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Optimal negotiation decision functions in time-sensitive domains

Optimal negotiation decision functions in time-sensitive domains
Optimal negotiation decision functions in time-sensitive domains
The last two decades have seen a growing interest in automated agents that are able to negotiate on behalf of human negotiators in a wide variety of negotiation domains. One key aspect of a successful negotiating agent is its ability to make appropriate concessions at the right time, especially when there are costs associated with the duration of the negotiation. However, so far, there is no fundamental approach on how much to concede at every stage of the negotiation in such time-sensitive domains. We introduce an efficient solution based on simultaneous search, which is able to select the optimal sequence of offers that maximizes expected payoff, given the agent's beliefs about the opponent. To this end, we show that our approach is consistent with known theoretical results and we demonstrate both its effectiveness and natural properties by applying it to a number of typical negotiation scenarios. Finally, we show in a number of experiments that our solution outperforms other state of the art strategy benchmarks.
190-197
Baarslag, Tim
a7c541d8-8141-467b-a08c-7a81cd69920e
Gerding, Enrico H.
d9e92ee5-1a8c-4467-a689-8363e7743362
Aydogan, Reyhan
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schraefel, m.c.
ac304659-1692-47f6-b892-15113b8c929f
Baarslag, Tim, Gerding, Enrico H., Aydogan, Reyhan and schraefel, m.c. (2015) Optimal negotiation decision functions in time-sensitive domains At 2015 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Joint Conferences on Web Intelligence (WI) and Intelligent Agent Technologies (IAT), Singapore. 06 - 09 Dec 2015. 8 pp, pp. 190-197. (doi:10.1109/WI-IAT.2015.161).

Baarslag, Tim, Gerding, Enrico H., Aydogan, Reyhan and schraefel, m.c. (2015) Optimal negotiation decision functions in time-sensitive domains At 2015 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Joint Conferences on Web Intelligence (WI) and Intelligent Agent Technologies (IAT), Singapore. 06 - 09 Dec 2015. 8 pp, pp. 190-197. (doi:10.1109/WI-IAT.2015.161).

Record type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)

Abstract

The last two decades have seen a growing interest in automated agents that are able to negotiate on behalf of human negotiators in a wide variety of negotiation domains. One key aspect of a successful negotiating agent is its ability to make appropriate concessions at the right time, especially when there are costs associated with the duration of the negotiation. However, so far, there is no fundamental approach on how much to concede at every stage of the negotiation in such time-sensitive domains. We introduce an efficient solution based on simultaneous search, which is able to select the optimal sequence of offers that maximizes expected payoff, given the agent's beliefs about the opponent. To this end, we show that our approach is consistent with known theoretical results and we demonstrate both its effectiveness and natural properties by applying it to a number of typical negotiation scenarios. Finally, we show in a number of experiments that our solution outperforms other state of the art strategy benchmarks.

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More information

Published date: December 2015
Venue - Dates: 2015 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Joint Conferences on Web Intelligence (WI) and Intelligent Agent Technologies (IAT), Singapore, 2015-12-06 - 2015-12-09
Organisations: Agents, Interactions & Complexity

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 381126
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/381126
PURE UUID: 83d88002-7ddb-4d7a-8cf8-201bc79fd31b

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Date deposited: 23 Sep 2015 16:47
Last modified: 16 Nov 2017 17:33

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Contributors

Author: Tim Baarslag
Author: Enrico H. Gerding
Author: Reyhan Aydogan
Author: m.c. schraefel

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