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Anglo–Burgundian Military Cooperation, 1420–1435

by

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ABSTRACT

FACULTY OF HUMANITIES

HISTORY

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ANGLO–BURGUNDIAN MILITARY COOPERATION, 1420–1435

Aleksandr Lobanov

Apart for a few episodes such as the battle of Cravant (1423), the defence of Paris (1429) and especially the capture of Joan of Arc at the siege of Compiègne (1430), the military aspect of Anglo–Burgundian alliance in 1420–1435 war is little known to general audience. This stage of the Hundred Years War is presented largely as a series of English successes in the 1420s followed by the defeats and setbacks after 1429. The present study aims to uncover this largely ignored aspect of one of the most dramatic stages of the Hundred Years War, which at a certain point brought the English to the walls of Orléans – an undoubted peak of their centuries-long efforts to subdue the French kingdom.

For the aims of research, the course of the Hundred Years War in the 1420s–early 1430s has to be considered not in the terms of the English fighting against the French but as a struggle of two alternative claims to the French throne, both of them relying on certain support among the French population. One of these suggested that the French crown remained with the Valois dynasty represented by Charles VII, the other tried to introduce the Dual Monarchy of England and France under the governance of the House of Lancaster, as formalised by the Treaty of Troyes (21 May 1420). The role of Philip the Good, duke of Burgundy, the most high-ranking French partisan of the Dual monarchy, as the pillar of the Lancastrian power in France becomes the subject of study. This raises the question of the system of obligations between the duke and the Lancastrian government, the modes of its practical exploitation and the significance of the duke’s contribution to the Lancastrian war efforts.

With this in mind, this study provides a chronological reconstruction of Anglo–Burgundian military cooperation in its development by placing it in a wider military and diplomatic context. Having assembled the evidence on the
practice of military assistance it proceeds to discussing the most widely em-
ployed models of cooperation and interaction between the allies eventually
leading to a certain reconsideration of the whole nature of the Anglo-
Burgundian alliance. What the research reveals is the scale and continuity of
the alliance which retained its importance from December 1419 to September
1435, the significance of the allies’ efforts in supporting each other and variety
of its models and, finally, the crucial influence of the military power or weak-
ness factor on the diplomacy and politics in France.
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DECLARATION OF AUTHORSHIP

I, Aleksandr Lobanov

declare that this thesis and the work presented in it are my own and has been
generated by me as the result of my own original research.

Anglo-Burgundian Military Cooperation, 1420–1435

I confirm that:

1. This work was done wholly or mainly while in candidature for a research
degree at this University;
2. Where any part of this thesis has previously been submitted for a degree or
any other qualification at this University or any other institution, this has
been clearly stated;
3. Where I have consulted the published work of others, this is always clearly
attributed;
4. Where I have quoted from the work of others, the source is always given.
   With the exception of such quotations, this thesis is entirely my own work;
5. I have acknowledged all main sources of help;
6. Where the thesis is based on work done by myself jointly with others, I have
   made clear exactly what was done by others and what I have contributed
   myself;
7. Parts of this work (Appendix E) have been accepted for publication as:
   A. Lobanov, ‘The Indenture of Philip the Good, duke of Burgundy, of 12
   February 1430 and the Lancastrian Kingdom of France’, EHR, 130 (2015),
   [scheduled for the April issue (543), pages to be confirmed].

Signed:.................................................................................................................................

Date:........................................................................................................................................
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I have to acknowledge specially the patience, eagerness to help and tolerance to my spoken French of all and every member of staff whom I contacted during my visits to the archives and libraries in France. I am also very thankful to the members of the digitisation department of the Bibliothèque Nationale de France for making a significant and ever-growing part of their collections available online at the Gallica digital library (this especially relates but is not limited to manuscripts and local French journals); their efforts saved me a fortune.

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## Definitions and Abbreviations

### List of abbreviations

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AB</td>
<td>Annales de Bourgogne.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADCO</td>
<td>Archives Départementales de Côte d’Or (Dijon).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADN</td>
<td>Archives Départementales du Nord (Lille).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMM</td>
<td>Archives Municipales de Mâcon (Mâcon)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN</td>
<td>Archives Nationales (Paris).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basset</td>
<td>The chronicle of Peter Basset and Christopher Hanson in London, College of Arms MS. M9 fos. 31r–66v.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEC</td>
<td>Bibliothèque de l’Ecole des Chartes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BL</td>
<td>British Library (London).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNF</td>
<td>Bibliothèque Nationale de France (Paris).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brut</td>
<td><em>The Brut or the Chronicles of England</em>, ed. by F. W. D. Brie,</td>
</tr>
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Canat  *Documents inédits pour servir à l'histoire de Bourgogne*, ed. by M. Canat, t. I (Châlon–sur–Saone, 1863).


Cochon  *Chronique Normande de Pierre Cochon, notaire apostolique à Rouen*, ed. by Ch. de Robillard de Beaurepaire (Rouen, 1870).

Cordeliers  An anonymous chronicle known as *La Chronique des Cordeliers* in BNF, MS. Fr. 23018.


Dunes  *Chroniques relatives à l'histoire de la Belgique sous la domination des ducs de Bourgogne. (Textes Latins). Chroniques des religieux des Dunes, Jean Brandon – Gilles de*

DKR Report of the Deputy Keeper of the Public Records

EHR The English Historical Review.


*Fenin* *Mémoires de Pierre de Fenin comprenant le récit des événements qui se sont passés en France et en Bourgogne sous les règnes de Charles VI et Charles VII (1407-1427)*, ed. by E. Dupont (Paris, 1837).


Gruel

Itinéraires
*Itinéraires de Philippe le Bon, duc de Bourgogne (1419-1457) et de Charles, comte de Charolais (1433-1467)*, ed. by H. vander Linden (Bruxelles, 1940).

Journal du siege d’Orléans

Hall

Letters and Papers

Monstrelet

Monstrelet (eng.)
The Chronicles of Enguerrand de Monstrelet … Continued by Others to the Year MDXVI, ed. by T. Johnes, 13 vols (London, 1810).

MSAN
Mémoires de la Société des Antiquaires de Normandie.

MSAP
Mémoires de la Société des Antiquaires de Picardie.

NMS
Nottingham Medieval Studies.

ODNB

Ordonnances

PCEEB
Publications du Centre européen d'études bourguignonnes (XIVe-XVIe s.).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TNA</td>
<td>The National Archives (Kew).</td>
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</table>
A note on terminology: collective identities in France in the 1420s–1430s.

While it is generally accepted that the Hundred Years War was fought between the English and the French, any study looking more closely at relations between and within the parties engaged in the struggle for the control of France requires a more developed terminology, designating the partisan identities where both sides sought to present themselves as French whilst refusing to acknowledge their opponents as worthy of the same national identity. Another ambiguity is the application of the terms ‘Burgundians’ or ‘Anglo-Burgundians’ to any French-born adherents of the Lancastrian Regime as well as to the inhabitants, subjects and political partisans of the duke of Burgundy. In an attempt to avoid lengthy explanations, a preliminary definition of the terms used henceforward to describe the collective identities of France in the 1420s–1430s seems appropriate.

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1 The duke of Bedford in his disciplinary ordinances (1423) prohibited the subjects of Henry VI to style the adherents of Charles VII as ‘French’ (and their leader as the ‘King’) by reserving for them the term ‘Armagnacs’, B. J. H. Rowe ‘Discipline in the Norman Garrisons under Bedford, 1422–35’, *EHR*, 46 (1931), p. 205.
2 See, for example: ‘les Anglois et aussi leurs alliez de la langue françoise, nommez Bourguignons’, *Pucelle*, p. 336.
3 The ambiguity of the term is noted in A. Leguai, ‘La «France Bourguignonne» dans le conflit entre la «France Français» et la «France Anglaise» (1420–1435)’, in *La “France Anglaise” au Moyen Age*, *Actes Du 111e Congrès National Des Societies Savantes (Poitiers, 1986)* (Paris, 1988), p. 46. This vagueness is to a certain degree resolved in the Russian historical practice reserving a specific term *буринъон* (pronounced as French *bourguignon*) to describe the political adherents of the duke of Burgundy regardless of their origin.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term:</th>
<th>Applied to:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>Natives of the kingdom of England and dependent territories(^5) (regardless of political sympathies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>Natives of the kingdom of France (regardless of political sympathies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lancastrians</td>
<td>Supporters of the Treaty of Troyes, accepting the succession of the Lancastrian dynasty to the throne of France after the death of Charles VI of France (regardless of their origin)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valois partisans / Armagnacs / Dauphinists</td>
<td>Followers of Dauphin Charles (future Charles VII) and the rights of the Valois dynasty to the throne of France (regardless of their origin)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burgundians</td>
<td>Subjects, servants and partisans of the duke of Burgundy. In cases when either geographic or political aspect has to be emphasized they will be described as ‘natives of Burgundy’ or ‘Burgundian partisans’ respectively</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normans, Gascons, Bretons, Parisians</td>
<td>Natives of the corresponding places and regions (employed when local identity is of special interest)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welsh, Irish etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^5\) This may include Welshmen, Irish etc. unless their specific origin is of particular importance.
Introduction

On 1 December 1420, Advent Sunday, Paris greeted the King of France, Charles VI, returning to his capital. Alongside the king rode Henry V, King of England, who six months earlier had been proclaimed heir to the French throne and appointed as regent of the French kingdom. After them, the young duke of Burgundy, Philip, clad in black as a sign of mourning for his murdered father, followed, alongside the brothers of the English king. This procession represented the advent of a new regime, intended to re-establish peace and order in a country which had suffered from partisan discords and hostilities between the Armagnacs and the Burgundians for almost a decade. This regime was introduced by the Treaty of Troyes signed in May 1420, which opened a new stage in the Hundred Years War by changing the role played by the English in hostilities. It allowed Henry V to enter Paris not as a conqueror (as he had been perceived for five years since his first invasion of France in 1415) but as a member of the French royal family and effective ruler and heir to the kingdom of France.

This was, however, in no way the end of the Hundred Years War. The Treaty of Troyes was never accepted in the regions of central and southern France controlled by the remnants of the Armagnac party. They presented the last surviving son of Charles VI, the Dauphin Charles (the future Charles VII), a youth of seventeen, as their leader and the heir to the French throne. This was the opposition Henry V and (after his death) his brother John, duke of Bedford, regent of France for underage Henry VI, fought to suppress. Until 1435 the duke of Burgundy and his adherents supported them in this struggle, becoming an important pillar of the Lancastrian regime in France. However the role

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Introduction

played in the war by the Burgundians, with only a few exceptions such as the battle of Cravant (1423) or the capture of Joan of Arc before Compiègne (1430), remains in the shadow of the deeds of the English.

On the other hand, the Treaty of Arras of 1435, which marked the reconciliation of Philip the Good with Charles VII and the collapse of Anglo-Burgundian alliance, is often presented as the turning point in the Hundred Years War, and even of the fifteenth-century history of England. The inability of the English to win the war without Burgundian support is emphasized, leading to the suggestion that the alliance had been of significant importance. What can be said for sure is that, of all the periods of the Hundred Years' War, the 1420s were the decade when the kings of England came the closest to their goal of uniting the kingdoms of England and France under their sway.

The question of the role and character of Anglo-Burgundian alliance has been inevitably discussed in more or less detail in a number of studies of Valois Burgundy, the biographies of the dukes and the members of their entourage who played an important role in forming and pursuing the duke's policy in the 1420s–30s. However, Anglo-Burgundian relations have only occasional-

---


6 See, for example, C. Berry, ‘Les Luxembourg-Ligny, un grand ligneage noble de la fin du Moyen Âge’ (thèse pour doctorat, Université Paris Est Creteil Val-de-Marne, 2011); B. de Lannoy, Hugues de Lannoy, le bon seigneur de Santes (Bruxelles, 1957); J. Pot, Histoire de Regnier Pot, Conseiller des Ducs de Bourgogne, 1362 (?) – 1432. (Paris, 1929); B. Schnerb, ‘Jean de Villiers, seigneur de L’Isle-Adam, vu par les chroniquers bourguignons’, PCEE, 41 (2001), pp. 105–121. The biography of Louis de Chalon, prince of Orange does not pay that much attention to the relations with English, F.
ly been the subject of dedicated investigation. The first attempt at a focused study undertaken by L. V. D. Owen largely ignored the military side of the alliance after the death of Henry V, describing the following period as that of gradual reconciliation between Duke Philip and Charles VII. Owen regarded the Anglo-Flemish wool trade as a key factor behind the Anglo-Burgundian cooperation both economic and political. However, as perfectly shown by J. H. A. Munro, the influence of mercantile factor was much more ambivalent, first facilitating the alliance, but then contributing to its break-down.

Several attempts have been made to define the place of the principalities of the duke of Burgundy within the Lancastrian regime. C. A. J. Armstrong drew attention to the conflicts between the duke of Burgundy aiming to extend his powers in the kingdom, and the Lancastrian government in Paris defending the accustomed rights of the French crown. Armstrong’s perception of the Anglo-Burgundian relations was that of a gradual decrease which eventually came to a rupture in 1435. His interpretation was generally accepted by A. Leguai.

The concept of decline was further explored by R. Vaughan, who presented a most pessimistic yet influential perception of the alliance. Bringing attention to some important dimensions of the conflict such as the personal aspects of the enmities and alliances, he tended to see the Anglo-Burgundian alliance as a shield Philip the Good needed to protect himself against the Dauphin while pursuing his own interests. This leads to a presentation of joint military

Barbey, Louis de Chalon prince d’Orange, seigneur d’Orbe, Échallens, Grandson, 1390-1463 (Lausanne, Geneve, Neuchatel, Vevey, Montreux, Berne, 1926).
11 Franco-Burgundian warfare was sporadic and mostly peripheral, Franco-Burgundian negotiation began as early as 1422. The English alliance was only a by-product of Philip’s pursuit of his own material interests’, R. Vaughan, Philip the Good, p. 6.
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efforts as deteriorating after the initial success in 1420, with the duke mostly acting on defensive. He portrayed Duke Philip as a quasi-mercenary only taking the field if paid by the crown. Vaughan considers the Anglo-Burgundian relations since 1431 to decline steadily while the duke’s reconciliation with Charles VII became only a matter of time.

More recently, M. Warner emphasized the military importance of the partnership, which seemed to him a matter of survival for the Burgundian party. In return, Burgundian support granted a certain degree of legitimacy to the Lancastrian position in France. He suggested that English military power was the key guarantee of the Burgundian loyalty, pointing out that even the French victories of 1429 did not break the trust in the English and indeed for a while led to the strengthening of the alliance.

The position presented by Warner may seem to underestimate the role of Burgundian military power, presuming that, as it was not able to win the war on its own, its contribution to the war efforts of the Lancastrian regime in France was negligible. Even if so (which may be arguable), little attempt has been made to analyse and estimate the support and assistance provided by the English to their Burgundian allies. This also raises the question how the English military support could affect the policy of the Burgundian duke and his loyalty to the Lancastrian cause.

Therefore a comprehensive study of the development of the political and military situation in the parts of France engaged in Anglo-Burgundian interaction is necessary. In this context the traditional presentation of the Hundred Years War as an Anglo-French conflict appears unacceptable for the aims of the present study. First, the dynasties of Lancaster and Valois represented two rival claims to the French throne, two alternative monarchies. Secondly, the environment in which they struggled was the kingdom of France (with adjacent territories such as the Franche-Comté or Dauphiné), already devastated by almost a decade of partisan wars. The vacuum of royal power meant that every-

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12 R. Vaughan, Philip the Good, pp. 11–12, 14–15.
13 R. Vaughan, Philip the Good, pp. 16–18.
14 R. Vaughan, Philip the Good, pp. 26–27.
one considering himself powerful enough sought to secure his interests as an independent actor. This was true of the greater noble houses but was not limited to them: the career of Perrinet Gressart presented by A. Bossuat provides a perfect illustration of this. Alliances and truces, diplomacy and propaganda, treachery and military violence were all instrumental in this struggle. For various reasons some of these actors chose to support the Valois cause, others sided with the Lancastrians, many were ready to change sides or temporarily to abstain from the conflict if it seemed more advantageous. Thirdly, the Lancastrian government of France positioned itself not as an English occupying regime but as the legitimate government of France, widely employing traditional French institutions and seeking loyalty and service from those Frenchmen who were ready to accept it.

In a wider sense, the subjects of this present study are the forms, processes and interfaces of cooperation and coordination between political powers and military systems engaged in a war against a common enemy. European military history provides numerous examples of military alliances and allied warfare, from that of Greek city states in order to face Persian invasion in the early fifth century BC to the World Wars of the twentieth century. It can be even suggested that throughout human history few wars were fought simply between two states neither supported by a third side. Many medieval campaigns and battles from the Crusades to the Wars of the Roses were fought by the composite armies brought together by temporary political accord. Some of such alliances, such as the aulde alliance of 1295 between France and Scot-

17 This approach therefore tries to combine certain aspects of two approaches to the study of Lancastrian or English France outlined by Ph. Contamine as ‘Le courant analytique et critique’ (in recognizing the complex, multipolar character of struggle in France during the 1420s–1430s (though applicable for its Valois part as well as the Lancastrian) and the difficulties in obtaining support for the war from England after 1422) and ‘Le courant revisioniste’ (in taking for serious the Lancastrian efforts in establishing their power in France within the Dual Monarchy framework), see Ph. Contamine, ‘La “France Anglaise” au XVe siècle. Mythe ou réalité?’ in La “France Anglaise” au Moyen Age. Actes Du 111e Congrès National Des Societies Savantes (Poitiers, 1986), (Paris, 1988), pp. 21–28.
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land, could last for centuries; others did not survive a single battle. Such partnerships could take a wide diversity of forms dependent on the parties involved, their geographic and political situation, development of technologies and military organisation etc. The fifteen-year-long period of Anglo-Burgundian cooperation might be expected to provide an excellent case study.

The term *alliance* is now used in the international relations field to describe a political system of coexistence of several states, regulated by a formal treaty concluded in times of peace and presuming a certain level support in case of war, engaging one of the allies from a promise of non-aggression to an obligation to help the ally if he was attacked. The Anglo-Burgundian alliance of 1419–1435 does not fit into these frames: it was a war-time construct and the duke of Burgundy was not a sovereign power. Hence the term *alliance* is employed in this study as describing a system of mutual obligations between the Lancastrian rulers of France and the duke of Burgundy (and consequently between their dominions) in making war against a common enemy – the Dauphin Charles. As this resulted in a number of joint military efforts, the present research is focused on the applications of Anglo-Burgundian alliance in the military sphere – *military assistance*. Due to the reciprocal character of Anglo-Burgundian assistance it is appropriate to describe the process as *cooperation*.

Sending soldiers to fight on behalf of or together with an ally is probably the most ancient and most traditional form of military assistance, but not the only possible method. There are two general forms (although not mutually exclusive) it can take: reinforcing an ally or weakening the enemy. The ally’s military capabilities can be increased by providing him on a privileged basis with valuable resources (including finances, weapons, victuals, munitions, raw materials of military importance, manpower, information) or introducing to his army technical and tactical innovations through training and advising. A specific resource which can also be shared is access to territory for the operations of an ally.

The weakening of an enemy may to a certain degree be achieved without military engagement, by dint of undermining his ability to wage war through economic measures, or forcing him to abstain from aggression by the fact of the existence of an alliance. The enemy may be made to divert a part of his forces, either into the struggle against the internal conflicts, or to meet the
threat of an attack by, or to resist the actual military operations of the assisting ally.

The respective importance of these models of assistance is different for modern and medieval armies. While the Lend–lease programme played a great part in the World War II, in the fifteenth century, when the tempo of technical progress was slow and armaments were mostly the property of soldiers and captains, the importance of material resources was much less. As soldiers were expected to enter service with their own equipment, its production and circulation were widespread. Their distribution was only limited by the state in case of war. Almost the only relevant kind of ‘high-tech’ equipment were gunpowder weapons, especially pieces of siege artillery. Similarly, because of lack of a significant technological gap, the use of military advisors was also of little importance. In the case of interaction between two military systems such as those of the English and Burgundians it is more appropriate to speak of influences on tactics and military organisation. We shall consider these in due course.

Within this study attention will be paid to the following levels within which the cooperation may take place:

- **Policy (Strategy).** At this level the subjects of analysis are the political context, the framework of mutual obligations, the network of

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18 An example of a privileged provision of a commodity of military importance can be found in a licence, issued on 16 July 1426 to Hugues de Lannoy, then captain of Meaux, and several other Burgundians, to ship bows and arrows from England without paying customs, *CFR. Henry VI*, p. 241. This seems to be of commercial rather than military importance.


20 The provision of the artillery to allies was not unusual, especially given that most artillery pieces were distributed between the cities and towns.
treaties and truces made by the allies, their diplomatic efforts in influencing the positions of other powers engaged in the conflict. The superposition of aims, threats and opportunities on this level makes the allies formulate their military objectives and to define the forces assigned for their achievement, whether in coordination or acting on their own.

- **Campaign (Logistics and Operations).** This level deals with the organisation and implementation of objectives through the planning of campaigns, the ways of assembling and victualling the armies, and the choice and prioritisation of objectives, and the manouevring of the armies during battle-seeking or battle-avoiding campaigns.

- **Battlefield (Tactics).** This level deals with the coordination of military efforts on the battlefield (or more often during sieges), the choice of tactics, the respective role of allied contingents, the organization of command.

This thesis is organised into two parts. The first part, formed by the first five chapters, aims to assemble the evidence scattered through a wide spectre of primary and secondary sources and to put it in political and military context in an attempt to write a history of Anglo-Burgundian military cooperation. It explores the general development of the course of the war as well as particular cases which made one of the allies seek their partner’s assistance, and the ways in which support was provided. It aims to reconstruct (to the extent to which the sources make this possible) the size of the contingents participating in joint operations, their terms and conditions of service and ways of funding, and the role played by each of the partners during particular engagements.

The division into the chapters follows the key periods in the history of the Anglo-Burgundian alliance: the establishment of Anglo-Burgundian alliance under Henry V, the continuation of conquest under the duke of Bedford, the temporary estrangement in Anglo-Burgundian relations from late 1424 and their gradual recovery in 1427–1428, the crisis caused by the victories of Joan of Arc in 1429 and the desperate attempt to reverse the losses by the royal expedition to France leading to the coronation of Henry VI in 1431, and finally the last years of the alliance, an uneasy passage to its eventual collapse in
September 1435. Within the chapters the information is organised according
to the chronology of events and the theatres of war.

The second part of the thesis, its sixth chapter, analyses and summarises
the material of previous chapters by exploring the forms and patterns of joint
military activity. This attempts to answer what were the interfaces of coopera-
tion and most widely used models, in assembling, organising and commanding
joint armies, and on the battlefield. To put it succinctly, it aims to answer why,
in which situations and how, the allies worked together.

Cooperation with the duke of Burgundy in organising and coordinating
war efforts was never considered by the Lancastrian government of France a
specific sphere of activity worthy of creation of a special institution like the
Combined Chiefs of Staff in the World War II. Therefore no single corpus of
documents covering the Anglo-Burgundian partnership exists. Such matters
were either solved within the administrative framework of the Lancastrian Dual
monarchy, or through diplomatic means. The evidence therefore has to be
sought among the governmental records of Lancastrian France, the Burgundian
State and, to a lesser degree, the kingdom of England.

The documents providing most extensive and detailed evidence on mili-
tary activity are the accounts of chief financial officers of the Lancastrian
France and the État Bourguignon. For the period under consideration only four
such accounts for the Lancastrian kingdom of France are known to survive –
three of the receiver-general of Normandy and one of the treasurer for war
(with a few extracts from another).21 The accounts of the receivers-general of

21 These are the accounts of Pierre Surreau, receiver-general of Normandy for 1423–
1425 (BNF, MS. Fr. 4485) and 1428–1429 (BNF, MS. Fr. 4488) and his journal of ex-
penses for 1424–1426 (BNF, MS. Fr. 4491). The overview of the three accounts of
Pierre Surreau is provided in Ch. de Beaurepaire, ‘De l’administration de la Normandie
sous la domination anglaise aux années 1424, 1425 et 1429 d’après trois comptes de
la recette générale de Normandie, conservés à la Bibliothèque Nationale’, in MSAN, 3

The only surviving account of a Lancastrian treasurer for wars for the period
under consideration is the first account of André d’Espuron for 1427–1428 (BNF,
MS. Fr. 4484). Short but valuable extracts from the last account of his predecessor,
Benoit Colenot, for 1425–1426 are found in BNF, MS. Fr. 32510, fos. 367r–369v.
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the duke of Burgundy in Lille and in Dijon for 1420–1435 show a better rate of survival. The most useful of these is the war account (compte d’armes) of Jean Abonnel, duke’s receiver–general, composed to put together the duke’s expenses in his service to the Lancastrian regime in 1429–1430. This account together with the duke’s indenture for the campaign of 1430 provide good ground for the reconstruction of Anglo-Burgundian cooperation during this campaign, the last major attempt to turn the tide of the war after the setbacks

The accounts of the duke’s receiver–general in Lille for 1420–1435 with their subsidiary documents are ADN, B 1920–1956. For the fifteen years of Anglo-Burgundian alliance only those for 1427, 1429 and 1430 are missing. Of the accounts of the receiver–general at Dijon ADCO, B 1623, 1625, 1643, 1649, 1659 were used in this current project.

These accounts contain information on ordinary and extraordinary sources of income and a wide variety of expenses, including the payments to the armies assembled by the duke, rewards for military (and other) service, and payments of wages to messengers and ambassadors.

This account is bound together as ADN B 1942 with the 3rd account of Jean Abonnel as the receiver general of the duke of Burgundy (for 1431), but they have separate foliation. For this reason they will be henceforward referred to as ADN B 1942 (compte d’armes) and ADN B 1942 (3e compte).

Several extracts from this account were published among the pièces justificatives in P. Champion, Guillaume de Flavy capitaine de Compiègne. Contribution à l’histoire de Jeanne d’Arc et à l’étude de la vie militaire et privée au XVe siècle (Paris, 1906), pp. 168, 169, 174–180, 182–183, which erroneously refers to this source as ADN, B 1492. Some other extracts (with only a description of the manuscript but no exact references), including the list of the Burgundian artillery lost at the siege of Compiègne are printed in [F. J. A.] de La Fons-Melicocq, ‘Documents inédits sur le siège de Compiègne de 1430’, La Picardie, 3 (1857), pp. 21–29.

This remarkable document which had attracted surprisingly little attention of historians survives in a contemporary unsigned copy, ADN, B 302 no. 15576. A detailed study of the indenture and its political context is made in the author’s article, which came out of print after the thesis had been submitted: A. Lobanov, ‘The Indenture of Philip the Good, duke of Burgundy, of 12 February 1430 and the Lancastrian Kingdom of France’, EHR, 130 (2015), p. 302–317. The text of the indenture is also given in the Appendix E.
of 1429. The financial documents, related to contribution of the kingdom of England to the war in France have been analysed by H. L. Ratcliffe.25

When the accounts did not survive, their absence can to some degree be compensated for by subsidiary documents. The evidence on the soldiers in Lancastrian service, taken from muster and review rolls and letters of protection, has been recently brought together in the Soldier in Later Medieval England database.26 Unfortunately, in general, the corpus of subsidiary documents of the Lancastrian government of France remains widely scattered and badly indexed.27 Other documents employed for the research involve different treaties such as those defining the framework of alliance but also those made with the enemies such as local truces made with the Dauphinists and the treaties of

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26 The online version of the database is available at www.medievalsoldier.org. I am much in debt to Prof. A. Curry and Prof. A. Bell for providing me with an offline copy of database which allowed greater flexibility in setting SQL queries to the data and proved an extremely valuable tool in tracing the soldiers’ careers (mostly, of the English but occasionally of certain Burgundians as well). The database was used in almost every case when a reference to a muster roll or a letter of protection was required during this study. In cases when the data obtained from the database was verified by checking the original document, only the reference to the original will be given. In other cases the reference will be followed by [SLME] to mark that the original was not accessed and the information is only based on the database evidence. In the latter cases the manuscripts referred to are not included in the bibliography.

27 For the destiny and distribution of these documents see A. Curry, ‘English Armies in the Fifteenth Century’, in Arms, Armies and Fortifications in the Hundred Years War, ed. by A. Curry and M. Hughes (Woodbridge, 1994), pp. 48–50; M. Nortier, ‘Le sort des archives dispersées de la Chambre des Comptes de Paris’, BEC, 123 (1965), pp. 460–537. For this study the documents in the British Library, Archives Nationales de France and Bibliothèque Nationale de France were used. Some pieces from the French collections are available in transcription in TNA, PRO 31/8.

The most important materials on the engagement of the kingdom of England in the war include the indentures made by the captains of English expeditionary armies going to France in The National Archives known as Indentures of War, TNA, E 101/70 and 71.
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surrender. They also include the protocols of governmental activity\textsuperscript{28} and \textit{memoranda} and projects circulating between the allies.\textsuperscript{29} Some of these documents has been published and calendared in various collections such as those by T. Rymer,\textsuperscript{30} J. Stevenson,\textsuperscript{31} M. Canat,\textsuperscript{32} A. Longnon\textsuperscript{33} as well as among the \textit{pièces justificatives} for the studies on various aspects of the Hundred Years War and fifteenth–century French or Burgundian history.\textsuperscript{34}

Documents can provide invaluable details of military organisation and the interfaces of interaction between the allies. They report little details, however, on the tactical level – the actions on the battlefield. Narrative sources – chronicles and letters, reporting the course of the events during 1420s and early

\textsuperscript{28} This includes a collection of pieces related to the work of the council in England, assembled in \textit{Proceedings and Ordinances of the Privy Council of England}, ed. by N. H. Nicolas, 6 vols (London, 1834–1837). On the French side a useful source is found in the journal of the secretary of the Parlement of Paris, combining the reports on daily activity of the Parlement with its author’s personal experiences (such as his report on the assault of Paris by the Armagnacs led by Joan of Arc in 1429) and citing some of the royal documents presented before the Parlement, \textit{Journal de Clément de Fauquembergue greffier du Parlement de Paris 1417-1435}, ed. by A. Tuetey, 3 vols (Paris, 1913–1915). Certain documents of political importance, registered by the Parlement of Paris are in AN, X\textsuperscript{4} 8603 and 8605.


\textsuperscript{30} \textit{Foedera, conventiones, litteræ, et cujuscunque generis acta publica}, ..., ed. by T. Rymer, 16 vols. (London, 1704–1735), vol. IX-XI.


\textsuperscript{32} \textit{Documents inédits pour servir a l’histoire de Bourgogne}, ed. by M. Canat, t. I (Châlon-sur-Saone, 1863).

\textsuperscript{33} \textit{Paris pendant l’occupation Anglaise (1420-1436)}, ed. by A. Longnon (Paris, 1878).

\textsuperscript{34} One of the most important among such collections are the document published in support of the history of Burgundy by Dom. Urbain Plancher. In spite of certain errors, especially in the dating, this collection remains essential for everyone doing research on the Burgundian State. [U.] dom. Plancher, \textit{Histoire générale et particulière de Bourgogne}, 4 vols. (Dijon, 1739–1781).
1430s – provide the only means able to fill (and still only to a certain degree) this gap. Burgundian chronicles – dominated by a magnificent trio of those written by Enguerrand de Monstrelet, Jean de Wavrin and Jean Le Fèvre, seigneur de Saint-Rémy, but also including the Mémoires of Pierre de Fenin and Le livre des trahisons de France envers la maison de Bourgogne and some others – deserve a primary place among the narrative sources on Lancastrian France and on Burgundian efforts on its behalf. Armagnac chronicles tend to provide little detail except for particular campaigns. Ironically, very much the same may be said of the English and Norman chronicles more interested in local affairs. Apart for the Journal d’un bourgeois de Paris, an important source

35 La Chronique d’Enguerrand de Monstrelet en deux livres avec pièces justificatives 1400-1444, ed. by L. Douët d’Arcq, vols. III–VI (Paris, 1857–1862); there exists also an English edition containing certain variations which will be referred to in such cases: The Chronicles of Enguerrand de Monstrelet ... Continued by Others to the Year MDXVI, ed. by T. Johnes, 13 vols (London, 1810); Recueil des Croniques et Anchiennes Istoires de la Grand Bretagne, a Present Nomme Engleterre par Jehan de Waurin, seigneur du Forestel, ed. W. Hardy, 5 vols (London, 1864–1891); Chronique de Jean Le Fèvre, seigneur de Saint-Remy, ed. F. Morand, 2 vols (Paris, 1876–1881).

These three chronicles traditionally serving as primary narrative sources on the history of Lancastrian France, show a good level of interdependence, either as a consequence of the authors being able to compare their notes or of availability to them of the same pre-existing text, see L. Visser–Fuchs, ‘Une Très Belle Besogne’: Jean de Wavrin’s Description of Battles, PCEEB, 54 (2014), p. 58. Though very detailed in their accounts, even they sometimes prove imprecise especially in reporting the size of armies and occasionally the sequence of events, therefore their evidence has to be collated with other narrative and especially documentary sources.


37 This chronicle was written after the death of Charles the Bold in 1477 (which is mentioned). It, however, provides an independent and detailed narrative on the events of the 1410s–1430s especially related to the person of Jean de Villiers, seigneur de L’Isle–Adam, one of the most notable Burgundian captains engaged in service to the Lancastrian regime, See 'Le Livre Des Trahisons De France Envers La Maison De Bourgogne', in Chroniques relatives à l’histoire de la Belgique sous la domination des ducs de Bourgogne. (textes Français), ed. by [J.–M.–B.–C.] Kervyn de Lettenhove (Bruxelles, 1873), pp. 1–258.
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on the life of the French capital, there are two chronicles of Lancastrian France deserving special mention. The first one is the anonymous chronicle also known as *La Chronique des Cordeliers*, the author of which, probably a native of Picardy and Burgundian partisan, put his text up to 1431. Another narrative is a notable exception among the English chronicles, composed in the 1450s by Peter Basset and Christopher Hanson for Sir John Fastolf. This unfinished narrative ending during the report on the siege of Orléans provides a de-

39 In the early twentieth century this chronicle was being prepared by G. Lefèvre-Pontalis for publication in the *Publications de la Société de l'Histoire de France* series but the edition seems never to have been finished, see G. Lefèvre-Pontalis, ‘Le siège de Meulan en 1423’, *Commission des antiquités et des arts du département de Seine-et-Oise*, 23 (1903), p. 54 n. 1; P. Champion, *Guillaume de Flavy*, pp. XI-XII. Thus, the chronicle remains only available in a single manuscript, BNF, MS. Fr. 23018.

Even though never published in full, the chronicle was widely used by historians, and its significant portions were published. The most lengthy passage covering the reign of Charles VI from 1404 to 1422 (fos. 328–430v) was put in an appendix to the chronicle of Monstrelet by L. Douët-d'Arcq, ‘Extrait d’une chronique anonyme pour le règne de Charles VI 1400–1422’, in *Monstrelet, VI*, pp. 192–327. The passage related to the story of Joan of Arc (fos. 483–507) was published (unfortunately, omitting the passages not relating to the Maid) in J. Quicherat, ‘Supplément aux témoignages contemporains sur Jeanne d’Arc’, *Revue Historique*, 19 (mai–août 1882), pp. 72–83. Another edition of the same folios, also with some omissions, is found in S. Luce, *Jeanne d’Arc à Domremy. Recherches critiques sur les origines de la mission de la Pucelle* (Paris, 1886), pp. 336–344. The passages concerning the war in Argonne (fos. 480r–483v) and the siege of Compiègne in 1430 (fos. 496v–503r with omissions) are printed in P. Champion, *Guillaume de Flavy*, pp. 117–118, 162–166. The chronicle is also cited extensively by R. A. Newhall, including for example the citation of the duke of Bedford’s letters to Sir Thomas Rempston in the aftermath of the battle of Verneuil, R. A. Newhall, *The English Conquest of Normandy 1416-1424. A Study in Fifteenth Century Warfare* (New Haven, 1924; repr. New York, 1971), pp. 319–320 et al.

Due to the absence of a single full edition and the existence of several overlapping pieces scattered across various publications, all references to the chronicle, referred to as Cordeliers, for the aims of consistency will be made following the foliation of the manuscript.

tailed account of the war from the Agincourt campaign including the extensive lists of the participants for a number of major engagements.\textsuperscript{41}

Other types of sources such as local Burgundian accounts, municipal records or judicial documents of the Lancastrian regime have been used only to a limited degree when accessible or when of particular interest.\textsuperscript{42} It is possible that a wider study of local sources throughout the north of France, based on a prosopographical analysis may be able to reveal further links and relations between the allies.

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\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{41} This chronicle was one of the sources used in the sixteenth century by Edward Hall but remains important in its own right.

For more details on this source see B. J. H. Rowe, ‘A Contemporary Account of the Hundred Years’ War from 1415 to 1429’, \textit{EHR}, 41 (1926) pp. 504–513. The chronicle remains unpublished and the only manuscript is College of Arms, MS. M9, fos. 31–66v. I am grateful to Prof. A. Curry for providing me with a transcript.

\textsuperscript{42} These include, for example, the complaints on the abuses of the English garrisons in Bassigny, ADCO, 11880; the protocols of the city council of Reims, \textit{Reims Deliberations}, the materials of the Parlement of Paris, \textit{English Suits} etc.
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Chapter 1: The reign of Henry V (1420–1422)

1.1 Defining the frameworks of Anglo–Burgundian co-operation.

1.1.1 Anglo–Burgundian military interaction before 1419.

The English were found in the service of the duke of Burgundy from the mid–1380s. Small mercenary companies hired by the duke became the first, and for a while the only, model of cooperation. In 1411 this practice reached a new level when John the Fearless approached the English government controlled then by Henry, Prince of Wales (the future Henry V), seeking military assistance against the Armagnacs. As a result of this, a force of some 1200 men under Thomas FitzAlan, earl of Arundel, and Sir Gilbert Umfraville, earl of Kyme, was sent to the continent. For diplomatic reasons this turned out into a mercenary force hired by the Burgundian duke; English soldiers as well as the others of the Duke John’s army must have been accepted into the service of Charles VI on their arrival to Paris. Having taken part in the hostilities against the Armagnacs the English mostly returned home by the end of the year. In the next year Henry IV chose instead to send the duke of Clarence to assist the Armagnacs. However, some Englishmen must have remained in the Burgundian service. In late 1412 they were still serving in the personal bodyguard of the duke of Burgundy. They were also found among the Burgundians in 1414 at

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3 These must have been the bodyguard archers of prince Henry, sent by him in 1411 to guard the Burgundian duke, B. Schnerb, ‘Aspects de l’organisation militaire dans les
The reign of Henry V

the defence of Soissons and Arras and in the service of Waléran de Luxem-
bourg.⁴

The campaign of 1417 provided another curious model of cooperation
between the English and the Burgundians. The negotiations between Henry V
and Duke John in Calais in October 1416 do not appear to result in the signing
of an Anglo-Burgundian truce as the duke of Burgundy refused to make a trea-
ty against his overlord, the king of France. However, both actors must have
considered the party of Armagnacs (then in control of Paris and the person of
Charles VI) their primary adversaries. In the following year two simultaneous
offensives were undertaken by the English in Normandy, and by John the Fear-
less through Picardy towards Paris and then bypassing it towards Chartres and
Tours. The Armagnacs had to concentrate their forces for the defence of the
capital, a matter of vital political importance. This ‘cooperation without coop-
eration’ between English and Burgundians helped both parties achieve their
goals with less opposition which they could expect otherwise. Either side
benefited from the menace posed by the other party, while the enemy had his
hands bound by the necessity to maintain control of Paris.⁵ However in May
1418 Paris opened its gates to the Burgundians, who obtained control of
Charles VI. Armagnac survivors fled to the south taking dauphin Charles with
them. Now the Burgundians found themselves in the same vulnerable position.
The duke of Burgundy had to seek reconciliation with his former sworn ene-
mies the Armagnacs. This reconciliation, achieved in July 1419, proved short-
term and led to a tragic finale.

Thus by 10 September 1419 when John the Fearless, duke of Burgundy,
was hacked to death by the Armagnacs during the meeting with Dauphin

⁴ B. Schnerb, ‘Aspects de l’organisation militaire’, p. 666. At the siege of Soissons the
English served on both sides and eventually those in the Burgundian camp defected to
the Armagnacs, letting them into the city. Monstrelet, III, pp. 7–8. Waléran de Luxem-
bourg reportedly had a company of about 60 Englishmen in his army later that year,
Monstrelet, III, p. 51.
⁵ R. A. Newhall, The English Conquest of Normandy, pp. 69–70.
Charles at the bridge of Montereau, the English and the Burgundians had long experience not only of rivalry and fighting each other but also of military assistance. In the late fourteenth – early fifteenth centuries this cooperation employed a number of different models from the level of individual mercenaries to that of interstate negotiations and treaties.

1.1.2 The game of three. France in late 1419 – early 1420.

One of the reasons which eventually made Philip, the only son of John the Fearless and hence the new duke of Burgundy, seek alliance with the English was the complex military and political situation in France. The kingdom, especially its northern regions, had been a theatre of continuous three–way hostilities since at least 1417, preceded by a series of conflicts throughout the 1410s.

When Rouen opened its gates to the English in January 1419 most of Lower Normandy was already under the English control. In 1419 the English continued their advance in Upper Normandy and towards Paris. By the end of the year the conquest of Normandy was almost brought to an end, with only a few exceptions like Mont–Saint–Michel. As soon as negotiations with Charles VI and John the Fearless proved fruitless, the capture of Pontoise with a surprise night attack on 31 July 1419 opened the English the way to the outskirts of Paris.7

Duke Philip (known later as Philip the Good), succeeded his father not only as the duke of Burgundy but also as the count of Flanders, Artois and Burgundy, seigneur of Salins and Mechelen. His marriage with Michelle of France, a daughter of Charles VI, brought him the châtellenies of Péronne, Montdidier and Roye. Burgundian dominance extended not only to these territories but also those of the cadet branches of the house of Burgundy, dukes of Brabant and counts of Nevers, and those in obedience to the government of Charles VI

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8 For the position of the dukes of Burgundy as the head of the house of Valois–Burgundy, see C. A. J. Armstrong, ‘La politique matrimoniale des ducs de Bourgogne de la maison de Valois’, in *AB*, 40 (1968), pp. 5–58, 89–139; repr. in C. A. J. Arm–
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in Troyes, established and staffed by John the Fearless. The latter included Paris and parts of Ile-de-France, Champagne and Picardy with some of its most important cities such as Troyes, Reims, Laon, Provins, Senlis, Beauvais, Amiens and Abbeville. Auxerrois, Tonnerois and Mâconnais were also under Burgundian control as well as Chartres, their outpost to the west of the Seine and the Yonne. Languedoc in 1419 was formally obedient to the royal government at Troyes, but the Burgundians did not possess real power in that region except for an enclave on the lower Rhone around Orange, Nîmes and Pont-Saint-Esprit, possessions of Louis de Chalon, prince of Orange, a vassal of the duke of Burgundy.9 By the end of 1420 this enclave was suppressed and Languedoc was brought to the obedience of the Dauphin.10

The remnants of the Armagnac party, supported by the houses of Anjou and Bourbon, controlled the valley of the Loire down from Nevers and the valley of the Rhone down from Lyon with the territories to the south-west of these to the borders of English possessions in Aquitaine.11 Dauphiné was also under their control. They maintained a number of strongholds in Ile-de-France, Champagne and Picardy including Compiègne, Guise, Meaux, Melun, Montereau, and Sens, which impeded communication between two main clusters of Burgundian dominions and contributed to the blockade of Burgundian-controlled capital of France.12

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11 These included the former apanage of the duke of Berry, the reversion of which to the crown is considered a crucial point for the restoration of the French state, E. F. Jacob, 'The Collapse of France, 1419–20', *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library*, 26 (1941–42), p. 313.

12 R. Vaughan, *John the Fearless*, p. 265. 95 % of the commerce of Paris passed by the rivers Seine, Oise, Marne and Yonne, G. Minois, *La guerre de Cent Ans*, p. 403. By late 1419 the lower Seine was held by the English, who also got control of the Oise at Pontoise. The communications upstream the Marne were cut by the Armagnacs at Meaux and those upstream the Seine at Melun and Montereau.
The position of the young duke of Burgundy at his accession in September 1419 was difficult. Philip lacked his father’s charisma, authority and experience to claim his position in the kingdom. Moreover, the control of the king and of Paris (separate from each other) imposed obligations of defending both as well as the kingdom as the whole, while in the military aspect the Burgundian party may have been the weakest compared to the English and the Armagnacs. The seeming possibility of reconciliation with the Armagnacs had been broken in the most brutal way by the Montereau murder. Thus an English alliance seemed almost the only option.

1.1.3 The military alliance (December 1419 – May 1420)

The series of complex negotiations in late 1419 and early 1420 between the English, the Parisians, Philip the Good and also the entourage of Charles VI at Troyes has been studied in detail by P. Bonenfant and does not need to be reconsidered in this study. By the end of the year the consensus was achieved and formalised in the treaty signed on 25 December at Rouen by Henry V with the representatives of the duke of Burgundy.

The king and the duke promised each other fraternal love and support. They obliged themselves to continue the war against the Dauphin and not to deliver the Dauphin or anyone involved in the Montereau murder (should they be captured) without their partner’s consent. Duke Philip undertook to employ his influence so that Charles VI accepted the peace conditions offered by Henry V, which suggested that the English king would be proclaimed heir to the French throne and would marry the French king’s daughter Katherine. These conditions would solve the dilemma his father faced; the young duke would be making a formal alliance with the English but not against the king of France. In his turn, Henry V promised to marry one of his brothers to one of Duke Philip’s sisters and to secure the grant to Philip the Good, his wife Michelle and their potential heirs male, of lands in France worth 20 000 l. annually.\(^\text{13}\)

At this starting point of collaboration the agreement achieved was an alliance between two independent political powers against a third one and to-

\(^{13}\) P. Bonenfant, *Du meurtre de Montereau*, p. 220. For the text of the treaty see *Foedera*, IX, pp. 825–827.
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wards a conclusion of a treaty between Henry V and Charles VI. This treaty did not include Paris or other subjects of the King of France. English relations with Paris during this period were formally not those of alliance or collaboration but those of a temporary ceasefire, which could be only prolonged in case of cessions from the Parisians.

Almost as soon as the alliance was concluded the English and the Burgundians started to join forces against the Armagnacs. One of the first cases was the siege of the castle of Tremblay in Ile de France.\(^{14}\) A significant force from Paris came to take part in the siege even though the relations between Paris and the English were not clear.\(^{15}\) When the Armagnac defenders eventually decided to surrender themselves to the English, this was disputed by the Parisians on the ground that they entered the town first. It is not clear how the dispute was solved, but as the siege was brought to an end the partners took leave of each other.\(^{16}\)

Another early attempt of cooperation happened in Picardy. On 10 December Roye fell to a surprise Dauphinist attack and the Burgundians under Jean de Luxembourg besieged the city. After several weeks the Armagnacs agreed to surrender on 18 January, being promised a safe conduct to Compiègne with their belongings. As soon as the Anglo-Burgundian alliance was concluded on 25 December, the earl of Huntingdon was ordered to provide help to the siege of Roye if requested.\(^{17}\) The English eventually only appeared before Roye just after the place had been surrendered. Not considering themselves bound by any agreements made by the Burgundians, they, led by the earl of Huntingdon

\(^{14}\) Probably, Tremblay-en-France (dep. Seine-Saint-Denis, arr. Le Raincy, ch.-l. de cant.). The place was reduced before the end of February, See *Fauquembergue*, I, p. 351,

\(^{15}\) The Parisians were led on this occasion by Gauthier Raillart, knight of the watch (*chevalier du guet*) in Paris. Their effective are estimated as 400 men, *Religieux*, VI, pp. 390–391.

\(^{16}\) *Abrégé des Grandes Chroniques*, pp. 234–235; *Religieux*, VI, pp. 390–393. The first of these chronicles describes the conflict as that between the English and the Burgundians, while the second one as that of the English and the Parisians (while both chronicles make difference between the latter and the Burgundians).

\(^{17}\) P. Bonenfant, *Du meurtre de Montereau*, pp. 114–115. The commission, dated 27 December, is printed in *Bréquigny*, p. 116 (no. 706).
and Sir John Cornwall, pursued the Armagnacs and attacked them, killing some and taking others prisoners. Some Burgundians tried to stop them but with little result, while others joined the English. Jean de Luxembourg proved unable to make the English deliver their prisoners, some of which were then sent to England. Thus, it does not appear that the Burgundian commander had any powers over the English force, despite the claims of some historians. The English commanders must have just considered this a good possibility to obtain prisoners and booty, and the incident may have contributed to the reputation of Sir John Cornwall as a great ransom dealer.

These several cases illustrate the character of collaboration at this preliminary stage: the partners were no way subordinate to one another but were sometimes willing to provide help against a common enemy.

In March 1420 Duke Philip of Burgundy, accompanied by a significant army, began his journey to Troyes. At Saint Quentin an English embassy to the

18 The English force was estimated as 1000 men by Pierre de Fenin. For this incident at siege of Roye see Monstrelet, III, pp. 367–371; Fenin, pp. 122–124; Chastellain, I, pp. 97–102. Other chronicles such as Cordeliers, fos. 394r–394v; Abrégé des Grandes Chroniques, p. 235; Religieux, VI. pp. 392, 393, mention the siege but give little details. The version in Le Livre des Trahisons suggests that some of the Burgundians, not pleased with the conditions of surrender (presumably the same captains who then joined the English in attacking the Armagnacs) invited the English to deal with the Armagnacs, Trahisons, pp. 146–147. In fact, the English were summoned by the duke of Burgundy, as shown in P. Bonenfant, Du meurtre de Montrebeau, p. 114.

19 The Earl of Huntingdon was ordered to put himself at the disposal of the duke of Burgundy, J. H. Wylie, W. T. Waugh The Reign of Henry the Fifth, III, p. 196. See also C. Berry, Les Luxembourgs-Ligny, p. 276. However, the earl’s commission did not suggest his subordination to the Burgundian command, see Bréquigny, p. 116 (no. 706).


21 The size of the ducal army on the way to Troyes is estimated by chroniclers as 6000 men. Monstrelet, III, p. 377. This estimation seems reasonable given that on coming to
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court of Charles VI, led by Richard Beauchamp, earl of Warwick, accompanied by some 200 men-at-arms and 300 archers, joined the duke’s army. On his way Philip the Good laid siege to Crépy-en-Laonnois which surrendered after fifteen days. The English delegation remained with the duke during the siege, although it does not seem that they took any part in the fighting.

The duke then proceeded via Laon, Rheims and Chalons to Troyes where he entered on 21 March. After his arrival, negotiations with the entourage of Charles VI began. By 9 April the consensus was achieved and the general conditions of the future Treaty of Troyes were accepted by both sides. It was decided Henry V should arrive in Troyes for the conclusion of the treaty. To facili-

Troyes the duke sent about a half of his army back to Picardy, Monstrelet. III, p. 385. At the conclusion of the treaty of Troyes both rulers were to be accompanied with 2 500 men, J. H. Wylie, W.T. Waugh, The Reign of Henry the Fifth, III, p. 199. If this was a half of the army with which the duke opened the campaign, the latter must have amounted to 5–6 000 men.


23 The Armagnac garrison was allowed to leave and the demolition of the fortifications was ordered. For the most detailed report siege of Crépy–Valois see Trahisons, pp. 147–153, which gives the battle disposition of the Burgundian army. See also Cordeliers, fos. 394v–395r; Monstrelet, III, pp. 375–377; Wavrin, II, pp. 297–298; Chastelain, I, pp. 108–112; Abrégé des Grandes Chroniques, p.236; Religieux, VI, pp. 394–395.

24 Le Livre des Trahisons especially mentions that the English (under the duke of Clarence, according to this chronicler) were encamped separately from the ducal forces and acted as mediators in setting up the negotiations between the Armagnacs and the Burgundians for the surrender of the place, Trahisons, pp. 149, 150. If this evidence is true, the willingness of the Armagnacs to treat with the English rather than with the Burgundians here and at Tremblay may be the evidence of the severity of Armagnac-Burgundian conflict.

tate his coming several places on his way were to be temporarily ceded to him to secure the passage.\textsuperscript{26} The English ambassadors could now return to their king with good news. Each party was to be accompanied by 2500 armed men,\textsuperscript{27} and this is probably why Philip the Good, who was staying alongside Charles VI, disbanded half of his army, allowing them to return to Picardy.\textsuperscript{28} Those who remained in the duke’s service were in the meantime sent to fight the Arma-

Henry V left Pontoise on 8 May 1420 and arrived in Troyes on 20 May.\textsuperscript{30} After the minor adjustments the Treaty of Troyes was solemnly concluded on the following day opening a completely new page in Anglo-Burgundian rela-

\subsection*{1.1.4 The Treaty of Troyes (1420)}

The treaty of Troyes was technically an edict of the king of France to his subjects introducing certain important changes into the matrimonial and govern-

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{26} J. H. Wylie, W.T. Waugh, \textit{The Reign of Henry the Fifth}, III, p. 198–199.
\bibitem{28} Monstrelet estimates the number of those who left the duke as 3 000 horses, \textit{Monstrelet}, III, p. 385.
\bibitem{29} For these expeditions see \textit{Monstrelet}, III, pp. 385–388; \textit{Trahisons}, pp. 153–155.
\bibitem{31} For the procedure of conclusion and publication of the Treaty of Troyes see P. Du-

\end{thebibliography}
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Katherine of France. Due to the French king’s incapacity Henry was to be regent during his father-in-law’s life. To put an end to the conflict between England and France – a proposed aim of the treaty – after the expected accession of Henry V to the French throne, the two crowns were to be inherited jointly by his heirs staying forever in the hands of a single monarch. Several articles were aimed at preserving the traditional French institutions, customs and freedoms to prevent their unification with the political system of England. The kingdoms were to be united only by the person of monarch. The territories conquered by Henry V were to be restored to the kingdom of France on his accession to the throne, while the faithful subjects of Charles VI were to be either restored in their possessions conquered by the English or provided with compensation.

Although the ancient conflict with England may have been dealt with, there remained an important domestic problem of the French kingdom – Dauphin Charles and his adherents – which Henry V in his new capacity of the regent of France was to resolve. The treaty laid down that no peace could be made with soy-disant Dauphin Charles by Charles VI, Henry V or Philip of Burgundy without their mutual agreement and that of the three Estates of the realm, which is sometimes considered a total prohibition of any contacts with the Dauphin. In fact, however, what was prohibited as ‘paix ou concorde’ was only concluding a peace treaty which would provide a permanent solution to

33 It has been shown that the potential succession of Henry V to the French throne was not based on his marriage, the latter only expected to cement the settlement, see A. Curry ‘Two Kingdoms, One King’, pp. 30–31.
34 Les grands traités, pp. 103, 104–105 (art. 1, 5–6). Henry was also to stop styling himself the king of France, Ibid., p. 110 (art. 21).
36 Les grands traités, pp. 109 (art. 18). This only referred to the conquests of Henry V but not to Aquitaine and Calais. It became possible to avoid the question of the sovereignty over Aquitaine. As the titles of the king of England (and thus of the duke of Aquitaine) and of the king of France were to be held forever by the same person any conflict of loyalties was most unlikely.
37 Les grands traités, p. 109 (art. 19).
38 Les grands traités, p. 106 (art. 12).
39 Les grands traités, p. 113 (art. 29).
40 See, for example, A. Curry, ‘Two Kingdoms, One King’, p. 29.
the conflict, while temporary cessations of hostilities induced by the current political and military situation (for which the duke of Burgundy was often blamed by the historians) were not considered unacceptable.41

The treaty of Troyes altered the nature of the English participation in the Hundred Years War. The war aimed to realise the ancient claim to the throne was now to turn into that for the re-establishment of the order in the kingdom. As heir and regent of France Henry V now had to employ his forces and military talents to put an end to the civil war which had been tearing the kingdom apart throughout the 1410s.42

Ironically the Treaty of Troyes did not impose on the Burgundian duke any specific role in this war. The duke was promised participation in the custody of the person of Charles VI but not in the governance of the kingdom.43 The decision to make no separate peace with the Dauphin was the only formal obligation on the side of Philip the Good which was not equivalent to his active participation in the war. Moreover, any lands recovered from the rebels would be restored to the crown or to their rightful owners in case of their loyalty to

41 The condition of truce was considered a form of the state of war, not that of peace, see M. H. Keen, The Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages (London, Toronto, 1965, repr. Aldershot, 1993), p. 104.

The obligations imposed on simple subjects of France by their oath to observe the treaty of Troyes (the formula of which is given in art. 13, Les grands traités, pp. 106–108) did not include such prohibitions. This therefore should be ascribed to the fact that they were not in the position to treat for peace on their own. However the truces were concluded at least as a part of contemporary military practice. It seems unlikely that the subjects would be given greater freedom than their lords in negotiating with the Dauphin, therefore it should be suggested that the prohibition did not relate to truces.

42 A. Curry, The Hundred Years War (New York, 1997), p. 108. This change of the nature of the war was soon to result in the reduction of support from the kingdom of England. The commons could claim that they had fullfilled their duty by restoring their king to the French throne, but that the king’s French subjects should pay for the re-establishment of the order in the kingdom, C. T. Allmand, Henry V (London, 1992), p. 382; PRME, IX, p. 263.

43 Les grands traités, pp. 113–114 (art. 27).
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the new regime. Duke Philip, thus, could not expect to gain much by the participation in the war. The treaty also estranged Philip the Good from the potential (however distant) succession to the French throne. As the crown was to go to the heirs of Henry V so that the crowns of England and France remained united, all the princes of Valois blood were disinherited, including Philip the Good. Technically, Philip the Good was no more (but still no less) bound to participate in the war with the Dauphin than any other subject of Charles VI.

What the duke of Burgundy gained by the treaty of Troyes was the delegation of responsibility for the destiny of French kingdom which passed to him from his father. This estrangement from the throne and the governance must have been one of the first steps towards positioning himself as an independent power. Though Philip the Good never abandoned the wish of playing the primary role at the French court, the Treaty of Troyes to a certain degree set him loose to pursue his own interests and promised him a certain degree of protection from the Dauphinists. Nevertheless, the Treaty of Troyes did not cancel the agreements achieved in December 1419 and personal obligations agreed then, including the continuation of the war against the Dauphinists and the promise of Anglo-Burgundian marriage, which will create a matrimonial link between the house of Burgundy and the new ruling dynasty of France.

It thus appears that the framework of Anglo-Burgundian cooperation in the following years was defined on two levels. The treaty of Troyes introduced

45 Duke’s partisans however could be restored in possession of the lands in Normandy lost to the English by 1420 or receive a compensation. *Les grands traités*, p. 109 (art. 19).
46 This argument is one of the key points of the article in A. Curry, ‘Two Kingdoms, One King’, pp. 23–35. By May 1420 in the order of succession to the throne of France, which was only through the male line, Philip the Good was preceded by, not to mention the already disinherited Dauphin Charles, the descendants of the House of Orléans (Charles, Jean and Philip) and those of the House of Anjou (Louis III, René and Charles). Even in spite of his modest position a claim for the French crown had been advanced on behalf of Philip the Good during the negotiations which preceded the conclusion of the Treaty of Troyes. This claim was unconditionally rejected by Henry V, A. Leguay, ‘La "France Bourguignone" ’, pp. 43–44.
47 A. Leguay, ‘La "France Bourguignone" ’, p. 46.
the new model of coexistence for the kingdoms of England and France, known in the historiography as the Lancastrian Dual Monarchy. It also defined the mutual position of Charles VI and Henry V for the period of transition to this model. Simultaneously the military alliance of December 1419 regulated the personal relations between the two greatest nobles of Lancastrian France – Henry V, regent of France, and Philip, duke of Burgundy.

1.2 The campaign of 1420

1.2.1 The reconquest of the Seine valley

The stay of Charles VI at Troyes from mid-1419 was due to the English menace to Paris. Now that the English were no longer enemies and Henry V was going to take control of the government of the French kingdom, there was every reason for the king to return into his capital. However, the communications of Paris were still threatened by the Armagnacs controlling the Seine at Melun and Montereau, the Oise at Compiègne and the Marne at Meaux. Even though a communication line between Paris and Troyes through Lagny-sur-Marne and Provins did exist and was used by both John the Fearless in 1419 and Henry V in 1420, the capital was suffering from a lack of victuals and Armagnac incursions. If Paris was to become the seat of the new regime its security had to be provided. The control over the middle Seine and the lower Yonne would restore communications with the Burgundian-held territories. The fact that Montereau was one of the places in that region suggested that its recovery (and that of the body of John the Fearless) would be a first step towards the restoration of order in the kingdom after the murder of John the Fearless.

The joint military operations began almost immediately after the Treaty of Troyes had been signed. On 1 June the castle of Montaigu-lès-Troyes, besieged by the Anglo-Burgundian forces surrendered.48 After marrying Catherine

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48 The delegation which negotiated the surrender consisted of Simon Fourny, bailli of Troyes, Pierre de Luxembourg, count of Brienne and Conversan, Lourdin de Saligny, Martel du Mesnil and two English knights, whose names are not specified, The demolition of the castle was ordered by Charles VI two days later (although this was not completed under Lancastrian rule), T. Boutiot, Histoire de la ville de Troyes, II, p. 435. The
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Valois on 2 June, Henry V took the field on 4 June, setting out to bring the lower course of the Yonne into obedience.\textsuperscript{49} The Anglo-Burgundian siege of Sens resulted in its surrender on 11 June.\textsuperscript{50} Villeneuve-le-Roi fell to Burgundian assault, possibly with English support.\textsuperscript{51} Villeneuve-l'Archevêque, which the English had failed to capture, surrendered to Jean de Villiers, seigneur de L'Isle-

site of the castle, some 15 km to the southwest of Troyes, is now divided between the communes of Souligny and Laines-aux-Bois (dep. Aube, arr. Troyes).

\textsuperscript{49} According to Juvenal des Ursins, the two kings moved from Troyes southward via Érvy-le-Châtel (dep. Aube, arr. Troyes, ch.-I. of cant.) and Saint-Florentin (dep. Yonne, arr. Auxerre, ch.-I. of cant.), bringing these in Lancastrian obedience before proceeding before Sens, \textit{des Ursins}, p. 378. This is supported by T. Boutiot, who suggests that Henry V proceeded from there to Joigny and then downstream the Yonne to Ville-neuve-le-Roy and Sens. T. Boutiot, \textit{Histoire de la ville de Troyes}, II, pp. 436–437. There is no doubt however that Joigny willingly accepted the Treaty of Troyes and was not taken by force, see A. Challe, ‘Histoire de la ville et du comté de Joigny’, \textit{Bulletin de la société des sciences historiques et naturelles de l'Yonne}, 36 (1882), pp. 246–248. C. L. Kingsford describes the route to pass via St. Florentin and Villeneuve-le-Roi, C. L. Kingsford, \textit{Henry V. The typical medieval hero} (London, New York, 1901), p. 309. The diversion via St. Florentin would extend the route from Troyes to Sens from about 60 to about 90 km. According to the letter of John Ofort, by 6 June the two kings were already before Sens, \textit{Foedera}, IX, pp. 910–911.

\textsuperscript{50} For the date see \textit{Bourgeois}, p. 140 and n. 3. The surrender was negotiated by Sir John Cornwall on behalf of Henry V and Charles VI, \textit{Fenin}, pp. 138–139. The news of surrender had reached Paris by 13 June. See \textit{Choix de pièces inédites relatives au règne de Charles VI}, ed. by L. Douét-D'Arcq, 2 vols (Paris, 1863–1864), II, pp. 407. For the siege see also \textit{Religieux}, VI, pp. 442–444. A. Tuetey discards the notes by numerous chroniclers (\textit{Cordeliers}, fo. 396v; \textit{Monstrelet}, III, p. 402; \textit{Wavrin}, II, p. 317; \textit{St. Remy}, II, pp. 9–10; \textit{Chastellain}, I, pp. 138–141; \textit{Basset}, fo. 40r) that the city held out for twelve to fifteen days, \textit{Bourgeois}, p. 140 n. 3. It may, however, suggest that the siege was actually laid before Henry V and Charles VI left Troyes on 4 June.

\textsuperscript{51} Now Villeneuve-sur-Yonne (dep. Yonne, arr. Sens, ch.-I. of cant.). \textit{Monstrelet}, III, p. 407; \textit{Wavrin}, III, p. 323; \textit{Chastellain}, I, p. 149. The chroniclers place the account of its capture after that related to the siege of Montereau, but there is no doubt that the place was recovered earlier. It is not clear whether the letters of Henry V given 7 and 8 June ‘apud Villam de Neef le Roy’ and ‘apud Villam de Villenoef le Roy’ (\textit{Foedera}, IX, p. 911–912) should be considered an evidence that the place had been already brought into obedience or that the king supervised its siege.
Adam, on 8 July.\textsuperscript{52} Within a fortnight the lower Yonne was in the Lancastrian hands with the only exception of Montereau.

This town is situated on the left bank of the Yonne at its influx to the Seine, while the castle was on the right bank of the Yonne, exactly on the point. The faubourgs on the right bank of the Seine and on the right bank of the Yonne were connected with the town by a bridge of a complex structure.\textsuperscript{53} The siege was laid on 16 June with the castle and the town invested simultaneously.\textsuperscript{54} The town fell to an assault on 23 or 24 June, undertaken without any expressed orders by a company of both English and Burgundians.\textsuperscript{55} The Dauphinists retreated to the castle, while the Lancastrians lodged in the town. The body of John the Fearless was exhumed and after a solemn service, sent to Dijon for the burial.\textsuperscript{56} Then the siege was laid to the castle, which surrendered by 3 July.\textsuperscript{57} An English garrison was placed in the town and the army proceeded

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{52} Villeneuvel–l'Archevêque (dep. Yonne, arr. Sens, ch.-l. of cant.). A Picard, Anthoine de Rebecque, was given command of the place, \textit{Trahisons}, pp. 157–158.
\item \textsuperscript{53} R. Vaughan in reconstructing the details of the murder of Jean Sans Peur refers to certain topographical details and applies the view of the bridge of Montereau dated 1611. He also addresses the fact that the faubourgs shown on the view did already exist in early fifteenth century, See R. Vaughan. \textit{John the Fearless}, pp. 276, 281–282 and Plate 8.
\item \textsuperscript{54} J. H. Wylie, W.T. Waugh \textit{The Reign of Henry the Fifth}, III, p. 208. \textquoteleft... le roy d'Angleterre, le duc de Bourguoigne et leurs gens misrent le siege tout entour de la ville et chastel de Mousstreaue ou fault Yonne...' \textit{Wavrin}, II, p. 318.
\item \textsuperscript{56} It was transported by vessel up the Yonne to Cravant and then by the land, B. Schnerb, \textit{Jean Sans Peur}, pp. 693–694. This suggests that the course of the Yonne was under Burgundian control and thus the siege of Villeneuve–le–Roi had been brought to a successful end.
\item \textsuperscript{57} According to the chronicles, the Lancastrian army crossed the Seine by a new–built bridge and encamped between the Seine and the Yonne. There seem to be two possible explanations: either the army first crossed to the right bank of Seine by the bridge of Montereau in view of the castle and then crossed it backwards by a new–built bridge
\end{itemize}
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down the Seine.\textsuperscript{58} Moret was abandoned by the Armagnacs,\textsuperscript{59} and the Lancastrians approached Melun.

The siege of Melun began on 13 July and lasted for over four months. The topography of the city, located on the island on the Seine with fortified faubourgs on both banks, required that the besiegers divided their forces in two halves separated by the river.\textsuperscript{60} While some level of communication could be, and was actually, maintained by a temporary bridge,\textsuperscript{61} Henry V had to appoint a commander for the part of his army which he could not lead in person. The duke of Burgundy, however young and inexperienced compared to many English commanders, was the first among the French nobles in what was technically the army of Charles VI of France.\textsuperscript{62} The authority of Henry V as regent of France and king of England extended over both the French and the English. This was not the case for the duke of Burgundy, and Henry V had therefore to authorise Duke Philip to command his English subjects regardless of their rank to the other side of the castle, or the Seine was mistaken for the Yonne in the source used by the chroniclers.

After the town was conquered Henry V sent a number of Armagnac prisoners captured in the assault to persuade their comrades in the castle to surrender. When they failed, the king ordered them to be hanged in view of the defenders. This act of violence was possibly not completely unnecessary for just several days later the captain of the castle decided do come to terms with the besiegers and negotiated a safe passage for the garrison, \textit{Monstrelet}, III, pp. 405–406; \textit{Fenin}, p. 141; \textit{Wavrin}, II, pp. 320–322; \textit{St. Remy}, II, pp. 11–12; \textit{Chastellain}, I, pp. 146–148.

A. Burne gives 1 July as the date when the castle surrendered but does not mention his sources, A. H. Burne, \textit{The Agincourt War}, p. 148. Safe conducts to Guillaume de Chaumont, Armagnac captain of Montereau, were issued on 3 July, \textit{CNR. Henry V}, 42, p. 375. On 6 July the citizens swore obedience to the Troyes regime, \textit{Foedera (app.)}, p. 80 (original in AN, J 646/16).

\textsuperscript{58} The chronicles expressly mention that the garrison was composed of the English, \textit{Monstrelet}, III, pp. 406–407; \textit{Wavrin}, II, pp. 322. Basset’s chronicle names Richard Beauchamp, earl of Warwick as the Lancastrian captain of the place, \textit{Basset}, fo. 40r.

\textsuperscript{59} \textit{Berry}, p. 95.


\textsuperscript{61} \textit{Monstrelet}, IV, p. 411; \textit{Wavrin}, II, p. 327; \textit{St. Remy}, II, p. 16.

\textsuperscript{62} An extensive list of Lancastrian captains present at the siege of Melun is given in \textit{Basset}, fos. 40r–41r.
and status in the affairs concerning the siege of Melun from the side of Brie.\textsuperscript{63} The relevant document suggests that the English contingents of Henry V’s army continued to obey him as a king of England and were not included in the administrative system of the kingdom of France.

Henry V encamped on the left bank of the Seine together with his brothers and other English captains and the forces of duke Louis of Bavaria. Philip the Good and his forces were lodged on the right bank reinforced with the companies of some English captains, the earl of Huntingdon being the most important among them.\textsuperscript{64} It seemed likely that the Dauphin would try to raise the siege and, should this happen, Henry V and his forces would be the first to face them. In case of Dauphinist attack Henry V ordered a circumvallation (a fortification line erected during the siege to prevent the relief of the besieged place) to be erected.\textsuperscript{65} The Burgundian troops, in their turn, were in a position to obtain surrender of the places of Brie. As the locals were suspicious of foreigners (‘moult doubtoient Englès, Picars et Bourguignons’), this mission was entrusted to the seigneur de l’Isle-Adam, a native of the Ile-de-France.\textsuperscript{66}

\textsuperscript{63} \textit{Foedera}, X, p. 4. This letter dated 12 July is written in Latin widely used in contemporary English administration but uncommon in that of French kingdom. Henry V is styled ‘Rex’ and speaks of ‘Subditos & Ligeos nostros’. As he abstained from using the royal title of France, as prescribed by the Treaty of Troyes, this letter appears to be addressed only to the English subjects of Henry V.

L. V. D. Owen erroneously considered this document an evidence that Philip the Good was given sole command of the siege, L. V. D. Owen, \textit{The Connection between England and Burgundy}, p. 55.

\textsuperscript{64} \textit{Monstrelet}, III, p. 410; \textit{Fenin}, p. 143; \textit{Wavrin}, II, p. 326; \textit{Chastellain}, I, p. 154. W. T. Waugh suggested that the English contingent on the Burgundian side of the siege was intended to control the allies, but this suggestion seems speculative, J. H. Wylie, W.T. Waugh \textit{The Reign of Henry the Fifth}, III, p. 210. He also believes that it the English and the Burgundians were to be kept apart in order to avoid disturbances, Ibid., p. 213. While certain incidents did definitely take place, the situation does not seem to get out of control.

\textsuperscript{65} \textit{Monstrelet}, III, p. 411; \textit{Fenin}, p. 143; \textit{Wavrin}, II, p. 327. According to Juvenal des Ursins, it was the strength of this circumvallation, which prevented the Armagnacs from trying to raise the siege, \textit{des Ursins}, p. 379.

\textsuperscript{66} \textit{Trahisons}, p. 158.
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The siege turned into a blockade as attempts to demolish the fortifications by artillery bombardment and mining did not bring significant success.\(^{67}\) An assault undertaken on request of the dukes of Burgundy and Bavaria also proved a failure. Henry V did not prevent the dukes from this attempt but did not join them (and probably neither did any English troops).\(^{68}\) His bringing Charles VI to the siege to remind the Dauphinois that opposing their king was an act of treason was no more successful.\(^{69}\) Eventually Henry had to starve the defenders to surrender, notwithstanding the outbreak of disease among the besiegers.\(^{70}\)

The chronicles mention the departure of certain Burgundian captains before the siege was brought to an end. This is generally ascribed to the epidemics among the besiegers or to lack of payment.\(^{71}\) Some cases, however, are be-

\(^{67}\) Although the extensive mining operations did not facilitate the fall of Melun the siege became known for the underground combats between the knights of both sides. A suggestion that these feats of arms might be fought on a horseback (J. Barker, *Conquest. The English Kingdom of France in the Hundred Years War* (London, 2010), p. 33) does not seem reasonable and is completely discarded by the account by des Ursins, that when Louis Juvenal des Ursins (chronicler’s brother) was going to take part in the fighting, Barbasan had his axe shortened ‘for the mines are sloping, tortuous, and narrow’. See the episode retold in C. L. Kingsford, *Henry V*, p. 314–315.

\(^{68}\) C. L. Kingsford, *Henry V*, p. 313.

\(^{69}\) A similar attempt aimed at the Scots serving with the Dauphinois was made by bringing the Scottish king James I, then the prisoner of the English, before Melun, *Wavrin*, II, p. 329, 331; *St. Remy*, II, p. 16.


\(^{71}\) Philip the Good’s forces were received in the service of the king of France and were to be paid from the king’s finances. These, however, proved insufficient and the duke of Burgundy had to employ his own funds. See for example: ‘Ausquelz capitaines pource que largent du Roy notreditseigneur ne povoit furnir l’celluiusigneur ordonna argent leur estre baillie pour leurs estat en Intencion quil deust estre Recouvre sur le Roy notreditseigneur’, ADN, B 1923, fo. 234v. For Philip the Good’s expenses in main-
lieved to have more personal causes. Thus the departure of Louis de Chalon, prince of Orange, is ascribed to his unwillingness to swear loyalty to the King of England.\textsuperscript{72} The prince, however, had been present at the conclusion of the Treaty of Troyes and must have given an oath to respect the treaty then.\textsuperscript{73} On the other hand, as his lands in Franche-Comté and Dauphiné depended on the Empire, the prince technically was not a vassal of the king of France.\textsuperscript{74} The prince’s departure may have been caused by his disaffection towards Henry V for refusing to support the Burgundian assault of the town.\textsuperscript{75}

Another widely-reported Anglo-Burgundian conflict was a quarrel between the King of England and Jean de Villiers, seigneur de l’Isle Adam and marshal of France. The chroniclers depict the scene as the conflict over the matters of court ritual.\textsuperscript{76} It should be noted, however, that the marshal came before the regent from the valley of the Yonne,\textsuperscript{77} where the town of Villeneuve-le-Roi had been lost to the Armagnacs, creating a breach in the Lancastrian control over the course of the river.\textsuperscript{78} Therefore Henry V’s displeasure may have taining his army see also Plancher, IV, pp. 21, 23; [L.–F.–J. de la Barre], Mémoires pour servir à l’histoire de France et de Bourgogne, 2 vols (Paris, 1729), I, pp. 240–241.

\textsuperscript{72} Reporting this episode by the chroniclers is discussed in E. F. Jacob, ‘The Collapse of France, 1419–20’, p. 323. The prince was believed to have given the oath to the English by 1424, ADCO, B 11890, 2\textsuperscript{nd} interrogation of Estienne Charlot, fo. [7v]. It seems likely that in that case the oath to support the Treaty of Troyes was meant.

\textsuperscript{73} Monstrelet, III, p. 389; Wavrin, II, p. 304; St. Remy, II, pp. 2–3.

\textsuperscript{74} This is an explanation for his withdrawal given by Berry Herald, Berry, p. 96.

\textsuperscript{75} D. Seward, Henry V as Warlord (London, 1987), p. 149. It is worth noting that the Prince was especially summoned by the duke to the siege for the assault of the boulevard before the town, [L.–F.–J. de la Barre], Mémoires, I, p. 240. If this is true, it may explain his departure after the enterprise had failed.

\textsuperscript{76} Monstrelet, IV, pp. 9–10; Fenin, p. 147; Wavrin, II, pp. 337–338.

\textsuperscript{77} The marshal came either from Joigny (Monstrelet, IV, p. 9; Wavrin, II, p. 338) or from Sens (Fenin, p. 147).

\textsuperscript{78} The Chronicle of Cordeliers places the report of the fall of Villeneuve-le-Roi during the stay of Henry V in Paris (January 1421). Cordeliers, fos. 400v–401r. Monstrelet dates it by February 1421, Monstrelet, IV, p. 35. These dates can not be correct as on 16 November 1420 Philip the Good authorised a payment of the wages to 50 men-at-arms under Lancelot de Leurieu, knight, brought to Auxerrois in the aftermath of the fall of Villeneuve-le-Roi, ADN, B 1923, fo. 235v. The fall of Villeneuve-le-Roi during the
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been based on the loss of Villeneuve-le-Roi or the marshal’s failure to recover it swiftly.

Whatever the sentiments among his captains may have been, Duke Philip himself remained loyal to the Lancastrian cause and summoned Jean de Luxembourg and his men from Picardy to replace those who had left the army. These Picards estimated as some 400 men joined the siege about October 1420.79 They were supplemented by the English from the garrison of Calais.80

As no Dauphinist army appeared to relieve Melun, its defenders by 17 November were made to discuss the conditions of surrender. The negotiations were held on the Lancastrian side by a joint commission consisting of Sir Walter Hungerford, Jean de Roubais and Jean de Courcelles.81 The garrison was only granted their lives; five to six hundred prisoners were sent by the Seine to Paris to be placed in the prisons of the city.82 Pierre Le Verrat, a Burgundian partisan, was appointed captain of the city.83

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80 Letters of Henry V to Sir William Bardolf, lieutenant of Calais, given 10 Sep 1420 at the siege of Melun, Foedera, X, pp. 19–20. The chronicle of Peter Basset mentions ‘Sire de Bardolf’ among the Lancastrian participant in the siege which may suggest that he personally led the contingent from Calais to the siege of Melun, Basset, fo. 41r.

81 Foedera, X, p. 29. Monstrelet and Wavrin, who cite the articles of the treaty of surrender (but not its preamble) name Richard Beauchamp, earl of Warwick, and Sir John Cornwall as the negotiators on the Lancastrian side, Monstrelet, IV, p. 13, Wavrin, II, p. 341.

82 Monstrelet, IV, p. 14; Wavrin, II, p. 342; Bourgeois, p. 143.

1.2.2 The advent of the new regime in Paris

The arrival of the Melun prisoners in Paris became a prelude to the triumphant entry of the two kings. There was no rush, however. After Melun surrendered, Henry V stayed for a while in Corbeil with Charles VI who had been living there during the most part of the siege (except for his brief visit to the camp of the besieging army). As Corbeil lies between Paris and Melun, even before Melun surrendered nothing technically prevented the king of France from returning to his capital before the capitulation of Melun. The solemn entry must have been deliberately chosen to take place on Advent Sunday.

The English entered the French capital while the siege of Melun was still in progress. In late July 1420, when the siege of Melun was just established, Philippe, count of Saint Pol and Burgundian captain of Paris, was commissioned together with Jean and Louis de Luxembourg and several other notable Burgundians to receive the oaths of obedience to the Treaty of Troyes from the cities of Picardy. He was replaced as the captain of Paris by Thomas, duke of Clarence, and English soldiers were placed in the Bastille of St. Antoine, the Louvre, the hôtel de Nesle and Bois de Vincennes. Henry V may have even visited the French capital before the siege of Melun was brought to an end.

Thomas Beaufort, duke of Exeter, was commissioned on 18 November to take possession of Melun in the name of Charles VI, Foedera, X, p. 30. His commission, however, did not name him as the captain. It is thus possible that he was only authorised to receive the surrender.

84 Bourgeois, p. 144.
87 Monstrelet, IV, pp. 1–2; Wavrin, II, p. 333; St. Remy, II, pp. 17–18; Chastellain, I, pp. 161–162.
88 Letters of Henry V to William Alyngho dated Paris, 11 November 1420, BNF, MS. Fr. 26043, no. 5559. The documents enrolled in the Norman rolls for August–November 1420 give both Melun and Paris as the place of issue, CNR. Henry V, 42, p. 376–383. Some chroniclers suggest that Henry V came to Paris after capturing Montreame (thus before or, possibly, early during the siege of Melun), see for example, Abrége des Grandes Chroniques, p. 245; Raoulet, p. 168.
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A solemn entry was a matter of ritual, combining the military triumph with the presentation of Henry V as the rightful heir of Charles of VI, an important step for the legitimation of the new regime. On 1 December the two kings entered Paris accompanied by a great retinue of both French and English. Henry V was presented as the heir to the throne by riding in the Dauphin’s place and he deliberately demonstrated deference to Charles VI.\(^9\) The campaign of 1420 came to an end and the order in the kingdom was re-established to a degree that the king could return to his capital.

Several days later the duke of Burgundy presented his accusation of the Dauphin for the murder in Montereau to the Parlement of Paris demanding from the supreme court of the French kingdom justice and punishment for the murderers of his father. In October 1419 at the funeral service for John the Fearless in Arras Philip the Good and his adherents are reported to have been displeased with preacher’s words advising him to put his trust in the king’s justice rather than his own vengeance.\(^9\) This, however, was what the duke actually did in 1420. The duke’s appeal to the Parlement may have intended to demonstrate the restoration of the order in the kingdom and the return from the chaos of the civil war to the work of traditional institutions. On the other hand, this presumed that the crown was responsible for the punishment of those guilty in the crime.\(^9\)

The diplomatic and military successes of 1420 allowed Henry V to achieve his main goal of the campaign. He established his authority in Paris and secured the new regime to a degree that he could return to England after more than three years of absence in order to have his queen crowned, to deal with affairs of his kingdom of England and to search for the funds for the continuation of the war in France. In January 1421 Henry V returned to England via

\(^{9}\) For Charles VI’s and Henry V’s entry in Paris see N. Murphy ‘Ceremony and Conflict in Fifteenth–Century France: Lancastrian Ceremonial Entries into French Towns, 1415–1431’, in Explorations in Renaissance Culture, 39:2 (2013), pp. 120–121. I am grateful to Dr. N. Murphy for sharing the draft of this paper to me.

\(^{9}\) Monstrelet, III, pp. 361–362.

\(^{9}\) The efforts of the Lancastrian regime in providing justice to the murderers of Montereau, being a separate theme, of certain importance for Anglo–Burgundian relations but not directly related to the military cooperation, are discussed in Appendix F.1.
Rouen, leaving the command in Paris to the duke of Exeter and the governance of Normandy to the duke of Clarence for the period of his absence. Philip the Good accompanied Henry V to Amiens and returned to his northern dominions.

Though Henry V may have failed to solve the problem of supplying the Paris,² he won control of the course of Seine, and operations against the remaining Armagnac strongholds could be continued in the following years. The control of the crossings on the Seine and the Yonne created a kind of circumvallation line on a strategic scale against a possible Armagnac counterattack while Champagne and Picardy now caught between the Lancastrian and Burgundian dominions would be gradually brought to Lancastrian obedience. While it would not prevent small companies from penetrating this line, a major invading army would probably first need to gain at least one of the fortified places guarding the crossings on the Seine. This would allow Henry V in the following years to aim at the gradual reduction of territories to the north and east of the Seine.

1.3  The campaign of 1421

1.3.1  The military situation of early 1421

During the absence of Henry V from France the Lancastrian regime suffered a number of setbacks. First, Villeneuve-le-Roi besieged by the seigneur de L’Isle-Adam was relieved.³ On 29 January the Armagnac commanders reported to the Dauphin that they arrived in the town and made the Burgundians retreat.⁴ This was a local loss but it had certain importance for the victualling of Paris.⁵ Another local failure was a joint raid undertaken by Mauroy de Saint-

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² See the complaints of the Bourgeois, pp. 145–146, 149–151.
³ For the siege of Villeneuve-le-Roi see Trahisons, pp. 161–163, which dates it February 1421.
⁵ A treaty was concluded afterwards which allowed the victuals for Paris to pass through Villeneuve-le-Roi being taxed by the Dauphinists, Cordeliers, fos. 400v–401r;
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Léger, Burgundian captain of Creil, and the English from the garrisons of Gournay and Neufchâtel, who were defeated near Montépilloy by the Armagnacs from Compiègne. This attempt, though unsuccessful shows that at least some Burgundians on a local level were keen to cooperate with the English.96

A greater problem followed when on 22 March 1421 the English army making a raid in Anjou was defeated at Baugé. The duke of Clarence, brother of Henry V and lieutenant of Normandy, was killed together with several notable English captains, while several others – among them the earls of Huntingdon and Somerset – were taken prisoners. Thomas Montacute, earl of Salisbury, succeeded in bringing the remains of the army back to Normandy and organising the defence of the duchy.97 The defeat was a serious blow to the English cause not only weakening the English forces in France, but also underlining the myth of the English invincibility and hence divine support.98 The positions of the Lancastrian regime in Paris and elsewhere suffered a ‘loss of certainty’,99 coupled with the anxiety that the Dauphin could exploit the suc-

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96 Montépilloy (Oise, arr and cant. Senlis). See Monstrelet, IV, p. 20; Wavrin, II, pp. 349–350. The exact dates of these events are not clear. They may have taken place in late 1420, that is before Henry V’s departure for England.

97 For the military aspect of the battle see A. Burne, The Agincourt War, pp. 151–163.


99 J. D. Milner, ‘The Battle of Baugé’, p. 491. The insecurity of the English positions in Paris is to a degree illustrated by the popular disturbances after the arrest on 8 June 1421 of the seigneur de L’Isle-Adam, marshal of France, on the orders of the duke of Exeter, who suspected the marshal of the intention to surrender Paris to the Armagnacs, Fauquembergue, II, p. 17; Cordeliers, fos. 405r–405v; Monstrelet, IV, p. 37; Wavrin, II, p. 357. There was hardly any connection between this arrest (ordered by the
cess at Baugé by advancing against Normandy or Paris. The officers of the Parliament of Paris were ordered to confirm their oaths to observe the Treaty of Troyes.\footnote{100}

In early 1421 it also became clear that Jacques de Harcourt, captain of Le Crotøy\footnote{101} and hitherto an adherent of the duke of Burgundy, refused to accept the Treaty of Troyes and continued to make war on the English.\footnote{102} The conflict between de Harcourt and the duke of Burgundy emerged when the former captured the ship belonging to the duke’s vassal Emond, seigneur de Bouchers, and refused to return the ship to the owner. The seigneur de Bouchers sought help not from the duke of Burgundy, his feudal lord, but from Sir William Bardolf, lieutenant of Calais.\footnote{103} This English knight was intensively involved in Anglo-Burgundian interaction since at least 1407 and thus possibly known to the Picard noble.\footnote{104} Moreover, in March 1421 Bardolf was given the powers of the admiral.\footnote{105} It is thus possible that, since the case involved an act of maritime

duke of Exeter) and the marshal’s possible conflict with Henry V during the siege of Melun; it is more likely that lack of success of de L’Isle-Adam at Villeneuve-le-Roi contributed to his poor reputation in the eyes of the English, J. H. Wylie, W.T. Waugh The Reign of Henry the Fifth, III, pp. 323–324. The seigneur de Châteauvillain is also reported to be arrested due to the suspicions of his connections with the enemies, Cordeliers, fo. 405v; J. H. Wylie, W.T. Waugh The Reign of Henry the Fifth, III, p. 324. Faouembergue, II, pp. 14—15.

Le Crotøy (Somme, arr. Abbeville, cant. Rue).

Cordeliers, fo. 403v. In December 1419 Jacques de Harcourt was no enemy to Philip the Good, as an attempt was made to purchase a canon from him for the siege of Roye, ADN, B 1920, fo.56v.


Letters dated 2 March 1421, appointing him admiral without prejudice to the duke of Exeter, admiral of England, Ireland and Aquitaine, Foedera, X, p. 68. He was replaced by Ralph Rochford as the lieutenant of Calais by July 1421, POPC, II, p. 365, but no earlier than 1 April 1421, TNA, E 403/64.
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violence, he was acting in his new capacity when he undertook a punitive raid against Le Crottoy destroying the ships of de Harcourt.106

By May 1421 de Harcourt was engaged in private wars with some of local nobles such as Emond de Boubers and Raoul d’Ailly, vidame of Amiens. Others supported his war against the Lancastrian regime, delivering to him or helping him to gain a number of places in the region including Gamaches107 and Airaines.108 Jacques de Harcourt established contacts with the Armagnacs from Compiègne marking his final desertion to the Dauphinist cause.109 Thus, the mouth of the Somme became a new centre of opposition to the Lancastrian rule. This was a problem both to the duke of Burgundy (and his influence over the Somme cities) and to the English anxious over the security of the shipping in the Channel.110 If the news of Baugé did not greatly affect the terms when Henry V’s was initially intending to return to France and take control of the war in person,111 the news on the actions of de Harcourt could have affected the king’s plans.112

1.3.2 Henry V’s arrival in France. Relief of Chartres.

Henry V disembarked at Calais on 10 June 1421 with an army of four to five thousand men.113 By this time of his arrival the Dauphinist offensive against

106 Monstrelet, IV, p. 42.
107 Gamaches (Somme, arr. Abbeville, ch.–l. de cant.).
108 Airaines (Somme, arr. Amiens, cant. Molliens–Dreuil)
110 With the defection of the duke of Brittany to the Dauphinist cause in 1421 the port of Le Crottoy became used by Breton pirates operating in the Channel, R. A. Newhall, The English Conquest of Normandy, p. 287.
Normandy inspired by the recent victory at Baugé was stopped by the earl of Salisbury at Alençon and on 21 June the earl could inform Henry V of his successful retaliation raid in Anjou. Assumptive Salisbury’s report trustworthy, the borders of Normandy may seem secure. The main problem for the king of England as the regent of France remained the Dauphinist garrisons to the north and east of the Seine and especially those in the mouth of Somme which were a source of threat on sea as well as on land. Thus it appeared the king could begin with the submission of Jacques de Harcourt and establishing his power in Picardy.

Henry V remained in Calais for about a week before proceeding to Montreuil–sur–Mer, where he met Philip the Good and spent three days in discussions with him. Philip the Good was entrusted with the siege of Compiègne and on 25 June he was given 3000 écus for related expenses. It may have been presumed that in the meantime Henry V would advance against Le Crotey but the plans had to be changed. Two days later the duke ordered his army to assemble at Péronne on 15 July to fight the Armagnacs in Picardy while the king was to hasten elsewhere.


114 For the earl’s letter see Foedera, X, p. 131.
115 In his letter to the mayor and aldermen of London dated 12 July 1421 Henry V wrote that initially his aim was to go to Picardy and to put its government in order, but these plans were to change due to the military situation, Delpit, p. 231; Letters of the Kings of England, ed. by J. O. Halliwell, 2 vols (London, 1848), I, pp. 103–105.
116 Montreuil (Pas–de–Calais).
117 24–26 June, Itinéraires, p. 17. See also, Monstrelet, IV, p. 46; Wavrin, II, p. 365.
118 ADN, B 1923, fo. 30r. The payment was authorised by royal letters at Montreuil on 25 June 1421.
119 See Philip the Good’s letter to his councillors in Dijon, dated 27 June 1421, St.–Riquier, reporting (among other matters) on the duke’s meeting with Henry V and the issue of the summons, ADCO, B 11942, no. 38bis.
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This must have been due to the news that the Dauphin led his army towards Chartres, received by Henry V at Montreuil.\textsuperscript{120} The Armagnacs captured several surrounding places including Gallardon taken by assault on 27 June.\textsuperscript{121} Chartres itself was besieged since 23 June. The news of the Henry V’s arrival in France was brought to the besieged city by the bastard de Thiant who, with a strong force, fought his way into the city.\textsuperscript{122}

Now Henry V sought a pitched battle with the Dauphin which could outweigh any moral losses of Baugé. The king of England made his way to Paris, arriving there unexpectedly on 4 July,\textsuperscript{123} while his army was marching to Mantes via Beauvais and Gisors.\textsuperscript{124} After a few days in the capital Henry V joined his army at Mantes on 9 July.\textsuperscript{125} On the next day he was much rejoiced to see Duke Philip also coming there, with a contingent assembled for the anticipated battle with the Dauphinists.\textsuperscript{126} The Burgundian duke, however, was due to return shortly as the army for the campaign in Picardy was already being summoned to assemble. The Burgundian force brought to Mantes is estimated as 400 men-at-arms by the Chronicle of Cordeliers.\textsuperscript{127} This closely corresponds with the numbers in the undated report associated with Hugues de Lannoy concern-

\textsuperscript{121} The Burgundian garrison was put to the sword, G. du Fresne de Beaucourt, \textit{Histoire de Charles VII}, I, pp. 227–228.
\textsuperscript{122} \textit{Cordeliers}, fo. 405r.
\textsuperscript{123} \textit{Bourgeois}, p. 154.
\textsuperscript{124} \textit{Monstrelet}, IV, pp. 46–47; \textit{Wavrin}, II, p. 367.
\textsuperscript{125} According to Burgundian chroniclers, he took a considerable force from Paris to Mantes, \textit{Monstrelet}, IV, p. 47; \textit{Wavrin}, II, p. 368.
\textsuperscript{126} J. Le Févre de Saint Remy suggested that at Gisors Henry V received the news that the Dauphin was awaiting him before Chartres in order to give battle, and then sent to Philip the Good, ordering the duke to join him, \textit{St. Remy}, II, p. 38.

The duke’s speedy arrival was to a degree due to the advice of his mother, Marguerite of Bavaria. After the battle of Baugé she had recommended him to be ready to lead an army to Paris. As a result of this advice the troops from Picardy, Vermandois and Artois were ordered to assemble by 29 June, hence the duke was able to bring them to Regent’s army, J. H. Wylie, W.T. Waugh \textit{The Reign of Henry the Fifth}, III, p. 326. \textsuperscript{127} \textit{Cordeliers}, fo. 405v.
ing the forces the duke could employ for the campaign in Picardy. According to this schedule, the duke could field 541 men-at-arms and some 450 gens de trait, but, according to the Chronicle of Cordeliers, not everyone was able to assemble in time. The account of the duke's receiver-general contains payments to 8 knights and 1 squire banneret, 16 knights bachelor, 498 squires, 598 gens de trait, 4 trumpeters and 9 minstrels, a total of 1134 men. Though there is not much evidence on the English participation in the defence of Chartres, its relief was due to become a joint operation.

128 This undated draft report originating from BNF, MS. Fr. 1278 is published in B. de Lannoy, Hugues de Lannoy, pp. 201–211, where it is dated early 1422. R. Vaughan believes that it must have been composed for the campaign of 1421 rather than that of 1422, R. Vaughan, Philip the Good, p. 14.

It may be suggested that there was no significant changes between 1421 and 1422 in the feudal powers exercised by Philip the Good in his northern dominions and thus the schedule concerning the contingents which could be assembled for the campaign provide a reliable estimation of the duke's military capabilities.

It may be also arguable whether this report related to the campaign of 1421. Sample letters of summons contained in the document suggest that the duke undertook to serve the king in Picardy and that the army was due to be assembled by mid-May, B. de Lannoy, Hugues de Lannoy, p. 204. Thus, the report was probably composed no later than in April. It is not clear, however, whether in April 1421 de Harcourt was already considered a threat by the duke. The Chronicle of Cordeliers dates the outbreak of hostilities with him by late May, Cordeliers, fos. 403v–404r. However, the Lancastrian administration at Rouen considered those of Le Crottoy king's enemies by 2 May, Bréquigny, p. 227 (no. 1296).

It is also not clear when in 1421 the duke could make his obligation to serve Henry V, who had stayed in England since January. Philip the Good in 1421 is reported to follow the advice of his mother initially intending to assemble the army on 9 May and lead it to Burgundy or to Paris should need arise in the aftermath of the defeat at Baugé. Then as the situation in Picardy became more difficult the muster was delayed until 29 June, this time intending the advance against de Harcourt, Plancher, IV, p. 30–31.

129 Cordeliers, fos. 405v–406r.
130 ADN, B 1923, fos. 238r–241r.
131 Chartres, held by the Burgundians since 1417, must have had a Burgundian garrison. Dauphin Charles believed that there were some Englishmen in Chartres, see his letter to the citizens of Lyon dated 9 July 1421 in G. du Fresne de Beaucourt, Histoire
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However, the battle never took place. By 12 July Henry V, still at Mantes, received news that the Dauphin had abandoned the siege of Chartres on 5 July and retreated to the Loire. Thus, Henry V and Philip the Good took leave from each other, the duke returning to Picardy, while Henry V was determined to follow southward seeking another chance for a pitched battle.

1.3.3 Philip the Good’s campaign in Ponthieu, 1421.

While the duke and the king were at Mantes the Dauphinists were admitted to Saint-Riquier in several miles to the northwest of Abbeville. With Airaines and Pont-Remy already in the Armagnac hands their grip around Abbeville tightened. This made Saint-Riquier a primary objective, even though the task of bringing Compiègne to obedience was not revoked.

Philip the Good came to Amiens where he issued orders demanding the *bonnes villes* provide infantrymen and craftsmen for the siege of Saint-Riquier. The duke proceeded to Auxi-le-Château awaiting his forces to as-

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133 According to Le Févre de Saint Remy, the place was captured by the Armagnacs while the duke of Burgundy was at Mantes, *St. Remy, II.* p. 40. It seems possible that Philip the Good may have heard of the fall of Saint-Riquier while he was at Mantes, since an English detachment of some 600 men from Calais was sent for the siege, *Cordeliers,* fos. 407v–408r. It can be suggested they were brought to the Burgundian army on the orders of Henry V, probably given during the meeting at Mantes.

134 The sum of 9373 *écus d’or* was assigned to the duke on 15 July 1421 for the ‘re-couvrerent de ses [king’s – A.L.] villes de compiege et de st. Riquier’, ADN, B 1923, fos. 30v–31r.

135 *Cordeliers,* fo. 407r.
semble there. The total effectives of the duke’s army in this campaign seem to amount to some 2000–3000 men.

Philip the Good first suppressed Armagnac garrisons on the right bank of the Somme between Amiens and Abbeville, Pont-Rémy the most important of them. Thus, he cut the communications between Saint-Riquier and Airaines. Moreover, now the Somme prevented the enemy from helping the besieged. Having thus secured his rear from a possible surprise attack of a relief army the duke of Burgundy could lay siege to Saint-Riquier. The siege lasted for

136 Monstrelet, IV, p. 51, Itinéraires, p. 17. Auxi-le-Château (Pas-de-Calais, arr. Arras, ch.-l. de cant.).
137 According to Dom U. Plancher, the army consisted of 15 knights banneret, 43 knights bachelor, 1214 squires, 938 archers, 291 gens de trait, 8 trumpeters and 9 minstrels (a total of 2518 men), estimated as about 3000 men, Plancher, IV, p. 32. The character of this schedule suggests that it must have based on a documentary source, though no reference is provided.

The payments made to an army before Saint-Riquier as a result of the musters taken on 16 Aug 1421 give the effectives of 13 knights and 1 squire banneret, 37 knights bachelor, 1044 squires, 1119 archers and gens de trait, 6 trumpeters and 9 minstrels (a total of 2229 men), ADN, B 1923, fos. 238v–242v. In a financial sense this was 1740 paires (a wage-rate of man-at-arms) as confirmed by the compensation to the marshal of Burgundy of the reward due to him if he was taking the musters, ADN, B 1925, fos. 122v–123r. These numbers correspond well with those of U. Plancher, the difference possibly due to the casualties and desertion during the siege. These numbers relate to the soldiers in the duke’s payment and do not include the men of his hôtel, the contingents sent to the siege by the English, the cities of Abbeville and Amiens.

A suggestion of R. Vaughan that the duke of Burgundy only had 541 men-at-arms and 445 gens de trait for the campaign (based on de Lannoy’s schedule discussed above) should be discarded as it does not take into account the forces assembled in mid-July 1421.

The estimate of R. de Bellevall of about 6000 men including the contingents from Amiens and Abbeville is based on the chronicles (Monstrelet, IV p. 55; Wavrin, II, p. 370; St. Remy, II, p. 40; Raoulet, pp. 177–178), which overestimate Burgundian effectives as well as those of the English, R. de Bellevall, La Journée de Mons-en-Vimeu, p. 56.

138 The difficulties of crossing the Somme in its lower course with the bridges controlled by the enemy are well illustrated by the Agincourt campaign of 1415, See, for example, A. Burne, The Agincourt War, pp. 55–62.
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about a month. The Burgundians only blocked the gates facing Abbeville and Auxy but not those towards Le Crottoy possibly due to insufficient forces of the besiegers. 139 The Dauphinists made numerous sallies taking some Burgundian prisoners. According to the Chronicle of the Cordeliers, an English detachment of 600 men, mostly archers, came from Calais to join the siege but in August it was sent back by the duke. 140

On 29 August it was discovered that the Dauphinists from Compiègne were marching to relieve those in Saint–Riquier. If the Armagnacs could merge their forces with Jacques de Harcourt at Le Crottoy and catch the Burgundians between their joint forces and those of the garrison, Philip the Good would have to fight superior enemy forces in most unfavourable circumstances. 141 He therefore had to employ his control of the Somme bridges to intercept the relieving party before they cross the river. The siege had to be abandoned and the duke’s army marched to Abbeville, sending forward the scouts to discover the enemy movements. On receiving the news that the Armagnacs were heading for the ford of Blanchetaque, 142 Philip left his infantry behind at Abbeville and sped with the horsemen down the Somme, catching the Dauphinists still on the left bank.

A hard–fought mounted clash that followed was decided by the personal valour of the duke and his entourage rather than by tactical skill. The day was eventually won by Philip the Good and most of Armagnac leaders were taken

139 The number of the Dauphinists in St.–Riquier differs in various narratives: 400 lances (Raoulet, p. 177.), 1200 horses (Monstrelet, IV. p. 48), 2 200 horses (Cordeliers, fo. 406v) on their arrival to Picardy. Pierre de Fenin speaks only of 600 combatants during the siege, Fenin, p. 583. Given the size of the Burgundian army dividing it into three parts would result in each being weaker than the garrison and thus vulnerable in case of a full–scale sally.

140 Cordeliers, fos. 407v–408r. The English participation in the siege is also mentioned by Walsingham (Walsingham, II, pp. 764, 765) and in Les Croniques de Normendie, p. 58 (which erroneously places this siege before the treaty of Troyes).

141 Such perspective is depicted in Walsingham, II, pp. 764, 765.

142 This ford began from Saigneville on the left bank of the Somme and was some 2 000 yards long, A. H. Burne, The Crecy War: a Military History of the Hundred Years War from 1337 to the peace of Bretigny, 1360 (London, 1955), p. 158.
prisoners.\textsuperscript{143} However the duke was now in no position to resume the siege. The losses among his entourage must have been considerable,\textsuperscript{144} while many Burgundian nobles discredited themselves by fleeing from the battlefield on the false news of the duke’s death. It appears that the duke’s army was last paid on 16 August for the following 10 days of service: thus it is not clear whether the duke had funds to re-establish the siege. Finally it can be assumed that at his hasty leave from Saint-Riquier the duke may have had to abandon his siege artillery, which included two big canons and two bombards.\textsuperscript{145} However, the victory brought the duke a number of prisoners, among them Louis de Nesle, brother of seigneur d’Offémont, the Dauphinist leader at Saint-Riquier. By November the latter agreed to exchange the town and captured Burgundians for the duke’s prisoners and a safe passage to the territory held by the Dauphinists.\textsuperscript{146}

Though Philip the Good won a tactical victory at Mons-en-Vimeu, his campaign of 1421 obtained only a limited degree of consolidation of Lancastrian positions in the region compared with the start of the year. The expected advance against Compiègne never took place and Jacques de Harcourt at Le Crotoy remained a serious threat to the Lancastrian control of Artois, Vimeu and Ponthieu.

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\textsuperscript{143} The chronicles provided an unusually detailed description of the battle and the lists of the participants and casualties on both sides. See Cordeliers, fos. 408v–411v, Monstrelet, IV, pp. 59–68, Fenin, pp. 164–170, Wavrin, II, pp. 375–382, St. Remy, II, pp. 39–44. This must be due to the fact that this was a first major engagement fought by Philip the Good, knighted by Jean de Luxembourg before the battle, and thus a favourable chance for the duke to show his prowess. For the battle see also R. de Belleval, La Journée de Mons-en-Vimeu, pp. 61–88.

\textsuperscript{144} The significance of the losses is emphasised in J. H. Wylie, W.T. Waugh, The Reign of Henry the Fifth, III, p. 335.

\textsuperscript{145} [F. J. A.] de La Fons-Melicocq, ‘1421. Documents inédits. Siège de St.-Riquier: – Bataille de Mons-en-Vimeu’, in La Picardie, 3 (1857). pp. 150–151. While the canons are reported to weigh 3 000 pounds each and the bombard 8 000 pounds each it seems doubtful whether it was possible to organize their evacuation within a single night.

\textsuperscript{146} Monstrelet, IV, pp. 72–73; Wavrin, II, p. 387.
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1.3.4 From Dreux to Meaux: Henry V in 1421

As the Dauphin had withdrawn from Chartres, Henry V advanced against Dreux. The lands around this place were mostly already under the English control but it remained a source of trouble.\textsuperscript{147} The town was invested on 18 July and by 8 August the garrison agreed to surrender if not rescued until 20 August.\textsuperscript{148} When Dreux fell, the English king proceeded to Chartres where he was joyfully welcomed by the garrison.\textsuperscript{149} Having captured a number of small places around Chartres,\textsuperscript{150} Henry decided to engage the Dauphin in pitched combat by entering the Loire valley. It is also possible that he obtained the information that his adversary was assembling an army for the relief of Dreux.\textsuperscript{151}

Henry advanced to the Loire, reaching it at Beaugency. The town fell to the English but the castle remained in the Dauphinst hand. This did not prevent Henry from sending a company under the earl of Suffolk to the southern bank of the river but this attempt to lure the Dauphin to the battle with the

\textsuperscript{147} Thus, in June 1421, a raid was made from Dreux against the abbey of Bec, which the English managed to repulse, J. H. Wylie, W.T. Waugh \textit{The Reign of Henry the Fifth}, III, p. 315.

\textsuperscript{148} K. H. Vickers, \textit{Humphrey Duke of Gloucester. A Biography}, (London, 1907), pp. 99–100; J. H. Wylie, W.T. Waugh \textit{The Reign of Henry the Fifth}, III, pp. 326–327. It is reported that the Armagnacs, allowed to leave from Dreux, up to the number of 400 men were robbed and killed by the ‘bastard de Thiery’, \textit{Cochon}, pp. 286–287. The editor of the chronicle, Ch. de Robillard de Beaurepaire, wondered whether it could refer to Jean, bastard de Thiant. To support this suggestion it may be noted that the bastard de Thiant participated in the defence of Chartres in June 1421, and that Chartres lay on the way from Dreux towards the Loire.

\textsuperscript{149} Henry must have intended to give a pitched battle to the Dauphin around Chartres, hence the summons issued across Normandy, demanding the garrison detachments and the feudal levy to join him at Chartres by 23 August, \textit{CNR. Henry V}, 42, pp. 431 (13 and 18 August 1421).

\textsuperscript{150} See the list of these places in J. H. Wylie, W.T. Waugh \textit{The Reign of Henry the Fifth}, III, p. 327.

English failed. Suffering from lack of provisions, Henry V marched up the Loire and thence to the valley of the Yonne.

On 22 September the English army appeared before Villeneuve-le-Roi. Whether it was the presence of the redoubtable English king or the overwhelming superiority of his army that influenced the Dauphinists, after mere five days of defence the garrison surrendered, being allowed to leave with their belongings.\(^{152}\) With the capture of Villeneuve-le-Roi the Seine–Yonne line was restored.\(^{153}\) As the Dauphin clearly avoided pitched battle Henry V decided to return to the establishment of Lancastrian power in Champagne and Brie, making his target the city of Meaux which had provided the Armagnacs with a hold on the lower Marne.

The town of Meaux is located on the left bank of the Marne. On the other bank it also had a fortified suburb known as the Market (\textit{marché}) of Meaux, protected from three sides by the loop of the Marne with a ditch on the fourth side. These strong fortifications were defended by a garrison of about 1,000 Dauphinists resolved to fight to the last.\(^{154}\)

The siege attracted much attention of the chroniclers and it seems excessive to retell its course.\(^{155}\) The command over the main divisions of the besieged

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\(^{153}\) The capture of Villeneuve-le-Roi and Beaugency were mentioned by the \textit{Bourgeois} who notes that these towns were very troublesome to Paris, \textit{Bourgeois}, p. 157. It is not clear, however, how the capture of Beaugency could affect the Parisians since, on the one hand, any important trade routes passing through the place could only lead to the lands of Valois obedience, while on the other hand, the Dauphinist garrison of the town remained intact and could continue to harass the Parisians once the Lancastrian army had left.

\(^{154}\) J. H. Wylie, W. T. Waugh \textit{The Reign of Henry the Fifth.} III. p. 327. The effectives of the besieged are somewhat confirmed by the note that some seven to eight hundred prisoners were taken at the surrender, \textit{Wavrin}, II, p. 406.

\(^{155}\) B. Bove gives the list of episodes of the siege noted by the chroniclers as they appear in various narratives. See B. Bove ‘Deconstructing the Chronicles: Rumours and Extreme Violence during the Siege of Meaux (1421–1422)’, \textit{French History}, 24 (2010), pp. 520–523.
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ing army appears to be held by the English commanders.\textsuperscript{156} However, a number of Burgundian contingents was present in the Lancastrian army, including those of Pierre de Luxembourg, count of Conversan and Brienne,\textsuperscript{157} Guillaume, seigneur de Chastillon, Jean, bastard de Thiant.\textsuperscript{158} A Breton contingent was brought by Arthur de Richemont.\textsuperscript{159} Jean de Gingins, a captain from Savoy with a long record of service to John the Fearless, was also present and, according to chronicles, played an important part in the capture of the town.\textsuperscript{160} These captains of Burgundian allegiance seem to be technically in the service of the king of France and possibly under the command of royal officers, some of them of English descent, like Henry V, regent of France, or Thomas Beaufort, duke of Exeter, captain of Paris. W. T. Waugh describes the siege of Meaux as Henry’s masterpiece even in comparison to his sieges of Rouen and Melun since in this case it was his systematic approach to the siege works that sealed the fate of the defenders.\textsuperscript{161}

While Meaux was under siege, on 5 April 1422 Pont–Meulan was captured by the Armagnacs.\textsuperscript{162} Thomas Montacute, earl of Salisbury, assembled the forces in Normandy for the siege, while Pierre de Luxembourg, count of Brienne


\textsuperscript{157} He had been captured by the Armagnacs on his way from the siege of Melun in 1420 and brought to Meaux, \textit{Monstrelet}, III, p. 413; \textit{Wavrin}, II, p. 330; \textit{Chastellain}, I, pp. 160–161. His release was negotiated by his brother Jean de Luxembourg on his visit to the siege of Meaux in January–February 1422. He then remained with a besieging army and participated in the negotiations for the surrender of the place, \textit{Cordeliers}, fo. 420r; \textit{Monstrelet}, IV, p. 80; \textit{Fenin}, p. 173; \textit{Basset}, fo. 44v.

\textsuperscript{158} \textit{Monstrelet}, IV, p. 92; \textit{Wavrin}, II, p. 403. These lists seem to contradict the opinion that the Burgundian chroniclers tried to present the situation as if the Burgundians took no part in the siege as presented in J. H. Wylie, W. T. Waugh, \textit{The Reign of Henry the Fifth}, III, p. 340.

\textsuperscript{159} \textit{Monstrelet}, IV, p. 81; \textit{Wavrin}, II, p. 392; \textit{Basset}, fo. 44v.

\textsuperscript{160} \textit{Monstrelet}, IV, p. 82; \textit{Wavrin}, II, p. 393. The name of this captain is alternatively transcribed as ‘de Guigny’. He was knighted during the siege. For his previous career see B. Schnerb, ‘Bourgogne et Savoie au début du XVe siècle: évolution d’une alliance militaire’, \textit{PCEEB}, 32 (1992), pp. 20–22.


\textsuperscript{162} \textit{Fauquemberg}, II, p. 42.
and Conversan, was sent there by Henry V from the siege of Meaux. After a short joint siege the Armagnacs surrendered on 15 April.

Eventually in May 1422 the garrison of the market of Meaux (the city had been already captured) became willing to discuss the conditions of surrender. On the Lancastrian side the only Frenchman among the negotiators was Pierre de Luxembourg, undoubtedly moved by his personal interests. The conditions were as harsh as the garrison could expect after more than half a year of resistance. The Dauphinists were only promised their lives and they were to become prisoners. There was still a number of exceptions, some of them unconditional, while others could retain their lives by surrendering fortified places under their command.

This clause gave strategic importance to the siege of Meaux as its surrender brought the Lancastrians a number of other places, Compiègne being the most important of them. It agreed to surrender if not relieved by the Dauphin by 18 June. Those unwilling to swear allegiance to the Treaty of Troyes were allowed to leave to the lands controlled by the Dauphin ‘outre la riviere de Saine’ with their goods except for the weapons and church belongings. The Dauphinist captain of Compiègne, in his turn, was to deliver to the Lancastrians—

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164 The recovery of Pont-Meulan became known in Paris on 16 April, Fauquembergue, II, pp. 42–43.

165 He obtained absolution from his ransom due to one of the Dauphinist captains at Meaux, Monstrelet, IV, p. 94; St. Remy, II, p. 53; Wavrin, II, p. 405.

166 The text of the treaty of surrender in English is published in Foedera, X, pp. 212–214. A somewhat different text organised as a number of articles appears in the Burgundian chronicles, Monstrelet, IV, p. 94; St. Remy, II, pp. 52–53; Wavrin, II, pp. 404–406. F. Morand in his editor’s note to the text of the treaty in the chronicle of the seigneur de Saint-Remy suggests that the conditions of the surrender in the Burgundian chronicles were rather a revision than a citation of the original text which he believes to be the one in Foedera, St. Remy, II, p. 53 n. 1.

167 Foedera, X, p. 212.

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ans the fortifications under his governance. The surrender of Compiègne was received by the duke of Bedford. Hugues de Lannoy, who probably returned from Vimeu to Henry V’s entourage, became captain.\(^{169}\)

Apart from Compiègne, the Dauphinists agreed to surrender Gamaches in the county of Eu, the castle of Montagu in Champagne and several other castles. Other castles including Moy were evacuated by the Dauphinists themselves.\(^{170}\) After this series of surrenders the territories under their control in Northern Picardy were effectively reduced to the two enclaves around Guise and Le Crottoy.

1.4 Hostilities in 1422

1.4.1 Philip the Good’s visit to the siege of Meaux

While Henry V was besieging Meaux Philip the Good was assembling his forces, probably with an intention to continue hostilities in northern France. By the end of 1421 the marshal of Burgundy Jean de Cotebrune came to Lille with an army mustered at Troyes on 21–30 October 1421.\(^{171}\) It was assembled to serve ‘le roi et le Duc en leurs présentes guerres’.\(^{172}\) Jean de Luxembourg tried


\(^{171}\) According to Monstrelet, this army numbered up to 6 000 horsemen, Monstrelet, IV, p. 74. Gilles de Roye gives 5 000 men under the prince of Orange, Dunes, p. 184. The Chronicle of Cordeliers estimates this company as 500–600 men-at-arms, Cordeliers, fo. 413v. J. de la Chauvelais, based on the muster rolls in ADCO, B 11798, reports presence of 23 knights and 11 squires banneret, 23 knights bachelor, 596 squires and 10 trumpeters, [J.] de la Chauvelais, ‘Les armées des trois premiers ducs de Bourgogne de la maison de Valois’, Mémoires de l’Academie des Sciences, Arts et Belles-Lettres de Dijon, 6 (1880). pp. 274–275. A certain number of gens de trait (probably inferior to that of squires as usual in the armies originating from the two Burgundies) must have accompanied these men-at-arms but they were to be mustered separately and related documents are not known to survive. It thus seems possible to estimate the total effectives of this force as some 1 000 men.

\(^{172}\) J. de la Chauvelais, ‘Les armées’, pp. 274–275. W. T. Waugh, suggests that the army was specially dispatched to escort the duke to Burgundy, J. H. Wylie, W. T. Waugh, The
to employ this force against the Dauphinist garrisons in the environs of Guise but finding the enemy castles ready for the defence the captains from Burgundy decided to retreat and Jean de Luxembourg had to dismiss his own forces as well.¹⁷³

In January Philip the Good, joined by these Burgundian nobles and the count of Saint-Pol, brought this army from Arras to Paris where he met the King and the Queen. On 16 January the duke left Paris going before Henry V and spent several days with him.¹⁷⁴ Even if his troops played any part in the siege there were no notable results achieved and the meeting must have had diplomatic rather than military significance.¹⁷⁵ By the end of January the duke returned to Paris and thence proceeded to his Burgundian dominions.¹⁷⁶

The duke’s plans at this stage are very unclear. The fact that Philip had summoned an army from his Burgundian dominions to the north suggests that he was expecting to make war there. When he moved his army through Picardy from Amiens towards Beauvais he had his banner unfurled and his army divided in the battle array with vanguard and rearguard.¹⁷⁷ These preparations show that he was aware of the possible battle with the Dauphinists on his way or even challenged them to fight him.¹⁷⁸

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*Reign of Henry the Fifth*, III, p. 343. It seems likely that a different formula would have been used in that case.

¹⁷³ His expedition was aimed against the seigneur of Moy (probably modern Moy-de-l’Aisne to the south-east of St.-Quentin) and of Chin (probably, Chigny to the east of Guise). See *Monstrelet*, IV, pp. 74–75 for this expedition. Moy was eventually abandoned by the Dauphinists following the surrender of Meaux, *Monstrelet*, IV, p. 98; *Wavrin*, II, p. 409; *St.-Remy*, II, pp. 55–56.

¹⁷⁴ *Fauquembergue*, II, pp. 35–36.


¹⁷⁶ *Itinéraires*, p. 22.


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Nevertheless, the duke eventually decided to depart for his Burgundian principalities. It may have been the dangerous situation in Charolais that forced Philip the Good hasten to Dijon.\textsuperscript{179} It may have been the influence of Burgundian nobility in his army. By the time of the duke’s arrival at the siege of Meaux these nobles had shown little desire to fight in the North.\textsuperscript{180} The chroniclers emphasize the fact that the duke had not visited Burgundy since his accession to the ducal title.\textsuperscript{181} The duke’s absence may have been taken as negligence by the nobility and other duke’s subjects. The complex of these factors forced Philip’s departure to Dijon and Henry’s consent to it.\textsuperscript{182}

The meeting at the siege of Meaux had important consequences, as is revealed by the replacement of key military officers of France in late January. Antoine de Vergy and Jean de la Baume were made marshals of France en déportant tous aultres,\textsuperscript{183} Hugues de Lannoy became the master of the crossbowmen, while Jean de Luxembourg was appointed the captain of Picardy with

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\textsuperscript{179} \textit{J. d’Avout, La querelle}, p. 337.  \\
\textsuperscript{180} This seems to be illustrated by their unwillingness to engage in the siege operations against the castle of Moy as well as by the desire of Louis de Chalon to avoid meeting with Henry V, \textit{Monstrelet}, IV, p. 78–79. The question of his oath of allegiance to Henry V is discussed above (See Ch. 1.2.1.). It is also worth noting that this army was reported to oppress greatly the inhabitants of the lands which they passed, \textit{Monstrelet}, IV, p. 75; \textit{Bourgeois}, p. 163.  \\
\textsuperscript{181} \textit{Monstrelet}, IV, p. 79; \textit{Wavrin}, II, p. 390; \textit{St.-Remy}, II, p. 47.  \\
\textsuperscript{182} On 15 February 1422 Philip the Good made his entry to Dijon and on 27 February the city gave an oath to respect the Treaty of Troyes, though not without mentioning that this was made on the duke’s insistence, d’Avout, \textit{La querelle}, pp. 337–338. During the duke’s stay in Burgundy he also received an oath to observe the Treaty of Troyes from Charles II, duke of Lorraine, who on 6 May 1422 swore to do his best to enforce the acceptance of the treaty in his domains and to suppress any opposition to the Lancastrian regime. The duke’s obligation is printed in B. Schnerb, \textit{Bulgnéville (1431). L’État bourguignon prend pied en Lorraine}, (Paris, 1993), pp. 127–128.  \\
\textsuperscript{183} This meant deposition of Claude de Beauvoir, seigneur de Chastellux, marshal of France since the Burgundian conquest of Paris in 1418, and Jacques de Montberon, promoted to marshalsy after the arrest of the seigeneur de L’Isle–Adam. Both made formal protests against this decision, \textit{Fauquemergue}, II, p. 36.
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a commission to bring the region into obedience to the Lancastrian regime.\textsuperscript{184} Thus, though the duke was heading for his Burgundian dominions, the conduct of war in Picardy was entrusted to his close and trusted adherents who were to act on the royal commission. The house of Luxembourg had great influence in Picardy and demonstrated strong sympathies for the Lancastrian cause, making Jean de Luxembourg a good choice for the conduct of the campaign. Hugues de Lannoy, another distinguished anglophone in Duke Philip’s entourage, was to join him in this commission.

1.4.2 The submission of Vimeu, 1422

The surrender of Saint-Riquier in November 1421 did not put an end to the hostilities in Picardy. The Armagnacs from Saint-Riquier joined the garrisons in Champagne and in Le Crotot. While Henry V was besieging Meaux and the duke of Burgundy had his army disbanded, the initiative was left to Jacques de Harcourt. The result of his attempt to retake the initiative is reported in different ways in the chronicles. Some chroniclers describe it as an accidental skirmish in Vimeu between the company of Jacques de Harcourt and the English from the garrisons of eastern Normandy.\textsuperscript{185} According to the Chronicle of Cordeliers, however, the Dauphinists attacked a castle in Vimeu, where after a four-hour assault they were forced to flee by the arrival of the English from the garrison of Eu.\textsuperscript{186} While this report is quite different from the others including the variance in describing Dauphinist effectives,\textsuperscript{187} it seems unlikely that there were two different engagements won by the Lancastrians in the same period in the same region\textsuperscript{188} but rather that the same incident is being reported in both

\textsuperscript{184} The above mentioned Burgundians (with the exception of Jean de Luxembourg) gave their oaths of office on 3 February 1422, \textit{Fauquembergue}, II, pp. 36–37. See also a fragment of the letter from ADN, B 17633 mentioning the appointment of Jean de Luxembourg, printed in B. de Lannoy, \textit{Hugues de Lannoy}, p. 196.

\textsuperscript{185} \textit{Monstrelet}, IV, p. 76; \textit{Wavrin}, II, p. 388; \textit{St.-Remy}, II, p. 46.

\textsuperscript{186} \textit{Cordeliers}, fo. 414v.

\textsuperscript{187} The chronicle of Cordeliers estimates forces of de Harcourt as 1600 men-at-arms (\textit{Cordeliers}, fo. 414v), other chronicles speak of 600–700 soldiers (\textit{Monstrelet}, IV, p. 76; \textit{Wavrin}, II, p. 388; \textit{St.-Remy}, II, p. 46).

\textsuperscript{188} The chronicle of Cordeliers dates this skirmish December 1421 (\textit{Cordeliers}, fo. 414v); Monstrelet gives no exact date but places the event between the narratives be-
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cases. The outcomes are the same in both versions: the Dauphinists including de Harcourt himself were forced to flee, losing some 200–400 men killed and captured.¹⁸⁹ The version in the Chronicle of Cordeliers resembles several other examples of the swift rescue by the English of their besieged companions like those at the abbey of Bec in 1421, and at Le Mans by Talbot in May 1428. What may be important in this case is the fact that Vimeu was a region under the Burgundian control and thus the English were probably helping their allies, not their compatriots. This necessarily implies that the ideas of cooperation must have been understood not only by the commanders–in–chief but also by the local captains, at least in this region where the Dauphinist positions were caught between those of the English and the Burgundians.

Jean de Luxembourg and Hugues de Lannoy, commissioned by Henry V to conduct the war in Picardy, opened the campaign in March 1422.¹⁹⁰ First, the castle of Quesnoy was besieged, brought into obedience and demolished.¹⁹¹ An English force under the command of Sir Ralph Boteler,¹⁹² captain of Eu, joined

tween Philip the Good’s arrival to Arras on 16 December and his departure from thence after Christmas (Monstrelet, IV, pp. 75–77; the duke’s itinerary notes his stay at Arras on 21–24 December, Itinéraires, p. 21). Other chronicles are less precise.

¹⁸⁹ Cordeliers, fo. 414v; Monstrelet, IV, p. 76; Wavrin, II, p. 388; St.-Remy, II, p. 46. The latter chronicler remarks that the prisoners were put to ransom by the English. J. L. Kirby suggests that ‘the prisoners from Le Crotot’ mentioned in the signet letter of Henry V were taken in this battle and not in that of Mons–en–Vimeau, Calendar of Sig

net Letters of Henry IV and Henry V, ed. by J. L. Kirby (London, 1978), p. 187 no. 917. According to the chronicles the prisoners of Mons–en–Vimeau were released without ransom by Philip of Burgundy in return for the surrender of St.–Riquier and there is no mention that any of them were handed to the English, Monstrelet, V, pp. 72–73; St.-Remy, II, p. 43–44; Wavrin, II, p. 387.

¹⁹⁰ Cordeliers, fo. 416v. Wavrin dates the summoms of the army by May but this does not correspond with his own mention that the army was in the field during Easter which that year was 12 April, Wavrin, II, pp. 395, 397. Jean Le Févre de Saint–Remy gives no report on the warfare in Picardy in 1422.

¹⁹¹ Quesnoy–sur–Araine (Somme, arr. Amiens, cant. Molliens–Dreuil) For the siege see Cordeliers, fo. 416v; Monstrelet, IV, pp. 84–85; Fenin, p. 588; Wavrin, II, pp. 395–396. The chronicle of Cordeliers and de Fenin pretend the castle was taken by assault and gives no report of its destruction.

¹⁹² Surname occasionally spelt as Butler or in the French sources as Le Bouteiller.
the besiegers before Gamaches.\textsuperscript{193} The joint Anglo-Burgundian force then besieged Airaines.

While Jean de Luxembourg was before Airaines the Dauphinist activity around Montdidier increased. First, the castle of Mortemer was captured,\textsuperscript{194} then the town of Pierrepont was taken and the castle besieged.\textsuperscript{195} This menace forced the Lancastrians to dispatch a part of their army in an attempt to repulse the Armagnacs without raising the siege. According to the chronicle of Cordeliers, only 300 men-at-arms and 400 archers, both Burgundians and Englishmen, of the besieging army, which consisted of 700 men-at-arms and 2000 archers, were sent against the approaching Dauphinists.\textsuperscript{196} The command was exercised by Hugues de Lannoy, master of the crossbowmen of France, and Sir Ralph Boteler, captain of Eu.

\textsuperscript{193} De Fenin estimates the English contingent as 120–140 men, while Monstrelet and Wavrin give 200–300 soldiers, \textit{Fenin}, p. 179; \textit{Monstrelet}, IV, p. 83; \textit{Wavrin}, II, p. 396. The chronicle of Cordeliers speaks of 60 men-at-arms and 400 archers under the count of Eu, \textit{Cordeliers}, fos. 418r–418v. This title was held by young Henry Bourchier (c. 1408–1483), son of Sir William Bourchier (d. 1420). He was underage and had not yet begun his service in France, L. Clark, ‘Bourchier, Henry, first earl of Essex (c.1408–1483)’, \textit{ODNB}. It thus appears that the chronicler mistook ‘captain’ for ‘count’.

W. T. Waugh suggested that the place was besieged but the siege was soon abandoned, basing his suggestion on a piece in \textit{Foedera} mentioning ‘illos qui in comitiva [...] Radulphi Botiller in obsidione Villae de Gamaches’, \textit{Foedera}, X, p. 520 (7 April 1422); J. H. Wylie, W. T. Waugh, \textit{The Reign of Henry the Fifth}, III, p. 353. The Burgundian chroniclers do not mention the siege and it seems possible that the document in \textit{Foedera} refers to the proposed rather than real aim of Sir Ralph Boteler’s company.

\textsuperscript{194} \textit{Monstrelet}, IV, p. 83; \textit{Wavrin}, II, p. 396. According to Monstrelet the captain of the castle was at the siege of Airaines when it was captured.

\textsuperscript{195} Pierrepont-sur-\textit{Avre} (Somme, arr. Montdidier, cant. Moreuil), in about 8 km to the north of Montdidier. Although no chronicle mentions that the castle was taken by the Dauphinists, they give no evidence that its garrison participated in the battle that followed.

\textsuperscript{196} \textit{Cordeliers}, fo. 418v; \textit{Fenin}, p. 588. The last source suggests that the number of English in this company was only 120–140 men. Other chronicles only estimate the effectives of the whole detachment as 1 000 soldiers, \textit{Monstrelet}, IV, p. 88; \textit{Wavrin}, II, p. 398.
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As the Lancastrians arrived before Pierrepont on 1 May\textsuperscript{197} the Dauphinists retreated, setting the town on fire, probably hoping to avoid being pursued by their enemies. According to the most detailed description of the engagement in the chronicle of Cordeliers, the archers made their way through the burning town while the men-at-arms had to seek for a ford in order to cross the river. These archers pursued the enemy without waiting for the men-at-arms and the Dauphinists, seeing that they were opposed by archers only, regrouped and launched a counterattack. The archers, however, held out until the arrival of their men-at-arms forced the Armagnacs to withdraw. The first stage of battle was over.\textsuperscript{198}

The Lancastrians were decided to fight their enemies who had taken a position on a hill nearby. Several knights were dubbed in anticipation of the battle. The allies dismounted and formed a battle array. This probably suggests that they initially expected to fight the battle in the traditional English defensive way.\textsuperscript{199} But when the Dauphinists, who had made no attempt to attack the allies, after several hours of waiting began to leave the field in the array the Burgundians tried to pursue them although with little success. The allies could return to the siege of Airaines.\textsuperscript{200}

\textsuperscript{197} Chronicles provide different descriptions of the route of the allied army. Monstrelet and Wavrin suggest they were moving via Conty (Somme, arr. Amiens, ch.–l. of cant.) where they lodged for the night, to Moreuil (Somme, arr. Mondidier, ch.–l. of cant.) and thence to Pierrepont, \textit{Monstrelet}, IV, p. 89; \textit{Wavrin}, II, p. 399. According to the chronicle of Cordeliers, the Anglo–Burgundians were at Breteuil when they discovered that their adversaries were in Pierrepont and hastened there, \textit{Cordeliers}, fos. 418v–419r. In both cases either from Conty via Moreuil or from Breteuil the allied force was to pass between 20 and 30 km before the battle which necessarily implies that both men-at-arms and archers were mounted.

\textsuperscript{198} \textit{Cordeliers}, fo. 419. Other chronicles omit this stage of the battle and from the mentioning of the fire in the town go to the knightng of certain Burgundians before the anticipated battle, \textit{Monstrelet}, IV, p. 89; \textit{Wavrin}, II, p. 399; \textit{Fenin}, p. 588.

\textsuperscript{199} The fact of dismounting of the allies is confirmed by most chronicles, \textit{Cordeliers}, fo. 419v; \textit{Monstrelet}, IV, p. 89; \textit{Wavrin}, II, p. 400. The chronicle of Cordeliers emphasizes that it was done as the English preferred to fight on foot.

Airaines soon agreed to surrender by 11 May if not relieved. On the day appointed it was delivered to the Burgundians and its defenders were allowed to leave. The castle was demolished afterwards.\(^{201}\) After this success Jean de Luxembourg disbanded his army.\(^{202}\)

On 22 May 1422 Richard Beauchamp, earl of Warwick, was commissioned to bring to obedience Le Crotory, Saint–Valéry, Noyelles and Gamaches.\(^{203}\) The latter place surrendered on 18 June 1422.\(^{204}\) The English army then laid siege to Saint–Valéry on the southern bank of the Somme estuary. In spite of heavy resistance and numerous sallies, the earl managed to organize the blockade of the town both by land and by sea and set up siege engines to force the town to negotiate for surrender after three weeks.\(^{205}\) Negotiations were held by the Burgundians and, according to the chronicle of Cordeliers, it was agreed that the town will be delivered ‘en l’obéissance du roy de France et du duc de Bourgogne, et non autrement’.\(^{206}\) The date of surrender had been set for 4 September unless relieved.

\(^{201}\) Cordeliers, fo. 421v; Monstrelet, IV, pp. 90–91; Wavrin, II, pp. 400–401.

\(^{202}\) Cordeliers, fo. 421v.

\(^{203}\) Transcription of his commission in TNA, PRO 31/8/136. His forces on this campaign are estimated as 3000 men, F. C. Louandre, Histoire d’Abbeville, I, p. 342.

\(^{204}\) Monstrelet, IV, p. 101; Wavrin, II, pp. 412–413. The town was a part of the county of Eu being a part of Normandy and having an English count, this was probably the reason why after surrender an English captain was placed there. The treaty of surrender is in AN, J 626/20, a transcription is in TNA, PRO 31/8/135.

\(^{205}\) Monstrelet, IV, pp. 101–103; Wavrin, II, pp. 413–414.

\(^{206}\) A. Huguet, ‘Aspects de la Guerre de Cent Ans en Picardie maritime, 1400–1480’, MSAP, 48 (1941), 50 (1944), 48, p. 147; Cordeliers, fos. 424v–425r. The negotiations must have been in progress since the very start of this campaign. On 14 June 1422 a safe conduct was issued by Jacques de Harcourt to Hugues de Lannoy, master of crossbowmen, Jean de Harcourt, bishop of Amiens, and Christophe de Harcourt to come to Le Crotory; it has been printed in B. de Lannoy, Hugues de Lannoy, p. 211. Based on Wavrin’s account, it was believed that the aim of the mission was to induce Jacques de Harcourt to capitulate and as Le Crotory remained in his hands till early 1424 the mission was considered fruitless, Wavrin, II, p. 416; for such interpretation see, for example, C. Bréard ‘Le Crotory et les armements maritimes des XIVe et XVe siècles’, MSAP, 4 sér., 4 (1903), p. 29; B. de Lannoy, Hugues de Lannoy, p. 66. In fact,
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After the hostages were provided the siege was raised and the Lancastrians could hasten to the journée of Cosne-sur-Loire. Saint-Valéry surrendered on the appointed day: Jean de Blondel was appointed captain. Thus, this siege was undertaken under the English command and probably with mostly an English army but on behalf of the duke of Burgundy. Nevertheless, in the following years the military command of Saint-Valéry came into the hands of the English. The fall of Saint-Valéry left Le Crotay as the last Dauphinist stronghold in Ponthieu.

1.4.3 The journée of Cosne-sur-Loire, 1422.

While Philip the Good remained in his Burgundian dominions, hostilities resumed in the middle course of the Loire. First, the Dauphinists took La Charité-sur-Loire in late June. Then their forces appeared before Cosne-sur-Loire and an agreement was concluded appointing the journée for the relief of the town. The duke, anxious of the Dauphin's power, appealed to Henry V it seems likely, given the account in Cordeliers, that the embassy managed to negotiate the surrender of Saint-Valéry.

207 The presence of Richard Beauchamp at the journée of Cosne is attested by a number of chronicles, Monstrelet, IV, p. 107; Fenin, p. 184; Walsingham. pp. 772–773. Hugues de Lannoy also took part in that journée, B. de Lannoy, Hugues de Lannoy, p. 66.

208 Cordeliers, fo. 427r; Monstrelet, IV, pp. 130–131.

209 Sir Ralph Boteler is named the captain of the town and castle of Saint-Valéry in the quittance, given on 31 March 1423, BNF, MS. Fr. 26046, no. 67. This may have been due to the preparations for the advance against Le Crotay. The removal from the cap-taincy may have induced Jean Blondel to abandon Lancastrian cause in July 1423, for his defection see V. de Beauville, Histoire de la ville de Montdidier, 3 vols. (Paris, 1857), I, p. 140.

On 29 September 1423 James Fiennes, squire, was retained as the captain of Saint-Valéry for 1 year, BNF, MS. Fr. 4485, p. 250–252; BNF, MS. Fr. 26047, no. 260. He remained in office until the end of June 1424 when the fortifications were demol-ished following the capture of Le Crotay.

210 Various dates are given in different sources: 6 August (Monstrelet (eng.), V, p. 364), 12 August (Cordeliers, fo.425v, Geste des Nobles, p. 185), 15 August (St.-Remy, II, p. 59), 17 August (Wavrin, II, p. 418), 27 August (Monstrelet, IV, p. 106). F. Morand believed 16 August to be a correct date (St.-Remy, II, p. 59 n. 2). Some other historians accept the date of 12 August, J. H. Wylie, W.T. Waugh The Reign of Henry the Fifth, III,
asking for an English force for an anticipated battle. Henry V was keen to lead the English army in person but the deterioration of his health made him return to Vincennes, delegating the command to his brother, the duke of Bedford. The English joined the duke of Burgundy at Vezelay. Duke Philip’s forces included 1500 men mustered at Avalon on 4 August for this campaign as well as the contingents brought from Picardy by Jean de Luxembourg, Hugues de Lannoy and Antoine de Croy. Deploying his army in three divisions, the duke of Burgundy decided to include the contingents of all three nations (the Burgundians, the Picards and the English) in each of them. Phillip himself remained in the main division together with the duke of Bedford. Basset’s Chronicle claims that Henry V appointed Philip the Good his lieutenant general for this expedition, while Bedford remained in command over the English.

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211 The chroniclers estimate the Dauphinist army as 20,000 men, which is probably an overestimation, Cordeliers, fo. 423v; Monstrelet, IV, p. 106.

212 The Geste des Nobles suggests that Cosne-sur-Loire had an Anglo-Burgundian garrison (‘les Anglois et Bourgoignons qui dedans furent’, Geste des Nobles, p. 185), which may explain the English participation in the journée. However, an English presence in the Loire valley in 1422 seems most dubious.

213 De Fenin estimates the size of the English contingent as 3,000 men, Fenin, p. 184.

214 1116 men–at–arms (including knights and bannerets), 420 gens de trait, 12 trumpeters and 6 minstrels were reviewed by the marshal of Burgundy, [J.] de la Chauvelais, ‘Les armées’, pp. 274–275.

215 According to the Chronicle of Cordeliers, Hugues de Lannoy and Antoine de Croy brought 300 men–at–arms to the ducal army, Cordeliers, fo. 424v. The account records only 145 men–at–arms (including knights and bannerets) and 162 gens de trait in the retinue of Antoine de Croy and 44 men–at–arms and 71 gens de trait in that of David de Brimeu, seigneur de Humbercourt, ADN, B 1925, fos. 126v–127v. The retinue of Jean de Luxembourg is not mentioned.

216 Cordeliers, fos. 425v–426r; Monstrelet, IV, p. 108; Wavrin, II, p. 420. It is noteworthy that the difference between the Burgundians and the Picards was made by the Burgundian chroniclers and probably, by the duke himself.

217 Basset, fos. 46r–46v.
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Unfortunately this model of tactical cooperation did not undergo the trial by battle. The Dauphinists did not risk combat.\(^{218}\)

The English commanders returned from Cosne to Vincennes only to find their king on his deathbed. On 31 August 1422 Henry V died. The situation that Charles VI might outlive Henry V was hardly taken seriously at the conclusion of the treaty of Troyes. The treaty clearly made Henry VI the next in the succession line, but the succession of an infant could never be taken for granted and he definitely could not take the regency while Charles VI was still alive. The conclusion of the Treaty of Troyes was very much due to the personal charisma, reputation and capabilities of Henry V and his demise removed one of the pillars on which the Lancastrian rule in France was based. From this point of view, his death opened a new stage in the history of Lancastrian France and Anglo-Burgundian relations.

1.5 Cooperation under Henry V

The years 1420–1422 were crucial for the establishment of Anglo-Burgundian cooperation in the military sphere. After the first joint campaign, the character of which was defined by political as well as military considerations, the allies came to pursuing the war on their own, whilst remaining in close coordination of their efforts. After taking leave of each other in early 1421, Henry V and Philip the Good met thrice and their meetings had clear influence on the course of operations. If needed, English forces were sent to support Burgundian war efforts, while some Burgundians in royal service found themselves under the command of Henry V or his English captains. Thus, the English were found under the Burgundian command and vice versa. This coop-

\(^{218}\) The *Geste des Nobles* suggests that both armies were deployed in battle order, but the Armagnacs did not risk crossing the Loire and had to deliver the hostages given to them when the delayed capitulation had been made. The same source also mentions a raid of a joint Anglo-Burgundian force amounting to 2 000 men towards La Charité undertaken during this confrontation. The allies had to return to their main forces before Cosne without any result on the arrival of the Armagnacs, *Geste des Nobles*, pp. 185–186. This raid is also reported by Pierre de Fenin, *Fenin*, p. 185.
eration was not necessarily imposed by the high command; some joint operations seem to have been undertaken by the initiative of local commanders.\textsuperscript{219}

In spite of Henry V’s position as the regent, military power in Lancastrian France was not usurped by the English. To put the kingdom of France under direct English military control was no longer the aim of the English king. Only a few places conquered in 1420–1422, such as Dreux and Montereau, received English garrisons.\textsuperscript{220} The rest were delivered to the Burgundian allies, trusted enough to be given control of some of the most important conquered places like Compiègne.\textsuperscript{221} In some cases, however, as with Villeneuve–le–Roi (after its recovery in 1421), Melun or Saint–Valéry, such decisions could be later reconsidered in favour of appointing an English captain. In late December 1420 Henry V replaced a number of \textit{baillis} but unlike those in Normandy the new \textit{baillis} were all Frenchmen.\textsuperscript{222} In a similar way the new marshals of France and the master of crossbowmen were also Burgundians. The resources of English manpower for war as well as for administration were limited and Henry V sought the support of his new French adherents, in order to legitimise the new regime in the eyes of the French.

\textsuperscript{219} These may have included the siege of Tremblay in early 1420 (see Ch. 1.1.3), the raid leading to the defeat before Montépilloy in late 1420 or early 1421 (see Ch. 1.3.1), the repulse of Jacques de Harcourt’s attack in Vimeu (see Ch. 1.4.2).

\textsuperscript{220} According to Basset’s chronicle, Richard Beauchamp, earl of Warwick, was appointed captain of Montereau on its capture, \textit{Basset}, fo. 40r. Dreux was put under the command of Gilbert Halsall, J. H. Wylie, W.T. Waugh, \textit{The Reign of Henry the Fifth}, III, p. 327.

\textsuperscript{221} L. Carolus–Barré, ‘\textit{Compiègne et la Guerre}’, p. 385.

\textsuperscript{222} According to Prof. A. Curry, throughout the period of English occupation of Normandy the offices of \textit{bailli} were held by the English with only a few exceptions (a paper given by A. Curry at Harlaxton Symposium 2014). In late 1420 Robert Le Jeune became \textit{bailli} of Amiens, Jean Rapiout of Sens and Auxerre, Nicolas Surreau of Chartres, Jean de Chauffour of Chaumont (in October rather than December 1420), Jean Monjon of Sens, \textit{Gallia Regia}, I, pp. 61, 203–204, II, pp. 123, 152, V, p. 387. The appointment of Frenchmen as \textit{baillis} by Henry V as opposed to the Englishmen appointed to the bailliages of Normandy is also noted in N. Murphy, ‘War, Government and Commerce: The Towns of Lancastrian France under Henry V’s rule, 1417–22’, in \textit{Henry V: New Interpretations}, ed. by. G. Dodd (Woodbridge, 2013), p. 260.
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There is no evidence of any personal conflicts between Henry V and Philip the Good, though some conflicts with the Burgundians are noted. At the sieges of Tremblay and Roye, when the mutual status of the allies was not yet clear, conflicts arose over prisoners. Before Sens the quarrels were caused by the dispute about whether the English or the Burgundians were stronger and Henry V had to order his men not provoke their new allies. The siege of Melun became a more difficult case for Anglo-Burgundian relations, to a degree that at a certain point it appeared to W. T. Waugh ‘as though the alliance was in danger’. Waugh believed that previous conflicts made it necessary to divide the English from the Picards and that the English contingent on the side of Brie was actually there to control rather than assist the duke of Burgundy. The departure of certain Burgundian captains from the siege is also presented as the evidence of a crisis in relations between the allies. The conflicts between the English and the Burgundians at the siege of Melun are confirmed by the documents as well. It appears, however, that W. T. Waugh was overestimating this possible crisis. As letters of remission show, the soldiers whether in field or in garrison could often find a reason for a violent brawl. The lack of provisions, diseases and problems with the payment of wages accompanied by the difficulties of a lengthy siege contributed to the undermining the morale of the be-

\footnote{See Ch. 1.1.3.}
\footnote{Fenin, p. 139.}
\footnote{J. H. Wylie, W.T. Waugh, The Reign of Henry the Fifth, III, pp. 210, 213. However, in such case it would be unwise to place these English forces under Duke Philip's command, see Ch. 1.2.1.}
\footnote{On 16 September Philip the Good ordered a payment of 20 fr. to two Englishmen, beaten in the quarters of the marshal of Burgundy in order to help them recover and to avoid further conflicts between the English and the Burgundians, ADN, B 1920, fo. 107r. As no names were given it may be presumed that the Englishmen were no more than simple men-at-arms, therefore the sum which exceeded the monthly wages of a man-at-arms in the duke's army (about 15 fr.) was quite significant for them. The case is reported in B. Schnerb, Les Armagnacs et les Bourguignons. La maudite guerre 1407-1435 (Paris, 1988, repr. 2001), p. 296.}
\footnote{For the examples of such cases see a number of letters of remission published or summarised in Actes de la Chancellerie de Henri VI concernant la Normandie sous la domination anglaise (1422-1435), ed. P. le Cacheux, 2 vols (Rouen, Paris, 1908), I, pp. 246-247, 273-276, 393-395 and II, p. 93-95, 109-114, 309-311, 319, 344.}
siegers. The conflicts before Melun seem to have been caused by the difficulties of this kind of military enterprise rather than by any special hatred on a personal level. Some conflicts between the English and the Burgundians may have been inevitable but the situation was hardly serious enough to threaten the alliance. One of the attempts to prevent escalation was made by Henry V in disciplinary ordinances given at Mantes, prohibiting his soldiers on pain of death from reproaching anyone for his nationality. 228 Personal conflicts are widely noted throughout 1420 but not in the following years, leading to a suggestion that the problem was successfully dealt with.

The outcome of operations in 1420–1422 was generally positive for the Lancastrians but not as successful compared to 1417–1419. As the three–side conflict transformed into two–sided, the Dauphinist opposition increased in its resolve. The Lancastrian advance became slower, even if still quite steady. The defeat of Baugé had little consequences except for a number of important captains killed and captured. In the campaign of summer 1421 the Dauphinists were extremely lucky in breaking Lancastrian campaign plans and expectations but they never managed to achieve a tactical victory. In 1422 their advance against Cosne happened too late to relieve Meaux or Saint–Valéry.

The strategy of Henry V appear to be based on several crucial points. That he saw a major battle with the Dauphin as desirable as shown by the campaign of 1421 and by the king’s desire to personally lead an army at the journée of Cosne. If the enemy avoided battle, the second consideration was the consolidation of territories under Lancastrian rule by gradually suppressing the Dauphinists in Champagne and Picardy and thus relieving the pressure on Paris and other Lancastrian lands. The course of the Seine and the Yonne had to be controlled to facilitate victualling Paris and its communication with Normandy.

228 'whether French, English, Welsh or Irish or of anywhere else', A. Curry, ‘The Military Ordinances of Henry V: Texts and Contexts’, in War, Government and Aristocracy in the British Isles c. 1150–1500. Essays in Honour of Michael Prestwich, ed. by C. Given-Wilson, A. Kettle, L. Scales (Woodbridge, 2008), p. 248 (clause x). Another clause prohibited debates ‘on account of past or future hatreds on which deaths arise’, Ibid. p. 242 (clause i). The Mantes ordinances were traditionally dated by historians to 1419, however, A. Curry considers it possible that they were actually composed in July 1421 when the Anglo–Burgundian army was assembling at Mantes intending to raise the Dauphinist siege of Chartres, Ibid. pp. 234–236.
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but also as a kind of circumvallation, preventing the Dauphin from massive in-
tervention in the warfare in Champagne and Picardy. The care for the security
of this line was illustrated by swift recovery of Pont-Meulan in April 1422 and
the extensive fighting for Villeneuve-le-Roi up to its capture in 1421. Of spe-
cial importance became the submission of Ponthieu due to its threat to the
shipping in the Channel. The task of consolidation however was not brought to
an end by the death of Henry V and was left to his successors. These strategic
considerations were to a significant degree to define the Lancastrian strategy
in the following years until the objectives were largely achieved by mid–1424.
Chapter 2: From the death of Henry V to the truce of Chambéry (1422–1424)

2.1 Bedford’s debut as the Regent of France

The death of Henry V on 31 August 1422 left the regency of France vacant. On his deathbed the king of England apparently advised his brother John, duke of Bedford, to offer regency to Duke Philip of Burgundy; in case of refusal Bedford was to take the responsibility himself.¹ Being a Valois prince and the greatest among the French partisans of the Lancastrian regime Philip the Good was a possible choice to regency for Charles VI and could possibly claim it due to proximity of blood, the motive employed by his father in his anti-Armagnac propaganda.² To do so, however, was to claim back the responsibilities he had set aside by the Treaty of Troyes; the years 1420–1422 were successful for the Lancastrian cause but most problems remained unresolved. On the other hand, the duke of Bedford was the third in the succession line, preceded by the ill Charles VI and the newborn Henry VI.³ It was impossible to predict how long either of them would last.⁴ Bedford’s appointment to regency would also introduce him to the French as the heir to the throne of France.⁵

¹ Monstrelet, IV, p. 110; St. Remy, II, p. 62. As J. P. Genet puts it, it was Philip the Good, not the duke of Bedford, who was to become regent for Charles VI (but not for Henry VI), J.–P. Genet, ‘Le roi de France anglais et la nation française au XVIe siècle’, in Identité régionale et conscience nationale en France et en Angleterre du Moyen Âge à l’époque moderne. Actes du colloque, ed. by R. Babel and J.–M. Moeglin (Sigmaringen, 1997), p. 57.
² Thus, in 1417 John the Fearless complained that during the king’s incapacity the kingdom was governed by a simple Gascon noble, the count of Armagnac, and not by the prince of the blood, B. Schnerb, L’etat bourguignon, p. 166.
³ As A. Curry has pointed out, according to the treaty of Troyes, the crown of France was to pass to the heirs general rather than heirs male of Henry V, A. Curry ‘Two Kingdoms, One King’, pp. 30–31.
⁴ When the Treaty of Troyes was concluded in 1420 no one expected Charles VI to outlive Henry V, but by early September 1422 it may have been already clear that the king
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Philip came to Paris soon after Henry V’s death and held conversations with the duke of Bedford and other members of the council of the late Henry V. It appears that no final decision over regency was made during this meeting and for a while Bedford only styled himself the governor of Normandy. The death of Charles VI on 21 October did not make Philip the Good come to Paris, even though the funeral was delayed, possibly in anticipation of the duke’s reaction. Instead of coming, Philip sent to Paris a delegation led by Hugues de

of France would not last long (he actually died within two months), see B. Schnerb, État bourguignon, p. 177.

On the contrary, it could not be taken for granted that Henry VI would ever grow up to accept the ruler’s responsibilities. The fact that it eventually happened may be considered a remarkable success of the Lancastrian dynasty in securing the English throne for themselves, C. Carpenter, The Wars of the Roses. Politics and the constitution in England, c. 1437-1509 (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 75–76. Setting aside the political factor, even in royal and great noble families child mortality could be extremely high. To give but a few examples, Charles, the first-born son of Charles VI and Isabel of Bavaria died in 1401 in the age of nine, B. Schnerb, Armagnacs et Bourguignons, p. 29. It was only the third son of Philip the Good, Charles, who survived his infancy, M. Sommé, Isabelle de Portugal, duchesse de Bourgogne. Une femme au pouvoir au XV° siècle (Villeneuve d’Ascq, 1998), pp. 50–51.

Enguerrand de Monstrelet noted that at the funeral the body of Charles VI ‘n’estoit [...] accompagné de nul de princes de son sang, sinon du duc de Bethfort’; he is thus giving Henry V’s brother the status of the prince of the blood which technically he could not claim, Monstrelet, IV, p. 122.

Monstrelet, IV, pp. 112–113; St. Remy, II, pp. 64–65; Walsingham, II, p. 777; Fenin, p. 187. According to the Itinéraires, Philip the Good was staying in Paris from 31 Aug till 10 Oct (Itinéraires, p. 26), which is probably, an overestimation.

It appears that this visit also resulted in liberation of Jean Villiers, seigneur de L’Isle–Adam, imprisoned since June 1421, Monstrelet, IV, p. 130; Wavrin, III, p. 5.

For the presentation of Bedford as the governor of Normandy, see for example BNF, MS. Fr. 26046 nos. 5, 10, 15; Bl., Add. Ch. 85, 86. The latest of these was issued on 3 Dec 1422. On the other hand, he is reported to start styling himself regent by 10 October, J. Ferguson, English Diplomacy, 1422-1461 (Oxford, 1961), pp. 1–2.

The funeral ceremony only took place on 9–11 November 1422, Fauquembergue, II, pp. 70–72.
Lannoy.\(^9\) The duke’s letters, presented on 7 November 1422, suggested that the duke remained loyal to the Treaty of Troyes and was ready to serve the kingdom (‘prest d’entendre et soy employer au bien de ce royaume’), including military assistance. The duke’s representatives were authorised to inquire in which position the duke could do this.\(^{10}\) Philip the Good thus made no express claim for regency. He delegated the decision to the royal administration in Paris, in which the number of Burgundian sympathisers was significant. As the Duke Philip’s position clarified, it was possible to bury the late king and to appoint a regent for the new one. On 11 November while returning from the funeral of Charles VI the duke of Bedford demonstrated his claim to the regency by ordering the sword of State to be carried in front of him.\(^{11}\) On 19 November the chief administrators of the state and the members of the Parlement of Paris gave an oath of obedience to Henry VI and John, duke of Bedford, was formally proclaimed regent.\(^{12}\)

The question of whether Philip the Good’s decision to leave regency to Bedford was voluntary or forced has stimulated a number of opinions amongst historians, who can hardly be expected to generate a definite conclusion as no specific document on this matter is known to exist.\(^{13}\) What is possible to con-

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\(^9\) It may be notable that just before this mission, in October 1422, Hugues de Lannoy was sent to the duke of Bedford in order to negotiate his marriage with Anne of Burgundy, B.-A. Pocquet du Haut-Jussé, ‘Anne de Bourgogne et le testament de Bedford (1429)’, in BEC, 95 (1934), p. 296; E. C. Williams, My Lord of Bedford 1389-1435 (London, 1963), p. 100.

\(^{10}\) ‘chargez de savoir quelle charge on lui vouldroit baillier et à quoy on le vouldroit employer par deça, afin que, selon ce, il peust amener en sa compaignie ou faire venir gens d’armes’, Fauquembergue, II, pp. 68–70.

\(^{11}\) C. A. J. Armstrong, ‘La Double Monarchie’, p. 343. The chronicle of the Cordeliers also notes that Bedford was present at the funeral service ‘vestu en habit roial’, Cordeliers, fo. 429r.


\(^{13}\) B. Schnerb, L’Etat bourguignon, p. 177. To mention but a few opinions, some historians accept without any doubt that Philip the Good declined the position of regent. See for example, E. Perroy, La Guerre de Cent Ans, 7 éd. (Paris, 1945), p. 237; P. Bonenfant, Philippe le Bon, p. 43; E. C. Williams, My Lord of Bedford, p. 76; R. Vaughan, Philip the Good, p. 16. B. Rowe suggests that after Henry V’s death Bedford occupied
From the death of Henry V to the truce of Chambéry clude is that the responsibility for maintaining the Lancastrian regime in France fell on the duke of Bedford, and the duke of Burgundy showed no signs of displeasure.

In spite of support in Paris and from Philip the Good, Bedford’s status lacked security. Thus far, Lancastrian authority in France was very much based on the personal charisma and reputation of Henry V. As military leaders both brothers had won a single major battle each, but the naval victory won by Bedford off Harfleur (1416) was no match for a triumph at Agincourt. John played no significant part in the conquest of Normandy, being the protector of England during Henry V’s absence. Although he came to France on several occasions in 1420 and 1422 he was never given an independent command and remained in the shadow of his elder brother. Bedford had a good administrative experience in England, but this could hardly impress the French. Therefore, by late 1422 the Dauphinists had no more reason to fear Henry V, and still had no reason to fear Bedford, who was to prove himself.

This seeming lack of a Lancastrian powerful hand induced the Armagnacs to intensify their efforts. Jacques de Harcourt resumed the raids in Artois. In January 1423 the Dauphinists gained Meulan, gaining a crossing of the Seine downstream from Paris. The threat to the Burgundian borders persisted. Some of Bedford’s French subjects may have felt that the age of English power was gone with Henry V. A conspiracy aimed to deliver the city to the Dauphin was himself with the affairs of Normandy, possibly expecting Duke Philip to take the regency, which he did not, leaving the matter to the Burgundian-dominated council, B. Rowe, ‘The Grand Conseil’, pp. 208–209. J. Barker makes an assumption (possibly based on Walsingham) that after the death of Charles VI Philip of Burgundy may have had to resign the position of regent, which he might have initially accepted, not to be associated with the service to the English king of France, J. Barker, Conquest, p. 48, Walsingham, II, p. 777. This idea seems dubious given that Philip had been absent from Paris when Charles VI had died and had not hasten to the capital afterwards.

On the other hand, C. A. J. Armstrong considered it more likely that Philip of Burgundy was refused the regency by the English, C. A. J. Armstrong, ‘La Double Monarchie’, p. 345). This opinion is shared by A. Leguai who doubts whether Henry V did really expect Philip the Good to take the regency, A. Leguai, ‘La “France Bourguignone”’, pp. 46–47.
discovered in Paris.\textsuperscript{14} A century later, Hall wrote of the withdrawal of certain French nobles to the cause of Dauphin after the death of Henry V and Charles VI.\textsuperscript{15}

Bedford thus needed to consolidate all the French powers willing to support the Lancastrian regime. With this in mind, he met Philip, the duke of Burgundy, and Jean V, the duke of Brittany, in Amiens. The conference resulted in the signing on 17 April 1423 of a treaty of mutual friendship and support. The military aspect of the treaty suggested assistance to each other with 500 soldiers on request, to be paid by the receiving side since the second month of their service.\textsuperscript{16} Unlike the Treaty of Troyes this was not a constitutional document but a private pact between the greater nobles of the Lancastrian kingdom of France which has been compared with the letters of brotherhood in arms.\textsuperscript{17} In this relation, it to a certain degree was a replacement of the treaty made in Arras and Rouen in December 1419, putting Bedford in the place of Henry V. The new treaty, however, was more than just a private declaration of friendship and alliance. The dukes of Burgundy and Brittany not only accepted Henry VI as the king of France,\textsuperscript{18} but also Bedford as his regent. Thus, the treaty of Amiens set a distinctive point in the dispute (if any) over the regency of France after the death of Charles VI. The importance and of this treaty and its influence on Anglo-Burgundian relations has often been underestimated by historians.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{14} 	extit{Monstrelet}, IV, p. 135.
\textsuperscript{15} 	extit{Hall}, p. 115.
\textsuperscript{16} 	extit{Foedera}, X, pp. 280–281. This edition contains an important misprint, suggesting that the dukes promised to help each other with 100 men and not 500 as it was actually presumed. This misprint can be detected by collating with other editions or one of the original copies of the treaty with seals which is ADN, B 297, no. 15465. The treaty is cited in chronicles such as 	extit{Monstrelet}, IV, pp. 147–149; 	extit{Wavrin}, III, pp. 25–27. The translation of the treaty in English appears in 	extit{Gregory}, pp. 153–156; 	extit{GCL}, pp. 126–128.
\textsuperscript{17} C. A. J. Armstrong, ‘La Double Monarchie’, pp. 346–347.
\textsuperscript{18} E. C. Williams, 	extit{My Lord of Bedford}, p. 101.
\textsuperscript{19} There are several reasons behind this underestimation. Some historians believe the treaty to be undermined by the separate Breton-Burgundian treaty made in Arras and the subsequent defection of Brittany to the Dauphinst cause, C. A. J. Armstrong ‘La Double Monarchie’, pp. 346–347; R. Vaughan, 	extit{Philip the Good}, pp. 9–10; M. Warner,
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According to the chroniclers, during this meeting at Amiens the duke of Burgundy asked the duke of Bedford to give him Amiens, Abbeville, Montreuil, Doullens, Beauquesne in the case that Pérrone, Roye and Montdidier were placed under subjection of Henry VI. The châtellenies of Péronne, Roye and Montdidier were the dowry of Michelle of France (d. 1422), the first wife of Philip the Good. Philip referred to the obligations taken by Henry V in December 1419, when the English king undertook to obtain for the duke of Burgundy from Charles VI a grant of lands to the annual value of 20,000 l.p. At Amiens Bedford promised to present this question to the Great Council, and on 8 September 1423 the châtellenies were delivered to the duke of Burgundy for life, together with Tournai which had not yet accepted Lancastrian rule. Thus the old obligation, which may have become a kind of payment for recognition, was fulfilled.

Another promise of Henry V – to marry one of his brothers to a Burgundian princess – was also confirmed at Amiens. It was decided that the duke of Bedford would marry Anne of Burgundy, sister of Duke Philip. The negotiations for a marriage had been in progress since October 1422 and by 12 December they had resulted in a ratification of the marriage contract. The ceremony was arranged to take place in Troyes on the day of Ascension, 13 May 1423; in this the duke of Bedford was literally following his brother’s footsteps. During 1423–1424 he had to prove that he could match his brother as a governor and military leader.


22 It has been suggested that this marriage was a Burgundian initiative, E. C. Williams My Lord of Bedford, p. 100; C. A. J. Armstrong, ‘La Double Monarchie’, p. 345. It seems that it was timely and important for both sides.

23 E. C. Williams, My Lord of Bedford, p. 102.
2.2 Operations of early 1423

One of the first challenges met by the new regent of France was the urgent necessity to recover Meulan which had been delivered to the Dauphinists by its citizens in January 1423.24 The importance of the control over the Seine for the Lancastrian France has already been discussed: communication between Paris and Normandy was especially vital.25 The Regent personally led the army before the town.26 The Armagnacs hoped that the Dauphin would send an army to relieve them, but, when this army did not risk a battle with the besiegers, they agreed on 1 March to surrender the town to their adversaries on the following day.27 The conditions were rather hard relative to those of the previous campaigns, probably due to the audacity of the enterprise. The Dauphinists were only guaranteed their lives but could retain freedom by swearing allegiance to the Lancastrian regime.28 As at the surrender of Meaux, the composition presumed the surrender of other places held by the Dauphinist cap-

24 G. Lefèvre-Pontalis dates the fall of Meulan 1 Jan 1423, G. Lefèvre-Pontalis, ‘Le siège de Meulan, p. 57, also J. H. Ramsay, Lancaster and York, I, p. 330. This is probably based on the evidence of the bourgeois of Paris, Bourgeois, p. 182, also in Basset, fo. 46v. Monstrelet and Wavrin give 14 January as the date of capture, Monstrelet, IV, p. 134; Wavrin, III, p. 8. On contrary, according to Pierre Cochon, the place was lost in the last week of December, Cochon, p. 290.
25 G. Lefèvre-Pontalis, ‘Le siège de Meulan’, p. 59. It may be noteworthy the Burgundian chroniclers report the discovery of a Dauphinist conspiracy in Paris immediately after the narrative on the fall of Meulan, Monstrelet, IV, pp. 134–135; Wavrin, III, pp. 8–9. Although no direct relations are made for these events it may be suggested that there was also a concern that Meulan could become a base for a Dauphinist attempt to gain Paris by treason in the way the Burgundians had it done in 1418.
26 G. Lefèvre-Pontalis suggests that Bedford left the siege to the earl of Salisbury once it was established, G. Lefèvre-Pontalis, ‘Le Siège de Meulan’, p. 59. However, several grants made at the siege of Meulan in February–March 1423 may suggest that Bedford returned to the siege and was present at the surrender, see Paris pendant l’occupation Anglaise, pp. 80–81 (AN, JJ 172/361), p. 84 (AN, JJ 172/266).
28 According to Jean de Wavrin this was what the Dauphinist captain, Jean Malet, seigneur de Graville, chose to do, Wavrin, III, p. 17. If true, this did not prevent him from continuing fighting against the Lancastrians.
From the death of Henry V to the truce of Chambéry, tains.29 This brought Marcoussy, Monthlery and Etampes into Lancastrian obedience, contributing to the security of Paris.30

The chronicles reflect the presence of the French adherents of the Lancastrian regime at the siege. Both Monstrelet and Wavrin describe the Lancastrian forces as consisting of the English,31 the Normans,32 the Picards and the Burgundians.33 Jean Lefèvre de Saint–Remy acknowledges the presence of the English and the Parisians.34 The treaty of surrender mentions Pierre le Verrat, the former royal prévôt of Paris, Pierre de Fontenay, seigneur de Rance, an ancient Burgundian partisan and a member of the council of France,35 and Jean de Puligny, seigneur de la Motte, councillor and chamberlain of the duke of Burgundy, who participated in the negotiations on the Lancastrian side.36

The successful outcome of the siege of Meulan allowed Bedford to meet the dukes of Burgundy and Brittany in Amiens in April and in the following

30 Monstrelet, IV, p. 142 (making no mention of Etampes); Wavrin, III, p 16.
31 For the list of the English at the siege see Basset, fo. 47r.
33 Monstrelet, V, p. 136; Wavrin, III, p. 10.
34 St. Remy, II, p. 72.
35 By 19 March 1423 he was councillor and maître d’hôtel of the duke of Bedford, BNF, P.O. 1189 (Fontenay), no. 33. For his career see L. Mirot, ‘Notes sur le manuscrit de Froissart et sur Pierre de Fontenay, seigneur de Rance, son premier possesseur’, BEC, 83 (1922), pp. 297–330.
36 In the same January 1423 he received an annual rent of 600 l.t. from the duke of, possibly a reward for joining the siege, Paris pendant l’occupation Anglaise, pp. 78–79 (AN, JJ 172/201). He was also granted the seigneurie of La Motte–Tilly (dep. Aube, arr. and cant. Nogent-sur-Seine) in inheritance by Henry V on 27 December 1420, AN, JJ 172/53. It is thus unlikely that it was the same person as one ‘Jehan de La Motte’ who was to remain prisoner at the king’s disposal at the surrender of Meaux in 1422, Cordeliers, fo. 420v.
month to marry Anne of Burgundy. While the Regent was spending his honey-
moon in Troyes, the Lancastrian army under the earl of Salisbury was bringing
Champagne to obedience. Three days after the Bedford’s marriage the bailli of
Troyes was ordered to raise 10 000 l.t. for the sieges of Pont-sur-Seine and
Montaguillon. Pont-sur-Seine was taken by assault on 25 May. The report of
Clement de Fauquembergue on this event notes that the place was captured by
the earl of Salisbury, the seigneur de l’Isle-Adam ‘et autres François et An-
glais de sa compagne’. The formula suggests that the Burgundians such as
the seigneur de l’Isle Adam were acting under the English command, in the
company of the earl of Salisbury. After the fall of Pont-sur-Seine several small-
er castles in the neighbourhood were also brought to obedience.

While Bedford returned to Paris, he left the earl of Salisbury, in the field, with the enormous powers as the governor of Champagne, Brie, the balliages

37 He stayed in the city for twenty five days after his marriage, which took place on 13
May 1423, E. C. Williams, My Lord of Bedford, p. 104.
38 Pont-sur-Seine (dep. Aube, arr. and cant. Nogent-sur-Seine), Cordeliers, fo. 438r;
Monstrelet, IV, p. 151; Wavrin, III, p. 30; St. Remy, II, p. 75. T. Boutiot suggests that it
was already in 1420 that Pont-sur-Seine had an English garrison; however he mentions
Jean and Clavin de Clou as the captains of the place, T. Boutiot, Histoire de la ville de
Troyes, p. 457. These were actually Savoyard mercenaries who had been in the Bur-
The place reportedly was taken by the Dauphinists on 13 October 1422, T. Boutiot,
39 He was released from the Bastille and restored in command soon after the death of
Henry V. His liberation is ascribed to the request of Philip the Good during the latter’s
visit to Paris in late 1422, Monstrelet, IV, p. 130; Wavrin, III, p. 5.
40 Fauquembergue, II, p. 98. The city of Troyes also provided a company of artillery
men, crossbowmen and labourers for the siege, having hired the bombardier of Pierre
de Luxembourg, count of Saint Pol (unfortunately, his name is not specified), T. Bou-
41 Traînel, Gumery, Soligny (dep. Aube, arr. and cant. Nogent-sur-Seine), T. Boutiot,
Histoire de la ville de Troyes, II, p. 459. Unfortunately no evidence is given of joint par-
ticipation in the submission of these places.
42 The earl is believed to have taken the castle of Orsay between Paris and Montlhéry,
followed by a colourful episode of Armagnac prisoners brought to Paris with ropes
round their necks and their lives only spared by the duke of Bedford on the pleas of his
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of Melun, Sens, Auxerre, and of Nivernois, Donziois, Mâconnois and Sois-
onnois. Thus the supreme military and civil authority over a greater part of

the Lancastrian kingdom of France to the south of Normandy and Picardy and
to the east of the Seine–Yonne line was concentrated in his hands. As these
territories lay adjacent to the domains of the duke of Burgundy, Duke Philip
and his administration must have been interested in bringing these regions in-
to Lancastrian obedience. Thus a good degree of cooperation on the part of

wife, See Monstrelet, IV, pp. 155–156; Wavrin, III, pp. 33–35; St. Remy, II, p. 75; Geste

des Nobles, p. 195; Bourgeois, p. 186 (the two last sources only mentioning the siege).

This story echoes a famous scene at the surrender of Calais in 1347, C. A. J. Arm-
strong, 'La Double Monarchie', p. 369 n. 5; M. Warner, ‘Chivalry in action: Thomas
Montagu and the war in France, 1417–1428’, NMS, 42 (1998), p. 171. This leads to a
suggestion that the scene was deliberately staged in order to improve the regent’s
reputation of a strong and strict ruler and to introduce his wife to the Parisians as a
mediator and peacekeeper. However, as A. Tuetey has noted, it is only Wavrin who
mentions that Salisbury participated in the siege of Orsay, Bourgeois, p. 186 n. 1. It is
thus possible that the earl was actually staying in Champagne, rather than returning to
the environs of Paris for the submission of Orsay.

43 The title given, according to the summaries of the letters of surrender for Fère–en–
Tardenois in BNF, NAF 7626, fos. 187r–188v and Bodleian MS. Carte 92, fo. 196v. Ac-
cording to the notes in BNF, MS. Clairambault 948, fo. 77 (without reference to the
original source), Salisbury was appointed governor of Champagne and Brie by the royal
letters issued on 4 June 1423. M. Warner, gives 13 June 1423 as the date of the first
recorded reference to the earl as the governor of Champagne, M. W. Warner, ‘The
Montagu earls of Salisbury c. 1300–1428: a Study in Warfare, Politics & Political Cul-
nal documents may show a certain variation in the list of territories covered by the
earl’s powers of governor. See, for example, BNF, MS. Clairambault 76, nos. 21–23;
Clairambault 948, no. 67; Fr. 25767, no. 45: BL, Add. Ch. 11520.

44 For the discussion of his powers see M. W. Warner, ‘The Montagu earls of Salisbury’,
pp. 138–141.

45 The Burgundians were already waging the war in Champagne. On 1 November 1420
Guillaume, seigneur de Châtillon, took Château-Thierry by assault, BNF, MS. Fr. 26048
531. In the following year Antoine de Lorraine, count of Vaudemont, was defeated by
La Hire during a raid in the environs of Vitry, Raoulet, p. 175–176; Religieux, VI, p.
459. In 1422 Saint Dizier was besieged and brought to surrender by Antoine and Jean
Burgundian allies might be anticipated. The need for English assistance was soon revealed by the request for help coming from the dowager duchess of Burgundy. The relief was required for the garrison of Cravant, a town in Auxerrois, besieged by a great Armagnac army, which might proceed against the duchy of Burgundy should Cravant fall. The Regent ordered the earls of Salisbury and Suffolk, Lord Willoughby, the last only recently having come from England, and other captains to hasten to the succour of the Burgundians.

2.3 The battle of Cravant, 31 July 1423

The period of 1420–1435 witnessed several pitched battles fought by joint armies, composed of the English and the Burgundians: Cravant (1423), Rouvray (1429), Patay (1429), Bulgnéville (1431), Lagny-sur-Marne (1432). However the battle of Cravant was the only major battle when the allied army was composed of relatively equal contingents provided by each of the partners. Thus, neither military system dominated and it was necessary to solve a number of problems dealing with organisation of command, choice of tactical scheme to ensure the maximal use of the peculiarities of each.

The battle attracted attention of numerous chroniclers, among which the most detailed accounts are provided by Jean de Wavrin and the Livre des...

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46 Robert, Lord Willoughby, was leading one of the retinues in the expeditionary force, indented to serve for 6 month which had just crossed from England in May–June 1423, H. L. Ratcliffe, ‘The military expenditure’, pp. 6–8.

47 According to Wavrin, a small force was left before Montaguillon to maintain the siege, Wavrin, III, p. 70. This siege will be discussed further, see Ch. 2.6.

48 For this chapter I am very grateful to J. Day who brought my attention to some aspects of battlefield topography and certain sources including the earl of Suffolk’s report which necessitated the reconsideration of the combat scheme offered by A. H. Burne.
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*Trahisons.* More surprisingly, three contemporary eye–witnes accounts of the battle are known to survive. There are two relations of the victory sent by Jean de Toulonoge, marshal of Burgundy, and William de la Pole, earl of Suffolk, to the duke of Burgundy and to the Lancastrian government in Paris respectively. Another account of the battle is given in the grant of Cravant to the chapter of Auxerre by the seigneur de Chastellux several weeks after the victory. These pieces of first–hand evidence may help reconstruct the course of the battle.

Cravant is situated in about 17 km upstream the Yonne from Auxerre. The struggle for the town dated back to February 1423 when the Bastard de la Baume captured it for the Dauphinists, thus obtaining a crossing on the upper Yonne and a base for raids against Auxerre and surrounding regions. In late June the place was recovered by the Burgundians under Claude de Beauvoir, seigneur de Chastellux, and Guy ‘Le Veau’ de Bar, seigneur de Presles. However in only a few days, on 30 June, the Burgundians found themselves besieged in the town by the arriving Armagnac army. Burgundian captains

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49 The reports of Jean de Wavrin (*Wavrin*, III, pp. 61–70) Enguerrand de Monstrelet (*Monstrelet*, IV, pp. 158–162) and Jean Léfevre de Saint–Remy (*St.–Remy*, II, pp. 76–79.), follow the same storyline with a different level of details. It is possible that de Wavrin, who claims to witness the battle (*Wavrin*, III, p. 109), used his personal experience to enhance the account of their common source.


54 ADCO, B 5425, fos. 85r (capture of Cravant), 86v (Armagnac raids from Cravant).


56 ADCO, B 5425, fo. 87r. The Burgundians trappd in the town included Claude de Beauvoir, seigneur de Chastellux, Guy de Bar, seigneur de Presles, Jean, seigneur de Digoine, François de la Palud, seigneur de Bologneux, seigneur d’Usselot, seigneur de Chandoi (or Chambdée), H.–P.–C. de Chastellux,* Histoire généalogique ... de Chastellux*, p. 86; *Plancher*, IV, p. 73. It is difficult to agree with the *Geste des Nobles*, listing
trapped in the town sent envoys to Marguerite of Bavaria, dowager duchess of Burgundy, who, as it was mentioned above, appealed for help to the Regent of France. In the meantime Jean de Toulounge, marshal of Burgundy, was charged by the dowager duchess and her council to assemble the nobles of the two Burgundies for the relief of Cravant. It does not appear that a journée was appointed to decide the destiny of the town. The Burgundians were resolved to defend it to the last even in spite of the lack of victuals, which made them by the end of the five-week-long siege start eating their horses.\textsuperscript{57}

The English and the Burgundians met at Auxerre on 29 July.\textsuperscript{58} The captains held a council in the city cathedral and ordinances for the anticipated joint campaigning were issued.\textsuperscript{59} R. Vaughan suggested that these ordinances represented English superiority in the military sphere and acceptance of the English tactics by the allied army.\textsuperscript{60} As shown by B. Schnerb, the tactics of the defensive combat in dismounted formations, developed by the English during the fourteenth century, were introduced in the ducal armies in the reign of

\begin{flushright}
Pierre de Fontenay, Lourdin de Saligny and Regnier Pot as those besieged, \textit{Geste des Nobles}, p. 191. The suggestion that ‘although in Burgundian territory, the garrison was mainly English’ (E. C. Williams, \textit{My Lord of Bedford}, p. 107) is not supported by any evidence.

\textsuperscript{57} H.-P.-C. Chastellux, \textit{Histoire généalogique ... de Chastellux}, p. 391.

\textsuperscript{58} The forces, brought by the earls of Salisbury and Suffolk will be hereafter treated as English, although they probably included Burgundian partisans from central and northern France. The list of the Burgundians present at the battle, given in Peter Basset’s chronicle, shows several such personages, including Pierre de Luxembourg, count of Brienne and Conversan, the seigneurs de Croy, de Châtillon, de L’Isle–Adam and the bastard de Thiant, \textit{Basset}, fo. 48v. The actual presence of some of them, especially those of standing, seems dubious, as it is not attested by other sources (See Appendix, B.2.). On the other hand, the seigneur de l’Isle Adam who had served under the earl of Salisbury at the siege of Pont-sur-Seine could have followed him to Montaguillon and thence to Auxerrois.


\textsuperscript{60} R. Vaughan, \textit{Philip the Good}, pp. 14–15.
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John the Fearless. Thus the demand for everyone to dismount before the battle and to send their horses to the rear, the prohibition on taking prisoners during the battle and on leaving the ranks on the march as well as the disciplinary measures for the transgression of these (art. 5, 7, 9) may have been simply general precautions for the intended kind of battle.

Several articles (art. 2–4) were included to reinforce the cooperation between the English and Burgundian elements of the army. It was specially ordered that the soldiers of two nations should coexist in amity under the pain of punishment by their captains (art. 3). In order to insure the fulfilment of this clause two marshals were appointed for the army, one for the English and the other for the Burgundians (art. 2). As the maintenance of discipline in the army was one of the responsibilities of the marshals, this system provided a certain level of impartiality in case of any nation-based conflicts.

The scouts sent forward before the army were to be formed of an equal number of soldiers for each nation (art. 4). A special formation of a reconnaissance company was possibly a tribute to the Burgundian experience. This time the reconnaissance party was to consist of 60 English and 60 Burgundian

61 B. Schnerb, ‘La bataille rangée dans la tactique des armées Bourguignonnes au début du 15e siècle: essai de synthèse,’ *AB*, 61 (1989), pp. 12–14. It should be noted, however, that such experience was mostly related to the warfare in the northern France, while the Burgundian contingent at Cravant represented the nobility of the two Burgundies.

62 The Burgundian battle plan of 1417, proclaimed those who would leave the ranks guilty of *lese-majesté*, B. Schnerb, ‘La bataille rangée’, p. 23.

63 The importance given by the earl of Salisbury to establishing good relations between the English and the Burgundians in a joint army is emphasised in M. Warner, ‘Chivalry in action’, p. 152.

64 B. Schnerb identifies the attention towards the organisation of the reconnaissance as one of the features of the Burgundian armies, affected by the personality of John the Fearless, B. Schnerb, ‘La bataille rangée’, pp. 11–12. The English military ordinances only speak of harbingers, sent forward by each captain to assign the lodgings; their other responsibilities are not specified, A. Curry ‘The Military Ordinances’, pp. 241, 246, 248 (articles d, e, y, z, l1).
men-at-arms with a similar quantity of archers.\textsuperscript{65} The appointment of such joint reconnaissance was not simply a matter of trust (or lack of it) among the allies, but may also have been the result of the relative expertise on each side. The Burgundians, mostly assembled from the southern group of the duke’s dominions, must have had a better knowledge of the terrain, but they may have lacked the skill of efficiently deploying the archers, in which their English allies had greater experience.\textsuperscript{66}

The fact that the archers were expected to play an important role in the anticipated combat is attested by an article ordering them to provide themselves with sharpened poles to protect themselves against a cavalry charge as it had been done at Agincourt (art. 6). Thus, in spite of the generally offensive objective of raising the siege, the allies considered the defensive battle style at least as possible if not expected battle tactics.

It appears that the ordinances were not an attempt to introduce the superior English organisation to an allied army following an old-fashioned French military tradition, but an attempt to adjust two military traditions to each other in order to reach better cooperation and to combine the achievements of both of them.

The joint army left Auxerre on 30 July. Marshal de Toulouse reported its size as 1500 men-at-arms, although it is not clear from the text whether the number relates to the whole army or to its Burgundian component.\textsuperscript{67} According to the \textit{Livre des Trahisons}, the English had 500 men-at-arms and 2000 archers, while the Burgundians had 1000 men-at-arms not counting other soldiers.\textsuperscript{68} Given that in the armies assembled in the two Burgundies the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{65} This size of company seems something of a standard unit in the Burgundian armies. See, for example, the company sent to trace the Dauphinists before the battle of Mons-en-Vimeu (\textit{Monstrelet}, IV, p. 56), a force sent to outflank the Dauphinists in the ensuing battle (Ibid., IV, p. 69).
\item \textsuperscript{66} The lesser role played by the archers in the contingents from the two Burgundies as opposed to those from Flanders and Artois in the Burgundian armies is mentioned in B. Schnerb, ‘Aspects de l’organisation militaire’, pp. 221–222.
\item \textsuperscript{67} M. Quantin, ‘Épisodes’, p. 28.
\item \textsuperscript{68} ‘et d’arbalectriers et pionnaille tant que sans nombre’, \textit{Trahisons}, p. 169.
\end{itemize}
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number of *gens de trait* was usually inferior to that of the men–at–arms,⁶⁹ it seems reasonable to estimate Lancastrian effectives as about 4000 men including 1500 men–at–arms. This does not include some 400 Burgundians within Cravant.⁷⁰

According to the *Livre de Trahisons*, the Lancastrian army had an artillery train of 30 to 40 veuglaires, brought from Auxerre,⁷¹ which were to play an important part in the battle. The characteristics of this type of gun could differ significantly, but the accounts of the ducal receiver–general mention two veuglaires firing gunstones of 5 and 6 lb. respectively and one greater veuglaire sent for the relief of Cravant.⁷² Such guns were likely to have removable chambers greatly increasing their rate of fire, and were probably the most suitable of contemporary guns to be employed as field artillery.

The earl of Suffolk’s report describes the Armagnac army before Cravant as deployed in three divisions, two of them deployed on the heights to the north and to the south of the town. The third was deployed between the city walls and the river in a loop then made by the course of the Yonne.⁷³ It may be suggested that the last division was engaged in siege operations, while the two others were aimed to repel a possible relieving force.⁷⁴

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⁶⁹ See B. Schnerb, ‘Aspects de l’organisation militaire’, p. 221. The difference between forces assembled in Picardy and Burgundy will be discussed further Ch. 6.2.3.
⁷⁰ *Plancher*, IV, p. 73.
⁷¹ *Trahisons*, p. 169.
⁷² ADCO, B 1623, fos. 163r–163v. It is possible, that other guns were either kept in Auxerre, or their delivery was organised by other officers. For the parameters of veuglaires in the reign of Philip the Good see R. Smith, K. devries, *The Artillery of the dukes of Burgundy* (Woodbridge, 2005), pp. 30–31.
⁷⁴ ‘et avoient prins place sur une montaignette devant la dite ville de Crevent […] et toutefois avaient laissie leur siege garny de gens’, *Wavrin*, III, p. 66. He does not men–
The Lancastrians first tried to approach the town from the north, following the right bank on the Yonne. Having discovered the Armagnacs on an impenetrable position on a hilltop, protected by a small creek, they did not risk an assault. Instead they crossed to the left bank of the Yonne and approached Cravant from the west. It seems unlikely that this manoeuvre took the Armagnacs by surprise; it must have made them abandon their position on the heights and concentrate their forces along the bank of the Yonne, probably with an intention of protecting the bridge leading towards the town from the west. The two armies were now facing each other, separated by the river with the besieging town in the Armagnacs’ rear. As the town of Cravant is reported to be situated an arrow’s flight from the Yonne, the Armagnacs, must have been caught in the crossfire.

The armies spent about three hours facing each other in skirmishing. According to Wavrin, the Lancastrians were provoking the Armagnacs to attack. It seems unlikely that the archery duel could last for three hours therefore this harassment must have been dealt with artillery fire, from the positions protected by the river and out of range of the Dauphinist Scottish archers. It is not

\[75\] \textit{Wavrin}, Ill, pp. 66–67.
\[76\] \textit{Wavrin}, III, p. 67. This is not mentioned in the report of Suffolk.
\[77\] A. H. Burne, \textit{The Agincourt War}, p. 189; \textit{Trahisons}, p. 169. It appears that A. H. Burne did not use the \textit{Livre des Trahisons}, so he was probably basing this idea on his personal examination of the terrain.
\[79\] The \textit{Livre des Trahisons}, reporting the use of the guns in the battle, tells that they were set up ‘pour tirer droit au lonc des estandars quy estoient sur le bort de rivière tous en bataille’ and that Burgundians ‘tiroient de leurs veuglaires tout au long des batailles, desquels ils firent grant occision’, \textit{Trahisons}, p. 170. This may be interpreted either that the artillery was dispersed laterally or that the Burgundian gunners managed to find a position for a flanking fire against the Armagnac ranks, which would possibly inflict greater mortality. The earl of Suffolk, acknowledging the effective use of artillery only notes the presence of a single gun: ‘un canon qui estoit assis devers nous, & les grevoit moul’. F. de Belle–Forest, \textit{Les grandes annales}, II, fo. 1069v. For
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clear what eventually triggered the Lancastrian attack. Was it some movement (possibly sign of confusion) in the enemy ranks as Suffolk describes,\textsuperscript{80} an understanding, that the Armagnacs were not going to attack themselves,\textsuperscript{81} or possibly the fact that the artillery was running out of ammunition? The Lancastrians advanced towards the river with archers providing a defensive barrage and men-at-arms, led by the earl of Salisbury in person, bursting into the water in order to engage the enemy in close combat. Their charge was successful and the enemy began to give ground. Then the final blow was delivered by the garrison of Cravant which made a sally and attacked the Dauphinists from the rear. This turned a defeat into a disaster.\textsuperscript{82}

The Armagnacs fled southwards towards Bazarnes and Mailly-le-Château, which surrendered by 1 August.\textsuperscript{83} The witnesses define their casualties as between 2500 and 5000 men;\textsuperscript{84} the numbers provided by the chroniclers are even greater.\textsuperscript{85} The Lancastrian casualties, according to the earl of Suffolk, were as low as some 30 men.\textsuperscript{86} Although probably an underestimation, this may suggest that the Lancastrian charge was made against a largely demoralised enemy.

\footnotesize{the interchangeable use of the terms ‘veuglaira’ and ‘canon’ in the early fifteenth century see R. Smith, K. devVries, \textit{The Artillery of the dukes of Burgundy}, p. 22. These authors suggest also that the artillery fire was supplemented with archery, Ibid., pp. 27, 29.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{80} F. de Belle-Forest, \textit{Les grandes annales}, II, fo. 1069v. It has been suggested that the Dauphinists were disordered by the artillery and archery fire which facilitated the infantry attack, R. Smith, K. DeVries, \textit{The Artillery of the Dukes of Burgundy}, p. 27.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{81} Wavrin, III, p. 67.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{82} A. H. Burne, \textit{The Agincourt War}, pp. 189–190.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{83} M. Quantin, ‘Épisodes’, p. 30.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{84} 300 captured and 3 600 killed, according to Suffolk, F. de Belle-Forest, \textit{Les grandes annales}, II, fo. 1069v. About 1000 captured and 1500 killed men-at-arms (probably, not counting the soldiers of lower rank), according to Toulouseon, M. Quantin, ‘Épisodes’, p. 30. The seigneur de Chastellux gives a total sum of four to five thousand, H.-P.-C. de Chastellux, \textit{Histoire généalogique… de Chastellux}, p. 392.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{85} 3000–4000 killed, 2000 captured, Cordeliers, fo. 439r; total losses of 8 000 men, Basset, fo. 49r, 300–400 prisoners and 5 200 killed, Wavrin, III, p. 69.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{86} F. de Belle-Forest, \textit{Les grandes annales}, II, fo. 1069v. It is possible that this only refers to the loss of men-at-arms.}
The *Livre des Trahisons* provides a different description of the battle suggesting that when the Lancastrians were half a league away from the town, as the army was being deployed in the battle order, the English under the earl of Salisbury crossed to the right bank of the Yonne, while the Burgundians with their artillery remained on the left bank. Thus the allies were able to shoot their opponents from three directions: the English from the right bank of the river, the Burgundians (with both *gens de trait* and artillery) – from the left and the besieged – from behind. When the English approached the Dauphinists, the Burgundians led by the seigneur de Rochefort rushed through the river but found themselves under a heavy fire of the Scottish archers. Seeing this, the earl of Salisbury made his archers suppress the Scots which allowed the Burgundians to cross the river. In the ensuing close combat the enemy turned to flight.87

Unfortunately, it seems impossible to offer a reliable reconstruction of the events without knowing exactly the course of the Yonne in the fifteenth century and being unable to analyse the tactical opportunities which may have been provided by the curves of the river. However, a matter of doubt in this narrative is the assumption that the English could cross the river before engaging with the Dauphinists. This would require a hidden movement of a large corps after the Armagnacs had already left their position on the height and deployed their battle order along the Yonne. Such a movement could possibly provide another explanation for the three-hours delay in the attack, which is however not mentioned in the *Livre des Trahisons*. However, no other sources mention such manoeuvre.88

This report of the *Livre des Trahisons* makes a distinct difference between the English and the Burgundians within a joint army. Each of the allies seems to act in his own way but in close cooperation with the partner leading to a successful execution of a rather complicated battle plan. However this marked distinction between the English and the Burgundians is not found in the other

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88 The earl of Suffolk’s reports suggests that some of the archers and scouts (*coureurs*) crossed before the main charge and engaged in skirmishing with the Dauphinists, F. de Belle–Forest, *Les grandes annales*, II, fo. 1069v. This however seems quite different from the description given by the *Livre de Trahisons*.
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sources. Although the report of Jean de Touloungeon tends to pay more attention to the participation of Burgundians it does not seem an attempt to overshadow the participation of the English. The same is true for that of the earl of Suffolk.\textsuperscript{89} The chronicles of Peter Basset and of Cordeliers make no difference between the allies.\textsuperscript{90} Wavrin consistently uses the formula ‘Anglois et Bourguignons’ throughout the description of the battle.\textsuperscript{91} He however, either willingly or not, gives the glory for the day to the English by mentioning only two names – those of the earl of Salisbury and Lord Willoughby – as those who led the decisive charge.\textsuperscript{92}

It is thus possible that the report of the \textit{Livre des Trahisons} should simply be interpreted in the way that the English were the first to cross the river and were shortly afterwards followed by the Burgundians. This would correspond with the praise of the English leaders by Wavrin. Given the ordinances, trying to merge the allies in a single army, and the orders issued at Cosne (1422)\textsuperscript{93} it may be suggested that the allies were to fight together in joint formation rather than form separate divisions. This may lead to an assumption that the Burgundians formed either \textit{de jure} or \textit{de facto} the second line in the battle order. The myth of the English invincibility believed to affect the Armagnacs from Agincourt till the siege of Orléans could have influenced the Burgundians as well. Other evidence of the high reputation of the English may be found in the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{89} ‘s’est porté nobleme[n]t mo[n]seigneur de Salsebry, tous les seigneurs de Bourgoigne, & tous ceux de nostre party & compagnie [...] & semblablement ceux de la ville se sont tresbien portez’, F. de Belle–Forest, \textit{Les grandes annales}, II, fo. 1069v.
\item \textsuperscript{90} ‘se Rengherent bourguignons & engloix en bataille et se mirent en leawe’, also ‘Et par ainsi en demoura lonneur et lavictoire ausd[its] engloix et bourguignons’, \textit{Cordeliers}, fos. 438v, 439r. ‘dun mesme couraige lesdiz anglois et bourgoingnons [...] se ferirent dedens icelle riviere’, \textit{Basset}, fo. 48v.
\item \textsuperscript{91} \textit{Wavrin}, III, pp. 64–69. The only exception is made for ‘ceulz de la ville de Cravant’, when describing the sally of the garrison, \textit{Wavrin}, III, p. 68.
\item \textsuperscript{92} \textit{Wavrin}, III, p. 67.
\item \textsuperscript{93} For the \textit{journée} of Cosne see above Ch. 1.4.3.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
reports that after the battle about eighty knights were made by the earl of Salisbury in person.\footnote{Cordeliers, fo. 439r; Wavrin, p. 70. Several more knights were made a day before the battle, Wavrin, III, p. 64. The total number of those knighted at the battle amounted to two hundred, according to Jean de Toulongeon, M. Quantin, ‘Épisodes’, p. 30.}

The military importance of the victory at Cravant lay in the fact that Dauphin’s army was partly dispersed and partly eliminated, and thus no longer available for the active operations. The threat to the duchy of Burgundy was removed as well as any hope that help may be provided to the Armagnac garrisons to the east of the Seine. For Anglo-Burgundian relations the victory of Cravant demonstrated the willingness of the Lancastrian regime to provide military assistance to the Burgundians as well as the great military qualities of the Lancastrian armies which must have pushed the Burgundians towards maintaining the partnership. On a tactical level both allies showed themselves ready and able to adopt the military practices of the partner to the utmost efficiency.

2.4 The submission of Le Crotøy, 1423–1424

Though Le Crotøy remained the only Dauphinist stronghold in Ponthieu, Jacques de Harcourt continued to contest Lancastrian domination in the region. On 11 November 1422 Rue fell to his men.\footnote{Rue (Somme, arr. Abbeville, ch.–l. de can). See Monstrelet, V, p. 131; St.-Remy, II, pp. 70–71.} On 20 March 1423 a small group of Dauphinists captured the castle of Domart by surprise attack;\footnote{Domart–en–Ponthieu (Somme, arr. Amiens, ch.–l. of cant.) St. Remy, II, p. 72. According to Wavrin, the attack happened about 22 March, Wavrin, III, p. 17.} it was, however, soon exchanged for a safe passage to Le Crotøy, when Antoine, seigneur de Croy, came with reinforcements.\footnote{Wavrin, III, p. 17–18; Monstrelet, IV, p. 135; St.-Remy, II, pp. 72–73.} The raids of de Harcourt’s companions brought them to the environs of Arras.\footnote{Monstrelet, V, pp. 144–145.} Ponthieu was in no way pacified.

In May Sir Ralph Boteler, given charge of a new campaign against de Harcourt, laid siege to Noyelles–sur–Mer which quickly surrendered.\footnote{Noyelles–sur–mer (Somme, arr. Abbeville, cant. Nouvion).}
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had to abandon Rue to the English, who installed a garrison there as well as in Noyelles.\textsuperscript{100} Now the English could proceed against Le Crottoy, which was invested on 24 June.\textsuperscript{101} The town was blockaded both by sea and by land with the Lancastrian force amounting to some 1500 men.\textsuperscript{102} The Chronicle of the Cordeliers notes that the siege was held by the English without help from the Picards.\textsuperscript{103} The surrounding \textit{bonnes villes} such as Abbeville and Amiens contributed to the siege,\textsuperscript{104} but no Burgundian participation is noted. It was only in October that the treaty of surrender was concluded.\textsuperscript{105} The \textit{journée} was to take place on 1–3 March 1424 and until then the hostilities were suspended. The town was due to surrender if not relieved.\textsuperscript{106} Jacques de Harcourt was allowed

\textsuperscript{100} \textit{Wavrin}, III, pp. 36–37. Hugh Warburton, squire, with 20 men–at–arms and 40 archers was the captain of Rue from Michaelmas 1423 till 13 March 1424, R. A. Newhall, \textit{The English Conquest of Normandy}, p. 298 n. 172; BNF, MS. Fr. 4485, pp. 252–253. It is also possible that an English garrison was also installed at Montreuil as John Belton, knight, is styled the captain of Montreuil in February 1423, TNA, C 76/106, calendared in \textit{CFR. Henry VI}, p. 222.

\textsuperscript{101} \textit{Cordeliers}, fo. 439r; \textit{St. Remy}, II, p. 76.


\textsuperscript{103} ‘fu mis et clos le siege du Crottoy […] par les engloix tant seulement que pau de pic–cars y eubt’, \textit{Cordeliers}, fo. 439r.


\textsuperscript{105} As at the siege of Saint–Valéry the negotiations were mediated by the bishop of Amiens, brother of Jacques de Harcourt. See R. A. Newhall, \textit{The English Conquest of Normandy}, pp. 299–300. Ch. de Beaurepaire, while noting that it may have been the defeat at Cravant which made the Dauphinists in Le Crottoy seek conditions of surrender, gives 5 October as the date when the treaty of surrender was made, Ch. de Beaurepaire ‘De l’administration de la Normandie’, p. 212. A. Ledieu, based on the municipal accounts of Abbeville dates the treaty 13 October, A. Ledieu, ‘Documents inédits sur le siège du Crottoy’, p. 361.

\textsuperscript{106} For the treaty of surrender see \textit{Monstrelet}, IV, pp. 166–169; \textit{Wavrin}, III, pp. 76–80.
to go to the Dauphin seeking for help. He never returned, killed in a minor skirmish.\textsuperscript{107}

In the meantime the English also prepared for the \textit{journée}. In February 1424 a number of captains in England indented to serve for 1 month under the duke of Gloucester at the recovery of Le Crottoy.\textsuperscript{108} This suggests that the capture of Le Crottoy was considered important for the English rather than for the French kingdom within the Dual monarchy. Such claim may have based on the ancient English possession of Ponthieu,\textsuperscript{109} or on the rights of Jacqueline of Bavaria, newly wed to Humphrey, duke of Gloucester.\textsuperscript{110} It is noteworthy, however, 

\textsuperscript{107} Jacques de Harcourt was killed in an abortive attempt to capture the castle of Parthenay from his uncle, \textit{Monstrelet}, IV, pp. 170–171.

\textsuperscript{108} The service was described as the ‘service de guerre en les parties par de la la meer en la compagnie de humfrey duc de Glocestre pour le recoverier de les Chastel & ville de Crotoye’, TNA, E 101/71/2/804, see also 805, E 404/40/148–149, 154–158, 160, 162, 165–166, 168–169. For the effectives of these retinues see H. L. Ratcliffe, ‘The Military Expenditure’, pp. 10–11. This list, however, does not take into account that there were actually two retinues serving under Sir John Kighley, one consisting of himself, 1 other knight, 28 men-at-arms and 90 archers (TNA, E 404/40/169), the other one of 30 men-at-arms and 90 archers (TNA, E 404/40/168), for which he was paid the wages of 115 l. 10 s. and 112 l. 10 s. st. respectively (TNA, E 403/664, m. 17, 18). Thus the effectives of the force should amount to 172 men-at-arms and 516 archers, a total of 688 men.

\textsuperscript{109} The county was held by the English kings in 1279–1369 as the legacy of Eleanor of Castile (being several times confiscated by the French crown during this period). According to the treaty of Brétigny (1360) it was given to the king of England in full sovereignty, but with the denunciation of the Treaty in 1369 the county was conquered and incorporated in the royal domain of France by Charles V. See E. H. Shealy, ‘The Persistence of Particularism: the County of Ponthieu in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries’, in \textit{Documenting the Past. Essays in Medieval History Presented to George Peddy Cuttino} (Wolfeboro, 1989) pp. 33–47.

\textsuperscript{110} The county was her dower after her first marriage with Jean of France (d. 1417). Jean IV, duke of Brabant, the second husband of Jacqueline, was styling himself the count of Ponthieu in 1422, BNF, MS. Fr. 26044, no. 5755. However, it appears that the county was granted to Jacqueline back in 1406 with the exception of Le Crottoy, AN, X\textsuperscript{10} 8603, fos. 87v–88r, transcription in TNA, PRO 31/8/136.

The wedding of Humphrey of Lancaster with Jacqueline of Bavaria must have taken place in early 1423, J. H. Ramsay, \textit{Lancaster and York}, I, p. 332.
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that the expedition was financed from the English Exchequer and not from the
duke of Gloucester’s private funds.

As H. L. Ratcliffe has shown, the expedition did sail to France, even if
without the duke of Gloucester himself, but it is difficult to agree that it was
‘a wholly successful expedition which merited the relatively minimal cost’. As
the Dauphin could send no forces for the relief of Le Crotoy, the military con-
frontation on 1–3 March 1424 was a pure formality. The company of some 500
men which Bedford had with him at Amiens must have been sufficient to re-
ceive the surrender of the place and install Sir Ralph Boteler as its Lancastrian
captain. The expedition from England seems rather a costly nonsense, more-
over that by February 1424, when the indentures were made, it was probably
clear that no resistance was expected.

It is however noteworthy that while journée of Le Crotoy was taking place,
the dukes of Bedford and Burgundy negotiated at Amiens over the conflict
between the dukes of Brabant and Gloucester over the lands of Jacqueline of
Bavaria. The expedition for the recovery of Le Crotoy may thus have been a
demonstration on the duke of Gloucester’s side of his intention to retain the
possessions of his wife. The disputes over the status of Ponthieu were brought

\[\text{[Footnotes]}\]

111 H. L. Ratcliffe, ‘The Military Expenditure’, pp. 9, 10, 12. The arrival of the soldiers
from England for the journée is attested by the Livre des Trahisons which overesti-
mates their effectives as 6 000 archers, not counting the nobles, Trahisons, p. 177.
113 Fenin, p. 208. According to the Livre des Trahisons, Jean de Harcourt (probably, the
bishop of Amiens) replaced his brother in surrendering the city to Bedford, Trahisons,
p. 177. Bedford’s company must have been largely formed of the members of his
household, no detachments were taken from the garrisons of Normandy, A. Curry, ‘The
Organisation of Field Armies in Lancastrian Normandy’, in Armies, chivalry and war-
also included a company of 12 men-at-arms and 3 archers under Guillotin de Lansac,
BNF, MS. Fr. 4485, pp. 257–258.
114 Philip the Good was at Amiens from 1 to 11 March, Itinéraires, p. 37.
115 Ch. de Beaurepaire, ‘De l’administration de la Normandie’, pp. 174, 212.
to an end in July 1424, when the county was restored to the royal domaine of France.\footnote{AN, X\textsuperscript{10} 8603, fos. 87v–88r, transcription in TNA, PRO 31/8/136. The letters on the reversion of Ponthieu were issued at Vernon on 15 July 1424 and enregistered by the Parlement on 24 July 1424, Fauquembergue, II, p. 138.}

After its surrender, Le Crottoy remained under the English control in spite of the discontent among the local nobility.\footnote{Monstrelet, IV, pp. 177–178.} Sir Ralph Boteler held the captaincy until the early 1430s.\footnote{He styled himself ‘lieutenant au Crottoy pour le duc de Bedford’ in 1425, C. Bréard, ‘Le Crottoy et les armements maritimes’, p. 173. He was styled captain of Le Crottoy and Rue in early 1430, TNA, E 404/46/176. For some details on his captaincy see A. Huguet, ‘Raoul Bouteiller capitaine du Crottoy pendant la Captivité de Jeanne d’Arc’, Bulletin de la Société d’Émulation d’Abbeville, 1930 (Abbeville, 1931), pp. 256–265.} The English also retained control of Rue while other garrisons maintained during the siege must have been abandoned.\footnote{The fortifications of Saint-Valéry, after some delay, were demolished by 1 July 1424, BNF, MS. Fr. 4485, p. 252. There is no evidence of English garrisons at Noyelles and Montreuil after March 1424.} The English presence at Le Crottoy was probably caused by its importance as a port on the Channel but also as a mean of a pressure on the duke of Burgundy, re-

\footnote{The status of Le Crottoy and Rue remains unclear. The garrison of Rue was paid from the finances of Normandy up until 13 March (BNF, MS. Fr. 4485, pp. 252–253), however it remained in the English hands until 1435. There is also little evidence on the financing of Le Crottoy. There is some evidence, however, that in administrative and financial matters these two places were much closer related with the kingdom of England than any other French places and after 1435 Le Crottoy obtained a specific status, with the captain reporting to the English exchequer and the place mentioned separately of Normandy in the diplomatic treaties. This matter has been approached in more details in my papers given at the conferences held in Saint–Petersburg State University (March 2014) and the University of Durham (November 2014). An attempt to set the question of the status of Le Crottoy was made in A. Labanov, ‘Le Crottoy in 1424–1429: between Lancastrian England and Lancastrian France’ [in Russian: A.М. Лобанов, ‘Ле Кротуа в 1424-1449 гг.: между Ланкастерской Англией и Ланкастерской Францией’] in British World. History of Britain: modern studies [in Russian: Британский мир. История Британии: современные исследования] (Moscow, 2015), pp. 11–16.}
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minding him of the need to maintain the alliance with the Lancastrian re-
gime.\textsuperscript{120} 

The siege of Le Crotôy, occasionally considered a joint Anglo-Burgundian enterprise,\textsuperscript{121} appears to have been undertaken without any Burgundian partici-
pation. The present overview of this campaign, however, seems appropriate for
two reasons. First, it crowned the three-years-long joint efforts for the sub-
mission of Ponthieu and Vimeu which remained relatively quiet until the French
victories of 1429. On the other hand, the proposed involvement of the duke of
Gloucester in the \textit{journée} of Le Crotôy seems a prologue to the dynastic con-
lict in which the dukes of Bedford and Burgundy as the heads of the houses of
Lancaster and Valois-Burgundy respectively tried to bring their cadet relatives
to a composition. This conflict coupled with the attempts to maintain the alli-
ance was to dominate the relations between the Dual monarchy and Burgundy
since late 1424.

\textbf{2.5 The siege of Compiègne, 1424}

The year 1424 began for the Dauphinists with the recovery of Compiègne,
which fell to them on 7 January.\textsuperscript{122} Lancelot de Fransières, lieutenant of the
town, became their prisoner.\textsuperscript{123} The loss of this important city made the Lan-

\textsuperscript{120} ‘donc le pays de Vimeu, de Ponthieu et d’Artois furent en grant effroy, de paeur que
les alliances qui estoient faites entre les Englez et le duc Phelipe, ses aliez, ne se
rompesissent; car bien leur sembloit que s’aucunement lesdites alliances se rompoient,

\textsuperscript{121} See, for example, R. Smith, K. deVries, \textit{The Artillery of the dukes of Burgundy}, p. 25,
91; D. Grummitt, \textit{The Calais Garrison. War in Military Service in England, 1436-1558}
(Woodbridge, 2008), p. 20.

\textsuperscript{122} L. Carolus–Barre, \textit{‘Compiègne Et La Guerre, 1414–1430’}, p. 385.

\textsuperscript{123} Pierre de Fenin names him captain of the town (\textit{Fenin}, p. 210) but he was actually
lieutenant to Hugues de Lannoy, L. Carolus–Barré \textit{‘Compiègne et la guerre’}, p. 385.

In the letters of remission issued to him on 30 Aug 1423 Lancelot de Francières
is styled former lieutenant to the captain of Compiègne, C. Gut, \textit{‘Scènes de la vie jour-
nalière à Compiègne et aux environs (1420-1435) d’arpès les lettres de rémission’},
however that these letters should be dated 1424, as they deal with the events of some
castrian captains in the area, namely, Jean de Villiers, seigneur de l’Isle–Adam, Lionel de Bournonville and Jean, bastard de Thiant, try to recover it. Within several days after its capture, they tried to win the town back with a surprise attack. When the attempt failed, the Lancastrians tried to establish the siege but the Armagnac sallies soon made them retreat.

Compiègne was again invested in late February on Bedford’s orders, when the Regent was on his way to meet the duke of Burgundy at Amiens and to hold the journée of Le Crotoy. Compiègne was the only possible source of the relief for Le Crotoy, therefore it was necessary to blockade the Dauphinists in the city. Philip, seigneur de Saveuse, was given charge of the siege. According to de Fenin, the Regent asked (*priia*) a Burgundian noble and the latter agreed (*accorda*) to accept the charge. If this report is true, the relations in this case seem to be those of allies rather than those of the ruler and a subject. The seigneur de Saveuse was reportedly provided with men and money for the siege by the regent. According to Burgundian chroniclers, this included some 300 Englishmen under Sir John Salvain, *bailli* of Rouen, and Sir Richard Merbury, captain of Gisors. Most Burgundian captains reported to be present at the siege – the seigneur de l’Isle–Adam, Lionel de Bournonville, the bastard de Thi-ant – seem to be in Lancastrian rather than Burgundian service during this period and thus technically could also be sent by the duke of Bedford. The English contingents were encamped together with the seigneur de Saveuse himself

two years earlier, and Compiègne only came under Lancastrian rule on 18 June 1422 as shown in L. Carolus-Barré, ‘Compiègne et la guerre’, p. 385.

124 According to the chronicle of the Cordeliers, the Lancastrians came on the eighth day having with them contingents from Paris and Noyon, Cordeliers, fo. 445v. It is possible that this force was redirected from some operations in the environs of Compiègne.

125 Monstrelet, IV, p. 174; Wavrin, III, p. 87; Fenin, pp. 210–211; Trahisons, pp. 176–177; Geste des Nobles, p. 194.

126 Fenin, p. 211.

127 The effectives of the English contingent are only mentioned in Fenin, p. 211. Their presence is also attested by the accounts, BNF, MS. Fr. 4485, p. 129; R. A. Newhall, The English Conquest of Normandy, p. 156 n. 1. See also, Monstrelet, IV, p. 176; Wavrin, III, p. 89.
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at La Venette on the right bank of the Oise while certain Burgundian captains were encamped at Royalieu on the left bank.128

According to Basset’s chronicle, however, the English contingents were deployed on both banks of the Oise.129 The list of the participants is also very different with only the seigneur de l’Isle-Adam appearing in both sources.130 It seems possible that the Burgundian chroniclers mistook Sir Thomas Gargrave, lieutenant of Rouen, for the bailli of Rouen. Given that neither of these chroniclers mention the earl of Suffolk and Jean de Luxembourg to participate in the siege, their presence seems most unlikely as well as the idea that either of them served under the seigneur de Saveuse.131 Thus, the list of captains in the Basset’s chronicle seems dubious.

However, Basset’s evidence on this siege should not be discarded altogether. His report that Compiègne was surrendered in exchange for the liberation of Guillaume Remon, an Armagnac captain captured by the English, is supported by the administrative records.132 This exchange is presented as the ultimate way to make the Dauphinists surrender, as the Lancastrian forces could no longer maintain the siege due to the lack of provisions and deser-

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128 Monstrelet, IV, p. 176; Wavrin, III, p. 89; Fenin, p. 597. Ironically, this places the English camp in the same place where they would be placed during the siege of 1430. For that siege see below Ch. 4.3.4.

129 Basset, fo. 51r.

130 For the list of the Lancastrians reported to be present at the siege of Compiègne see Appendix B.3.

131 Jean de Luxembourg is reported to have attended the meeting of the dukes of Bedford and Burgundy at Amiens and thus may have been able to come before Compiègne, Cordeliers, fo. 447r. The members of the Saveuse family were regularly serving in the armies of Walleran and Jean de Luxembourg but not vice versa, C. Berry, ‘Les Luxembourg-Ligny’, pp. 509–510.

tion. In fact, it appears to be only one of the clauses of the treaty of surrender made on 15 March. Compiègne was due to open its gates to the Lancastrians if not relieved within a month and provided hostages in support of it. On 13 April Bertrand de Montferrand, a Gascon chamberlain of the duke Bedford, received the surrender and the Armagnacs were allowed to leave with their arms and belongings. The seigneur de l'Isle-Adam became the new captain of Compiègne.

2.6 The earl of Salisbury in Champagne, late 1423–1424.

The county of Champagne, which Thomas Montacute, earl of Salisbury, was commissioned by the duke of Bedford to bring into obedience, was a part of the royal domain. The great cities of Champagne such as Troyes, Reims, Châlons-sur-Marne had been supporting the Burgundian cause since 1417–1418. However, numerous small places and castles remained in the hands of Armagnac captains who continued to disturb the citizens and their mercantile communications.

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134 The reported duration of the siege varies from 15 days (Fenin, p. 212) to 3 weeks (Monstrelet, IV, p. 176). Some chronicles omit the second siege going from the failure of the first one to the conclusion of the treaty, Cordeliers, fo. 447, Trahisons, p. 177.
136 The role of the Bertrand de Montferrand in the siege is not clear. He is only mentioned in the Livre des Trahisons as one of those who 'besongnièrent tellement que Compiengne se rendi à eux'. He was present at the surrender as Bedford’s commissioner, Monstrelet, IV, p. 177, Wavrin, III, p. 90. L. Carolus–Barré names him ‘lieutenant de Bedford’ in the passage related to the decisions over the destiny of the citizens of Compiègne, L. Carolus–Barré, ‘Compiègne et la guerre’, p. 386.
137 Monstrelet, IV, p. 177, Wavrin, III, p. 90.
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The very task of organising the campaign in such region was a matter of Anglo–Burgundian cooperation as the baillis, captains and other officers in Champagne were largely partisans of the Burgundian party. They were subordinate to the earl as the royal governor: he even seems to have been authorised to replace local officers. However, the personal allegiance of many of them may have been towards the duke of Burgundy rather than the Lancastrian government in Paris. Thus, a campaign waged in this Burgundian zone of influence by an English governor would require a great deal of negotiations with these city elites to obtain help both in finances and in auxiliary troops. The successes of the earl of Salisbury in these affairs have been analysed by M. Warner.

Although the earl must have brought some troops with him, other contingents must have been brought by the local captains. Unfortunately, the few names provided by the chroniclers describing the sieges in this region give insufficient evidence to make any conclusions at the tactical level.

The first Salisbury enterprise was the siege of Montaguillon, which started in summer 1423 and lasted well into 1424. Eventually the Armagnacs surrendered on being allowed to leave on paying a ransom and the castle was demolished afterwards. While this siege was in progress, on 14 January 1423

141 Even these troops were not purely English. A muster roll of 84 men–at–arms and 178 archers of his retinue under the command of Sir Lancelot de Lisle taken on 1 July 1424 demonstrates a variety of names hardly of English origin, such as Jehan de Courcelles, Michel de la Riviere, Philibert de Bouvay, Henry de Bethencourt (men–at–arms), Jehan Francoiz, Gillet le Borgne, Philipot de Brabant (archers), BL, Add. Ch. 11520.
142 The castle of Montaguillon in the commune of Louan–Villegruis–Fontaine (Seine–et–Marne, arr. Provins, cant. Villiers–Saint–Georges) was located about 18 km to the north of Nogent–sur–Seine. It was besieged in 1420 by the seigneur de Chastellux, but without success, T. Boutiot, Histoire de la ville de Troyes, II, p. 460.
143 The most detailed reports of the siege are those by Enguerrand de Monstrelet and Jean de Wavrin, Monstrelet, IV, pp. 154–155; Wavrin, III, pp. 31–33. The exact dates of
Salisbury concluded the treaty with the Armagnac captain of Fère-en-Tardenois. The latter agreed to deliver the place to the earl in two months after he brought a number of other Armagnac fortresses into Lancastrian obedience. Until then the Dauphinst captain of La Fère remained in command of the place but undertook to abstain from making war. The nearby castle of Nesles-en-Tardenois was also besieged. On 13 June 1424 Jean de Villiers, seigneur de L'Isle-Adam, was appointed king's lieutenant for its siege; the place agreed to surrender on 30 August.

Meanwhile the earl of Salisbury in person laid siege to Sézanne on 4 April. Its fortifications were mined and on the 24 June the place was taken by the siege however remain unclear. According to Wavrin, when the earl of Salisbury went for the relief of Cravant, the siege was already in progress and only a small force was left to maintain it until his return, Wavrin, III, p. 70. According to Pierre de Fenin, the siege was laid after the victory at Cravant (Fenin, p. 198), while the chronicle of the Cordeliers suggests that it was only established in September, Cordeliers, fo. 441v. The siege is estimated to last for six (Monstrelet, IV, p. 154; Wavrin, III, p. 32; Basset, fo. 48v.) or eight months (Cordeliers, fo. 441v; Fenin, p. 198). It must have been still in progress by 14 January 1423 (Bodleian MS. Carte 92, fo 196v; BNF, NAF 7626, fos. 187r–188v). According to the Bourgeois de Paris, Montaguillon surrendered to the English in February 1424 (Bourgeois, p. 193.).

144 Fère-en-Tardenois (dep. Aisne, arr. Château-Thierry, ch.-l. of cant.).
148 For the surrender see Cordeliers, fo. 449r.
From the death of Henry V to the truce of Chambéry assault in which the garrison and many inhabitants were massacred.\textsuperscript{150} During this siege Guillaume, seigneur de Chastillon, was knighted by the earl of Salisbury.\textsuperscript{151} Soon after this success, the earl must have been recalled to Normandy for the \textit{journée} of Ivry, which led to the battle of Verneuil on 17 July 1424, in which the earl was to play an important part.

Champagne was not completely brought into obedience in 1423–1424, but several important places were won and the zone of Lancastrian control extended eastwards. These operations should be considered an example of a successful campaign where the overall command on a strategic level was successfully executed by an Englishman over dispersed military contingents which were largely of Burgundian origin.

2.7 The siege of Ivry and the battle of Verneuil

By late spring 1424 the government of Bedford must have expected the Dauphinists (recently reinforced by a strong Scottish corps) to seek a major battle, presuming that their offensive would start in June. The duke of Burgundy was due to be in Paris about that time\textsuperscript{152} and thus he was expected to join the Regent for the anticipated battle. Therefore on 8 May 1424 the feudal levy of Normandy was ordered to assemble on 2 June, summoned to ‘joindre avec la puissance de notre trecher & tresame oncle Jehan Regent notredit Royaume de france duc de bedford et de notre trescher & tresame oncle et cousin le duc de bourgogne qui prouchainement seront ensemble’\textsuperscript{153}

\textsuperscript{150} M. Warner, ‘Chivalry in action’, p. 158. It was only in October, that the letters of remission were issued to the citizens of Sézanne, S. Luce, \textit{Jeanne d’Arc à Domremy. Recherches critiques sur les origines de la mission de la Pucelle} (Paris, 1886), pp. 118–119. According to Jean Chartier (who erroneously dates the submission of ‘Sedanne’ year 1423) the earl of Salisbury became the seigneur of the town and installed his captain, \textit{Chartier}, I, p. 38. However, there seems to be no other evidence of the English garrison placed in this town.

\textsuperscript{151} \textit{Monstrelet}, IV, p. 185; \textit{Wavrin}, III, pp. 97–98.

\textsuperscript{152} He actually came to Paris and stayed there from 12 June till 5 July, \textit{Itinéraires}, pp. 39–40.

\textsuperscript{153} BNF, MS. Fr. 26047, no. 257.
The Dauphinists, however, delayed the opening of the campaign, awaiting the arrival of Lombard mercenaries, whom they believed to be a remedy against the English archers. Therefore by mid-June the duke of Bedford dispatched the seigneur de L’Isle-Adam to invest Nesles–en–Tardenois, while William de la Pole, earl of Suffolk, went to recover Ivry. The latter place after several weeks agreed to surrender on 15 August unless relieved.\(^{154}\)

The \textit{journée} of Ivry provided a perfect cause for a major battle. On the appointed day a strong Lancastrian army combining the detachments from the English garrisons with Norman feudal levy was before Ivry. A Burgundian detachment was also present. Jean de Wavrin, an eye-witness, names Jean de Villiers, seigneur de l’Isle–Adam, the seigneur de Moy, and Jean du Neufchâtelet, seigneur de Montagu, as the leaders of this company, coming from the siege of Nesles.\(^{155}\) The Regent reportedly rejoiced at their coming and the seigneur de L’Isle–Adam was entrusted the banner of France at the \textit{journée}.\(^{156}\)

The English army spent a day of 15 August in battle orders before Ivry but the enemy did not appear and the place surrendered. On the following day a notable and difficult to explain incident took place. Bedford, while preparing

\(^{154}\) For the discussion over the date of \textit{journée} see M. K. Jones ‘The Battle of Verneuil’, p. 385–386. According to Jean Raoulet, the siege was undertaken both by the English and the Burgundians, \textit{Raoulet}, p. 184. Basset’s chronicle only lists Englishmen, \textit{Basset}, fo. 51v.

\(^{155}\) \textit{Wavrin}, III, p. 100. See also \textit{St. Remy}, II, p. 84.

\(^{156}\) This banner is described by Wavrin as ‘dazur a trois fleurs de lis dor’. Apart from this banner, those of Saint George, of Edward the Confessor, the banner with the quartered coats of arms of England and France and Bedford’s personal are reported, \textit{Wavrin}, III, p. 103.

It has been suggested that Bedford’s banner in the battle of Verneuil combined the crosses of St. George and St. Andrew (which would provide something of a very first version of the Union Jack), see for example J.–P. Genet, ‘Le roi de France Anglais’, p. 53. This seems to originate from Wavrin’s mention that the duke of Bedford’s coat \textit{(robe)} bore the two crosses (‘et pardessus avoit une grande croix blanche, par deseure laquele avoit une croix vermeille’) representing the two kingdoms of England and France (not mentioning that one of them was a saltire). Wavrin emphasizes that according to what he had heard, only Bedford who represented the king of England and France, was entitled to wear such insignia, \textit{Wavrin}, III, p. 101.
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his army for a march against the Dauphinists before Verneuil, ordered the Burgundian contingent to return to Nesles, to the great sorrow of the Burgundian captains. ¹⁵⁷

M. K. Jones has ascribed this decision to Bedford’s lack of trust in his allies presumably caused by the news of the negotiations of the Burgundian representatives with the Dauphinists, strengthened by the discovery of a conspiracy in Rouen, its participants sure that the duke of Burgundy had made peace with the Dauphin. The final straw must have been the defection to the Arma gnacs of several Norman and Picard nobles on the eve of the battle. ¹⁵⁸

However, these arguments leave ground for reconsideration. If the Burgundian contingent was sent away for the reasons of security, these measures did not seem to affect individual Burgundians fighting in the English armies. ¹⁵⁹ If the regent’s decision was affected by the conspiracy discovered in Rouen and the defection of certain nobles, it would seem unreasonable that Bedford’s reactions only targeted the Burgundians but not the Norman feudal levy. It is also worth noting that, while the news of contacts between Philip the Good and the Dauphinists were hardly pleasant for the duke of Bedford, even the truce with Charles VII (which was only concluded several months later) was technically not a breach of the treaty of Troyes. ¹⁶⁰

It seems possible, however, that the Burgundian contingent was leaving not for the siege but for the journée of Nesles, which actually surrendered on 30 August. ¹⁶¹ As no battle happened before Ivry and the Regent was disposed towards seeking the battle, it was impossible to predict how far to the south—

¹⁵⁹ One of these was Jean de Wavrin, who, according to his own testimony, was serving under the earl of Salisbury: ‘et moy acteur de ceste euvre, quy lors estoie audit voyage en la compagnie du conte de Salisbery’, Wavrin, III, p. 101.
¹⁶⁰ See the discussion of the Treaty of Troyes, Ch. 1.1.4.
¹⁶¹ The Chronicle of Cordeliers reports that Nesles surrendered on the penultimate day of August by capitulation, Cordeliers, fo. 449r. Although there is no clear reference that a journée was appointed, the conclusion of the treaty of delayed surrender would explain the coming of de L'Isle-Adam to Bedford’s army before Ivry while Nesles was not yet brought into obedience.
west this pursuit might lead the Lancastrians.\textsuperscript{162} The Burgundians had to cross some 200 km in a fortnight to appear before Nesles in time. Considering that a day journey for an army varied between 15 and 25 km,\textsuperscript{163} they would only able to follow Bedford for several days.\textsuperscript{164} To let the Burgundians stay with the army was to risk that they might fail to appear before the castle on the journée appointed and the whole siege of Nesles would prove vain. Thus, the reason for their dismissal may have been logistical and, as Wavrin puts it, they had ‘grant besoing et cause legitisme de retourner a leur dit siege de Nelle’.\textsuperscript{165}

Although the contingent of the seigneur de L’Isle–Adam left the Lancastrian army, it should not be taken that no Burgundians fought at Verneuil. Jean de Wavrin was one. Another example was Thibault, the bastard son of seigneur de Montagu, who stayed with an English army with Bedford’s consent.\textsuperscript{166} The version G of the Brut chronicle even notes in the Lancastrian army ‘also many Capitaynes, with moche peple of the Duke of Burgoyns’.\textsuperscript{167} It seems clear, how-

\textsuperscript{162} After all, the last battle-seeking campaign, that of Henry V in 1421 lasted about a month (not taking into account the siege of Dreux) and failed to engage the Dauphin into the battle, See above, Ch. 1.3.4.


\textsuperscript{164} Considering for simplicity that they would be following the Armagnacs in the direction exactly opposite to Nesles, after 4 days spent in the pursuit with Bedford’s army (60 km, giving the minimum rate for a large army) they would need to travel 240 km in 10 days (24 km or 15 miles/day).

In fact the Burgundians were dismissed at Evreux on 16 August and had to pass to Nesles, covering 200 km in 14 days (14.3 km/day). Should they have left Bedford’s army at Verneuil on 18 August they would have had to travel 220 km in 12 days (18.3 km/day). Such speed of march may look realistic but it should be taken into account that in the fifteenth century roads and bridges were few and no maps were available to the commanders, hence no precise timing was possible.

\textsuperscript{165} \textit{Wavrin}, III, p. 108.

\textsuperscript{166} \textit{Wavrin}, III, p. 108. On 6 April 1426 Thibault, the bastard of Neufchâtel was granted several seigneuries worth 200 l.t. of annual revenue together with an annual rent of 100 l.t. for life for his services to the king in the battle of Verneuil, AN, JJ 174/179. I am grateful to professor B. Schernb for this reference.

\textsuperscript{167} \textit{Brut}, p. 497 (Continuation G). This report, however, may have been based on some evidence related to the journée of Ivry.
From the death of Henry V to the truce of Chambéry ever, that the Burgundians in the battle of Verneuil were not assigned any specific or separate role on the battlefield.

According to Wavrin, Bedford claimed that he had enough soldiers to deal with the Dauphinists.168 M. K. Jones considered it an attempt to encourage the rest of his army whilst not allowing Burgundians to stay.169 While the Regent was definitely making a virtue of necessity, it has been noted that the passage echoes the famous dialogue of Henry V with Hungerford at the vigil of Agincourt.170 In the early years of his regency Bedford sought to prove himself a proper replacement of his great brother and in some cases was literally following Henry V’s footsteps. Was this yet another case of such policy? Whatever it was, there can be little doubt that the triumphant victory at Verneuil (described as the ‘Second Agincourt’ by A. H. Burne171) had earned the duke of Bedford the reputation comparable to that of Henry V and gave new impulse to the notion of English invincibility.

2.8 The English in Mâconnais (1423–1424)

Although the meetings between the dukes of Bedford and Burgundy in Paris in June – early July 1424 were not succeeded by a joint pitched battle against the Dauphinists, it brought significant political decisions. On 21 June 1424 the duke of Bedford was granted the duchy of Anjou and the county of Maine.172 On the very same day the counties of Auxerre and Mâcon together

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168 Wavrin, Ill, p. 107.
170 A. H. Burne, The Agincourt War, pp. 200–201. For Henry V’s dialogue with Hungerford see Gesta Henrici Quinti. The Deeds of Henry the Fifth, ed. F. Taylor, J. S. Roskell (Oxford, 1975), pp. 78–79. It is possible that the Regent was intentionally copying the example of his brother to improve his own reputation in the way that the scene with the Regent, his wife and the Dauphinist prisoners of Orsay echoed that with the bourgeois of Calais. See above, Ch. 2.2.
171 The title of the chapter on the battle in A. H. Burne, The Agincourt War, p. 196.
172 On the very same day on the advice of the council, at which Philip of Burgundy was present, the duchy of Anjou and the county of Maine were granted to John, duke of Bedford, on the ground that he held no lands in France, A. Lecoy de la Marche, Le Roi René. Sa vie, son administration ses travaux artistiques et littéraires d’après les documents inédits des archives de France et d’Italie, 2 vols. (Paris, 1875), p. 40 n. 1.
with the châtelainie of Bar-sur-Seine were given to the duke of Burgundy.\textsuperscript{173} The meeting at Paris involved uneasy debates with the duke of Bedford over the conflict between the dukes of Brabant and Gloucester, thus the grant may have been expected to appease the Burgundian duke. It was also suggested that this concession was to counterbalance the efforts of Arthur de Richemont in negotiating the rapprochement between the duke of Burgundy and the Dauphin.\textsuperscript{174} On the other hand, the submission of the lands to the east of the Seine, begun under Henry V, seemed to be coming to an end and the new strategic course had to be decided upon.

The lands ceded to Philip the Good were the most southern territories in Lancastrian obedience. They lay adjacent to the Burgundian principalities, and Philip the Good was much concerned with their defence. Mâcon had supported the Burgundian party since 1417 and to a significant degree remained under Burgundian control. This was a consequence of the weakness of royal power and the strong Burgundian presence in the region.\textsuperscript{175} Paris was simply too far from Mâcon compared to Dijon;\textsuperscript{176} moreover the communications with the capital were inevitably going through the lands of the House of Burgundy.

Technically, the cession of the territories was not permanent. The lands were delivered to the duke for two years to compensate the sums owed to him and his ancestors by the crown. After two years he was either to provide evidence that these debts were not fully covered, or to return the territories to the crown.\textsuperscript{177} The Lancastrian government not only pleased the duke and delegated responsibility for the defence of these territories but also reserved an opportunity to claim them back when the political and military situation might become favourable. Thus, the decisions made in Paris on 21 June 1424 defined

\textsuperscript{173} \textit{Plancher}, IV, pp. XLI-XLII; the originals are in ADCO, B 11926 (21 June 1424); the transcriptions are available in TNA, PRO 22/39/XXVI–XXIX. On 29 June Philip the Good gave written promise to return the granted lands to the crown once he was repaid the sums due to him, \textit{Foedera (app.)}, p. 234.


\textsuperscript{176} The distance from Mâcon to Paris is about 400 km, while Dijon is only some 120 km away.

\textsuperscript{177} \textit{Plancher}, IV, pp. XLI-XLII.
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the strategic plan for the following two years: Philip the Good was to secure
the southern borders of Lancastrian France, while the duke of Bedford was in-
tending to conquer Anjou and Maine.

The English forces took some part in the hostilities in Mâconnais both be-
fore and after its cession to the duke of Burgundy. Their coming to Mâconnais
seems first to become a matter of discussion in 1422.\(^{178}\) On 1 August 1423
Jean de Touloungeon, marshal of Burgundy, in his report on the victory of
Cravant informed the duke of his plan to recover the castle of La Bussière in
Mâconnais,\(^{179}\) and of his intention to ask the earl of Salisbury to send 200 or
300 English archers with him.\(^{180}\) There seems to be no evidence that this re-
quest was fulfilled. However, when on 26 August the marshal was ambushed
and taken prisoner at La Bussière,\(^{181}\) the Burgundians appealed to the earl of
Suffolk to assist in the defence of Mâconnais.\(^{182}\)

After the battle of Cravant, while the earl of Salisbury returned to the
siege of Montaguillon, the earl of Suffolk remained in Auxerrois where he cap-
tured Toucy and Saint-Fargeau.\(^{183}\) In September 1423 he at the Burgundian re-

\(^{178}\) In July 1422 Philip the Good ordered an assembly of an army intending to join Henry
V at Melun and proceed against the Dauphinst forces on the Loire and then to Lyon-
152. This project must have been abandoned due to the death of Henry V.


\(^{181}\) For his capture see J.–L. Bazin, ‘La Bourgogne de la mort du duc Philippe le Hardi’, p.
166.

\(^{182}\) Plancher, IV, p. 78.

cant.), about 25 km to the west of Auxerre. The place is spelt as ‘Coussy’ by the edi-
tors of the Burgundian chronicles, Monstrelet, IV, p. 163; Wavrin, III, p. 70. This is oc-
casionally uncritically identified with the castle of Coucy, see for example A. Lapierre,
La guerre de Cent Ans dans l’Argonne et Rethelouis (Sedan, 1900), p. 66. The latter
castle had actually been under the Burgundian control since 1419, Monstrelet, III, p.
310. Saint–Fargeau (dep. Yonne, arr. Auxerre, ch.–l. de cant.) is in about 20 km to the
west of Toucy. Burgundian chroniclers suggest that Suffolk had returned to the siege
of Montaguillon before this campaign, Monstrelet, IV, p. 163, Wavrin, III, p. 70. This
quest came to Mâconnais in September and within a week took Germolles near Chalon-sur-Saône, and then Vinzelles and Leynes in the environs of Mâcon.\footnote{An account of this swift campaign is found in the city records of Mâcon. The earl of Suffolk came to Mâcon on 13 September 1423. On the following day he came before Germolles (dep. Saône-et-Loire, arr. Chalon-sur-Saône, cant. Givry, comm. Mellecy) and made it surrender. On 15 September the English proceeded to Vinzelles (dep. Saône-et-Loire, arr. Mâcon, cant. Mâcon-Sud), making its defenders after a short resistance to deliver themselves in the king’s mercy. A day later they came to the castle of Leynes (Saône-et-Loire, arr. Mâcon, cant. La Chapelle-de-Guinchay) making it surrender, AMM, BB 13, fo. 85r. I am grateful to Dr. Benoît Léthenet for kindly sharing the photos of the documents related to the English presence at Mâconnais. Jean de Wavrin claims to have participated in this expedition but provides little detail, \textit{Wavrin}, IV, p. 70. See also J. Calmette, \textit{The Golden Age of Burgundy}, p. 137; J. d’Avout, \textit{La querelle}, p. 346.}

However, by late October he was reported be in Nivernais, possibly participating in the preparations for the recovery of La Charité-sur-Loire, which was to fall to a surprise attack by Perrinet Gressart about Christmas.\footnote{L. Jarry mentions William Glasdale as \textit{bailli} of Alençon in 1423, L. Jarry, ‘Le Compte de L’Armée Anglaise au siege d’Orléans, 1428–1429’, \textit{Mémoires de la société archéologique et historique de l’Orléannais}, 23 (1892), p. 638. However, according to G. Dupont–Ferrier, Glasdale only became \textit{bailli} of Alençon in 1425 replacing Sir John Harpelay. The latter is actually styled \textit{bailli} of Alençon in AN, K 62/11/17 (31 January 1425), K 62/11/19 (11 February 1425). See also \textit{Gallia Regia}, I, p. 43; \textit{Suits}, p. 294–295. In fact, however, in October 1423 – September 1424 Harpelay was \textit{bailli} (and captain) of Evreux, See BNF, MS. Fr. 4485, pp. 207–209; BNF, MS. Fr. 25767 no. 49 (20 November 1423); BL, Add. Ch. 1419 [SLME] (1 September 1424). Therefore it appears that Glasdale was already \textit{bailli} of Alençon in 1423–1424 but in late 1424 or early 1425 was briefly replaced by Harpelay.} After the earl left Mâconnais the command over the English in the region seems to have fallen to William Glasdale, styled the lieutenant of the earl of Salisbury, royal gov–
From the death of Henry V to the truce of Chambéry, Mathew Gough also served in Mâconnais and in February 1424 took prisoner the Bastard de la Baume.

In April 1424 a process was held in Dijon against a Franciscan friar Estienne Charlot, who confessed revealing to the Dauphin the conspiracy aimed to deliver the city of Lyon to the earl of Salisbury. Presumably, this happened

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186 ‘escuyer lieutenant de [...] monseigneur le conte de Salisbury & du perche gouverneur general dudit pays pour le Roy notresigneur’. Glasele’s retinue, was mustered at Mâcon before the baili, Philiber de Saint-Léger, on 2 November 1423 and amounted to 62 men-at-arms and 149 archers BNF, MS. Fr. 25767 no. 45. Therefore Basset’s chronicle and a similar list of the English captains in France from Bl, Harley MS. 782 are erroneous in styling Glasele’s captain and baili of Mâcon, Basset, fo. 49v; Brequigny, p. 249 (no. 1359). By 29 December 1423 Glasele (by then absent from Mâcon) was styled ‘capitaine general sur le fait de la guerre au bailliage de mascon pour le Roy notresigneur’, AMM, BB 13, fo. 98r.

187 According to the Basset’s chronicle, this happened in a skirmish near Courcillon, Basset, fo. 49v. The location is not identified, but possibly Courcelles-en–Beaujeuaiges near Mâcon (dep. Rhône, arr. Villefranche-sur-Saône, cant. Belleville). The capture of bastard de la Baume (without mentioning his name) by the English is confirmed in the letters of the Burgundian captains in Charollais. By 15 February 1424 he was reported to be held by the English at Saizy (Nièvre, arr. Clamecy, cant. Tannay), Plancher, IV, p. XXXVIII.

According to the suit in the Parlement of Paris however, in late 1423 or early 1424 Ymbert, bastart de la Balme, having command of Château–Renard (Loiret, arr. Montargis, ch.–l. of cant.) and Charny (Yonne, arr. Auxerre, ch.–l. of cant.) was captured near Château–Renard, English Suits, p. 149. This may have been another bastard. Moreover, the one who had captured Cravant is mentioned as Guillaume, not Ymbert by the editors of the English Suits, p. 149 n. 6.

188 Interrogation protocols of this process, in which Odette de Champdivers and her daughter Marguerite of Valois (former mistress and bastard daughter of Charles VI respectively), proved to be involved, are discussed (and cited extensively) in C. Lavriotte, ‘Odette de Champdivers ou la petite reine à Dijon après la mort du Charles Vi, documents puisés aux archives de Bourgogne’, Mémoires de l’académie de Dijon, 2 sér., 2 (1852–1853), pp. 154–162. The texts presented by C. Lavriotte as citations contain certain differences with the materials of the process in ADCO, B 11890, therefore, references to both sources seem appropriate.
in preceding March.\textsuperscript{189} The earl of Salisbury was expected to come to Dijon and thence to Chalon-sur-âne to meet the conspirators in person and arrange how the English would be admitted in the city.\textsuperscript{190} One of the protocols suggested that Lyon was to be delivered to the \textit{bailli} of Alençon when he came before the city.\textsuperscript{191} Among other things Estienne Charlot reported to the Dauphin that the English were still at Mâcon.\textsuperscript{192}

After the meeting at Paris giving Mâconnais to him, Philip the Good returned to Burgundy with the intention to recover the valley of the Saône between Châlon and Mâcon. He ordered his army to assemble on 20 August.\textsuperscript{193} During September the duke’s forces brought La Bussière and Tournus into his obedience.\textsuperscript{194} William Glasdale was retained by the duke of Burgundy on this

\textsuperscript{189} Estienne Charlot had reported that when he was given an audience by Charles VII for the news he brought, Tanneguy du Châtel was not present, as he went to greet the Scots who came to join the Dauphin, C. Lavirotte, ‘Odette de Champdivers’, p. 157. The Scottish expeditionary corps under the earl of Douglas descended at La Rochelle in late March 1424, G. H. Ditcham, The Employment of Foreign Mercenary Troops in the French Royal Armies, 1415–1470’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1978), p. 45.

\textsuperscript{190} C. Lavirotte, ‘Odette de Champdivers’, pp. 161, 162. See also ADO, B 11890, fo. [12r]–[12v] (16 May 1424, 2\textsuperscript{nd} interrogation of Odette de Champdivers); fo. [13r] (26 May 1424, 4\textsuperscript{th} interrogation of Estienne Charlot).

\textsuperscript{191} ‘que le bailli dalencon devoit aler devant lido Lyon et que lors par lez dessusdz lui seroit donne entrée.’ ADO, B 11890, fo. [11r] (26 April 1424, 1\textsuperscript{st} interrogation of Odette de Champdivers). Nevertheless, Odette still expected the earl of Salisbury to come to Dijon or Chalon.

\textsuperscript{192} ‘le Interroga ledit evesque [Martin de Gouge, bishop of Clermont – A.L.] de la ville de Mascon sil y avoit beaucop de gens darmes le que Resondit que oy et que mesmement les angloiz y estoient’, ADO, B 11890, fo. [6r] (26 April 1424, 2\textsuperscript{nd} interrogation of Estienne Charlot).

According to the city records of Mâcon, the English were still in the city by 29 December 1423. By this date Glasdale was absent from Mâcon leaving one \textit{Guillaume Lyenart} as his lieutenant, AMM, BB 13, fos. 98r–98v.


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campaign with 100 men-at-arms and 300 archers, he set out from Mâcon on 6 September to besiege La Roche-Solutré. By 22 September the castle agreed to surrender on 4 October if not relieved. Philip the Good amassed an army of 1500 men-at-arms (not counting the gens de trait) near Mâcon but the Armagnacs did not appear at the journée and La Roche surrendered to Glasdale. On the following day 5 October the treaty of Chambéry introduced the cease-fire in Mâconnais. Glasdale took leave of the duke rewarded with a grant of 500 fr.

The English expeditions to Mâconnais both in 1423 and 1424 were caused by the need to provide help to the Burgundians in this Burgundian-dominated region. The English operations were successful but it does not ap-

195 Plancher, IV, p. 91. The men-at-arms are reported to receive 15 francs a month, which was a standard rate in the ducal armies while the archers had only 5 francs (instead of 7,5). These details may suggest that his evidence was based on a documentary source.

196 For the siege Glasdale was provided by the city of Mâcon a remarkable number of artillery pieces including 1 great (grosse) bombard, 6 bombards, 1 small bombard and 3 grosses aubelestes, See the extract from the city archives of Mâcon, printed in A. Arcelin, ‘Histoire du château de la Roche de Solutré’, Annales de l’Académie de Mâcon. Société des arts, sciences, belles-lettres et d’agriculture, 2 sér., 2 (1880), pp. 155–157.

197 For the siege see J.-L. Bazin, ‘La Bourgogne de la mort du duc Philippe le Hardi’, pp. 172–174. The effective of the duke’s army are given according to an extract from the registres of Mâcon, cited in A. Arcelin, ‘Histoire du château de la Roche de Solutré’, p. 121.

As shown by J.-L. Bazin and A. Arcelin, Philip the Good did not come to receive the surrender, remaining at Charnay-les-Mâcon (possibly, the place chosen to hold the journée). In the duke’s absence the place must have been surrendered to Glasdale, as suggested by Wavrin whose report on the siege of La Roche is unusually imprecise. The chronicler dates the siege of La Roche before Philip the Good’s departure from Burgundy in February 1424, therefore he suggests that Philip the Good came for the journée ‘en faveur de lalyance quil avoit aux Angloiz' and that the place was delivered to Glasdale ‘pour et au nom du roy Henry'. It appears that on the contrary it was Glasdale who came to Mâconnais to assist the duke in the recovery of the county, now held by Philip the Good, See Wavrin, III, pp. 70–72.

198 Plancher, IV, pp. XLIV–XLV. This truce will be discussed in more detail further.

199 ADCO, B 1625, fo. 171v (7 October 1424).
pear that the Lancastrian government in Paris had enough resources to extend its power to the region. Therefore the cession of Mâconnais alongside with other territories seems very much the acceptance of status quo and an attempt to get rid of the obligations the Lancastrian regime was not able to fulfil. This delegation of responsibility however did not suggest the reversion of allied assistance as the campaign of 1424 showed.

2.9 The campaigns against Guise, 1422–1425

The cluster of castles around Guise became an important centre of Dauphinist resistance in the north-eastern corner of the French kingdom. The Armagnacs from Guise were threatening the environs of Laon and the cities on the upper Somme and Oise, as well as the lands of Jean de Luxembourg, seigneur de Beaurevoir.\footnote{His castle of Beaurevoir was situated some 30 km from the Dauphinist stronghold. Therefore Jean de Luxembourg was already engaged in the hostilities against the Armagnacs at Guise. In late 1420, he launched a punitive raid against them in response to the attacks of his own lands, Monstrelet, IV, pp. 7–8. A. Matton dates this raid July 1420, A. Matton, Histoire de la ville et des environs de Guise, 2 vols (Laon, 1897–1898), I, pp. 196–197. During the winter of 1421–1422 he tried to employ the forces that had come to the Duke Philip’s support from the duchy of Burgundy to reduce the Dauphinist castle of Moy, but proved unable to succeed. See above, Ch. 1.4.1.} This made this staunch Lancastrian partisan and one of the best captains of Philip the Good a perfect choice to lead the operations in this region. He was appointed captain-general for the king and the duke of Burgundy.\footnote{C. Berry, ‘Les Luxembourg–Ligny’, p. 292.}

The county of Guise belonged to René of Anjou, then a minor in the custody of the duke of Bar. It was confiscated on the grounds of supporting the Dauphin.\footnote{In a letter to the duke of Lorraine, reproaching him for the intention to support René of Anjou, given at Rouen on 22 August 1424, Bedford claimed that the castle had been held for four years by the king’s enemies under Olivier Layet, one of Montereau murderers, and that the Lancastrian government was no longer going to permit this, S. Luce, Jeanne d’Arc à Domrémy, pp. 322–323.} Its grant to Jean de Luxembourg by Henry V in February 1422 was

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200 His castle of Beaurevoir was situated some 30 km from the Dauphinist stronghold. Therefore Jean de Luxembourg was already engaged in the hostilities against the Armagnacs at Guise. In late 1420, he launched a punitive raid against them in response to the attacks of his own lands, Monstrelet, IV, pp. 7–8. A. Matton dates this raid July 1420, A. Matton, Histoire de la ville et des environs de Guise, 2 vols (Laon, 1897–1898), I, pp. 196–197. During the winter of 1421–1422 he tried to employ the forces that had come to the Duke Philip’s support from the duchy of Burgundy to reduce the Dauphinist castle of Moy, but proved unable to succeed. See above, Ch. 1.4.1.
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confirmed in the name of Henry VI on 4 June 1423. It, however, seems to remain a kind of a ‘conditional offer’ as Jean de Luxembourg continued to be only styled seigneur de Beurevoir in 1423–1424.

The grant induced Jean de Luxembourg to conquer the county, but this was not his private war, for which his resources would be insufficient. It was Philip the Good, duke of Burgundy, whom the Lancastrian government charged to bring Guise into obedience, presumably during the duke’s visit to Paris in September 1422. While Duke Philip left the command in the field to Jean de Luxembourg, he contributed significantly to the financing and organisation of the war. In April 1423 he presented a campaign plan, presuming coordinated advances against Guise and Le Crotoy together with Lancastrian forces to the Estates of Artois and was promised the aide. The cities of the region such as Laon and Péronne, also contributed to the operation with finances and aux-

204 See, for example, the letters of the duke of Bedford given on 6 June 1424, Letters and Papers, II, pt. 1, pp. 28–31, certifications for the delivery of money for the siege, B. de Lannoy, Hugues de Lannoy, pp. 214–215.
206 ‘que mons’ de Bourgoingne avoit [...] envoyé à le ville, contenant que le Roy li avoit commandé à mettre le siège devant Guisse’; the duke’s letters were received in Mons in Hainault on 19 September 1422, Cartulaire des comtes de Hainault, de l’avènement de Guillaume II à la mort de Jacqueline de Bavière, ed. by L. Devillers, 6 vols (1881–1896), IV, pp. 309–310.
207 He is mentioned as being commissioned either by the king and the duke of Burgundy, or only by the duke of Burgundy: see the pieces published in B. de Lannoy, Hugues de Lannoy, p. 214–215 (8 December 1423), 218 (6 March 1425, referring to April 1423).
208 C. Hirshauer, Les états d’Artois de leurs origines à l’occupation française, 1340-1640, 2 vols (Paris, Bruxelles, 1923), I, pp. 198–199. See also B. de Lannoy, Hugues de Lannoy, pp. 72, 218. The plan of operations must have been discussed at the conference of the dukes of Bedford, Burgundy and Brittany at Amiens in mid–April 1423.

During May 1423 Burgundian ambassadors approached the duke of Brabant, and the cities of Flanders, Hainault and Cambræcis for their assistance. In the following month Hugues de Lannoy travelled to Paris to negotiate with the duke of Bedford concerning the siege.210

The approaches to Guise were protected by a number of minor fortresses and castles, therefore the first campaigns of Jean de Luxembourg in November 1422 and February 1423 were short raids aimed to reduce these places into obedience and establish Burgundian presence in the region. The campaigns of 1423 (July to December or January 1424), and 1424 (April to September) were more complicated combining raids with prolonged sieges.211 This is where the English started to take part in the hostilities. In June 1423 John Mowbray, earl marshal of England, crossed with his retinue to Calais.212 In the following month he joined Jean de Luxembourg in coming to the rescue to the bailii of Vermandois and the bastard of Saint Pol, besieged in one of the castles on the borders of Rethelais.213 The Dauphinists were brought into flight.214

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212 His retinue consisted of 120 men-at-arms and 360 archers, roughly what was promised by Bedford by the treaty of Amiens. It crossed to Calais between 28 May and 5 June. Other retinues of the same expeditionary force, which was to serve for six months, crossed to Normandy and were employed at other theatres, some of them like that of Robert, Lord Willoughby, took part in the battle of Cravant. H. L. Ratcliffe, ‘The military expenditure’, pp. 6–8.

213 These were the bailii of Vermandois and Jean, bastard de Saint Pol, seigneur d’Haubourdin, Monstrelet, IV, p. 163; Wavrin, III, pp. 72–73. The name of the place, where these were besieged varies significantly in the chronicles. Wavrin gives the spelling ‘Bohain’, which may be identified with Bohain-en–Vermandois (dep. Aisne, arr. Saint-Quentin, ch.–l. of cant.), Wavrin, III, pp. 72–74. This however does not correspond with the report that the Armagnacs were pursued for 20 leagues, as Guise
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On his return from Rethelois Jean de Luxembourg proceeded against the Dauphinist castles between Laon and Hirson. According to Wavrin, the English then undertook a raid in Laonnois resulting at the capture of La Follie.215 The *Livre des Trahisons* reports a similar raid in the environs of Hirson in September, undertaken by the English and the Burgundians of the retinue of the seigneur de L’Isle-Adam under Lionel de Bouronville.216 According to the chronicle of the Cordeliers, La Follie surrendered in mid-October,217 hence it appears would be only 20 km from Bohain. Monstrelet spells this places as ‘Balham’, *Monstrelet*. IV, p. 163 This is identified as as Balham (dep. Ardennes, arr. Rethel, cant. Asfeld) in C. Berry, *Les Luxembourgeois-Ligny*, p. 293. A. Janvier interprets this toponym as ‘Bethléem’, suggesting that this must refer to some monastery, known to the chronicler, A. Janvier, ‘Le bâtard de Saint-Pol’, MSAP, 26 (1880), p. 389. Finally the chronicle of the Cordeliers gives ‘lavan leez Rains’, which is possibly Lavannes (dep. Marne, arr. Reims, cant. Bourgogne), *Cordeliers*, fo. 439v.

214 They are reported to be pursued for 20 leagues, *Cordeliers*, fo. 439v; *Monstrelet*, IV, pp. 163–164. According to the *Cordeliers*, this brought Lancastrian almost to the gates of Mouzon which corresponds with the distance given. The chronicle of Cordeliers also suggests that the castle of *Beaumort* (probably, Beaumont-sur-Argonne) was taken during this raid, *Cordeliers*, fo. 439v. If this is true, the place must have been recovered by the Armagnacs afterwards.

According to Berry Herald, the Armagnacs were pursued to the gates of Mouzon by the Lancastrians under Jean de Luxembourg, the earl-marshals and the earl of Salisbury and this induced Charles VII to send the earl of Buchan to relieve the Valois partisans in Champagne. The earl, however, chose instead to lay siege to Cravant, *Berry*, p. 110.

215 This may have been La Folie in the commune of Any-Martin-Rieux (dep. Aisne, arr. Vervins, cant. Aubenton) in about 12 km to the east of Hirson. This could as well be the castle of La Folie in Braine (dep. Aisne, arr. Soissons, ch.–l. of cant) near Soissons or La Folie in the commune of Boué (dep. Aisne, arr. Vervins, cant. Noyon-en-Thiérache).


217 *Cordeliers*, fo. 441r.
that all three chronicles are reporting the same operation,\textsuperscript{218} which was most probably taking place in September–November. It is thus possible that before that the English participated in the sieges undertaken by Jean de Luxembourg in August.

The next campaign started in April 1424 with the operations against Oisy. This place had been invested by Jean de Luxembourg in autumn 1423 and by late January 1424 the conditions of surrender were being discussed.\textsuperscript{219} It is thus possible that the journée was already appointed to take place on 5 May and this date should be considered the start of the campaign.\textsuperscript{220} By that date Sir Thomas Rempston brought an English contingent from Normandy to assist the Burgundians. He was later joined by the soldiers from the expeditionary force sent to France in spring 1424.\textsuperscript{221}

After Oisy surrendered the allies proceeded to invest Wiège,\textsuperscript{222} which held out for three weeks. The Dauphinists from Guise trying to raise the siege were ambushed and defeated.\textsuperscript{223} The surrender of Wiège allowed the Lancastrians in

\textsuperscript{218} Both Wavrin and the \textit{Livre des Trahisons} estimate them as 600 men, which is a slight overestimation of the size of the earl marshal’s retinue, Wavrin, III, p. 73; Trahisons, p. 173.

\textsuperscript{219} Jean de Luxembourg was disposed to accept the surrender of Oisy in return for a sum of 1000 écus and the duke’s pardon for the Dauphinist captain; he, however, had to consult the duke’s council on this matter. Therefore, his powers seem to be only limited to military command, B. de Lannoy, \textit{Hugues de Lannoy}, pp. 74, 216–218. This also suggests that though Jean de Luxembourg had to raise the siege in order to recover Ham in October 1423, he then returned before Oisy.

\textsuperscript{220} The chronicles suggest that the date of surrender was established after a short siege by the Anglo-Burgundian force, Cordeliers, fo. 447r; Monstrelet, IV, p. 179; Wavrin, III, p. 92. It however seems possible that the date of journée was appointed by Jean de Luxembourg in late January.

\textsuperscript{221} On this expedition see H. Ratcliffe, ‘The military expenditure’, pp. 12–15.

\textsuperscript{222} On 6 May the retinue of Sir Thomas Rempston was mustered before Wiège, BNF, MS. Fr. 4485, p. 281. R. A. Newhall omits the siege of Wiège by erroneously suggesting that this must was taken before Guise, R. A. Newhall, \textit{The English Conquest of Normandy}, p. 306 n. 227.

\textsuperscript{223} Among the captives were Poton de Xaintrailles and Odon, seigneur de Verduisant. In addition to paying his ransom Poton de Xaintrailles was also made to leave with his retinue beyond the Loire, depriving the Armagnacs at Guise of their best captain and
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early June to invest Guise. The siege lasted until 18 September, when the treaty of surrender was concluded by Jean de Luxembourg and Sir Thomas Rempston for the Lancastrians with Jean de Proisy, Dauphinist governor of Guise. It was agreed that the place should surrender to the king of England and France, the duke of Burgundy, each one of them, or their representatives or those of each of them on 1 March 1425 unless relieved. The garrison and the inhabitants faithful to the Dauphin would be allowed to leave beyond the Loire. The hostilities were suspended until the appointed journée while the Armagnacs promised to make no repairs of the fortifications. After the treaty was concluded, Jean de Luxembourg returned to his fortress of Beaurevoir while Sir Thomas Rempston took his soldiers to Paris.

The surrender of Guise was received by Jean de Luxembourg on 26 February. The Lancastrian army assembled for the journée on 1 March was disbanded on the news of this surrender. By February 1425 the Burgundians were already engaged in the war in Hainault against Humphrey, duke of Gloucester, and Jacqueline of Bavaria, his wife. Therefore they were keen to avoid the arrival of an English force so close to the borders of Hainault as well as the slightest chance that Guise might be placed under English control. The case of Le Crototy in March 1424 may have warned Philip the Good.


224 The chroniclers report that Jean de Luxembourg disbanded his army and returned to Beaurevoir with his prisoners after the skirmish before Wiège, Monstrelet, IV, p. 182; Wavrin, III, p. 94. The chronicle of the Cordeliers gives 29 June as the date when the siege was established, Cordeliers, fo. 448r. Even if the Burgundian army was disbanded for several weeks, the English must have remained in the field. On 6 June the retinue of Sir Thomas Rempston was mustered in Lesquielles–Saint–Germain (dep. Aisne, arr. Vervins, cant. Guise) in 4 km to the north from Guise, BNF, MS. Fr. 4485, pp. 281–282.

225 'Mon dit seigneur le rçent et monditseigneur de Bourgongne ou l'un d'eux et les commis d'eux ou de l'un deulx, nous ou l'un de nous', Monstrelet, IV, p. 201.

226 For the treaty of surrender see Cordeliers, fos. 452v–455v; Monstrelet, IV, pp. 199–205. It is also printed in [l'abbé] Pescheur, Histoire de la ville de Guise, pp. 327–331.

227 Monstrelet, IV, p. 206.

228 David de Poix was appointed its captain and governor by Jean de Luxembourg Cordeliers, fo. 456r; Monstrelet, IV, pp. 229–230.

229 Monstrelet, IV, p. 230.
The status of the English forces participating in the campaigns against Guise is best documented for the campaign of 1424. The contingent of 100 men–at–arms and 300 archers brought to the siege by Sir Thomas Rempston was drawn from English forces in Normandy.\textsuperscript{230} It was first mustered at Gournay on 6 April and was paid monthly till September from the finances of Normandy.\textsuperscript{231} The powers to take the musters of this force were given to Jean de Luxembourg, who in turn could delegate them to his subordinates.\textsuperscript{232} However, the contingent brought to the siege by Sir Thomas Rempston was not the only English company at the siege.

Several retinues from the expeditionary army sent to France in Spring 1424 also participated at the siege. The chroniclers do not report the size of this force.\textsuperscript{233} Fortunately, a certification for a payment to a messenger for delivering letters to the siege of Guise made on 26 July mentions alongside de Luxembourg and Rempston six other captains, all of them serving on the expedition of 1424.\textsuperscript{234} Their retinues together amounted to 110 men–at–arms and

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\textsuperscript{230} This included the companies taken from the garrisons of Harfleur and Rouen, but these were not led by William Mynours, captain of Harfleur, and Sir Thomas Gargrave, lieutenant of Rouen, as suggested in A. Curry, ‘The Organisation of Field Armies’, pp. 217–218. The abovementioned officers stayed in the garrison in charge of the remaining soldiers. Other garrisons of Normandy also contributed to the siege like Saint–Valéry, BNF, MS. Fr. 4485, p. 251.
\textsuperscript{231} For the payments to this contingent amounting to 17885 l.t. see BNF, MS. Fr. 4485, pp. 280–282.
\textsuperscript{232} Thus, on 3 August this commission was delegated to Jean Lievyn, governor of Oisy. Original in AN, K 62/11/4. Published in \textit{Letters and Papers}, II, pt. 1, pp. 28–31 following a transcription in BNF, NAF 7626, fos. 426r–428v.
\textsuperscript{233} Both Monstrelet and Wavrin mention the arrival into France of this expeditionary force, the effective of which are most exactly described as 1600 men. They report that a part of this force was sent to the siege of Guise but give no names or numbers, \textit{Monstrelet}, IV, p. 183; \textit{Wavrin}, III, p. 94. In fact the expedition consisted of 411 men–at–arms and 1230 archers, H. L. Ratcliffe, ‘The military expenditure’, p. 13.
\textsuperscript{234} BNF, P.O. 1778 (Luxembourg), no. 25. For the names see Appendix B.4. As usual this expeditionary force was paid in advance before embarking for France therefore its service left no traces in the financial documentation of Lancastrian France.
\end{flushright}
From the death of Henry V to the truce of Chambéry

330 archers. Thus the English participation in the siege of Guise seems to be at least twice as great as usually accepted. As the chronicles estimate the besieging army as 1600–2000 men, the English possibly formed almost a half of it.

The tactical role played by the English remains unclear. They are not reported as participating in the ambush against the Dauphinists during the siege of Wiège. The chronicles present it as a mounted skirmish, decided by the factors of surprise and mobility and the ways to retreat being cut. The Burgundians, presumably, did not need English help to fight the battle in such way. However, according to the chronicle of the Cordeliers, when La Hire besieged a certain fortress in Rethelois in June 1424, the English contributed to the force of 500 men-at-arms and 800 archers sent from the army before Guise, which successfully raised that siege.

Although Jean de Luxembourg as a claimant to the county of Guise played the primary role in the submission of Thiérache, and the English may have been subordinate to him in military matters, the relations between the allies

235 See H. L. Ratcliffe, ‘The Military Expenditure’, pp. 13–15. This corresponds most closely with the size of the Earl–marshal’s retinue in the previous year.
236 The actual effectives of the English expeditionary force engaged at the siege of Guise could be even greater, given the mention of ‘autres capptaines de pais dengleterre’ in BNF, P.O. 1778 (Luxembourg), no. 25. It does not appear, however, that the whole of the expeditionary force was employed at the siege, as its most important captains such as the Lords Willoughby and Poynings or Sir William Oldhall are not mentioned in this document as well as in other sources, related to the siege. Their alibi is also attested by their participation in the battle of Verneuil on 17 August 1424, Bas-set, fo. 53v.
seem to be more complex. The language of the treaty of surrender may sug-
gest horizontal relations of alliance rather than a vertical of subordination with
two captains representing each of the allies as the parties to the treaty on the
Lancastrian side. Thus, the duke of Burgundy was acting as the partner rather
than subordinate of the Lancastrian government in Paris. This is well illustrated
by the appearance of the clause suggesting that the place could be delivered to
one of the allies, which was eventually employed.

2.10 Military cooperation in 1423–1424

The operations in 1423–1424 in general followed the strategic plan es-
tablished under Henry V. The period may be considered a ‘model’ for Anglo–
Burgundian relations within the framework established by the Treaty of Troyes
and not yet significantly strained by the discords over Hainault, Holland and
Zealand. Joint operations were numerous during this period and the Burgundi-
ans played a significant role in the military efforts of the kingdom. The joint
operations extended over their widest ever territory: from the mouth of Somme
in the north to the Mâconnais in the south, although the latter theatre must
have proved too remote and was eventually left to the duke of Burgundy.

This illustrates the fact that the English kings could hardly conquer
France by force, based on the fact of simple demographics. The support
among the French, especially the French nobility, was therefore crucial for the
Lancastrian kingdom of France to survive. The Lancastrian regime was never
established firmly enough to build its relations with the Burgundian nobility on
demands of obedience rather than negotiations towards a mutual interest. As
Philip the Good became less inclined to participate in the war himself, the mili-
tary role played by those nobles who would prefer to follow the duke rather
than to serve the king (especially the Lancastrian king), tended to diminish.
However, Duke Philip remained much involved in the planning and organisa-
tion of the war and did not prevent his subjects from fighting the Armagnacs,
if they wished. To a certain degree it may be said that, unlike 1420–1421, in
1422–1424 the Lancastrian government had to rely on the Burgundians rather
than on the duke of Burgundy. Such military activity was quite predictably con-
centrated in the regions where the interests of the duke and such his subjects
lay. Thus, Jean de Luxembourg and the captains of his entourage like Philippe,
seigneur de Saveuse, or the bastard de Wandonne were fighting the Dau–
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phinists in Picardy and Thiérache. Guillaume, de Châtillon, captain of Reims and Château–Thierry was engaged in a number of joint undertakings in 1420–1424.  

It is noteworthy that in 1423–1424 several joint operations were planned in advance with the aims distributed between the allies. The meetings between Philip the Good and Bedford in Paris in September 1422 and June 1424 and in Amiens in April 1423 and in February 1424 had distinct political and strategic impact. The war efforts were coordinated in space and time as shown by timely provision of expeditionary contingents to support the operations against Guise. The operations of the earl of Salisbury in Champagne may illustrate the support, which could be obtained from local nobility and cities.

2.11 Bottom line: the truce of Chambéry

An important point in the Anglo–Burgundian relations was set by the truce concluded at Chambéry on 28 September 1424 by the representatives of the duke of Burgundy and the Dauphin with the mediation of the duke of Savoy. The ceasefire was to last from 5 October 1424 until 1 May 1425 covering the two Burgundies, Nivernais, Donzyois, Charolais and Mâconnais on the Burgundian side as well as the adjacent Dauphinist territories. This was the first major truce concluded by the duke of Burgundy with the Dauphin. Although technically no breach of the treaty of Troyes, this act was hardly friendly to the Lancastrian regime. While the duke might pretend that he was no longer able to continue the war, it were the Armagnacs who benefited from the truce

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240 He had captured Château–Thierry by assault in 1420 and remained its captain until at least 1425, BNF, MS. Fr. 26048 no. 451. He participated in the campaign of Philip the Good in 1420, taking part in the siege of Crépy–en–Laonnois (Trahisons, p. 149) and possibly remained with the duke up to the siege of Melun (Basset, fo. 41r). He served at the siege of Meaux (Monstrelet, IV, p. 92) and, may have come with the earl of Salisbury to the battle of Cravant (Basset, fo. 48v). He was then knighted by the earl of Salisbury at the siege of Sèzanne (Monstrelet, IV, p. 185; Wavrin, III, pp. 97–98).

241 For the text of the treaty see Plancher, IV, pp. XLIV–XLV. It seems likely that the ceasefire was to start on 5 October to allow already appointed journée of La Roche–Solutré to take place, See above, Ch. 2.8.

242 This matter was discussed earlier, see Ch. 1.1.4.
being able to regroup their forces against the duke of Bedford, compensating for the catastrophic losses of Verneuil.\textsuperscript{243}

The truce, consequently prolonged several times, was followed by further steps towards a rapprochement. On 30 November 1424 Philip the Good married Bonne of Artois, the dowager countess of Nevers.\textsuperscript{244} In the same month the duke held peace negotiations with the Dauphinst ambassador at Mâcon. These were followed by another marriage – that of Agnes of Burgundy with Charles, heir to the duke of Bourbon – arranged in September 1425. Thus, the duke of Burgundy seemed to reestablish the relations with the house of Bourbon, a source of incessant threats to the borders of Charolais. His relations with the Dauphin also appeared to move toward reconciliation in the wake of Constable Richemont’s favour at the Dauphinst court.\textsuperscript{245}

Nevertheless, it can hardly be admitted that Philip the Good was really intending to defect to the Dauphin after 1424. Although he was not virtual ruler of the kingdom of France, as his father had been, Philip had extended his territories and retained a good measure of influence in the regions most crucial for Burgundian power, such as Paris, Picardy and Champagne. According to the Treaty of Troyes, the submission of the Dauphinst resistance was the king’s responsibility, not his.\textsuperscript{246} Thus, once the regions in which Burgundian interests lay were securely under the Lancastrian rule, the continuation of war promised little to the duke. Was not it better to let his lands benefit from relative peace

\textsuperscript{243} The possibility for the Armagnacs to regroup their forces by weakening the borders with Burgundy in the aftermath of the truce is noted in J. d’Avout, \textit{La querelle}, p. 364.

\textsuperscript{244} She was also a granddaughter of Duke Jean of Berry (d. 1416), once one of the Armagnac leaders, and the sister of Charles d’Artois, count of Eu, prisoner in England since Agincourt. The marriage served to consolidate the positions of the house of Burgundy as Philip the Good obtained tutelage over his nephews and stepsons, counts of Nevers and Etampes.


\textsuperscript{246} The same became true for the punishment of the Montereau murderers as the case was presented to the Parlement of Paris. See Ch. 1.2.2. and Appendix F.1.
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provided by the truces and enjoy freedom in his policy? His further participation in the war could become a bargaining factor for Philip the Good in his relations with the Lancastrian regime.

What could the duke of Burgundy gain from joining the Dauphin in 1424–1425? After the disaster of Verneuil the power of the Dauphin was at its lowest, while the Lancastrian power seemed invincible. The defection would inevitably expose the duke’s territories to Lancastrian rampage, while hardly any help could be expected from the Valois would-be king. How could this outweigh the benefits of Philip the Good’s position under the Lancastrian regime?

It is possible that the reason behind this rapprochement was Duke Philip’s attempt to provide himself with some support should he find himself engaged in a war against all the Lancastrian Dual monarchy in consequence of the conflict over the lands of Jacqueline of Bavaria. At the same time, the apparent rapprochement with the Dauphin from late 1424 was a political manoeuvre aimed at the duke of Bedford. The need to maintain the alliance with Burgundy induced the Regent to abstain from supporting his brother Gloucester and made him more disposed towards purchasing Burgundian support. In return, Bedford could cede to the duke the pieces of kingdom he was not really able to manage, reserving for the crown the right to demand them back.

In 1420–1424 Burgundian policy towards the Lancastrian kingdom of France was dictated by the considerations of security of the Burgundian dominions and the need for military help against the Armagnacs. With the relative removal of the Dauphinist threat by late 1424 these relations were to be forged by the political interests of Philip the Good.

247 As the events of 1435–1436 would show, the outbreak of war between the Lancastrian Dual monarchy and the Burgundian states was inevitable if the duke defected. This is what occurred in 1436 even though both the duke and the Lancastrian government were probably disposed to remaining de facto neutral. This will be very briefly discussed further, see Ch. 5.5.2. The Lancastrian positions in France in 1424 were much stronger than in 1436, which, in the case of defection, would make war against the English highly likely and all the more disastrous for Philip the Good.

248 M. Warner suggests that the duke of Burgundy actually had no intention to join the Dauphinists in 1425–1427 and emphasises the importance of the Lancastrian military power in this decision, M. W. Warner, ‘The Montagu Earls of Salisbury’, pp. 136–137.
Chapter 3: From the invasion of Hainault to the defeat at Orléans (1425–1429)

3.1 Political context

The period between late 1424 and late 1427 is generally considered one of decline for the Anglo-Burgundian alliance caused by a number of factors. While the Dauphinist threat was as low as it ever was, the direction of the English advance diverted to the south-west against Maine, Anjou and later Brittany.¹ The duke of Burgundy, protected by a truce with the Dauphin could support his interests in Hainault and Holland. These were threatened by Humphrey, duke of Gloucester, Bedford’s younger brother, who decided to support his wife, Jacqueline of Bavaria, against her former husband, Jean of Brabant, and led an army into her county of Hainault in late 1424.² Philip the Good proved anxious to support the cause of his cousin duke of Brabant. Thus, Bedford faced an uneasy choice between the loyalties to his brother and his brother-in-law. The position eventually chosen by the Regent seems to defend the Anglo-Burgundian alliance rather than to favour Gloucester’s ambitions. By April 1425 the adventurer duke had to return to England.³

On Gloucester’s return home he found himself engaged in the conflict with Henry Beaufort, bishop of Winchester and chancellor of England. The situation in England kingdom wavered on the brink of an armed conflict and the duke of Bedford seemed to be the only person able to cope with the situation. Therefore he had to leave for England in the last days of 1425 and only returned to France in mid-1427.

² Jacqueline of Bavaria, countess of Hainault, Holland and Zealand, fled from her husband Jean IV, duke of Brabant, to England in 1421. Her flight was assisted if not orchestrated by Henry V, who may have intended to use her presence in England to keep a hold over the duke of Burgundy. She married the duke of Gloucester in January 1423, K. H. Vickers, *Humphrey, Duke of Gloucester*, pp. 93–96, 126–127; J. Ferguson, *English Diplomacy*, pp. 8–9.
From the invasion of Hainault to the failure at Orléans

On his departure from France the Regent appointed the duke of Burgundy to preside in the Great Council, whenever he would like to take the place. Otherwise the governance was left to the chancellor of France Louis de Luxembourg, while military command was divided between the earls of Warwick, Salisbury and Suffolk. This seems to have been only an act of respect towards the duke, who, it appears, never attended the sessions of the council during Bedford’s absence.

Bedford’s return to France opened a short period of revival between late 1427 and early 1429 when joint operations were resumed on the eastern borders of Champagne, in Argonne and later against Orléans. To a certain degree this was a return to the cooperation models of early 1420s when the Burgundian forces supported the military efforts of the Lancastrian regime, but this time without the duke of Burgundy, himself still bound by the truce with the Dauphin. This brief rapprochement soon suffered further setbacks and, by mid-1429 when the Dauphinist victories before Orléans and in the Loire valley, set the Lancastrian cause in France on the brink of collapse, Anglo-Burgundian relations were suffering yet another crisis.

This political context, greatly different from the situation in 1420–1424, must inevitably have altered the forms of cooperation. This chapter aims to trace these changing forms and the geographic areas where joint operations continued to take place in 1425–1428. This task is made more difficult by the fact that the military operations of this period to the east of the Seine are only briefly mentioned in contemporary narrative sources, whose attention was attracted to the English conquests in Anjou and Maine and Philip the Good’s wars in Hainault and Low Countries. Therefore this chapter has to be based largely on scarce documentary evidence and works on local history.

4 ‘Item [...] le duc de bourgongne quant son plaisir sera estre en notre grant conseil en sera le chief et en son absence [...] Levesque de therouenne chancellier de france’, however, the powers to make administrative decisions were given to the chancellor or to the chancellor and the members of the council, not to the duke, suggesting the nominal character of Philip the Good’s appointment to the presidency. See AN, X1a 8603, fo. 90r, also transcribed in TNA, PRO 31/8/136 (26 Nov 1425).

5 According to his itinerary, Philip the Good engaged in the warfare in Holland and Zeeland never travelled further to the south than to his county of Artois in 1426 – early 1427, Itinéraires, pp. 52–63.
3.2 Hostilities in Champagne, late 1424 – mid 1427

Soon after the battle of Verneuil Thomas Montacute, the earl of Salisbury was relieved of the governorship of Champagne and Brie and given charge of the operations in Maine. The war in Champagne seems to have been left to the Burgundians. The victory at Verneuil presumably undermined the will for resistance among the Armagnacs in Champagne, realising that no succour could be expected. The castle of Nesles–en–Tardenois surrendered on 30 August 1424. On 4 October a treaty of surrender was concluded with La Hire at Vitry–en–Pernois. The Lancastrian negotiators on this occasion represented various patterns of the service to the regime. There were several long–standing Burgundians, promoted to important positions in the central administration like Pierre Cauchon, bishop of Beauvais, Jean de Courcelles, seigneur de Saint–Liebaut, and Pierre de Fontenay, seigneur de Rance. A different case was Jean de Neuchâtel and his bastard son Thibault, who served the Dual Monarchy as

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6 The letters of remission for the citizens of Sézanne issued in October 1424, while speaking of the capture of the town by Salisbury in preceding June, name him ‘lors gouverneur […] de Champagne et de Brye’, suggesting that he was no longer in office, S. Luce, Jeanne d’Arc à Domrémy, p. 119. Thus, his potential quarrel with Philip the Good at the wedding feast of Jean de La Trémoille in November 1424 was unlikely to make him abandon the governorship of Champagne.

7 The report that the castle was delivered ‘en la main de messire Jehan de luxembourcq’ (Cordeliers, fo. 449r) seems unlikely given his engagement at the siege of Guise. Pierre de Fenin names Antoine, seigneur de Croy, as the new captain of the place, Fenin, p.212.

8 Cordeliers, fo. 455v; Monstrelet, IV, p. 206; Wavrin, III, p. 125. The treaty of surrender is published in S. Luce, Jeanne d’Arc à Domrémy, pp. 119–127. The treaty was confirmed by La Hire on 16 March 1425, S. Luce, Jeanne d’Arc à Domrémy, pp. 152–153.

9 Thibault, bastard of Neuchâtel, is not named among the negotiators. He, however, is mentioned to receive the oath to adhere to the treaty of surrender from the Armagnacs and appointed one of the conservators of the truce, thus, he must have been present at its conclusion, S. Luce, Jeanne d’Arc à Domrémy, pp. 125, 127. Thibault, bastard of Neuchâtel, and his brother Antoine were legitimised in November 1424, while their father was rewarded with the seigneuries of Sommevole, Conflans and Vitry–la–Ville, J.–C. Birquy, Une dynastie comtoise: Les Seigneurs de Neuchâtel en Bourgogne, 2 vols. (L’Isle–sur–le–Dous [?], 2009 [?]), I, pp. 242, 253.
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military captains, rather than administrators, retaining their connection with the duke of Burgundy. The English were represented by Sir Lancelot de Lisle, a captain belonging to the military affinity of the earl of Salisbury.\(^{10}\) A local truce was made until 2 April 1425 when a journée was to be held between Mont Aimé and Trécon.\(^{11}\) In case of Lancastrian victory not only Vitry but also the surrounding places of Larzicourt, Heiltz–l’Évêque and Blacy were to surrender.\(^{12}\)

The castle of Mont Aimé, before which the journée of Vitry was to take place, rather predictably became the next Lancastrian objective. The aide for its siege had been already demanded from the cities of Champagne in October 1424.\(^{13}\) It appears that the castle was invested by August 1425\(^{14}\) and fell in January 1426. According to L. P. Anquetil, the siege lasted for nine months, which would move its start date to April 1425, and was maintained by the Reims militia under Guillaume, seigneur de Châtillon, captain of Reims.\(^{15}\) In fact, de Châtillon was assisted by the baillis of Vermandois, Valois and Vitry and a number of other Burgundian seigneurs. An English force of 50 men–at–arms and 150 archers was brought by Thomas, Lord Scales, as well as smaller contingents under Edmund Heron, one of the English commanders at Vertus, and

\(^{10}\) For the outline of the career of Sir Lancelot de Lisle see L. Jarry, ‘Le Compte de L’Armée Anglaise’, p. 637.

\(^{11}\) The site of this castle (demolished in 1427) on an isolated hill in about 5 km to the south of Vertus is now divided between the communes of Bergères–lès–Vertus and Val–de–Marais (dep. Marne, arr. Châlons–en–Champagne, cant. Vertus); Trécon (dep. Marne, arr. Châlons–en–Champagne, cant. Vertus).


\(^{14}\) The aide for the siege (then already in progress) was levied in the dioceses of Reims, Châlons, Troyes and Langres in September 1425, Letters and Papers, II, pt. 1, pp. 62–65.

\(^{15}\) [L. P.] Anquetil, Histoire civile et politique de la ville de Reims, 3 vols. (Reims 1756), II, pp. 371–373. The protocols of the city council only mention financial assistance and sending 100 pioneers for the siege, and, possibly, some crossbowmen and a bombard, Reims Deliberations, pp. 36, 40–47.
Thomas Grett, captain of Courville. The total effectives of the besieging army amounted to almost a thousand men.\textsuperscript{16}

Many sources report that the earl of Salisbury commanded the siege.\textsuperscript{17} In fact, he was engaged in the conquest of Maine where Mayenne only surrendered on 31 October.\textsuperscript{18} His presence before Mont Aimé is only attested from late December,\textsuperscript{19} and it appears that when the siege was brought to an end, the earl returned in February 1426 to Maine to invest La Ferté Bernard.\textsuperscript{20} The appearance of the earl in Champagne just after he had been made responsible for the operations in Normandy, Maine and Anjou,\textsuperscript{21} and between the two sieges held by his forces in Maine, though verified by documents, seems difficult to explain. It is noteworthy, however, that in the records of the Reims city council the earl is usually mentioned alongside the autres commissaires du roi, and mostly concerning the levy of 1200 l.t. from the city for the maintaining of the siege in January 1426.\textsuperscript{22} It is thus possible that Salisbury, given his experience

\textsuperscript{16} For the list of participants see the extracts from the accounts of Benoît Colenet, treasurer for wars for Henry VI, in BNF, MS. Fr. 32510 fo. 367 r and Appendix B.5.

\textsuperscript{17} Cordeliers, fos. 466r–466v; Monstrelet, IV, p. 255; T. Bouiot, Histoire de la ville de Troyes, II, p. 472. See also the depositions of Thomas Dring who claimed to have served under the earl at the sieges the latter held before Mont Aimé and then before La Ferté Bernard, English Suits, p. 171. The same sequence of the events is given under year 1426 in the Geste des Nobles, p. 200.

\textsuperscript{18} He was besieging Le Mans from July (surrendered 10 August 1425), then continued to Mayennes (surrendered on 31 October), E. C. Williams, My Lord of Bedford, p. 128–129; R. Planchenault, ‘La Conquêtr de Maine par les Anglais. La campagne de 1424–1425’, Revue historique et archéologique du Maine, 2 sér., 5 (1925), pp. 12–21.

\textsuperscript{19} He is first mentioned in the records of the city council of Reims on 20 December 1425 and appears frequently up to 27 January 1426, Reims Deliberations, pp. 39–45.


\textsuperscript{21} This appointment was made before Bedford’s departure to England at the session of the council on 26 November 1425, E. C. Williams, My Lord of Bedford, p. 137; AN, \textsuperscript{Xvi} 8603, fos. 90r–90v, a transcript available in TNA, PRO 31/8/136.

\textsuperscript{22} Reims Deliberations, pp. 42–45. This corresponds with the summary of a personal account of Pierre Cauchon, bishop of Beauvais, for his journey to Champagne in the


24 The final consensus was reported to the city council on 19 January 1426. According to this report, Guillaume, seigneur de Châtillon, had sworn that if the castle was taken and not demolished he would no longer serve the king and the English, *Reims Deliberations*, p. 44. He seems to have broken both promises.

25 Several chronicles, however, suggest that the castle was demolished, *Monstrelet*, IV, p. 255; *Fenin*, p. 199 (placing the siege in 1423).


27 BNF, MS. 32510, fo. 367v. The origins and the career of this person will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

However, these plans had to be abandoned when Mont Aimé, garrisoned by the English, fell to the Dauphinists due to treason. On 7 September the Armagnacs attacked the nearby town of Vertus; some of the English under Edmund Heron and Digon Amore tried to hold out in one of the gatehouses. A Lancastrian force was hastily assembled for the recovery of the place, but apparently the relief attempt failed and both Heron and Amore were killed. On 7 October the earl of Salisbury was commissioned to recover Vertus and Mont Aimé. He was retained for three months with 300 men-at-arms.

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29 On 7 September 1426 the city council of Reims decided to write to the king’s council concerning the capture of Mont Aimé and asking him to deal with it, Reims Deliberations, p. 64. The Chronicle of Cordeliers places the fall of Mont Aimé between the events of May and July 1426. According to it, the castle was lost due to the treason of one of the Englishmen and one former Armagnac serving in the garrison. The English captain of the castle whose name is not mentioned, was killed, Cordeliers, fo. 469v; the surrender by an English traitor is also mentioned in Monstrelet, IV, p. 270.

30 The full size of the Lancastrian force sent for the recovery of Vertus is not clear. Richard Beauchamp, earl of Warwick, Sir John Fastolf, Sir John Popham, Richard Waller and William Glasdale were ordered ‘outre les autres’ to send a total of 53 men-at-arms and 159 archers for its relief. The payment of 780 l. 9 s. 11 d.t. for 15 days from 28 September 1426 was ordered on 12 October from the finances of Normandy, BNF, NAF 7627, fos. 18r–20v; for the company sent by Sir John Fastolf see also AN, K 62/25/18 or a transcription in TNA, PRO 31/8/135/7A (26 September 1426). Other 50 men-at-arms and 150 archers under Thomas, earl of Salisbury, Sir Richard Lowick and Guillaume de Criguenon were paid by the war treasurer, BNF, MS. 32510 fo. 368v. The wages in both cases were assigned without taking the musters due to the emergency. It is possible that other contingents were engaged, but financed through different sources of which no evidence is known to survive.

31 Edmund Heron is reported to be killed at the siege of Vertus on 26 September 1426, BNF, MS. Fr. 32510, fo. 369r. He was considered dead by 12 October 1426, as follows from the preamble of the abovementioned document, BNF, NAF 7627, fo. 18v. Digon Amore died in Vertus (with no further details given) before September 1427, according to AN, JJ 174/104.

32 BNF, MS. Fr. 32510, fo. 369r. The earl wanted to leave on a pilgrimage to Jerusalem after his commission had expired in June 1426, but received a papal dispensation and was persuaded to remain in service until the end of September, BL, Add. Ch. 7943. It appears that the fall of Vertus just a few days before the end of his new term prevent-
From the invasion of Hainault to the failure at Orléans

arms and 900 archers.\textsuperscript{33} There is no evidence that Vertus offered any resistance worth mentioning, but the siege of Mont Aimé seems to have lasted until late March 1427.\textsuperscript{34} A third of the Salisbury’s army on this campaign was formed by the contingent under Robert Hungerford, being a part of the expeditionary force brought from England in 1426.\textsuperscript{35} Some contingents were brought from Normandy.\textsuperscript{36} The rest was formed by a mixture of the retinues under both English and Burgundian captains, among the latter Colard de Mailly, Henry de La Tour and Jean de Dinteville, \textit{baillis} of Vermandois, Vitry and Troyes respectively, Guillaume, seigneur de Châtillon, and others. These were paid by the treas-

\textsuperscript{33} The royal letters, concerning the army of Salisbury, were only issued in early December, while the service was accounted to begin from Michaelmas. This may be due to the \textit{ad hoc} nature of the campaign, triggered by the loss of Vertus, BNF, MS. Fr. 4484, fo. 36r.

\textsuperscript{34} \textit{Bourgeois}, p. 212. Salisbury was initially commissioned to serve until the 1 January 1427 but the commission was then prolonged till 1 April 1427, BNF, MS. Fr. 4484, fos. 36r–36v. Nevertheless, the payments to the soldiers under his command for April contain no mention of the siege being in progress, see BNF, MS. Fr. 4484 fos. 40r–44r. In the records of the city council of Reims the last mention of the siege appears on 16 March. After that date the demolition of the castle becomes a matter of discussion, \textit{Reims Delibérations}, pp. 84–85. Thus the suggestion of S. Luce that the siege was brought to an end between 14 April and 3 June 1427, apparently exaggerates its length.

\textsuperscript{35} For this expedition see H. L. Ratcliffe, ‘The Military Expenditure’, pp. 20–22. Their term of service expired on 9 March 1427 and was prolonged until the end of month. By that time the company expected to consist of 100 men–at–arms and 300 archers reduced to 84 men–at–arms and 236 archers on 10 March, BNF, MS. Fr. 4484, fos.36r, 39r–39v. This contingent does not appear to be serving with the earl of Salisbury in April 1427.

\textsuperscript{36} Robert, Lord Willoughby, served at the siege for 1 month as knight banneret with 1 other mounted man–at–arms and 17 archers, a part of his retinue as the captain of the city and castle of Rouen. They passed the musters on 17 February 1427 and were paid for their service by the earl of Salisbury, see a transcription in TNA, PRO 31/8/138 (6 Apr 1427). It is possible that other contingents may have been sent from Normandy to the siege of Mont Aimé, but this is to be supported by the documentary evidence.
urer for wars. The castle eventually was made to capitulate and was demolished afterwards.

After Mont Aimé fell, Salisbury was briefly retained by the king for the month of April with 200 men-at-arms and 600 archers to act against the enemies in the vast area extending from Champagne and Ile-de-France to Orléannais and the county of Blois. Some 400 men were concentrated at Nogent and Montigny under his command on 23–24 April 1427.

However this concentration seem to have had no impact as a month later many of these captains were engaged with the earls of Warwick and Suffolk at the siege of Montargis. Salisbury provided a company for this enterprise but was not present in person and probably returned to England by July 1427. The Lancastrian army before Montargis was mostly formed of the English although minor French contingents joined the siege in late July like those of Jean Le Baveux, Lancastrian captain of Montlhéry, and Pierre le Verrat. The latter, a stout Lancastrian adherent with strong ties to Paris where he had briefly held the prévôté in 1421–1422, was also a councillor of the duke of Burgundy from 1424. However, his presence at the siege seems a consequence of his Parisian

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37 For the lists of participants see BNF, MS. Fr. 32510, fos. 369r–369v; MS. Fr. 4484, fos. 37r–39v, also Appendix B.7.
38 Jean de Luxembourg is reported to be present at its surrender, Monstrelet, IV, p. 270.
40 S. Luce, Jeanne d’Arc à Domrémy, p. 158. This included English retinues of Sir Lancelot de Lisle, Sir Thomas Gargrave, Sir Richard Lowick, Sir Henry Biset, Sir John de La Pole, William Gloucester and Thomas Grett, BNF, MS. Fr. 4484, fos. 42v–44r.
41 Among the English captains engaged at the siege of Montargis were Sir Lancelot de Lisle, Sir Thomas Gargrave, Sir Henry Biset, Sir John de la Pole, BNF, MS. Fr. 4484, fos. 48v–59r.
42 PRME, X, p. 319. For his men at the siege of Montargis see BNF, MS. Fr. 4484, fos. 57r–59r.
43 The company of Jean Le Baveux amounted to 5 men-at-arms and 40 gens de trait, that of Pierre le Verrat to 15 men-at-arms and 40 gens de trait, BNF, MS. Fr. 4484, fos. 67v–68r.
44 ADCO, B 1643, fo. 49v.
From the invasion of Hainault to the failure at Orléans rather than Burgundian connections and there seems to be no evidence of the duke’s involvement in the siege.

3.3 The English garrisons in Bassigny

It was probably a consequence of the English participation in hostilities in Champagne in 1423–1424 that English garrisons began to appear in this traditionally Burgundian-dominated region extending even to the valley of the Meuse. This was a region with its own political landscape dominated by local networks of power, ambitions and conflicts with the dukes of Lorraine and Bar as key actors. The interests of certain pro-Burgundian noble houses like those of de Luxembourg, de Neufchâtel and de Vergy lay in the region. There were also Armagnac garrisons at Vaucouleurs in the south and at Beaumont-en-Argonne and Mouzon in the north led by experienced captains.

The English probably first appeared on the borders of Barrois in June 1420 in the company of Pierre de Luxembourg.45 In July 1421, when Henry V landed at in Calais, he dispatched the earl of Worcester to this region to support the cause of Pierre de Luxembourg (then prisoner of the Armagnacs at Meaux).46 Worcester captured Thonnance and two other fortresses in the environs of Condrecourt before returning to Henry V.47 In December 1422 an ex–

45 ‘estans en garnison au lieu de Bar à l’encontre du conte de Brenes et de plusieurs Anglois estans avec luy’ S. Luce, Jeanne d’Arc à Domrémy, pp. 77–78. Pierre de Luxembourgh, the count of Brienne and Conversan, attended the wedding of Henry V and Katherine of France at Troyes on 2 June 1420. He was later at the siege of Melun and was captured by the Armagnacs on his return and brought to Meaux and only negotiated his freedom during the siege of Meaux in 1422. See Ch. 1.

46 The retinue of Richard Beauchamp, earl of Worcester, for the campaign of 1421 consisted of 40 men-at-arms (including himself and Sir Richard Merbury) and 123 archers, TNA, E 101/50/1 [SLME]. He may have been joined by other retinues for the mission to Barrois. The earl of Worcester was killed at the siege of Meaux in 1422, A. H. Burne, The Agincourt War, p. 174.

47 Thonnance-lès-Joinville (dep. Haute-Marne, arr. Saint-Dizier, cant. Joinville), Condrecourt-le-Château (dep. Meuse, arr. Commercy, ch.-l. of cant.). For a contemporary report on this expedition see S. Luce, Jeanne d’Arc à Domrémy, pp. 314–316. This report, containing excuses for making the English stay for a few days longer than they were ordered to, done in anticipation of the possible battle against the Barrois, appears
emption from a particular payment was granted by the duke of Bar to the monastery at Tannois, on the grounds that the monastery had been burnt ‘par le conte de Brenes et plusieurs Angloïx’. Thus the English may have had certain knowledge of the region, but their permanent presence is only reported from 1424.

The two most important English garrisons in the area were those of Nogent-le-Roy and Montigny-le-Roy, belonging to the royal bailliage of Chau mont. Since its capture from the Armagnacs in 1417 Nogent-le-Roy was held by the Burgundians. It is not clear when and how these places came under English control. The first known mentions of the English at Montigny date from October 1424. According to J. de La Boullaye and M. Guyard, Nogent was cap-

to be written by a Burgundian receiver of the English military assistance. It may be guessed that the author could be Marguerite de Baux, Pierre de Luxembourg’s wife, left in charge of the family estates during her husband’s captivity.

49 S. Luce, Jeanne d’Arc à Domrémy, pp. 83–84.
50 Nowadays Nogent or Nogent-en-Bassigny (dep. Haute-Marne, arr. Chaumont); Montigny is now a part of the commune of Val-de-Meuse (Haute-Marne, arr. Langres).
52 On the other hand, on 1 October Nicolas Rolin summoned the English from the garrison of Montigny-le-Roi to come for the journée of La Roche-Solutrê in Mâconnais, J.-L. Bazin, ‘La Bourgogne de la mort du duc Philippe le Hardi’, p. 174. The journée was appointed for 4 October and no further operations were planned (see Ch. 2.8.), therefore there was no chance that the soldiers from Montigny could arrive in time, which may put this evidence under some doubt.

According to the documents originating from the duchy of Bar and published by S. Luce, in October 1424 a force of some 300 horses from Montigny was reported before La Marche (presumably, Lamarche (dep. Vosges, arr. Neufchâtel, ch.–l. of cant.). These, however were not considered English. However, by January 1425 the forces lodged in Montigny-le-Roi were reported as English. S. Luce, Jeanne d’Arc à Domremy, pp. 147–148.
From the invasion of Hainault to the failure at Orléans
tured by Digon Amore in 1425, which may suggest that Montigny-le-Roi had
been already under his command. 53

These garrisons became a source of great disturbances even for those of
their neighbours who were supporting the Lancastrian regime. The duke of
Lorraine addressed his complaints to the duke of Bedford. 54 In December 1424
Digon Amore was told to respect the subjects of the duke of Bar, undoubtedly
in response to complaints from Barrois. 55 The city of Langres, forced to pay
200 écus to obtain its safety, appealed to the baili of Chaumont and the Re-
gent, demanding the evacuation of the fortresses by the English. 56 An extensive
list of their abuses and depredations was composed in order to present the
case to Châtelet. 57 In February 1426 Girard Vion was sent by the council of Bur-
gundy to the chancellor and the council of France ‘pour le fait de la Charité sur
Loire, Noigent le Roy et Montigny’. 58 They were also engaged in hostilities with
the Barrois at Condrecourt, who in January 1426 captured their cattle before
Nogent and Montigny. 59

53 ‘message pour annoncer à la duchesse de Bourgogne la prise de Nogent-le-Roi par
Digon Amore’, Inventaire-Sommaire des archives communales de Langres antérieures à
1790, ed. by J. de La Boullaye (Troyes, 1882), p. 103; M. Guyard, ‘Langres pendant la
Guerre de Cent Ans’, pp. 12–13. M. W. Warner believes that both places were brought
148.

54 S. Luce dates this document (in which the year is lacking) 10 April 1422 (p. 317), but
it definitely belongs to the reign of Henry VI. The Regent mentions having asked the
earl of Salisbury to bring the captain to order. It seems likely that the earl acted as the
governor of Champagne, the office which he held since June 1423 and which he aban-
doned by October 1424, hence year 1424 for the document. It is noteworthy that Di-
gon Amore is only styled captain of Montigny-le-Roy, not of Nogent, thus supporting
the suggestion that the latter was not yet under his control, see S. Luce, Jeanne d’Arc à
Domrémy, pp. 317–318.

55 S. Luce, Jeanne d’Arc à Domrémy, p. CLII n. 1.

56 Inventaire sommaire … de Langres, pp. 59, 102.

57 ADO, B 11880.

58 A. Bossuat, Perrinet Gressart, p. 75.

59 S. Luce, Jeanne d’Arc à Domrémy, pp. 169–170.
These garrisons were not exclusively composed of English, although English names such as Richard Palmer, Richard Scale, and William Porter are mentioned in the complaints. On the contrary, one of the lieutenants of Digon Amore, known as ‘Le Petit Picard’, was most likely a native of France. The names and nicknames of several other men – Guillemin ‘Fort Espice’ d’Orne, Etienne de Laval, bastard de Valance, Guillaume Le Gay, Le Connestable, Le Flamenc – also seem to reflect their French origin. The nationality of Digon Amore himself may provide ground for discussion. Historians tend to describe him as an Englishman, however, his English origin is not emphasized in the contemporary documents. His title of the seigneur de Blandery also contributes to these doubts. A search in the Soldier in Later Medieval England database may suggest Richard More, a man-at-arms in the retinue of Richard Beauchamp, earl of Worcester, in 1421, as one who could became later known

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60 ADCO, B 11880, fo. 9v.
61 ADCO, B 11880, fos. 18v, 26r.
62 ‘Guillaume Portier’, ADCO, B 11880, fo. 20r.
63 For his abuses in late 1425 see AN, JJ 174/104. He was presumably the same person as Colin Escirart ‘dit le petit picart’ a captain in the service of the duke of Burgundy, received with a retinue of 27 pays at the muster before Pierre de Bauffremont, governor and captain-general of Burgundy, ADCO, B 11740 (18 Feb 1433). Two years later he was again in the duke’s service in the garrison of Coublanc (dep. Haute-Marne, arr. Langres, cant. Prauthoy), ADCO, B 11740 (20 Sep 1435).
64 ADCO, B 11880, fos. 1v, 2r, 6v, 7r, 23v. For the full name of this personage, for whom most often only the nom de guerre is mentioned see S. Luce, Jeanne d’Arc à Domrémy, pp. 145 and also 116. The same nom de guerre was taken by Jean de Pailly, one of the écorcheur captains, in the 1430s.
65 ADCO, B 11880, fos. 2r, 15r, 15v. One Guillaume, bastard de Valance, was serving the Armagnacs in Dauphiné by 1430, F. Barbey, Louis de Chalon, p. 151.
66 Inventaire sommaire ... de Langres, pp. 63, 64, 102; S. Luce, Jeanne d’Arc à Domrémy, p. 317 (annotation to the document referred to in the next footnote).
67 ‘feu digon amoure pour le temps qu’il estoit capitaine de negent et montigny le Roy’, AN, JJ 174/104; ‘Dicon Amors, escuier, seigneur de Blandery, capitaine de Montigny le Roy pour monseigneur le roy’, S. Luce, Jeanne d’Arc à Domrémy, pp. 317–318; ‘feu hemon heron Jadix chevalier Digon la More, et autres dela nacion de notre Royaume d’angleterre’, BNF, NAF 7627, fo. 18v. In the latter case it may be doubted whether he or only the soldiers under his command were considered Englishmen.
68 S. Luce, Jeanne d’Arc à Domrémy, pp. 317–318.
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as Digon Amore. It is noteworthy that the earl of Worcester led an English force to the eastern Champagne in June–July 1421. While this is hardly enough for a sure identification, other references seem less relevant. The military experience of Digon Amore included the participation in the battle of Cravant in 1423 and the siege of Arzillières in early 1426.

The extensive evidence of the abuses committed by the garrisons of Nogent and Montigny leads to the question whether they were, if only formally, a part of the Lancastrian military or simply a pack of adventurers. The complaints of the duke of Lorraine in 1423 resulted in a commission by the Regent to the earl of Salisbury (probably, already in his capacity of the governor of Champagne) to order Digon Amore to respect the subjects and the borders of Lorraine. The suggestion of A. Bossuat, accepted by M. W. Warner, that it was the earl of Salisbury who stood behind the ravages made in November 1425, seems anachronistic as there is hardly any evidence that the earl, then mostly engaged at the conquest of Maine, had any control over these garrisons. It is only in October 1426 that Salisbury is styled the captain of both places with a modest retinue of 6 men–at–arms and 32 archers (divided equally between the

69 TNA, E 101/50/1 [SLME].
70 S. Luce, Jeanne d’Arc à Domrémy, pp. 314–316.
71 It is difficult to identify Digon Amore with Richard de la More who had served in Ireland in 1374–1376 (TNA, E 101/33/34, 35, 38 [SLME]) almost 50 years earlier. A possible candidate could be Richard Moris (or Morris), a man–at–arms in the garrisons of Pont–Meulan and Poissy under Sir Robert Harling in 1422–1423 (AN, K 62/7/2 [SLME]; BNF, MS. Fr. 25766 no. 816 [SLME]). Several more personages called Richard More, Morys, de la More, Armorer etc. can be found in the expeditions of 1415–1420 but only as archers.
72 For the battle of Cravant see Basset, fo. 48v; Letters and Papers, II, pt. 2, p. 385. For the siege of Arzillières see, BNF, MS. Fr. 32510, fo. 367v.
73 S. Luce, Jeanne d’Arc à Domrémy, pp. 317–318.
74 According to A. Bossuat, the earl was moved by his conflict with the duke of Burgundy over certain lands in Nivernais, A. Bossuat, Perrinet Gressart, pp. 76–77. M. Warner, based on the evidence given by A. Bossuat, suggests that the raid in the county of Burgundy in late 1425 and the presence of the English garrisons were to serve as a warning aimed to prevent the duke from further rapprochement with the Dauphinists, M. Warner, ‘The Anglo–French Dual Monarchy’, p. 119.
two garrisons.\textsuperscript{25} This must have been due to the death of Digon Amore in the preceding month and the re-appointment of Salisbury to the governorship of Champagne and Brie in response to the recovery of Vertus and Mont Aimé by the Armagnacs. The appointment of the redoubtable English earl must have also served to emphasize the royal authority behind these garrisons.\textsuperscript{26}

On 3 June 1427 the earl of Salisbury, probably with an intention of returning to England, appointed Sir Thomas Gargrave his procur\emph{e}ur for the garrisons.\textsuperscript{27} In October 1427 when the term of Salisbury’s captaincy expired and while the earl was still in England, Sir Thomas Gargrave and Thomas Grett were formally appointed captains of Montigny and Nogent respectively, to remain in office until otherwise decided by the Regent.\textsuperscript{28} Both new captains had already held their positions in April 1427 (presumably, under the command of Salisbury)\textsuperscript{29} and were not unknown to the earl. Thomas Grett (occasionally spelt as Giét in the French sources) may have begun his service as an archer in the earl’s retinue back in 1417.\textsuperscript{30} He then served as the captain of Courville in Champagne and it was in this capacity that he appeared at the first siege of Mont Aimé.\textsuperscript{31} In August 1426 he is found in the company of Sir Lancelot de

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\textsuperscript{25} BNF, Ms. Fr. 32510, fo. 369r. G. Dupont–Ferrier referring to this manuscript erroneously gives 60 as the number of men–at–arms, \textit{Gallia Regia}, II, pp. 172–173. Salisbury was appointed captain for 1 year to be dated from Michaelmas 1426 by the royal letters issued in Paris on 7 October 1426, BNF, Ms. Fr. 4484, fo. 147r. The actual number of the soldiers may have been slightly higher, up to 9 men–at–arms and 39 archers, but those exceeding the indented number were not paid by the treasury, BNF, Ms. Fr. 4484, fos. 148v–149r.

\textsuperscript{26} S. Luce, \textit{Jeanne d’Arc à Domrémy}, p. CLI.

\textsuperscript{27} BNF, Ms. Fr. 4484, fos. 149r–149v.

\textsuperscript{28} BNF, Ms. Fr. 4484, fos. 150v–151v. The account lacks payments to the garrisons in July–September 1427.

\textsuperscript{29} BNF, Ms. Fr. 4484, fos. 43r–43v.

\textsuperscript{30} TNA, E 101/51/2 m. 9 [SLME].

\textsuperscript{31} Courville (dep. Marne, arr. Reims, cant. Fismes). L. P. Anquetil reports his attempt to extend his captaincy to the nearby town of Fismes by taking several of its citizens prisoners and threatening to execute them unless he is given control of the town’s defences, [L. P.] Anquetil, \textit{Histoire ... de Reims}, II, pp. 364–367.
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Lisle, one of the captains serving under the earl of Salisbury. Sir Thomas Gar-
grave was an experienced soldier with a career dating back to the expedition
of 1415. He was a lieutenant to the earl of Warwick, captain of Rouen, in the
early 1420s and served under Salisbury at the sieges of La Ferté–Bernard in
March 1426 and Mont Aimé since October 1426. As the records illustrate,
Grett was remaining with the garrison while Gargrave was not present in-
person. However, in January 1428 the command of Nogent and Montigny was
given to another captain from the earl of Salisbury’s entourage, Sir Lancelot de
Lisle, who remained in office at least until September 1428 and was later killed
before Orléans in January 1429.

It may be noteworthy that the stream of complaints, extensive during the
captaincy of Digon Amore, seems to diminish after the command passed to the
earl of Salisbury and his entourage. This may have been also due to the reduct-
on of the garrison’s efectives from several hundred men under Digon Amore
to several dozen under Salisbury, which must have made the garrisons less
dangerous for the surrounding area. It may be also be relevant that, from the
appointment of Salisbury, the fiscal officers from Langres are regularly found
among the commissioners receiving the musters. Thus, a certain measure of
control over the garrison seems to be given to one of the cities which had suf-

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82 AN, K 62/25/11 [SLME]. He may have been ‘le seigneur de Gres, nepveu du feu conte
de Salebris, qui estoit capptaine d’Yenville’, killed before Orléans on 3 March 1429,
Journal du siege d’Orléans, p. 54.
83 For the career of Sir Thomas Gargrave up to 1426 see TNA, E 101/45/4 m. 3 [SLME]
(for the campaign of 1415); BNF, MS. Fr. 26046 no. 5, 26047 no. 147; MS. Fr. 25766
no. 713 (for his lieutenancy of Rouen); Basset, fo. 53v (for the battle of Verneuil); BL,
Add. Ch. 94 [SLME] (for the siege of La Ferté–Bernard); BNF, MS. Fr. 32510, fo. 369v
(for the siege of Mont Aimé).
84 BNF, MS. Fr. 4484, fo. 152r.
85 BNF, MS. Fr. 4484, fos. 152v–154r. For the report of his death see Journal du siège
d’Orléans, pp. 31–32.
86 The assertion by S. Luce that the situation with the abuses of the English did not
change in 1426 under Gargrave and Grett, who presumably continued putting to ran-
som the subjects of the king of France and the duke of Bar, is illustrated with the evi-
dence of January 1426, the period ofcaptaincy of Digon Amore, and therefore needs
further support, S. Luce, Jeanne d’Arc à Domrémy, pp. CLII, 169–170.
87 BNF, MS. Fr. 4484, fos. 148v, 150r, 151v, 153v.
fered from the abuses of Digon Amore. However, it appears that the lands of the duke of Bar, who had only briefly accepted the Lancastrian regime in 1429, remained a target for the forces at Nogent and Montigny.\footnote{See S. Luce, \textit{Jeanne d’Arc à Domrémy}, p. 249 and n. 1.}

The establishment of the English garrisons in Nogent and Montigny close to the northern borders of the two Burgundies resulted in a specific form of Anglo-Burgundian cooperation. Divided by a distance of some 200 km from the nearest major English-held garrisons such as those at Montereau and Meaux they had to survive within a Burgundian-dominated environment. They must have relied on their own local network of contacts rather than the distant Lancastrian government in Paris in making their way through the political and military perturbations of the early 1430s. This is why contingents from these garrisons would be often found taking part in enterprises organised by Burgundian captains in the region.

3.4 The campaign in Argonne, 1427–1428

The recovery of Mont Aimé by the Armagnacs in late 1426 earned them a respite of about a year. The Lancastrians had to abandon their plans of further advance to the east of Champagne and concentrate its efforts on the recovery of the castle. However once it was reduced to obedience the actions against the last Armagnac strongholds in the Argonne became a matter of consideration.

By this time the most important local nobles had accepted the Lancastrian regime. The duke of Lorraine swore obedience in 1422 with the mediation of the duke of Burgundy.\footnote{Plancher, IV, p. XX.}\footnote{Robert de Saarbruck, damoiseau de Commercy first in January 1424 concluded peace and alliance with the dukes of Lorraine, Bar and Burgundy,\footnote{S. Luce, \textit{Jeanne d’Arc à Domrémy}, p. LXXVII.} and then on 25 October 1425 swore obedience to the Lancastrian regime.\footnote{S. Luce, \textit{Jeanne d’Arc à Domrémy}, pp. 164–166.}. The position of the duchy of Bar, where the powers were divided between Louis de Bar, cardinal bishop of Verdun, and his heir and ward René of Anjou, brother-in-law of Dauphin Charles, remained more difficult. However, it
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does not appear that the Barrois were keen to resist the Lancastrian regime.
Thus the Armagnacs in Vaucouleurs, Beaumont-en-Argonne and Mouzon and
several places in the environs were left to themselves against the Lancastrians.

On 22 August 1427 Antoine de Vergy was appointed governor and cap-
tain-general of Champagne and Brie and the city and bishopric of Langres in
order to bring into obedience the Armagnac-held places of Mouzon, Beau-
mont, Passavant and Vaucouleurs.92 On the same day Guillaume, seigneur de
Châtillon, and Colard de Mailly, bailli of Vermandois, were commissioned to
present the need for the submission of these places to the inhabitants of Noy-
on, Saint-Quentin, Soissons, Laon, Reims, Chalons and Rethelois.93 On 3 Feb-
uary a commission for the governance of Champagne, composed of French
adherents of the Lancastrian regime, was appointed.94

On 20 January 1428 Jean de Luxembourg was appointed king’s lieutenant
for war in Champagne, Vermandois, Picardy, Thierrache and Rethelois with a
retinue of 600 men-at-arms and 1000 gens de trait. The Lancastrian force as-
sembled at Attigny-sur-Aisne near Soissons and by 17 April invested Beau-
mont-en-Argonne.95 It surrendered by the end of May, and the Armagnacs
were allowed to go to Laneuville-sur-Meuse.96 On 7 June 1428 Raucourt sur-
rendered.97 Lancastrian garrisons were placed at Beaumont-en-Argonne and
the castle of Villers near Mouzon.98 Mouzon itself concluded with Jean de Lux-

92 S. Luce, Jeanne d’Arc à Domrémy, pp. CLVII, 195–197.
94 This consisted of Pierre Cauchon, president, Jean de Luxembourg, Antoine de Vergy,
Guillaume, seigneur de Châtillon, Colard de Mailly and Jean Milet, T. Boutiot, Histoire
de la ville de Troyes, II, p. 476.
95 Cordeliers, fo. 480r. The musters of the army were held at Attigny (Ardennes, arr.
Vouziers, ch.–l. of cant.) on 8–12 April 1428 see BNF, MS. Fr. 4484 fos. 75r–100r.
96 Laneuville-sur-Meuse (Meuse, arr. Verdun, cant. Stenay). For the siege of Beaumont
see P. Champion, Guillaume de Flavy, pp. 18–20, giving 28 May 1428 as the likely date
97 Raucourt–et–Flaba (dep. Ardennes, arr. Sedan, ch.–l. of cant.), P. Champion, Guil-
laume de Flavy, p. 21.
Jean de Luxembourg appointed Waleran de Bouronville for the defence of Beaumont
and Villers with 100 men–at–arms and 100 archers. By July 1428, Jean de Luxembourg
embour a truce until 1 October 1428 promising to surrender if not relieved by the Dauphinists. These Lancastrian successes must have induced the duke of Bar to reconsider the balance of power in the region and make a truce with Jean de Luxembourg in late May or early June. The Barrois even besieged Passavant which surrendered on 6 October 1428. Then, in July–August 1428, they expelled the Armagnacs from Laneuvville-sur-Meuse and demolished the castle.

While the operations against Beaumont and Mouzon were successfully pursued, on 22 June 1428 Antoine de Vergy was commissioned to besiege Vaucouleurs, one of the last Armagnac strongholds in the region. He was ordered to assemble an army of 1000 paies, but actually by mid-July he assembled some 400 men-at-arms and 400 archers (a total of about 600 paies). They were to be supplemented by the contingents of Jean, count of Fribourg, and Pierre 'Patrouillart' de Trie, seigneur of Mouchy-le-Châtel and captain of Beauvais, but it appears that the siege was brought to an end before they joined the besiegers. By 22 July a treaty of surrender was presumably made between the Burgundians and Robert de Baudricourt, captain of Vaucouleurs. The document is not known to survive, hence the conditions are obscure. What can be said for sure is that this put an end to the campaign.

was commissioned by the royal letters for the defence of the places, while the garrison was reduced to 40 men-at-arms and 60 gens de trait, BNF, MS. Fr. 4484 fos. 160r–161v.


100 27 March and 22 May 1429 respectively. The royal letters, offering the prolongation of the ceasefire until Trinity, issued at Paris on 5 March 1429, are cited in N. Goffart, 'Précis d’une histoire de la ville & du pays de Mouzon (Ardennes)', Revue de Champagne et Brie, ser. 2 no. 4 (1892), pp. 57–58. It appears that the place remained in Dauphinist hands.

101 The truce was concluded in late May or early June 1428, S. Luce, Jeanne d’Arc à Domrémy, p. 210 n. 1.


103 P. Champion, Guillaume de Flavy, pp. 21–22.

104 For the organisation of the campaign against Vaucouleurs and its results see S. Luce, Jeanne d’Arc à Domrémy, pp. CLXVI–CLXIX. See also Ibid. pp. 216–225, 227–228
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The campaigns in the valleys of Meuse were successful but not decisive. The status of Mouzon and Vaucouleurs remained conditional and eventually both places stayed in Dauphinist hands. Their destiny was to be solved in the valley of the Loire, where the Lancastrian regime concentrated its efforts in the siege of Orléans.

The operations of Burgundian captains in Argonne and against Vaucouleurs do not seem to be supported by the English contingents. However, they do form a part of the cooperation between the Burgundians and the Lancastrian regime. As the account of André d’Esparnon illustrates, Jean de Luxembourg and Antoine de Vergy were not acting on their own or Philip the Good’s behalf but were duly retained in the service of the Lancastrian crown of France and were receiving payment from the king’s treasurer for wars.

3.5 The Burgundians at the siege of Orléans, 1428–1429

While Jean de Luxembourg with the help of the duke of Bar was bringing Armagnac garrisons in Argonne into obedience, the main enterprise of 1428 was the expedition brought to France by the earl of Salisbury. Within a few months the redoubtable earl extended Lancastrian domination to the banks of the Loire, conquering Beaugency, Meung and Jargeau and laying siege to the city of Orléans.

Unlike previous expeditionary forces sent from England since 1423, that of 1428 was formed of a single great retinue under the earl of Salisbury. It is suggested that the campaign was orchestrated by Salisbury and the duke of Gloucester according to their interests.105 The decision to proceed with the siege of Angers, taken by Bedford and Philip the Good at the session of the Great Council in Paris in late May – early June 1428, followed the policy of late

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1420s when each duke pursued his own interests. Salisbury was able to insist that his army was employed for an advance against Orléans. This decision moved the offensive line to the east in an attempt to pierce the Loire frontier in the area where the maximum pressure could be achieved through the involvement of both allies. Ironically, given the anti-Burgundian reputation of Salisbury and Gloucester, the change of objective from Angers to Orléans would facilitate rather than prevent Anglo-Burgundian cooperation in the campaign.

It seems appropiate to discuss here the degree of animosity the earl of Salisbury presumably felt to the duke of Burgundy. Assuming that the report of his quarrel with the duke of Burgundy, due to the latter’s advances towards the countess of Salisbury at the wedding feast of Jean de la Trémoille is true, how did it affect the earl’s actions? It is possible that the duke’s misbehaviour may have affected the English lords in France such as Salisbury and Suffolk but not to a degree of plotting the duke’s murder, as Guillaume Benoit, Breton-inspired secretary of the earl of Suffolk, tried to present it in his forgeries. The quarrel did not make the earl resign the governorship of Champagne; he was no longer in this position by the time of the ill-fated feast. Salisbury did not join the duke of Gloucester in the Low Countries, as he had presumably promised to do. The ravages of Lancastrian garrisons over the


107 Fenin, p. 225.

108 Ironically, the future husband of Alice Chaucer, countess of Salisbury, after the death of the earl before Orléans in 1428.

109 There is no doubt among historians that these documents were forged in an attempt to alienate Philip the Good from the English alliance. The point raised by M. W. Warner is that if these forgeries were to be trusted by the contemporaries, a certain level of anti-Burgundian feelings must have existed among the leading English commanders, M. Warner, ‘The Anglo-French Dual Monarchy’, pp. 123–126. The rumours of Philip the Good’s intention to assassinate Salisbury are also reported to circulate about 1425, M. Warner, ‘Chivalry in Action’, p. 148.

110 See above Ch. 3.2.

111 E. C. Williams, My Lord of Bedford, p. 122. C. A. J. Armstrong and M. Warner suggest that Salisbury returned to England in mid 1426 in order to help the duke of Gloucester organise a new army to be send in Hainault, C. A. J. Armstrong ‘La Double Monarchie’,
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borders of Burgundy cannot be identified with the periods when the earl was in charge of their actions.\textsuperscript{112} Thus, though Salisbury may have had certain disputes with the Philip the Good,\textsuperscript{113} it appears that personal antagonism between the earl and the duke should not be overestimated and extended to all the Burgundians.

The Burgundians joined the offensive even before siege was laid to Orléans. The castle of Sully-sur-Loire, belonging to George de La Trémoille, was brought to surrender by Guillaume Rochefort, who installed an Anglo-Burgundian garrison there.\textsuperscript{114} The government of the castle was then taken by Jean de La Trémoille, seigneur de Jonvelle.\textsuperscript{115} While the de La Trémoille family definitely sought to maintain its property, the military importance of the castle changing hands should not be disregarded. Another Anglo-Burgundian garrison was reportedly installed in Marchenoir.\textsuperscript{116} Guillaume de Rochefort followed

\textsuperscript{p. 361; M. Warner, ‘The Anglo-French Dual Monarchy’, p. 129. In fact, Salisbury did not return to England until summer 1427. See above, Ch. 3.2.}

\textsuperscript{112} See above Ch. 3.3.

\textsuperscript{113} He was pursuing the case against the duke of Burgundy in the Parlement of Paris in an attempt to obtain the implementation of a royal grant of certain territories in Nivernais, prevented by Philip the Good as the stepfather and guardian of Nevers brothers. See English Suits, pp. 127–131; A. Bossuat, Perrinet Gressart, p. 31. It is not clear why in September 1428 this case was extended in an attempt to challenge the tutelage by Philip the Good of the Nevers brothers, C. A. J. Armstrong, ‘La Double Monarchie’, p. 361; M. Warner ‘The Anglo-French Dual Monarchy’, p. 120.

\textsuperscript{114} Sully-sur-Loire (dep. Loiret, arr. Orléans, ch.–l. of cant.)

\textsuperscript{115} He was the brother of George de La Trémoille, seigneur de Sully, an influential partisan of Charles VII, Pucelle, p. 259.

\textsuperscript{116} Marchenoir (dep. Loir-et-Cher, arr. Blois, ch.–l. of cant.). About 9 February 1429 an Anglo-Burgundian party attacked several Dauphinists on their way from Orléans to Blois and took prisoner the Bourc de Bar, a bastard son of Guy ‘Le Veau’ de Bar, who was taken to Marchenoir, Journal du siège d’Orléans, pp. 35–36. After the English failures of summer 1429 the Lancastrians (described as the English and the Burgundians) at Marchenoir first promised to become obedient to the Valois cause but soon recalled their promise and continued fighting the Dauphinists, Pucelle, pp. 309–310; Journal du siège d’Orléans, pp. 106–107. According to the latter source, the composition was obtained by Arthur de Richemont and when he had to leave the Dauphinist army, they returned to the war.
the earl of Salisbury before Orléans. A company of his men amounting to 10 men–at–arms (himself not included) and 30 gens de trait was received in the royal service as a part of 200 men–at–arms and 600 archers, financed by the Lancastrian government of France, to support the earl of Salisbury. It is not clear, however, how the rest of the Burgundians at the siege of Orléans were paid. The historians seem to accept that they were retained in the royal service and thus presumably received their wages from the treasurer for wars. The documentary evidence is lacking while narrative sources give no detail.

On 12 November 1428 the council of Burgundy summoned the duke’s vassals to assemble in arms at Montbard on 28 November in order to proceed before Orléans. A lengthy list of captains in this levy included such figures as

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117 Pucelle, p. 260. He is also mentioned among the faux François who remained at the siege after the death of the earl of Salisbury: ‘entre lesquelles fut Messire Guillaume de Rochefort, Hue de Prez, Eustace Gaudin, Geoffroy de Lamé, Jean de Chainviller, Jean le Baveux, Guillaume Languedoc, Jean de Mazis, Guillaume de Broillac’, Pucelle, p. 265. Some of the personages listed like Hue de Prez, baili of Chartres, or Jean Le Baveux, captain of Monthéry, were Lancastrian officers and the payments for their contingents appear in the account of Pierre Surreau (BNF, MS Fr. 4488 ), see L. Jarry, ‘Le Compte de L’Armée Anglaise’, pp. 573–574 (Jean de Baveux), 580–582 (Hue de Prez). Eustace Gaudin, not mentioned in the account, was a knight from Chartrain, who joined the Lancastrian regime in 1426 after having served under Boucicault and Jacques de Bourbon, count of La Marche. Although he had fought against the Armagnacs in 1411–1412 he was then serving within royal forces and does not seem to be a devoted Burgundian. For his career see B. Schnerb, ‘Fortune et infortunes de messire Tassin Gaudin’, in Guerre, pouvoir et noblesse au Moyen Age. Mélanges en l’honneur de Philippe Contamine, ed. by J. Paviot and J. Verger (Paris, 2000), pp. 629–639.
118 BNF, MS. Fr. 4484 fos. 128v–129v.
119 M. Boucher de Molandon, baron A. de Beaucorps, ‘L’armée anglaise vaincue par Jeanne d’Arc sous les murs d’Orléans. Documents inédits’, Mémoires de la société archéologique et historique de l’Orléannais, 23 (1892), pp. 805–806; A. E. Burne, Agincourt war, p. 229. The sole surviving account of André d’Esparnon, treasurer for wars, only runs to the end of September 1429, thus, not including the siege of Orléans. It contains no mention of any Burgundians engaged at the early stage of the campaign. However, it is not impossible that a particular account could be made for this purpose. U. Plancher, however, suggests that certain sums from the Burgundian receivers were also employed for the payment to the soldiers, Plancher, IV, pp. 126–127.
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Guillaume de Vienne, Antoine and Jean de Vergy, Thibault and Jean de Neuchâtel. However, on the day appointed for the assembly the soldiers were dismissed. This must have been due to the temporary abandonment of the siege of Orléans on 8 November, following the death of the earl of Salisbury and not to the general withdrawal of the Burgundians from the siege.

This withdrawal was achieved through the efforts of the embassy from Orléans which in March 1429 approached Philip the Good suggesting that the city could be delivered to him and not to the English. According to the conditions offered, the duke would appoint his officers in the city and receive half of its taxes, the rest going for the ransom of the duke of Orléans. The English would receive free passage through Orléannais and 10 000 écus d’or annually for their wars. It is possible that the suggestion presumed a journée to be held as in March 1429 Philip the Good ordered Antoine de Toulouse, marshal of Burgundy, to bring him 200 men for the anticipated battle before Orléans.

In early April Philip the Good came to Paris to discuss this offer with the Regent and the ambassadors of Orléans. Bedford on advice of his French councillors, such as Raoul le Sage and Philippe de Morvilliers, firmly rejected the proposal. The duke of Burgundy, outraged with the failure, ordered his sub-

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120 For the full list of the captains expected to take part in the siege, amounting to some 50 names, see J.-L. Bazin, ‘La Bourgogne de la mort du duc Philippe le Hardi’, pp. 193–195.
121 The siege was resumed on Bedford’s orders on 1 December 1429. For the abandonment and renewal of the siege see Journal du siège d’Orléans, pp. 13–15.
125 ‘pour aller a la Bataille qui se devoir tenir devant la ville dorleans’, ADCO, B 1643, fo. 83r. The order was cancelled afterwards.
126 C. A. J. Armstrong, ‘La Double Monarchie’, p. 352. M. K. Jones suggests that Bedford’s interest towards putting an end to the siege was caused by excessive expenses
jects to abandon the siege and left Paris on 21 April 1429,\textsuperscript{127} by which date his herald bearing the duke’s order had already reached Orléans.\textsuperscript{128} By the end of April the letters were published throughout the two Burgundies prohibiting the duke’s subjects from military service outside the lands of Burgundy without permission from the duke or his marshal.\textsuperscript{129}

The total size of the Burgundian contingent present at the siege also remains unclear. Some scholars considered it insignificant.\textsuperscript{130} C. Dezama spoke of 500 men.\textsuperscript{131} Others believed that the Burgundians amounted to 1,500 men.\textsuperscript{132} Thus on a single day the besieging army lost about one tenth to one third of its effectives. Within a fortnight, on 30 May the Dauphinist relief force led by Joan of Arc entered the town and by 8 May the siege had to be abandoned.

K. deVries brought attention to the specifics of the Dauphinist operations in May–June 1429: two periods of very intensive warfare in raising the siege on 31 April – 8 May and then in winning the Loire valley from the English on 12–18 June, were divided by almost a month of passivity. He has shown that in the second case this was due to necessity of overrunning the divided English forces on the Loire before the reinforcements could be brought from Paris by Sir

and losses related to the siege, M. K. Jones, ‘”Gardez mon corps, sauvez ma terre”’, p. 25.
\textsuperscript{127} Itinéraires, p 76.
\textsuperscript{128} According to the Journal of the Siege of Orléans, the embassy returned to the city on 17 April, Journal du sie"e d’Orléans, pp. 69–70. See also C. Desama, ‘Jeanne d’Arc et la diplomatie de Charles VII’, p. 291.
\textsuperscript{129} ADCO, B 1643, fo. 109r. The account item, containing the payment to a notary from Dijon for having copied the letters, is undated but appears in a chronologically organised series of payments to the same person between those for 28 April and 3 July 1429.
\textsuperscript{132} M. Boucher de Molandon, baron A. de Beaucorps, ‘L’armée anglaise’, p. 806; See also A. H. Burne, Agincourt War, p.229; E. C. Williams, My Lord of Bedford, p. 167; G. L. Harriss, Cardinal Beaufort, p. 181.
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John Fastolf.\textsuperscript{133} However the rumours of the latter’s possible arrival at the siege were known to the Dauphinists in Orléans in early May and must have made them increase the pressure against the besiegers.\textsuperscript{134} If the idea to send reinforcements under Sir John Fastolf to the siege was actually considered by the English command it must have been a reaction to the departure of the Burgundians as well as the extension of service of the Norman levies made to stay at the siege for the additional six days till 29 April.\textsuperscript{135} Even if such attempts were made, Fastolf did not leave Paris until the siege was raised.

There is thus no doubt that the Anglo-Burgundian discord over the destiny of Orléans contributed greatly to the failure of the siege. It is however still open to argument whether the negotiations over the surrender of Orléans to Philip the Good were really the ultimate hope of the besieged or a determined piece of Charles VII’s policy aimed to alienate the duke of Burgundy from the Lancastrian cause while the recovery of Orléans was being planned and prepared.

However offended Philip the Good may have been, his conflict with Bedford did not result in the total withdrawal of the Burgundians from the Lancastrian service. As soon as in June 1429 the Burgundians were present in the force assembled by Sir John Fastolf in an attempt to hold the English positions in the Loire valley, which was defeated by the Dauphinists in the battle of Patay.\textsuperscript{136} On the other hand, a deterioration in relations must have become of

\textsuperscript{133} K. de Vries, \textit{Joan of Arc. A Military Leader} (Stroud, 2003), p. 94.

\textsuperscript{134} K. de Vries, \textit{Joan of Arc}, p. 74.


\textsuperscript{136} Jean de Wavrin claimed to have participated in this expedition. He expressly states, that he had been serving under the command of Sir John Fastolf, when he describes the retreat from the battlefield of Patay: ‘je le sievis comme mon capittaine, auquel le duc de Bethfort mavoit commande obeyer et mesmes servir sa personne’, although this may simply be an attempt to avoid reproaches in personal cowardice, G. H. P. Le Brusque, ‘From Agincourt (1415) to Fornovo (1495): Aspects of the Writing of Warfare in French and Burgundian 15\textsuperscript{th} Century Historiographical Literature’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, King’s College London, 2001), p. 49. He also mentions Jean, bastard de Thiant (who was also said to be present at the battle of Rouvray 2 Feb 1429), and Philippe d’Aigreville, son of Guy d’Aigreville, Burgundian \textit{bailli} of Sens in 1411–1413, as serving in the same army, \textit{Wavrin}, III, pp. 283–284, 304.
importance, as after Patay Bedford’s government would have to seek desperately for help while facing the Dauphinist armies inspired by Joan of Arc and her victories.

3.6 Specifics of cooperation in 1425–1429

The decline in the relations between Philip the Good and the Lancastrian regime in France and even the duke’s open conflict with the duke of Gloucester were not able to ruin Anglo-Burgundian cooperation completely. What the duke of Burgundy sought by making the truce of Chambéry was to exempt himself and his dominions from the war. However, the treaty did not prevent his partisans and subjects from entering the Lancastrian service.

Collisions between the obligations towards the duke and the king are well illustrated by the case of La Charité-sur-Loire. This place located in Nivernais, but dependant on the crown of France rather than the county of Nevers, was captured in last days of 1423 by Perrinet Gressart. This was an adventurer who had begun his career in the service of the duke of Burgundy and became the duke’s pannetier. He was reluctant to accept the truce and when ordered by Philip the Good to deliver La Charité to Arthur de Richemont, he refused to do so, claiming in both cases that he was the captain of the place for the king and that the duke of Burgundy had no power over the place depending directly of the crown.\textsuperscript{137} The career of Gressart would lead to the suggestion that he was motivated not by the loyalty to the Lancastrian regime but rather by self-interest in continuing incursions into Berry and retaining the base for his operations. However, his status as a royal officer and the support of the duke of Bedford proved to be valuable resources to defend his interests.

The participation of Burgundian captains in the hostilities led the Dauphin to accuse the duke of Burgundy of breaking the truce. On 22 May 1428 Philip the Good excused himself by claiming that captains like Jean de Luxembourg, Antoine de Vergy and their men were acting not on his or his councillors’ orders but on those of the Lancastrian king of France and his Regent.\textsuperscript{138}

\textsuperscript{137} A. Bossuat, Perrinet Gressart, pp. 52–59, 69–74.
\textsuperscript{138} S. Luce, Jeanne d’Arc à Domrémy, pp. CLIX, 211–212; Plancher, IV, pp. LXXVI–LXXVII.
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pears that the duke’s excuses were respected by the Dauphin since a month later he ratified the prorogation of the truce with the duke until 1 November 1428. *Philip the Good was able to benefit from the very same collision which had caused many troubles to him in the case of Perrinet Gressart in Nivernais.*

Even if the duke abstained from hostilities the Lancastrian regime could provide enough opportunities for interested Burgundians. This included not only particular campaigns against the Armagnacs but long–term offices in local and central administration. People like Guillaume de Châtillon, captain of Reims, Colard de Mailly, *bailli* of Vermandois, Henry de La Tour, *bailli* of Vitry, played an important part in extending the Lancastrian domination eastwards in Champagne. Thus the period of 1425–1429 demonstrates the range of career opportunities provided for Burgundian partisans by the Lancastrian regime. This to a certain degree could balance the effect of the duke’s passivity and possibly increase relations on a personal level.

What could hardly be expected to support such relations were the hostilities in the Low Countries. Both sides in this conflict engaged a number of those who had been previously fighting together. Thus, John Mowbray, earl marshal, who was the chief lieutenant of Gloucester in his expedition of Hainault, had participated in the siege of Melun in 1420 and led a part of the English expeditionary force to the help of Jean de Luxembourg in Laonnois in 1423. *This time Jean de Luxembourg was fighting against him, becoming the chief lieutenant for Philip the Good during the conflict in Hainault.* Philiph the Good’s expedition in Holland attracted a great number of Burgundian nobles, among them the seigneur de L’Isle-Adam who, since his release in late 1422, was generally found in the service of the Lancastrian regime rather than the duke of Burgundy. *However this outbreak of hostilities does not seem to have alien–*

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*139 S. Luce, Jeanne d’Arc à Domrémy, p. 215.*

*140 K. H. Vickers, Humphrey, Duke of Gloucester, pp. 140–141. For his participation in the siege of Melun see Basset, fo. 40v. Concerning his service in Laonnois see above Ch. 2.9.*

*141 Wavrin, III, p. 136.*

*142 For his participation in the wars in Holland see B. Schernb, ‘La préparation des opérations militaires au début du XVe siècle: l’exemple d’un document prévisionnel bourguignon’, in Guerre et Société en France, en Angleterre et en Bourgogne, XIVe-XVe*
ated those Burgundian partisans from the duke of Bedford and his regime. Jean de Luxembourg had already been retained in 1428 for the campaign in Ar- gonne. It may be suggested that for the persons involved the consequences of the conflict with the English in 1425–1426 did not exceed those of 1415–1419.

A certain influence on the Anglo-Burgundian relations on a personal level may have been also caused by the English losses before Orléans. Not only the earl of Salisbury was slain but also a number of captains including William Glasdale, Sir Lancelot de Lisle, possibly Thomas Grett (but not Sir Thomas Gar- grave\textsuperscript{143}), all with experience of service under the earl.\textsuperscript{144} This service often led them to participate in joint operations with the Burgundians in Mâconnais (in case of Glasdale) and in Champagne (in other cases). It is difficult to estimate the effect of these casualties, but the loss of the Salisbury’s disciples could have affected not only purely military matters but also the communications among with the Burgundians especially in the local administration of Lancastrian France.

However difficult the Anglo-Burgundian relations may have been after 1425 there is no doubt that the Lancastrian regime in France had always acted from a position of strength. This superiority was first seriously put in doubt after the failures before Orléans and in the Loire campaign in May–June 1429. These defeats opened a new stage in Anglo-Burgundian relations.


\textsuperscript{143} He is reported to have been mortally wounded by the same canonball as the earl of Salisbury, \textit{Basset}, fo. 63v. This story taken by Hall (\textit{Hall}, p. 145) earned Gargrave a bit role in Shakespeare’s \textit{Henry VI. Part I} (Act I, Scene 4, lines 525, 531). He however was not killed at this occasion as the payments to him and his retinue were continued in December 1428, see A. Jarry ‘Le compte de l’armée Anglaise’, p. 559.

Chapter 4: Resisting the crisis (June 1429 – December 1431)

4.1 The coronation campaign of Charles VII, July–September 1429

4.1.1 The vacuum of Lancastrian power (17 June – 25 July 1429)

The failure of the siege of Orléans was a significant setback but no catastrophe for the Lancastrians. As A. J. Pollard noted ‘The real turning-point came with the destruction of their army a month later’. After Patay the Lancastrian regime had to seek desperately for reinforcements, while Charles VII won a temporary freedom of action.

On receiving news of Patay, Bedford, after deliberations with the Parisians, sent an embassy to the duke of Burgundy urging him to arrive in Paris for consultations on the situation. The delegation consisted of the bishop of Noyon, two representatives of the University and several leading citizens of Paris. The Regent tried to exploit the traditional alliance of Burgundian dukes with the capital to win back Philip the Good’s sympathies. For his personal part, the will made by Bedford at Corbeil on 14 June 1429 may have also aimed to recover his relations with the duke of Burgundy.

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3 According to this will, Anne of Burgundy, duchess of Bedford, became heiress to all Bedford’s movables and immovables in France. As the Regent was childless, Philip the Good was the heir presumptive to his sister. This made it possible for him to succeed one day to the duchy of Anjou and county of Maine, granted in 1424 to Bedford and his legitimate (but not necessarily male) heirs, J. Stratford, *The Bedford Inventories*, pp. 9, 15. The first editor of the testament, B.-A. Pocquet du Haut-Jussé, brings attention to the fact that the will was held by the duke of Burgundy (although Bedford may have had a copy) and it is in the Archives Départementales de Côte d’Or that the document is found (ADCO, B 309), B.-A. Pocquet du Haut-Jussé, ‘Anne de Bourgogne’, p. 287.
Resisting the crisis

The Parisian embassy was successful; on 10 July Philip the Good arrived in the capital. Bedford employed all means to consolidate the alliance with his brother-in-law. He organized a pageant presenting the events of 1419 in Montereau in order to remind both the duke and the citizens of Paris of the ‘rock on which the Anglo-Burgundian alliance rested’. The agreement with the duke of Burgundy cost the duke of Bedford 40,000 francs, promised to Philip the Good for the payment of his troops to be employed at the defence of Paris. Philip the Good used the situation to improve his control over the capital. On 12 July the new prévôt des marchands and the échevins were appointed. On 16 July Jean Villiers, seigneur de l’Isle-Adam, was made captain of Paris and of the Bastille Saint-Antoine, receiving the military control of the capital. About the same time Jean, bastard of Saint-Pol was given the captaincy of


5 P. Bonenfant, Philippe le Bon, p. 49; E. C. Williams, My Lord of Bedford, p. 175.

6 Letters and Papers, II, pt. 1, pp. 101–111. Half of the sum was paid by the end of month, for the remainder the jewels were provided as a pledge. The first payment was made to Jean Abonnel, receiver general of the duke of Burgundy, on 27 July, ADN, B 1942 (compte d’armes), fo. 5r.

7 G. L. Thompson, Paris, p. 105. Unfortunately, no reference is given for this date. According to the Bourgeois, the new officers took their responsibilities during the first week of July before Philip the Good came to Paris, Bourgeois, pp. 239–240. The new prévôt des marchands, Guillaume Sanguin had been the maître de l’hôtel of the dukes of Burgundy, at least three of four among the new échevins had Bourguignian connections going back to 1410s. See the editorial footnotes by A. Tuetey in Bourgeois, pp. 239–240.

8 Bedford was the captain of Paris in 1423 and no evidence that he gave up this command is available. The captaincy of the Bastille Saint-Antoine was held by Sir Ralph Boteler since at least 1428, G. L. Thompson, Paris, pp. 86–89. The Bourgeois also confirms that the seigneur de l’Isle-Adam was appointed during the duke’s visit to Paris in July, Bourgeois, p. 241. On the other hand, both Wavrin and Monstrelet pretend that he was only appointed during the duke’s visit in September, Wavrin, III, p. 345; Monstrelet, IV, p. 362.
Meaux. Philip the Good remained in Paris for several days before returning to Picardy with his sister Anne, duchess of Bedford.

In another attempt to restore the Lancastrian military fortunes, the army assembled in England by Cardinal Henry Beaufort, bishop of Winchester, for a crusade against the Hussites was diverted to serve in France for half a year at Bedford's request. It was also probably at his demand that on 3 August the Council in England demanded that all English holders of Norman fiefs returned within a month to France in person or by deputy in order to fulfil their feudal obligations. The Regent was desperately trying to restore the military power of Lancastrian France.

Instead of attacking Paris, Charles VII choose to have himself duly crowned and anointed as a king of France in Reims, then in Lancastrian hands. The journey begun from Gien on 29 June, was a deep intrusion into the Lancastrian territory passing through Auxerre, Troyes, Chalons-sur-Marne and

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9 Wavrin, III, p. 310–311; Monstrelet, IV, p. 334. The importance of this command is well illustrated by the lengthy sieges of this city in 1421–1422 and 1439 as well as by the size of the garrison, which amounted to 100 men-at-arms and 300 archers, TNA, E 101/52/35/2. However, by November 1430 the garrison of the same size was under the command of Richard Beauchamp, earl of Warwick, who must have replaced the bastard of St. Pol as the captain of Meaux, POPC, IV, p. 132.

10 For the role, possibly, played by the duchess in reconciling her husband with her brother see B.-A. Pocquet du Haute-Jussé, 'Anne de Bourgogne', pp. 312–313. The duchess was accompanied as far as to Lens in Artois by a company of 20 English archers from the retinue of John, Lord Talbot. This escort was possibly led by Thomas Everyngham, squire, who was subsequently paid the archers' wages for the journey, J. Stratford, The Bedford Inventories, p. 390.

11 For the project of Anglo-Burgundian crusade see Appendix F.2. On 1 July 1429 the cardinal agreed to serve with this army in France for half-year, till 21 December. It was promised that the cost of the expedition would be repaid and the Cardinal would be able to proceed on Crusade in the next May, Foedera, X, pp. 424–426, POPC, III, pp. 339–344. See also G. L. Harriss, Cardinal Beaufort, pp. 185–186.

12 POPC, III, pp. 349–351.


14 Unlike the following cities, Auxerre only allowed the army of Charles VII to pass through and to purchase provisions but did not swear allegiance and was not placed
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finally coming to Reims, which the dauphin entered on 16 July. On the following day Charles VII was anointed as a king of France in Reims cathedral. After his coronation, he stayed with his army in the city until 21 July, receiving promises of loyalty from many towns of Champagne and Brie.

The dauphin met little resistance on their way. At Troyes the Burgundian garrison of some 600 men was ready to defend the place, but seeing the preparations for the assault, the citizens came to a composition with the besiegers and induced the garrison to accept it. At Reims Burgundian captains responsible for its defence found the inhabitants not inclined to resist the dauphin. Their passivity may have been due to military considerations as well as the freshly-born national feeling. With the English field army destroyed there was little chance of help in case of siege, which would only bring hardships and harsher conditions of surrender. The captains could only promise that the city would be relieved if it held out for six weeks; this proved unacceptable for the citizens. The Lancastrian garrison of Reims had to withdraw to Château-

under his rule. It has been suggested that this was done in order not to alienate the duke of Burgundy to whom the city belonged since 1424.

15 See T. Boutiot, Histoire de Troyes, II, pp. 493–504 for the cession of Troyes. T. Boutiot names sires de Rochefort, de Plancy and Philibert de Moulant (also styled the captain of Nogent-sur-Seine) as the commanders of the garrison. This suggests that the garrison of Troyes was Burgundian and not Anglo-Burgundian as often described, see, for example, Journal du siège d’Orléans, p. 109. According to the conditions of the surrender, the garrison was allowed to leave with their belongings, Pucelle, pp. 314–319. Ordonnances, XIII, pp. 142–144.

It is worth noting that the defence of the French communes was their own responsibility rather than royal. The conditions of the acceptance of Troyes in the obedience of Charles VII prescribed that no permanent royal garrison would be placed in the city other than for the needs of its defence, Ordonnances, XIII, pp. 143. This may be the reason why on the Troyes side the composition was made by the citizens and not by the garrison commanders.

16 According to Wavrin, Philip, seigneur de Saveuse, was sent to Reims (where Guillaume, seigneur de Châtillon, was the captain throughout the 1420s) by the Regent in an attempt to keep the city in obedience to king Henry, Wavrin, III, pp. 315–316. Journal du siège d’Orléans, pp. 112–113; Pucelle, p. 320. T. Boutiot suggests that the decisions of the citizens of Châlons and Reims to surrender their cities to the dauphin were greatly influenced by the events at Troyes, T. Boutiot, Histoire de Troyes, II,
Thierry. When Charles VII approached that place a couple of weeks later they for the same reasons had to abandon it and retreat to Paris.  

On the 25 July Bedford returned to Paris with the army he managed to assemble. This included the forces recruited by Cardinal Henry Beaufort for the crusade against the Hussites, diverted instead to make war in France, and 700 Picards led by Jean Villiers, seigneur de l'Isle Adam. Bedford remained in Paris until 4 August and probably received reinforcements from the other sources such as the Burgundian forces that had retreated from Reims and Château-Thierry, estimated by Wavrin as some 400 men.

4.1.2 The confrontation at Montépilloy (15 July 1429)

It may have been on the news of the new Lancastrian army that Charles VII turned southward towards Château-Thierry and Provins, where he stayed for several days since 2 August. The Armagnacs then spent a day in battle orders in the field near Nangis demonstrating to the English, should they appear,

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pp. 502–503. Unfortunately, the journal of deliberations of the city council of Reims contains a gap from 12 July till 2 August, Reims deliberations, p. 135.

18 Wavrin, III, pp. 315–316, 319. Monstrelet, IV, p. 340. Among these captains Philip, seigneur de Saveuse, Guillaume, seigneur de Châtillon (both having fled from Reims), Jean de Croy and Jean de Brimeau are mentioned.

19 Beaufort's force may have only amounted to some 600 men, while some 800 men more were brought by Sir John Radcliffe, G. L. Harriss, Cardinal Beaufort, p. 187.

20 Bourgeois, p. 242. This source describes the total of the army which arrived at Paris to be of 4000 men strong. It is worth noting that these forces arrived in Paris on 25 July, while the money promised to the duke of Burgundy during his stay in Paris were still to be paid on 27 July, Letters and Papers, II, pt. 1, p. 106.

21 Jean de Croy and Jean de Brimeau, from the garrison of Château-Thierry definitely joined Bedford’s army by 15 July, Wavrin, III, pp. 319, 326. The same is true for Philippe, seigneur de Saveuse, who had retreated to Château-Thierry from Reims, Wavrin, III, pp. 315–316, 319; Monstrelet, IV, p. 340. He was then received to the service of the duke of Burgundy at Arras on 3 August in order to go to Paris, ADN B 1942 (compte d’armes), fos. 9r–10. This suggests that, after Château-Thierry fell to Charles VII (who was in the town on 29 July, according to Cagny, p. 160), de Saveuse first went before the duke of Burgundy at Arras and only then joined Bedford in Paris.

their readiness for the battle. Nothing suggests, however, that Charles VII really sought a pitched battle against Bedford. He probably intended to return to the kingdom of Bourges as soon as possible but the crossing at Bray-sur-Seine proved blocked by a Lancastrian force. Having discovered this, Charles VII turned northward and without meeting any resistance proceeded to Crépy-en-Valois via Coulommiers and La Ferté-Milon.

Meanwhile Bedford led his army upstream along the right bank of Seine to Montereau via Corbeil and Melun. From there on 7 July he sent a challenge to Charles VII. Issued in the place symbolic for the Anglo-Burgundian partnership and enmity to the dauphin, this challenge contained an appeal to the events of 1419; the Regent pretended to be disposed to consider peace with Charles, but not such a false and treacherous one, like that violated by the murder of Jean sans Peur. This rhetoric undoubtedly was intended to remind the Burgundian allies that the Dauphin was not the side to treat with.

23 J. H. Ramsay, I, p. 402; A. H. Burne, The Agincourt War, p. 262. The origin and the effectiveness of this force is not clear. The way from Paris to Bray-sur-Seine via Melun is about 100 km. As the Regent had left Paris with his army only on 4 August (Fauquembergue, II, p. 317) and Bray-sur-Seine was occupied on 5 August. It seems impossible that Bedford could leave there a part of his army (as suggested in E. C. Williams, My Lord of Bedford, p. 178) unless it was especially sent there in advance and its leave several days before the departure of the regent did not catch the attention of the Parisians.

It can be only a guess that an English part of this detachment may have come from Montereau where a garrison is reported to be present by Michaelmas 1428, Letters and Papers, II, pt. 2, p. 539. Another possible source could be the Anglo-Burgundian forces which had retreated from Troyes in July.

24 Cagny, p. 161. It appears that at this point Charles had outmanoeuvred Bedford for by 7 August while Bedford was still in Montereau, the Dauphinist army was already on its march northward at Coulommiers.

25 ‘Et tous jours sommes et serons enclins et volontaires à toutes bonnes voies de paix, non fainte, corrompue, dissimulée, violée ne parjurée, comme à Monstreau fault Yonne celle dont par vostre coule et consentement, s’ensuit le très horrible, détestable et cruel murde commis contre loy et honneur de chevalerie, en la personne de feu nostre très chier el très amé père, le duc Jehan de Bourgongne’, Monstrelet, IV, pp. 342–343.
The message reached Charles VII on 11 July at Crépy-en-Valois. Bedford manoeuvred trying to remain between the capital and the Dauphinists. On 13 July the Regent interrupted the Dauphinist advance to the capital via Dampmartin, meeting them between Thieux and Mitry. The two armies spent a day skirmishing but no major battle followed. Charles VII moved his army towards Senlis. The Regent withdrew his army to Louvres and then marched to Senlis. The Lancastrians took the position near the abbey of Notre-Dame-lé-Victoire to the south-west of Senlis, placing themselves between the town and the Armagnacs encamped near Montépilloy. On 15 July two armies once again found themselves facing each other in the battle orders.

Bedford’s position was well fortified. The archers were protected by wooden poles. La livre des Trahisons also suggest that the Lancastrians made use of the ruins of the village. In the rear the Anglo-Burgundians had the river Nonnette with the ford which only allowed two horsemen to cross it at once. This could prevent envelopment by the enemy but also made the retreat impossible.

26 J. H. Ramsay Lancaster and York, I, pp. 402–403 seems to present the most accurate account on the manoeuvres of both armies on 11–16 August.
28 Louvres (Île-de-France, arr. Val-d’Oise).
29 A. Burne once again ascribes the initiative in this manoeuvring to the English (A. Burne, Agincourt War, p. 262) but it seems difficult to explain why should Bedford move to Senlis instead of protecting Paris and why Charles had to follow him. It seems much more reasonable that Bedford was only trying to intercept the Dauphinist approach to Senlis.
30 Montépilloy (Oise, arr. Senlis, cant. Senlis). Perceval de Cagny and Jean le Fevre de Saint-Remy names la Victoire as a toponym describing the English location, Cagny, p. 162; St.-Remy, II, p. 147. Both Monstrelet and Wavrin mention une ville nommee le Bar, Monstrelet, IV, p. 344; Wavrin, III, p. 325. This may place the Anglo-Burgundian position near the villages of Baron and Borest standing on the Nonette.
32 Trahisons, p. 198.
33 Pucelle, p. 329.
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The Lancastrian army was reportedly deployed in a single division with the English on the left flank and ‘les Picars et autres de la nation de France’ on the right.34 The archers were deployed in front of the battle order and/or on the wings.35 Most of the Lancastrian army prepared to fight dismounted but, according to Saint–Rémy, a small force of Burgundians under the bastard of Saint–Pol and Jean de Croy fought on horseback and took part in skirmishing.36 The army was to fight under three banners: that of Saint George, that of England and that of France. The latter was entrusted to Jean Villiers de l’Isle–Adam.37 As Jean de Wavrin notes this was a homage to the Burgundian presence in the army.38

The number of the Burgundians at Montépilloy was estimated at about 600–800 men by the chroniclers, which corresponds with the reported size of the force brought to Paris by the seigneur de L’Isle–Adam on 25 July.39 However, according to the account of Jean Abonnel, several Burgundian retinues were mustered at Arras between the last days of July and 3 August for one–month

34 Thus, the Burgundians must have been treated on the same basis as the Normans, unlike the battle of Verneuil in 1424 when the Norman levy remained in the army while the Burgundians were sent away. See M. K. Jones, ‘The Battle of Verneuil’, pp. 403–405.
35 Monstrelet and Wavrin report that archers were deployed in the front, Wavrin, III, p. 326; Monstrelet, IV, p. 345. According to the Livre des Trahisons, however, they were placed on the wings, Trahisons, p. 198. This may suggest that the two statements are complementary or that these wings were slightly advanced forward giving the formation a very flat U–shape. For the reconstructions of English battle formations in fourteenth and fifteenth centuries see M. Bennett, ‘The development of Battle Tactics in the Hundred Years War’ in Arms, Armies and Fortifications, in the Hundred Years War, ed. by A. Curry and M. Hughes (Woodbridge, 1994), pp. 11, 12, 18.
36 This included the capture of the guns with which the Dauphinists tried to provoke the Lancastrians to attack, Trahisons, p. 199. Jean de Croy was wounded in the skirmishes, St.-Rémy, II, p. 148, Trahisons, p. 199. In March 1430 Philip the Good granted him 1500 l. to recover from his wound, ADN, B 1942 (compte d’armes), fo. 58v.
37 Wavrin, III, p. 325; Monstrelet, IV, p. 345. The English edition of the chronicle of Monstrelet erroneously pretends that it was the banner of St. George which was entrusted to him, Monstrelet (eng.), VI, p. 293.
38 Wavrin, III, pp. 325–326.
39 Wavrin, III, p. 326 (700–800 men); Monstrelet, IV, p. 345 (600–800 men).
service in Paris. These companies amounting to 400–500 men had enough time to join the Lancastrian army by 15 August.\textsuperscript{40} It thus seems likely that the Burgundian component of Bedford’s army at Montépilloy exceeded 1000 men.

The confrontation at Montépilloy did not break out into a major battle as the Armagnacs did not risk to assault the English positions. Eventually both commanders decided to withdraw. The Armagnacs marched to Crépy-en-Valois and then to Compiègne which had just proclaimed its loyalty to Charles VII. The Lancastrians withdrew to Paris via Senlis. According to the chronicle of Pierre Cochon, Charles VII withdrew his forces due to the lack of supplies and only then the Lancastrians could leave their position.\textsuperscript{41} Taking into account the report of a narrow ford in the Lancastrians’ rear, it seems reasonable that Bedford’s army could not leave its encampment while the enemy was in the field.

4.1.3 The Dauphinist attempt on Paris

Although Arthur de Richemont, constable of France for Charles VII, joined the Dauphinist army for the battle of Patay he remained banned from the court\textsuperscript{42} and his absence at the coronation at Reims was a sign of the king’s displeasure with him. In spite of this, the constable launched a series of attacks on the borders of Normandy, which much troubled the Lancastrians.\textsuperscript{43}

\textsuperscript{40} ADN, B 1942 (compte d’armes), fos. 8r–10r. This includes the retinues of Philippe, seigneur de Saveuse, Jean de Créquy, Simon de Lalaing and Jean de Fosseux, mentioned by the chroniclers to be at Montépilloy (See Appendix 8.8.). Two other retinues were subordinate to the seigneur de L’Isle–Adam. There is thus every reason to believe that these contingents joined Bedford by 15 August.

It is tempting to identify these forces with the remnants of the garrisons of Reims and Château–Thierry, however, the person of Philippe, seigneur de Saveuse, seems to be the only evidence in support of this version.

\textsuperscript{41} Cochon, pp. 301–302.

\textsuperscript{42} After a period of favour in 1425–1427 Arthur de Richemont was removed from the court through the intrigues of Georges de La Trémoille, the new favourite of Charles VII who remained in power until 1433.

\textsuperscript{43} E. Cosneau, while acknowledging that this campaign was almost unnoticed by the chroniclers, suggests that it was possibly undertaken in coordination with the actions of the main army of Charles VII, E. Cosneau, \textit{Le Connetable Richemont}, p. 174.
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Bernay fell on 27 July. Evreux was besieged and agreed to surrender on 27 August, if not relieved. Bedford had to choose between saving this town or continuing to block the way to Paris for the dauphin. He hastened to Evreux, sending de L'Isle–Adam back to Paris. While Evreux was relieved, Senlis fell to Charles VII followed by Saint Denis and Montjoye. The Dauphinish thus approached Paris, breaking its communications with Normandy.

Bedford did not speed back to Paris as soon as immediate menace to Evreux was removed. He instead remained at Vernon assembling the forces. This decision left Paris open to the Dauphinish assault on 8 September 1429, but the risk seems to be deliberate. A great city like Paris was unlikely to be captured without a long siege, unless by treason. With Bedford at Vernon, Charles VII could not lay a full-scale siege to Paris. On the other hand, given the series of volte-face in Champagne, Brie and Vermandois, could Bedford be sure that Paris would defend itself? If so, could he risk that his army might be trapped in a potentially rebellious city? Staying at Vernon Bedford had access to the Norman semonce des nobles. In the unlikely case that the capital might surrender without resistance, the army assembled by him would protect Normandy, otherwise it could be brought to the relief of Paris. After all, was not

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45 E. C. Williams, My Lord of Bedford, p. 179; J. Barker, Conquest, p. 133.
46 G. L. Thompson, Paris, p. 106.
47 This period of the Hundred Years War shows that very few major cities were taken by assault rather than by surprise attack, treason, or composition. Even in this case a certain period of siege works and artillery bombardment was to precede the assault as in case of Caen taken by the English in 1417, almost the only example of a city of such scale taken by assault. For the siege of Caen see R. A. Newhall, The English Conquest of Normandy, pp. 58–61. A. Burne, Agincourt War, pp. 118–123.
49 This would be much like what really happened with the English army of Edmund Beaufort, duke of Somerset, in Rouen in 1450. For the siege of Rouen see J. Favier, La Guerre de Cent Ans, (Paris, 1980), p. 600.
50 Vernon was the place where the Norman levy was assembled for the journée of Ivry in 1424 and for accompanying supplies to Orléans in early 1429, see documents, printed in Chronique du Mont-Saint-Michel (1343-1468), ed. by S. Luce, 2 vols (Paris, 1879, 1883), I, pp. 136, 276.
Bedford instructed by Henry V on his deathbed to hold Normandy at all costs. It seems that in this situation it was deliberately chosen to entrust the defence of Paris to the French (including the Burgundian) adherents of the Lancastrian cause.

Moreover, Paris was not the only possible target for Charles VII who stayed in Compiègne, having just received the oaths of fidelity from Senlis, Beauvais and a number of smaller places. He could proceed to the north, where the cities of Picardy were showing sympathies to his cause. He could advance eastward against the upper Normandy. Should Bedford stay in Paris, he would have to pursue the enemy, taking the risk of arriving too late. At Vernon Bedford was in a better position to react to the events in both Upper and Lower Normandy. Therefore, the position at Vernon allowed Bedford to assess whether the concept of the Lancastrian kingdom of France had any support among the French and was still worth fighting for it.

While the Lancastrian and Valois armies were trying to outmanoeuvre each other, the new king of France entered negotiations with the duke of Bur-

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52 He probably did not remove from the city small garrisons, which might be present in Paris, but he did not bring his field army to the the capital and entrusted its defence to the locals and the Burgundians (see below).
53 About this time Creil was lost to the Dauphinists by Lionnel de Bournonville, *Wavrin*, III, 336. For a longer list of places which accepted Charles VII see *Wavrin*, III, p. 337; *Monstrelet*, IV, p. 354.
54 *Wavrin*, III, p. 337; *Monstrelet*, IV, p. 354. On 21 August 1429 Philip the Good had to send his councillor and maître de l'hôtel, Jacques de la Viesville, seigneur de Norrem, to Abbeville and Amiens in order to keep them under Lancastrian rule, ADN, B 1942 (3e compte), fo. 46r. See also the letters of remission to several citizens of Abbeville, imprisoned there in 1429 for speaking bad (sic!) of Joan of Arc, AN JJ 175/125, printed in Procès de condemnation et de rehabilitation de Jeanne d'Arc dite La Pucelle, ed. by J. Quicherat, 5 vols (Paris, 1841–1849), V, pp. 142–145.
55 According to the journal of the siege of Orléans, the news that Charles VII took Senlis made Bedford to leave Paris with his army, ‘doubtant que le roy ne voulisst tirer à re-conquester Normandie’, *Journal du siège d'Orléans*, p. 125. While the sequence of events may be incorrect, the idea that by staying at Vernon Bedford was in a position to resist Charles VII in invading Normandy is noteworthy.
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gundy. A Dauphinst embassy under Regnault de Chartres, archbishop of Reims and chancellor of France, came to the duke at Arras. The offers of Charles VII included most of what would later be offered and accepted at the congress of Arras in 1435.\textsuperscript{56} According to Wavrin, Jean de Luxembourg was among the most ardent supporters of the negotiations.\textsuperscript{57} He was one of the most resolute adherents of the Lancastrian regime,\textsuperscript{58} but this time having the command for the duke on the borders of Picardy and Laonnois, he probably felt his forces insufficient to resist the Armagnacs should they proceed in that direction.\textsuperscript{59} Other anglophile Burgundian councillors like Jean de Thoisy, bishop of Tournai, and Hugues de Lannoy were persuading Philip the Good to remain loyal to the treaty of Troyes.\textsuperscript{60} The appointment of Jean de Luxembourg to lead the Burgundian embassy to Charles VII may have sought to balance these interests.

The negotiations at Compiègne resulted on 28 August with a conclusion of a truce expected to last until Christmas. It covered the right bank of the Seine from Nogent-sur-Seine to Harfleur, excluding the places standing on the river. The cities of Picardy were encouraged to join the treaty as well as those under the English control. Paris was not included in the truce among other Seine towns moreover, a special reservation allowed Philip the Good to defend it if he wished.\textsuperscript{61} This suggests that Charles VII had already decided to make an

\textsuperscript{56} For the negotiations over the possible conditions of the general truce see Plancher, IV, pp. LXXVIII–LXXXI.

\textsuperscript{57} Wavrin, III, p. 335.

\textsuperscript{58} He has revealed himself as one of the most active French commanders of Lancastrian France having fought in Picardy in 1421 in Guise region in 1423–1425, in Argonne in 1427–1428. He was to remain loyal to Henry VI even after the Treaty of Arras until his death in 1441, Les Chevaliers de l'Ordre de la Toison d'or au XVe siècle (Frankfurt am Main, 1994), p. 46.

\textsuperscript{59} C. Berry, Les Luxembourg-Lagny, pp. 309–310.

\textsuperscript{60} Wavrin, III, pp. 335–336; Monstrelet, IV, pp. 352–353.

\textsuperscript{61} A. Sorel, La Prise de Jeanne d'Arc, pp. 327–328. It is not clear whether the English ever joined the truce. J. Favier considers that this treaty in fact prevented the cities of Picardy, which after the coronation in Reims had been showing signs of disloyalty towards Lancastrian cause, from falling under the Valois rule. He thus suggests that the treaty impeded Charles VII, where he could have expected success, J. Favier, La Guerre de Cent Ans, pp. 504–505.
attempt against the capital. The Burgundian duke, in his turn, while purchasing the security of Artois and Picardy was not breaking his traditional alliance with the Parisians, by leaving them undefended.

Seeing the enemy approaching Paris, Bedford on 27 August issued summons of the feudal levy of Normandy, intending to attack the Dauphinists before Paris on 10 September. Several days later he rescheduled the attack for 8 or 9 September. However, the assembly took longer and Bedford’s army which included Burgundian companies of Lionel de Bournonville and Jean, bastard de Thiant, only appeared before Paris about 15–16 September.

Bedford’s intention to give battle on 10 September was to be announced throughout Normandy. There must have been enough Valois sympathisers to report this to Charles VII and this may be the reason why the Dauphinist attempt on Paris was undertaken on 8 September so that Bedford’s forces would

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62 The date of 10 September appears in the *vidimus* by Michiel Durant, vicomte of Rouen, of Bedford’s letters issued on 27 August, *Letters and Papers*, II, pt. 1, pp. 111–114. These letters, addressed to the baillis, were to initiate the summons of the feudal levy in Normandy.

63 In the letters to Thomas Gower, lieutenant of Falaise (1 September) Bedford expressed his intention to give battle on 8 or 9 September, demanding that Gower hastened to join him, *Letters and Papers*, II, pt. 1, pp. 118–119.

64 The effectives of these companies were rather moderate. Lionel de Bournonville, knight bachelor, passed the musters on 14 September with 6 men–arms and 8 archers. Three more archers joined him on 19 September, BNF, MS. Fr. 4488, p. 595. Jean, bastard de Thiant, knight, had with him 1 other man–at–arms and 8 archers on 14 September, Ibid., p. 598.

65 For the assembly of this army see G. L. Thompson, *Paris*, p. 107. The difficulties in implementing the Bedford’s plans are easy to trace. The letters issued on 27 August at Vernon were only seen and reproduced by the vicomte of Rouen on 8 September, *Letters and Papers*, II, pt. 1, pp. 111–114. The company, summoned from Falaise only passed musters on 14 September, A. Curry ‘The Organisation of Field Armies’, pp. 216–217, 219.

66 *Letters and Papers*, II, pt. 1, pp. 111–114, 115–117. On contrary, the letters to Thomas Gower, giving 8–9 September as the date for the battle, were simply an order to the military commander and were not expected to be announced aloud. It seems possible that Bedford hoped to misinform Charles VII, but the delays in assembling his army made him abandon this plan.
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not interfere. The Dauphinists led by Joan of Arc and the duke of Alençon attacked the walls between the gates of St.–Denis and St.–Honoré but were eventually fought off.67 Charles VII, who remained at Saint–Denis, did not allow another attempt and several days later withdrew his army back to the kingdom of Bourges.

The effectives and composition of the defenders remain open to doubt. Monstrelet and Wavrin estimate the garrison of Paris as 400 men, naming Louis de Luxembourg, the bishop of Thérouanne, Jean Villiers seigneur de l’Isle–Adam and Simon Morhier, the royal prévôt of Paris as its primary leaders. They designate the defenders as Parisians and make no mention of the English.68 According to Percival de Cagny, the defence was entrusted to the citizens and the Burgundians of the seigneur de l’Isle–Adam without any English support.69 Le Fèvre de Saint–Remy, on the contrary, mentions the plusieurs seigneurs d’Angleterre and gives to the English the praise for the successful defence.70 The Bourgeois notes the presence of 40 or 50 English men–at–arms reporting that they fulfilled their duty well.71 La Chronique de la Pucelle and the Journal du siège d’Orléans make no mention of the Burgundians, only naming Louis de Luxembourg and Simon Morhier among the defenders (generally defined as les Anglois).72 These chronicles estimate the English contingent as 2 000 men and name messire Jean Rathelet, an English knight, among its commanders.73 G. L.


70 ‘mais les Anglois defendifrent si bien la ville que les Français ne peurent rien faire et retrayerent’, St. Remy, II, p. 149.

71 Bourgeois, p. 246. His report that there were no men–at–arms in the city during this assault except for 40–50 Englishmen seems quite dubious.


73 Pucelle, p. 332; Journal du siège d’Orleans, p. 125.
Thompson has identified this personage with Sir John Radcliffe sent by Bedford from Vernon to Paris with 95 men-at-arms and 700 archers.\footnote{G. L. Thompson refers to the additional payment made to Radcliffe’s soldiers on 27 August in order to meet the costs of living in Paris (in BNF, MS. Fr. 4488) but notes that no Parisian source mentions their arrival. Although he eventually concludes that ‘Sir John’s force had probably gone to Paris earlier [before 8 September]’, his phrasing choice of verb ‘gone’ instead of ‘come’ or ‘arrived’ seems to conceal certain doubt that they arrived in time. See G. L. Thompson, Paris, pp. 106–107.}

From the tactical point of view, the assault on Paris seems to be an unusual enterprise. The presence of Bedford’s army at Vernon prevented the Dauphin from splitting his forces for the blockade of the city. Although the Armagnacs were seen before Paris for several days before 8 September, no siege operations are reported. The assault was undertaken openly, but by only a limited part of the Dauphinist army, with the rest not even engaged in deflecting enemy attention.

This has usually been explained in the way that the enterprise was undertaken, on the demands of the party of war led by the duke of Alençon and inspired by Joan of Arc, and that the failure gave Charles VII an occasion to finish the campaign. If Charles VII could recover the capital of France this would be a brilliant finale for the coronation campaign, if only for propaganda purposes. However, for almost a century already the capital had been shown to be quite difficult to cope with: the rebellion of Étienne Marcel (1356–1358), the Cabochien movement (1413) and last, but in no way least, the events of May–June 1418 were the examples.\footnote{In fact, for the most part of the fifteenth century the French kings will tend to stay away from Paris. Charles VII himself will arrive in Paris for the first time only a year after its liberation and for a mere 3 weeks. For his visit J. Favier, La Guerre de Cent Ans, pp. 546–547.} Could Charles be really ready and intending to establish his control over the capital with the ruthless military force?

G. L. Thompson must be right in describing the attempt on Paris as ‘a display of force and the charisma of Joan of Arc’ in the hope that the capital
Resisting the crisis

accepted Charles VII.\textsuperscript{76} It was thus very much a symbolic action resulting in a symbolic response – Joan of Arc wounded by a Parisian crossbowman. Unlike the places of Champagne and Vermandois, the capital proved inclined to defend itself. The Parisians had their reasons for such steadfastness. The decade of the Burgundian and Lancastrian control saw a significant redistribution of the Armagnac property in the city, which would be restored to the ancient owners by Charles VII if he was admitted in the city.\textsuperscript{77} The citizens could also expect the Valois king’s displeasure for their role in the massacre of the Armagnacs back in 1418. Therefore, the Parisians could gain little and possibly lose much, should Charles VII obtain control of Paris.\textsuperscript{78}

The summer campaign of 1429 revealed that the conception of the Lancastrian France was still shared by the main political powers of France on whose support it was based from its start in 1420: the Burgundian party and the Parisians. In July 1429 (once again as in late 1419 – early 1420) Paris played a great role in bringing together the English and the Burgundians. The commonality of Burgundy and Paris in the conflict with the Dauphin seems to be well realised by both the duke and the citizens.\textsuperscript{79} The successful defence of Paris in 1429 had shown that the cause of Lancastrian regime in France was worth fighting for, although a greater participation on the English side was required if any significant results were to be achieved.


\textsuperscript{77} This was expressly stated in Charles VII’s letters given at Compiègne on 22 August suggesting that all the property lost by his adherents in the territories under the English or Burgundian control was to be returned to them or to their heirs, \textit{Ordonnances}, XIV, pp. 102–105.

\textsuperscript{78} It therefore seems difficult to agree with E. C. Williams suggesting that ‘He [Bedford – A.L.] knew that if the enemy made an immediate advance on Paris after the battle of Patay, while Duke Philip was still estranged the Parisians would have opened their gates to the advancing army and welcomed Charles within their walls’, E. C. Williams, \textit{My Lord of Bedford}, p. 174.

\textsuperscript{79} It seems that this bond would work in other direction after the treaty of Arras. Once the duke of Burgundy was able to reconcile himself with Charles VII, the path became open for the Parisians.
4.2 Preparations for the campaign of 1430

4.2.1 Philip’s visit to Paris, September 1429.

The failure before Paris marked an end of Charles VII’s coronation campaign. After spending several days at Saint-Denis the Valois king of France turned his army back to his lands and had it disbanded on 21 September. The reconquered lands were provided with strong garrisons, but the strategic initiative passed to the Lancastrians.

By the end of the month the dukes of Bedford and Burgundy met again at Paris in order to discuss further actions. Bedford returned to the capital from Normandy several days after the assault and remained in the city, except for a brief visit to Saint-Denis to impose the fine on the townsmen for having surrendered their town to Charles VII. Philip the Good came to the capital from Hesdin in the last days of September.

81 These garrisons were placed under the general command of Charles de Bourbon, count of Clermont, Pucelle, pp. 335–336; Wavrin, III, p. 343.
82 The Bourgeois tells that Regent returned to the capital three or four days after the assault, Bourgeois, p. 246. In a footnote to this report A. Tuetey noted that it is only on 18 September that Bedford’s presence is attested by a documentary source. This probably leads to the use of both dates in research works on the subject: 11–12 September (E. C. Wilson, My Lord of Bedford, p. 181) or 18 September (J. H. Ramsay, Lancaster and York, I, p. 413; J. Favier, La Guerre de Cent Ans, p. 506). The date of Bedford’s return to Paris is of certain interest, as Charles VII remained in Saint Denis until 13 September, and it can be questioned, whether his retreat was caused by Bedford’s arrival or vice versa. However, there is no evidence that this time the Regent made any efforts to prevent the Dauphin from returning to the Loire.
83 The itinerary of Philip the Good suggests that he left Hesdin on 23 September and was in Paris on 28 September, Itinéraires, p. 79. The chronicles date his departure from Hesdin several days earlier: 19 September (Wavrin, III, p. 343); 20 September (Monstrelet, IV, p. 359); the Bourgeois of Paris dates his arrival the last day of September (Bourgeois, p. 247).
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This journey was a significant military expedition. The *Bourgeois de Paris* estimated the duke’s retinue as 6 000 men, and though it actually only amounted to 2 300 men, this was still a significant force. On the march the army was organised in a traditional array of three divisions. It appears that the duke could not be sure whether the Armagnacs intended to respect the truce he had made with Charles VII. Thus, they retained control of certain towns expected to be ceded to him for the period of the truce. Given that the enemy failed to keep one of the promises, could the duke be sure, the rest would be kept? Eventually, no fighting happened. The only notable contact with the Armagnacs happened while passing by Senlis, when the count of Clermont, went out with a small company to greet the duke of Burgundy and the duchess of Bedford, under the cover of truce. This meeting resulted in nothing more than formal greetings.

It is not clear whether the security of the duke’s journey was the sole reason to assemble this army. However, while the truce was in progress, these forces could not be used against the Armagnacs to the east of the Seine. Bedford, in his turn, does not seem to be planning an immediate counter-offensive. His positions in Normandy and Maine were still under constant en-

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85 These soldiers passed the musters on 26–27 September to serve for 20 days, ADN B 1942 (*compte d’armes*), fos. 8v–10r. See Appendix C.2.
86 Jean de Luxembourg reportedly led the vanguard, while Philippe, seigneur de Saveuse was in charge of the rear-guard and the duke remained in the main division, *Monstrelet*, IV, pp. 359–360; *Wavrin*, III, p. 343.
87 See, for example, extracts from the communal registers of Beauvais dated 12 September, mentioning the disappointment of the duke of Burgundy that Beauvais, Creil, Compiègne and Senlis were not delivered to him as it was promised, P. Champion, *Guillaume de Flavy*, p. 139. It appears that eventually only Pont-Sainte-Maxence was delivered to the duke, P. Champion, *Guillaume de Flavy*, p. 152; A. Sorel, *La Prise de Jeanne d’Arc*, pp. 156–158.
89 At this period he must have been occupied with the reorganisation of the garrisons in Normandy, A. Curry, 'L’effet de la libération de la ville d’Orléans sur l’armée Anglaise; les problèmes de l'organisation militaire en Normandie de 1429 à 1435', in
emy pressure. Thus, it was only decided to undertake a joint campaign next year for the recovery of the lost places in Île-de-France and on the Oise.\textsuperscript{90} Although the soldiers of Duke Philip's retinue are not reported to have taken part in any military engagements of notice, their wages were included in the expenses section of the \textit{compte d'armes} of Jean Abonnel.\textsuperscript{91}

Thus the meeting was not followed by immediate military enterprises. However, political discussions between the dukes, joined by Cardinal Beaufort,\textsuperscript{92} resulted in important decisions, which altered the balance of power in Lancastrian France. According to the Burgundian chroniclers, Philip the Good was proclaimed the governor of Paris, which charge he reluctantly accepted at the request of the Parisians and only until the next Easter.\textsuperscript{93} In fact his appointment was much more significant. Although Bedford did not give the regency to him,\textsuperscript{94} Duke Philip was appointed governor of a number of baillages and senechalties covering almost all French territories not under direct English military control.\textsuperscript{95} It has been shown that in Picardy and especially in the bailiwick of Amiens Philip the Good remained royal governor up to his \textit{volte-face} of

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\textsuperscript{90} Monstrelet, IV, p. 362; Wavrin, III, p. 345.

\textsuperscript{91} ADN B 1942 (\textit{compte d'armes}), fos. 11r–17r


\textsuperscript{93} Monstrelet, IV, p. 362; Wavrin, III, p. 344. It is possible that the term was related to the arrival of Henry VI in France which became already a matter of discussion.

\textsuperscript{94} This is how it is described in the chronicle of Pierre Cochon, which also suggests that the English completely evacuated Paris in October 1430 and moved to Rouen, \textit{Cochon}, p. 305.

\textsuperscript{95} This included the territories still in Lancastrian obedience such as Paris, Chartres, Melun, Sens, Chaumont-en-Bassigny, Saint-Gengoul, Amiens, Ponthieu, but also some, controlled by the Dauphinists like Troyes and Tournai. AN X\textsuperscript{6} 8605, fos. 14r–14v. Tournai had already been ceded by the Lancastrian government to the duke in 1423 in order to induce him to put the city to obedience (C. A. J. Armstrong, ‘La Double Monarchie’, pp. 351–352), but Philip instead preferred to let the town buy his neutrality. See also R. Vaughan, \textit{Philip the Good}, pp. 18–19.
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1435 and undertook certain measures in order to defend that region from the adherents of Charles VII.96

Although the duke of Bedford retained the title of Regent, his power became limited to Normandy and the Pays-de-Conquête, which had suffered greatly in 1429 and were to suffer even more during the forthcoming winter. This responsibility made the duke withdraw to Rouen.97 Cardinal Beaufort returned to England and Philip the Good made his way back to his northern dominions.98

4.2.2 Negotiations during autumn 1429 – winter 1430.

The decision to postpone active military operations until the spring of 1430 was probably connected with the suggestion of the expedition to France to be led (at least nominally) by Henry VI in person. The main goal of this expedition would be the recovery of Reims and the coronation of Henry VI as the king of France. This plan had been a matter of discussion since as early as in April 1429 and became even more urgent after the coronation of Charles VII.99 This expedition could be expected to break the practice in existence since the late years of Henry V’s rule, when the kingdom of England provided very limited support to the Lancastrian kingdom of France. With this in view, the period from late autumn of 1429 to spring 1430 saw active Anglo-Burgundian negotiations concerning the organisation and planning of the forthcoming campaign.

97 Bedford left Paris either on 17 (J. H. Ramsay, Lancaster and York, I, p. 414; G. L. Hariss, Cardinal Beaufort, p. 192), 20 (Cochon, p. 305) or 29 October 1429 (E. C. Williams, My Lord of Bedford, p. 183). The last date also appears in the receipt of Robert Jolivet, abbot of Mont Saint Michel, for the payment made to him for his absence from Rouen in order to participate in the deliberations with the cardinal and the duke of Burgundy, Letters and Papers, II, pt. 1, pp. 126–127. It may suggest that 29 October is the date of Bedford’s arrival to Rouen rather than his departure from Paris.
The coronation of Henry VI as the King of England at Westminster on 6 November was a first step towards this expected expedition.\textsuperscript{100} Even before it, since mid-October the king’s intention of going to France for the coronation was announced in the letters to his French subjects.\textsuperscript{101} The preparations for the expedition began.

The autumn of 1429 brought an additional occasion for Anglo-Burgundian communications. The Burgundian embassy, returning from Portugal with Philip the Good’s bride, Princess Isabel, arrived in England on its way back to Flanders. The princess’s fleet was dispersed by winds and several ships (including that of the princess) had to take refuge at Plymouth. It was only on 25 December that the duke’s bride eventually landed at Sluis.\textsuperscript{102} In the meantime the princess received a warm welcome in England.\textsuperscript{103} A Portuguese prince, accompanying his sister, reportedly attended the coronation of Henry VI.\textsuperscript{104}

In the very same days another Burgundian embassy, composed of Hu- gues de Lannoy and Quentin Menart, was in England.\textsuperscript{105} There may have been

\textsuperscript{101} A. Curry, ‘The “Coronation Expedition”’, p. 29.
\textsuperscript{102} The fleet had sailed from Lisbon on 8 October and the duchess arrived in Plymouth on 29 November, M. Sommé, \textit{Isabelle de Portugal}, pp. 32–34.
\textsuperscript{103} On 6 December 1429 £100 were paid to William Aleyn, clerk of the household of Henry VI, for her expenses, \textit{Foedera,} X, p. 436.
\textsuperscript{104} \textit{Brut}, p. 437 (Continuation D); \textit{Brut}, p. 451 (Continuation E). This must have been prince Ferdinand, the youngest of Isabel’s brothers, M. Sommé, \textit{Isabelle de Portugal}, p. 32.
\textsuperscript{105} On 15 December Hugues de Lannoy and Quentin Menart were presented golden cups by the Council of England, \textit{Foedera,} X; p. 438, \textit{POPC,} IV, p. 9.
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various pretexts for their visit, but it was suggested by P. Champion, that strategic matters may have been discussed during this visit. This suggestion is based on a notable memorandum ascribed to Hugues de Lannoy. Its sixteen unnumbered articles can be divided in several groups. The first articles insisted that Henry VI should send his representatives to the proposed peace conference at Auxerre, at least to avoid accusations in the lack of desire for a general peace. He was also to try to influence the decision of the Pope concerning the appointment of cardinals to act as mediators, in order to have suitable persons chosen (art. 1–2). It was recommended that the king arrived in France with an army before the anticipated conference, so that he would be able to continue war should the negotiations prove fruitless. He was also advised to send before Christmas a great force under an experienced captain to France to deal with the current problems (art. 3–4).

The group of articles relating to Anglo-Burgundian cooperation (art. 6–10) is of great interest. A lengthy presentation of the importance for the king to have the duke of Burgundy on his side was followed by a suggestion that the duke and his subjects were not bound to serve the Lancastrian king of France

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106 The official aim of this mission is not clear. It has been suggested that they were sent to attend the coronation of Henry VI or to announce Philip the Good’s wedding, B. de Lannoy, Hugues de Lannoy, pp. 87–88. The continuation D of the Brut reports the presence of a French bishop and some knights and squires at the coronation, Brut, p. 437 (Continuation D). These however could be the members of the Burgundian embassy to Portugal.

107 P. Champion, Guillaume de Flavy, p. 142 n. 2. The memorandum expects the truce with Charles VII to expire after Christmas. This suggests, it was composed before the truce was prolonged. The memorandum is published among the pièces justificatives in P. Champion, Guillaume de Flavy, p. 142–146 from BNF, MS. Fr. 1278.

108 The conference was to start on 1 April, P. Champion, Guillaume de Flavy, p. 35. See also J. Ferguson, English Diplomacy, p. 13; G. L. Harriss, Cardinal Beaufort, p. 195.

109 P. Champion, Guillaume de Flavy, pp. 142–143.

110 P. Champion, Guillaume de Flavy, pp. 143–144. Such force amounting to 3199 men was actually sent in January 1430 under the command of John, bastard of Clarence, A. Curry ‘The “Coronation Expedition” ‘, p. 31.
without compensation.\textsuperscript{111} Then suggestion of a suitable reward was given: one of the provinces of France should be ceded to the duke of Burgundy as a hereditary possession or as a guarantee for the payment of a certain sum within a given term (suggesting that the province would become the duke’s inheritance if the sum was not paid in time) (art. 6).\textsuperscript{112} For his part, Philip the Good would employ his armies to secure the road to Reims for the coronation. He demanded the payment of wages for at least 1000 men-at-arms and 1000 \textit{gens de trait} for half a year of service at these military efforts. He also asked that a part of the English force, which would be sent to France by Christmas, joined him in these enterprises (art. 7–9).\textsuperscript{113}

A number of other articles discussed the measures to be undertaken in respect of certain political powers so that they either joined the Lancastrian cause or refrained from helping Charles VII. These included the English operations in Gascony (art. 5), the negotiations with the duke of Savoy (art. 11), the duke of Brittany and his brother Arthur de Richemont (art. 14),\textsuperscript{114} the kingdom of Scotland\textsuperscript{115} (art. 13) and a number of other states and lords (art. 12).\textsuperscript{116}

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\textsuperscript{111} ‘l’imagination des vassaulx et subgez de monditseigneur de Bourgogne est que il n’est point […] tenu de exposer les personnes de lui et de sesdiz vassaulx et subgez sans renumeracion’, P. Champion, \textit{Guillaume de Flavy}, p. 144.
\textsuperscript{112} P. Champion, \textit{Guillaume de Flavy}, p. 144.
\textsuperscript{113} P. Champion, \textit{Guillaume de Flavy}, pp. 144–145.
\textsuperscript{114} There exists a separate memorandum addressed to the duke of Burgundy concerning the policy towards Brittany. It proposes to win back the loyalty of the duke of Brittany by granting him the county of Poitou, and that of de Richemont by granting him the office of the constable of Lancastrian France together with Touraine and Saintonge. It is expected that Charles VII may be then forced to flee to Languedoc by the attacks of the Bretons on the lower Loire and the Lancastrians, acting from La Charité. It is published in P. Champion, \textit{Guillaume de Flavy}, pp. 146–148; and also in E. Cosneau, \textit{Le Connetable de Richemont}, pp. 539–541, where it is dated 1431.
\textsuperscript{115} It was probably with this advice in mind that the safe conducts were issued on 24 January 1430 for a Scottish delegation including three bishops and four earls coming to treat for peace between England and Scotland. At the same day the English ambassadors were also appointed, \textit{Foedera}, X, pp. 446–448.
\textsuperscript{116} P. Champion, \textit{Guillaume de Flavy}, pp. 144–145.
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In the end (art. 15) it was suggested that Cardinal Beaufort should be sent to the duke of Burgundy for the continuation of negotiations, with full powers. It was insisted that the cardinal was ‘tres fort désiré, prouffitable et necessaire et a l’en en lui tres grande et singuliere confidence’. The duke of Bedford and the French council were said to agree with this choice.¹¹⁷

Although the memorandum began with a recommendation to the king of England to send his representatives to the anticipated peace conference at Auxerre, the real subject of the document was undoubtedly military cooperation in the likely case the conference proved fruitless.¹¹⁸ Thus, the peace initiatives were only intended to justify the king’s military efforts.

The idea that Philip the Good was not bound to serve the Lancastrian king of France may seem surprising: as a governor of several royal baillages he was an officer in the king’s service. On the other hand, accompanied by the eulogy of the duke’s power, this statement seems an ultimatum. The king faced a choice between satisfying the demands of his overmighty vassal or losing his services (and, possibly, his allegiance). After all, Philip the Good had been engaged in the negotiations with Charles VII since summer 1429. The question of Philip the Good’s intentions during the winter of 1429–1430 with respect to his allegiance, either to Lancastrian or Valois king of France, remains speculation. It seems that he took precautions to distance himself from this ultimatum, presenting it as the opinion of his vassals and subjects.¹¹⁹

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¹¹⁷ P. Champion, Guillaume de Flavy, p. 146.
¹¹⁸ ‘que pour [...] conduite de la guerre, se l’en fault a la dicte paix generale, comme est a presupposer, veu l’orgueil desdiz adversaires’, P. Champion, Guillaume de Flavy, p. 144.
¹¹⁹ The idea that a prince was expected to take decisions based on the counsel of his advisors could be used to absolve him from the responsibility for certain misdeeds by placing it upon those who had given bad counsel. This is for example what Charles VII did, concerning the murder at Montereau, in order to reconcile himself with Philip the Good, Y. Malinin. France in the Late Medieval Age: the materials of scientific heritage, ed. M. Anikeev, A. Karachinskiy, V. Shishkin [in Russian: Ю. П. Малинин, Франция в эпоху позднего средневековья. Материалы научного наследия, сост., отв. ред. М. В. Анikeев, А. Ю. Карачинский, В. В. Шишkin] (St. Petersburg, 2008) pp. 64–65; see also P. S. Lewis, Later Medieval France: The Polity (London, 1968), p. 100.
The fact that the memorandum was addressed to Henry VI reflects changes in the balance of power within the Lancastrian Dual Monarchy. Certain tensions between Bedford and the Council of England existed earlier. In 1428 the earl of Salisbury as the single leader of a powerful force brought from England was able to insist on the offensive against Orleans rather than advance on Anjou as Bedford and the French Council suggested. Although Bedford had retaken the control over this army after the death of Salisbury, he failed to deal with the crisis of 1429 on his own and had to acknowledge that the Lancastrian regime in France urgently required support from the kingdom of England. This suggested that the council of England would play a greater role in the administration of the Lancastrian France. The king’s expected arrival in France also meant that Bedford’s powers of Regent would be suspended, although this was not formally decided until 16 April 1430.

This time the duke of Burgundy was addressing the king of England (and therefore his Council of England, since Bedford stayed in Normandy). By ignoring the Regent of France and his council, the duke was trying to obtain possession of one of the provinces of the kingdom. This looks much a desire to receive what he had been refused by the government of the Lancastrian kingdom of France, which had been keeping a very watchful eye on the observation of the royal judicial, fiscal and other rights in the Burgundian-controlled territories.

As for the choice of Cardinal Beaufort the duke of Burgundy had reason to confer his trust on him. The Cardinal was a natural ally for the duke as the

121 This is displayed by his appeals to the Council of England, such as that for the redirection of Cardinal Beaufort’s crusading army or for the king’s coronation in France which was undoubtedly expected to be supported by the resources of his kingdom of England as well as that of France.
123 Probably the best known example was Bedford’s refusal to allow Orléans to be surrendered to the duke of Burgundy which decision was taken on the advice of his French councillors (See above Ch. 3.5). For other cases see C. A. J. Armstrong, ‘La Double Monarchie’, pp. 348–352, 354–363.
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leader of the opposition to the duke of Gloucester in England. He must have obtained still greater confidence by his mediation between Philip the Good and Jacqueline of Bavaria, which concluded the struggle for Holland and Zeeland by the treaty of Delft, profitable for the duke, and also in course of the preparations for the crusade against the Hussites. At the same time by his insistence that Cardinal Beaufort should continue negotiations for the duke’s service (which looked very much like presenting him as the only possible choice) the duke must have been increasing Cardinal’s political influence in England as opposed to that of Gloucester.

In general, the memorandum reflected the new position of the duke of Burgundy. Once the government of Bedford had shown its weakness, Philip the Good was keen to extend his power in France at its expense, and in order to achieve this, he agreed to offer his help.

After the arrival of Princess Isabel in Flanders the duke’s attention for a couple of months was occupied by the wedding celebrations, which attracted numerous guests including the duchess of Bedford (although not the duke himself) rather than by the continuation of the war. These celebrations saw the establishment by Philip the Good of the order of the Golden Fleece. This chivalric undertaking sought to consolidate around the duke the nobility of his numerous dominions as, according to the statutes of the order, its knights could not be members of other orders. Philip the Good himself had refused to accept the Garter and this clause must have prevented any further discussion on this subject. No English were admitted in the Order of the Golden Fleece in 1430–1435, but in 1433 Jean de Vergy had to abandon Bedford’s personal Order of the Root to accept a place among the knights of the Golden Fleece.

124 G. L. Harriss, *Cardinal Beaufort*, pp. 176–177. He also suggests it was Beaufort who was responsible for the treaty of Delft between Philip the Good and Jacqueline of Bavaria and for the expedition of the Burgundian soldiers to the siege of Orleans.

125 There is a suggestion that the duke of Bedford might be in Bruges in mid-December when Isabel’s arrival was expected, but no evidence of his presence either then or during the celebrations in January 1430 seems to be known, C. A. J. Armstrong, ‘La Double Monarchie’, p. 369 n. 2.

126 This is for what he was reproached by the Bourgeois of Paris, *Bourgeois*, p. 249.

In spite of this demonstration of self-dependence, Anglo-Burgundian diplomacy was in progress. By 15 December the Royal council decided that Cardinal Beaufort should journey to the court of the duke of Burgundy. In early 1430 the Cardinal crossed to Flanders to meet with Philip the Good. The duke of Bedford was represented only by his secretary Gervaise le Vulre. It is possible that Bedford could not leave Normandy due to a difficult situation in the duchy, but it also suggests that the Regent took only a secondary role in the forthcoming negotiations.

4.2.3 Philip the Good’s indenture, 12 February 1430.

These negotiations between the duke of Burgundy and Cardinal Beaufort led on 12 February 1430 to the signing of formal indenture by which Philip the Good obliged to serve Henry VI in the forthcoming campaign. The conditions of this indenture were as follows:

- The duke of Burgundy agreed to serve King Henry with a force of 1 500 men–at–arms and 1 500 gens de trait for three months as soon as he received 50 000 saluts d’or for the payment to his troops. The duke undertook to take the field within 20 days after the

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128 POPC, IV, p. 9. The Cardinal crossed to Calais on 27 January 1430 and proceeded to Bruges, Brut, p. 437 (Continuation D). It is not clear, when he actually departed, since as late as on 8 February a rather modest sum of £ 28 4 s. was assigned by the Council for his passage to Calais, POPC, IV, p. 18.
129 G. L. Harriss, Cardinal Beaufort, p. 196 see also n. 12; ‘pour leur dire & exposer de-par nous certaines grosses besongnes & matieres secretes par nous a lui charges tou-chans le un le prouffit de monditseigneur le Roy et de ses pays & subgetz’, BL, Add. Ch. 7959.
130 ADN B 302 no. 15576. The enumeration of articles which is absent in the original document is given, according to its edition in Appendix E.
131 This sum was in fact delivered as 25 000 nobles, suggesting the exchange rate of 2,70 francs for a noble. Other contemporary financial documents give an exchange rate of 2,75 fr. for a noble (TNA, E 101/52/35/2 and 3) or 2,89 fr. for a noble (ADN, B 1942 (compte d’armes), fo. 6r). Even in the latter case, the surplus left to the duke did not exceed 7% of the sum.
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surety for the payment was provided to the duke’s representatives in Bruges on 8 March or later (art. 1).132

- After these three months the duke was to ready to serve for an additional nine months or to send the king 600 men-at-arms and 600 *gens de trait*. This service was due to be paid according to the rates customary in the French kingdom (art. 1).
- The English were also for the first three months to support the duke with a supplementary force of 500 soldiers under Thomas Burgh to assist the duke of Burgundy, which troops were to be paid by the King (art. 3).133
- Burgundian forces were to be mustered and reviewed by the marshal of Burgundy and his representatives. The royal officers would only be authorized to demand such reviews to be taken and to be present at them (art. 1).
- The county of Champagne and Brie would be ceded by the king to the duke of Burgundy and his male heirs of the body134 in apanage with all the *aides* from these lands, of which half is to be spent for its defence. The king retained the right to buy this county back within 7 years for a sum of 300 000 *saluts d’or* (art. 2–2.3).
- In the case that any places outside Champagne came into Lancastrian obedience and delivered themselves to the government of the duke

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132 Thus, the earliest possible date when the duke could begin the war was 28 March 1430. This supports the suggestion that the truce was not prolonged into April.

133 Except for his possible participation in the battle of Cravant the previous career of this captain does not reveal much experience of joint operations with the Burgundians. His long service in France is outlined in A. R. Bell, A. Curry et al., *The Soldier in Later Medieval England* (Oxford, 2013), p. 69 and n. 83, 84.

Presumably, the reason for his appointment was the fact that Thomas Burgh was one of the commanders of the English force that had sailed to France under the bastard of Clarence in January 1430 and could be expected to remain in service when the duke of Burgundy would take the field, *Brut*, p. 438 (Continuation D); TNA, E 403/691 m. 7, 13.

134 By February 1430 Philip had no such heirs and the Lancastrian regime could expect that Champagne would one day revert to the crown due to the extinction of the house of Burgundy rather than be bought back in seven years.
of Burgundy, he would be able to accept them and would reserve the
profits and revenues from it (art. 3.2).

- The duke was also to obtain the postponement of the peace confer-
ence to be taken at Auxerre for two months until 1 June, so that
Henry VI could arrive there in person or send his representatives (art.
4).

This indenture seems a clear response to the conditions presented in
the Burgundian memorandum of late 1429. The grant of Champagne and Brie
to the duke was not simply an attempt to bind Philip the Good to the Lanca-
stinian cause.\(^{35}\) It was a payment for the fact of the duke’s participation in the
projected campaign, while the military expenses still had to be paid by the
Lancastrian government. Although Champagne was largely controlled by the
Dauphinists, the control of this county, a bridge linking his northern and
southern groups of territories, was of great importance to the Burgundian duke
and its capture by the enemy in 1429 may have induced Duke Philip to contin-
ue fighting for the Lancastrian regime. On the other hand, the recovery of
Champagne was a necessary prerequisite for Henry VI’s coronation at Reims,
therefore by granting the county to Philip the Good, the Lancastrians induced
Philip the Good to reconquer it for their mutual interest.

The form of the indenture and the conditions of service show certain
differences from contemporary Lancastrian indentures of war.\(^{36}\) First of all, the
latter were simply the documents of military administration and had no content
of diplomatic and political importance. Therefore only the conditions of mili-
tary service are comparable. The number of soldiers, their wages and the dates

\(^{35}\) As often depicted, see E. C. Williams, *My Lord of Bedford*, p. 182; C. T. Allmand,
*Lancastrian Normandy*, p. 35.

\(^{36}\) The fact that a formal indenture was concluded is of certain interest. While in the
English armies indenting for service was a general practice, in the Burgundian armies it
was usually muster, not a preliminary contract, which marked the engagement in the
France the practice of the *lettres de retinue* appears to be largely abandoned, at least
in Languedoc, by the end of the 1420s, See Ph. Contamine, ‘Les armées française et
anglaise à l’époque de Jeanne d’Arc’, *Revue des sociétés savantes de Haute-Normandie*,
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and places of musters were discussed in a slightly different manner but this
difference may have been caused by their application to the traditional French
or Burgundian procedures as well as by the fact that, since there was no need
to ship the forces across the Channel, the exact dates and places of the muster
were not as critical.

The musters taken during the campaign of 1430 suggest that the duke
never assembled the 1500 men-at-arms prescribed by the indenture. However,
in terms of payment his army was very close to the expected size of 2250
paies as he replaced the missing lances with a double number of gens de trait.
The share of gens de trait in the duke’s army therefore rose from projected
50% to about 70–75%, almost a standard of contemporary English armies.137
When the earl of Salisbury indented for service in France in 1428, his contract
suggested that he could exchange 200 of his 600 men-at-arms for three times
the number of archers.138 The indenture of Philip the Good contained no such
clause but there is no evidence that the duke was ever blamed for doing so. As
the Burgundian contingents were to be mustered by the duke’s officers, it
seems appropriate to wonder whether the royal control over the musters of the
duke’s army remained purely nominal.

Another notable difference compared to the English indentures of war
was the absence of clauses concerning the king’s rights over a share of cap-
tain’s profits of war and over important prisoners. It may to a certain degree
explain why Joan of Arc was not immediately ceded to the English after her
capture before Compiègne.139 The duke was also permitted to take under his
government any places which might agree to this – undoubtedly, satisfaction
for the conflict about the destiny of Orléans in April 1429. So by concluding
this indenture with the Council of Henry VI in England Philip the Good not only

137 See Appendix C.3. The composition of the Burgundian armies in 1420s–1430s will
be discussed in more detail further, see Chapter 6.2.3.
138 Foedera, X, pp. 392–394. A vidimus of this indenture is published in Letters and Pa-
pers, I, pp. 404–14. The original is TNA, E 101/71/2/825.
139 On the other hand it does not remove the question, if she was ever considered a
prisoner of war, moreover a valuable one. See discussion of this matter in A. Curry,
‘Les Anglais face au procès’, pp. 80–81. The matter of her prisoner status is worth fur-
ther discussion.
obtained titles and money but also the concessions he had not be able to get from Bedford’s government in France. At the same time, the conditions of the duke’s service were in some aspects privileged compared to those of English captains in Lancastrian service.

The indenture designated a point at which a settlement acceptable for both parties was achieved. Measures were undertaken for its implementation. Almost as soon as Cardinal Beaufort returned to England the county of Champagne and Brie was ceded to the duke of Burgundy and the deliverance of the money, envisaged by the indenture was ordered. On 9 March 12 500 marks were to be given to Richard Wydeville and Richard Bokeland together with 100 marks for their travel expenses in going to the duke of Burgundy. By the end of March the sum was received by Duke Philip. After Easter the duke, having mustered his army at Péronne, began his offensive. A few days later on 23 April, Saint George’s day, Henry VI landed at Calais. The campaign of 1430 was to begin.

4.2.4 The plan of operations in BNF, MS. Fr. 1278.

Since the very start of its planning the campaign of 1430 was aimed at the recovery of Reims and coronation of Henry VI. This idea was reconsidered in a strategic memorandum from BNF, MS. Fr. 1278. The document is not dated so its creation in March–April 1430 can only be verified by its contents as on the one hand it reports the sieges of Torcy and Château–Gaillard to be in progress, on the other it speaks of Henry VI’s arrival in France as a future possibility. Thus, its identification by R. Vaughan with a plan sent to Calais

140 POPC, IV, p. 31; AN, X16 8605, fo. 15.
141 POPC, IV, pp. 31, 32.
142 Foedera, X, p. 454; ADN, B 1942 (compte d’armes), fo. 5v.
143 BNF, MS. Fr. 1278, fos. 12r–14r. This memorandum is published in P. Champion, Guillaume de Flavy, pp. 155–160; an abstract in English is provided in R. Vaughan, Philip the Good, pp. 22–24.
144 Château–Gaillard fell to the Armagnacs on 24 February and the siege was laid to it by the English by 28 February. It held out until June; Torcy lost on 26 October 1429 was recovered in August 1430, J. H. Ramsay, Lancaster and York, I, pp. 414, 419.
145 ‘presuppose que le Roy soit passe en France avecques sa puissance que len puet estimer a X° combatans pour le moins’, P. Champion, Guillaume de Flavy, p. 157. The
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(probably after Henry VI had landed there on 23 April may be of certain doubt. On the other hand, when Duke Philip took the field he must have had some plan of campaign in mind. The surviving text contains certain corrections and is probably a draft, although quite neat. Therefore, it cannot be said for sure whether the plan that has survived was ever actually presented to the English. It might have been as well substituted either for its revised version or for a completely different plan.

This project was critical of the direct advance towards Reims believing the city well fortified and requiring a lengthy siege. Such siege, it was suggested, even if successful would bring little prestige to the Lancastrians (presumably as compared to its easy submission to Charles VII in 1429). On the other hand, it could not be said for sure whether Paris would be able to hold out long enough while the main Anglo-Burgundian forces would be besieging Reims. Thus the siege of Reims was to be replaced by a number of operations to be undertaken simultaneously in a number of theatres:

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hope that the army of English king will be of 10 000 at least also reveals the lack of information on the real situation. The total effectives of the English forces sent to France in 1430 did not exceed 8 000 men (including the company of the bastard of Clarence which had crossed in January), A. Curry, ’The “Coronation Expedition”’, p. 31.

This expectation might reveal one more reason why Philip the Good might have chosen to remain on the Lancastrian side in 1429–1430. He was certainly informed of the project of the French coronation of Henry VI almost from the start and must have understood that this enterprise would allow the Lancastrian regime to use to a significant degree the resources of the kingdom of England and bring a major army to the continent. He could have shared the hopes of the Lancastrian government that this force might turn the tide in France. On the other hand this was also probably not the best time for the volte-face, since this could turn this anticipated power against him.

146 R. Vaughan, Philip the Good, p. 25.
147 A. Bosssuat doubts that this project could have been an expression of the ideas of duke’s anglophile councillor Hugues de Lannoy rather than Philip the Good, A. Bosssuat, Perrinet Gressart, p. 110.
1000 mounted Englishmen, 200 Burgundian men–at–arms and the forces of Perrinet Gressart – to make attacks against Berry and Bour-bonnais;\footnote{A. BossuAT\textsc{at} suggests that this part of plan was not implemented, A. BossuAT, \textit{Perrinet Gressart}, p. 126. In fact, however, Thomas Beaufort, count of Perche, was sent to La Charité with 120 men–at–arms and 360 archers in August 1430, G. L. Harriss, \textit{Cardinal Beaufort}, p. 205; BL, Add. Ch. 11671. By November, however, he was recalled back to Paris, M. K. Jones, ‘The Beaufort Family and the War in France, 1421–1450’ (un–published doctoral thesis, University of Bristol, 1982), pp. 78–80; BNF, MS. Clairambault 11, no. 159. It, thus, appears that though some attempts were made in this theatre, no notable results were achieved.}

1000 men including both English and Burgundians – to hold the Seine–Yonne line from Corbeil to Villeneuve–le–Roi and to try to de-prive Sens and Melun, held by the Armagnacs, of supplies;\footnote{This clause is omitted in R. Vaughan, \textit{Philip the Good}, pp. 23–24.}

700–800 men – to finish the siege of Aumale and proceed for the operations in the Ile–de–France;

The duke of Burgundy with 1200 men–at–arms, 1000 archers and 200 crossbowmen with 1000 English archers – to wage war in Laon-inois and Soissonnois, preparing the offensive against Reims;

The sieges of Torcy and Château–Gaillard should be brought to a successful end and then the English in Normandy would besiege Louviers;

The main English forces should bring to obedience Beauvais then continue with the siege of Creil and then proceed to the Ile–de–France;

The duke of Burgundy would organise the blockade of Compiègne by taking several surrounding places and making it impossible for sup-plies to reach the town.\footnote{P. Champion, \textit{Guillaume de Flavy}, pp. 157–160.}

Thus, there were two main offensives projected: the Burgundians would act in Champagne while the English advanced via Beauvais and Creil and into the Ile–de–France for the relief of Paris. These were to be supported by the recove-ry of positions in Normandy and with diversions in other theatres. On the other hand, the plan made the duke of Burgundy responsible for the blockade...
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of Compiègne. R. Vaughan even claimed that Philip the Good was ‘only interested in this military collaboration with his allies in order to obtain Compiègne for himself at their expense, and possibly also Champagne’. On the other hand, in November 1430 when the siege of Compiègne proved a failure the duke claimed in his letter to Henry VI that this siege was undertaken on the king’s request and against his will while he would prefer to attack Creil or Laonnois according to the plan of campaign sent to Calais. Given that no mention of the proposed Burgundian participation in the siege of Creil is given in the text, it may be suggested that the duke was either referring to some other plan, which did not survive, or otherwise that by November he was more interested to find an excuse for his failure than to provide exact references.

4.3 The coronation campaign of Henry VI, 1430.

4.3.1 Paris and Normandy in late 1429 – early 1430

Even after Charles VII had retreated across the Loire, the situation in Normandy and the Pays de Conquête remained difficult for the Lancastrians. On 25 September Laval was lost to the Armagnacs. Aumale and Étrepagny in the Upper Normandy fell about the same time. A month later on 26 October Torcy surrendered. La Hire took Louviers on 8 December; then on 24 February 1430 he gained Château-Gaillard by surprise. The fall of this stronghold overlooking the Seine menaced the communication between Paris and Rouen by river. Enemy successes forced the English into a lengthy campaign of

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151 R. Vaughan, *Philip the Good*, p. 22.
154 *Cochon*, p. 314; E. Carleton Williams, *My Lord of Bedford*, p. 185.
156 *Cochon*, p. 308; J. H. Ramsay, *Lancaster and York*, II, p. 414; J. Barker, *Conquest*, pp. 142–143. The English captain was imprisoned for having failed to provide due resistance.
siege warfare, which lasted well into 1430 employing both the resources of Normandy and the reinforcements coming from England.\textsuperscript{157}

The Valois-Burgundian border in Champagne and Picardy remained relatively quiet.\textsuperscript{158} The only notable engagement in this region happened in February 1430 when Jacques, seigneur de Crévecœur, and Robert de Saveuse escorting supplies to Clermont-en-Beauvaisis were attacked by the Armagnacs near Saint-Just-en-Chaussée. The engagement turned into something of a Burgundian ‘Battle of the Herrings’: Burgundian commanders dismounted their men (mostly archers) and held out until the Armagnacs realised the futility of their efforts and retreated.\textsuperscript{159}

The situation in Paris was facilitated by the prompt inclusion of the capital in the Burgundian truce with the Dauphinists.\textsuperscript{160} Initially expected to last until Christmas it was prolonged until mid-March.\textsuperscript{161} A Burgundian garrison under Philippe, seigneur de Saveuse, and Jean de Brimeu was established in the

\textsuperscript{157} Thus, the bastard of Clarence who arrived from England in January 1430 (A. Curry, ‘The “Coronation Expedition”’, p. 31) took who charge of the siege of Torcy (\textit{Monstrelet}, IV, p. 368).

\textsuperscript{158} While the truce was in progress five Armagnac knights even took part in the joustings held at Arras on 20 February to celebrate the duke’s marriage, \textit{Monstrelet}, IV, pp. 376–377; \textit{St. Remy}, II, pp. 175–176.

\textsuperscript{159} The similarity is still greater, given that the abovementioned supplies are reported to include provisions for the Lent, \textit{Monstrelet}, IV, pp. 375–376.

\textsuperscript{160} The extension of the truce for Paris was signed at Senlis on 18 September, printed in A. Sorel, \textit{La prise de Jeanne d’Arc}, pp. 330–331. Unfortunately no reference to the original document is given. The same document is quoted in \textit{Cordeliers}, fos. 490r–492r.

\textsuperscript{161} P. Champion mentions the letters dated 25 November with the prolongation of the truce, unfortunately without reference, P. Champion, \textit{Guillaume de Flavy}, p. 34 n. 3. This probably was expected to last until 2 February 1430, but in late January was in turn prolonged until 15 March, see the attestation of prolongation by Jean Tudert, dated 29 January 1429, ADN, B 301, no. 15570/7. According to Monstrelet, the truce was to last until Easter, \textit{Monstrelet}, IV, p. 378. This assertion is accepted by some historians, although it does not seem to be supported by any surviving documents. It contradicts the chronicle of Cordeliers expressly stating that the truce had expired by 21 March, \textit{Cordeliers}, fo. 496r.
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city. As the truce was not strictly observed by the captains, and the victual-
ling of Paris remained problematic, the presence of this Burgundian force was justified.

On 21 March, probably as soon, as the truce had expired, an attempt of
the Burgundian garrison to counter an Armagnac raid against the suburbs of
Paris proved a defeat. Several prisoners were taken by the Dauphinists, among
them Philip, seigneur de Saveuse, the bastard of Saveuse, the bastard of Saint
Pol, and a Parisian Colinet de Neufville. The victors then successfully entered
Saint–Denis by night escalade on 23 March and having caught the defenders
unaware were able to get away with their booty. The Chronicle of Pierre
Cochon only reports the first encounter and does not name the bastard of
Saveuse among the casualties at that engagement.

By 17 April, the command over the Burgundian garrison of Paris went to
Philip, seigneur de Ternant. Although the exact numbers of the garrison are
not given in the compte d’armes, the payment amounted to 383 paires, which

162 According to the muster of 15 January 1430, it included 135 men–at–arms, 502
gens-de-trait and 3 trumpeters, ADN 1942 (compte d’armes), fos. 18r–19r. Monstrelet
estimates the force as 500 combatants, Monstrelet, IV, p. 365.
163 Bourgeois, p. 251. The chronicle of Pierre Cochon notes that the garrison of Saint
Denis was composed of 200–300 Burgundians, wearing St. Andrew’s cross, Cochon, p.
309.

These events are also described by Monstrelet, who presents them as two
separate engagements. No exact dates are given and the report is placed before that
on the marriage of Philip the Good in January 1430, implying that these skirmishes
happened while the truce was still in existence. It is suggested that during the assault
on Saint Denis Philip de Saveuse was in Paris and once he had been informed of the
assault he rode out of the city to help the garrison of Saint Denis, but the battle was
over by the time he arrived. If the dates given by the Bourgeois are correct this would
suggest that the seigneur de Saveuse was ransomed almost on–the–spot. According to
Monstrelet, the bastard of Saveuse participated in the defence of Saint–Denis and no
mention of his capture is given, Monstrelet, IV, pp. 365–367.
164 Cochon, p. 309.
165 St. Remy reports his depart for Paris, St. Remy, II, p. 177.
166 ADN, B 1942 (compte d’armes), fo. 22r.
is quite close to 395.5 paies recorded for January\textsuperscript{167} and may reflect the casualties.

According to Monstrelet, while the truce with the Dauphin was in progress, some Burgundians joined the English forces, who were not included in the truce, to legitimately fight the Armagnacs.\textsuperscript{168} As an example of this he tells of the joint attack on Créil by the English from the castle of Neuville le Roi and the Burgundians.\textsuperscript{169} The Lancastrians lured the enemy out of the town into the ambush and captured the Dauphinist captain Jacques de Chabannes. At the same skirmish one Georges de Croix was in turn captured by the Armagnacs and was soon exchanged for de Chabannes, who also had to pay a certain sum of money.\textsuperscript{170}

Upstream the Seine from Paris Melun fell to the Armagnacs before Easter. The control of the town had been given to a Burgundian, Dreux, seigneur de Humières, who in turn conferred it to his brothers. The citizens had the garrison driven out and the town swore allegiance to Charles VII.\textsuperscript{171} They chose a moment when most of the garrison was on a raid against the Armagnacs for their uprising. About a hundred Lancastrian survivors held out in the castle for about twelve days but eventually had to surrender on being allowed to leave.\textsuperscript{172} This happened after the Lancastrians from Corbeil failed to relieve their parti-

\textsuperscript{167} ADN, B 1942 (compte d’armes), fos. 18r–19r.
\textsuperscript{168} \textit{Monstrelet}, IV, p. 363.
\textsuperscript{170} \textit{Monstrelet}, IV, p. 364. The English present in the skirmish are named Faucques, Bohort de Bazentin and Robinet Eguethin. In the English edition of the chronicle their names are spelt respectively as Foulkes, Bohart de Boyentin and Robinet Eguetin, \textit{Monstrelet (eng.)}, VI, pp. 316–317. Bohort de Bazentin was certainly a Picard, not an Englishman. Other persons could be Robert Guethin (or Richard, who is more likely to attract attention) and Foulke Eyton or Fouques of Arras; the latter would be captured by Joan of Arc in the same region later that year.
\textsuperscript{172} \textit{Chartier}, I, p. 125–127 (speaks of the Anglo–Burgundian garrison of the town).
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sans.173 The Armagnacs from Melun also took from the English Provins and Moret in Gatinais.174

4.3.2 The Burgundian invasion of Dauphiné, 1430

Although the intervention of Louis de Chalon, prince of Orange, in Dauphiné was, primarily, his private war for the recovery and extension of his possessions in the region, it should be considered in the context of Lancastrian war efforts of 1430.175 The duke of Burgundy supported, perhaps even inspired, the prince and reinforced him with a detachment of Burgundian nobility.176 The same was true for the duke of Savoy who remained deaf to the ambassadors of Charles VII urging him to give no help to the prince, and provided the latter with the free passage through his territories also permitting his subjects to join the prince’s army.177 The support of the duke of Savoy was purchased by Louis de Chalon with a promise to divide Dauphiné with him in case of successful conquest.178 It thus seems likely that the war in Dauphiné was an attempt to attach the duke of Savoy to the Lancastrian cause as recommended by the Burgundian memorandum of late 1429.179 It is possible that the prince had some English mercenaries in his army but there seems to be no clear evidence that Lancastrian government dispatched forces in his support.180

173 M. Lecomte, Histoire de Melun, pp. 54–55. He describes those who retreated to the castle as ‘les Anglais et leurs partisans’ and those from Corbeil, who tried to come to their help, as ‘les Anglais’.
174 Chartier, I, p. 127.
175 Jean Le Fèvre, seigneur de Saint-Remy, names him the royal governor of Languedoc thus suggesting that he was acting on Henry VI’s behalf, St. Remy, II, p. 255. However it is not clear how well was this chronicler informed of the campaign in Dauphiné.
176 F. Barbey, Louis de Chalon, pp. 132–134. Louis later claimed to have a letter from the duke dated 5 April 1430 urging him to start the war, ibid. p. 133 n. 1.
177 The Summa chronicorum Franciae even suggests that he sent 300 men to the Prince of Orange, BNF, MS. Fr. 1965 fo. 102v. There were definitely some Savoyards like François de La Palu, seigneur de Varambon, who fought in the prince’s army.
179 See above Ch. 4.2.2.
180 The suggestions, that the English took part in the invasion of Dauphiné (such as in K. Daly ‘War, History and Memory in the Dauphiné in the Fifteenth Century: Two Ac-
The campaign proved a complete disaster. Before Louis de Chalon could start his offensive, his fortresses in Dauphiné were attacked by the Armagnacs. This cost him a number of places (with their garrisons), while only providing an excuse that he was fighting in order to defend his possessions. The decisive battle took place on 11 June when Louis de Chalon marched from his castle of Anthon to attack the enemies who had just captured Colombiers.\textsuperscript{181} His army of some 1 200 men was ambushed by the Dauphinists on the march and suffered a crushing defeat. A number of Burgundian nobles were killed or captured.\textsuperscript{182} The prince himself saved his life by flight.\textsuperscript{183}

counts of the Battle of Anthon (1430)\textsuperscript{1}, The Fifteenth Century, 8 (2008), pp. 29–45) seem to be based on the evidence of the process against the prince of Orange, published in Choix de documents historiques inédits sur le Dauphiné, publiés d’après les originaux conservés à la bibliothèque de Grenoble et aux Archives de L’Isere, ed. by C.-U.-J. Chevalier (Montbéliard, Lyon, 1874), pp. 300–338. First the English (with no particular names given) are mentioned as serving in the garrisons of the prince’s castles together with the Burgundians and Savoyards, Ibid p. 312. Then, among the captains of the prince’s army appears one ‘Johannus Ludovici, magnus Anglicorum et Burgundorum capitaneus’, Ibid. p. 330. This may possibly refer to Sir Lewis John, but this identification is open to much doubt.

\textsuperscript{181} Le Févre de Saint-Remy erroneously suggests that the battle took place when Anthon, besieged by the prince, was relieved by the Dauphinists. \textit{St. Remy}, II, p. 255. The account of the battle appears in this chronicle only after the report of the first chapter of the order of the Golden Fleece. Since his report is mostly dealing with the behaviour of Jean de Neufchâtel, seigneur de Montagu, expelled from the order for his flight from the battlefield at Anthon, it may be suggested that Le Févre may be reliant on the information which was circulating at the chapter rather than on the witnesses’ reports.

\textsuperscript{182} One of the prisoners of Anthon was Guillaume de Vienne, seigneur de Bussy, son of a notable Burgundian noble Guillaume de Vienne, seigneur de Saint-George. In September 1431 a sum of 3000 fr. was granted by Philip the Good to the seigneur of Saint George to help him ransom his son, R. Ambuhl, \textit{Prisoners of War}, p. 221. This must have been not enough as later this month Isabel of Portugal, duchess of Burgundy, wrote to Henry, Cardinal Beaufort, asking him to support her plea to Henry VI (still in France then) on behalf of the seigneur de Bussy, \textit{La Correspondance d’Isabelle de Portugal, duchesse de Bourgogne (1430-1471)}, ed. by M. Sommé (Ostfildern, 2009), pp. 42–43.

\textsuperscript{183} J. Barker, \textit{Conquest}, p. 152.
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If the invasion of Dauphiné was a part of the plan aimed to divert the Dauphinist forces over a vast number of theatres, it did not achieve its goal. The results of the campaign were also unlikely to induce the duke of Savoy openly to support the Lancastrian cause. On the contrary, the southern borders of Mâconnais and Charolais were now open to enemy attacks.

4.3.3 The road to Compiègne

Philip the Good assembled his army at Péronne in mid–April 1430, and having spent Easter in this town, took the field. The vanguard under Jean de Luxembourg and Antoine, seigneur de Croy left Péronne on 20 April 1430 and the duke followed two days later. He marched via Montdidier to Gournay-sur-Aronde and laid siege to it. The Armagnac captain agreed to surrender on 1 August unless relieved and to abstain from hostilities until then. The duke then proceeded to Noyon, where he spent about a week. In the meantime Jean de Luxembourg made the castle of Provinlieu in Beauvaisis surrender before returning to the duke.

From Noyon the Burgundians followed down the Oise towards Compiègne. To secure their base at Noyon from a possible attack by the left bank of the Oise the Burgundians needed to gain control over the bridges across the Aisne. This made Choisy-au-Bac, a fortress controlling the bridge across the Aisne close to its confluence with the Oise their first aim. When the fortress was besieged on 7 May 1430, the defenders themselves destroyed the bridge, thus depriving themselves of any reinforcements from Compiègne. On

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184 Cordeliers, fo. 497r.
185 Monstrelet, IV, p. 378.
186 Monstrelet, IV, p. 379.
187 Monstrelet, IV, p. 381.
189 P. Champion, Guillaume de Flavy, p. 38–39.
190 P. Champion, Guillaume de Flavy, p. 39.
16 May the captain agreed to surrender the castle on being allowed safe passage to Compiègne with the garrison. Choisy was then demolished by the Burgundians.\textsuperscript{191}

As the indenture made with Henry VI suggested, the duke was joined by an English contingent, under the command of Sir John Montgomery instead of Thomas Burgh.\textsuperscript{192} It was first entrusted with the defence of Pont-l’Évêque\textsuperscript{193} protecting the communications of the duke’s army as it marched along the Oise to Choisy. The Dauphinist attempt to cut this line\textsuperscript{194} resulted in a sharp skirmish against the English and the Burgundian companies of Philippe, seigneur de Saveuse, and Jean de Brimeu, left by the duke to defend Noyon. The Armagnacs had to withdraw, unable to accomplish their goal.\textsuperscript{195}

It is generally considered that about the same time the captain of Soissons, Guichard Bournel, sold the city to the Burgundians under Jean de Luxembourg.\textsuperscript{196} The Chronicle of the Cordeliers suggests that in May a local truce was made for Soissons until 24 June.\textsuperscript{197} This truce may in fact be the reason why

\textsuperscript{191} P. Champion, \textit{Guillaume de Flavy}, p. 40; Sorel gives 15 May as the date of capitulation, A. Sorel, \textit{La prise de Jeanne d’Arc}, p. 159; \textit{Monstrelet}, IV, pp. 381–382.

\textsuperscript{192} According to A. Sorel, the earls of Suffolk and Arundel were present in the Burgundian army when it arrived at Noyon. Unfortunately no references are given, A. Sorel, \textit{La Prise de Jeanne d’Arc}, p. 150.

\textsuperscript{193} Pont l’Évêque (Oise, arr. Compiègne, cant. Noyon) standing on the Oise 2 km from Noyon.

\textsuperscript{194} The attack against Noyon was presumably expected to make Duke Philip abandon the siege of Choisy, A. Sorel, \textit{La Prise de Jeanne d’Arc}, p. 152.

\textsuperscript{195} Monstrelet describes the action as ‘très dure et aspre escarmouche’ but mentions that the casualties were only about 30 men on each side, which should be quite low, given the effective of the adversaries. The French forces are considered to be no less than 2 000 men strong (Monstrelet, IV, pp. 382–383; even 4000, according to Cordeliers, fo. 497v; discussed in P. Champion, \textit{Guillaume de Flavy}, pp. 39–40). The English contingent must have been between 800 (P. Champion, \textit{Guillaume de Flavy}, p. 39) and 1200 (Cordeliers, fo. 497v) men strong while the retinues of de Saveuse and de Brimeu amounted to the total of some 450 men, according to the muster taken on 18 April (see Appendix C.3.1).

\textsuperscript{196} See for example A. Sorel, \textit{La Prise de Jeanne d’Arc}, pp. 151–152.

\textsuperscript{197} Cordeliers, fo. 499r.
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Joan of Arc, hoping to cross the Aisne in the city, was not allowed by Boursel to enter with her soldiers. The admittance of the captains could not have any military effect while allowing the army to cross the river could probably be considered a breach of truce. It appears that Soissons was only delivered to the Burgundians in June.\textsuperscript{198}

During May other fortresses over the Aisne such as Attichy and Vic-sur-Aisne were brought to the submission by the Burgundians.\textsuperscript{199} Thus, the line of the Aisne was secured and the Burgundians could proceed to Compiègne.

4.3.4 The siege of Compiègne

The city of Compiègne, situated on the left bank of the Oise, had strong fortifications including an encircling wall with many towers. The Oise provided a natural defence for the city on the north–west, and the moat, which surrounded the town on the other sides, was connected with the river. Communications with the right bank of the river were maintained by a stone bridge,

\begin{flushright}
\footnotesize
198 Wavrin places a brief mention of the capture of Soissons by Jean de Luxembourg between the arrival of Huntington and capture of the boulevard before the bridge; both events are dated June in other sources, \textit{Wavrin}, III, p. 364.

Jean de Luxembourg was at Soissons in the last days of June 1430 (a payment made in January 1431 to Jean d’Avelus, knight, sent by duke Philip to Jean de Luxembourg at Soissons for his journey of 4 days ending on 30 June, ADN, B 1942 (3e compte), fo. 26r. In July Jean de Luxembourg was repaid 4 000 \textit{saluts d’or} by the duke of Burgundy, ADN, B 1942 (compte d’armes), fo. 64r; printed with some omissions in P. Champion, \textit{Guillaume de Flavy}, p. 168.

According to Jean Le Févre, Soissons was brought into submission by Jean de Luxembourg on his return from his raid to Laonnois in August (\textit{St. Remy}, II, p. 182), but this can hardly correlate with the payment made in July.

199 \textit{Cordeliers}, fo. 498v. It may be suggested that ‘Achery’ in the chronicle is the same mistake for Attichy that appears in the Douet d’Arcq’s edition of Monstrelet in the passage concerning the capture of Jean de Brimeu, where the editor spelt the place, where the Armagnacs came from, as Acheri identifying it with Achery (Aisne), in some 40 km to the north–east of Noyon, \textit{Monstrelet}, IV, p. 383 and n. 1. The English edition of the same chronicle transcribes the location name as Attichy (presumably, Attichy (Oise, arr. Compiègne) standing on the Aisne almost halfway between Compiègne and Soissons), which appears to be much more reasonable.
\end{flushright}
which had a gatehouse and a wooden drawbridge facing the left bank of the Oise where the bridge was protected by a boulevard, with its own moat and drawbridge. Similar boulevards protected the other gates of the city: the north-eastern leading towards Choisy, south-eastern, also known as the gates of Pierrefonds leading to Crépy-en-Valois and the south-western leading down the Oise to Verberie.\footnote{Verberie (Oise, arr. Senlis, cant. Pont–Sainte–Maxence). For more details on the fortifications of Compiègne see A. Sorel, La Prise de Jeanne d'Arc, pp. 161–167.}

After the fall of Choisy the Burgundians crossed to the right bank of Oise by a temporary bridge and were joined by the forces, which had been staying at Noyon at Pont l'Évêque. The campaign plan suggested blocking the gates of Compiègne with bastides in order to starve the city to surrender. It was reasonable to begin the siege with operations on the right bank of the Oise preventing enemy incursions into Burgundian–controlled territory.\footnote{Most likely this route was used by the Dauphinists to attack Pont–l'Évesque bypassing the Burgundians before Choisy, A. Sorel, La Prise de Jeanne d'Arc, pp. 153–155.} On 21 May the Lancastrian army approached Compiègne by the right bank.\footnote{Cordeliers, fo. 497v.} The Englishmen of Sir John Montgomery were placed at La Venette slightly downstream from the city.\footnote{Venette (Oise, arr. Compiègne, cant. Compiègne–Sud–Ouest).} The position at Margny facing the boulevard defending the bridge of Compiègne was entrusted to Baudot de Noyelle.\footnote{Margny-lès–Compiègne (Oise, arr. Compiègne, cant. Compiègne–Nord).} Jean de Luxembourg lodged at Clairoix, overlooking the confluence of the Aisne and the Oise,\footnote{Clairoix (Oise, arr. Compiègne, cant. Compiègne–Nord).} while the duke remained at Coudun.\footnote{Coudun (Oise, arr. Compiègne, cant. Ressons–sur–Matz) about 4 km upstream on the Aronde from its confluence with the Oise.} The position at Margny had no visual contact with that at Clairoix and was separated by a marsh from La Ve-
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This division of forces was intended to control the three roads going from the bridge in different directions.

On the 23 May probably the most famous act of Anglo-Burgundian cooperation took place. Joan of Arc led a sally against the camp of Baudot de Noyelle at Margny. However, Jean de Luxembourg, who happened to witness the attack, dispatched reinforcements to Margny, which fought the Dauphinists back. The retreat was cut off by the English advancing along the Oise from their lodgings at Venette. As a result, the Armagnac rear-guard was destroyed and Joan of Arc with some of her adherents captured.

In the evening Duke Philip came to Margny to see the captured Joan and to estimate the situation. On the next day the army was reviewed and a day later the deployment of the forces was changed. Philip the Good moved his quarters to Clairoix, while Jean de Luxembourg joined Baudot de Noyelle at Margny, probably taking command over the forces there.

The efforts were concentrated against the boulevard protecting the bridge. A bastide was erected in front to deploy the Burgundian artillery. After a period of bombardment and mining operations the boulevard was eventually taken in mid-July by assault personally led by Duke Philip. It was then used to place artillery bombarding the city across the Oise. While the boulevard remained in Dauphinist hands they could use it to amass forces for the sallies to

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207 P. Champion, Guillaume de Flavy, pp. 44–45.
208 A. Sorel, La Prise de Jeanne d’Arc, p. 169.
209 For more details on the capture of Joan of Arc see for example P. Champion, Guillaume de Flavy, pp. 43–47; A. Sorel, La Prise de Jeanne d’Arc, pp. 191–198. Some narrative sources make no mention of any English participation in the capture: St. Remy, II, pp. 179–180; Trahisons, p. 203.
210 see Appendix C.3.2.
211 Monstrelet, IV, p. 390. It may be caused by the casualties taken by the latter’s forces on 23 May. Baudot de Noyelle does not appear as a commander of separate retinue until September when the forces were redeployed and he was given a separate command, See Appendices C.3.1–3.5. It seems likely that during the summer his retinue was included in that of Jean de Luxembourg.
the right bank of the Oise. Now with the boulevard captured and the bridge demolished, this threat was gone. Philip the Good, however, had to dispatch a part of his army under Antoine, seigneur de Croy to deal with the attacks of the citizens of Liège against duke’s territories.213

A temporary bridge across the Oise was built near La Venette and the Lancastrians (especially the English contingent of John Holland, earl of Huntingdon, which had replaced that of Sir John Montgomery)214 began to overrun the left bank. Verberie and Saintines were taken during the raid down the Oise.215 It was probably about that time that Jean de Luxembourg made a raid to Soissonnois and Laonnois. Initially dispatched in order to relieve Vitry-en-Perthois, besieged by the Armagnacs, he had failed to arrive in time, but on his way back he besieged Crépy–en–Laonnois and forced it to surrender on 6 August.216

On 1 August, the journée of Gournay-sur-Aronde, Philip the Good appeared before the castle to oppose any Armagnac attempt to relieve it. No help was provided to the place and the Dauphinist captain had to surrender. Gournay passed into the custody of the seigneur de Crevecoeur, already the captain of Clermont–en–Beauvaisis.217 According to Monstrelet, about a thousand Eng-

214 Monstrelet, IV, p. 396; Wavrin, III, p. 364. St. Remy suggests that earls of Huntington and Arundel joined the siege in June, St. Remy, II, p. 181. The Chronicle of Cordeliers suggests that they were present at the siege from the start, Cordeliers, fo. 497v. Hall’s Chronicle first places the English under the command of the earls of Arundel and Suffolk at the start of the siege (Hall, p. 156) and then reports the arrival of the earl of Huntington and Sir John Robessart with 1 000 archers (Hall, p. 159).
216 St. Remy, II, p. 182; Cordeliers, fo. 501r.
217 Monstrelet, IV, p. 398. For the Crevecoeur’s command at Clermont see Monstrelet, IV, pp. 375–376, 397; Wavrin, III, p. 366.
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lishmen under the earl of Huntingdon and the duke of Norfolk accompanied Philip the Good at the journée.218

The news of the sudden death on 4 August 1430 of the Philip de Saint Pol, duke of Brabant, reached the Burgundian camp by 15 August.219 Philip the Good, who had pretensions to inherit the duchy from his childless cousin, had to leave the siege, considering his personal presence essential to secure the succession. John de Luxembourg, recalled from Laonnois, was put in charge of the operations.220 First, he ordered the erection of two small bastides upstream from Compiègne. Then, on 28 August the main Burgundian forces crossed the river, while the English returned back to La Venette.221 Jean de Luxembourg established his quarters at the abbey of Royallieu,222 blocking the road down-stream the Oise. A bastide was erected against the gates towards Pierfonds, garrisoned with 300 Burgundians under Jean, seigneur de Créquy, and Colard ‘Florimont’ de Brimeu.223 Thus a new stage of the siege was introduced as the communications of Compiègne with the Dauphinist-controlled territories were cut and its survival became dependent on its supplies.224

218 Monstrelet, IV, p. 398; Wavrin, III, p. 367. The presence of the duke of Norfolk is not reported at any earlier stages of the siege of Compiègne. As the chronicles suggest that the duke went to Paris once Gournay surrendered, it appears that he especially came for the journée.
219 St. Remy, II, p. 182.
220 Monstrelet, IV, p. 400, 402; Wavrin, III, p. 369.
223 The bastide was built only one and a half arrow flights away from the city gates, Monstrelet, IV, pp. 402–403; Wavrin, III, pp. 370–372.
224 A question has been raised, why the hunger did not play any part in the siege and why the powerful Burgundian artillery achieved so little, R. D. Smith, K. DeVries, The artillery of the dukes of Burgundy, pp. 102–103. It appears that although the siege had begun in mid-May, it was not until mid–August that the city was blockaded. The artillery bombardment until then was made across the Oise and could only damage the buildings on the bridge and within the city as well as the walls facing the river. Nothing suggests that an assault across the river was ever planned by the besiegers.

This in turn may raise a question why the duke of Burgundy made little attempt to extend the siege operations to the left bank of the Oise after the boulevard protect–
The change in the character of the siege must have induced the Armagnac decision to break the siege, when the victuals in the city began to run out. A strong relief force assembled at Senlis and marched towards Compiègne.\textsuperscript{225} By the 24 October the Armagnacs were encamped at Verberie.\textsuperscript{226} The decisive events came on the following day. Informed that the enemy was approaching, Lancastrian commanders decided that the garrisons of the bastides would remain in the fortifications, while the bulk of the army would meet the enemy at Royallieu. The English crossed there, leaving only a small company for the defence of their camp at La Venette. The Burgundian baggage train was sent to the rear under a small guard. As usual, preparing for a defensive combat, the Lancastrian battle order was set on foot.\textsuperscript{227}

The main Armagnac forces appeared before the Lancastrian positions, staying mostly on horseback out of the range of the archery fire. Several knights were made on the Lancastrian side in the anticipation of the battle but

\textsuperscript{225} Lancastrian forces after the depart of the duke of Burgundy are estimated as some 3–4 000 men, \textit{St. Remy}, II, p. 183. This number must be approximately correct as there were about 2 300 Burgundians (according to September muster, see Appendix C.3.5.), while the English contingent is reported to be of about 1 000 men.


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nothing more than some skirmishing without any result took place.\footnote{Among the newly dubbed knights were Dreux, seigneur de Humières, Ferry de Mailly, Laigle de Sains and Gilles de Saucourt, \textit{Monstrelet}, IV, pp. 412–413; \textit{Wavrin}, III, pp. 380–381.} What the Lancastrians did not know was that Poton de Xaintrailles was moving by the Pierrefonds road against their bastide while another mounted squad was sent by the indirect route to enter the city by the gates leading to Choisy (which were not blocked by the English bastides) and to induce the citizens to make a sally.

The Armagnacs managed to exploit to their advantage the Anglo-Burgundian choice of fighting dismounted defensive combat. The bulk of the Lancastrian army could not leave their positions without taking the risk of being attacked on the march by the Dauphinist cavalry. Having placed themselves on the defensive, they left the initiative to the Armagnacs. These employed their advantage of mobility to divide Lancastrian forces and launch successful assaults against the bastides encircling the city, which could not receive succour from the main Lancastrian forces. First, the bastide on the Pierrefonds road fell to the Armagnac attacks, its garrison either killed or captured. Then one of the small bastides on the Oise followed and the other at this point was abandoned. Only Baudot de Noyelle was able to hold his position. By the end of the day the Armagnac relieving army entered the city.\footnote{L. Carolus-Barré, ‘Le siège de Compiègne’, p. 46–49; See \textit{Monstrelet}, IV, pp. 413–416; \textit{Wavrin}, III, pp. 379–386 for the course of operations. The report in the \textit{Livre des Trahisons} blames the English who reportedly retreated to their bastide shocked by the size of the Valois army, \textit{Trahisons}, p. 202.}

The Dauphinists obtained a significant success, not only taking a number of important prisoners but also completely wiping out the Lancastrian siege fortifications around Compiègne. The Lancastrians could not resume the siege while the Armagnac relief force remained in the city and could only continue to bombard across the river, which they had done since late July with little effect. It was therefore decided to offer pitched battle to the enemy on the next day\footnote{This decision may have echoed a similar demonstration made by the English before Orleans before abandoning the siege, \textit{Journal du siège d’Orléans}, p. 89.} and the English returned to La Venette while the Burgundians

\footnote{Among the newly dubbed knights were Dreux, seigneur de Humières, Ferry de Mailly, Laigle de Sains and Gilles de Saucourt, \textit{Monstrelet}, IV, pp. 412–413; \textit{Wavrin}, III, pp. 380–381.}
stayed at Royallieu. But the failure on the previous day must have affected the morale of the army. Numerous desertions were reported during the night. In the morning Jean de Luxembourg had also to cross to La Venette, leaving his position at Royallieu to the enemy and destroying the bridge. By the evening a general retreat was decided, and during the night the army departed towards Noyon. The bastide facing the bridge, the only one not captured by the enemy, was demolished by the besiegers.

Although Monstrelet claims that the Lancastrians left ‘tres grand nombre de grosses bombardes, canons, veuglaieres, serpentes, culevrines, et aultres artilleries’, the account of Jean Abonnel only notes the loss of six bombards and two other siege machines. This may suggest that the siege artillery, probably too cumbersome to be evacuated in a single day and possibly requir—

231 Monstrelet, IV, pp. 416–418; Wavrin, pp. 386–389. Le Fèvre de Saint Remy blames for the decision the English not willing to continue the siege as they were unpaid for several days, St. Remy, II, p. 186. Monstrelet also mentions that the decision to retreat was taken ‘consérans qu’il estoit chose impossible de longuement entretenir leur gens’, which may be due to the financial problems or to the demoralisation in the wake of enemy success, Monstrelet, IV, p. 418.

Contemporary English chronicles do not seem to contain detailed information on the siege, but a later chronicle of Edward Hall makes a decided attempt, worth lengthy citation, to save the reputation the English pretending that once the duke of Burgundy left for Brabant ‘takyng with hym his best capitaines’, Jean de Luxembourg ‘beying of small strength and lesse corage […] advised the Englishmen, to depart for that tyme, tyll the next sommer: whiche thereto at the first, would in nowise agree. But there was no remedy, for he was capitan generall, and had the ordynaunce vnder his rule, so without that, thei could nothyng doo: Werthere in great displeasure, they returned into Normandy. After whose departure, the captain set fire in all the bastiles, and secretly departed’, Hall, p. 160.

232 Monstrelet, IV, p. 418; Wavrin, III, p. 389.

233 Monstrelet, IV, p. 418. See also Wavrin, III, pp. 389–390.

234 ADN, B 1942 (compte d’armes), fos. 84v–85r.
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...was left to the enemy, but the smaller artillery pieces were not lost.

It appears that the role of the English in the siege of Compiègne was secondary to that of the Burgundians. They were certainly subordinate to the Burgundian command in tactical aspects although not in financial questions. All their reported activity – the capture of Joan of Arc, the journée of Gournay-sur-Aronde, the raids towards Senlis and Crépy-en-Valois – were field operations. Once the enemy attack was anticipated, the English were summoned to form a part of the battle order. It may be suggested that the English contingent was held back in the ranks of the Burgundian army for a possible pitched battle, while the siege operations were mostly performed by the Burgundians.

4.3.5 The second campaign of Philip the Good in 1430

The failure at Compiègne was followed by a number of setbacks including the loss of Gournay-sur-Aronde and Pont-Saint-Maxence. According to the Chronicle of Cordeliers, the Armagnacs recovered all they had lost except for Soissons. Their advance over the right bank of the Oise culminated in the attempt to besiege Clermont-en-Beauvaisis held by Jacques, seigneur de

235 Hall’s Chronicle expressly states that the guns were left ‘for lacke of cariage’, Hall, p. 160.

236 It may on the other hand be that the cost of them was considered insufficient related to that of the siege artillery, which amounted to 8 000 francs of 32 gros each, ADN, B 1942 (compte d’armes), fos. 84v–85r. In part of the artillery lost worth 1 700 francs belonged personally to Jean of Luxembourg making Hall’s report that he induced the English to leave the siege and then withdrew his forces still more dubious.

237 Being a part of the king’s expeditionary army the English contingents must have been paid for six months before crossing to France and then monthly in advance for the rest of the year they indentured to serve, A. Curry ‘The “Coronation Expedition”’, p. 32. As their service started in April the first six months were to expire in October. This corresponds well with the notice of Le Fèvre de Saint Remy that by the end of the siege the English were not inclined to stay before Compiègne, because they had not been paid for 8 days already, St. Remy, II, p. 186.

238 For a more detailed list see Monstrelet, IV, p. 419; Wavrin, III, p. 391.

239 Cordeliers, fo. 503r.
Crèvecoeur, with a garrison of some 80 combatants.\textsuperscript{240} Nevertheless, he held out for about 10 days and then the enemy retreated on news that the earl of Huntington and the bastard of Saint-Pol had taken the field in order to raise the siege.\textsuperscript{241}

On 4 November Philip the Good, by this time aware of the failure before Compiègne and the Armagnac advances, sent Pierre de Bauffremont, seigneur de Charny, and Jean de Pressy, seigneur de Mesnil, his chamberlains and councilors, to the king of England and his council, then in Rouen.\textsuperscript{242} The duke’s letters reproached the king for making the duke undertake the siege of Compiègne instead of attacking Creil and Laon (which the duke pretended to be his expressed intention), and also for the failure to provide money for the payment both to the duke’s and to earl of Huntington’s men.\textsuperscript{243} The duke, nevertheless, assured the king of his devotion to the Lancastrian cause and pretended that he had been already on his way back from Brabant when he heard of the failure before Compiègne. He reported that his forces would assemble on 10 November at Corbie to resist the Armagnac threat to the lands between the Oise and the Somme, and asked Henry VI for military support. He also insisted that the money due to him should be paid to him so that he may be able to continue the war.\textsuperscript{244} The instructions given to the duke’s ambassadors\textsuperscript{245} suggested that

\textsuperscript{240} The garrison received the wages of 53,5 paies, ADN, B 1942 (compte d’armes), fos. 53r–53v. With a proportion of 60–70\% gens de trait this would amount to about 80 soldiers.

\textsuperscript{241} Monstrelet, IV, pp. 420–421; Wavrin, III, pp. 391–393. According to P. Champion, referring to the Cordeliers, the siege was abandoned by the Armagnacs on 15 November, P. Champion, Guillaume de Flavy, p. 59 n. 3; Cordeliers, fos. 503v–504r.

\textsuperscript{242} Of which Cardinal Beaufort and Richard Beauchamp, earl of Warwick, are specially mentioned in the instructions of the envoys, Letters and Papers, II, pt. 1, p. 165.

\textsuperscript{243} It is notable that the duke’s indenture only suggested that the English force of 500 men would join the duke for the first three months of the campaign and spoke nothing of the expenses related to the artillery, see ADN, B 302 no. 15576 (Appendix E). It appears that these conditions as well as the size of the Burgundian contingent after the first three months (increased from 600 men–at-arms and 600 archers to 800 men–at-arms and 1000 archers) were reconsidered during the campaign.

\textsuperscript{244} Letter published in Letters and Papers, II, pt. 1, pp. 156–164. The duke’s demands for money may be due to his financial problems which had already made him halve the wages of his officers on 25 July, P. Bonenfant, Philippe le Bon, pp. 51–52.
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if the king was unable to make a repayment the duke could be satisfied with the delivery to him of the duke of Bourbon, a prisoner in England since the battle of Agincourt.246 They also were to inform the king of the threat to the borders of Burgundy both from the Armagnacs, reportedly gathering forces in Bourbonsnais, Maconnais and Auxerrois, and also from German princes, asked to support him with a certain number of English archers serving at the king’s payment.247 The king was also encouraged to assist in the liberation of certain Burgundian prisoners by exchanging them for some of the Armagnac prisoners of the English.248

It is not clear to what degree the delegates had used all the powers given to them, but it appears that the necessary payments were made. The compte d’armes contains two payments of 19 500 francs and 19 163 francs made by John Hotoft, treasurer of war for Henry VI, on the 2 November.249 It may be possible that by 4 November, the date of the duke’s letters, Philip the Good was unaware that the problem was already being solved. As appears from the compte d’armes only the service for about half-month in October (before the siege was raised) remained unpaid.

247 These were intended to cooperate with the Burgundian men–at–arms, Letters and Papers, II, pt. 1, pp. 173–176.
248 Jean, seigneur de Créquy, Jacques and Colard ‘Florimont’ de Brimeu and Waleran de Beauval, captured before Compiègne are personally named among these prisoners, Letters and Papers, II, pt. 1, pp. 177–179.
249 ADN, B 1942 (compte d’armes), fos. 6r–6v.
Table 1. Payments to the duke of Burgundy for the campaign of 1430

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month (beginning on 10th day)</th>
<th>Effective, men-at-arms / gens de trait</th>
<th>Evidence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apr – May</td>
<td>1500 / 1500</td>
<td>25 000 nobles (£ 8333, 6 s. 8 d.) POPC, IV, p. 31, 32; Foedera, X, p. 454; ADN, 1942 (compte d’armes), fo. 5v (March 1430)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May – June</td>
<td></td>
<td>Serving at Philip the Good’s expense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June – July</td>
<td></td>
<td>£2364 / 19500 fr. TNA, E 101/52/35/2, 3 ADN, B 1942 (compte d’armes), fo. 6v (12 July 1430)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July – Aug</td>
<td>800 / 1000</td>
<td>19 500 fr. BL, Add. Ch. 369, 370; ADN, B 1942 (compte d’armes), fo. 6r (12 August 1430)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug – Sep</td>
<td></td>
<td>19 500 fr. ADN, B 1942 (compte d’armes), fo. 6r–6v (2 November 1430)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep – Oct</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct – Nov</td>
<td></td>
<td>1963 nobles ADN, B 1942 (compte d’armes), fo. 6v (2 November 1430)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the meantime, the duke of Burgundy actually assembled an army at Corbie intending to invest Guerbigny. A reconnaissance force of 500–600 men was sent forward and, joined by Gérard, bastard de Brimeu from the garrison of Roye, advanced from Péronne to Lihons towards Guerbigny. On 20 November this vanguard was caught completely unaware by the Armagnacs near Bouchoir. Some of the Lancastrians under the leadership of Sir Thomas Kyri—

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251 Bouchoir (Somme, arr. Montdidier, cant. Rosières–en–Santerre). St. Remy, II, p. 193. According to Monstrelet, the Lancastrian force of 500–600 men was reinforced by some 40 combatants under Gérard, bastard de Brimeu, while the Armagnacs, led by Poton de Xaintrailles, had about 1 200 men, Monstrelet, IV, pp. 422–424.

According to Monstrelet, they marched ‘sans eulx mettre en ordonnance de bataille, ne envoyer leurs coureurs devant eulx, ainsi que le font et ont acoustumé de faire droites gens d’armes, exprs en fait de guerre, et mesmement quant ilz furent près de leurs ennemis’, that most of them were not wearing their armour. The description looks like an example of how the vanguard should not conduct itself. Jean le Fèvre
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ell had tried to make a stand, but after a short combat had to surrender. Almost all the participants on the Lancastrian side who deserved mention in the chronicles appear in the list of casualties either as slain or taken prisoner.²⁵²

Receiving the news that his vanguard had been annihilated, the duke of Burgundy advanced to Guerbigny and then to Roye, where he stayed for a time, awaiting English reinforcements.²⁵³ The English force of some 400–500 men under Thomas Beaufort, count of Perche,²⁵⁴ and Sir Louis Robersart was sent to support the duke. On 26 November they were attacked by the Armagnacs at Conty to the south of Amiens.²⁵⁵ Most of the English retreated to the castle,


²⁵² The Lancastrians lost 50–60 men killed and 80–100 taken prisoners, Monstrelet, IV, p. 424.

²⁵³ ‘attendant le conte de Staffort, le conte d’Arondel et aulcuns aultres Anglois, que paravant il ait mandés à venir vers lui’, Monstrelet, IV, p. 426. Lefèvre de Saint–Remy reports that he (being the Toison d’Or king of Arms) was sent to ask the English, who had raised the siege of Clermont, to join the duke of Burgundy. Having failed to find them, he went to Rouen and the duke of Bedford promised to send help to Philip the Good, St. Remy, II, p. 194.

²⁵⁴ Described as ‘le conte de Persche, frère au duc de Sombresset’, St. Remy, II, p. 194. Thomas Beaufort is reported to be in La Charité–sur–Loire in August 1430 with a retinue of 120 men–at–arms and 360 archers before returning to Paris by November and then to England by the end of the year, G. L. Harriss, Cardinal Beaufort, p. 205. He could have taken part in the events on his way back to England.

²⁵⁵ Conty (Somme, arr. Amiens, ch.–l. of cant.)
losing most of their horses, but Sir Louis Robersart was slain.\textsuperscript{256} This failure prevented the English from joining the Burgundian army.\textsuperscript{257}

While Duke Philip was waiting, the Dauphinists appeared before Roye, offering battle to him. Two armies stood before each other in battle orders, but both sides found formal reasons not to engage in combat and the confrontation only resulted in minor skirmishes.\textsuperscript{258} On the next day the Armagnacs withdrew.

Then the duke, according to Monstrelet, was reinforced by the Humphrey, earl of Stafford, with some 600 men.\textsuperscript{259} He besieged the castle of Laigny-les-Châteaigniers defended by Philippe de Gamaches, abbot of Saint Pharon of Meaux.\textsuperscript{260} The castle only surrendered after the lower court had been taken by

\textsuperscript{256} St. Remy, II, pp. 194–195. A. Curry gives 27 November as the date of his death in PRME, X, p. 437. It was generally believed that being the knight of the Garter he deliberately refused to save his life by retreating, St. Remy, II, p. 195. M. Vale mentions that his death was later recalled by Ghillebert de Lannoy in his Enseignements Paternels as an example of chivalrous behaviour, M. Vale, War and Chivalry. Warfare and Aristocratic Culture in England, France and Burgundy at the End of the Middle Ages, (Athens, Georgia, 1981), p. 27, referring to Oeuvres de Ghillebert de Lannoy voyageur, diplomate et moraliste, ed. by C. Potvin (Louvain, 1878), pp. 457–458.

\textsuperscript{257} ‘quant audit conte de Perche, il ne fut point devers le duc et ne passa point Amiens’, St. Remy, II, p. 195.

\textsuperscript{258} According to Monstrelet, Philip the Good was convinced by his advisors not to risk himself in the combat given that there was no adversary of an equal status (the only great noble among the Armagnacs was Louis de Bourbon, count of Vendôme, a descendant of a cadet line of the House of Bourbon and thus a prince of blood although of rather low standing). Other considerations included the numeric supremacy of the enemy (estimated as about 1 600 men) and low morale of the Burgundians after the failures at Compiègne and Bouchoir. It was eventually suggested that Jean de Luxembourg might lead the army in the battle, but the Armagnacs refused, insisting on the duke’s participation in the battle, Monstrelet, IV, p. 426.

\textsuperscript{259} The arrival of the earl of Stafford to the duke of Burgundy is not attested by Jean Lefevre de Saint–Remy, see St. Remy, II, pp. 195–197.

\textsuperscript{260} Laigny (Oise, arr. Compiègne, cant. Lassigny). This prelate was an ardent Dauphinist, having participated in the defence of Meaux in 1421–1422 and of Compiègne in 1430, P. Champion, Guillaume de Flavy, p. 59 and n. 1.
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assault.261 While the siege was in progress on 2 December 1430 the council of England authorized the payment of the wages for 40 days to Sir John Montgomery with a retinue of 17 men-at-arms (paid 8 d. a day therefore, presumably, dismounted) and 207 archers with an unspecified number of King’s grooms and pages ad proficiscendum, de Villa Calesii, versus Ducem Burgundiae.262 It is not clear whether this force was to play any significant role. After Lagny fell, Philip the Good marched to Montdidier installing a garrison there and then proceeded to his northern dominions,263 while Stafford returned to Normandy.264 By mid-December the campaign of 1430 came to an end.

4.3.6 Results of the campaign of 1430

The campaign of 1430 was a major act of Burgundian participation in the military activities of Lancastrian France. It was planned in the entourage of Philip the Good and Burgundian forces played the most active part in it. What was intended to become Henry VI’s coronation campaign also saw a high level of participation by the kingdom of England in the French affairs, unparalleled at least since 1417.265 The attempts to create an even wider anti-Valois coalition advocated by de Lannoy’s memorandum brought to nothing, Charles VII seems to have enough soldiers at his disposal to counteract the Lancastrian attacks. On the contrary, Philip the Good had to divide his attention between the war in France, the conflict with Liège and the need to establish his power in Brabant. Even the loss of the charismatic leadership of Joan of Arc early in the campaign does not seem to have much affected the enemy. Lancastrians suf–

261 The siege was still in progress on 4 December, P. Champion, Guillaume de Flavy, p. 60 n. 7, 8.
262 POPC, IV, p. 72; Foedera, X, p. 481. The Foedera does not mention the payment for Sir John Montgomery’s retinue. On the same day a payment of 500 l. to Jean de Luxembourg was authorised, POPC, IV, p. 72.
263 The duke was back at Peronne on 8 December and then proceeded to Brussels via Bapaume and Arras, Itinéraires, p. 89.
264 Monstrelet, IV, pp. 427–428.
265 J. Barker, Conquest, p. 144.
fered several defeats – Anthon, Compiègne, Bouchoir, Conty – which were reported to have a negative effect on the morale of the Burgundian army.266

By the end of the year, however, it was evident that very little had been obtained. The Lancastrians recovered some of their losses in Normandy and around Paris. However, the Seine – Yonne line was broken by the enemy controlling Melun and Sens. In Picardy, it may be suggested, no significant changes took place except for the surrender of Soissons to the Burgundians, to a certain degree counterbalanced by the Armagnac advance on the left bank of the Oise towards Roye and Montdidier. Thus, the lengthy borders of Burgundian dominions were more vulnerable than ever, tempting Philip the Good to seek a diplomatic solution where he could not deal with military force.

The ill success of the campaign, however, can hardly be ascribed to the tensions between the Anglo-Burgundian allies. On the tactical level there were numerous examples of mutual help and support at the defence of Noyon, in the episode with the capture of Joan of Arc and at raising the siege of Clermont-en-Beauvaisis. The relations between Philip the Good and the council of Henry VI may have suffered certain difficulties, but the English were eager to provide help to the duke. The English contingent remained with the Burgundian army throughout the campaign and not for three months, as prescribed by the indenture. The retinue of the duke of Norfolk seems to have been especially sent for the journée of Gournay-sur-Aronde. Anglo-Burgundian cooperation in the campaign of 1430 seems to have been closer than ever both before and after.

4.4 The coronation campaign of Henry VI, 1431.

4.4.1 English operations in Normandy and the Ile-de-France.

The campaign of 1430, projected as the coronation campaign of Henry VI, failed to obtain its objective. The king’s chances of being crowned at Reims by the end of the year were hardly greater than they had been in April at his arrival in France. But the young king could not stay on the continent forever. Both Bedford and Beaufort, the two most influential men in Lancastrian France

266 Monstrelet, IV, p. 426.
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had reasons to desire his return to England. Bedford’s regency was suspended while the king was in France, and he must have felt himself constrained by the council, which now administered the kingdom in Henry VI’s name. On the other hand, the government of England during the king’s absence was exercised by Humphrey, duke of Gloucester, an old rival of the cardinal, who may have felt his position in England threatened. However, to let Henry VI return to England without being crowned in France would have been a great diplomatic failure. Such an acknowledgement of impotence would have undermined the position of the Lancastrian regime in France.

Therefore by mid–1431 a coronation in Paris instead of Reims became a matter of discussion. In the advice given to the members of council of England going to France both Paris and Reims were seen as possible places for the coronation, but for their part Gloucester and the English council considered it quite appropriate to have the king crowned in Paris.²⁶⁷ It was also emphasized that before the king might go to Reims, not only this city with the surrounding territories, but also Louviers threatening the communications between Paris and Rouen, had to be brought to obedience.²⁶⁸ This decision was left to Bedford, Cardinal Beaufort and the French council.²⁶⁹

By the end of 1430 the first six months of service (for which the captains of the coronation expedition were paid in advance) expired. Some of the captains may have returned to England in October–November. Others were kept in the king’s service in France, given charge of the garrisons in Normandy, but the reinforcements were still much required.²⁷⁰ In late 1430 Cardinal Beaufort crossed to England to seek military and financial support for the continuation of the campaign.²⁷¹ As a result of his efforts a force of some 2 600 men including the retinues of Edmund and Thomas Beaufort, the cardinal’s nephews, was

²⁶⁷ These matters were discussed in March 1431 when certain persons were appointed to the council of France, and they must have left in mid–May together with Cardinal Beaufort, A. Curry, ‘The “Coronation Expedition” ’, p. 43 and n. 83.

²⁶⁸ POPC, IV, pp. 92–93; A. Curry, ‘The “Coronation Expedition” ’, p. 44.

²⁶⁹ POPC, IV, pp. 92–93.


²⁷¹ For Beaufort’s visit to England see G. L. Harriss, Cardinal Beaufort, pp. 202–204; A. Curry, ‘The ‘The “Coronation Expedition” ’, pp. 43-44.
recruited to sail to France by the end of April. Richard Nevill, earl of Salisbury, was to follow by early July with some 800 men.\textsuperscript{272}

This army landed at Calais. Then, according to the Chronicle of Cordeliers, a part of it then proceeded directly to Normandy, while the rest crossed the Somme and advanced as far as Brétouil. However it was soon also recalled to the siege of Louviers, the main target of English efforts in 1431.\textsuperscript{273} It was probably this second force which was staying at Amiens in early May 1431, recruiting gunners, crossbowmen, pioneers and other labourers for this siege.\textsuperscript{274}

While Cardinal Beaufort was in England, on 30 January Bedford came to Paris.\textsuperscript{275} In March–April with the support of Parisian militia he recovered several places in the environs of the capital but failed to take Lagny-sur-Marne.\textsuperscript{276}

In 1431 Louviers became the main English objective. The first attempts against the place undertaken in late 1430 proved fruitless, and the siege was re–established in late May 1431.\textsuperscript{277} The royal letter to Philip the Good dated 28 May promised the duke English help for the defence of the borders of Burgundy but only after the siege have been brought to a successful end ‘par le moy–en et bon aide de monseigneur de Bourgoingne, de Monseigneur de Stafford, de mon dit seigneur de Guise,\textsuperscript{278} de monseigneur de Salisbury’.\textsuperscript{279} There is,

\textsuperscript{272} G. L. Harriss, \textit{Cardinal Beaufort}, p. 204.
\textsuperscript{273} \textit{Cordeliers}, fo. 507r. This chronicle gives no exact dates for these events but since they are placed before report of Joan of Arc’s execution, it appears that the English force, that was staying in Picardy for some time, was not the one appointed to help Jean de Luxembourg in his campaigns in July–August.
\textsuperscript{274} M. K. Jones, ‘The Beaufort Family’, p. 82; A. Curry, ‘The “Coronation Expedition”’, p. 44.
\textsuperscript{275} \textit{Bourgeois}, p. 261; \textit{Fauquembergue}, III, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{276} \textit{Bourgeois}, pp. 263–264.
\textsuperscript{278} For the grant of the county of Guise to Jean de Luxembourg, See Ch. 2.9.
\textsuperscript{279} \textit{Plancher}, IV, pp. LXXXVI–LXXVII; \textit{Letters and Papers}, II, pt. 1, pp. 188–193. Richard Nevill, earl of Salisbury was to leave England in late June or early July (G. L. Harriss,
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however, hardly any evidence of either Philip the Good or Jean de Luxembour,
count of Guise participating in the siege; only some Burgundians long engaged
in Lancastrian service like Philibert de Moulant, master of the king’s artillery. 280
Another Burgundian contribution to the siege was the capture of La Hire who
left the place in a hope to bring reinforcements, by the men of Jean de Maissis
dit de Campanas, Burgundian captain of Dourdain. 281 After this capture the
town was eventually delivered to the English in late October. 282 Now the way
from Rouen to Paris was more or less secure.

4.4.2 Hostilities in Champagne, 1430–1431.

The coronation campaign of Charles VII brought him the control of the
most important cities of Champagne. However, control of the county continued
to be disputed by the Burgundians, especially after it was granted to Philip the
Good in March 1430. In the next two years this struggle resulted in a number

Cardinal Beaufort, p. 204) so his participation in the siege must have been seen in a
future prospect, when the letter was written on 28 May. Nevertheless, this mention
may be considered a demonstration of the intention to employ his troops for the siege
when they arrived instead of sending them to support the duke of Burgundy.

280 M. H. Guibert, ‘Louviers’, p. 216. Philibert de Moulant served as the master of the
king’s ordnance since at least 1423, G. Ritter, ‘Extraits du Journal de Trésor (1423–
1424)’, BEC, 73 (1912), p. 473. In this capacity he participated in a number of sieges
including those of Montargis (1427), Orléans (1428–1429), Lagny-sur-Marne (1432).
He was also the captain of Nogent-sur-Seine during the 1420s, T. Boutiot, Histoire de
la ville de Troyes, II, pp. 457, 487–488. However, by 1434 he went into the service of
the duke of Burgundy becoming his écuyer d’écuerie, ADN, B 1951, fo. 141r; J. Garnier,
L’artillerie des ducs de Bourgogne, pp. 151–153, 158–159.

281 M. H. Guibert, ‘Louviers’, p. 229. There is evidence of the correspondence by the
duke of Burgundy with the captain of Dourdain and in October 1431 with the royal
council in Rouen over the capture of La Hire, ADN, B 1942 (3e compte), fos. 97v, 123v,
127r, 136r. La Hire was purchased from the duke of Burgundy by the Lancastrian gov-
ernment for £1000, A. Curry, ‘Les Anglais face aux procès’, pp. 82 n. 38.

282 According to the treaty of surrender concluded on 22 October, the town was to be
the fall of Louviers 25 October, Bourgeois, p. 273. Some authors give 28 October as
the date of capitulation, see for example E. C. Williams, My Lord of Bedford, p. 207, G.
L. Harriss, Cardinal Beaufort, p. 211.
of engagements where the English contingents came to the help of the Burgundians.

In February 1430 the Armagnacs took the castle of Larrey. On 7 February the Estates of Burgundy consented to the assembly of troops to resist the enemy and voted a tax to finance the military efforts. The army of some 600–700 soldiers (mostly infantrymen) was mustered on 26 February. It included a company of 80 ou 100 Cavaliers anglois, brought from Nogent and Montigny by John Dedham. The siege, laid on 9 March, proved a tough one: after the Burgundian artillery made a breach, three assaults were repulsed by

283 Larrey (Côte-d’Or, arr. Montbard, cant. Laignes) about 12 km to the west of Châtillon-sur-Seine.
284 Canat, p. 298.
285 U. Plancher considered the army to be 6 to 7 000 strong, Plancher, IV, p. 137. This is an overestimation as shown by O. Belotte based on the muster-roll, O. Belotte, ‘Les opérations militaires dans la vallée de la Seine aux confins de la Bourgogne et de la Champagne de 1429 à 1435’, Les Cahiers d’Histoire Militaire, 3 (1970), p. 106. M. Canat also gives 26 February as a date of the muster, Canat, p. 298. For the list of the Burgundian participants see J. L. Bazin, ‘La Bourgogne de la mort du duc Philippe le Hardi’, pp. 204–205.

There is a significant variation in how this captain’s surname is spelt. The spelling of Dedham appears in the original documents, BL, Add. Ch. 11608; M. Keen, The Laws of War, pp. 263–267. It also appears in William of Worcester’s notes together with the spelling Dehad (possibly, erroneous), Letters and Papers, II, pt. 2, p. [530]. It was also spelt as Dodham (B. Schnarb, Bulgnéville, p. 64), Adam (St. Remy, II, p. 259), Ladam (Monstrelet, IV, pp. 459–460) and even as Doudain (Plancher, IV, p. 137; J. Pot, Histoire de Regnier Pot, pp. 280–281).

The Soldier in Later Medieval England database gives numerous references for the service of those called John Adam, most of them archers, except for one, who served as a man–at–arms under Hugh de Courtenay, earl of Devon in his naval service in 1418, TNA E 101/49/34 m. 7 [SLME]. There is also John Dedham, appearing as an archer in 1437 (BNF, MS. Fr. 25773 no. 1171 [SLME]) or as a simple man–at–arms in 1442, (BL, Egerton Ch. 186, [SLME]), which can hardly refer to this captain.
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the Dauphinists. Finally, by the end of March the garrison agreed to surrender on being allowed to depart with their belongings and prisoners and receiving a ransom for the castle on 1 April the Armagnacs left Larrey.

Another example of the Anglo–Burgundian cooperation in 1430 (this time in the north of Champagne) were the actions of the garrison of Montaigu led for Jean de Luxembourg by an Englishman William Corawen and a Burgundian George de Croix. The castle was besieged by the Dauphinists in late April 1430. The siege, however, was abandoned soon after the composition for Gournay-sur-Aronde had been made and the main forces of Philip the Good were again in the field. The garrison of Montagu later that year came to relieve the fortress of Champigneux, besieged by the provost of Laon, and

\[\text{\textsuperscript{288}}\text{U. Plancher reports that the English were displeased with these favourable conditions Plancher, IV, p. 138.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{289}}\text{The castle thus was delivered a few days before the appointed day of surrender (4 April), O. Belotte, ‘Les opérations militaires’, p. 106 ; J.-L. Bazin, ‘La Bourgogne de la mort du duc Philippe le Hardi’, p. 205.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{290}}\text{Identified as a location within Amblyen (Aisne, arr. Soissons, cant. Vic-sur-Aisne), a place on the left bank of the Aisne some 10 km downstream from Soissons, by C. Berry, ‘Les Luxembourg–Ligny’, p. 314 n. 1339. It can as well be Montaigu (Aisne, arr. Laon, cant. Sissonne) about 15 km to the east of Laon.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{291}}\text{Guillaume Coram and George de Le Croix, Monstrelet, IV, p. 380. The latter may have been the same George de Croix, who had been captured by the Armagnacs earlier this year in a skirmish with the garrison of Creil and then exchanged for Jacques de Chabannes, Monstrelet, IV, pp. 363–364.}\]

William Corawen is reported to be captured together with Sir Thomas Kyriell in the skirmish at Bouchoir later that year, Monstrelet, IV, p. 424. See above Ch. 4.3.5. He then continued to serve Jean de Luxembourg in the east of Champagne and in the county of Ligny in 1433–1434, Monstrelet, V, pp. 75, 114; Gruel, p. 93. By October 1435 he returned to Normandy and served in the garrison of Gournay under Sir Thomas Kyriell, BNF, MS. Fr. 25772 no. 1003 [SLME]. He continued to serve in Normandy until mid 1440s becoming the captain of Gournay and Gerberoy and then Gisors.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{292}}\text{Monstrelet, IV, pp. 379–380. C. Berry believes that the place fell to the Armagnacs, but only refers to Monstrelet, C. Berry, ‘Les Luxembourg–Ligny’, p. 315.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{293}}\text{Identified with Champigneul (dep. Ardennes) by Douet d’Arcq (Monstrelet, IV, p. 398), but as well can be Champigneul–Champagne (Marne, arr. Châlons-en–Champagne, cant. Écury-sur–Coole) near Chalons-sur–Marne.}\]
made the enemy abandon the siege. According to Monstrelet, Champigneux also had a joint Anglo-Burgundian garrison.

When La Hire captured Château-Gaillard on 24 February 1430 he also deprived the English of one of their most valuable prisoners, Arnauld Guilhem, sire de Barbazan. In 1430 he is reported as defeating at La Croisette the Anglo-Burgundians who threatened Chalons. In September Charles VII appointed Barbazan his governor of Champagne. First, he was admitted to Ville-neuve-le-Roi. Then Pont-sur-Yonne surrendered to Barbazan by a composition, and he proceeded to besiege the castle of Chappes, a Burgundian outpost some 20 km upstream the Seine from Troyes. He was assisted in this siege by the new duke of Bar, René of Anjou. Antoine de Touloungeon, marshal of Burgundy, assembled the nobility of the duchy and marched to the succour of the garrison. It is not completely clear whether any English contingent had joined the marshal’s army but attempts to summon them were made.

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295 Monstrelet, IV, p. 399.
296 He was captured at the surrender of Melun in November 1420 and (after not being found guilty of the murder of John the Fearless) was kept in Château-Gaillard. For more details see Appendix F.1. His liberation may have prevented his exchange for John, Lord Talbot, captured in the battle of Patay, then under consideration, A. J. Pollard, John Talbot, p. 17; J. Barker, Conquest, p. 143.
297 Chartier, I, pp. 128–130. See also A. Lecoy de la Marche, Le Roi René, I, p. 96. The report on this battle suggesting a major defeat of Anglo-Burgundians (estimated as enormous 7–800 combatants) remains very obscure. T. Boutiot identifies it with the unsuccessful attempt to raise the siege of Anglure in 1431, see T. Boutiot, Histoire de la ville de Troyes, II, pp. 531–532.
299 Perrinet Gressart, who happened to be in this town, managed to flee to his stronghold of La Charité, J. Barker, Conquest, p. 143; B. Schnerb, Bulgnéville, p. 28; BNF, MS. Fr. 1965, fo. 103v.
301 For a representative list see Monstrelet, IV, pp. 395–396.
302 Claude de Tennarre was paid on 6 November 1430 for his expenses in going from Mâcon to the marches of Troyes in order to bring a certain number of the English to join the marshal of Burgundy against the duke’s enemies on the borders of Burgundy, Canat, p. 306. On 11 December Jean de Digoine came to Bray-sur-Seine to find out
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Barbazan thrice avoided the battle offered to him by de Toulonjeon and eventually on 13 December managed to ambush a part of the Burgundian army. The ensuing battle was won by the Dauphinists. The Burgundian captain of Chappes tried to intervene by organising a sally, but he was captured and the castle surrendered shortly afterwards.

The castle of Anglure became de Barbazan’s next target in May 1431. Bedford dispatched sent John FitzAlan, earl of Arundel, with 1 600 men, both English and Burgundians, to relieve the garrison. When the Lancastrians arrived in early June, Barbazan had his army deployed on a well fortified position. After some skirmishing, where the seigneur de L’Isle–Adam was wounded, the Lancastrians did not risk an assault. They could only evacuate the garrison and set the castle on fire. It is not clear whether the dispatch of Lancastrian force was a result of the pre–appointed journée or a simple reaction to the need for help. However, it appears that the force assembled was only intended to solve the local problem but not to continue lengthy operations in the region.

whether the English, besieging the place, were free to join the marshal’s army, J.–L. Bazin, ‘La Bourgogne de la mort du duc Philippe le Hardi’, p. 211.

303 J. H. Ramsay, Lancaster and York, I, p. 420 n. 1., A. Bossuat, Perrinet Gressart, p. 138; B. Schnerb, Bulgnéville, pp. 28–30. T. Boutiot believed this battle to take place in May (possibly, according to the placement of the relevant account in the chronicle of Monstrelet). This does not correspond with his own mention that the expenses made by the city of Troyes for the siege of Chappes related to the financial year finishing on 30 September 1431, T. Boutiot, Histoire de la ville de Troyes, II, pp. 518–519, 526–527.


305 Anglure (Marne, arr. Épernay), located in about 40 km to the north–west of Troyes, near the confluence of the Seine and the Aube.

306 Monstrelet, IV, p. 441; Wavrin, III, p. 396. Among the captains of the French origin Jean Villiers, seigneur de L’Isle–Adam, the seigneur de Châtillon and the seigneur de Bonneul are mentioned.

307 Monstrelet, IV, p. 441; Wavrin, III, p. 396. T. Boutiot specifies the terms of the siege with the evidence on the participation of Troyes in it, T. Boutiot, Histoire de la ville de Troyes, II, pp. 530–532.
4.4.3 The war in Lorraine and Barrois and the battle of Bulgnéville.

The death on 25 January 1431 of the childless Charles II, duke of Lorraine, led the renewal of struggle for the succession to the duchy.\textsuperscript{308} It was disputed by René of Anjou, the late duke’s son-in-law and successor, and Antoine of Lorraine, count of Vaudemont, a descendant of the cadet line of the House of Lorraine. René, a younger son of Louis II of Anjou and Yolande of Aragon, and thus a brother-in-law of Charles VII, was brought up in the house of Charles, cardinal and duke of Bar, who had made him his heir. Although Charles de Bar had sworn obedience to the Lancastrian regime and had made his son-in-law pay homage to Henry VI in May 1429, in July René retracted this oath and joined Charles VII for the later stage of his coronation campaign. In late 1430 – early 1431 he joined the seigneur de Barbazan in the war in Champagne.

His defection to the Valois cause gave ground to Antoine, count of Vaudemont to revive his claim to the duchy of Lorraine\textsuperscript{309} and seek Lancastrian and Burgundian support.\textsuperscript{310} The count of Vaudemont received a warm welcome when he came before Philip the Good at Hesdin in mid-April 1431. The marshal of Burgundy, Antoine de Toulouse, who had come to seek support from the duke in the defence of Burgundy, was ordered to provide help to the count. The greater nobility of Picardy was preoccupied with the defence of their own lands now threatened by the Armagnacs, but a number of lesser nobles willingly took part in the expedition. They were joined by the contingents mus-

\textsuperscript{308} B. Schnerb, Bulgnéville, p. 30.

\textsuperscript{309} He had disputed René’s right of succession as early as in 1425 when the testament of Charles of Lorraine had been made, although with little success.

\textsuperscript{310} The duchy of Lorraine was adjacent to the northern border of the county of Burgundy and its defection to the Dauphin must have been considered a threat by the duke of Burgundy and his councillors. According to the English response, the duke must have expressed his fears for the safety of the two Burgundies in his letter to Henry VI. For the English response see Letters and Papers, II, pt. 1, pp. 188–193. The defection of Barrois and Lorraine to the Dauphinists threatened communications between southern and northern group of Burgundian dominions. B. Schnerb has analyzed the itineraries of the dukes of Burgundy in their journeys between Lille and Dijon in 1414–1443, B. Schnerb, Bulgnéville, pp. 18, 20, visualised on the map on p. 72.
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tered in Burgundy. The army also included an English force under Sir Thomas Gargrave and Sir John Dedham. The contingent from Montigny and Nogent must have joined the forces assembled from the two Burgundies at their muster appointed at Montsageon near Langres on 17 June.

Hall’s chronicle, written in the mid-sixteenth century, gives a different report on the origin of the English assistance, suggesting that the count of Vaudemont came before the dukes of Bedford and Burgundy then in Paris and the duke of Bedford sent Sir John Fastolf with 600 archers to support the count. Although this report contains evident errors it may contain a kernel of truth. The English contingent at Bulgnéville is estimated as 600 men, presumably, 400 of them archers. The garrisons of Nogent and Montigny–le–Roi

311 For the composition of the Burgundian army see B. Schnerb, Bulgnéville, p. 60–64. For the count of Vaudemont’s visit to the duke of Burgundy and the preparations see B. Schnerb, Bulgnéville, pp. 37–41.
312 B. Schnerb, Bulgnéville, p. 64. The former appears as Thomas Gargarion in St. Remy, II, p. 259, Thomas Gergerain in Monstrelet, IV, p. 459, possibly, as a result of mistranscribing ‘v’ for ‘n’ by the editors.
313 Hall, p. 164. Philip the Good did not visit Paris in 1431, Itinéraires, pp. 89–97. The candidature of Sir John Fastolf as the leader of the English at Bulgnéville is also open to certain doubt. Hall employed the chronicle written by Christopher Hanson and Peter Basset for Sir John Fastolf, who consequently was one of its primary personages, see B. J. H. Rowe, ‘A Contemporary Account of the Hundred Years’ War from 1415 to 1429’, EHR, 41, pp. 504–513. Unfortunately the surviving part of this unfinished chronicle does not last to the battle of Bulgnéville, ending with the battle of Rouvray (1429). It is not impossible that Hall used some subsidiary notes which have not survived. However, given the historians’ interest in the person of Fastolf, it seems rather unlikely that his participation in a major pitched battle has escaped their attention. In the notes of William Worcester in Lambeth MS. 506, printed by J. Stevenson, John Dedham is mentioned as the leader of the English in the battle where René of Anjou was captured, Letters and Papers, II, pt. 2, p. [530].
314 B. Schnerb, Bulgnéville, p. 64, referring to A. Bossuat, Perrinet Gressart, p. 150 n. 2. The latter in turn gives the reference to the case in the Parlement of Paris between the duke and John Dodham in 1432, where the latter mentioned that ‘en la derreine bataille mena VF combatans avec le mareschal et autres seigneurs de bourgogne’, M. H. Keen, The Laws of War, p. 264. The suggestion on the share of the archers probably belongs to B. Schnerb.
were unlikely to field such a numerous force.\textsuperscript{315} Therefore it seems possible that the greater part of this contingent was provided by the Lancastrian central government.\textsuperscript{316}

The Burgundian army invaded the duchy of Lorraine in a kind of chevauchée, making René of Anjou abandon the siege of Vaudemont. The short campaign resulted on 2 July 1431 in the battle of Bulgnéville. The Burgundians were inferior in numbers and chose to adopt defensive tactics. Their army took a strong position on a hill with a stream in their rear. The carts and carriages were placed behind the lines and to the flanks to prevent attempts at encirclement.\textsuperscript{317} The archers\textsuperscript{318} were deployed on the flanks and in front of the battle orders, protected by sharpened poles.\textsuperscript{319} They were supported by the artillery placed in the front.

Monstrelet specially mentions the role of a certain English captain in the organization of the battle order.\textsuperscript{320} Given the modest share of the English in the army, it seems likely that the decision over the choice of tactics was made by the Burgundian commanders. Antoine de Toulouse, marshal of Burgundy, 

\textsuperscript{315} For these garrisons see above, Ch. 3.3. The contingent of 80–100 men provided for the siege of Larrey seems much more corresponding to their effective after 1426. According to Monstrelet, who mentions Sir John Dedham as the captain of Montigny, he was accompanied with ‘six vings combatans ou environ’, Monstrelet, IV, p. 459.

\textsuperscript{316} This suggestion in turn leads to the questions of how the dispatch of these forces (which would amount to about 500 men) may have been organised. In spite of the coincidence of effectives, it seems unlikely that the force may have been sent in accordance with the treaty of Amiens as the help was provided to the count of Vaudemont rather than the duke of Burgundy. Unfortunately, there seems to be no documentary evidence related to this aspect of expedition. This absence may not only be due to the non-survival of the sources, but may have been also resulted from the possible engagement of expeditionary forces from England, which would leave little trace in the financial accounts of Lancastrian France.

\textsuperscript{317} Monstrelet, IV, pp. 461–462.

\textsuperscript{318} Monstrelet expressly speaks of archiers and archiers Picards in his report on the battle, Monstrelet, IV, pp. 460, 464.

\textsuperscript{319} Monstrelet, IV, pp. 460, 461.

\textsuperscript{320} ‘se préparent et mirent en grande ordonnance de bataille, la plus grand partie par le conseil d’ycelui chevalier anglois’, Monstrelet, IV, p. 461.
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who must have exercised general command over Burgundian army, is reported
to have asked Philip the Good especially for *gens-de-trait* during his visit to the
duke’s court at Hesdin in the spring 1430. On the other hand, once the deci-
sion was taken, the expertise of the English was a valuable asset in its imple-
mentation. There was need for advice on tactics as the contingents from the
two Burgundies opposed fighting on foot as advocated by the Picards and the
English. To ensure due discipline everyone was commanded to dismount on
pain of death.

The battle turned out to be short and decisive. The Burgundians held
their position firm and rebuffed the Armagnac assault. The left wing of the lat-
ter did not even engage in the close combat and fled. The Sire de Barbazan was
killed in the battle, while the duke of Bar was captured together with the
bishop of Metz and a number of German nobles fighting on his side.

Once the military might of René of Anjou was crushed at Bulgnéville and
the siege of Vaudemont was raised, Antoine de Toulounge withdrew his forc-
es for the defence of the Burgundy. It seems possible that in this conflict the
Burgundians sought to remove the Dauphinist threat to their borders rather
than to change the ruler of the duchy. In the truce with Charles VII made by

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321 "Requérant [...] à eulx faire ayde de ses capitaines de Picardie, acompaňnié de ce
certain nombre des gens d’armes, et par espréal de gens de trait, lesquelz, come ils

322 *Monstrelet* does not specify the name of the English knight acting as the advisor. It
appears that Sir Thomas Gargrave who may have fought at Agincourt and Verneuil
must have been a perfect candidate. His previous career was outlined above, see Ch.
3.3. The limited evidence on the career of Sir John Dedham does not suggest such ex-
perience.

323 *Monstrelet*, IV, p. 461. This must demonstrate the difference of military traditions
among the northern and the southern groups of Burgundian dominions. It is also worth
mentioning that despite an obviously minor English component the army was per-
ceived as tripartite (‘les Bourguignons, Picars et Anglois’) by Monstrelet, *Monstrelet*, IV,
p. 462.

324 The notes of William of Worcester report that ‘ut dicitur, dictus Johannes Dedham


Philip the Good in December 1431 Lorraine was considered belonging to René of Anjou. This, however, may have been a diplomatic manoeuvre in aimed at setting a greater price for his freedom.

4.4.4 Philip the Good's policy in 1431.

The military activity of Philip the Good in 1431 bears no comparison with that in 1430. The duke remained in his northern dominions unwilling, and most likely unable, to undertake a major offensive. On 17 April 1431 Quentin Menart and Christian Hautain were sent by the duke with letters to the council of England. Of the fourteen articles in this document the first eight depicted the grievous situation in different parts of the Burgundian lands and duke's expenses for their defence. Then Philip the Good informed the king of his intention to send 1 000 men to Picardy under Jean de Luxembourg and a similar contingent under Antoine de Toulonjeon to Burgundy. The duke asked Henry VI to support these efforts with 1 000 men and 2 000 men respectively to serve for 2 months (art. 9). He also demanded that 50 000 francs were repaid to him for his expenses during the siege of Compiègne (art. 14). What is most important, the duke warned the king and his council that in case his requests were not met, 'qu'il [the king – A.L.] ne soit pas mal content s'il [the duke] trouve maniere de sauver lesdits pays' (art. 11). Given the miserable state of his lands, so extensively described, it may have been expected that the maniere he would be looking for was a composition with Charles VII.

327 ‘les Duchiez de Bar & de Lorraine apparten. à nostre cousin le Duc de Bar’ in the Burgundian copy of truce. See Plancher, IV, p. CV.
328 For these letters see Plancher, IV, pp. LXXXV–LXXXVI.
329 These included Burgundy and the Charolais (art. 1), Rethelois (art. 2), Artois (art. 3), the châtelainies of Peronne, Montdidier and Roye (art. 4) and Namur (art. 5).
330 This was the contingent which on the way to Burgundy won the battle of Bulgnéville.
331 It has been shown above that the sums due to the duke for the siege of Compiègne were with a little exception repaid by November 1430. What was not repaid, however, were, presumably, Duke Philip's expenses for the operations in November–December 1430.
332 Plancher, IV, p. LXXXVI.
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Almost simultaneously other letters were sent by the duke to the council at Rouen. These letters also dealt with the destruction of the Burgundian territories, requesting assistance by the royal troops in Picardy and Burgundy, and the repayment of the debts for the siege of Compiègne. The royal council agreed to send Jean de Luxembourg with 600 men-at-arms and 1,200 archers to Picardy for two months (July and August), but the direction of any contingents to Burgundy was delayed until the siege of Louviers (which had just been started) came to a successful end. For the siege of Compiègne it was suggested that a joint commission should be created to investigate the situation. The duke’s letter to Rouen must have discussed certain diplomatic matters (not mentioned in the letter sent to England) including the proposed English negotiations with the representatives of the emperor. The English promised to keep the duke informed of all the details of negotiations and not to come to any treaty without advice and consent of Philip the Good.

This letter has been described as ‘conciliatory answer’, but actually it seems unlikely it was considered as such by the duke of Burgundy. The English designated the recovery of Louviers as their primary goal and while some help could be provided in Picardy, they refused to spread their forces as far as to the borders of Burgundy. It is not clear whether the letters, sent to Rouen, mentioned the duke’s intention to seek for other than a military solution. As Cardinal Beaufort, to whom the letters dispatched to England were ad-

333 A response to these issued on 28 May is printed in Plancher, IV, pp. LXXXVI–LXXXVII; Letters and Papers, II, pt. 1, pp. 188–193. It may be suggested that the delay of the answer until 28 May as opposed by 15 May, the date suggested by the duke, may be caused by the return of Cardinal Beaufort from England.

334 It appears that these forces were actually dispatched to Picardy since the Chronicle of Cordeliers reports that on 28 July Jean de Luxembourg went to Laonnois with 2,500 horsemen and made much damage to the lands, Cordeliers, fo. 509r.


336 G. L. Harriss, Cardinal Beaufort, p. 210. Nevertheless, G. L. Harriss is probably right that by his accompanying letter Cardinal Beaufort was ‘making every effort to placate Philip’, thus using his personal prestige in the eyes of Philip the Good in order to influence the duke’s position.
dressed, returned to Rouen by 28 May, the council at Rouen must have been aware of this article. As no worthy response was provided on this matter, the duke could pursue his plans.

Philip the Good’s intention to ensure the security of his lands was no mere words. In April 1431, almost simultaneously with the dispatch of letters to the English court, the duke of Burgundy sent to Charles VII his ambassadors, authorized to negotiate for the general peace or a truce. After long negotiations the truce for two years was signed at Chinon on 8 September. On the Burgundian side it covered the two Burgundies, Charolais, Maconnais, Auxerrois, Rethelois, Tonnerois, the region of Donzy, bishopric of Langres and a number of smaller territories including the towns of Champagne bailliages still held by the Burgundians. Special clauses provided inclusion in the treaty for the duchies of Lorraine and Bar; it was also suggested that the towns conquered by Jean de Luxembourg in Vermandois be included in the treaty. These conditions left Picardy not covered by the truce.

Almost at the same time the negotiations were begun in Bourg-en-Bresse for a local truce between the Burgundians and the representatives of the House of Bourbon. The truce was concluded on 8 October and ratified by Philip the Good on 19 October. No exact term was appointed but the treaty could be renounced by either side after notification made in six weeks in advance. Per——

337 The duke’s letter dated 17 April suggested that Cardinal was expected to be in England. Plancher, IV, p. LXXXVI.
339 The Burgundian ambassadors arrived in Troyes on their way to Chinon on 15 April. The embassy consisted of Guy de Jaucourt and Jean de La Trémoille, seigneur de Jonvelle, brother of Georges de La Trémoille, the favourite of Charles VII, T. Boutiot, Histoire de la ville de Troyes, II, p. 528.
340 Plancher, IV, pp. LXXXIX–XCII.
341 ‘toutes les villes, terres, chasteaulx & seignories que tiennent tous les adhérans & tenans le party de mondit Sgr. de Bourgoingne, ez Bailliages de Chaumont, Troyes & Vitry’, Plancher, IV, p. XC.
342 It was specially suggested that in case that any breach of the truce might happen in Vermandois, this would lead only to the local renewal of war and would not invalidate the whole truce, Plancher, IV, p. XC.
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Perinet Gressart, probably, because of his well-known independence, had to give a special solemn obligation to observe this truce.343

As early as 1 October Charles VII sent his ambassadors to the duke of Burgundy in order to treat for the general truce.344 In one of these ambassadors' letters of accreditation it was presented as a continuation of a process begun by the fruitless negotiations in Compiègne in 1429.345 The Armagnac representatives were also authorized to treat for a general truce or even peace with Henry VI, although it does not appear that they were given a chance to employ these powers.346 These negotiations led to the signing of a truce between Charles VII and Philip the Good on 13 December 1431. A day earlier Duke Philip wrote to Henry VI informing the king of his decision which he justified by the dangerous state of his lands and by the lack of military or financial support from the royal government, which made him (as far as he claimed) disband his armies due to the lack of funds. Philip the Good emphasized that he had kept the royal government informed of his urgent need for support and had sent a number of embassies to Rouen and London on that subject. He also mentioned that the representatives of Artois and the royal towns of Picardy (of which Amiens, Abbeville, Noyon, St. Quentin and Chauny are expressly mentioned) had addressed him in order to be included in the truces.347 Therefore, he tried to convince the king, his decision was only caused by necessity, not by evil intention.348 Given that the letter was sent from Lille only a day before the signing of the truce it is clear that Philip the Good cared little of the possible reaction by Henry VI and his council. The truce, concluded for six years from

344 Two letters of procuration for this embassy, both dated 1 October, are published in Plancher, IV, pp. XCII–XCIII, XCIII–XCIV.
345 'sur voye & traitié de bonne paix entre nous & nostred. cousin de Bourg.', Plancher, IV, p. XCIII.
346 Plancher, IV, p. XCIV.
347 The intention of Amiens, Corbie, Bray-sur-Somme, Picquigny, Saint–Riquier, Abbeville, Monteuil and other places to respect the truces was confirmed in January 1432, E.–E. Delgove, Histoire de la ville de Dourlens (Amiens, 1865), p. 77.
13 December 1431, covered all the dominions of Philip the Good and also those of the counts of Nevers and Rethel and Jacqueline of Bavaria.\(^{349}\) Paris, Saint-Denis, Corbeil, Meaux and Chartres could also be included in the truce if they wished.\(^{350}\) It appears that the duke sought to defend his adherents in these cities, which did not belong to him, but there seems to be no evidence that any of the places made use of this provision.

Philip the Good promised not only to abstain from the hostilities but also to prevent his subjects from taking part in them.\(^{351}\) Although it is doubtful that the latter obligation was fully observed, Duke Philip's personal intervention in the military affairs of Lancastrian France was suspended. The truce he had made with the dauphin in 1424 was a part of complicated political game, aimed at giving the duke freedom of action in the Low Countries; if he allowed the Dauphin to regroup his forces after Verneuil, this was done to keep the Lancastrians busy with the war in France. The truce of 1431 was dictated by the insecurity of the duke's lands and communications and the disappointment in the military capabilities of the Lancastrian regime.

Although offered honourable and advantageous conditions of reconciliation by Charles VII, Philip the Good remained still attached to the Lancastrian cause by a number of links such as his oath to observe the Treaty of Troyes and his sister's marriage to the duke of Bedford. In support of this relation Philip the Good especially reserved for himself in the truce the right to serve the dukes of Brittany and Bedford with 500 men-at-arms.\(^{352}\) This was a reference to the treaty of Delft in 1428. For the Burgundian version of the truce see Plancher, IV, pp. CIII–CVIII.

\(^{349}\) The underage counts of Nevers and Rethel were in the custody of Philip the Good, their uncle and stepfather. Jacqueline of Bavaria had proclaimed Duke Philip her heir by the treaty of Delft in 1428. For the Burgundian version of the truce see Plancher, IV, pp. CIII–CVIII.
\(^{350}\) Plancher, IV, pp. CVII–CVIII.
\(^{351}\) ‘nous ne offendrons, ne ferons offende […] & ne souffrerons par nos hommes, sujets ou souluyers estre offendus […] led. Charles nostre Adversaire, ne les pays, citez, villes & fortresses, terres & seignouries ten. son partie & estans en son obéissance’, Plancher, IV, p. CV. This was undoubtedly a reaction to the situation of 1427–1428, when the duke denied that he was engaged in the operations of Antoine de Verzy and Jean de Luxembourg on the pretext that they were in the service of the Lancastrian kingdom of France and not in the duke's. For that situation see above, Ch. 3.4.
\(^{352}\) Plancher, IV, p. CVIII.
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e to the Treaty of Amiens signed in 1423 suggesting that the duke either never considered the treaty annulled in spite of Jean V’s defection to the Valois side in 1425 or considered it re-established after the duke of Brittany reconciled himself with the English in 1427. On the other hand, Henry VI was about to leave France and the decisions over the government had to be made. The reservation left by Philip the Good, suggested that Bedford would have a military asset no one else would be able to employ; therefore to some degree it supported Bedford’s restoration to regency.

4.4.5 The Coronation of Henry VI in Paris.

Once Louviers was brought to obedience and the direct threat to Rouen was removed, the question of Henry VI’s visit to Paris became a matter of the day. However, the routes were not completely secure and when the king left Rouen in late November for the journey to the capital, he was accompanied by two to three thousand English soldiers.353

The young king’s solemn entry to the capital on 2 December,354 followed the footsteps of Henry V who had also chosen the first Sunday of Advent for his entry to Paris back in 1420.355 The magnificent procession reached its culmination at the pageant representing Henry VI with the crowns of both England and France over his head, where the duke of Burgundy and the count of Nevers were represented as giving him the shield with the French coat-of-arms while the duke of Bedford and the earls of Warwick and Salisbury – that with the English one.356 Its position as the culmination of the entry must have underlined the importance of the alliance of the crowns of England and France.357 This,

353 Monstrelet, V, p. 2.
355 A. Curry, ‘The “Coronation Expedition”’, p. 49.
356 Monstrelet, V, p. 4; Wavrin, IV, p. 8. The characters of the pageant were identifiable by their coats-of-arms.
357 It has been suggested that this pageant was not sponsored by the municipality and was probably a piece of the royal propaganda, G. L. Thompson, Paris, pp. 201–202. As J.-P. Genet notes, this pageant was the only one to introduce the ideas of the Dual Monarchy into a very French–fashioned ceremony as opposed to Henry VI’s entry in London in the following year where the symbols of the Dual monarchy were more widely employed, J.-P. Genet, ‘Le roi de France’, p. 52.
however, was only a piece of artwork – neither the duke of Burgundy nor the count of Nevers came to Paris to greet Henry VI.

The subsequent coronation of Henry VI on 16 December is believed to have given little support to the Lancastrian position in France due to numerous infractions of French traditions.\textsuperscript{358} The mere fact of coronation in Paris instead of Reims must have seemed surprising if not insulting to the French. Secondly, the crown was laid on the king’s head by the English prelate, Cardinal Henry Beaufort, not one of the French bishops present. This might seem an infraction of the articles of the Treaty of Troyes demanding that the kingdom of France should not in any way be subject to that of England. But in spite of any possible personal ambitions of Henry Beaufort, his cardinalate may have given him precedence over the French prelates present\textsuperscript{359} and as a cardinal he may have been expected to represent the universal church rather than the kingdom of England.

Last but not least, no great nobles of France attended the ceremony.\textsuperscript{360} Even Jean V of Brittany, who had visited Henry V in Rouen,\textsuperscript{361} and Philip of Bur-

\textsuperscript{358} Jean de Wavrin regreted that everything concerning the coronation was done according to the English rather than French customs, \textit{Wavrin}, IV, p. 10.

\textsuperscript{359} The bishops of Thérouanne, Beauvais and Noyon attended the coronation, \textit{Monstrelet}, V, p. 5; \textit{Wavrin}, IV, p. 9. It seems likely that the bishops of Evreux and Paris, present at the king’s entry a fortnight earlier remained in Paris until the coronation. For Henry VI’s entry see \textit{Monstrelet}, V, p. 2; \textit{Wavrin}, IV, p. 5. It has been suggested that Bedford may have preferred that the bishop of Paris conducted the ceremony, J.–P. Genet, ‘Le roi de France’, p. 52.

\textsuperscript{360} John Hardyng in his chronicle tells that the dukes of Burgundy, Brittany and \textit{Embarre}, counts of Saint–Pol and Foix (the latter actually a Valois partisan) were present, \textit{The Chronicle of John Hardyng, Containing an Account of Public Transactions from the Earliest Period of English History to the Beginning of the Reign of King Edward the Fourth together with the Continuation by Richard Grafton, to the Thirty Fourth Year of King Henry the Eighth}, ed. by H. Ellis (London, 1812), p. 396. Hall’s Chronicle suggests that the duke of Burgundy did attend the ceremony and so did the count of Vaudemont, \textit{Hall}, p. 161. These suggestions are disproved by contemporary documents.

\textsuperscript{361} A. Curry, ‘The “Coronation Expedition”’, p. 45.
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gundy did not come to Paris. Moreover, none of the anglophile courtiers of Philip the Good such as Jean de Luxembourg, Hugues de Lannoy or Jean de Thoisy, seems to have been present. Even the presence of Jean Villiers, seigneur de l’Isle-Adam, probably the most influential Burgundian in Paris (and possibly still its captain) is not reported. The chronicles only note the presence of several Burgundians of lesser standing such as Jean, seigneur de Courcelles, Jean de Pressy, seigneur de Mesnil, Jean, bastard de Saint Pol, seigneur de Haubourdin, Jean, bastard de Thiant. Most of these personages (except for the bastard de Saint Pol) seem to be engaged more in the service to the Lancastrian crown than of the duke of Burgundy, thus their presence must have been rather due to that obligation.

Henry VI did not stay in Paris for long after the coronation. He returned to Rouen by the New Year and proceeded in mid-January to Calais; by 9 February he was back in England. Cardinal Beaufort accompanied him as far as Calais, but then took leave from the king to meet Philip the Good at Ghent. There he stayed for several months probably both in attempt to secure the English interests at the court of Burgundy and also to deal with the accusations brought against him by Gloucester in England.

### 4.5 The outcomes of 1429–1431.

The Valois successes of 1429 resulted in the complete alteration of the military situation in northern France. Within a single year many conquests of the previous decade were nullified and the situation came to resemble that of 1419. The Lancastrians held control over Paris, most of Normandy, Artois and Ponthieu and the Burgundian dominions in the south. The English conquests of the mid 1420s in Maine were balanced by the loss in 1429-30 of the greatest

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362 Louis de Luxembourg, bishop of Thérouanne, and Jean de Mailly, bishop of Noyon, were sent to the duke on 1 October 1431 and returned to take part in the coronation by 2 December. See the quittance of Jacques de Lunain, royal secretary, who accompanied them, *Rouen au temps de Jeanne d’Arc et pendant l’occupation anglaise (1419-1449). Documents publiés avec introduction et notes*, ed. by P. Le Cacheux (Paris, Rouen, 1931), pp. 223–224.


cities of Champagne which had been held for the Burgundians since 1417. The Seine-and-Yonne line was broken in several places with the fall of Troyes, Sens and Melun. A wedge was driven between the allies.

In spite of this overwhelming defeat the duke of Burgundy (though after some initial hesitation in 1429) decided to continue to support the Lancastrian cause. This must have been due to the project of the French coronation of Henry VI set forward by the Lancastrian government. Throughout the Hundred Years’ War military expeditions personally led by kings tended to attract greater number of soldiers compared with those under non-royal captains. Therefore to side with Charles VII, while a powerful English intervention was anticipated, would have been most unwise for Philip the Good. The duke in turn sought to benefit from the growing role of the kingdom of England in the military efforts of Lancastrian Dual Monarchy. He hoped to obtain from Henry VI’s English council what he could not receive from Bedford’s government of France more concerned with the traditional privileges of the French crown. The duke’s indenture for the campaign of 1430 represented an important success for his diplomacy.

The subsequent campaign showed a good degree of cooperation between the allies. Even the major defeat before Compiègne only led to a temporary withdrawal of the English forces but as Philip the Good took the field again they came to assist him. However the campaign obtained very little. While the English managed to redeem most of their losses in Normandy, the only major Burgundian success was the recovery of Soissons.

It appears that the duke’s hope for a powerful English army coming to France with the King did not materialize. The English in 1430 had sent to the continent almost 8000 men 365 – a number unrivalled in the 1420s. However, the plan of campaign, arranged in the duke’s entourage, hoped that the king would bring at least 10000 men to France. 366 This overestimation may have led

365 This includes 3199 men who crossed with the bastard of Clarence, and 4792 men coming with the king, A. Curry, ‘The “Coronation Expedition”’, pp. 30–31.
366 ‘presupposé que le Rot soit passé en France, avecques sa puissance, que l’en puet estimer a Xe combatans pour le moins’, P. Champion, Guillaume de Flavy, p. 157. Given that this project was composed in March–April 1430, it is possible that this was the
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to the eventual failure of the campaign which depleted the resources of both allies. Duke Philip, who also found himself engaged in the war with Liège and fearing an attack from the Empire, was not able to undertake major operations on its own and had to return to the defence of his borders. The English by 1431 were more concerned with having Henry VI crowned and returned to England rather than turning the tide of the war, therefore little help could be spared to the Burgundians.

Lancastrian failures in 1429 or 1430 could be ascribed either to the supremacy of Valois France or to the inadequate support of the Lancastrian cause in France from England. The attempts of rapprochement with Charles VII in 1429 had shown his untrustworthiness; on the other hand, the hope for greater English engagement was not completely lost. Unable to continue a full-scale war the duke had little choice but to step aside trying to find out which of the adversaries fighting for the French throne – Lancaster or Valois – would prove more powerful.

number which the Burgundians expected to arrive with the king (not taking into account the retinue of the bastard of Clarence, which had already crossed to France).
Chapter 5: The final years (1432–1435)

5.1 The political background of the early 1430s.

5.1.1 The failure of truces, 1431–1433.

It is tempting to consider the final stage of the Anglo-Burgundian alliance as a period of steady deterioration, a gradual shift by Philip the Good from making a truce with Charles VII in December 1431 towards accepting him as the king of France in September 1435 and engaging in the war against the English by the following spring. This apparent consistency is misleading, since it fails to take into account the extensive hostilities in which the duke of Burgundy was involved since at least mid-1433 and which occasionally made the Burgundians fight alongside the English.

Although the general truce, which Philip the Good signed with Charles VII in December 1431, obliged the parties to prevent their subjects and soldiers from hostilities, it proved unable to bring peace to the Burgundian dominions. The measure of control both princes exercised over their captains, often motivated by personal interest or old enmities, was often very limited. In some cases the distinction between the Burgundian and Lancastrian forces proved too vague for the Dauphinist captains. Some of the Burgundians sought to benefit from this situation. Perrinet Gressart, as in the 1420s, excused himself by pretending to act on behalf of the Lancastrian regime when his men captured the place of Marcigny in December 1431 and castle of Meauce in March 1433. Other Burgundian captains, of whom Philippe, seigneur de Ternant, governor of Rethelais, is named by the chroniclers, used the English insignia of the red cross to attack the Dauphinists in spite of the truce. The appointment of Sir


3 In his assault of the castle of La Bonne or La Boué in Laonnois, Monstrelet, V, pp. 41–42; Wavrin, IV, p. 34. See also Monstrelet, V, pp. 26–27. Another similar case was the capture of Belfort in late 1431 by Guillaume, seigneur de Châteauvillain. See M. H.
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Thomas Kyriell to the captaincy of Clermont en Beauvaisis may have been another attempt to get round the truce.⁴

As Monstrelet puts it, after only several months it became clear that the ceasefire had failed.⁵ The truce was confirmed and renewed at the conference of Auxerre in November 1432,⁶ but it was not respected. On 29 November 1432 the Dauphinists tried an escalade at Maisey, and, being rebuffed, set the town on fire.⁷ On the following day they captured Avallon.⁸ In May 1433 Auxerre and Noyers were attacked but held out.⁹ In February 1433 the Estates of Artois discussed the ways to maintain the truce but also the aide for the defence of the county.¹⁰ Nevertheless in late April 1433 the loss of Saint-Valéry-sur-Somme supplemented the infractions of the truce.¹¹

As a result of all these transgressions Philip the Good must have realised that the security of his borders had to be maintained with force of arms. By mid-1433 the duke of Burgundy was preparing to engage once again in the hostilities against Charles VII and his adherents.

5.1.2 The first steps towards general peace, 1432–1433.

By 1432 there were several reasons to seek a general peace in France. For the duke of Burgundy this seemed the only way to put an end to the war

Keen, The Laws of War, p. 113; C. Taylor, C. Taylor, Chivalry and the Ideals of Knighthood in France during the Hundred Years War (Cambridge, 2013), p. 120.
¹⁰ ADN, B 1948, fo. 79r. Raoul de Gaucourt was invited to come to Arras on 8 February concerning the maintenance of the truces, ADN, B 1948, fo. 99v.
¹¹ The response in the name of Henry VI to the letters sent by the duke of Burgundy, given on 7 July 1433, mentions ‘Saint Walery qui a este de nouvel pris en la trive de mon dit seigneur de Bourgongne’. Thus, Philip the Good’s truce with Charles VII was still acknowledged by the Lancastrian regime, Letters and Papers, II, pt. 1, p. 257.
against the Charles VII without breaking the oath made by him in 1420 in Troyes. The Lancastrian government was not completely ill-disposed to the idea of general peace, its greatest adherent being Cardinal Beaufort. Although his attempts to establish the conciliatory government of France during the Coronation expedition were nullified by Bedford’s restitution to the Regency after Henry VI had returned to England, the Cardinal continued to play an important role in French policy and may have expected to recover his influence in Papal curia through his peace-making efforts.  

In 1431 the conflict in France once again attracted the attention of the Holy See. Nicolo Albergati, the cardinal of Saint Cross of Jerusalem, was appointed legate to France for the mediation for a general peace between Henry VI and Charles VII. He met Henry VI at Rouen in autumn 1431 and proceeded to Paris on 20 February 1432. Six days later Bedford and Louis de Luxembourg visited him at Corbeil offering this town as a possible place for the anticipated peace conference. The regent tried to oppose Auxerre as the suggested place of conference on the grounds that the city was difficult to reach for the Lancastrian ambassadors, but the cardinal was ready to mediate for the peace between Charles VII and Philip the Good, should English representatives fail to attend.

In spite of Bedford’s pretensions, the Lancastrian government seemed disposed to these negotiations. While the details were being discussed in 

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12 The Cardinal was engaged in peace negotiations from October 1429, when a conference was decided to be held in Auxerre in the following year, J. Ferguson, *English Diplomacy*, p. 13.

G. L. Harriss suggested that by 1432 Beaufort may have planned to leave England (possibly, resigning his bishopric or exchanging it for one in France) in order to employ himself in the diplomatic support of Lancastrian cause in France. This was only prevented by the capture of his treasure on the orders of the duke of Gloucester, G. L. Harriss, *Cardinal Beaufort*, pp. 217–218.


15 *Bourgeois*, p. 280.

16 *Bourgeois*, p. 281 n. 2.

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France, on 22 February 1432 the Council in England appointed ambassadors for the negotiations with the Dauphin, even though the location of the conference was not specified.\textsuperscript{18} The conference was expected to open on 8 July\textsuperscript{19} but the date was postponed several times until late November. In the meantime the Burgundian representatives negotiated with those of Valois at Semur.\textsuperscript{20} When the conference finally assembled at Auxerre, the Valois delegates refused to discuss peace unless the Agincourt prisoners were brought to France to take part in the negotiations. A new meeting was scheduled for March 1433 either at Corbeil or Melun.\textsuperscript{21}

When the conference opened at Corbeil, the Lancastrians\textsuperscript{22} suggested re-locating the negotiations to Calais; the prisoner dukes of Bourbon and Orleans were brought to Dover in anticipation that the Dauphinists would accept. They however pretended they had to consult Charles VII first. A four-month truce suggested by Cardinal Albergati and Regnault de Chartres, chancellor of Charles VII, was rejected by the Louis de Luxembourg on the grounds that it would be more profitable for the Dauphinists than for the Lancastrians.\textsuperscript{23}

Thus, up to mid-1433 extensive diplomatic efforts failed to obtain anything. The Lancastrian and Armagnac positions proved mutually exclusive in the question which of the pretenders to the French throne was to renounce his

\textsuperscript{18} Foedera, X, p. 500; POPC, IV, p. 109. The ambassadors were John Langdon, bishop of Rochester, Sir Henry Bromflete and Thomas Bekynton. They were reappointed in late June, when wages were assigned to them, Foedera, X, p. 514; POPC, IV, pp. 119–120.

\textsuperscript{19} Plancher, IV, p. CXVII

\textsuperscript{20} Plancher, IV, p. 162.


\textsuperscript{22} Represented by John Langdon, bishop of Rochester, Sir John Fastolf and Thomas Bekynton, who received their powers on 1 December 1432, Foedera, X, pp. 530–531. Presumably, Bekynton was Gloucester’s protégé, while Fastolf acted as Bedford’s representative, S. Cooper, The Real Falstaff: Sir John Fastolf and The Hundred Years’ War (Barnsley, 2010), pp. 69–70.

claims. Both adversaries considered their position too strong to abandon their rights. The English were also restricted as the renunciation of Henry VI’s right would most likely ruin the career of the king’s advisor responsible for the decision. However fruitless these conferences might have been, the commitment of the papal legates to seek separate peace between the Dauphinists and either the Burgundians or the English, must have contributed to the deterioration of confidence between the partners.

5.1.3 Bedford’s widowerhood and second marriage, 1432–1433.

In the meantime personal relations between John, duke of Bedford, and Philip the Good suffered an unpredictable blow. On 14 November 1432 Anne of Burgundy, duchess of Bedford, died during an epidemic in Paris, without bringing an heir to the duke. She was also Duke Philip’s sister, and her mediation between her brother and her husband is believed to have contributed significantly to strengthening the Anglo-Burgundian partnership. Her death also tore the only matrimonial link between the houses of Burgundy and Lancaster, which had made Philip the Good a relative (even if rather distant) of King Henry VI.

An even greater strain in the personal relations between Bedford and Philip the Good is believed to have been caused by Bedford’s subsequent marriage. As early as 20 April he married Jacquetta, daughter of Pierre de Luxembourg, count of Saint Pol, and niece of Jean de Luxembourg and Louis de Lux-


26 E. C. Williams, My Lord of Bedford, p. 222. The Duchess died after a long illness: already on 22 September the pilgrimages for her health were made by Giles de Ferieres, duke’s secretary, BL, Add. Ch. 119.

27 See, for example, G. du Fresne de Beaucourt, Histoire de Charles VII, II, p. 455; E. C. Williams, My Lord of Bedford, pp. 104, 222. This assertion derives from the contemporary chroniclers’ reports, Monstrelet, V, 45; Wavrin, IV, pp. 35–36. The Bourgeois de Paris also tells that she was much loved by the Parisians, Bourgeois, p. 289.

28 Henry VI, however, continued to style Philip the Good his uncle, see for example Letters and Papers, II, pt. 1, p. 262 (7 July 1433).
embourg, bishop of Thérouanne, where the wedding took place.\textsuperscript{29} The latter, the Lancastrian chancellor of France since 1425, is considered the architect of this matrimonial alliance.\textsuperscript{30} This marriage is considered to be an insult for the duke of Burgundy, displeased both by the short period of mourning after his sister\textsuperscript{31} and also by the fact that Pierre de Luxembourg, his vassal, did not seek duke’s permission for the marriage.\textsuperscript{32}

An attempt to reconcile the dukes was undertaken by Cardinal Beaufort who induced both Bedford and Philip the Good to come to Saint-Omer. Nevertheless no meeting occurred since the dukes found it impossible to solve the question of who was to pay a visit to whom.\textsuperscript{33}

Following the failure of this meeting and that of the anticipated peace conference at Calais, the duke of Bedford sailed to England at the end of June. His visit which was to last for about a year was caused by the need to mediate in a new conflict between Beaufort and Gloucester over the government of

\textsuperscript{29} Bourgeois, pp. 293–294.

\textsuperscript{30} Monstrelet, V, p. 55.

\textsuperscript{31} It may however be noted that Philip himself did not attend his sister’s funeral, although he must have had enough time to arrange the visit as the funeral took place on 8 January 1433, almost two months after the duchess’s death. E. C. Williams, \textit{My Lord of Bedford}, pp. 222–223.


\textsuperscript{33} Monstrelet, V, pp. 57–58; Wavrin, IV, pp. 38–40. Philip the Good was at Saint-Omer between 1 and 5 June 1433, \textit{Itinéraire}, p. 109. As presented by J. Ferguson, this meeting may have marked the peak of a series of reprisals including Bedford’s absence at Philip the Good’s wedding in 1430, the creation of the Golden Fleece expected to rival the Garter and Bedford’s order of the Root, and Duke Philip’s absence from the coronation of Henry VI in Paris in December 1431, J. Ferguson, \textit{English Diplomacy}, pp. 13–14. It has also been suggested that Bedford may have become more and more disenchanted with Philip the Good, C. T. Allmand, ‘Le traité d’Arras de 1435: une perspective Anglaise’, in \textit{Arras et la diplomatie européenne XVe-XVIe siècles}, ed. by D. Clauzel, Ch. Giry-Deloison, Ch. Leduc (Arras, 1999), p. 103.
England and, more important, to mobilize the popular support and the resources of the English kingdom for the continuation of the war in France.³⁴

5.1.4 The embassy of Hugues de Lannoy, 1433.

Whatever his personal relations with Bedford might have been, by June 1433 the duke of Burgundy was resolved to resume his participation in the hostilities against Charles VII. The intentions of the Lancastrian government in making war and the scale and forms of help the duke could hope to receive, were of great importance to him. As Bedford was returning to England, these matters were to be discussed in the king’s council, where some of the members, like Cardinal Beaufort, may have been more disposed to the Burgundian duke. This is probably why, only a few weeks after the abortive meeting at Saint-Omer, Philip the Good sent his representatives to Henry VI and his council in England.³⁵ The ducal ambassadors, Hugues de Lannoy and Guy Guilbaut, crossed the Channel together with Bedford.³⁶ By 18 July de Lannoy returned to Lille and sent the duke an extensive report on his mission together with the written answers given to him by the English council.³⁷

The first articles of the memoranda presented by Hugues de Lannoy to the Council in England invoked the desolation and destruction of the kingdom of France, advising the king to seek a general peace or general truce to relieve


³⁵ According to de Lannoy’s report, he was instructed by Philip the Good at Arras, Letters and Papers, II, pt. 1, p. 220. The duke was at Arras on 28–29 May and again on 6–20 June after his return from Saint-Omer, Itinéraires, p. 109. It was probably during his second stay that de Lannoy received his instructions. E. C. Williams gives 15 June as the starting date of the mission, E. C. Williams, My Lord of Bedford, p. 229.


³⁷ The letters presented by Hugues de Lannoy to the council of Henry VI are published in B. de Lannoy, Hugues de Lannoy, pp. 232–234. His report to the duke and the response given by the English council to the duke’s letters are published in Letters and Papers, II, pt. 1, pp. 218–249 (report) and 249–262 (answer).
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his subjects of the hardships of war.\textsuperscript{38} The lengthy response on the king’s behalf declared his disposal towards peace and placed the responsibility for the failure of the recent diplomatic enterprises on the Dauphinists. It was also claimed that the four-month truce almost negotiated at Corbeil had been rejected on the grounds that it would be more advantageous for the Armagnacs than for the Lancastrians.\textsuperscript{39}

If peace could not be achieved, continued the duke, the king should send so powerful an army to France that his enemies would be made to seek truce or peace. The duke emphasised his own efforts in leading 3 000 men from Picardy to Burgundy to be joined by a local levy in the operations against the Dauphinists, in designating and financing a force under the count of St. Pol for the recovery of Saint-Valéry and of another 600 men under Jean de Luxembourg to hold the middle Somme, also in keeping 400–500 soldiers in the garrisons of Burgundy. He especially asked for a further force of 100 men-at-arms and 300 archers or the money for their wages in order to reinforce Jean de Luxembourg. He then returned to the idea that a great army should be sent to France by Henry VI, promising in this case to serve the king with all his forces and subjects at his own cost.\textsuperscript{40}

The latter suggestion is in sharp contrast with the duke’s position of late 1429 when he demanded the grant of a great seigneurie as a cost of his engagement in the war. In 1429 the duke may have felt the Lancastrians needed him more than he needed them. By 1433 the duke discovered, however, that the truces with the Dauphinists were not reliable, and he had no choice but to engage in the war which he realised he could not win without greater Lancastrian participation.

The king’s response concerning the military aspects suggested that the king would pay for four months for the following forces:

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\textsuperscript{38} B. de Lannoy, \textit{Hugues de Lannoy}, p. 232.
\textsuperscript{39} \textit{Letters and Papers, II}, pt. 1, pp. 250–256.
\textsuperscript{40} ‘en ce cas mon dit seigneur se présente de servir le roy de très bonne et franche voulenté, de tout son pouvoir, de ses subgéz t aliéz, et d’y exposer avec la puissance du roy tout ce que Dieux lui a presté, et en porter de charge autant et si avant que possible lui sera’, B. de Lannoy, \textit{Hugues de Lannoy}, pp. 232–234.
• 1600 soldiers (combatans) under the count of Saint Pol (together
with 500 men paid by the duke of Burgundy) – for the recovery of
Saint-Valéry
• 1200 soldiers under John Holland, earl of Huntingdon, for the de-
fence of France\textsuperscript{41}
• 900 soldiers under John FitzAlan, earl of Arundel, to take the field
on the borders of Lower Normandy\textsuperscript{42}

These were the field forces, not counting the garrisons of Normandy, An-
jou and Maine, said to exceed 6 000 men.\textsuperscript{43} Thus, the list of the duke’s military
efforts was balanced by the crown’s efforts in maintaining its cause in France.
The issue of working for a general peace or sending a major expedition to
France were to be discussed in the Parliament, a rather evasive response. The
king also assured the duke of Burgundy that he was not going to abandon his
rights to the crown of France and was disposed to continue defending his
crown with the help of the duke of Burgundy and his other subjects and allies.
The final paragraph of the king’s letter contained promises not to believe any
possible sinister reports against Duke Philip, thus expressing his trust in him.

The embassy also opened a new important direction for the Burgundian
diplomacy by approaching the duke of Orleans, prisoner in England after Agin-
court. In his dying days Henry V had prohibited his liberation while his son was
still a minor, due to the duke’s nominal leadership of the Armagnac party and
his proximity in blood to Charles VI.\textsuperscript{44} It has been suggested that Orleans was
also something of a hostage thereby securing the loyalty of the duke of Bur-

\textsuperscript{41} The expeditionary force under the earl of Huntingdon indented to serve for six
months, sailed to France in early May 1433, H. L. Ratcliffe, ‘The Military Expenditure’,
pp. 85–86.
\textsuperscript{42} By May 1433 the earl of Arundel was appointed lieutenant for war in the lands be-
tween the Seine, the Loire and the sea with 200 lances and 600 archers and also 20
lances and 60 archers of his personal retinue, a total of 880 men, AN, K 63/24/3
(quittance, 10 May 1433).
\textsuperscript{43} Letters and Papers, II, pt. 1, pp. 257–258.
\textsuperscript{44} By 1422 Charles of Orléans, son of Louis, duke of Orleans and younger brother of
Charles VI, was the second closest relative of Charles VI through the male line, after
the Dauphin Charles.
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gundy.45 Thus if the duke suspected the English of seeking their own peace with Charles VII or the leaders of the Armagnac party, he could easily expect that these negotiations would be held with the mediation of Duke Charles. By participating in the liberation of the duke of Orleans the duke of Burgundy could put an end to the old enmity between the houses of Orleans and Burgundy, attach Duke Charles to his party and relieve himself of the threat that the English could use the captive duke against him. The duke of Orleans could also become a valuable addition to any coalition of princes aiming to obtain a greater part in the governance of France, whichever of the pretenders might eventually win the throne.

What de Lannoy was able to discover during his mission, and what he reported to Philip the Good, was that the captive duke was disposed to act as a mediator for the general peace in France, that he had not been approached by the English for this purpose and was ready to cooperate with the duke of Burgundy for the procurement of peace.46 He also obtained confirmation of the duke’s words from a Burgundian servant of the prisoner, who also offered his help in establishing contacts between the two dukes.47 This was the beginning of a long and uneasy diplomatic process, which finally led to the release of Charles of Orleans in 1440.

The report of de Lannoy bears the influence of a certain lack of trust towards the English, who in their turn were also not always friendly towards the Burgundians.48 Thus, the earl of Warwick reproached Philip the Good that during the king’s visit to France the duke had found no time to come before the king.49 Nevertheless an overall impression, which Hugues de Lannoy considered worth placing in the preamble of his account (even though it was also expressed in the king’s official response) was that the English had no plans to break their alliance with Philip the Good by coming to a separate composition

45 J. Ferguson, *English Diplomacy*, p. 19 n. 3.
48 ‘en disant tous les mauux que len pouvoit dire de monseigneur de Bourgoingne, en le menachant lui et ses pays.’, *Letters and Papers*, II, pt. 1, p. 242 see also p. 220.
with Charles VII.\textsuperscript{50} He also spent much time in assuring his master of Bedford’s personal good disposition towards him, of which Duke Philip must have been dubious after the incident at Saint-Omer in May 1433.\textsuperscript{51}

Ironically, probably the most important information, reported by Hugues de Lannoy, was the news received on his way back at Calais from Jean de Saveuse, a member of the entourage of the duke of Orleans.\textsuperscript{52} Georges de La Trémoille was now removed from power in the Dauphin’s entourage and Arthur de Richemont was about to return to the court.\textsuperscript{53} This meant a major change in the balance of power within the Dauphinist party, and provided Philip the Good with a more trustworthy partner at the court of Charles VII.

Thus, the mission of Hugues de Lannoy coincided with several major changes in Anglo–French affairs during the summer 1433 which were to be of importance in the following years. First, the duke of Burgundy was once again engaged in the war against the Dauphinists. Second, the first advances were made to the duke of Orléans, introducing a new political line to be pursued till early 1440s. Finally, the accession of Arthur de Richemont was opening a way to Philip the Good’s rapprochement with Charles VII.

5.2 Hostilities in the Île-de-France, 1432–1435.

5.2.1 The sieges of Lagny-sur-Marne in 1432.

When Henry VI was leaving Paris in January 1432 the strategic situation around the French capital remained difficult. Its communications with Normandy and Picardy remained hindered by the Dauphinists at Beauvais, Creil and Senlis. The routes upstream the Seine and the Yonne to Auxerrois and Burgundy and upstream the Marne remained interrupted at Melun and Lagny-sur-Marne respectively. On the left bank of the Seine Chartres fell to a surprise at-

\textsuperscript{50} Letters and Papers, II, pt. 1, pp. 220, 260.


\textsuperscript{52} This servant of Orléans family was also a brother of the Burgundian partisans Philippe, Robert and Bon de Saveuse, For his career see W. Davoine, ‘Messire Philippe, seigneur de Saveuses’ (mémoire de maîtrise, Université de Lille III – Charles de Gaulle, 2000), pp. 18–22.

\textsuperscript{53} Letters and Papers, II, pt. 1, pp. 244–245.
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tack by the Dauphinists in April 1432. Given the Dauphinist pressure on the capital of France and its communications the Lancastrians sought ways to extend their control in the Ile-de-France. Lagny-sur-Marne, lost in 1429, was the Dauphinist outpost nearest to Paris. Bedford’s attempt to recover it in early 1431 failed. Its submission became the major objective for the Lancastrians in 1432. 57

A new attempt on Lagny was made in March 1432. The Lancastrian army of some 1 200 men was led by the earl of Arundel and included a number of Burgundians such as Jean de Villiers, seigneur de l’Isle Adam, Jean, the bastard of Saint-Pol, and Jean ‘Galois’ d’Aunay, seigneur d’Orville. After eight days of

54 The captain of the city, Guillaume de Villeneuve managed to escape, while Jean de Fétigny, the pro-Burgundian bishop of Chartres, was slain. Probably the most detailed report on the fall of Chartres is in Monstrelet, V, pp. 20–25. See also Bourgeois, pp. 282–283 and notes by A. Tuetey. Wavrin only briefly reports the event without mentioning any personages on the Lancastrian side, Wavrin, IV, p. 20. An attempt to recover the city undertaken by Simon Morhier, prévôt of Paris, proved a failure, Bourgeois, p. 284.

55 Pucelle, p. 335; Dunes, p. 208.

56 Bourgeois, p. 263. Pierre Cochon describes the first attempt to recover Lagny-sur-Marne, which he dates April 1430, as a joint enterprise of the English and the ‘Bourguegnons de Paris’, resulting in the loss of some 800 men, killed and captured, Cochon, p. 310.

57 The Parisians petitioned Henry VI asking him to reduce Lagny into Lancastrian obedience almost as soon as the king returned to England, Delpit, pp. 248–249 (March 1432).

58 Burgundian chroniclers briefly mention an unsuccessful attempt to take the place by surprise by seigneur de l’Isle Adam and the bastard of Saint-Pol with the participation of the English, Monstrelet, V, pp. 10–11, Wavrin, IV, p. 12. It is not clear if they meant the same enterprise that took place in March or an earlier one, but the report is placed in the same paragraph with that of the reappointment of the seigneur de l’Isle Adam to the marshalcy of France, which took place on 2 May 1432, Bourgeois, p. 283 n. 4.

59 Identified as Jean ‘Galois’ d’Aunay, seigneur d’Orville from Normandy in Wavrin, IV, p. 22 n. 9. It appears that he possessed the castle of Orville, which became an arena of fighting against the Armagnacs in 1435. The site of castle, demolished in 1438, now is a part of the commune of Louvres in Ile-de-France (dep. Val d’Oise, arr. Sarcelles, cant. Goussainville) close to Charles de Gaulle airport.

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bombardment the Lancastrians undertook the assault but were rebuffed and three days later had to raise the siege and return to Paris.\(^60\)

The duke of Bedford decided to lead the army in person when the siege was re-established in late May or early June.\(^61\) Although the Lancastrians were much more numerous\(^62\) it was intended to starve the place into surrender rather than win it by assault. Therefore a Dauphinist attempt to provision the besieged town with victuals, munitions and reinforcements was expected. Bedford anticipated the battle to take place in early July,\(^63\) but in fact the attempt only followed on 9 August.

Trying to fight their way into the town, the Dauphinist had their army deployed in three divisions and so did the Lancastrians to resist them. At least two of these divisions included both the English and the Burgundians. One, ‘ou estoient lenfant de Wearwic et le seigneur de Lilladam’, confronted the forces of Rodrigo de Villandrandio.\(^64\) In the other one Sir Thomas Kyriell fought alongside the bastard of Saint Pol, Philibert de Vaudrey and Jean, seigneur

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\(^{60}\) Monstrelet, V, pp. 27–30; Wavrin, IV, pp. 22–25. E. C. Williams suggests that this siege was begun on 1 May rather than in March, E. C. Williams, My Lord of Bedford, p. 214, which corresponds with the mention of the seigneur de l’Isle Adam as the marshal of France.

\(^{61}\) The siege was in progress by 27 June, BNF, P.O. 3021 (Villiers), no. 29. Burgundian chroniclers report the siege to last for about 4 months, Monstrelet, V, p. 35; Wavrin, IV, p. 32. Given that it was raised on 20 August, it may have started in late May. J. H. Ramsay suggests that the siege was begun in early May, J. H. Ramsay, Lancaster and York, I, p. 445.

\(^{62}\) Monstrelet and Wavrin estimate the Lancastrian army as about 6000 men. Such effects goes in sharp contrast with those of the Valois relieving army (600–800 men, according to the same chroniclers), which made the Regent summon reinforcements for his army, Monstrelet, V, pp. 31–33; Wavrin, IV, pp. 26–29. J. H. Ramsay suggests that, given the scale of the financing from England, Bedford could have no more than some 350 men–at–arms and 1000 archers, J. H. Ramsay, Lancaster and York, I, p. 445.

\(^{63}\) On 22 June Bedford summoned the Norman levy to come before Lagny by 1 July ‘pour lui aident a resister pour ung journee de bataille ausdits ennemis et adversaires’, BNF, MS. Fr. 26055, nos. 1849, 1855.

\(^{64}\) Wavrin, IV, p. 29.
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d’Aumont. Although no mention is made on this subject, it may be suggested that the remaining division was led by Bedford in person.

In a severe fighting that followed the Dauphinists managed to bring some victuals and a small band of soldiers into the town. However, this was not enough to make the Lancastrians abandon the siege. Therefore the Dauphinists marched upstream the Marne, crossing it at La-Ferté-sous-Jouarre and proceeding to Mitry, where they remained for several days threatening Paris. This manoeuvre made Bedford abandon the siege on 20 August and return to the capital. When he then advanced against the Dauphinists they did not accept the battle, pretending that their goal of relieving Lagny had been achieved.

Reports on the siege of Lagny mention a number of the Burgundians who rather unusually originated from both northern and southern groups of Philip the Good’s dominions. The most important figure among the northerners was the seigneur de L’Isle–Adam, just reinstated in the marshalcy of France, who acted in this office during the siege, taking the musters of the Lancastrian reti-

65 Monstrelet, V, p. 34; Wavrin, IV, p. 30.
66 About 80 men, Monstrelet, V, p. 34; Wavrin, IV, p. 30. Lefèvre de Saint–Remy claims that they were able to supply the place with men and provisions which made Bedford abandon the siege, St. Remy, II, p. 265.
68 Wavrin names this place Mutry en France (Wavrin, IV, p. 31), Monstrelet gives Vitry en France (Monstrelet, V, p. 34). Possibly, the same Mitry on the route from Dammartin to Paris where an armed confrontation took place in August 1429.
69 J. H. Ramsay, I, p. 445. The Bourgeois claims that the Lancastrians were so closely pursued that they had to leave their artillery, Bourgeois, p. 286. The retreating Lancastrian army, however, greatly outnumbered the garrison of Lagny and thus should have been able to organise the defence of its artillery train. On the other hand the loss of artillery, if it did really take place, may have been caused by the need for hastily departure or by the lack of carriage. It may also have resulted from panic caused by the threat to Paris, Chartier, I, p. 146.
70 He presented his letters of nomination and gave the oath of office in the Parlement of Paris on 3 May 1432, Fauquembergue, III, p. 57.
Another northerner was Jean de Luxembourg, bastard de Saint Pol. It seems likely that Oudart de Renty, a Picardian noble, slain in the battle before Lagny, served in the retinue of one of them. Other cases deserve discussion in more detail.

5.2.2 Philibert de Vaudrey and Jean, seigneur d’Aumont, in Lancastrian service.

Philibert de Vaudrey and Jean, seigneur d’Aumont, both nobles from Burgundy commanded a company of 500 Burgundians. They were presumably sent by Philip the Good in accordance with the Treaty of Amiens of 1423, the only type of support the Burgundian duke could provide without breaking his truce with Charles VII. These captains travelled from Auxois and Montagne in March to in Artois and Ponthieu by late May before joining the duke of Bedford in the Ile-de-France.

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71 See BNF, P.O. 3021 (Villiers), no. 29; BNF, MS. Fr. 26056, no. 1863 (both pieces relate to the company of Robert, Lord Willoughby).
72 Monstrelet, V, p. 34; Wavrin, IV, p. 31.
73 See above p. Ch. 4.4.4. The chronicles emphasise that the force was sent by Philip the Good to ‘servir son bon frère le duc de Bethfort’, Monstrelet, V, p. 30; Wavrin, IV, p. 25. This formula putting unusual attention on the matrimonial relationship between the dukes may have originated from an unknown documentary source available to the chroniclers. Together with the coincidence of effectives and the clause in the truce of 1431, it contributes to the suggestion that the force was sent in accordance with the treaty of Amiens.
74 Their itinerary may be traced through the messengers sent by the duke of Burgundy to make them leave certain of the duke’s lands. Thus, in March 1432 Philibert de Vaudrey, and Jacques and Guillaume d’Aumont were ordered by the Burgundian government to remove their soldiers from the bailliages of Auxois and Montagne, ADN, B 1945, fo. 74r. This demand was supplemented by a grant of a horse to Philibert de Vaudrey also in March, ADN, B 1945, fo. 160v. By the end of May Philibert de Vaudrey and the seigneur d’Aumont were commanded to leave Artois and Ponthieu, ADN, B 1945, fo. 76v.
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After their return from the siege of Lagny, they took possession of Pont-Remy on the Somme, expelling the men of the seigneur de Saveuse.75 By late October Philibert de Vaudrey was styled captain of Pont-Remy when a messenger was sent to him from Abbeville with complaints on the abuses of his men.76 In November 1432 Philip the Good again wrote to Philibert de Vaudrey and the seigneur d’Aumont ‘entour Amiens, Abbeville ou a Eu’, demanding that they stopped pillaging and ransomning the duke’s lands.77 In the following months they were approached repeatedly by the duke’s envoys over their conflict with the citizens of Amiens.78 Pont-Remy was only surrendered to Jean de Luxembourg in return for a certain sum of money in early 1433.79

In spite of their abusive behaviour, these Burgundians seem to have remained technically in Lancastrian service. In September 1432 Philibert de Vaudrey and Jean, seigneur d’Aumont, were considered commanding soldiers at the defence of Eu.80 On 11 December 1432 John FitzAlan, earl of Arundel was appointed lieutenant for war in the lands between the Seine, the Somme and the Oise. The earl’s indenture suggested that he would hold this command for two months with 1800 men including 300 men under Philibert de Vaudrey, now styled governor of Eu, and 200 men under Sir Thomas Kyriell. These two companies, amounting to 500 men, enjoyed a somewhat special status: while the rest of the earl’s army was to be reviewed before the king’s commissioners, these were to be mustered by the earl’s commissioners at his disposal.81 This

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75 The seigneur de Saveuse assembled his men in an attempt to drive them off but, seeing them well entrenched, did not risk an assault and left the place to them, Monstrelet, V, p. 39.
76 A. Huguet, ‘Les aspects de la guerre’, 48, p. 161 n. 2. His presence at Pont-Remy in October 1432 is also attested in ADN, B 1948, fos. 75r–75v.
77 ADN, B 1945, fo. 88r. See also A. Huguet, ‘Aspects de la guerre’, 48, p. 162.
78 ADN, B 1948, fos. 94v, 97r, 120v.
79 The fortifications of Pont-Remy were demolished afterwards, A. Huguet, ‘Les aspects de la guerre’, 48, p. 161 n. 2.
80 On 20 Sep 1432 Philibert de Vaudrey and Jean, seigneur d’Aumont, were given by Pierre Surreau, receiver-general of Normandy, 400 l. t. for the upkeep of soldiers in the defence of Eu, BNF, MS. Clairambault 138, no. 42.
81 The relative proportion of men-at-arms and archers in the earl’s army was not prescribed in the indenture, BNF, MS. Fr. 26056, no. 1965 (vidimus of the indenture, 15 January 1433).
did not mean that these soldiers were not in the payment of the Lancastrian government as only two days later the wages were assigned to Philibert de Vaudrey for 2 months of service under the earl of Arundel with 100 men–at–arms and 200 *gens de trait*; his service due to begin in February 1433.\(^{82}\) In March 1433 Philibert de Vaudrey passed musters with 67 men–at–arms and 117 *gens de trait* to accompany the duke of Bedford to Calais.\(^{83}\) It appears that this was his last mission in Lancastrian service, for in April 1433 he was recalled with his men to accompany Philip the Good on his journey to Burgundy.\(^{84}\)

### 5.2.3 Sir Thomas Kyriell, captain of Clermont for the Burgundians.

It has been noted that the retinue of Sir Thomas Kyriell was to have among the forces of the earl of Arundel in late 1432 – early 1433 a specific status similar to that of Philibert de Vaudrey. It is thus appropriate to take a closer look at the career of this captain in early 1430s.

After having served in the garrison of Gournay in Normandy in 1430,\(^{85}\) Kyriell was taken prisoner by the Dauphinois on 20 November 1430 in a skirmish near Bouchoir fighting in the vanguard of Philip the Good’s army.\(^{86}\) The duke helped him to pay his ransom and in April 1431 Sir Thomas was serving with 100 men ‘sur la Riviere de Somme’.\(^{87}\) In late 1431 or early 1432, he was appointed captain of Clermont–en–Beauvaisis replacing Jacques, seigneur de Crévecoeur, on condition that he would surrender the place to the duke of Bur–

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\(^{82}\) BNF, MS. Fr. 26056, no. 1969.

\(^{83}\) AN, K 63/19/18.

\(^{84}\) ADN, B 1948, fo. 115r.

\(^{85}\) A. Curry, ‘Kyriell, Sir Thomas (1396–1461)’, *ODNB*.

\(^{86}\) See above, Ch. 4.3.5.

\(^{87}\) He was paid 300 fr. for his service on the Somme border and 1500 saluts d’or for his ransom, the latter probably being the greatest sum ever granted by the duke to an Englishman during the years of the alliance and quite likely to cover the whole amount (or the greater part) of the ransom. It is also notable that he is simply styled ‘messire thomas kyriel, chevalier’ without any mention of his English origin, customary for the grants of this kind. Although the articles are crossed out in the receiver–general’s account, the reference to the quittances suggests that the payments were actually made, ADN, B 1942 (*3e compte*), fos. 92r–92v.
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gundy, when demanded. Kyriell placed an English garrison in Clermont, and started raiding the surrounding territories, held by the Dauphinists.  

It may have been due to the ultimate failure of the truce with Charles VII or to the damages made by the Kyriell’s men in the Burgundian châtelanie of Montdidier, but by mid-1432 Philip the Good wanted Clermont returned to him. Throughout the summer and autumn 1432 the duke bombarded the English captain with his letters on this matter.  

Eventually he had to seek assistance of the duke of Bedford and it was only at the Regent’s request that Kyriell surrendered the captaincy to Guy IV de Nesle, seigneur d’Offémont. 

Thus during the most of 1432 Sir Thomas Kyriell appears to be in the service of the duke of Burgundy, rather than that of Bedford and the Lancastrian government in Paris. It is however not clear whether this had already happened by the time of his capture in November 1430 or only on his return from captivity.

The mention of Sir Thomas Kyriell fighting alongside the bastard de Saint Pol and Philibert de Vaudrey at the siege of Lagny may thus be ascribed to his being one of the captains of a 500–strong force provided by the duke of Burgundy. It seems likely that he remained in the same status by the time of his intended service under the earl of Arundel. The evidence available is not con-

88 He was appointed through the influence of Jean de Luxembourg, Monstrelet, V, p. 18–19; Wavrin, IV, pp. 18–19.
89 BNF, MS. Fr. 26056, no. 1982. In July the duke sent Bon Rapport poursuivant to Kyriell, being at the siege of Lagny, ADN, B 1945, fo. 80r. He was again approached in September, ADN, B 1945, fo. 83v, and in October, ADN, B 1948, fo. 73v.
90 Monstrelet, V, p. 19; Wavrin, IV, pp. 19–20. This was the same Guy IV de Nesle, seigneur d’Offémont, who vigorously defended Saint–Riquier against Philip the Good in 1421 and was later captured by the Lancastrians on his daring attempt to sneak into the besieged Market of Meaux in 1422. He obtained pardon in July 1422, having sworn obedience to the treaty of Troyes. The letter of remission is AN, JJ 172/117; a transcript is available in TNA, PRO 31/8/136/2; summarised in C. Gut, ‘Les pays de l’Oise sous la domination anglaise (1420–1435) d’après les registres de la Chancellerie de France’, in La guerre, la violence et les gens au Moyen Âge, ed. by Ph. Contamine, O. Guyotjeannin, 2 vols (Paris, 1996), II, p. 163.
clusive, but extensive enough to provide a hypothesis. This assumption might lead to some reconsideration of the Lancastrian army before Lagny. On the one hand, if the contingent ‘provided’ by Duke Philip was partly composed of Englishmen this would debase Philip the Good’s contribution. On the other hand the complicated career of Sir Thomas Kyriell in 1430–1432 illustrates a high degree of cooperation at a personal level between the English and the Burgundians.

5.2.4 Lord Talbot’s Oise campaign, 1434.

A new attempt to extend the area under Lancastrian control around Paris was undertaken in 1434 when John, Lord Talbot, brought an expeditionary army from England to France. After arrival in Paris he advanced against Beaumont-sur-Oise and Creil. The former was abandoned without resistance but the latter held out for about 6 weeks before surrendering. The Anglo-Burgundian army returned to Paris, then Talbot went to Pont-Saint-Maxence, which quickly surrendered. The Lancastrians then took several minor places on the way to Crépy-en-Valois, which fell to an assault. Talbot proceeded to Clermont-en-Beauvaisis to receive its surrender. He then came before Beauvais but, seeing no chance to take the place, disbanded his army.

The bulk of the Lancastrian army on this campaign was formed by an expeditionary force brought by Talbot from England, which amounted to 140

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93 The treaty of surrender was made on 13 June, promising that the castle surrenders on the dawn of 20 June, unless relieved, see M. Mathon, *Histoire de la ville ... de Creil*, pp. 79–83.

94 The London Chronicle *Cleopatra C IV* credits the earl of Arundel for this assault, *Cleopatra C IV*, p. 136.

95 Clermont was lost earlier in 1434 to a treachery of La Hire, who captured its captain, Guy IV de Nesle, seigneur d’Offemont, by fraud, and made him surrender the place, *Monstrelet*, V, p. 103–104.

96 For the course of the campaign see *Monstrelet*, V, p. 91; *Wavrin*, IV, pp. 43–46.
men-at-arms and 780 archers, a total of 920 men. These were reinforced on their arrival in Paris by the French companies of the seigneur de L'Isle-Adam and Galois d'Aunay, seigneur d'Orville, up to a total of 1,600 men. Guillaume de Bourronville, an offspring of a well-known Burgundian family from Picardy brought a company of 20 mounted men-at-arms from the garrison of Pontoise for the siege of Creil, probably accompanying some provisions, as they returned to their garrison after a few days and long before the siege was put to an end. The earl of Arundel is sometimes mentioned alongside Talbot on this campaign. The earl crossed to France with another expeditionary force in June 1433. It is unlikely that he arrived in time for the recovery of Beaumont and Creil, but he may have joined Talbot during the second stage of the campaign.

Overall command was executed by Lord Talbot as the king's lieutenant and captain-general for war in the region between the Seine, the Somme the Oise and the sea. Although several French seigneurs served in this Lancastrian force, it is described only as 'Anglois' by the Burgundian chroniclers. This may reflect the perception that most of the Burgundian soldiers and captains engaged in the operations were in the service of the central Lancastrian government and not provided by Philip the Good and that the campaign was an enterprise of Lancastrian France rather than of the duke of Burgundy.

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97 H. L. Ratcliffe, 'The Military Expenditure', pp. 90–93. The chroniclers estimate his army as 800 men, Monstrelet, V, 91; Wavrin, IV, p. 43; Cleopatra C IV, p. 136. The increasing degree of archers to almost 85% in this expeditionary army may reflect problems with its funding and recruitment.

98 Monstrelet, V, p. 91.

99 These soldiers were only absent from the garrison from 29 May till 3 June 1434, A. Bell, A. Curry et al., The Soldier in Later Medieval England, p. 249; BL, Add. Ch. 1140 (counter-roll of the garrison of Pontoise for 30 March – 28 June 1434).

100 The full effective of this expedition amounted to 234 men-at-arms and 934 archers, of which 50 men-at-arms and 144 archers formed the earl's personal retinue, H. L. Ratcliffe, 'The Military Expenditure', pp. 93–96.

101 As suggested in Bourgeois, p. 299.

102 The earl is specially credited for the assault of Crépy-en-Valois by Cleopatra C IV, p. 136.

103 See the treaty of surrender for Creil, M. Mathon, Histoire de la ville ... de Creil, p. 80.

104 Monstrelet, V, p. 92; Wavrin, IV, pp.44–45.
5.2.5 The siege of Saint–Denis, 1435.

Saint–Denis was captured by the Dauphinsts on 1 June 1435, and became a base for their operations against Paris, its environs and its communications. The citizens appealed for help to the Regent and the chancellor of France. A Picard force of some 500 men was sent to counteract Dauphinst attacks. The coming of these forces, however, did not prevent the Dauphinsts from capturing the castle of Écouen and from besieging the castle of Orville near Louvres, for which the journée was appointed. The Lancastrians assembled a significant force, including the contingents from the expeditionary force brought in 1435 by John, Lord Talbot, from England, but the Dauphinsts did not appear.

By late August Saint Denis was invested. After a period of siege operations on 9 September the Lancastrians assaulted the walls but were repulsed and returned to the blockade. The besieged hoped that the constable de Richemont would help them after his return from the Congress of Arras. He however made no attempt to break the siege and Saint Denis had to be surrendered on 4 October.

106 Monstrelet, V, pp. 125–126; Wavrin, IV, p. 67. According to the chronicles, these soldiers were sent by the Lancastrian government at Rouen. However, a record of a minor grant to Jean de Luxembourg, bastard de St. Pol (named as one of the leaders of this army by the chroniclers), in Burgundian receiver-general’s account suggests that it was Duke Philip who sent him from Picardy to Paris to resist the duke’s enemies at Saint Denis, ADN, B 1954 fo. 138r (grant of 250 l. to buy himself a horse, 29 September 1435).
107 Écouen (dep. Val d’Oise, arr. Sarcelles, ch.–l. of cant).
109 Wavrin, IV, pp. 67–68.
111 G. Thompson, ‘Monseigneur Saint Denis’, p. 32.
112 Bourgeois, p. 308. According to Guillaume de Gruel (writing for the constable de Richemont and hence not impartial), the news of de Richemont’s coming to Senlis from
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Whatever hopes might the Dauphinists at Saint Denis put in the reconciliation of the duke of Burgundy with Charles VII, these were never realised. On 21 September 1435, the very day when the treaty of Arras was concluded, Philip the Good sent Cauberghe poursuivant with the letters *touchans aucunes choses secrettes* to the seigneur de L’Isle-Adam and the bastard de St. Pol, being at the siege. Therefore, the Burgundian captains before Saint Denis were probably informed of the reconciliation as soon as it happened, but they were not instructed to abandon the siege. The Burgundians only left after the Dauphinists surrendered and the place was brought under the obedience of Henry VI.

5.3 Hostilities in Picardy, 1433–1435.

5.3.1 The last campaign of Pierre de Luxembourg in 1433.

Picardy, pacified by 1424, found itself under attacks after Compiègne and Beauvais accepted Charles VII in 1429. These cities became Dauphinist bases for the incursions towards the north, while the presence of Valois forces also induced the rise of the local resistance to the Lancastrian rule. The bailiages of Amiens and the senechalcy of Ponthieu (with the exception of Le Crotoy and Rue), adjacent to the Burgundian counties of Artois and Boulonnais and châtellenies of Péronne, Roye and Montdidier, were among the territories placed under Duke Philip’s government in October 1429. Although Burgundian government was only expected to last until Henry VI’s arrival in France, it does not appear that this was the duke’s view. However, the powers executed by the duke over these territories were not full, which made him act through negotiations rather than enforcement.

Arras made the Lancastrians more agreeable in making the composition for surrender and eventually letting the Dauphinists leave with their belongings, artillery and prisoners rather than with staves only, *Gruel*, p. 106.

113 ADN, B 1954, fo. 89r.


115 AN, Xii 8605, fos. 14–14v.

From 1432 fighting was almost permanent in the valley of the Somme as well as in Laonnois with places and castles being lost and taken by both parties and with penetrating chevauchées undertaken by the Dauphinists to the right bank of the Somme.\footnote{For such raids see Monstrelet, V, pp. 45–46, 79–81.} On the Lancastrian side defensive operations were generally conducted by the local nobility under the banners of the duke of Burgundy or the members of de Luxemburg family. In spite of the loss of Ramures and Monchaux the English did not seem to play an active part in these hostilities.\footnote{Rambures (dep. Somme, arr. Abbeville, cant. Gamaches); Monchaux–Soreng (dep. Seine–Maritime, arr. Dieppe, cant. Blangy–sur–Bresle).} The placement of the Burgundians under Philibert de Vaudrey for the defence of Eu and Pont–Rény proved disastrous for the surrounding territories. The role played by the field army of the earl of Arundel in early 1433 does not seem to be impressive either. It was the fall of Saint–Valéry–sur–Somme to the Dauphinists in April 1433 which triggered the new stage in the cooperation between the allies in this region.

The town of Saint–Valéry on the southern bank of the Somme estuary captured by the Lancastrians in September 1422\footnote{See above, Ch. 1.4.2.} was then abandoned and its fortifications demolished by mid–1424.\footnote{BNF, MS. Fr. 26047, no. 260.} When the control over Saint–Valéry was delivered to Philip the Good in 1429, its fortifications were restored.\footnote{A local document issued on 22 April 1432 reports that the fortifications were restored about a year earlier, A. Huguet, ‘Raoul Bouteiller’, pp. 271–272.} Although in December 1431 the place was specially included in the truce with Charles VII,\footnote{Plancher, IV, p. CIII.} it did not prevent its capture by a Dauphinist surprise attack in late April 1433.\footnote{The messengers sent from Abbeville to Calais before the duke of Bedford returned back by 28 April, A. Huguet, ‘Les aspects de la guerre’, 48, pp. 164, 167–168. On 15 May Jean de Brimeu, seigneur de Humbercourt, still styled the governor of Saint–Valéry was paid the wages for this office for the period of 3,5 months from 6 January till 21 April 1433, BNF, P.O. 519 (Brimeu) no. 11. It may be therefore presumed that the place fell between 21 and 28 April.}

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This was not the best time for the Anglo-Burgundian relations. John, duke of Bedford had just married Jacquetta of Luxembourg and stayed in Calais awaiting the Valois representatives to come for peace negotiations. Whatever personal discords between the leaders there were, the recovery of Saint-Valéry was important not only for Bedford and Burgundy but also for the government of England. For the first time since 1424 the Dauphinists held a Channel port to the east of Mont Saint Michel. The importance of maintaining the control over the Channel was well understood in both England and France. The presence of Bedford and the chief councillors of England in Calais where they could be approached by the Burgundian envoys must have facilitated the decision-making.124

Pierre de Luxembourg, appointed lieutenant for the king, the Regent and the duke of Burgundy, was given supreme command of the campaign due to start with the recovery of Saint-Valéry.125 His brother, Jean, count of Ligny and Guise, was given charge of defending the Somme frontier.126 The appointment of the de Luxembourg brothers to such important commands in Duke Philip’s absence suggests that they may have attracted the duke’s displeasure but definitely not distrust.127

124 It appears that Hugues de Lannoy together with Quentin Menart were in Calais in early May 1433; several messengers were sent by the duke to Calais to them or to the Cardinal of England and the members of the great council, ADN, B 1948, fos. 108v (5 May), 109r (6 May), 109v (9 May; 12 May), 110v (date not given), 112r (13 June; 15 June).
125 ‘lieutenant du Roy de monseigneur le Regent et de monseigneur le duc de bourgogne en ceste partie’, BL, Add. Ch. 46341. French historians follow Lefèvre de Saint-Remy in dating his appointment June 1433, St. Remy, II, p. 268; G. du Fresne de Beau-court, Histoire de Charles VII, II, p. 47; A. Huguet, ‘Les aspects de la guerre’, 48, p. 179. It however appears that he received the charge by the end of May, when the first payments were made to him from the English Exchequer for the recovery of Saint-Valéry, POPC, IV, pp. 162–164 (24 May, minute of the council), TNA, E 404/49/142 (26 May, warrant for payment).
127 The version of the duke’s displeasure with the de Luxembourg family seems to originate from the report of Enguerrand de Monstrelet: ‘Duquel mariage le duc de Bourgongne, quand il fut retourné de ses pays de Bourgongne où il estoit pour lors, n’en

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The projected siege of Saint-Valéry induced a complex funding scheme. By the end of May Normandy and the *pays de conquête* were to contribute for the maintenance of 100 men-at-arms with archers for the recovery of Saint-Valéry, Monchaux, Rambures and other places.\(^{128}\) The letters on this subject noted that these operations were to be undertaken with support from the resources of the king in England, of the duke of Burgundy, and also of the inhabitants of Ponthieu, Vimeu and Amienois. The Lancastrian government in England contributed a total of 8 000 marks for the siege of Saint-Valéry.\(^{129}\) Amiens and Abbeville were invited to participate with artillery and provisions.\(^{130}\)

According to the materials of de Lannoy’s embassy, the Lancastrian government was to provide for the siege 1600 men to be joined by 500 Burgundians. Although the effectives of the Burgundian contingent coincided with those, envisaged by the treaty of Amiens, this time the duke undertook to pay for four months of its service.\(^{131}\) A sum of 5500 fr. a month was assigned to the count of Saint Pol by Duke Philip.\(^{132}\)

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\(^{128}\) The number of archers was not specified but, presumably 300 were implied, BNF, MS. Fr. 26057, no. 2074 (Meulan and Poissy), 2075 (Pont-Audemer); AN, K 63/24/4 (Montivilliers). A transcript of the latter piece is in TNA, PRO 31/8/136/1 (31 May 1433), it is also calendared in *Foedera (app.)*, p. 404 and in BL, Add. MS. 10597, fos. 32v–33r.

\(^{129}\) For the detailed list of payments see H. L. Ratcliffe, ‘The Military Expenditure’, p. 89.


\(^{131}\) B. de Lannoy, *Hugues de Lannoy*, p. 233 (mémoire presented by Hugues de Lannoy to the English council, June 1433).

\(^{132}\) The count demanded to have 6000 fr. a month, A. Huguet, ‘Les aspects de la guerre’, 48, p. 179. A loan of money for the payment to the soldiers was discussed with the citizens of Arras in early July, ADN, B 1948, fos. 84v–85r.
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The siege was eventually established by late July under the command of Pierre de Luxembourg, count of Saint Pol, and Robert, Lord Willoughby.133 After about three weeks the Dauphinists came to a composition. A journée was appointed to take place on 24 August. If not relieved, the Dauphinists were to be allowed to leave with their belongings and prisoners.134

The journée was held between the castles of Monchaux and Rambures, the nearest places, which could provide help to the besieged.135 The joint Anglo-Burgundian force, reinforced by city contingents,136 was uncontested. Robert de Saveuse was sent to take possession of Saint-Valéry which was delivered to him.137

133 In April 1433 Robert, Lord Willoughby was styled king’s lieutenant between the rivers of Somme, Oise and Seine, Foedera (app.), p. 403 (23 April 1433). He may have acted in this office during the campaign in Vimeu.

134 The Dauphinists only detained the prisoners taken before the siege, two Dauphinists and three Lancastrians (among them Mathiew Gough), captured during the siege were to exchanged, BL, Add. Ch. 46341.

According to the account of Robert de Saveuse a sum of 5000 saluts d’or was paid by the count of Saint Pol ‘pour la reddition de lad. Ville de S Wallery, ainsi qu’il avoit esté traiti’, A. Huguet, ‘Les aspects de la guerre’, 50, p. 426. The Somme towns were invited to contribute for the provision of this sum. A tax of 2 800 l. was also imposed on Amiens. The city tried obtain a reduction down to the sum of 1500 l. but in vain. The requested sum however was not completely collected by 17 August. Abbeville was charged with 2500 l. See N. Murphy, ‘Between France, England and Burgundy’, p. 156; A. Huguet, ‘Les aspects de la guerre’, 48, pp. 184–185. The English Exchequer may have also contributed to this sum. The assignation of 2000 marks for the siege of Saint-Valéry on 13 August must have been intended for the journée rather than for the siege itself, POPC, IV, p. 178.

Quite surprisingly, however, the treaty of surrender (as presented in a vidimus in BL, Add. Ch. 46341) does not mention that such sum was to be paid. I am grateful to Dr. Rémy Ambühl for checking his notes on this matter with mine.

135 Or possibly this was due to the fact that the count of Saint Pol intended then to attack these places, as suggested in A. Huguet, ‘Les aspects de la guerre’, 48, p. 191.

136 The presence of companies from Péronne, Arras, Amiens and Abbeville is noted, A. Huguet, ‘Les aspects de la guerre’, 48, pp. 188–190, 195.

The count of Saint Pol then proceeded against Monchaux which had been lost to the Armagnacs in summer 1432. By 26 August, almost as soon as the Lancastrian force appeared before their walls, the Dauphinists agreed to surrender the castle if not relieved on 15 October. The journée was appointed to take place before the castle of Happlaincourt not far from Péronne. In the meantime Pierre de Luxembourg expected to invest Rambures but on 31 August he suddenly died in an epidemic and his death put an end to the campaign.

The journée for Monchaux was held by Louis, the son and successor of the late count of Saint Pol, and the late count’s brother Jean after the castle of Happlaincourt was recovered by them. They reportedly assembled five to six thousand men under their banners. An English force of 800 to 1200 men under Lord Willoughby and Sir Thomas Kyriell was also present. The Lancastrians spent the day in battle orders but no Armagnacs appeared; yet Monchaux was not surrendered.

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138 The English captain of the place was at the siege of Lagny, when the castle was captured, Monstrelet, V, p. 35.
140 The site of the castle is now within the commune of Villers–Carbonnel (dep. Somme, arr. and cant. Péronne). For its loss in September 1433 and recovery see Monstrelet, V, pp. 75–76.
141 Monstrelet, V, p. 76; St. Remy, II, p. 271.
142 Robert, Lord Willoughby, commanded a company of 1 knight banneret (himself), 142 men–at–arms and 470 archers, a part of 200 men–at–arms and the archers (presumably, 600), ordered to be at the journée, TNA, PRO 318/138 (10 Oct 1433). Monstrelet speaks of 1200 Englishmen and it is not clear whether these are included in the total effectives of five to six thousand men given above, Monstrelet, V, p. 76.
143 Monstrelet, V, p. 77; St. Remy, II, p. 271. The Dauphinists probably considered themselves quit of the promise given to Pierre de Luxembourg by his death. It is, however, not clear why the place chosen for the journée was almost 100 km from the disputed castle.
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5.3.2 The first campaign of Jean, count of Etampes, 1434.

The recovery of Saint-Valéry proved to be the only result of the large-scale campaign of 1433 but even it was nullified when in January 1434 the town was once again lost to the Dauphinists. Therefore a new campaign had to be undertaken in the coming year.

During Duke Philip’s brief visit to Picardy in 1434 he brought with him Jean, count of Etampes, brother of the count of Nevers, whom the duke appointed his lieutenant in Picardy on 27 April. Unlike the late count of Saint-Pol, the new lieutenant does not seem to have had any powers from the central Lancastrian government. Given the local interests of the house of Nevers, the young count could have been expected to balance the influence of de Luxembourg family in the region.

The count began the campaign investing Moreuil, which surrendered after eight days. His next aim was the castle of Mortemer, which soon surrendered and was demolished. Then he proceeded to Saint-Valéry, where the Dauphinist captains quickly agreed to deliver the place on being allowed to leave with their belongings and a payment of a certain sum of money to them.

144 Monstrelet, V, p. 85.
146 The placement of the young count, brother of the count of Nevers, in charge of operations in Picardy may be due to the local interests of the house of Nevers. Saint-Valéry was the apanage of Jeanne d’Artois (d. 1420), maternal great-aunt of the Nevers brothers, whose possessions were not divided at this stage, A. Huguet, ‘Les aspects de la guerre’, 48, pp. 213–215 and notes. Before the brothers became of age, Philip the Good acted as their warden after his marriage with Bonne d’Artois, see BNF, MS. Fr. 26048, no. 522 (6 Dec 1425). The marriage of Jean d’Etampes with Jacqueline d’Ailly, the daughter of Raoul d’Ailly, vidame of Amiens, celebrated in early 1436 may have intended to consolidate his positions among the nobility of the lower Somme region, A. Huguet, ‘Les aspects de la guerre’, 48, p. 217.
if they were not relieved by a certain date. On the appointed day the place was
delivered to the Burgundians and the Dauphinists left for Rambures. The Eng-
lish came for the journée, led by Louis de Luxembourg, Lancastrian chancellor
of France. Jean de Brimeu, who had been the captain of Saint-Valéry when first
lost in 1433, was reinstated in the office.\textsuperscript{150} The count of Etampes then re-
turned to Artois, leaving the English to deal with Monchaux on their own; the
place was soon bought from the Dauphinists.\textsuperscript{151}

In an attempt to suspend the hostilities in the region, Jean, count of
Etampes, concluded on 17 September 1434 a local truce with Arthur de
Richemont.\textsuperscript{152} The ceasefire was to last for six months, after which period ei-
ther side willing to resume the hostilities had to notify their adversaries a
month before an actual attack. The list of lands and places covered by the
truce is given in its first two chapters, thereby describing the military situation
in the region and the borders of the territories controlled by each party. Dauph-
ininist control was acknowledged over the Beauvaisis, Lannois and the lands
between the Oise, the Aisne and the Serre except for the lands of the count of
Ligny, the countess of Marle and the viscountess of Meaux in this area, which
were left to the Burgundians. The lands under their control included all the
northern group of the duke’s dominions from Boulonnois to Hainault and Na-
mur and from Flanders to the Somme valley. Rambures remained the only
Dauphinist outpost in Vimeu, while the Burgundians control of Soissons was
also acknowledged. Several places were to change hands, in accordance to the
treaty. The Dauphinists were to surrender Ham and Breteuil; the fortifications

\textsuperscript{151} Monstrelet, V, p. 94.
\textsuperscript{152} The text of the truce exists in two versions, which can be described as ‘Dauphinist’
and ‘Burgundian’, the latter signed at Péronne and the former at Ham. The two ver-
sions differ in preamble and the list of signatories, the only other difference is the or-
der of the articles listing the territories included in the truce on each side (art. 1–2).
For the Burgundian version see [F. J. A.] de La Fons-Melicoq, ‘Documents Inédits pour
servir à l’histoire des guerres dans le nord de la France, sous Charles VII’ in La Picar-
die, 7 (1861), pp. 563–569. The Dauphinist variant is published in E. Cosneau, Le Con-
netable Richemont, pp. 547–551.
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of the latter being due to be demolished. In return the Burgundians undertook to demolish the fortifications of Bruyères in the environs of Laon.\textsuperscript{153}

Unlike the truce of 1431, this treaty was of local importance, only covering the northern group of the Burgundian dominions. It was expressly stated that the participants were free to continue fighting outside the territories covered by the truce. In practice however, even this clause was not strictly adhered to. It was already in December 1434 that La Hire took the castle of Breteuil which had not yet been razed as the treaty stipulated.\textsuperscript{154} The demolition eventually took place after July 1435 when La Hire was induced to leave Picardy for a substantial sum of money.\textsuperscript{155}

5.3.3 Hostilities in 1435

In the last days of April 1435 the Dauphinois captured Rue from the English.\textsuperscript{156} The town became a base for the raids into Artois and Boulonnais, which extended northward to Étaples and Samer.\textsuperscript{157} Saint-Riquier may have been

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item This place had been taken by the men of Jean de Luxembourg from the garrison in Montaigu (dep. Aisne) in 1433, \textit{Monstrelet}, V, pp. 68–69.
\item N. Murphy, ‘Between France, England and Burgundy’, p. 157.
\item N. Murphy, ‘Between France, England and Burgundy’, p. 159.
\item \textit{Monstrelet}, V, p. 117; \textit{Wavrin}, IV, p. 58. The fall of Rue is dated early May 1435 in the first chronicle, but it was already on 30 April that messengers reporting its capture were sent from Arras to Paris ADN, B 1954, fos. 49v–50r.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}

A thorough but an inconclusive study of the chronology of events around Rue in 1435 made by A. Huguet seems to be based on false precondition. Referring to a piece of evidence dated 29 April (‘Furent ouverter et leues unes lettres […] faisant mention de la prinse de la ville de Rue, que détenoient les anemis et aversairs du roy […] et dudit Mons. le duc’), he interprets it as that about that date Rue was recovered from the king’s and the duke’s enemies who had held it. This leads him to a suggestion that the town was again lost by the Lancastrians by 7 May, A. Huguet, ‘Les aspects de la guerre’, 48, pp. 220–222. It appears, however that the cited piece of evidence could rather refer to its capture by the Dauphinists. It seems more appropriate to agree with E. Prarond who dates the fall of Rue to late April, E. Prarond, \textit{Abbeville aux temps de Charles VII, des ducs de Bourgogne maîtres du Ponthieu, de Louis XI (1426-1483)} (Paris, 1899), p. 35.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textit{Monstrelet}, V, p. 118; \textit{Wavrin}, IV, p. 59. Étaples-sur-Mer (dep. Pas-de-Calais, arr. Montreuil, ch.-l. of cant.), Samer (dep. Pas-de-Calais, arr. Boulogne-sur-Mer, ch.-l. of
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
briefly captured by the Dauphinists in late May, but by mid-June it was Burgundian again.\textsuperscript{158}

The fall of Rue prompted Philip the Good on 30 April to ask help from Louis de Luxembourg, chancellor of France, in Paris.\textsuperscript{159} In the meantime preparations for the siege were begun on the duke’s orders by Jean de Croy, his captain-general of Picardy, who assembled some 400 men for the blockade of Rue.\textsuperscript{160}

Rue was considered an important outpost of Le Crotoy,\textsuperscript{161} therefore its capture by the enemy made the Lancastrian government react. John FitzAlan,

\textsuperscript{158} On 26 May a messenger was sent to Louis de Luxembourg, chancellor of France, concerning the capture of Saint Riquier, ADN, B 1954, fo. 77v. However since 11 June 1435 certain Burgundians are reported to be at Saint-Riquier, suggesting that either it was recovered or the news of its capture proved false, ADN, B 1954, fo. 78v (11 June, Guillaume, seigneur de Châtillon and the seigneur de Beaumont), fo. 80v (27 June, Jean de Croy).

\textsuperscript{159} ADN, B 1954, fos. 49v–50r.

\textsuperscript{160} In early July the wages were paid for 1 month to 400 men under his command, ADN, B 1954, fos. 81v–82r. In September 1435 he was also paid the wages for 200 \textit{paies} for July and for 356 \textit{paies} for 15 days from 10 August, ADN, B 1954, fos. 215v–216r.

\textsuperscript{161} The English garrison was installed in Rue during the siege of Le Crotoy in 1423. However, unlike Noyelles-sur-mer and Saint-Valéry-sur-Somme the place was not abandoned after 1424 and seems to remain under the English military control as well
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earl of Arundel was ordered to assemble 2000 men for its recovery. However on his way northwards he received the news of the fall of Gerberoy. His decision to recover this place first led to the rout of his army and his capture and death. Thus, English participation in a potential siege of Rue was prevented, but by mid-July Philip the Good was still intending to undertake the siege, having informed the chancellor of France of this. But it does not appear that the siege was ever laid. Eventually, in accordance with the course of negotiations in Arras, by 27 August a truce was concluded with the Dauphinists in Rue.

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as Le Crottoy. In 1429–1430 Sir Ralph Boteler was the captain of both places, TNA, E 403/691 m. 16; E 404/46/176.

162 On 5 May 1435 Sir Thomas Kyriell passed the musters at Eu as knight bachelor with a retinue of 38 mounted men–at–arms and 105 archers, being a part of 2000 men ordered for the recovery of Rue under John, earl of Arundel, BNF, MS. Clairambault 219, no. 51; transcript available in TNA, PRO 31/8/138.


164 ‘pour le fait de siege que len a entencion de brief mettre & asseoir audit lieu de Rue’, ADN, B 1954, fo. 82r. It is not clear whether the siege was established but some skirmishing took place during the Dauphinist raids and some Dauphinists of notice were taken prisoners, A. Huguet, ‘Les aspects de la guerre’, 48, pp. 222–223. A. C. Reeves is thus wrong in suggesting that ‘The Duke of Burgundy did not hasten to his ally’s rescue’, A. C. Reeves, ‘The Congress of Arras’, History Today, 22:10 (1972: Oct), p. 726.

165 On 22 August Charolais herald accompanied Henry de Villeblanche, a servant of the duke of Bourbon, to Rue in order to make the truce with the Dauphinists there so that they stopped attacking the Burgundian lands. On the following day Châteaubelin poursuivant brought from Arras safe conducts for the conclusion of the said treaty and proceeded to Montreuil-sur–mer, asking the mayor and the échevins to send 6 tunns (queues) of wine to Rue. The Burgundians however were cautious of the Dauphinist attempt to solve the problem of Rue by diplomatic means: on the same 22 August another messenger was sent to Saint–Riquier, Abbeville and Saint–Valéry inducing the captains and the inhabitants to keep watch against those of Rue; a day later a similar message was sent to Hesdin. On 5 September a messenger was sent to Montreuil–sur–mer with the same warnings, although by this time the truce was already made with the Dauphinists in Rue and there seems to be no other sources of threat in the region. ADN, B 1954, fos. 86r–87r, 88r.
Eventually Rue must have been evacuated by the Dauphinists soon after the treaty of Arras, which gave the town to Philip the Good.  

The last Dauphinist enterprise in Picardy preceding the treaty of Arras was the raid across the Somme by La Hire and Poton de Xaintrailles in August 1435 while the Congress of Arras was in progress. On receiving news of the incursion Philip the Good sent several his captains to deal with the invaders. Some of the English present at the Congress joined them with their retinues. What might have become one of the last acts of Anglo-Burgundian cooperation was prevented, after some skirmishing, by the Valois delegates at Arras who ordered their partisans to retreat surrendering their booty and prisoners. It has been suggested that this raid was a part of a greater Dauphinist plot, aimed at affecting Duke Philip’s position at the Congress by demonstrating the vulnerability of his dominions.

These operations of 1435, although abortive, illustrate that in Picardy as well as in the Ile-de-France the English and the Burgundians were ready to fight together against the Dauphinists until the very last days of the alliance. The only difference was that in this region, because of closer proximity to the duke’s landed interests, the role played by the English contingents was usually secondary to that of their Burgundian allies.

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166 Monstrelet, V, p. 199. The prisoners captured in the skirmishes in Boulonnois and Artois were set free at the delivery of Rue. In 1438–1439 Philip the Good had to pay a compensation of 2000 saluts d’or to their captors (initially expected to be paid by the duke of Bourbon and the constable de Richemont). A relevant article from the accounts is printed in F. Lefils, Histoire civile, politique et religieuse de la ville de Rue, p. 221 n. 1 and also in [F. J. A.] de La Fons-Melicocoq, ‘1435–1467. Documents inédits pouvant servir a l’histoire de plusieurs villes de Picardie durant les guerres du XVᵉ siècle’, in La Picardie, 3 (1857), pp. 411–412.

167 According to Monstrelet, the English sent some 300 men, while the total effective of the army, led by the counts of Etampes, Ligny and St. Pol, amounted to 1200–1600 men, Monstrelet, V, p. 147.


169 J. Favier, La Guerre de Cent Ans, p. 539.
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5.4  Warfare on the borders of Burgundy, 1433–1434.

5.4.1  Philip the Good’s campaign of 1433.

By mid–1433 when Philip the Good decided to move his army to the northern borders of Burgundy, Tonnerrois and Auxerrois the Lancastrians made several important advances in Champagne and Gâtinais which created some ground for coordination of operations with the duke of Burgundy.

The first notable Lancastrian success came on the night of 2–3 October 1432 when Provis was taken by a sudden escalade. The assault force, assembled from the garrisons of Meaux, Montereau, Corbeil and Brie–Comte–Robert, was led by Sir Thomas Gerard, captain of Montereau, Mondot de Lansac, a Gascon in the English service, and Jehan Raillart. The latter, knight and chamberlain of the duke of Burgundy, had served in 1430 in the garrison of Paris under the seigneur de l’Isle–Adam, then captain of the capital. In mid–1432 he commanded a retinue of 20 men–at–arms and 100 archers in an expeditionary force sent to France from England – an exceptional case for a Frenchman.

The Lancastrians had about 400 combatants, against 500 men in the garrison, therefore the place was gained after severe fight with heavy losses.

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170 BNF, MS. Clairambault 112, nos. 31–32. He may have been a relative of Gauthier Raillart, Burgundian chevalier de guet at Paris by 1420.

171 H. L. Ratcliffe, 'The Military Expenditure', p. 82; See also CFR. Henry VI, p. 288 for the letters of protection issued to the Englishmen, going to France in his retinue. The surname is spelt as ‘Raylard’ in the document of the English Exchequer, TNA E 403/703; E 404/48/21. The spelling variation in the English documents does not exceed those found in the French records for the service of his namesake, another Jean Raillart, an archer in the retinue of John Stanlaw, treasurer of Normandy, in 1432–1433, BNF, MS. Fr. 25770, nos. 740 (21 December 1432), 762 (28 March 1433); MS. Fr. 25771, nos. 772 (2 June 1433), 785 (1 August 1433). The surname is spelt as ‘Raillart’, ‘Raillard’, ‘Rayliard’ and ‘Rayllard’ respectively. It was possibly the same person who was paid as a trumpeter for the delivery of letters from Rouen to Paris and bringing the response in September 1432, BNF, MS. Fr. 26056, no. 1897.

172 Wavrin, IV, p. 42; Bourgeois, pp. 288–289; F. Bourquelot, Histoire de Provins, 2 vols (Provins, Paris, 1839–1840), pp. 84–85. The town had defected to Charles VII during his coronation campaign of 1429, in June 1430 it had been besieged by the English
The city was placed under the governance of Gaucher du Bruillat, knight, seigneur de Coursan and de la Grange, who became bailli of Provins.\textsuperscript{173} The military command must have been left to Thomas Gerard, who was styled the captain of Provins in January 1433.\textsuperscript{174} He began the reconstruction of the town defences, but nevertheless before the end of the year, Provins was lost to the Dauphinist assault.\textsuperscript{175}

Before this happened the Lancastrians advanced to Pont-sur-Seine, which was taken on 28 January 1432, and was followed by a number of minor places near Troyes.\textsuperscript{176} By February the citizens of Troyes estimated the English forces at Pont-sur-Seine as 800 men, and expected that their city would be attacked.\textsuperscript{177} But Troyes was not the first objective. On 27 June François de Suriennes gained Montargis.\textsuperscript{178} Several days later Perrinet Gressart met the earls of Huntingdon and Arundel and the seigneur de L'Isle-Adam at Château-Landon.\textsuperscript{179} These captains in charge of a powerful army intended to advance either upstream the Seine against Troyes or upstream the Yonne to Auxerrois. They suggested that Gressart should make his 600 men at Montargis join them, but the adventurer refused on the pretext of the menace caused by Ro-

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\textsuperscript{173} Wavrin, IV, p. 43; F. Bourquelot, \textit{Histoire de Provins}, II, pp. 86, 90 n. 1, 455–458. It is possible that he was a relative of Guillaume de Bruillart (or Brewlard), knight and Lancastrian captain of Dreux.

\textsuperscript{174} F. Bourquelot is citing a notarial act given 3 January 1433, unfortunately without giving a reference to the original document, F. Bourquelot, \textit{Histoire de Provins}, II, p. 88 n. 2.

\textsuperscript{175} F. Bourquelot, \textit{Histoire de Provins}, II, p. 91.


\textsuperscript{177} ‘arrivéeent, audit Pons, V’ combtens angloix, avec Ilf qui desja y estoient’, M. T. Boutiot, \textit{Histoire de la ville de Troyes}, II, pp. 568–570 (letters to Charles VII, 7 February 1433). The citizens also reported having received news that the earl of Arundel was to advance with a powerful army from Paris via Provins to the lands of Champagne.

\textsuperscript{178} A. Bossuat, \textit{Perrinet Gressart}, pp. 197–199.

\textsuperscript{179} Château–Landon (dep. Seine-et-Marne, arr. Fontainbleau, ch.–l. of cant.) in some 18 km to the north of Montargis. The earl of Huntingdon was the commander of the expeditionary army of 200 men—at–arms and 900 archers, brought from England in early May, H. L. Ratcliffe, ‘The Military Expenditure’, pp. 85–86.
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drigo de Villandrando.\(^{180}\) By 12 July the English were before Sens having gained a number of places on the Seine.\(^{181}\)

In the same period Philip the Good entered Champagne with an army brought from Picardy. The duke spent the first days of July before Troyes but did not risk attacking the city.\(^{182}\) He tried to contact the English commanders but no joint operations seem to have been undertaken at this stage.\(^{183}\) The correspondence of Perrinet Gressart shows that in spite of all the transgressions, the Burgundian administration in Dijon (and presumably the duke as well) did not consider the truce broken, while the adventurer tried in vain to induce them to stop taking the truce into consideration and to engage in the hostilities. He pretended that as soon as it became known that he had adhered to the

\(^{180}\) ‘les contes de Utyton et d’Arondel [...] lesquelz ont en leur compagnie V° Anglois d’Angleterre et le Mareschal de L’Isle et autre capitaine français en ont de mille à XII cents’, H. de Flamare, *Nivernais pendant la guerre de Cent Ans. Le XVe siècle, 2 vols* (Paris, Nevers, 1913–1925). II, pp. 55–56 (Letters of Perrinet Gressart to the counts of Nevers and Rethel, 6 July 1433). Unlike the works of Monstrelet and later chroniclers, the letters by Gressart were of immediate importance and the numbers were expected to be considered trustworthy. On the other hand, compared to the size of field armies presented in the response given by the council of Henry VI to Hugues de Lannoy, the size of the English contingent seems greatly exaggerated. Such a suggestion may be supported by another letter dated 12 July where Gressart describes the Lancastrian army as ‘plus de deux mil combattans qui sont ès marches de par deçà’, H. de Flamare, *Nivernais*, II, p. 59.


\(^{183}\) On 15 July Franche–Comte herald was sent by the duke ‘devers les angloiz ou pays de Gastinoiz’, ADN, B 1948, fo. 116r. A. Bossuat mentions his voyage in the context of the *journée* of Pacy, but by mid–July Philip the Good had not yet entered Tonnerois and laid siege to Pacy, A. Bossuat, *Perrinet Gressart*, p. 209 n. 5.
truce he would fall from grace in the eyes of the Lancastrian government and Lancastrian forces would be recalled from the valleys of the upper Seine and the Yonne back to the Ile-de-France. The intentions of the duke of Burgundy for the campaign were expressed in the mémoire given to Hugues de Lannoy. If the state of truce still existed, the recovery of the places lost due to its breaches could not be considered itself a breach, but attacks against places left in the enemy hands by the truce would be regarded so. It may appear that the duke was not going to break this line.

Whatever were the reasons of Philip the Good, he proceeded up the Seine and invested Mussy–l’Evêque. After it fell the duke entered Tonnerois, laying sieges to Lézinnes and Pacy-sur-Armançon. The former soon surrendered to the duke’s mercy, who promised to spare the lives of the garrison if they induced Pacy to capitulate. Pacy eventually agreed to surrender on 1 September if not relieved. The remaining month was used to bring into obedience several surrounding fortresses.

On the appointed day the journée of Pacy was held and the castle surrendered. The duke proceeded against Avallon, which was taken by assault, and

184 H. de Flamare, Nivernais, II, pp. 58–60 (Letters of Perrinet Gressart to the counts of Nevers and Rethel, 12 July 1433). The councillors reported that the count of Clermont promised not only to enforce the truce in his lands of Bourbonnais, Forez and Beaujo-lais, but also make the royal enclaves of Saint-Pierre-le-Moûtier and Sancoins to repect it. See also A. Bossuat, Perrinet Gressart, pp. 199–200.

185 ‘faire aucune notable entreprise sur les enenmis et les rebouter et metre peine de recouvrer aucune plaches qu’ilz ont prises sur trièves en icellui pais et faire tout le mieux qu’il pourra pour le bien du roy et de son royaume’ B. de Lannoy, Hugues de Lannoy, pp. 233–234 (mémoire, presented to Henry VI by Hugues de Lannoy, June 1433).


189 For the details see St. Remy, II, p. 276–277, which provides the most detailed description of this campaign as compared to Monstrelet and Wavrin.
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finished the campaign in November by taking Pierre-Perthuis. It does not appear that the Lancastrian government sent any forces for these sieges. The only notable exception was the journée of Pacy.

5.4.2 The English at the journée of Pacy, 1 September 1433.

When the date of journée was appointed, numerous letters were issued to the seigneurs and officers of the two Burgundies and Champagne in order to make them join the duke before Pacy on 1 September. One of these letters was sent to the chancellor of France, the seigneur de L’Isle-Adam, and the captains of Montereau and Provins. Another envoy, sent to Paris, was Philibert de Vaudrey, probably with respect to his recent experience of service under Lancastrian command.

The chroniclers mention only John, Lord Talbot, and Jean de Villiers, seigneur de L’Isle-Adam as the leaders of the Lancastrian contingent coming for

190 Pierre-Perthuis (dep. Yonne, arr. Avallon, cant. Vézelay). A number of smaller places were also brought into obedience. Chablis surrendered after a short siege. Mailly-le-Ville, Mailly-le-Châtel and Saint-Bris surrendered after the fall of Avallon, while Cravant followed that of Pierre-Perthuis. For the course of the campaign see A. Bossvat, Perrinet Gressart, pp. 210–213.

191 Some contingents were sent to these sieges of late 1433 by Perrinet Gressart and François de Surienne, the letter taking part in the siege of Chablis, A. Bossvat, Perrinet Gressart, p. 212.

192 ADN, B 1948, fos. 116v, 123v–124v, 128v–129v, 139r–139v; ADN, B 1951, fos. 55r–55v. One of these letters was sent to the captains of Bar-sur-Seine, Anglure and several other garrisons with Couvrechief, pursuivant of John, duke of Bedford, ADN, B 1948, fo. 128v, See also A. Bossvat, Perrinet Gressart, p. 209 et n. 5.

193 It was sent with ‘Monceaulx pursuivant de messire Rogier fines chevalier angloiz’, ADN, B 1948, fo. 124r. Sir Roger Fiennes was the elder brother of Sir James Fiennes, Lord Say (d. 1450). He had served in France in the reign of Henry V and then on the expeditionary army of 1425. It has been suggested that he last served on the continent during the coronation expedition, L. S. Woodger, ‘Fiennes, Sir Roger (1384–1449) of Herstmonceux, Suss.’, in The History of Parliament: the House of Commons 1386–1421, ed. by J. S. Roskell, L. Clark, C. Rawcliffe, 4 vols. (Stroud, 1992), III, p. 70–73.

194 ADN, B 1948, fo. 235r. Unfortunately, no exact dates of his mission to Paris are given, but it is likely to be related to the journée of Pacy.
the journée.\textsuperscript{195} Several other names are found in the financial accounts of grants made to the captains by Duke Philip. Some of these are easy to identify, such as Sir John Neville and Guillotin de Lansac.\textsuperscript{196} It is not impossible that ‘Messire Jehan Hollant’ could refer to John Holland, earl of Huntingdon, but is more likely another man of this name.\textsuperscript{197} In other cases the identification is more difficult as in the case of ‘chescoing escuier angloiz’\textsuperscript{198} or of an anonymous English knight coming in the company of Lord Talbot.\textsuperscript{199}

A. J. Pollard has suggested that Talbot remained with the duke of Burgundy for the rest of the campaign. If true, this would be a major joint enterprise.\textsuperscript{200} However, the English presence at these sieges does not seem to be attested by the sources,\textsuperscript{201} while Le Fèvre de Saint Remy tells that these commanders returned to Paris after the journée.\textsuperscript{202} Given the format of a journée, it seems more likely that the English were invited to join the duke only for a sin-

\textsuperscript{195} According to Monstrelet the effectives of the force amounted to 1600 men, Monstrelet, V, p. 69. Saint Remy speaks of ‘mil combattans anglois’, St. Remy, II, p. 277, which does not contradict the previous estimate as the force must have included French contingents such as that of the seigneur de L'Isle-Adam.

\textsuperscript{196} ADN, B 1948, fos. 256r–256v, 258v.

\textsuperscript{197} ADN, B 1948, fo. 256r. The earl of Huntingdon was serving in France in 1433, but was he present at the journée of Pacy it would probably have been him rather than Lord Talbot who would lead the Lancastrians and he would definitely attract the attention of the chroniclers.

\textsuperscript{198} Possibly, a member of the Gascoigne family.

\textsuperscript{199} ADN, B 1951, fos. 165v.

\textsuperscript{200} ‘After the fall of Pacy on 1 September, Talbot continued to campaign with Burgundy, assisting him to take Avallon, Cravant, Mailly and Pierre Perthus’, A. J. Pollard, John Talbot, p. 19. A. J. Pollard’s suggestions were accepted by later historians, G. L. Harris, Cardinal Beaufort, p. 229. See also J. Barker, Conquest, p. 200.

\textsuperscript{201} The sources referred to by A. J. Pollard only mention that after the journée of Pacy, to which the English came, the sieges of Avallon, Cravant, Mailly and Pierre-Perthus followed, but give no express statement of English participation in these operations, see Monstrelet, V, pp. 68–69, J. H. Ramsay, Lancaster and York, I, pp. 449–450; A. Bossuauat, Perrinet Gressart, pp. 208–9. The accounts of the Burgundian receivers–general also give no evidence of English presence at these sieges.

\textsuperscript{202} ‘se retournèrent le seigneur de Tallebot, anglois, le seigneur de Lille Adam et plusieurs aultres, à Paris et ailleurs dont ilz estoient partis’, St. Remy, II, p. 279.
gle anticipated battle but not to stay in the duke’s army for the rest of the campaign.

5.4.3 The Englishmen in Philip the Good’s campaign of 1434.

In early February 1434 Philip the Good travelled to Chambéry to attend the wedding of Louis, the eldest son of the duke of Savoy. At this meeting the two dukes concluded an alliance against Charles, previously count of Clermont, who had just succeeded his father Jean as the duke of Bourbon, but who had refused to make homage to the dukes for certain lands in Beaujolais. On his return to Burgundy, Philip the Good ordered Baudot de Noyelles and Jean, bastard de St. Pol, to invade Beaujolais and start war against the duke of Bourbon.

In April Duke Philip travelled to his northern dominions to assemble an army for the campaign against the duke of Bourbon. While the duke was staying in Flanders on 28 June 1434 Talant poursuivant was sent to England concerning certain soldiers whom John, bastard of Clarence, was due to bring to the duke. There seems to be no evidence that this contingent ever arrived. On contrary, a response given by Henry VI’s council a fortnight earlier on 11 June to the duke’s ambassadors Jacques, seigneur de Crévecoeur, and Quentin Menart, stated that the king could not send an army to the duke’s help although the Lancastrians would come to the duke’s help if a battle was anticipated.

203 A. Leguiai, Les ducs de Bourbon, pp. 140–141.
204 St. Remy, II, pp. 297–298.
205 The duke stayed in the north from April till July, Itinéraire, pp. 120–125.
206 ‘certains archiers et nombre dehommes darmes que ledit Bastard devoit amener devers monseigneur’, ADN, B 1951, fos. 54r–54v, see also 69r. This should not be considered a part of an expeditionary army which sailed to France in June under John, earl of Arundel, as John, bastard of Clarence, does not appear among the captains of this force, H. L. Ratcliffe, ‘The Military Expenditure’, pp. 94–95. Another article, which is crossed out, deals with the duke’s envoy sent in England to ‘faire le paiement en en-gleterre des archiers cy devant nommez’, ADN, B 1951, fo. 54v. Thus, this English contingent was expected to be in the Burgundian payment.
207 Plancher, IV, pp. CXL–CXLIII.
This may be why just before his departure for Burgundy, Philip the Good summoned Jean de Villiers, seigneur de L'Isle-Adam, to join him, ordering him to 'hastivement lever & cueillir tant anglois que autres de ses pays de bourlon-noiz.' The role played by de L'Isle-Adam and his retinue in the campaign escaped the notion of the chroniclers. The financial accounts, however, show that it formed a part of the garrison of Belleville in Beaujolais, captured by the Burgundians during this campaign. They also reveal the presence of the Englishmen in his retinue. On 4 March 1435 Philip the Good granted 225 fr. 'A messire Jehan de Repplay, chevalier, et a Guillaume Baron, escuier du pais d'Angleterre' who had served on the garrison of Belleville in the company of the seigneur de L'Isle-Adam. Another grant of 150 fr. was made to an Eng-

208 The duke stayed at Valenciennes during 28–31 July, by 15 August he was in Dijon, Itinéraire, pp. 125–126. The company of 125 paies was received in the duke's service without muster as they were probably to join the duke's army after the start of the campaign, ADN, B 1951, fos. 253r–253v.

209 Belleville (dep. Rhône, arr. Villefranche-sur-Saône, ch.–l. of cant.) was one of the places for which the homage was expected from the duke of Bourbon, Plancher, IV, p. CXLVI. For its capture see Monstrelet, V, pp. 99–100; St. Remy, II, pp. 302–303. Other retinue leaders in the garrison of Belleville, which amounted to a total of 361 paies by 1 December 1434, were Simon de Lalaing, Harpin de Ricaumez and the Guillaume de Bauffremont, seigneur de Scey, ADN, B 1951, fo. 246r.

210 ADN, B 1954, fo. 115v. The former can be identified with Sir John Ripley, who served in 1429–1430 as man-at-arms in the garrison of Pontoise, having a number of Burgundians possibly connected with the seigneur de L'Isle-Adam, BNF, MS Fr. 25768, no. 434, 25769, no. 450; BL, Add. Ch. 11663. He was the lieutenant of Pontoise for Robert, Lord Willoughby, in 1431 but was replaced with William Chamberlain by Michelmas, AN, K 63/13/18 (29 June 1431), 22 (5 Aug 1431); calendared in Foedera (app.), pp. 393, 394. He was again the lieutenant of Pontoise for Robert, Lord Willoughby by December 1435 and remained in office till the fall of the place to the Dauphinists in February 1436, Chartier, I, pp. 217–218.

Having regained his freedom, he is found serving in the garrisons of Meaux in 1439 (A. J. Pollard, John Talbot, p. 97 n. 114) and of Mantes in 1441 (BNF, MS. Fr. 25776, no. 1538 [SLME]). In the following year Sir John Ripley fought under John, Lord Talbot, at the siege of Dieppe and was taken prisoner, BNF, MS. Fr. 25776, nos. 1591, 1596 [SLME], A. J. Pollard, John Talbot, p. 60–61. The ransom and the loss of his property at Pontoise (which had fallen to the Valois forces in 1441) ruined his career. When Sir John Ripley was killed several years later, his other possessions reverted to the
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lish squire John Falo or Falso, taken prisoner by the Dauphinists while serving in the garrison of Belleville.²¹¹

The seigneur de L’Isle–Adam was still at Belleville in mid–November 1434 when a diplomatic meeting between the Burgundians and the representatives of the duke of Bourbon took place in the town.²¹² In the following month the place was delivered to the duke of Bourbon according to the conditions of the preliminary peace made by him with the duke of Burgundy.²¹³ After the surrender of Belleville de L’Isle–Adam served in Auxerrois with Philibert de Vaudrey.²¹⁴ He returned to Paris in time to accompany Philip the Good from the capital to Pont–Saint–Maxence in late April 1435.²¹⁵ Nothing suggests that during this campaign Jean de Villiers was executing his office of the marshal of France, or

crown as he was childless. This made his widow Isabelle, without means of subsistence, petition the council of Normandy in 1446, only to obtain a single payment of 25 l.t., C. T. Allmand, _Lancastrian Normandy_, p. 76. It seems possible that before joining the garrison of Pontoise John Ripley may have served as an archer at Avranches in 1424 (BNF, MS. Fr. 25767, no. 95 [SLME]) and then as a man–at–arms in the retinue of Sir John Salvain in September 1429 (AN, K 63/7/18 [SLME]).

The name of William Baron, on the contrary, looks rather common among the Englishmen, with about of 40 records throughout 1420s–1440s. One William Baron was serving as a retinue leader in the field army under John, earl of Arundel in March 1434, BNF, Fr. MS. 25771, nos. 818–819 [SLME]. It was possibly the same person who served as the lieutenant to the earl of Arundel at the gates of Rouen in 1432, BNF, MS. Fr. 25770, nos. 717, 722 [SLME]. He may have later served as a man–at–arms in the garrison of Rouen in 1436–1437, Archives Départementales de Seine Maritime 100/J/33/12 [SLME], BNF, MS. Fr. 25773, nos. 1150, 1241 [SLME]. These records, however, could relate to several different persons.

²¹¹ ADN, B 1954, fos. 108r–108v (2 January 1435). The name is spelt in two different ways within the same article.

²¹² ADN, B 1954, fo. 54r.

²¹³ On 12 December 1434, a messenger was sent by Louis de Chalon, prince of Orange, to the captains at Belleville, ordering them to surrender the place on the following Monday (that is 13 December), ADN, B 1954, fo. 57r. See also A. Leguay, _Les ducs de Bourbon_, pp. 144–145.

²¹⁴ ADN, B 1951, fos. 252v–253r; B 1954, fo. 114r. See also J. L. Bazin, ‘La Bourgogne de la mort du duc Philippe le Hardi’, p. 255.

²¹⁵ ADN, B 1954, fo. 213v.
representing any participation of the Lancastrian regime.\textsuperscript{216} It appears that he was serving the duke out of his personal relationship and obligations and that English soldiers in his retinue were simply soldiers of fortune.

5.4.4 The garrisons of Nogent and Montigny after 1431.

In 1430–1431 the garrisons of Nogent and Montigny supported the Burgundian operations on the upper Seine and in Barrois. They continued raiding Barrois after the victory of Bulgnéville and in May 1432 the Burgundian government in Dijon addressed the captains of Nogent and Montigny asking them to stop making war on the places, given to the duke of Burgundy as a pledge for René, the imprisoned duke of Bar.\textsuperscript{217} In 1432 John Dedham, captain of Montigny-le-Roi, was sued by Philip the Good in the Parlement of Paris for capturing Louis Bournel, travelling with the duke’s safe conduct.\textsuperscript{218}

In the following years these English forces were found at a greater distance from their home garrisons. In October 1432 Sir Thomas Gargrave, captain of Nogent and Montigny, was serving with a retinue of some 100 paies at supplying Auxerre for an expected conference.\textsuperscript{219} One of his subordinates, Thomas Scones (or Scoues), squire, with 12 men-at-arms accompanied Burgundian ambassadors from Dijon to Semur-en-Auxois on their way to Auxerre.\textsuperscript{220} In the next year the captains of Nogent and Montigny were invited to join the duke for the journée of Pacy-sur-Armacçon although it is not clear

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\textsuperscript{216} The seigneur de L’Isle Adam seems never to have been styled marshal of France in the Burgundian receiver-general’s account for 1432–1435. After the congress of Arras, he had to excuse himself before the order of the Golden Fleece for having taken this post without consultations with the duke. This, he pretended, was due to technical reasons and not to evil intention, \textit{Die Protokollbücher des Ordens vom Goldenen Vlies. Band 1 Herzog Philipp der Gute 1430-1467}, ed. S. Dünnebeil (Stuttgart, 2002), pp. 67–69.
\textsuperscript{217} ADN, B 1945, fo. 75r.
\textsuperscript{218} The materials of the process are printed in M. H. Keen, \textit{The Laws of War}, pp. 263–267.
\textsuperscript{219} ADCO, B 1649, fo. 122v, J.–L. Bazin, ‘La Bourgogne de la mort du duc Philippe le Hardi’, p. 229. For Gargrave’s service in Bassigny in 1426–1427 see Ch. 3.3.
\textsuperscript{220} ADCO, B 1649, fo. 122v.
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whether they responded the summons. Given the revival of the hostilities in Bassigny and Langres following the defection of Guillaume, seigneur de Châteauvillain to the Valois cause in 1433, it is tempting to believe that the two English garrisons would take part in the Burgundian operations in the region led by Jean de Vergy including the sieges of Grancey and Chaumont, but this is not supported by the sources. It appears that there were hardly any other English forces in the area who could have made an unsuccessful attempt on Langres in 1433 after the city joined the seigneur de Châteauvillain.

Another notice concerning the two garrisons comes from Hugues de Lannoy who in the report on his embassy to London in 1433 mentions having met the seigneur de Varambon, who told him ‘quil ne peut finely savoir Nogent ne Montigny’. Thus, Philip the Good may have been trying to establish his control over the two places but he did not succeed. Nogent and Montigny remained in the English hands till the rupture of the Anglo-Burgundian alliance.

221 ADN, B 1948, fo. 124v.
224 Letters and Papers, II, pt. 1, p. 249. François de La Palud, seigneur de Varambon, was a Savoyard captain with a distinguished record of service to the duke of Burgundy, who by 1433 made him his councillor and chamberlain. He was with the seigneur de L’Isle-Adam at the siege of Villeneuve-le-Roi in early 1421, he defended Cravant with Guy de Bar and Claude, seigneur de Chastellux against the Armagnacs in 1423 and then served Philip the Good in Holland in 1425. In the 1430s he fought alongside the prince of Orange in the battle of Anthon, where he was captured, then at the siege of Chappes and in the battle of Bulgnéville. He was thus always serving the duke of Burgundy rather than the Lancastrian regime but during the two last engagements he may have contacted the English from Montigny and Nogent. For more details of his career see J. Paviot, ‘François de La Palud, seigneur de Varambon, un encombrant seigneur du XVIe siècle’, Hommes, cultures et sociétés à la fin du Moyen Âge. Liber discipulorum en l’honneur de Philippe Contamine, ed. by P. Gilly and J. Paviot (Paris, 2012), pp. 257–292.
Having concluded peace with Philip the Good Charles VII could direct his forces against the English outposts in the region. By 26 December 1435 Montigny was besieged by the Dauphinists under the seigneur de La Suze.²²⁵ It appears that Burgundian forces were not engaged at this siege as on 20 January 1436 Guillaume de Saulx and Jean de Rochefort were sent from Dijon to Montigny in an attempt to negotiate that the fortresses were surrendered to the duke of Burgundy rather than to the Dauphinists.²²⁶ Thus, the rupture of the Anglo-Burgundian alliance did not mean the immediate outbreak of war. It appears that Montigny was eventually captured and demolished,²²⁷ while the surrender of Nogent was bought by Jean de Vergy for 3000 écus.²²⁸ The exact date and the organisation of the submission of the places remains unclear.²²⁹ It is

²²⁵ Inventaire-Sommaire ... de Langres, p. 116.
²²⁶ ADCO, B 1659 fos. 132r–133v.
²²⁷ L. de Plépape, Histoire militaire du pays de Langres, p. 104.
²²⁸ This sum was consequently reimbursed to Jean de Vergy by Charles VII by his letters given on 14 February 1441, A. du Chesne, Histoire généalogique de la maison de Vergy justifiée par chartes, titres, arrests & autres bonnes & certaines preuves, enrichie de plvsieurs figves, & divisée en dix Liures (Paris, 1625), pp. 212. 214–216. These letters refer to the surrender of Nogent as having taken place ‘depuis six ans’, that is before February 1435, an evident miscalculation. L. de Plépape gives 2 May 1436 as the day when the payment was made, unfortunately without referring to his source, L. de Plépape, Histoire militaire du pays de Langres, p. 91.
²²⁹ Monstrelet reports the recovery of the fortresses by Jean de Vergy ‘avec lui plusieurs capitaines François’ placing this passage among the events of late 1435 – early 1436, thus, before the war between the English and the Burgundians had been decided, Monstrelet, V, p. 205. An inquisition made in November 1444 of the abuses made by the écorcheurs in the lands of Luxeuil and Faucogney mentions several cases committed by the soldiers being at the siege of Montigny–le–Roi. One of these is reported to take place about ‘le jour de la Saint Ylaire qui fut en l’an IIII’XXXVII’, which may refer to 13 January 1438 or possibly 1437, dependent on the chronology in use. Other testimonies refer to the events as having happened 8–9 years ago, that is between late 1435 and late 1436. See A. Tuetey, Les écorcheurs sous Charles VII. Épisodes de l’histoire militaire de la France au XVe siècle, 2 vols. (Montbéliard, 1874) II, pp. 360, 364, 366. The journal of the city receiver of Langres for 1437–1438 mentions a dispatch of a bombard to the siege of Montigny by the city. This may suggest that the siege was still or once again in progress in 1437–1438, though it is not impossible, it could refer to the siege of 1435–1436, J. de Boullaye, Inventaire-Sommaire ... de Langres, p. 102.
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only from 1439 that Sir Thomas Gargrave, the last known English captain of Nogent and Montigny, is found again in the lists of English armies, his absence in the meantime possibly caused by a need to ransom himself. Thus after the Anglo-Burgundian rupture in 1435 the decade-long story of the two most remote English outposts in France quickly came to an end.

5.5 **The Congress of Arras and its consequences (1435 – early 1436).**

5.5.1 **The congress of Arras and the treaty of Arras.**

The campaigns of Duke Philip on the borders of Burgundy in 1433 and 1434 restored his position to a certain degree and made Charles, the new duke of Bourbon and lieutenant of Charles VII in the region, seek a new truce. The negotiations began in late 1434 and eventually led to the peace conference which opened at Nevers on 20 January.

This conference did not only serve to finalise the reconciliation between the dukes of Bourbon and Burgundy, establishing the truce. In addition to Charles, duke of Bourbon, the Dauphinois delegation at Nevers also included another brother-in-law of Philip the Good, Arthur de Richemont, constable of France, who had recently returned to power at the court of Charles VII. It was decided at Nevers that a conference for general peace should assemble in Arras on 1 July 1435. It was also agreed that if the ambassadors of Henry VI failed to come to terms with Charles VII, Philip the Good would treat for a separate peace; conditions of such reconciliation were also discussed.

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230 He served in the garrison of Pontoise in 1439–1441, BNF, MS. Clairambault 202, nos. 6, 7, 10, 11 [SLME]; AN, K 67/1/40 [SLME] (6 September 1441). He then served in the garrison of Mantes, BNF, MS. Fr. 25776, no. 1548 [SLME] (18 October 1441). He became the lieutenant of Mantes in the following year, BNF, NAF 8637, no. 51 [SLME] (9 September 1442). Thus, his career in France began in 1415 lasted over 30 years.


232 Plancher, IV, pp. CXLV–CXLVI.

233 Plancher, IV, pp. CXLIV–CXLV.
In May 1435 Philip the Good dispatched Hugues de Lannoy, Jacques, seigneur de Creveceur, and Quentin Menart to England, inviting Henry VI to send his representatives to the conference about to be held in Arras.\textsuperscript{234} The English council responded by promising to send the embassy, but delaying their arrival until 15 July on the grounds that the king had not been informed in time.\textsuperscript{235}

Powers to the ambassadors issued on 20 June are known to exist in three variants. That one published in length in \textit{Foedera} placed Philip the Good at the head of the Lancastrian embassy. In the other two variants Cardinal Beaufort, and John Kemp, archbishop of York, were named in his place.\textsuperscript{236} The embassy was expected to represent both kingdoms of the Dual monarchy and was composed of both the English and the French. There were two notable Burgundians among the suggested ambassadors: Jean de Villiers, seigneur de L’Isle-Adam and Jean de Luxembourg, count of Ligny and Guise.\textsuperscript{237} Louis de Luxembourg, count of Saint Pol, and Colard de Mailly, \textit{bailli} of Vermandois, may have been considered a part of Jean de Luxembourg’s entourage.\textsuperscript{238} Among other ambas-

\textsuperscript{234} Gifts were given to the ambassadors and Toison d’Or King of Arms by the council of England on 4 June, \textit{POPC}, IV, p. 301.


\textsuperscript{236} \textit{Foedera}, X, pp. 611–613. It is noteworthy that Cardinal Beaufort is not named among the ambassadors in the set of powers, suggesting that Philip the Good would take charge of the delegation. Thus, Beaufort’s presence was not required, should Philip the Good side with the Lancastrians. This may support the suggestion by J. G. Dickinson, that the cardinal’s role at the congress was not negotiating with the Valois representatives but saving the Anglo-Burgundian alliance, \textit{The Congress of Arras}, pp. 35–39.

\textsuperscript{237} Their proximity to the duke was acknowledged by their membership of the order of the Golden Fleece.

\textsuperscript{238} Louis de Luxembourg was only seventeen, having inherited the comital title from his father in 1433. Colard de Mailly combined his service to the Lancastrian regime with his office of \textit{bailli} since 1425, with a number of campaigns made together with or under the leadership of Jean de Luxembourg including the campaign in Picardy in 1421, the siege of Guise in 1424, and the campaign in Argonne in 1428. Both of them followed Jean de Luxembourg in not accepting the Treaty of Arras and remaining in Lancastrian obedience, but on his death in 1441 reconciled themselves with Charles VII and took part in the war on the Valois side. See A. Ledru, \textit{Histoire de la maison de Mailly}, I, pp. 276–281, J. G. Dickinson, p. 47 n. 2.
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sadors there were many men who had started their career supporting the Burgundian party, but during 1420s – 1430s had become identified with the Lancastrian regime rather than with Philip the Good.239

In practice however, the Burgundian participation in the Lancastrian embassy proved to be minimal. Philip the Good took no interest in leading the delegation. The seigneur de L’Isle–Adam and Colard de Mailly were at the siege of Saint Denis.240 Jean and Louis de Luxembourg did not join the Lancastrian delegation and only visited the congress on a handful of occasions.241 It was the representatives of Lancastrian governments of England and France, not those of the Burgundian party who were to negotiate with the ambassadors of Charles VII.

Negotiations opened on 10 August. The course of the congress was divided into two clear stages. Initially the ambassadors of Henry VI and Charles VII negotiated through mediation seeking a way for a general peace. The Lancastrian and Valois delegations did not meet but presented counter–offers in writing through the mediation of two cardinals representing the Pope and the council of Basel. The final offer was presented to the English on 4 September, but proved unacceptable to them.242 The negotiations reached stalemate. The English ambassadors could only offer to report the Valois offers to the king or the council but no particular date for the resumption of the congress was ap-

239 Such persons were Louis de Luxembourg, bishop of Thérouanne, Lancastrian chancellor of France, Pierre Cauchon, bishop of Lisieux, Jean de Mailly, bishop of Noyon, Guy Le Bouteiller, seigneur de La Roche–Guyon.
240 See Appendix B.14.
241 On 22 July a messenger was sent to Jean de Luxembourg, count of Ligny and Guise, at Thérouanne or Saint Pol, ADN, B 1954, fo. 83r. According to Lefèvre de Saint–Remy, Jean and Louis de Luxembourg, count of St. Pol, entered Arras on 8 August and served lances to Pierre de Bauffremont, seigneur de Charny, in his single combat against a Spanish knight, fought on 11 August, St. Remy, II, pp. 312–320. They must have then left Arras as on 22 August the two counts were invited to come there in order to greet Cardinal Beaufort at his coming, ADN, B 1954, fo. 86r. Several days later the count of Ligny was in the Burgundian force sent to expel La Hire and Poton de Xaintraillies from Artois, ADN, B 1954 fo. 86v. He was again absent from Arras by 17 September, ADN, B 1954, fo. 89r.
pointed. Even though Philip the Good had revealed to Cardinal Beaufort his intention to make separate peace with Charles VII, the Lancastrian delegation departed from Arras on 6 September.

At the second stage of the congress the reconciliation between Philip the Good and Charles VII became a matter of discussion. As a result of this Duke Philip was absolved by the cardinals of the oath given to the Treaty of Troyes in 1420, and the Treaty of Arras was signed on 21 September 1435. The articles of the treaty of Arras can be divided in three major groups relating to the redemption for the murder at Montereau, the cession of territories to the duke by the Valois regime and finally the interfaces of interaction between the duke and his dominions and subjects and Charles VII as the king of France. During the previous fifteen years the duke failed to obtain justice over the murderers of his father from the Lancastrian regime, now he was promised it by Charles VII (who denied his personal involvement in the murder). These articles, first of all, were necessary for both parties to save the face and make a reconciliation possible. Moreover, the Valois king acknowledged all the grants made to the Burgundian duke by the Lancastrians with the sole exception of the county of Champagne and Brie, nominally given to the duke in 1430. These were supplemented with a grant to the duke and his heirs of Ponthieu and the Somme towns which made the river a border of the ducal state. In return, the duke had to accept Charles VII as the king of France but was relieved of any feudal services and even of paying formal homage to the king. He could collect the taxes in his lands for himself and his subjects were not bound to respond to the royal military summonses. No treaties with the English were to be made

244 For the text of the treaty see Les grands traités, pp. 116–151.
246 It does not appear that the title of the count of Champagne and Brie ever appeared in the documents issued on Duke Philip’s behalf.
247 In the same manner as the Lancastrians in their grants to the duke of Burgundy of Auxerre, Mâcon and Bar-sur-Seine (1424) and of Champagne and Brie (1430), Charles VII reserved for himself a way of demanding the return of these territories should the situation become more favourable – by buying them back for 400 000 écus, Les grands traités, pp. 138–141.

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by either side without the other’s consent. These conditions left Philip the Good only nominally dependent on Charles VII; therefore in the treaty of Arras the duke and the king were presented as parties of equal status.

What the Treaty of Arras did not stipulate was that the duke was to engage himself in the war between Charles VII and the Lancastrian regime. It appears that Duke Philip’s intention in September 1435 was to offer himself as a mediator between the two monarchies. Time was to show the scale of his miscalculation.

5.5.2 Diplomatic and strategic consequences of the Treaty of Arras.

The peace–mediating advances of Duke Philip proved a failure from the very start. The duke's envoys, consisting of two heralds and a friar, the latter representing the cardinals, crossed to England but were refused audience before the king. Their letters were taken from them and presented before the king’s council but the envoys had to return without any written answer. Philip the Good became a persona non grata for the Lancastrian government: to treat with him (at least, other than from a position of force) was to justify his treason and undermine Lancastrian pretensions for the French crown.

When Parliament assembled on 10 October, the opening speech of the chancellor presented the situation as a choice of either accepting the humiliating offers made by the ambassadors of Charles VII at Arras or defending the

249 Les grands traités, p. 145.
251 On the contrary the king promised to help the duke in the case that the latter might find himself in the war with the English in the consequence of the Treaty, Les grands traités, p. 145. The war was thus considered possible but not inevitable.
252 A manoeuvre which at a first glance resembles that made by the duke of Savoy in the conflict of the dukes of Burgundy and Savoy with the duke of Bourbon in 1434, A. Leguai, Les Ducs de Bourbon, pp. 143–144.
rights of the crown with the force of arms. Parliament responded with granting a tenth and a fifteenth supplemented with an income tax to help the crown meet the war expenses. The duke of Gloucester was given the captaincy of Calais, which suddenly became a frontier town and needed reinforcement. The English council decided to strengthen the political situation of England by a web of alliances. In December 1435 letters were sent to Jacqueline of Bavaria and the cities of Holland and Zealand enquiring of their position if war with Philip the Good occurred. Embassies were also sent to the emperor and several German princes of the lower Rhine.

This activity was supplemented by popular reaction. The news of the Treaty of Arras provoked an outbreak of hostilities against the duke’s subjects especially the Flemish merchants in England some of whom were killed. Burgundian ships were detained in the English ports or attacked by privateers, while the border incidents were taking place in the marches of Calais. As K. H. Vickers summarised, ‘the country in general was too angry with the Duke to realise the advantages of his neutrality’.

It is possible, however, that the popular anti-Burgundian feeling proved instrumental for the government towards obtaining support for the war aimed actually against Charles VII rather than Philip the Good. The reinforcing of

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255 PRME, XI, p. 163.
258 These anti-Burgundian riots were stopped by the government, M.-R. Thielmans, Bourgogne et Angleterre, p. 68.
259 M.-R. Thielmans, Bourgogne et Angleterre, pp. 74, 76–78.
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Calais was reasonable, given the insecurity in Anglo-Burgundian relations but nothing suggests that the city was intended to become a base of operations against Burgundian Flanders and Boulonnais. In addition to the defence of Calais the funds granted by the Commons were to be employed towards the dispatch of two armies into France. One under Richard, duke of York, was to be sent to Normandy while another under Edmund Beaufort, count of Mortain, to the borders of Anjou and Maine. Even the diplomatic approaches towards the German princes, given the small size of the contingent requested on their side may seem a defensive alliance rather than a coalition for the invasion.

It is also possible that this reflected the drastic deterioration of the military situation in France. As a consequence of the Treaty of Arras the Dauphinists in Picardy, who had previously shared a part of their efforts in the raids against the Burgundian territories, concentrated their forces against the English. The lands of Caux were overrun by the enemies: Fécamp, Montivilliers, Tancarville and – worst of all – the ports of Harfleur and Dieppe fell to them by the end of the year. The council in Rouen, headed now by Bishop Louis of

\[\text{[\textbf{PRME}] The Reign of King Henry VI, [POPC], English Diplomacy [Bourgogne et Angleterre, Lancaster and York]}\]

\[\text{C IV \text{[\textbf{Cleopatra C IV}]}}\]

\[\text{C IV \text{[\textbf{Cleopatra C IV}]}}\]

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262 According to the indenture of the duke of Gloucester for the captaincy of Calais, cited in the Parliament roll the garrison with the exception of three officers (captain, lieutenant and marshal) was to be composed of foot soldiers, PRME, XI, p. 168. Its offensive potential therefore seems dubious.

263 R. A. Griffiths, The Reign of King Henry VI, p. 201. It may be noteworthy that the king obtained a promise from the House of Lords that, if Calais was besieged by the duke of Burgundy, they would serve at their own cost at its relief, POPC, IV, p. 352c. The siege of Calais was definitely considered a possibility after Arras, but it does not seem that it was considered inevitable. On the other hand, this promise of the unpaid service in case of emergency permitted the crown to employ the available finances elsewhere.

264 J. Ferguson, English Diplomacy, pp. 69–70.

265 M.-R. Thielmans suggests that it was only between 14 December 1435 and 28 January 1436 that the Lancastrian government started considering Valois France rather then Burgundy as the most urgent threat and began seeking a way to coexist with the duke in the new circumstances, M.-R. Thielmans, Bourgogne et Angleterre, p. 78.

266 J. H. Ramsay, Lancaster and York, I, pp. 480–481. The London Chronicle Cleopatra C IV ascribes the rebellion in Caux (which was supported by the Dauphinist forces) to the ‘exitation of the Duke of Borgoyne’, Cleopatra C IV, p. 139. It seems likely that this
Luxembourg, Lancastrian chancellor of France, pleaded the king for the help: a response was given on 28 January 1436 promising to send as soon as possible two armies to Normandy. The chancellor also approached Philip the Good through his brother Jean de Luxembourg, count of Ligny, offering an informal agreement of non-aggression. However, after some consideration the duke rejected the offer.

It appears that the turning point was passed on 19 February 1436 when Philip the Good sent letters to the king of England reproaching him for what the duke considered hostile political acts. It is difficult to say whether the answer given by the English council on 17 March was expected to offer a final attempt of reconciliation or rather to persuade the subjects of Henry VI of the righteousness of their cause in the war against Burgundy. Philip the Good did not wait for Henry VI to exculpate himself. On 27–28 February letters were issued by Charles VII and Philip the Good respectively, promising pardon to the Parisians for having sworn obedience to the Lancastrian regime. On 8 March the duke addressed the Four Members of Flanders, informing them of his intention to conquer Calais and asking them to support him with men and finances, which were subsequently promised to him. By the end of month the duke’s plans became known to the English. Both sides were now preparing for war.

The first acts of this war followed in the Ile-de-France. The Constable de Richemont was approaching Paris, this time supported by Burgundian contingents under the seigneurs de L’Isle-Adam, de Ternant and de Varambon. On 20 February Pontoise was delivered by the citizens to Jean de Villers, seigneur

may have been partly due to the Burgundian influence in the region but also to the example of reconciliation with Charles VII given by Philip the Good.


273 *Gruel*, p. 113.
The final years
de L'Isle–Adam; the English garrison was taken prisoners.\textsuperscript{274} On 13 April this
captain, now in the ranks of Charles VII’s army, was, for the second time in his
adventurous life, admitted into the capital of France by the Parisians. The Eng-
lish could only withdraw to the Bastille and surrendered on 17 April on being
allowed to leave.\textsuperscript{275} In 1420 the Treaty of Troyes and the Burgundian alliance
brought Paris to the English. Without Philip the Good they could only keep it
for a few months.

The treaty of Arras was a great victory for the Francophile party over the
Anglophiles in Philip the Good’s entourage. The outbreak of the Anglo-
Burgundian war in spring 1436, although facilitated by English hostility
(whether advocated by the government or spontaneous), was their second ma-
jor success. After sixteen years the King of England and the duke of Burgundy
were once again at war with each other.

5.6 The character of military cooperation in 1432–1435.

The joint operations of 1432–1435 were mostly concentrated in two re-
gions: the environs of Paris (extending to the lower Oise valley) and the lower
Somme (including Ponthieu and Vimeu). This was due to the fact that these
were the regions where English and Burgundian interests coincided. Paris had
strong and long-held Burgundian sympathies and the duke was keen to uphold
his reputation among the bourgeoisie by contributing to the relief of the capi-
tal in the face of the Dauphinist pressure. That is why Burgundian contingents
were sent for the siege of Lagny-sur-Marne in 1432 and then for the recovery
of Saint Denis in 1435.

The mouth of the Somme was another region of mutual importance. For
the Burgundians the Somme provided a natural frontier which to a certain de-
gree impeded the Dauphinist raids against Philip the Good’s county of Artois

\textsuperscript{274} Sir John Ripley, the English lieutenant of Pontoise, who had only recently served with
the seigneur de L'Isle–Adam in Beaujolais, tried to hold out in one of the gatehouses
but was forced to surrender, \textit{Chartier}, I, pp. 217–218. J. Barker, reporting this episode
reasonably notes that de L'Isle–Adam could only take command of Pontoise if author-

\textsuperscript{275} J. H. Ramsay, \textit{Lancaster and York}, I, pp. 481–482.
and his dominions to the north. The creation of a Dauphinist foothold at the mouth of the Somme troubled the Lancastrians since it posed threats both to the shipping in the Channel and to their stronghold of Le Crotoy. It also threatened the towns of the lower Somme such as Amiens and Abbeville over which the duke of Burgundy sought to extend his influence. That is why Dauphinist operations against Saint-Valéry-sur-Somme and Rue each time resulted in a joint Anglo-Burgundian response.

However, the course of the hostilities in Picardy in 1433–1435 reveals how little success the Lancastrians managed to obtain. The Anglo-Burgundian allies showed themselves able to assemble considerable armies, but these armies were used to very little effect. Most fortified places of importance taken by the Lancastrians during the last years of alliance were bought rather than won. 276 This made this war a source of constant expense for the Lancastrian party: for the maintenance of a siege, for assembling a greater army for a mock journée, for paying a ransom for the place to the Dauphinist garrison and finally either for the demolition of the fortifications or for another siege of the same place several months later. The gains of war, if any, could hardly balance these expenses as happened in 1421, when the surrender of Saint-Riquier was eventually purchased through the deliverance of the prisoners taken at Mons-en-Vimeu. 277 By contrast, for the Dauphiniasts this was a war of gains, composed of the booty from their raids and ransoms paid by the besiegers. For them the war could feed itself and this must have attracted men into their ranks.

Facing a choice of either paying the sum comparable to the monthly wages of the besieging army to the garrison or maintaining the siege for several months before a conclusive result could be achieved, the first option was always chosen. Under Henry V sieges were conducted over several months but this persistence was rewarded, since the enemy garrison was eventually either taken prisoner or allowed to leave across the Seine, removing them from the continuation of the war. These sieges were a part of a clear strategy of steadily

277 See above, Ch. 1.3.3.
The final years

reducing the enemy territory into submission. The sieges of 1430s were only a reaction to a local crisis aimed at recovering the situation in the locality.

This may have been a part of a greater crisis at the strategic level. In 1432–1435 the Lancastrian government and the duke of Burgundy were pursuing almost two separate wars – Philip the Good fought on his southern lands and, to a lesser degree, in Picardy and the Ile-de-France, the Lancastrians in the Ile-de-France, Maine, and (to a lesser degree) in Picardy. The military situation of 1431 may have resembled that of 1419 but the strategy of the allies was different. Unlike 1420–1424 Picardy, and especially Champagne, remained only secondary theatres, the attempts of the allies to remove the wedge, driven between them in 1429, were insignificant. Was it due to the Lancastrians being more interested to retain their positions in Maine, the personal apanage of the duke of Bedford from 1424? Was it because Champagne was granted to Philip the Good in 1430 and the reduction of the county was considered his responsibility? It appears that the principal reason may have been the over-extension of the frontiers which both allies had to defend, leading to a lack of resources, – human, material and financial – which could be used for counter-attacks.

Nothing suggests that Philip the Good ever considered himself capable of winning the war against Charles VII on his own. Therefore the possibility that the war might be won by force must have correlated with a greater measure of participation in the war from resources of the kingdom of England, the strategic reserve of the Lancastrian regime. The English needed to turn the tide of war, to make happen the miracle which failed in 1430. Otherwise, if the war could not be won, then peace, however difficult, was the only option for the duke. For the English, however, the war in France still remained very much an internal problem of the French subjects of Henry VI.

Anglo-Burgundian diplomacy illustrates well the shift in the duke’s approach to these alternatives from 1429 to 1435. In the autumn of 1429 Hu-gues de Lannoy composed a mémoire envisaging the framework of Anglo-Burgundian cooperation for the anticipated coronation expedition. He mentioned briefly that the king of England should send delegates to the projected peace conference at Auxerre, only to show his will for peace. In 1433 Hugues de Lannoy was again sent before Henry VI, this time advising the English king, among other matters, to try seek peace or truce, and if this could not be achieved to send such a mighty army that the king’s enemies would have to
seek peace or truce. Finally, in 1435 the same Hugues de Lannoy was one of the members of the Burgundian embassy sent to invite Henry VI to send his representatives for the congress of Arras. The instructions of the Burgundian envoys contained lengthy justifications of Philip the Good’s decision to seek general peace and suggestions for the king’s participation in the conference. Only at the very end was it recommended that Henry VI should send a powerful army to France which could be immediately turned against the Dauphinists should they show no desire for peace. According to R. Vaughan, after 1433 ‘nothing could now restore Philip’s waning loyalty to the English, nor stimulate his interest in French affairs’, yet there was a means of doing this – a major intervention of military resources of England into French affairs – and the duke clearly expressed it.

Unfortunately, the kingdom of England once again proved unable to meet the duke’s expectations. Although expeditionary forces were sent to France each year between 1432–1435 they could only deal with current challenges but not turn the tide of the war. This coincided with a major crisis in the finances of the English crown publicized by Ralph, Lord Cromwell, in the Parliament of 1433. The programme of mobilizing the resources of the crown for the war in France was offered by John, duke of Bedford, during his visit to England in 1433–1434 but apparently did not bring quick results. While the crown was in trouble, parliamentary support was quite limited, only providing two grants of the tenth and fifteenth over the four years from 1432 to 1435. Ironically, the Commons would only respond in the Parliament of October 1435 when the Burgundians had defected, but by this time it was too late. All the English government was able to do before the congress of Arras was to send an expedition of some 2000 men under John, Lord Talbot, which took part in the siege of Saint Denis. This, although greater than any other expeditionary force sent

278 B. de Lannoy, Hugues de Lannoy, p. 232.
280 R. Vaughan, Philip the Good, p. 27.
283 See PRME, X.
The final years after 1431, was hardly enough to impress Philip the Good and to affect his decision.

It is often suggested that the reconciliation with Charles VII was decided in general terms during the preliminary negotiations in Nevers in early 1435 and that, at Arras, Philip the Good only waited for the English diplomats to fail so that he could justify his separate treaty with Charles VII through the arguments of the public good and desire for peace. If this was true, why would the duke recommend sending an army to France in 1435? It appears, actually, that up to the very last moment Duke Philip was offering the government of Henry VI a way to save the Anglo-Burgundian alliance.

In spite of all the difficulties, Anglo-Burgundian cooperation in the military sphere was continued up to the very last days of the alliance. It is notable that the conclusion of the Treaty of Arras did not prevent bringing the siege of Saint Denis to an end and did not cause the immediate outbreak of the hostilities between the former allies. On the contrary, most incidents which eventually provoked the Anglo-Burgundian war seemed to happen in the regions belonging to Lancastrian England rather than France, be it in London, where the Flemish were mistreated, at sea with ships brought to the English ports or in the marches of Calais. There were hardly any significant anti-Burgundian feelings in Lancastrian France, but it was very much the outburst of these in England which made the Anglo-Burgundian war inevitable.

The eventual rupture of the Anglo-Burgundian alliance was affected by a wide complex of factors of political, military, economic and personal nature. But this was not due to the fact that the Lancastrians came to be considered a greater evil than the adherents of Charles VII. It was rather due to the perceived inability of the Lancastrian regime to win the war.
Chapter 6: Aspects and models of military cooperation

It has been shown in the previous chapters that Anglo-Burgundian cooperation in the military sphere was extensive and abundant, taking various forms and spread over wide territories of northern France. This section aims to summarize Anglo-Burgundian experience of joint operations and to identify the interfaces through which it was projected, organised and implemented, as well as the most frequent models employed.

6.1 The reasons for the cooperation

It has been claimed that the Anglo-Burgundian alliance was doomed from the start as it was only based on a shared hatred towards the Dauphin and his adherents.1 This opinion bases the fifteen-year-long military efforts on the unstable basis of irrational personal feelings. Philip the Good may have been motivated by the desire to avenge the death of his father, John the Fearless (although the degree to which it influenced his policy rather than was instrumental in it and how this changed over time can be a matter of discussion) and to continue the war against the ancient enemies of his father. However, until the end of 1419 Henry V was ready to negotiate with the Armagnacs as well as with the Burgundians and there seems to be no evidence of any particular antipathy towards either party. The latter could only be caused by general disapproval of the murder at Montereau, which would also show that the Dauphinists were not a party fit to negotiate with. Though possibly a part of the ‘good king’ myth, Henry V is reputed to be a person scrupulous and unbiased in the matters of honour and justice,2 he thus may have considered this outra-

2 See the characteristic of Henry V in Religieux, VI, p. 381. His impartiality was illustrated, for example, with the execution of Bertrand de Caumont for helping some Dauphinists engaged in the murder at Montereau to escape at the surrender of Melun in November 1420. The execution was carried out in spite of pleas for mercy from Thomas, duke of Clarence (whom the king promised to persecute if he did not stop) and even Philip, duke of Burgundy. See Appendix F.1.
Aspects and models

geous crime an insult to the divine order. However, there seems to be no clear evidence that he had this view.

To present the Anglo-Burgundian alliance as a consequence of personal sympathies and antipathies of its leaders is to ignore the political context. On the one hand, since 1416 at least, John the Fearless showed himself disposed to the English alliance, but not against the king of France. The treaty of Troyes offered his son a perfect solution of this dilemma. On the other hand, efforts of Henry V and John, duke of Bedford, in trying to maintain continuity between the France of Charles VI and Lancastrian France, should not be ignored. Henry V was accepted as the heir and regent of France in the circumstances of the decade-long partisan war. Being an external force in the conflict and reputed to be a ruthless champion of order, he must have been perceived by some Frenchmen as a person able to put an end to the civil war. The legitimacy of his cause was no more doubtful than that of the Dauphin, disinherit ed by his father for the Montreau crime. In 1420–1422 it was not clear which of the governments in France – Lancastrian or Valois – would eventually emerge as a victor.

If the Lancastrian attempt to secure the crown of France for themselves is taken as serious, looking within a framework of traditional French institutions it is possible to identify several rational reasons encouraging Anglo-Burgundian cooperation in the military sphere.

The essential idea of the treaty of Troyes was the delegation of responsibility for the destiny of the French kingdom. By accepting the treaty Philip the Good stepped back from the ambitions of his father and grandfather to play the leading role in the French politics, and let Henry V and his successors to take this role. The position of power was surrendered together with all the responsibilities it implied, primary amongst them the defence of the kingdom against its enemies, both external and internal. The latter were expressly identified by the Treaty of Troyes with the so-called Dauphin and the remnants of the Armagnac party.3

What was the role left to the duke of Burgundy then? Except for the obligation not to make separate final peace with the Dauphin, the Treaty of Troyes  

3 Les grands traités, p. 106 (art. 12).
did not specify the degree of his participation in the war.\(^4\) Philip the Good thus was no more bound to fight against the Dauphin than any other subject of the French crown. He was, of course, also keen to defend his numerous dominions against Dauphinish attacks. As most of them were held as fiefs from the crown of France,\(^5\) with the obligation to maintain peace and order in them, Duke Philip could in case of need seek royal help in defending his lands.\(^6\) On the other hand, as a great vassal of the crown the duke of Burgundy would be expected and requested to provide support to the king with *consilium et auxilium*. The latter, of course, by the Late Middle Ages did not mean a forty–day period of unpaid military service; it could take different forms. Service was most likely to be paid by the crown, if not in case of emergency. This could be done either by accepting the duke’s forces in the king’s service or by delegating certain royal powers to the duke through a commission to the governance of certain regions or to the organisation of efforts against a particular objective.\(^7\) Thus the political framework of the Lancastrian kingdom of France provided fertile ground for various forms of joint military actions.

Feudal obligations towards the crown of France were supplemented by personal treaties of friendship made by Philip the Good with the English regents of France. The first of these was made between Henry V and Philip the Good in late 1419. After Henry V’s death it was replaced by the treaty of Amiens in April 1423. The articles of the latter treaty specified the amount of military help the signatories – dukes of Bedford, Burgundy and Brittany – could expect from each other in case of need. These treaties provided a different, highly personal, dimension to the military cooperation.

Another major means for Anglo–Burgundian interaction were the career opportunities offered by the Lancastrian administration to the Burgundian par–

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\(^4\) See above Ch. 1.1.4.
\(^5\) Some of the duke’s territories – the county of Burgundy, the duchy of Brabant (since 1430) etc. – were Imperial fiefs, but they must have been less threatened by the Dauphinish attacks.
\(^6\) This seems to be the model in the cases of the *journée* of Cosne–sur–Loire in 1422 and the relief of Cravant in 1423.
\(^7\) For the practice of the dukes’ engagement in the royal service from the fourteenth century to the time of John the Fearless see B. Schnerb, ‘Aspects de l’organisation militaire’, pp. 6–23.
Aspects and models

tisans. After the Treaty of Troyes the English Regent of France did not extend his administrative system into the French kingdom but inherited that created and staffed by John the Fearless.⁸ Though some changes were made, the system continued to exist and provide opportunities for those willing to work within it. It may be true that the key positions in the military administration of Normandy and pays de conquête were held by the English, and Anjou and Maine were granted to Bedford in apanage, but to the north and the east of the Seine the English presence only extended to several garrisons including Nogent and Montigny in Bassigny, and Le Crotot and Rue in the mouth of Somme. The key offices in the bailliages of Amiens, Vermandois, Senlis, Meaux, Chartres, Chaumont, Vitry and others were held by the Frenchmen, often with a Burgun-
dian background. The same was true for military commands in Paris and for the membership of the Great Council.⁹

The specifics of this model was the lengthy character of service defined either by a pre–appointed term of military service or at the Regent’s pleasure in case of administrators. Once enlisted, the same service was expected of an officer whether an Englishman or a Burgundian. The joint composition of the armies employed by the earl of Salisbury at the siege of Mont Aimé (1425–1426 and 1426–1427) and in other operations in Champagne was due to the engagement of retinues of Burgundians holding office as baillis and captains.

This pattern could work in two directions. English mercenaries were found in the Burgundian service from at least late fourteenth century.¹⁰ The 1420s and early 1430s were no exception. While royal service may have seemed to be more promising than ducal, it was still possible for an Englishman to enter the service of the duke of Burgundy or one of the Burgundian nobles such as de Luxembourg brothers. Sir Thomas Kyriell spent most of 1431

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¹⁰ For the presence of the English in Burgundian armies in late fourteenth – early fif-
and 1432 in the duke’s service.\textsuperscript{11} Sir John Ripley joined the company of Jean de Villiers, seigneur de L’Isle-Adam for Philip the Good’s campaign in Beaujolais in late 1434.\textsuperscript{12} William Corawen (or Coroan) spent several years in the service to Jean de Luxembourg in the east of Champagne and Barrois.\textsuperscript{13}

Thus the basis of the cooperation was not only based on personal rivalries and enmities of the princes but also on feudal obligations and the opportunities offered by the new political regime, which attracted both English and Burgundians.

6.2 Cooperation on the battlefield

6.2.1 The character of joint operations

The fifteen–year–long history of Anglo–Burgundian alliance witnessed over fifty cases when a joint army, including both English and Burgundian contingents, was found on a battlefield fighting, or at least ready to fight, the Dauphinists.\textsuperscript{14} It is possible to identify several main classes of these tactical engagements, which can be described in a following way:

\textbf{Siege} an operation undertaken by a joint Anglo–Burgundian army against a Dauphinist fortification. This is not limited to the

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\textsuperscript{11} See above Ch. 5.2.3.

\textsuperscript{12} See above Ch. 5.4.3.

\textsuperscript{13} He is mentioned as one of the commanders in the castle of Montagu near Laon in 1430, \textit{Monstrelet}, IV, p. 399. In late 1430 he was captured in the skirmish near Bou–choir together with Sir Thomas Kyriell, \textit{Monstrelet}, IV, p. 424. He was then fighting in the eastern Champagne for Jean de Luxembourg in 1433, \textit{Monstrelet}, V, p. 75. In late 1434 or 1435 he was defeated by the Dauphinists in the county of Ligny, \textit{Monstrelet}, V, p. 114. By October 1435 he was back to the Lancastrian France and served in the garrison of Gournay under Sir Thomas Kyriell, BNF, MS. Fr. 25772, no. 1003 [SLME] (10 Oct 1435); MS. Fr. 25774, no. 1295 (18 January 1438); MS. Fr. 25773, no. 1171 [SLME] (Feb 1438).

\textsuperscript{14} This does not count the engagements in which only individual Burgundians may have participated without forming any significant part in the battle orders, like in the battle of Verneuil (1424). For the list of these see Appendix A.
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conventional sieges like that of Compiègne (1430) but also includes surprise escalades like the capture of Provins (1432).

**Journée** a situation when the battle is appointed to be held on a particular day at a specified place to determine the destiny of a place under siege, which would surrender in case of the besieger’s victory in the battle.

**Battle** a situation of an Anglo-Burgundian army opposing the Dauphinists in the open field. The scale may vary from the minor skirmishes like one at Bouchoir (1430) to major battles like Bulgnéville (1424).

**Relief** an operation undertaken by one of the allies (on his own or jointly with another partner) to raise the siege of a certain place held by another partner. A most notable example is the battle of Cravant (1423) where the Dauphinist siege of a Burgundian-held place was raised by a joint Anglo-Burgundian army

**Defence** the actions for the defence of a fortification by joint Anglo-Burgundian force against the Dauphinist siege.

The relative percentage of these models of engagements is shown on the fig. 1.
It is easy to see that a great majority of the listed engagements were related with the besieging and defending the fortified places. Even some major battles were taking place either as a relief attempt, like at Cravant (1423) or during the siege like at Lagny-sur-Marne (1432). The battles in the open field which are more than simple skirmishes are few: Verneuil (1424), Rouvray (1429), Patay (1429), Montépilloy (1429), Bulgnéville (1431). This is a good illustration of the general character of this stage in the Hundred Years war when the fourteenth-century chevauchées were almost abandoned in favour of steady conquest.

It may be questioned whether the joint operations were projected or emergency actions. The defence and relief cooperation models suggest a response to the enemy attack. The battles could happen on the initiative of either or both adversaries. But the sieges, although sometimes undertaken in immediate response to the enemy successes (Saint Riquier (1421), Meulan (1423), Compiègne (1424)), could often be a part of a campaign planned in advance (operations against Guise (1422–1424), siege of Compiègne (1430)), when the respective roles and degrees of participation of both allies could be outlined. On the other hand participation in a joint siege which could last for weeks or
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even months required much greater efforts in assembling and paying the soldiers, engaged at the siege compared to the relief operations or journée which tend to last for only a few days. Over a half of joint operations were sieges and it is thus notable that these logistical difficulties did not prevent Anglo-Burgundian allies from consistently following this model.

On contrary the cases when the English and the Burgundians were found together on the defensive are few, not to say exceptional. At the siege of Chartres (1421) the English may have been brought into the city among the reinforcements from Paris, led by the bastard de Thiant. Another case was the Dauphonian assault of Paris (1429), when the defence of the French capital was entrusted to the Picard forces of the seigneur de L'Isle-Adam, supported by the English of the garrison of Paris and possibly by reinforcements sent by Bedford. Although individual Burgundians are occasionally found serving in the English garrisons, their participation in the defence of the places may be difficult to trace as they did not form separate retinues within the garrison. The situation could be different for great cities like Paris or (in theory) Rouen having several independent military commands which could be divided between the companies of various origin. Thus while in some cases the Burgundian soldiers may have participated in the defence of the places of the English France, they acted under the command of English captains. The same may be true for the English soldiers in the Burgundian service, although at a lesser scale, the only notable example being the English presence in the retinue of the seigneur de L'Isle-Adam at Belleville in Beaujolais in late 1434.

6.2.2 Tactics of the Anglo-Burgundian forces

During the period of 1420–1435 joint armies, composed of both English and Burgundian contingents, thrice fought the Dauphinists in major pitched battles: at Cravant (1423), at Bulgnéville (1431) and before Lagny-sur-Marne (1432). To these may be added the battles of Verneuil (1424), Rouvray (1429) and Patay (1429), fought by generally English forces although with a certain number of the Burgundians in their ranks. In several other cases battle was anticipated with Lancastrian and Dauphinist forces facing each other in battle or-

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15 Thus, the English and Burgundian captains occasionally coexisted in the various commands in and around Paris, G. L. Thompson, Paris, pp. 86–87.
ders, but eventually no major combat followed, such as at Cosne-sur-Loire (1422) at Montépilloy (1429) and before Compiègne (1430). These were the great military enterprises which are described in more or less detail in the narrative sources and they can be supplemented by a number of less important or less reported skirmishes, sieges and journées.

It is worth noting that in most of the major engagements with the exception of Cravant (1423) the Anglo-Burgundian armies were fighting in a defensive style relying on the coordination of the firepower of archers and gens-de-trait with the combat skills and defensive equipment of the dismounted men-at-arms. This tactic, usually associated with the English military tradition, was employed by the Burgundians at least from 1412, as shown by B. Schnurb. This tactical scheme suggested that the centre of battle formation was formed of dismounted men-at-arms, while the archers were usually deployed on the flanks. The placement of archers at Agincourt is a matter of some discussion. In the 1420s the archers are reported to be placed before the main division at Verneuil (1424), Montépilloy (1429) and at Bulgnéville (1431).

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16 In fact there was heavy fighting for the bastides erected before Compiègne but due to the tactical skill of the Armagnacs the bulk of the Anglo-Burgundian army which had prepared itself for a pitched battle did not actually take part in the combat. See above, Ch. 4.3.4.

17 Even at Cravant the defensive manner of combat was considered a possible variant as follows from the ordinances issued by the earl of Salisbury before the battle. See Ch. 2.3.


20 See the schemes provided in M. Bennett, ‘The development of Battle Tactics’.

21 See the comparison of the evidence provided by the sources, coming to the conclusion that the archers were placed in front of the men-at-arms as well as on the wings in A. Curry, *Agincourt: A New History*, pp. 230–233.

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This battle style was reliant on the choice of a good position and the massive employment of missile weapons. The natural strength of position was an important factor. It was preferable to deploy an army on the high ground, giving a number of the advantages to the defender. The anxiety to avoid an enveloping enemy manoeuvre was also a consideration. On the journée of Ivry (1424), the Lancastrian position was protected by the hill, preventing an attack from the rear.\textsuperscript{23} At Montépilloy (1429) and Bulgnéville (1431) the position was chosen with the river at the rear. While this must have prevented almost any chance of encirclement, it also placed the defending army in the situation when no retreat was possible, which could to a certain degree motivate the soldiers to fight to the last.

When possible the measures to fortify the position were taken. The most common defence were sharpened poles placed before the ranks in order to break enemy cavalry charge. It has been suggested that the Burgundians could have accepted the usage of sharpened poles as an anti-cavalry obstacle after facing it in the battle of Nicopolis (1396).\textsuperscript{24} It appears that this tactical scheme was first successfully employed in Western Europe by the English at Agincourt. After this victory it became one of the standard features which the English employed at Verneuil (1424),\textsuperscript{25} Rouvray (1429),\textsuperscript{26} and Montépilloy (1429).\textsuperscript{27}

The other stratagem was using the carts and wagons for the fortification of the battle order either by placing them to the flanks or at the rear in order

\textsuperscript{24} M. Bennett, ‘The development of Battle Tactics’, pp. 13–15. Ph. Contamine had suggested that the pits, discovered during the excavations on the field of the battle of Aljubarrota (1385), could be used for the placement of the poles, Ph. Contamine, The War in the Middle Ages, p. 121. This is not supported by the excavators, who report that they were looking for any traces of wooden poles in the ditches and pits discovered on the battlefield, but found no such evidence. A. do Paço, ‘The Battle of Aljubarrota’, Antiquity, 37 (1963), pp. 264–270. A more recent study of the battle also suggests these were used as pit traps rather than for the placement of the poles, J. G. Monteiro, ‘The Battle of Aljubarrota (1385): a Reassessment’, Journal of Medieval Military History, 7 (2009), p. 87.
\textsuperscript{25} Brut, p. 565 (Continuation H); M. K. Jones, ‘The Battle of Verneuil’, p. 387.
\textsuperscript{26} Basset, fo. 65v.
\textsuperscript{27} Monstrelet, IV, p. 345; Wavrin, III, p. 326.
to prevent envelopment, as was done at Bulgnéville (1431) and probably at Montépilloy (1429),\textsuperscript{28} or by deploying archers under their cover as seems to be done by Jacques, seigneur de Crevecoeur, in a skirmish near St. Just (1430)\textsuperscript{29} and slightly earlier by Sir John Fastolf at Rouvray (1429).\textsuperscript{30} On the other hand, the report on the battle of Rouvray in Basset’s Chronicle suggests that Fastolf had his front protected by the poles, while the carts were placed to the rear to prevent encirclement.\textsuperscript{31}

The Burgundian contribution towards the improvement of the missile capabilities of the army seems to be the employment of artillery in field battles. Bombards may have been used since the battle of Crécy (1346)\textsuperscript{32} in a sole discharge against an approaching enemy, probably in the attempt to break off the charge with a frightening effect of thunder, smoke and flames over both men and horses. The Burgundians at Bulgnéville used lighter artillery, (1431).\textsuperscript{33} This discharge could be supported by the battle cries also consistently employed by the English to ruin enemy morale.\textsuperscript{34}

\textsuperscript{28} The role of the wagon camp in the battle of Verneuil is not clear. M. K. Jones describes the horses of the English army to be kept with the baggage train as a ‘living wall’ which ‘would prevent the French cavalry outflanking their position and attacking from the rear’, M. K. Jones, ‘The Battle of Verneuil’, pp. 387–388. This would suggest that the horses and the baggage train were to be placed immediately next to the army positions. However the descriptions of battle suggest that the Lombards for a time left the scene of the battle being preoccupied with pillaging the English baggage train which may suggest that it was located at some distance from the battle formations, as suggested in A. H. Burne, Agincourt War (Ware, 1999), pp. 203, 205.

\textsuperscript{29} Monstrelet, IV, pp. 375–376.

\textsuperscript{30} The idea that this tactical scheme could be a distant perception of the Hussite experience (first suggested in 1890s) is taken critically in S. Cooper, The Real Falstaff, p. 57.

\textsuperscript{31} Basset, fo. 65v.


\textsuperscript{33} B. Schnerb, Bulgnéville, p. 85 ; R. Smith, K. DeVries, The Artillery of the dukes of Burgundy, pp. 28, 105.

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The other way to use the artillery in field combat was to exploit its superiority in the range of fire compared to the bows and crossbows and to bombard the enemy ranks in order to either shake his morale or make them attack. This is how the artillery was used by the Dauphinists at Rouvray (1429)\textsuperscript{35}, Montépilloy (1429)\textsuperscript{36} and later at Formigny (1450).\textsuperscript{37} The main disadvantage of this tactic was the low rate of fire which allowed the guns to be Overpowered by a counterattack, as happened in the two latter cases.\textsuperscript{38} Rouvray also proved a failure as the attack was begun before the bombardment gave any results.\textsuperscript{39} The Lancastrians avoided both mistakes when they used Burgundian veuglaires in a very similar way at Cravant, where the artillery positions were separated from the enemy by the Yonne and the bombardment was supplemented with a decisive assault once some disorder was seen in the enemy ranks.\textsuperscript{40} In general, the employment of the artillery in the field battles seems to be found in the French and Burgundian armies rather than those of England. Presumably, the English felt confident in their archers and saw no need to increase their missile capabilities in such a way. The rate of fire for the artillery of the period (even if using replacement chambers) was of no match to that of the longbow, and the niche left for the field artillery in a pitched battle seems quite limited.

The battle of Bulgnéville (1431) seems an exemplary case of Anglo-Burgundian defensive tactics, employing almost every element possible. The army was deployed in a foot formation on a hill with the river behind it. The archers with the artillery were deployed in front of the battle orders, protected by the sharpened poles, while the flanks and the rear of the formation were defended with the wagons. The enemy attacked in three divisions; one of

\textsuperscript{35} A. Burne, \textit{The Agincourt war}, p. 235.
\textsuperscript{36} \textit{Trahisons}, pp. 198–199.
\textsuperscript{37} A. Burne, \textit{The Agincourt war}, p. 319.
\textsuperscript{38} For Montépilloy see \textit{Trahisons}, pp. 198–199. For Formigny see A. H. Burne, \textit{The Agincourt War}, p. 319.
them, mounted, was forced to retreat without even engaging in close quarters with the Lancastrians.\textsuperscript{41}

In fact by the period in discussion the sight of the enemy prepared for defensive battle in a strong position would often make the commanders avoid the battle rather than trying an assault. This is what happened at Cosne-sur-Loire (1422) and at Montépilloy (1429). The Lancastrians themselves obtained such experience at their attempt to raise the siege of Anglure (1431). They found the Dauphinists under the seigneur de Barbazan entrenched in a strong position and eventually did not risk engaging in the battle choosing to evacuate the place instead.

Though an army on a well chosen defensive position might seem impregnable, the Dauphinists by the early 1430s started to exploit the weaknesses of this tactic. Once the army was deployed in battle order, it was unable to change position in the presence of the enemy without risking of being attacked on the march. This weakness was possibly first revealed at Montépilloy (1429) where, according to one of the sources, the English, having a river with a narrow ford behind their positions, were only able to leave them after the Dauphinists had left.\textsuperscript{42} Next time this led to the failure of the Lancastrians before Compiègne (1430) where their main forces were blocked on their prepared positions by the Dauphinists, keeping out of distance of arrow flight, while their bastides, erected to block the city, were wiped out.\textsuperscript{43} The destiny of the siege of Lagny (1432) was resolved not by battle before the place where only a small company of Dauphinists managed to enter the town but by the manoeuvre of the Armagnac army which created a menace to Paris and made the duke of Bedford abandon the siege. If the Lancastrians could hardly be defeated in a pitched combat, it proved that they could be outmanoeuvred.

\textsuperscript{41} B. Schnerb suggests that the Armagnac horsemen did not attempt to attack the Burgundians seeing their strong position and the large quantity of archers, B. Schnerb, \textit{Bulgnéville}, p. 86. It is as well possible that the charge might have been broken off by the Burgundian arrows and cannonballs before the Armagnacs reached the Burgundian positions.

\textsuperscript{42} \textit{Cochon}, pp. 301–302.

\textsuperscript{43} See above, Ch. 4.3.4.
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6.2.3 The composition of Burgundian armies

One of the crucial components of the ‘English’ defensive tactics, widely adopted by the Burgundians by 1420–30s, was the massive employment of missile weapons. It was thus necessary for the Burgundian dukes that their armies included significant contingents of archers and crossbowmen (often united in the documents as *gens or hommes de trait*) to successfully use this tactic. As B. Scherb has shown, the share of *gens de trait* increased significantly during the reign of John the Fearless.\(^4^4\) By the accession of Philip the Good it fluctuated around 50%\(^5^5\) but exceeded 70% by the start of 1430s, possibly due to English influence.\(^4^6\) The latter number is close to a standard rate for the English armies in 1410s and 1420s.\(^4^7\) It is worth noting that these effectives refer to the ‘main body’ of the duke’s armies receiving payments from the duke’s receiver-general. The armies may have included other contingents such as the duke’s *hôtel* (when the duke was leading the army in person),\(^4^8\) the town militias or English companies, likely to have different proportions of various types of soldiers.

\(^{44}\) This share was insignificant in the fourteenth century only reaching 12% in 1382. During the reign of John the Fearless it increased from some 27% in 1405 to 41% in 1417, B. Scherb, ‘Aspects de l’organisation militaire’, pp. 215–219; B. Scherb, ‘La bataille ranée’, pp. 25–26; B. Scherb, *L’État Bourguignon*, p. 267.

\(^{45}\) There were 1119 *gens de trait* (50,20%) in the Burgundian army at the siege of Saint-Riquier (1421), amounting to 2229 men, ADN, B 1923, fos. 237r–244v.


\(^{47}\) R. A. Newhall, *The English Conquest of Normandy*, p. 32. There was a certain trend to still greater increase of the archers’ percentage in the English armies as shown in A. Curry, ‘English Armies in the Fifteenth Century’, p. 45.

\(^{48}\) The duke’s *hôtel* amounted to two to three hundred men in the 1420s–1430s, E. Nosova, *The Court of Burgundy in the Fifteenth Century: Structure, Organisation, Social Composition* [in Russian: Е. Носова, Бургундский двор XV века: структура, организация, социальный состав] (unpublished candidate of sciences dissertation, Saint Petersburg State University, 2011), p. 194. Presumably, only a part of these men were consistently employed as soldiers. The military role of the duke’s *hôtel* was approached by F. Viltart, but his study mostly refers to the reign of Charles the Bold, F. Viltart, ‘Les fonctions militaires de l’hôtel ducal’, *Histoire et images médiévales*, 17, (2009), pp. 38–43.
This change in the armies’ composition seems to be taking place *de facto* rather than *de jure*. When the indenture was made in February 1430 with Philip the Good, the duke undertook to field 1500 men-at-arms and 1500 *gens de trait* (2250 *paies*) for the first three months and 600 men-at-arms and 600 *gens de trait* (900 *paies*) afterwards.\(^{49}\) A fifty-percent share of *gens de trait* was thus expected. By mid-1430 it was decided that after three months the duke would receive wages for 800 men-at-arms and 1000 *gens de trait* (1300 *paies*), thereby acknowledging the growth of the latter’s share to 55.56\%.\(^{50}\) However, the actual percentage was even greater fluctuating about 70–75\% as appears from the war account of Jean Abonnel (see Appendices C.3.). Thus, though the growth of the proportion of *gens de trait* in the armies may have been influenced by the English alliance,\(^{51}\) the treaties made between the duke of Burgundy and the Lancastrian government tend to overestimate the number and proportion of men-at-arms which the Burgundians could provide, perhaps in an attempt to follow earlier French standards where men-at-arms far outnumbered gens de trait.

These numbers refer to the ducal armies assembled in the northern group of the Burgundian dominions and especially in Picardy. The situation in the southern dominions was quite different.\(^{52}\) For example, in the army mustered in August 1431 for the defence of the borders of Burgundy the share of the *gens de trait* only slightly exceeded 30\% for the whole army with the highest percentages of only 50–60\% in particular retinues.\(^{53}\) Another example is provided by the retinue of Pierre de Bauffremont, seigneur de Chargny, who

\(^{49}\) ADN, B 302, no. 15576 (Appendix E).

\(^{50}\) TNA, E 101/52/35 no. 2 (16 July 1430).


\(^{52}\) Such difference during the preceding period of 1405–1417 is illustrated by the table putting together the evidence on the share of *gens de trait* in the retinues originating from different Burgundian dominions in B. Schnerb, ‘Aspects de l’organisation militaire’, p. 221.

\(^{53}\) See Appendix C.4.
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had about 23% of *gens de trait* in the retinue he brought from Burgundy to the siege of Compiègne in July 1430.\(^{54}\)

Burgundian administration was aware of this difference. Antoine de Touloungeon on his visit to Duke Philip in spring 1431 especially requested from the duke archers for the defence of Burgundy.\(^{55}\) It is possible that an exceptional percentage of *gens de trait*, exceeding 80%, in the army brought by Philip the Good from Picardy to Burgundy in 1434,\(^{56}\) was due to the intention to dilute them with the men-at-arms of the two Burgundies. It has been suggested that the lack of *gens-de-trait* may be explained by the absence of shooting guilds in the towns of Burgundy.\(^{57}\) The Burgundian government took measures to change this situation and in 1426 Antoine de Touloungeon, the marshal of Burgundy, induced the local seigneurs to train their men with missile weapons and addressed the administration of the region in order to organize shooting competitions.\(^{58}\) It may be of note that the Burgundian plan of campaign in 1430 suggested that Philip the Good would assemble 1200 men-at-arms from Burgundy and Picardy and 1000 Picard archers and crossbowmen.\(^{59}\) By the end of

\(^{54}\) He left Burgundy for the siege of Compiègne in early June 1430, *Canat*, I, p. 303. At the muster taken on 28 July 1430 his retinue included himself as a knight banneret, 5 knights bachelor, 101 men-at-arms, 33 gens de trait (23.24%), 1 poursuivant and 1 trumpeter, a total of 132 *paires*, ADN, B 1942 (*compte d’armes*), fo. 39r. By 19 September his retinue reduced to 1 knight banneret, 3 knights bachelor, 83 men-at-arms, 37 gens de trait (29.60%) and 1 poursuivant, ADN, B 1942 (*compte d’armes*), fo. 47r. See also Appendices C.3.4–5.

\(^{55}\) ‘Requérant [...] à eulx faire ayde de ses capitaines de Picardie, acompanyiés de ce certain nombre des gens d’armes, et par espécial de gens de trait, lesquelz, comme ils disoient, leur estoient moult nécessaires.’, *Monstrelet*, IV, pp. 455–456.

\(^{56}\) Reviews taken on 1–3 August 1434 at Vervin-en-Thiérache before Baudot de Noyelles and Gerard Rolin, ADN, B 1951, fos. 240r–242r; see Appendix C.5.

\(^{57}\) B. Schnerb, *Bulgnéville*, p. 62.


\(^{59}\) ‘accompaignez de Xif hommes d’armes, bien esleuz et bien choisis de ses paiz de Bourgongne et de Picardie et de mil archiers de Picardie et arbalestriers’, P. Champion, *Guillaume de Flavy*, p. 159.
the year, seeking to obtain king’s help on the borders of Burgundy, the duke asked for the archers to be used together with the men-at-arms of Burgundy.  

The underestimation of missile weapons in the two Burgundies must have affected the preferred style of battle. It is notable that in two best known cases when the English had to cooperate with the natives of the two Burgundies – at Cravant (1423) and at Bulgnéville (1431) – special ordinances had to be issued specifying that everyone was to dismount on pain of death and introducing other features of the defensive combat style. At Bulgnéville this was made on the insistence of the English and the Picards while the nobles from the two Burgundies wanted to fight on horseback. The Burgundian contingents in the north of France also seem to have practised dismounted tactics in 1410s. It thus appears that it was not all Burgundian men-at-arms but especially the men-at-arms of the two Burgundies to whom these ordinances were primarily addressed at Cravant and Bulgnéville.

A notable exception to this trend is found in the case of the detachment brought in 1432–1433 to the Lancastrian service by Philibert de Vaudrey and Jean, seigneur d’Aumont. It is only in the last documents that a proportion of gens de trait unusually high for the contingents raised in the two Burgundies (c. 66%) is revealed. This could be attributed to replacing the losses from the local human resources of Picardy during half-year service including the heavy fighting before Lagny-sur-Marne (1432). However, even before its arrival at the siege of Lagny this contingent had shown its expertise in archery-based defensive tactics by routing the Armagnac company which tried to attack it on

60 ‘quil lui plaise ordonner et bailler a mon dit seigneur le nombre de archers […] pour (avecques les gens et subgiez de mon dit seigneur des diz pays de Bourgoingne, dont il y a bon nombre et souffissant de gens darmes), resister et faire guerre’, Letters and Papers, II, pt. 1, pp. 175–176.
61 Monstrelet, IV, p. 461.
63 In December 1432 the forces were estimated as 100 men-at-arms and 300 archers, BNF, MS. Fr. 26056, no. 1969. The musters of March 1433 give 67 men-at-arms and 117 gens de trait (63,59%), AN, K 63/19/18. On this company see above Ch. 5.2.2.
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its way. It is thus possible that this proportion of *gens de trait* was maintained from the start of their service.

The composition of the Burgundian armies reflects that, by the 1420s, they were accustomed to defensive tactics although the English expertise was respected. The battle order at Bulgnéville was organised on the advice of an English knight (probably Sir Thomas Gargrave, whose military experience seems to have included Agincourt and Verneuil), even though the English formed only a minority in the Burgundian army. Philippe de Commynes in the late fifteenth century also ascribed the custom of dismounting for a battle to the English influence during the early years of Philip the Good’s reign. The superiority of the English archers was also acknowledged. On several occasions the Burgundians tend to describe the English forces as simply archers. Thus, according to *Le Livre des Trahisons*, the earl of Salisbury came for the relief of Cravant (1423) with 2 000 archers. The Burgundian project of the joint crusade against the Hussites suggested that the English component of the army was to consist of four to six thousand archers. It was also especially noted that these archers were to be of English origin, which seems to be a kind of quality criterion. In a similar way, the plan for the campaign of 1430 composed in Duke Philip’s entourage suggested that ‘le roy lui baille avecques ce mil archiers d’Angleterre’.

6.2.4 Deployment and command on the battlefield

Before addressing the question of how these joint armies were commanded before and during the battle it is necessary to bring attention to the fact

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65 He served as a man-at-arms in the French expedition of Henry V in 1415, TNA, E 101/45/4 m. 3 [SLME]. For his presence at Verneuil see *Basset*, fo. 53v.
67 ‘Le conte de Salbry vint de France atout deux mille archiers’, *Trahisons*, p. 169. It is later expanded that he also had 500 men-at-arms, ibidem.
69 P. Champion, *Guillaume de Flavy*, p. 159.
that in the Middle Ages decision-making in the military sphere was not based on the principle of single authority, taken for granted in almost every modern army. Important solutions were expected to be based on the council rather than one’s personal will. In some cases when there was a military leader of outstanding authority, such as Henry V, Philip the Good or John, duke of Bedford, he would be presented as the commander-in-chief (still presuming that his decisions were based on a council with his captains). However in many cases the military commitments on various levels from commanding an army on a campaign to leading a small detachment of soldiers on a battlefield or on a scouting mission would be trusted to several captains of more or less equal standing jointly, rather than to a single person.

To a degree this may be illustrated by the siege of Compiègne (1430). At the beginning the authority of Philip the Good seems to be undisputed. However, when the duke had to depart for Brabant, the siege was left to Jean de Luxembourg, count of Guise and seigneur de Beaurevoir. According to Monstrelet, it appears that at the later stage, most important decisions were taken jointly by Jean de Luxembourg and John Holland, earl of Huntingdon, the leader of the English contingent. The resistance to the Armagnac attempt to raise the siege of Lagny-sur-Marne seems another example. The Lancastrian army was deployed in three divisions, and for two of these the lists of the chief captains are given. It may be suggested that the third division remained under the personal command of the duke of Bedford, his leading companions overshadowed by the Regent’s authority.

It may be within the same idea of the conciliar command that some attempts at an organised joint command are found. At Cosne-sur-Loire (1422) Philip the Good is reported to have had with him the duke of Bedford, the leader of the English, in the main division of the joint army. In the battle of

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70 For the importance of a good council and the ability to follow it in the martial matters, being one of the aspects of the chivalric virtue of prudence, see C. Taylor, *Chivalry and the Ideals of Knighthood*, pp. 241–243.


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Cravant (1423) the English contingent was led by the earls of Salisbury and Suffolk and the Burgundian – by Jean de Toulonoge, marshal of Burgundy. After the allies had joined their forces a number of measures was taken to divide the responsibilities between the English and the Burgundians (an equal representation of both nations among the scouts, the appointment of two marshals of the army). It was also ordered that the allies rode ‘tous ensamble en un gost’, although it is not clear whether this should be applied to the marching order only or to the battle order as well. After the battle was won, two separate reports (not identical but not contradictory as well), were composed: by Jean de Toulonoge to the duke of Burgundy and by the earl of Suffolk to the king’s council in Paris. It is not clear how the command was exercised during the battle, but there is also no mention of the Burgundians taking any specific place in the battle orders and thus it seems possible to imagine some form of joint command at Cravant.

In fact there is very little evidence of whether one of the allies was given a particular place in the battle formations or a specific role. On the contrary, at Cosne-sur-Loire (1422) the three divisions of the Anglo-Burgundian army were especially formed so that each of them included the soldiers of all three nations present in the army: the English, the Picards and the natives of the two Burgundies. The lists of the captains in the two Lancastrian divisions at Lagney-sur-Marne (1432) also show their mixed composition.

In the skirmish at Pierrepont (1422) the two corps in which the Lancastrian force divided at a certain stage are described as that of the archers, who burst through the town set on fire by the Armagnacs and crossed the river by the bridge engaging in the battle, and that the men-at-arms who had to seek the ford but managed to come in time to the succour of their archers. The distinction is thus made between the types of the soldiers. However, in the most detailed report on this engagement in the chronicle of Cordeliers, the number of the archers corresponds with a number of the Englishmen in the joint army and it is tempting to suggest that these two corps may have been actually

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74 Monstrelet, IV, pp. 159–160.
75 For the journée of Cosne-sur-Loire see Cordeliers, fos. 425v–426r; Monstrelet, IV, p. 108; Wavrin, II, p. 420.
76 Wavrin, IV, pp. 29–30.
of military cooperation

those of the English and the Burgundians respectively. On the other hand, other chroniclers provide different numbers and this suggestion lacks documentary or eye-witness support. It is also notable that the Burgundian contingent in this engagement was of Picard origin and thus may be expected to include a certain number of its own *gens de trait*.77

In many other cases, such as at Verneuil (1424),78 Chappes (1429), and Bulgnéville (1431), the effectives of one of the allies seem to be too insufficient to be given a particular place in the battle formation. It may be taken for granted that the size of the contingent, as well as the inferior status of its commander, would result in its being placed under the allied command. This did not mean, however, that advice based on the experience would not be appreciated as shown by the example of Bulgnéville.

Probably the only case when some distinction is found was the confrontation at Montépilloy (1429) when Bedford placed the English on his left flank and the French (including a Burgundian contingent mostly originating from Picardy) on the right.79 While the rest of the Lancastrian army was going to fight on foot, some of the Burgundians remained mounted and took part in the skirmishing, capturing the guns with which the Dauphinists tried to provoke the Lancastrians to leave their positions80.

This exception seems to prove the rule that in general Anglo–Burgundian joint armies on the battlefield proved to be homogeneous with no need to as-

77 The Chronicle of the Cordeliers, which often tends to be more precise than others when describing the size of the armies, estimates the English contingent which joined the Burgundians for the siege of Airaines earlier during this campaign as 40 men-at-arms and 400 archers. The total effectives of the force sent from the siege to resist the Armagnacs before Pierrrepont are estimated as 300 men-at-arms and 400 archers, *Cordeliers*, fos. 418r–418v.

Other chroniclers estimate the English contingent during the campaign as 120–140 (*Fenin*, p. 179) or 200–300 soldiers (*Monstrelet*, IV, p. 83; *Wavrin*, II, p. 396).

78 After the depart of the Burgundian contingent (see M. K. Jones, ‘The Battle of Verneuil’, pp. 403–405) probably only individual Burgundians like Jean de Wavrin and Thibault, bastard of Neufchâtel, remained in Bedford’s army.


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sign one of the allies a specific place in the battle orders to fit his style of warfare. This made it possible for the Burgundians to fight successfully under the English orders and *vice versa*. The matters of command and subordination between the allies on the battlefield must have been regulated by the status of the commanders and the size of their contingents.

### 6.3 Administration of joint armies

#### 6.3.1 The types of joint armies

Having outlined the ways how the joint armies acted in the tactical engagements it is necessary now to consider the interfaces of interaction which could bring them to the battlefield. Late Medieval Western Europe knew no permanent field armies.\(^1\) The armies were assembled for a particular goal and were usually expected to stay in the field for no longer than several months. In contemporary French practice the word *armée* meant a military campaign as well as an army assembled for such campaign. Thus, in the case of every particular joint engagement (or a series of consecutive engagements) it was necessary that a decision for joint participation was made, the contingents were assembled and brought together.\(^2\)

The years of occasional joint operations make it possible to identify several models employed in the Lancastrian France.\(^3\) First there were the armies assembled for a single decisive battle, be it a *journée* for the surrender of a certain place or an urgent need to raise a siege laid by the enemy. Second there were the campaigns of conquest (or of ‘recovery’ or ‘bringing into obedience’ as it would be styled in the contemporary documents), often planned in advance, which suggested a siege or a series of sieges. These in their turn followed several main patterns, which will be discussed further:

\(^1\) With the exception of the small companies of bodyguard the first successful attempt to establish a permanent standing army is traditionally identified with the military reform of Charles VII in 1447. This matter is discussed in more detail in Ph. Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, pp. 165–172.


\(^3\) The difference in organisation of emergency and pre-planned campaigns has been noted in A. Curry, ‘The Organisation of Field Armies’, pp. 209–210.
1. A joint campaign of the army under the personal leadership of the Regent of France and the duke of Burgundy, the model only realised in the campaign of 1420.
2. The campaigns waged by the government of Lancastrian France with the assistance of Burgundian contingents.
3. The campaigns waged by the duke of Burgundy or Burgundian commanders in the service to the Lancastrian regime, possibly involving Lancastrian forces as well. This was the case of Philip the Good’s campaigns in Ponthieu in 1421 and against Compiègne in 1430 or the campaigns of Antoine de Vergy and Jean de Luxembourg in Argonne in 1427–1428.
4. The campaigns undertaken by the duke of Burgundy for the defence of his dominions with the assistance of the contingents provided by central Lancastrian government. This was the case of the expedition in Mâconnais in 1424.

The number of joint campaigns undertaken by the allies is quite significant. The list here only contains those which included a series of tactical engagements. It also does not include the campaigns fought by the Burgundians in the Lancastrian service with little or no support of the English forces like that of Philip the Good in Ponthieu (1421) and those in Argonne (1427–1428).
### Table 2. Main joint Anglo-Burgundian campaigns.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaign (Region, dates)</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Main engagements&lt;sup&gt;94&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Commander-in-chief [Commander of the allied forces]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seine Valley, June – Nov 1420</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>capture of Montaigu–les–Troyes siege of Sens, siege of Villeneuve–le–Roi, siege of Montereau, siege of Melun</td>
<td>Henry V [Philip, duke of Burgundy]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vimeu, early 1422</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>siege of Le Quesnoy, [E] siege of Gamaches, siege of Airaines, relief of Pierrepont</td>
<td>Jean de Luxembourg and Hugues de Lannoy [Sir Ralph Boteler]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thiérache, April – September 1424</td>
<td>3 / 4</td>
<td>siege of Oisy, siege of Wiege, siege of Guise</td>
<td>Jean de Luxembourg [Sir Thomas Rempston]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ile-de-France, August – September 1429</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>confrontation at Bray–sur–Seine confrontation at Mitry, confrontation at Montépilloy, [E] journée of Evreux, defence of Paris</td>
<td>John, duke of Bedford [Jean de Villiers, seigneur de L’Isle–Adam]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Picardy, April – October</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>[B] siege of Gournay–sur–Aronde</td>
<td>Philip, duke of Burgundy, then Jean de Luxembourg&lt;sup&gt;95&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<sup>94</sup> The engagements fought by the English on their own are preceded with [E], those, fought by the Burgundians only are preceded with [B]

<sup>95</sup> Command left to Jean de Luxembourg on Duke Philip’s departure to Brabant in August 1430.
of military cooperation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Commander</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Picardy, November – December 1430</td>
<td>skirmish at Bouchoir, [E] skirmish at Conty, [B] confrontation at Roye, siege of Laigny-les-Châtaigniers</td>
<td>Philip, duke of Burgundy [Humphrey, earl of Stafford]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vimeu, July – August 1433</td>
<td>siege of Saint-Valéry, journée of Saint-Valéry, siege of Monchaux</td>
<td>Pierre de Luxembourg [Robert, Lord Willoughby]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ile-de-France, July / August –</td>
<td>journée of Orville</td>
<td>John, Lord Talbot</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

86 Other commanders such as Sir John Steward and the earl of Arundel are mentioned alongside Sir John Montgomery and John, earl of Huntingdon, but it is only the two latter whose names are consistently mentioned in the narratives, suggesting their primary role. See Appendix B.11.
It should be noted that military cooperation was not limited to participation in joint tactical engagements. In theory, any military operations undertaken by one of the allies would at least have an effect of diverting enemy forces which could otherwise be used against another ally. From this point of view it was only during the truces made by Philip the Good with Charles VII in 1424–1428 and 1431–1433 that Anglo-Burgundian cooperation was suspended. Even during these periods the suspension was far from complete, as some captains choose either to bypass it by entering the service of the Lancastrian regime (or by remaining in this service if they had already entered it), or by simply ignoring the truce.

### Interfaces of decision-making on war strategy

The coordination of military efforts undertaken by the allies, either on their own or jointly, demanded that the decisions were made over certain crucial questions such as the distribution of the objectives, the timing of the operations, the appointment of the key commanders and financial matters. The way these problems were solved is an important part of the military infrastructure of the Anglo-Burgundian alliance.

Since the years of Henry V the most important questions seem to have been solved through personal meetings with the duke of Burgundy. The campaign of 1420 in the Seine valley must have been decided and prepared at Troyes between the signing of the Treaty of Troyes and Henry V’s wedding with Catherine of France. The campaign may have lasted longer than expected but its aims were achieved and in January 1421 both leaders returned from Paris to their dominions: Henry V to England and Philip the Good to Flanders.

During the active stage of the campaign of 1421 (before laying siege to Meaux) Henry V twice met Philip the Good and both meetings coincided with the changes in the campaign plan. First on the way from Montreuil-sur-Mer to Abbeville in late June it was decided that the English king would proceed southwards to raise the siege of Chartres, while Duke Philip continued the war.
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in Picardy. At the second meeting at Mantes in July Henry V decided to follow the retreating Dauphin towards the Loire, and Philip the Good was sent back to recover Saint Riquier and (if possible) continue by laying siege to Compiègne. The next meeting took place during Philip the Good’s visit to the siege of Meaux in January 1422. Although the duke then proceeded to Burgundy, a number of important appointments to key military offices were made including the appointment of Jean de Luxembourg as captain of Picardy and the decision that he would lead the campaign in Vimeu.

This was the last time Philip the Good met Henry V. The next time he had to treat with John, duke of Bedford. The meeting took place in Paris in September–October 1422. A number of political matters must have been discussed such as the choice of the new regent and the Burgundian marriage of the duke of Bedford. But the military affairs were not ignored. Thus it must have been during this meeting that Philip the Good was commissioned to bring into obedience the castle of Guise and on his return to his northern dominions he started the preparations for that campaign.

The next conference happened in April 1423 when the dukes of Bedford, Burgundy and Brittany assembled at Amiens in order to sign the treaty of mutual friendship and assistance which was of certain military importance. Another meeting at Amiens took place in late February – early March 1424 when Bedford and Philip the Good met to supervise the surrender of Le Crottoy and to discuss the conflict arising between the dukes of Brabant and Gloucester. It seems to be at this meeting that Bedford appointed the seigneur de Saveuse to lay siege to Compiègne. The presence of the earl of Salisbury and Jean de Luxembourg, who several months later were to take charge of operations in Champagne and Thiérache respectively, may suggest that the military plans for the campaign of 1424 were also discussed.

The final meeting between the two dukes before the truce of Chambéry took place in Paris in June – early July 1424. The arrival of the Dauphinist army

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87 See above Ch. 1.3.2–1.3.3.
88 See above Ch. 1.4.1.
89 See above Ch. 2.9.
90 See above Ch. 2.1.
91 See above Ch. 2.4.
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was expected and the two dukes intended to face it together, but the Dauphinists eventually only took the field in August. The political impact of the meeting was the grant on 21 June 1424 of Anjou and Maine to the duke of Bedford, and Auxerrois, Mâconnois and Bar-sur-Seine to Philip the Good, thus mutually designating the zones of responsibility. It is difficult to say whether the English participation in Duke Philip’s expedition to Mâconnois in the following autumn was decided then or after the battle of Verneuil, but the duke’s intention to undertake this campaign may have been discussed.92

The outline of these meetings serves to illustrate their regular character in 1420–1424. It is also possible to identify them with the particular important decisions in the military sphere. The personal meetings may have been preceded and supplemented with the exchange of letters but it appears that while Philip the Good remained engaged in the war the key solutions over strategic matters were taken jointly by the dukes of Bedford and Burgundy.

After Duke Philip returned to the French war the instrument of the personal meetings was also employed, which eventually led to a bitter conflict over the possible surrender of Orléans to the duke of Burgundy, which may have ruined the entire campaign.93 During the crisis of 1429 two more meetings were organised with the mediation of the citizens of Paris, Anne of Burgundy, and Cardinal Beaufort which helped to maintain at least the Lancastrian hold over Paris. The conference at Paris in October 1430 held by the Cardinal and the two dukes proved the last occasion Philip the Good and John, duke of Bedford saw each other.94

The new stage in the decision making over the matters of Anglo-Burgundian alliance was caused by the preparations for Henry VI’s coronation expedition. From late autumn 1429 the duke of Burgundy started to discuss his possible participation in the campaign with the Council in England rather than the duke of Bedford in Rouen. Several memoranda were presented not only discussing the military matters but also diplomatic approaches to be made to various European and French princes engaged in the conflict with a

92 See above Ch. 2.7.
93 See above Ch. 3.5.
94 For the conferences in July and October 1429 see above Ch. 4.1.1. and 4.2.1.
final goal of turning the tide of the war and destroying the Dauphinist re-
sistance. When Henry VI landed on the continent, a detailed project of military
operations was presented to him on the side of the duke of Burgundy. This
campaign project demonstrates a remarkable level of detail, not only designat-
ing the objectives to be achieved but also the effectives to be employed against
each of them.\textsuperscript{95} This practice was followed by the memorandum brought by
Hugues de Lannoy during his embassy to England in July 1433, when the duke
decided to engage once again in the war as the truce he had made with Charles
VII in December 1431 proved a failure.\textsuperscript{96} The document presented to the coun-
cil of Henry VI in the name of Burgundy not only contained the suggestion that
the king should once again cross with a magnificent army to France, but also a
report on the current efforts of the duke of Burgundy against the Armagnacs in
Picardy and Burgundy and clear demands for the military support of these op-
erations. Although some of the duke’s suggestions may have been preliminari-
ly discussed by the duke’s representatives with Bedford and Beaufort at Cal-
ais,\textsuperscript{97} there is a distinctive change in the way the decisions are made. The per-
sonal meetings were expected to come to a \textit{consensus} (even if under certain
pressure on the royal side); in this case what Philip the Good did was to inform
the king of his efforts and preparations and to ask for assistance. It was left to
the king and the council whether and to what degree they should meet the
duke’s demands.\textsuperscript{98} The position of the Burgundian duke thus showed a greater
level of independence.

It is not impossible that this shift from the practice of personal meetings
with the Regent of France to that of embassies and written memoranda to the
king’s council in England was a consequence of a personal conflict between
Bedford and Burgundy, dating back to the decision over the destiny of Orlé-
ans.\textsuperscript{99} It seems more important, however, that after the crisis of 1429 it may
have been realised by Philip the Good, that the war could not be won by the

\textsuperscript{95} See Ch. 4.2.
\textsuperscript{96} B. de Lannoy, \textit{Hugues de Lannoy}, pp. 232–234.
\textsuperscript{97} B. de Lannoy, \textit{Hugues de Lannoy}, pp. 233.
\textsuperscript{98} \textit{Letters and Papers}, II, pt. 1, pp. 249–262.
\textsuperscript{99} J. Ferguson considered Bedford’s refusal to allow Philip the Good take possession of
Orléans a turning point in the relations between the two dukes, which were never to
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Lancastrian kingdom of France solely and that it was only the engagement of the kingdom of England and its resources which could save the Lancastrian cause on the continent. Since late 1429 the demand for greater English involvement in the war becomes a consistent motive in the Burgundian diplomacy up to the embassy, sent to invite the English representatives to attend the congress of Arras.

These were the models employed by the high command to plan the operations on the large scale. However on the local level joint operation could be undertaken by a decision of the captains. In early 1421 Mauroy de Saint-Léger, Burgundian captain of Creil, joined his forces with the English from Gournay and Neufchâteil for a raid in Valois, but was eventually defeated by the Dauphinists before Montépilloy. The need to help an ally could also induce joint operations. In 1430, in the aftermath of the Lancastrian retreat from the siege of Compiègne, Jacques, seigneur de Crevecoeur was besieged by the Dauphinists at Clermont-en-Beauvaisis. Having heard of this, the earl of Huntingdon and the bastard de Saint-Pol joined their forces and hastened to the relief, making the enemy abandon the siege after only about ten days. The participation of the English garrisons in Bassigny in the hostilities waged by the Burgundians in the region must have been decided on a local level without instructions from Paris or Rouen, which were over 250 km away. This suggests that for those Burgundians who had chosen the active service the Lancastrian regime the English were companions not strangers.

6.3.3 Single engagements.

There were generally two types of situation where a joint army would be assembled for a single engagement. First there were the cases of journée held in the regions of mutual interest like the mouth of Somme. Secondly there were emergency cases when an allied garrison was under siege and needed relief.

\[100\] Monstrelet, IV, pp. 20.


\[102\] On these garrisons see Ch. 3.3, 4.4.2 and 5.4.4.
of military cooperation

Assembling an army for a single decisive battle may possibly be considered the easiest type of a joint campaign to organise.\textsuperscript{103} As it was expected to last for only a few days and certainly no longer than a week or two (taking in account the time necessary to reach the battlefield), it was often possible to avoid the administrative formalities such as passing the musters and assigning separate wages to the army. In case of emergency it was possible to accept certain contingents into the service without taking the musters. However in many cases the army would be simply composed either from the contingents which had already been paid their wages like any field armies already in service or detachments taken from the garrisons. Alternatively it was possible to engage the contingents on unpaid service such as the feudal levy. Unfortunately, this practice would result in the difficulties in reconstructing the effective due to the absence of the financial records.

In some cases, however, a special field army may have been formed for a particular \textit{journée}; for example in 1433 Robert, Lord Willoughby was put in charge of 200 men–at–arms and the archers (presumably, 600) for the \textit{journée} of Monchaux in Vimeu.\textsuperscript{104} Even in this case a short expedition would be relatively inexpensive. As a result of this a number of engagements of this type was held by the joint Anglo–Burgundian forces in 1420–1435, with both allies applying for each other’s help. Ironically, however, the engagements of that kind were almost never actually fought.

\textsuperscript{103} This may be illustrated by Henry VI’s response to Philip the Good’s request for soldiers in 1434. It was then suggested that no contingent could be sent to support the duke during the campaign, but that the English would come to the duke’s help if a battle was expected, \textit{Plancher}, IV, pp. CXLI–CXLIII.

\textsuperscript{104} TNA, PRO 31/8/138 (10 October 1433).
## Aspects and models

Table 3. *Journées* held by the Anglo-Burgundian forces.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Commander-in-chief</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August 1422</td>
<td>Cosne-sur-Loire</td>
<td>Philip the Good [John, duke of Bedford]</td>
<td>Siege abandoned by the Armagnacs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.08.1424</td>
<td>Ivry</td>
<td>John, duke of Bedford [Jean de Villiers, seigneur de L'Isle-Adam]</td>
<td>Place surrendered to the Lancastrians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.08.1430</td>
<td>Gournay-sur-Aronde</td>
<td>Philip the Good [John Mowbray, duke of Norfolk]</td>
<td>Place surrendered to the Lancastrians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.10.1433</td>
<td>Montchaux(^{105})</td>
<td>Jean de Luxembourg [Robert, Lord Willoughby]</td>
<td>No result</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.09.1433</td>
<td>Pacy</td>
<td>Philip the Good [John, Lord Talbot]</td>
<td>Place surrendered to the Lancastrians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1434</td>
<td>Saint-Valéry-sur-Somme</td>
<td>Jean of Nevers, count of Etampes [Louis de Luxembourg, bishop of Thérouanne]</td>
<td>Place surrendered to the Lancastrians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1435</td>
<td>castle of Orville</td>
<td>John, Lord Talbot</td>
<td>Place surrendered to the Lancastrians</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{105}\) Montchaux was the place to be surrendered. The Anglo-Burgundian force awaited the Armagnacs at Villers-Carbonnel.
When a *journée* was appointed the summons could be sent out widely. In 1433 expecting a *journée* for Pacy-sur-Armançon, Philip the Good sent letters to almost all the *baillis* of his dominions and of the surrounding royal bailliages, to the chancellor and marshal of France in Paris to the English garrisons from Montereau and Provins to Nogent and Montigny in Bassigny. There was not much problem in assembling an army for a short enterprise and a significant contingent was sent to the duke’s support, but it only joined Philip the Good to hold the *journée* but not to continue the campaign on his behalf.  

Sometimes, however, a pre-appointed *journée* could become an assembly point for a lengthy period of further invasion into the enemy territory following the surrender of the place currently disputed. This may have been the case of the campaign against Guise in 1424, which started with either a brief siege or (which seems likely but lacks supporting evidence) the *journée* of Oisy.  

Another example is the campaign in Vimeu in 1434 when after Saint-Valéry fell as a result of *journée* the English proceeded to besiege Monchaux. In other cases when the term between making the treaty of surrender and the established *journée* was short (which would often suggest a formal character of the *journée*) it was possible that the besieging army was not disbanded and remained in the field ready to continue the campaign of conquest once the *journée* was held. This is what happened at the siege of Saint-Valéry in 1433. In these cases the *journée* itself was not the only reason for assembling an army and should be considered as one of the episodes of a conquest or reconquest campaign.

For the relief operations more or less the same logistical considerations were true as for the *journées*. The difference was that no precise date for the battle was agreed upon with the enemy. This could allow the relieving side to assign more time for the summons of his army, but it was possible that the siege would be raised by the time this army assembled, as happened with Chartres (1421), Paris (1429) and on a lesser scale with Clermont-en-Beauvaisis (1430). If the siege was not raised however the result could be a major battle like that before Cravant (1423) or Lagny-sur-Marne (1432), in the

106 See above, Ch. 5.4.2.
107 See above, Ch. 2.9.
108 See above, Ch. 5.3.2.
latter case with Anglo-Burgundians being the besiegers and the Dauphinists trying to break the siege.

6.3.4 Long-term campaigns. Organisation and funding

The key difference between the single engagements and the campaigns of conquest was their projected length. If the soldiers were expected to stay in the field for over a month certain administrative arrangements had to be undertaken in order to have the soldiers paid their wages.\(^{109}\)

Due to significant cost of the enterprise it was often necessary first to collect sufficient funds, which in case of major enterprises could involve summons of the local Estates or application for the loans. The organisation of funding was dependant on the way it was expected to employ the forces. If the duke of Burgundy was waging a campaign in his own right as he did in Thiérache in 1422–1424, in Burgundy in 1433–1434 and in the mouth of the Somme in 1433–1435, these operations were funded from the duke’s resources. In other cases the duke or his captains could be received in the king’s service. In this case the payment would be paid through the king’s treasurer for wars and the forces mustered by the king’s officers such as the marshal of France, the master of the crossbowmen or their commissioners. This model may have been employed in 1420 when Philip the Good entered the service of Charles VI before the conclusion of the Treaty of Troyes, it was employed in the case of Burgundians engaged in the hostilities in Argonne in 1427–1428 and possibly for the campaign of Jean de Luxembourg in Vimeu in early 1422.\(^{110}\) Unfortunately with a few exceptions the accounts of the Lancastrian treasurers for war for France are not known to survive and the information which should have been contained in them is not available. Finally, there was also a variant, when Philip the Good received from royal finances money for paying the wages to his soldiers and was waging war as if on his own. This is what took place in 1421 and in 1429–1430. This model is described in detail in the indenture for the campaign of 1430; it is noteworthy that according to

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110 For these campaigns see BNF, MS. Fr. 4484 fos. 73r–105v, 214r–218v.
one of the clauses of the indenture the duke’s armies were to be mustered by his officers while the royal officers were only left with controlling powers.\textsuperscript{111}

If in the tactical aspect Anglo-Burgundian armies showed a great measure of uniformity when it came to finances, they tended to have a very heterogeneous character, consisting of the contingents assembled and paid through various sources. For example, the campaign for the recovery of Saint Valéry and several adjacent places in summer 1433 involved financial contributions from the duke of Burgundy, the duchy of Normandy, the English exchequer and the Somme towns.\textsuperscript{112} The army consequently consisted of several contingents, similar to the campaign in Thiérache which eventually led to the siege of Guise (1424) where the Lancastrian army was composed of:\textsuperscript{113}

- Burgundian forces, paid from the finances of Philip the Good;\textsuperscript{114}
- An English contingent of 400 men under Sir Thomas Rempston, detained from the garrisons of Normandy and paid from the finances of the duchy;
- Contingents from an English expeditionary force amounting to some 450 men, paid in advance by the English Exchequer before embarking for France.

To these, on some occasions, could be added city contingents, paid from municipal finances, feudal levies during their periods of unpaid service \textit{etc.}

It would be quite natural that the expeditions sent from England and paid in advance could be used as a mobile reserve for the Lancastrian government. Unfortunately the size of such contingents engaged at every particular engagement is difficult to trace as they leave no trace in the financial documents. That at Guise can only be reconstructed by comparing a document listing the English captains before Guise with those in the records for the expeditionary army.\textsuperscript{115} Another example is the company engaged at the second siege of Mont Aimé (1426–1427) which was kept at the siege after its initial term of service

\textsuperscript{111} ADN, B 302, no. 15576 (Appendix E).
\textsuperscript{112} See above, Ch. 5.3.1.
\textsuperscript{113} See above Ch. 2.9.
\textsuperscript{114} ADN, B 1929, fos. 32v–33r. Several aides were raised in the Burgundian lands, Ch. Hirschauer, \textit{Les États d’Artois}, II, pp. 20–21.
\textsuperscript{115} BNF, P.O. 1778 (Luxembourg) no. 25; for more details see Ch. 2.9.
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ran out, receiving wages from the treasurer for wars. However, in the case of the siege of Compiègne (1430) the size of the English contingent in Philip the Good’s army remains unknown. All we can do is accept the figure of 500 men, in the duke’s indenture of February 1430, as an approximate estimation.

The heterogeneous character of the armies sets certain obstacles to the scientific reconstruction of the scale of the events. It is often impossible to say whether the sources available provide full details of a certain army or whether there may have been other contingents engaged recorded in different and no longer extant financial accounts.

6.3.5 Long-term campaigns. Supreme command and distribution of powers

The heterogeneous structure of the armies was not only revealed in their allied nature but also in formation from a number of contingents of various origin, each of which could in turn consist of several individual retinues of captains. This sets up the question of how these forces were to be commanded.

When Bedford commanded the army in person, his authority as regent must have been undisputed. In some cases the commander-in-chief of the army was appointed through a special commission. This may relate with the command over a particular region: thus the earl of Salisbury in 1423–1424 acted within his wide powers as the royal governor of Champagne, Brie, Auverrois, Nivernois and Mâconnais (limited to the first two areas after 21 June 1424). But it could be also a commission for a particular objective, such as several years later, when the earl was retained for three months with 300 men-at-arms and 900 archers for the recovery of Vertus and Mont Aimé.

The appointment of Jean de Luxembourg as captain-general of Picardy in 1422 or captain-general for the operations against Guise (1422–1424) suggests that he executed the command in the area of his responsibility, unless joined by a person of an outstanding authority like the Regent of France (a theoretical possibility in both cases). In 1422 he shared the command with Hu
gues de Lannoy, recently promoted to the office of the master of crossbow-

116 The retinue of Sir Robert Hungerford, BNF, MS. Fr. 4484 fos.36r, 39r–39v.
117 BNF, MS. Fr. 32510, fo. 369r.
men. The powers of this office extended throughout the kingdom, while those of de Luxembourg were limited to a particular province, and it is difficult to identify whether one of the Burgundians was in a superior position. There is no doubt, however, that when Sir Ralph Boteler, captain of Eu, joined this army, his status as a local military officer placed him in a subordinate position.

The campaigns against Guise were to a certain degree a different case since de Luxembourg seems to be appointed captain-general not by the king but by the duke of Burgundy, and commanded the forces assembled in the duke's lands and paid with the duke's funds. The treaty of surrender for Guise was concluded on the Lancastrian side by de Luxembourg in the name of the duke of Burgundy and by Sir Thomas Rempston in the name of the king of France, suggesting that on the appointed day the place would be delivered to the king, the duke, any one of them or the representatives of them or of any one of them. On the other hand it appears that at the siege Sir Thomas Rempston was subordinate to Jean de Luxembourg, as the latter was given by the duke of Bedford powers to take the musters of Rempston's contingent and was even able to delegate these powers.\textsuperscript{118}

On contrary at the recovery of Saint Valéry (1433) Pierre de Luxembourg, count of Saint Pol, whose army included both English and Burgundian contingents was the lieutenant for both the king and the duke of Burgundy. He was the only negotiator on the Lancastrian side for the surrender of Saint Valéry.\textsuperscript{119} It may be suggested as the same for the siege of Monchaux which followed, and when the count died before the appointed journée, this must have made the treaty of surrender void in the eyes of the Dauphinists who simply ignored the journée.

\section*{6.3.6 Long-term campaigns. United army (1420).}

The campaign of 1420 was the only case throughout the fifteen years of alliance when the joint Anglo-Burgundian army acted together throughout the

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\textsuperscript{119} BL, Add. Ch. 46341.
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campaign with both the English Regent of France (Henry V in this case) and
duke of Burgundy present. After the regency of France passed to Bedford on
Henry V’s death, never did he and Philip the Good lead the forces in battle or at
a siege together. The same was true for Henry VI’s visit to his kingdom of
France in 1430–1431, when the duke of Burgundy never came to see the
young monarch.\textsuperscript{120}

Unlike all other joint campaigns where one of the allies provided the bulk
of the joint army, while the second only contributed with an auxiliary force, in
1420 the effectives of the forces engaged by each ally on the campaign were
relatively similar. The preliminary decisions over the organisation of the meet-
ing at Troyes suggested that the king of England and the duke of Burgundy
would bring 2 500 men each with them.\textsuperscript{121} Although Henry V and Philip the
Good received reinforcements during the campaign it appears that the army
retained its mixed character.

The position of Philip the Good – not even knighted yet – as a second-in-
command was clearly illustrated at the siege of Melun, where the duke of Bur-
gundy was given charge of a half of the besieging army, including certain Eng-
lish companies which Henry V deliberately chose to place under the command
of his ally.\textsuperscript{122} The letters of Henry V on this matter may suggest that there may
have been still two old armies – that of Henry V led by the English king and
that of Charles VI, led by the duke of Burgundy – rather than a new army of
Lancastrian France. This division (or rather lack of union) can be also illustrated
by the Burgundian attempt at an assault, not supported by Henry V. The high
status of Philip the Good within the joint army was evidently a result and an
acknowledgment of his social and political standing.

The fact that the campaign of 1420 was the first and the only action to
employ this model of command may suggest that this was due to political ra-
ther than military reasons. When the Treaty of Troyes was made, there were
several centres of power in France, not limited to the Armagnacs, the Burgun-

\textsuperscript{120} In 1433 Richard Beauchamp, earl of Warwick, in a conversation with Hugues de Lan-
noy, Burgundian ambassador to the English court, blamed the duke for not coming be-
\textsuperscript{121} J. H. Wylie, W.T. Waugh, \textit{The Reign of Henry the Fifth}, III, p. 199.
\textsuperscript{122} \textit{Foedera}, X, p. 4.
diants and the English. The king of France, however incapable, and his entourage was another such centre, being the source of the legitimacy of governance. Royal authority was divided between the person of the king and his administrative institutions, of which Paris was the epicentre. The main goal of the campaign was to re-establish the lost unity of the kingdom of France, by putting together all the political powers of the French kingdom except the illegitimate Armagnacs. This was to be achieved by the return of the king and of royal entourage to Paris, which after the Treaty of Troyes became much more secure than it had been in 1419 as English control over the lower Seine valley was no longer a threat to the capital. On the other hand, Henry V needed to enter what he believed one day to become his own capital as the victor who had restored communications with Burgundy. The presence of Philip the Good at his side was also expected to legitimise the new Regent in the eyes of Burgundian-dominated Parisian population. Henry V entered Paris not only as the heir to Charles VI but also to the policy of the Burgundian party.\textsuperscript{123}

Thus, the campaign of 1420 was to some degree a half-year-long royal entry to Paris but simultaneously the quest of Philip, the new duke of Burgundy, for justice. For this reason, once the Treaty of Troyes was signed, the king of France, the regent of France and the duke of Burgundy were destined to pass this way together up to the session of the Parlement of Paris where the representatives of Duke Philip demanded punishment for the murderers of his father.\textsuperscript{124} This unity was important as a symbol of the new political system introduced by the treaty of Troyes, the demonstration of the re-establishment of the rule based on justice as opposed to violence, of the restoration of order in

\textsuperscript{123} ‘In Paris and the lands adjacent to it Henry [V – A.L.] had been accepted only after the Treaty of Troyes […] Here Henry had come as the protégé of the dominant Burgundian faction’, B. Rowe, ‘The Grand Conseil’, pp. 208–209.
\textsuperscript{124} This unity does not mean that these three persons were always to stay at the same place. In fact the location of Charles VI and the queens during these campaign was often different from that of Henry V and Philip of Burgundy. For example during the siege of Montereau the King of France resided at Bray-sur-Seine and during the siege of Melun – at Corbeuil. But what is important is the fact that despite the way to Paris was open after the siege of Melun was set, Charles VI did not made his entry there until the fall of Melun and then in the company of Henry V and Philip.
Aspects and models

the country after the chaos of the civil war. All these factors made Paris and its restitution as capital the political and strategic aims of this campaign.

6.3.7 Long-term campaigns. Auxiliary forces.

The character of the campaign of 1420 was defined by the coincidence of the political aims of Henry V and Philip the Good. As the Lancastrians established themselves in Paris, the primary concern for the duke of Burgundy became the defence (and if possible, expansion) of his dominions. As a result of this, from 1421 both Henry V (and then his brother) as Regent and the duke were waging their own wars against a common adversary. However some of the enemy strongholds could attract the attention of both partners, inducing them to join forces in attempting to reduce the enemy into obedience. This was the reason for extensive cooperation in the mouth of the Somme in 1421–1424 and again in 1433–1435, where the Dauphinists threatened both the Burgundian county of Artois and the Burgundian-dominated, but formally royal, Somme towns such as Abbeville and Amiens as well as the northern borders of Lancastrian Normandy. In other cases one of the allies needed a partner’s military support for a particular major enterprise.

As a result of this, providing auxiliary military contingents for campaigns waged by the ally became a common practice which continued until 1435. The relevant cases, which make it possible to make judgements on the effectives of these forces, are listed in the Table 4.
Table 4. Effectives of the supplementary contingents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Engagement / Campaign</th>
<th>Assisting side</th>
<th>Effectives of the contingent [projected], soldiers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1422</td>
<td>Campaign in Vimeu</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>120–140125 or 440126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1424</td>
<td>Siege of Guise</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>c. 840127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1424</td>
<td>Expedition to Mâconnais</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>400128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1426</td>
<td>Siege of Arzillières</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>80129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1428–1429</td>
<td>Siege of Orléans</td>
<td>Burgundian</td>
<td>500–1500130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1429</td>
<td>Confrontation at Montépilloy</td>
<td>Burgundian</td>
<td>600–1300131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1430</td>
<td>Siege of Larrey</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>75–100132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1430</td>
<td>Siege of Compiegne</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>[500]133</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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125 *Fenin*, p. 184  
126 *Cordeliers*, fo. 418v  
127 See above Ch. 2.9.  
128 *Plancher*, IV, p. 91.  
129 BNF, MS. Fr. 32510, fo. 367v.  
130 For the discussion of the effectives of the Burgundians before Orléans see above Ch. 3.5.  
131 The chroniclers estimate the Burgundian contingent as 600–800 men, *Monstrelet*, IV, p. 345; *Wavrin*, III, p. 326. It is possible that it was more numerous. See above Ch. 4.1.2.  
133 According to the indenture, ADN, B 302, no. 15576 (Appendix E).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Side</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1431</td>
<td>Battle of Bulgnéville</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1432</td>
<td>Siege of Lagny-sur-Marne</td>
<td>Burgundian</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1433</td>
<td>Siege of Saint-Valéry</td>
<td>Burgundian</td>
<td>[500]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1434</td>
<td>Talbot’s Oise campaign</td>
<td>Burgundian</td>
<td>700–800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1435</td>
<td>Campaign against Saint-Denis</td>
<td>Burgundian</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are several trends observable from this table. First, both allies were able to benefit from the partner’s military assistance. Secondly, in most cases the effectives of the auxiliary force fluctuated between 400 and 800 men. The schemes through which these forces were provided may be debated. It seems most likely that, in 1432, a contingent of 500 men was sent by Philip the Good to join the duke of Bedford in accordance with their mutual obligations by the Treaty of Amiens, being the only legal way the Regent could be supported by the Burgundian duke during the latter’s truce with the Dauphin. Although the evidence is lacking, it seems possible that the contingents for the expedition

134 P. Champion cites the chronicle of Cordeliers (*Cordeliers*, fo. 497v) which gives the English effectives as 1200 men at the defence of Pont-l’Évêque during the early stage of the campaign. He, however, accepts an estimate of 800 men, although the origins of this number are not clear, P. Champion, *Guillaume de Flavy*, p. 39.

135 M. H. Keen, *The Laws of War*, pp. 263–267; B. Schnerr, *Bulgnéville*, p. 64. The same numbers are given in otherwise very dubious account in *Hall*, p. 164.


137 See the response given to Hugues de Lannoy, Ch. 5.1.4.

138 See the discussion above Ch. 5.2.4.

139 *Wavrin*, IV, p. 67. It is possible that this number only refers to the forces sent by Philip the Good and that the actual size of the Burgundians (including those in Lancastrian service such as the seigneur de L’Isle-Adam) in the army was greater.
to Mâconnais (1424), at Bulgnéville (1431), at Saint-Valéry (1433) and for the campaign against Saint-Denis (1435) may have been provided under the same obligations. However, in other situations the case was definitely different. The Burgundian forces at Montépilloy (1429) were provided according to the negotiations between Bedford and Burgundy in Paris in July 1429. The presence of the English before Compiègne was determined by Philip the Good’s indenture made in February 1430. The Burgundians who joined the expeditionary force of Talbot at Paris for the campaign along the Oise (1434) seem most likely to have been in the service of the Lancastrian government; nothing suggests that any forces were sent for this campaign by Duke Philip. The English forces before Guise (those which were not a part of an expedition from England) were paid from the finances of Normandy throughout the campaign, while the Treaty of Amiens suggested that the soldiers were to be paid by the side which received them, from the second month of their service.

Whatever the schemes were which brought these auxiliary companies into allied armies, it reveals that effectives of 500 men, with which the dukes promised to support each other by the treaty of Amiens, were in no way negligible. This was an adequate estimate of the human resources which one ally could lend to the other for a significant period without risking ruin to his own cause. This is revealed by the practice in the other cases which can be found to have nothing to do with the treaty of Amiens.

The respective roles of the allied forces on the battlefield has already been discussed. The evidence on this matter at the operational level is probably even more scarce. It may be noteworthy, however, that during several sieges held by a Burgundian-dominated joint army – at Airaines (1422), at Guise (1424) and at Compiègne (1430) – the English contingents are reported to be employed for field operations. In the first case this was the attempt to relieve Pierrepont resulting in the skirmish with the Dauphinists in which the Burgundians were also involved, in the second case – an attempt to relieve a fortress in Rethelais, attacked by La Hire. At Compiègne, however, the English simply raided surrounding enemy lands. It may appear therefore that the Burgundians

\[140\] It seems possible that of 600 Englishmen reported to be at the battle about 100 came from the English garrisons in Bassigny and the remaining 500 may have been sent by the central government.
considered the English forces more appropriate for field operations, especially when there was a chance of a battle with the Dauphinists, while their presence at the siege operations was not that necessary. It should be realised, however, that the evidence on which this suggestion is based, lacks both consistency and reliability.

6.4 The captains

The choice of captains to lead the allied forces, their personalities, motivations and career models are also an important aspect of Anglo-Burgundian cooperation. Due to the restrictions of length of this thesis, it is only possible to touch briefly on this topic (which undoubtedly requires a broader prosopographic study) and to outline the main trends.

For the Burgundians there was always an option of entering Lancastrian service but not everyone was willing to do so. As shown by Louis de Chalon, prince of Orange, it was sometimes possible to serve the duke of Burgundy, but not the king of France and his English regent. Even in this case, however, following Duke Philip might occasionally result in fighting alongside the English. The chance of this was greater in the north than in the south, because the English presence was stronger in the region. Therefore among the nobility of the northern Burgundian dominions and adjacent lands of Picardy there is a number of families consistently providing captains for joint operations – de Luxembourg, de Lannoy, de Châtillon, de Mailly, de Saveuse, de Bournonville, de Humières etc. – while in the south only the members of the de Vergy and de Neufchâtel families showed some interest in serving the Lancastrian regime outside Burgundian dominions. The difference between the two models can be illustrated by the careers of the two captains most often found commanding Burgundian contingents in the joint armies (Table 2) – Jean de Luxembourg, seigneur de Beaurevoir (and subsequently count of Guise and Ligny), and Jean de Villiers, seigneur de L’Isle-Adam.

Jean de Luxembourg, who knighted Philip the Good before the battle of Mons-en-Vimeu (1421) is reputed to have been one of the duke’s most trusted captains and was mostly found in the duke’s service. He replaced the duke when Philip the Good avoided taking the field in person – in Vimeu (1422), against Guise (1422–1425), and at the later stage of the siege of Compiègne.
of military cooperation

(1430). On some occasions de Luxembourg entered Lancastrian service for a particular campaign such as in Vimeu (1422) or at Argonne (1427–1428), but it does not appear that he held any permanent command.

The career of Jean de Villiers, seigneur de L’Isle–Adam, was different. Having regained his freedom in late 1422, for the next couple of years he was fighting in Champagne and the Oise valley, presumably in Lancastrian rather than Burgundian service, taking part in the sieges of Compiègne and Nesles and the journée of Ivry (1424). In 1429 he commanded the force sent by Philip the Good for the defence of Paris and then held the captaincy of the capital in the king’s service. After his restoration to the marshalcy of France in 1432, he led armies consisting of or including Burgundian contingents in Lancastrian service and executing his office of marshal for the armies of Lancastrian France such as before Lagny-sur-Marne (1432) and Saint–Denis (1435).

It may seem ironic that in 1435 Jean de Luxembourg chose to retain his loyalty to Henry VI, while de L’Isle Adam followed Philip the Good in switching his allegiance to the Valois cause. The case of Jean de Luxembourg in staying loyal to the Lancastrian cause after the Congress of Arras, defined by a combination of his territorial power and self–dependence and high position of his relatives in the Lancastrian France, was in many ways exceptional though he was followed by some of his retainers such as Colard de Mailly, Lancastrian bailli of Vermandois. Other Burgundians for most part chose to follow Philip the Good. The few exceptions were mostly men who had made a career in Lancastrian service and had associated themselves with the Lancastrian regime rather than the duke of Burgundy or those whose possession lay in Normandy.

141 In a letter of remission to one Simon Le Barbier issued in November 1424 he is reported to be in the garrison of Compiègne under the seigneur de L’Isle–Adam, who, however is not expressly styled captain, C. Gut, ‘Scènes de la vie journalière à Compiègne’, pp. 143, 158–163 (original in AN, JJ 173/34).

142 His importance to Bedford as a native of Ile–de–France, not of the Burgundian dominions, presumably revealed in his carrying the banner of France at Ivry (1424) and Montépilloy (1429) has been emphasized in B. Scherb, ‘Jean de Villiers’, pp. 115–116. Nevertheless, he remained closely associated with the duke of Burgundy.

143 For his being in the king’s service see his musters taken by Pierre Le Verrat for Jean Narjo, treasurer for wars, in May and June 1430, BNF, MS. Clairambault 112, nos. 31–32.
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The most notable example was Guy Le Bouteillier, who switched his allegiance from the Burgundian cause to the English even before the murder of Montreuau. This was also the case of Jean, bastard de Thiant, who, having begun his career in the service of John the Fearless, became Lancastrian captain and bailli of Senlis and later bailli of Meaux.

For the English captains, however it seems difficult to find any distinctive correlation between their personal qualities, status and experience and the engagement in joint operations. The latter appears to be primarily the consequence of commissions given to them. Almost every English commander in charge of field armies to the north-west of the Seine or around Paris would occasionally have fought together with the Burgundians. The case of Salisbury, with the governorship of Champagne, Auxerrois, Nivernais etc. entrusted to him was probably the most exceptional but the same was also true of other captains serving in Upper Normandy or Île-de-France, such as the earls of Huntingdon and Arundel, Lords Talbot and Willoughby.


145 For his service in the 1410s see *Monstrelet*, III, pp. 150, 255, 281; *Berry*, p. 84. He was appointed captain and bailli of Senlis on 27 January 1419 and gave an oath for the office on 7 February, J. Flammermont, ‘Histoire de Senlis pendant la seconde partie de la Guerre de Cent Ans (1405–1441)’, *Mémoires de la Société de l’histoire de Paris et d’Île-de-France*, 5 (1878), (Paris, 1879), p. 226; *Fauquembergue*, I, pp. 250–251. He was again the bailli of Senlis from 1424 and presumably to up its loss in 1429. In the 1430s he was the bailli of Meaux and the captain of Crépy-en-Valois up to its loss in 1433. He was executed after the fall of Meaux to the Valois forces, *Monstrelet*, V, p. 68; *Gallia Regia*, IV, p. 97, V, pp. 388, 436.

During the two decades of his service to the Lancastrian regime the bastard de Thiant took part in a number of joint operations including the defence of Chartres (1421), the sieges of Compiègne and Ivry (1424), the battles of Rouvray and Patay (1429), *Cordeliers*, fo. 446r; *Monstrelet*, IV, pp. 172, 310–311; *Wavrin*, II, p. 365, III, pp. 84, 283–284, 304; Fenin, p. 211; J. Flammermont, ‘Histoire de Senlis’, p. 237.
Two records of service may illustrate the random nature of the involvement of English captains in joint operations. John Holland, earl of Huntingdon, brought an English force before Roye (1420), then served on the campaign of 1420, when at the siege of Melun he was placed under Duke Philip’s command. His further service, however, was suspended by his capture at Baugé (1421) and it appears that afterwards he only once fought alongside the Burgundians, before Compiègne (1430). Still more unusual was the case of John Mowbray, earl marshal. He also served on Henry V’s campaign of 1420, taking part in several joint sieges including that of Melun. He remained in France until 1422. In 1423 he came to France with the expeditionary army and fought at Thiérache alongside Jean de Luxembourg against the Dauphinists from Guise. However, in the following year he joined the duke of Gloucester, taking command of his army during the invasion of Hainault.\textsuperscript{146} There he had to fight very much the same Burgundian captains led by Jean de Luxembourg with whom he had raided Thiérache in 1423. Nevertheless, in 1430 Mowbray (by then duke of Norfolk) took part in Henry VI’s coronation expedition and on 1 August 1430 brought an English detachment to reinforce Philip the Good for the \textit{journée} of Gournay-sur-Aronde.\textsuperscript{147}

Other evidence that there were few personal preferences are the cases when Burgundian interest about particular English captains was expressed. In both such cases the English captains – Thomas Bourg in 1430\textsuperscript{148} and John, bastard of Clarence, in 1434\textsuperscript{149} – do not seem to have had a record of any earlier cooperation with the Burgundians. Thus, it does not appear that the personal qualities of the captain were a primary consideration.

\textsuperscript{147} It may be noteworthy that on 16 April 1430 several days before Henry VI’s crossing to France it was announced in the king’s council any potential conflicts between the Englishmen going to France with the king and the men of the dukes of Bedford and Burgundy or other king’s allies and subjects were to be resolved by the king’s council. The duke of Norfolk and the earl of Huntingdon were noted to be present (as well as the earl of Warwick), \textit{POPC}, IV, p. 36–37. It is not clear whether the contingents of these captains were considered most likely to cause such conflicts or this was simply a coincidence.
\textsuperscript{148} ADN, B 302, no. 15576 (Appendix E). See Ch. 4.2.3.
\textsuperscript{149} ADN, B 1951 fos. 54r–54v. See Ch. 5.4.3.
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It can therefore be suggested that, for Burgundian captains fighting alongside the English, it was generally a result of their own choice based on their local interests and personal loyalties and just one of the career opportunities open to them. By contrast, among the English who had already chosen to serve in France, engaging in joint operations was very much a matter of chance, mostly depending on the region of their service.

6.5 General observations

Trying to summarize how, and in which cases, the English and the Burgundians fought together, it is possible to see that, on a tactical level, Anglo-Burgundian armies reveal a great level of commonality both in their composition and in the tactics employed. This must have facilitated the government of the armies in battles and other actions. An important exception were the forces assembled in the two Burgundies which were much less ready to accept the tactical forms already in use in the English armies and among the Picards. This difference, however, had little effect in reality. On the one hand, these contingents were less often engaged in joint operations as compared to the Picards. On the other hand, chief Burgundian commanders such as Philip the Good himself and the de Toulonoge marshals of Burgundy sought to introduce tactics of dismounted defensive combat in the south. Therefore in cases of joint engagement (Cravant (1423), Bulgnéville (1431) they were able to ensure that the soldiers from the two Burgundies fought as prescribed.

While there was a great deal of uniformity in the composition of armies and on a tactical level, the organisation and implementation of Anglo-Burgundian cooperation on a strategic scale was extensive and complex. It involved a variety of models which are difficult to systematize and which at a first glance seem a random collection of separate cases having little in common. It is only through a series of projections of this multi-dimensional structure that some similarities and patterns may be revealed.

The practice of cooperation reveals a curious coexistence of vertical and horizontal interfaces of interaction between the allies. On the one hand, the Burgundians, and occasionally Philip the Good himself (in 1421 and 1430), entered the service of the Lancastrian regime, placing themselves within its hierarchy. While the duke could reserve for himself certain privileges within this
vertical system of relations, it is not clear to what degree the same may have been true of Burgundian captains when they entered the Lancastrian service.

The horizontal links of alliance and personal amity were another interface which encouraged cooperation. At Guise (1424) and at Saint–Valéry (1433) the sieges were conducted by joint armies fighting for the king of France and the duke of Burgundy, each element of the army retained and paid through the institutions of the party which it represented. In other cases military assistance may have been provided according to the personal treaty of friendship made between Philip the Good and John, duke of Bedford in Amiens in 1423, of which the siege of Lagny-sur-Marne (1432) is the most revealing episode. This treaty neither lost force with the Breton defection to the Dauphin’s cause in 1425 nor was negligible in terms of military significance. The level of mutual obligations was determined by the demands and possibilities of the allies.

It also appears that on the personal level, at least for those Burgundians who chose to serve the Lancastrian regime, the need for cooperation with the English did not give rise to many problems. The allies showed a good deal of willingness to support each other. The local political and military situation could be an important factor making the captains act jointly even when no formal subordination was imposed on them. This is illustrated by the engagement of the English garrisons in Bassigny in the Burgundian military efforts in the region in the 1430s.

It may therefore be claimed that the military cooperation between the English and the Burgundians was based on a combination of the following factors: the captains’ decisions to enter the service of the ally, placing themselves in its hierarchy (for the Burgundians this would mean technically the service of the king of France, always a possibility for any Frenchman), co-ordinated strategic decisions of Lancastrian and Burgundian governments (based on horizontal interfaces of alliance and friendship) and local political and military situation as perceived by the captains.
Conclusion

Having outlined in the previous chapter the interfaces of cooperation and the models employed for the organisation of joint military efforts it is now appropriate to discuss what these war efforts may reveal on the nature and character of relations between the allies. There are several key aspects which appear to deserve reconsideration.

First among these is the scale of cooperation between Philip the Good and the Lancastrian rulers of the French kingdom both in time and in space. The first joint enterprises started as soon as the Anglo-Burgundian alliance was concluded in December 1419, thus even before the model of the Dual Monarchy was ratified by the Treaty of Troyes on 21 May 1420. When the latter was sealed, the king of England and the duke of Burgundy formally joined their forces in war, launching a major campaign in the Seine valley leading to a solemn entry to Paris in December. Although some periods of most intensive cooperation can be identified, there is no distinct downturn during the 1430s. The last joint operations in 1435 were only brought to an end a fortnight after the duke of Burgundy accepted Charles VII as the king of France. Therefore the Anglo-Burgundian alliance retained its military importance literally from its first days to its last. In geographic terms it extended across a vast territory from the mouth of the Somme in the north to the environs of Mâcon in the south and from Chartres in the west to the battlefield of Bulgnéville in the county of Vaudemont in the east, even if mostly concentrated in Île-de-France, Champagne and Picardy. On more than fifty occasions a joint Anglo-Burgundian force opposed the Dauphinists on a battlefield (or divided by the walls of a fortress) ready to fight them.

The second aspect is the variety of forms this cooperation could take, which is not limited to the abovementioned engagements. The English and the Burgundians fought together in battles and skirmishes, raided enemy territories, besieged fortresses and came to each other’s help in cases of necessity. The forces of each ally were occasionally found under the other’s banners, and in some cases the evidence of joint command can be traced. On a personal level many Burgundians happened to serve the Lancastrian king of France by
Conclusion

holding offices and military commands in his service, or simply fighting for him in the defence of their local interests.¹ Some Englishmen in turn joined Burgundian armies in the same way as had been happening before 1419 and would continue after 1435. The duke himself followed different strategies of participation: at times he formally entered the king’s service (1420, 1421, 1430), and at other times he sought royal assistance in the defence of his lands (1423–1424, 1431, 1433, 1434) even if not always with success; he also provided such help himself, especially for the defence of Paris (1429–30, 1435). He could also allow (and possibly induce) his greatest vassals (such as Jean de Luxembourg, Huguès de Lannoy or Antoine de Vergy) to employ their forces in the king’s service (1422, 1427–8). Finally, in operations against Guise (1422–1425) his status seems to be somewhere between that of the king’s commissioner and governor in the region and that of the king’s ally.

This variety of models leads us to a third aspect – the dualistic nature of the Anglo–Burgundian alliance, combining mutual obligations between the Lancastrian crown of France and its Burgundian vassals with personal relations between the duke of Burgundy and the Lancastrian regents of France (and to a lesser degree between particular captains). The treaty of Amiens appears to have retained its importance at least till 1433 (and, possibly, even up to Bedford’s death in 1435). On the other hand, the military effect of some reported personal conflicts (such as that of the earl of Salisbury with the duke of Burgundy) appears to be overestimated. If the conflict between Bedford and Burgundy after 1433 could ruin their personal relations, it little affected the military cooperation between the allies. On the contrary, an ill-timed outburst of Duke Philip’s rage in April 1429 led only to a temporary estrangement with Bedford but may have resulted in Lancastrian failure before Orléans making it possible for Charles VII to turn the tide of war. The factor of personal amity (whether formalised by the treaties or informal) between the leaders in maintaining the Anglo–Burgundian alliance therefore should not be disregarded but may need certain reconsideration.

¹ Those who like Louis de Chalon, prince of Orange, found service to the Lancastrian king unacceptable, could still contribute (whether willingly or not) to the Lancastrian war efforts by serving the duke of Burgundy in the defence of his dominions or in making private wars against Valois adherents.
Finally it may be asked why both the English and the Burgundians remained interested in maintaining the alliance for so long. M. Warner has presented this in a way that the English could provide Philip the Good with military power and protection against the Dauphinists in return for the duke’s political support legitimising their claim to the French throne. The matter is more complicated.

The willingness of the English to cooperate with Philip the Good is easy to explain. As the English power in France positioned itself as that of the king of France, every Frenchman, accepting this power and willing to employ himself in the royal service must have been welcome. This was not simply a matter of legitimacy: the military contribution of the Burgundians was at times quite significant, especially in remote theatres such as Mâconnais, Thiérache or Argonne, but also in Picardy and around Paris. However, if the Burgundian duke was left to act on his own, his policy could be opportunistic. When in 1424 Bedford delegated to Duke Philip the defence of the southern borders with the grant of Mâconnais and Auxerrois, he hardly expected their security to be eventually obtained through a truce with the Dauphin.

The opportunism of Philip the Good may have been one of the factors limiting the scale of cooperation. Duke Philip was not simply a mercenary. When he entered royal service he could expect to be paid from royal finances and the sums actually paid to him only covered his expenses. However, as the negotiations of late 1429 – early 1430 illustrate well, the duke could turn his military support into a matter of heavy bargaining. It is noteworthy then that the Lancastrian regime had its own source of manpower – England and Normandy – which could provide soldiers, reliable both in tactical and political aspects. Moreover, having fought together since 1417 or even 1415 these men must have formed an established network of personal relations, reputations, and patronage, into which system the Burgundians entering the Lancastrian service had to incorporate themselves. Therefore, while the Lancastrian regime was ready to accept into his service those who sought it (like Jean, bastard de Thiant, or Eustace Gaudin), until the tide of war turned, it preferred to rely on its own resources rather than seek external help at all cost.

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Conclusion

Another important impediment was probably the fact that the ultimate victory over the Dauphin does not appear to have been a primary goal for Duke Philip, who seems to have been more interested in the security, prosperity and extension of his dominions. As the treaty of Arras shows, the punishment of his father’s murderers was important for Philip the Good, but it was not an idée fixe, which dominated his policy. As long as his interests coincided with those of Lancastrian regime (for example, when his borders were under pressure), he was more disposed towards coordinating military efforts and joining forces. When his lands became more or less secure he preferred to pursue his dynastic interests rather than obtain a decisive victory in the war. We must presume that he considered the latter the responsibility of the royal government.

On the other hand, the duke hardly wanted the Lancastrian government to become powerful enough to treat him in terms of subordination rather than coordination. He still sought to extend his influence in France. This may be the reason why, on several occasions, Philip the Good advocated the engagement of other great princes of France in the political life of the Lancastrian France. This advice, first of all, related to the dukes of Brittany and Savoy, but he may have pursued the same course in approaching the imprisoned duke of Orléans in 1433. This would serve to balance the dominance of English captains and post-Cabochien French administrators in the government of Lancastrian France. It is open to speculation whether such a policy could have saved the Lancastrian cause, but it shows that French affairs were not abandoned by Philip the Good. In the meantime potential, Burgundian reconciliation with Charles VII remained impeded by a number of factors even setting aside the old enmities and the question of retribution for the Montereau murder. The Dauphinists had proved an untrustworthy diplomatic partner (at least until Richemont’s return to power in 1433) while the duke could hardly expect to obtain at the Valois court the position he had in Lancastrian France.

Last but not least, English military power remained an asset of crucial importance. This not only included the forces employed by Bedford on the con-

---

3 See, for example, P. Champion, *Guillaume de Flavy*, pp. 142–146 (1429); E. Cosneau, *Le Connetable de Richemont*, pp. 539–541 (1429 or 1431); *Letters and Papers*, II, pt. 1, pp. 227–228 (1433); *Plancher*, IV, p. CXVI (s.d. but possibly c. 1433).
tinent but (at least after 1429 when the latter proved insufficient) also those which could potentially be brought from England. Until 1429 Lancastrian military power was uncontested. By 1430 Philip the Good accepted the Lancastrian promise of power coming with the royal expedition, but by 1431 it failed to meet his expectations. In 1433–1435 he desperately demanded a proof that this English military power existed and could be employed in France, a proof that Lancastrian Dual Monarchy was not a paper tiger. Unfortunately, the kingdom of England did little, and only reacted to the Burgundian defection. The same gap between Lancastrian France and Lancastrian England, which, according to M. Keen, was responsible for the ultimate collapse of the English power in France in the late 1440s, had previously ruined the Anglo-Burgundian alliance in 1435.

The development of Anglo-Burgundian military cooperation was far from a gradual decline from the first successes in 1420 to its dissolution at the congress of Arras. The process was in no way straightforward but complex, based on the ever-changing coincidences and conflicts of local and temporary interests, and having its ups as well as its downs. The political landscape of France in the first third of the fifteenth century was very dynamic, formed by a number of factors – diplomatic efforts, personal relations, economy, military successes and setbacks etc. – which were all interdependent. This may explain the variety of forms and the shifting shapes which the Anglo-Burgundian cooperation took. The aims pursued by the Lancastrian government of France and the duke of Burgundy were never fully identical, which prompts the question as to whether the collapse of alliance was simply a matter of time. Fifteen years of military cooperation and the scale which this took may demonstrate, on the other hand, its significant potential for survival.

---


6 As may appear from the account in R. Vaughan, Philip the Good, pp. 6–27.
## Appendix A

### Joint Anglo-Burgundian tactical engagements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Engagement</th>
<th>Year / months</th>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Siege of Montaigu-lès-Troyes</td>
<td>May – June 1420</td>
<td>Siege</td>
<td>Place surrendered on 1 June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siege of Sens</td>
<td>June 1420</td>
<td>Siege</td>
<td>Place surrendered on 11 June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siege of Villeneuve-le-Roi</td>
<td>June 1420</td>
<td>Siege</td>
<td>Place captured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siege of Montereau</td>
<td>June – July 1420</td>
<td>Siege</td>
<td>Place surrendered by 3 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siege of Melun</td>
<td>July – Nov 1420</td>
<td>Siege</td>
<td>Place surrendered on 18 November</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skirmish at Montépilloy</td>
<td>Late 1420 / early 1421</td>
<td>Battle</td>
<td>Dauphinist victory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence of Chartres</td>
<td>June – July 1421</td>
<td>Defence</td>
<td>Siege abandoned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siege of Saint-Riquier</td>
<td>July – Aug 1421</td>
<td>Siege</td>
<td>Siege abandoned</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1 The list involves situations when a joint Anglo-Burgundian army was facing the Dauphinists in battle orders (on a battlefield or at the siege) ready to fight them, regardless of whether the combat was eventually fought.

2 The models are defined in Ch. 6.2.1.
### Appendix A. Joint Anglo-Burgundian engagements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Siege of Meaux</td>
<td>1421–1422</td>
<td>Siege</td>
<td>Place surrendered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siege of Pont-Meulan</td>
<td>April 1422</td>
<td>Siege</td>
<td>Place surrendered on 15 April</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siege of Airaines</td>
<td>April–May 1422</td>
<td>Siege</td>
<td>Place surrendered on 11 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skirmish at Pierrepont</td>
<td>April / May 1422</td>
<td>Battle</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Journée of Cosne-sur-Loire</em></td>
<td>Aug 1422</td>
<td><em>Journée</em></td>
<td>Place relieved by the Lancastrians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siege of Meulan</td>
<td>Jan–Feb 1423</td>
<td>Siege</td>
<td>Place surrendered on 1 March</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siege of Pont-sur-Seine</td>
<td>May 1423</td>
<td>Siege</td>
<td>Place taken by assault on 25 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relief of <em>Balham</em></td>
<td>July 1423</td>
<td>Relief</td>
<td>Place relieved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battle of Cravant</td>
<td>31 July 1423</td>
<td>Relief</td>
<td>Lancastrian victory, place relieved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siege of La Follie</td>
<td>Sep–Oct 1423</td>
<td>Siege</td>
<td>Place surrendered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siege of Compiègne [first]</td>
<td>Feb–March 1424</td>
<td>Siege</td>
<td>Place surrendered on 13 April</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siege of Oisy</td>
<td>April–May 1424</td>
<td>Siege</td>
<td>Place surrendered on 5 May</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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³ Possibly, actually a *journée* negotiated by Jean de Luxembourg during the siege of this place during winter 1423–1424. See Ch. 2.9.
Appendix A. Joint Anglo-Burgundian tactical engagements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Siege of Sézanne</th>
<th>April – June 1424</th>
<th>Siege</th>
<th>Place taken by assault on 24 June</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Siege of Wiège</td>
<td>May / June 1424</td>
<td>Siege</td>
<td>Place surrendered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siege of Nesles-en-Tardenois</td>
<td>June – Aug 1424</td>
<td>Siege</td>
<td>Place surrendered on 30 August</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siege of Guise</td>
<td>June – Sep 1424</td>
<td>Siege</td>
<td>A journée appointed for 1 March 1425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>journée of Ivry</td>
<td>15 Aug 1424</td>
<td>journée</td>
<td>Place surrendered to the Lancastrians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siege of Vitry</td>
<td>Sep [?] – Oct 1424</td>
<td>Siege</td>
<td>A journée appointed for 2 April 1425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>journée of La Roche-Solutré</td>
<td>4 Oct 1424</td>
<td>journée</td>
<td>Place surrendered to the Lancastrians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siege of Mont Aimé [first]</td>
<td>April / Aug 1425 – Jan 1426</td>
<td>Siege</td>
<td>Place surrendered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siege of Arzillières</td>
<td>c. Feb 1426</td>
<td>Siege</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siege of Mont Aimé [second]</td>
<td>Oct 1426 – March 1427</td>
<td>Siege</td>
<td>Place surrendered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siege of Montargis</td>
<td>July – Sep 1427</td>
<td>Siege</td>
<td>Siege raised by the Dauphinsts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siege of Orléans</td>
<td>Oct 1428 – May 1429</td>
<td>Siege</td>
<td>Burgundian forces recalled on 17 April; siege raised by the Dauphivist afterwards</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix A. Joint Anglo-Burgundian engagements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Battle of Rouvray</td>
<td>12 Feb 1429</td>
<td>Battle</td>
<td>Lancastrian victory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battle of Patay</td>
<td>18 June 1429</td>
<td>Battle</td>
<td>Dauphinist victory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confrontation at Mitry</td>
<td>13 July 1429</td>
<td>Battle</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confrontation at Montépilloy</td>
<td>15 July 1429</td>
<td>Battle</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence of Paris</td>
<td>8 Sep 1429</td>
<td>Defence</td>
<td>Assault repulsed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skirmish before Creil</td>
<td>early 1430</td>
<td>Battle</td>
<td>Lancastrian victory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siege of Larrey</td>
<td>March 1430</td>
<td>Siege</td>
<td>Place surrendered on 1 April</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence of Pont-l’Évêque</td>
<td>15 May 1430</td>
<td>Relief</td>
<td>Lancastrian victory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skirmish before Compiègne capture of Joan of Arc</td>
<td>23 May 1430</td>
<td>Relief</td>
<td>Lancastrian victory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siege of Compiègne [second]</td>
<td>May - Oct 1430</td>
<td>Siege</td>
<td>Siege abandoned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Journée</em> of Gournay-sur-Aronde</td>
<td>1 Aug 1430</td>
<td><em>Journée</em></td>
<td>Place surrendered to the Lancastrians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dauphinist relief of Compiègne</td>
<td>25 Oct 1430</td>
<td>Battle</td>
<td>Siege abandoned</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix A. Joint Anglo-Burgundian tactical engagements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date/Duration</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relief of Clermont-en-Beauvaisis</td>
<td>Late Oct / early Nov 1430</td>
<td>Relief</td>
<td>Siege abandoned by the Dauphinists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skirmish at Bouchoir</td>
<td>20 Nov 1430</td>
<td>Battle</td>
<td>Dauphinist victory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siege of Laigny-les-Châtignieres</td>
<td>Nov – Dec 1430</td>
<td>Siege</td>
<td>Place surrendered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relief of Chappes</td>
<td>Dec 1430</td>
<td>Relief</td>
<td>Releiving force defeated by the Dauphinists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relief of Anglure</td>
<td>May 1431</td>
<td>Relief</td>
<td>Place evacuated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battle of Bulgnéville</td>
<td>2 July 1431</td>
<td>Battle</td>
<td>Lancastrian victory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siege of Lagny-sur-Marne [first]</td>
<td>March 1432</td>
<td>Siege</td>
<td>Siege abandoned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siege of Lagny-sur-Marne [second]</td>
<td>May / June – Aug 1432</td>
<td>Siege</td>
<td>Siege abandoned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armagnac relief of Lagny</td>
<td>9 Aug 1432</td>
<td>Battle</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capture of Provins</td>
<td></td>
<td>Siege</td>
<td>Place taken by assault</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siege of Saint-Valéry-sur-</td>
<td>July – Aug 1433</td>
<td>Siege</td>
<td>Place surrendered on 24 August</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix A. Joint Anglo-Burgundian engagements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Somme</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siege of Monchaux</td>
<td>Aug 1433</td>
<td>Siege</td>
<td><em>Journée</em> appointed for 15 October 1433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Journée of Monchaux</em></td>
<td>15 Oct 1433</td>
<td><em>Journée</em></td>
<td><em>Journée</em> ignored by the Dauphinists and held in vain; the place not surrendered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Journée of Pacy-sur-Armançon</em></td>
<td>1 September 1433</td>
<td><em>Journée</em></td>
<td>Place surrendered to the Lancastrians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siege of Creil</td>
<td>May - June 1434</td>
<td>Siege</td>
<td>Place surrendered on 20 June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siege of Pont-Sainte-Maxence</td>
<td>Summer 1434</td>
<td>Siege</td>
<td>Place surrendered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siege of Crépy-en-Valois</td>
<td>Summer 1434</td>
<td>Siege</td>
<td>Place taken by assault</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siege of Clermont-en-Beauvaisis</td>
<td>Summer 1434</td>
<td>Siege</td>
<td>Place surrendered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Journée of Saint-Valery-sur-Somme</em></td>
<td>Summer 1434</td>
<td><em>Journée</em></td>
<td>Place surrendered to the Lancastrians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Journée of Orville</em></td>
<td>Summer 1435</td>
<td><em>Journée</em></td>
<td>Place relieved by the Lancastrians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siege of Saint Denis</td>
<td>Aug - Oct 1435</td>
<td>Siege</td>
<td>Place surrendered on 4 October</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B
Lancastrians in joint engagements

B.1 The siege of Meulan (1423)

Legend:

N  Negotiators for the surrender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personage</th>
<th>Sources</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>John, duke of Bedford, regent of France</td>
<td>AN, JJ 172/266, 361; <em>Cochon</em>, p. 291; <em>Cordeliers</em>, fo. 432r; <em>Geste des Nobles</em>, p. 189.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Montacute, earl of Salisbury</td>
<td><em>Cordeliers</em>, fo. 433v–434r; <em>Monstrelet</em>, IV, p. 138; <em>Geste des nobles</em>, p. 189; <em>Gregory</em>, p. 150; CGL, p. 124.</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William de la Pole, earl of Suffolk</td>
<td><em>Basset</em>, fo. 47r.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas, Lord Scales</td>
<td><em>Basset</em>, fo. 47r.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir John Fastolf</td>
<td><em>Basset</em>, fo. 47r; <em>Cordeliers</em>, fo. 433v–434r; <em>Monstrelet</em>, IV, p. 138; <em>Gregory</em>, p. 150; CGL, p. 124.</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Richard Poyning</td>
<td><em>Basset</em>, fo. 47r.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Harling</td>
<td><em>Basset</em>, fo. 47r.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Woodville, seigneur de Preaulx</td>
<td><em>Basset</em>, fo. 47r; <em>Cordeliers</em>, fo. 433v–434r; <em>Monstrelet</em>, IV, p. 138; <em>Gregory</em>, p. 150–153.</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

1 Both published in *Paris pendant l’occupation anglaise*, p. 80–81, 84.
2 The description of the siege in the chronicles of Monstrelet and Wavrin is based on that of Cordeliers, they also cite the same treaty of surrender providing the same list of participants. The treaty is cited in English in *Gregory*, p. 150–153.
Appendix B. Lancastrians in joint engagements

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>150; <em>CGL</em>, p. 124.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Burgundians</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean 'Chapelain' de Puligny, seigneur de Motte-Tilly</td>
<td><em>Cordeliers</em>, fo. 433v–434r; <em>Monstrelet</em>, IV, p. 138; <em>Gregory</em>, p. 150; <em>GCL</em>, p. 124.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Appendix B. Lancastrians in joint engagements

B.2 The battle of Cravant, (31 July 1423)

Legend:

+ person present at the battle, according to the source
?

a dubious identification of a person
S person present in the Burgundian garrison of Cravant, according to the source
B/H person, only mentioned in the chronicle of Peter Basset (B) or that of Edmund Hall (H), !

person, receiving payment for the soldiers engaged in the expedition for the relief of Cravant
Appendix B. Lancastrians in joint engagements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Englishmen</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Montacute, earl of Salisbury</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
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<tr>
<td>William de la Pole, earl of Suffolk</td>
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<tr>
<td>William, Lord Molyneys</td>
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<td>Thomas, Lord Scales</td>
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<tr>
<td>Robert, Lord Willoughby</td>
<td>?4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Richard Poynings</td>
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1 The list of the Englishmen, published in *Letters and Papers*, p. 385 (according to an early XVI-century transcript in BL, MS. Harley 782 f. 51) is identical to that in Basset’s chronicle. However, it completely omits the list of Burgundians, given by Bassett. The only notable difference, concerning Lord Poynings is discussed below.


3 ADCO, B 1623 ; BNF, MS. Bourgogne 104.

Appendix B. Lancastrians in joint engagements

| Englishmen (pt. 2)                  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 |
|------------------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| Sir John Arthur                   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   | +  |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Sir Henry Biset                   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Sir John Crafford                 |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |    |    |    | B  |    |    |    |
| Sir Thomas Fleming                |   |   |   |   |   |   |   | + |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Sir John Grey                     |   |   |   |   |   |   |   | + |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Sir Reginald Grey                 |   |   |   |   |   |   |   | + |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Sir Gilbert Halsall               | + | + |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Sir Edmund Heron                  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   | + |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Sir Richard Lowyk                 |   |   |   |   |   |   |   | + |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Sir Lancelot de Lisle             |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   | B  |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Sir William Oldhall               |   |   |   |   |   |   |   | + |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Sir John Pashelay                 |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Sir William Peyto                 |   |   |   |   |   |   |   | + |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Sir Thomas Rempston               |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |    |    |    | +  |    |    |    |
| Rix Amadoc / Richard Ap Madocke   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   | + |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Digon Amore                       |   |   |   |   |   |   |   | + |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Jennekyn Banaster                 |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   | B  |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Thomas Burgh                      |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |    |    |    |    | H  |    |    |

5 ‘Sir de Ponlyges’ in *Letters and Papers*, as opposed to ‘Le jeune Sire de Ponyngges’ in *Bassett*, fo. 48r. Given that Robert, Lord Poyning (1382–1446) was in no way young by 1423 this may actually refer to his eldest son Richard Poyning (d. 1429), P. Fleming, ‘Poyning , Michael, first Lord Poyning (c.1318-1369)’, *ODNB.*
Appendix B. Lancastrians in joint engagements

| William Glasdale |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Mathew Gough | + |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Davy Loyd** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | H |

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⁶ ‘Jean, seigneur d’Annay’, *Wavrin*, III, p. 64.

⁷ Styled seigneur or sire de Vergy in *Monstrelet, Wavrin and St. Remy, Roye & But*.

⁸ ‘le sire de Bergyer’, *Bassett*, fo. 48v ; ‘The lorde of Vergier’, *Hall*, p. 118
### Appendix B. Lancastrians in joint engagements

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10 ‘seigneur Dety’
11 ‘seigneur de thil’, ADCO, B 1623, fo. 216v
13 ‘Guillelmus de Vienna’, which may refer to his son as well, *Roye & But*, p. 189.
### Appendix B. Lancastrians in joint engagements

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<td>Perrinet Gressart</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>François ‘L’Arragonnois’ de Surienne</td>
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</table>

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14 Mentioned as the bailli of Troyes.
Appendix B. Lancastrians in joint engagements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Burgundians (pt. 4)</th>
<th>1</th>
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<td>Antoine de Touloungeon</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jean de Vaubusin</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guillaume de Vienne, seigneur de Bussy</td>
<td>+</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jean de Vienne</td>
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<td>Copin de la Viesville</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jacques de Villers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Amé de Viry</td>
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<tr>
<td>the bailli of Aumont</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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¹⁵ ‘Guillelmus de Vienna’, which may refer to his father, seigneur de Saint-George as well, *Roye & But*, p. 189.

361
### Appendix B. Lancastrians in joint engagements

#### B.3 The siege of Compiègne (1424)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personage</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Englishmen</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William de la Pole, earl of Suffolk</td>
<td><em>Basset</em>, fo. 51r.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Thomas Gargrave</td>
<td><em>Basset</em>, fo. 51r.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bertrand de Montferrand</td>
<td><em>Trahisons</em>, p. 177.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Burgundians</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean de Luxembourg</td>
<td><em>Basset</em>, fo. 51r.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean de Villiers, seigneur de L'Isle-Adam</td>
<td><em>Monstrelet</em>, IV, p. 176; <em>Fenin</em>, p. 211; <em>Wavrin</em>, III, p. 89; <em>Trahisons</em>, p. 177; <em>Basset</em>, fo. 51r.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the seigneur de <em>Monserel</em></td>
<td><em>Wavrin</em>, III, p. 90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean 'Lionel' de Bournonville</td>
<td><em>Monstrelet</em>, IV, p. 176; <em>Wavrin</em>, III, p. 89; <em>Fenin</em>, p. 211.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean, bastard de Thiant</td>
<td><em>Monstrelet</em>, IV, p. 176; <em>Wavrin</em>, III, p. 89; <em>Fenin</em>, p. 211.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Others:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simon Morhier</td>
<td><em>Basset</em>, fo. 51r.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

1 *Le conte de ligny* in *Basset*, fo. 51r. This source continues to style Jean de Luxembourg the count of Ligny in its account on the siege of Guise (1424) even though he did not received this title until 1431, *Basset*, fo. 55r. In fact Philip de Saint Pol, brother to the duke of Brabant, was the count of Ligny in 1424, but his presence at the siege seems almost unlikely.
### Appendix B. Lancastrians in joint engagements

#### B.4 The siege of Guise (1424)

**Legend:**

- C Only coming to the siege in anticipation of an attempt to raise the siege by the duke of Bar (Cordeliers, fo. 449r)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personage</th>
<th>Notes</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>John Bayous¹</td>
<td>BNF, P.O. 1778 (Luxembourg) no. 25.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Dansanger</td>
<td>BNF, P.O. 1778 (Luxembourg) no. 25.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Lynoz</td>
<td><em>Basset</em>, f. 55r.</td>
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<tr>
<td>John Orell</td>
<td>BNF, P.O. 1778 (Luxembourg) no. 25.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christopher Preston of Lancashire</td>
<td>BNF, P.O. 1778 (Luxembourg) no. 25.</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>le bastard de Stamfort</em></td>
<td><em>Wavrin</em>, III, p. 96.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roland Standish</td>
<td>BNF, P.O. 1778 (Luxembourg) no. 25.</td>
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<tr>
<td>William Waller</td>
<td>BNF, P.O. 1778 (Luxembourg) no. 25.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nicolas Warberton</td>
<td><em>Basset</em>, f. 55r.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Burgundians</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ The names of the captains of the English expeditionary force mentioned in this piece are given according to the transcriptions based on the English financial documents in H. L. Ratcliffe, ‘The military expenditure’, pp. 14–15.
Appendix B. Lancastrians in joint engagements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Notes</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jean de Melun, seigneur d'Antoing</td>
<td>C</td>
<td><em>Cordeliers</em>, fo. 449r; <em>Monstrelet</em>, IV, p. 184; <em>Wavrin</em>, III, p. 95; <em>Fenin</em>, p. 214.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David de Brime seigneur de Humbercourt</td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Cordeliers</em>, fo. 449r.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the seigneur de Lesdam</td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Cordeliers</em>, fo. 448v.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baudot, seigneur de Noyelle</td>
<td>C</td>
<td><em>Cordeliers</em>, fo. 449r.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hugues de Lannoy, seigneur de Santes</td>
<td>C</td>
<td><em>Cordeliers</em>, fo. 449r.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean ‘Lionel’ de Bourronville</td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Cordeliers</em>, fo. 448v; <em>Monstrelet</em>, IV, p. 184; <em>Wavrin</em>, III, p. 95.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean de Luxembourg, the bastard of Saint Pol</td>
<td>ADN, B 1933 fo. 108v; <em>Cordeliers</em>, fo. 448v; <em>Monstrelet</em>, IV, p. 184; <em>Wavrin</em>, III, p. 95.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Colard de Mailly</td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Monstrelet</em>, IV, p. 184; <em>Wavrin</em>, III, p. 95.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ferry de Mailly</td>
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<td><em>Monstrelet</em>, IV, p. 184; <em>Wavrin</em>, III, p. 95.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daviot de Poix</td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Cordeliers</em>, fo. 448v; <em>Monstrelet</em>, IV, p. 184; <em>Wavrin</em>, III, p. 95.</td>
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<tr>
<td>the bastard of Burgundy</td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Cordeliers</em>, fo. 448v.</td>
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<tr>
<td>the bastard de Coucy</td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Cordeliers</em>, fo. 448v.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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2 ‘et ses freres’, *Cordeliers*, fo. 449r. This may refer to Ghillebert and Baudouin de Lannoy.

366
### B.5 The first siege of Mont Aimé (1425–1426)

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<tr>
<td><strong>English</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Thomas Montacute, earl of Salisbury</td>
<td><em>Monstrelet</em>, IV, p. 255</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas, Lord Scales</td>
<td>BNF, MS. Fr. 32510, fo. 367r.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Thomas Dring</td>
<td><em>English suits</em>, p. 171 et al.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Grett</td>
<td>BNF, MS. Fr. 32510, fo. 367r.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Edmund Heron</td>
<td>BNF, MS. Fr. 32510, fo. 367r.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Burgundians</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guillaume, seigneur de Châtillon</td>
<td>AN, JJ 173/449; BNF, MS. Fr. 32510, fo. 367r.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean, seigneur d’Irque, bailli of Valois</td>
<td>BNF, MS. Fr. 32510, fo. 367r.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bertrand de Bourmont, seigneur de Manicamp</td>
<td>AN, JJ 173/449; BNF, MS. Fr. 32510, fo. 367r.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Geoffrey, seigneur de Villers, bailli of Vermandois</td>
<td>BNF, MS. Fr. 32510, fo. 367r.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Galliot de Bournonville</td>
<td>BNF, MS. Fr. 32510, fo. 367r.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Waleran de Bournonville</td>
<td><em>Monstrelet</em>, IV, p. 255; <em>Fenin</em>, p. 199.</td>
<td>killed (actually, badly wounded)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colard, bastard de Brouly</td>
<td>BNF, MS. Fr. 32510, fo. 367r.</td>
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<td>Jean de Croy</td>
<td>BNF, MS. Fr. 32510, fo. 367r.</td>
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<td>Jaques de Ham</td>
<td>BNF, MS. Fr. 32510, fo. 367r.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Henry de La Tour, bailli of Vitry</td>
<td>BNF, MS. Fr. 32510, fo. 367r; <em>Fenin</em>, p. 198–199.</td>
<td>captured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huguenin de Lille, prévôt de Laon</td>
<td>BNF, MS. Fr. 32510, fo. 367r.</td>
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1 This letter of remission is referred to according to a partial edition in S. Luce, *Jeanne d’Arc à Domremy*, p. 176–178. The incident, for which the pardon was granted, is reported to take place on the way to the siege, not during the siege itself.

2 serving in the retinue of Guillaume, seignur de Châtillon.

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### Appendix B. Lancastrians in joint engagements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Source</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Huchon 'Ogier' Loquinghenhem</td>
<td>AN, JJ 173/449.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thibault, bastard de Neufchâtel</td>
<td>BNF, MS. Fr. 32510, fo. 367r.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Claude de Tenarc</td>
<td>BNF, MS. Fr. 32510, fo. 367r.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry, bastard de Varians</td>
<td>BNF, MS. Fr. 32510, fo. 367r.</td>
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3 man-at-arms in the retinue of the seigneur de Manicamp

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Appendix B. Lancastrians in joint engagements

B.6 The siege of Arzillières (1426)

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<th>Personage</th>
<th>Sources</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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<td>Digon Amore</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean de Neufchâtel, seigneur de Montagu</td>
<td>BNF, MS. Fr. 32510, fo. 367v.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry de La Tour, seigneur de Pierreport, <em>bailli</em> of Vitry</td>
<td>BNF, MS. Fr. 32510, fo. 367v.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean de Châtillon, seigneur de Troissy</td>
<td>BNF, MS. Fr. 32510, fo. 367v.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thibault, bastard de Neufchâtel</td>
<td>BNF, MS. Fr. 32510, fo. 367v.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Burgundians</strong></td>
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369
### B.7 The Second siege of Mont Aimé (1426–1427)

<table>
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<tr>
<td><strong>English</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Thomas Montacute, earl of Salisbury</td>
<td>BNF, MS. Fr. 4484, fos. 36r–39v, Fr. 32510, fo. 369r; <em>Monstrelet</em>, IV, p. 270.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Perche</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Robert, Lord Willoughby</td>
<td>TNA, PRO 31/8/138 (6 Apr 1427)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Alan Buxhill</td>
<td>BNF, MS. Fr. 4484, fos. 37r–37v; MS. Fr. 32510, fo. 369r.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Thomas Gargrave</td>
<td>BNF, MS. Fr. 32510, fo. 369v.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sir Robert Hungerford</td>
<td>BNF, MS. Fr. 4484, fos. 39r–39v.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sir Lancelot de Lisle</td>
<td>BNF, MS. Fr. 32510, fo. 369r.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sir Richard Lowick</td>
<td>BNF, MS. Fr. 32510, fo. 369v.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Henry Biset</td>
<td>BNF, MS. Fr. 32510, fo. 369r.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Robert Conyas'</td>
<td>BNF, MS. Fr. 32510, fo. 369v.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Burgundians</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean de Luxembourg, seigneur de</td>
<td><em>Monstrelet</em>, IV, p. 270.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beaurevoir</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guillaume, seigneur de Châtillon</td>
<td>BNF, MS. Fr. 32510, fo. 369v; MS. BNF, Fr. 4484, fos. 37r–37v.²</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean de Dinteville, <em>bailli</em> of Troyes</td>
<td>BNF, MS. Fr. 4484, fo. 37v.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacques de Han</td>
<td>BNF, MS. Fr. 4484, fo. 37v.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colart de Mailly, <em>bailli</em> of Vermandois</td>
<td>BNF, MS. Fr. 4484, fo. 38v.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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¹ Possibly Robert Conyers, who served as a man–at–arms at Evreux in 1423–4 (BNF, MS. Fr. 25767 no. 49 [SLME]; BL, Add. Ch. 1419 [SLME]) and in the invasion of Maine in 1425 (AN, K 62/11/19 [SLME]). He was knighted by 1430 when he became lieutenant of Avranches (BNF, Fr. 25769 no. 465 [SLME]), then in 1435 of Cherbourg (BNF, MS. Fr. 25772 nos. 945 [SLME], 1036 [SLME]).

² Received together with Jean de Pressy the musters of the retinues of Sir Alan Buxhill (15 Feb 1427), Jean de Dinteville (19 Feb 1427), Jacques de Han (24 Feb 1427).
Appendix B. Lancastrians in joint engagements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Source Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jean de Pressy</td>
<td>BNF, MS. Fr. 4484, fos. 37r–37v.(^3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerard Rolin</td>
<td>BNF, MS. Fr. 32510, fo. 369v.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean de Torsenay</td>
<td>BNF, MS. Fr. 4484, fo. 39r; Fr. 32510, fo. 369v.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry de La Tour</td>
<td>BNF, MS. Fr. 32510, fo. 369v.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Others</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean d’Auzonville</td>
<td>BNF, MS. Fr. 32510, fo. 369r.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Godefroy de Beaumont</td>
<td>BNF, MS. Fr. 32510, fo. 369r.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bastard de Chevreuse</td>
<td>BNF, MS. Fr. 32510, fo. 369r.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eustace Gaudin(^4)</td>
<td>BNF, MS. Fr. 4484, fo. 38r; MS. Fr. 32510, fo. 369r.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Haron</td>
<td>BNF, MS. Fr. 32510, fo. 369v.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Hunart</td>
<td>BNF, MS. Fr. 32510, fo. 369r.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jehan de Mante(^5)</td>
<td>BNF, MS. Fr. 32510, fo. 369r.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Sac</td>
<td>BNF, MS. Fr. 32510, fo. 369v.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louis Wartsumbury</td>
<td>BNF, MS. Fr. 32510, fo. 369r.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^3\) Received together with Guillaume, seigneur de Châtillon, the musters of the retinues of Sir Alan Buxhill (15 Feb 1427), Jean de Dinteville (19 Feb 1427), Jacques de Han (24 Feb 1427).

\(^4\) Appears as ‘Tassin Gaudin’

\(^5\) Jean de Mante served as a man–at–arms under the earl of Salisbury at the siege of La Ferté–Bernard in early 1436 (BL, Add. Ch. 94 [SLME]).
Appendix B. Lancastrians in joint engagements

B.8 Burgundians at the confrontation at Montépilloy

Legend:

* captains of the retinues mustered in Arras in the last days of July; received into the service of the duke of Burgundy for 1 month to go for the defence of Paris.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personage</th>
<th>Sources</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jean de Villiers, seigneur de l’Isle-Adam</td>
<td><em>Wavrin</em>, III, p. 325–326; <em>Monstrelet</em>, IV, p. 345</td>
<td>Carried the banner of France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean, seigneur de Croy</td>
<td><em>Wavrin</em>, III, p. 326; <em>St.-Remy</em>, II, p. 146 (Mitry*); 147–148; <em>Monstrelet</em>, IV, p. 345; ADN B 1942 (3e compte), fo. 58v</td>
<td>Knighted; fought on horse-back; wounded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean de Créquy*</td>
<td><em>Wavrin</em>, III, p. 326; <em>Trahisons</em>, p. 199; <em>St.-Remy</em>, II, p. 146 (Mitry); <em>Monstrelet</em>, IV, p. 345</td>
<td>Knighted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anthoine de Bethune</td>
<td><em>Wavrin</em>, III, p. 326; <em>Monstrelet</em>, IV, p. 345</td>
<td>Knighted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jehan de Fosseux*</td>
<td><em>Wavrin</em>, III, p. 326; <em>Monstrelet</em>, IV, p. 345</td>
<td>Knighted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philip, seigneur de Saveuse*</td>
<td><em>Wavrin</em>, III, p. 326; <em>Monstrelet</em>, IV, p. 345</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hugues de Lannoy</td>
<td><em>Wavrin</em>, III, p. 326; <em>St.-Remy</em>, II, p. 146 (Mitry); <em>Monstrelet</em>, IV, p. 345</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean de Brimeu</td>
<td><em>Wavrin</em>, III, p. 326; <em>St.-Remy</em>, II, p. 147 (Mitry); <em>Monstrelet</em>, IV, p. 345</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simon de Lalaing*</td>
<td><em>Wavrin</em>, III, p. 326.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean de Lalaing*</td>
<td><em>Monstrelet</em>, IV, p. 345</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Some persons are not expressly mentioned by Le Fèvre de Saint-Remy when speaking of the confrontation at Montepilloy but a list is given before the mention of the confrontation at Mitry two days earlier, *St.-Remy*, II, p. 146–147. Given that no division of forces by Bedford is reported for these days it may be suggested that those who were present at Mitry were in the same army two days later.

2 Probably a mistake for Simon de Lalaing.
Appendix B. Lancastrians in joint engagements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Wavrin, III, p. 326; Pucelle, p. 330; St.-Remy, II, p. 146 (Mitry), 147-148; Monstrelet, IV, p. 345; Trahisons, p. 199.³</th>
<th>Knighted by Bedford; fought on horseback</th>
<th>Knighted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jean, bastard de Saint-Pol, seigneur Haubourdin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;le Liegeois&quot; de Humieres</td>
<td>Wavrin, III, p. 326; Monstrelet, IV, p. 345</td>
<td></td>
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³ Mentioned as the 'sire de Haubourdin'.
### B.9 Burgundians at the defence of Paris, 8 September 1429

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personage</th>
<th>Source</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Jean Villiers, seigneur de l'Isle-Adam</td>
<td><em>Wavrin</em>, III, p. 340; <em>Cagny</em>, p. 165; <em>St.-Remy</em>, II, p. 149;¹ <em>Monstrelet</em>, IV, p. 355; <em>Cordeliers</em>, fo. 486v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huques de Lannoy, seigneur de Santes</td>
<td><em>Cordeliers</em>, fo. 486v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippe, seigneur de Saveuse</td>
<td><em>Cordeliers</em>, fo. 486v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean, bastard de Saint Pol, seigneur de Haubourdin</td>
<td><em>Cordeliers</em>, fo 486v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean, bastard de Thiant</td>
<td><em>Cordeliers</em>, fo. 486v</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹St.-Remy names the seigneur de l'Isle Adam marshal of France, but he was reinstated in this office only in 1432, *Les Chevaliers de l'Ordre de la Toison d'or*, p. 48.
### Appendix B. Lancastrians in joint engagements

#### B.10 Burgundians at Paris / Saint Denis 21–23 March 1430

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personage</th>
<th>Sources</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Philip, seigneur de Saveuse</td>
<td>Bourgeois, p. 251; Monstrelet, IV, p. 365; Cochon, p. 309; ADN, B 1942 (compte d’armes), fo. 18r.</td>
<td>Captured off Paris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean de Brimeu</td>
<td>Monstrelet, IV, p. 366. ADN, B 1942 (compte d’armes), fo. 18r</td>
<td>Retreated to the abbey at St. Denis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bastard of Saveuse</td>
<td>Bourgeois, p. 251; Monstrelet, IV, p. 366</td>
<td>Captured outside Paris (Bourgeois); Retreated to the Paris Gate of St. Denis (Monstrelet)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anthoine de Wistoc</td>
<td>Monstrelet, IV, p. 366.</td>
<td>Captured at St. Denis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thierry de Malingheham</td>
<td>Monstrelet, IV, p. 366–367.</td>
<td>Captured at St. Denis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florimont de ... [missing]</td>
<td>Monstrelet, IV, p. 366.</td>
<td>Captured at St. Denis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estevenin de Thenquettes</td>
<td>Monstrelet, IV, p. 367.</td>
<td>Killed at St. Denis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jehan de Haute Cloche</td>
<td>Monstrelet, IV, p. 367.</td>
<td>Killed at St. Denis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guillaume de Beauval</td>
<td>Monstrelet, IV, p. 367.</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

1 Possibly, Colard ‘Florimont’ de Brimeu.
Appendix B. Lancastrians in joint engagements

### B.11 The siege of Compiègne

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personage</th>
<th>Musters (ADN, B 1942)</th>
<th>Other sources</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18 Apr</td>
<td>24 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Burgundians</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Philip the Good, duke of Burgundy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raoul d’Ailly, vidame of Amiens</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean de Melun, seigneur d’Antoing</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean, seigneur d’Auxy</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean de Luxembourg, seigneur de Beaurevoir</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>seigneur de Beauvoir</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pierre de Bauffremont, seigneur de Chargny</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louis de Berghes, seigneur de Cohern</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean van der Clite, seigneur de</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Berry, p. 144; Cordeliers fo. 498r; Hall, p. 156, 159; Monstrelet, IV, p. 383–390; St. Remy, II, p. 177; GCL, p. 155; Trahisons, p. 200, 202; Wavrin, III, p. 355, 359, 368.*

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1. Styled count of Ligny (‘conte de Ligney’) by Le Févre de Saint Remy, although he did not succeed to this title until the death of his aunt Jeanne de Luxembourg on 18.09.1430.

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Appendix B. Lancastrians in joint engagements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commines²</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jean, seigneur de Créquy</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacques, seigneur de Crévecoeur</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anthoine de Croy, seigneur de Croy</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seigneur de Dours</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean de Brimeu, seigneur de Humbercourt</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drieu, seigneur de Humieres</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>seigneur d'Inchy</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>seigneur de Lignières / Linières</td>
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<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
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<tr>
<td>Robert, seigneur de Mammines</td>
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<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
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<tr>
<td>seigneur de Rolllepot</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>seigneur de Saint Symon</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hugues de Lannoy, seigneur de Santes</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippe, seigneur de Saveuse</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guillaume de Bauffremont, seigneur de sceix</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waleran, seigneur de Wavrin</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cavart de l'Atre</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean d'Avelus</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean d'Ayne</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacques Bainquechin</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
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</table>

² He was absent from the siege from 25 April until 12 August (ADN, B 1942, fo. 50).
Appendix B. Lancastrians in joint engagements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Waleran de Beauval</td>
<td>Monstrelet, IV, p. 415; Wavrin, III, p. 384.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean de Belles</td>
<td>Monstrelet, IV, p. 391; Wavrin, III, p. 363.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colart de Bethencourt</td>
<td>Monstrelet, IV, p. 415; Wavrin, III, p. 384.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antoine de Bournonville</td>
<td>Cordeliers, fo. 498r.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galiot de Bournonville</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archambaut de Brimeu</td>
<td>Monstrelet, IV, p. 414; St. Remy, II, p. 185; Wavrin, III, p. 383.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colard ‘Florimont’ de Brimeu</td>
<td>Monstrelet, IV, p. 403, 415; St. Remy, II, p. 177, 183, 185; Wavrin, III, p. 371, 372, 384; ADN, B 1942 (3e compte), fo. 36v.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David de Brimeu</td>
<td>St. Remy, II, p. 177;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deppert de Brimeu</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gérard de Brimeu</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacques de Brimeu</td>
<td>Monstrelet, IV, p. 400, 403, 411, 413–415; St. Remy, II, p. 177, 185; Wavrin, III, p. 368, 371, 372, 382, 384; ADN B 1942 (compte d’armes), fos. 50r–50v; ADN, B 1942 (3e compte), fo. 35r.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thiebaut de Cautignies (Cotygies)</td>
<td>Monstrelet, IV, p. 391; Wavrin, III, p. 363.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silvestre de Chariat</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lyonel de Conteville / Lyonel de Courteville</td>
<td>Monstrelet, IV, p. 414; Wavrin, III, p. 383.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ernoul de Créquy</td>
<td>Monstrelet, IV, p. 415; Wavrin, III, p. 384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raoul de Créquy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ameulx de Cohem</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bastard de Courteuse</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aubert de Folleville</td>
<td>Monstrelet, IV, p. 403, 416; Wavrin, III, p. 371, 385.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean de Fosseux</td>
<td>Monstrelet, IV, p. 413; ADN, B 1942 (compte d’armes), fo. 52r.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sire de Fosseux</td>
<td>Wavrin, III, p. 381.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippe ‘Le Borgne’ de Fosseux</td>
<td>Monstrelet, IV, p. 411; ADN, B 1942 (compte d’armes), fo. 52v.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lois Francois</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kanart</td>
<td>Monstrelet, IV, p. 403, 416; Wavrin, III, p. 371.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simon de Lalaing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Baldouin ‘Le Begue’ de Lannoy</td>
<td>St. Remy, II, p. 177; ADN, B 1942 (3e compte), fos. 42v–43r.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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### Appendix B. Lancastrians in joint engagements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>+</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jacques de Lievin</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferry de Mailly</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph de Noorearmes</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coppin de Noorculines</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Godeffroy Penseu</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David de Poix</td>
<td>+</td>
<td><em>Monstrelet</em>, IV, p. 403, 413; <em>Wavrin</em>, III, p. 371, 381.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean Remacle</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Martin de Rodder</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laigle de Sains</td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Monstrelet</em>, IV, p. 412–413; <em>Wavrin</em>, III, p. 381.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert de Saveuse</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bastard de Saveuse</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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3 ‘Laigle de Saint–Gille. de Saucourt’, presumably, Laigle de Sains and Gille de Saucourt.
Appendix B. Lancastrians in joint engagements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lancelot de Viefville</th>
<th>+</th>
<th>Cordeliers*, fo. 498r; Monstrelet, IV, p. 388; Trahisons, p. 203; Wavrin, III, p. 358.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guillaume, bastard de Wandonne</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Monstrelet, IV, p. 398.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Englishmen**

| John Mowbray, duke of Norfolk | | Monstrelet, IV, p. 398. |
| John FitzAlan, earl of Arundel | | Berry, p. 144; Chartier, I, p. 121; Cordeliers fo. 498r, 500v; Hall, p. 156; St. Remy, II, p. 181, 183–184; Dunes, p. 208. |
| William de la Pole, earl of Suffolk | | Hall, p. 156. |
| Humphrey Stafford, earl of Stafford | | Berry, p. 144. |
| Sir John Montgomery | | Brut, p. 439 (Continuation D); Monstrelet, IV, p. 383, 396; GCL, p. 155; Wavrin, III, p. 355, 364–365; Vitellius A XVI, p. 274; ADN, B 1942 (3e compte), fo. 42v. |
| Sir John Robersart | | Hall, p. 159; Monstrelet*, IV, p. 396; Wavrin, III, p. 364. |
| Sir John Steward | | Brut, p. 439 (Continuation D); GCL; Vitellius A XVI, p. 274. |

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4 The chronicle quotes the letter of the duke of Burgundy to Henry VI reporting of the capture of Joan of Arc and mentioning Sir John Montgomery and Sir John Steward as the commanders of the English contingent present at the siege.

5 Called simply seigneur de Robersart in the chronicle of Monstrelet. This could as well refer to his son Louis.
## B.12 Skirmish at Bouchoir

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personage</th>
<th>Sources</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Burgundians</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaques de Heily</td>
<td>Monstrelet, IV, p. 422–424; St. Remy, II, p. 193; ADN B 1942 (3e</td>
<td>Killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>comptte), fo. 36v</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daviot de Poix</td>
<td>Monstrelet, IV, p. 422–424; St. Remy, II, p. 193.</td>
<td>Captured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geoffroy de Thoisy</td>
<td>ADN B 1942 (3e comptte), fo. 36v</td>
<td>Captured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laigle de Sains</td>
<td>Monstrelet, IV, p. 424.</td>
<td>Captured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lermite de Boval / lermite darboval</td>
<td>Monstrelet, IV, p. 424; ADN B 1942 (3e comptte), fo. 44v</td>
<td>Captured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Englishmen</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Thomas Kyriell</td>
<td>Monstrelet, IV, p. 422–424; St. Remy, II, p. 193.</td>
<td>Captured (Monstrelet),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Killed (St. Remy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robin Hairon</td>
<td>Monstrelet, IV, p. 424</td>
<td>Captured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Corawen</td>
<td>Monstrelet, IV, p. 424</td>
<td>Captured</td>
</tr>
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</table>
### B.13 The siege of Lagny-sur-Marne (1432)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personage</th>
<th>Sources</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>John, duke of Bedford</td>
<td>College of Arms, MS. M9, fo. 120; Bourgeois, p. 286; Monstrelet, V, p. 32, 33; Wavrin, IV, p. 27, 28, 29; St. Remy, II, p. 264–265; Hall, p. 168, 169.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John FitzAlan, earl of Arundel</td>
<td>College of Arms, MS. M9, fo. 120.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert, Lord Willoughby</td>
<td>College of Arms, MS. M9, fo. 120; Hall, p. 168; BNF, MS. Fr. 26056, no. 1863; PO 3021 (Villiers) no. 29.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>l'enfant de Warwick</td>
<td>Monstrelet, V, p. 33–34; Wavrin, IV, p. 29.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Richard Guethin</td>
<td>College of Arms, MS. M9, fo. 120; Hall, p. 168.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir John Fastolf</td>
<td>College of Arms, MS. Arundel 26, fos. 57v–58v.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir William Fulthorpe</td>
<td>College of Arms, MS. M9, fo. 120; Hall, p. 168.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Thomas Gerard</td>
<td>College of Arms, MS. M9, fo. 120; Hall, p. 168.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Thomas Griffyne of Ireland</td>
<td>College of Arms, MS. M9, fo. 120; Hall, p. 168.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Phillip Halle</td>
<td>Hall, p. 168.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir John Handford</td>
<td>College of Arms, MS. M9, fo. 120; Hall, p. 168.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Richard Harrington</td>
<td>College of Arms, MS. M9, fo. 120; Hall, p. 168.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Thomas Kyriell</td>
<td>Monstrelet, V, p. 341; Wavrin, IV, p. 30; ADN, B 1945, fo. 80r.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir John Montgomery</td>
<td>College of Arms, MS. M9, fo. 120; Hall, p. 168.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Ralph Neville</td>
<td>College of Arms, MS. M9, fo. 120; Hall, p. 168.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Andrew Ogard</td>
<td>College of Arms, MS. M9, fo. 120; Hall, p. 168.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Richard Ratcliffe</td>
<td>Hall, p. 168.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir John Salvain</td>
<td>College of Arms, MS. M9, fo. 120; Hall, p. 168.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Ralph Staundish</td>
<td>College of Arms, MS. M9, fo. 120; Hall, p. 168.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Richard Standish</td>
<td>College of Arms, MS. M9, fo. 120;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Davy Hall</td>
<td>Hall, p. 168.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Hudson</td>
<td>College of Arms, MS. M9, fo. 120</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leonard Ornesto</td>
<td>Hall, p. 168.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Stanguish</td>
<td>Hall, p. 168.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunelay</td>
<td>Monstrelet, V, p. 35 ; Wavrin, IV, p. 32.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B. Lancastrians in joint engagements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Burgundians</th>
<th>Monstrelet, V, p. 32, 34; Wavrin, IV, p. 27, 29; BNF, PO 3021 (Villiers) no. 29; College of Arms, MS. M9, fo. 120.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jean Villiers, seigneur de L'Isle-Adam, marshal of France</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean, seigneur d'Aumont</td>
<td>Monstrelet, V, p. 32, 34; Wavrin, IV, p. 27, 30; College of Arms, MS. M9 fo. 120.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean de Luxembourg, bastard of Saint-Pol</td>
<td>Monstrelet, V, p. 32; Wavrin, IV, p. 27, 30.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oudart de Renty</td>
<td>Monstrelet, V, p. 34; Wavrin, IV, p. 31.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philibert de Vaudrey</td>
<td>Monstrelet, V, p. 32, 34; Wavrin, IV, p. 27, 30; College of Arms, MS. M9, fo. 120.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bastard d'Aunay, seigneur d'Orville / le Galloys deuney</td>
<td>Monstrelet, V, p. 32; Wavrin, IV, p. 27; College of Arms, Ms. M9, fo. 120.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B. Lancastrians in joint engagements

### B.14 Campaign of Saint-Denis (1435)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personage</th>
<th>Operations 1</th>
<th>Operations 2</th>
<th>Operations 3</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>John, Lord Talbot</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Monstrelet,</em> V, p. 184; <em>Wavrin,</em> IV, p. 68, 88; <em>Cleopatra C IV,</em> p. 138; <em>Hall,</em> p. 175; BNF, MS. Clairambault 824, no. 7; P.O. 3021 (Villiers) no. 32, 33.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>le seigneur de Warwich</em></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Monstrelet,</em> V, p. 126; <em>Wavrin,</em> IV, p. 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas, Lord Scales</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Monstrelet,</em> V, p. 184; <em>Wavrin,</em> IV, p. 68, 88; <em>Cleopatra C IV,</em> p. 138; <em>Hall,</em> p. 175; <em>Bourgeois,</em> p. 306.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert, Lord Willoughby</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Wavrin,</em> IV, p. 88; <em>Bourgeois,</em> p. 306; <em>Cleopatra C IV,</em> p. 138; <em>Hall,</em> p. 175.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>le sire de Staufort</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Bourgeois,</em> p. 306.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Kirkeby</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>BNF, MS. Clairambault 824, no. 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Richard Guethin</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>BNF, MS. Clairambault 824, no. 5.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Banastre</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>BNF, MS. Fr. 25772, no. 974; NAF 20522, no. 60.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Gloucester, master of ordnance</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>BNF, P.O. 3021 (Villiers), no. 31, 35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Standish, captain of Conches</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>BNF, NAF 20522, no. 59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Burgundians

1. The subcolumns of the Operation column relate to:
   1 – Picardian force sent to Paris
   2 – *Journée* for the castle of Orville
   3 – The siege of Saint Denis

The personages, reported to be present are marked with +; The names of the Picards does not appear in the list of those present at the *journée*, but Wavrin says of ‘*les autres devandtis quy a Paris estoient*’, which must refer to them and they are marked with ? in this case.
### Appendix B. Lancastrians in joint engagements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Relationship</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jean Villiers, seigneur de L'Isle Adam, marshal of France</td>
<td>+  +</td>
<td>Monstrelet, V, p. 184; Wavrin, IV, p. 68, 88; Cleopatra C IV, p. 138; Hall, p. 175; Chartier, I, p. 180; BNF, P.O. 3021 (Villiers), nos. 31–36, MS. Clairambault 824 nos. 5–7, NAF 20522 nos. 58–60, 62.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean de Humières</td>
<td></td>
<td>Monstrelet, V, p. 186, 187; Wavrin, IV, p. 91, 92.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georges de Richaumes</td>
<td></td>
<td>Monstrelet, V, p. 184; Wavrin, IV, p. 68.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean, bastard of Thiand</td>
<td></td>
<td>Monstrelet, V, p. 184; Wavrin, IV, p. 68, 88.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Other French

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Relationship</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Louis de Luxembourg, bishop of Thérouanne</td>
<td></td>
<td>Monstrelet, V, p. 184; Wavrin, IV, p. 89.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>seigneur de fetilles</td>
<td></td>
<td>BNF, P.O. 3021 (Villiers) no. 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>François de Surienne</td>
<td>+  +</td>
<td>Monstrelet, V, p. 184; Wavrin, IV, p. 68, 88.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brichanteau³</td>
<td></td>
<td>Chartier, I, p. 183</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

² Mentioned as ‘le bastard de Saint-Pol’, which may also refer to his brother Louis.
³ Squire, nephew of Simon Morhier, Chartier, I, p. 183.
Appendix C
Composition of the Burgundian armies

C.1 The siege of Saint–Riquier (1421)


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Captain</th>
<th>Men-at-arms</th>
<th>Gens de trait</th>
<th>Non-combatants</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% of gens de trait</th>
<th>% of total effectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jean de Luxembourg, seigneur de Beaufroid</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>586</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1053</td>
<td>55,65</td>
<td>47,24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antoine, seigneur de Croy and de Renty</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>46,53</td>
<td>15,52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean van der Clite, seigneur de Commines</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>40,33</td>
<td>10,90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles, seigneur de Longueval</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>42,74</td>
<td>5,25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>André de Valins</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>51,67</td>
<td>8,08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raoul Tesson</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td>75</td>
<td>48,00</td>
<td>3,36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>seigneur de Querquam</em></td>
<td>40</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>40,58</td>
<td>3,10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>seigneur de Jenly</em></td>
<td>25</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
<td>16,67</td>
<td>1,35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>seigneur de Sarcus</em></td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0,00</td>
<td>0,81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gérard de Brimeu</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>62</td>
<td></td>
<td>98</td>
<td>63,27</td>
<td>4,40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1095</strong></td>
<td><strong>1119</strong></td>
<td><strong>15</strong></td>
<td><strong>2229</strong></td>
<td><strong>50,20</strong></td>
<td><strong>100,00</strong></td>
</tr>
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</table>
Appendix C. Composition of the Burgundian armies

C.2 The journey to Paris (September 1429)

**Source:** ADN B 1942 (*comptes d’armes*) fos. 11r–17r.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Captain</th>
<th>Men-at-arms</th>
<th>Gens de trait</th>
<th>Non-combatants</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% of gens de trait</th>
<th>% of total effectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jehan de Luxembourg</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>301</td>
<td></td>
<td>439</td>
<td>68,56</td>
<td>19,19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean de Melun, seigneur d’Anthoing</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>62,80</td>
<td>9,05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippe, ‘Le Borgne’ de Fosseux</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>84</td>
<td></td>
<td>135</td>
<td>62,22</td>
<td>5,90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacques de Brimeu</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>57</td>
<td></td>
<td>86</td>
<td>66,28</td>
<td>3,76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anthoine, seigneur de Croy</td>
<td>449</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>15,73</td>
<td>23,34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philip, seigneur de Saveuse</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>103</td>
<td></td>
<td>247</td>
<td>41,70</td>
<td>10,80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jehan de Brimeu</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>78</td>
<td></td>
<td>109</td>
<td>71,56</td>
<td>4,76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>seigneur de Dours</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>69,57</td>
<td>3,02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raoul de Créquy</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>82,91</td>
<td>5,11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>seigneur de Beauvoir</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
<td>39</td>
<td>82,05</td>
<td>1,70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dreux de Humières</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>67,11</td>
<td>3,32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colard de Mailly</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
<td>73,33</td>
<td>1,31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victor, bastard de Flandres</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>63,63</td>
<td>0,96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>seigneur de Steenhuzee</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>76,79</td>
<td>2,45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean van der Clite, seigneur de Commines</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>62,71</td>
<td>2,58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guibert de Lannoy</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>22,22</td>
<td>0,79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jehan Dayne</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>26,67</td>
<td>0,66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pierre Descornay</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>60,00</td>
<td>0,22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guerard Descornay</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
<td>12,00</td>
<td>1,09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>1029</strong></td>
<td><strong>1195</strong></td>
<td><strong>9</strong></td>
<td><strong>2288</strong></td>
<td><strong>52,23</strong></td>
<td><strong>100,00</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix C. Composition of the Burgundian armies

C.3 The siege of Compiègne (1430)

Legend:

(A) the personal presence of the captain is not attested by the account

* the number given includes *gens-de-trait* and *demi-lances*.

** the number given includes *gens de trait* and *compagnons de haches*.

*** share of *gens de trait*, excluding the retinues marked with * or **

Commentaries:

Category “men-at-arms” summarises all those who in the original account appear as knights and esquires banneret, knight bachelor and esquires, the latter being far most numerous category.

Category “noncombatants” includes only the categories of non-combatants who were received during musters like poursiers, heralds and trumpeters. It does not refer to valets and servants, who were probably on pay of their masters and whose quantity does not appear in the financial documents.
Appendix C. Composition of the Burgundian armies

C.3.1 Muster 18 April 1430

Source: ADN B 1942 (compte d’armes) fos. 25r–29r.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Captain</th>
<th>Men-at-arms</th>
<th>Gens de trait</th>
<th>Non-combatants</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% of gens de trait</th>
<th>% of total efectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jean de Luxembourg</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>986</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1237</td>
<td>79,71</td>
<td>36,65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean de Melun, seigneur d’Anthoing</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>113</td>
<td></td>
<td>164</td>
<td>68,90</td>
<td>4,86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anthoine, seigneur de Croy and de Renty</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>749</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>973</td>
<td>76,98</td>
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<td>91</td>
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<td>2,70</td>
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<td>3,85</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jehan de Brimeu, seigneur de Humbercourt</td>
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<td>143</td>
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<td>199</td>
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<td>3375</td>
<td>76,27 (76,71)**</td>
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1 Reported by Monstrelet to be in the garrison of Clermont-en-Beauvaisis together with Jacques, seigneur de Crevecoeur (Monstrelet, IV, p. 397.).
Appendix C. Composition of the Burgundian armies

C.3.2 Review 24 May 1430.

Source: ADN B 1942 (*compte d’armes*), fo. 29r–33r.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Captain</th>
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<th>Gens de trait</th>
<th>Non-combatants</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% of gens de trait</th>
<th>% of total effectives</th>
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<td>196</td>
<td>72,96</td>
<td>5,76</td>
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<td>Antoine, seigneur de Croy</td>
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<td>644</td>
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<td>18,94</td>
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<td>25</td>
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<td>0,74</td>
</tr>
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<td>73,08*</td>
<td>3,06</td>
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<td>9,11</td>
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<tr>
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<td>19</td>
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<td>0,56</td>
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<td>3401</td>
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399
### Appendix C. Composition of the Burgundian armies

#### C.3.3 Review June 1430

**Source:** ADN B 1942 (*compte d'armes*), fo. 33r–37v.

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<th>Gens de trait</th>
<th>Non-combatants</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% of gens de trait</th>
<th>% of total effectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>193</td>
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<td>5,79</td>
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<tr>
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<td>60</td>
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<td>2,16</td>
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<td>seigneur de Dours</td>
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<td>77,00</td>
<td>3,00</td>
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<td>117</td>
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<td>Philippe, seigneur de Saveuse</td>
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<td>244</td>
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<td>78,46</td>
<td>9,34</td>
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## Appendix C. Composition of the Burgundian armies

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C.3.4  Review 28 July 1430

Source: ADN B 1942 (compte d’armes), fo. 38r–42v.

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<th>Total</th>
<th>% of gens de trait</th>
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Appendix C. Composition of the Burgundian armies
Appendix C. Composition of the Burgundian armies

C.3.5 Review 19 September 1430

Source: ADN B 1942 (compte d’armes), fo. 43r–48v.

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<th>% of total effectives</th>
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<td>223</td>
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---

1 under Jean de Luxembourg
Appendix C. Composition of the Burgundian armies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name, seigneur de Crequy</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>16.67</th>
<th>0.26</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>seigneur d'Auxy (A)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>47.62</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pierre de Beauffremont, seigneur de Charny</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>29.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>seigneur de Santes &amp; co.</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>70.77</td>
<td>2.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simon de Lalainq</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>80.72</td>
<td>3.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raoul de Crequy (A)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>74.73</td>
<td>3.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>le Borgne de Fosseux</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>47.37</td>
<td>1.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean de Fosseux</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>73.75</td>
<td>3.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bastard de Saveuse (A)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>72.73</td>
<td>1.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loys francois</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>61.54</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>702</td>
<td>1617</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2331</td>
<td>69.37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix C. Composition of the Burgundian armies

#### C.4 Army for the defence of Burgundy, August 1431


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Captain</th>
<th>Men-at-arms</th>
<th>Gens de trait</th>
<th>Non-combatants</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% of gens de trait</th>
<th>% of total effectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>François de la Palu, seigneur de Varambon</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>29,91</td>
<td>19,16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernard de Châteauvillain, seigneur de Thil</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td>93</td>
<td>17,02</td>
<td>5,28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guy ‘Le Veau’ de Bar, seigneur de Presles</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>58,54</td>
<td>4,61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean de Senoilly</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
<td>55,00</td>
<td>1,12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saladin Danqlure</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>47,06</td>
<td>0,96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louis de Chalon, prince of Orange</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>426</td>
<td>18,97</td>
<td>23,99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antoine de Toulonjoue</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>573</td>
<td>32,11</td>
<td>32,19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claude de Chastelus, seigneur de Beaurevoir</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>47,59</td>
<td>8,15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antoine de Villecourt</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>41,98</td>
<td>4,55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL:</td>
<td>1187</td>
<td>553</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1779</td>
<td>31,07</td>
<td>100,00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### C.5 Expedition to Burgundy, 1433

**Source:** ADN, B 1951, fos. 240r–242r.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Captain</th>
<th>Men–at–arms</th>
<th>Gens de trait</th>
<th>Non-combatants</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% of gens de trait</th>
<th>% of total effectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jean de Hornes</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>814</td>
<td></td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>81,40</td>
<td>54,50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean de Luxembourg, bastard de St. Pol</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>282</td>
<td></td>
<td>349</td>
<td>80,80</td>
<td>19,02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waleran, seigneur de Wavrin</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>154</td>
<td></td>
<td>176</td>
<td>87,50</td>
<td>9,59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simon de Lalaing</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>136</td>
<td></td>
<td>171</td>
<td>79,53</td>
<td>9,32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baudot de Noyelle</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
<td>29</td>
<td>89,66</td>
<td>1,58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harpin de Ricaumez</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>94</td>
<td></td>
<td>110</td>
<td>85,45</td>
<td>5,99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL:</strong></td>
<td><strong>329</strong></td>
<td><strong>1506</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1835</strong></td>
<td><strong>82,07</strong></td>
<td><strong>100,00</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix C. Composition of the Burgundian armies
Appendix D

Lancastrian captains of Nogent-le-Roy and Montigny-le-Roy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Captain of Montigny-le-Roy</th>
<th>Captain of Nogent-le-Roy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10 April 1424</td>
<td>Digon Amore</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Oct 1426</td>
<td>Thomas Montacute, earl of Salisbury</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April – July 1427</td>
<td>Sir Thomas Gargrave (procureur for the earl of Salisbury)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct – Dec 1427</td>
<td>Sir Thomas Gargrave</td>
<td>Sir Thomas Grett</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Jan 1428 – 29 Sep 1428</td>
<td>Sir Lancelot de Lisle Eustace Gaudin (his procureur)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 July 1431</td>
<td>Sir John Dedham</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 1432</td>
<td>Sir John Dedham</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 1432</td>
<td>Sir Thomas Gargrave</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 March 1433</td>
<td>Sir Thomas Gargrave</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1 Year not given in the document, erroneously dated 1422 in S. Luce, *Jeanne d’Arc à Domrémy*, p. 317–318.

2 Appointed for 1 year from Michaelmas 1426 by royal letters given 7 October 1426, BNF, MS. Fr. 4484, fo. 147r.

3 BNF, MS. Fr. 4484, fo. 43r, 149r–150r

4 BNF, MS. Fr. 4484 fos. 150v–152v.

5 BNF, MS. Fr. 4484 fos. 150v–152v.

6 BNF, MS. Fr. 4484 fos. 153r–154r.


9 ADCO, B 1649 fo. 122v.


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Appendix E
The indenture of Philip the Good for the campaign of 1430.

Contemporary copy, Archives Départementales du Nord, B 302, no. 15576

Editorial notes:

Bold font, capitalisation and punctuation are used according to the original document.¹

[X]  article number X (article numbers are added for the purpose of referencing)

[fo. XX]  folio XX starts

[fo. 2r]

Copie

Ceste endenture faite entre Tresreverend pere en dieu H. Cardinal dannegleterre &c. Pour & ou nom du Roy notreseigneur et ayant pouvoir souffissant de lui en ceste partie Et treshault et puissant prince P. duc de Bourgoingne Tesmoigne que pour lamour et affection que le dit duc de Bourgoingne porte envers la personne de notreditseigneur le Roy et pour lentretenement et conservacion de sa couronne de france A voulu & consenti pour le mettre sus lui en sa personne et les siens en guerre contre le dauphin & celux qui tienent son party En la fourme & maniere qui sensuit

[1.] Premierement le dit duc servira le Roy en ses guerres alencontre de ses ennemis pour un an entier commencant Ian et Jour que le dit duc par lui ou ses gens commencera a faire la guerre alencontre desdiz ennemis Prenant du Roy pour les deux premiers mois Lm³ salus dor ou la valeur pour estre payez au-dit duc ou ses deutez en la ville de Bruges le Jour de pasques prochain venant ou devant Pour le paiement de mil V⁵ hommes darmes Et M V⁵ hommes de trait

¹ The text of the indenture has been published in A. Lobanov, ‘The Indenture of Philip the Good, duke of Burgundy’, pp. 314–317. In that publication a different editorial policy was pursued for the sake of clarity on advice of the journal’s editorial board.
Appendix E.

pour les deux premiers mois Et duquel payement de L\textsuperscript{m} salus dor faire audit terme leRoy baillera seurte de marchans souffissant en la dicte ville de bruges dedans le VIII\textsuperscript{e} Jour de mars prouchain venant Ou cas que par fortune de vent contraire ne soit empschie Et se empeschement y avoir dedans ce Jour le plusstost aprez que faire se porra sans malengien Et se baillera Icelle Seurte es mains de Colin le fevre changer demourant audit lieu de Bruges laquelle seurte ainsi faite le dit duc commencera la dicte guerre dedans XX Jours apréz ensuivants Et pour le tiers mois ensuivant le dit duc servira le Roy en sesdizques guerres avec [fo. 2v] mesmes le nombre de M V\textsuperscript{e} hommes darmes & autant de gens de trait a ses propres despens Et pour les IX mois desloirs ensuivants le dit duc servira le Roy sil lui plait ou fera servir a V\textsuperscript{e} hommes darmes & a V\textsuperscript{e} hommes de trait prenant du Roy les gaiges acoustumez danciennetee en france En faisant durant le dit tamps moustres veues & Reveues des gens dudit duc devant son mareschal de Bourgoingne ainsiquil est acoustume danciennetee Pourveu que le Roy pourra si lui plaist avoir de sesdiz commis presens A faire lesdizques moustres veuez & Reveues Et lesquelles moustres veuez & Reveues se feront par tant de foiz qu il plaira ausdzis commis

[2.] Item le Roy pour lamour & affection quil porte A la personne dudit duc et pour les granz fraiz et despens quil lui convendra faire es guerres des-susdizques donnera baillera et transporterà audit duc de Bourgogne en ap-panagé la conte de champagne & de brie pour en Joir lui & ses hoirs masles ys- sans de son corps en tous prouffiz et Revenues ordinaires & extraordinaires tant de demaine comme daydes & la tenir entierement en telz honneurs prê-rrogatives et droiz que les contes de champagne & de brie sont tenue ancièn-nement de la couronne de france Pourveu toutesvoyes que ou cas que les Roy ou ses hoirs Roys de france et dangleterre bailleroient ou baillier feroient audit duc ou a ses hoirs dedans VII ans commencant au Jour de pasques prouchain venant qui sera mil CCCC & XXX III\textsuperscript{c} mil salus dor telz que len forge presente-ment es monnaie du Roy ou la valeur a une foiz Realment & de fait la dicte conte Retournera au Roy ou a ses hoirs Et se non elle demoura audit duc Et en Joyera comme dit est en appanage pour lui & pour lesdiz hoirs masles [fo. 3r]

[2.2.] Et de ce seront faites trois lettres Cestassavoir deux du Roy seellees de son grant seel de france dont lune sera de don et transport fait par le Roy audit duc de la dicte conte de champagne & de Brie en la meilleur et plus convenable fourme que faire se pourra lautre par laquelle le Roy ottroyera

414
audit duc les aydes qui auront cours en Icelle conte de Champagne et de Brie Parmi ce que la moitie diceulx aydes sera employee et convertie ou payement des soldees des gens darmes & de trait pour la garde & defense du pays Alencontre desdiz ennemis durant le dit temps de VII ans Et se en dedans le dit tamps de VII ans la dicte conte de champagne & de brie nestoit Rachettee les devantiz aydes demourront dela en avant plainement et entierement et sans charge audit duc ou a sesdiz hoirs masles Et aussi en seront faites autres lettres confirmatoires du Roy soubz son grant seel dangleterre

[2.3.] Et la tiers lettre sera dudit duc seelee de son grant seel Par laquelle Il promettera & obligera lui et ses hoirs de Rendre & Remettre en la main du Roy ou de ses hoirs Roys de france & dangleterre la dicte conte de champagne & de brie ou cas que dedans le dit tamps de VII ans la dicte somme de III mil salus dor ou la valeur diceulx seroit baillee & delivree A une foiz comme dit est audit duc ou a ses hoirs masles

[3.] Item durant les trois premiers mois que le dit duc doit servir a M V^c hommes darmes Et M V^c hommes de trait le Roy Baillera audit duc Thomas bourg Cappitaine & ceulx de sa Retenue Jusques au nombre de V^c combattans payez pour le Roy pour le fo. 3v dit temps Sauf que se presentement Il est a siege Il ne le laissera point Jusques a ce qu'il sera acheve & mis a fin Et Icelle acheve Il ne yra point a aultre siege mais sera tenu de venir avec le dit duc on service du Roy Ainsi que par le dit duc ou ses commis sera ordonne

[3.2.] Et sil advient que durant le tamps dessus declare aucunes villes ou places en ce Royaume hors mise la dicte Conte de champagne & de brie se veulent Rendre audit duc et eulx Reduire a lobeissance du Roy par condicion quelles soient et demeurent par aucun tamps en la main et gouvernement du dit duc & Icellui duc les puisse Recevoir a tousjours en et soubz lobeissance du Roy et Reservant les prouffiz et Revenues

[4.] Item le dit duc de son coste mettra paine & diligence que la Journee a Aucerre le premier Jour davril prouchain venant soit continuee et Ralongiee de deux mois Cestassavoir Jusques au premier Jour de Juing ensuant Ouquel cas le Roy sera a la dicte Journee ou y envoyera ses gens si lui plaist

En tesmoing de ce A la partie de ceste endenture laquelle demourra devers le dit duc le dit Tresreverend pere en dieu a mis son signet & saing ma- nuel le XII Jour de fevrier Ian mil CCCX XXIX Ainsi signe h. cardinal dangleterre
Appendix F

F.1 Persecution of the Montereau murderers

The murder of John the Fearless undoubtedly facilitated if not initiated the Anglo–Burgundian alliance against the Dauphinists. Therefore the punishment of the murderers was to become a matter of great importance for the Anglo–Burgundian partnership. B. Schnerb in his biography of John the Fearless provided a detailed account of the persecution of the participants of the murder throughout the period of Anglo–Burgundian cooperation and up to the treaty of Arras, when Charles VII in order to reconcile himself with Duke Philip admitted the bad advice given to him by his councillors and promised a long list of measures with which he was to atone the evil.¹ It appears, however, that several new details may be contributed to this remarkable study.

During the meeting of Montereau both princes were expected to be accompanied each by ten persons, who were to give the oath before the meeting.² The names of those present on the side of the dauphin were well known to the Burgundians.³ The list of those suspected was however not limited to them. As R. Vaughan has shown, when the fighting in the enclosure at the bridge began, other Armagnacs burst onto the bridge both to help in murdering the duke and also to prevent the Burgundians lodged in the castle of Montereau from interfering. This suggested a designed plot, therefore these men were to share the responsibility for the duke’s murder.⁴

The special status of the Montereau murderers was first formalised in the Anglo–Burgundian treaty made at Rouen on Christmas 1419, when Henry V promised not to liberate any of them, should those fall in his hands, without

¹ B. Schnerb, Jean sans Peur, pp. 699–710.
² [L.-F.-J. de la Barre], Mémoires, I, p. 273.
³ B. Schnerb, while admitting that this list is sometimes varied in the sources gives the following names: Guillaume, viscount of Narbonne, Pierre de Beauval, Robert de Lairé, Tanguy du Châtel, Arnaud–Guilhem de Barbazan, Guillaume Bataille, Pierre Frotier, Olivier Loyet, Hugues de Noyers, Louis d’Escorailles, B. Schnerb, Jean sans Peur, p. 682, 783 n. 13.
⁴ See the analysis of the events on the bridge of Montereau in R. Vaughan, John the Fearless, pp. 278–284.
Appendix F.

the consent of the duke of Burgundy. Thus the acknowledgement of the enormous character of the crime and the disposition for the punishment of the murderers became one of the bricks on which the Anglo-Burgundian partnership was being built even prior to the Treaty of Troyes.

The process of outlawing the murderers was finalised with the presentation of the case to the Parlement of Paris in December 1420 after the return of Charles VI and Henry V in Paris. On 23 December 1420 royal letters were issued proclaiming those who had killed John the Fearless guilty of the crime of lèse-majesté, for breaking the peace made in Pouilly in July 1419.

From the siege of Sens in June 1420 a clause started appearing in the treaties of surrender, which left those who may be found guilty of participation in the murder at the king’s disposal, even when the rest of the garrison was granted life or safe passage. The fact that the murderers of Montereau in case of their capture were considered prisoners of public importance and were to be ceded to the king is also attested by special clauses in English indentures of war, first found in those made on 1 May 1421. The absence of the clause in the set of indentures made on 8 Feb 1420, two months after the Anglo-Burgundian alliance was concluded but before the Treaty of Troyes, may suggest that the punishment of Montereau murderers only became a matter of public importance for Henry V, after he became the regent of France. Although this matter disappears from the indentures of expeditionary forces sent from

5 *Foedera*, IX, p. 826.
8 It is found in the indentures made on 1 May 1421, TNA, E 101/70/5/695 (Sir John Sceope), E 101/70/5/702 (Sir John Robersart) E 101/70/5/708 (Sir Thomas Radcliffe).
England after the death of Henry V,\textsuperscript{10} it is still usually found in those made by the Lancastrian captains and other officers in France.\textsuperscript{11}

In 1429 the duke of Bedford on several occasions employed the memory of the murder at Montereau to reinforce the ties with the duke of Burgundy. It became the central theme of a ceremony performed when Philip the Good arrived in Paris in July 1429 when the Anglo–Burgundian alliance was at stake.\textsuperscript{12} In early August Bedford chose Montereau as a place to issue the challenge to Charles VII.\textsuperscript{13} This as well as the renewal of interest to the war in France in England while the coronation expedition of Henry VI was being projected may be the reason why the clause concerning the Montereau murderers reappears from 1430 in the indentures of the expeditionary armies, sent from England up until the Anglo–Burgundian rupture in 1435.\textsuperscript{14}

These formal obligations regulating the treatment of the murderers of John the Fearless illustrate the importance of the matter for the Lancastrian regime. During the period of Anglo–Burgundian cooperation several Armagnacs, considered to be engaged in this crime, some of them even belonging to those ten persons, who had accompanied the dauphin, fell into the Lancastrian hands.

The first application of this clause is found at the surrender of Montereau in 1420. The Armagnac captain of the place, Pierre de Guîtry, was accused by

\textsuperscript{10} See for example TNA, E 101/2/799 (Robert, Lord Willoughby, 1423), TNA, E 101/2/823 (Sir Robert Hungerford, 1426), \textit{Foedera,} X, pp. 392–394 (Thomas Montacute, earl of Salisbury, 1428), vidimus of the same in \textit{Letters and Papers,} I, pp. 404–414. This created ground for a collision if any of the murderers would be captured by the soldiers of these expeditionary armies while fighting in France, although no practical cases of this kind are reported.

\textsuperscript{11} See for example AN, K 62/10 (Nicolas Burdet, \textit{bailli} of Cotentin, 1424); \textit{Cartulaire de Louviers,} ed. by Th. Bonnin, 2 vols (Evreux, 1871), Il, pt. 1, pp. 65–66 (Guillotin de Lansac, captain of Louviers, 1426), BNF, MS. Fr. 26056 nos. 1964 (Sir John Montgomerie, \textit{bailli} of Caux, 1432), 1965 (John FitzAlan, earl of Arundel, field service, 1433).

\textit{Bourgeois,} p. 241.

\textsuperscript{12} \textit{Cordeliers,} fos. 487v–489r; \textit{Monstrelet,} IV, p. 340–344; \textit{Wavrin,} III, pp. 320–324.

\textsuperscript{14} See for example TNA, E 101/70/4/680 (Sir John Denham, 1430), E 101/70/5/684 (Sir John Steward, 1430).
Appendix F.

one of the Burgundians, Guillaume de Bierre, squire,\textsuperscript{15} of having taken part in the murder, offering him to exculpate himself through a judicial combat. Some chronicles suggest that the Armagnac captain managed to prove his innocence and was allowed to leave.\textsuperscript{16} It appears, however, that the matter began being discussed only when the Armagnacs had already left as the case was under discussion during the siege of Melun. On 16 July 1420 Philip the Good granted a moderate money sum to the herald who had delivered the letters of defiance on behalf of Guillaume de Bierre and to the poursuivant sent by the sire de Guity before the duke.\textsuperscript{17} This poursuivant probably came to obtain a safe conduct for his master, which was granted by Henry V on 15 July.\textsuperscript{18} It appears, however, that the combat did not actually take place.\textsuperscript{19}

It is noteworthy, however, that a judicial combat was chosen to solve the case. By Late Middle Ages the application of this form of trial was quite limited. In his treatise on the judicial combats written in the 1430s for Philip the Good, Jean de Villiers, seigneur de L’Isle-Adam, who had served at the siege of Montereau in 1420,\textsuperscript{20} stipulated that the combat could only be organised in the case of a committed crime, punishable by death, when the guilt could not be proven by evidence available.\textsuperscript{21} Given the reputation of Henry V as being strict and ruthless in the questions of justice, his agreement to the trial, expressed in issuing a safe conduct, makes it is possible to suggest that the accusation

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{15} B. Schernb, \textit{Jean sans Peur}, p. 700.
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\end{flushleft}
\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{17} ADN, B 1920, fos. 106v–107r.
\end{flushleft}
\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{18} \textit{Foedera}, X p. 6; \textit{Lettres des Rois}, pp. 383–384; \textit{CNR. Henry V}, 42, p. 374. At the surrender of Montereau on 3 July other safe conducts were issued to Guillaume de Chau mont allowing him to go to France or to Santiago de Compostela, \textit{CNR. Henry V}, 42, p. 375.
\end{flushleft}
\begin{flushleft}
\end{flushleft}
\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{20} ADN, B 1920, fo. 104r.
\end{flushleft}
\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{21} \textit{Traites du duel judiciaire relations de pas d’armes et tournois par Olivier de la Marche, Jean de Villiers, seigneur de l’Isle-Adam, Hardouin de la Jaille, Antoine de la Sale etc.}, ed. by B. Prost (Paris, 1872), p. 30.
\end{flushleft}
against this Armagnac captain was only based on the words of the Burgundian squire, who himself had not been present at the bridge of Montereau.22

The second case is that of Guillaume de Lara, viscount of Narbonne, one of the ten adherents of the dauphin, especially blamed by the Burgundian chroniclers for slaying Archambault de Foix, sire de Navailles, who tried to defend John the Fearless.23 Although the viscount escaped Lancastrian justice during his life, when he was found dead on the battlefield of Verneuil on 17 August 1424, his corps was quartered and the body placed on a gallows.24 His guilt seems to be indubitable and this posthumous humiliation was a demonstration of the royal justice eventually committed over him. The treatment of his body imitating that of the executed criminal suggests that were he taken alive, would undoubtedly have been executed.

The remaining three cases are related to the siege of Melun in 1420. One Tanguy, bastard de Coëtmenet, known as Le Borge Tanguy, a retainer of Tanguy du Châtel was captured at the fall of Melun and was found to possess certain souvenirs of the Montereau murder. He was sentenced by the Parlement to be executed in Paris on 15 March 1421.25

Another case was that of Bertrand de Caumont, a Gascon squire in the English service, who helped one of the Armagnacs from Melun to escape when the city fell to the English.26 B. Schnerb following the report of Monstrelet gives

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22 His name does not appear in the list of those accompanying the duke, thus even if he was present at Montereau on the infamous day of 10 September 1419 he must have been in the castle with the other Burgundians.
24 B. Schnerb, Jean sans Peur, p. 709. For the sources see Raoulet, p. 188; Dunes, p. 192. According to the latter source another Montereau murrderer, ‘dominus Robertus de Loyre’ (most likely, Robert de Lairé), was also captured at Verneuil, although no details on his further destiny are given, Dunes, p. 192.
25 B. Schnerb, Jean sans Peur, pp. 704–705.
26 The chroniclers’ reports on this episode contain certain variation. Des Ursins tells that three Armagnacs squires, ‘Raimond de Lore, le Bastard de Ducy, & le Bastard de Seine, who were believed to be engaged in the Montereau crime escaped with a help of an Englishman, who was afterwards executed, des Ursins, pp. 383–384.
the name of this Armagnac as ‘Aymenon de Lau’. However, the Chronicle of Cordeliers, which provides a very detailed description of the case, names the Armagnac that escaped as Olivier Loyet, one of the ten and the one reported to strike a final blow to the duke. He would be thus one of the most desirable prisoners for the Lancastrians and had all reasons to do his best to avoid being captured. Bertrand de Caumont, who helped him escape, was consequently executed on the orders of Henry V even in spite of the pleas of the duke of Clarence, the king’s brother, and the duke of Burgundy. The king of England used the case to claim that he does not want traitors in his army and to demonstrate his resolution to impose justice regardless of any personal sympathies. Olivier Loyet was later believed to have fought the Lancastrians at Thiérache and eventually, according to the chronicle of Cordeliers, he was captured by the English at Beaugency in 1428 and quartered together with a nephew of Tanneguy du Châtel. The chronicle gives no specific reasons for their execution, but such treatment seems to be exceptional and its connection with the Montereau murder seems most probable.

Probably the most unclear among those of the garrison of Melun is the case of Arnaud Guillaume, seigneur de Barbazan, to which B. Schnerb dedicat-

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27 B. Schnerb, Jean sans Peur, p. 701.
28 ‘Olivier Lyet, qui avoit frappe l'espie au corps dudict defunct de Bourgongne comme dit est’, Cordeliers, fo. 398r. His participation in the act of the duke’s murder is attested by other Burgundian chroniclers, Monstrelet, IV, p. 344; Wavrin, II, p. 285; St. Remy, I, p. 376.
29 Cordeliers, fo. 398v. The punishment of Bertrand de Caumont corresponds to the article 30 of the Mantes ordinances of Henry V, stating that an attempt to rescue one condemned to death was to be punished by death, A. Curry, ‘The military ordinances of Henry V’, pp. 247–248 (clause jj). This may suggest that even though no formal sentence did exist over Olivier Layet, his guilt was out of doubt. Henry V may have referred to the same clause in putting an end to his brother’s pleas against the execution of de Caumont.
30 See Bedford’s letters to the duke of Lorraine, given on 22 August 1424 speaking of ‘ledit Guise […] dont estoit capitaine Olivier Leet, l’un de principal murdriers de feu beau père de Bourgogne’, printed in S. Luce, Jeanne d’Arc à Domrémy, p. 322. It is not clear how he escaped the Anglo-Burgundians at the capture of Guise.
31 Cordeliers, fo. 481r.
ed a separate sub–chapter. This Gascon noble, an ancient servant of the
house of Orléans was the captain of Melun, when it surrendered after a long
siege in November 1420. He was one of the ten men accompanying the dau–
phin to the bridge of Montereau and was reputed to have a great influence
over the dauphin.34

During the investigation that followed his capture Barbazan was put to
torture and admitted his guilt but he recanted this statement later on. He was
trying to have his case prosecuted by the English referring to the promises
which may have been made to him during negotiations for surrender. He was
probably expecting the English to be less biased than the French justices, pos–
sibly dominated by ancient Burgundian partisans.35 Anyway, his application was
not accepted.

What is clear is that by 1425 Barbazan was considered a prisoner of war,
a great ransom was appointed for him and he was transported to Château–
Gaillard.36 The fact that the Armagnac captain remained imprisoned should not
be perceived a part of punishment for the alleged crime. According to the con–
ditions of surrender accepted by the garrison of Melun, its soldiers were to be
taken prisoners,37 a common practice when a staunch resistance was shown by
a long siege. Thus the captain was now simply sharing the destiny of his sub–
ordinates.

32 B. Scherb, Jean sans Peur, pp. 706–709.
33 He was a chamberlain of Louis duke of Orléans (d. 1407) and was made the sen–
eschal of Agenais by him in 1405, B. Scherb, Bulgnéville, p. 48.
34 B. Scherb, Jean sans Peur, p. 706. He is reported to be ‘son premier & principal
Conseiller & Chambelan’, to whom the Dauphin ‘baille & fait porter son seel de secret
pour seller & expediter toutes Lettres qui luy sembleroient estre expediens & néces–
saires touchant le fait de la guerre, & autremet pour le bien de sa Seignorie’, See [L.–
F.–J. de la Barre], Mémoires, I, p. 306.
35 It may be noteworthy that at the siege of the castle of Tremblay in early 1420 (prior
to the treaty of Troyes) the Armagnac garrison preferred to surrender themselves to
the English rather than the Burgundians, Abrégé des Grandes Chroniques, pp. 234–
235; Religieux, IX, pp. 43–44. The choice to become prisoners of aliens rather than
compatriots could be possibly explained by the hope of impartial treatment.
36 B. Scherb, Jean sans Peur, pp. 706–708.
37 Cordeliers, fos. 387v–398r; Monstrelet, IV, pp. 12–13 ; Fenin, pp. 145–146.
Appendix F.

B. Schnerb attributes the cessation of the process against Barbazan and the transformation of his status into that of the prisoner of war to several reasons. The first of them was the English defeat at Baugé which brought to the Armagnacs a number of English prisoners of high standing which could possibly be exchanged for the seigneur de Barbazan. This reason may be put to certain doubt as since the victory of Agincourt in 1415 the English had at their disposal a number of Armagnac prisoners of the highest standing, including the dukes of Orléans and Bourbon, the counts of Eu and Vendôme. On the other hand, there seems to be no coincidence between the date of the battle of Baugé and that of the cessation of the process. In November 1422 the duke of Burgundy addressed the Parlement, asking that de Barbazan should either be condemned or absolved. The second cause presented by B. Schnerb was the death on 24 January 1424 of Marguerite of Bavaria, dowager duchess of Burgundy; it is suggested that her son was much less interested in pursuing the case. Finally the lack of evidence against the Armagnac captain is admitted as a possible cause.

Barbazan recovered his freedom in 1430 when Château-Gaillard fell to a surprise attack of La Hire. Appointed lieutenant general of Champagne for Charles VII, he was killed in the following year in the battle of Bulgnéville. Although the circumstances of his death may thus resemble those of the viscount of Narbonne, there is no evidence of any mutilation of his body. Arnaud Guilihem, seigneur de Barbazan, was duly buried in the collegiate church of Vaucouleurs.

This is other evidence, however circumstantial, that by the time of his death he was not considered one of the murderers. It actually appears that the only evidence of Barbazan's guilt was his confession given under torture and then recanted. Even his presence at the scene of the murder is not evident.

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38 B. Schnerb, Jean sans Peur, p. 707.
40 B. Schnerb, Jean sans Peur, pp. 707–708.
42 B. Schnerb, Bulgnéville, p. 91.
from the testimonies of the Burgundian witnesses. While it is possible that during the life of the dowager duchess his process was being spurred even in spite of the lack of evidence, it does not seem that he was really believed to have played an important part in the crime. As B. Schnerb remarks, even Burgundian chroniclers tend to present him as the one opposing the plot even if unsuccessfully. De Fenin expressly suggests that he was found not guilty of murder. This approach is shared by some historians, although it is still difficult to say if their desire to exculpate de Barbazan may be influenced by his reputation of a chevalier-sans-reproche.

Thus, out of five cases related to the punishment of the Armagnacs engaged in the murder of Montereau (including that of Bertrand de Caumont) three where the guilt was proven resulted in the most strict penalty possible, while two others where it seemed impossible to prove the guilt of the accused (if not that innocence might be discovered) resulted in no punishment. It is thus noteworthy that in dealing with the its most important judicial case the Lancastrian regime in France was not aimed at favouring one of the parties against the other by turning the process into a propaganda event with pre-defined decisions, which would possibly reinforce its bonds with the Burgundian party. The process seems to be aimed at the discovery of the truth regardless of partisan affinity of those who may be brought to justice (as once again shown by the case of de Caumont).

The goal of the Lancastrian regime was not to ensure the victory of the Burgundian party in their war with the Armagnacs, but to re-establish the royal authority in the kingdom. It has already been shown that the prosecution of this policy in supporting the royal rights of supreme justice and other matters

43 Antoine de Vergy and, Guy de Pontailler, pretend not to have seen de Barbasan on the bridge of Montereau. He is said to be standing next to Tanguy du Châtel, when the latter attacked the duke, by Jean Séguinat although without mentioning that he was engaged in the fighting, [L.–F.–J. de la Barre], Mémoires, I, pp. 285, 286.
44 B. Schnerb, Jean sans Peur, p. 709, referring to Monstrelet, III, p. 347. See also Wavrin, II, p. 287.
45 ‘Et luy vouloit–on bailler charge qu’il scavoit de la traison qui avoit este faite du duc Jehan; mais enfin il eut fut trouvé non culpable, et pour ce fut tenus prisonnier sans estre mis à mort’, Fenin, p. 146.
46 See, for example, T. Boutiot, Histoire de la ville de Troyes, II, p. 402.
Appendix F.

could have strained the Anglo-Burgundian relations.\textsuperscript{47} It may be argued that insufficient persistence on the side of the Lancastrians in punishing the Monte-reau murderers could have cost the regime a certain measure of Burgundian support, but this was not expected to be bought at the cost of discrediting the royal justice by making it unjust.

\begin{footnotesize}
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F.2 Anglo–Burgundian crusading projects

While the Anglo–Burgundian quarrel in the Low Countries was coming towards its end and cooperation in France began to revive, another joint military project became a matter of discussion – a crusade expected to bolster the prestige of both Lancastrian Dual monarchy and the duke of Burgundy all over the Christendom.

Crusading ideals were influential among the English and Burgundian nobility.¹ Both Philip the Good and Henry V were the sons of crusaders: John the Fearless fought the Turcs at Nicopolis (1396), while Henry IV, whilst earl of Derby, travelled to Prussia, where he joined the Teutonic knights in their reises, and to the Holy Land. Many members of their entourage had a crusader background – to name but a few – Richard Beauchamp, earl of Warwick, Hugues and Ghillebert de Lannoy. Henry V on his deathbed claimed it had always been his intention to go on a crusade and to recover Jerusalem.²

Crusading ambitions of the Lancastrian regime date back to the very first days after the Treaty of Troyes. According to Chastellain, during the siege of Melun (1420) Henry V and Philip the Good promised each other to take part in the crusade.³ In 1421–1423 Guillebert de Lannoy led a Burgundian intelligence mission to the East, which he then presented in Voyages et ambassades de Lannoy as undertaken on behalf of the king of England and the duke of Burgundy. As Henry V had died before his return, the Burgundian traveller crossed to England to report to young Henry VI and his councillors on his mission.⁴

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¹ For a more detailed study of the importance of the crusading idea for both the English and the Burgundians and the attempts of joint expeditions since mid-fourteenth century see J. Paviot, ‘Angleterre et Bourgogne: deux voies pour la Croisade aux XIVe et XVe siècles’, PCEEIB, 35 (1995), pp. 27–35. It has been also suggested that Jean de Wavrin and Jean Le Fèvre, seigneur de Saint-Remy, participated in the crusade against the Hussites in 1420, G. H. P. Le Brusque, ‘From Agincourt (1415) to Fornovo (1495)’, pp. 38–39.

² As reported, for example, in Monstrelet, IV, p. 112.

³ Chastellain, I, p. 334, as cited in G. H. P. Le Brusque, ‘From Agincourt (1415) to Fornovo (1495)’, p. 37.

⁴ J. Paviot suggests that it was Duke Philip who offered this expedition to Charles VI and Henry V, J. Paviot, ‘Angleterre et Bourgogne’, p. 32. For the de Lannoy’s visit to
Appendix F.

By 1427, when Henry Beaufort, bishop of Winchester, was created cardinal, the Hussites of Bohemia seemed an important problem to the apostolic see. Martin V appointed the new cardinal his legate for the crusade against the heretics. In late July Beaufort joined the crusading army which had entered Bohemia. The poorly organised campaign proved a disaster and Beaufort was keen to organise a new expedition, allegedly claiming that the crusade would not fail if he had ten thousand English archers in his army. By the end of winter 1427–1428 he must have become critical of the idea of a new crusade being made by the German princes on their own.5

This is why in March 1428 the Cardinal met Philip the Good at Bruges. He soon obtained the duke’s confidence by mediating in the negotiations with Jacqueline of Bavaria resulting in July 1428 with the treaty of Delft, favourable for Burgundy. He also managed to animate the duke’s enthusiasm to lead the campaign against the Bohemian heretics.6 About the same time Beaufort was authorized by the Pope to preach for the crusade in England.7 In the aftermath of these meetings a written advice, providing a kind of a ‘road map’ for the organisation of the crusade, was composed by Ghillebert de Lannoy.8 This extensive document suggested a number of questions to be solved with the Papacy, the Empire and other powers in order to have the duke of Burgundy put in

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6 G. L. Harriss, Cardinal Beaufort, pp. 174–177.
7 G. Holmes, ‘Cardinal Beaufort and the Crusade’, p. 726.
8 J. Paviot, however, suggests that de Lannoy’s project was an alternative rather than a result of development of Beaufort’s plans, J. Paviot, ‘Angleterre et Bourgogne’, p. 33. This may seem dubious, given the intended employment of the English resources for the campaign advocated by de Lannoy.
charge of the crusade, to obtain funding through the church institutions and to facilitate the organisation of the expedition.\(^9\)

The military aspect of de Lannoy’s advice suggested that an army of some fifteen thousand men had to be assembled for the crusade. About half of these, three to four thousand men-at-arms and four thousand \textit{gens de trait}, were to be provided by the duke of Burgundy. The Cardinal promised the duke that he would assemble four to six thousand archers, \textit{tous du royaume d’Engleterre}.\(^{10}\) Thus the crusading army seemed to de Lannoy a joint Anglo-Burgundian force of an unprecedented size, which was to act under Burgundian military command (although this leadership was to be shared with Cardinal Beaufort in his capacity of a papal legate).

The project of Anglo-Burgundian anti-Hussite crusade received very limited support and was eventually abandoned in the wake of the French successes of 1429.\(^{11}\) Nevertheless in certain aspects the advice, developed for Philip the Good by Ghillebert de Lannoy, shows several features important for the development of Anglo-Burgundian relations in the following years.

For the aims of the crusade the duke of Burgundy was relying on the resources of Lancastrian England rather than France. At the same time it was suggested that papal legates should be sent to both the duke of Bedford and Dauphin Charles asking them to make a truce in order to serve the Christendom.\(^{12}\) This may have been a step increasing the role of papal mediation in the Anglo-French conflict throughout the early 1430s, one of the first steps on a way which would eventually lead to the reconciliation at Arras in 1435.


\(^{10}\) [G. de Lannoy,] \textit{Œuvres}, pp. 230–233.

\(^{11}\) See Ch. 4.1.1.

\(^{12}\) ‘et le induire que, pour le bien de cristieneté, il s’i vuele employer en sa personne, et porroit on, s’il lui plaisoit, trouver, le temps pendant, aucunes triewues ou abstinences de guerre à ses adversaires et d’un commun acord besongnier’, \textit{Œuvres de Ghillebert de Lannoy}, pp. 234–235.
Glossary

The policy in describing collective identities both geographic, linguistic or po-
litical has been defined in the introduction.

circumvallation a fortification line erected around a besieged place
in order to prevent its relief.

gens de trait A category of soldiers in the French armies (includ-
ing Burgundian) incorporating archers and cross-
bowmen.

journée A day appointed in the treaty of surrender for a for-
tified place when the it was obliged to open the
gates if not relieved. The hostilities were usually
suspended until the day appointed.

homme de trait see gens de trait

paie A term used equivalent to the monthly wages of a
man–at–arms in French (and Burgundian) armies.
The wages to other categories of soldiers were pro-
portional, therefore for the financial aims the armies
were often estimated in paies.
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¹ I’m grateful to Dr. Benoît Léthenet for providing me with the photos of the passages related to the English presence in Mâconnais in 1423–1424.
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