Recommending fair payments for large-scale social ridesharing

Abstract

We perform recommendations for the Social Ridesharing scenario, in which a set of commuters, connected through a social network, arrange one-time rides at short notice. In particular, we focus on how much one should pay for taking a ride with friends. More formally, we propose the first approach that can compute fair coalitional payments that are also stable according to the game-theoretic concept of the kernel for systems with thousands of agents in real-world scenarios. Our tests, based on real datasets for both spatial (GeoLife) and social data (Twitter), show that our approach is significantly faster than the state-of-the-art (up to 84 times), allowing us to compute stable payments for 2000 agents in 50 minutes. We also develop a parallel version of our approach, which achieves a near-optimal speed-up in the number of processors used. Finally, our empirical analysis reveals new insights into the relationship between payments incurred by a user by virtue of its position in its social network and its role (rider or driver).

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ORCID for Sarvapali Ramchurn: orcid.org/0000-0001-9686-4302

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