The illusion of discretion
The illusion of discretion
Recent writers have invoked the idea that epistemic rationality gives us options in an attempt to show that we can exercise direct doxastic control without irrationality. Specifically, they suggest that when the evidence for p is sufficient but not conclusive, it would be rational either to believe p or to be agnostic on p, and they hold that we can in these cases effectively decide to form either attitude without irrationality. This paper argues against the version of epistemic permissivism (``Discretion'') invoked by these writers and shows that other defensible permissivisms do not support their cause. It proceeds as follows. §1 introduces the issue. §2 undermines two arguments for Discretion and uses some lessons from their failure to mount an argument against Discretion. §3 presents a further argument against Discretion. §4 offers an error theory to explain our misguided attraction to Discretion. §5 explains why other defensible permissivisms do not help to support the view that we can exercise direct doxastic control without irrationality
1635-1665
Sylvan, Kurt
507b57c8-e6ec-4a02-8b35-6d640b08b61c
2015
Sylvan, Kurt
507b57c8-e6ec-4a02-8b35-6d640b08b61c
Abstract
Recent writers have invoked the idea that epistemic rationality gives us options in an attempt to show that we can exercise direct doxastic control without irrationality. Specifically, they suggest that when the evidence for p is sufficient but not conclusive, it would be rational either to believe p or to be agnostic on p, and they hold that we can in these cases effectively decide to form either attitude without irrationality. This paper argues against the version of epistemic permissivism (``Discretion'') invoked by these writers and shows that other defensible permissivisms do not support their cause. It proceeds as follows. §1 introduces the issue. §2 undermines two arguments for Discretion and uses some lessons from their failure to mount an argument against Discretion. §3 presents a further argument against Discretion. §4 offers an error theory to explain our misguided attraction to Discretion. §5 explains why other defensible permissivisms do not help to support the view that we can exercise direct doxastic control without irrationality
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Illusion Of Discretion Author Copy.pdf
- Accepted Manuscript
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Accepted/In Press date: 7 June 2015
e-pub ahead of print date: 2 July 2015
Published date: 2015
Organisations:
Philosophy
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 378794
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/378794
ISSN: 0039-7857
PURE UUID: a35b1d45-87bb-49a6-a794-c7e0620efdeb
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Date deposited: 17 Jul 2015 08:27
Last modified: 14 Mar 2024 20:28
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