Party mandates and the politics of attention: party platforms, public priorities and the policy agenda in Britain
Party mandates and the politics of attention: party platforms, public priorities and the policy agenda in Britain
This paper develops an attention-based model of party mandates and policy agendas, where parties and governments are faced with an abundance of issues, and must divide their scarce attention across them. In government, parties must balance their desire to deliver on their electoral mandate (i.e. the “promissory agenda”) with a need to continuously adapt their policy priorities in response to changes in public concerns and to deal with unexpected events and the emergence of new problems (i.e. the “anticipatory agenda”). Parties elected to office also have incentives to respond to issues prioritized by the platforms of their rivals. To test this theory, time series cross-sectional models are used to investigate how the policy content of the legislative program of British government responds to governing and opposition party platforms, the executive agenda, issue priorities of the public and mass media
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Froio, Caterina
a3d1593e-a4cf-4852-b91e-1d20e27481b3
Bevan, Shaun
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Jennings, Will
2ab3f11c-eb7f-44c6-9ef2-3180c1a954f7
21 January 2016
Froio, Caterina
a3d1593e-a4cf-4852-b91e-1d20e27481b3
Bevan, Shaun
3142fa60-e99e-4f65-8ece-37cea21799cf
Jennings, Will
2ab3f11c-eb7f-44c6-9ef2-3180c1a954f7
Froio, Caterina, Bevan, Shaun and Jennings, Will
(2016)
Party mandates and the politics of attention: party platforms, public priorities and the policy agenda in Britain.
Party Politics, .
(doi:10.1177/1354068815625228).
Abstract
This paper develops an attention-based model of party mandates and policy agendas, where parties and governments are faced with an abundance of issues, and must divide their scarce attention across them. In government, parties must balance their desire to deliver on their electoral mandate (i.e. the “promissory agenda”) with a need to continuously adapt their policy priorities in response to changes in public concerns and to deal with unexpected events and the emergence of new problems (i.e. the “anticipatory agenda”). Parties elected to office also have incentives to respond to issues prioritized by the platforms of their rivals. To test this theory, time series cross-sectional models are used to investigate how the policy content of the legislative program of British government responds to governing and opposition party platforms, the executive agenda, issue priorities of the public and mass media
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Accepted/In Press date: 21 August 2015
Published date: 21 January 2016
Organisations:
Politics & International Relations
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 380787
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/380787
ISSN: 1354-0688
PURE UUID: 16cd4fd1-4cb3-4326-886b-e7cde92d5c90
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Date deposited: 17 Sep 2015 13:21
Last modified: 15 Mar 2024 03:42
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Author:
Caterina Froio
Author:
Shaun Bevan
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