Against second-order reasons
Against second-order reasons
A normative reason for a person to φ is a consideration which favours φing. A motivating reason is a reason for which or on the basis of which a person φs. This paper explores a connection between normative and motivating reasons. More specifically, it explores the idea that there are second-order normative reasons (not) to φ for or on the basis of certain first-order normative reasons. In this paper, I challenge the view that there are second-order reasons so understood. I then show that prominent views in contemporary epistemology are committed to the existence of second-order reasons, specifically, views about the epistemic norms governing practical reasoning and about the role of higher-order evidence. If there are no second-order reasons, those views are mistaken.
398-420
Whiting, Daniel
c0847bb4-963e-470d-92a2-5c8aae5d5aef
June 2017
Whiting, Daniel
c0847bb4-963e-470d-92a2-5c8aae5d5aef
Abstract
A normative reason for a person to φ is a consideration which favours φing. A motivating reason is a reason for which or on the basis of which a person φs. This paper explores a connection between normative and motivating reasons. More specifically, it explores the idea that there are second-order normative reasons (not) to φ for or on the basis of certain first-order normative reasons. In this paper, I challenge the view that there are second-order reasons so understood. I then show that prominent views in contemporary epistemology are committed to the existence of second-order reasons, specifically, views about the epistemic norms governing practical reasoning and about the role of higher-order evidence. If there are no second-order reasons, those views are mistaken.
Text
SecondOrderReasons_NOUS_DW.pdf
- Accepted Manuscript
More information
Accepted/In Press date: 18 October 2015
e-pub ahead of print date: 6 January 2016
Published date: June 2017
Organisations:
Philosophy
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 383023
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/383023
ISSN: 1468-0068
PURE UUID: 14c23ea6-9349-4853-84a9-b0d7c13ba357
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Date deposited: 10 Nov 2015 10:35
Last modified: 14 Mar 2024 21:37
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