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Power balanced circuits for leakage-power-attacks resilient design

Power balanced circuits for leakage-power-attacks resilient design
Power balanced circuits for leakage-power-attacks resilient design
The continuous rise of static power consumption in modern CMOS technologies has led to the creation of a novel class of security attacks on cryptographic systems. The latter exploits the correlation between leakage current and the input patterns to infer the secret key; it is called leakage power analysis (LPA). The use power-balanced (m-of-n) logic is a promising solution that provides an answer to this problem, such circuits are designed to consume constant amount of power regardless of data being processed. This work evaluates the security of cryptographic circuits designed with this technology against the newly developed LPA. Two forms of LPA are investigated, one is based on differential power analysis (LDPA) and the other based on Hamming weight analysis (LHPA). Simulations performed at 90nm CMOS technology reveal that (m-of-n) circuits are totally resilient to LHPA and have a higher security level against LDPA than standard logic circuits.
Halak, Basel
8221f839-0dfd-4f81-9865-37def5f79f33
Murphy, J.
ac5964f7-48bd-424f-9cc6-6faa2b36e590
Yakovlev, Alex
d6c94911-c126-4cb7-8f92-d71a898ebbb2
Halak, Basel
8221f839-0dfd-4f81-9865-37def5f79f33
Murphy, J.
ac5964f7-48bd-424f-9cc6-6faa2b36e590
Yakovlev, Alex
d6c94911-c126-4cb7-8f92-d71a898ebbb2

Halak, Basel, Murphy, J. and Yakovlev, Alex (2015) Power balanced circuits for leakage-power-attacks resilient design At IEEE Science and Information Conference, United Kingdom. 28 - 31 Jul 2015.

Record type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)

Abstract

The continuous rise of static power consumption in modern CMOS technologies has led to the creation of a novel class of security attacks on cryptographic systems. The latter exploits the correlation between leakage current and the input patterns to infer the secret key; it is called leakage power analysis (LPA). The use power-balanced (m-of-n) logic is a promising solution that provides an answer to this problem, such circuits are designed to consume constant amount of power regardless of data being processed. This work evaluates the security of cryptographic circuits designed with this technology against the newly developed LPA. Two forms of LPA are investigated, one is based on differential power analysis (LDPA) and the other based on Hamming weight analysis (LHPA). Simulations performed at 90nm CMOS technology reveal that (m-of-n) circuits are totally resilient to LHPA and have a higher security level against LDPA than standard logic circuits.

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More information

Published date: July 2015
Venue - Dates: IEEE Science and Information Conference, United Kingdom, 2015-07-28 - 2015-07-31
Organisations: EEE

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 379697
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/379697
PURE UUID: c3755f3c-a47b-464e-b3f4-62dd107d631d

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 27 Jul 2015 13:43
Last modified: 17 Jul 2017 20:41

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Contributors

Author: Basel Halak
Author: J. Murphy
Author: Alex Yakovlev

University divisions

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