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If you justifiably believe that you ought to Φ, you ought to Φ

If you justifiably believe that you ought to Φ, you ought to Φ
If you justifiably believe that you ought to Φ, you ought to Φ
In this paper, we claim that, if you justifiably believe that you ought to perform some act, it follows that you ought to perform that act. In the first half, we argue for this claim by reflection on what makes for correct reasoning from beliefs about what you ought to do. In the second half, we consider a number of objections to this argument and its conclusion. In doing so, we arrive at another argument for the view that justified beliefs about what you ought to do must be true, based in part on the idea that the epistemic and practical domains are uniform, in a sense we spell out. We conclude by sketching possible implications of our discussion for the debates over what is wrong with akrasia and pragmatic encroachment on justified belief and knowledge.
0031-8116
1873-1895
Way, Jonathan
2c3f95c6-ba9f-4640-b2f6-d23363a96c48
Whiting, Daniel
c0847bb4-963e-470d-92a2-5c8aae5d5aef
Way, Jonathan
2c3f95c6-ba9f-4640-b2f6-d23363a96c48
Whiting, Daniel
c0847bb4-963e-470d-92a2-5c8aae5d5aef

Way, Jonathan and Whiting, Daniel (2016) If you justifiably believe that you ought to Φ, you ought to Φ. Philosophical Studies, 173 (7), 1873-1895. (doi:10.1007/s11098-015-0582-2).

Record type: Article

Abstract

In this paper, we claim that, if you justifiably believe that you ought to perform some act, it follows that you ought to perform that act. In the first half, we argue for this claim by reflection on what makes for correct reasoning from beliefs about what you ought to do. In the second half, we consider a number of objections to this argument and its conclusion. In doing so, we arrive at another argument for the view that justified beliefs about what you ought to do must be true, based in part on the idea that the epistemic and practical domains are uniform, in a sense we spell out. We conclude by sketching possible implications of our discussion for the debates over what is wrong with akrasia and pragmatic encroachment on justified belief and knowledge.

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Accepted/In Press date: 12 October 2015
e-pub ahead of print date: 22 October 2015
Published date: July 2016
Organisations: Philosophy

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 382924
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/382924
ISSN: 0031-8116
PURE UUID: b637d820-4d94-4295-8bb7-d28de0bcbc33

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Date deposited: 06 Nov 2015 12:02
Last modified: 14 Mar 2024 21:34

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