 Ibid., p. 42.
29 Eagleton 2000, p. 11.
1910), and Moritz Goldstein’s ‘Deutsch-jüdischer Parnass’, published in the Munich-based journal Der Kunstwart in 1912, amongst many others. Although Jewishness only entered his published work in Der freie Satz, Schenker regularly responded to these debates in his diary.\(^{30}\) Some facets of Schenker’s identity as a Jew – as can be determined by his diary and correspondence – were expressed consistently, others transmuted by the various discourses and historical developments taking place during his lifetime. His observations during the 1910s disclose an increasingly fragmented attitude in relation to the Jewish Question, and his attacks on music critics such as Paul Bekker evoked a conjoined Jewish-journalistic image that was, like his outspoken anti-modernism, frequently activated in anti-Semitic discourse especially in the years after the First World War.

In terms of historiography, historian Michael Steinberg identifies two broad approaches to fin-de-siècle Viennese culture. On one side, there is Carl Schorske’s argument of generational tension and the rejection of Liberalism in crisis, on the other side there are attempts to redefine Austrian modernism – ‘against Schorske’ – as an essentially Jewish event, paying attention to the aspect of Austrian Jews and Jewish components in fin-de-siècle Viennese culture.\(^{31}\) The latter is precipitated by the disparity between the number of Jews living in Vienna (only circa eight point six percent of the Viennese population were Jewish by religion or descent (i.e. 175,318 out of 2,031,498) in 1910)\(^{32}\) and the predominance of Jews amongst the artists and critical thinkers of Austrian modernism, the most frequently evoked roster of which consists of Freud, Theodor Hertzl, Schnitzler, Kraus, Mahler, Schoenberg, Hermann Broch, Viktor and Max Adler, and Otto Bauer.\(^{33}\) According to Steinberg, analyses of this phenomenon are prone to a methodological trap, namely ‘the argument that the intellectual agenda or production of either a single individual or, worse, an entire cultural style or period (‘fin de siècle Vienna”) is determined by a certain fixed

\(^{30}\) See, for instance, diary entry on 19 June 1916 (Federhofer 1985, p. 315), in which Schenker comments on an essay titled ‘Die Judenfrage’ (‘The Jewish Question’) by German writer Oskar A. H. Schmitz.
\(^{31}\) Steinberg 1988, 10.
\(^{33}\) Steinberg 1990, p. 172.
cultural or religious identity’. Even so, some general concepts of middle-class Viennese Jewry are broadly applicable to the sources considered here.

Cultural historian George Mosse demonstrates to what degree Bildung, aesthetic or otherwise, played a role in Jewish assimilation into German culture. He is chiefly concerned with the ideal of self-education or character formation, and with ‘those manners and morals that constitute the idea of respectability’. Nationalism provided some social cohesion, yet it was education that served to define the middle classes into which the Jews became emancipated: ‘the concept of Bildung was meant to open careers to talent and better citizenship through a process of self-cultivation based upon classical learning and the development of aesthetic sensibilities.’ Most middle-class Jews sent their children to the Realgymnasien, which, more practically orientated than Humboldt’s humanistic Gymnasium, taught ‘bourgeois vocations’ while, at the same time, inculcating virtue and self-cultivation.

Exploiting the upward mobility that Bildung granted gave middle-class Jews the opportunity to distance themselves from the stereotype of the ghetto Jew, perceived within German mental economies as rootless, unproductive and asocial. For the Jewish generation following that of the Gründerzeit, Bildung became increasingly detached from the idea of citizenship, and, instead, devoted to the search for aesthetic values. As Mosse writes, ‘now the product rather than process counted’. He continues:

*Bildung* furthered a cultural vision of the world. This facilitated the division between culture and other aspects of life that led many Germans to equate Bildung with a vague quest for ‘higher things’, […] but also made it easier to support cultural innovation while remaining traditionalist in politics and social life. Moreover, it blinded to political realities those who were committed to the primacy of humanistic culture. Jews tried to make contact with the masses of Germans, largely through literature, but many were also suspicious of these masses. [Jews] shared fully […] the lingering doubt of liberals about the relationship between what they regarded the real Volk of enlightened and liberal men and the masses of the German nation.

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34 Ibid., p. 173.  
35 Mosse 1993, p. 131.  
36 Ibid., p. 132.  
37 Ibid.  
38 Aschheim 1982, p. 11.  
In the build-up to the First World War, Jewish enthusiasm for German art and literature became increasingly compromised by the rise of anti-Semitism. The love for German classical culture that had manifested itself in Jewish Goethe scholarship, for instance, did not provide a lasting or specific German-Jewish heritage. Mosse argues that some thinkers attempted to use their own scholarship to exorcise the irrational (i.e. anti-Semitism as a culturally based argument) that had attached itself to German works of art, or, as in the case of Sigmund Freud, the German psyche. At the same time, anti-Semitism was intimately related to the emergence of a new critique of culture (Kulturkritik), particularly in Vienna. As ‘conventional’ German art such Beethoven’s symphonies became increasingly commercialised and democratised, a new art was required as a basis for a new ‘artistic aristocracy’ open to Jewish intellectuals. Avant-garde art itself, therefore, turned into a critique of what was considered the philistine culture of the masses, including the educated middle-classes.

Leon Botstein identifies the ideology underlying this development as the politically conservative ideal of sustaining the social exclusivity that Viennese Jewry could entertain during the late nineteenth century. Behind this lay an ethical aspect: art became a critique of the perceived sanctimoniousness of the Catholic petite bourgeoisie, a stratum that Jews were traditionally denied access to. (The majority of Catholic men in Vienna were artisans or workers, while the great majority of Jews were traders, merchants, self-employed, or businessmen.) Jewish avant-garde artists went on to reject the bourgeoisie, including their own parents’ uncritical embrace of material wealth. However, as a symptom of the increasing fragmentation of Jewish identity caused by anti-Semitism, Jewish critics, none more so than Karl Kraus, began to redirect their critique against artists, critics, and the public alike. Botstein writes:

Kraus, and later Schoenberg, developed a nearly paranoid suspicion of a conspiracy linking the commerce of art (including patronage and the

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41 Ibid., p. 48.
42 Botstein 1991, p. 82.
43 Ibid., p. 83.
politics of art institutions), the philistine audience, the press, and the self-styled modern artist. [...] Most fin de siècle modernism appeared to pander to a debased sense of art and revelled in a facile bohemianism designed to enhance the journalistic fame associated with making new art. In contrast, Kraus and his followers argued that the exemplary vehicle for art – language – was also the instrument of truth telling.\footnote{Botstein 1997, p. 13.}

Karl Kraus was a Viennese journalist and satirist whose work, which was mostly self-published in his journal Die Fackel, has been recognised as having had a significant influence on figures such as Schoenberg, Loos, and Wittgenstein, and, as Nicholas Cook suggests, Schenker.\footnote{Cook 1989, p. 424.} Although no copies of Die Fackel have been preserved in Schenker’s archive (neither are any other journals), he read it regularly and commented on it in his diary, particularly during the First World War. As such, Kraus poses an almost inescapable point of reference for Schenker’s attacks on journalism as a profession as well as on specific writers. Although Kraus’s own polemics against journalists have habitually been associated with the idea of Jewish self-hatred,\footnote{German philosopher Theodor Lessing described Kraus as ‘a shining exemplar of Jewish self-hatred’ in his classic study Der jüdische Selbsthaß (1930); Zohn 1997, p. 20.} American literary scholar Paul Reitter offers a more nuanced reading that suggests that Kraus, in his criticisms, distanced himself from journalism’s values in terms of German-Jewish assimilation, as well as the values of journalism’s anti-Semitic antagonists.\footnote{Reitter 2008, p. 179. Emphasis in original.} Like Kraus, Schenker chronicled cultural decline using language that paralleled and at times overlapped with right wing and anti-Semitic commentary.

**Musical Participation**

One way of reading what Robert Snarrenberg calls Schenker’s ‘most complete pronouncement of the psychological state of present musical culture’, namely the preface to Kontrapunkt 1, is as a taxonomy of musical participation.\footnote{Snarrenberg 1997, p. 145.} In the ‘Kunst und die Teilnehmenden’ drafts, in which Schenker disregards those
participants already dealt with in *Kontrapunkt* 1 (performers and composers), he self-evidently set out to do the same. His socially marginalising view of the relationship between music and society was one he shared with Theodor Adorno, an influential German philosopher and musicologist who, in addition, shared with Schenker a number of assumptions about musical structure.\(^\text{51}\) Cook has already suggested that Schenker's work is infused with music-sociological thinking along the lines of Adorno, viewing Adorno's 'Types of Musical Conduct' set out in his *Einleitung in die Musiksoziologie* (*Introduction to the Sociology of Music* 1962) as 'a kind of latter-day version' of Schenker's early article 'Das Hören in der Musik' (1894), for instance.\(^\text{52}\) However, Schenker's writings from around 1910 provide a more suitable basis for an investigation of Schenker's thinking through the lens of Adornian theory, because here Schenker more purposefully imposes traits common to cultural conditions and practices that he expressly views as tied to more or less appropriate kinds of listening. One of the most insistent criticisms levelled against Adorno's analysis of the relationship between music and society is that it is 'granting too much autonomy to musical works, while approaching society from too grand, too totalizing a perspective'.\(^\text{53}\) The same criticism can be levelled against Schenker, and it is their shared practice of imposing categories and schemata upon music and society that makes Adornian theory an obvious reference point.

Adorno set out the central tenets of his theory of the culture industry in his 1938 essay 'On the Fetish Character of Music and the Regression of Listening', which was written in response to Walter Benjamin's essay 'The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction' (1936).\(^\text{54}\) The concept of regressive listening reappears in Adorno's distinction of types of musical conduct set out in his *Einleitung in die Musiksoziologie*. These principally refer to modes of listening and corresponding social actions; they are qualitative profiles from which he deduces various modes of listening as a 'sociological index'.\(^\text{55}\) Adorno distances himself from the idea of a typology in absolute terms, considering the


\(^{52}\) Cook 2007, p. 192.

\(^{53}\) Dineen 2011, p. 43.

\(^{54}\) Bernstein 1991, p. 4.

\(^{55}\) Adorno 1977, p. 2.
establishment thereof as a ‘principle of stylization’ imposed onto the matter, rather than an appropriate means to reflect reality.\textsuperscript{56} Adorno explains: ‘What the typology intends, being well aware of social antagonisms, is to come from the thing itself, from music itself, to a plausible grouping of the discontinuous reactions to music.’\textsuperscript{57} The types of conduct are to be considered ideal types, momentarily suspending the gradations between them. Nonetheless, Adorno concedes that once applied to empirical research, these types need to be differentiated, allowing for appropriate gradations as rendered by empirical research. Crucially, the resulting canon of types of musical conduct is not to be considered as one subjectively guided by musical taste, but as one defined by the congruence between the music and the listener, the ‘adequacy or inadequacy of the act of listening to that which is heard’.\textsuperscript{58} In order to determine the extent of correlation, the ‘listened-to’ therefore needs to be an objectively structured and meaningful work, open to analysis, although Adorno concedes that the criteria for such analytical insight are themselves subject to sociological and musical factors.

Nearly all Schenker’s observations about the social workings of different groups of listeners can be located in Adorno’s later framework of types. Correlations between the two men’s thoughts are, of course, not entirely coincidental. Adorno was familiar with Schenker’s claims for the \textit{Urlinie},\textsuperscript{59} which may have helped shape his concept of ‘structural listening’, i.e. hearing the large-scale organisation of a piece of music beyond its immediately audible surface. Adorno in fact associates this faculty with his first type of musical conduct, that of the ‘expert’: ‘[The] horizon [of structural listening] is a concrete musical logic: the listener understands what he perceives as necessary, although the necessity is never quite causal.’\textsuperscript{60} Like Schenker, Adorno turns this at least partly into an issue revolving around individual freedom:

Under the prevailing social conditions, making experts of all listeners would of course be an inhumanly utopian enterprise. The compulsion which the work’s integral form exerts upon the listener is not only

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., p. 3.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{59} Federhofer 2004, 303.
\textsuperscript{60} Adorno 1977, p. 5.
incompatible with his nature, with his situation, and with the state of nonprofessional music education, but with individual liberty as well.\textsuperscript{61}

Given these social conditions, Adorno bestows legitimacy on the second type of listener, the ‘good listener’. Like the expert, the ‘good listener’ is capable of listening beyond the foreground of the notated text, and of passing judgement based on technicalities rather than being guided by the biases of taste. He or she is, however, not aware – or not fully aware – of technical and structural implications, comparable to a native speaker who, although proficient in speaking the language, may be ignorant of its grammar and syntax. The good listener is a ‘musical’ person, an attribute dependent, according to Adorno, on the homogeneity of a musical culture, such as the aristocratic circles of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.\textsuperscript{62} Adorno does not, however, consider homogeneity of musical culture as a necessary prerequisite for ‘good’ listening; rather, the ‘good listener’ is part of an elite that, historically, became increasingly threatened by the disproportionally growing number of listeners in general. The demise of the ‘good listener’ therefore leads to a polarisation of types of musical conduct: one either understands everything or nothing, a notion manifest in Schenker’s thinking as well.

Adorno’s third type, the ‘cultured listener’, or ‘cultured consumer’, is the sociological descendent of the ‘good listener’, filling the social void left by the latter’s demise. The cultured listener may be a serious enthusiast or vulgar snob: he or she substitutes technical insight and structural listening with secondary knowledge, be it of a biographical nature, or discussing the reproduction of a work of art: ‘The structure of hearing is atomistic: the type lies in wait for specific elements, for supposedly beautiful melodies, for grandiose moments. On the whole, his relation to music has a fetishist touch.’\textsuperscript{63} Being a consumer at heart, the ‘cultured listener’ accumulates musical experience, often excessively, by attending concerts and collecting records; as such, the consumption becomes as significant as the work of art. The cultured consumer’s fixation on musical surface events is, according to Adorno, a particularly common trait, yet he or she acts elitist, hostile to the masses; the type’s

\textsuperscript{61} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{62} Adorno 1977, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{63} Ibid., p. 7.
principles are that of reactionary conservativism, its views conformist and conventionalist. Yet, he continues, it is this type that precipitates public musical life by taking up positions of managers, organisers, and administrators in charge of venues, festivals, orchestras, etc. Adorno views these public figures as manipulating cultural institutions into becoming the agents of the culture industry, even if ‘they are the ones to guide that reified taste which wrongly deems itself superior to that of the culture industry’. In the same vein, Adorno’s view of music criticism tends to reduce it to its role within the power relationships inherent in the culture industry: ‘Once the audience’s public opinion about music really turns into bleating, into a reiteration of clichés to demonstrate one’s own cultural loyalty, many critics feel more strongly to bleat along in their fashion.’

Even so, the critic’s authority, he concludes, remains intact.

Materially uncontrollable by the public, the critic’s authority becomes a personal one, an additional agency for the social control of music by standards of conformity, draped with more or less good taste. [...] The crux – a knowledge of composing, an ability to understand and judge the inner form of structures – is hardly called for, if for no other reason, because there are none who might judge that ability itself, who might criticize the critics.

Music Criticism

Schenker’s view of works of art such as the symphonies and sonatas by Beethoven was conceived during a period that represents a significant transformation in the perception and study of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century music. German musicologist Carl Dahlhaus refers to the profound turn in aesthetic precepts in early-twentieth-century music-analytical thought as one in which the composer’s biographical factors ceased to determine the aesthetic significance attributed to works of art. Dahlhaus writes: ‘The notion that a work of art represents a document about its creator was not so much called into question as summarily dismissed on the grounds of being inimical to art. [...]’

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64 Ibid.
65 Ibid., p. 8.
66 Adorno 1977, p. 149.
67 Ibid., p. 151.
68 Dahlhaus 1983, p. 22.
Sympathetic identification with an individual personality gave way to structural analysis of a musical creation.\(^6^9\) Descriptive music criticism in the vein of E. T. A. Hoffmann’s 1810 review of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony had had a profound impact on music being viewed as a cultural signifier throughout the nineteenth century and beyond. Music criticism mirrored the perceived subjectivity of the work of art, as opposed to the ‘objectivity’ of the sciences. This was partly due to what Michael Steinberg calls music’s ‘capacity to organize subjectivity’.\(^7^0\) He argues that the (musical) language of subjectivity turns out to be difficult to distinguish from the experience of subjectivity. Musicologist Gary Tomlinson refers to this kind of subjective engagement with music as ‘writing analysis’:

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\text{[A]s an outgrowth of Eurocentric conceptions of music, writing analysis was linked to Europe’s positing of its own musical (and other) uniqueness in world history. In a profound tautology it was positioned so as to confirm a Hegelian culmination of world musical history in the very absolute music that helped define it. In this confirmation, analysis offered criteria constructed on a foundation of European views, including an ideology of writing, as a universal gauge of musical worth.}\(^7^1\)
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The study of music criticism was slow to carve out a space for itself within musicology in the second half of the twentieth century. Whereas in Europe there had been efforts to institutionalise the study of criticism (with an emphasis on aesthetics), it was disregarded as a ‘soft’ and undemanding branch of musicology in American academia.\(^7^2\) Only a few years before the foundation of the Institut für Wertungsforschung (Institute for Aesthetics) in Graz in 1968, the influential American musicologist Joseph Kerman wrote: ‘Criticism does not exist yet on the American music-academic scene, but something does exist which may feel rather like it, theory and analysis…’\(^7^3\) This notion, one that Kerman later distanced himself from, indicates that as late as the 1960s the academy was still uncertain about the relationship between analysis (which Kerman refers to as ‘formalistic criticism’)\(^7^4\) and criticism. The ensuing struggle to identify the aesthetic principles underlying their relationship is reminiscent of Schenker’s

\(^{6^9}\) Ibid., p. 22-23.  
\(^{7^0}\) Steinberg 2004, p. 4.  
\(^{7^1}\) Tomlinson 2003, p. 40.  
\(^{7^2}\) Subotnik 1991, p. xxix.  
\(^{7^3}\) Kerman 1965, p. 65.  
\(^{7^4}\) Kerman 1985, p. 115.
own efforts to distinguish his analytical work from that of his peers. In 1975 Kerman, who despite his suspicions of the musical academy exhibited little interest in newspaper criticism, wrote:

If in a typical musical analysis the work of art is studied in its own self-designed terms, that too is a characteristic strategy of some major strains of twentieth-century criticism. We might like criticism to meet broader criteria, but there it is. Perhaps musical analysis, as an eminently professional process, fails to ‘open access between the artist and his audience’, and perhaps it does indeed fail ‘to confront the work of art in its proper aesthetic terms’ – such failures, too, are not unknown in the criticism of literature or the other arts.75

In his seminal book *Contemplating Music: Challenges to Musicology* (1985) Kerman eventually argued for moving academic practice away from producing analyses along Schenkerian lines of mostly classical and Romantic works, and not only reinstate criticism but also performance practice and ‘the study of music in culture’ (including non-Western musics) within the discipline.76 In its wake, scholars such as Rose Rosengard Subotnik introduced Adorno’s emphasis on cultural analysis into American musicology. She draws attention to a point noted by several thinkers since early-Romantic German literary critic Friedrich Schlegel first voiced it, namely that criticism provides a counterpart to the work of art itself, therefore representing a valuable instrument for an intellectual approach to music. It does so particularly in the case of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century music, ‘which, in its own way, has been preoccupied with the same problems of communicating meaning and establishing value in a relativistic world as criticism has been’.77 This position is indicative of her preoccupation with the work of Adorno, who viewed the musical work as ‘in itself already critical’.78 Paying particular attention to the way nineteenth-century German aesthetics and literary criticism had shaped modern criticism, Subotnik argues that, in part, ‘disunity of character and aims is implicit in all modern criticism’, and that ‘modern criticism by its very nature resists most definitive

77 Subotnik 1991, p. 91.
generalisations’.\(^79\) One generalisation that does seem valid to her, however, is that ‘modern criticism is an activity primarily concerned with the interpretation of meaning and, as such, depends heavily on the exercise of individual discretion for both its practice and its interpretation’.\(^80\) Subotnik contends that the concern with interpretation – an approach towards any human statement or artefact that by its very nature cannot be guaranteed to be universally valid – is a distinctly modern phenomenon in the Western world.\(^81\) Empiricism, she argues, generally does not bring forth absolute knowledge, as it is prone to revision, yet criticism cannot claim even an approximate measure of truthfulness. This is partly due to the fact that ‘expertise in criticism consists not in the mastery of any body of facts but in the refinement of an unquantifiable sensitivity’.\(^82\) In addition, criticism covers a realm extending far beyond that of the specialised empiricist, potentially encompassing all of human experience and thought. Even domains clearly delimited by the critic may include a far greater set of variables or unknowns than the firmly restricted areas of empirical research; being inherently relativistic, criticism is not primarily concerned with traditional scientific boundaries. With reference to the ‘scientific’ practice of preparing critical editions of music (such as Schenker’s \textit{Erläuterungsausgabe}), Subotnik writes:

Whereas the traditionalist may admit that the ‘facts’ of a modern critical edition could someday be challenged, such a scholar can scarcely imagine that the very idea of such an edition might be dismissed or rejected by some future culture as an ideal of significant knowledge. The critic, by contrast, must grapple from the outset with the notion of a time and place in which not only one’s dates but also one’s interpretations of data and ideals of knowledge underlying one’s interpretations may be disregarded or even ridiculed.\(^83\)

Critics, therefore, have in some sense to acknowledge their own presence in their writing.\(^84\) Moreover, the critic is likely to distrust an injudicious use of generally accepted doctrines, or at least feel the need to clarify his or her position in relation to such doctrines. Subotnik challenges the ‘inhuman’

\(^{80}\) Ibid.
\(^{81}\) Ibid., pp. 88-9.
\(^{82}\) Ibid., p. 91.
\(^{83}\) Ibid., p. 92.
\(^{84}\) Ibid.
demands placed upon the critic of mastering not only their own literary craft but also the critic’s chosen domain in its entirety. She argues that such a degree of knowledge is neither relevant to criticism nor intellectually attainable. Instead, she calls for the necessity to understand the critic’s ‘indefinable, yet not imperceptible’ principles of order, emphasising the epistemological value of fairness over that of accuracy.\(^{85}\)

The ultimate sources of the good modern critic’s principle of order [...] are not, I say, fully accessible to scientific demonstration, explanation, or validation precisely because honesty, which forms the foundation of those principles, is an essentially moral rather than scientific attitude. And for the perception of moral rigor, a capacity of fairness not only has power; it has far more power, I submit, than a capacity for accuracy.\(^{86}\)

The ambiguities surrounding the matter of morality in criticism were a matter of keen interest to Hans Keller, whose approach to journalistic criticism may to no small part be related to the particulars of the life – which shares similarities with Schenker’s biography – of this at times eccentric writer.\(^{87}\) However, unlike Schenker, Keller was fully aware of the irony that his sustained critical assaults represented, namely to attack criticism with criticism.\(^{88}\) His interpretation of the psychological impact of criticism provides a prism through which to make out Schenker’s invective not only as a consciously chosen literary device, but also as an outlet for grievances. Schenker was acutely aware of his own detractors; indeed, the ‘damages’ of criticism to the artist and to artistic

\(^{85}\) Ibid., pp. 92-93.
\(^{86}\) Ibid., p. 93.
\(^{87}\) Keller was born in Vienna into a cultured assimilated Jewish family; his father was a successful architect and his mother at various times knew such prominent figures of the Vienna intellectual scene as the writer Peter Altenberg and the socialite Alma Mahler. Shorty after Kristallnacht, Keller fled Vienna and, after a period of internment on the Isle of Man, found refuge in London. He became an amateur psychoanalyst, freelance musician, writer, and self-appointed ‘scourge of the critics’ (Wintle 2003, 7). Only in 1959 was he eventually offered a position with the BBC’s Third Programme, following a lengthy struggle to gain recognition, which is reminiscent of Schenker’s efforts in this respect. Keller created an outlet for his criticisms in The Music Survey, an outspoken journal that he co-edited from 1949-52; this is, again, reminiscent of Schenker’s hard-fought-for outlet for his criticisms in the ‘elucidations’ of his Erläuterungsausgabe and his introductions, aphorisms, and miscellaneous observations in his Tonwille pamphlets and elsewhere.

\(^{88}\) Keller 1987, p. 5.
production,⁸⁹ which is how he came to view his music-theoretical work, is one of the central themes in his ‘Kunst und Kritik’ draft. Although arguments relating to Schenker’s sense of being ostracised have previously been suggested in the context of his polemical output,⁹⁰ they have not yet been explored in detail.

Keller had a scholarly interest in psychology and psychiatry in his early career, including a lengthy period of self-analysis along Freudian lines. He judges the act of criticism as stimulated by a certain critical agency, the superego: ‘it can be said that civilised hate is a function of one or the other type of criticism – that it doesn’t allow itself expression, even consciousness, without appearing in the guise of such a function.’⁹¹ He continues:

[T]here is no criticism worth its acknowledged name without a critical situation being postulated – a crisis of thought produced by that destructiveness which the recipient of the criticism enthusiastically identifies with; for he, too, is in perpetual search of stable channels for his aggression – ceteris paribus even more so, in fact, than the critic or musicologist, who has this destructiveness built into his professional system.⁹²

In his view music critics are hypocrites methodically creating insoluble problems in order to ward off unemployment.⁹³ The critic may pose ‘as a helper, sometimes even a healer, or at least a teacher’, yet he or she practices ‘critical torture’.⁹⁴ This ‘torture’ is the result of a series of idiosyncrasies: one is the mismatch of conceptual and musical thought, i.e. the impossibility of verbalising music. Like Schenker before him, Keller is particularly seething in his condemnation of the critics’ references to musical logic comparable to literary texts, their ‘verbal sense-making and nonsense-making’ of metaphors such as ‘argument’, ‘validity’, ‘logic’, and ‘well-reasoned’,⁹⁵ charging them with the failure to make clear what kind of musical logic these terms refer to in the first place. Another kind of torture, Keller argues, is of a more general kind, torture by proxy.

⁸⁹ Kunst und Kritik’, OC C/408.
⁹¹ Keller 1987, p. 91.
⁹² Ibid., p. 95. ceteris paribus (Latin): all things being equal.
⁹⁴ Ibid., p. [113].
It is practiced by the mere fact that the critic’s apparent addressee is the ‘wrong’ one:

‘[The critic] addresses the public and so degrades the proper addressee of his complaint to the role of a silently suffering eavesdropper – even though, to try to save his soul, he may cheat himself into believing that he addresses the composer or performer and allows the public to eavesdrop to the extent of paying for his living – for the artist would certainly never do so’. 96

In terms of the artist’s response to such ‘public’ criticism, ‘the critic will have succeeded in his most ignoble task, the creation of a profound and insoluble psychological and aesthetic problem’. 97 Keller’s reading inescapably links criticism to the destruction of the criticised matter; he locates the human need to destroy even in ‘constructive’ criticism, in which aggression is concealed by semantics. Schenker’s own intolerance of receiving negative reviews or, worse still, being ignored by his peers clearly arises from the sources considered in this thesis, as does his self-proclaimed mission to ‘annihilate’ all those writers on music that he came to regard his ‘opponents’. 98

**Criticism, Discourse**

French philosopher Michel Foucault’s definition of critique, namely ‘not to want to be governed’ (or, more precisely, ‘not to want to be governed in this way’), 99 immediately confers a political dimension to the meaning of criticism. His dictum is based on three historical anchoring points: firstly, the *critica sacra*, the inquiry into what sort of truth the Bible holds, and which established itself during the transitional period between the late Middle Ages and the modern era; secondly, the ‘natural law’, which took on a critical function in the sixteenth century, and which Foucault defines as more or less a legal issue. His third anchoring point is the problem of certainty in its confrontation with authority. 100 Foucault writes: ‘If

96 Ibid., p. 124.
97 Ibid., p. 125.
98 Ibid., p. [89]; Snarrenberg 1997, p. 149.
100 Ibid., p. 46.
governmentalisation is indeed this movement through which individuals are subjugated in the reality of social mechanisms of power that adhere to a truth [...] critique will be the art of voluntary insubordination, that of reflected intractability.’ Foucault’s contrasting of the latter interpretation of critique with that expressed by Kant in ‘What is Enlightenment?’ (1784) forms the basis of Austrian philosopher and art theorist Gerald Raunig’s interpretation of criticism as a complementary set of ‘textual and social machines’.\footnote{Raunig 2010, p. 17.} Kant viewed the function of criticism as the exercising of authority based on knowledge, i.e. as the maintaining of humanity in an authoritative way in relation to a certain historical minority condition.\footnote{Foucault 2010, pp. 47-8.} Foucault’s construal of critique as an apparatus for resistance, ‘not wanting to be governed in this way’, is, according to Raunig, an attack on the scientification and constriction of Kant’s definition, resembling previous rejections of Kant’s position by thinkers such as Marx and Engels. Raunig, however, suggests that the two definitions (critique as discourse (Kant) and critique as social revolt (Foucault)) are in fact complementary, hence his more neutral terminology ‘textual and social machines’. The ‘textual machine’ reaches back, in modern times, to eighteenth-century Germany, where the critic’s responsibility was to understand, judge, and make understandable philosophical texts.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 19-20. Raunig here refers to the definition of criticism by German writer Gottlieb Stolle in his \textit{Anleitung zur Historie der Gelahrheit} (1718).} Raunig suggests that criticism can, in this light, be viewed as interplay between judgement and invention. The ‘social machine’ on the other hand, which he regards to have arisen from the schism between the Church (clerics) and new religious or semi-religious communities (laypeople) during the Middle Ages, can be defined by reform and invention. He proposes that critique is at its most powerful when the textual and social machines become interlinked, as in Marxist literary criticism.\footnote{Ibid., p. 27.}

The way in which textual and social critique correspond to each other is to a large degree determined by the \textit{topos}, the critic’s ‘point of view’ that acts as the ‘commentary of criticism’,\footnote{Gürses 2010, p. 182.} as Turkish-Austrian philosopher Hakan Gürses explains. Gürses considers textual critique as fulfilling three primary functions.
Firstly, it constructs a ‘third criterion’ (Feld des Dritten) besides the subject/critic and the object/the critiqued, i.e. the methodology that the subject chooses to apply in his or her critique, and which must be separate from the other two criteria. Secondly, critique introduces a historical perspective (in Gürses’ estimation the most important ‘third criterion’), as it inspects the causality between the past conditions of the critiqued matter and its condition in the present time, while also presupposing its future state. Thirdly, critique provides a set of scholarly instruments, such as positivism, philological exactitude and knowledge of history, in order to argue for social change.\textsuperscript{107} However, as the subject is itself determined by various cultural factors (for instance gender, the collective structure of language, power relations, class, etc.), it needs to clarify how it views itself and its choice of ‘third criterion’ in relation to the criticised object as well as society. In other words, the subject needs to justify its position, something that Schenker did with candour. Gürses calls the subject’s deliberately occupied position the topos of critique.\textsuperscript{108} He identifies four such topoi, of which I will briefly introduce the two that I consider relevant for this study, ‘esotopical’ critique and ‘exotopical’ critique.\textsuperscript{109} In esotopical critique, the subject and the object share the same social order. The subject draws on existing and accepted moral values and standards (that are nevertheless violated) in order to advocate reform. Esotopical critique, Gürses argues, is immanent in democratic societies; it focuses on the interpretation of values that are anchored in such societies, and advocates improvement and reorganisation rather than revolution. In exotopical critique, the topos is located outside the social order through which the object is viewed. It is concerned with an altogether different social order from the one that the subject is part of, and its objective is to advocate fundamental social change. Therefore, not only the future social order but also the standards by which critique is measured lie outside the established social order. Both eso- and exotopical critique avail themselves of normative reasoning as well as empirical arguments.

Judged by the multifarious array of source material for ‘Kunst und Kritik’, Schenker sought to articulate a cultural diagnosis that could claim to be

\textsuperscript{107} Ibid., p. 180.
\textsuperscript{108} Ibid., p. 185.
\textsuperscript{109} Ibid., p. 186.
performed from a remote and pure analytical space of some higher historicity. Yet his theory of criticism does not betray the professional frustrations, personal rivalries, and controversies that he experienced in the boisterous, occasionally even riotous atmosphere of early-twentieth-century Vienna. His observations were very much shaped within the social order that he came to reject. The broader issues of knowledge and power within societies that are intimated in Schenker’s writings are at the heart of Michel Foucault’s cultural theory, which he shaped partly by adapting, partly by radically departing from earlier structuralist approaches to linguistics and semiotics by Ferdinand de Saussure and Roland Barthes respectively. Foucault’s ‘discursive’ approach focuses on how individuals view themselves within their culture. He gives the linguistic concept ‘discourse’ an altered meaning, extending the notion of the production of knowledge through language to include practice as well. Foucault thereby goes beyond Saussure’s distinction between language and practice, while promoting the idea that physical objects and actions only take on meaning within a discourse. He argues that a discourse never consists of only one statement or action, but will appear across a range of texts and forms of social conduct; however, if these discursive events refer to the same object, style, or strategy (including procedures of exclusion), they belong to the same ‘discursive pattern’.¹¹¹

In his later work, Foucault is thought of as concerned with how knowledge is ‘put to work through discursive practices in specific institutional settings to regulate the conduct of others’, as the late cultural theorist Stuart Hall puts it.¹¹² Foucault focuses on the effectiveness of knowledge, the ‘will to truth’,¹¹³ in institutions such as prisons, yet his conclusions can be applied to society as a whole as well, at least within certain historical periods. He writes:

The will to truth, like other systems of exclusion, rests on an institutional support: it is both reinforced and renewed by whole strata of practices, such as pedagogy, of course; and the system of books, publishing, libraries; learned societies in the past and laboratories now. But it is also renewed, no doubt more profoundly, by the way in which knowledge is

¹¹¹ Hall 1997, p. 44.
¹¹² Ibid., p. 47.
¹¹³ Foucault 1981, p. 54.
put to work, valorised, distributed, and in a sense attributed, in a society.\textsuperscript{114}

Hall concludes that ‘[k]nowledge linked to power [...] not only assumes the authority of “the truth” but has the power to make itself true. All knowledge, once applied in the real world, has real effects, and, in that sense at least, “becomes true”.\textsuperscript{115} This notion is manifest in, for instance, Schenker’s grievances about the musical public’s ill-advised faith in the music critics’ ‘systematic deception’ – including what he considered the suppression of his own work – that run through most of the sources considered here.\textsuperscript{116}

Although Schenker’s two separate essays on music criticism, ‘Kunst und Kritik’ and ‘Musikkritik’, remained unpublished during his lifetime, they were conceived with publication in mind and, as such, share a crucial characteristic with his other published works, namely an ‘appeal to a collective error’.\textsuperscript{117} In his provocative reading of Schenker’s polemics, Ian Biddle identifies his tendency to, in Biddle’s words, ‘consistently address the community of reader-scholars in both explicit and implicit ways as dangerously susceptible to a false consciousness’ as grounded in Schenker’s struggle for professional assuredness.\textsuperscript{118} Yet, to return to Eagleton’s questions cited at the top of this chapter, who was Schenker’s critique intended to reach, influence, impress? Only his Tonwille journals feature a dedication: ‘to a new generation of youth’.\textsuperscript{119} It intimates a utopian readership that transcends the gloomy vision of society reviled in Schenker’s earlier work. Even so, the dedication is, to all intents and purposes, meaningless, unquantifiable, and the journal’s characterisation Flugblätter (‘pamphlets’, but more strictly translated as ‘flyers’) evokes the association with leaflets being dropped from a height in order to achieve the widest possible distribution.\textsuperscript{120} Perhaps, conversely, Schenker addressed

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{114} Ibid., p. 55.
  \item \textsuperscript{115} Ibid., p. 49. Emphasis in original.
  \item \textsuperscript{116} ‘Kunst und Kritik’, C/404; see Appendix, p. 258.
  \item \textsuperscript{117} Biddle 2011, p. 125.
  \item \textsuperscript{118} Ibid. Emphasis in original.
  \item \textsuperscript{119} Schenker [1921-4] 2004 and 2005.
  \item \textsuperscript{120} Schenker dropped this characterisation both from the subtitle (which changed into Vierteljahresschrift (quarterly publication)) and the imprint (which changed from Tonwille-Flugblätter Verlag to Tonwille-Verlag) in issues 7 through 10 (1924). SDO Ian Bent and William Drabkin, ‘Der Tonwille’
\end{itemize}
himself to ‘nobody in particular’, like another artist assuming authority over his audience, the *enfant terrible* of 1960s Austrian literature Peter Handke, does in his play *Publikumsbeschimpfung* (*Offending the Audience, 1965*). In her essay ‘Eine Sendung für Alle und Keinen’, German philosopher Sandra Man – taking her cue from Nietzsche – turns the question of the addressee into an answer that may illuminate Schenker’s appeals ‘without end, without let up, without mercy’.

What matters is not to separate Everybody from Nobody, to distinguish and divide. On the contrary, Nobody holds Everybody together. *For Everybody and Nobody*, then, addresses literally all. But there is nobody to determine and decide if the demands have been met, if the reception has taken place. [...] The address is and remains undetermined. By not resolving the problem of the addressing through deciding: by whom, for whom, but by continuing to address, to send, to dispatch, that precisely is where the openness of the public sphere lies.


121 ‘Wir werden niemanden meinen.’ Handke 2012, p. 44.

122 The title of Man’s essay is a play on the subtitle of Nietzsche’s *Also Sprach Zarathustra: Ein Buch für Alle und Keinen*, translated variably as *A Book for Everyone and Nobody* (Nietzsche 2005) and *A Book for All and None* (Nietzsche 2006); Biddle 2011, p. 154.

CHAPTER 3
‘Die Teilnehmenden’: Schenker on Musical Participation

Musical participation, i.e. the social practice of performing, listening to, and interpreting music, has taken a fairly prominent place in recent critical studies of Schenker’s writings. As ‘a form of culture’ it represents an obvious socio-cultural context within which he operated as well as one that he vocally confronted.¹ Although modern-day usage of the expression ‘musical participation’ connotes social inclusivity in terms of shared musical experiences, Schenker’s writings on the matter do not. His elitism appears so alien to modern readers that it seems to necessitate repeated assertion even to those initiated in his theory. Matthew Pritchard stresses: ‘If [“musical truth”] excluded 99% of people from musical “participation”, then that was something Schenker was quite prepared to accept.’² This notion perplexes because it suggests that although Schenker may have conceived of an abstract interrelationship of music and social meaning,³ he held what we might today judge a rather parochial view of the social function of music. After all, if what Schenker considered ‘musical truth’ reveals itself to almost no one, it is – despite his own claims to the contrary – socially irrelevant. To paraphrase Hans Keller, many people prefer to listen to music without advice such as Schenker’s.⁴ As Pritchard puts it, ‘the advantages of music theory and notation in pragmatic communication between composers and performers do not necessarily translate to advantages in a wider interpretative discourse involving critics and listeners’.⁵ Yet the issue might be inverted along the lines of a research question such as: how – if at all – did the wider interpretive discourse involving critics and listeners shape Schenker’s view of the advantages of music theory and notation in pragmatic communication between composers and performers? Schenker’s stance was, after all, reactionary, his mission that of an

¹ Snarrenberg 1997, p. 140.
² Pritchard 2013, 169.
⁴ Keller 1987, p. 146.
⁵ Pritchard 2013, 173.
outsider; Ian Biddle notes that ‘in its commitment to a view of culture in which the Tonraum of the composer/author predestines its reception and which, most importantly, thereby obviates the need for “translation”, Schenker is a radical.⁶ Establishing exactly who or what Schenker reacted against requires some kind of framework in terms of whom he considered as partaking in musical culture. Robert Snarrenberg proposes the following:⁷

Figure 6.

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Nonmusicians
  | Musicians
  |   | Creators (Schaffenden)
  |   | Re-creators (Nachschaffenden)
  |   | Renderers (Vortragenden)
  |   | Receivers (Aufnehmenden)
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He devised this diagram based on statements in a variety of Schenker’s publications, ranging from his early essay ‘Das Hören in der Musik’ (1894) to his journals dating from the 1920s, namely Der Tonwille and Das Meisterwerk in der Musik. Snarrenberg observes that in a healthy musical culture, artistic creation, i.e. composition, would, for Schenker, be matched by re-creation, i.e. interpretation, be it in terms of performance (by what he calls ‘renderers’) or an active listening experience.⁸ Although Snarrenberg’s work has been considered as historically informed,⁹ it is, on this occasion, historically anodyne: it exhibits no effort at probing the cultural and literary context of Schenker’s polemics. In addition, Snarrenberg’s analysis suffers from a perceived lack of sources that would allow some kind of systematic exposition of Schenker’s view of music and society.¹⁰ ‘Kunst und die Teilnehmenden’ is Schenker’s only theoretical text exclusively devoted to this matter. Here Schenker squarely compartmentalises those he considered as participating in music into three groups:

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⁶ Biddle 2011, p. 124.
⁷ Snarrenberg 1997, p. 142.
⁸ See Chapter 1, p. 44.
⁹ Cook 2007, p. 251.
¹⁰ See also Cook 2007, p. 314.
Leaving aside the artist, be it one who produces or reproduces, the relationship of art to the rest of humanity is merely one of participation, enjoyment. These masses as a whole may now be differentiated more specifically according to their degree of interest. The Volk are to be considered as the lowest level because they show the least degree; from this a smaller circle, with greater degree of commitment, makes up the public. Within the public, a particular group, that of the critics, emerges.\(^{11}\)

Schenker here categorically speaks of *die Teilnehmenden* as passive consumers rather than re-creative participants, a notion that he proceeds to anchor firmly within broader sociological considerations relating to the Volk and the lay public. Although he is known to have been critical about certain music journalists, the prominence that he bestows here on critics in the context of participation transcends scholarly interest into this facet of his thinking. As Snarrenberg acknowledges, Schenker's concept of receivers as re-creators was an idealised one, and one that was more or less limited to himself and his followers. For that reason, Snarrenberg's diagram could be amended as follows:

![Figure 7.](image)

Still, Schenker acknowledged a variety of active elements of musical society, while denying that their role could be a recreating or even reflective one. He described them as 'forced to partake, without even being able to partake'.\(^{12}\)

In *Das Meisterwerk in der Musik* 2 he presents this idea as paralleling Schiller's

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\(^{11}\) 'Kunst und die Teilnehmenden', B/407; see Appendix, p. 230. Emphases in original.

\(^{12}\) I have here adopted Snarrenberg's liberal translation of 'nehmen' (Schenker 1910, p. xiv) into 'partake' (Snarrenberg 1997, p. 146) rather than 'take' (Schenker [1910] 1987a, p. xx).
dissolution of the traditional division between the active and the contemplative portion of mankind. After citing Schiller’s appeal for ‘a class of people who without working are active and can idealise without becoming over-emotional, who unite in themselves all the realities of life with the fewest possible of its limitations and are carried by the current of events without becoming prey to them’, he proposes the following:

The class of people that Schiller envisions here can, by extension, be paralleled in music. It is quite consistent with Schiller’s idea to include all those who work in the commercial world of music [öffentlich \( \text{Musikbetrieb} \)], nowadays so inflated, among the ‘active portion’. Understood in this way, the growth of the latter portion spells a concomitant shrinking of the ‘contemplative portion’. How beneficial such a class as Schiller had in mind could be, therefore, in countering the increasing disproportion between the two groups, and the grievous harm that this does to the art of music.

The contortion of Schenker’s rigid model of active participation and passive consumption, as set out in ‘Kunst und die Teilnehmenden’, was precipitated by the growing public enthusiasm for the arts and journalism, a development that was one of late-nineteenth-century Vienna’s most prominent cultural features. As such, it exerted pressure not only on his convictions, but also on his own role as a writer on the much-prized Masterworks in music. As Schenker was in the habit of rhetorically placing his theory of music anterior to his ideology (as if the latter was by necessity the result of the former), scholars such as Snarrenberg have tended to view his polemics primarily as a corollary to the originality of his vision of musical structure. At the same time, Schenker’s writings on musical participation are rich in non-musical references. The ‘Kunst und die Teilnehmenden’ essays, which in terms of chronology sit about halfway between Schenker’s abandonment of his journalistic activities in 1900 and his implementation of the \( \text{Urlinie} \) in 1921, provide an opportunity for a coherent survey of some of the cultural anxieties underlying Schenker’s thinking on the \( \text{Volk} \), the public, and the music critics. The overall objective of this chapter is to explore and accentuate those themes that recur in his discussions of the various

\(^{14}\) Ibid.
participants, with the aim to trace that aspect of his rejection of music criticism that developed out of his views on society.

The Volk

Schenker’s distinction between the Volk and the Publikum was neither self-evident nor necessarily meaningful even during the fin-de-siècle. Notwithstanding demographic attributes, it may be more useful to read Schenker as differentiating between those parts of society that were visibly and audibly part of the musical public sphere and those who were not, the latter representing the Volk. The word Volk, a loaded concept underpinning German thought from the early nineteenth century onwards, denotes a group of people that share the same ethnicity, culture, and language. During the nineteenth century, German philosophers such as Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Eduard Hartmann and Philipp Mainländer increasingly viewed the Volk through an elitist prism, associating the term with ‘the masses’, or ‘the rabble’. By the turn of the century, German political parties appealed to the Volk as a synonym for the petite bourgeoisie and the proletariat. In contrast, as was claimed by thinkers such as Herder, Fichte, and Wagner, the idea of the German Volk was one of a transcendental essence fused to each of its members, regardless of class. German irrationalism, as this movement has come to be termed, developed a powerful political dimension. It reacted to the mid-nineteenth-century liberal ideals of rationality and individualism by emphasising the dimensions of synthesis and feeling. Initially not widely contaminated with questions of race, assimilating into the Volk by embracing German nationalism provided an avenue for those wishing to enter German society, including Jews in Vienna and elsewhere.

Schenker’s thinking about the Volk and its relationship to works of art suffered from a profound conflict compounded by these variably elitist and nationalist narratives. On one hand Schenker, like several other Jewish intellectuals such as Otto Weininger, Karl Kraus, and Arnold Schoenberg,

18 Mosse 1966, p. 4.
mistrusted the masses. On the other hand, he venerated what he considered to be German genius, i.e. composers who – with the exceptions of Mendelssohn, who was born into a family of Jewish intellectuals, and possibly Schumann – themselves hailed from the Volk in terms of their humble economic background. Both sides became prominent features in Schenker’s later publications, and the latent contradiction remained a matter of argument; in a letter to August Halm, for instance, he explains in 1918:

And when I say briefly that I distinguish between Beethoven, who emerged from the [Volk] (‘Baron Beethoven’ for example would be a farce that would show the dear creator as a frivolous jester), and the [Volk] that remained [Volk], with that I surely declare my approach well enough. The delusion that all of the [Volk] is, like Beethoven, capable of the same characteristics in intellectual and moral regard damages humanity.

The idea of defining the Volk’s relationship to art had occupied several classical and Romantic thinkers, yet Schenker, in ‘Kunst und das Volk’, seems to have specifically responded to (or at least found his views reflected in) a contemporary source, a newspaper article filed together with the draft. It is the summary of a lecture, ‘Kunst und Volk’, given by Friedrich Naumann on 19 October 1908, published in the Berliner Tageblatt. Naumann was a German politician and theologian who in 1918, along with the sociologist Max Weber, became a founding-member of the social-liberal German Democratic Party, which formed part of the centre-left Weimar Coalition between 1919 and 1932.

Naumann’s liberal background is noteworthy, given the similarities in other respects between his and Schenker’s arguments. These parallels demonstrate that scepticism toward the masses was neither the sole preserve of ‘modernist’ intellectuals nor that of social conservatives advocating aristocratic ideals, such as Schenker. Naumann’s article outlines some of the fundamental questions that Schenker ponders in ‘Kunst und das Volk’, including: ‘What use is art to the

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20 Mosse 1993, p. 143.
21 SDO DLA 69.930/2 (17 January 1918), transcr. by Ian Bent, transl. by Lee Rothfarb (2006)
lowest stratum of the Volk, and what do they do for it?’23 His reference to the ‘below’ correlates with Carl Schorske’s emphasis on the Liberals’ preoccupation with social strata and order.24 Another article filed together with Schenker’s draft in fact pays witness to the pervasiveness of such thinking among the political classes. It is a report from the German Reichstag dating from 30 November 1907, from which Schenker only retained an extract of a speech by Bernhard von Bülow, Chancellor of the German Empire between 1900 and 1909. In it, Bülow responds to criticism relating to his alleged involvement in the so-called Eulenburg Affair, a controversy that entailed allegations of homosexuality among members of the imperial cabinet and included a vicious press campaign against Bülow.1 His speech concluded (complete with an annotation by the reporter):

We live in an era in which a minister need not fear the tyranny from above. What does a minister of today have to risk from above? […] He may be well advised, however, to be fearful of our age’s demagoguery from below, of the tyranny from below, which is the most oppressive, most terrible of all. (Buoyant applause from right and left.)25

Schenker’s own thinking was infused with a similar tiered outlook on society and consternation in response to left-wing efforts of levelling social stratification. His, like Naumann’s, arguments relating to the Volk hinge on notions of productivity (both in the artistic and economic sense), reception, and judgement, and for both of them the Volk was severely limited in relation to all three of these. Although Naumann avoids going into detail about the issue of productivity (‘The fact that it is far more difficult for the man of the Volk to be

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23 ‘Was hat die Unterschicht des Volkes von der Kunst, und was tut es für sie?’; ‘Naumann über “Kunst und Volk”’, in Berliner Tageblatt, 20 October 1908; OC B/429.
25 ‘Wir leben in einer Zeit, wo ein Minister sich gar nicht so zu fürchten braucht vor der Tyrannie von oben. Was hat denn heute ein Minister von oben zu riskieren? […] Wohl aber soll in unseren Tagen ein Minister sich fürchten vor der Demagogie von unten, vor der Tyrannie von unten, die die drückendste, schlimmste aller Tyrannien ist. (Lebhafter Beifall rechts und links.)’ ‘Aus dem Reichstag (Telegramm der Neuen Freien Presse)’, in Neue Freie Presse, Morgenblatt, 30 November 1907; OC B/428. For a detailed analysis of the Eulenburg Affair see Norman Domeier, Der Eulenburg-Skandal: Eine politische Kulturgeschichte des Kaiserreichs (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 2010).
productive than to enjoy hardly needs to be justified.‘),

26 his conclusion is uncompromisingly elitist: ‘Art is and will always be undemocratic; the deeper one appreciates it, the more it resists the masses, which naturally includes the educated masses.’

27 Schenker shared this central tenet, and I will briefly outline three strands in Schenker’s thinking in this regard that clearly arise from ‘Kunst und das Volk’: his views on folk music, the role of education, and those on political efforts to broaden musical participation.

**Volksmusik**

Schenker’s analysis of the Volk’s productivity, receptivity, and judgement is closely tied to notions of ‘high’ and ‘low’ art. For him, the Volk lacks the economic stability to engage with ‘artificially crafted larger forms’ such as symphonies, a circumstance that, in his view, necessarily limits its own productivity to small units such as short poems and folk song, i.e. ‘low art’. He rarely wrote about folk music or folk song in his publications, although his early journalistic output does include a medium-length essay on the genre, ‘Volksmusik in Wien’ (‘Folk Music in Vienna’), published in 1894. The article was likely to have been inspired by the publication of Brahms’ *Deutsche Volkslieder* earlier that year.

29 Brahms and Schenker got to know each other in the years before the composer’s death in 1897, and Brahms’ folk song arrangements, in Schenker’s own words, were borne out of a polemical intention, a protest against previous, in Brahms’ judgement artistically inferior editions.

30 Notwithstanding his admiration for Brahms, the distinction between small-scale compositions and ‘artificially crafted larger forms’ was fundamental to

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26 ‘Daß die Produktivität selbst dem Mann des Volkes noch weit schwerer gemacht ist als das Genießen, braucht kaum begründet zu werden.’ ‘Naumann über “Kunst und Volk”’, in *Berliner Tageblatt*, 20 October 1908; OC B/429.

27 ‘Kunst ist und bleibt undemokratisch, gerade je tiefer man sie faßt, desto mehr sträubt sie sich gegen die Masse, wozu freilich auch die der Gebildeten zu rechnen ist.’ Ibid.

28 ‘Kunst und das Volk’, B/410; see Appendix, p. 232.

29 Federhofer 1985, xxvi. See also Suppan 1997, p. 475.

30 Schenker 1987, p. 29. According to Schenker, Brahms destroyed a polemical manuscript that was to accompany this eventually independent collection of folk songs.
Schenker’s thinking, and he remained uneasy and ambiguous about folk music until his old age.\(^{31}\)

Schenker’s polarisation of small-scale and extended musical forms could be related to music that is immanent to all humans on the one hand, and music that contributes to contemporary culture, edification, and, ultimately, character on the other.\(^{32}\) He resolves the implicit contradiction between his views of the minimally productive \textit{Volk} and the German genius emerging from the \textit{Volk} by drawing on Herder, a writer whom he considered a ‘great spirit’ equal to Goethe.\(^{33}\) Herder in fact coined the German term \textit{Volkslied} (along with \textit{Volkspoesie}) in his 1773 essay ‘Auszug aus einem Briefwechsel über Ossian und die Lieder alter Völker’ (‘Extract from a Correspondence on Ossian and the Songs of Ancient Peoples’). Schenker’s juxtaposition of \textit{Volkslied} with the notion of artifice and ‘large forms’ rather than Romantic aesthetics is Herderian throughout, as is the semantic interchangeability of the terms folk music and national music.\(^{34}\) (The latter point relating to nationally specific art is epitomised in Schenker’s \textit{Credo} that concludes his essay: ‘I believe that every nation is different, and that for instance only the German \textit{Volk} could produce a Bach, a Handel, a Philip Emanuel Bach, a Haydn, a Mozart, a Beethoven.’)\(^{35}\)

Herder refined his binary view of folk song and high art in two publications dating from the late 1770s,\(^{36}\) in which he shifted to viewing folk song as raw material that could be turned into something bigger, akin to, in his words, ‘metallic ore, as it comes from the fold of Mother Nature, into minted classical coins’.\(^{37}\) In the final chapter of ‘Kunst und das Volk’, Schenker in fact alludes to Herder’s ‘fold of Mother Nature’:

\begin{quote}
Genius hails from the \textit{Volk}; but by taking possession of art, by creating and proliferating it, it steps over the boundary that is drawn for the \textit{Volk}. Through art it sets itself apart from the primordial fold; and by surpassing
\end{quote}

\(^{31}\) Deisinger 2012, pp. 183-97.
\(^{32}\) Wiora 1975, 33.
\(^{33}\) Federhofer 1985, p. 334.
\(^{34}\) Gelbart 2007, p. 197.
\(^{35}\) ‘Kunst und das Volk’, B/414; see Appendix, p. 235.
\(^{36}\) These were his essay ‘Vom Erkennen und Empfinden der menschlichen Seele’ (1778), and his introduction to the collection of \textit{Volkslieder} (1779).
not only the *Volk*, but all other persons of rank – counts, princes, emperors, and kings – it puts itself at the pinnacle of the entire nation, up there in order to represent its emblem.\(^{38}\)

The idea that works of art could reconcile the *Volk* into individual creation had a direct impact on nineteenth-century conceptions of genius.\(^{39}\) Like not only Herder and Schiller but also Kant and Berlioz, amongst others, Schenker claimed that composers drew from the *Volk*'s (or nature's) primal genius while transforming it into a higher form of art.\(^{40}\) By the same claim, art had become more than a merely individual and rule-based artifice. As American musicologist Matthew Gelbart has observed, Beethoven was the first composer to be set up by his supporters as the embodiment of such a new synthetic genius, and he ‘easily internalised this role in his own thinking’.\(^{41}\) Yet this narrative from ‘low’ to ‘high’ art was, in reality, neither an unmitigated process, nor a one-way track; the definitions only came to exist in relation to each other.\(^{42}\) Efforts to instil in individuals a sense of character building through art stretch back to antiquity and became prominent features of German aesthetics during the classical period, as can be traced in writers such as Herder and Goethe, but also the ‘practical humanism’ of eighteenth-century philanthropic efforts in which Viennese classicism is rooted.\(^{43}\) These efforts manifested themselves in increasing stylistic contacts between what came to be considered ‘high’ and ‘low’ art in genres such as the German *Singspiel*, whereas composers such as Brahms and all others in Schenker’s canon found inspiration in the folk idiom and readily drew from it.

In ‘Volksmusik in Wien’ Schenker introduces two concepts in which his *Weltanschauung* and his music-theoretical thinking overlap. On one hand, he argues, the ‘heart of German music’ is ascetic and un-Romantic: ‘No superficial grandeur of nature glimpses he who walks this hard and bleak path.’\(^{44}\) On the

\(^{38}\) ‘Kunst und das Volk’, B/414; see Appendix, p. 235.
\(^{39}\) Gelbart 2007, p. 197.
\(^{42}\) Ibid., p. 7.
\(^{43}\) Wiora 1975, 33-4.
other hand, he continues, German music is ‘consequently, almost ascetically’ rooted in one of the simplest musical constructs in Western music, namely the diatonic triad.\footnote{‘consequentes, beinahe asketisches Festhalten in der Diatonik’; Ibid.} The latter is easily identified as fundamental to his mature theory, yet German folk music too is based on the diatonic triad, as Schenker acknowledges in another early article, dating from 1896: ‘In the original geniuses alone does that event of nature return in the artistic creation that is also audible in folk song.’\footnote{Ibid., p. 345, transl. in Cook 2007, p. 65.} As Austrian musicologist Wolfgang Suppan points out, Schenker, for all his maudlin verbosity in ‘Volksmusik in Wien’, shows little appreciation for the folk genre (or the Volk), nor are his attempts to distinguish between folk and art music in purely musical terms particularly successful.\footnote{Suppan 1997, pp. 474-5.} Schenker deflects from the issue by turning to what he considered to be Trivialmusik instead. As opposed to the folk genre (with its associations with organicism and nationhood), he wholeheartedly rejects its ‘lower’ variants. These could be heard at informal events that (as Schenker notes) often had strong ties to Vienna’s folk traditions:

Within the realm of folk music belong not only the folk song, the distinctive ‘Viennese folk song’, but also the larger formal categories such as waltzes, couplets, and polkas in a Viennese manner. It is no longer permissible to say that this is music of the Volk, for the Volk; it is to a greater part a lower stratum of operetta, so to speak, occasionally also a lower stratum of art operetta itself, which debases itself to such an extent as to stoop to the Volk, where it achieves a distending not only in terms of ovations but also, in step with it, soaring profits.\footnote{‘In den Rahmen der Volksmusik gehört nicht blos das Volkslied, das specielle ‘Wiener Volkslied’, sondern auch größere Formengattungen, Walzer, Couplets, verwienerte Polka’s [sic]. Es ist nicht mehr gut zu sagen, diese Musik sei aus dem Volk für das Volk, sie ist zum größten Teil eine Unterschicht der Operette in Wien sozusagen, mitunter leider auch eine Unterschichte der Kunstoperette selbst, die sich dermaßen erniedrigt, um zum Volk herabzusteigen, wo sie dann einen mehr in die Breite gehenden Beifall und mit dieser Verbreitung des Beifalls auch schritt haltende Vervielfachung des Geldes erzielt.’ Federhofer 1990, p. 124.}

The kind of music that Schenker talks about here, although generally produced by well-known composers, was not born out of popular demand for new or original musical material. It was predominantly made up of already
known music that was arranged into potpourris and other compilations, indicating that their autonomy as musical works of art played a subordinate role to reaching as wide an audience as possible. His critique corresponds with the middle classes’ ideological rejection of *Trivialmusik*, something that German musicologist Sabine Schutte refers to it as a ‘pull upwards’ reacting to a ‘maelstrom’ from the working classes. For that purpose, the word *Volk* became redefined to denote the proletariat, alienated and modern. This essentially social development played a significant role in the increasing ideological separation of ‘high’ and ‘low’ art during the second half of the nineteenth century, a development which, in Austria, endured throughout much of the twentieth century. Partly in response to the commercialism of music, the ‘soaring profits’ that Schenker remarks upon, the notion of ‘high’ art – and reverence for the Viennese classical composers in particular – became detached from that of mere entertainment. Schenker returns to this issue in ‘Kunst und das Volk’:

Restrictions in leisure time and restrictions in perspectives lead the *Volk* of their own accord only to the most miniscule insights that they can easily achieve by themselves. Unselfconscious and unswayed, it is drawn to where they can hear music in its lowest forms, such as song, dance, march, potpourri, etc.

His alternative to such trivial consumption, namely the ‘hard and bleak path’ cited in ‘Volksmusik in Wien’, was a subject to which Schenker devoted another essay in 1895, ‘Zur musikalischen Erziehung’ (‘Musical Education’). Although less uncompromising than some of his later writings, Schenker exhorts not only an insistence on greater instruction in the theory of music but also the need for critical editions, two activities with which he would soon replace his journalistic career. A decade later, he demanded of his readers nothing less than a general musical literacy matching his own, even if he judged the endeavour of educating the *Volk* to such a level ultimately unachievable, or, in his words, a ‘difficult task, which we may never catch up with again’.

49 Schutte 1973, p. 84-5.
51 Wagner 2005, p. 17.
52 ‘Kunst und das Volk’, B/411-2; see Appendix, p. 233.
54 ‘Kunst und das Volk’, B/408; see Appendix, p. 231.
Education

By the time Schenker wrote ‘Kunst und das Volk’ in 1911, nineteenth-century ideals around education had narrowed. For middle-class men of his generation, Bildung had not only meant immersion into German classical culture, but also acquiring ‘an intellectual apparatus that enabled the gifted to interpret their crazy-quilt environment’, as William Johnston puts it.\footnote{Johnston 1972, p. 73.} For some of that elite, education had become transmuted into a means of preserving their position at the top of its artistic and intellectual life.\footnote{Volkov 1996, p. 96.} This politically somewhat naive notion is likely to have played some part in Schenker’s own elitism. Yet any l’art pour l’art sensibility is obscured from his mature writings by his alignment with an ideology that was in diametrical opposition to highbrow ‘dissimulation’,\footnote{Volkov 1985, p. 95.} namely the völkisch movement.

The völkisch movement was rooted in a vulgarised form of German idealism. Rejecting the pursuit of wealth and material goods, early exponents of völkisch thought, such as German historian Paul de Lagarde, proclaimed deference to German intellectual traditions as a superior alternative to Western utilitarianism.\footnote{Stackelberg 1981, p. 2.} Like Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, Lagarde appropriated freedom and individuality by stressing the creative and religious aspects that shape the individual. As such, the very concept of ‘personality’ hinged, according to him and his followers, not on self-realisation in a bourgeois-capitalist sense, but was delineated by völkisch ideals from the very outset.\footnote{Mosse 1966, p. 35.} Overtly political, the völkisch movement differentiated itself from the liberal middle classes’ preoccupation with aesthetics and the self by its conservative agenda. Despite proposing to bridge the chasm between the privileged and the underprivileged by promoting a national consciousness, the exponents of völkisch ideology aimed to maintain social stratification.\footnote{Stackelberg 1981, pp. 3-5.} In response to social and political developments following the Gründerzeit and the 1873 stock market crash – such as the rise of the working classes and democratic mass politics – social realities were transformed into questions of race. As such, the völkisch

\textsuperscript{55} Johnston 1972, p. 73.
\textsuperscript{56} Volkov 1996, p. 96.
\textsuperscript{57} Volkov 1985, p. 95.
\textsuperscript{58} Stackelberg 1981, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{59} Mosse 1966, p. 35.
\textsuperscript{60} Stackelberg 1981, pp. 3-5.
movement, precipitated by ‘academic proletarians’ (academics with a marked interest in secondary education), became, according to historian George Mosse, institutionalised ‘where it mattered the most’, namely the education of youth.\(^{61}\) Dazzled by a fixation on German culture in hereditary terms, \(\text{völkisch}\) ideology effortlessly tallied with nationalism and anti-Semitism, leading to the founding of the Pan-German movement led by Georg von Schönerer in Austria during the 1880s, and the Pan-German League in Germany in 1891.\(^{62}\) However, the ideology of the \(\text{Volk}\) was not unanimously right wing or anti-Semitic. It was common currency amongst society in general, and Jews in particular.\(^{63}\) The best-known example of a left-leaning Jew embracing \(\text{völkisch}\) irrationalism was Austria’s ‘father of socialism’ Victor Adler, who – not unlike Schenker – sought to affirm his belonging to the German \(\text{Volk}\) beyond that of the previous generation’s mere veneration of German classical culture.\(^{64}\)

Schenker’s most outspoken adoption of \(\text{völkisch}\) rhetoric through his emphasis on education can be found in the subtitle of his journal \(\text{Der Tonwille},\) which appealed to ‘a new generation of youth’ while promoting strict learning as a vehicle to recapture the ideals of the past. His overall pattern of arguments echoes Lagarde’s co-option of education into reformist radicalism. One of the most pervasive exponents of such emphasis on \(\text{Erziehung}\) was Julius Langbehn, author of \(\text{Rembrandt als Erzieher} (\text{Rembrandt as Educator}, 1890),\) a highly influential book the title of which is a play on Nietzsche’s \(\text{Schopenhauer als Erzieher}\) (1874). Like Schenker, Langbehn emphasises the values of the past rather than the creation of new ones, with the objective to counteract a perceived demise in contemporary culture.\(^{65}\) It is likely that Schenker had read (or was at least familiar with) \(\text{Rembrandt als Erzieher}:\) in \(\text{Kontrapunkt} 1,\) for instance, he casually refers to Rembrandt, the artist, as a guarantor of the autonomy of works of art.\(^{66}\) In addition, he developed the same Nietzschean literary style that pervades Langbehn’s prose, and both coupled an emphasis on education with the rejection of democracy, the ‘specialised’ sciences, and a

\(^{61}\) Mosse 1966, p. 152.
\(^{63}\) Beller 1989, p. 158.
\(^{64}\) Johnston 1972, p. [99]; see also Beller 1989, pp.155-62.
\(^{65}\) Niemeyer 2002, p. 115.
variety of other modern social and intellectual phenomena. Most notably, Langbehn, like Schenker after him, integrated Beethoven into his nationalist cultural symbolism: both rendered the composer as an Erzieher who could teach Germans how to overcome the dangers posed by socialism.

While a detailed comparison between Rembrandt als Erzieher and Schenker’s work lies beyond the remits of this study, the ‘Kunst und das Volk’ folder contains two newspaper clippings on the subject of education, which help trace the emphasis on Erziehung in Schenker’s reading materials and, at the same time, contextualise his own ‘Kunst und das Volk’. The articles were both published in the Neue Freie Presse and date from early August 1911, suggesting a particularly direct bearing on an addendum to the ‘Kunst und das Volk’ draft probably finished around that time.

The first item is a substantial feuilleton titled ‘Youth of Today and of Yesteryear’ by Alfred von Berger, at the time influential in his role as director of the Vienna Burgtheater and a regular contributor to the Neue Freie Presse. Berger’s sprawling essay is a harrowing account of his own youth as a lower middle-class Viennese child growing up in the 1850s and 60s – an experience that Schenker, of course, had not shared. Berger had published a traumatised account of his childhood already ten years earlier, in Im Vaterhaus (1901), an autobiographical text with an emphasis on self-discipline that is reminiscent of comparable memoires by Austrian writer and feminist Rosa Mayreder and dramatist Franz Grillparzer.

The perhaps more revealing article (marked ‘K. u. V.’, i.e. ‘Kunst und [das] Volk’ by Schenker) is a brief report on the opening address given on the occasion of the hundredth anniversary of the University of Breslau by its president Alfred Hillebrandt. Hillebrandt’s speech is a forthright admonition against education pandering to calls for what he viewed as its utilisation. As such, it is emblematic of the intellectual traction that precipitated the conservative revolution of higher education around the turn of the century, not

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67 See also Niemeyer 2002, pp. 112-6.
68 Dennis 1996, p. 57.
69 Alfred Freiherr von Berger, ‘Jugend von heute und ehemals’, in Neue Freie Presse (6 August 1911); OC B/432.
only in Breslau but also at other universities, including in Vienna.\textsuperscript{71} Here we encounter again anxieties relating to the loss of distinction between ‘high’ and ‘low’: ‘The levelling wave of the present, which seeks to bring the high and the low onto the same plane, also threatens to immerse new circles of people who strive for admission to the universities, as it cannot tolerate independent entities with their own existence.’\textsuperscript{72} Hillebrandt speaks out against the establishment of \textit{Volksuniversitäten}, possibly referring to evening adult classes such as the ones offered at the Volksheim Ottakring in Vienna from 1905 onwards, situated in the then predominantly proletarian suburb of Ottakring. Financed by the Rothschild banking family and counting Ernst Mach amongst its supporters, the Volksheim Ottakring was an early example of Vienna’s social-democratically led educational institutions that acted as a conduit for the teachings of, amongst others, members of the \textit{Wiener Kreis}, who were dissatisfied with the anti-democratic (and anti-Semitic) climate at the University of Vienna.\textsuperscript{73} Hillebrandt argues that the term \textit{Volksuniversität} in itself represents a contradiction, as higher education must ‘hurry ahead’ of the masses ‘without looking back’, and ‘pull them upwards’ beyond their own inadequacies.\textsuperscript{74} His emphasis on school education within this process, expressed in concert with his anxieties relating to the breakdown of social hierarchies (as well as a references to German universities’ rootedness in German soil), is \textit{völkisch} throughout, and his elitism can easily enough be related to Schenker’s own scepticism towards youth movements and stress on \textit{Erziehung}. In the addendum to ‘Kunst und das Volk’, in which he sets out to further elucidate ‘how the \textit{Volk} relates to art’,\textsuperscript{75} he writes:

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[71] Stadler 2012, p. 49.
\item[74] ‘aufwärts und nach hoch ziehen’; ‘Die Zentenarfeier der Breslauer Universität’ in \textit{Neue Freie Presse}, Morgenblatt, 3 August 1911; OC B/430.
\item[75] Addendum to ‘Kunst und das Volk’, B/415; see Appendix, p. 235.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
The nature of youth in most cases reveals itself as an appearance of prowess, and I want to declare, in opposition to common perceptions, that a closer look will reveal the true, humble measure of men despite the appearances to the contrary even during the youth of the person concerned. In the interest of human progress there is nothing more urgently desirable than to rid oneself from the delusions regarding the youth. Essentially, humankind requires nothing more than the leading minds, who unlock and pave all ways into the intellectual and material worlds; what good is it – apart from satisfying parental vanity – to mollycoddle and overrate what is in truth an unproductive epoch that, excluding genius, induces correspondingly unproductive lives of men and women.76

Volkskonzerte

Political efforts to socially broaden education after 1900 included providing the Volk with access to musical performances. In fact, ‘Kunst und das Volk’ contains a single topical discussion, namely that of the Viennese Arbeiterkonzerte, or Worker’s Union Concerts. The Arbeiterkonzerte (more precisely Arbeiter-Symphonie-Konzerte) were instigated by the Austro-Marxist David Josef Bach, a member of Freud’s circle and later a strong adherent of Karl Kraus, and supported by Victor Adler.77 Part of a comprehensive social programme that included not only the Volksuniversitäten but also investment in social housing, public transport and recreational venues (a programme eclipsed only during the years of Red Vienna, when the city was governed by the Social Democrats), the first such concert officially took place at the Vienna Musikverein in 1905. The venue, a traditional bastion of bourgeois culture, held tremendous symbolic meaning. Although only a small part of the audience were industrial workers,78 Bach, several years later, described the first concert in the following terms:

On 28 December 1905 a new audience set foot in the Great Hall of the Musikverein in Vienna. About eighty years earlier this society exhibited a new face, the middle classes, as the supporters of musical life in Austria, and in Vienna in particular. On this evening the working classes for the

76 Ibid., B/416-7; see Appendix, p. 237.
78 Kotlan-Werner 1987, p. 921.
first time played a visible role in Viennese musical life. It was a historic evening.\textsuperscript{79}

Unlike a large part of Viennese intellectuals who spent their working days in grandiose inner-city coffee houses and scarcely seemed to register the realities of working-class experience,\textsuperscript{80} Schenker was at least peripherally aware of it. Yet as much as he rejected the \textit{grande bourgeoisie} for what he viewed as its unreflecting consumption of German art, he rejected the proletariat for its aspirations for democratic legitimacy. In the realm of music, he charged both with pretence, affectation, and even deception – ‘Snobbery above, snobbery below’.\textsuperscript{81} This thinking along class lines became more pronounced in the hysterical exegesis of his essay ‘Die Sendung des Deutschen Genies’ published in Der \textit{Tonwille} 1 in 1921. ‘Kunst und das Volk’, on the other hand, demonstrates that his view of the proletariat as encroaching and contagious was already well defined during the pre-war years, and his counter-narrative to the \textit{Arbeiterkonzerte}, in which his separation of the \textit{Volk} and \textit{Publikum} became suspended, anticipates the tone of moral outrage of his post-war writings:

Influenced, of course, all the more so in today’s organisation of worker’s communities, the \textit{Volk} shows, as one so often reads in the press, ‘genuine’ appreciation also for highly complex works of music, yet all this is based only on an illusion, which originates in part from the famous name of the composer, and in part from the authority of the promoters. But since illusion and real appreciation are two different matters entirely, one should beware of rating the \textit{Volk’s} ovations for a Beethovenian symphony more highly than those of any other audience; and one will understand when I say that the most positive gain is only achieved by the promoters, who are hardly better-informed about the ways of art than the workers, yet at the least usurp the imposing role of great leaders, which in this case was ever so easy to achieve. Looked at in this way, therefore, those events that occupy increasingly more space in our concert life under the title of \textit{Volks-} or \textit{Arbeiterkonzerte}, are not, as one might think, to be viewed as events that enhance musical progress. They are rather the products of exaggerated sentimentality, or, as the case may be, a

\begin{enumerate}
\item[80] Timms 1986, p. 16.
\item[81] ‘Kunst und das Volk’, B/413; see Appendix, p. 234.
\end{enumerate}
very real aspiration to rise above, the hatchery of new snobbish circles. If art had to suffer the snobbery, the arrogance of those circles that came to prominence through wealth or some other kind of relation to art at least, these are now suddenly joined from the depths of the proletarian masses by an innumerable new horde of people that collectively decrees its understanding of art with the allures of fancied royalty, in the same way that the higher strata have done in the past. In truth, they represent a new pack of most poisonous snobbery; snobbery above, snobbery below – this is where ignorance and undervaluation of art has finally led to in such a regrettable fashion.\(^{82}\)

The *Volkskonzerte* and the *Arbeiterkonzerte* resembled each other in terms of their non-subscription format, a choice of outdoor as well as concert hall venues, and low ticket prices. However, although Schenker mentions them (and their organisers) in one breath, they in fact originated in different eras. Whereas the *Arbeiterkonzerte* were born out of left-wing political resolve during Karl Lueger’s term of office as the city’s Christian Social mayor, the *Volkskonzerte* go back to the *Gründerzeit*, and the short-lived political dominance of Liberalism. As the Vienna Philharmonic’s subscription concerts at the Musikverein were expensive and relatively infrequent, the *Volkskonzerte* provided a platform accessible not only to the proletariat but also to the lower middle classes.

\(^{82}\) ‘Kunst und das Volk’, B/412-3; see Appendix, pp. 233-4.
Figure 8. *Ein Volkskonzert vor dem Wiener Rathause* (detail), engraving based on an original drawing by Austrian painter and illustrator Theodor Breidwieser, 1892. This is a rare depiction of one of the Viennese Volkskonzerte, which took place throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. An anonymous text accompanying this illustration (both from an as yet unidentified publication) reads: ‘When the military band turns up, all of Vienna becomes electrified. [...] The concertgoers are very easy to classify and distinguish. The enthusiastic artistic youth from distant suburbs stand in a close circle around the musicians; then a second circle of child-minders and maids [...], while, in a third circle, there are sauntering guests, whose stopping would offend against good manners. The occupiers of chairs, which may be rented for two Kreuzer each, and which have been set up all around the Bosquets and lawns, make up the outermost chain. Members of the finest middle-class circles can be found among these guests enjoying the free concert, because ‘a Viennese dance and a Viennese song’ attracts them as much as the aforementioned, only they do not show it as noticeably.’

83 ‘Wenn die “Banda” kommt, wird ganz Wien elektrisiert. [...] Die Konzertgäste kann man sehr leicht klassifizieren und trennen. Im engen Kreis um die Musiker stehen die begeisterten Kunstjünger und -Jüngerinnen aus den fernen Vorstadtgründen, dann umkränzen, als zweiter Ring, die Kindermädchen und Bonnen […], während der dritte Rang auf und abwandelnde Gäste sind, bei denen das Stehenbleiben gegen den guten Ton verstoßen würde. Als äußerste Kette sind dann die Inhaber der Sessel, welche à zwei Kreuzer zu vermieten und rings um die Bosquets und Rasenplätze aufgestellt sind. Mitglieder der besten bürgerlichen Kreise sind unter diesen Freikonzertgästen zu finden, denn auf sie übt “an wean’rischer Tanz und an wean’risches Lied” genau dieselbe Anziehungskraft aus wie auf die Vorerwähnten, nur zeigen sie es nicht so
In her study of the Viennese Volkskonzerte, American Brahms scholar Margaret Notley cites David Josef Bach reminiscing about his first meeting with Arnold Schoenberg during an outdoor military band concert in the early 1890s such as the one illustrated above. Bach, like Schenker a migrant Ostjude from Galicia, wrote: 'For most of us it was the only opportunity to actually hear music'. Unlike the politically motivated Arbeiterkonzerte, the Volkskonzerte enjoyed varying degrees of support from all parts of the political spectrum, partly due to the fact that Liberalism continued to – at least symbolically – hold sway over the city’s cultural institutions even after its political eclipse. Given Schenker’s overt references to the proletariat – one of the earliest such references in his writings – his deliberations of these events were more than only broadly political, as he came to claim later in his life. ‘Kunst und das Volk’ was written less than a month after the defeat of the conservative Christian Social Party by the Social Democrats in Vienna in the Reichstagswahlen of 1911. Schenker noted this event in fatalistic terms in his diary: ‘The more this catastrophe appears to be surprising, the less it surprises in truth, if one considers that the power of suggestion of a Lueger has become extinguished!’ (Despite Lueger’s strategically espoused anti-Semitism during his incumbency as mayor of Vienna between 1897 and his death in 1910, Schenker spoke highly of this politician even later in his life.)

The role of leaders is a recurring theme in ‘Kunst und das Volk’. In his discussion of the Arbeiterkonzerte in this context, Schenker makes an unquestioned link between political leadership and leadership in art. The auffallend.’ This source, together with the illustration, was published in an unknown periodical in 1892. Although the author owns the original, its exact publication date and venue remains to be identified.

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84 Notley 1997, 423.
87 ‘Je scheinbar überraschender diese Katastrophe, desto weniger überrascht sie in Wahrheit, wenn man bedenkt, daß die suggestive Kraft eines Lueger erloschen!’ Diary entry, 13 June 1911; Federhofer 1985, p. 328.
prototypical leader figure in German thought was the *Volksheld* (*Volk* hero), who, in the work of *völkisch* writers such as Dietrich Eckart, derived his elemental strength from his rootedness and proximity to nature, as well as his simple social virtues.\(^{89}\) Amid the deep frustrations suffered by cultural pessimists on seemingly every level of life, intellectuals subscribing to Nietzschean ideals, such as Stefan George and his circle, actively endorsed the idea of a charismatic leader to adopt the role of the mythical *Volk* hero.\(^{90}\) While Schenker, particularly in the aftermath of the First World War, joined conservative commentators in calling for a leader who could overturn democratisation and with it Marxism, he also came to envision a musical genius that would comparably rule the *Volk* in its participation in art. In fact, ideals of political and artistic authoritarianism became, for the most part, synchronised in Schenker's later thinking, a notion epitomised in his grotesque call for 'music-"Brownshirts"' to drive out 'music-Marxists' in 1933.\(^{91}\) Yet in the *Arbeiterkonzerte*, he found his vision of robust governance anathematised through what he saw as political and educational dilettantism and hollow aspiration. On the occasion of attending a concert celebrating the twenty-year anniversary of the foundation of the *Arbeiterkonzerte*, he noted in his diary: 'A disgraceful speech by Dr Bach, from which one clearly can deduce that he does not know whether he has in front of him an already educated audience or one that is yet to be educated.'\(^{92}\)

As his snipe against Bach bears out, the discrepancy between the educated middle classes and the uneducated masses represented a fault line in Schenker's thinking, which became more pronounced as the social makeup of concert audiences continued to become more fluid after the turn of the century. Yet – to reshape the issue – given the socially broadened access to art, what exactly distinguished, in Schenker's view, the *Publikum from the Volk*? He was, of course, not alone amongst his contemporaries in aiming to discern these

\(^{90}\) Mosse 1966, p. 205-6.
\(^{91}\) 'Musik-"Braunhemden", Musikmarxisten'; letter to Felix-Eberhard von Cube, 14 May 1933; Federhofer 1985, p. 329. 'Brownshirts' of course refers to the *Sturmabteilung*, a paramilitary organisation founded by Hitler in 1921 that played a key role in his rise to power.
\(^{92}\) 'Eine infame Rede von Dr. Bach, aus der man deutlich entnehmen kann, daß er nicht wisse, ob er vor sich ein schon gebildetes oder erst zu bildendes Publikum habe!' Diary entry, 27 September 1924, Federhofer 1985, p. 169.
somewhat fictitious entities. Of the thinkers of the period who wrote in this matter – such as Ferdinand Tönnies – the eminent American sociologist Robert Ezra Park perhaps came closest to providing a concise answer to the question, and, inadvertently, Schenker’s own view of it. As Park put it only a few years prior to Schenker’s 1908 outline for the ‘Kunst und die Teilnehmenden’ project, ‘the public is critical’.

The Public Sphere

Park, like Schenker, had started his career by working for almost a decade (1887-98) as a barely noticed and poorly paid journalist. His cessation of writing for American newspapers was followed by a period of immersion in German idealism, as well as studies in 1899-1900 with German sociologist Georg Simmel. In his doctoral thesis ‘Masse und Publikum’ (1904), written in German during his studies at the University of Heidelberg, he reflects on his journalistic activities in an attempt to define a journalist’s readership. For Park, a significant distinction between the public and the masses was that while both can feel and empathise, only the public exhibits the capacity to think critically. He writes:

Within the public, opinions are divided. Where the public stops being critical, it dissolves or transforms itself back into a mass. Therein lies the fundamental attribute that distinguishes the mass from the public; namely that the mass is subjected to the force of a collective opinion, which it follows uncritically. The public, on the other hand, because it is made up of individuals that have differing opinions, will be guided by foresight and sensible reasoning.

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94 See Ferdinand Tönnies, Kritik der Öffentlichen Meinung (Berlin: Julius Springer, 1922).
95 ‘das Publikum ist kritisch’; Park 2001, p. 274.
Park’s points here are easily compatible with Schenker’s views on society. In ‘Kunst und das Volk’, Schenker isolates limited judgement as the ‘unselfconscious’ (but suggestible) Volk’s main characteristic; and his chief criticism of the Volks- and Arbeiterkonzerte revolves around the audiences’ posturing critical attitude, their ‘very real aspiration to rise above’ and snobbery.\footnote{‘Kunst und das Volk’, B/411 and 413; see Appendix, pp. 233 and 234.} At the same time, Schenker was no more tolerant of traditional concert audiences, nor did he grant them any greater insight into the Masterworks. His classification of those participating in art into the Volk, the public, and the critics is, after all, hierarchical only in terms of passive rather than active participation. While accepting the notional legitimacy of the listener’s privately expressed ‘impressions’ in response to music,\footnote{Ibid., B/411; see Appendix, p. 233.} he objects to the role that interval gossip (Pausentratsch) plays within the concert experience. Schenker’s rejection of the era’s emphasis on aesthetics (Gefühlskultur), an innermost cultural characteristic of fin-de-siècle Vienna,\footnote{Schorske 1981, p. 7.} is consistently expressed in his mature output. Yet what exactly did he have in mind when referring to ‘impressions’ in response to listening to music? In ‘Kunst und das Volk’ he describes them as a superficial rather than structural mode of listening, reminiscent of Nietzsche’s charge against the public that ‘never learns to get beyond interest in the material alone’.\footnote{Nietzsche [1878] 1996, p. 89.} Schenker writes of ‘a superficial impression of the musical material itself, of the different sound characteristics, the charm of contrasting dynamic shadings, here and there also a particularly prominent tune.’\footnote{‘Kunst und das Volk’, B/411; see Appendix, p. 233.} While his assertion that these diverse elements ‘reach the recipient’s consciousness by happenstance only’ might be deemed overdrawn,\footnote{‘Kunst und Kritik’, C/38-5-6; see Appendix, p. 245.} it is the public’s voicing of these ‘superficial’ impressions that seems to more deeply provoke Schenker’s disapproval, as well as his recourse to legal jargon. He sternly admonishes in ‘Kunst und Kritik’: ‘In recognising someone’s right to make a judgment we are not at the same time approving the form in which the
received impression is communicated to others.\textsuperscript{103} Accordingly, he berates what he views as transgressions, recognisably anticipating Adorno’s assessment of the ‘cultured listener’; in \textit{Kontrapunkt} 1 Schenker writes:

Vanity and the desire to be entertained drive [the dilettante] to art, but he stubbornly insists that such an impulse be viewed as ‘artistic instinct’ and held in high esteem. A serious organic relation to art remains foreign to him forever; but he arrogantly demands that his relation to art be recognised as the only correct one. [...] In short, he acts as master of the situation, generously promotes Bach, Mozart, and Beethoven, and proudly manufactures ‘festivals’, ‘jubilees’, and the like.\textsuperscript{104}

Figure 9. \textit{Jubiläumsfeier der Wiener Philharmoniker im Großen Saal des Wiener Musikvereins} (1910); engraving by Austrian painter and illustrator August Mandlick. The performance depicted took place on 20 March 1910, and was that of Bruckner’s \textit{Te Deum}, conducted by Felix Weingartner.

Schenker’s critique can be explained – as he does in ‘Kunst und das Volk’ – through the notion of artifice in music. Since the classical repertoire required familiarity with an uncommon (and in the course of the nineteenth century increasingly complex) musical language, turn-of-the-century concert audiences – often themselves amateur musicians, or individuals who had, at any

\textsuperscript{103} Ibid., C/378; see Appendix, p. 240.
\textsuperscript{104} Schenker [1910] 1987, pp. xviii-xix.
rate, had invested in developing some kind of musical literacy – felt mandated to a sense of exclusivity.\textsuperscript{105} Public concerts therefore provided a perfect platform for the middle classes to display ‘musicality’, an ill-defined but powerful conception of tastefulness and accomplishment that has no formal analogies in the reception of the visual arts or the theatre.\textsuperscript{106} This in turn was achieved by voicing aesthetic judgement, in what Schenker referred to as sharing ‘impressions’. The fact that interval gossip took place in public rather than in private – the crux of Schenker’s objection – held special significance to those participating in it. It was indicative of a wider socio-cultural development in which the idea of the public sphere itself had taken on the fervour of political determination.

True to Jürgen Habermas’ contention of the public’s seizure of something that in the past had been highly prized by a privileged few, the ideals of the Austrian Baroque became reinvented, along with its architecture (as can be seen by the neo-baroque style of some of the Ringstrasse buildings),\textsuperscript{107} its interiors, and its entertainments. Yet while the aristocracy – including Emperor Franz Joseph – showed little interest in the arts, the middle classes’ emulation of aristocratic ideals manifested itself in taking piano lessons (a pursuit of which Schenker, who earned his living by giving piano lessons from the 1890s onwards, had first-hand experience) and purchasing sheet music and specialised periodicals. Most importantly, it led to communal attendance of the formal events at Vienna’s purpose-built opera house and concert halls,\textsuperscript{108} among other venues such as the Burgtheater and, after the Habsburg collapse, amidst the baroque splendour of the setting of the Salzburg Festival. Through interval gossip, the public not only replicated what they viewed as being the cultured ways of the aristocracy, but also celebrated their own good taste in art.

Speaking broadly of the nineteenth century, Habermas describes the public concert experience in these words:

\textsuperscript{105} Botstein 1985, p. 84.
\textsuperscript{106} Adorno 1977, pp. 138–9.
\textsuperscript{107} Carl Schorske makes this connection between the \textit{bourgeois} appropriation of baroque splendour and the Ringstrasse’s symbolic power of a triumphant Liberalism in Schorske 1981, pp. 24–62.
\textsuperscript{108} These venues on or near the Ringstrasse primarily include the Hofopertheater (1869), the Musikverein (1870), and, from 1913 onwards, the Konzerthaus.
Admission for a payment turned the musical performance into a commodity; simultaneously, however, there arose something like music not tied to a purpose. For the first time an audience gathered to listen to music as such – a public of music lovers to which anyone who was propertied and educated was admitted. [...] Art became an object of free choice and of changing preference. The ‘taste’ to which art was oriented from then on became manifest in the assessments of lay people who claimed no prerogative, since within a public everyone was entitled to judge.109

As evident in ‘Kunst und das Volk’, Schenker’s thinking on what he came to label the ‘aristocracy of genius’ was antithetical to the hierarchy of social strata;110 his writings certainly exhibit none of the light-hearted enthrallment with aristocracy that, for instance, pervades Hugo von Hofmannsthal’s and Richard Strauss’s opera Der Rosenkavalier (1911), and they turned more programmatic only in his post-war output. After the breakup of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, Schenker came to embrace the ‘aristocracy of genius’ not just as a metaphor for the elite, but also claimed that it represented ‘an intrinsic bond’ with the monarchy.111 His earlier commentary on the public sphere ostensibly rests on ethical considerations revolving around the idea of hypocritical mimicry in particular, of the masses ‘elevating themselves above their station’, as he later put it.112 His horror in the face of a ‘innumerable new horde of people that collectively decrees its understanding of art with the allures of fancied royalty’ was far from unique among intellectuals,113 and similar espousals were in fact quite commonplace in the feuilletons of the broadsheets of his day. Theodor Lessing, for instance, also associated the rise of the musical layperson with the tarnishing effect of modern life, noting in a feuilleton in the Neue Freie Presse in 1911: ‘The standard of the masses rises, but the tenderer souls perish. Now every ass is clever and every snob has great talent.’114 Given the outspoken

110 Schenker 2005b, p. 165.
111 Schenker [1921] 2004, p. 3. See also Clark 2007, 143.
113 ‘Kunst und das Volk’, B/413; see Appendix, p. 234.
114 ‘Das Niveau der Masse steigt, aber die zarteren Einzelseelen gehen zu Grunde. Schon hat jeder Esel Verstand und jeder Snob ein großes Talent.’ Theodor Lessing, ‘Die Psychologie des Lärms’, in Neue Freie Presse,
Kulturkritik of those that considered themselves as the cultural elite, it comes to little surprise that Schenker’s polemics were occasionally well-received, even by non-musicians. This can be gauged by Adalbert Seligmann’s commentary on the preface of Kontrapunkt 1 published in the Neue Freie Presse in 1911. Seligmann was a painter and art critic known today for his painting Theodor Billroth operiert (Theodor Billroth Operating, 1889). At the time a staff writer at the Neue Freie Presse, he reiterates some of Schenker’s polemics, and amplifies his denunciation of the modern age’s ‘glaring anarchy, unbridled individualism [and] the cult of personality’.\footnote{Seligma\nn was a painter and art critic known today for his painting Theodor Billroth operiert (Theodor Billroth Operating, 1889). At the time a staff writer at the Neue Freie Presse, he reiterates some of Schenker’s polemics, and amplifies his denunciation of the modern age’s ‘glaring anarchy, unbridled individualism [and] the cult of personality’.\footnote{Citing Kontrapunkt 1, he concludes: ‘In an “era so confused in its spiritual and social outlook” as the present, finding such opinions in print and publication is truly satisfying.’}

In the crucible of public concerts, the powerful ideology of the public sphere met with another fiction, namely that music ‘speaks’ to the listener, and that his or her impressions and interpretations thereof can add to the very fabric of works of art.\footnote{During the course of the second half of the nineteenth century, the idea of an intuitive aesthetic appreciation (Gefühlsverständnis) opened up the concert experience to a wider, non-professional audience, and the ‘ambience’ of concerts, along with the listeners’ response to the music performed, was increasingly deemed just as important as the performances themselves.\footnote{After the turn of the century, the same emphasis on inwardness (Innerlichkeit) – perhaps epitomised in Schoenberg’s setting of Stefan George’s 1907 poem ‘Entrückung’, with its expressive opening line ‘Ich fühle luft von anderem planeten’ (‘I feel the air of another planet’), in his Second String Quartet – created an ever more exclusive audience for proponents of musical modernism as well. The significance bestowed on the listener’s interpretation and, by extension, his or her own psyche, generated greater self-awareness.}}


\footnote{‘die helle Anarchie, der schwankenlose Individualismus, der Kult des “Persönlichen”’; Adalbert Seligmann, Feuilleton, Neue Freie Presse, undated, probably 1911; OC 2, p. 26.}

\footnote{‘In einem “geistig und sozial so verworrenen Zeitalter wie das unsrige” solche Ansichten gedruckt und verlegt vorzufinden tut wahrhaft wohl.’ Ib\d. Translation of the quotation (Schenker 1910, p. xi) adopted from Schenker 1987a, p. xix.}

\footnote{Steinberg 2004, p. 9.}

\footnote{Volkov 1996, p. 94.}
among critics and audiences alike. Adolf Weißmann, a highly influential music critic in Berlin, remarked on this development in an article dating from 1907 and retained in Schenker’s ‘criticism folder’:

[Our professional judges of music] are concerned with gaining their salvation for the future by cloaking their judgments in impressions. It is clear that, as a result, their position has shifted. Anyone in an audience has impressions that are more or less justified and therefore believes himself to be a colleague of Mr Critic.119

The newspaper writers’ stress on feeling was by no means born out of or limited to music criticism; it had been a crucial aspect of the reflective feuilleton altogether. In literary terms, the feuilleton represents more than mere subjective commentary ‘below the line’: its distinctiveness reflects the Liberal era’s cult of the individual.121 Thus the very nature of the feuilleton is intimately linked with its mission: it is not merely a literary manifestation vis-à-vis Liberalism, it also represents a voice of protest against any mechanisation, alignment, and disembodiment of life associated with the free economy.122 Rather than ‘cloaking’ judgements, it could be argued that rendering ‘a state of feeling became the mode of formulating a judgement’, as Schorske puts it.123

Schenker’s ‘criticism folder’ contains a particularly pertinent example of how this new occupation with the self became part of the wider discourse about the aesthetics of art and criticism. Published in the Neue Freie Presse in April 1908 and representing the most substantial item in the folder, it is a two-part feuilleton titled ‘Kunst und Kunstkritik: Eine psychologische Studie’ by Erwin von Schwartzenau, a Viennese civil servant and politician at the time occupying the role of the senate president of the higher administrative court.124 Weißmann

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121 The feuilleton was separated from the rest of the page by a horizontal line running across the page; Rossbacher 1992, p. 83.
122 Ibid.
124 Schwartzenau occupied this post between 1906 and 1912. For more information on this relatively obscure figure in Austrian politics see
locates the cause for even amateurs voicing opinions on the subject of criticism in Richard Wagner's prose writings, specifically those on his own music, through which the composer, as Weißmann views it, has rendered the profession of the critic superfluous. Schenker, on the other hand, introduces the figure of Wagner into his deliberations about Laien from a slightly different vantage point. In the Ninth Symphony monograph he unambiguously decries Wagner’s part in the democratisation of high art, his appeal to lay judgement, and the resultant impact on the ideology of the public sphere. Schenker writes:

Wagner dealt musical art its deathblow by appealing to the broadest spectrum of the populace as audience for his own ‘music dramas’ (ah, the theater!) and thus incapacitating it for dedication to the more arduous differentiations of absolute music. It was he who, constantly flattering the so-called ‘naive’ listener, made the approach to tonal art easier for laymen than they, with their laziness, self-indulgence, or conceit – and always with the mutual assurance of their capacities for decisive ‘judgment’ on the basis of so-called musical sensitivity – already made it on their own accord! 

Here Schenker anchors his association of Wagner and lay judgement in the context of the composer's alleged subversion of his own concept of 'absolute music'. Wagner is believed to have derived the idea of absolute music from a range of German thinkers, including Schiller and Schopenhauer, and first applied it in a programmatic commentary accompanying a performance of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony that he conducted in 1846. Although today the term is primarily used to denote music that is non-representational (as opposed to music that aims to represent some kind of extra-musical content), Wagner originally used the term 'absolute' to express its nullity, akin to the philosophical Absolute: instrumental music could mean anything, or nothing in particular. However, in the years around the 1848 revolutions, Wagner conflated his abstract vision of absolute music with what has been described as the Romantic

\[126\] Steinberg 2004, p. 11, and Garratt 2010, pp. 27-34. 
valorisation of music.\textsuperscript{128} Romantic aesthetics were orientated towards a dramatic (or, more precisely, poetic) narrative to which music was subjected, a notion exemplified in Robert Schumann’s youthful assertion in 1828 that ‘every composer is a poet, only at a higher level’.\textsuperscript{129} Wagner called it \textit{dichterische Absicht} (poetic intent), and mapped this notion onto music from the early Romantic period, particularly the symphonies of Beethoven.\textsuperscript{130} In his \textit{Niedergang} essay Schenker quotes Wagner’s \textit{Oper und Drama}, in which the composer first introduced the idea of poetic intent:

> In the works from the second half of his creative life Beethoven [...] goes beyond the musically absolute, which ordinary convention recognised as comprehensible, i.e. in some recognisable form of dance or song – in order to speak in a language that often appears as an arbitrary omission of mood and, not belonging to a purely musical relationship, is connected only by the bond of a poetic intent, which, however, cannot in fact be expressed with poetic clarity in music.\textsuperscript{131}

In this essay Wagner argued for a poetic aesthetic as a higher development of ‘purely musical relationships’.\textsuperscript{132} Nietzsche viewed the result of Wagner’s clouding the waters of ‘poetic clarity’ and his emphasis on the listener’s psyche as the ‘presumption of the layman, of the art idiot’.\textsuperscript{133} Schenker, too, associates Wagner’s influence with his anxieties about false authority, and, as he saw it, the erroneous emphasis on individualism that enabled uninitiated listeners to make facile correspondences between music and their own emotional responses to it. Alert to the overtly political dimensions of Wagner’s thinking, he writes in the Ninth Symphony monograph: ‘It was [Wagner] who bestowed, with what may be compared to usurped imperial powers, the general suffrage, and thus elevated the “naive” listeners, the

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\textsuperscript{128} Ibid., p. 7.
\textsuperscript{129} Jensen 2012, p. 39.
\textsuperscript{130} Steinberg 2004, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{131} Schenker 2005a, 105. Schenker’s response is unsurprisingly confrontational: ‘These works, above all, give evidence of a purely musical cohesiveness precisely according to those laws that Wagner did not understand or refused to recognise; whereas a poetic intent can perhaps be supposed but unfortunately not proven, and in any event plays a secondary role so long as music exists as such.’ Ibid., 106.
\textsuperscript{132} Steinberg 2004, p. 139.
\textsuperscript{133} Nietzsche [1888] 1988, p. 42.
\end{flushright}
millions of ciphers, to the status of “individuals” and “personalities”!\footnote{Schenker [1912] 1992, p. 19.} Wagner’s reactionary emphasis on subjective freedom in his Zurich writings was embedded within a wider Hegelian ideology of social reform;\footnote{Garratt 2010, pp. 54-5.} in historian Michael Steinberg’s words, ‘the absolute nationalizes the abstract’, thereby making ‘the abstract signify, and signify absolutely, as the voice of the nation’.\footnote{Steinberg 2004, p. 139.} Even so, it is perhaps noteworthy that Wagner revised his conception of absolute music out of polemical intent. He specifically responded to Viennese music critic Eduard Hanslick’s appropriation of the term in his Vom Musikalisch-Schönen.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 1-2.} Like Wagner in his 1846 programme note, Hanslick considered the absolute as self-contained and self-referential within music: whereas music may evoke emotions, it does not contain or express them. Although Schenker may not have entirely shared Hanslick’s Formalästhetik,\footnote{Nicholas Cook discusses affinities between the two men’s thinking on music in Cook 2007, pp. 48-62. Schenker later rejected Hanslick’s formalism entirely, writing in Erläuterungsausgabe op. 109 (1913): [Hanslick’s] formalism can never explain or refute that which rests on its own laws, as the life of tones precisely does! ‘Niemals wird doch [Hanslick’s] Formal-Ästhetik erklären, bezw. widerlegen können was auf eigenen Gesetzen so ruht, wie eben das Tonleben!’ Schenker 1913, p. 57.} he too viewed absolute music as something that Wagner had usurped in Oper und Drama. Ironically, however, it was the ‘Bismarck of music criticism’, as Verdi had once called Hanslick, who may have more actively precipitated what Schenker regarded as ‘that massive catastrophe whose witnesses we now become’ by actively encouraging the Viennese public to make up its own mind.\footnote{‘Bismarck der Musikkritik’, Korngold 1991, p. 90; Schenker [1912] 1992, p. 19.}

In Schenker’s observation of this development, lay judgement not only lost its private character by being made in public but, together with the works of art, became subjected to the machinations of the critic’s ‘phoney’ – to use Hans Keller’s idiom – profession. This relatively modern term, nowadays often associated with the kind of mid-century American teenage slang epitomised in J. D. Salinger’s novel The Catcher in the Rye (1951), was central to Keller’s outlook on the music critic’s trade. Keller suggested that because this particular
'phoney profession’ is generally respected due to its implication of critical thinking, it is also one that, as a result, is able to create problems that it then fails to solve – it thereby produces permanently insoluble problems in order to avert unemployment.\textsuperscript{142} Schenker's complaints in ‘Kunst und Kritik’ recognisably prefigure this notion:

\begin{quote}
[T]he occasion of creating a judgement is bereft of its chance character and its place is taken by rendering judgments by trade, a trade that actively seeks and creates opportunity, since the contest of creating a means of livelihood takes hold of any given person without weighing them up, without testing them. And so we have arrived at that criticism that in the form of daily, journalistic criticism fatally occupies such a conspicuous place in today's public life.\textsuperscript{143}
\end{quote}

\section*{The Music Critics}

Schenker’s thinking on music criticism in the years after Hanslick’s death in 1904 was undoubtedly shaped by a combination of factors, including the lacklustre critical reception of his own work (counting his compositions) in Vienna, and a wider fallout between artists, critics, and audiences that was generated by the challenges posed by musical modernism. However, at this point I want to address a profoundly contradictory \textit{idée fixe} in Schenker’s thinking that predates both these developments. Notwithstanding his newly-acquired role as music critic in 1891 (while Hanslick was still active for the \textit{Neue Freie Presse}), Schenker’s first ever published sentence, a polemic, reads: ‘For some time now, critics and the public have been whispering to each other that Brahms has entered into his third and weakest creative period.’\textsuperscript{144} In response to a shift of public mood \textit{vis-à-vis} Brahms’ ‘late style’,\textsuperscript{145} Schenker here alludes to a conspiracy between the public and the critics against the Master. His latent objection revolves around the notion that the public is unqualifedly critical

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\textsuperscript{142} Keller 1987, p. 14. \\
\textsuperscript{143} ‘Kunst und Kritik’, C/380; see Appendix, p. 240. \\
\textsuperscript{144} Heinrich Schenker, ‘Johannes Brahms: Fünf Lieder für eine Singstimme mit Pianoforte, op. 107’, in \textit{Musikalisches Wochenblatt}, vol. 22 (1891), transl. in Karnes 2008, p. 81. \\
\textsuperscript{145} Margaret Notley offers an analysis of what might be regarded as Brahms’ ‘late style’ – arguably from 1890 onwards – in Notley 2007, pp. 36-70.
\end{flushright}
towards art, but not sufficiently critical towards itself. He elaborates in ‘Kunst und Kritik’:

[A] clandestine union of interest binds the public and critics. Because it is itself uninformed, the public cannot gauge the critic’s ignorance, and therefore has no idea that criticism can inform the public even less, the less it itself is informed. […] In any case, [the critic] then makes it his aim to keep the public in the dark about how one can write and think about music differently. Objectively argued articles are banished from the newspapers, and in this way he succeeds in mollifying the public and taking them in. Public and criticism are as one yet again.  

Perhaps the most immediately striking aspect of Schenker’s argument is the paradox nestled within the notion of a clandestine public. After all, the public sphere’s defining feature is its demarcation from the private and the secret, its openness from which the German term for the public sphere, Öffentlichkeit, derives. In the context of late nineteenth-century music criticism, Schenker’s allegation of reciprocity between criticism and public opinion is almost synonymous with Hanslick’s journalistic activities at the Neue Freie Presse. ‘Kunst und Kritik’ is the earliest text in which Schenker openly expresses hostility towards Hanslick, something he continued to do during the 1910s in particular. The reason behind Schenker’s antagonism may lie in the fact that Hanslick’s conception of musical formalism was not as abstract as his famous reference to ‘tonally moving forms’ makes it appear. Hanslick’s thinking on musical participation was grounded in the same ideology of bourgeois social emancipation that informed Wagner’s revolutionary writings of 1849-51. For Hanslick, absolute music could claim to be universally understood and therefore accessible to the listener regardless of his or her ethnicity or class. In his journalistic work, he promoted this social agenda in practical terms. In his early, pre-1848 writings, Hanslick laments the cultural backwardness of 1840s Vienna: ‘The public at large does not like any music that has to be listened to with attention and seriousness, to say nothing of musical education’,  

146 ‘Kunst und Kritik’, C/403 and 405; see Appendix, pp. 258 and 260.  
147 ‘Das große Publikum mag keine Musik, deren Anhören Aufmerksamkeit, Ernst, oder gar eine höhere musikalische Bildung verlangt.’ Yoshida 2001, p. 185.
distances himself from that notion after the defeat of Liberalism. After the failed revolution, he gradually reassesses his musical aesthetics, and comes to regard music as overtly autonomous, as a highly cherished refuge for the world-weary. However, Hanslick did not entirely disengage his music criticism from his former socio-political mission. In his autobiography *Aus meinem Leben* (1894) he declares:

I have always held on to the principle to only speak to the public, not the artist. […] If my extensive critical career has yielded any real benefit, it consists solely in the gradual educative influence on the public. Criticism is not all-powerful against the true value or lack of value of the artist. It is of real authority only if – to put it bluntly – it is in the right. The public will not be fooled. It follows its own impressions, and these are for the most part – not always – right.

Schenker’s polemics against Hanslick are alert to the critic acting as a mouthpiece of public opinion and for public consensus, putting taste over reasoned judgement and thereby ‘staging’ public opinion. He is particularly scathing about the self-styled expert status that Hanslick, as he saw it, bestowed on himself through his powerful position as chief critic of the *Neue Freie Presse*. Schenker’s overt references to the damages inflicted by the abuse of authority are consistent with his broader political views. Yet Hanslick achieved popularity not through his claims of musical insight alone; he was also gifted with the kind of witty and brilliant writing style that was characteristic of the *feuilleton*.

Although the *feuilleton* was expressly addressed to the public, it essentially remained a monologue, appreciated for its stylistic ingenuity, rather than its educated assessment: it prompted conversations, but not with the author, as Ferdinand Kürnberger, one of the most influential Viennese writers of the

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148 Yoshida 2001, p. 188, and Habermas 1989, p. [236].
150 Adorno 1977, p. 149; Habermas 1989, p. [236].
nineteenth century, described it.\textsuperscript{151} Hanslick's journalistic activities arguably weakened his own advocacy of ‘absolute’, pure music that, in theory, was detached from semantics.\textsuperscript{152} According to music critic Max Graf, Hanslick’s career was indebted to what he euphemistically described as the light-hearted atmosphere particular to Vienna. Graf, whose own first journalistic publication in 1890 ‘made a scarecrow out of the celebrated critic’,\textsuperscript{153} recalls this ‘Viennese’ ambience in the following terms:

Hanslick represented the charming and superficial Viennese charm to perfection. The perfect harmony between Hanslick and the musical taste of Viennese society explains the hold he had upon his Viennese readers. After reading the stock-exchange quotations, the most unmusical banker turned to Hanslick’s latest critique, enjoying his elegant style, his wit, and his poisoned remarks on the music of Wagner or Liszt, which the banker disliked just as violently as Hanslick did. Hanslick, then, represents the type of critic who is his reader’s mouthpiece. […] He and he alone was the real representative of the taste of Viennese society.\textsuperscript{154}

It could be argued that Hanslick institutionalised music criticism exactly through his alertness to public taste, therefore realising its democratising potential. By assuming the role of the listeners’ advocate, Hanslick sought to foster the public’s independent critical judgement, while monitoring its progress from the vantage point of an avuncular educator.\textsuperscript{155} Notwithstanding the influence that Hanslick’s music-aesthetic thinking arguably had on Schenker during his formative years, some of Schenker’s earliest published work can without difficulty be read as direct critiques of the critic’s function as the official representative of public opinion. In his 1891 Brahms review, for instance, Schenker writes: ‘Criticism sticks to what has already been decided. Otherwise, there would be no aesthetic in whose name it still speaks.’\textsuperscript{157} Twenty years later, in ‘Kunst und Kritik’, he speaks out against Hanslick by name. In an

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{151} Rossbacher 1992, p. 83.
\bibitem{152} Schröder 2012, p. 16.
\bibitem{153} Graf 1947, p. 24. In addition to being a music critic, Max Graf is today also known for taking part in what is considered to be the first psychoanalytic study of a child, namely that of his son ‘Little Hans’, supervised by Sigmund Freud. Freud published the findings in his \textit{Analyse der Phobie eines fünfjährigen Knaben} (1909).
\bibitem{154} Ibid., pp. 246-9.
\bibitem{155} See also Gooley 2011, pp. 322-3.
\bibitem{157} Karnes 2008, p. 81.
\end{thebibliography}
unambiguous tone of debunking rather than critiquing what he considered Hanslick’s ‘empty clap-trap’,\(^\text{158}\) he writes:

> The gullible public may well think that, for instance, the famous critic Hanslick […] had somehow to be knowledgeable simply because he passed himself off as a knowledgeable musician; in contrast, the truly educated musician is at liberty to see through the lack of comprehension even of the aforementioned critic.\(^\text{159}\)

Schenker’s anger against Hanslick and music journalists in general was exacerbated by what he judged to be a kind of charlatanism of those occupying these socially highly regarded positions. It is perhaps no coincidence that the first clipping in his ‘criticism folder’ dwells on what he evidently considered an injustice to the ‘truly educated’, in the form of a quotation of French sculptor and architect Antoine Étex, the designer of the Eiffel Tower in Paris. Schenker may in fact have borrowed from Étex’s venom against *feuilletonists* in his own essay; the architect is quoted as saying:

> Because the critics assert their follies with great confidence, they sometimes end up like all liars who often tell the same lie repeatedly: they believe it themselves, and the public believes them too. But since artists do not have the time to seize on all this stupid clap-trap and expose it as such, the public swallows the nonsense and believes it to be pure wisdom.\(^\text{160}\)

All of Étex’s points reappear in Schenker’s own essay: the critics’ deceitfulness, their self-delusion, and the public’s blind faith in them. However, there is a broader historical context for Schenker’s dim view of Hanslick beyond the latter’s journalistic output, which was, in Hanslick’s later years, limited to about twelve *feuilletons* a year.\(^\text{161}\) In tandem with the expansion of concert audiences during the nineteenth century, there was an explosive growth in

\(^{158}\) ‘Kunst und Kritik’, C/399; see Appendix, p. 255.  
\(^{159}\) Ibid., C/406; see Appendix, p. 261.  
\(^{161}\) Korngold 1991, p. 87.
literature about music, including the relatively novel genres of guidebooks to the repertoire, self-teaching guides about the elements of music such as instrumentation and basic music theory, popular general histories of music, and concert guides.¹⁶² Although expressly writing about newspaper criticism in ‘Kunst und Kritik’, Schenker does nonetheless cite the German illustrated music periodical Die Musik in the course of the essay, and there is nothing to suggest that he was any more positive about music criticism published in venues other than daily broadsheets, including monographs. On the contrary, the shelf life of book-length accounts such as Hanslick’s survey of Viennese musical life Geschichte des Concertwesens in Wien (History of Concert Life in Vienna, 1869) elicited from Schenker a sense of moral indignation, which is well illustrated by two aphorisms committed to paper several years later. These two notes, which were written on the same day, 10 November 1917, became physically separated from each other – most likely due to their references to two different planned publications – and not put to use thereafter:¹⁶³

Journalist – critic – because he only ever shares his impressions, he merely records his diaries. What presumption! Does the world already know the diaries of Spinoza, a Christ, or a Moses?¹⁶⁴

One is supposed to take for granted their musical insights, as if those were somehow to reveal themselves automatically. Hanslick, too, wrote books even under the pretentious title Diary of a Musician; what held him back from divulging his insights there? Instead, he preferred to write a History of Concert Life and more such tat.¹⁶⁵

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¹⁶² Botstein 1992, 131.
¹⁶³ OC 12/490 and 12/533.
¹⁶⁵ ‘Musikalische Kenntnisse sollte man [ihn] glauben[,] als müßten sich solche nicht irgendwo verraten. Hanslick schrieb ja auch Bücher sogar unter dem ausspruchsvollen Titel ‘Tagebuch eines Musikers’[,] was hat ihn gehindert hier seine Kenntnisse auszukramen? Dafür schrieb er lieber ‘Geschichte des Konzertwesens’ und derlei Plunder mehr.’ OC 12/533. Emphasis in original. Aus dem Tagebuche eines Musikers: Kritiken und Schilderungen (From the Diary of a Musician: Criticisms and Accounts) was an anthology of Hanslick’s opera reviews, the final volume of his large series Die Moderne Oper: Kritiken und Studien (Modern Opera: Criticisms and Studies, 1875-92).
Schenker’s depreciatory opinion of *History of Concert Life in Vienna* is scarcely surprising. Hanslick here offered an easily comprehensible – if highly subjective – four-part periodisation of the history of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century music, something Schenker specifically rejected in a polemic against music historians in 1915. In addition, Hanslick paralleled his outline of the development of music with a grand narrative of the progression of Habsburg society as a whole, portrayed as an evolution from absolute rule to the democratisation of society and musical life alike. The second volume (1870) of *History of Concert Life in Vienna*, on the other hand, was an anthology of previously published articles. By republishing them under the title of ‘history’ (and as a second instalment to a volume of historical scholarship) Hanslick, as Kevin Karnes has noted, ‘inscrib[ed] the critical essay within the historical work and, by extension, the recording of subjective impressions within the narration of cultural history’. By the account of Schenker’s resentment of Hanslick’s ‘diary’ records of Viennese musical life and their influence on public opinion, the latter succeeded in this mission. He also succeeded by providing the foundation for the subjective stances that most Viennese music critics of the period assumed in their work, including, as Karnes has demonstrated, the young Schenker.

Perhaps as a result, ironically, Schenker was not alone in his posthumous criticism of Hanslick. Schenker was acquainted with most Viennese music critics who were active around the turn of the century. These principally included (in alphabetical order): Hanslick, Theodor Helm, Richard Heuberger, Robert Hirschfeld, Max Kalbeck, Ludwig Karpath, Hans Liebstöckl, Felix Salten, Gustav Schoenach, Ludwig Speidel, and Richard Wallaschek. While Heuberger and Kalbeck were well known followers of Hanslick, the post of chief critic at the *Neue Freie Presse* was after Hanslick’s death taken over by his amanuensis Julius Korngold. Korngold had, by his own claim, occasionally ghost-written

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166 See Schenker 1915, p. 30-1.
167 Karnes 2008, p. 54.
168 Ibid., p. 59.
169 Sandra McColl provides a complete list of identifiable critics active in Vienna in 1896-7 (including their affiliations to particular newspapers) in McColl 1996, pp. 23-30.
feuilletons for Hanslick in the two years before the senior critic's death, and the post was handed over to him under Hanslick's personal auspices.\footnote{Korngold 1991, pp. 87-90.}

According to Korngold, the younger generation of critics aimed to distance themselves from Hanslick and what some may have considered his 'dictatorship of taste' (\textit{Geschmacksdiktatur}).\footnote{Stuckenschmidt 1969, 31.} In terms of a generational divide akin to the one that Schorske suggests for the literary and artists' groups \textit{Jung Wien} and \textit{Secession} (most members of which were born in the 1860s) and the older generation of Austrian Liberalism, only Max Kalbeck (1850-1921) can be considered as part of the latter.\footnote{McColl 1996, pp. 30-31.} His younger colleagues lost interest in the dichotomy between tradition and modernism as manifest in Hanslick's championship of Brahms and rejection of Wagner and Bruckner. As such, partisanship in relation to liberal and conservative, traditional and revolutionary, let alone Brahmsian and Wagnerian positions does not provide a meaningful prism through which to understand Schenker's relationships with certain critics – even if he did not relent in his views on Brahms and Bruckner even when they no longer divided public opinion to quite the extent they had done in the late nineteenth century.\footnote{See Rothfarb 2011 pp. 414-6.} Modern life introduced new paradigms for artists and critics alike, something that is well illustrated by Korngold in his memoirs:

In a revealing concealment of interests, composers, performers, and commentators intended to take up extra- and contra-musical representations of modern times and lifestyle through language, technique, and style: community, the youth movement, a relaxation of sexual ethics, urban 'pace', the demand for variety and amusement, and last but not least the machine! Imagine a Hanslick faced with such chaos! Faced with the destruction of tonal order, the distortion of voice leading, chord, and rhythm, this obsession with ugliness, hostile to expression, feeling, soul, and humanity – all those matters that had been enshrined in the concept of the defeated Romantic era!\footnote{‘\textit{In kennzeichnender Interessenverkleidung von Produzierenden, Wiedergebenden und Schreibenden sollte Außer- und Widermusikalisches in Zeit und Lebensform an Sprache, Technik und Stil bilden: Gemeinschaftswesen, Jugendbewegung, gelockerte Sexualethik, großstädtisches 'Tempo', Abwechslungs- und Amüsierbedürfnis und nicht zuletzt die Maschine! Sich einen Hanslick vor solches Chaos gestellt zu denken! Vor diese Zerstörung der tonalen Ordnung, Verfraßung von Stimmführung, Klang und Rhythmus, vor}
Yet even before his death, Hanslick was vulnerable to criticism by his peers, and Schenker can be associated with one of the most outspoken of Hanslick’s critics, Robert Hirschfeld. Hirschfeld wrote for the specialist music journal *Neue Musikalische Presse* and the liberal *Illustriertes Wiener Extrablatt*, amongst other newspapers, but was particularly influential on Viennese public opinion due to his pursuit of writing programme notes and concert guides between 1892 and 1913, including those for the Vienna Philharmonic Orchestra. Although Schenker frequently mentions Hirschfeld in his diary from 1902 onwards, the association between the two men is unlikely to have been particularly affable. Notwithstanding their differences, it is probable that Schenker found his meetings with Hirschfeld stimulating. In an episode that markedly prefigures not only Schenker’s stance against ‘opposed’ music critics in general but Hanslick in particular, Hirschfeld published a polemical pamphlet, *Das kritische Verfahren Eduard Hanslicks* (*Eduard Hanslick’s Critical Method*) in 1885. Even though the pamphlet was precipitated by Hanslick’s dismissive comments about Hirschfeld’s doctoral thesis on Renaissance vocal music (a genre almost forgotten in late-nineteenth century Vienna, and one that Hanslick had no apparent interest in), it addressed a variety of themes far beyond Renaissance music. Leon Botstein, who has written on Hirschfeld more than any other scholar, identifies five elements in Hirschfeld’s argument, two of which would have chimed with Schenker’s views after 1900, and two of which were contrary to them. The former include a formalist aesthetic asserting the ‘validity of an inner classicism and truth’ beyond historical shifts of style, and a caution against ‘reflexive’ subjective judgements, since they were anathema to what might be regarded as ‘objective criticism’.

The latter comprised Hirschfeld’s dual admiration for the music of the Renaissance and that of Wagner, and ‘a romantic view of the emotional spontaneity of an idealized but untutored audience […] adapted from the ideology of Wagner’s own direct appeal to the public’. Although Schenker recorded frequent meetings with Hirschfeld in

diesen Häßlichkeitswahn, gegen Ausdruck, Gefühl, Seele und Menschlichkeit, wie all dies im Begriff der bekämpften Romantik eingeschlossen war! Korngold 1991, 94.

176 Botstein 1985, pp. 962-964.  
177 Ibid., pp. 899-900.  
178 Ibid.
coffee shops in the years after the turn of the century, little is known of what he made of them. They do, however, suggest that Schenker was familiar with a milieu that Korngold describes in these terms:

It was a Viennese specialty, the gossipy intellectuals’ coffee shop of its time, with its opinions, judgements, whisperings and affiliations, but also militant meddling. [...] Many of these discussions informed the reporting in the newspapers, and completely informed their critical resorts.  

Figure 10. Viennese coffee shop, circa 1910.

In fact, Schenker was himself drawn into ‘militant meddling’ in response to one of Hirschfeld’s campaigns in 1907, which, at the same time, is an excellent example of the kind of interventions that journalists came to view as within the remit of their authority. Hirschfeld sought to remove Gustav Mahler from his position as director of the Court Opera, a drive that became engulfed in a full-fledged press campaign with decidedly anti-Semitic overtones, and which may indeed have played a part in Mahler’s resignation from the post in the same year. Schenker, along with 68 other public figures including Hugo von Hofmannsthal and Stefan Zweig, signed an open letter, published in the Neue

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Freie Presse on 25 May 1907, that aimed to dissuade Mahler from leaving. Hirschfeld attacked the signatories in an article published in the Illustirtes Wiener Extrablatt the next day, leading, according to Schenker’s diary, to a personal confrontation with Hirschfeld.\textsuperscript{180} Schenker’s diary entry commenting on Hirschfeld’s public attack is revealing in terms of his rejection of letting ‘taste alone’ dictate ethics or, for that matter, criticism:

[Hirschfeld] shows himself quite simply incapable of understanding that, even though I may have serious criticisms to level against Mahler in the most forceful manner, that does not mean that I should at the same time make him suffer for the standards [that I] apply to him, [standards] that could indeed still less be applied to the other musicians around him. It is, however, quite futile to try to instruct on such a subject someone who thinks that taste alone governs in art, especially a virtually uneducated taste. People […] cannot understand how one should seriously criticize someone’s achievement without also thereby wanting directly to press for their personal removal, especially when, as was the case with Mahler, removal would be bound to cause greater disadvantage than gain.\textsuperscript{181}

Schenker’s siding with Mahler the opera director – despite his reservations about Mahler the composer – is not hugely surprising. By 1907, he considered his own activities as met by a premeditated conspiracy that was borne out of the critics’ lack of musical abilities combined with public disinterest in his sophisticated technical explanations. As the discursive pattern of ‘Kunst und die Teilnehmenden’ and his other writings from the period demonstrate, Schenker was fixated on the role of power – or, more specifically, the breakdown of authority – in his views on those that were variably ‘drawn’ or ‘driven’ to music. Just as the Volk could not be trusted to rule itself, the musical public could not be entrusted into the hands of critics. His taxonomy of types of musical conduct can be reduced to a critique of the abuse of power, be it by those who turn music into a commodity, or those who assume the role of cultural experts. Considering that Schenker, at least by 1911, viewed music critics as the embodiment of both these groups, it comes as little surprise that his ensuing crusade against the profession was infused with a moralising tenor that


\textsuperscript{181} Ibid.
effortlessly combined textual criticism with social critique. His seizure of the authority of famous composers from the past and his dictatorial exertion of that authority is indicative,\textsuperscript{182} to say the least, of his own authoritarian need to quell the ambitions of all those that he considered \textit{die Teilnehmenden}.

\textsuperscript{182} See Adorno 1977, pp. 55-6.
CHAPTER 4
Responding to Criticism: ‘Kunst und Kritik’ and its Origins

Recent studies have explored Schenker’s thinking in relation to the discursive nature of music journalism predominantly in dialectical terms, i.e. by viewing it as a corollary to his fully developed theory of music and analytical practice. Leslie Blasius writes:

Inasmuch as Schenker closes the notion of representation by stipulating that music can only be represented by other music and thus, conversely, that music may only represent other music, he can be said to dissolve [...] the problem that lies at the theoretical heart of music criticism. Hence, we might more accurately assert that by this move, he does not subsume but rather completely rewrites the critical agenda.¹

Despite the fact the Schenker himself claims as much in Der Tonwille 1 (1921), in which he asserts that the signification of music in language is being ‘given the lie’ by the Uirlinie, Blasius’ argument is – by his own admission – overtly abstract. Even so, Schenker’s theory, his ‘notes about notes’,² could reasonably be viewed as ‘rewriting the critical agenda’, particularly in the context of his Fünf Uirlinie-Tafeln (Five Analyses in Sketchform, 1932), which feature no prose commentary at all. Since, as Matthew Pritchard notes, ‘the destruction of critical “loose talk” and unsubstantiated hyperbole has been constitutive to the legitimacy of analysis as a discipline’,³ Schenker’s own writings on this very notion (and at a time when music analysis was not an established academic discipline), therefore, are of particular interest. Yet in ‘Kunst und Kritik’ he barely mentions music theory, let alone how criticism and analysis relate to each other; there is only one single reference to music theory in his essay:

[H]ow should [the critic] test the theory, how should he understand whether the systems that have been proclaimed are indeed well founded

¹ Blasius 1996, pp. 105-6.
² Muller 2005, 103.
³ Pritchard 2013, 172.
or not? Here, too, he is required to wait for some sort of public success that is somehow talked about, to hear private judgements of more competent musicians and the like.4

Instead of expanding on this, Schenker probes the psychological and sociological underpinnings of criticism, an endeavour perhaps better expressed by the working title for the essay, ‘Über menschliche Kritik’ (‘On Humanly Criticism’).5 In his effort at devising a structural theory to that end, Schenker expressly operates within the context of music journalism as a social phenomenon, an approach that German musicologist Werner Braun has termed Metakritik (meta critique).6 Braun’s definition of Metakritik describes a significant element of Schenker’s undertaking with remarkable accuracy: instead of predominantly attacking the music critic’s character as a pedantic Beckmesser figure or someone who is prone to misinterpretation, the ‘meta critic’ aims to expose the profession as the embodiment of social decline subjecting the readership to the stultifying utilitarianism of market forces. ‘Kunst und Kritik’ was conceived not only against the backdrop of the tumultuous critical responses to musical modernism but also during a period in which Schenker slowly came to realise the uniqueness of his contribution to the understanding of the Masterworks. At the same time he remained an outsider in the Viennese musical establishment, as well as remote from the city’s academic institutions, and the above quote from his essay on criticism – presumably conceived with the critical reception of his own work in mind – introduces doubts as to the purportedly abstract nature of his deliberations. Schenker’s critical reception already has been addressed in existing literature, but only peripherally and with little sense of purpose beyond establishing its existence. I will argue that it was central not only to the views set out in ‘Kunst und Kritik’, but also to the way in which he perceived himself within the public discourse on music. This is not to say that it was the singular stimulus in either respect: Schenker was not the only thinker of his time to engage with the perpetual ambiguities surrounding music journalism. It is unlikely to be coincidental that he started exhibiting heightened interest in other writers’ ideas about criticism just as his first theoretical volume,

4 ‘Kunst und Kritik’, C/392-3; see Appendix, p. 250.
5 OC C/463.
6 Braun 1972, p. 128.
Harmonielehre (1906), was published and proffered to reviewers. ‘Kunst und Kritik’ offers a glimpse of how his thinking on the subject evolved. The feuilletons on music-, art-, and literary criticism filed together with the draft provide an invaluable resource for addressing what Kevin Korsyn has dubbed the ‘transmission question’,\(^8\) namely how and under what intellectual conditions Schenker absorbed ideas that inform his writings.

In this chapter I will argue that Schenker’s ‘Kunst und Kritik’ is a statement of a set of views that he had cultivated in the preceding years in response to the critical reception of his early work as well as of some of the public debates about criticism that proliferated in the broadsheets during the same period. In order to support this argument I will offer a reading of three principal sources: Schenker’s essay ‘Kunst und Kritik’ (1911), the collection of newspaper articles in the ‘criticism folder’ (1906-13), and reviews of Schenker’s early work as collated in his scrapbook (1903-1911 only).

\(^8\) Korsyn 2009, 156.
The Critical Reception of Schenker’s Early Works

Figure 11. Schenker’s scrapbook. Although he started collecting reviews of his performances and publications (as well as newspaper articles that only fleetingly mention his name) in 1902, the scrapbook became Jeannette’s pet project probably at some point after taking over Heinrich’s daily record of events in the summer of 1911.9

Schenker’s ambition to gain recognition in Vienna can be explained not only by his residence in the imperial city but also by its self-proclaimed status as the world’s capital of music, in which critical recognition could mean the difference between an international or a provincial career.10 He enjoyed a certain level of aristocratic patronage, notably by Alphons von Rothschild, an art collector hailing from the prominent Jewish banking family and a piano student of his from the 1890s onwards. Although this did not amount to the kind of financial support (and, implicitly, recognition) enjoyed by, for instance, Schenker’s acquaintance Arthur Schnabel, a pianist who relocated from Galicia to Vienna in 1884 as well,11 Rothschild’s support from 1899 onward is likely to have enabled Schenker to relinquish journalism within the following year.

10 Botstein 1992, p. 311.
11 Johnston 1972, p. 132.
Schenker’s first independent publication was *Ein Beitrag zur Ornamentik* (1903), published in the aftermath of, and as an afterword to, a critical edition of selected keyboard works by C. P. E. Bach. The critical responses to his debut were positive. Julius Korngold, in his only ever review of any of Schenker’s publications, spoke highly of the author’s emphasis on the melodic implications of ornamentation, and his fellow Viennese critics Richard Wallaschek and Hans Liebstöckl welcomed and even augmented Schenker’s polemics against Hans von Bülow, a previous editor of these keyboard pieces who had been a prominent figure in German musical life in the late nineteenth century. The critical as well as commercial success of the volume led to a second edition in 1908. This revised edition was the first project in which Schenker worked directly under Emil Hertzka, who had become director of Universal Edition in 1907. In this role, which he held until his death in 1932, Hertzka, a Hungarian Jew, promoted some of the most renowned composers of his time, including those of the Second Viennese School, Strauss, Mahler, Zemlinksy, Weill, Szymanowski, and many others.

Hertzka’s responsibility as promoter was one that Schenker held him to personally. During 1908 he unremittingly urged Hertzka to send complimentary copies of the second edition of *Ein Beitrag zur Ornamentik* to a number of music critics as well as professional contacts that he had gained mostly through his students. Indeed, the second edition attracted reviews in German newspapers, including that of Berlin-based critic Herman Wetzel, who spoke positively about Schenker’s C. P. E. Bach edition as well as the essay, although noting too frenetic a tone in his polemics. This charge would haunt Schenker not only in future reviews by Wetzel, but by other critics as well. Schenker’s editing of music, particularly Bach’s *Chromatische Fantasie und Fuge* (*J. S. Bach’s Chromatic Fantasy and Fugue*, 1910) and the *Erläuterungsausgabe* (1913-21) attracted more or less unanimously positive reviews during his lifetime, whereas his polemical posturing polarised his critics and split them into those who by all accounts appreciated his combative literary style and those who felt it was too subjective, intolerant, or simply inappropriate in the context of a scholarly publication.

It would appear that it was during his work on *Harmonielehre* (1906) that Schenker first came to reflect on the impact of public opinion on his own
livelihood in particular and artistic production in general. Approaching the Stuttgart-based music publisher Cotta to bring out his (already drafted) volume in 1905, Schenker justified the anonymous authorship — ‘by an artist’ — of the volume in this way:

A critical edition of C. P. E. Bach, published by order of Universal Edition here, to which I have written a supplementary book, Ein Beitrag zur Ornamentik, has had such success with the press and the public that, in accordance with a long-standing human foible, hostile opinions have suddenly been expressed about my work as a composer, despite the successes of the performances, and despite the fact that firms such as Simrock, Breitkopf & Härtel, Weinberger, etc. have published my works. So as not to jeopardize my future work, I elected to assume anonymity for the time being.¹²

Schenker’s contradictory remarks about the critical reception of his compositions, which he spoke of proudly (‘true “treasures”’),¹³ even decades later, are likely to relate to three performances that took place within four months of each other in 1903/4. Two of these, which featured his three choral works for female voices without accompaniment op. 8, Vorüber, Agnes, and Im Rosenbusch der Liebe schlief were performed in Vienna to mixed reviews.¹⁴ In addition, his Syrian Dances (1899), orchestrated by Arnold Schoenberg, received a prestigious performance under Ferruccio Busoni at the Berlin Beethovensaal in 1903 as part of a new music series championed by Busoni, and, as such, became the most widely reviewed of his compositions. Schenker, who attended the performance, noted ‘bad “reviews”’ in his diary.¹⁵ The Syrian Dances were the last item of a programme of relatively obscure or new orchestral works; Schenker’s four dances were preceded by the prelude to the second act of Vincent d’Indy’s opera L’étranger, Debussy’s Prelude à l’après-midi d’un faune, Berlioz’s Marche troyenne from his opera Les Troyens, César Franck’s symphonic poem Les Djinns, and Carl Nielsen’s Second Symphony.

'De Fire Temperamenter' ('The Four Temperaments'), conducted by the Danish composer himself. There are twenty-one brief reviews of this performance of Syrian Dances in Schenker's scrapbook in total, and his own assessment of these expressed in his diary is apt. Most reviewers considered the work trivial and one-dimensional, inappropriate for the new music series. (Several reviews in fact evoke Schenker's own description of what he considered Trivialmusik in 'Volksmusik in Wien', including references to the operetta genre and beer gardens.) Other critics were evidently dismayed by its exoticism: 'Heinrich Schenker's Syrian Dances possess nothing that significantly distinguishes them from Negro fairy tales, Turkish military jingles, or suchlike magic.' The composition may have magnetised the critics' wrath partly because it was the only piece of German music on the programme, as several reviewers noted, yet his contribution was seen as comparably modest and, as most argued, not particularly ambitious. Its place in the programme – following Nielsen’s score – may have reinforced this impression.

Schenker's collection of reviews of this concert offers an excellent example of the candour that German music critics adopted in response to modern music. Adolf Weißmann's already cited feuilleton from 1907 includes a short reflection on this development. Weißmann’s musings are indicative of both the challenges of new music to criticism as well as the growing disintegration between composers and audiences during these years. Speaking of musical life in Berlin, Weißmann here in fact refers to works introduced through Busoni's new music series that the performance of Schenker's Syrian Dances was also part of:

The more mediocre the artistic production, the more criticism can develop alongside art. I have, by now, unconditional faith in the mediocrity of contemporary musical accomplishment. At the same time as a calm, collected, and diplomatic critic fearfully sniffs around a new work that sports everything but melodic invention, and fumbles about it from all

16 'Heinrich Schenker's Syrische Tänze [...] haben nichts, was sie wesentlich von Niggermärchen, türkischer Scharwachenmusik oder dergleichen Zauber unterscheidet.' Review, Berliner Local-Anzeiger, 6 November 1903; OC 2, p. 5.
17 Botstein 1985, p. 1267.
sides, I freely and happily proclaim my opinion, and I take satisfaction from knowing that I am not raising spoiled children.\textsuperscript{18}

Generally speaking, the critics’ alienation was caused by the lack of a theoretical framework for modern music, and their estrangement manifested itself in the implementation of an extensive figurative vocabulary.\textsuperscript{19} Schenker’s work, for example, was described as: ‘odd’, ‘boisterous’, ‘meagre’, ‘crude’, ‘cheerful’, ‘shallow’, ‘ineffectual’, ‘uninteresting’, ‘flimsy’, and ‘melodious’.\textsuperscript{20} Many reviewers differentiated between Schenker’s composition and Schoenberg’s orchestration, and considered the added modernist lustre that the orchestration imparted as variably welcome or not welcome; responses included ‘exotically coloured’, ‘lurid’, and ‘officious’.\textsuperscript{21} The reviewers’ distinction between content and surface (i.e. composition and orchestration) is indicative of the greater focus on timbre and colour attributed to turn-of-the-century composers and listeners.\textsuperscript{22}

Nielsen’s symphony was described, rather unimaginatively, as ‘spirited’ (\textit{temperamentvoll}), ‘pathological’, and ‘provoking ill temper’.\textsuperscript{23} Although the references to pathology are most likely a play on the work’s programmatic content based on the four humours, they may also be viewed as a judgement on modernity (including its fascination with illness) as a whole, something that, as Julius Korngold makes abundantly clear in his memoirs, was considered as part of the critic’s role as well.\textsuperscript{24}

As has previously been suggested, this critical reception of Schenker’s


\textsuperscript{19} Painter 2007, p. 82.

\textsuperscript{20} ‘eigenartig’, ‘ungestüm’, ‘dürftig’, ‘roh’, ‘lustig’, ‘flach’, ‘belanglos’, ‘uninteressant’, ‘fadenscheinig’, ‘melodiös’; all quotations are extracted from a variety of anonymous reviews of the concert published in German newspapers in the days following the performance in question. Clippings of these can be found in OC 2, pp. 5-7.

\textsuperscript{21} ‘exotisch koloriert’, ‘grell’, ‘aufdringlich’; Ibid.

\textsuperscript{22} See Painter 2007, pp. 82-9.

\textsuperscript{23} ‘temperamentvoll’, ‘krankhaft’, ‘kann einen cholerisch machen’; OC 2, pp. 5-7.

\textsuperscript{24} See Chapter 3, p. 122.
compositions may have played a part in his decision to publish *Harmonielehre* anonymously.\(^{25}\) In the afore-quoted letter to Cotta, he differentiates between his own critique of contemporary composers such as Bruckner, Reger, and Strauss, to be published in *Harmonielehre*, and journalistic criticism by claiming that his are ‘robust criticisms of modern dilettantism’, which ‘far from being merely asserted in journalistic fashion’, are ‘bolstered by arguments theoretical in nature’.\(^{26}\) At the time of publication, Schenker requested copies of *Harmonielehre* to be sent to Viennese music critics Robert Hirschfeld, Julius Korngold, Max Kalbeck, Hans Liebstöckl, and Ludwig Karpath.\(^{27}\) Anticipating their reviews, he reports to Cotta a few months later:

> In Vienna the ‘gentlemen of the press’ are girding themselves up to write their *feuilletons* about [*Harmonielehre*]. All the signs are that they will be highly enthusiastic, but even so the essentials of it will surely pass them by. However, there is no known cure for the press; they have left it to the journalists, pampered though they be by kings and statesmen, to come to terms with their ignorance as best they can.\(^{28}\)

By ‘ignorance’ Schenker most probably meant the critics’ presumed lack of competence or interest in following his elaborations of the rules of harmony and compositional technique. He was right in being sceptical: only one of the Viennese critics, Karpath, who was his student from 1906 onwards, wrote about the volume, although it attracted an enthusiastic review from Berlin-based Max Burkhardt, a writer otherwise unknown to Schenker.\(^{29}\) Max Graf, in his book *Composer and Critic* (1947), offers a clue as to what may have been at the root of Schenker’s struggle to gain recognition in Vienna:

\(^{25}\) See Ayotte 2008, p. 27.
Unlike the Germans, the Viennese would not tolerate dry and pedantic learning [...] They even preferred a quite unprincipled cynicism spiced with literary charm to the utmost learning without literary grace. [...] It was precisely this superficial Viennese wit that, being itself sterile, regularly turned against great artists as Wagner, Bruckner, and Mahler. But Vienna loved to play; and even seriousness had to smile in order to impress.\\footnote{30}

Graf here not only alludes to the literary wit and brilliance associated with the \textit{feuilleton}, but also the devolution of aesthetic judgement and music analysis into cultural criticism. Schenker was left to witness this development escalate during the very years that his \textit{Harmonielehre} went unacknowledged in Vienna, namely in the wake of the 1907 and 1908 premieres of Schoenberg’s First Chamber Symphony, First and Second String Quartets, and the Viennese premiere of Strauss’s \textit{Salome}. Broadly speaking, the revolutionising developments in music during those years, particularly in terms of tonality, made it possible for Schenker to look back at eighteenth and nineteenth-century music as a paradise lost.\\footnote{31} Yet there is little indication that Schenker deemed it worthy to publicly comment on what is now considered a significant turn not only in the history of Western music but also music criticism. He does, however, observe in ‘Kunst und Kritik’ that ‘[the critics] are overcome with fancifulness, a zeal for derision and wit, [and] the most overbearing opinions about culture and art if the issue at hand concerns sending a fragile work on its way.’\\footnote{32} All five critics to whom Schenker entrusted \textit{Harmonielehre} had been outspoken detractors, even agitators in response to the aforementioned premieres and the general fallout between composers, audiences, and critics provoked by these events is likely to have shaped his increasingly outspoken scepticism towards music journalism. Arnold Schoenberg, for instance, publicly asserted after what Karpath declared the ‘ unholy scandal’ of the premiere of his partly atonal Second String Quartet at Vienna’s Bösendorfer-Saal on 21 December 1908:\\footnote{33}

\\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext{30} Graf 1947, pp. 274-5. \textit{Composer and Critic} – by Graf’s own assessment the first ‘history of music criticism’ – was written during his exile years in New York (1938-47) and published in English only.


\footnotetext{32} ‘Kunst und Kritik’, C/398, see Appendix, p. 254.

\footnotetext{33} Auner 2003, p. 62.
\end{footnotes}
The Viennese music critics, with very few exceptions, are of such incompetence and ignorance that one can now evaluate them only on the basis of the extent or lack of damage they cause. Moreover, most of them actually understand their trade in this sense: producing advertising for a popular artist or stirring up opinion against an unpopular one.\textsuperscript{34}

Schenker’s own occasional comments on modernist works confided to his diary, such as that following his attendance of the Viennese premiere of Salome on 15 May 1907, bear witness to what degree he had come to consider his well-rooted certitudes – even in response to ‘fragile’ works\textsuperscript{35} – as overriding un-evidenced opinions asserted in ‘journalistic fashion’. Whereas Robert Hirschfeld complained of the same performance that ‘cleverly worked-out series of tones that calculatedly resist every comprehension rob the ear of its powers of discretion’, and most other commentators could not help but dwell on their revulsion of the modernist themes treated in the libretto based on Oscar Wilde,\textsuperscript{36} Schenker’s review is notably sober:

The storyline remains inaccessible to the viewer’s sensibilities, and boredom is the only consequence (as long as the nervous infection through advertisements and suchlike is of course left out. – Strauss’s music, with its ‘motives’ (one bar long, or even shorter!) relies on the same trick over and over again, the trick of neighbour note tension; the larger scale, on the other hand, is of an unrivalled triviality. Bad passing notes, and so on.\textsuperscript{37}

Schenker here plays down the opera’s innovative aspects and their effects by foregrounding the traditional (if, by his reckoning, badly executed)

\textsuperscript{34} Auner 2003, p. 61.
\textsuperscript{35} ‘Kunst und Kritik’, C/398; see Appendix, p. 254.


musical devices that Strauss employed. As can be gaged from this, he gradually came to demand of criticism that it be of comparable artistic standard to the object under discussion, or, in the case of an inferior work, above it. The latter notion is encapsulated in his interpretation in the Niedergang essay of ‘The Hero’s Adversaries’ in Strauss’s Ein Heldenleben (1898). The musical passage in question is commonly viewed to be a caricature of the composer’s own detractors, and music critics in particular.38 Schenker here gripes that the irony of the critics’ ‘nonsensical chattering’ is turned ‘against music itself’,39 rather than presented as part of a rational musical argument.

Perhaps as a consequence of the standards that he held his contemporaries to, the issue of the critical reception of his work remained a matter of contention that came to a head in late 1908 in relation to his next publication after Harmonielehre, the Instrumentations-Tabelle, published under the pseudonym Artur Niloff. It is a wall chart of Western instruments featuring illustrations, overtone ranges, notations, and a repertory list, and is still in publication today by Universal Edition.40 In a letter to August Halm in 1918 Schenker claims that it was conceived with music critics in mind, ‘out of pity [...] for the critics of the daily newspapers in Vienna, who [...] have used English terms such as “stopped” in their reviews, [and have] praised Sebastian Bach’s clarinets to all the Heavens.’41 (Bach did of course not call for clarinets, which came to prominence only around the time of his death, in his works.) Schenker’s sarcastic ‘pity for the critics’ aside, his negotiations with Hertzka featured requests that were relatively uncharacteristic for the theorist, such as including a modern instrument, the heckelphone. This wind instrument, which was only invented in 1904, featured prominently in Salome and Schenker, peculiarly,

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38 See, for instance, Specht 1921, p. 285.
39 Schenker 2005a, 119.
wished to include it ‘in honour of’ Strauss’s forthcoming opera Elektra (1909).\footnote{SDO WSBL 33 (January 1909), transcr. and transl. by Ian Bent (2004-5) \(<http://mt.ccnmtl.columbia.edu/schenker/correspondence/letter/wslb_33_1109.html>\) (2 May 2014).} Hellmut Federhofer suggests that the pseudonym under which the table was published, Artur Niloff, is a partial anagram of the last name of Schenker’s best friend Moriz Violin.\footnote{Federhofer 1985, p. 30.} Violin may have helped in create the table, although the extent of his involvement is difficult to determine, and the reasons behind Schenker’s decision to publish the work under a pseudonym are so far unknown. Schenker had demonstrated interest in instrumentation as early as his 1901 article ‘Beethoven—“Retouche”, and the subject features heavily in the Niedergang essay; Ian Bent speculates that Schenker may have intended to use the table in a future incarnation of the latter essay.\footnote{SDO OJ 5/16 (21 December 1908), transcr. and transl. by Ian Bent and William Drabkin (2005) \(<http://mt.ccnmtl.columbia.edu/schenker/correspondence/letter/oj_516_5_122108.html#fn3>\) (15 January 2014).} Whatever the circumstances, Schenker’s embrace of the idea of the table’s benefit to the public is well documented in his correspondence with Hertzka in the months following its publication. His hopes for the educative impact of his ‘History without Words’, as he referred to it,\footnote{‘History without Words’ is, by Schenker’s own account, a play on Mendelssohn’s Songs without Words, a collection of short piano pieces popular in the nineteenth century and since. SDO WSBL 33 (January 1909), transcr. and transl. by Ian Bent (2004-5) \(<http://mt.ccnmtl.columbia.edu/schenker/correspondence/letter/wslb_33_1109.html>\) (2 May 2014).} lay, in contrast to Harmonielehre, in its easily absorbed nature and plain practical application. Consequently, he was unmistakably offended by negative remarks about the table made by Robert Hirschfeld:

November 15, 1908[:] Someone else[,] Dr. Robert Hirschfeld: incapable of making a comment on my Harmonielehre, he turns all the more sharply against the more modest Instrumentations-Tabelle. He assimilates it by eye, and believes that in so doing he understands it. But in order to divest himself of the gratitude that he at least ought to feel for having finally learned something from it that was unknown to him until then – in any case, what he has learned from me is more than any reader of his feuilletons was in a position to learn from him himself. In any case, this is true, while he who has just been enriched by me ungratefully denies it, he
prefers to make childish objections and ironical comments: he thinks this or that is lacking. Would it even be possible to fit on one inexpensive Tabelle all that Dr. R. H. still does not know?! […] I don’t think so! Criticism merely for the sake of criticism and knavery – that’s what it is, and nothing more.46

Hirschfeld’s comments acted as a catalyst for several heated letters to Hertzka with reference to ‘that idiot at the [Wiener] Extrablatt’, as Schenker refers to Hirschfeld in a draft letter.47 Schenker’s main charge against the critic is Hirschfeld’s alleged inability to truly ‘assimilate’ the information provided because, he argues, Hirschfeld ‘cannot make head or tail of anything if it has no words!’48 However, the table did feature a brief prose introduction, which caused another spat with Hirschfeld almost a year later. The quarrel was caused by an ambiguity involving the valve horn and the natural horn, which arose from an alteration to the text by Universal Edition’s proof-reader Josef von Wöß.49 Schenker had raised the issue with Hertzka at the time of publication, yet his concerns had been dismissed by Universal Edition. Even long after the incident, Schenker complains to Hertzka: ‘It may perhaps interest you to learn, for example, that Dr. Robert Hirschfeld misses nothing so much as the clarification of that point, where even in my own Tabelle I was not allowed – to put it into words!’50 However, he was compensated for the fuss over the error by the table’s commercial success, which had led Hertzka to ponder a price rise only a few weeks after the initial print-run, and Schenker to muster new confidence in the musical public at large. After rejecting the suggestion of an immediate price rise, he writes:

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48 Ibid.
49 Josef von Wöß was an Austrian composer best known today for his piano transcriptions of several of Mahler’s symphonies.
[The table’s] sales may tell you whether, so to speak, behind the back of a daily criticism that out of necessity deals in mere hot air, the public itself will summon any desire to go beyond this on their own and instruct themselves on matters over which the ‘critics’, because they too are ignorant on it, were until now completely unable to instruct them. But I prophesy: in the coming weeks, on the occasion of the premiere of Elektra in the opera house, there will suddenly be a conspicuous lot to read about e.g. ‘basset horns’ and the like in the daily reviews. Please be sure to join me in having a good laugh.51

This paragraph demonstrates the extent to which Schenker viewed his work as productive in the sense of adding to the public’s edification, evidently sensing a weakening in the critics’ hold over public opinion. As such, Schenker here prefigures Schoenberg’s objection to Viennese music critics voiced to Karl Kraus only a few weeks later. Over the subsequent five years, Schenker more fully articulated his claim that he ought to rightfully fill the void that had opened up as a result the public’s waning confidence in the critics. In 1912 he writes to Hertzka of his undertaking to protect artists against ‘indolent, destructive critics’ (a reference to Korngold), a mission that he considered ‘in the interest of the public’.52 At the same time, his comments about Strauss’s Elektra abundantly demonstrate another facet in Schenker’s thinking that, despite the light-hearted reference in the above diary entry, would gain a central place in his judgement of music journalism, namely that critics crib – if not outright plagiarise – ideas from artists. Given the critics’ ignorance, he insinuates in ‘Kunst und Kritik’, they are ‘forced to see whether a musician of stature or some other great artist has not voiced an opinion about the matter at hand’.53

The lack of public acknowledgment turned for Schenker into a frustrating impasse that did not, paradoxically, go entirely unnoticed by the press, as an article in Neues Wiener Abendblatt by an as yet unidentified author and dating from 1912 attests to:

53 ‘Kunst und Kritik’, C/393; see Appendix, p. 250.
Day in and day out Schenker, who lives in our midst unbeknown to most, publishes one substantial musicological opus after another, without anyone finding it worthy to even mention his epochal works. Abroad, things fare differently with him. Throughout Germany Schenker’s books – particularly that on counterpoint – have exerted a sensational impact.54

However, Schenker’s scrapbook would suggest that Kontrapunkt 1 was neither widely reviewed in German newspapers, nor particularly positively. The scrapbook contains altogether seven reviews of the volume (a similar number to those of Harmonielehre), one of which dates from after the above-quoted article was published. Of the other six, all published in 1911, five appeared in German newspapers, and of these, three were by the same author, Hermann Wetzel, who welcomed the volume with reservations. Wetzel, who had already written disparagingly about Harmonielehre (‘I regret to say that I cannot rate highly either the book’s systematic-theoretical part or its practical-pedagogical one’),55 voiced a string of criticisms relating to Kontrapunkt 1’s value as a didactic text. These are summarised as follows in his conclusion: ‘Schenker’s entire work suffers from the idée fixe, which in my opinion is a delusion, that counterpoint ought to be executed in its pure form, without the inclusion of harmonic or rhythmic considerations.’56 Although the volume fared better with some of the other reviewers, there is little evidence of the ‘sensational impact’ claimed in the Neues Wiener Abendblatt. Be that as it may, Schenker evidently noted more

reviews of *Kontrapunkt* 1 appearing in Germany than in Austria, compared to those of *Harmonielehre*, only two of which had been published in Germany and three in Austria. This is likely to have played part in his decision to urge Hertzka to advertise the Ninth Symphony monograph in Germany: ‘My public lies there, not here, where for example J[ulius] K[orngold] has been suppressing my [Harmonielehre and Kontrapunkt 1] since the year 1906 so resolutely – though without doing me any damage.’\(^57\) This somewhat incongruous statement is representative of Schenker’s ambivalence towards the press and its powers; it would seem that it dawned on him during this period that if the critical reception of his theoretical publications so far were a measure, his works were unlikely to ever receive what he considered their rightful appraisal in journals and newspapers. As might be expected, the lack of critical acknowledgement – as well as Wetzel’s repeatedly disparaging reviews – did not go unmentioned in Schenker’s correspondence with Hertzka:

> In accordance with this doleful state of affairs, it is thus certainly not to be expected that the *Neue Freie Presse* will take a work such as mine. Even in Vienna, where it is an open secret that I among all the writers on music know my job best, nothing can be expected from the *[Neue Freie] Presse*. […] [I]n the past year alone Mr. H. Wetzel has written no fewer than four times about me in various places, and very offended, at that […] My works will in years to come have only their immeasurable profit, which they themselves yield, to thank for their successes! Profit such as this works wonders, or at any rate more than all the hymns of the *[Neue Freie] Presse* and the like.\(^58\)

As this source demonstrates, Schenker’s confidence in his work developed, ironically, in concert with its disappointing critical reception. His rejection of music critics was not unqualified; he wrote warmly about Hans Liebstöckl, for instance, who had supported ‘the Schenkerian method’ in passing in three reviews published during the winter of 1910.\(^59\) Yet there can be little

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\(^{59}\) SDO OC 1/A, p. 4-5 (30 May 1911), transcr. by Martin Eybl, transl. by Ian Bent (2007)
doubt that Schenker came to amalgamate his view of music journalism with his dissatisfaction in relation to the critical appraisal of his works. The genetic development of ‘Kunst und Kritik’ offers some insights in this regard. Although the essay can be considered a first draft in terms that it has not been substantially revised or typed out, it nonetheless contains discernable additions that may have been inserted either during the initial stages or some time later; Schenker’s mention of a ‘first draft’ in his diary on 19 July 1911 may have referred to a shorter version of the essay. The significance of these additions, which were incorporated by cutting up pages and inserting new pieces of paper, lies in the fact that they display a consistently subjective, even intimate tone of argument.\(^6\) The same tone, including self-reference, tends to creep in at the end of chapters. Chapter 1 probably represents the best example in this regard: in the final sentence Schenker asserts his facility to alleviate the uncertainty that, in his diagnosis, had befallen public judgement. Schenker’s ‘last thoughts’ on each of the chapters’ subject matter are less formal conclusions than personal reflections. As such, they weaken the structure of the essay and undermine the implicit objectivity of his argument. Yet they superbly convey the extent to which he conflated music criticism with what Hans Keller describes ‘a kind of human weirdness so universal that it has no chance, or faces no risk, of being recognized for what it is’.\(^6\) namely the human urge to destroy. His own position vis-à-vis the critics’ destructiveness is first intimated in the conclusion of chapter 1 and in his apparent afterthought to chapter 2 quoted earlier, in which he suggests that music theory suffers a fate akin to that of underappreciated works of art. This neglect, he argues in the addendum to chapter 3, is perpetrated by a conspiracy of silence: ‘In most cases this is the result of personal reasons of vengefulness, and in the remaining [case the critic] is fated to do so owing to his ineptness.’\(^6\) (Schenker mentions being ‘treated to a conspiracy of silence’ in the Ninth Symphony monograph, if without reference to ‘personal reasons of vengefulness’).\(^6\) Keller terms this kind of critical ignorance, total neglect, as

60 These addenda are marked as such in the Appendix.
62 ‘Kunst und Kritik’, C/402; see Appendix, p. 257.
‘passive critical resistance’,\textsuperscript{64} which he deems just as effective as open hostility. According to his scrapbook, Schenker, who cites ‘psychological inhibitions’ inflicted upon artists by critics,\textsuperscript{65} had an exaggerated, even mildly paranoid sense of this ‘conspiracy’, which he inflates into a matter of life and death in the addendum to chapter 5 of ‘Kunst und Kritik’. This text may provide an insight into what has been discussed in his often animated encounters with critics such as Hirschfeld:

[The critics] are ruthless towards the one who is exceptional; and if he reproaches them in righteous indignation, accusing those who are of no use to art of making life unnecessarily difficult for those who could by all means be beneficial to art, they pretend to be astonished about the accusation of inhuman conduct, and with a naivety that is second only to their ignorance they rant and rave that one ought to let them live, that they had a right to exist like anyone else. What malign presumption; the same men who truly do not deserve life and who, as it is given to them anyway, use it only to damage exceptional men, conversely make out that it is they who are denied to live. On the contrary, it is they who do not want to let artists live!\textsuperscript{66}

Whatever the specific circumstances around Schenker’s lapses into far from impartial language may have been, the battle lines were evidently drawn. Entrenched within ‘clandestine unions of interests’, ‘conspiracies of silence’, and ‘open secrets’, he came to view journalism as an essentially hostile force, a belief epitomised in a line committed to his diary during the same summer: ‘I must use my own powers to breach the wall of the press, not until then to will a freedom and prepare the advantage to myself’.\textsuperscript{67} Schenker had formerly shifted from esotopical to exotopical critique of music journalism, i.e. from within the profession to from outside it, after giving up writing for newspapers at the turn of the century. During the subsequent decade he had hoped to connect not only with music academia, which he would turn against in 1913, but also with the official representatives of the musical public. His failure to do so put him into a camp with modern composers who suffered under the same ‘superficial, sterile

\textsuperscript{64} Keller 1987, p. [89].
\textsuperscript{65} ‘Kunst und Kritik’, C/410; see Appendix, p. 264.
\textsuperscript{66} Ibid., C/411; see Appendix, p. 264.
wit’, as Max Graf put it, of the Viennese feuilletonists that he did, which might go some way in explaining his defence of Mahler against Hirschfeld in 1907. He noted on that occasion in his diary: ‘People want to speak only of a ‘genius’ (on account of their own vanity!) or to criticize the artist (as it were, out of desire for revenge, because ‘genius’ has not manifested itself in him).’

Despite his deliberate self-positioning outside the jurisdiction of journalism, Schenker had hoped to see his achievements validated and disseminated by the most influential members of Vienna’s musical establishment such as Hirschfeld and Korngold. By 1911 Schenker evidently judged the captive ‘wall of the press’ impenetrable from within, and he fully adopted the role of an outsider, as a letter to Alphons von Rothschild written in the same year makes abundantly clear:

> I am still battling alone against the academies, professors, virtuoso performers, against every fraud that is committed, knowingly or unknowingly, and it goes without saying that musicians – whom an ignorant public (which sits out the piece, so to speak, without hearing it) and an even more ignorant press (which abuses music in order to introduce the jargon of the travel-guide) too emphatically label ‘artists’ – protect themselves from being unmasked. It is so agreeable to be called an artist without being one, and all the more agreeable when the public and the salons adulate [them] and pay money!

Viewed along the lines of Michel Foucault’s order of discourse, Schenker’s resolute self-positioning outside the perceived symbiosis of critics and the public becomes a facet of his subject-position. Foucault coined this term to denote the individual subject’s position from which the discourse makes sense to the subject. More significantly, Foucault proposes that this subject-position is constructed by the discourse, i.e. that, if applied to the case of Schenker’s early critical reception, the theorist constructed a subject-position from which his critical reception became meaningful. The contents of the ‘criticism folder’ display Schenker’s pursuit to circumscribe the topos of his critique, his quest to understand and define the dichotomy of artistic production

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70 Hall 1997, p. 56.
and journalistic reflection. His equivalence of ‘those who could be beneficial to art’ with ‘artists’ in the above quotation from ‘Kunst und Kritik’ is merely one of an abundance of references – beyond the often-cited anonymous authorship of Harmonielehre (‘by an artist’) – suggesting that he increasingly came to view his activities as artistic recreation rather than scientific analysis (let alone criticism) during the first decade of the century. Schenker’s self-perception as an artist, which is his most consistently expressed self-identification anywhere in his output, may not be hugely remarkable to music analysts today. Modern-day application of Schenkerian theory allows, in contrast to Schenker’s own certitudes, for matters of intuition and creativity, even artistic licence. Yet exactly what defined an artist as opposed to a mere critic was a far less anodyne matter of debate in Schenker’s day than it may appear today.

The Artist and the Critic

Similar to its French and Italian equivalents, the German word Kritik carries several meanings, for which there are in fact three words in English: ‘review’ (a formal assessment or appraisal, especially in newspapers), ‘critique’ (an analysis and judgement on the merits and faults of a person or artistic work), and ‘criticism’ (disapproval based on perceived faults). This distinction is noteworthy because Schenker did not refer to his own analyses as Kritik, but rather defined them in neutral terms such as ‘inform of content’, thereby circumventing any notion of interpretation or criticism. He did, however, embrace vibrant, even ‘idealist’, polemicising in his literature surveys and cultural commentary, and the latter did share the designation Kritik with that for music journalism in his vocabulary. Schenker’s conscious embrace of polemics can be linked to around 1910 and his engagement with the idealist philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte, a writer who was often attacked during his lifetime for his

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71 Pritchard 2013, 167.
72 ‘Kunst und Kritik’, C/381; see Appendix, p. 241.
73 Blasius 1996, p. 103.
aggressive and combative writing style.\textsuperscript{74} Specifically, the ‘criticism folder’ contains a note mentioning to ‘A Hitherto Unpublished Essay by Fichte Against the Waywardness of Criticism’ (‘Eine bisher unveröffentlichte Abhandlung Fichtes gegen das Unwesen der Kritik’), edited and introduced by Friedrich Dannenberg, in volume 16 (1911) of the philosophical journal \textit{Kant-Studien}.\textsuperscript{75} In this short essay, Fichte fights back against those who have passed judgment on his polemical style, and in the Ninth Symphony monograph Schenker quotes from this particular text. Although the quotation takes a prominent position at the end of the preface and Schenker deemed it ‘to speak for [himself]’ as well,\textsuperscript{76} its source has not been previously tracked down:

> Whoever wishes to judge publicly my stance or that of any polemicizing philosopher should have first read and assimilated what is said here. And if I fail to convince, let him lay his \textit{counter-arguments} clearly and openly on the table [...] But if a person has no such counter-arguments, let him be silent and refrain from interfering with what he cannot alter on rational ground, however it may affect his feelings. His feelings may well be wrong.\textsuperscript{77}

In the Ninth Symphony monograph, this quotation is preceded by a brief exposition of Schenker's views on the critical reception of his early works. What seems to be on the forefront of his mind here is his critics’ ambiguity: general approval with vague and, in his mind, unsubstantiated reservations. He explains in ‘Kunst und Kritik’:

> The critic pretends to be at odds with something; by doing so he wants to create the impression of having reservations about the work of art. Naturally he withholds the details of his reservations, but in this way he has already succeeded in making the public believe in his superiority. Also widely used is the phrase ‘this is not the right place to talk about it’, whereby the critic refuses to support [his reservations] with factual arguments, while at the same time readily gives the impression that he has such arguments at his disposal.\textsuperscript{78}

\textsuperscript{75} OC C/432.
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid., pp. 26-7. The passage originates from Fichte 1911, p. 362.
\textsuperscript{78} ‘Kunst und Kritik’, C/404; see Appendix p. 259.
Conversely, Schenker viewed voicing his unreserved but substantiated disapproval of those who wrote about Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony as part of his overall critique. Yet while he seemed to be at ease refuting the readings of Beethoven’s score by Hugo Riemann and Herrmann Kretzschmar, both noted contributors in the fields of music theory and hermeneutics respectively, he seemed less so with Richard Wagner’s writings on the work. Nicholas Cook poses the question: ‘What explains the aporias and silences that invade Schenker’s writing whenever he turns his pen against Wagner and the programmatic conception of musical meaning that he personifies?’ His answer involves Schenker’s entrapment in the ‘magic circle’ of Wagner’s thought, i.e. the contingency of his own arguments on Wagnerian concepts, which he, at the same time, attempts to suppress with his critique. Cook’s credible assessment of an ‘anxiety of influence’ here employs a revisionary approach to literary criticism associated with American literary critic Harold Bloom. One of Wagner’s concepts – which Cook however leaves vague both in the article and his later book, for it only emerges from the Ninth Symphony monograph peripherally – clearly materialises in ‘Kunst und Kritik’ and can be disconnected from music altogether: that of the artist as critic. Schenker’s attention to Wagner’s writings on music in German musical life goes back to at least the 1890s. In the context of criticism, one of the earliest references to Wagner in Schenker’s archive is Adolf Weißmann’s 1907 article already repeatedly cited here. It begins:

For some time now one has heard that criticism has become cautious and unsure. Without a doubt Richard Wagner is responsible for this. In a way he was justified in wanting to do away with the sad privilege of the greats to be misunderstood by their contemporaries and to speak in his own voice. Thus he too went among the critics [...] and intended to use his criticism to snuff out the light of any other.

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79 Cook 1995, 98.
80 Ibid., 102.
82 Cook 2007, pp. 86-8.
83 ‘Seit längerer Zeit schon hört man die Aeußerung, daß die Kritik vorsichtig und unsicher geworden ist. Zweifellos ist Richard Wagner daran schuld. Er hatte den berechtigten Wunsch, auf das traurige Privilegium der Großen, von der Mitwelt missverstanden zu werden, zu verzichten und in eigener Sache zu
Weißmann is likely to refer to Wagner’s takeover of the Neue Zeitung für Musik in 1850, an event that some observers viewed as Wagner’s attempt to replace the institution of music criticism with his own writings and that of those who shared his vision for the ‘art-work of the future’. Wagner’s artistic separatism together with his rejection of the intellectual elitism of the educated public created a profound conflict amongst his followers. It also created a division amongst commentators on music at large that could be felt well into the early decades of the twentieth century, and was widely talked about in Vienna. On the occasion of Wagner’s autobiography becoming available to the public in the spring of 1911, Julius Korngold illustrates popular interest in Wagner in the following, characteristically ornate way:

Wagner and no end! This mighty figure does not let go of the minds of men. Obsession with his art has given way to peaceful possession; there are supposedly even strong personalities who have ‘transcended’ his art. And then there rises next to the artist the man, and seizes even the strongest beings, that man who appeared to be at a disadvantage against them. Compromised in equal measure by friend and foe alike through deliberate obfuscations and light-hearted revelations, he instantly ruled [over them] as soon as he began to speak to the world.

Historically, Wagner was perhaps the first German artist to seriously compromise nineteenth-century Jewish enthusiasm for German music and German art altogether. By the 1870s Wagner had not only established his standing as a committed anti-Semite but, at the same time, had redefined Germanness in his own powerful terms. In Leon Botstein’s words, ‘the Jews were


trapped': wanting to be at the forefront of a new artistic movement that seemed to explicitly offer passage for assimilation into the German Volk, any Jewish criticism of the composer was ascribed to ‘defensiveness, a desire to for revenge, and a philistine but characteristically Jewish adherence to established and conventional norms of judgement’. Schenker’s own writings on Wagner from the 1890s bear witness to this, ranging from uncertainty about his music and no less cautious scepticism towards his polemics to eventual, if rather indirect, distancing from Wagner in his critique of Wagner’s reorchestrations of Beethoven’s symphonies. Schenker’s journalistic writing style in the latter article, ‘Beethoven-“Retouche”’, appears to be cowed into discretion by his own assessment that anyone opposing Wagner would be at the receiving end of derision and misinterpretation.

After the turn of the century Jews attempted to exorcise those parts of Wagnerian ideology that had turned their enthusiasm ambivalent. Botstein cites music historian Guido Adler, who in his 1903/4 lectures on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the composer’s death attempted ‘to rescue Wagner’s legacy from the radical nationalist and racialist orthodoxies energetically propagated by Wagner’s epigones at Bayreuth’. Trying to identify his own position in the wake of Wagnerian thought over the following years, Schenker came to reject almost all of Wagner’s output. Cook suggests that Schenker in writings from 1901 to 1912 attempts to redefine the German in music: ‘[Schenker] wretches it away from the Wagnerians and relocates it back in time to the Viennese classics, back to a legacy that is common to Jew and gentile.’ Yet, as Cook also points out, Schenker was entrapped in Wagnerian ideology, and unable or unwilling to distance himself from several notions that were associated with Wagner, including that of the artist-critic. The artist-critic was, of course, the category with which Schenker identified himself, and one that he not only purportedly shared with a host of classical writers influential in literary criticism, such as Goethe and Schiller, but also with several Romantic composers,

87 Botstein 2009, p. 158.
88 Federhofer 1990, pp. 289-90 and 259-68.
89 Ibid. p. 261.
90 Botstein 2009, p. 162.
91 Cook 2007, p. 88.
92 Cook 1995, 102.
including Wagner himself. Schenker’s recognition of the notional legitimacy of Wagner’s writings may in fact have accounted for his ‘anxiety of influence’ relating to the composer, including his attempt to discredit Wagner the critic in the Ninth Symphony monograph.

Schenker developed his views at least in part in response to an ongoing public debate that all-too-easily became obscured by the more topical responses to modern music. The debate centred on the question of who was in the position to criticise works of art in the first place. Of course, the question was not particularly new, and Schenker did consult classical writers that had voiced an opinion about the subject during the years that he gathered sources in his ‘criticism folder’. It includes notes with references to Herder’s series of critical essays _Kritische Wälder_ (1796), specific paragraphs in Jean Paul’s _Vorschule der Aesthetik_ (1804), a work that he spoke highly of later in his life,\(^{93}\) and Friedrich Hebbel’s play _Michel Angelo_ (1851). Schenker’s immersion in this literature no doubt informed his assessment voiced in ‘Kunst und Kritik’ that ‘one only has to consult the works of the greatest poets, musicians, philosophers, and scholars in order to recognise that they have at all times applied the most acerbic vocabulary of rebuke and resentment against daily criticism’.\(^{94}\)

Yet the issue also continued to engross the public imagination throughout the years in which Schenker pieced together his ‘sociology of music’. As the ultimate preoccupation with the self associated with _fin-de-siècle_ aestheticism, critics – often in a display of high moral tone – turned their attention to each other’s work, a mirroring that has been termed as the _feuilleton’s_ ‘auto-reflex’.\(^{95}\) Mirrors were a frequently employed analogy for the pursuit of those who wrote _feuilletons_, one captured by playwright Franz Werfel in _Spiegelmensch_ (_Mirror Man_, 1921), a play that satirised Kraus, as well as by playwright and _Neue Freie Presse_ staff critic Hermann Bahr, who published an article on criticism with the

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\(^{94}\) ‘Kunst und Kritik’, C/377; see Appendix, p. 238.

title ‘Spiegelung’ in 1923.\textsuperscript{96} Not surprisingly, many critics represented in Schenker’s collection of newspaper clippings were sceptical of the artist as critic. The issue receives a kaleidoscopic treatment in the first newspaper clipping that Schenker put into the ‘criticism folder’, German art critic Karl Eugen Schmidt’s \textit{feuilleton} ‘Artists and Critics’.\textsuperscript{97} Although the clipping is undated and its source is unknown, it is likely that the article appeared at the time of Schmidt’s book \textit{Künstlerworte}, a compilation of artists’ judgements on art and criticism published in 1906.\textsuperscript{98} In this article, Schmidt introduces the topic by weighing verdicts by figures such as influential American (but mostly London-based) post-impressionist painter James McNeil Whistler, Antoine Étex, and the French Romantic painter Eugène Delacroix. Schenker may not have been particularly interested in these men’s specific opinions; he considered art reviews, along with literature criticism, as well executed in broad sheets, writing to Hertzka in the same year:

You will be aware that in the daily newspapers these days are to be encountered the most substantial [\textit{sachlichsten}, also ‘most objective’] discussions from the realms of painting, literature, philosophy, history, chemistry, etc., which, for example, the \textit{Neue Freie Presse} publishes on specifically ‘Art’, ‘Literature’, etc. pages at the back. Music, alone, is denied this privilege.\textsuperscript{99}

What is likely to have drawn Schenker to Schmidt’s article is the latter’s contrasting juxtaposition of artist and critic. It includes, for instance, Whistler’s studious attention to and corrections of reviews of his own works, which led to the painter’s belief that artists alone are competent critics. Indeed, Schmidt suggests that criticism may not always be unproductive: literary luminaries such as Goethe, he claims, were productive even in their criticisms. This point was central to Schenker’s own view of criticism: ‘the fact remains that there is nothing objectionable about reviews that benefit the author, the reader, art or scholarship.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{97} Karl Eugen Schmidt, ‘Künstler und Kritiker’ [source unidentified], OC C/450.
\item \textsuperscript{98} Karl Eugen Schmidt, ed., \textit{Künstlerworte} (Leipzig: E. A. Seemann, 1906).
\end{itemize}
for example those published in one journal or another by the likes of a Goethe, a Schiller, a Grillparzer'.\(^{100}\) The same was true, Schenker continues in ‘Kunst und Kritik’, for judgements passed by composers on each other’s work, including those of Schumann and Wagner. He was not alone among his contemporaries to hold such a view. Theatre critic Felix Salten’s feuilleton ‘Let the Artists Speak Out’ reveals the highly assimilated Hungarian Jew’s anxiety about what he refers to as the ‘organised sterility’ of critics: \(^{101}\) A single word about music from Wagner, Schumann, or Hugo Wolf [counts for more] than all that has ever been written about music by sterile onlooker-reasoning, it has a deeper resonance, a more genuine colour and a greater sense of life.\(^{102}\) Salten, a member of Jung Wien, wrote this as an apology for dramatist Frank Wedekind’s attack on theatre critics in his pamphlet Schauspielkunst (The Art of Theatre, 1910). Like Wedekind, he considers journalists as undermining intellectual life by debasing public discourse about art, while at the same time celebrating their own activities: ‘[The sterile] live among us like anchorites and sacred cows, says Wedekind. And one may want to add that they themselves have brought about this state of affairs.’\(^{103}\) Salten was himself not without his critics: for Karl Kraus, whose caricature of Salten in his first large satirical text Die demolirte Literatur (1897) had led to a physical scuffle between the two, he represented the worst of journalistic trivialisation and pretentious aestheticism.\(^{104}\) Schenker, who spoke highly of Salten’s elitism during the 1930s,\(^{105}\) made a point of drawing lines under Salten’s references to the critics’ vacuity in his article. His own assessment of critics encompasses some of Salten’s points about ‘those who are of no use to

\(^{100}\) ‘Kunst und Kritik’, C/380; see Appendix, p. 240.

\(^{101}\) Felix Salten, ‘Die Künstler sollen reden’, in Die Zeit, 26 June 1910; OC C/438.

\(^{102}\) ‘ein einziges Wort über Musik von Wagner, Schumann oder Hugo Wolf [wiegt] schwerer als alles, was von steriler Zuschauervernunft jemals […] über Musik geschrieben wurde, hat tieferen Vollklang, echtere Farbe, höhere Lebendigkeit’; Ibid.

\(^{103}\) ‘Wie Anachoreten und Säulenheilige leben [die Unfruchtbaren] heute, sagt Wedekind. Und man darf hinzufügen, daß die Sterilen diesen Zustand heraufbeschworren haben.’ Ibid.


\(^{105}\) See Federhofer 1985, p. 293.
art’, as he put it, most notably their sway over the level of public debate about art, their power to ‘mollify the public and take them in’ at the expense of artists.\textsuperscript{106}

Perhaps surprisingly, Schenker was also keen to document praise for criticism in the newspapers, if, no doubt, in exasperation. His clippings in this regard exhibit a notable French flavour, and include a ‘Toast to Criticism’ by Edmond Rostand, a poet and dramatist best known for his play \textit{Cyrano de Bergerac} (1897), delivered at the annual banquet of the French Association de la Critique in 1913.\textsuperscript{107} Schenker’s interest in the ostensible power play between artists and critics manifests itself in the occasional peculiar clipping. One of these refers to a ‘boycott of criticism’ relating to a controversy in 1912 headed by the Frankfurt Cäcilienverein, a musical association connected to the venerable Frankfurt Museum Concerts.\textsuperscript{108} On the occasion of one of its concerts, the promoters refused to hand out press tickets owing to German music critic Paul Bekker’s previous confrontational reviews in the \textit{Frankfurter Zeitung} (and apparent intent to provoke a showdown) relating to the conductor of the event, Willem Mengelberg.

Another somewhat curious clipping is a fragment – a mere sentence – of a review by Julius Korngold dated 12 October 1907. The performance in question was that of Italian tenor Enrico Caruso in the part of Duke of Mantua in Verdi’s \textit{Rigoletto}, a repeat appearance on Mahler’s behest after his debut, in the same role, at the Hofoper in 1906. Schenker marked Korngold’s following sentence: ‘[Caruso] enriches, and everybody can learn from his art: singers, singing teachers, and – we do not shirk from saying so – critics as well.’\textsuperscript{109} Two years later Korngold wrote a substantial feuilleton on criticism, which is also preserved in the ‘criticism folder’. Although the critic had, as Schenker, been trained at the Vienna Konservatorium, his arguments are particularly telling in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{106} ‘Kunst und Kritik’, C/405; see Appendix, p. 260.
\item \textsuperscript{107} ‘Ein Trinkspruch Rostands über die Kritik’, in \textit{Frankfurter Zeitung}, 21 March 1913, OC C/375.
\item \textsuperscript{108} ‘Boykott der Kritik’, in \textit{Berliner Börsenkurier}, 21 November 1912; OC C/414.
\end{itemize}
terms of their defence of lay judgement. What is interesting here is the centrality Korngold bestows on Wagner in his reflections. Quoting from Wagner’s newly published letters to Hanslick and Schumann, amongst others, Korngold presents the composer’s critiques primarily as advertisements for his own music. He strategically juxtaposes this notion with Wagner’s advocacy for lay judgement – Wagner is quoted as saying: ‘the content of art is a matter for the individual, not criticism’ – as well as the closed shop of his own writings. He again quotes Wagner: ‘Technique is collectively owned by the artists of all times [...] One can speak about it, but only amongst artists: the layperson shall never learn of it.’ Here Korngold attempts to discredit Wagner by portraying him as a manipulator who bestowed the right to criticise alternatingly on expert and layperson, depending on what suited his own interests. Korngold’s scepticism in relation to artists’ judgements was not directed exclusively against Wagner:

We have been handed down the queerest judgements by Berlioz, Spohr, Mendelssohn and many other composers, including those of Schumann, that rare exemplar of a productive artist who was blessed with a talent for critical sensitivity, and, last but not least, Wagner himself. [...] Productive and critical constitutions are rarely kept in balance; if the former is strong and genuine, it tends to exclude the latter. In what ways do most ‘artist-critics’ distinguish themselves from the critic per se, who is thoroughly trained in technique, history, and aesthetics of his field? Only inasmuch as they have not given up trying to compose after leaving music college...  

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112 ‘Die Technik ist das Gesamteigentum der Künstler aller Zeiten [...] Hierüber läßt sich sprechen, aber eben nur zwischen Künstlern: der Laie soll nie etwas davon erfahren.’ Ibid.
Schenker may have had Korngold’s rationalisation in mind when delivering his own grim assessment of critics that praise ‘the integrity and naivety of the mind’. He complains: ‘It is [...] doubly ungrateful on the part of critics if, when confronted about their harmfulness and not without grotesque megalomania, they counter that the situation would be far worse if only musicians judged other musicians. Not without malice, and believing themselves to be in the right, they declare that Handel had wrongly and, on the face of it, unjustly misjudged Gluck, as had Beethoven – in the beginning – misjudged Weber, and Wagner Brahms, and Tchaikovsky Brahms as well.’

What lay at the heart of the matter was that critics, too, had come to view their feuilletons as artistic production. Although this ‘ideology of writing’ harks back to figures such as E. T. A. Hoffmann, it was, ironically, more fully developed by the same composers and writers whom Schenker, at least in part, sanctioned, namely those pooled together under the loose label Neudeutsche Schule (New German School): Berlioz, Liszt, Wagner, Schumann, and Hans von Bülow. The term Neudeutsche Schule was introduced, with an emphasis on Liszt and Berlioz, by German music journalist Franz Brendel in 1859, as a less politically charged alternative to Wagner’s vision of modern composers in his essay Das Kunstwerk der Zukunft (The Art-Work of the Future, 1849); Schenker is likely to speak of this group in his reference to Berlioz as a member of a ‘new “French”, and, what is even more, “French-German School”’ in his essay. Despite the artistic and political differences between the members of the New German School, they had at least two things in common: each considered himself a legitimate heir of Beethoven, and through their writings on Beethoven and other composers they created dialectical counterparts to works of music that aimed to parallel them in complexity and virtuosity. Their literary presentations of musical compositions in turn opened music to a wider literate public, the “naive” listeners, the millions of ciphers decried in the Ninth Symphony monograph. The practice of translating music into language, something Schenker had called “associations of ideas” born in language’ in

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114 ‘Kunst und Kritik’, C/405; see Appendix, p. 260.
115 Ibid., C/393-4; see Appendix p. 251.
117 ‘Kunst und Kritik’, C/387; see Appendix, p. 246.
118 Schröder 2012, p. 17.
1894, was highly complex.\textsuperscript{120} As German musicologist Berenike Schröder notes, Wagner and his contemporaries aimed to transfer a semantically undefined medium into one that was itself open to interpretation.\textsuperscript{121} The consequences of this highly influential movement are easily recognisable in Schenker’s assessment in ‘Kunst und Kritik’, in which he objects not only to a popular presumption towards an ideology of writing, but acknowledges the lasting legacy of artist-critics of the past: ‘The quantity of [the critic’s] literary offering itself impresses the reader; if the latter does not further recognise where it has been taken from. […] Instead of using his own firm judgment [the critic] seeks to reuse […] what a Schumann, a Wagner, a Weber has committed to reviews.’\textsuperscript{122} Schenker – despite his antagonism towards Wagner – fully subscribed to the paradigm of the productive artist versus the journalist who merely mimicked art. He returned to this problem ten years later, in an unpublished polemic against Paul Bekker. The passage chimes with his dissociation of criticism from the broadly political spectrum associated with Hanslick’s advocacy of Brahms and rejection of Wagner:

If, for instance, […] Wagner gave his opinion against Berlioz, Brahms against Wagner, Tchaikovsky against Brahms, if all these and other composers gave their opinions in favour or against each other, then this much is clear: that those opinions and beliefs provide, so to speak, a very welcome contribution to the understanding of the said composers as composers and personalities. But what should and can we do with the opinion of, for instance, a Hanslick against Wagner? How should this opinion be valued? Perhaps as a contribution to our understanding of Hanslick’s personality? So who was Hanslick? Beside these questions he certainly was no one.\textsuperscript{123}

\textsuperscript{120} ‘in der Sprache geborenen “Ideenassociationen”’; Federhofer 1990, p. 99.
\textsuperscript{121} Schröder 2012, pp. 258-9.
\textsuperscript{122} ‘Kunst und Kritik’, C/398 and 393; see Appendix, pp. 254 and 250-1.
\textsuperscript{123} Wenn z. B. […] Wagner gegen Berlioz, wenn Brahms gegen Wagner, Tschaikowsky gegen Brahms usw., wenn all diese und andere Komponisten für oder widereinander ihre Meinung abgaben, so ist zumindest dieses sicher, dass jene Meinungen und Bekenntnisse einen, wenn man will, sehr willkommenen Beitrag zur Erkenntnis des betreffenden Komponisten als Komponisten und Persönlichkeiten gibt: Was sollen und können wir aber mit der Meinung z. B. eines Hanslick gegen Wagner anfangen? Als was soll diese Meinung gewertet werden? Als Beitrag etwa zur Erkenntnis der Persönlichkeit Hanslicks? Wer war denn Hanslick? Vor diesen Fragen doch sicher niemand.’ OC 39/53.
Schenker may have been right in questioning if Hanslick would have been remembered by posterity at all were it not for Wagner.\textsuperscript{124} Considering Schenker’s high opinion of his own work – particularly by 1921, i.e. after his ‘discovery’ of the \textit{Urlinie} – it is tempting to read the last few sentences of this passage by replacing Wagner’s name with Schenker’s. In response to Nicholas Cook’s question of ‘what explains the aporias and silences that invade Schenker’s writing whenever he turns his pen against Wagner’, the sources in the ‘criticism folder’ provide an answer beyond Schenker’s tacit acceptance of Wagner’s precepts of musical interpretation: his self-identification as an artist beyond reproach was indebted to Wagner’s own commanding realisation of that very image.

If the question of \textit{who} should criticise music has remained part of public debates since Schenker’s lifetime, as a recent polling of opinions for the Austrian music journal \textit{Österreichische Musikzeitschrift} aptly displays,\textsuperscript{125} other issues raised in ‘Kunst und Kritik’ were never widely discussed, such as the question of \textit{what} ought to be criticised. Most performers, composers, critics, and academics today are likely to at least notionally accept Adorno’s statement that it is the music critic’s function to ‘translate the musical work from its molten, hardened, petrified condition back into the force-field that every work, every performance encompasses’.\textsuperscript{126} In ‘Kunst und Kritik’ Schenker introduces an idea that perhaps most profoundly undermines music journalism altogether: rather than reviewing

\textsuperscript{124} Lenneberg 1984, 29.
\textsuperscript{125} Austrian conductor Nikolaus Harnoncourt, for instance, maintains that only musicians are in the position to give constructive criticisms with regard to performance, as they share a common understanding of the challenges posed by matters of notation and technique: ‘The entire rehearsal process is indeed based on nothing other than criticism.’ (‘Die ganze Probenarbeit basiert ja auf nichts anderem als auf Kritik.’) British opera director and librettist David Pountney holds the Schenkerian view that, ‘in the best case scenario’, music critics are ‘a useful kind of parasites’ (‘Im besten Fall sind [die Kritiker] eine nützliche Art von Schmarozern!’), and Austrian conductor Franz Welser-Möst cautions against the music critic’s foible of offering subjective impressions ‘in the cloak of objectivity’ (‘Mäntelchen der Objektivität’). Viennese music critic Wilhelm Sinkovicz, on the other hand, views music journalism as the redeemer of concert and opera life, which, he suggests, may otherwise become marginalised to performing Mozart in eighteenth-century wigs and ‘highly subsidised funerals of world premieres’ (‘hoch subventionierte Uraufführungs-Begräbnisse’). \textit{Österreichische Musikzeitschrift}, vol. 66, no. 6 (2011), 24, 41, 51, and 46.
\textsuperscript{126} ‘das musikalische Werk aus einem geronnenen, verhärteten, versteinerten Zustand in das Kraftfeld zurückzuübersetzen, das ein jedes, und jede Aufführung, eigentlich ist’; Adorno 1968, 21.
performances, the critic ought to review scores. As if to reinforce his point, Schenker cites an anecdote that he deemed significant enough to import into his *Erläuterungsausgabe* op. 111 (1915). In ‘Kunst und Kritik’ he writes: ‘I remember how even one of the most eminent critics of his time, Hanslick, has once assured me that he never judges [a work] after reading the score alone, but only after a performance’, thereby turning, in Schenker’s assessment, ‘a handicap into a virtue’. He explains: ‘As is apparent from the style in which he wrote his reviews, he was unable to fully form a definitive impression by reading the score alone, and was therefore dependent on the helping hand of actual sound.’ Schenker’s charge that Hanslick was not only unwilling but also unable to form judgements based on the score alone may not be entirely fair. Hanslick was, at any rate, well known for labouring over a new score weeks in advance of its performance, something that is well supported by Korngold’s memoirs.

Schenker’s emphasis on criticising musical texts as opposed to specific performances and their cultural context can be explained by the fact that ‘Kunst und Kritik’ was written alongside another essay, ‘Kunst des Vortrags’: Schenker started work on the essay on 1 July 1911 and dictated it to Jeanette four weeks later, ten days after ‘Kunst und Kritik’ was finished. In ‘Kunst des Vortrags’, Schenker firmly establishes the autograph score as the trusted link between composer and performer. His stress on performances to authentically reproduce the autograph score, to ‘recognise the single schema of reproduction that must change as little as the composition’, can be related to Karl Kraus’s mission to rid language from its modern utilisation, as Nicholas Cook has suggested in his discussion of Schenker’s essay on phrasing slurs ‘Weg mit dem Phrasierungsbogen’ in *Das Meisterwerk in der Musik* 3. Kraus considered language as having been vandalised by those who professed themselves to be its experts, namely those who made their living from it, the feuilletonists. His stress on how language (and Viennese culture altogether) was cheapened as a

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127 Schenker 1915, p. 27.
128 ’Kunst und Kritik’, C/388; see Appendix, p. 247.
129 Ibid.
130 Korngold 1991, p. 79.
131 Schenker 2000, p. 4.
132 ’Man gebe dem Werk was ihm gebührt und dann erkennt man das einzige Schema der Wiedergabe, das ebensowenig wechseln darf wie die Komposition.’ Note dated 7 November 1912; OC 12/134.
result manifested itself, beyond polemics, in his scrutiny regarding grammatical and typographical perfection. This scrutiny, according to Paul Reitter, ‘was a modernist conceit that served as a means of stressing how special, how singularly intense and reverential [Kraus’s] relationship to language was.’\(^{133}\)

After 1911, Schenker’s analogous display of textual authority and figurative authorial prowess was to share its venue,\(^ {134}\) the *Erläuterungsaugabe*, with his altogether most forceful remonstrations against journalism as a whole, and one journalist in particular.

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\(^{133}\) Reitter 2008, p. 20. Emphasis in original.

\(^{134}\) See also Biddle 2011, p. 126.
CHAPTER 5
Pale Fire: Schenker’s Polemics against Paul Bekker

If one were, akin to Karl Kraus, to conduct raids on words such as ‘natural musician’, ‘elemental rhythmic force’, ‘late Romanticism’, or ‘intellectually refined’ – one could generate an entire dictionary of such coinage –, this would result in a procession of linguistic ghosts that would make one shudder.

Theodor Adorno

In the previous chapters I have placed Schenker’s thinking on journalistic music criticism in the broader contexts of his thinking on society and his frustration at not achieving public recognition. I have also demonstrated how his polemics were part of a wider public debate about the fundamental nature and function of criticism. This debate – generated by and perpetuated in daily newspapers, journals, and polemical pamphlets – showed no signs of relenting in the following decade. Schenker fully took part in it, a fact that is slightly obscured by the format through which he published his attacks, namely within his critical edition of Beethoven’s late piano sonatas, the Erläuterungsausgabe. Even so, he did issue a newspaper article on the public discourse on music in early 1916, which is a reproduction of a long polemical passage from his then forthcoming EA op. 111. This article shows that he was well aware of the exposure that publishing in popular journals could generate. It also indicates that he deemed his polemics – despite protestations to the contrary elsewhere – independent (or at least independent enough) from his musical analyses. Most importantly, the


2 In line with a convention set out by William Drabkin, I will use the term Erläuterungsausgabe for the four published volumes collectively, and the abbreviations EA op. 109, EA op. 110 etc. for the individual volumes. See Drabkin 1973/4, 319.
brief introduction to the article by the editors reveals the topical nature of Schenker’s polemics, and, perhaps, his alacrity for further public debates:

It just so happens that the theme of this fragment touches on a related matter, which in recent times has been at the centre of a more or less public discussion. In this chapter, Schenker again takes up arms against music historians. No doubt, the following essay is extraordinarily aggressive. [...] It goes without saying that, if any [of his] targets wish to be heard, we will demonstrate the greatest allegiance by granting space in our journal to responses as well.

Although the article does not mention any names (and only a part of it in fact deals with ‘music historians’), Schenker’s targets, as Hellmut Federhofer has suggested, would have been obvious to his readers. These included the music historian Guido Adler along with music critics Herrmann Kretzschmar and Paul Bekker. (As it turned out, none of the writers deigned Schenker’s provocations with a response, although Bekker, years later, dismissed his work in a couple of brief and lacklustre comments.) As indicated in the portentous introduction quoted above, Schenker’s secondary literature surveys in the Erläuterungsausgabe were a far cry from neutrally reviewing the existing literature on Beethoven’s sonatas by eminent scholars of the past such as Adolf Bernhard Marx, an early writer on Beethoven, Wilhelm von Lenz, author of a highly influential six volume study of the composer published in 1855 to 1868, and Beethoven’s first biographer (as well as the composer’s amanuensis) Anton Schindler. In the first volume, the younger generation of writers was represented by the notably conservative Willibald Nagel, who published a book on the sonatas in 1905, and Paul Bekker, who, fourteen years Schenker’s junior, had

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3 Der Merker was edited by music critics Richard Specht and Richard Batka. The publication of the article had been facilitated by Ludwig Karpath. See Federhofer 1985, p. 53.


5 Federhofer 1985, p. 53.
risen to prominence almost overnight with his book *Beethoven* (1911). What Schenker had in mind with his *Erläuterungsausgabe* was a complete revision of the reception of Beethoven’s sonatas, and, as such, he directed his criticism against all those that he deemed false authorities on the works, which included the previous editors of the sonatas Hans von Bülow and Hugo Riemann. His dogged determination to prove seemingly everyone wrong is perhaps best illustrated by an unpublished aphorism: ‘It is high time that we nailed shut the coffin lid over Lenz, Bekker, and so on – and to summon the immortals, the geniuses!!!!’ In another aphorism, dating from early 1918, Schenker exhibits his overwrought buoyancy: ‘Would you, layperson or hermeneuticist, hazard a dance with me???’, perhaps a play on Figaro’s cavatina ‘Se vuol ballare’ in Mozart’s *Le nozze di Figaro* with its lines ‘If you’ll come / To my school / I’ll teach you / How to caper.’ and ‘All your plots / I’ll overthrow.’

Bekker, whose monograph on Beethoven Schenker consistently rejected in all four volumes of the *Erläuterungsausgabe*, was a great admirer of Wagner and the composer’s champion Hans von Bülow, and he adopted both men’s emphasis on the democratising potential of music, which partly manifested itself in his advocacy for musical hermeneutics. While ‘deeply indebted to this methodological trend’ early in his own journalistic career, sometime around the turn of the century Schenker came to view the practice of metaphorically describing the musical surface without, as he saw it, penetrating its content as anathema to his theory of music. Of course, not all instrumental music by the composers in Schenker’s canon was as ‘absolute’ as his analytical practice would seem to suggest. Even Bach, Handel, and the Viennese classical composers created musical metaphors that would appear to demand some kind of extra-musical interpretation; these most commonly involved nature imagery.

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6 ‘Es ist Zeit, den Sargdeckel über Lenz, Bekker, u.s.w. zuzuklappen – die Ewiglebenden, die Genies rufen!!!!’ OC 12/354. Although this note is undated, Schenker’s reference to both Lenz and Bekker indicates that it was written during his work on the *Erläuterungsausgabe*.

7 ‘Willst Du, Laie oder Hermeneut, ein Tänzchen mit mir wagen???’ OC 12/531, dated 22 January 1918.


9 Karnes 2008, p. 84.
and animal sounds, but could also be quite specific, such as those employed by Beethoven in his orchestral work *Wellingtons Sieg* (*Wellington’s Victory*, 1813). Yet Schenker came to fully reject the idea of making music accessible through figurative language and imagery that required a degree of general education but no specialist musical knowledge. Even so, his final extended polemic against Bekker, which his publisher Emil Hertzka removed from the second volume of *Der Tonwille* in 1922, seems implausibly hostile:

> I can say boldly that I am stronger than Bekker [...] because I am engaged in the services of the aristocracy of genius. [...] Meanwhile, I shall have ever greater faith in reincarnation: the sixteenth Bekker will finally have to learn to read music, and indeed in my school and no other. And he will not understand why the first Bekker kicked about with his short democratic legs and struggled so wildly against learning to read music, yet found the courage to set up a corner-shop for democratic phrases and celebrate the future before his people.\(^\text{10}\)

Bekker personified Schenker’s disparaging view of music journalism in several ways. His position as chief music critic for the *Frankfurter Zeitung* between 1911 and 1923 gave him the opportunity to champion new works and widely disseminate his theory of musical reception and his vision of the role of music and music criticism in post-war society. Although he never articulated a cohesive theory of criticism,\(^\text{11}\) his ideas are refracted in a series of critical essays dating from the 1910s. According to German musicologist Andreas Eichhorn these include, amongst others, three key articles that Schenker read and preserved in his archive: ‘Nachklänge zur Alpensinfonie: Kritik und Antikritik’ (‘Further Reflections on the Alpine Symphony: Criticism and Anti-Criticism’, 1915), ‘Die Musikalische Form’ (‘Musical Form’, 1916),\(^\text{12}\) and ‘Kritik und Persönlichkeit’ (‘Criticism and the Ethos of Personality’, 1919). Through a close reading of all these and further sources found in the ‘Bekkerei’ folder, I will more fully explore Schenker’s anxieties in relation to Bekker’s work, and firmly locate his polemics against the critic, including ‘Musikkritik’, within some of the cultural debates relating to criticism and society during the 1910s and early 1920s.

\(^{10}\) Schenker 2005b, p. 165.
\(^{11}\) Eichhorn 2002, p. 213.
\(^{12}\) This was in fact a preview – the first chapter, to be precise – of Bekker’s sociology of music *Das Deutsche Musikleben*, which came out in the same year.
The Erläuterungsausgabe

In June 1912, upon the release of the Ninth Symphony monograph, Schenker and Hertzka reached a breakthrough in their already advanced discussions about the planned Erläuterungsausgabe of Beethoven’s last five piano sonatas.\(^\text{13}\) Although the two men’s different visions for this project would continue to lead to heated debates over the following decade – and ultimately play a part in the demise of their professional relationship – Hertzka’s concessions in 1912 regarding remuneration inspired Schenker to a certain loftiness. After receiving Hertzka’s offer of 6000 Kroner for the entire project (paid in 1200 Kroner instalments per volume), he replied:

> Believe me when I say that in Noah’s Ark, which will land somewhere one of these days when the Flood of the ‘moderns’ is over, it will be my works that occupy the place of honor, and that will be ordained to usher in the new future. Only then will people extol Austria’s soil, which, manifestly predestined for music, has the power to heal the new generation of mankind. And people will remember you with gratitude as the person who offered them a hand toward this. Do not take all of this as mere words, exaggeration – it will come to pass just as I say, ‘that the word of the prophet will come to fulfillment’, and all of that. If only you think that [Universal Edition] is showing the principal fortresses of music, the Ninth Symphony, the Chromatic Fantasy, the last five sonatas (even C. P. E. Bach), in that bright new light that humanity will soon come to crave, then UE will henceforth secure superiority over all the publishing houses of Germany.\(^\text{14}\)

Schenker scholars are likely to recognise Schenker’s reference to ‘that bright new light’, as Ian Bent adopted it as the title of his article on the origins of

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\(^\text{13}\) Schenker first announces this project as early as in the foreword of Ninth Symphony monograph (Schenker [1912] 1992, p. 8). The fifth volume, that of op. 106 (the ‘Hammerklavier’ sonata) remained unrealised, although Schenker – despite the loss of Beethoven’s autograph score – did undertake considerable work on it, including a graphic analysis. Nicholas Marston describes this in detail in Heinrich Schenker and Beethoven’s ‘Hammerklavier’ Sonata, Royal Musical Association Monographs, XXIII (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013).

the ‘Erläuterung series’.\textsuperscript{15} Bent applies this term to include not only Schenker’s editions of the four Beethoven sonatas (sonatas op. 109 (1913), op. 110 (1914), op. 111 (1915), and op. 101 (1921)), but also those of Bach’s \textit{Chromatische Fantasie und Fuge}, as well as his C. P. E. Bach editions, including \textit{Ein Beitrag zur Ornamentik}.\textsuperscript{16} Schenker’s evident proclivity to bombastic religious metaphors aside, he viewed the work of his peers as lacking the transformative powers of his own unique gloss, a position that he had fully and unequivocally taken up by the time he wrote the Ninth Symphony monograph. His demonstrations of how his work relate to alternative – but also similar – approaches offered by other authors of his time were to occupy him for years to come. His thinking on that matter notably evolved between writing the Ninth Symphony monograph, in which for the first time he decisively takes up position against other writers on music, and the subsequent decade, during which his \textit{Erläuterungsausgabe} of the four Beethoven sonatas appeared in print.

Schenker closely ties his polemics to the format (and, arguably, genre) of the \textit{Erläuterungsausgabe}, which therefore warrants some consideration. Essentially, the Beethoven \textit{Erläuterungsausgabe} represents a synthesis of all of Schenker’s earlier work for Universal Edition. He edited the musical text, as he had done in his editions of the Bach and C. P. E. Bach pieces, and doing so contributed to the large projects of critical editions (\textit{kritische Ausgaben}) of works by classical composers that marked the emergence of modern musicology in the late nineteenth century. These projects represented commercial ventures aiming to satisfy a growing professional and amateur market; as such, they were a prominent part of the commercialisation of music during the late nineteenth century.


\textsuperscript{16} Schenker himself referred to these works, with the addition of the Ninth Symphony monograph, as a cycle in a letter to Hertzka in 1914, emphasising their marketability as a special genre. He writes (his emphasis): ‘Why do you not place advertisements in the \textit{Neue Freie Presse}? [...] With J.S. Bach [\textit{Chromatic Fantasy and Fugue}], C.P.E. Bach [\textit{Keyboard Works}], the \textit{Ninth Symphony}, Op. 109, etc., we have already presented a cycle to which one could point as a speciality.’ SDO WSLB 200 (19 February 1914), transcr. and transl. by Ian Bent (2004) <http://mt.ccnmtl.columbia.edu/schenker/correspondence/letter/wslb_200_21914.html> (13 September 2013).
century, marking a change from the previous practice of teachers handing down printed music to their students. Moreover, as Gary Tomlinson writes, critical editions also signified a new faith in the possibility of representing the musical score as a stable, authoritative text, 'in the belief that this text can bring [the reader] closer to the singular expressive intent that motivated the composer'. Schenker fully subscribed to the ideology of abstracting the work of art from the historical changes signified by previous editions and, as a result, performance conventions. Unlike his earlier editorial work, the Beethoven Erläuterungsausgabe represents a restoration of the autograph scores, which he consulted through a variety of contacts, including the Wittgenstein family (which held the autograph score of sonata op. 109) and other archives and individuals in Vienna and Berlin. In EA op. 110, he refers to his editions as 'alcohol-free', 'editor-free', and cleansed from the 'abuses' of earlier editors. For Schenker, previous printed editions – including the original editions, which contained engraving errors and other deviations from the autograph scores – masked the composer's intentions by adding (often minute) interpretive or expressive commentary, such as editorial changes to phrasing and pitches.

In chorus with this undertaking Schenker complemented his critical edition with a substantial editorial apparatus. These Erläuterungen took on more or less the same design as that of the Ninth Symphony monograph: an analysis of the music, including notes on performance practice, and a review of existing literature. This combination in a single publication of printed music and prose commentary – the latter of which in fact outbalances the score – was highly uncommon. As Bent has shown, Schenker's two-publications-in-one design led to seemingly endless arguments with Hertzka, and their differing visions

17 Large 1984, p. 32.
18 Tomlinson 2003, p. 40.
19 See also Cook 1991, p. 94.
20 'alkoholfrei', 'herausgeberfrei', 'Mißbräuche'; Schenker 1914, p. 23.
22 As Schenker points out, the most significant difference to the Ninth Symphony monograph concerns his notes on performance, which were not given their own rubrics in the Erläuterungsausgabe, but included in the main analysis of the music. See Schenker 1913, p. 22.
23 One rare example from the period is American composer Charles Ives, who wrote an essay exceeding 32,000 words to accompany his self-published Piano Sonata no. 2 (known as the Concord Sonata) in 1921. The two have been reprinted in a single volume in later editions.
more often than not found expression in disputes about remuneration and marketing. Partly out of commercial considerations, Hertzka was sceptical of the unwieldy editorial apparatus proposed by Schenker. These critical editions were, after all, first and foremost intended as performance material rather than scholarly monographs, and advertised as such by Universal Edition. As Bent writes, ‘the designation *kritische Ausgabe* was selling Schenker short, selling the listening public short, selling the performance world short, and even selling [Universal Edition] itself short – all this, of course, as Schenker saw it’.\(^{24}\) One nowadays largely overlooked detail about these volumes is the fact that they were technically double-authored, as the cover pages make abundantly clear:

\(^{24}\) Bent 2005, 115
Schenker accentuated the relationship between Beethoven’s and his own work in the predominantly polemic prefaces to each volume. His increasingly hostile remarks about other writers on these sonatas in the introductions and literature survey sections are not particularly out of character in relation to his preceding and subsequent publications. Yet in the context of a critical edition, they provide a notably pugnacious framework not only to his more factual analyses in the remaining ‘elucidations’, but the actual critical edition, namely that of Beethoven’s score, as well. He explains in a letter to Hertzka in 1913:

I have illuminated my method in principle by means of quotations [of other literature] and have set forth the [differences] in such a way that no
reader, no reviewer can be left in any doubt whatsoever as to which type of explanation is the better. [...] I could not deliver the work up defenseless to the braying hounds of today. People should hear from my own lips that the milk which the world (the eternal, great suckling!) needs is to be obtained from me alone.\(^{25}\)

His determination to demonstrate his unique insight into these works – and his claims of objectivity in particular – evokes analogies to an entirely unrelated, fictional work, namely Vladimir Nabokov’s labyrinthine novel *Pale Fire* (1962). Set in mid-twentieth-century America, the novel’s text represents the result of its highly unreliable and by all accounts mentally unstable protagonist’s self-imposed task of editing the autograph of a late colleague’s poem. Setting out to render ‘an unambiguous *apparatus criticus*’ alongside the poem,\(^{26}\) ‘*Pale Fire*’, the commentator is convinced that it cannot be properly understood without his intuitive interpretation. From his point of view, the poem’s narrative is inspired by his own fantastical life story, which he had confided to the poet during private meetings shortly before the latter’s death. As might be expected, his pedantic efforts to save the poem from other editors and critics soon descend into allegations of conspiracies and delusions of grandeur. Although Schenker was of comparably sound mind, his polemics exhibit not only a similar, real-life sense of entrenchment but also a burgeoning sense of ownership over the works of art: in *EA* op. 101, he eventually lapses into writing about ‘our’ sonata.\(^{27}\) Readers expecting nothing but a new performing edition of these sonatas – as advertised – were variably excited or taken aback by his posturing against supposed rivals. Most contemporary commentators, including Max Graf and Schenker’s enthusiastic apologist Walter Dahms, wrote positively both about Schenker’s editorial work and his analyses of the music. Dahms, a somewhat enigmatic music critic and writer based in Berlin, whom Schenker had never met face-to-face but regularly corresponded with over the following decades, gloats:


\(^{27}\) Schenker 1921, p. 19.
Schenker picks to pieces the descriptions of the E major sonata by such people as Marx, Lenz, Nagel, and Bekker. He passes especially severe judgment on the harmful conceitedness of Hans von Bülow, and uses polemics to annihilate Kretzschmar’s verbal extravagances. These illusory ‘greats’ must of course be deposed in the face of so much factual evidence. But Beethoven emerges once again in his true form.28

Other critics expressed reservations about the supposed exclusivity of Schenker’s approach, and his attacks on other writers in particular. Hermann Wetzel, for instance, notes about the first volume:

I could particularly have done without the unnecessarily impetuous and unfriendly insults against departed and living colleagues. [...] The confusion that still holds sway over our musical aesthetics is caused by such writers, who are incapable of objectively examining opposing views, and, if they have to reject them, to do so in a considerate manner. The Schenkerian style of polemicism strikes me as especially precarious, as it can be found in a work that is intended for the hands of our studying youth.29

The most striking similarity with the fictional editor of ‘Pale Fire’ involves the parallels suggested by the respective writers between the external struggle involved in creating the edition (in Schenker’s case overcoming those who systematically suppressed his contributions, as he saw it) and the internal resolve to fully realise the work of art’s meaning. As Dahms would record, Schenker anchored his critique in Bülow’s widely used edition of the same sonatas, writing to Hertzka during their initial discussions about the project: ‘Von Bülow is at long last refuted on a thousand points – through the authentic words of Beethoven, not just through the notes on the page, which can be interpreted

this way or that […]. The chief adversary is slain, but the victory must be turned to advantage! Referring to letters by Beethoven, Schenker aims to validate his pursuit by drawing parallels between Beethoven and himself, emphasising their purportedly shared abhorrence of journalistic music criticism. The longest Beethoven quotation, in EA op. 109, is part of a letter to his publisher Breitkopf & Härtel, written in response to the negative critical reception of the revised version of his oratorio Christus am Ölberge, dated 8 October 1811:

You may have the oratorio, and indeed everything reviewed by whom you like. It annoys me to have written a word to you about the wretched review; who can trouble himself over such critics when he sees how the most wretched scribblers are praised by the very same wretched critics, and how they speak in the harshest way of works of art, and are indeed forced to do so by their ineptness, because they have not, as the cobbler has his last, the proper standard […] And now criticise as long as you like, I wish you much pleasure; it may give one a little prick like the sting of a mosquito, and then it becomes quite a nice little joke. Cri-cri-cri-cri-cise-cise-cise-cise – But not forever, that you cannot do. God grant it.

Jeanette’s copy of this letter, along with others, was placed in the ‘criticism folder’, which is one of several indications that Schenker consulted its contents during the writing of the Erläuterungsausgabe. While only quoting the entire passage on this one occasion, Schenker retained its last line (‘…cri-cri-cri-cri-ti-ci-ci-ci-cise-cise-cise – But not forever, that you cannot do…’) as a motto at the top of each literature survey section of the Erläuterungsausgabe.

32 OC C/421-31.
His positioning of the motto ostensibly demands some kind of inductive reasoning. Taken out of context, the passage seems to suggest – as Schenker is likely to have intended – that Beethoven himself would have rejected the literature that Schenker proceeds to review and dismiss. In his initial discussion of Beethoven’s letter in EA op. 109, however, the citation of Beethoven’s polemics is by no means incidental. Referring to his reading as new research, Schenker aims to rehabilitate what, he suggests, had commonly been interpreted as Beethoven’s bad temper.33 Although he does not cite any particular literature in this respect, he may have been responding to Paul Bekker’s Beethoven, in which the author – also referring to Beethoven’s letters, if different ones – writes: ‘Sheer rage was to [Beethoven] an absolutely necessary means of relieving his feelings. The gift of moderation was denied him by his upbringing, but when he lost his temper, his most common fault, he […] hastened to make amends.’34 Schenker, conversely, argues not only that Beethoven was right to denounce his critics, but joins the composer by doing likewise:

How drastically and yet, despite all ferocity, clearly and unemotionally Beethoven in the above letter articulates the distance that he sees between his creations and their ‘critics’! But who will now, after reading my work, dare to suggest that he judged the distance as too great? Given these circumstances, would it not be dishonesty, perfidy, to score a point against the genius-imbued artist just to satisfy one’s own limitations, and degrade him as a liar, only so that, in the few seconds of life that are granted to a flash in pan [Eintagsfliege], one’s own unproductive vanity is allowed to successfully exist even in the face of genius?35

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33 Schenker 1913, p. 24.
34 Bekker [1911] 1927, p. 53.
Schenker here employs several rhetorical devices at once: while making both an emotional plea for the composer and a logical appeal for his own polemics (complete with adopting Beethoven’s comparison of critics to insects), he firmly establishes his ‘elucidations’ as the rational basis for both. Perhaps more than anywhere else in the opening volume, Schenker aims to demonstrate his credentials, usurping Beethoven himself to become his witness. In the context of the reviewed literature, which on the whole tends to be enthusiastic about Beethoven’s work and hagiographic about his life, its flaws lay, in Schenker’s view, in suppressing the musical ‘facts’ that he perceived as unambiguously demonstrating genius. Moreover, his own contemporaries failed to recognise his work as illustrating them. By almost effortlessly transcending a century and endeavouring to ‘retrospectively rehabilitate’ Beethoven’s outwardly bad-tempered letter, Schenker, perhaps inadvertently, offers a glimpse of how he viewed the tepid critical reception of his own work. A note on a scrap of paper marked ‘op. 111’, which is likely to date from this period, reveals his vexations:

I obviously have the irrefutability of my analyses to thank for the fact that people shy away from them, and, [instead] review the polemical tone, however – – – I see through their inability to critique, thus all claims that they comprehend everything reveal themselves as untrue.37

As already intimated in the preface to the Ninth Symphony monograph, Schenker was not inclined to keep his ruminations private; responding to the reviews of EA op. 109, in the second volume Schenker unleashes a tirade against journalists that is unequalled in his output. His invective includes the following sentence, with its faint echo of Beethoven’s letter quoted above:

May the all-too-numerous male lady-chefs, who in their newspapers prepare the beggar’s soup for the musical rabble, and about whom I for sure know that if they were in the position to raise objections against me, overcome even the cowardice of their silence and scream their objections from all the rooftops, may they also in the

36 Schenker 1913, p. 24.
37 ‘Ich verdanke es offenbar der Unwiderleglichkeit meiner Analysen dass man davor zurückweicht und den polemischen Ton bespricht, obgleich ich – – – Ich erkenne daraus die Unfähigkeit zur Kritik und alle Behauptungen erweisen sich als unwahr, die darauf hinzielen, als hätte man alles gewusst.’ Emphases in original. OC 12/525.
future express their opposition through a silence forced upon them by necessity[.]

The convoluted structure of this sentence ties together several of the arguments expressed in ‘Kunst und Kritik’. While Schenker may have hoped for critical engagement with his work on technical terms, he was confronted not only by conspiratorial ignorance, as he saw it, but also by a profound development in German musical discourse that sought altogether different ways of approaching music. Although the highly complex development of musical hermeneutics stretched back to the early nineteenth century, it reached an apex in Bekker’s *Beethoven*. Schenker saw no possibility of opening a dialogue between hermeneutics and his own analyses and, unsurprisingly, his reviews of Bekker’s work yield little potential for musical debate. The following excerpt from *EA* op. 110, in which Schenker cites a typical example of Bekker’s florid style and then evaluates it, demonstrates how he mostly resorts to claims anchored in his theory of criticism rather than his theory of music:

[Bekker writes:] ‘A gently rising introductory melody with Beethoven’s surprising description *con amabilità* leads to a warmly emerging song inspired by Haydn, which dissolves in rippling successions of chords. A ruminative octave motive appears only provisionally to take over. Grace and sensibility dominate the movement; there is very little dark shading. It resembles the dawn of a brilliant day, the course of which is still unknown to us.’

Note well: it is the art of the hermeneutics to read off the achievements of the composer, yet to ‘announce’ that which is read off in a tone of voice as if also interpreting: some word that says nothing, some adjective or the like takes care of the deception so thoroughly that laypeople for the most part assume an interpretation, when basically something has been said that they could have worked out for themselves.

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*Schenker 1914, p. 28.*

Here Schenker combines textual criticism with calling into question his opponent’s character, a strategy common in the journalistic critical discourse of the period and exemplified by Karl Kraus’s *ad hominem* attacks against his targets, which occasionally included music critics as well.\(^{40}\) As already anticipated in ‘Kunst und Kritik’, by 1914 Schenker viewed journalism as having a destructive influence on societal cohesion, noting in his diary: ‘One of the great future dangers for all nations I see in the unbridled expansion in the power of the press, which sooner or later will render governance an impossibility altogether.’\(^{41}\) One issue that was fundamental to his disapproval of journalism during the following years was its commercial aspect: despite having no particular skills or competence, journalists were able to make money out of meretriciously reflecting upon other peoples’ achievements. To Schenker, such conduct seemed to directly connect with hermeneutic traditions, as the above quote from EA op. 110 suggests. He portrays Bekker not only as a mere mimic, but as a hypocrite as well. Yet beyond his alleged hermeneutic deceitfulness, Bekker fuelled Schenker’s antagonism by championing what might be called an inversion of his own thinking on music and society. The clearest example of the two men’s diametrically opposed beliefs involves the symphony genre, and Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony in particular.

**Paul Bekker**

*Beethoven* was Bekker’s first book. Born in 1882 as the son of a Jewish Lithuanian tailor and a Berlin seamstress, his early aspiration was to become a musician.\(^{42}\) While still a teenager, he worked as a freelance violinist with the

\(^{40}\) McColl 1998, 300.

\(^{41}\) ‘Eine der großen Gefahren der Zukunft sehe ich für alle Länder in dem schrankenlosen Wachstum der Macht der Presse, das über kurz oder lang das Regieren überhaupt unmöglich machen muß.’ Diary entry, 10 May 1914, Federhofer 1985, p. 309.

\(^{42}\) All of Bekker’s biographical information in this chapter is taken from Andreas Eichhorn’s monograph *Paul Bekker: Facetten eines kritischen Geistes*, Studien und Materialien zur Musikwissenschaft, XXIX (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 2002), where it is located in a two-part biographical sketch (pp. 31-104 and pp. 568-
Berlin Königliche Kapelle, and soon took over the musical directorship of a provincial theatre in Bavaria, the Aschaffenburg Stadttheater. His work in Aschaffenburg as well as a similar engagement in Görlitz, Saxony, was in both instances abruptly terminated owing to a character trait that Bekker shared with Schenker, namely his willingness to damage and sacrifice working relationships because of artistic differences, choices that he treated with the highest ethical gravitas. Although Bekker continued to work as a violinist over the following few years, including a short period with the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra, he eventually decided to become a private violin teacher in 1906. Concurrent with his activities as a musician, he had been writing reviews and essays for newspapers since 1902, and worked as a music critic for two Berlin dailies between 1906 and 1911. His appointment as chief music critic of the Frankfurter Zeitung in October 1911 roughly coincided with the publication of Beethoven, a monograph that he had been working on since 1909. Unlike Schenker’s Ninth Symphony monograph, which achieved only modest sales with an overall print run of 1200 copies, Bekker’s Beethoven was hugely popular, leading to five reprints (1912 (Schenker acquired this second edition), 1913, 1916, 1921 and 1923) with total sales figures approaching 30,000 copies. The popularity of the monograph, in turn, elevated Bekker’s music reviews for the Frankfurter Zeitung to national renown, leading Austrian-born British composer Egon Wellesz to dub him ‘the Hanslick of Germany’ in his memoirs. Wellesz was likely to have been alluding to the extraordinary influence that the critic commanded, but there was another parallel: central to each man’s approach was an idea borrowed from Wagner. While Bekker rejected Hanslick’s design of ‘absolute’, self-

583). Eichhorn was the first researcher to fully access Bekker’s Nachlass, which, like Schenker’s, is today located in two archives in the United States. As such, Eichhorn’s book shares certain features with Federhofer’s authoritative monograph on Schenker, including its non-chronological structure.

45 Eichhorn 2002, p. 43.
contained music, he developed his own theory relating to Wagner’s poetic intent, namely the ‘poetic idea’.

Unlike Schenker, Bekker did not conceive music to be autonomous, writing in *Beethoven*: “[Beethoven] demanded intellectual co-operation. He regarded listening to music as a living experience, and with him the terms “to compose” and “to write poetry” were interchangeable.” Bekker’s emphasis on music as ‘lived experience’ was not entirely new; it was inspired by Herrmann Kretzschmar’s adaptation of German hermeneutic philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey’s methodology. Bekker’s implementation of the poetic idea had significant political overtones. He was left-leaning, and as such fully subscribed to political efforts to broaden access to the arts as a means to emancipate lay listeners. Whereas Schenker viewed the technical intricacies of works such as Beethoven’s symphonies as representing an ‘unbridgeable chasm’ between ‘high’ art and the Volk, Bekker proposed the opposite, as if to say the more complex the work, the greater the potential for poetic realisation. Bekker writes:

The symphonies might as well be described as speeches to the nation, to humanity. […] Because Beethoven absorbed and turned to good use the stimuli he thus received from without, he succeeded in making the instrumental symphony, hitherto addressed to a small circle of amateurs, the art form of democracy.

This reveals Bekker’s indebtedness to Wagner, who wrote about Beethoven’s symphonies in 1879: “[Beethoven] believed that he had to speak in large, vivid strokes to the people, to all of mankind, in the spacious hall.” Unlike Schenker’s view of music as self-referential, Bekker believed that music ‘spoke’

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46 See Bekker [1911] 1927, p. 63.
47 Bekker dedicates an entire chapter of *Beethoven* to his theory of the poetic idea, which is placed between the biographical section and the discussion of the composer’s works.
48 Bekker [1911] 1927, p. 64.
50 ‘Kunst und das Volk’, B/410; see Appendix, p. 232. Schenker writes: ‘One could say that the chasm between a symphony as being the most extended form and the people as decisive and unbridgeable, as long as the Volk remains the Volk, and the symphony a symphony!’
51 Bekker [1911] 1927, p. 147.
52 Notley 1997, 430.
to its audience, that Beethoven’s symphonies were *Volksreden* (orations to the *Volk*), as he would put it in 1918. Consequently, the listeners could relate to, if nothing else, the external poetic ideas that it associated with the ‘orator’, the musical ego as the emancipated subject. Nowhere else are the visions of Schenker and Bekker further apart than in their respective readings of the finale of Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony. As Schenker struggles to make sense of the loss of structural coherence due to the movement’s extra-musical programme, including the setting of Schiller’s ‘Ode to Joy’, Bekker defuses the notion of a chasm between the work of art and its listeners by proposing that the choral finale ‘ideally, demands that the audience should join in the singing’, akin to congregations joining in hymns.

The success of *Beethoven* added new momentum to the ongoing debate about the achievements and limitations of music criticism, as did, on a relatively smaller scale, Schenker’s review of Bekker’s book. While some of the aforementioned reviewers of the early volumes of the *Erläuterungsausgabe* expressed unease and scepticism about Schenker’s polarisation of his and Bekker’s work, Hans Friedrich, a contributor to the Austrian music journal *Der Merker*, dedicated a considerate part of his essay ‘Über Musikkritik’ (‘On Music Criticism’) to the problem in 1917. Striking a more emollient tone than many of his colleagues, Friedrich describes the issue in this way:

By bringing us closer to the inner nature of Beethoven’s genius, a masterful critic such as Bekker achieves surely nothing less than Schenker with his Beethoven editions, even if these cannot be appreciated enough, as they at long last present us with historical faithfulness and, in addition, masterworks that can be performed; Schenker’s precious gifts would have to be regarded even more highly if he had voiced his undoubtedly necessary corrections of other Beethoven scholars in a key of pure objectivity.

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53 Ibid., 426.
54 Ibid., and Steinberg 2004, p. 101.
60 ‘Ein genialer Kritiker, wie Bekker, leistet, indem er uns der inneren Natur des Beethovenschen Genius näherbringt, dich gewiß nichts Geringeres as Schenker mit seinen Beethovenausgaben, wenn dieselben auch gar nicht genug anerkannt werden können, indem uns mit ihnen endlich historische Treue und zudem reproduzierende Meisterwerke geschenkt wurden; diese kostbaren
‘Bekkerei’

After the outbreak of the First World War, both Schenker and Bekker came to view their respective work with new urgency and increasingly as part of a broader socio-political mission. Schenker’s response was broadly aligned with that of the majority of Viennese Jews. As documented in, among other memoirs, Stefan Zweig’s autobiography Die Welt von Gestern (The World of Yesterday, 1942), Jews embraced the occasion to demonstrate national loyalty.61 In his EA op. 111, written within the first year of the war, Schenker’s established veneration of German genius turned more programmatic, as did his rejection of ‘the many, the all-too-many, who threaten to bring her again under the dominion of the lower-standing foreign nations under the banner of an uncritical evaluation which is in reality the result of an incapacity to see as duty demands the greater as greater.’62 He gradually came to equate those who continued to conspire against his reading of German genius with outright traitors:

Precisely those who avail themselves of the most unclean practices in order to hold back my work reproach my polemical deportment for its ‘lack of refinement’. Oh, these German Englishmen! […] Not until our hypocritical Englishmen, who always point their fingers at others, have become German will I gladly dedicate myself to the correction of honest mistakes, which are simply nothing but mistakes.63

Although Schenker in later years played down his expectations for an ‘objective counterattack’ to his unremitting reviews of Beethoven, he did

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62 ‘die Vielen, Allzuvielen, die unter dem Titel vorurteilsloser Schätzung, in Wahrheit aber aus Unfähigkeit, das Größere nach Schuldigkeit auch größer sehen, sie wieder nur unter die Botmäßigkeit der tieferstehenden fremden Nationen zu bringen drohen.’ Schenker 1915, Vorwort.
63 ‘Gerade diejenigen, die sich der unsaubersten Praktiken bedienen, um meinen Arbeiten den Weg zu unterbinden, werfen meiner polemischen Haltung “Mangel an Vornehmheit” vor. Oh, diese deutschen Engländer! […] Bis nur erst unsere heuchlerischen, mit den Fingern stets nach anderen weisenden Engländer einmal zu Deutsche geworden, dann widme ich mich gerne ausschließlich nur der Richtigstellung von ehrlichen Irrtümern, die nichts als bloß Irrtümer sind.’ Schenker 1916, p. 29.
nonetheless monitor Bekker’s articles in the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, and collected over 30 of them between 1913 and 1923. The first article retained in Schenker’s archive in which Bekker specifically writes about the role of music criticism, ‘Nachklänge zur Alpensinfonie: Kritik und Antikritik’, is a polemic related to his own review of the premiere of Richard Strauss’s *Eine Alpensinfonie* in 1915. The review itself, not found amongst Schenker’s papers, is remarkable in several respects, including the circumstances in which it was written. Serving as a member of the infantry regiment in the army postal service on the Western front, Bekker was hundreds of miles away from the premiere in Berlin, therefore forced to fulfil one of Schenker’s stipulations in ‘Kunst und Kritik’, namely to review the score rather than the performance.

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Bekker made no efforts to conceal that he did not actually attend the premiere. Eichhorn points out the cinematographic character of the review's introduction and conclusion, in which Bekker fades out of the realities of life on the front and in to the imagined performance in Berlin, thereby heightening the somewhat uncanny aspect of an opulent orchestral performance during wartime.\textsuperscript{67} Bekker's main criticism revolves around what he considers Strauss's naive, uncritical engagement with the sequence of mountain imagery that he evokes, instead of what Bekker considers the desirable reflective engagement with the experience: ‘Of course, the naive artist gives us nothing but the reflection of things, but he does so not only by offering us the visibly observable contours, but all the emotional inner life and relationships as well. But exactly

\textsuperscript{67} Eichhorn 2002, p. 244.
that is lacking from the *Alpine Symphony*. This criticism, including its evocation of Schiller’s distinction between naive and sentimental art, provides a poignant counterpoint to the very aim of Bekker’s article – and his vision of music criticism altogether – in which he calls attention to the listener’s poetic, intuitive engagement with the work of art. One notable aspect of his review is his turning against a highly esteemed figure of German musical life, something that would become a recurring theme in his work. It provoked hostile responses from Strauss’s supporters, including Jewish Viennese music critic Richard Specht, who compared Bekker with Princess Salome, the protagonist of Strauss’s eponymous opera who is bludgeoned to death after kissing the decapitated head of the prophet John the Baptist: ‘Mr B. has danced his critical Dance of the Seven Veils with bravura; but in doing so he has only revealed himself – he won’t be rewarded with the Straussian head of Jokanaan by a long shot […] Kill that critic.’ (The last sentence is a reference to ‘Kill that woman’, the final line of Strauss’s opera.) In his reply, the aforementioned ‘Nachklänge zur Alpensinfonie’, Bekker deliberated on his vision of the role of music criticism in society in more detail, anticipating not only his sociology of music, *Das Deutsche Musikleben* (1916), but also his theory of musical phenomenology. However, in the case of ‘Nachklänge zur Alpensinfonie’, Bekker’s arguments revolve around another issue that may have piqued Schenker’s interest, namely the question of the degree to which music can be analysed based on the printed score alone.

Although Schenker had already voiced the idea that music should first and foremost be approached via the score in both ‘Kunst und Kritik’ and ‘Kunst...’

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70 Bekker repeatedly returned to this theme in his later output, including his often-cited essay ‘Was ist Phänomenologie in der Musik?’, in *Die Musik*, vol. 17, no. 4 (January 1925). Coincidentally, Bekker briefly mentions Schenker in this essay (a clipping of which is duly preserved in the latter’s scrapbook, OC 2, p. 66).
des Vortrags’, he revisited it during his work on the *Erläuterungsausgabe*, his most ambitious editing project, with, as would be expected, a strong emphasis on the significance of the autograph score. The *Erläuterungsausgabe*’s critical success rested, after all, on what Wetzel had called Schenker’s *Textkritik*, his editing of the music. Specht – who Schenker occasionally mentions in his correspondence together with other Viennese music critics that he found objectionable – challenged Bekker’s review of the *Alpine Symphony* on the basis of him merely having access to the score, without actually listening to the performance. Bekker, in turn, takes issue with the notion that a score could be ‘read’ in the first place: ‘Can one “read” music? One can only hear it, either in reality or in one’s imagination.’ Schenker may not have found this statement entirely disagreeable; in ‘Kunst des Vortrags’, he had noted: ‘Just as an imagined sound appears real in the mind, the reading of a score is sufficient to prove the existence of the composition.’ Yet Bekker’s emphasis on ‘one’s imagination’ goes well beyond the ability to hear a score. He detaches sound (real or imagined) from printed music altogether, stressing the metaphysical, imaginary nature of the listening experience, which, in *Das deutsche Musikleben*, he came to call ‘musical form’. One of Bekker’s preliminary observations on the matter in ‘Nachklänge zur Alpensinfonie’ is that the listening experience is contingent on the listener’s personality and therefore on external influences. Bekker’s concept of musical form became central to his thinking about music, and was the focus of an eponymous article, a preview of *Das deutsche Musikleben* (which he also wrote while in the field and which was initially to be subtitled ‘Ein Kriegsbuch’ (‘A War Book’)) published in 1916. This article became the first item of a new folder, which Schenker titled ‘Bekkerei’.

Bekker viewed musical form as the result of the energetic interaction between the productive artist and society. Antithetical to Hanslick’s ‘tonally moving forms’, Bekker’s musical form anticipates the energetic approaches of

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72 Schenker 2000, p. 3.
73 Bekker 1916, p. 3.
August Halm and Austrian-Swiss music theorist Ernst Kurth in the mid-1920s: musical events represent energetic values, the sum of which sets up a teleological dynamic network. Unlike hermeneutics, energetics was concerned with the inherent dynamic of music, rather than emotions. Bekker’s perception of musical form could better be described as socio-energetic (or sociological), as his teleological framework categorically includes the listener as a sentient, social being. Accordingly, he viewed the work of art not as autonomous, but as requiring the act of being listened to within a social context in order to become fully realised. Music, therefore, cannot be absolute; there is no difference between its apparent content and its real content. The role of criticism, according to Bekker, is to mediate the energetic agency between the artist and society. As the critic too is not autonomous but part of society, his judgement must reflect on the ‘form’. Bekker concludes:

Criticism is among the creative elements of form, creative not by the making of that which lives, but by furthering insight into that which lives. This ever-changing energy within art is the form. [...] Thus, society, musicians, and criticism are the three elements of musical form: Society and musicians as the creative powers, and criticism as the principle of insight, which brings to the light of day the form as a social phenomenon, through the synthesis of these creative powers.

It is difficult to imagine a theory of music more anathema to Schenker’s insistence on the autonomy of absolute music, his ‘autonomania’, as philosopher Aaron Ridley dubs it. What Schenker and Bekker did have in common, however, was their deep faith in music to effect – or at least represent – substantial socio-political changes. Bekker, impassionate about the war from the

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75 Rothfarb 1992, p. 56.
77 Ridley explains: ‘The autonomaniac begins by assuming that music is, essentially, pure sound, and then sets about investigating it in accordance with a method which reinforces that assumption.’ Ridley 2004, p. 168.
outset, distanced himself from German nationalism, and hoped for the conflict to bring about a catharsis, giving way to his vision of a utopia in which music and society together would express a new social and spiritual order. In his words: ‘The old rigid form of music has become the past, it has fallen into disuse along with the forms of the old ordering of society and has lost its living effectiveness.’\(^{78}\) By developing into a medium that is accessible to all, art, in Bekker’s view, could become the ‘basis of a new way of contemplating life’, i.e. the ‘expression of lived experience’ that he had already anticipated in *Beethoven*.\(^{79}\) Schenker’s vision for a new social order and the role of the German Masters in it, on the other hand, was fundamentally militant, as the preface to *EA* op. 111 bears witness to:

In the terrible hardship of this war which was so wickedly forced upon the German people, Beethoven not only proved himself to be a true helper and comforter in the company of a few other great men, but also, above and beyond this, as the highest symbol, the most exquisite talisman of a nation which the enemy powers, being themselves so backwards, and overvaluing themselves frivolously, but also unfortunately overvalued, dared to slander as a nation of ‘barbarians’.\(^{80}\)

In what is perhaps the most remarkable passage of *EA* op. 111, Schenker takes an unprecedented stance against social, national, and artistic egalitarianism in that volume’s literature review, and systematically transfers his hierarchical thinking about the reception of music onto European society.\(^{81}\) More succinctly, he complains in a letter to August Halm in 1918 of ‘untold woeful confusion in political matters’, which ‘is to be traced solely to Karl Marx, just as the musical confusion is to be traced to Richard Wagner’, and – even more

\(^{78}\) ‘Die alte starre Form der Musik ist Vergangenheit geworden. Sie ist mit den Formen der alten Gesellschaftsordnung verfallen und hat ihre lebendige Wirkungsfähigkeit verloren.’ Bekker 1916, p. 236.

\(^{79}\) ‘Ideen, die [...] zur Grundlage einer neuen Daseinsanschauung werden.’ Ibid. See also Rothfarb 1992, 52.

\(^{80}\) ‘In der hehren Not dieses dem deutschen Volke so freventlich aufgezwungenen Krieges erwies sich Beethoven nicht nur mit noch wenigen anderen Großen im Bunde, als ein wahrer Helfer und Tröster, sondern auch darüber hinaus mit als das höchste Wahrzeichen, der köstlichste Talisman einer Nation, die die feindlichen Mächte, so rückständig selbst, sich frivol überschätzend, leider auch überschätzt, eine “Nation der Barbaren” zu schmähne wagten.’ Schenker 1915, Vorwort.

concisely – in a diary entry written two weeks later: ‘Germany has two executioners: Wagner and Marx! The suns of the yesteryear must penetrate the darkness!’\(^8\)\(^2\) Despite increasingly difficult living conditions, Schenker remained bellicose about the German war efforts. He registered German military victories in positive terms in his diary,\(^8\)\(^3\) and even took to political activism.\(^8\)\(^4\)

Of course, neither Schenker’s nor Bekker’s visions turned into reality. Schenker’s hopes for modern-day absolutism evaporated with the dawn of the First Republic, and Bekker’s anticipation of a significant change in the role of concert life after the war similarly turned out to be a figment of his imagination. Bekker’s frustration at this was partially channelled into an article that became the focus of Schenker’s subsequent attacks on the critic, ‘Kritik und Persönlichkeit’, published in *Frankfurter Zeitung* in 1919. In this, Bekker is at his most introspective; in striking contrast to *Das Deutsche Musikleben*, society plays no part in Bekker’s deliberations on the phenomenology of criticism. What does remain from his earlier writings, however, is a focus on the process of individual cognition: music, he claims, is formed during the process of reception (the performance), and this formation depends on the individual’s disposition. The critic – or, rather, the critic’s personality – therefore becomes part of the work of art itself: ‘I feel, I see only that which is in me. The work of art comes to life for me only as far as it is part of my being. […] I can analyze Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony harmonically and thematically, right down to the last details, and yet inwardly may stand further from the work than some listener who knows not the first thing about compositional technique.’\(^8\)\(^5\)

While witnessing the development in Bekker’s thinking on music criticism from a distance, Schenker’s first opportunity to respond to the items in his ‘Bekkerei’ folder presented itself in the next and final volume of his


\(^8\)\(^3\) Federhofer 1985, p. 325.

\(^8\)\(^4\) See Deisinger 2010, pp. 22-3.

Erläuterungsausgabe, EA op. 101 (1921), the publication of which had been delayed by wartime (and post-wartime) conditions. During the preceding years Schenker’s theory had matured as he was working on an early version of Der freie Satz. This version was finished by 1917, although he kept revising it in subsequent years. His work on ‘Freier Satz’, as it had been provisionally titled, led to his formulation of the Urlinie, a term that he introduces along with his first published graphs in EA op. 101. Like his political proclamations, his opinions on Bekker’s work (some of which are recorded in a collection of unpublished aphorisms) turned increasingly frantic and display to what degree the critic remained on Schenker’s mind during those years. Bekker’s failure to even mention the Erläuterungsausgabe in his reviews further aggrieved him, particularly as Bekker repeatedly wrote on the subject in 1918, including an article about critical editions in the context of a new Edition Peters catalogue and a review of Hugo Riemann’s new analyses of Beethoven’s sonatas. Schenker kept the Riemann review in his ‘Bekkerei’ folder, but sent the Edition Peters review to Hertzka, remarking: ‘The fact that the ass does not mention me – the first person to draw attention to the mischief [of inferior editions], and to do so (as you have seen) successfully – is readily to be explained by the kicks that he received from me.’ However, by 1919 Schenker’s attention had turned to an altogether more ominous – and more widely discussed – affair ensnaring Bekker.

‘Musikkritik’

Schenker considered his post-war polemics against Bekker as ‘a fatal blow’ against the critic, boasting to his friend Moriz Violin in 1921: ‘The place of

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87 See also Siegel 1999, p. 23.
88 Paul Bekker, ‘Katalog der Edition Peters’, in Frankfurter Zeitung, 4 April 1918, and ‘Hugo Riemann’s Beethoven-Analysen’, in Frankfurter Zeitung, 25 July 1918; OC 12/1226. In addition, the Peters catalogue mentioned a rival French edition that was based on Beethoven’s autographs, yet neglected to do Schenker’s Erläuterungsausgabe the same honour.
[Bekker’s] execution matters little to me, just so long as the head rolls!\textsuperscript{90} Schenker here refers a polemical passage from EA op. 101, which Hertzka had removed at proof-stage with the words: ‘If he is to be hanged, then at least not in my house!’\textsuperscript{91} This soon motivated Schenker to publish an altered and extended version of the same polemic – with the added title ‘Musikkritik’ – under the flag of his Tonwille journal, a plan again thwarted by Hertzka in the following year. Hertzka’s refusal to publish these polemics was partly out of commercial considerations: Bekker’s championship of new music (Bekker in fact coined the German term Neue Musik in 1919) meant that Universal Edition was keen on maintaining good relations with him. Yet there were more fundamental issues relating to Hertzka’s discomfort with Schenker’s planned attacks on Bekker through Universal Edition.

Schenker’s review of Beethoven for his EA op. 101 was written sometime in 1920, shortly before it was published in the following year, and ‘Musikkritik’ was completed in May 1922. Although Schenker reused some of the earlier material in ‘Musikkritik’, there are considerable differences between the two versions. The two texts are made up in the following ways: Both versions include a polemical discussion of ‘Kritik und Persönlichkeit’, Bekker’s aforementioned article that emphasises the metaphysical nature of music, and any given critic’s subjective approach to music. The earlier version contains several paragraphs that Schenker replaced and extended in the second, and is taken out of its original context, namely the literature review that was not removed from EA op. 101. Notwithstanding the fact that Schenker deemed it suitable to detach his discussion of ‘Kritik und Persönlichkeit’ from his ‘elucidations’, it was – or would have been – well integrated in the remaining review of Bekker’s writings on the sonata.

Schenker had seemingly exhausted the effectiveness of his feuilleton-style re-narrations of Bekker’s work in his EA op. 111, where he quotes passages taken from Beethoven without engaging with them at all, as if rendered speechless. In his EA op. 101, however, he fully employs the

\textsuperscript{91} ‘Wenn er schon gehenkt werden soll, so zumindest nicht in meinem Hause!’; Diary entry, 8 April 1921; Federhofer 1985, p. 34.
disruptive, absurd vignettes characteristic of the *feuilleton*, mockingly ‘reviewing’ Bekker’s deliberations concerning the final movement of the sonata: ‘Oh, I scent trouble… what antecedent? Of what? Where? The ‘minor fugato’ – consequent to that antecedent? I scent trouble… Bekker is clearly apprehensive, hurries to finish off and is thereby in more of a hurry than Beethoven […] what’s the rush?’⁹² His keenness to show Bekker’s analysis to be nonsense may have something to do with the latter’s reference, in the same discussion, of the final movement, to an ‘inner line of development’ (*innere Entwicklungslinie*),⁹³ a term that comes uncomfortably close, at least semantically, to Schenker’s own concept of the *Urlinie*. Bekker’s unwillingness rather than inability, as Schenker judged it, to explain this idea in detail ushers in a new accusation: precisely because Bekker is no mere ‘scribbler’ but an influential critic, goes Schenker’s charge, his withholding of details must be considered treachery, ‘on Beethoven, on the reader, on morale’.⁹⁴ This verdict is easily recognisable as one of the qualms Schenker fostered in ‘Kunst und Kritik’ ten years earlier: Having achieved positions of power, journalists were adroit at maintaining authority by alluding to insights rather than demonstrating them. Yet the gear-change from discussing *Beethoven* to accusations of betraying morality – a charge perhaps resonant of the alleged immorality of Arthur Schnitzler’s play *Reigen* during the tumultuous aftermath of its Viennese premiere (1921) – was more topical than it may seem. *Beethoven* had gained different political currency (as well as an expanded readership) after the First World War. During the twilight of the *Kaiserreich*, Bekker’s portrayal of a Promethean Beethoven-figure served as a metaphor for social and political cataclysm; in the post-war context, on the other hand, the same image signified active emancipation, a notion tangled up in the moderate middle’s optimistic embrace of social democracy.⁹⁵ In Austria, the Social Democrats, which had played only a minor role during the monarchy, enjoyed a significant upturn during the 1919 general elections after the

⁹⁴ ‘hier ist abscheulicher Verrat an Beethoven, an Leser, an die Morall!’; OC 39/51.
introduction of the general suffrage. Jews in particular viewed Socialism as their only viable political option (considering that the Social Democrats were the only party to largely distance themselves from anti-Semitic propaganda), and some Jews – such as Victor Adler – sought to shed their Jewish identity in favour of a Socialist one.\(^9\) As such, Schenker’s outspoken denunciation of social democracy, manifest in what has been described as the ‘embattled psychopathology’ of his essay ‘Die Sendung des Deutschen Genies’,\(^9\) was atypical amongst Viennese Jewry. Yet, as the title of the essay suggests, he too sought a more radically defined identity. Most of his Jewish contemporaries who did not embrace Socialism were drawn to Jewish nationalism, including Felix Salten.\(^9\) Some even turned to a Catholic cultural revival, such as Hugo von Hofmannsthal, whose vision for the Salzburg Festival derived from a German Christian ideology rooted in völkisch values. Schenker, on the other hand, sought to more drastically affirm his belonging to the German Volk, and publicly attacking Bekker provided an opportunity to do so.

Schenker’s ‘fatal blow’ against Bekker was conceived against the backdrop of German composer Hans Pfitzner’s attack on Bekker in Die neue Ästhetik der musikalischen Impotenz: Ein Verwesungssymptom? (1919), a 150-page polemical pamphlet that had an overriding influence on public debates surrounding music criticism during the post-war years. Thomas Mann, for instance, noted the explicitly political dimension of Pfitzner’s argument in his Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen (Reflections of a Nonpolitical Man, 1919).\(^9\) Bekker’s spat with Pfitzner snowballed into a wide-ranging anti-Semitic press campaign against the critic in 1920, which led Bekker to withdraw from the editorial office of Frankfurter Zeitung in 1921 (although he continued to write for its feuilleton). Whereas ‘Musikkritik’ makes no direct reference to these debates, the earlier version of the essay in EA op. 101 does. In it, Schenker quotes Bekker’s two-part polemic in response to Pfitzner’s attack, ‘Impotenz’ – oder Potenz?: Eine Antwort an Herrn Professor Dr. Hans Pfitzner’, published in the

96 Herzog 2011, p. 100.
97 Wintle 2013, 139.
Frankfurter Zeitung on 15 and 16 January 1920.\textsuperscript{100} Hertzka was well aware of the affair since Bekker’s response was reprinted in Universal Edition’s new house journal Musikblätter des Anbruch soon after it appeared in Frankfurter Zeitung.\textsuperscript{101} The reprint was not without calculation: Musikblätter des Anbruch, which literally translates into ‘Musical Dispatches of Der Anbruch’, started in 1919 as a musical corollary to Der Anbruch: Flugblätter aus der Zeit (A New Day: Dispatches from the Age), a Viennese journal that promoted expressionist art.\textsuperscript{102} Musikblätter des Anbruch aggressively promoted the same internationalist agenda – one that Hertzka was not only personally committed to but also exercised in his frequent occupational travels – that Pfitzner attacked in his polemic.\textsuperscript{103} A few months later Alban Berg entered the debate in the same journal, with an article that was brought to Schenker’s attention by Violin.\textsuperscript{104} Analogies between Schenker’s and Pfitzner’s conservatism and thinking on music and society have already been suggested in the literature on Schenker,\textsuperscript{105} yet the genetic development of ‘Musikkritik’ demonstrates in greater detail how Schenker appropriated his almost exact contemporary’s rhetoric to the point of aping him in his own writings.

The polemical exchange between Pfitzner and Bekker in 1919 and 1920 was anticipated by a number of smaller quarrels between the two in the preceding years. The most prominent of these was Bekker’s review of the premiere of Pfitzner’s opera Palestrina (1917), in which – as he had done previously with Richard Strauss – the critic openly turned against a venerated German composer. Bekker considered the opera, which was deemed ‘patriotic

\textsuperscript{100} OC 12/1224-5.  
\textsuperscript{101} Bekker’s article was reprinted in Musikblätter des Anbruch, vol. 4 (1920), and he continued to write dozens of articles for the journal until 1933.  
\textsuperscript{103} Hailey 2006, p. 62.  
German art’ by the Imperial German government and subsidised accordingly, as lacking drama, ineffective, and unsuitable for the stage. He was critical of the composer again in an article on criticism, a clipping of which represents the second item in Schenker’s ‘Bekkerei’ folder. In this *feuilleton*, a ‘contribution to the formation of musical judgement’, Bekker distinguishes between two modes of musical composition, *Erfindung* (the musical idea, or impulse) and *Gestaltung* (technique). Related to Schenker’s own distinction between organic and inorganic musical development in ‘Der Geist der musikalischen Technik’ almost thirty years earlier, Bekker here aims to penetrate the question of how musical ideas relate to technique. Dismissing Pfitzner as a composer who fervently believes in the former but is jaded about the latter, Bekker concludes that both creative modes are subordinate to any given artist’s overall vision of the work of art, his or her personality. Eichhorn speculates that Pfitzner may have been particularly angered by Bekker’s demystification of the idea of genius by diminishing the function of *Erfindung* within the compositional process. Pfitzner had stressed the role of *Erfindung* in his collection of essays *Vom musikalischen Drama*, published three years earlier in 1915, and he did revisit the issue again in *Die neue Ästhetik*. However, the latter’s notoriety was owing to its radical political rather than musical proclamations. Bekker in fact quotes some of the most offending passages in his “‘Impotenz” – oder Potenz?’:

In the ignominy and outrage of the revolution, we sadly witnessed that German workers, the German Volk have been led by Russian-Jewish criminals, whom they idolised in a way that they had never granted to any of their German heroes and benefactors. In the world of art we witness how a German man of the Volk, someone as sharp-witted and knowledgeable as Mr Bekker – who without a doubt would be well suited to serve a social institution as its leader – spearheads the international-Jewish faction in art. [...] The boundary-line that divides Germany is not to be drawn distinguishing between Jew and non-Jew, but between those who feel German-nationalist and those who feel internationalist.

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106 Weiner 1993, p. 36.
108 Ibid.
109 ‘In der Schmach und dem Frevel der Revolution erlebten wir mit Trauer, daß deutsche Arbeiter, deutsches Volk sich von russisch-jüdischen Verbrechern anführen ließen und ihnen eine Begeisterung zollten, wie sie sie noch keinem ihrer deutschen Helden und Wohltäter gönnnten. In der Kunst erleben wir, daß
Pfitzner, who shared with Schenker a belief in the structural order of music as a paradigm for social cohesion, here alludes to Bekker’s championship of composers such as Mahler and Schoenberg. He anchors his critique in what seems to be purely musical matters, namely Bekker’s ‘poetic idea’, which he rejects: ‘To locate processes of some kind, whether internal or external, or spiritual or intellectual experiences and developments within the progression of music, and to have it be dictated by the “poetic idea” […] is a grave error in thinking – and to manufacture a school of aesthetics around it a deception of catastrophic proportions.’ As Schenker had done in the earlier editions of his *Erläuterungsausgabe*, Pfitzner quotes passages from *Beethoven* which he views as self-explanatory evidence of the kind of dilettantism, the ‘musical impotence’ that he charges Bekker of masking with his ‘poetic idea’. Yet concealed behind musical impotence, Pfitzner argues, is the ‘Jewish-international spirit’ rotting German society, the nation’s true symptom of decay. Pfitzner turns less figurative about Bekker’s lack of prowess in his discussion of the critic’s alleged subversion of the musical ‘idea’ and, as a consequence, genius. After a lengthy recapitulation of his views, he chides:

> This is the fingerprint of the actual concept of ‘idea’, which can without difficulty be recognised as such, to which Bekker, however – and I want to add: all of our generation – seems to be impervious. He seems to be lacking the organ with which to conceive of it, a lack that, out of impermanence thereof, he wants to elevate to the level of a decree that has music-aesthetic virtue.

111 ‘Vorgänge, innere oder äußere, irgendwelcher Art, seelisch, geistige Erlebnisse und Entwicklungen in zeitlicher Folge in der Musik zu statuieren und durch die “dichterische Idee” diktieren zu lassen […] ist ein großer Denkfehler, auf ihn eine Ästhetik aufzubauen ein katastrophaler Schwindel.’ Pfitzner 1919, p. 22.

113 ‘[D]ieses ist die Signatur des eigentlichen Begriffs ‘Einfall’, der als solcher auch durchaus erkannt werden kann, wozu aber Bekkern – und ich möchte
In Pfitzner’s estimation, Bekker’s undermining of the idea of genius, together with his appeals to the lay listener’s aesthetic judgment, threatened not only musical but also political hegemony.\(^{114}\) Bekker’s reply to Pfitzner in “Impotenz” – oder Potenz? is likely to have irked Schenker for Bekker’s omission of any reference to his work in the context of contemporary efforts at a ‘technical description of the organic structure’ of music, instead of which he acknowledges Riemann and Halm.\(^{115}\) Not surprisingly, however, Bekker focuses on Pfitzner’s nationalism and anti-Semitism, noting, that ‘with the term ‘Jewish’ we have now gained a new, outclassing swear-word, with the licence to hurl it against anybody who does not feel “German national” in the style of Pfitzner.’\(^{116}\)

What Pfitzner considered impotence, Schenker views as fraudulence that degrades German genius, equally a symptom of the all-encompassing social and political morass of modern times:

Of course, Bekker too, like all that surround him in the age of heinous Wilsonism, cheap robbery, and even cheaper fibbing about morals and progress, wants to dodge the difficult-to-reach and difficult-to-accomplish and present something great to the world with the cheapest, the very cheapest of means (the cardinal principle of every democracy, every gripe over progress). [...] Even a Bekker must earn a living, and he would rather write music criticism than go down a coal mine or suchlike place, despite having every sympathy for the working classes. Should however the danger arise that he, as is he case now, is led to the conclusion that criticism is worthless – hey, presto – he turns worthlessness into a worth (following the principle of democracy and the wage-church), which he proclaims all the more loudly.\(^{117}\)

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\(^{114}\) See also Weiner 1993, p. 51.


\(^{116}\) ‘mit dem Wort ‘jüdisch’ [hat man] jetzt ein neues, deklassierendes Schimpfwort gewonnen […], das man jedem entgegenschleudern darf, der nicht ‘deutsch-national’ im Pfitzner-Stil empfindet.’ Ibid.

\(^{117}\) ‘Nur freilich möchte auch [Bekker], wie rings um ihn alle im Zeitalter eines ruchlosen Wilsonismus, billiger Räubereien und noch billigeren Moral- und Fortschrittsgelüters sich um das Schwer-zu-erreichende und Schwer-zu-leistende herumdücken und schon mit Billigem, Allerbiligerstem etwas Großes der Welt vormachen (das Grundgesetz aller Demokratie, jeglichen Fortschrittssaulens). […] Auch ein Bekker will leben, und lieber schreibt er Musikkritiken, als daß er, trotz aller Neigung zum Arbeiterstand, in eine
Schenker here puts Bekker’s activities into a Marxist context. Pfitzner’s essay (or at least Bekker’s reply) must be considered as an obvious influence in this respect, particularly as Schenker adopts Pfitzner’s derogatory evocation of Bekker’s betrayal of the German working classes: Bekker, despite his social-democratic leanings, never expressed any particular interest in the proletariat. Although Schenker may not have subscribed to Pfitzner’s irrational notion of the musical ‘idea’ or his radical anti-Semitism, he did, however, appropriate the post-war nationalist rhetoric that pervades the composer’s polemic, including in the preface of Kontrapunkt 2 (1922), where he summons up ‘impotence’ in the context of an anti-democratic tirade. The same rhetoric, however, was widely contaminated with the anti-Semitic view that conceived, like Pfitzner did, Jewish internationalism as a tactic to foment socialism and weaken national character.

Schenker followed the fallout from Die neue Ästhetik in the newspapers; in fact, most of the clippings in the ‘Bekkerei’ folder date from between 1920 and 1922, suggesting his deepening interest in Bekker’s affairs. The latter’s arguments turn erratic and defensive, as Schenker is likely to have noted in the context of Bekker’s quarrel about Pfitzner’s claims with Berlin-based critic Karl Krebs. Following a stinging remark by Bekker about an obscure Mainz music critic – L. Fischer – over being unable to identify a wrongly billed keyboard concerto by Bach, Fischer aimed to discredit Bekker by insinuating that he was in reality a first generation Ostjude named Baruch Hirsch. While there is no direct reference to this name – which was to haunt Bekker for years to come – in the ‘Bekkerei’ folder, some of the articles mention defamatory attacks on Bekker, and it includes a defence of Bekker by the editors of Frankfurter Kohlengrube steige oder dgl. Droht ihm einmal die Gefahr, daß er, wie hier, durch seine eigene Logik auf den Unwert der Kritik gebracht wird – schwups macht er (nach dem Gesetz der Demokratie und der Lohn-Kirche) aus Unwert einen Wert, den er desto lauter hinausschreit.’ OC 39/52, partly transl. in Schenker 2005b, p. 163.

118 Botstein 2000, p. 359.
121 Paul Bekker, ‘Kritik der Kritik’, in Frankfurter Zeitung, 1 November 1920; OC 12/1217.
Schenker kept abreast of Bekker’s difficulties through other channels as well, including the conductor Wilhelm Furtwängler, who in 1920 encouraged him to sharpen his attacks on Bekker. Schenker entertained an at times strained friendship with Furtwängler over the decades following their first meeting in 1919; Furtwängler provided financial support for *Das Meisterwerk in der Musik* 3, and the prestige resulting from his association with the illustrious conductor remained a matter of pride for Schenker until his death. The discord between Bekker and Furtwängler erupted during the conductor’s short-lived directorship of the subscription series of the Frankfurt Museum Concerts between 1920 and 1922, yet remained private, documented solely by an exchange of letters between them during 1921. Schenker’s zeal to further confront the critic was reignited only in response to a surprise reprisal by Bekker in response *EA* op. 101 (excluding, of course, the material that was removed by Hertzka).

Bekker’s retaliation appeared in two articles in the *Frankfurter Zeitung* in the spring of 1922. The first article is a review of a new book on Romantic harmony by Ernst Kurth, in which Bekker mentions in passing Schenker’s ‘theoretical *a priori* proclamations’, his ‘method of counting and measuring’, which ‘has been prized by many as a learned approach’. Schenker, however, considered the second article, which features a brief review of his facsimile edition of Beethoven’s *Moonlight* sonata (1921) as the more offensive, noting it as an ‘attack’ in his diary.

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125 Schenker is likely to refer to Furtwängler in his vainglorious aphorism about conductors in *Der Freie Satz*, see Schenker 1979, p. 160.
128 SDO diary entry, unidentified, 28 April 1922, transcr. by Marko Deisinger, transl. by Scott Witmer (undated)
Still more unwelcome with facsimile prints, in which each beholder seeks unmediated contact with the composer, is the effect of superfluous and sterile introductions by the editors [such as] the fatuous comments by Schenker on Beethoven’s autograph, together with his ‘Urlinie’. If such personal expectorations have to be published at all, then at least they are out of place in this context, and actually spoil the impression of such a publication.  

‘Musikkritik’ was conceived as a direct response to this paragraph, as Schenker confided to his diary shortly after Bekker’s article was published. In this stand-alone essay, he tones down the political remarks from his anathematising of ‘Kunst und Persönlichkeit’ by concealing Bekker’s name, but adds them to a newly devised conclusion that may be best described by Schenker’s working title for the essay, ‘Bekker contra Schenker’. The issue of potency lingers, as his ‘I can say boldly that I am stronger than Bekker’ demonstrates, and so does Pfitzner’s central indictment of Bekker’s betrayal of the German Volk. By connecting his political allegations with the distinctly aesthetic issues surrounding Bekker’s ‘Kunst und Persönlichkeit’, Schenker, whether calculatedly or not, precisely replicates the plot of Pfitzner’s Die neue Ästhetik.

As might be expected, Hertzka, who by Schenker’s own account shared Bekker’s ‘pacifist-international, cosmopolitan, democratic’ leanings, took exception to Schenker’s claims for a ‘genius-aristocracy in the context of imperialism and militarism’. In a letter dated 19 May 1922 he indicates his alarm at the new political currency that Schenker’s hounding of Bekker had gained


132 OC 52/563.

133 Diary entry 4 June 1922, Federhofer 1985, p. 34. ‘Genie-Aristokratismus im Rahmen von Imperialismus und Militarismus’, OC 52/313.
within the context of right-wing propaganda. Yet Hertzka in the same letter also offers an incisive assessment of Schenker’s expanded discussion of ‘Kritik und Persönlichkeit’. His first criticism revolves around an issue that modern commentators have surprisingly neglected to comment upon since the publication of ‘Musikkritik’: Schenker does not provide any context for the quotations taken from ‘Kunst und Persönlichkeit’, a relatively long essay that is more nuanced than Schenker’s extracts would suggest. For instance, Bekker acknowledges the fact that his arguments may be seen as facilitating arbitrariness in judgement, a notion that Schenker parodies as Bekker’s ‘conclusion that criticism is worthless’. In any case, the article was unknown to Hertzka and the reader of Der Tonwille, he suggests, was unlikely to be familiar with the three-year-old feuilleton either, much less be able to put Schenker’s quotations into context. Yet it is Hertzka’s second criticism that more severely weakens Schenker’s argument: he suggests that it is self-contradictory, and does not in fact confute Bekker’s claims.

Schenker’s discussion of music criticism in the context of ‘Kritik und Persönlichkeit’ contests and ridicules Bekker’s emphasis on ‘artistic feeling alone’ as the basis for critical judgement. Bekker disengages expert knowledge from reaching ‘into the substance of the artwork’, and polemically suggests: ‘Knowledge of one’s subject alone is worthless, because the work of art is never the product of such knowledge; on the contrary, the latter is only a speculative derivation and specialization of artistic creativity, achieved after the event.’ This may have particularly maddened Schenker because he suspected it to be a hidden attack on his Ninth Symphony monograph, as Bekker mentions harmonic and thematic analyses of Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony in the context of ‘knowledge of one’s subject’, if in passing.

Schenker’s grandstanding response (‘I would really not advise that critic to compete with me at playing or conducting, or to express critical opinions’) is comprehensible enough against the background of Schenker’s display of

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135 Schenker 2005b, p. 163.
136 Ibid., p. 162.
137 Ibid.
prowess akin to that of Pfitzner. Yet dazzled by his chosen targets for mockery in ‘Kunst und Persönlichkeit’, his arguments become trapped between his rejections of both Bekker’s claims of a ‘special art of criticism’, i.e. an undefined talent, and the musical scholarship – the ‘knowledge of one’s subject’ – of his day. The latter in point in particular was not lost on Hertzka, who criticises Schenker’s of arcane argumentation that neglects to offer a reasoned assessment of the issue raised, namely exactly what defines competence in criticism. No less fundamental, Hertzka’s repudiation of Schenker’s political denouncements unambiguously signals the insurmountable political rift between the two men that would contribute to the breakdown of their professional relationship over the following years.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of ‘Musikkritik’ is the fact that Schenker was more invested in it than the relatively slight essay might seem to justify. Hertzka’s refusal to publish it, along with his other political writings intended for Der Tonwille, notably impacted on their professional relationship. Unwilling or unable to respond to Hertzka’s criticisms and present a new version of the essay, Schenker came to think of Hertzka’s removal of anything that his readership might consider controversial as spoiling his chances of receiving wider recognition. Although unpublished in 1922, ‘Musikkritik’ was not entirely laid to rest, and Schenker’s polemics against Bekker may have indirectly played a part in an éclat at Universal Edition in the following year. The affair involved an article on Schenker by his one-time student Otto Vrieslander, and Schenker’s response to the affair suggests a significant shift in terms of his Jewish identity, including, for instance, his suspicions of being stigmatised as an anti-Semite by ‘all baptised Jews’. Both Hellmut Federhofer and Nicholas Cook have commented on the obscure incident, yet no one has pursued the affair in detail, partly because some of the historical evidence is likely to be lost. To conclude this chapter, I will put together the available pieces of information, including some as yet unexplored archival sources, with a view to offering some

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138 Ibid.
141 ‘alle getaufte Juden’, letter to Otto Vrieslander, 6 May 1923; Federhofer 1985, p. 316.
suggestions as to why Schenker withdrew not only from attacking music journalists but polemicising altogether during the mid 1920s.

Epilogue

Although a piano pupil of Schenker’s for only one year in 1910-1, Otto Vrieslander, a German composer and teacher, became one of his closest supporters. Vrieslander continued Schenker’s early theoretical work on C. P. E. Bach’s music and writings and, in 1917, wrote a substantial unpublished accompanying guide to Harmonielehre, a treatise that he acknowledged to have had a significant impact on his own work, yet at the same time considered ‘difficult and complicated’ and therefore in need of elucidation. Vrieslander’s first opportunity to publish his ecstatically enthusiastic appraisal of his former teacher’s work in a widely read journal availed itself – after a number of aborted projects including a Festschrift in honour of Schenker’s fiftieth birthday in 1918 – when he was approached by Universal Edition to write an article for its Musikblätter des Anbruch journal early in 1923. He had already published an article on Schenker only a few months earlier, in the Prager Presse of 16 September 1922, but it is doubtful to have had any significant impact, and was unknown even to Hertzka. Despite the fact that music critic Paul Stefan was the official editor of Musikblätter des Anbruch, it was Hertzka who approached Schenker about ‘an awkward situation’ in relation to Vrieslander’s article soon after it had been submitted in February 1923. Hertzka mentions two polemical passages that he wishes to cut as they, in his words, ‘go far beyond the blows of Der Tonwille in both tone and manner’. One passage concerned an attack on Bekker, the other one on Kretzschmar. (Although proof sheets of these ‘26-28 lines’ were attached to the letter, they are not filed with it and unfortunately

144 ‘eine unangenehme Situation’; OC 52/573.
145 ‘zwei kurze Absätze mit Hieben, die in ihrem Ton und in ihrer Art noch weit über den “Tonwillen” gehen’; Ibid.
146 ‘26-28 Zeilen’; Ibid.
may be lost.) Given the fact that the two had come to reasonable compromises in the past, Hertzka continues, he would prefer to cut these with Schenker’s agreement and without approaching Vrieslander. Unsurprisingly, Schenker, accusing Hertzka of ‘terroristic’ censorship in response,\textsuperscript{147} declined to protect Hertzka, who proceeded with the wisdom of Solomon: the article was to be divided into two parts, the first published within a week, the other (which included the offending passages) after consulting Vrieslander. Hertzka’s tiptoeing around the issue as well as Schenker’s rebuff are easily explained: as the former may have suspected, Schenker was most likely behind the attack on Bekker in the first place, as he had approached Vrieslander to have ‘Musikkritik’ published alongside Vrieslander’s earlier article in the \textit{Prager Presse}, or elsewhere, only a few months before.\textsuperscript{148} The issue was delicate as \textit{Musikblätter des Anbruch} was a journal widely read not only amongst the Viennese musical cognoscenti but also other international publishers. After excising Schenker’s attack on Bekker from \textit{EA} op. 101, Universal Edition had distanced itself from his political writings by publishing \textit{Der Tonwille} under the fictitious imprint of Tonwille-Flugblätterverlag.\textsuperscript{149} Having suppressed ‘Musikkritik’ even from \textit{Der Tonwille}, Hertzka was evidently keen not to see his earlier efforts undone by Vrieslander’s article. It has to be assumed that what Vrieslander had written about Bekker was either openly political or likely to be read as such: in his justification for cutting the ‘abuse and insult’ relating to Bekker, Hertzka repeats his earlier assertion of not sharing Schenker’s ‘German-national outlook’.\textsuperscript{150} Without knowing the afore-mentioned proof sheets it is impossible to tell if the second part of the essay was indeed cut or not. Vrieslander’s self-righteous discussion of Schenker’s ‘opponents’ contains an editorial note, in which the

\textsuperscript{147} Schenker’s response is unfortunately lost, but Hertzka cites Schenker’s accusation in OC 52/574.

\textsuperscript{148} Schenker notes in his diary in December 1922: ‘[t]o Vrieslander (letter): ask for the date of the Prague article; whether Bekker article can be printed’. SDO diary entry, unidentified (21 December 1922), transcr. by Marko Deisinger, transl. by Scott Witmer (undated) <http://www.schenkerdocumentsonline.org/documents/diaries/OJ-03-04_1922-12/r0021.html> (15 July 2014).


\textsuperscript{150} OC 52/574.
editors distance themselves from both Schenker’s and Vrieslander’s polemics. As might be expected, the article was not well received by the readers of the journal. Bekker threatened to abandon his association with *Musikblätter des Anbruch*, and Hertzka received a letter of protest by composer Franz Schreker, a supporter of Bekker who had succeeded Kretzschmar as the director of the Berliner Musikhochschule, a powerful position that Vrieslander had singled out in his attack.\(^{151}\)

Vrieslander’s comments on Bekker are more likely than anything else in the article to have initiated the most opaque aspect of the entire affair, namely that Schenker conceived himself to be stigmatised as a ‘swastika-bearer’ (*Hakenkreuzler*).\(^{152}\) The invective against Bekker may have played some part in this allegation, as it was common currency in the anti-Semitic discourse in relation to the critic’s name during the early 1920s. Given the social and political climate, there was very little latitude for verbally harassing Bekker without provoking associations with anti-Semitic agitation. Schenker’s refusal to distance himself from Vrieslander’s polemics – thereby compromising Universal Edition, given *Musikblätter des Anbruch*’s political agenda – is likely to have sparked discord amongst its staff and financial backers, most of whom were Jewish.\(^{153}\) Although Schenker referred to ‘all baptised Jews’ turning against him within only a couple of months of the essay’s publication in a letter to Vrieslander, he did not in fact know where the slur of being a *Hakenkreuzler* had originated from.\(^{154}\)

As with his claims of a conspiracy of silence a decade earlier, Schenker’s (this time private) comments on the affair exhibit paranoid tendencies. His comments on Julius Korngold’s discussion of a music-theoretical subject, namely Ernst Kurth’s linear counterpoint,\(^{155}\) published in the *Neue Freie Presse* on 1 May 1923, amply demonstrates Schenker’s perception of being obliquely

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\(^{151}\) Hailey 2006, p. 63.

\(^{152}\) Diary entry, letter to Otto Vrieslander; Federhofer 1985, p. 316. The swastika had been firmly associated with the German and Austrian far-right, including the Pan-Germans and other *völkisch* groups since the 1890s. See Mees 2008, pp. 60-2.


\(^{154}\) Federhofer 1985, pp. 316-7.

circumvented as the direct result of Vrieslander’s article: ‘And now even Korngold in the *Neue Freie Presse* has taken possession of the ‘linear’ E[rnst] Kurth, in order to praise him to high heavens (tacitly against me), just as he had done previously with Bekker.’\footnote{\[U\]nd schon hat sich auch Korngold in der *N[euen] F[reien] Pr[esse]* des ‘linearen’ E. Kurth bemächtigt, um ihn, ähnlich wie seinerzeit Bekker (stillschweigend gegen mich) hochzuloben.’ Fedderhofer 1985, p. 316.} Schenker seemingly conflated instances such as Korngold’s refusal to grant his *Urlinie* the same promotion as Kurth’s linear counterpoint with what he perceived to be the kind of internationalist conspiracy of which he, like Pfitzner, had accused Bekker and ‘the modern Jewish composers’ (jüdische Neutöner).\footnote{SDO diary entry, unidentified (6 May 1923), transcr. by Marko Deisinger, transl. by Scott Witmer (undated) <http://www.schenkerdocumentsonline.org/documents/diaries/OJ-03-04_1923-05/r0006.html> (11 June 2014).} A few months later he confided to his diary some of his most striking anti-Semitic thoughts; in response to a postcard from Violin sent in the summer of 1923 he notes: ‘[Violin] admits in the face of the Jewish activities that he is a Jewish enemy of the Jews; correctly notes: the Jews top the list as Germany's enemies.’\footnote{SDO diary entry, unidentified (4 June 1923 = Fedderhofer 1985, pp. 317-8), transcr. by Marko Deisinger, transl. by Scott Witmer (undated) <http://www.schenkerdocumentsonline.org/documents/diaries/OJ-03-04_1923-06/r0004.html> (11 June 2014).} His judgments were not restricted to assimilated Jews; of a fellow guest residing in the same hotel as the Schenkers during their summer holiday he speaks of ‘the the usual washed out, uneducated, sunken down low, truly Jewish type of person’.\footnote{SDO diary entry, unidentified (10 August 1923 = Fedderhofer 1985, pp. 318), transcr. by Marko Deisinger, transl. by Scott Witmer (undated) <http://www.schenkerdocumentsonline.org/documents/diaries/OJ-03-04_1923-08/r0010.html> (11 June 2014).} The *Hakenkreuzler* allegation rested on Schenker’s mind for years to come,\footnote{Fedderhofer 1985, pp. 317-8.} and the affair around the Vrieslander article was not swiftly forgotten by his contemporaries either. In 1925, Universal Edition ran a carnival parody edition of *Musikblätter des Anbruch* called *Abbruch*, the title of which might most faithfully be translated as ‘demolition’. It contains a mock questionnaire, ‘What does new music mean to you?’, featuring a series of imagined answers by contemporary writers such as Schoenberg, Bekker and Schenker. The parody on Schenker
unambiguously associates him with the perceived irony, even hypocrisy of a Jewish German nationalist:

I am most astonished to receive your questionnaire ‘What does new music mean to you’. As you are no doubt aware I am today the most important living writer on music [and] have proven that new music is not music at all and that there is nothing after Beethoven and Schumann (hallowed be the name) and perhaps Brahms, and that all this only became clear after I discovered it and that I will proclaim this to all mankind because we Germans will not be trifled with and the good Lord still dwells among us and the Jews will come to see their world empire defeated in the name of German Art, in the name of Beethoven, in the name of Bach, in the name of Schumann, in the name of Brahms, and in the name of Heinrich Schenker from Pódwoloczyska. God grant it!  

(Although a Galician town, Pódwoloczyska was not Schenker’s birthplace.) The parody is particularly biting because the questionnaire also features a reply by the presumably fictional character Gotthold Piefke, which unambiguously relates anti-modernism to radical anti-Semitism (‘Throw them out, that Jewish gang, / Throw them out of our fatherland’). There is no clipping of this in Schenker’s scrapbook, an omission that, although understandable, calls into question the scrapbook as the reliable representation of his critical reception that it might be taken for. It is plausible that there was least some causality between the ridicule that Schenker had been publicly subjected to in 1925 and his ceasing of nationalist declarations and Kraussian criticism during the mid 1920s. He never mentioned Bekker again in print after the Vrieslander affair, doing so for the last time in Der Tonwille 5 (1923).

In the same year, Schenker’s ‘Bekkerei’ folder came to its conclusion. Bekker resigned from the Frankfurter Zeitung with a sense of estrangement, and withdrew from public life to work on a monograph on Wagner, which appeared in 1924, and a biography of Hans von Bülow, which he left unfinished. In 1925 he realised his dream of becoming a theatre manager and opera

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161 Abbruch: Faschingsblätter für neue Musik (1925), 15; transl. in full in Hailey 2006, p. 64.
162 Pódwoloczyska is not related to Podhajce, a village near Schenker’s birthplace that is mentioned in Federhofer 1985, p. 1, and elsewhere.
director, first at the Staatstheater Kassel, then, between 1926 and 1931, at the Staatstheater Wiesbaden. In 1934 he was expelled from Germany as a ‘traitor, who agitates against Germany abroad’, and emigrated to New York via Paris. Although he continued to write articles for, amongst other papers, the émigré paper New Yorker Staatszeitung, and published a book in English, Story of the Orchestra (1936), he lived out the last years of his life with a sense of displacement shared by numerous exiled Europeans. Within months of Bekker’s death in 1937, Schenker’s vision of the downfall of journalistic music criticism set out in ‘Kunst und Kritik’ was notionally implemented through Hermann Goebbels’s bid to dismantle the genre:

In place of art criticism up till now, which in complete contortion of the term ‘criticism’ during the age of Jewish infiltration has been turned into the judgement over art, there will be the art report. […] The art report of the future presupposes an awareness of artistic production and artistic accomplishment. It requires training, tact, fair-mindedness, and respect in relation to artistic intent.  

The resonances of Schenker’s tireless diatribes against the profession in what Adorno describes as Goebbels’s ‘obtuse transposition on the intellect of the difference between productive and unproductive labor’ pay witness to the degree of conservatism that had pervaded right-wing thinking on this matter during the inter-war years. Schenker’s miscellaneous observations in his later works Das Meisterwerk in der Musik and Der freie Satz exhibit an altogether transcendental quality compared to his topical post-war writings; he retreats into the allegorical certitudes of Goethe’s and Nietzsche’s aphorisms. His departure from criticism seems to signal his notional rise above artistic differences of opinion, perhaps akin to his own evocation of ‘God’s creation’, which, ‘by virtue

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167 Adorno 1977, p. 149.
of its being creation, towers above all the relativisms of men.\textsuperscript{168} Reading 
Die Fackel ‘for the first time in a long time’, he notes in his diary in 1927:

The further one progresses in positive creation, the better one understands that all criticism is empty babble, however much it is informed by so much intellect and pure contemplation. [...] [C]riticism is almost always an idle occupation! Not even the so-to-speak purest, most impartial achievement of Kraus elicits in me an unconditional joy. [...] There are few shining lights derived from a variety of knowledge-based materials to be seen here, rather a critically cold dialectical wit, which runs dry on its own account.\textsuperscript{169}

\textsuperscript{168} Schenker [1926] 1996, p. 122. In response to unfavourable reviews of Der Tonwille 5 and 6 in Die Musik in 1925 (OC 2, p. 67), for instance, he declares to Violin: ‘Oh, they have their sights on me; and I am laughing. My task is to present something; the imbecilic people can come to terms with everything else for themselves.’ SDO OJ 6/7, p. 23 (26 July 1925), transcr. and transl. by William Drabkin (2013) <http://www.schenkerdocumentsonline.org/documents/correspondence/OJ-6-7_23.html> (22 June 2014).

The ‘Kunst und Kritik’ fragment breaks off with a colloquialism that translates into English as: ‘every cloud has a silver lining’. It remains uncertain if Schenker intended to elaborate further on the benefits of criticism, but it would appear to be more likely that this was intended as a final polemical downbeat closing the matter. Exactly what he regarded the cloud’s silver lining to be also remains a matter for speculation. It might have involved his vision of a spiritual and social cataclysm that would, after the inevitable self-destruction of modern culture – including what Nietzsche declared its ‘licensed fools’, i.e. journalists – allow ‘that bright new light’ to clear the purgatorial mist and transfigure humankind.\(^1\)

Schenker certainly did not have the music critics’ redemption in mind: as Hellmut Federhofer once put it, Schenker ‘saw weaknesses and shortcomings only in others’;\(^2\) and the latter’s writings on music journalism amply display his overwhelming conviction in his own accomplishments and his mission, as well as his priggish righteousness. Routinely condemning what he considered worthless in his contemporaries’ efforts to write about music, Schenker’s own compulsive drive to undermine, even annihilate his ‘opponents’ brings to mind Arnold Schoenberg’s sketch of the theorist as ‘overly-excited, shrieking, and venomous’, his espousals ‘critical trash’: if, as Schenker claimed, there were no more geniuses such as those of the past, then all that was left were critics, posing, according to Schoenberg, ‘no reason to give them credence, for anyone knows as much as non-genius’\(^3\) The cause for Schoenberg’s contempt was a covert attack by Schenker buried within a footnote of his review of Paul Bekker’s


\^3\ Simms 1977, 122, and Schoenberg 1984, p. 203. Schoenberg’s polemics were written in 1923 and 1939 respectively, but remained unpublished until the 1970s.
Beethoven in the Erläuterungsausgabe op. 111, and it is intriguing to imagine how Schenker might have responded to the logical impasse posed. Schoenbergs dismissal of his polemics as an intellectual terrain vague aside, the most obvious inconsistency is Schenker’s interest in reading music journalism. Hans Keller suggests that those who habitually do so “show by their very interest that they identify with all that is phoney about the profession, with its lustful creation of unsolvable problems, its destructiveness, its omniscience, responsibility for which they therefore share by proxy.” There is little indication that Schenker conceived of his reading habits in this light, yet on the point of his ‘phoniness’ there can be little doubt; he even acknowledged his condescending enjoyment of a borrowed journal that he evidently deemed inferior in a letter to Felix Salzer in 1933: ‘Permit me […] to keep Die Musik (lucus a non lucendo) for a while longer; the issue not only amuses me, but also instructs me through the perspective of such a [Musikus]! You can be assured of the return of the issue.’

Despite my emphasis on the socio-historical context of music journalism in Schenker’s day, the same seemingly unchanging issues about music journalism, its democratic potential, and its follies are being discussed in today’s media with remarkable recurrence. The issue of the perceived breakdown of critical authority by ‘citizen critics’ using digital media platforms in particular has prompted newspaper writers to assert their professional status in a manner that is redolent not only of the contentions of Schenker’s contemporaries, but his

4 The passage in question has been translated into English in Simms 1977, 113-4.
5 Keller 1987, p. 162.
6 SDO FS 40/1, p. 16 (30 June 1933), transcr. and transl. by Hedi Siegel (2011) <http://www.schenkerdocumentsonline.org/documents/correspondence/FS-40-1_16.html> (8 July 2014). Schenker here probably refers to the Brahms centenary issue of Die Musik, which features articles by Hermann Wetzel and Richard Specht, amongst others. Lucus a non lucendo (Latin): incorrectly translated by Heidi Siegel in her footnote to this entry, this Latin phrase translates into ‘a grove because it is not light’, a play on the semantic opposites of lucus and lucere that denotes an etymological contradiction.
own as well. Nevertheless, the latter debates, arguments, and polemical disputes were very much of their time as well, and may appear to the modern reader as intricate, even disorientating, as a house of mirrors. Exactly what was and what was not reflected in feuilletons was Schenker’s main concern with regard to journalism, and I will here summarise my findings along these lines.

1) Music journalism reflected society. The notion that music criticism gave voice to public opinion was the first that Schenker committed to print. The date of the article, 1891, would seem to mark him out as alert to what Schorske declared an at the time relatively recent trend. Yet the related notion that criticism also precipitates public opinion remained surprisingly unexpressed in Schenker’s commentary on that matter. It could be argued that this point was self-evident to him, although he did emphasise that the critic ‘is never the first [to take a stance]; it is only ever after a hundred or a thousand others have already grouped together that he, chasing [public] opinion, belatedly seizes the word’. The issue was deep-seated in his thinking and can be explained within its own logic: in ‘Kunst und das Volk’, he introduces three competences that delineate musical participation: productivity, receptivity, and judgement. In order to produce adequate judgments, an individual has to listen in what Schenker judged an adequate manner, which, in turn, can only be achieved by possessing artistry corresponding to that of the composer. Schenker poses that newspaper critics, devoid of such talent, make up for their inadequacy by restating public opinion, or, worse still, composer’s judgments. As a result, the public perceive them as promoters, yet in reality, according to Schenker, they subvert the kind of hierarchy crowned by what he later labelled ‘aristocracy of genius’. Genius was not only not mediated to the lay public by experts, but instead subjugated to the market forces that govern modern society, its self-regulating industry that ‘generously promotes Bach, Mozart, and Beethoven, and proudly manufactures “festivals”, “jubilees”, and the like’, as he put it in Kontrapunkt 1. At his most extreme, Schenker judged the asocial process of self-cultivation and the

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10 ‘Kunst und Kritik’, OC C/412; see Appendix, p. 265.
Bildungsbürgertum’s ‘collective good taste’ to be mutually exclusive.\textsuperscript{13} Music journalists were, in his view, doubly implicated: they not only made a living out of absorbing fashions but also gave themselves the air of moral authority. This is the reason why Schenker judged that despite their superficial productivity critics could never precipitate public opinion, i.e. ‘create an artist’,\textsuperscript{14} a privilege he granted to what he considered truly productive artists only. His view of journalistic practice as anathema to artistic creation was one that he was deeply committed to even later in his life, noting in his diary in 1927 that ‘the entire sum of criticism that has swollen over the millions of years is insufficient to produce the tiniest beetle, to say nothing of a cosmos, which exists because it is based on laws.’\textsuperscript{16} His emphasis on the dichotomy between artistic production and journalistic reflection is coherent with his rejection of the aspirational and consumerist values of the ‘Age of the Feuilleton’.\textsuperscript{17} His stance in this regard explains his denunciation of Hanslick after 1911, and his self-identification as a creative artist (as opposed to a ‘destructive’ critic)\textsuperscript{18} accounts for his for the most part merely generic or overtly technical public critiques of modern composers and their work. The latter point is particularly striking as his rejection of modern music, as documented in his diary, in fact intensified during the years in which he put together his ‘theory of criticism’.\textsuperscript{19}

2) Music journalism reflected itself. As has been demonstrated, Schenker was not the only thinker to take exception with the journalistic writings of his contemporaries. The unrelenting criticism directed towards the feuilleton, particularly in regard to literary criticism, had in fact been one of the liberal era’s notable cultural features, and music critics and composers joined the fray shortly after the turn of the century. Despite his notes with references to Jean Paul,

\textsuperscript{13} Geuss 1999, p. 42.
\textsuperscript{14} ‘Kunst und Kritik’, OC C/412; see Appendix, p. 265.
\textsuperscript{17} Hesse [1943] 2002, p. 18.
\textsuperscript{19} See Morgan 2002, pp. 249-50.
Herder, Fichte, and other classical thinkers corralled in the ‘criticism folder’, it is the debates of his time that appear to have been at the forefront of Schenker’s thinking. In fact, the most likely reason for his consultation of German philosophers’ opinions on criticism (along with Beethoven’s letters on the subject) was to marshal them as witnesses to his case against journalism. Wagner was called as his Crown witness, and with good reason; despite Hanslick’s best efforts, the composer was hugely celebrated in Vienna after the turn of the century, and his anti-liberal, anti-journalistic (presumably as well as anti-Semitic) proclamations rested uneasily on the minds of music critics. The notion of the artist-critic was not Wagner’s invention, but it was one that he had firmly enshrined within his art-religion, and his calls for the abolition of the profession by the hands of creative artists had unsettled, according to the testimony of Weißmann, Korngold, and many others, at least some of the journalistic establishment. The same is true for the new paradigms in relation to modern music, which more profoundly undermined audiences’ expectations by purposefully challenging the role that concert music and opera had played during the second half of the nineteenth century. Music criticism turned not only introspective and psychological, i.e. stressing the critic’s personality in relation to his judgment, but also argumentative and confrontational. Differences of opinion transmuted into public displays of rivalry that were followed with interest – even enjoyed – not only by the general public, but also by Schenker.

3) Music journalism did not reflect Schenker’s activities. Nietzsche described feuilletonists as ‘half-rational, witty, extravagant, silly, sometimes in attendance only to ameliorate heaviness of mood and to drown down the all too weighty solemn clangour of great events’ (‘schweren, feierlichen Glockenklang großer Ereignisse’). For Schenker, who evoked Nietzsche in, amongst other writings, his essay on the Urlinie in Der Tonwille 1 (‘The hour of turning back has tolled’ (‘Die Stunde der Umkehr hat geschlagen’)), the ‘great events’ obscured by the press did not exclusively lie in the past. It was his own discernment of what he in the same essay described as the composer’s ‘visionary gift’ (and, by extension, the ‘visionary gift’ itself) that he considered to be drowned out by

20 See Biddle 2013, pp. 117-8.
journalistic clatter, the ‘noise of the world’.\textsuperscript{23} Schenker’s expectations of the press were somewhat unrealistic. In Korngold’s 1923 discussion of Ernst Kurth’s theories in the \textit{Neue Freie Presse} – in the context of which Schenker alleged circumvention of his own work – the venerable music critic goes as far as apologising for ‘dragging the reader into theoretical undergrowth’ and pledging not do so again.\textsuperscript{24} Korngold may have conceived these lines with a feuilletonist’s characteristic twinkle in his eye, yet his assertion was by all accounts justified. Even if Max Graf’s portrayal of musical public that shunned pedantic learning in favour of literary grace and wit is likely to be somewhat hyperbolical,\textsuperscript{25} music theory along the lines of Schenker’s work was beyond general public interest, and therefore outside the daily broadsheets’ remits. His frustration at not being suitably appraised by his peers is consistently expressed in his publications and private documents following the low critical impact of \textit{Harmonielehre}, which apparently rounded off his view of music journalism as a comprehensive failure. It was only then, i.e. in his subsequent publications \textit{Kontrapunkt} 1 and the Ninth Symphony monograph, that the \textit{Publikum} became methodically transmuted into \textit{Laien} in his discussions, and that he set out on his ‘sociology of music’ in ‘Kunst und die Teilnehmenden’, which demoted all participants to mere consumers and frauds. It was also during those same years that he went into battle against Wagner, his designated cause for the entire malady. Schenker – evidently conflicted about the composer’s legacy – was by no means the first writer to be critical of Wagner, yet he nonetheless had held high hopes for his repudiation of Wagner in the Ninth Symphony monograph to have a strong impact on the musical public.\textsuperscript{26} After the decidedly un-dramatic

\textsuperscript{23} OC 12/454.


\textsuperscript{25} Graf 1947, p. 274-5.

\textsuperscript{26} Schenker noted in his diary upon completion of the book: ‘First and greater evidence-based blow against Richard Wagner has been delivered! What will people say now of the reasons that I have put forward there?’ SDO OJ 1/10, p.126 (18 May 1911), transcr. and transl. by Ian Bent (2006) <http://mt.ccnmtl.columbia.edu/schenker/diary/oj_110_p126_51811.html> (15 July 2014).
outcome of his envisioned ‘Wagnerdämmerung’, he sought confrontation with several of Wagner's followers, including Paul Bekker. Yet despite Schenker's increasingly commented upon wartime rabble-rousing, his ‘service behind the lines’, Bekker does not seem to even have been aware of Schenker's merciless assaults for almost a decade, and his eventual retorts came nowhere near the grand polemical debates that he entertained with, amongst others, his Viennese counterpart, Julius Korngold. Schenker's deliberate attempts to ratchet up tension with Bekker (including his endorsement of Vrieslander’s polemics in his 1923 article) seem to pay testament to his self-proclaimed zeal to entertain such public displays of power.

These three conclusions go someway in answering the first two research questions that I have posed in the introduction of this thesis, namely why Schenker rejected music journalism and how he formed his opinions. The correspondences in his mind between society, journalism in general and music criticism in particular are evident: like democratically elected leaders, journalists and music critics were, in his eyes, dilettantes, opportunistic and manipulative. His problematisation of musical insight as a corollary to musical literacy touched on the very nature of music criticism: music critics, after all, aimed to speak to as broad a public as possible, and Bekker, for instance, avoided including musical notation even in his books. Hans Friedrich, cited in Chapter 5 in the context of the critical reception of the Erläuterungsausgabe, made the simple point: had Schenker aimed to write for newspapers, he too would have had to make his ‘elucidations’ far more accessible. Of course, Schenker by the time he came to produce his Erläuterungsausgabe had lost all interest in writing for ‘daily’, let alone ‘democratic’ newspapers. He considered his publications as canonical

28 Simms 1977, 123.
29 One such polemic, which was precipitated by Korngold’s attack on modern music in Neue Freie Presse in 1924, has been published in English translation in Haas 2013, p. 151.
31 Schenker 2005, p. 165.
and, around 1920, was on the verge of fully realising his pioneering analytical graphs. Although he had rejected avant-garde art, which many Jews considered as a basis for a new ‘artistic aristocracy’ open to Jewish intellectuals, there are palpable analogies between artistic modernism and Schenker’s own theoretical, or, as he saw it, artistic work. Professionally isolated and in the self-proclaimed service of the ‘aristocracy of genius’, Schenker, for all his emphasis on the laws of music from the past, created a radical new way of analytical notation that – requiring methodological insights well beyond basic musical literacy – was exclusive by nature. He disaffected his contemporary readers by hypostatising his theory, dictating a fixed mode of musical participation, and presenting his arcane musical analyses in concert with an autocratic ‘closure’ of virtually any other means to write about music that was accessible to the wider musical public. His most drastic claim, namely that music can only be represented by music, is easily recognisable as a means to that end, even if his own analyses too are replete with figurative language and imagery, not to speak of his wholehearted embrace of one of the at the time most widely held extra-musical fictions, that of a nationally owned or national music.

In terms of answering the third research question, namely in what ways Schenker responded to music journalism, his polemics against Bekker are perhaps more interesting than others because they can be located within a specific topical context. Schenker’s preoccupation with music journalism was only one of several developments in his thinking in the first two decades of the twentieth century that culminated around 1920. The two most widely known of these are his increasing equation of German genius with the German nation and, of course, his music-analytical work leading up to his formulation of the *Urlinie* and the *Ursatz*. Neither of these has been fully explored yet by scholars, although some new areas have been surveyed in recent years, including Schenker’s work on the early version of *Der freie Satz* and the political diary that

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32 Botstein 1991, p. 82.
34 Blasius 1996, p. 105; Pritchard 2013, 168; Wagner 2005, p. 28. Hans Keller, who was familiar with Schenker’s theories (Keller 1994, p. 180), came closer to Schenker’s claims of representing music with music by composing his analyses to be performed together with the works in question.
he kept during the First World War.\textsuperscript{35} His attacks on Bekker represent an intersection of his efforts to deplore the ‘enemies within’, both in music criticism and those elements in society that did not share his vision for Austria-Germany. His deployment of anti-Semitic tropes served as a means to that end. In literary terms, they are firmly embedded within the \textit{Kulturkritik} of his contemporaries such as Karl Kraus, and other, lesser-known figures quarrelling about art and society during the first decades of the twentieth century. The lack of Kraus’s linguistic aestheticism in Schenker’s cloying, anachronistic wordings easily obscures the fact that the latter also aimed to exhibit stylistic command of the German language. He employed a style that recognisably set him apart from the objects (and subjects) of his criticisms: the structurally loose, wandering and subjective \textit{feuilleton}, an – in Walter Benjamin’s words – ‘artistic device of the physiologies’ that reflected their authors’ organic engagement with the world around them.\textsuperscript{36} Schenker’s linguistic self-aggrandisement would have had the same alienating effect on the untrained reader as Kraus’s, as would a more profound parallel between the two men’s writings: while speaking of raising the standards of journalism and musical discourse respectively, they at the same time, paradoxically, proclaim these public arenas as corrupt and ruined beyond redemption.\textsuperscript{37} In contrast to Kraus, Jewishness played no part in Schenker’s polemics against journalists. However, in the years in which Schenker worked on the \textit{Erläuterungsausgabe} the Jewish Question was extensively debated in Vienna and elsewhere, and it is unlikely that in his eagerness to discredit hermeneutics he was entirely unaware that by doing so, he evoked an anti-journalistic image that had become widely contaminated with anti-Semitism. Even if, unlike Kraus’s, Schenker’s hostility towards journalists was not intended as a critique of German-Jewish strategies for assimilation, the broader social, non-musical context of stressing journalistic vacuity could not have escaped


\textsuperscript{36} Benjamin 1973, pp. 36-7.

\textsuperscript{37} See Timms 1986, p. 41.
him. In this respect, his polemics against Bekker are far from neutral on that matter, particularly after he exchanged his hollow mockery of Beethoven in the private battlefield of his Erläuterungsausgabe for a choice of rhetorical weapons that was all too charged. Although unpublished at the time, Schenker here – quite literally – failed to disassociate himself from some of the most inflammatory commentators of his time, who, in contrast to him, were far more outspoken about the ‘Jewishness’ of feuilletonism.

Schenker’s post-war polemics mark him out as a highly atypical member of Viennese Jewry, which Marsha Rozenblit describes as clinging to its pre-war Austrian-German-Jewish triparte identity by asserting loyalty to the Austrian Republic and their adherence to German culture without affirming their membership to the German Volk.\(^\text{38}\) Despite this peculiarity, Schenker’s quest for a national identity that so spectacularly clashed with his Jewishness, as the authors of Abbruch had noted, can be consolidated with a well-known evocation of German-Jewish literature by novelist Franz Kafka. Kafka, who serves as a reminder that not all early-twentieth-century German-language modernism was Viennese, remarked about Jews writing in German in 1921: ‘[W]ith their back legs they stuck to the Judaism of their fathers, and with their front legs they found no new ground. Their despair over this was their inspiration.’\(^\text{39}\) Although Schenker’s radical nationalist proclamations count amongst the most infamous passages in his cultural exegesis, they occupy only a relatively small part of his output, namely that published in the years after the First World War. Although undoubtedly conceived in response to the outcome of the war, his thinking on the German nation had gradually developed throughout the preceding decade and, as far as the interplay between the ‘textual and social machines’ of his relentless critique is an indicator,\(^\text{40}\) amalgamated with his music-theoretical thinking. The most consistently expressed (and progressively radicalised) strand in Schenker’s thought in this regard is the notion of betrayal from within: just as the public was deceived by those who claimed to speak on their behalf, namely aestheticians and critics, the Volk was betrayed by leaders that ‘lagged

\(^{38}\) Rozenblit 2001, p. 163.
\(^{39}\) Reitter 2008, p. [107].
\(^{40}\) Raunig 2010, p. 17.
behind'. \footnote{‘Führer [...] die nachhinken’; diary entry, 27 October 1925; Federhofer 1985, p. 328.} Further research into his life before 1921, which after all led to what he is today best known for, the analytical practice of his mature output, may want to integrate Schenker’s various discursive strands by more fully retrieving his attitudes towards culture and politics that evolved alongside them, including those expressed throughout the \emph{Erläuterungsausgabe}. It might also wish to expand its scope beyond the bright lights of Schenker’s musical theories and analyses and their polemical shadows, and seize the opportunity offered by his archive to more fully recapture the man who knew ‘personal, productive answers to a thousand questions’. \footnote{Kosovsky 1999, p. 10.} Although this study on criticism has highlighted Schenker’s urge to ‘loathe, hate and reject’, \footnote{Keller 1987, p. 90.} love played no less a part in his thinking. Since throughout my thesis he has been shown to be a misanthrope co-opting Beethoven into the assorted roles of a genius intrinsically keeping the masses at bay, a harsh decrier of critics, and a bellicose wartime icon, it may be apt to close on an altogether more generous note. Eclipsing anything that Bekker had written in this vein in \textit{Beethoven}, it is an excerpt of a short critical essay that Schenker dictated to Jeanette in reflection of the Beethoven centenary festival in Vienna in 1927. Possibly inspired by Beethoven’s at the time widely publicised Heiligenstadt Testament, this quotation is no less Schenkerian than the \textit{Urlinie}, and might have united even music critics in agreement:

Beethoven’s love for humanity is paralleled by his love for music: it is divine love, no matter if sparked by one entity or another! Humanity would have to possess Beethoven’s love for music in order to imagine his love towards humankind. Conversely: it is out of his love for god and humanity that his love for music flows\footnote{‘Es ist mit Beethovens Liebe zur Menschheit wie mit seiner Liebe zu den Tönen: eine göttliche Liebe ist es ob sie sich an jenem oder diesem Objekt entzündet! Die Menschheit müßte Beethovens Tonliebe besitzen, um sich seine Menschenliebe vorstellen zu können. Umgekehrt: aus seiner Liebe zu Gott und Menschheit quillt auch die Liebe zu den Tönen – –’ OC 12/254.} – –
APPENDIX

‘Kunst und die Teilnehmenden’: Two Fragments by Heinrich Schenker

A Note on the Transcription

The German text is revised: it takes into account Jeanette’s corrections of mistakes as well as Schenker’s modifications to the first draft without marking them as such, as these represent only minor changes to what is clearly a text in its early stage. For the same reason, I have used Schenker’s ‘first thoughts’ in the rare cases in which his corrections proved indecipherable. Archaic spellings and misspelled words have been changed according to the new German orthography of 1996, although idiosyncrasies in vocabulary and grammar have been retained. Changes in punctuation are indicated in square brackets; the most common of these is the addition of commas in cases of appositions and subordinate clauses that commence with ‘z. B.’ (‘for instance’). Abbreviations have been undone except for the recurrent ‘usw.’ (‘and so on’) and ‘z. B.’ (‘for instance’), and all underscores and Roman numerals have been retained. Quotations from published works have not been edited.

{B/407} page break, new item (not adopted in translation)
[word] minor emendations
[sentence] commentary
Kunst und die Teilnehmenden

Einleitendes

§ 1 Allgemeine Einleitung.
Der Kunst steht, sofern vom Künstler, sei es vom produzierenden oder reproduzierenden abgesehen wird, die übrige Menschheit bloß teilnehmend, genießend gegenüber. Diese ganze Masse nun lässt sich nach dem Grade der Teilnahme des Nächeren unterscheiden und zwar kommt a) den minimalsten Grad offenbarend das Volk als unterste Stufe in Betracht b) woraus sich dann als ein engerer Kreis mit größerem Grade der Teilnahme das Publikum bildet. Innerhalb des Publikums macht sich als ein besonderer Stand, der der Kritiker bemerkbar.

Art and the Participants

Introduction

§ 1 General Introduction.
Leaving aside the artist, be it one who produces or reproduces, the relationship of art to the rest of humanity is merely one of participation, enjoyment. These masses as a whole may now be differentiated more specifically according to their degree of interest. The Volk are to be considered as the lowest level because they show the least degree; from this a smaller circle, with greater degree of commitment, makes up the public. Within the public, a particular group, that of the critics, emerges.

Kunst und das Volk

§ 2 Beschränkte Produktionsfähigkeit des Volkes in der Musik.
Alle Kunst setzt Muße voraus; jene Zeit, die der Lebenskampf den Menschen abnötigt, kann keine Kunst zur Entstehung bringen; erst die Stunden der Sättigung, der Rast und des Wohlbefindens, sie sind es, die den beruhigten Menschen zu den höchsten Freuden des Schaffens hinführen. Doch liegt es nicht allein an der Sorge, die den Menschen den Zutritt zur Kunst unmöglich macht; ein mindestens {B/408} ebenso starkes zweites Hindernis bereitet die Kunst selbst. Auf ein eigenes Material gestellt, auf Gesetze gegründet, die gleichmäßig aus eben diesem Material und aus der menschlichen Psyche überhaupt und hier des Näheren sowohl aus der Seele des

Art and the Volk

§ 2 The Volk’s limited abilities in musical creation.
All art requires leisure; the time that is occupied with the struggle of making a living can yield no art; only the hours of satisfaction, rest, and well-being, it is these that lead the calm and collected man to the greatest joys of creation. But it is not only life’s worries that are an obstacle to man’s participation in art; art itself poses an equally severe obstacle. Built on its own particular foundations and on laws that are cogently and mightily made up in equal measure by those intrinsic foundations and the human psyche and, in particular, the soul of both the composer and the recipient, art requires the concentration of all senses on its material and laws. Regrettably, no history of music has
Schaffenden als des Genießenden mit zwingender, ewiger Gewalt sich ergeben, bedarf die Kunst der Konzentration aller Organe auf das Material und die Gesetze. Leider hat es noch keine Musikgeschichte dargestellt, wie die Beschaffung des Materials der Tonkunst vor sich ging; hierher würde gehören die Darstellung des Ringens um eine längere Tonreihe, um die Systeme und die Formen, welche Darstellung aber weniger vom Standpunkt des äußerlichen, chronologischen Sachverhaltes der bloß äußerlichen beobachteten Fakta, als vielmehr lediglich vom Standpunkt des Materials selbst gesehen zu erfolgen hätte. Trotz der Versäumnis dieser schwierigen, vielleicht nie mehr einzuholenden Arbeit, ist soviel unter allen Umständen klar, dass z. B. eine Sonate oder ein Symphony zu schreiben doch niemals gelingen kann, der von der gemeinen Lebenssorge erdrückt, oder sonst nie von der Sonate oder der Symphonie etwas vernommen[,] der weder das Instrument des Klaviers oder die übrigen Instrumente kennt und dem die ungünstige Beschaffenheit seines Milieus ein Kennenlernen der Systeme, der Formen unmöglich macht. Es ist darnach nun zu verstehen, dass das große Volk als solches, wegen all’ dieser Ursachen niemals Zutritt zur musikalischen Kunst erlangen kann. In demselben Maße, als die Stunden der Sorglosigkeit geringer sind, kann das Volk in produzierender Hinsicht nur dasjenige erfinden und verrichten, wozu allenfalls die wenigen Stunden hinreichen: ein paar Zeilen Gedichtes, ein paar Töne Musik mag zu erraffen möglich sein; doch auch bei diesen kargen Erzeugnissen kommt vor dem Gesichtspunkt der Kunst sicher nur der Stoff mehr in Betracht: die Liebe, so far succeeded in revealing the nature of that musical material; such an endeavour would have to include a depiction of the labours that effect a longer series of notes and of the systems and forms, the representation of which would have to be carried out less in terms of the external, chronological conditions of only empirically observed facts, but in terms of the very foundations themselves. Despite the neglect of this difficult task, which we may never catch up with again, it is obvious that a person will certainly not succeed in writing, for instance, a sonata or a symphony if he is overwhelmed by the everyday woes of life, or has never heard anything of a sonata or symphony, if he knows not of the piano or any other instrument, and if the unfavourable conditions of his environment render knowledge of the systems and the forms an impossibility. It follows that for all these reasons the common man, as it were, will never gain access to musical art. To the same extent that leisure time is limited, the Volk can, in terms of creation, only invent and perform that which can be reaped in a few hours: a few lines of a poem, a few notes of music; but even in relation to these meagre products it is – in terms of artistic production – surely always the subject matter that must be considered as most important: love, in its manifold appearances relating to the fatherland or the relationship between the sexes, nature, military strife, and suchlike. The distance separating the Volk from art became all the greater in the course of time, the further one made progress in solving the main problem of music, namely to increase the quantity of notes, to exceed the small measure of the folk song, and to develop it into the artificially created larger forms. One could say that the

§ 3 Beschränkte Aufnahmefähigkeit des Volkes.
Die oben dargelegten Umstände sind es wieder, die auch in der Frage der Aufnahmefähigkeit die entscheidende Rolle spielen; ein volles Erwidern einer Symphonie bleibt dem Volke für immer verschlossen, wenn nicht anders jedes Abhören schon als solches für Erwiderung gehalten wird. Es ist aber nicht alles Hören gleichwertig und wo z. B. ein Beethoven, ein Brahms zumal bei so hohem Genie der Resultate und Erfahrungen so vieler vorausgegangener Jahrhunderte, dazu auch noch seiner eigenen, bei alleiniger Konzentration auf die Kunst, gesammelten Erfahrungen bedurfte, kann unmöglich aus dem Stegreif ein Mann des Volkes, z. B. ein Arbeiter[,] zu vollem Besitz gelangen. Man müsste denn sonst zu dem sonderbaren Schlusse kommen, dass eben der letzten genannte Arbeiter, je weniger er davon weiß, ein desto größeres Genie als Beethoven und Brahms ist. Wer wird das aber im Ernst behaupten wollen? Somit reduziert sich das Hören des Volkes

chasm between a symphony as being the most extended form and the people as decisive and unbridgeable, as long as the Volk remains the Volk, and the symphony a symphony!

§ 3 Restrictions in the Volk’s receptivity.
The circumstances presented above also play a decisive role in relation to receptivity; it is forever denied to the Volk to fully respond to a symphony, unless every process of listening is considered a response in itself. But not all listening is of equal validity, and it is impossible for a man of the people such as a worker to suddenly possess the abilities of a Beethoven, a Brahms, who – not to mention his great genius – drew on the insights and experiences of so many previous centuries, as well as his own insights, which he accumulated by focusing exclusively on art. Otherwise one would have to come to the curious conclusion that the first-mentioned worker is a greater genius than Beethoven and Brahms the less he knows about music. But who would seriously wish to claim that? Hence the people’s listening abilities in relation to complex works of art are reduced only to what they can hear, as it were. They know nothing of how the content of music may rub against its form, how the genius’s command
gegenüber vorgeschrittenen Kunstwerken der Musik lediglich auf dasjenige, was es eben hören kann. Es weiß nichts davon, wo das Material widerstrebt, worin sich die Herrschaft eines Genies über dasselbe ausdrückt, es weiß nichts von Freud und Leid des Autors, da er dem Zuformendem gegenüberstand; nichts von den Niederlagen und Siegen, es hört nicht die Form, nicht einmal den Gedanken und nicht einmal das Motiv; und was nach Abzug alles dessen, was allein hörenswert ist übrig bleibt, ist ein äußerlicher Eindruck des Tonmaterials selbst, der verschiedenen Klangcharaktere, der Reiz kontrastierender, dynamischer Schattierungen, hier und dort auch einer besonders einleuchtenden Tongruppe.

§ 4 Unfähigkeit zum Urteil in Kunstsachen.
Bei so beziehungslosem Hören ist das Volk unfähig ein richtiges Urteil in Kunstsachen zu besitzen. Beschränkung der Zeit, Beschränkung der Gesichtspunkte, führen es von selbst nur zum Kleinsten und ohne Aufwand an Geist am leichtesten Fasslichen. Unbefangen und unbeeinflusst zieht es daher am liebsten wo es Musik in niedrigsten Formen als Lied, Tanz, Marsch, Potpourri usw. hören kann. Beeinflusst freilich, zumal bei der heutigen Organisation der Arbeierschaft, zeigt es, wie man in den Journalen so gerne sagt, ‘echtes’ Verständnis auch für die höher organisierungen Kunstwerke der Musik, doch beruht das alles nur auf einer Suggestion, die zum Teil von berühmten Namen des Komponisten, zum Teil von der Autorität der organisierenden Führer herrührt. Da aber Suggestion und Verständnis over the content reveals itself, they know nothing of the joys and pains of the composer as he faced the yet-to-be-formed matter; nothing about the defeats and victories, they do not hear the form, not even the theme or even the motif; and all that is left after those things that alone are worth listening to have been discounted is a superficial impression of the musical material itself, of the different sound characteristics, the charm of contrasting dynamic shadings, here and there also a particularly prominent tune.

§ 4 [The Volk’s] Inability to Judge in Artistic Matters.
Given such an arbitrary mode of listening, the Volk is unable to make correct judgements in artistic matters. Restrictions in leisure time and restrictions in perspectives lead the Volk of their own accord only to the most miniscule insights that they can easily achieve by themselves. Unselfconscious and unswayed, it is drawn to where they can hear music in its lowest forms, such as song, dance, march, potpourri, etc. Influenced, of course, all the more so in today’s organisation of worker’s communities, the Volk shows, as one so often reads in the press, ‘genuine’ appreciation also for highly complex works of music, yet all this is based only on an illusion, which originates in part from the famous name of the composer, and in part from the authority of the promoters. But since illusion and real appreciation are two different matters entirely, one should beware of rating the Volk’s ovations
zweierlei sind, so wird man sich wohl hüten, den Beifall des einer Beethovenschen Symphonie zujubelnden Volkes höher als den jedes Publikums überhaupt einzuschätzen und man wird begreifen, wenn ich sage, dass den positivsten Gewinn allerdings nur die Führer erzielen, die, kaum wenig mehr als die Arbeiter über die Dinge der Kunst orientiert, mindestens die hervorragende Rolle von Führern usurpieren, die in diesem Falle doch so leicht zu erreichen war. Von diesem Standpunkt aus sind daher jene Veranstaltungen, die {B/413} unter dem Titel Volks- bzw. Arbeiterkonzerte immer mehr Raum im Konzertleben einnehmen, durcharisicht nicht, wie man meint, als Mehrer musikalischen Fortschritts anzusehen. Vielmehr sind sie als Produkte übertriebener Sentimentalität, bzw. einer sehr reellen Rollengier, die Brutstätte neuer snobistischer Kreise. Hatte bei diesen die Kunst unter dem Snobismus, der Anmaßung jener Kreise zu leiden, die mindestens durch Reichtum oder sonstige Beziehung zur Kunst in den Vordergrund traten, so gesellts sich dazu plötzlich aus der Tiefe der Proletarier eine unübersehbare, neue Menschenmenge, die als Masse mit den Alluren einer eingebildeten Majestät ihr Verständnis für die Kunst einfach ebenso dekretiert, wie es die höheren Stände vorhin taten, in Wahrheit aber eine neue Herde giftigsten Snobismus vorstellt; Snobismus oben, Snobismus unten – dahin ist man aus Unkenntnis und Unterschätzung der Kunst in traurigster Weise endlich gekommen.

§ 5 Das Volk als die ehrwürdige Genitrix des Genies.
Doch Ehre dem Volke als dem Urschoß, aus dem im letzten Grunde for a Beethovenian symphony more highly than those of any other audience; and one will understand when I say that the most positive gain is only achieved by the promoters, who are hardly better-informed about the ways of art than the workers, yet at the least usurp the imposing role of great leaders, which in this case was ever so easy to achieve. Looked at in this way, therefore, those events that occupy increasingly more space in our concert life under the title of Volks- or Arbeiterkonzerte [Workers' Union Concerts], are not, as one might think, to be viewed as events that enhance musical progress. They are rather the products of exaggerated sentimentality, or, as the case may be, a very real aspiration to rise above, the hatchery of new snobbish circles. If art had to suffer the snobbery, the arrogance of those circles that came to prominence through wealth or some other kind of relation to art at least, these are now suddenly joined from the depths of the proletarian masses by an innumerable new horde of people that collectively decrees its understanding of art with the allures of fancied royalty, in the same way that the higher strata have done in the past. In truth, they represent a new pack of most poisonous snobbery; snobbery above, snobbery below – this is where ignorance and undervaluation of art has finally led to in such a regrettable fashion.

§ 5 The Volk as the Honourable Progenitor of Genius.
But honour to the Volk as the primordial womb from which genius,

\[Addendum to ‘Kunst und das Volk’\]

\{B/415\} Um zur richtigen Wertschätzung dessen, was das Volk in Sachen Kultur bedeutet [comma removed] zu gelangen, mag es des besseren Verständnisses halber gestattet sein, hier eine Analogie anzuführen. Diese betrifft die vielgepriesene Jugend, die an Schwung, Talent, Genie angeblich so überreiche Jugend. Auch an diesem Punkte nämlich ist das Urteil der Menschheit einer starken Täuschung in the last instance, emerges. If we consider that all musical geniuses (including those from the other arts and sciences) hail from social strata that are opposed to those privileged by birth and through wealth, and which, combined, represent the Volk in the wider sense of the Volk, we have to honour in reverence and gratitude those forces rooted in the Volk that beget our geniuses. Does this represent a contradiction to the negations expounded above? No! Genius hails from the Volk; but by taking possession of art, by creating and proliferating it from within, it transcends the threshold that the Volk is limited to. Through art it sets itself apart from the primordial womb; and by surpassing not only the Volk but all other persons of rank – counts, princes, emperors, and kings – it puts itself at the pinnacle of the entire nation, in order to represent its emblem there. I believe that every nation is different, and that for instance only the German Volk could produce a Bach, a Handel, a Philip Emanuel Bach, a Haydn, a Mozart, a Beethoven. Honour therefore to the Volk, the primordial womb, from which genius ultimately emerges.
unterworfen. So begrüßen die Eltern das Wunder ihres Kindes und wissen sich oft kaum vor Staunen über die Begabung desselben zu fassen. Das Kind wächst heran, wird zum reifen Jüngling oder Mädchen und entfaltet mit zunehmender körperlicher Reife parallel auch geistige Züge, die man gerne wieder als Talent bezeichnet. Nun rüstet sich das junge menschliche Wesen zu einem Akt überschüssiger Kraft, zu einem Akt großer Verve und Gier, welcher ganz besonders verkannt wird. Statt darin eine geradezu regelmäßig zu nennende rein physische Erscheinung zu erblicken, missdeutet man den Überschwang als eine wirklich reelle Kraft. Mit den ersten Säften kommt nämlich die erste Gier; je stärker jene, desto stärker diese; je stärker aber die letztere, desto kräftiger und weiter wird der junge Mensch über die nahen und nächsten Ziele hinausgeschleudert. Daher auch der Überschwang des Jünglings in allem, was er denkt, fühlt und erstrebt, also in den Lebensanschauungen, in Liebe und Arbeit! Bald indessen berichtigt ihn das ferne Ziel selbst; der Aufschwung erweist sich als unzulänglich, und daher trügerisch, die Gier ebbt ab und so fließen Gedanken und Gefühle zurück in die Nähe. Diese wird nun zum entgültigen Maß seiner wirklich vorhandenen Kräfte, hier findet er endlich Wege und Ziele, die zu erreichen ihn glücklich macht, ob sie gleich nicht jene sternfernen Ziele sind, nach denen er in seiner ersten Aufwallung gelangt.

‘Wozu in die Ferne schweifen, sieh’ das Gute liegt so nah’... Der hiermit getadelte Fehler des Menschen beruht also, wie man sieht, nicht etwa

child grows up, turns into a mature young man or woman and along with physical maturity develops intellectual features that may with good grace be described as talent. It follows that the young human being sets out to achieve an act of exuberant prowess, an act of great verve and ambition, which tends to be especially misconceived. Instead of recognising it as a normal, purely physical feature, the immoderation is interpreted as true and real prowess. With the initial surge comes the first ambition: the more forceful the former, the more forceful the latter. But the more forceful the latter, the stronger and further the young person is catapulted beyond the near and most nearby goals. This explains the youth’s exuberance in all that he thinks, feels, and endeavours, i.e. his outlook on life, his loves and labours! But the distant goals themselves soon correct him; the upsurge proves insufficient, and, as a result, deceptive; the ambition subsides and in this way thoughts and feelings retreat back to what is near. The latter becomes the true measure of his actual prowess, here he finds ways and aims which to achieve make him happy, even if they are not those faraway goals towards which he aspired in his initial enthusiasm.

‘Why travel far afield, behold, delights await just around the corner’... The human failing condemned with these words is based, as we can see, not in a weakness of character, but, for all intents and purposes, on a purely mechanical principle of the human organism. Meanwhile, this characteristic reoccurs in the lives of all of humankind. Bearers of a young nation or a young religion inevitably

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in einer Charakterschwäche, vielmehr auf einem sozusagen rein mechanischen Prinzip des menschlichen Organismus überhaupt. Diese Erscheinung kehrt indessen im Leben auch der Menschengemeinschaft wieder. Auch Träger z. B. einer jungen Staaten- oder Religion, überspannen (weil sie müssen) in der ersten Aufwallung der jungen Säfte ihre Ideen und Ziele. Sie berauschen sich in Expansion und Eroberungen, als könnten sie je Zentrum der politischen oder religiösen Welt werden. Mit zunehmendem Alter des Staates oder der Religion versiegt die Gier und das wahre Maß tritt hervor, doch freilich wieder nach Umständen der übrigen Welt, der Staaten und Religionen. So betrachtet erweist sich der Inhalt der Jugend meistens als ein Schein von Kräften, und im Gegensatz zum allgemeinen Urteil möchte ich es bestimmt aussprechen, dass ein guter Blick ein wahres, bescheidenes Maß des Menschen trotz gegenteiligen Scheines doch wohl auch schon in der Jugendepoche des Betreffenden entnehmen können. Im Interesse der Entwicklung der Menschheit ist kaum etwas ähnlich dringend wünschenswert, als von der Täuschung bezüglich der Jugend sich freizumachen. Schließlich bedarf die Menschheit im Grunde doch nur der führenden Geister, die alle Wege ins Geistige und Materielle eröffnen und ebnen; was sollte es dann, abgesehen von der gemeinen Befriedigung elterlicher Eitelkeit, sonst nützen, wenn man eine in Wahrheit unproduktive {B/417} Epoche, die, das Genie ausgenommen, in ein ebenso unproduktives Mannes- bzw. Frauenalter hinüberleitet, hätschelt und überschätzt. Man verrammelt damit höchstens nur die Wege jenen overextend themselves in the initial exuberance of their ideals and aspirations. They inebriate themselves with expansion and conquests, aiming to become the centre of the political or religious world. With advanced maturity of the state or the religion the ambitions subside, and the true measure of things emerges, depending, of course, on the conditions of the rest of the world, i.e. states or religions. Viewed in this way, the nature of youth in most cases reveals itself as an appearance of prowess, and I want to declare, in opposition to common perceptions, that a closer look will reveal the true, humble measure of men despite the appearances to the contrary even during the youth of the person concerned. In the interest of human progress there is nothing more urgently desirable than to rid oneself from the delusions regarding the youth. Essentially, humankind requires nothing more than the leading minds, who unlock and pave all ways into the intellectual and material worlds; what good is it – apart from satisfying parental vanity – to mollycoddle and overrate what is in truth an unproductive epoch that, excluding genius, induces correspondingly unproductive lives of men and women. One at best barricades the means of those young minds whose character is contingent on the truth of their very first strengths. Genius alone amongst men can maintain the potential of early ambitions until the end of life. It maintains the heights into which it has been catapulted by its initial vigour, because its energy does not subside. At the hands of his ever-flowing powers, the furthest distances turn into striking distance, and more than that: the fulfilment of the pursuit even makes the goals themselves vanish!

{C/377}

Kunst und Kritik

Allgemeines

§ 1 An die Spitze dieses Abschnittes will ich eine Wahrheit setzen die von Zeit zu Zeit immer wohl im Unterbewusstsein der Menschen ruhte, noch öfter aber von dem betroffenen Stand geleugnet und vertuscht wird. Es ist nämlich eine nur allzu leicht konstatierbare Tatsache, dass gegen die sogenannte Kritik überhaupt nicht nur die Kleinen und Kleinsten opponieren, sondern auch die großen und größten Genies. Man braucht ja nur in den Werken der größten Dichter, Musiker, Philosophen und Gelehrten zu lesen, um zu bemerken, dass sie gegen jene Kritik des Tages, die sich eben die Kritik kat’ exochen [schlechthin] nennt, aller Zeiten die schärfsten Worte des Tadels und des Unmutes vorbrachten. Dieses ist also umso nötiger von vorhinein zu bemerken, als die Kritik gerade die Bundesgenossenschaft der Großen behauptet und heuchlerischerweise dem Publikum vormacht, als wäre sie eine notwendige und von den Größten anerkannte Institution die

Art and Criticism

Introduction

§ 1 At the very beginning of this section, I wish to proclaim a truth that has surely always rested in the hearts of men, but which is still being denied and covered up on a regular basis by the profession that it concerns. It is an ever so easily determinable fact that not only the small and smallest are in opposition to so-called criticism, but also the great and greatest geniuses. One only has to consult the works of the greatest poets, musicians, philosophers, and scholars in order to recognise that they have at all times applied the most acerbic vocabulary of rebuke and resentment against daily criticism, which calls itself criticism per se. It is all the more important to note this from the outset, since criticism claims to be in union with the great, and duplicitously makes the public believe to be a necessary institution that is acknowledged as such by the great, and sadly scorned by small talents merely because, and only because, it does not praise them. As has been said, this claim, however, is a
leider nur die kleinen Talente schmähen weil sie von ihr nicht gelobt werden. Wie gesagt ist diese Behauptung aber eine infame Unwahrheit, die im Kampf ums Dasein, den ja auch die Kritiker führen, vorübergehende Vorteile bringt, eben die Heuchelnden übersehen lassen, dass nach geraumer Zeit die Lüge immer als solche dennoch enthüllt, und die Wahrheit erst recht den gewohnten Triumph feiern wird. Nach Abzug dieser Lüge nun hat man das Recht, die Kritik daraufhin {C/378} zu untersuchen, was sie selbst aus Eigenem leistet, wie sie sich zur Produktion, zur Reproduktion verhält, worin sie schadet oder nützt, usw.

§ 2 Kein Zweifel, dass die Lust zum Urteil in gewissen Sinne im Gradmesser der Verarbeitung und des Genusses eines fremden Werkes mit Recht vorstellt: man ist eines Eindrucks voll und fühlt sich gedrängt, ja gezwungen denselben zu formen. In diesem Sinne ist das Urteil des Empfangenden seine eigene Produktion, worauf er freilich desto mehr beschränkt bleiben muss, je weniger er wirklich schaffender Künstler oder Gelehrter ist. Wie jedes Schaffen, selbst auch das kleinste, bereitet auch das Schaffen eines Urteils, das ist die Formung eines Eindrucks, eine große Freude zunächst dem Urteilenden selbst. Ist letzterem dann auch beschieden, andere Menschen damit zu beeinflussen, so weiß er sich in dem Gefühl gehoben, auch noch anderen mit seiner Urteilschöpfung eine Freude bereitzu haben. Wir haben somit in der Urteilslust eine organische Eigenschaft des Geistes zu erkennen, in der, wie gesagt, die Konsumation fremder Werke ihren eigenen Ausdruck findet.

disgraceful lie which momentarily benefits the critics in their struggle to survive, yet makes the charlatans overlook that after some time the lie will always be exposed as such in any event, and that truth will observe its usual triumph all the more for it. Having exposed this lie, we are now permitted to scrutinise criticism as to its intrinsic accomplishments, how it relates to production, to reproduction, in what ways it is damaging or useful, and so on.

§ 2 No doubt about it, the pleasure of judgement rightly projects itself as an indicator of [any given listener's] engagement and enjoyment of a new work: one is filled with an impression and feels compelled, even obliged, to fully articulate the same. Seen in this light, the recipient’s judgement is his own production, to which he must of course restrict himself the less he is a truly productive artist or scholar. Like all production, even the smallest, the production of a judgement, which is an impression put into words, also gives great pleasure in the first instance to the one who is judging. If it is also granted to the latter to influence other people with his judgement, then he feels elevated in the knowledge to have given enjoyment to others therewith as well. We therefore have to acknowledge the inclination towards expressing judgements as an organic property of the human mind, in which, as has been said, the consumption of new works finds its own expression.

§ 3 In recognising someone’s right to make a judgment, we are not at the same time approving the form in which the received impression is communicated to others. In any event, this much becomes evident from the above: it goes against the grain of the pleasure to judge that is immanent in all humans to turn towards judging at specific times in a professional capacity. Discounting from the present discussion the private sharing of impressions, which is generated in private and as such aims to uphold private character, the fact remains that there is nothing objectionable about reviews that benefit the author, the reader, art or scholarship, such as those published in one journal or another by the likes of a Lichtenberg, a Lessing or a Herder, by a Goethe, a Schiller or a Grillparzer, for instance. It was either the significance of the subject or that of its treatment that prompted those reviewers to voice their opinions in favour or in opposition. The occasion of the work was thus seized, at the same time as [their] own productive powers ruled above and beyond. But the matter is entirely different and far less agreeable when the occasion of creating a judgement is bereft of its chance character and its place is taken by rendering judgments by trade, a trade that actively seeks and creates opportunity, since the contest of creating a means of livelihood takes hold of any given person without weighing them up, without testing them. And so we have arrived at that criticism that in the form of daily, journalistic criticism fatally occupies such a conspicuous place in today’s public life.
§ 4 So ist es denn erst die Gelegenheit des Tages, die, indem sie auch einen Zwang des Tages schafft, die an sich schöne Freude des Urteils herabsetzt und depraviert. Doch kommt dazu leider noch eine zweite Lüge: im Grunde genommen fordert die Zeitung ihrem ursprünglichen Wesen nach nur einfache Berichterstattung; sie meldet einen Brand, einen Dammbruch, Todesfälle, politische Zusammenkünfte, Verhandlungen, Zusammenstöße usw. und sie meldet alle diese Ereignisse wie es die Sache fordert, ohne begleitende Kritik, die ja gegenüber einem Brand, einem Dammbruch usw. völlig deplatziert wäre. Und wenn allenfalls eine Bemerkung unterläuft, die die Ursache des Brandes, des Dammbruchs, Zusammenstößes enthüllt, so ist sie im selben Maße als sachlich anzuerkennen und willkommen zu heißen. Kaum aber ergreift der Berichterstatter das Wort um über ein Ereignis der Kunst, sei es nun Pro- oder Reproduktion, zu melden, so überkommt ihm plötzlich die Lust die Rolle eines einfachen Berichterstatters zu verlassen und vielmehr die eines Kunstrichters sich anzumaßen. Er erzählt dann nicht den Inhalt (ach, wie viel würde dazugehören einen musikalischen Inhalt zu erzählen?), er berichtet nicht über den Erfolg des Stücks, oder des Spielers, das alles dünkt ihm zu wenig. Es ist, als wäre mit der Aufgabe über die Kunst zu berichten, dem erhabenen Gegenstand zuliebe auch seine Eitelkeit übers Normale gewachsen, und er schämt sich dann einfach nur Tatsachen mitzuteilen, mögen die auch von konstitutiver Bedeutung sein. Ohne zu ahnen, dass auch im Kunstwerk doch nur die tatsächlichsten Zustände des Tonlebens in Frage kommen und

§ 4 Thus it is only the opportunism of the day that, by also generating a necessity of the day, debases and depraves the in itself exquisite joy of rendering a judgement. Yet sadly a second lie is added into the bargain: to all intents and purposes, journalism conventionally demands nothing but mere reportage; it tells of a fire, a breach in a dyke, deaths, political summits, negotiations, confrontations, and so on, and it communicates these things as the matter demands, without any added criticism, which of course would be utterly misplaced when writing about a fire, a breach in a dyke etc. If a remark creeps in that tells of the cause of the fire, the breach in a dyke, a confrontation, then it is to be recognised as factual and to be welcomed in equal measure. However, as soon as the reporter speaks up about an event in art, be it the work of art itself or its performance, he is suddenly enticed to abandon the role of a mere reporter and assume that of a referee. In such a case he does not tell the contents (alas, what would it take to inform about a musical content?), he speaks not of the success of a work or a performer – no, he considers all these things beneath his calling. It is as if, faced with the task of writing about art, his vanity – for the sake of the elevated subject matter – has grown beyond what is normal, and he is reluctant to simply tell of facts, no matter how much these are of constitutive substance. Without understanding that in the work of art too only the concrete facts of the musical realm must be considered, and that the worthiness or worthlessness of a work depends solely on the actual facts relating to the arrangement of the notes, they succumb to merely common impressions, which to exclusively share they deem their sole duty.
dass Güte, bzw. der Unwert des Werkes lediglich von den Tatsächlichkeiten in der Anordnung der Töne abhängt, geben sie sich bloß einem allgemeinen Eindruck hin, den allein mitzuteilen sie für ihre ausschließliche Aufgabe erklären. Darüber zur Rede gestellt pflegen sie mit Vorliebe zu behaupten, dass wer sich der Öffentlichkeit als Produzierender aussetzt, auch eine öffentliche Kritik anzunehmen verpflichtet sei; wieder eine Ausrede, die dem Rezensenten in seinen Beruf hier einhelfen soll. Genau besehen aber steckt auch in der Ausrede, wie in jeder überhaupt, eine Unwahrheit, denn ist auch jene Behauptung an sich wahr und richtig, so enthält sie leider keine Aufklärung über den nicht minder wichtigen und entscheidenden Punkt, nämlich dass ja auch die Kritik gewissermaßen in die Öffentlichkeit trete, ohne aber, wie die Produktion selbst, von einer anderen Instanz kritisiert zu werden. Man wende nicht ein, die Kritiken verschiedener Kritiker seien es selbst, die einander beurteilen, und schließlich sei es auch das Publikum, das eine Kritik der Kritik handhabt. Denn damit gelangen wir wieder in einen gefährlichen circulus vitiosus, denn ist es wahr, dass die Kritik, wie sie behauptet, dazu da ist, um das Publikum anzuleiten, wie kann es dann auch wahr sein, dass umgekehrt das Publikum da ist die Kritik zu beurteilen?

I. Kapitel
Die Kritik und das Kunstwerk

§ 1 Jedes Kunstwerk stellt eine eigene Welt zunächst für sich selbst vor; eigene Voraussetzungen zeitigen darin eigene Konsequenzen, weshalb denn nicht ein Kunstwerk dem anderen gleichen kann. Um das

Confronted about this it is their preferred custom to claim that whoever passes himself off in public as a productive artist must accept public criticism; again a subterfuge, which is called upon to sustain the critic in his trade. However, upon closer scrutiny this subterfuge – like any other – is based on an untruth, because although the above claim is true and accurate in itself, it does not, regrettably, provide any answers relating to a no less important and crucial point, namely that criticism too effectively commands public attention, yet without – unlike artistic production – being criticised by a higher authority. One ought not object that it is the critics themselves who judge other critics, or that it surely must be the public that criticises the critics. If that were the case we end up in a vicious circle: if it is true that criticism, as it claims, is here in order to guide the public, how can it be also true that the public, on the other hand, is here to judge criticism?

Chapter 1
Criticism and the Work of Art

§ 1 Every work of art first and foremost represents a world in itself; its particular rudiments yield their own particular effects, which is why no work of art can be like any another. In order to enjoy and assess a work of
Es ist nötig, die Absicht des Autors zu verstehen und an der Ausführung zu bemessen, inwiefern der Autor selbst seine eigene Absicht erreicht hat. So sage ich damit zugleich auch dieses, dass in den meisten Fällen, aus Mangel an Einsicht in das Tonleben und dessen Wirkungen, der Autor nicht einmal noch seine eigene Absicht selbst kennt, daher leichter eine unerlaubt schlechte bzw. sogar unausführbare [Ausführung] fasst. Den Genien allein, betone ich mit größtem Nachdruck, dass nun es vorbehalten ist, genau so viel zu wollen, als die Wirkung herzugeben vermag, welchen Einklang allein man Stil zu nennen hat[,] und es ist ohne weiteres klar, dass zur Beurteilung solcher Dinge gerade unumgänglich streng-fachlichste Kenntnisse tiefster Art erforderlich sind:

If one commands such knowledge, one will, despite the incomparableness of works of art and artists per se, succeed in studying the value of one or the other work for any given purpose. Setting aside those works in which the author ([see Chapter 1, § [1]])² was unable to realise his ideas, we can recognise from the world of the perfect masterworks that although their perfection can not be measured – as it remains an absolute one in each case – it is possible at least to compare the artistic plans with each other. In this spirit we may be permitted to say that, for instance, Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony

² Reference missing, reconstructed.
z. B. die IX. Symphonie von Beethoven dessen I. schon wegen des Entwurfes überbietet, mag in beiden Fällen die künstlerische Absicht sonst sicher ganz voll erreicht worden sein. Aus desselben Grunde wird z. B. eine Symphonie von Brahms, da sonst gleiche Vollendung angenommen wird, über eine Klaviersonate selbst von Mozart zu stellen sein. Wie dem aber auch sei halte man stets daran fest, dass jeglicher Wert stets nur nach oben, niemals nach unten zu bemessen sei. Es ist diesbezüglich gerade der Kunstwerke hier ausdrücklich zu sagen desto notwendiger, je widerspruchsvoller die Menschen einerseits z. B. die Höhe der Berge bloß nach dem höchsten Gipfel Chimborazos, andererseits aber in allen übrigen Dingen, z. B. in Bewertung menschlicher Charaktere und Leistungen gerne nur nach dem tiefsten Stand urteilen, welches nun zur Folge hat, dass minderwertige \{C/385\} Leistungen, eben im Hinblick auf noch minderwertigere Leistungen, oft genug in den Himmel gehoben werden, was wie leicht zu denken nicht anders, als auf Kosten der Vorzüglichsten geschehen kann. Es ist aber notwendig, alle Liebe und Bewunderung ausschließlich nur dem Besten zuzuwenden, und zwar schon rein aus dem ökonomischen Grunde, weil bei der Kürze des Einzelnebens und beim Überfluss an Werken eine gute Wahl der Werke unter allen Umständen vonnöten ist. Wäre es denn möglich, dass wir auch die schlechten griechischen und lateinischen Autoren heute noch läsen, wo so viel des Guten und Besten aus jenen Epochen zu uns herüber kam, dass die Bewunderung auch der größten nachfolgenden Geister teilhaftig wurde[?] Man wird daher schon aus der Lust nach unten statt nach oben zu messen stets mit

surpasses his First in design alone, even if in both cases the artistic intent has surely been fully realised. For the same reason a symphony by Brahms, for instance, will arguably have to be deemed as above a piano sonata even by Mozart, even if it would have to be considered of equal perfection in all other respects. In any case, one must adhere to only ever rating any value by looking up to it, but never by looking down. It is all the more important to say this with reference especially to works of art, as humankind, paradoxically, judges the height of mountains only in relation to the highest peak of Chimborazo, yet judges human traits and accomplishments only by the lowest common denominator. This results in the outcome that inferior accomplishments, especially in relation to even more inferior ones, are often enough praised to high heaven, which, as could not be expected otherwise, happens on the expense of the exquisite ones. It is crucial to direct love and admiration only ever to the best, if only as a matter of economy: Given the brevity of an individual’s lifespan and the abundance of works, the appropriate choice of works is essential whatever the circumstances. Could it be imaginable that we still read the bad Greek and Latin authors today, given that so much of the good and best has passed to us from these epochs that even the greatest subsequent thinkers have admired it? One would be right to deduce from the inclination to judge downwards rather than upwards alone that those who judge do not at all possess the knowledge that is required to make such judgements in the first place.
Recht darauf schießen dürfen, dass dem Urteilenden die zur Urteilsfällung erforderlichen Kenntnisse überhaupt fehlen.


§ 6 If such knowledge is remiss, then one’s attitude towards a work of art is contingent on a range of effects that emanate from one element or another and thereby reach the recipient’s consciousness by happenstance only. Given the randomness of the effects that are gathered in this way, the result is a rather unsystematic general impression, under the influence of which, as I have already indicated above, the recipient is quite incapable to understand if the work has realised its own intentions, if it has style (which indicates the author’s character in general and in terms of the individual piece in particular), in what ways he supersedes other authors, and so on. [The recipient] therefore has nothing more to do than to take into consideration other factors when responding to his impressions and forming a judgement, factors that have nothing to do with musical composition but are all the more powerful in terms of suggestion. For instance, he takes into account superficial productivity, the esteem of the author, and so on. As a result, it has come to pass that greater mistakes have been made in the judgement of a Sebastian Bach, Mozart, or Brahms than of Beethoven [and] Wagner. The latter’s forcefulness and impetuosity was within easier reach for those who perceive in a merely superficial manner, compared to the inward-looking masters that I have mentioned first. Consequently it is not the internal prowess of invention alone that determines the esteem in which a work is held by public opinion; rather it is the superficial means of increased orchestral forces
§ 7 Wenn nun auch solchermaßen der auf unsystematischer Basis entstandene Gesamteindruck über den wahren Wert keine bindende Auskunft geben kann, so muss dennoch andererseits der Wahrheit halber zugestanden werden, dass in letzter Linie auch der so mangelhaft beschaffene Gesamteindruck einer richtigen Bewertung fast nahe kommt. Eine seltsame Ahnung jener imponderablen technischen Griffe, die in Wahrheit ein großes Genie von den übrigen Schaffenden so eigentümlich absondern, diese Ahnung ist es, die die Menschheit im Verlaufe von Jahrzehnten endlich begreifen lehrt, dass z. B. Berlioz durchaus kein Beethoven ist. Offenbar bietet Beethoven dem Publikum so viel, dass auch nur der kleinste Teil davon schon genügt, um ihn größer als Berlioz erscheinen zu lassen. Bedenkt man aber andererseits, dass dieselbe Menschheit, die scheinbar auf richtiger Spur und aristokratischer Gesinnung, still spricht, von einem 'Fortschritt' bei Berlioz (neue 'französische' und, was ist noch mehr, 'französisch-deutsche Schule') spricht, so muss man sich davor hüten, das Urteil der Menschheit anzuerkennen. Es bleibt endlich dabei, dass sie Berlioz von Beethoven dann doch nicht richtig zu unterscheiden vermag, wodurch sich dann die große Verwirrung im allgemeinen Urteil ohne weiteres leicht erklärt. Man weiß allgemein doch nicht recht, ob man im Fortschritt begriffen sei, worin dieser angenommener Weise läge; man weiß nicht zu sagen ob Wagner mehr nützlich oder schädlich gewesen, kurz es fehlt an jeglichen and increased dynamics, which, because they cajole the listener, feign the impression of a greater genius.

§ 7 Even if the general impression that has been formed in such an unsystematic manner cannot provide any binding information as to the true value, it has to be truthfully admitted that even under these circumstances the poorly obtained general impression comes close to an accurate assessment. A mysterious intuition of those imponderable technical manipulations, which in fact so singularly separate the great geniuses from other creators – it is this intuition which during the course of decades has taught humankind that, for instance, Berlioz is by no means a Beethoven. Beethoven evidently offers so much to the public that only the smallest fraction thereof suffices to make him appear greater than Berlioz. If one considers, on the other hand, that the same humankind that is apparently on an earnest path and of aristocratic disposition, still speaks of ‘progress’ in relation to Berlioz (new ‘French’, and, what is even more, ‘French-German School’) then one must beware of recognising the judgement of humankind. It continues to be the case that they cannot quite discern Berlioz from Beethoven, which easily and abundantly explains the great confusion in common judgement. One is generally not quite sure if one was on the course of progress after all, and how the same would hypothetically take shape; one does not know if Wagner had been relatively beneficial or damaging, in short, there is a lack of any affirmative certainty in judgement. If I, on the other hand, say only as much as that Berlioz was incapable of writing bass lines, and if I can prove it, then I have offered something more positive and

II. Kapitel
Kritik und Reproduktion

§ 1 Als ganz possierlich sind die Folgen zu bezeichnen, die sich für den Rezensenten aus seiner Vertrautheit mit der Kunst ergeben, wenn er einer reproduktiven Leistung gegenüber steht. Ich erinnere mich, dass einer der berühmtesten Rezensenten seines Zeichens, Hanslick, mir einmal versicherte, dass er nie bloß nach der Lektüre einer Partitur, sondern erst nach einer Aufführung urteile. Er selbst hielt das offenbar eine für gebotene Vorsicht; ich dagegen stehe nicht an zu behaupten, dass er aus der Not eine Tugend gemacht hat. Er konnte, was ja deutlich aus der Art hervorgeht, wie er seine Rezensionen schrieb, die Lektüre nicht schon zu einem definitiven Eindruck steigern und brauchte daher die äußerliche Hilfe wirklichen Erklingens. Als ersten Schaden eines solchen Verhaltens hat man zu bezeichnen, dass eine Menge Partituren und sonstiger Kompositionen bloß weil sie noch nicht aufgeführt wurden unbesprochen bleiben müssen. Und so fällt es höchst bedauerlich auf, dass während in ein Tagesblatt nicht nur sämtliche Wissenschaften, sondern auch \textit{C/389} die Erzeugnisse der Poesis und der bildenden Künste einbezogen werden, einzig und allein nur noch musikalische Werke dem allgemeinen Interesse entzogen werden. Es erscheinen Referate selbst auch über

valuable than the rest of humankind.

Chapter 2
Criticism and Performance

§ 1 We would have to describe as quite comical the results of the critic’s familiarity with art whenever he is faced with matters of performance. I remember how even one of the most eminent critics of his profession, Hanslick, has once assured me that he never judged [a work] after reading the score alone, but only ever after a performance. He obviously considered this necessary prudence; I, on the other hand, am not afraid to declare that he turned a handicap into a virtue. As is apparent from the style in which he wrote his reviews, he was unable to fully form a definitive impression by reading the score alone, and was therefore dependent on the helping hand of actual sound. As the first damage arising from such a practice we would have to refer to the abundance of orchestral scores and other compositions that must remain undisussed simply because they have not yet been performed. We notice with regret that at the same time as a daily newspaper may take into account not only all the sciences but also literature and the fine arts, it is only musical works that are still obscured from general interest. There even appear reviews of published theatre pieces that will never set foot on a stage; but it has not yet occurred to any critic to write about as yet unperformed musical scores, and precisely for the reason that I have stated above.
Buchdramen, die niemals die Bühne betreten werden, dagegen über unaufgeführte Partituren zu schreiben fiel noch keinem Rezensenten ein[,] und genau aus dem Grunde den ich oben angegeben.

Der zweite Schaden aber womöglich ist ein noch stärkerer: der Rezensent, der die Aufführung eines Werkes abgewartet hat, ist in Ermangelung einer eigenen Vorstellung völlig nur dem Eindruck preisgegeben, den die Ausführung seitens des betreffenden reproduzierenden Künstlers ausübt. Sein erster Eindruck ist somit bereits ein fremdes Erzeugnis und er ahnt noch gar nicht, dass möglicherweise ja schon der reproduzierende Künstler, der ihm zum ersten Mal das Stück vermittelt hat, sich bereits selbst am Werk versündigt habe. Wie sollte denn diesen Fehler gerade der Rezensent beurteilen können? Er ist genötigt, auf Hören und Glauben eine Komposition so zu nehmen, wie sie ihm vorgeführt wird und täte er es anders, er wäre eben kein – Rezensent.

§ 2 Die Posse ist in Steigerung begriffen: der Rezensent kommt in die Lage, außer dem Werk auch noch die reproduktive Leistung eines Künstlers beurteilen zu müssen. Soeben lernte er erst dank der Reproduktion das {C/390} Werk kennen, und nun sollte er gar die Reproduktion selbst beurteilen die ihm das Werk vermittelt hat. Ist das möglich, frag ich? Ist nicht vielmehr nötig, dass der Rezensent um den Reproduzierenden zu beurteilen eine eigene Vorstellung vom Werk hat, an der er jene Leistung abmessen könnte? Müsste er nicht schon in den Konzertsaal eine fixe und fertige Vorstellung mitbringen, um die etwaigen Mängel der Reproduktion tadeln zu können?

Indessen ist die Steigerung des

But the second damage is perhaps an even greater one: the reviewer who has bided his time until the performance is, due to the lack of his own imagination, a prisoner to his impressions, which are effected by the performance of the reproducing artist. The reviewer’s first impression is, therefore, [based on] an extrinsic influence, and he cannot fathom the possibility that perhaps the performer, who has communicated the piece in question to him for the first time, may have already sinned against the work. Precisely how should the critic be able, of all things, to judge the mistake? He is forced to accept a composition by listening and good faith alone, by the way it is being performed, and if he acted any differently, he would not be – a critic.

§ 2 The farce reaches new heights: the critic finds himself in the bind of having to judge not only the work but also the achievements of the performer. Having only just acquainted himself with the composition on the merit of the performance, he is now supposed to also evaluate the performer that has communicated the work to him. I must ask: is this possible? Is it not the more necessary that, in order to assess the performer, the critic possesses his own vision of the work, against which the achievement [of the performer] can be measured? Would he not have to take his fully formed ideas along to the concert hall in order to speak out against possible flaws in the performance?

Meanwhile, the farce has by no
Unsinns damit noch lange nicht erreicht, denn hier im folgenden Punkte tut er sich geradezu kaleidoskopisch auf; der Rezensent kommt in die Lage, das Werk, dessen Kenntnis er dem Virtuosen A. verdankt ein zweites mal vom Virtuosen B. zu hören. Was bleibt ihm, frage ich, übrig, als Herrn B. an A. zu messen und aus beider Herren Vortrag eventuell Rückschlüsse auf das Werk zu ziehen. Wieder ahnt er nicht, dass möglicherweise ja beide Virtuosen das Werk missverstanden und falsch interpretiert haben, ob der eine nun so, der andere anders gespielt hat. Man sieht, niemals entrinnt er den Folgen jenes ersten, ursächlichen Fehlers, der darin besteht, dass er nicht eben selbst auf Grund eigener hoher Kenntnisse in den Besitz des Kunstwerkes sich setzen kann.

Means reached its climax yet, but indeed unfolds kaleidoscopically in relation to the following point: the reviewer finds himself in the situation to hear a work – the familiarity with which he has virtuoso A. to thank – for a second time performed by virtuoso B. What other way is there for him, I ask, than to measure Mr B. in relation to A., and possibly to draw conclusions about the work from both gentlemen’s performance. Again he is ignorant of the likelihood that both virtuosos may have misunderstood and misinterpreted the work, no matter if one of them has played it in one manner, the other in another. As becomes plain to see, [the critic] can never escape the consequences of that first, causal error that is inherent in the fact that he is not fully in possession of the work of art in terms of his own knowledge.

[Note: the piece of paper that now makes up items C/390 and 392 has been cut in two, and the following addendum inserted. This accounts for the non sequitur of § 3, which logically follows the above paragraph.]

[Addendum to § 2]

\{C/391\} ad § 2
Die Unmöglichkeit, sich vom Eindruck des Reproduzierenden zu befreien ist eine so krasse, dass, wie ich es aus persönlicher Erfahrung weiß, dessen Vorführungen selbst solche Hörer erliegen, die nach vorausgegangenem gründlichen Studium im Vortrag bedeutender Meisterwerke ihm in geistiger und materieller Hinsicht überlegen sind. Es gehört zu den beinahe täglichen Erscheinungen unter meinen Schülern und Schülerinnen, dass sie in Stücken, die sie selbst zu beherrschen gelernt haben, den Vortragenden völlig unzulänglich finden, seinen Vortrag dagegen als lobenswert bezeichnen, wenn es um

ad § 2
The impossibility of freeing oneself from the spell of the performer reaches such an extent that – as I know from personal experience – even those listeners who, owing to their previous thorough study of the performance of eminent masterworks, are superior to him in musical and technical terms, succumb to it. It counts amongst the daily occurrences amongst my students that they judge performances of those pieces that they have themselves learned as deficient, while at the same time considering a performance of a piece that is as yet unknown to them as laudable. As pleasing as it is in terms of observing human nature to note
ein ihnen selbst noch unbekannt gebliebenes Werk gilt. So schön es menschlich betrachtet ist, wenn sie von einer Präsumtion zu Gunsten des Künstlers gerade im letzteren Falle Gebrauch machen, so ist es dennoch belehrend zu sehen wie wenig sie noch fähig sind, den daraus ergebenden logisch zwingenden Schluss zu ziehen, dass unmöglich ein Künstler ein Stück[,] z. B. von Chopin[,] wirklich vollendend gut vortragen kann, sobald er so grober Verstöße sich gegen ein anderes Meisterwerk[,] z. B. eines von Beethoven[,] schuldig machen konnte. Ist doch die Tonwelt eine auf unwandelbar demselben Gesetze beruhender Erscheinung.

§ 3 Anders steht es auch nicht mit der Beurteilung von Theorien seitens der Rezensenten; wie soll er die Theorie prüfen, wie verstehen, ob die verkündeten Systeme überhaupt welche oder keine sind, auch hier ist er genötigt erst irgendeinen öffentlichen Erfolg, der gleichwohl von sich reden macht, abzuwarten, private Urteile kompetenterer Musiker zu hören und dergleichen.

III. Kapitel
Von der kritischen Leistung selbst

§ 1 Aus all dem obigen ergibt sich mit Notwendigkeit, dass mit *bona* oder *mala fide* der Rezensent niemals eine wahre, sachliche Kritik leisten kann; nicht in Hinsicht des Werkes selbst, nicht in Hinsicht der Reproduktion. Die Not gegenüber der Kunst wie die Not des Berufs zwingen ihn, ob er will oder nicht, zu einer Leistung und zu einer Rolle, wie sie beide nicht kläglicher gedacht werden können. Er ist genötigt auszulügen ob nicht ein Musiker von Rang oder sonst ein

that they employ a positive presumption in favour of an artist particularly in the latter instance, it is nevertheless instructive to see how little they are still capable of drawing the logical conclusion: that it is impossible for an artist to perform a piece by, say, Chopin very well if he was at the same time guilty of grossly transgressing against another masterwork, for instance one by Beethoven. For the world of tones is a manifestation that forever rests upon the same immutable laws.

§ 3 It is no different with the assessment of theories on the part of critics; how should [the critic] test the theory, how should he understand whether the systems that have been proclaimed are indeed well founded or not? Here, too, he is required to wait for some sort of public success that is somehow talked about, to hear private judgements of more competent musicians and the like.

Chapter 3
On the Activity of Criticism Itself

§ 1 As a result of the above, the critic, whether it be in good or bad faith, will never achieve truthful, factual criticism either in relation to the work itself or in relation to the performance. The dilemma in relation to art as well as the dilemma of his occupation forces him willy-nilly into an activity and into a role that could not be more wretched. He is forced to see whether a musician of stature or some other great artist has voiced an opinion about the matter at hand.
großer Künstler sich über den Gegenstand geäußert hat der unter seiner Feder ist. Nicht nur was z. B. ein Spitta oder Jahn, sondern ein Schumann, Wagner, Weber in Abhandlungen oder Rezensionen, was ein Mozart, Beethoven, Mendelssohn, Brahms in Briefen oder sonst wie mündlich geäußert haben, sucht er statt eigenen, sicheren Urteils zu verwerten. Wäre es nur um das Publikum zu belehren, wäre schließlich auch dagegen nichts einzuwenden; indessen weiß man zu genüge – die Art wie sie es machen ist selbst der Beweis hierfür – dass nur die Verlegenheit sie dazu treibt. Doppelt undankbar ist es daher von der Seite der Rezensenten, wenn sie, über ihre Schädlichkeit zur Rede gestellt nicht ohne grotesken Größenwahn darauf hinweisen, dass es ja noch weit schlechter wäre wenn nur Musiker über Musiker urteilen wollten. Nicht ohne Bosheit und wie sie glauben mit Recht geben sie zum Besten, dass Händel den Gluck, Beethoven anfangs den Weber, Wagner den Brahms, Tschaikowsky ebenfalls den Brahms falsch und offenbar ungerecht beurteilt haben. In Wahrheit aber ist es doch völlig anders; denn wenn es sich auch so verhält, wie sie angeben, muss man dennoch zugeben, dass die Kritiken, die Künstler aneinander abgeben mindestens einen sehr willkommenen Beitrag zu unserer eigenen Beurteilung sowohl des Urteilenden, als des abgeurteilten Künstlers bieten, und zwar selbst auch noch dann, wenn der eine Künstler den anderen verurteilt hat; wenn z. B. Wagner gegen Mendelssohn protestierte, ist nicht darin auch eine Handhabe zu sehen, die uns ermöglicht, nicht nur über Mendelssohn, sondern auch über

Instead of using his own firm judgment he seeks to reuse not only what a Spitta or a Jahn, but also what a Schumann, a Wagner, a Weber has committed to reviews, what a Mozart, a Beethoven, a Mendelssohn, a Brahms has written in letters or has talked about. If it were only about educating the public, there would be nothing to object to about such a practice; but we know all too well – the way in which they do it is evidence enough in this case – that they are driven to it out of lack of knowledge only. It is therefore doubly ungrateful on the part of the critics if, when confronted about their harmfulness and not without grotesque megalomania, they counter that the situation would be far worse if only musicians judged other musicians. Not without malice and believing themselves to be in the right, they declare that Handel had wrongly and, on the face of it, unjustly misjudged Gluck, as had Beethoven – in the beginning – misjudged Weber, and Wagner Brahms, and Tchaikovsky Brahms as well. Yet in truth it is all entirely different: because even if what they claim is true, one has to admit that the criticisms that artists dispense about each other represent a very welcome contribution to our own assessment both of the said judges as well as the artists on which judgement had been passed upon, and this is true even in those cases in which an artist has condemned another; in the case of, for instance, Wagner protesting against Mendelssohn we can, for that reason, form a better assessment not only of Mendelssohn but also of Wagner; and in the case of Tchaikovsky opposing to the supposedly unmelodic Brahms, does this not offer us evidence for the former's evidently debased understanding of melody, and so on?
Wagner unser Urteil klarer zu stellen und wenn Tschaikowsky gegen den angeblich melodielosen Brahms opponiert, haben wir da nicht ebenso einen Beweis dafür, dass der erstere unter Melodie offenbar eine minderwertige musikalische Münze verstanden hat, usw.? Und nun frage ich: welchen Gewinn hat aber die Welt davon, wenn der Referent X gegen Mendelssohn schreibt oder Herr Y Brahms verleugnet? Und wenn außerdem noch bei so unproduktiver kritischer Leistung Widersprüche unter den Rezensenten selbst (eine regelmäßige Erscheinung des Tages) laut werden, ist das nicht, als wäre man noch tiefer ins-minus gesunken? Und nun versteht man es, weshalb ich es oben als undankbar schalt, wenn die Rezensenten ihr eigenes Rezensieren über das Urteil von Musikern selbst gesetzt wünschen! Gäbe es nicht die letzteren, wo nähmen die ersteren dann ihre vielen Zeilen und Paragraphen her?

[Note: The chapter originally ended here. The page has been cut and the following paragraphs inserted.]

§ 2 Eine große Rolle in der Abfassung der Kritiken spielt, wie man weiß, das Kokettieren mit der Nachwelt, das heißt die Besorgnis, es könnte die letztere je anders urteilen, als die Gegenwart; weil der Kritiker gelesen hat, dass, so oft es erschien, das Genie von den Zeitgenossen verkannt, jedenfalls unterschätzt wurde und manche von den Genies an den widrigen Verhältnissen zugrunde gingen, hat er begreiflicherweise den Ehrgeiz, ein vermutliches Genie nicht zu versäumen. Ich sage nicht, dass er es aus Liebe zum Genie tut, denn man liebt das Genie nur, wenn man auch die Kunst liebt und diese liebt man, And now I ask: What does the world gain if critic X writes against Mendelssohn, or Mr Y renounces Brahms? Moreover, if one considers the contradictions amongst the critics that surface as the product of such a quantity of unproductive critical activity (a regular occurrence of the day), is it not as if one had slipped further into the red? And now one will understand why I, in the above paragraph, chide critics as unthankful if they aspire to have their own judgment valued above that of musicians! If the latter did not exist, from where would the former derive their many lines and paragraphs from?

§ 2 As is well known, one important role in the writing of reviews is the coquetting with posterity, i.e. the anxiety that the latter might ever judge differently than the present; as a result of the critic having read that, as it often happened, genius was misjudged – or at least underrated – by its contemporaries, and that some of the geniuses have perished due to the [resulting] adverse conditions, he is understandably keen not to fail to spot a potential genius. I am not saying that he acts this way out of love for genius, because one can only love genius if one also loves art, and one can only love art not by ‘criticising’ but rather by gaining

knowledge of it. Therefore it shall be said in response to all too cheap ambition: a critic will never be capable of recognising genius, rather he will be compelled to come to the aid of false geniuses, of all people, and deny it to genuine genius. This inevitable fate originates from the critic’s lack of education! Fundamentally, every presentiment is completely displaced; posterity will be in no better position to judge than the present-day. No doubt about it. It is in no way paradoxical if I claim that even in all the future generations it will not be the public in the concert hall or the critic in newspapers that will arbitrate, but in a way (dependent on the inclinations of human nature, of course) only the greatest masters themselves. This is to be understood as follows: as long as a work by Beethoven will sound, its perfection will always bear testament to the shortcomings of any other piece by any given author. In this way, the better score will always surmount the weaker one. Thus it will be the Beethovens, Mozarts, Haydns, Bachs, and so on, and not the generals, notaries, merchants, ladies and gentlemen of the future that will assign the rank to a work, or to a person! It is therefore a travesty to aim to match one’s judgement with that of future posterity in advance, and the only sensible and truthful thing that remains to be done, even now, is to measure the distance of every new work to that of our masterworks, an undertaking – forever unattainable to the critics! – for which the deepest knowledge of the latter is a prerequisite.

§ 3 One thing that often bestows the critic with the appearance of being a real critic in the eyes of the public is the fact that it is possible for him suddenly to devote scores of columns to a composition. The quantity of his literary offering itself impresses the reader; if the latter does not further recognise where it has been taken from. [The reader] does not sense that the critic has put together a great number of notes just for that effect, and instead of thinking that he has done nothing but pilfer from somewhere else, he has full confidence in him, as if [the critic] were an original writer. It seldom occurs [to the reader] that the pen of the critic only ever flows in abundance when its subject matter happens to be a bad work of art, yet retreats into dumbness whenever it is a significant one. As a matter of fact, this symptom represents a notable phenomenon of the mind of all men – as if perfection were a sphere which makes everything slip off its surface, in the same way do the heads of the critics bounce off a true masterwork, and they are left to only ever offer their wisdom in few lines and in common terms such as ‘wonderful’, ‘unique’, ‘incomparable’, ‘masterful’, etc., but they are overcome with fancifulness, a zeal for derision and wit, [and] the most overbearing opinions about culture and art if the issue at hand concerns sending a fragile work on its way. Both cases are based on the same cause: Lack of knowledge of the artistic material makes it impossible for the critic to describe merits or shortcomings with absolute certainty. As the latter are, by nature, remote from any harmony and therefore appear to be radical, it becomes possible for the critic to find those in particular as the most accessible. This explains the conspicuous occurrence that the
wirken wird es dem Kritiker möglich, gerade sie am leichtesten zu finden. Daher erklärt sich die auffallende Erscheinung, dass wohl niemals je über die wahren Meisterwerke so viel und \{C/399\} ausdauernd geschrieben wurde als z. B. über Werke von Richard Strauss. Welchen Schaden aber eine solche ungerechte Aufteilung des Zeitungszeilenmaßes mit sich bringt, kann man nur ermessing, wenn man sich vergegenwärtigt, wie das Publikum auch den Kunstreferenten stets nur mit der Elle misst und wahre Bedeutung umso dort supponiert, wo auch die Zeitung sich länger aufhält. Was unter diesen Umständen eine solche Waffe in der Hand der Kritiker bedeutet, braucht nicht erst ausdrücklich gesagt zu werden. Freilich kann man heute eine desto größere Ausbreitung journalistischer Geschwätzigkeit konstatieren, je mehr Zeitungen fast täglich in die Welt gesetzt werden[,] und so mag denn damit die Tatsache erklärt werden daß anno [1874] ein Hanslick über 3 Streichquartette eines Johannes Brahms schon in Buchform nicht mehr als bloß, sage und schreibe [53] Zeilen deponiert, während zur Zeit über eine Symphonie von Mahler doch mindestens an sechs bis neun Spalten geschrieben werden! In beiden Fällen gibt es nur leeres Geschwätz; so zitiere ich z. B. aus der hier zuerst angeführten Kritik Wendungen wie:

[Note: The quotation is missing from the draft. The following text in italics is a reconstruction, i.e. phrases from the review that Schenker may have chosen. The full review in question is appended at the end of this essay.]

‘Der erste Satz...führt ein prachtvoll leidenschaftliches Thema ganz’

‘The first movement...masterfully develops a gloriously impassioned’

3 Numbers missing from the draft, reconstructed.
meisterhaft durch’, ‘die Themen sind echt quartettmäßig, die ganze Durchführung desgleichen’ und ‘die feinste contrapunktische Kunst, die kühnste harmonisch’, und ähnlich lauten die Ergebnisse in der Kritik über Mahler:

theme’, ‘the themes are genuinely quartet-like, the entire development as well’, and ‘the most sublime skills in counterpoint, the boldest statements in harmony’, and the results in the review of Mahler sound similarly:

[Note: The quotation is missing from the draft, as is any reference to a Mahler review. The following excerpt of Julius Korngold’s eight-column feuilleton on Mahler’s Seventh Symphony (1908), published in Neue Freie Presse on 6 November 1909, provides an example of what Schenker may have had in mind (quotation in italics).

‘Auch in dem neuen Werke begegnen wir der Häufung der Mittel, den Maßlosigkeiten des Ausdrucks, der schrankenlosen Individualisierung und Demokratisierung der Stimmen, ihrem schroffen Neben- und Gegeneinanderlaufen, dem überreichen motivischen und melodischen Veränderungsspiel, der Unersättlichkeit der Durchführungen, der nervenaufwühlenden Schärfe der Kontraste.’

‘In the new work too we come across the culmination of means, the excess of expression, the unbridled individualisation and democratisation of the voices, their angular juxtapositions and conflicts, the overabundant play of motivic and melodic mutations, the voracity of the developments, the roller-coaster asperity of contrasts.’

And now one will finally realise why, on the twenty-fifth anniversary of Wagner’s death, almost all reviewers of the daily newspapers were in agreement with each other that Wagner’s musical technique had, despite the critics, not yet been fully defined, as if it had not been the dailies themselves that had until then, out of ignorance of course, avoided to consider technique. And so it was possible for the so-called literature on Wagner to take on dimensions that cannot be rivalled by that on all the other masters combined, merely

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because Wagner’s music drama offered the cheap opportunity to fill volumes without even attending to the music in its essential points. This includes a fact that is easily reinterpreted after what I have said above, namely that a leading German musical journal, Die Musik, has in the course of eleven volumes achieved no more than – believe it or not – a single issue on the likes of Bach (and, what is more, of worthless content), but managed [nine] or [ten] volumes on Wagner.5

[Addendum to Chapter 4]

§ 4 Not seldom it happens that, in a mood of frivolously dumb arrogance, the critic does not find it worthwhile even to mention the name of the artist, but signs his own all the more proudly. What amusing tit-for-tat!

§ 5 Or the critic keeps quiet about the work and the artist. In most cases this is the result of personal reasons of vengefulness, and in the remaining [case] he is fated to do so owing to his ineptness. But in all these cases he is perfectly aware that he causes damage to the artist. It could therefore be said that he acts deceitfully and dishonourably by disgracing that title and that duty which he uses as his shield and

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5 Schenker may refer to the Bach-Heft, Die Musik, vol. 5, no. 1 (October 1906). The numbers of the Wagner volumes are missing from the draft and have been reconstructed. Die Musik ran 10 special editions (Sonderhefte) on Wagner, referred to as Wagner-Hefte from the fourth instalment onwards, between 1902 and 1911. These have been collated in a two-volume edition, Bernhard Schuster, ed., Die Musik: Daraus die Wagner-Hefte 1-13 (Berlin: Schuster & Löffner, 1902-13).
seiner Unfähigkeit angegriffen wird, am liebsten als sein Schild, als seine Ehre gebraucht und hinstellt.

IV. Kapitel
Kritik und Publikum

§ 1 Trotz alledem besteht in jenem Teil des Publikums, das auch Zeitungsreferate liest eine Präsumtion zugunsten des Kritikers; eine heimliche Interessengemeinschaft bindet Publikum und Kritik. Weil selbst ununterrichtet, weiß ja das Publikum die Ununterrichtetheit des Kritikers nicht abzuschätzen und ahnt daher gar nicht, dass die Kritik das Publikum noch weniger unterrichten kann, je weniger sie selbst unterrichtet ist.

§ 2 In weiterer Folge dieses Zustandes gelangen beide Teile zur unverständlichen Annahme, die Musik sei eben nichts anderes als was die Kritik dafür hält, ihr Stoff sei kein anderer, als den der Kritiker mitteilt und die Behandlung des Stoffes endlich wieder keine andere, als die der Kritiker ihm angedeihen lässt! Das Publikum schmeichelt sich mit dem Kritiker kunstkennerisch zu sein und plädiert für den Kritiker, der ihm den Stolz und die Freude der Selbstbeschmeichelung zuführt.

§ 3 Da der Kritiker aus dem Bund mit dem Publikum außerdem noch Geldvorteile bezieht, hat er das denkbar größte Interesse das Publikum im snobistischen Wahn zu bestärken und wenn es durchaus notwendig ist, schreitet er zu wissenschaftlichen Betrug, nur um seine Rolle aufrecht zu erhalten. Zu solchen Betrugsfakten zähle ich: der Kritiker gibt sich irgendwo nicht

Chapter 4
Criticism and the Public

§ 1 Despite of all of this there prevails a presumption in favour of the critic amongst those members of the public who also read reviews; a clandestine union of interest binds the public and critics. Because it is itself uninformed, the public cannot gauge the critic’s ignorance, and therefore has no idea that criticism can inform the public even less, the less it itself is informed.

§ 2 As a corollary of these circumstances, both [the public and the critics] arrive at the incomprehensible supposition that music is nothing other than what criticism deems it to be, that its material is none other than what the critic tells it to be, and that the only possible discussion of said material is ultimately that by the critic. In cohort with the critic, the public sweet-talks itself into being knowledgeable about art, and stands up for the critic, who nourishes its arrogance and joy of self-adulation.

§ 3 And since the critic moreover draws a financial gain from this union with the public, it is in his greatest interest imaginable to reinforce the public’s snobbish delusion, and if absolutely necessary he employs systematic deception in order to maintain his role. I consider the following facts as abetting such deception: the critic pretends to be at odds with something; by doing so he
einverstanden; damit will er den Schein erwecken, dass er Einwände gegen das Werk hat. Natürlich bleibt er die letzteren schuldig, doch hat er bereits den Effekt erzielt, das Publikum an seine Überlegenheit glauben zu machen. Ebenso weit verbreitet ist die Phrase ‘hier ist nicht der Ort’, womit der Kritiker ablehnt mit sachlichen Argumenten beizuspringen oder entgegenzutreten, wobei er aber wieder billig den Schein erweckt, als hätte er solche Argumente zur Verfügung. Gedankenlos, wie es nun einmal ist, lässt sich das Publikum den Betrug vormachen und nimmt in der Tat an, der Rezensent hätte wirklich alle Kenntnisse, um derentwillen man ihm das beste Vertrauen schenken darf. Die Mühelosigkeit der Lektüre unsachlich gehaltener Referate sagt, wie leicht zu denken, dem Publikum außerordentlich zu, und es fühlt sich dem Referenten gegenüber, der die Mühelosigkeit fördert, aufs dankbarste verpflichtet. Seine Erkenntlichkeit zeigt sich darin, dass es nicht die geringste Mühe sich nimmt, den windigen Betrug zu entlarven. Nichts aber wäre einfacher als dieses, denn im Grunde nämlich ist dasjenige, das er mit den oben angezogenen Phrasen zu vermeiden sich anschickt, doch nur die Sachlichkeit, die so unwillkürlich als ein Höheres hingestellt wird. Müsste denn aber das Publikum\{C/405\} nicht fragen, warum gerade diese Sachlichkeit, wenn sie das Höhere vorstellt, vorenthalten wird[?] Wittert gelegentlich der Rezensent die Gefahr einer solchen Frage, so weiß er sofort die Sachlichkeit, deren Ehren er für sich so betrügerischerweise in Anspruch nahm, andererseits ebenso wieder betrügerisch billig zu diskreditieren. Er preist dann plötzlich den vollen Gegensatz der Sachlichkeit, nämlich wants to create the impression of having reservations about the work of art. Naturally he withholds the details of his reservations, but in this way he has already succeeded in making the public believe in his superiority. Also widely used is the phrase ‘this is not the right place to talk about it’, whereby the critic refuses to support [his reservations] with factual arguments, while at the same time readily gives the impression that he has such arguments at his disposal. Unreflecting as it happens to be, the public lets itself be deceived and earnestly believes the critic to be truly informed and hence trustworthy. As can be easily fathomed, the effortlessness of consuming reviews lacking objectivity suits the public extremely well, and it feels greatly obliged to the critic who fosters such effortlessness. [The public] demonstrates its gratitude by making no effort to unmask that dubious imposture. Yet nothing would be easier to accomplish than just that, because fundamentally the only thing that [the critic] shuns with those above-quoted phrases is objectivity itself, which is so arbitrarily deemed a higher good. But would the public not at exactly that point have to scrutinise why the very objectivity that is deemed such a higher good is at the same time withheld? Whenever the occasion arises that the critic gets wind of a threat of such a question, he knows how to cunningly discredit the same objectivity that he had only just claimed so fraudulently in the first place. He then suddenly praises the antipode of objectivity, namely the integrity and naivety of the mind; he instructs that expert knowledge does nothing but spoil the capacity for enjoyment and judgement, and then proceeds to allude to the quarrels that musicians have fostered amongst themselves at any given time.
die geistige Unbescholtenheit und Naivität; er lehrt, fachmännische Kenntnisse verdüren nur die Fähigkeit zum Genießen, zum Urteilen, und weist auf die Gegensätze hin in denen Musiker gegen Musiker sich allezeit befinden. Jedenfalls sorgt er dann dafür, dass das Publikum nichts davon erfährt, wie man anders über Musik denken und schreiben kann. Sachlich gehaltene Referate verbannt er aus der Zeitung (siehe oben [Kapitel II], § [3]) und so gelingt es ihm, das Publikum zu beruhigen und gläubig zu machen. Publikum und Kritik sind wieder einmal eins.

§ 4 Nach oben hin aber, das heißt gegenüber wirklich überlegenen Musikern stellt der Rezensent jenes betrügerische Doppelspiel gerne anders dar: er versucht glauben zu machen, dass er die Musik popularisiere, auch wenn er nur so darüber schreibe. Hier ist möglicherweise ein Selbstbetrug anzunehmen, denn schließlich mag demjenigen, der es nicht anders weiß und daher nicht anders kann, seine Leistung immerhin in einem besseren Lichte erscheinen, als sie es verdient. Solchem Wahn ist daher nur zu entgegen: die Musik, populär dargestellt, darf ebenso wenig anders aussehen als z. B. Philosophie oder Chemie, wenn sie in einer Tageszeitung zu populärer Darstellung gelangen. In letzteren Fällen ist es dann ausgeschlossen, dass Sachlichkeit soweit gemieden wird, dass darüber der Gegenstand verloren ginge. Hielten die musikalischen Referenten damit nur halbwegs so, wie es diejenigen tun, die andere Gegenstände in den Zeitungen populär darstellen, so

In any case, [the critic] then makes it his aim to keep the public in the dark about how one can write and think about music differently. Objectively argued articles are banished from the newspapers (see [Chapter 2], § [3] above), and in this way he succeeds in mollifying the public and taking them in. Public and criticism are as one yet again.

§ 4 Towards those on top, by which I mean in the face of truly superior musicians, the critic presents this deceitful duplicity in a different light: he ventures to make them believe that he popularises music, even if he only ever writes about it in the way that he does. In this instance one may have to assume self-deception, since someone who knows no better and is therefore incapable of doing better may ultimately consider his achievements in a more favourable light then they deserve. Such folly can only be rebuffed with the following: even if represented in a popular way, music must look no different than, for example, philosophy or chemistry whenever these subjects end up being presented in a daily newspaper in a popular manner. In the latter cases it is unthinkable that objectivity would be avoided to such an extent so as to make the subject matter vanish. If the music critics would proceed in only a halfway decent manner as those who present other subjects in the newspapers, we could at best speak of a popularising

6 Reference missing, reconstructed.
könnte man allenfalls von einem popularisierenden Vortrag sprechen; doch dem ist, wie man sich täglich überzeugen kann, leider nicht so. Trotzdem aber zu fordern, dass man an die Kenntnisse glaube, auch wenn sie nirgends zum Ausdruck kommen, oder nur so, wie man es eben sieht, ist einfach lächerlich und kindisch. Mag wohl das gläubige Publikum annehmen, dass z. B. der hier bereits zitierte berühmte Rezensent, Hanslick, irgendwie gelehrt sein musste, einfach nur, weil er sich für einen kenntnisreichen Musiker selbst ausgab, so bleibt es dagegen dem wirklich unterrichteten Musiker unbenommen, den Mangel an Kenntnissen auch bei dem genannten Rezensenten zu durchschauen. Schließlich hat noch jedermann Platz gefunden, und den starken Drang besessen, wirkliche Kenntnisse mitzuteilen, sollten es also gerade nur die armen Rezensenten sein, die ihre Unkenntnisse abzuladen stets den Platz finden, niemals angeblich den Ort, an dem sie ihre Kenntnisse abladen konnten. Aus alldem geht somit jedenfalls soviel klar hervor, dass auch die Rolle eines popularisierenden Vermittlers zwischen Kunst und Publikum wieder nur eine Finte ist.

\[V.\ Kapitel\]
Schäden der Kritik

\[§ 1\ Unermesslich ist der Schaden, der der Kunst daraus entsteht, dass Publikum und Kritik ihr Antlitz stets nur so sehen, wie es sich in den Zeitungen und den ausschließenden unöffentlichen Gesprächen widerspiegelt. Nichts erniedrigt die Kunst so sehr, als dass man sie lediglich für das hält, als was sie in der Zeitung erscheint; nichts verwirrt account; but unfortunately, as one can observe on almost a daily basis, this is not the case. But to demand that one’s knowledge is taken at face value, just on a whim, despite the fact that it does not manifest itself anywhere at all, is, as one can witness, simply ridiculous and childish. The gullible public may well think that, for instance, the famous critic Hanslick, already cited here, had somehow to be knowledgeable simply because he passed himself off as a knowledgeable musician; in contrast, the truly educated musician is at liberty to see through the lack of comprehension even of the aforementioned critic. Everyone has ultimately found the opportunity (and has had the strong desire) to share real insight; how can it then be true that it is only ever the poor critics that find the space – but never, allegedly, the right place – to unload their knowledge? One thing that can be taken away from all this for certain is that the role of a popularising intermediary between art and the public is again nothing but a ruse.

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und schädigt das allgemeine Kunstgefühl so sehr, als der Wahn, auch z. B. ein Beethoven habe, von der göttlichen Inspiration freilich abgesehen, nur mit dem Vorrat an Kenntnissen gearbeitet, wie er als angeblicher Gesamtinhalt der Kunst in der Zeitung auch dem Publikum vermittelt wird. Hat je, frag ich, die Kritik das Publikum belehrt darüber, woran es läge, dass z. B. Beethoven einen Chopin, einen Grieg überrase? Hat die Kritik je darüber Auskunft gegeben, dass die Inspiration noch nicht alles sei und hat sie je über die Technik als solche geschrieben?

§ 2 Die Kritik wendet sich, um es ganz allgemein zu sagen, stets nur dem Persönlichen zu und versäumt es, das Werk selbst zu beschreiben, zu dem es, wie wir bereits wissen, ebenso wenig Zutritt hat, wie das übrige Publikum. Daher hat es ein musikalisches Werk vor dem Publikum niemals zu jener bestimmten Rolle einer bestimmten Persönlichkeit gebracht, wie sie Erzeugnis anderer Künste, z. B. der Poesie oder Malerei innehaben. Das Publikum weiß so ziemlich gut, was es sich unter Egmont, Tasso, oder der Sixtinischen Madonna vorzustellen habe, dagegen gar nichts, was es sich bei einer Symphonie von Haydn, Beethoven oder Brahms zu denken habe. Im Grunde ist es ja auch nicht das Werk, wovon das Publikum angezogen wird, sondern die persönlichen Momente sind es, die ausschlaggebend wirken: der Name des Autors, des Dirigenten, und der mitwirkenden Künstler. Und wenn auch immerhin einige wenige Werke, wie z. B. die Matthäuspassion und die Hohe Messe von Sebastian Bach oder die IX. Symphonie von Beethoven es zu jener Rolle gebracht haben, die die gesamte Welt ihnen

common artistic instinct to as great a degree than the delusion that, for instance, a Beethoven might have operated – discounting divine inspiration of course – only within the boundaries of knowledge that are communicated in the newspapers to the public as the supposedly sole contents of art. Has criticism ever, I ask, educated the public as to why, for instance, Beethoven surpasses a Chopin, a Grieg? Has criticism ever provided information as to why inspiration is not everything, and has it ever written about technique as such?

§ 2 Generally speaking, criticism only ever dedicates itself to individual reflections and fails to describe the work itself, to which, as we already know, it has as little access as the rest of the public. This is why a musical work has never inhabited the specific role of a specific meaning that products of other artistic creation occupy, such as poetry and painting. The public knows pretty well how to appreciate Egmont, Tasso, or the Sistine Madonna, but nothing of how to think about a symphony by Haydn, Beethoven, or Brahms. Fundamentally, it is not the work itself that attracts the public, but it is the superficial details that matter: the name of the composer, the conductor, and those of the performers. Although some works such as the St Matthew Passion, the Mass in B Minor by Bach or Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony have achieved the status that the whole world bestows on them, it would be a serious error to believe that these works have been granted the same pleasing revelation of their contents as the aforementioned theatre pieces – that it was a Mendelssohn or a Wagner who have on account of their authority defined the meaning of these masterworks once and for all. If
zubilligt, so wäre es eine schwere Täuschung zu glauben, hier läge eine ähnlich glückliche Enthüllung des Inhalts vor, wie bei den oben erwähnten Dramen – dass vielmehr ein Mendelssohn, ein Wagner es gewesen, die durch ihre Autorität gleichsam die Persönlichkeit jener Musikwerke ein für allemal kreiert haben. Denn ginge es nach der wahren Erkennnis des Inhalts, so wäre nicht zu erklären, weshalb andere Symphonien unserer Meister nicht so allgemein {C/410} durchdrungen sind, als sie es mit ihren bestimmten, nirgendwo wiederholten Charakterzügen verdienen.

§ 3 Auf diese Weise erklärt sich der materielle Schaden, den jene Unternehmungen notwendig erleiden müssen, die ihr Schwergewicht in die Werke als solche legen. Hat man je dem Publikum z. B. die Johannespassion beschrieben oder desselben Meisters Partiten oder Suiten? Nun wage man, die Werke zur Aufführung zu bringen; das Defizit ist unabweisbar, sofern nicht z. B. ein Messchaert mitwirkt, oder ein d’Albert vorträgt. Das Werk selbst, weil dem Inhalt nach unbekannt, hat keinen Geldkredit.

§ 4 Und so kann man es endlich als allgemein aussprechen, dass nur wenn ein berühmter Virtuose (Dirigent, Sänger, Klavier oder Violinspieler) es vorträgt, ein neues Werk überhaupt Beachtung findet.

§ 5 Und das allerletzte Resultat: Welch’ schädliche Rückwirkung auf die Lebensmöglichkeiten eines Künstlers, auf seinen Unterhalt das alles bedeutet, braucht nur gesagt zu werden. Wie denn schließlich auch diese ohne weiters einleuchten, dass die Erschwerung des Lebens dem

it were [only] a matter of truly recognising the content, it would be difficult to explain why other symphonies by our masters have not found the widespread appreciation that they deserve on account of their particular characteristics, which have been repeated nowhere else.

§ 3 This explains the material damages that are suffered by those whose endeavours concentrate on the works as such. Has anyone ever described to the public [Bach’s] St John Passion, or the same master’s partitas or suites? Now, supposing that one were to dare to perform these works; the shortfall [in ticket sales] would be inevitable unless it were a Messchaert who took part, or a d’Albert who performed. The work itself, because its content is still unrecognised, has no monetary value.

§ 4 And now we can at last proclaim it as a general truth that a new work only ever receives recognition if a famous virtuoso (be it a conductor, singer, pianist, or violinist) takes part in the performance.

§ 5 And the ultimate result: one scarcely needs to spell out the damaging repercussions for an artist in terms of his livelihood. It is perfectly obvious that the burdens of an artist’s life can also cause psychological inhibitions, and that art is therefore served in the worst way imaginable.
Künstler auch psychische Hemmungen verursacht und dass darin auch für die Kunst der denkbar größte Nachteil entsteht.

[Note: The chapter originally ended here. The page has been cut and the following paragraphs inserted.]

[Addendum to § 5]

\{C/411\} ad § 5 Freilich, gerade darum kümmern sich die Kritiker am allerwenigsten; sie sind völlig schonungslos wider den Begabten und wenn nun dieser in berechtigter Abwehr gegen sie den Vorwurf erhebt, dass sie, ohne der Kunst irgend zu nützen, das Leben demjenigen überflüssigerweise erschweren, der seinerseits der Kunst wohl nützen könnte, so stellen sie sich über den Vorwurf der Inhumanität erstaunt und mit einer Naivität, der nur ihre Unkenntnis die Wage hält, zetern sie, man sollte doch auch sie leben lassen, dass sie, wie jeder andere, ein Recht auf Existenz hätten. Welch' infame Unterstellung; Menschen, die das Leben wirklich nicht verdienen und, da sie es nun einmal haben, es nur dazu zu gebrauchen wissen, hervorrägenden Menschen zu schaden, tun so als wären umgekehrt sie es, die man nicht leben lassen wollte, wo umgekehrt sie selbst es sind, die den Künstler nicht leben lassen wollen. Doch wie es nun so beschaffen Tier-Menschen ergeht, befällt sie der Schaden gleichsam rücklings; indem sie mit der Macht einer verheerenden Pest sich ausbreitend den großen Künstler und damit die Kunst untergraben, sägen sie zugleich den Zweig ab, auf dem sie selbst sitzen und vernichten so jene Quelle aus der sie Unterhalt für sich und die ihren mit so geringer Anstrengung schöpfen konnten. Es

ad § 5 Of course, this is the last thing on the critics’ mind; they are ruthless towards the one who is exceptional; and if he reproaches them in righteous indignation, accusing those who are of no use to art of making life unnecessarily difficult for those who could by all means be beneficial to art, they pretend to be astonished about the accusation of inhuman conduct, and with a naivety that is second only to their ignorance they rant and rave that one ought to let them live, that they had a right to exist like anyone else. What malign presumption; the same men who truly do not deserve life and who, as it is given to them anyway, use it only to damage exceptional men, conversely make out that it is they who are denied to live. On the contrary, it is they who do not want to let artists live! As is the destiny of such bestial human beings, they fall prey to the very damage that they themselves have caused: by undermining the great artist and, consequently, great art with the force of a devastating plague, [the critics] saw off the branch on which they themselves are sitting and thereby destroy the source from which they and their ilk could nourish themselves with such little effort. The day will dawn on which there will be no more art and no more artists, and they will have to reach for another trade or branch of employment, which, however, will yield less glory and honour!
dämmert der Tag, an dem sie, weil es keine Kunst und keine Künstler mehr geben wird, nach einem anderen Handels oder Erwerbszweig werden zu greifen haben, der aber freilich weniger Glanz und Ehren bringen wird!

§ 6 Man wird auch so verstehen, weshalb es gerade der Kritik unmöglich fiel einen Künstler zu kreieren; am häufigsten kreieren Künstler die Künstler selbst durch persönliche oder schriftliche Äußerung und durch eigene Autorität. Der Kritiker aber ist niemals der erste, vielmehr nach hundert und tausend Menschen, die sich bereits gruppiert haben, ergreift er, mit der Meinung nachfolgend, verspätet das Wort.

VI. Kapitel
Das Nützen der Kritik

§ 1 Vom Nutzen der Kritik lässt sich überhaupt nur insoweit sprechen als gewiss auch einige Wahrheit in der Redensart steckt die da sagt: alles Böse hat auch ein Gutes.

Chapter 6
The Benefits of Criticism

§ 1 In terms of the benefits of criticism, one can only go as far as to acknowledge that there is certainly some truth in the colloquialism that says that every cloud has a silver lining.

Supplement

‘Brahms – Drei Streichquartette’ (1874)
by Eduard Hanslick

Brahms’ drei Streichquartette (1851) sind die erste Publikation des Tondichters auf diesem Gebiet. Das Quartett Nr. 1 in C-moll ist ein gedankenreiches und doch klares, ein geistvoll und doch nicht überspanntes Werk. Der erste Satz, den wir zuhöchst stellen, führt ein prachtvoll leidenschaftliches Thema ganz

Brahms’s Three String Quartets (1851) are the composer’s first foray into this genre. The First Quartet in C minor is a work rich in ideas, yet lucid and in no way quixotic. The first movement, which we rate the highest, masterfully develops a gloriously impassioned theme. A meditative Adagio in A flat major, which brings to
meisterhaft durch. Einem sinnenden, an Beethovens letzten Quartetts Style erinnernden Adagio in As-Dur folgt ein geistvolles F-moll Allegretto mit einem reizend melodiosen Trio in F-dur. Das lebhaft dahinstürmende Finale (C-moll) steht an Originalität der Erfindung und unmittelbarer Wirkung hinter dem früheren zurück; das Ungenügende jedes Quartettsspiels bei anhaltender Anstrengung in leidenschaftlichen Forte-Passagen schädigt auch dieses Stück, das uns eine doppelte Besetzung und Contrabässe hinzuwünschen läßt. Die Quartette sind dem Freunde des Komponisten, Professor Billroth in Wien, gewidmet, der das *Jus primae noctis* aller Brahmssehen Kammermusiken hat und bei dem auch die neuen Quartette zum erstenmal gespielt wurden. Die Vorliebe für das zweite (A-moll) oder das erste Quartett (C-moll) ist getheilt; bei mir sogar mathematisch so zu zwei und zwei Sätzen. Das leidenschaftlich Allegro und das launige Scherzo des C-moll-Quartetts überragen nämlich die beiden analogen Sätze des A-moll-Quartetts, welches wiederum in der tiefen, ruhigen Schwermuth seines Adagio und dem rhythmischen Zug des Finales seinen Vorgänger verdunkelt.

Das dritte Streichquartett von Brahms, B-dur, ein Werk reifster Meisterschaft gleich den zwei ersten, dürfte einen Vorzug vor ihnen noch voraus haben: es klingt heiterer, klarer, menschenfreundlicher. Die Themen sind echt quartettmäßig, die ganze Durchführung desgleichen – eine seltenwerdende Eigenschaft bei modernen Quartetten, die halb an den Klaviersatz mahnen, halb den Hinzutritt des Orchesters zu verlangen scheinen. Die feinste contrapunktische Kunst, die kühnste harmonisch, wir sind sie bei Brahms mind the style of Beethoven’s late quartets, is followed by an imaginative F minor Allegretto featuring a charming F major trio. Compared to the previous movements, the animated finale (C minor) falls short in terms of originality and immediacy; the deficiencies that can be witnessed in any quartet playing during sustained exertion in passionate, loud passages impairs this piece as well, and makes us wish for double the forces with added double basses. The quartets are dedicated to the composer’s friend Prof. Billroth in Vienna, who commands the *jus primae noctis* [right of the first night] of all of Brahms’s chamber music and at whose place the new quartets too were premiered. Our fondness for the Second (A minor) and the First Quartet (C minor) is equally apportioned – in my case mathematically so to two movements of each. The impassioned Allegro and the witty Scherzo of the C minor quartet surpass the two corresponding movements of the A minor quartet, which, in turn, outshines its predecessor in the deep, calm melancholy of its Adagio and the rhythmic strife of the finale.

The Third String Quartet by Brahms, in B-flat major, is, like the two previous ones, a work of most mature mastery, yet may be ahead of them on one merit: it sounds more cheerful, more transparent, more humane. The themes are genuinely quartet-like, the entire development as well – a quality that becomes more and more rare in modern quartets, which instead either remind us of harmony exercises or seem to demand the augmentation of an orchestra. The most sublime skills in counterpoint, the boldest statements in harmony: we have come to expect these from Brahms. But this time he surprises nevertheless with the transparent
gewohnt. Womit er uns diesmal noch überrascht, ist die heitere Klarheit welche den Grundcharakter des Quartetts bildet und in den Themen des ersten und des letzten Satzes geradezu volkstümliche Färbung annimmt. Von Mozart oder Haydn könnten dies Motive herrühren. Wollte man die schönsten Einfälle aufzählen, man würde nicht fertigwerden. Wie reizvoll überraschend wirkt gleich im ersten Satze der rhythmische Wechsel zwischen dem vorgezeichneten Sechsachtel- und dem heimlich unterschobenen Dreiviertel-Tacte, im Finale das plötzliche Auftauchen des Hauptmotivs aus dem Allegro! Das Andante (F-dur) ist ein breiter, süßer Gesang der ersten Violine. Das Scherzo, eine Art fantastischen Bratschesolos, das von den anderen drei Instrumenten mit Sordinen accompagnirt wird, gehört zu Brahms originellsten Stücken, ist aber beim ersten Hören nicht leicht zu fassen. Das Finale (Poco Allegretto) variiert ein gemütlich-heiteres Thema, ein Klang aus dem alten Wien, einfachste Liedform von vier zu vier Tacten, als Begleitung Tonika und Dominante.\footnote{Eduard Hanslick, \textit{Concerte, Componisten und Virtuosen der letzten fünfzehn Jahre: 1870-1885} (Berlin: Allgemeiner Verein der Deutschen Literatur, 1886), pp. 116-7.} nature that marks out the character of the quartet, and which takes on a downright folksy hue in the first and last movements. They could have derived from Mozart or Haydn. Even if we wanted to list only the most beautiful ideas, we would not come to an end. How charmingly startling are, even in the first movement, the rhythmic exchange between the written six-eight pattern and the stealthily planted three-four bar, and in the finale the sudden appearance of the main theme of the Allegro! The Andante (F major) is a generous, sweet song for the first violin. The Scherzo, a kind of fantastical viola solo that is accompanied by the other three strings with mutes, is among Brahms’s most original pieces but is not easy to grasp at first hearing. The Finale (Poco Allegretto) is a set of variations on a jovially-cheerful theme, a sound out of Old Vienna, the simplest song form in four four-bar phrases, accompanied by tonic and dominant.
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