Merging Multiple Information Sources in Federated Sponsored Search Auctions
Merging Multiple Information Sources in Federated Sponsored Search Auctions
The recent increase of domain{specific search engines, able to discover information unknown by general-purpose search engines, leads to their federation into a single entity, called federated search engine. In this paper, we focus on how it can effectively merge sponsored search results, provided by the domain-specific search engines, into a unique list. In particular, we discuss the case in which the same ad can be provided by multiple sources, which requires information about the ad to be merged. We approach the problem of merging and sharing the revenue using mechanism design techniques. The main impossibility result we obtain points out there exists no mechanism that satisfies the customarily required properties. Thus, we present several mechanisms that violate at most one of these properties, and we experimentally analyze them using a real-world Yahoo! dataset.
Ceppi, Sofia
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Gerding, Enrico H.
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Gatti, Nicola
aceed282-d524-4b1d-9ad8-0685eac20d3a
June 2012
Ceppi, Sofia
d6dd2f1c-c7a4-4ec1-b3d7-82b433ca5bf8
Gerding, Enrico H.
d9e92ee5-1a8c-4467-a689-8363e7743362
Gatti, Nicola
aceed282-d524-4b1d-9ad8-0685eac20d3a
Ceppi, Sofia, Gerding, Enrico H. and Gatti, Nicola
(2012)
Merging Multiple Information Sources in Federated Sponsored Search Auctions.
11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2012).
Record type:
Conference or Workshop Item
(Poster)
Abstract
The recent increase of domain{specific search engines, able to discover information unknown by general-purpose search engines, leads to their federation into a single entity, called federated search engine. In this paper, we focus on how it can effectively merge sponsored search results, provided by the domain-specific search engines, into a unique list. In particular, we discuss the case in which the same ad can be provided by multiple sources, which requires information about the ad to be merged. We approach the problem of merging and sharing the revenue using mechanism design techniques. The main impossibility result we obtain points out there exists no mechanism that satisfies the customarily required properties. Thus, we present several mechanisms that violate at most one of these properties, and we experimentally analyze them using a real-world Yahoo! dataset.
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Published date: June 2012
Venue - Dates:
11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2012), 2012-06-01
Organisations:
Agents, Interactions & Complexity
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 380506
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/380506
PURE UUID: 34bcad17-368d-44ff-bbb4-233985648e51
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Date deposited: 17 Aug 2015 09:20
Last modified: 15 Mar 2024 03:23
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Contributors
Author:
Sofia Ceppi
Author:
Enrico H. Gerding
Author:
Nicola Gatti
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