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UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON

FACULTY OF SOCIAL AND HUMAN SCIENCES

Department of Politics and International Relations

The Role of Public Institutions in Creating Social Capital:

Turkey's Experience

By

Ahmet Suheyl UCER

Thesis for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

May 2015

ABSTRACT

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THE ROLE OF PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS IN CREATING SOCIAL CAPITAL: TURKEY'S EXPERIENCE

Ahmet Suheyl Ucer

Following Robert Putnam's (Putnam 1993, 2000) seminal works in Italy and the US, social capital studies swept through social sciences in the following decades. As an umbrella term, social capital theory comprises the intangible assets of society such as trust, networks, and norms of reciprocity, and attracted the attention of political scientists connecting it to developmental outcomes. Although social capital is widely regarded as a path-dependant and historically accumulated asset of societies, the main argument of the research is to investigate the assumption public institutions can directly or indirectly create social capital applying top-down policies utilising state-civil society relationships.

To test the argument, the research selected Turkey as a case country, which has had historically dominant state centric policies, and a diverse/non-western sociological context. The research firstly employed a quantitative study to measure bonding and bridging social capital levels of Turkey's regions and provinces, and then a qualitative study was conducted to make comparisons of local governance settings between selected high social capital and low social capital localities.

The research has revealed regardless of economic development, cultural diversities or historical pasts, there is a significant consistency between levels of social capital and the quality of state-society relationships and citizen participation. Mainly, the paternalistic nature of state-civil society relationships, confrontational tradition in politics, political polarisation, fragmentation of local civil society and weaknesses of local associations have been found as the main culprits preventing social capital's production by top-down state policies in the Turkish context.

PREFACE

It was the summer of 2007, I was sitting comfortably in my office in an Eastern district of Turkey. The janitor knocked on the door, and informed me a group of civil society representatives arrived for a visit. I greeted them and ordered tea as usual. After a couple of polite introductory words, they stated the reason behind their visit. They were the executive committee of a fellow countrymen association based in Istanbul. They had many members who had emigrated from the district to Istanbul in the last decades. Their main aim as an association was to preserve the bonds between the mother villages and their people in the metropolitan city. They had planned a festival in a remote countryside area with beautiful pine tree forests, and were asking permission to stage it and invite the masses for the event. At that time the region was quite dangerous. Terrorists of the PKK were active and had killed three soldiers and wounded several in an ambush in the last month. The location of the proposed festival was quite close to the crime scene and providing a good opportunity for terrorists to organise a second hit and run. I replied it was not a good time for a festival and what they requested was impermissible. They looked each other for a couple of seconds, and their leader stated they were not scared of terrorists, but if I could deploy the gendarmerie, the festival and the people would be safe. This request was literally illogical and selfish, so I answered that I was not prepared to risk the soldiers' life in order for people to amuse themselves. Tension in the room peaked and the leader of the association raised his voice saying 'we've already made the arrangements, and spent nearly 25.000 lira for the activity, what will happen to our money, will you compensate our loss?' It was quite a large amount of money for an association, but I replied it was not my problem as they knew they were to obtain permission in advance to legitimise this kind of activity. Nevertheless, I offered a more secure location however, they did not listen to me and insisted on their initial demand making ridiculous suggestions. Their stubborn approach and reckless manner literally freaked me out and I rigorously replied: 'I will not let you laugh and play on the grass watered by martyrs' blood, so, we are done, and meeting is over!' They shouted at me back as the police guard drove them out, and threatened me they will complain to the Minister of Interior in person and I will eventually find myself in a worse district. At that moment I understood they were backed by some powerful politicians having direct connections with the Minister. Alone in my office, I sit back, set the aircon's temperature down, and reflected on what had taken place.

Such a dispute was quite unexpected when the state and society faced in Turkey. Traditionally, respect and obedience to the state authority was the main pattern of individual behaviour in dealings with the state. I was the governor of the district, the embodied form of the state authority and central government with regard to the local people. My decision should not have been challenged, as I offered the best options for the people. I thought I did well cutting them down to size. However, I did not feel good since the incident was very upsetting. I asked myself, how could those people dare to talk like that? What was the force that bonds them together? Who were they trusting? It was obvious they were quite confident with, and knowing well each other, trusting in their own relationships, and their last minute threat demonstrated they knew some politicians. Altogether, and most importantly, they were using their connections against the state to reach their target, whether legitimate or not.

This short example represents some of the problems and issues of civil society-state relationships in Turkey. As reflected in my behaviour, the state always expected obedience from the citizens. The idea the 'father state' knows everything and always makes the correct decisions, must have been taken for granted. Wasn't it the state who saved the nation from foreign invaders and bestowed the Republic creating a modern nation through revolutions? Even though I knew a robust civil society is an indispensable factor in modern democracies, I intrinsically used a nationalist discourse designed to protect the reputation of the state (or mine) against civilians. On the other hand, civil society in the past had been traditionally disorganised and was generally seen as a threat to the unity of the land and regarded as a security risk. Thus, legislation has mostly been restrictive for civil society organisations and, basic human rights and freedoms relating to meetings and demonstrations have not always been protected, moreover, they were undermined by the Constitutions from time to time. As another factor, political spheres regarded civil society as an instrument to dictate ideologies, or a repository of votes to seize and sustain power. Correspondingly, by being closer to the political parties, civil society used their relationships with powerful politicians to exploit state resources or to open doors to overcome the hurdles of the state bureaucracy.

Later in my profession as a governor in a couple of West Black Sea and East Marmara districts, I witnessed relationships with the civil society organisations show some differences from the eastern ones, and local people were more sensitive concerning the common issues, and demands were more community oriented instead of being individual or narrowly scoped. I observed, the existence of a couple of operational civil society organisations collaborating in social activities gives relief, and brings some obligations on my side to be more accurate in my public decisions, taking civil society more into consideration. In other terms, quality of the

relationships were far more desirable. So, what were the reasons behind those contrasting types of civil society-state relationships? Although it is a bilateral interaction, what would be my role in elevating the relationships to a more desirable level? Is it possible to combine people's existing connections, or networks with connections between the state and civil society in an effort to foster common good? When asking those questions, I wasn't aware there is a useful theory and an expanding literature explaining the value of these connections and good relationships that form 'social capital'.

When the Ministry of Interior announced a few district governors are to be sent abroad for academic studies and I was one of them, deciding on a research subject did not take long for me. It was a good opportunity to study civil society-state relationships where I had already had first-hand experience. Below, you will find the product of this decision.

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DECLARATION OF AUTHORSHIP

I, Ahmet Suheyl Ucer

declare that the thesis entitled

“The Role of Public Institutions in Creating Social Capital: Turkey’s Experience”

and the work presented in the thesis are both my own, and have been generated by me as the result of my own original research. I confirm that:

- this work was done wholly or mainly while in candidature for a research degree at this University;
- where any part of this thesis has previously been submitted for a degree or any other qualification at this University or any other institution, this has been clearly stated;
- where I have consulted the published work of others, this is always clearly attributed;
- where I have quoted from the work of others, the source is always given. With the exception of such quotations, this thesis is entirely my own work;
- I have acknowledged all main sources of help;
- where the thesis is based on work done by myself jointly with others, I have made clear exactly what was done by others and what I have contributed myself;
- none of this work has been published before submission, or [delete as appropriate] parts of this work have been published as: [please list references]

Signed:

Date:

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Abbreviations

AK Party: Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi)

ANAP: Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi)

CHP: Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi)

CSO: Civil Society Organisations

DERBIS: Associations Information System (Dernekler Bilgi Sistemi)

DP: Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti)

DSP: Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti)

EU: European Union

IPA: Instrument of Pre-accession Assistance

MHP: Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi)

NSC: National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Konseyi)

NUTS: Nomenclature of Units for Territorial Statistics

OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

POS: Political Opportunity Structure

RP: Welfare Party (Refah Partisi)

SHP: Social Democrat-Populist Party (Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti)

SODES: The Social Support Programme (Sosyal Destek Programı)

SSI: Social Security Institution

TurkStat: Turkish Statistical Institute (Türkiye İstatistik Enstitüsü)

Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Conceptual Framework and Research Question

In the beginning of the study, having 12 years of field experience across 5 different regions of Turkey, the researcher already had some insight regarding civil society-state relations. The shortcomings of civil society organisations, their struggle to create relationships with political and managerial figures, distinct sovereignty of state agencies over these relationships, the state bureaucracy lacking of a consultation culture, various approaches of local authorities towards civil society have all been observed ethnographically by the researcher. However, state-civil society relations is a multifaceted issue, hence a theory to cover and explain the variety of the factors in those relationships, was required to research the matter academically. During the review of the international literature, the researcher discovered a new concept; Social capital.

A rapidly growing interest in social capital as a concept has been observed since mid-1990s. Social capital's attention to the importance of social connections and their value as a resource for the individual and community as a whole is attractive from many respects. Societal norms of reciprocal actions, trustworthy relations among people, and networks of civic engagement are all various aspects of social relations shaping social capital. Following Robert Putnam's seminal works (Putnam, 1993, 2000), social capital's success in connecting the above concepts with broader areas like economic development, democracy and governance points to a wide range of study areas in political science. Many studies showing the consistent connection of social capital with better health, better education, less crime, more effective market economy, a cleaner environment, a better governance and so on, has attracted the attention not only of governments but also international development agencies, such as The World Bank and OECD (2001).

However, general opinion among the academia on the source of social capital tends to handle the concept as a consequence of social evolutions experienced by a society throughout the history. This view of path dependency gives almost no attention to the impact of the political institutions and agents over the evolution of the society. If the state is an exogenous factor in social capital's formation, some societies having low social capital stocks would have a little or no chance to create it through state interventions. This favoured bottom-up approach for social capital's roots is also criticised in the literature that today's social and political institutions and local or national governments might make an impact over the civil society and the accumulation of social capital (Fox 1996, Levi 1998, Maloney, et al. 2000, Warner 2001, Stolle 2003, Herreros 2004, Freitag 2006, Lowndes, et al. 2006). Thus, an institutional 'top-down' approach is also required to support

Chapter 1

and fill the gaps of social capital theory with the assumption that the state is also an endogenous factor, since the context in which a society evolves is regulated by governments and the legal systems.

So, the argument of the thesis is to investigate possible ways of creating social capital or helping the accumulation of social capital through deliberate governmental actions within a context. It is assumed throughout the thesis that the state mechanism (with its politicians and bureaucracy) can facilitate the production of social capital directly or indirectly through its organs' relationships with the civil society. These are mainly related to 'trustworthiness of state actions' (Rothstein and Stolle 2001,2002), the existence of meaningful participation channels in decision making processes (Maloney et al. 2000, Lowndes 2001) , and direct/indirect support flow from government to civil society. Thus, the heart of the thesis is concerned with the role a government could play in the construction of social capital. At this point, Turkey emerges as an appropriate context to apply a top-down approach for the social capital's creation. The researcher believes that social capital theory has evolved especially in developed and liberal countries in the western hemisphere and that is why the state's effect over the social capital's formation is widely neglected. However, as a developing and democratising country, state agencies in Turkey have traditionally played a key role in the transformation of the society. As it was mentioned in the preface, the state-centric tradition in Turkey is still alive, and it is possible to observe the influence of that tradition over the social and political matters. In addition, lessons from the contextual analysis of social capital and its production in Turkey will help understanding of the argument in other non-western contexts. Moreover, another reason to take Turkey as a case country is that, a thorough search on Turkish academic literature showed that social capital research in Turkey is quite limited, and an application of top-down approach in social capital's creation as a study is absent. Correspondingly, awareness level of the importance of social capital as a concept is sparse among Turkey's political and bureaucracy spheres. Social capital is addressed only once and vaguely in 'Development Plans for 2007-2013 and 2014-2018', which is the main framework for the future development prospects of governments. The governments spelled out in those documents a development prospect lacking a social capital aspect would be incomplete. However, there is nothing else addressing how social capital is created as a component of development policies.

In order to address the argument -the roles of the state in producing social capital in Turkey- the research needed to solve primarily two problems. One is how social capital could be measured effectively? Then, the research needs a way of judging the impact of the governmental actors over the creation of social capital in different localities with different social capital stocks.

Thus, the researcher has formulated the overarching research question simply as ‘what are the roles of public authorities in the production of social capital?’ This formulation reflects a clear institutional approach that argues deliberate state actions to influence social capital in a ‘top-down’ fashion.

1.2 The Research Hypothesis and Preferred Design

In order to answer the research question, the study has employed a strategy that builds up the knowledge and illuminates the arguments step by step. Initially, a thorough literature review that encircles the theoretical debates and discussions around the social capital concept was conducted. This activity has consisted mainly of researching social capital’s theoretical roots in social sciences, its strengths and weaknesses in explaining social phenomena, its various conceptualisations, and measurement issues. Through the literature review, sub-research questions that breaks-down the overarching research question have been crystallised allowing a better understanding of the issues.

The overarching research question involves a presupposition hypothetically, that is, ‘social capital could be created through top-down policies’. However, this hypothesis generates further questions. If social capital is to be produced by policies, how will social capital be measured? How will the policy makers know where to ‘invest’ and where to focus? As social capital is the product of both sociological infrastructure and political superstructures, it is assumed the social capital levels of regions in Turkey are affected by those pre-determiners. Thus, the first sub-hypothesis emerges as ‘social capital is not distributed evenly or equally across regions’. So, the first target of the research is to conceptualise and measure regional distribution of social capital in Turkey.

As the overarching research question infers a political approach to the creation of social capital, it is also assumed that social capital is a context dependent subject due to its sensitivity to political and legal frameworks. Thus, second sub-question emerges as ‘how the contextual features of localities are designed and, affect the production of social capital?’ Answers to this question will achieve the primary aim of the study since it involves an analysis of the state-civil society relations at local levels. Thus, second sub-hypothesis is formulated as ‘differences of social capital levels across localities correspond with the quality of the state-civil society relations.’ So, the second target of the research is to observe and analyse the local contexts and interpretation of the state and civil society relations.

The break-down of the overarching research question inevitably leads to a break-down of the empirical efforts. The first target of the study could only be achieved through a quantitative approach, involving a sophisticated statistical analysis to measure the distribution of social capital

across Turkey's regions. Conversely, second target is qualitative since it requires interpretation of local civil society –state relations. Hence, the study needs to employ a mixed method known as 'sequential two-phase design' (Creswell, 2014), the first phase of which provides basis for the second.

Regarding the data collection, each phase of the study required different data sources. For the first phase, ready-to-use official statistics were used for the quantitative analysis. However, the second phase, has predominantly relied on 63 semi-structured interviews conducted in six different case provinces across Turkey. Some official reports of local authorities, news bulletins and local media resources were also used to triangulate the findings in the content analysis of local relationships.

In short, the research was aimed to conceptualise and measure social capital across Turkey, and to interpret state civil society relationships through a 'top- down' perspective for social capital's production.

1.3 The Significance of the Study and Anticipated Academic Contributions

The research has emerged as the first empirical study in Turkish literature of political science evaluating civil society-state relationships empirically in the framework of social capital's production. Although lack of a similar previous study limits comparing the findings, some conclusions of this research could constitute a starting point to trigger further studies in this respect.

Secondly, along with a cautious academic perspective, the study relies on a significant field experience in state-civil society relations, which allowing the researcher to merge the theory and the practice in the body of the thesis. In addition the researcher is funded by the Ministry of Interior/ Turkish Government and the final version of the thesis will be submitted to the Ministry after graduation. Thus, the possible conclusions of the study may provide new insights for the top managers and politicians of the Ministry.

Academically, the study will contribute to the evolution of social capital theory of western civilisation applying it to a non-western context, and test some of its assumptions. This will show to what extent the realities of Turkey would fit in with the general social capital theory.

Varying from the few attempts found in Turkish literature, the measurement challenges of social capital in the Turkish context are tried to be eliminated here through an unprecedented

conceptualisation of social capital types, mainly under its ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ types. By means of the conceptualisation, the study will show what aspects of social capital are more sensitive to proposed top-down policies.

Finally, as a major contribution, empirical assessments of civil society-society-state relations through social capital framework will reveal the impeding factors in the relationships and possible inferences of various governance practices over the social capital’s production issue.

1.4 Outline of the Study

The study is organised under 10 chapters and a subsequent appendices section. Apart from the introduction and conclusion as the first and last chapters, the remaining 8 chapters present the theoretical roots of social capital theory, issues surrounding the relevant literature, contextual features of Turkey in respect to social capital theory, research design and preferred methods, and empirical findings of the quantitative and qualitative phases. In the appendix, information in the form of tables is given, and they are mostly related to statistical analysis and some background information supporting or explaining the findings.

Chapter 2 provides the reader with some basic information on the historical roots of social capital’s evolution as a concept. As the founding fathers of the theory, the noted works of Pierre Bourdieu, James Coleman and Robert Putnam are reviewed. Their varying approaches to social capital and different conceptualisations are discussed.

Chapter 3 reviews the studies triggered by the works of the above authors. Literature review has been conducted under the following themes: the importance of social capital, and its inferences over the important policy areas such as economy, education, health, crime prevention and government efficiency. At the end of the section, a basis is justified for governmental attention to policies to produce social capital. Continuing in the chapter, conflicting views regarding government intervention to create social capital was discussed using the relevant literature. Finally, the issues for social capital’s measurement, which consist a large body of literature, are reviewed in order to obtain a deeper recognition of the components of the concept, which are mainly, networks, norms and trust. Review of the measurement issues of social capital help to understand why an accurate contextual analysis, and an appropriate conceptualisation of social capital is required before any attempt to measure it.

In chapter four, Turkey’s contextual features that are considered to be very important in social capital’s bottom-up and top-down formation, have been highlighted. The evolution of the political environment in the Republican era, predominant state-centric approach in politics, evolution of

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civil rights and freedoms, effects of military coups and consequent Constitutions over civil society are discussed to show the importance of top-down reforms in changing contextual conditions and the legal framework for the transformation of the society over time. Following the descriptions of the superstructures, the infrastructures such as norms and values that constitutes social capital in the traditions of the Turkish nation were introduced, showing how Turkish society is distinctly different from the Western cultures, and the implications of different sociological backgrounds in creating different types of social capital were underlined.

Chapter 5 introduces the research design and methodology issues for the empirical phases of the study, and commences with a brief review of the significant social capital studies in Turkish academia. It revealed that most of the Turkish studies target measurement of social capital quantitatively and tended to be contended with the findings that show the low level of social capital in Turkey. There is no study that expanded and combined the measurement findings with a succeeding empirical work to reach a more comprehensive academic conclusion. Thus, the researcher suggested a design incorporating a quantitative measurement effort and a qualitative research in its body, leading the study towards more generalised findings. In the chapter, the researcher proposes his own conceptualisation to measure social capital in Turkey, because, in the preceding chapter, the contextual analysis have triggered a need for a more comprehensive social capital measure since available measurement studies failed in reflecting some sui generis facts on Turkey. Other information on general methodological issues affecting the research, namely the description of the 'explanatory sequential two phase design', various data sources and data collection techniques adapted for the study, the limitations and challenges and, the validity and reliability issues are dealt with in the chapter.

Chapter 6 puts into practice the suggested conceptualisation of social capital through the implementation of the measurement activity. Drawn from the general social capital literature, indicators for the various conceptualisations of social capital reflecting the contextual features of Turkey are introduced. A sophisticated statistical analysis technique known as 'factor analysis' was conducted using a computer programme. The quantitative analysis chapter produced findings showing dispersion of social capital types across Turkey's provinces and regions. The east-west dichotomy of social capital's dispersion, trade-off between social capital types, reflections of modernity and tradition over the social capital's production are important findings of the quantitative analysis. In this way, this chapter has answered the first sub-question and tested the first hypothesis. In the concluding sections of the chapter, findings of the first phase, their consistencies and discrepancies with the general assumptions of social capital theory, e.g., strong correlation between social capital and socio-economic development, crime prevention, satisfaction from public services, are discussed. As the first phase of the empirical research,

quantitative analysis has provided a basis for the decisions on case selection to initiate the second phase.

Chapter 7, 8 and 9 comprise the qualitative phase of the study. In order to answer the second sub-question, the qualitative phase focused on the interpretation of civil society-state relations in the selected provinces. The logic behind the case selection, brief descriptions of the selected provinces, interviews with the parties involved in state- civil society relationships are elaborated in these chapters. Case specific findings mainly concerned with the assessment of civil and political contexts, interpenetration levels of state and civil society, the effectiveness of political opportunity structures, and quality of governance are presented throughout. Implications of the findings for the social capital's production issues, consistency of better civil society-state relationships, meaningful practices of political participation and better contextual designs with higher social capital levels are presented and discussed for each case.

Finally in the concluding chapter, a general overview of the study, generalisation of the findings of each phase and discussions arising from them, the recommended policies for social capital's creation, achieved academic contributions and new questions for further studies are presented.

Chapter 2: SOCIAL CAPITAL AS A CONCEPT

2.1. Introduction:

As explained in the introduction, social capital as a concept is selected for this study since it pays attention to 'relationships' in many aspects of social and political life. These relationships are not only between people or people groups, but also they are between people and state structures. In political science's terms, relations of power between actors of society can be examined through social capital as a conceptual framework.

The emergence of social capital as a term and its rapid proliferation is attractive for social scientists. Although the main focus points of the concept already being extensively studied throughout the centuries, social capital's ability to bring many of these points under an umbrella term and its practicality to connect social phenomenon like trust, networks, norms, civic engagement, voluntarism and altruism with developmental outcomes is responsible from its significance.

Social capital's nature as a recent concept in social sciences and definition discussions of it make it necessary to begin this section exploring different perceptions of social capital in a historical perspective: What is social capital? How it has evolved as an interdisciplinary concept? What are the prominent criticisms to bear in mind when studying over social capital? Despite all the criticisms, why has it attracted the interest of academics and policy makers so profoundly? What is its importance and why is it necessary? Finally, how can governments intervene to create social capital?

2.2. What is Social Capital?

On first hearing the phrase 'social capital' may not make much sense or impact, but it is actually a value that all societies and individuals experience to a lesser or greater degree. One reason for a possible confusion in minds could be the word 'capital' which is widely used to refer to economic assets and or issues that people invest in for further profits. When they are combined, social capital becomes a challenging puzzle since investment in something labelled 'social' as an asset is an alien concept for many.

The main argument over the theory of social capital is based on the importance of 'relationships'. Social capital theory takes relationships as a kind of capital which enables people to achieve the goals they cannot achieve by themselves, or with greater effort.

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Relationships are shaped by networks. When a person knows more people, he would have greater social capital. However, knowing people is not enough in itself if they are unwilling to be of help to the person. There might be many reasons for willingness to help. For example feeling good about it as an outcome of altruism or as an obligation due to receiving similar help before. The most obvious reason rules the relationships seems to be shared values. Shared values also known as common opinions and attitudes to life are vital in a relationship if it is to produce social capital. People having common shared values are more likely to cooperate with each other to achieve mutual goals (Field 2003, p.2). Reciprocal actions through shared values, which are also known as 'norms', are facilitated by the 'trust' between parties. To summarise, social capital's main framework is constructed from norms and trust which rule relationships in a person's networks. Within this sense, accumulation of trust and norms of reciprocity in a personal social network is regarded as a kind of capital metaphorically.

From the aspect of social sciences, social capital attracted many academics especially from the 1980s onwards. During the era when neo-liberalism was on the rise, as it was strongly reflected in President Ronald Reagan's and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's policies, social capital is considered as a saviour from the defects of excessive individualism and neglected society. Early practice connecting social capital with important areas such as education, economic development and government efficacy, has attracted increasing interest. This also resulted in social capital evolved as an interdisciplinary concept and made its definition more complex (Halpern 2005, p.1).

To understand what social capital is and how it is used in social sciences, it is worth retracing back the concept through a historical perspective.

2.3. Historical Background of the Concept

Despite the fact that social capital came into fashion in social sciences during the last two decades, its origins can be traced back to the 19th century. As Portes pointed out, the term doesn't embody any idea really new to social sciences (Portes 1998, p.2).

Generally in the literature, the theoretical roots of social capital are based on the views of a French social scientist, Alexis de Tocqueville. During his visit to the United States in 1831, Tocqueville changed his initial thoughts, which could be described as excessive individualism and absolute equality before the law could create nothing but dictatorship, into a view the existence of vibrant associational life balances the harmful outcomes of individualism. In his

book, *Democracy in America*, he argued that membership activities in voluntary associations provided a social glue that helped to bond individual Americans together, unlike hierarchical and traditional social relations of European societies of that time (Field 2003, p.5). According to Tocqueville, through associational life, *'feelings and ideas are renewed, the heart enlarged, and the understanding developed only by the reciprocal action of man upon one another'* (Halpern 2005, p.5). Tocqueville's views on a robust civil society are considered as the base of the principal approaches of Robert Putnam, who is known as one of the leading authors of the concept (Whittington 2001, p.21). In Putnam's words, Tocqueville is the 'patron saint of American communitarians' and 'contemporary social capitalists' (Putnam 2000, p. 24 and p. 292).

Almost 60 years after Tocqueville, Emile Durkheim studied the social ties considered to be the one of the main foundation stones of social capital theory. According to Durkheim, society is not an aggregate of individuals like juxtaposed atoms. Rather it is formed by members who are united by deep and long-term ties. In his famous study, *Suicide*, he claimed that, all individual decisions, even as the most individualistic act of suicide cannot be understood without considering the effects of community and its characteristics. His study showed suicide was far more common in societies and groups characterised by social exclusion and loose social bonds (Halpern, *ibid*). The attention to social norms in the social capital literature was likely influenced by the works of Durkheim (Rea-Holloway 2008, p.7).

It is also possible to establish links between social capital and other major social scientists like Adam Smith, Karl Marx, Max Weber and Georg Simmel, since some parts of their works refer to the operations and consequences of social networks.

Although there is a consensus among the scholars the roots of social capital can be found unveiled in the historical debates, it is somehow arguable who specifically used the term first. According to Putnam and Gross, L. Judson Hanifan was the earliest user of the term, in 1916. He used the term to emphasise *'good will, fellowship, sympathy and social intercourse among the individuals and families who make up a social unit...The individual is helpless socially, if left to himself...If he comes in contact with his neighbour, and they with other neighbours, there will be an accumulation of social capital, which may immediately satisfy his social needs and which may bear a social potentiality sufficient to the substantial improvement of living conditions in the whole community'*. (Putnam and Goss 2002, p.4)

Despite the fact that Hanifan's earliest definition hadn't echoed in the academic spheres of that time, decades after in 1961, an urban planner, Jane Jacobs, revised the term to emphasise

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the value of neighbourhood and sidewalk ties in a modern metropolis (MacGillivray and Walker 2000, p. 198).

Social capital is also used in a broader and different meaning in a little known work in Canada. Published by the Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects, *'Housing and Social Capital'* described social capital as the assets like *'schools and universities, churches and related buildings, hospitals, roads and streets, airports, water and sewer systems, and other buildings and installations appertaining to public institutions and departments of government'* (Schuller, T., Baron, S. and Field, J. 2000, p.2). This marginal approach to social capital seems to be disapproved of by academics since there is not a similar usage of the term in the literature, to the best of the researcher's knowledge.

In the 1970s, social capital was used as a term by an economist Glenn C. Loury to highlight the inaccessibility of wider social ties to African Americans. In the 1980s, its exploitation by Pierre Bourdieu sounded the term more noticeably ever than before. Following him, James Coleman and Robert Putnam used the term in its contemporary meaning and gave rise to social capital studies in many different academic spheres (Woolcock 1998, p. 155).

Bourdieu, Coleman and Putnam are held responsible for social capital's proliferation as a contemporary concept in different disciplines. It might have resulted from their different backgrounds; as Adam and Rončević argued, Bourdieu can be classified as a 'pure sociologist', although he began his career as an ethnologist; Putnam is a political scientist; and Coleman is also a sociologists but related the concept with economics using the 'rational choice theory' as an economic analysis basis (Adam and Rončević 2003, p.157). Undoubtedly, there are other authors who contributed to the social capital concept with their studies, but the works of the three mentioned above are widely cited in social capital researches. Indeed, it is largely acknowledged subsequent authors generally tend to use conceptualisations of the above, to cite, test and/or criticise relevant ideas. So, to clarify the meaning of the concept, it is essential to review the approaches of these three founding fathers of social capital.

2.3.1. Pierre Bourdieu:

Bourdieu is regarded as the first contemporary analyst of social capital (Portes 1998, p.3; Narayan and Cassidy 2001, p.59)

In his famous article, *The Forms of Capital*, Bourdieu introduces social capital as a form of capital (Bourdieu 1986, p.241). Bourdieu's thinking about social capital is derived from the need of understanding social hierarchy, and his ideas were deeply influenced by Marxist

sociology (Field 2003, p.15). He takes capital as accumulated labour in objectified-economic or embodied- cultural/social forms.

According to Bourdieu, economic capital can be immediately and directly convertible into money and it shows itself in the form of possession of rights. He regards economic capital as the source of all other types of capital and argues that its combination with other types of capital (cultural and social) produces and reproduces the class hierarchy and inequality.

In Bourdieu's thinking, cultural capital is formed in three shapes: an individual's objectified cultural values symbolised by his pictures, dictionaries, instruments; and his disposition of body and mind in an embodied state; and institutionalised values like diplomas and certificates. When Bourdieu explains cultural capital, he criticises human capital theory stating that it accounts for only monetary investment in education and neglects the intervention of the family into a child's schooling and employment processes. He argues, *'from the very beginning, a definition of human capital, despite its humanistic connotations, does not move beyond economism and ignores, inter alia, the fact that the scholastic yield from educational action depends on the cultural capital previously invested by the family. Moreover, the economic and social yield of the educational qualification depends on the social capital, again inherited, which can be used to back it up.'* (Bourdieu 1986, p.243). In this way he connects cultural capital and social capital.

Eventually he defines social capital as it *'...is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition – or in other words, to membership in a group'*. (Bourdieu 1986, p.248). According to him, social capital provides 'credentials' to its owners in the form of family, tribe, school or party names which enables them to maintain their positions in the society. At this point, Bourdieu pays attention to social networks claiming that the amount of social capital of a person is determined by two factors: the size of networks that he can mobilise, and the capital of any type that his connections have. Membership to required networks is not accidental. It is inherited from family and other kinships, as the result of endless efforts to secure material or symbolic profits. Thus, he argues that social capital is a product of an investment strategy whether conscious or unconscious.

In conclusion, Bourdieu uses social capital as a means to explain privileged classes, power relationships, social inequalities and status relationships in capitalist societies. Bourdieu argues in such societies, economic capital is the fundamental resource and his concern is how social

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capital and cultural capital may be instrumental in increasing an individual's economic capital (Winter 2000, p.2).

Criticisms towards Bourdieu's conceptualisation of the term mainly arise from his view that social capital as an asset of the privileged classes. His theory does not leave room for the less privileged groups to benefit from social capital. Another criticism is he shows little interest in the negative outcomes of social capital. He accepts the possibility of 'embezzlement or misappropriation' by those in the position of representing the group but he compares them to criminal embezzlers of economic capital. So according to him, abuse of connections does not necessarily mean that social capital is harmful as it is impossible to claim that economic capital is harmful if it is used for malicious ends (Field 2003, p.19-20). In short, he used the social capital concept when discussing reasons for class inequality.

Despite the criticisms, the contribution of Bourdieu to the social capital concept is undeniable; especially, his effort to transform social capital from being a metaphor to be a concept deserves attention.

The gap left by Bourdieu that social capital's value as an asset for less privileged social layers, was filled by James Coleman's conceptualisation.

2.3.2. James Coleman:

Two years after Bourdieu's work, an American sociologist, James Coleman introduced social capital as a tool to bring together two seemingly contradictory traditions: economists' rational choice theory and sociologist's social action theory (Coleman 1988, p.97). Merging these opinions within the social capital framework, he attempts to explain why individuals tend to cooperate yet their immediate interests are best served by competition (Field 2003, p.20). In this way he builds a bridge between economics and sociology (Greeley 2001, p.236).

According to Coleman, *'Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity, but a variety of entities having two characteristics in common: they all consist of some aspect of a social structure, and they facilitate certain actions of actors-whether persons or corporate actors-within the structure.'* (Coleman 1988, p.98). In this functionalist definition, Coleman emphasises the aspects of social structure as resources to achieve individual targets. This definition might seem to reduce social capital to an individual asset level, however, according to Coleman, social capital helps individuals in achieving community level outcomes, as he examines the relations between family and community structure and school attainment of children. In this way he views social capital as a public good as well. This is the main distinction

between Coleman and Bourdieu. Bourdieu exploited social capital as the individual's asset which helps him to ensure his place in a competitive world of elites.

Coleman sees capital within a similar vein to Bourdieu, as physical, human and social capital; however, he describes social capital as the least tangible one since it exists in relationships.

For Coleman, social capital is facilitated by three aspects of social structures: Obligations, expectations and trustworthiness of social structures; information channels; norms and effective sanctions.

Based on the *trust* that the other party will reciprocate in the future, people do carry out some certain (helpful) actions for each other. These actions establish *expectations* for the helper and *obligations* for the recipient of the help. In this way, the possibility for further actions is facilitated.

Coleman regards information channels as valuable assets since acquiring information is expensive or at least it requires effort to obtain. People tend to relate within various networks to obtain information about many events forming a kind of social capital, and they can act for their best interests using it.

When it comes to norms and effective sanctions, Coleman argues a prescriptive norm can divert people to step back from their self-interest and cause to behave in accordance with the interests of the community. Effective norms must be supported by society within a mechanism of rewards like status and honour. The most common benefit of effective norms and sanctions is the reduction of crime. While the previous forms of social capital generally facilitates a certain category of actions, effective norms and sanctions work in two ways. Approved behaviours are encouraged by reward mechanisms, unapproved ones are constrained by the society. An example of norms that constrains action is that a young person, who is believed by the community as a good athlete, is expected to pursue sportive activities and actions and this supervision by the community holds him back from 'having a good time' (Coleman 1988 p,105).

Coleman places his social capital framework into practice at family and community level. Analysing school dropout rates of students, he observes students coming from high social capital level-which he defines as the amount of time spent with the child, the existence of sibling(s), existence of both parents and their higher education expectations of the child- tend to have lower dropout rates, regardless of the amount of human or financial capital that parents possess. Similarly at community level, he finds students of Catholic schools surrounded

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by a religious community have lower dropout rates than that of private school students. He explains this as a product and the importance of close networks. Parents of Catholic school students have intergenerational networks supervising the children of others.

Coleman draws attention in his study that weakly connected families and communities of the future will have to face with a declining human capital since social capital is vital in the creation of the former. Despite this prophecy, he does not suggest any strong solution to this matter. This is partly because social capital is '*a by-product of activities engaged in for other purposes*' in his view (Coleman 1994, p.312).

Coleman is criticised by Portes (1998, p.5) since he neglected the importance of weak ties. Although density of networks might be important in school education, in some conditions, weak ties are more effective for purposeful actions to access new resources or knowledge (Schuller, et al. 2000, p.7).

To summarise, Coleman's main contribution to the social capital debate might be the point that diverges him from Bourdieu. While Bourdieu describes social capital as the property of the privileged and emphasise its dark nature for the oppressed, Coleman showed in his empirically supported study that it could also be an asset of ordinary and less privileged groups (Field 2003, p.28). These comparisons reveal different conceptualisations of social capital leads researchers to different conclusions.

2.3.3. Robert Putnam:

Putnam is held responsible for the growing interest in social capital since he connects the term to development (Harris and Renzio 1997, p.920), within the policy areas of economics, health, education, crime, democracy and government efficiency, etc.

His initial use of the term is found in his book *Making Democracy Work, Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Putnam, 1993). His coinage of social capital bears traces of Coleman's definition. According to him, '*social capital...refers to features of social organisation, such as trust, norms and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions*' (Putnam 1993, p.167).

In his study, he compares the performance of regional governments of the North and South Italy. Assessing some national surveys, he finds that performance of the Northern regions is higher and better than the South's. He explains this situation based on the quality of relationships between civil society and regional government. According to him, 'social context

and history profoundly condition the effectiveness of institutions'. Thus, differences between the regions are the outcomes of the historical events which dating back to medieval times. He argues, in the largely autonomous North, norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement have been embodied horizontally in the society for the last ten centuries. However, in the authoritarian South, social and political institutions were structured vertically since the inherited effects of the medieval Norman invasion (Putnam 1993 p.181-182).

In his more popular study, *Bowling Alone*, he draws attention to the changing patterns of civic engagement in the United States. In that book, he describes the term as; '*social capital refers to connections among individuals-social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them*' (Putnam 2000, p.19).


Using many statistical data sets, he contrasts that Americans are less politically active and less engaged in civil life, which means they are less connected with each other than they were in the 1960s and 1970s. The main factors responsible for this decline is generalised by Putnam as increasing home-based electronic entertainment, changing family structures, women's increasing participation in the labour force, and more time spent for travel to and from work in big cities, etc. (Roberts 2004, p.475)

When he examines social capital's regional or national level outcomes, he takes generalised norms of reciprocity and trust as the lubricants that facilitate collective action. He underlines the importance of trust examining 'rotating credit associations' in which trust is guaranteed by strong norms. Trust is also regarded as the reason to invest in social capital. Putnam argues, as similar to other types of capital, owners of social capital want to increase it. Trustful behaviours among the parties will result in greater mutual confidence, as an accumulation of social capital. So, use of its sources does not decrease the social capital but increases, in contrast to economic capital. (Putnam 1993, p.168-169).

Putnam takes norms of generalised reciprocity as a highly productive component of social capital, since trust arises from them. An effective norm of generalised reciprocity, according to him, is likely to be associated with dense social networks. Putnam favours, to a large extent, horizontal social networks which bring people from similar power and status together, rather than vertical social networks that link unequal agents in a hierarchy. Networks of civic engagement, like neighbourhood associations, choral societies, cooperatives, and sports clubs are examples of horizontal networks. He claims that networks of civic engagement are an essential form of social capital, since people are more likely to cooperate and develop reciprocity in such dense networks.

The relationships of the sources of social capital are simplified in the Figure-1 below.

Figure 1: Causal relation of participation-trust



Unlike Bourdieu and Coleman, who take social capital as a private or public good, Putnam argues that social capital has two faces: private and public. This means that social capital is useful not only for individuals who invest in it but also for the community in which social capital is situated (Rea-Holloway 2008, p.18). However, social capital is not shaped by the individual alone. More importantly, connectedness of the community is decisive as Putnam puts: *'a well-connected individual in a poorly connected society is not as productive as a well-connected individual in a well-connected society. And even a poorly-connected individual may derive some of the spill-over benefits from living in a well-connected community'*.

Founding his theory on the concepts like reciprocity, collective (coordinated) actions, trust, and participation in networks, Putnam connects social capital with civil society. As noted above, this relationship arises from Tocqueville's ideas on civil society and democracy. Thus, the main determinant of social capital in a society is people's ability to cooperate and associate. This ability is supported and improved by collective norms and trust. In this sense, any decline in the level of participation and association would lead to a decrease in social capital, a danger about which Putnam warns the American community.

Putnam has received much criticism. His supposition that participation in social networks as a source of social capital is perceived as vague (Mohan and Mohan 2002, p.194). His way of presenting social capital as if it is a cure-for-all social failings is found too benign, romanticised and nostalgic (Field 2003, p.38). Circularity in his definitions is another point of concern: i.e. networks, norms and trust produce social capital, which enhances networks, norms and trust (Ferlander 2003 p.73). His assertion of declining social capital in the U.S. was also tested by Pamela Paxton and revealed no general decline in trust in institutions and in associational life (Paxton 1999, p.123). Putnam's empirical measurement of social capital has also been criticised for being reductionist (Winter 2001). Another point of criticism is he underemphasised the role of large-scale economic changes in undermining civil engagement in America (Edwards and Foley 2001, p. 10). He was also blamed for reducing whole civil society into some sort of voluntary organisations like sports clubs and cultural associations (Siisiäinen

2000, p.6). An important criticism which interests to this research mostly is his negligence of the role of politics, 'taking a bottom-up perspective' and 'neglecting the role played by political structures and institutions in shaping the context of associational activity and hence the creation of social capital' (Maloney, Smith, Stoker 2000, p.803).

Despite all these criticisms, Putnam's theory of social capital and his interest in structural definitions have drawn the attraction not only of academics but also of international development institutions like OECD and The World Bank (OECD 2001, The World Bank web site). His efforts to measure social capital at national level also provide a useful framework to make comparisons between regions or nations.

2.4. The Summary of the Key Aspects of the Founding Authors

All three authors seem to overlap in definitions of social capital since they emphasise the importance of social networks whether they are weak, or dense, horizontal or vertical regarding social capital as a resource for social action. However they differentiate when it comes to purposes, focus points, level of analysis and methods. Table-1 below provides a useful comparative analysis of the concept.

Table 1: Social capital conceptualisations of the founding authors

	Definition	Purpose	Focus Points	Level of Analysis	Methods
Pierre Bourdieu	Resources that provide access to group goods	To secure economic capital	Titles-names Friendships-associations Membership in elite groups Citizenship	Individuals in class competition	Interpretive observation.
James Coleman	Aspects of social structure that actors can use as resources to achieve	To secure human capital	Family size Parents' presence in the home Mother's expectations	Individuals in family and community settings	Longitudinal analysis of education surveys.

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	their interests		on child's education Family mobility Church affiliation		
Robert Putnam	Trust, norms and networks that facilitate cooperation for mutual benefit	To secure effective democracy and economy	Civic participation in community affairs Political participation	Regions /states in national settings	Longitudinal analysis of regional statistics and Household surveys. Social Capital Index

Source: Table is derived from Winter, 2000:5 and www.socialcapitairesearch.com (accessed: 06.06.2013)

In conclusion it can be argued to some extent that Coleman's definition of social capital as a public good has worked as a stimulation for Putnam's theory. Relying on exhaustive empirical evidences, Putnam's work popularised the concept and brought it to wider attention, and in turn generated new discussion among the scholars. With his narrower approach to social capital, Bourdieu emphasised the relationship of the concept with class hierarchy, which was largely ignored by Putnam and Coleman (Field 2003, p.42).

After Putnam's seminal works, many scholars have attempted to connect the concept with various areas like economy, democracy, health and education, etc. As outlined in the next chapter, many positive outcomes of social capital were observed through academic analysis. The increasing popularity of social capital has led to various conceptualisations and applications in many different contexts. Thus, it has also attracted severe criticism in many aspects, which are reviewed below.

2.5. The Key Criticisms:

Undoubtedly, most of the criticisms of the concept of social capital stem from its definitional variety and multifaceted character.

As briefly shown above, the multifaceted nature of social capital and its various applications changing from focuses to methods, presented the concept as a cure-for-all remedy and as an attempt to ensure numerous positive outcomes. As Woolcock (1998, p.155) argues social capital tend to explain too much with too little, since it is expected that a community with a higher stock of social capital would be safer, cleaner, wealthier, more literate, better governed, and generally happier. As Van Deth (2001, p. 1) notes, *'even if only one of these claims turns out to be true, studying social capital would be extremely worthwhile'*. This attempt has been described by Stirrat (2004, p.25) as 'the magic bullet' that kills all evils of the society.

This 'over versatility' (Schuller, et al. 2000, p.24) is also observed by Portes (1998, p.3) that social capital's application to so many events in so many different contexts led to a loss of any distinct meaning.

The starting point of the definitional vagueness might be as a result of the metaphorical formulation of the concept. If it is a type of capital, social capital is very different from the others. However, the idea of commentating social networks as a capital needs to be judged in accordance with the general features of 'capital'. Emphasising the economic definition of capital, Arrow (2000, p.4) argues that social capital does not include key elements such as *'a) extension in time, b) deliberate sacrifice in the present for future benefit, and c) alienability'*. He accepts that time is required to accumulate trust but it is not the same as investing in physical capital. According to him, especially for the second aspect of capital, social capital fails, since the social networks are established for intrinsic reasons, other than economic ones. Thus he urges to abandon this metaphor. Similarly Solow (2000, p.7) interrogates the 'capital' aspect of social capital asking some questions, 'what is social capital a stock of? What are the past investments in social capital?'

In a comprehensive study, Robison, et al. (2002, p.8-17) argues nine different aspects of capital; transformation capacity, durability, flexibility, substitutability, decay (maintenance), reliability, ability to create one capital form from another, opportunities for (dis)investment, and alienability. As social capital does not bear many of these aspects, the author argues the inappropriateness of the term of capital for social interactions.

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Another criticism is about the usage of 'social' and 'capital' in a phrase and comes from Claude Fischer: *'Using it does allow a sociologist to play in the same sandbox as economists; they have their kinds of capital and we have ours. And using the phrase probably allows the sociologist more access to the ears and wallets of the powers that be than simply writing about, say, friendship and church attendance.'* (Fischer 2005, p.157).

While economists are sceptical about the use of capital in sociology, some social scientists argue that social capital is used by economists as a Trojan horse (Haynes 2009, p.6) to colonialize social sciences (Fine and Green 2000, p.79-91). According to Fine and Green, the new developments in the economics required a wider scope beyond the market mechanism which takes information flow, technology or politics as exogenously given. Having recognised the limitations of highly individualistic view of human behaviour in explaining market imperfections, economists tended to use social capital to import social structures like trusts, norms or customs-which have previously been the preserve of other social sciences, into their mathematical modelling. But this attempt 'involves a mixture of arrogance, contempt and ignorance'. Arrogance of 'discovering' what has been already known by other social sciences, contempt for adding them a value using them in their 'rigorous' mathematical models, and ignorance derived from lack of knowledge about what has been achieved in other social sciences.

One another topic of criticism emerges from the unoriginality of the principal components of social capital like networks, norms and trust. It is clear these aspects of social capital have been the subjects of social sciences for a long time (Portes 1998, p.21). Thus it has been claimed that it is a presentation of old themes under a new brand. As Haynes (2009, p.8) quoted from Borgatti and Foster (2003, p.993); *'to a large extent social capital is "just" a powerful renaming and collecting together of a large swath of network research from the social support literature to social resource theory.'*

However, it seems that researchers are not worried about the term's weakness from a definitional or theoretical perspective. Instead, they are more interested in the term's practical implications derived from this heterogeneity. As Schuller et al. described, *'one of the most striking characteristics of social capital is the way that some of its weaknesses are also its strengths'* (2000, p.24).

Direction of causality is another point of criticism. Even the normative approach of Putnam that a decline in the membership rates to civic associations points a decline in social capital does not clearly express the direction of causality. Especially as a principal fragment of social

capital, trust's role in active civic participation is difficult to explore. Do people tend to associate since they trust each other? Or, they begin to trust each other as the result of association? As Durlauf (1999, p.3) more clearly noted, it is quite problematic that '*studies of social capital have yet to make a clear case for the direction of causality. Do trust-building social networks lead to efficacious communities, or do successful communities generate these types of social ties [trust]?*' Failing to detect the correct line of causality might bring the risk of adopting inappropriate policies which would damage the existing social capital.

Measurement of social capital is another point of criticism. Unlike physical or human capital, social capital is almost invisible unless serious efforts are made to see it (Ostrom 2000, p.180). The main risk in measuring social capital is oversimplifying the concepts. For example, measuring associational life in quantities, on which many social capital studies depend, gives little information about the network relations of the members. This has been perfectly described by Steven Durlauf :

"The empirical social capital literature seems to be particularly plagued by vague definition of concepts, poorly measured data, absence of appropriate exchangeability conditions, and lack of information necessary to make identification claims plausible. These problems are especially important for social capital contexts as social capital arguments depend on underlying psychological and sociological relations that are difficult to quantify, let alone measure" (Durlauf 2002: 475).

Despite the fact that social capital is presented particularly by Coleman and Putnam as a desirable asset, its negative outcomes are also needed to take into account. Social capital is not always benign. Social capital can enable groups or individuals to achieve a common goal, which could be harmful in conclusion for others (Field 2003, p.71). Social capital might reinforce inequality in a community, as it is noted in Bourdieu's ideas. Not only the illegal ones like the mafia, prostitution rings (Portes 1998, p.18), or street gangs, or racist groups (Ku Klux Klan) (Putnam 2000, p.22), but also legitimate actors of society might use it for their own interests only. Legitimate use of social capital in, for example, public recruitment might result in nepotism and create barriers against meritocracy.

There exists more points of criticism however, none deny the practicality of social capital as a whole. However, growing academic interest in social capital shows a general acceptance of it as a term and no one seems willing to abandon this metaphor in social sciences. Many of the criticisms could be nullified by making clear definitions and using a precise language (Mondak 1998, p.434 cited in Schuller et.al 2000, p.24).

2.6. The Conclusion

As discussed above the academic formulation of social capital as a concept has only emerged in the last 30 years. However its origins can be traced back down the ages in social sciences. Networks, norms of reciprocity and trust are formulated by the founding fathers of the theory and utilised for a better understanding of social reality.

Three founding fathers have formulated social capital as an asset for individuals and communities drawing attention to the positive outcomes of social connections. In particular Robert Putnam is responsible for the rapid proliferation of the concept among academia and political spheres. Social capital's promises for a stronger democracy, efficient governments and better operating economy, and its conclusions for health, education and crime prevention issues are echoed in social sciences.

The versatility of the concept, however, has given rise to points of criticisms as the various applications of social capital has reduced its clarity and increased its ambiguity. Since the complexity of the concept stems from the sophisticated nature of its components especially trust and social networks, social capital suffered as a scapegoat of the social sciences. However, despite all these criticisms, social capital has been used as a conceptual framework in many studies ranging from education to economic development, and from health to crime prevention that next chapter will deal with.

Chapter 3: LITERATURE REVIEW: IMPORTANCE, PRODUCTION AND MEASUREMENT ISSUES OF THE CONCEPT

3.1 Introduction

Following the key definitions and evolution of social capital as a concept already explained, this chapter will review the social capital literature through a perspective that aim to reveal the importance of social capital as policy area. In this effort, studies that connects the concept with prevailing development issues are discussed to show social capital's potential to create better societies. As main concern points of governments, economic development, education, health, crime prevention and effective governance issues are shown to be connected with the concept of social capital. Demonstrating social capital is a desirable asset that would lead to many positive outcomes for individuals, communities and nations, the main research question is crystallised through the end of the chapter.

Two main contrasting views about the sources for accumulation of social capital in a society are discussed in the second section of the chapter. Mainly, society-centred approach, that reflects a Tocquevillian understanding; and the institution-centred approach that argues the possible effects of superstructures over the formation of social capital are reviewed in detail. A need for an institutional top-down perspective to create social capital in developing countries which have traditionally weak civil societies and restrictive legal frameworks is presented.

Later in the chapter, measurement issues of social capital are discussed. Various conceptualisations of social capital, different methodological perspectives to measure its components and dimensions are presented. Finally a strategy to measure social capital in Turkey is introduced as a basis to answer the first sub-research question: *If social capital is to be produced by policies, how will social capital be measured?*

3.2 The Importance of Social Capital: Why is it needed?

Woolcock (1998, p.193-196) connects social capital to seven comprehensive fields when he reviews the literature: Social theory and economic development, families and youth behaviour problems, schooling and education, community life, work and organisations, democracy and

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governance, and general cases of problems of collective action. Woolcock argues (p.155) the conclusions of Putnam's studies which promise a safer, cleaner, wealthier and better governed society when a required level of social capital exists. Such promises are quite attractive that attracted not only academic spheres but also the institutional interests of governments and international bodies.

As an international development institution, influenced largely by Putnam, the OECD focuses on the importance of social capital on well-being stressing a flow of benefits from individual to national level. Offering its own definition of social capital as *'networks together with shared norms, values and understandings that facilitate co-operation within or among groups'*, the OECD stresses co-operation and shared values which are presented as the key components supporting a nation's well-being (OECD 2001, p.41-55). Besides the economic ones, the OECD arrays a range of benefits attributed to social capital: better health; improved child welfare; lower rates of child abuse; better adolescents in transition to adult life; lower crime rates and better government. From these aspects, the OECD emphasises social capital might be more important than human capital in supplementing economic capital.

Another development body, The World Bank¹ underlines the 'critical' importance of institutions, relationships and social norms in sustainable development and social cohesion: *'Social capital refers to the institutions, relationships, and norms that shape the quality and quantity of a society's social interactions. Increasing evidence shows that social cohesion is critical for societies to prosper economically and for development to be sustainable. Social capital is not just the sum of the institutions which underpin a society – it is the glue that holds them together.'*

The World Bank also presents eleven topics highlighting social capital's relationship with development: Crime and violence; economics and trade, education; environment; finance; health, nutrition and population; information technology; poverty reduction and economic development; rural development; urban development; and water supply and sanitation.

In this section, economic performance, education, health, crime and government efficacy will be dealt with since they are the major concerns of governments.

¹ Source: <http://go.worldbank.org/K4LUMW43B0>

3.2.1 Economic Performance and Social Capital

The economy might be the foremost benefit of social capital partly because 'capital' is the term's intrinsic fragment.

The relationship between social capital and economic performance is based on networks that facilitate information flow and reinforce contracts or other agreements. Economies having these features are considered to be more likely to embody desired innovation, risk taking and investment, effective competition and efficient allocation of resources.

Social capital and economic performance can be examined in three levels: micro, meso and macro level. (Halpern 2005, p.43-44)

At micro level, having a required social capital, namely robust family and community support, leads to access to human capital and then to economic capital as it is explained in Coleman's study previously. Therefore, social capital and the economy begin to interact in the early years of an individual. Another economic benefit of social capital at individual level shows itself in labour market mechanisms through job seeking networks. As Field (2003, p.44) puts *'it isn't what you know, but who you know'*. People having extending networks are more likely to find jobs than people who are in narrower ones. A classic example to social capital's functioning in the labour market is the famous study of Granovetter (1973). In this study he emphasises the strength of weak ties which are the networks beyond family and close friends. The logic behind the weak ties' superiority in comparison to dense networks is that a person would probably know the other people his close family or friends know. Thus, weak networks are more valuable in giving access to previously unknown resources.

In meso or community/firm level, social capital's major economic utility is its cost reducing aspect. One robust example to this is found in Coleman's work (1988). Observing the New York diamond market, ruled by strongly connected Jewish families, Coleman indicates that diamond merchants could easily hand over pouches full of diamonds to other merchants for inspection in their own premises. This free and trustful exchange is vital for the effective functioning of the market. He explains this situation as follows: *'...these close ties, through family, community and religious affiliation, provide the insurance that is necessary to facilitate the transactions in the market...The strength of these ties makes possible transactions in which trustworthiness is taken for granted and trade can occur with ease. In the absence of these ties, elaborate and expensive bonding and insurance devices would be necessary-or else the transactions could not take place'* (Coleman, 1988, p.99). Thus, social capital functions reducing the transaction costs.

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The macro level economic advantage of social capital is described by Fukuyama (1995), who underlines the 'trust' as the first and foremost source of social capital. According to him, key differences in political economies reflect differences in their stock of social capital, namely, the level of trust. Fukuyama compares high-trust and low-trust countries in terms of their economic performance. To him, Japan and the U.S. are good examples of high-trust countries and China and Taiwan as low-trust communities. Basing his theory on family patterns, he argues, trust to strangers in China is quite low since Chinese society tends to distrust strangers beyond the family ties. On the other hand, in Japan, he argues loyalty to groups 'eclipses' the small family ties and supports trust towards strangers (Fukuyama 1995, p.91-92). Fukuyama's assumptions are supported by the findings of the World Values Survey. According to the survey results, nations with higher social capital in terms of trust towards strangers tend to be strongly wealthier nations.

At macro level; series of studies, which follow in Putnam's footsteps, can be found in the literature that attempts to show the positive correlation between social capital and economic indicators. For example; Casey (2004), studied the relationship between social capital and economic differences of North and South Britain comparing 11 regions. A strong correlation was found between economic performance and level of trust.

Similarly, Iyer et.al (2005) showed parallel findings in the U.S. at state level. According to them, social capital is especially important for regional economic development and they draw attention to policy implications for governments. (Iyer, et.al 2005, 1036).

3.2.2 Education and Social Capital:

As already noted, one founding father of social capital, Coleman's work was intended to show the effect of social capital in the creation of human capital (Coleman, 1988). He studied ethnic minority students' educational achievement and school attainment. Using large national surveys, he concluded supervision of the family and neighbourhood towards the student resulted in higher educational success and lower dropout rates. He also found that school structure is also effective on these outcomes. Catholic schools, which provide stronger sets of rules, positively impact low income urban minority student dropout rates.

More recently, in a study of Dika and Singh, who reviewed fourteen relevant studies, it has been found that, a positive association between social capital and education is robust. (Dika and Singh, 2002, p.41-43).

Similar to its relationship with economic performance, social capital and education is related at individual, community and national level. At micro-level, parents and families support their children within their aspirations of education and employment. Not only the quantity, but also quality of time spent with a child is effective in the child's success in school.

At meso-level, in addition to the structure of the schools, parent-school relationships, parent-parent relations, teacher-teacher relations are also determining factors for educational achievement, provided the community has an outward-looking orientation.

In the US states and UK local authorities in particular, there is also a strong relationship between social capital and educational attainment at macro level (Halpern 2005, p.144-168).

While social capital is considered as a source to positive educational outcomes, it is argued that education itself can also be held responsible for high level of social capital. The reasoning is simple: School friends tend to keep in touch over time. Despite the geography of workplaces might lead to erode formerly close networks, proliferation of internet-based social networks allow people to revive forgotten friendships. As Field noted, *'university students, especially those living away from home, had access to widest networks and the most frequent contacts, which can be seen as the basis for the weak ties that would secure their future careers'* (Field 2003, p.49). Universities seem to be recognised the importance of these networks that they support alumni services. It is also argued individuals with higher education take part in voluntary and civic participation activities at a higher rate (Putnam 2000, p.46).

3.2.3 Health and Social Capital:

The main area where social capital and health correlate is mental health. The most famous citation to this connection is Durkheim's 100-year-old study *'Suicide'*, which reveals the relationship between social cohesion and suicide.

In general, Putnam asserts four 'plausible' explanations for social capital-health connectedness: Firstly, social networks reduce psychic and physical stress enabling access to tangible assistance and material help.

Secondly, social networks may bring obligations to its members to not to take drugs, smoke, drink, overeat and engaged in unhealthy activities.

Thirdly, a well-organised community is more likely to be successful in lobbying for better health services. Finally, social interaction might stimulate people's immune systems to fight

with disease. He provides evidence public health is better in high social capital states, and mortality level is higher in low social capital states (Putnam 2000, p. 327).

This positive relationship was also found in a range of studies that took place in different countries. For example, in England, Poortinga (2012) showed most indicators of social capital were significantly associated with lesser neighbourhood deprivation and higher self-reported health. D'Hombres et.al (2010, p.69) revealed in eight countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States, trust is positively and significantly correlated with self-reported health, whereas social isolation is negatively associated. On the other hand, their findings are less clear in associational membership-health relations.

Reviewing the micro-macro and meso level relationships between social capital and health, Halpern (2005) argues the existing evidence that health policy should focus on social capital as an important and largely neglected 'lever' to improve public health (p.111).

3.2.4 Crime and Social Capital:

Despite the fact that crime is affected by many factors such as income equality, mental disorders, poverty, and the effectiveness of prevention policies and so on, social capital can play a deterrent role on crime. The logic that lies behind social capital's crime prevention feature is its support for hampering norms associated with criminal activity.

In *Bowling Alone*, Putnam shows the negative relationship between social capital and violent crime all else is being equal (Putnam 2000, p.308-309). Another study, which analyses civic engagement and trust statistics in 99 different U.S. cities as the social capital indicators, has also found social capital has significant negative effects on homicide rates (Rosenfeld, et al. 2001, p. 294). In that study, the authors describe three mechanisms which link social capital and crime: social disorganisation, anomie, and strain theory. The first one, social disorganisation theory regards crime as the result of weak informal social control. When communities are disorganized, neighbours are unwilling to engage in the kinds of surveillance and monitoring that deters potential offenders. According to the 'anomie' theory, when people are highly doubtful of others, there will be little belief in the regulatory powers of norms. Thus, the amount of social capital at community level becomes negatively related to anomie, and anomie positively associates with criminal violence in accordance with conventional criminological theory. In this meaning, anomie refers to a lack of generalised trust in the communities. The last mechanism explained by the strain theory claims in some respects social capital serves as a resource like other forms of capital. Hence, a low stock of

social capital can be viewed as another form of deprivation along with poverty, joblessness, and limited education. Individuals draw on a community's stock of social capital just as they draw on physical and human capital resources to achieve goals and meet normative expectations. *'If the available stock of social capital is not sufficient for goal attainment, then classic strain theories of crime would predict higher rates of crime and delinquency, including criminal homicide, to result'* (Rosenfeld et. al 2001, p.286-287).

The OECD has a similar approach to crime-social capital connection. Quoting Sampson and Morenoff (1997), the OECD suggests communities characterised by i) anonymity and limited acquaintance among residents; ii) unsupervised teenage peer groups; and iii) low level of local civic participation, face an increased risk of crime and violence (OECD 2001, p.54).

Two additional points drawing attention to crime and social capital links to an economic approach. As mentioned, social capital has an aspect to decrease transaction costs. As Lederman et.al (2002, p.510) argue, social capital allows for peaceful resolutions of conflicts in this way. The second argument is communities with stronger ties among its members are better equipped to organize themselves to overcome the free-rider problem of collective action (p.510).

On the other hand, it is possible to relate social capital and crime in a positive direction. In this regard, Halpern argues 'criminal capital' which refers to networks of illegal actions of illegal people. The most common example in this area is organised crime, or the mafia. In these organisations, social capital works as a means to commit crime easily. This illustrates the point that social capital might take shape to allow 'bad' as well 'good' ends (Halpern, 2005, p.118-119). Social capital is generally 'good' for those who are inside the network. However, external effects for others are not necessarily positive. Putnam provides the example it was social capital that enabled Timothy McVeigh to bomb a federal building in Oklahoma City (Putnam 2000, p.21). He could not have committed that crime without the help of his friends who provide material, informational and technological support.

While more social capital might result in lower crime rates, low crime in a community can also foster social capital since communities with less criminals tend to be richer in terms of generalised trust. Despite the fact that there is a problem of the direction of causality, the social capital-crime relationship is evident and deserves governmental attention.

3.2.5 Effective Government and Social Capital:

The answers to the question of why some governments are more stable, efficient, and well-managed than the others are various. The most common response to this question consists of electoral competitiveness, institutional design, political polarisation, bureaucratic capacity and socio-economic modernity. After being introduced to social sciences, social capital has become an additional explanation for differences in governments' performance (Boix and Posner 1998, 689).

Putnam (1993, 2000) indicates the link between social capital and governmental performance using statistical data of voting behaviour, tax evasion, and civic and political engagement. He argues that regions in Italy or states in the U.S. with higher levels of trust and civic engagement tend to have better quality governments even when controlling for other social and economic factors (OECD 2001, p. 55).

Boix and Posner (1998) explain the mechanisms social capital enables effective government in five ways. Firstly; in democratic regimes, citizens are better informed by open networks and eager to replace poorly performing representatives through elections. Thus, representatives would not ignore their electors' wishes and demands. So, they act to meet the demands and put pressure on the bureaucrats to deliver public services as efficiently as they can. In other words, social capital produces good governance which results in citizens becoming 'sophisticated consumers of politics'. Active participation in civic associations provides participants with an environment to discuss civic and political affairs and to monitor and criticise governments' performance in meeting their demands.

Secondly; with its law enforcing nature (effective sanctions and obligations in Coleman's words), social capital helps government to allocate public funds more effectively. Governments need to establish law enforcement mechanisms to ensure citizens abide by the rules, for example, tax authorities to hamper tax evasion. Social capital reduces the need for such mechanisms since social networks create expectations among its members that others will comply with the rules. For example, in a tidy and clean neighbourhood which is monitored by the neighbours, no one would dare to dispose of their waste irresponsibly. This might reduce the city council's expenditure for waste management and enable allocating saved funds for other services.

The third mechanism works where citizens have 'civic virtue'. Social capital could help citizens to shift their focus of views from being self-interested to be more community-oriented. Civic

participation especially in voluntary organisations can create such a shift. This would decrease the welfare state costs through enforcing solidarity and charitable actions in the society.

The fourth mechanism is related to the first one. It is assumed social capital supports institutional effectiveness by means of its effects on the behaviour of bureaucrats and policy-makers. As these people are also the members of the community they work for, they are influenced by the community's social capital. In high social capital communities, policy-makers and bureaucratic elites would be able to collaborate and reach to a compromise more easily, work efficiently and more responsibly.

The fifth mechanism arises especially in the communities where hostile ethnic, religious or ideological differences are in effect. 'Consociational democracy' is preferred for these kinds of problems but it requires compromise among the fraction leaders without losing their communities' support (Boix and Posner 1998, 690-692).

In this sphere, social capital might produce negative outcomes. According to Rice (2001, p. 378), while governments work effectively when citizens are able to convey their concerns through organized and efficient group channels, it does not necessarily mean efficient networks operate always for common good. A highly networked community of self-interested individuals with private interests might divert the government to fulfil their demands. Links that connect interest groups and power elites could create misallocation of public resources and nepotism. In this regard, it is assumed, more social capital to monitor those interest groups will be needed. In other words, 'bright social capital' is required to defeat 'dark social capital'.

It was also discussed that direction of causality is arguable in social capital-effective government relationships. Halpern (2005) argues governments can make policy interventions to actively create social capital and it is difficult to determine the flow of reasons and outcomes. He exemplifies this uncertainty with the example of two mountain climbers who are tied together with an elastic rope. There are limits to how far one climber can move without other, they generally pull each other up, but sometimes down (p.187).

Reviewing the principal literature of social capital has revealed it has become into fashionable particularly after the mid-1990s following the seminal works of Robert Putnam. Its various applications through main social concerns like democracy and governance, economy, education, and health showed in general that communities with higher social capital stocks tend to have more democratic, safer, and healthier, more educated, in short, better lives.

However, social capital did not emerge as a robust theory which can be applicable to any context. Definitional and practical versatility resulted in researchers bending the concept of social capital in accordance with their study aims. Nevertheless, social capital still provides a useful framework to connect social phenomenon like trust, solidarity, altruism, voluntarism and civic engagement of people with various policy areas which are the main concerns of governments. However, there is a widespread belief that the role of public authorities in the creation of social capital is a relatively neglected area of research. The next section therefore handles the main approaches of sources of social capital and how state institutions could generate social capital in general.

3.3 Government Intervention to Create Social Capital:

The lack of state institutions' roles in social capital research is a phenomena. Although, high social capital is generally associated positively with better off societies, research is generally focused on the outcomes of social capital instead of pondering over its sources.

In the researcher's opinion, this is due to national contexts where the earliest social capital studies took place. In particular Putnam's noted *Bowling Alone* treatise tries to explain social capital patterns in the United States, one of the most developed and democratic countries in the world. It is well known the US is a country moulded for centuries by individualist community structures and liberal government policies. Thus, not surprisingly, the state has been regarded as an exogenous factor in building social capital theory and 'suspected' by social capitalist for its detrimental interventions from a neo-liberal point of view. Considering the political climate of western countries in late 1980s and early 1990s, spawned strong neo-liberal policies that neglected social matters and shrunk the size of the welfare state, the emergence of social capital as a saviour from excessive individualism is not a coincidence therefore. Putnam's overemphasis on civil society organisations regarded as 'non-governmental' ignores 'governmental' intervention since any intervention would be harmful for civil society. However, it is perhaps possible to support communities with some selected deliberate policies that create social capital directly or help with its creation. As a developed and highly democratic country, the US may not need a state intervention to create more social capital, but developing countries having relatively recent democratic regimes in addition might consider investing in social capital due to its various positive outcomes especially for development aspects. So, it is worth reviewing the main approaches for social capital generation at this point of the study.

Intervention policies are not welcomed by all, thus it can be argued there are two main conflicting ideas on state intervention to produce social capital: State intervention is harmful or useless, or state intervention is constructive and required.

These two conflicting views regarding social capital's production both stem from the debate over the sources of social capital. In this realm, two leading approaches come to the fore: the society-centred approach and institution-centred approach (Stolle 2003, p.21).

3.3.1 The society-centred approach:

Championed strongly by Putnam (1993) and neo-Tocquevillian thinkers, the society-centred approach suggests social capital is located in the sphere of civil society, in particular voluntary organisations and the largely disconnected ones from the state and political institutions. In *Bowling Alone*, Putnam 'suspects' that state institutions are in some way responsible for the decline in the social capital (Putnam 2000, p.281). His stance is more visible in his inference concerning the autocrat Norman invasion and colonisation of Italy. According to Putnam, inherited in over generations, the civic culture of the regions is path dependent. In other words 'where you get to is determined by where you have started from'. If it is the case, there are few options to affect social capital with deliberate policies (Fox 1996, p.7).

The society-centred approach suggests generalisation of trust and effective norms of reciprocity flourish through social interactions, and social interactions are mainly created in civil society associations. Putnam regards these organisations as 'schools of democracy' (Putnam 2000, p.338). The claim is civic virtues and cooperative values like altruism, commitment, voluntarism, tolerance, and a discussion culture are taught in membership interactions. These acquisitions provide members with a basis of trust and behaviour of reciprocity and the members carry these values to outer networks. By this mechanism, trust and norms of reciprocity are generalised in whole community.

One criticism of the society-centred approach is the generation of trust through associations bears the uncertainty of causal direction. Is it the association that create trust? Or is it trust that draws individual to the association originally? Some people might already have some level of trust which enables them to participate. Thus, generalisation of causal direction flowing from association to trust needs to be handled carefully and requires longitudinal data for each case (Stolle 2003, p.26).

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In addition to the causality problem, the dignifying of associations in creating social capital is impeded since the effect of an association on trust is widely determined by the type of the association (Stolle and Rochon 2001, Eastis 2001). Some associations are designed to alienate the outsiders and create a trust limited to in-group interaction. Moreover, especially racial, religious, sectarian or ethnic associations might easily create distrust of others who are outside the strictly defined circle. Some associations are designed to bring its members together for particular reasons and enable group activities while others keep in touch with their mass-members only via periodicals and bulletins or mail. In the creation of trust and norms of reciprocity, it is obvious associations facilitating face-to-face interactions bringing people horizontally from diverse social backgrounds are more likely to be successful in the creation of trust and reciprocal norms.

3.3.2 The institution-centred approach:

According to the society-centred approach, communities confined in low social capital stocks are stuck where they are and nothing can be done to enable them to move forward. However, it is strongly argued today's social and political institutions, local or national governments might make an impact particularly regarding generalised trust and civil participation (Fox 1996, Levi 1998, Maloney, et al. 2000, Warner 2001, Stolle 2003, Herreros 2004, Freitag 2006, Lowndes, et al., 2006). Thus, the society centred approach alone does not explain regional diversities of social capital in a particular country. The nature of public institutions and legal regulations certainly affect the context that social capital is created or damaged through various practices.

In comparison to the sociological or society-centred perspective, the institutional model fits squarely into the field of political science (Rothstein and Stolle 2002, p. 7). This approach claims state institutions can play an important role in the creation of social capital in the community.

One condition for the state apparatus to be successful in such an activity is related to its level of democracy. According to the World Values Survey findings, countries with higher rates of trust are also highly democratic. One reason is repressive governments tend to control civic developments limiting spontaneous group activities and discouraging trust. They like to have civil society organisations under their sole control. Stolle (2003 p.31) gives the example of the Democratic German Republic's state secret police, which set citizens against each other in

order to exercise tight social control. The existence of a democratic regime ensures the notion that citizens accept each other as equal creating a common faith and trust of people who they do not know.

The state's role in creating social capital or enabling suitable conditionals for its production is a self-reinforcing process. In other words social capital created or supported by the state will create more social capital, resulting in a 'virtuous circle' (Herreros 2004, p.101-110)

The first step of the virtuous circle, trust is created being the by-product of participation in associations. People might choose to participate as an outcome of state incentives.

Participation in associations creates social or particularised trust as well. Whatever its form, trust fosters the creation of or participation in new associations. In this way social capital creates more social capital. In other words, the state could give the initial push by facilitating civil participation to roll the wheels of social capital hastening its development.

The state's function as the primary law enforcing authority is also regarded as a direct way in creating generalised trust. The state observes its citizens' behaviour and ensures they comply with the regulations. When law breakers are punished fairly, citizens tend to approach each other more easily since they trust the other party will follow the regulations. In this way, the state encourages social trust among its citizens as the guarantor of contracts. In fulfilling this function, the state itself has to be trustworthy. If citizens are suspicious of the state's trustworthiness, it cannot realise its capacity to create social capital (Levi 1998, p.86). The state becomes trustworthy by having trustworthy attitudes and behaviour in the organs of state. To earn citizen's trust, the attitudes and behaviour of both political representatives and implementing state officials are crucial (Rothstein and Stolle 2002, p.11). Political leaders or representatives with credible and honoured commitments; uncorrupted, fair government bureaucrats-primarily law-enforcing ones like police and judges- would help people to have in trust state institutions. Trust in state institutions generates generalised trust throughout society. If people find institutions, the principal duty of which is to ensure social order, untrustworthy; they probably cannot trust each other leading to a lower level of social interactions.

The state can promote social capital indirectly by supporting civil associations. One obvious way of support is to provide some financial advantages and/or assistance to associations. Participation in associations might sometimes be costly. The physical needs of associations such as premises and management costs require financial resources. Associations especially those producing public goods might require more financial support to overcome free rider

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problem since their services are for people not just its members. If government subsidies are given to associations or its members, subsidies may act as incentives to participation.

Governments might also support civil society organisations with service provision contracts (Herreros 2004, p.84-86)

Enabling an appropriate environment for civil and political participation is another way state intervention to accumulate social capital. Jonathan Fox uses 'political opportunities structure' to explain different patterns of participation (Fox 1996, p.11-13): *This approach recognizes that participation involves costs, often risks as well, and both individuals and groups weigh these costs, explicitly or implicitly, against their perceived impact. In other words, all but the most ideologically committed citizen-participants continually ask themselves and each other: Why bother? What difference will it make?* When governments provide new channels which would create new participation contexts, they also encourage the formation of more autonomous and robust civil society organisations. On the contrary, where governments exclude civic participation in political activities, authoritarian nepotism might occur, freedoms of expression suffer, and justice is administered unfairly. In this case; political opposition, disadvantaged groups, ethnic or religious minorities are discouraged to engage in associational activities. Citizens are more willing to participate where democratic doors are open to enable citizens to take part in decision making processes.

As a similar approach, Lowndes et al. (2006) recommend a C.L.E.A.R. framework for effective official participation at local level. According to them, citizens tend to participate when they *can*, they *like* to participate when they feel part of something, they participate when they are *enabled*, they participate when they are directly *asked*, and they participate when the government is *responsive*.

Another study which emphasises the importance of an institutional design and political opportunity structure (Maloney, et al. 2000) criticises the bottom-up perspective dominating the social capital studies. Authors suggest '*research should not only focus on the effect of community-level social capital on government performance, but also on the effect of government-associational relationships on social capital. A top down perspective needs to supplement the more usual bottom-up approach championed by Putnam*'.

Although there is no definite road map that governments could follow to create social capital and benefit through its positive outcomes, it is obvious that national or local policies should consider taking into account subjects like the level of democracy, local participation, and common sense of citizenship, effective justice, and income equality.

In conclusion, the state's contribution in social capital production, directly or indirectly, can bring positive democratic, social and economic outcomes. Thus, in the researcher's view, the virtuous circle in creating of social capital is crucial for developing countries like Turkey, where generalised trust is low, civic engagement is weak and political participation channels are narrow. Thus, widening up the legal framework for civil society organisations and providing financial support for civil projects, state institutions can play an important and critical role in facilitating civil and political participation to generate social capital.

As the first sub-research question requires, any policy to produce social capital will need to know the level of social capital in the community. Thus, measurement of social capital is necessary before designing deliberate policies to create it. In the literature, measurement of social capital is a widely debated area, as the research will review in the following section.

3.4 The Measurement Issues of Social Capital in General: What to Measure, How to Measure?

At first sight measurement of social capital could be regarded solely as a methodological issue. However, there is expanding literature covering the measurement issues in social capital research. This is why, the measurement of social capital is handled as a theme under the literature review. In addition measurement of social capital is a problematic and the reviewing of measurement issues in the literature helps understanding of the components of social capital, its different operationalisations in different contexts, and the concept's versatile nature. Secondly, to emphasise the importance of the context dependant nature of social capital, and to address the need for a strong contextual analysis before measuring it, the issue of measurement is elaborated here in a broader sense instead of regarding it only as a methodological concern.

The issue of measuring social capital is inevitably problematic since it comprises components such as trust, norms of reciprocity and social connections which are intangible and subject to personal interpretation. As discussed in the previous sections, definitional diversity and different dimensions of social capital make its measurement more confusing than is generally realised. On the other hand, regardless of the difficulties, measuring social capital in a given context is important to be able to relate it to specific purposes like economic, social or political ends (Field 2003, p.123). To do this, public authorities will need to handle the issue of promoting social capital in a clear and understandable way before they develop policies and allocate budgets. They certainly wouldn't be interested in conceptual debates or grey

boundaries of social capital theory; instead, they require a baseline, a quantification of social capital, and perhaps even a social capital map (Roberts and Roche 2001).

Absence of a widely accepted definition and failure to design a comprehensive theory applicable to any context have inescapably forced researchers to produce their own definitions and measurement tools. Thus, the context specific nature of social capital leads to various operationalization of the concept in the field and made it more complex to theorise. This allowed each author to focus on a particular aspect of the concept, according to the aims and scope of their own study (Sabatini 2009, p.432).

Measuring social capital is not like measuring physical capital. When measuring physical capital, assets can be easily converted to universally accepted indicators like money or similar standardized measures. For example, to calculate the reserves of a coal mine, a miner needs to know only the dimensions and density of the mine and the rest is some relatively simple calculations. Similarly, a social scientist needs to know social capital's dimensions. However, any social scientist is not as lucky as the miner due to the fact he does not have a universally accepted measure like cubic meter or a weight scale. Nevertheless, the social scientist is not totally helpless. He can observe and somehow measure the dimensions of social capital not using conventional linear measures but proxies or surrogate indicators. In much of social capital research, scientists have tended to use proxy indicators to measure *networks*, *norms* and *trust* as main dimensions of social capital, which are reviewed below.

3.4.1 Networks:

As the main contemporary authors of social capital, Bourdieu, Coleman and Putnam emphasised the importance of networks when they define social capital. As a quick recall, *durable networks in which potential resources aggregate* in Bourdieu's work; *functional aspects of social structure* in Coleman's; and *connections arising from networks* in Putnam's. Thus, measuring social capital requires measuring networks.

Networks vary in many aspects (Stone 2001, p.7). In types, there are informal and formal ties that an individual or an organisation are subject to. Informal networks comprise family, relatives, friends and neighbourhood. Formal networks generally include associational membership, political activities, environment of work (i.e., colleagues/labour unions), and links with public authorities and institutions (i.e. a chair in a local committee).


Size and capacity is another point in describing the networks. At individual level, a person who has a small family and few relatives is likely to have less social capital than a person having numerous family connections. But more does not necessarily mean better. It is the capacity of network which allows members to access various resources. This leads to bridging, bonding and linking social capital classifications.

Bonding- Bridging Social Capital: According to Putnam (2000, p.446), the coinage of bonding-bridging social capital classification is credited to Ross Gittel and Avis Vidal. They suggests there are mainly two kinds of social capital, '*the type that brings closer together people who already know each other (we call this bonding capital), and the type that brings together people or groups who previously did not know each other*' [bridging capital] (Gittel and Vidal 1998, p.15). Bonding social capital generally refers to relations within narrow networks like family, close relatives, friends and neighbours. On the other hand, bridging social capital is addressed as distant friends, associations (formal or informal), colleagues, etc. (Woolcock 2000, p.10). Putnam argues that bonding social capital is *good for undergirding* relations and solidarity whereas bridging social capital is *better to access* external networks (Putnam 2000, p.22-23)

Homogeneity of shared values in close networks brings some advantages to maintain the unity and power relations in a given group; however, it might hinder the opportunity to establish ties with external resources and information, where cohesion is intense. This idea evokes the famous study of Granovetter on the effects of strong and weak ties in job seeking activities. Weak ties (or bridging social capital) connect people with new networks through distant acquaintances. They generate alienation and provide individuals with an *indispensable* opportunity to integrate within their society. In contrast, strong ties (or bonding social capital) lead to narrower cohesion and fragmentation of community divided into small groups (Granovetter 1973, p. 1378). While supporting its owners with strong in-group solidarity and cohesion, bonding social capital might result in detrimental effects for the rest of the community. The mafia and crime syndicates are typical examples of damaging bonding social capital. Being aware of the *dark side* of social capital, Putnam does not slander bonding social capital, on the contrary, he suggests that in many circumstances a mixture of bonding and bridging social capital can have *powerfully positive social effects*, offering a kind of '*sociological superglue*' and '*WD-40*' (a lubricant) (Putnam 2000, p.23). Similarly, Briggs (1998, p.178) explains these two aspects of social capital as helpful for *social leverage* (bridging social capital) and *social support* (bonding social capital). As a social leverage, social capital helps individuals to '*get ahead*' (through bridges) with new and mainly financial opportunities, and

helps to 'get by' (through bonds) as a social support especially in an emotional form. Figure 2 below explains the rationale of bridging-bonding classification in theory.

Figure 2: Bonding-Bridging Social Capital



Circles in Figure 2 stand for bonding networks of individuals in three groups, and the lines indicate their connections. In group 1, person A is connected to group members in various ways. However, he can connect with people in other groups only via C, E and D since he does not have any other means of access. In this case, the lines among three groups indicate bridging social capital which helps group members to establish acquaintanceships or to gain information flow from outer networks. It is clear the absence of bridging social capital prevents bonding groups or individuals from having new opportunities and they remain confined in their spheres.

Linking Social Capital: While bridging-bonding classification in networks refers to horizontal relationships among individuals and groups; linking social capital is used to describe vertical social relationships. It refers to connections of individuals or groups with others in positions of political or financial power (Sabatini 2009, p.430). Through linking social capital, individuals and groups can obtain access to resources or information from institutions of power. Linking social capital is especially important for civil society organisations to access government funds or to divert political decisions. Having a vertical connection with a public authority, an organisation increases its value or popularity through this kind of social capital. Halpern states

linking social capital can be viewed as a particular form of bridging social capital which constructs a vertical bridge across asymmetrical resources of power (Halpern 2005, p.25).

It is possible to classify networks further in accordance with their other characteristics. Primarily, local-global networks (from neighbourhood to region and nation), open-closed networks (ability to accept new members), dense-sparse networks (overlapping of networks of an individual), homogenous-heterogeneous networks (characteristics of members), vertical-horizontal networks (political-fiscal power structures), etc. (Stone 2001, p.18-23). However, all these classifications somehow overlap with bridging-bonding-linking network categories.

3.4.2 The norms of reciprocity and trust:

Although networks explain how connected people or groups are, it is the norms that govern and shape networks. Thus, norms of reciprocity and trust need special attention in measuring social capital.

Coleman's (1988) approach to social capital explains the logical connection between norms and networks. According to his example, social capital is derived from obligations, expectations and trustworthiness of structures (networks): *'If A does something for B and trusts B to reciprocate in the future, this establishes an expectation on the part of A and an obligation on the part of B.'* (Coleman 1988, p.102). Thus, trust and reciprocity are the norms facilitating co-operation and reduce the incentives to defect, reduce uncertainty and provide models for future co-operation.

Norms in general characterise the community. Shared values like tolerance, solidarity, altruism, voluntarism, democratic orientations, and obedience to rules are types of reciprocal norms and they are fostered by formal or informal sanctions. Existence of such norms leads to accumulation of trust within the community. Similarly, Fukuyama argues that trust *'...arises in a community of regular, honest and cooperative behaviour, based on commonly shared norms, on the part of other members of that community.'* (Fukuyama, 1995 p.26).

In social capital literature, trust is generally identified in three forms: Particularised trust (to familiars), generalised trust (to strangers) and institutional trust (to formal institutions of governance). (Stone 2001 p.25-29).

However, the causal relationship between trust and social capital is problematic, since trust can be viewed both as a source or an outcome of social capital simultaneously (OECD 2001, p.41). According to Putnam, this relationship is explained by participation in social networks

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which creates trust through reciprocal norms and trust facilitates participation in coordinated actions. This creates a virtuous circle, more participation enables more trust. Paldam (2000) formulates this causality as '*trust-cooperation complex*' as follows:

$$\text{Trust} \Leftrightarrow \text{ease of voluntary cooperation} \pm e \quad (e \text{ is a small error})$$

According to him, *ease of voluntary cooperation* is interlinked to trust. Without trust, cooperation is limited to activities that are easily monitored. Trust pays off with working together; and by working together, people build further trust in the form of goodwill (Paldam 2000, p.636). Thus, it is possible to define the trust-cooperation relationship by approaching in from both perspectives.

After reviewing the dimensions of social capital, measuring these dimensions is required to have some idea on the social capital level of a given nation, region, community or organisation. Review of literature of social capital's measurement reveals various practices and there is no universally accepted method of measurement. However, social capital studies tend to measure it by focusing on these three main dimensions. The most common practices are reviewed in detail below.

3.4.3 The practical measures of dimensions and problem of tautology:

Despite the fact that there is a wide consensus over the definition of the dimensions (networks-norms-trust) of social capital, methods of measurement at operational level are diverse. This diversity stems mainly from the lack of an obvious connection between theory and measurement (Paxton 1999, p.90). From a theoretical approach, interpretation of social capital by using former theories like human capital theory, network theory, or rational choices theory is possible. However, when it comes to materialise the abstract, it becomes a '*tricky business*' (Narayan and Cassidy 2001, p.61).

Networks, norms of reciprocity and trust are discernible from the view of an individual. One can identify his/her own network counting their family members, neighbours, friends or colleagues, or they can make a list of his trustworthy acquaintances. They feel the burden of obligations imposed by their environment, or enjoys working voluntarily. However, assessment and interpretation of these intrinsic values and feelings in the eye of a stranger is extremely difficult. Thus, this led researchers to develop techniques in order to capture the abstract, and to convert the intangible into tangible. Such a process required use of some indicator sets which are varied in the literature.

Putnam (1993, p.93-97) provides extensively cited practice of measuring social capital to explain differences in the performance of Italian regional governments. He used four indicators in order to compare the 'civicness' of regions. These are the numbers of associations, newspaper readership, electoral turnout rates and preference voting. In his analysis, the first three indicators are associated with social capital positively since they resemble local social cohesion, but the preference voting is regarded as an inverse indicator since it indicates a retarded community spirit (e.g., patriarchy, clientelism). He measured associational activity using a national census of associations and included sports clubs, choral societies, hiking clubs, bird watching groups, hunter's associations etc. Similarly, he relied upon national statistics collected by relevant public authorities for the remaining indicators.

In his more recent study in the US, he developed more comprehensive indicators in assessing the different levels and the decline of social capital in fifty states (Putnam 2000, p.291). He used 14 indicators of formal and informal associational activities and levels of trust as follows:

Measures of community organisational life

- Served on committee of local organisation in last year (per cent)
- Served as officer of some club or organisation in last year (per cent)
- Civic and social organisations per 1000 population
- Mean number of club meetings attended in last year
- Mean number of group membership

Measures of engagement in public affairs

- Turnout in presidential elections
- Attended public meeting on town or school affairs in last year (per cent)

Measures of community volunteerism

- Number of non-profit organisations per 1000 population
- Mean number of times worked on community project in last year

Measures of informal sociability

- Agree that 'I spend a lot of time visiting friends'
- Mean number of times entertained at home in last year

Measures of social trust

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- Agree that 'Most people can be trusted'
- Agree that 'Most people are honest'

In his study, Putnam obtained the required data from several resources from public and private survey databases including; National Election Studies, General Social Survey, US Bureau of Census, Roper Social and Political Trends Survey Archive, Needham Lifestyle Surveys, American Use of Time Project, etc.

One of the main criticisms for Putnam's work concerns associational activity indicators. First, the characteristics of the internal relations of the members might vary in associations even if they operate within the same area of service. For example, if the group is highly homogenous and leader oriented, the possibility to interact with other groups would decrease. In terms of network structures, this denotes bridging and bonding types of social capital. Some associations provide bonding ties through closed networks, which require particularised trust and high reciprocity among its members. Some strict religious associations or ethnicity based ones are examples. In contrast, some associations allow and encourage their members to connect with other networks, and enable access to outer resources. Secondly, the spirit of volunteering in associations can vary in different ways. Large and mass member associations are generally run by paid white-collar professionals who follow strict rules of management, reducing the member-association relationship to lower levels. On the other hand some local associations are member oriented and require activity of its members to operate, by allowing chances to create new networks among formerly unknown members. In summary, all associations are not alike, the inner and outer network structures of voluntary associations create different types of social capital.

As another component of social capital, trust is generally measured by the noted World Values Survey (WVS) question: 'generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?' The possible responses to this question are; 'Most people can be trusted', 'Need to be very careful', or 'Don't know'. The trust indicator is given by the percentage of people giving the first answer. This allows for cross-national comparisons (Fukuyama 2001, p. 15, Knack and Keefer 1997, p.1255). For example, according to the results of WVS (2007), the highest ranks are recorded by Scandinavian countries. Norway has the highest score with 74.2%, followed by Sweden (68%) and Finland (58.9%). Leading countries of the western world range as follows: USA (39.3%), Germany (36.8), GB (30.5) and France (18.8). Countries with the lowest trust rates are Brazil (9.4%), Malaysia (8.8%), Peru (6.3%), and Turkey (4.9%).

However, usage of the trust indicator as it is derived from the WVS is also subject to criticism (OECD 2001, p.44, Field 2003, p.125, Beugelsdijk 2006, p.372). Along with the debate of seeing trust as a source or outcome of social capital, one problem appears as the interpretation of the meaning of 'trust' and 'most people' by the respondents. This problem is more noticeable in cross-regional or cross-national studies. For example, the Turkish word for trust '*güven*' means trust and confidence at the same time, but English version of WVS asks the questions separately on both. In addition to this, the perception of the respondent against of the term 'most people' may vary due to the facts of the person's network type. If their networks consist largely of homogenous people, trust would be higher, in comparison to the trust level of a person with wider networks and a broader understanding of community. Similarly recent personal experiences of individuals affects their trust perceptions, in other words, trust perceptions might be fragile and could change quickly over time. However, trust is widely used in social capital studies as a 'rough and ready' measure (Halpern 2005, p.32).

Being highly interested in concept's positive outcomes on development, The World Bank has developed two measurement tools to assess social capital in developing countries: The Social Capital Assessment Tool (SOCAT) and The Social Capital Integrated Questionnaire (SOCAP IQ).

The SOCAT is a multifaceted instrument designed to collect social capital data at the household, community and organizational levels. It is an integrated quantitative/qualitative tool. SOCAT comprises five sections: Community Profile and Asset Mapping Interview Guide, Community Questionnaire, Household Questionnaire, Organizational Profile Interview Guides, Organizational Profile Score sheet. SOCAP IQ aims to generate quantitative data on various dimensions of social capital. Specifically, six dimensions are considered: groups and networks; trust and solidarity; collective action and cooperation; information and communication; social cohesion and inclusion; empowerment and political action².

SOCAT and SOCAP IQ differ from previous methods of measuring social capital since they are field oriented and derive data through specially designed questionnaires and interview questions, instead of using ready-to-use official statistics.

As already noted, the context dependant nature of social capital theory channelled researchers to use different sets of indicators which could be attributable to different aspects of social capital. Christian Grootaert compiles a list of indicators which have all been used in social

²Source: <http://go.worldbank.org/LHI4AYZEFO>

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capital studies (Grootaert 2001, p. 22-23). It is worth mentioning them to demonstrate how various indicators could be used in social capital's measurement.

Horizontal associations

- Number and type of associations or local institutions
- Extent of membership in local associations
- Extent of participatory decision making
- Extent of kin homogeneity within the association
- Extent of income and occupation homogeneity within the association
- Extent of trust in community members and households
- Extent of trust in government
- Extent of trust in trade unions
- Perception of extent of community organization
- Reliance on networks of support
- Percentage of household income from remittances
- Percentage of household expenditure for gifts and transfers

Civil and Political Society:

- Index of civil liberties
- Percentage of population facing political discrimination
- Index of intensity of political discrimination
- Percentage of population facing economic discrimination
- Index of intensity of economic discrimination
- Percentage of population involved in separatist movement
- Gastil's index of political rights
- Freedom House index of political freedoms
- Index of democracy
- Index of corruption
- Index of government inefficiency
- Strength of democratic institutions
- Measure of 'human liberty'
- Measure of political stability
- Degree of decentralization of government
- Voter turnout
- Political assassinations
- Constitutional government changes
- Coups

Social Integration:

- Indicator of social mobility
- Measure of strength of 'social tensions'
- Ethno-linguistic fragmentation
- Riots and protest demonstrations
- Strikes
- Homicide rates
- Suicide rates
- Crime rates

- Prisoners per 100,000 people
- Illegitimacy rates
- Percentage of single-parent homes
- Divorce rates
- Youth unemployment rate

Legal and Governance Aspects:

- Quality of bureaucracy
- Independence of court system
- Expropriation and nationalization risk
- Repudiation of contracts by government
- Contract enforceability
- Contract-intensive money

It is possible to diversify the list further. For example; blood donations (Guiso 2004, p.527-28) and number of lawyers in a given region or country (Knack and Keefer, 1997, p.1281-82). The variety of indicators also demonstrates that social capital's measurement is overwhelmingly a quantitative activity.

The existence of various kinds of indicators reflects the broad and very general conceptualisations of social capital. However, from an empirical point of view, this raises some tautologies around validity and reliability of indicators especially when depending on raw and aggregate data.

Despite the fact that relying on data collected for other purposes is a common method of data collection in social capital studies, it cannot be expected that ready-to use data sets can meet the theoretical specifications of the social capital concept precisely. This also leads to reliance on correlations instead of substantive arguments. On this point, it can be argued that most of the social capital indicators derived from data sets can be classified as *proximal* and *distal* indicators (Stone 2001, p.5). Although both proximal and distal indicators are outcomes of social capital, proximal indicators are more related to the concept's key dimensions of networks, norms and trust. Using associational activity as an indicator for networks is a typical example of a proxy indicator. On the other hand, distal indicators are indirectly related as outcomes of social capital. For example, life expectancy, health status, crime rates, participation in higher education are distal proxies. In *Bowling Alone*, Putnam calculates a social capital index using proximal indicators and matches them with distal ones. This introduces the danger that *research reliant upon an outcome of social capital as an indicator of it will necessarily find social capital to be related to that outcome* (Sabatini 2009, p.432). Thus, equating social capital with its outcomes can easily lead to tautological statements saying social capital exists wherever an outcome is observed (Portes 1998, p.5).

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Social capital study has not evolved theoretically or empirically enough to invalidate this tautology or to codify a single set of indicators appropriate for any context. This mainly resulted from the practical obstacles over data collection for empirical studies. Instead of stressing a valid notion of social capital, researchers simply prefer conceptualising social capital depending on easily available data (Roberts and Roche, 2001). In cross-country or regional studies in particular, researchers are confined to data sets collected and published by governments or research bodies. This leads the researcher the opinion that 'social capital is what one could measure'. Provided that the measurement is relevant to networks, norms and trust, and if the indicators have at least a logical (face) validity within the concept, this judgement looks benign. In practice, among the dimensions of social capital, networks and trust are studied more intensively due to the fact that it is easier to access quantitative data over associational activity and generalised trust when compared to accessing qualitative data required to assess norms and values (Van Deth, 2001, p.82-83).

One important point to emphasise in measurement activity is researchers need to remember the context specific nature of social capital. Particularly in cross-cultural studies, the sociological, cultural and political features of the context should be considered carefully and a suggested measure must reflect the context as accurately as possible.

To summarise, the dimensional approach in studying social capital is practical since it allows researchers to focus on specific aspects of social capital especially when the context and scope of the study require doing so. A further handy classification of social capital's dimensions is grouping them under two main categories: structural and cognitive social capital.

3.4.4 The structural and cognitive aspects of social capital dimensions: A useful strategy for measurement

The networks, norms and trust dimensions of social capital can also be classified under two main categories: Structural social capital and cognitive social capital. (Uphoff, 2000). This classification provides a clearer approach in assessing social capital since it reflects the main features of social capital and the interactions between them. Uphoff underlines understanding this distinction is as important as understanding the renewable and non-renewable resources of natural capital forms (Uphoff 2000, p.218).

Structural social capital is associated with various forms of social networks together with roles, rules, precedents and procedures. Cognitive social capital, on the other hand, is the product of mental processes resulting in norms, values, attitudes, beliefs shaped by the culture and


ideology of the community. Both forms of social capital consequently contribute to *mutually beneficial collective action*. Structural social capital facilitates collective action by reducing transaction costs, and makes cooperation more predictable and beneficial. Cognitive social capital predisposes people for collective action through shared norms like reciprocity and trust. Although rules, roles, precedents and procedures are all ultimately products of mental processes, they are more observable than norms and values; that is, structural social capital is external and objectified, while cognitive social capital is more internal and subjective. Paxton emphasises this in her definition of social capital:

Social capital involves two components:

1. *Objective associations between individuals*.—there must be an objective network structure linking individuals. This component indicates that individuals are tied to each other in social space.
2. *A subjective type of tie*.—the ties between individuals must be of a particular type—reciprocal, trusting, and involving positive emotion (Paxton 1999, p. 93).

Therefore, structural social capital can be observed through people's behaviours, while cognitive social capital is related to their beliefs and emotions. Thus, the first form of social capital can be modified directly and quantification is more probable, the second form is not easily changed and remains qualitative since it resides within people's thoughts (Krishna and Uphoff 1999, p.7). It is also possible to rename cognitive social capital as *cultural social capital* since norms of reciprocity and trust are highly dependent on the cultural settings that they evolve within (Van Deth 2003, p. 81).

Grootaert and Bastelaer (2002) develop this conceptualisation further adding the observation levels of social capital in the community. Social capital can be observed at micro level in the forms of horizontal networks of individuals and families and associated norms and values underlie these networks. At meso level observation, social capital appears as horizontal and vertical interactions between individual and society. At macro level, social capital can be observed as the institutional and political environment and governance characteristics which provide an atmosphere for the whole society.

Figure 3: Scope and forms of social capital

All four quadrants of Figure 3 (Grootaert and Bastelaer 2002, p.4) reflect different aspects of social capital and they are all interrelated. From the structural aspect of social capital, state institutions and legal regulations provide an appropriate or inappropriate environment for local level associations. In turn, efficient local associations foster implementation of public policies at micro and meso level. On the cognitive side of the figure, good governance with transparent operations, low corruption levels, predictable state actions support proliferation of democratic values, interpersonal or institutional trust at meso or micro level. In turn, local norms and trust provides assistance in improving governance settings through elected representatives and civil servants who internalised these norms as members of the community. Similar to the way that trust and norms govern networks and facilitate collective action, governance shapes state institutions and the rule of law practice.

When it comes to production of social capital, the widely accepted bottom-up perspective stresses the bottom-half of the diagram. However, this conceptualisation also fits in with top-down perspective which focuses on the top-half of diagram that draws attention to the role of state institutions and governance settings.

Although a state of the art measure for social capital requires covering all four quadrants of the diagram, social capital studies generally focus on the bottom-half of the diagram with a strong emphasis on bottom-left segment. As described above, this stems generally from practical and methodological difficulties in obtaining relevant data to use as indicators of social capital.

In conclusion, structural-cognitive social capital classification is useful for the conceptualisation of social capital in Turkish context. As the overarching research question ‘what are the roles of governments for the production of social capital’ implies an institutional approach, it is obvious that the state apparatus is to be used to produce social capital and operation of this policy would necessarily involve public institutions. Since the structural/networks aspect of social capital involve observable participation in associational activities, they are more likely to be changed through top-down policies. On the other hand, cognitive social capital is the outcome of long-standing social values like religion and cultural traditions that shape norms in the society. The dogmatic nature of religion and rigid traditions are almost impossible to change through policies, thus, any policy that aim to transform society’s social capital stock in a considerably short time needs to focus on the structural aspects of social capital. To avoid repetition, social capital’s conceptualisation under structural and cognitive dimensions in Turkey will be discussed broadly in the methodology chapter, in line with the features of the Turkish context.

In summary, measurement of social capital is a complex issue and there is no universally accepted method. Researchers tend to design their own measurement tools in accordance with the scope, size and nature of their study. Cross-national or national level studies generally employ ready-to-use statistical data gathered and published by institutions for various reasons. Organisational or community level researches use questionnaires or other face to face methods since sampling is small in size and individuals are reachable personally. Among the variety of social capital measurement practices, conceptualisation of social capital’s dimensions under structural and cognitive aspects looks fruitful as it could serve to distinguish externally changeable and more static components of social capital, allowing the researchers focusing on designing policies to create or foster structural social capital.

3.5 The Conclusion

This chapter has systematically dealt with the main discussions around social capital theory with special emphasis over its importance, production and measurement issues. As a rapidly proliferating concept in the academia, social capital was conceptualised by many authors in many different ways. However, one thing is for certain; networks, norms and trust have remained as the core components of the theory.

The challenges in measuring an abstract concept has led researchers to employ various indicators, creating many different examples of conceptualisations. All these varieties in the

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literature have revealed the multi-faceted nature of social capital. In fact, researchers' attempts to connect social capital with several conclusions like better economy, better health, better education, and so on, have enriched the literature of social capital.

However, there are mainly two camps of researcher' views concerning the discussions of social capital's origins. The overwhelming idea, which defends the society-centred approach, handles social capital as the production of long historical processes of nations. In contrast the second group of researchers suggests the favoured path dependency view is lacking due to negligence in highlighting the possible effects of state institutions on the concept. Thus, the dominant bottom-up perspective needs to be supplemented through a top-down approach.

Following the second idea, the researcher assumes Turkey as a developing and democratising nation is an appropriate context to apply and test the top-down approach for social capital's formation. So, the overarching research question persists following the literature review:

'What are the roles of public authorities for the production of social capital?'

In order to answer the question, the research needed to reveal the contextual features of Turkey. A contextual analysis is important due to the fact that the researcher should unveil first the main characteristics of the Turkish context in terms of the political conditions that regulate the civil context from the top, and the sociological background forming social capital from the bottom. Such an attempt is also required to justify a conceptualisation to serve as a basis for the measurement activity which will show regional dispersion of social capital. As discussed in the final section above, the research needs to offer its own conceptualisation reflecting the structural and cognitive aspects of social capital, and measure it in that sense. Thus, the research will conduct the contextual analysis of Turkey as the selected case study country.

Chapter 4: CONTEXT: CIVIL AND POLITICAL REALMS OF TURKEY

4.1 Introduction:

This chapter's primary aim is to provide information regarding Turkey's general socio-political conditions with particular emphasis on the main components and facilitators of social capital. As discussed in the conceptual framework and literature review, social capital is largely defined as the product of networks, norms and trust relationships in a given society. Approaching from a broader perspective, it can be said that the social capital level of a nation is significantly determined by the evolution of these components. In order to understand how social capital is evolved in a country, research needs to reveal the contextual framework of that nation from a historical approach. Turkey is no exception in this.

In consideration that social capital emerged as a concept in western hemisphere, especially in the US and Europe, the contextual analysis of Turkey becomes a requisite. As a late-democratic and late-industrialised country, Turkey has profoundly different social and political structures compared to western countries to which most western literature of social capital frequently refers. Tracking down a western concept in a non-western context is one of the main difficulties of this research and it can be muddled through to some extent by providing basic yet comprehensive knowledge of the main circumstances of Turkey in terms of top-down and bottom-up production of social capital. In order to equip the reader with the required information concerning the Turkish context, this chapter will first reveal Turkey's position in the world with reference to international indicators of development and democracy, then, elaborate two main realms: The political context and civil context.

Since the main argument of this research concerns the roles of public authorities for the production of social capital through a top-down approach, it is essential to explore perceptions of state authority towards civil society. In other words, it is important to understand political approaches which design the civil context in which civil society and its organisations operate. Thus, this chapter will give priority to analyse the political context first.

Political context in Turkey has been shaped largely by the state-centric policies throughout 20th century. Since the early years of the Republic, social and political reforms of the Turkish Revolution were realised by the military and bureaucratic elites. Through the top-down approach, a traditionally existing 'father state' understanding was fortified in the ideology of 'indivisibility of

the state and the nation', therefore the state and the nation were regarded as a single entity. These policies have affected civil society-state relations to the detriment of the former in general. So, this chapter will discuss the implications of the political context over the evolution of civil society in Turkey.

Following the explanations over the political context's evolution, this chapter will continue with a review of the civil context of Turkey. In general, current circumstances of civil society organisations in Turkey, features of the latest legal regulations, civil society organisation types and numerical information of civil associations will be provided to reflect the image of the civil context in readers' minds.

Following this stage, contextual analysis will turn to exploring fundamental sociological features of civil society in Turkey. This is required since a top-down approach to produce social capital does not argue it is the superstructures that solely affect social capital in a society. It is undeniable that the sociological background of a nation and its social and cultural codes would largely generate social capital from the bottom. It can be said, social capital's production can be perceived as a coin, one face of which is written by political context, the other is moulded by the sociological background. Therefore, contextual analysis needs to focus on the sociological patterns as well, which shape norms, networks and trust, the main components of social capital. The second major part of the chapter will explore the main characteristics of Turkish society with reference to traditions and understandings, mainly strong family relations and the effect of religious beliefs, and their implications for the three main dimensions of social capital.

Finally, the chapter will conclude with the implications of why Turkey is an important and suitable context to apply a top-down approach for the creation of social capital. This chapter will provide the required information to assess and visualise prevalent contextual features of Turkish society with particular emphasis on social capital.

4.2 Turkey at a glance:

In order to position Turkey among other countries, this section will refer to publications of internationally accepted institutions. Primarily socio-economic and democratic development levels of Turkey will be shown in comparison to other countries. Findings show that Turkey has average scores in many of the comparisons and incorporates both positive and negative development aspects.

Demographically, Turkey's total population is 76.667.864³ and 73.3% of population live in urban areas. Population per square kilometre is around 100 people. Table 2 below shows some information on the development level of Turkey and its position between world and EU averages. Figures are derived from the World Bank Database.

Table 2: An international comparison

Indicators	World	Turkey	EU
Life expectancy at birth-2012	70,8	74.9	80.5
Infant mortality (per 1000 live births)-2013	33.6	16.5	3.9
Literacy rate (%)	84.3 (2010)	94.9 (2012)	99.1 (2010)
Internet Users-2013(%)	38.1	46.3	75.5
Mobile cellular subscriptions-2013 (%)	93.0	93.0	124.6
GDP per capita-2013 (US \$)	10,610	10,971	35,438
GDP growth (annual %)	2.2	4.1	0.1
Unemployment, total (% of total labour force) (national estimate)-2012	5.6	9.2	10.5
Urban Population (%) -2013	53.0	72.4	74.4

As seen from the figures above, Turkey shows a higher performance than the World average against important development indicators, and is close to European standards. One notable point is Turkey could achieve higher GDP growth rate after the 2008 economic recession. United Nations' Human Development Reports also reflects Turkey's intensive efforts to realise developmental targets. Among nearly 182 countries all around the World, Turkey's Human Development Index rank has increased significantly from 88 in 2004 to 69 in 2014.

³ As of 31/12/2013. Source: Ministry of the Interior, General Directorate of Civil Registration and Nationality

Despite satisfactory performance in economic development, Turkey's indicators in terms of democracy and freedoms could be seen as disappointing. The results of international assessments for Turkish democracy and human rights are listed in Table 3 below:

Table 3: Level of democracy and human rights in Turkey

Institutional Reports	Turkey's Condition/Rank
Freedom House: World Freedom Report 2014⁴	Partly free
Freedom House: Freedom of Internet 2013⁵	Partly free
Freedom House: Freedom of the Press 2014⁶	Not free
Transparency International: Corruption Perceptions index 2013⁷	53 rd in 177 countries
Foreign Policy Magazine: Failed States Index 2013⁸	86 th in 177 countries
Charities Aid Foundation: World Giving Index 2013⁹	128 th in 135 countries
Social Watch Gender Equality Index 2012¹⁰	130 th in 168 countries
Hudson Institute: Philanthropic Freedom Index 2012¹¹	2.9 (1:Restrictive, 5:Conducive)
Economist Intelligence Unit: Democracy index 2012¹²	88 th on 167 countries
World Audit: World Democracy Audit 2014¹³	76 th in 150 countries
Global Democracy Ranking Index 2013¹⁴	61 st in 115 countries

⁴ For a detailed overview: <http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/turkey-0>

⁵ <http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2013/turkey>

⁶ <http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2014/turkey>

⁷ <http://www.transparency.org/cpi2013/results>

⁸ <http://ffp.statesindex.org/rankings-2013-sortable>

⁹ http://www.cafonline.org/pdf/WorldGivingIndex2013_1374AWEb.pdf

¹⁰ <http://www.socialwatch.org/node/14367>

¹¹ <http://www.hudson.org/policycenters/13-center-for-global-prosperity>

¹² www.eiu.com

¹³ <http://www.worldaudit.org/countries/turkey.htm>

¹⁴ http://democracyranking.org/wordpress/?page_id=747

At first glance, unsatisfactory democratisation and human rights conditions indicate an undesirable environment for the civil society. Although current economic development level seems more encouraging, poor democratisation processes have some influence over the evolution of civil rights and society. Differences between the levels of socio-economic development and consolidation of democracy and human rights can be explained to some extent through the political priorities of the Republic of Turkey since its foundation in 1923. Inherited from a long lasting Ottoman Empire, a state-centric approach has been the main characteristic of Turkish political and economic systems. Following an elitist culture of rule, the founders of Republic have preferred economic development to social and democratic transformation. In their view, a new country rising from the ashes of an old empire could only be possible via economic development and industrialisation. Inexistence of the circumstances that moulded the democratisation process (e.g., industrialisation and class conflict) in western countries for centuries has also let Turkish leaders give secondary importance to democratic reforms. As a result, democratisation of the Turkish nation lagged behind in comparison to economic development. Below, the chapter will continue with a brief overview of the circumstances that existed in the first years of Turkish Republic, and how democracy and the political context were evolved through time with particular emphasis on the regulations for civil society and social capital.

4.3 The Political Context in Turkey and its Effects on Civil Society

4.3.1 State-centric modernisation policy and top-down reforms

The Turkish nation may be the only nation that experienced such a swift revolution and abrupt disengagement from their cultural roots. In the first half of 20th century, Turkey experienced the collapse of a mighty empire, an independence war against foreign invaders, rapid reconstruction of state mechanism and radical political reforms. Thus, 20th century Turkish history is not just a sum of wars and peace treaties; it is an unprecedented example of a modernisation and westernisation process which had a tremendous impact on Turkish society. In this perspective, the evolution of civil society in Turkey can be understood through revealing of the modernisation practices that affected the nation as a whole. Therefore, this section will discuss how the state-centric approach of the Turkish elites tried to shape a new nation through top-down reforms; and then, the context, in which civil society operates, was designed over time.

When Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and his companions declared in 1923 the new Turkish State was a republic, their slogan was *'to raise whole nation above the level of contemporary civilisations'*. They aimed to create a modernised and westernised country with its all components. This was

also a challenge to long-standing institution like religion, religious laws, cultural traditions and existing social stratifications.

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his followers knew the Ottoman state organisation, which is profoundly identified with successive Sultan's rule, could not compete with European nation-state establishments. They also acknowledged the Islamic roots of the Ottoman state was the main barrier against social developments and reforms. Thus, they had to annul the monarchy (1922) before declaring the Republic in 1923. If they were to create a modern republic, and a secular nation-state, they felt the best way was to reduce the overwhelming Islamic practices over society to an individual belief system. Therefore, their second major attack against old establishments was to ban '*caliphate*', a title inherited by the Ottoman Sultans to rule all Muslims around the world. In 1924, the Grand National Assembly accepted a law to terminate the caliphate establishment, and all members of the Ottoman Dynasty were exiled to several European countries. The reform was symbolically the most important action of the new rule, severing society's connection with the old system. This was followed by a range of transformation reforms. The reforms were all aimed at converting the Turkish nation into a modern and contemporary society. Most significant of these reforms, which are also known as *Atatürk's Revolutions* are as follows: Abolition of religious laws and courts (1924), clothes and hat reform (1925), termination of dervish lodges and tombs (1925), modern civil code and penal code (1926), alphabet revolution that introduce Latin letters instead of Arabic ones (1928), Islam as the 'religion of the state' was removed from the Constitution (1928), calendar/time and measurement reforms (1925-1931), prohibition of family titles and surname reform (1934), enfranchisement of women (1930-1934), secularism was described as the state's policy in the constitution (1937), etc. As can be seen the reforms were designed to cover all areas of civil life purposefully to create a modern society. Despite the abrupt and ground-breaking nature of the republican reforms, little or no resistance from the nation was experienced. Although a few people provoked by local religious figures organised protests and armed attacks against reformers, people have accepted the new regulations in almost absolute obedience.

In short, the reconstruction of the new Turkish state and nation can be perceived as a 'top-down' transformation of an underdeveloped society into a modern nation gathered around a strong nation-state. It can be seen therefore the Turkish modernisation movement has been designed from the start as a state-centric westernisation project. Undoubtedly, the 'strong-state tradition' was the main driving force that anchored the state right into the society. The state apparatus in modern Turkey has justified itself assuming the transformative force, which has potential to change society, comes only from the top, and thus, the state has acted as an all-sovereign establishment over whole nation (Keyman 2006, p.23). This approach extolled the state as a holy-

entity and proposed the nation and state are inseparable and indivisible. This idea has been preserved in every Constitution of the Republic since 1921, stated as *'The Republic of Turkey is an indivisible entity with its land and its nation'*. The Nation was not the object of the state; it was the subject to serve for the state. In Turkish connotation, the state is named as 'father state', and the land is 'mother land'. In this sense, the nation is the child of this couple. New generations of Turkish society were raised having strong nationalist beliefs and full obedience to the state. This policy can be best reflected in the *Student's Oath* sung every morning in primary schools since 1933 until 2013. Boys and girls used to start a day with shouting out the following lines: *I am a Turk, upright and hardworking. My principle is to protect the younger and to respect the elder, to love my homeland and my nation more than myself. My ideal is to rise, to progress. My existence shall be a gift to the Turkish existence.* Obviously, the international political climate of the 1930s, mainly the rise of authoritarian regimes like fascism and communism have had impacts on Turkish politics. A simple conclusion of this idea is that state elites exist to rule the entire nation from the state's centre through a top-down perspective.

On the other hand, internal circumstances of Turkey in those days provided an environment conducive to top-down policies. Since Turkey had not experienced industrialisation process yet in the early 20th century, social classes like aristocracy, bourgeoisie and workers in western democracies did not emerge in Turkey as well (Caniklioglu 2007, p.118). **This resulted in a lack of** civil or political consciousness that could react against top-down reforms of Kemalist policies.

In such an environment, former subjects of the Sultan/new citizens of the Turkish Republic were expected to behave in a way to value the national aims above their individual interests, and they to forsake their individual freedoms in favour of a sovereign state. Where the state establishment impacted the social, political, economic and cultural realms significantly it would be naive to expect a functional civil society. However, the state elites imagined an active civil society which would support state-centric modernisation policies. In parallel with this view, the civil context in which civil society organisations would operate was designed to prioritise duties towards the state, and CSOs could only exist in a narrow area of life strictly framed to prevent any civil movement that was perceived as a risk to the indivisibility of state, land and the nation. Serif Mardin (1975) describes these state-society relations under 'centre-periphery' conceptualisation. According to Mardin, every society has a centre, strong or weak. Historically, the Ottomans placed the state mechanism into the centre of society and consolidated it through strong establishments and institutions. As the subjects of the Sultan, people had to stay on the periphery. Following this political tradition, the founders of the Turkish Republic regarded the state mechanism as the self-evident source of power, thus the state itself could not be questioned. It can be said the sovereignty of the Sultan was exchanged with sovereignty of the central state. Any other claimed

source of legitimacy- like society- was conceived as a major threat and an insult to peace and order of the Republic. Thus, the 'centre' has always been sceptical and distrustful of the 'periphery'. In fact, this attitude has led to a disunity of nation and state, whereas state elites claimed that nation and state are indivisible. The weakness of individuals against state and the disorganised appearance of society led to a centralised, authoritarian, patrimonial and static power structure. As the result, state has emerged as a 'father' who edifies his children/citizens with both compassion and infliction. The state organisation claimed that it made decisions for common good, without caring about common sense. Early totalitarian practices of the Turkish Revolution is known with the motto *'for the public, despite the people'*.

Having absolute sovereignty and patrimonial relations with society, bureaucracy as the state's main instrument, and politicians as regime's privileged actors, have developed populist, opportunist and personal interactions with existing civil society organisations, especially with labour unions and professional chambers. Thus, civil society organisations could not establish horizontal networks among each other to countervail the strong-central state. Instead, they have tended to establish contact with public officers and politicians through vertical networks in which their specific interests are met by state resources (Heper and Yildirim, 2011, p.6). Subsequently, civil society preferred to establish 'linking social capital' to take advantage and gain leverage. In such an environment, priority of civil society organisations was not to influence public sphere through setting up bridging networks among civil society and to participate in policy making. The state did not feel obliged to respond civil society demands in general since they are already connected particularly to serve mutual interests. Thus, civil society has remained as an 'outsider' in the democratic decision making.

Consequently, evolution of the civil context in Turkey had always been subject to top-down and state-centric approaches and CSOs could only operate in an environment constrained by clientelism. Laws and legal regulations were also introduced to limit possible actions of civil society, which are reviewed briefly below.

4.3.2 The evolution of the legal framework and changing perceptions towards civil society

The evolution of the legal framework and civil rights follow a fluctuating course throughout the Republican era. In essence, Turkish society has witnessed successive periods of freedoms and restrictions in terms of congregational rights such as forming of civil associations, labour unions, strike and collective bargaining, meetings and demonstrations. Domestic regulations were widely affected and mostly determined by the developments reflecting changes in national and international circumstances. Readers can find a detailed review of the evolution of the political

climate and its affects over civil rights and freedoms in Appendix 1, however, a brief version of the discussions is provided here to follow the course of the study.

The changing nature of the state's understandings on the civil rights and freedoms could be observed clearly analysing 1924, 1961 and 1982 Constitutions. Even though the Constitution of 1924 had recognised the main civil freedoms in accordance with the prevailing international climate of that time, the rise of fascist and totalitarian regimes throughout Europe were also reflected in some restrictions introduced through late 1930s. Shortly after the victory of democratic regimes in WWII, Turkey accepted the multi-party regime constitutionally and widened civil rights again. However, majoritarian practices of the ruling Democrat Party, and their violations of the legal system disturbed some important groups and resulted in the 1960 military coup. Although the coup was an undemocratic intervention to the legal system, the new 1961 Constitution fortified many human rights and freedoms extensively. New countervailing mechanisms that aimed to limit reckless applications of a majoritarian government were established. Bicameral National Assembly and a Court of Constitution are important examples of the new check and balance system. Throughout the term of the 1961 Constitution, Turkish society enjoyed an unprecedented era of freedoms. Associational activities proliferated, labour unions emerged as powerful organs of participation. However, the expanding freedoms did not lead to a more democratic environment for the whole country, instead, ideological differences between socialist, nationalist and Islamist groups deepened. Along with the new social movements of 1968, Turkey witnessed a period of street clashes and anarchy. For the military and political spheres, main culprit was the extensive freedoms of the 1961 Constitution. 'Association member' became synonymous with the terms 'terrorist or anarchist'. As a result, the 1980 military coup changed almost everything in terms of the framework for an organised civil society.

The product of the coup, the 1982 Constitution aimed to restrict civil freedoms. During the first half of the 1980s, nearly 30.000 civil associations were dissolved and banned. As the reflection of the rise of Neo-liberal policies, freedoms for labour unionism were narrowed and number of union members decreased significantly by millions. Relationships of associations with political parties were forbidden and any channel of non-electoral participation was blocked. Political participation was reduced to voting in general and local elections. In particular the youth became disaffected with political matters. Student associations in universities were made illegal. Until the mid-1990s, the wounds of the 1982 Constitution were not be healed.

Following the down course of 1980s, the legal framework started recovering in the mid-1990s. A significant external factor, full membership negotiations with the European Union became important for the re-recognising of civil freedoms. Starting with the 1993 Copenhagen Criteria,

Turkey realised many reforms constitutionally. As they are presented in Appendix 1, the main development was the change in the state's approach towards civil society. Governments recognised that relationships with the civil society should be a 'civil' business. A new public agency, The Department of Associations under the Ministry of Interior was established and relations with civil society were no longer a police business or security matter.

An important internal factor resulting in a change of perspective towards civil society was the devastating earthquake in 1999. Affecting the most developed region of Turkey, the earthquake has showed ineffective search and rescue mechanisms of the state failed, however, many civil associations operated effectively and voluntarily in the every phase of the disaster relief. So, civil society organisations proved themselves and the state begun to regard them as project partners.

Along with the EU pre-accession funds, many domestic funds started to be allocated for civil society through projects and regional development agencies. Joint projects with public institutions were supported in many service areas. As a reflection of the changing political climate, a tremendous leap in the associational figures was realised in the last decade, as they are shown in the following sub-sections.

Despite all reforms in terms of democracy, basic rights and civil actions, inherited political and civil patterns of behaviour of the Turks need time to evolve. Reforms and legal amendments can be made relatively quickly however, society's adaptation to new regulations and their change of preferences tends to take longer. According to the World Values Survey, the Turks are relatively disaffected with non-electoral political actions in comparison to western democracies. Derived from the World Values Survey (2010-2014), Table 4 below shows people are still unwilling to take part in joint political activities.

Table 4: Non-electoral political participation

I would never...	Western ¹⁵ %	Turkey %
Sign a petition	15.5	56.8
Join in boycotts	41.1	67.6
Attend peaceful demonstrations	32.8	63.2

¹⁵ Western countries took place in World Values Survey Wave 6 are: Australia, Cyprus, Estonia, Germany, New Zealand, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and United States. However; regarding that social capital theory and literature was extensively evolved in developed countries, contextual differences of Turkey would be best reflected keeping comparisons limited within Australia, Germany, New Zealand, Netherlands, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and United States. These countries are also classified as 'very high human development countries' by United Nations in 2014.

Join in strikes	41.2	67.8
Do any other act of protest	30.7	69.9

On the other hand, following the 1990s, state-civil society relations were finally started to normalise after 1980s' oppressive precautions. People's confidence in law and order-maintaining institutions increased, institutional trust¹⁶ was fortified through democratisation steps in people-power relations. The results of the WVS in Table 5 below indicates, how institutional trust was evolved positively between 1990 and 2011 in Turkey along with some Western countries.

Table 5: Institutional trust

	Turkey		Western
Confidence in...	1990	2011	2011-2013
Courts/Justice system	62.3%	67.4%	57.3%
The police	61.4%	74.4%	70.5%
Civil service/Bureaucracy	48.7%	57.4%	41.2%
Central Government	43.4%	58.9%	34.6%
National Parliament	55.2%	54.0%	32.3%
Political Parties	Not asked	34.9%	18.0%

When compared to the western average, Turkish people seem to feel more confident with their public institutions than Western nations. Even though scepticism about government agencies could be perceived as a feature of democratic citizenship (Hardin 1999, quoted in Rothstein and Stolle 2001, p.8), higher institutional trust in Turkey is an advantage for the aims of this study. When people trust in their governments, it is more likely they will cooperate with them. Thus, it would be easier to follow any top-down policies in Turkish context.

In summary the consequence of the changing internal and external conditions, Turkey has experienced a civil society reform process since the mid-1990s. Freedom of association has widely developed within the period. The father-state approach has been abandoned to a large extent and a 'servant-state' understanding has been embedded, at least legislatively. Consequently, it is claimed under current circumstances that state and society are more reconciled than ever before in the history of the Republic of Turkey. However, the political context is just the one side of the

¹⁶ Confidence and trust are translated into Turkish in exactly the same meaning.

coin. It is important to know about the civil context's ability to adapt to changing superstructures and operate in a more enabling civil environment. It is sociological and behavioural patterns, social norms and networks that form social capital from the bottom. Thus, this chapter will turn to analysis of the civil context in Turkey.

4.4 The Civil Context in Turkey:

This section starts with defining the legal framework for civil society organisations (CSO) in Turkey. As a reflection of sovereign nation-state understanding, operations of civil society organisations are regulated by particular laws and bylaws in some detail. Despite the fact there is not a clear definition of CSOs in Turkish legislation, there are several legal entities described in legal documents and they can be included in the umbrella term. Brief explanations of regulated CSOs below are necessary to be informed of the civil context in Turkey.

The most common type of CSOs in Turkey are 'associations'. According to Law of Associations Nr. 5253, an association is defined as *'A legal entity formed by at least seven real or legal persons who gather to unite their knowledge and works, in order to achieve a certain common goal which is non-profit and legally permitted'*. According to this legal definition, two main features of associations come to the fore: associations should have a legal and non-profit aim, and they are group of real and/or legal persons.

The second important CSO type in the Turkish context is 'charitable foundations'. According to Turkish Civil Law Nr. 4721, Article 101, charitable foundations are *'legal entities in the form of good or property ensembles which are formed by real or legal persons who allocate appropriate properties or property rights to achieve a certain and continuous service'*. The main difference between an association and a charitable foundation is the former is shaped as being a group of people, while the latter is an ensemble of properties. Despite the fact charitable foundations are also shaped by people, its main character is its reliance on an economic source to achieve a certain goal. Charitable foundations are managed by board of trustees while associations are formed by various people. Thus, associations are more likely to create social capital and are more valuable in the scope of this study.

In the Turkish context, trade unions and labour unions, professional organisations, chambers, and co-operatives are also regarded as CSOs; however, they have some inconsistencies in meeting the meaning and practices of civil society. For example, some professional organisations and chambers are established by law, membership to these organisations is mandatory for professionals such as advocates, pharmacists, medical doctors, architects and engineers.

Nevertheless, when the term CSO is used in a speech, all these forms of organisations come to mind in the Turkish connotation.

Table 6 below, shows numerical information about leading CSO types in Turkey:

Table 6: Civil society organisations in Turkey

Legal Status	Number	%
Associations	102.547 ¹⁷	84.4
Charitable Foundations	5.175 ¹⁸	4.3
Unions of Public Employees	137 ¹⁹	0.1
Labour Unions	140 ²⁰	0.1
Professional Chambers	4.749 ²¹	3.9
Cooperatives	8.723 ²²	7.2
TOTAL	121.471	100

A great majority of CSOs in Turkey operate in the form of associations. Although charitable foundations are also important in civil society, their practices are generally performed through economic means and a considerable portion of charitable foundations are aimed at educational support for children and youth. When it comes to labour unions, there are mainly two types based on the legal status of employees. In the Turkish context, the state is a large employer. Employees of the state are generally known as ‘civil servants’ (*memur in Turkish*), which is a legal status that conveys some extra limitations and obligations to the bearer. Only after 1995 did civil servants achieve the right to organise in unions. Due to the peculiar status of civil servants, unions

¹⁷ As of July 2014, Source: Ministry of Interior, Department of Associations www.dernekler.gov.tr

¹⁸ As of July 2013, Source: General Directorate of Foundations www.vgm.gov.tr

¹⁹ As of July 2014, Source: Ministry of Labour and Social Security
<http://www.csgb.gov.tr/csgbPortal/csgb.portal?page=uye>

²⁰ As of July 2014, Source: Ministry of Labour and Social Security
<http://www.csgb.gov.tr/csgbPortal/csgb.portal?page=uye>

²¹ As of 2010, Source: CIVICUS Civil Society Country Report for Turkey, 2010.

²² As of April 2014, Source: Ministry of Customs and Trade
<http://risk.gtb.gov.tr/data/53c51210f2937014d8929ac7/2014%20yili%20kooperatif%20ve%20birl%20sayisi.pdf>

of public employees are legally different from conventional labour unions. Thus, there are two types of labour organisations in the Turkish context. According to data publications of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, there are nearly 2.270.000 civil servants in the public sector and 12.300.000 workers in the private sector. However, only 9.68% of workers are members of a labour union.

As organised civil society is dominated by associations in Turkey, this study will pay more importance to associational activities and their relationships with public authorities. Additionally, basic characteristics of associations, such as their structures helping people create new networks, democratic election and assembly practises, voice and issue rising efforts make them much more valuable in social capital creation among their members. Current practices of association-state relationships in Turkey has also created a presupposition not only in Turkish public opinion, but also in researcher's idea that associations are regarded as the leading civil society organisations in the Turkish context. The term, CSOs is used to indicate associations unless otherwise stated throughout this study. Thus, civil society in Turkey will be elaborated in a greater depth through association activities below.

4.4.1 The current circumstances of associations as CSOs in Turkey:

According to data derived from the Department of Associations, the total number of association members is approximately 9.183.277 as of March 2013²³. When proportioned to total population, almost 12% of the Turkish nation is organised under associations. The low level of organisational activity is also reflected in a recent wave of World Values Survey (2010-2014). Table 7 below provides comparable data on organisational membership rates of several Western countries in the recent survey.

Table 7: Organisational membership rates in comparison

Not a member to a/an...	Western (%)	Turkey (%)
Religious organisation	58.7	97.3
Sports/recreational org.	62.7	95.5

²³ Readers might find these figures quite precise. In practice, Department of Associations of Ministry of Interior is able to track associational activities through a web portal known as DERBIS, Turkish acronym for Associations Information System, an e-state application. Through DERBIS, associations could easily report legal information, statements and any changes in their circumstances. This was designed to ease bureaucratic regulations against civil society, and it provides quite clear information about associations for the policy makers.

Art/music/educational org.	77.8	96.6
Humanitarian/charitable org.	77.1	97.2

Low membership rates of Turks to religious organisations can be explained to some extent because religious activities are generally performed informally due to secular legal regulations. In fact, there are various Islamic cults organised in social layers and many people have connections with these informal organisations. However, there is not a plausible causation for low rates in other fields of CSOs. The difference between actual membership figures of the Associations Department and WVS results is considered to be methodological. The sample size of WVS (2010-2014) in Turkey is just 1605 people. One way or another, low membership rates of Turkish people remain a fact in comparison to Western countries.

No matter how rare association membership is, dispersion of existing associations through activity types and geography requires attention to understand the Turkish civil context in a greater depth. According to the Department of Associations' publications, three main areas of operations dominate association types: Sports, Mosque construction, and mutual aid. Table 8 below shows dispersion of associations over their field of activities.

Table 8: Fields of Activities²⁴

Fields of Activities (2013)	%
Sports	17.45
Mosque construction	17.17
Mutual aid	16.35
Development	11.78
Professional cooperation	10.13
Community life	7.40
Friendship	4.64
Culture & art	4.46
Health	2.26
Environment	1.83
Social activities	1.63


²⁴ Source: Ministry of Interior, Department of Associations www.dernekler.gov.tr

Town planning	1.47
Civil rights	0.92
Youth	0.86
Other	1.65
TOTAL	100

Due to legal regulations, sports clubs are required to organise in the form of associations. Similarly, mosque construction activities are easier when charitable people gather around an association. Mosque builders can collect monetary aids when they are organised as associations since the Law of Charity Collection requires such an organisation involved in charitable works. A significant point is associations aiming to consolidate of civil rights are quite rare, so this reflects Turkish people do not prefer getting together to give voice to foster citizenship rights. Among the mutual aid associations, the most prevalent is 'fellow countrymen associations'. According to the Department of Associations, nearly %10 of all active associations are formed under this category. Fellow countrymen associations are established by inland immigrants who moved to metropolitan cities from almost all over Turkey. Through these associations, newly immigrated families could find jobs and homes to live more easily. They also keep their bonds with their birthplaces using association connections.

Along with the type of activities, geographical distribution of associations varies across the regions of Turkey. Graph 1 below shows the Marmara region has nearly 35% of all associations. It is also the most populated and socio-economically developed region of Turkey.


Graph 1: Geographical dispersion of associations (%)



When it comes to gender distribution of association members, figures show a totally unequal structure. The Department of Associations announced in 2011 that only 18.14% of association members are women. So, formal participation of women in civil society organisations is quite low.

The last data for quantification of associational activities is the increase in figures of association numbers over the years. Graph 2 below shows increasing trend of association numbers for the period of 1960-2014²⁵.

Graph 2: Increasing trend in association numbers



It is clear that associational activity in Turkey increased enormously in the second half of 20th century and continues to increase. This steady course of increase was interrupted sharply following the 1980 military coup, reasons of which were discussed in the previous section.

Following the quantitative data that reveals only one aspect of civil context, some qualitative indicators of civil fabric require discussing. In order to provide more accurate information on Turkish civil context; social values related to social capital, like religion, family, women, tolerance, trust, charitable actions and voluntarism of Turkish people will be reviewed mainly through the World Values Survey (2010-2014), Family Structure Research (2011) and Family Values Study (2010) results below.

²⁵ Source: Ministry of Interior Department of Associations' archive records.

4.4.2 The religious characteristics

It is possible one of the most prevalent features characterising the Turkish nation is religion. Table 9 below shows WVS results about religiousness.

Table 9: Religiousness

Agree with the statement...	Western	Turkey
Religion is very important in life	17.4%	68.1%
I pray several times a day	10.0%	48.6%
I am a religious person	48.9%	83.5%
I believe in God	63.1%	97.8%

Turkey has higher scores compared to Western countries in any question regarding religion. Another study illustrating the religious characteristics of the Turkish nation and reflections of religion over daily life is the Ministry of Family and Social Policy's Family Structure Research²⁶. According to surveys, Turkish people tend to consider religion when they decide on important matters and/or daily life actions. Table 10 below reveals religion is substantially dominant over the Turkish approach to social and individual decisions. In addition to Table 10, the same study has also showed 93.9% of Turks define themselves as performers of religious requirements.

Table 10: Reflections of religion over daily life (%)

Religion is...	Never decisive	Not decisive	Even	Decisive	Very decisive	No answer	TOTAL
Choosing a spouse	4.1	11.1	6.4	50.0	27.5	0.9	100
Choosing a friend	7.2	22.3	11.7	41.8	16.4	0.6	100
Relations with neighbours	7.9	25.1	13.4	37.8	15.2	0.6	100
Job preferences	10.1	28.8	15.4	31.0	13.3	1.4	100
Political voting	8.8	24.3	12.5	37.0	15.9	1.5	100
Clothing	7.0	22.1	11.5	41.5	17.3	0.6	100

²⁶ Family Structure Research (2011) Ministry of Family and Social Policies.

preferences							
Food choice	5.3	15.5	8.9	47.6	22.1	0.6	100

A similar study of the Prime Ministry's General Directorate of Family and Social Studies²⁷ found 70.3% of respondents agreed with the statement 'people should live their lives in accordance with religious norms'. In addition to that, 85.3% of participants think they should pray frequently.

In spite of the early practices of the republican era against religious beliefs, it is obvious citizens still attribute much importance to religion. In general, religion, particularly Islam, encourages people to be part of society and to be trustworthy through group prayers, charitable networks and fair behaviours. In this meaning, religion can be regarded as a source of social capital. However, religious organisations and groups can also create discrimination and polarisation and distrust of members of other religions or sects. Nevertheless, the unifying and bonding features of religions generally outweigh its negative outcomes which are generally misinterpretations and radical practices of religions. In Turkey's situation, religion is an important source of bonding social capital especially through its influence over family life and charitable networks, as they are discussed below.

4.4.3 The importance of family

Like religion, family is another important social foundation in Turkish society. Even though patriarchal family structures have eroded overtime, the Turks still regard family as an important source of social cohesion and solidarity²⁸. The World Values Survey shows 95.4% of Turkish respondents indicated their families as 'very important' in their lives (Western average is 87.8%). In addition, 93.7% of Turks trust their families 'completely' (Western average is 76.6%). In the Family Values Study (2010) of Prime the Ministry's General Directorate of Family and Social Studies, importance given to families is measured through specific survey questions. Table 11 below reveals family is very important for Turkish people.

Table 11: Importance of family

Statement	Totally agree	Agree	Neither agree nor	Disagree	Totally disagree	TOTAL
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²⁷ Family Values Study (2010).

²⁸ According to TurkStat, 68.6% of all families are nuclear (parents and children only). However, in Turkish connotation, family can extend through close relatives like married siblings, grandparents or uncles and aunts, even when they live in separate houses.

			disagree			
Family is the first place to refuge in times of financial or emotional troubles	41.8	42.0	9.8	4.2	2.2	100
I can go through any trouble for the sake of my family	48.2	42.1	7.6	1.8	0.3	100
Family elders' opinions are important in family life	27.7	44.8	17.9	7.2	2.4	100
It is important to meet relatives frequently	19.9	42.5	23.5	11.2	2.9	100
Children should know about parents' relatives	39.6	49.5	8.6	2.9	0.4	100

Another finding of the Family Structure Research (2011) quoted in Table 12 below, presents that Turkish people frequently get in contact with their family and relatives.

Table 12: Contact frequency with family members and relatives (%)

	Never	Few times a year	Few times a month	Few times a week	Everyday	TOTAL
Spouse	0.5	0.9	1.4	1.8	95.4	100
Mother	1.0	18.3	18.2	23.3	39.2	100
Father	1.8	19.4	19.4	22.1	37.3	100
Daughter	0.6	8.2	9.8	14.0	67.4	100
Son	0.6	7.8	7.7	10.7	73.2	100
Sister	1.8	24.2	30.9	26.0	17.1	100
Brother	2.5	23.7	30.2	24.1	19.5	100
Uncle-1 ²⁹	7.1	38.1	32.3	16.9	5.6	100
Uncle-2	6.6	41.5	33.2	15.1	3.6	100

²⁹ In Turkish, there are two different words for uncles and aunts. Uncle-1 is the father's brother, Uncle-2 is the mother's brother; Aunt-1 is the mother's sister, Aunt-2 is the father's sister. Similarly, Grandmother-1 is mother's mother; Grandmother-2 is father's mother. There are also some specific words for the brother's and sister's wives and husbands, and for the aunt's husband and the uncle's wife. These detailed classifications of relatives in the language might also be regarded to indicate the importance of relatives and respect towards them in Turks' daily life. Calling a family elder with his/her name is totally unacceptable and a shame.

Aunt-1	5.3	42.0	34.5	15.2	3.0	100
Aunt-2	6.6	41.4	34.7	14.0	3.3	100
Mother-in-law	3.0	26.2	29.5	23.6	17.7	100
Father-in-law	3.3	27.2	29.7	23.6	16.2	100
Grandmother-1	4.2	40.2	31.4	17.5	6.7	100
Grandmother-2	6.1	35.6	29.1	18.6	10.6	100
Grandfather	5.8	38.5	31.3	17.2	7.2	100

Table 12 shows the rate of respondents who never get in contact with relatives is not more than 7.1% in any category. Even though contacting frequency changes in proportion with the proximity of relations, it is still seen Turks preserve family connections extensively. There is also a connection between strong family structure and religiousness of society in general. The Family Values Study (2010) has detected this interconnection by asking for a clear statement. According to survey results, 87.1% of the sample agreed that ‘family should be loyal to religious and spiritual values’. Similarly, a specific question of the World Values Survey showed 69.4% of the Turkish sample defined themselves as someone where *tradition is important to him/her; to follow the customs handed down by one’s religion or family* (Western average is 36.8%).

These strong family ties and importance given to the family would also have consequences over people’s networks. Good relations with the extended family members would provide both emotional and fiscal support in times of crisis and other needs. However, if a person is widely supported by family establishment, his/her willingness to connect with other people would be less when compared to a lonely person. Therefore, surrounded and supported by robust family ties and close networks, this person would not feel the need to invest in bridging networks. Thus, a stronger family might mean less bridging social capital and more bonding social capital.

4.4.4 Trust and tolerance

Undoubtedly, the bonding features of religiousness and intense family connections lead to an inward-looking society. One of the main disadvantages of the Turkish nation in terms of bridging social capital is derived from these social structures which limit individuals through low trust levels to outer networks and to the strangers in society. WVS (2010-2014) has demonstrated Turkey has one of the lowest trust levels among participating nations as only 11.6 % of respondents find ‘most people’ trustworthy. Table 13 below shows trust levels towards social groups in Turkey and the Western average. Even though generalised trust is low, the Turks find their closer networks more trustworthy.

Table 13: Trust in people

	Western %	Turkey %
Most people can be trusted	44.6%	11.6%
Need to be very careful	53.7%	82.9%
Trust completely: Family	76.6%	93.7%
Trust completely: Neighbourhood	15.1%	36.9%
Trust completely: People personally known	28.6%	31.9%
Trust completely: People of another religion	5.1%	4.6%
Trust completely: People of another nationality	5.4%	4.4%

The Family Values Study (2010) has more comprehensive results than those of WVS with a larger sampling in Turkey. Table 14 below shows the percentages of trust towards other people decreases dramatically beyond familiar networks.

Table 14: Trust to social groups

	Trust completely	Trust partly	Neither trust nor distrust	Don't trust much	Distrust	TOTAL
Children	88.8	8.5	1.4	0.7	0.6	100
Spouse	88.1	7.8	1.5	1.3	1.3	100
Parents	85.3	7.8	4.9	1.0	1.0	100
Siblings	76.4	15.6	3.3	2.4	2.3	100
Relatives	36.4	34.3	12.2	9.5	7.6	100
Neighbours	21.7	36.8	23.1	11.7	6.7	100
Colleagues	20.4	38.0	23.5	10.9	7.2	100
Fellow countrymen	19.5	32.0	25.2	14.3	9.0	100
Persons first met	4.8	8.7	11.6	26.1	48.8	100

Low trust to outer networks deters people from getting involved in new social groups and prevents them from establishing bridges and connections that would help them finding new information channels, refuge points, jobs, etc. In other words, as long as trust level remains low, new opportunities to create social capital for individuals remain limited.

It is also interesting the Family Values Study revealed gender differences in social trust. Results indicated women feel less trust than men against most of the people in the groups in the table above.

Lower trust levels towards outer networks and strangers also correspond with high intolerance towards disadvantaged groups in society. The WVS (2010-2014) results revealed Turkish people have negative interpretations of 'some definite' people and do not want to have them as neighbours. Table 15 below indicates Turkey has higher levels of intolerance in any subject compared to the western average.

Table 15: Tolerance

Would not like to have as neighbours...	Western %	Turkey%
Drug addicts	81.3	93.3
People of a different race	7.4	35.8
People who have AIDS	15.5	74.9
Immigrants/foreign workers	13.3	30.5
Homosexuals	15.5	85.4
People of a different religion	5.5	36.8
Heavy drinkers	67.1	83.3
Unmarried couples living together	3.8	65.4
People who speak a different language	9.7	30.0

Intolerance against two particular groups, homosexuals and unmarried couples, is strikingly higher than the western average and can also be regarded as a reflection of high importance given to the family. Negative attitudes against heavy drinkers and drug addicts can be justified even in democratic societies; however, Turkey's significantly higher intolerance against different races and identities could give clues about the level of democratic culture, in terms of forbearance to other ideas or preferences. This finding can also be interpreted as Turkish people favour a rather homogenous community. In terms of bridging and bonding social capital classification, a more homogenous society would correspond with a more bonding social capital.

4.4.5 Charitable features

Another important feature of the social context and social capital potential of Turkey is charitable activities and attitudes of Turkish people. Even though the latest WVS wave does not ask about charitable and voluntary activities in the Turkish sample, another international institution,

Charities Aid Foundation's World Giving Index 2013, which measures *helping a stranger*, *donating money* and *volunteering time* as three main dimensions of charitable activities, showed Turkey is 128th among 135 countries. This research found that 34% of Turks help a stranger, 13% donate money to a charity and only 5% use their spare time for voluntary works.

On the other hand; it has been found in a research of the Third Sector Foundation in Turkey (TUSEV) 80% of people in Turkey make a donation. The difference between the two studies might result from methodological issues. TUSEV's (2006) study is probably more accurate since it involves direct donations not given through institutions. Thus, TUSEV's study is largely cited below.

As the reflection of a religious society, the main motive behind charitable donations is *to meet religious duties*³⁰. Table 16 below shows motivation factors behind donation activities of the Turks.

Table 16: Motivations behind donations

Motivation	%
To meet religious duties	32.5
Traditions and customs	26.2
Obligation felt to society	12.9
Personal satisfaction	12.2
Expectations from society	8.8
To continue family practices	7.1
Other	0.3

Additionally, the study above found 86.9% of respondents would prefer direct donations and not use intermediary institutions. When reasons behind this decision are asked, *most of the respondents (74.4%) expressed that individual giving is spontaneous, small, direct, and geared to help those close by to meet immediate needs, and therefore may not rely on an organized system of giving. Most importantly, since the sum given is small, such direct mobilization may also be more efficient than using an institutional intermediary.* Lack of knowledge (9%) and low trust (11.9%) of institutions also play a role in preferring direct aid rather than institutional

³⁰ In Islamic tradition, two main types of donations are required: *Zekat* and *Fitre*. Zekat is given by people who have capital stock at least equivalent to worth of 80 grams pure gold. 1/40 of capital stock has to be given to the poor as zekat each year. Fitre is given in Ramadan month and means feeding a poor for one day. In addition to these, generous giving of '*sadaka*' to the poor is always encouraged within the belief that '*sadaka draws troubles away*'.

intermediation. As a natural result of this, institutional donations remain limited making charitable associations weak.

When it comes to giving priorities, the study above revealed that people would prefer giving donations to relatives and neighbours initially. Responses showed 39.2% of them would give aid to relatives in need, 25.5% to a needy neighbour, and 18.8% to a needy person in the same region. So, almost 80% of people tend to give aid in their closer networks. This might also be regarded as a consequence of the Islamic belief system, which regards giving priority to relatives in charitable actions a better deed. This also explains why people generally prefer direct donations instead of contributing to civil society organisations; in simple terms, no one requires an intermediary institution to help a relative.

Among the various aims of institutional giving, aids to disadvantaged groups and education purposes are dominant. The first three rows of Table 17 below indicate nearly 60% of institutional charitable giving is aimed at the principal services of a welfare state.

Table 17: Areas of institutional giving

Areas of donations	%
Poverty alleviation	28
Education	18
Aids for the disabled	13
Religion	10
Disaster relief	9
Children and youth	6
Health	6
Human rights	4
Culture & art	2
Socio-economic development	2
Environment	0.8
Consumer rights	0.3
Animal rights	0.3
Research & development	0.3
Sports	0.3
Total	100

In summary, inward looking characteristics of society, religion and strong family ties are also reflected in charitable activities. People tend to give donations directly to the poor who are members of their immediate and informal networks. Bonds that glue social layers together are strengthened through these donation patterns. In such a society, it would be natural that charitable civil society organisations cannot emerge as financially strong establishments. In terms of bridging social capital, it is difficult to say people get into new formal networks extensively through their charitable activities since they do not need formal associations to carry out a 'good deed'. In other words, charitable activities are realised in closed networks that are qualitatively more supportive in producing bonding social capital in Turkey's environment.

4.4.6 Women's position in Turkish society

The last indicator concerning the main characteristics of Turkish society is the general perceptions towards women. As the result of strong family ties, women's role in society is strongly associated with family life. Even though women's position in society has evolved positively following educational and political reforms throughout the history of the Republic, the general perception in Turkey defines women's role as mothers and wives.

According to TurkStat (2013), the education level of women is generally lower than that of men. Nearly 7.5% of women at the age of 15 and over are still illiterate. This rate is much lower for men, which is 1.5%. Table 18 below shows women's education rate decreases towards higher education levels.

Table 18: Education levels by gender (15 years of age and over)

Education level	Total	Male	Female	Male%	Female%
Illiterate	2.643.712	443.640	2.200.072	16.8	83.2
Literate but no school completed	3.829.953	1.203.461	2.626.492	31.4	68.6
Primary school	14.994.232	6.454.722	8.539.510	43.0	57.0
Primary education	11.959.942	6.783.011	5.176.931	56.7	43.3
Secondary school	2.828.299	1.720.425	1.107.874	60.8	39.2
High school	12.085.335	6.976.694	5.108.641	57.7	42.3
Higher education	6.706.780	3.762.530	2.944.250	56.1	43.9
Master's	532.757	313.397	219.360	58.8	41.2
Doctorate	154.180	93.407	60.773	60.5	39.5
Education status	1.683.918	862.885	821.033	51.2	48.8

unknown					
Total	57.419.108	28.614.172	28.804.936	49.8	50.2

Illiteracy is also more prevalent among the elderly. TurkStat also revealed more than 1.3 million of illiterate citizens are over 65 years of age. Naturally, illiteracy rates will decrease as older generations pass away. However, low rates in women education at any schooling level is still a fact. Family Structure Research (2011) has also revealed women's average age of marriage is around 20. This explains to some extent why women quit education before university level.

Along with lower education levels, society tends to cast feminine roles for women to a large extent. According to TurkStat, labour force participation rate of women is around 26%³¹ and lowest among EU and candidate countries in 2011. This might be a result of androcentric ideas that governs social and family relations.

According to WVS (2010-2014), perceptions towards women in Turkish society are substantially different from those of western cultures. Table 19 below indicates that women in Turkey are not regarded as bread winners, politicians or business executives.

Table 19: International perceptions towards women

Agree with the statement...	Western %	Turkey %
When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women	8.5	59.4
When a mother works for pay, the children suffer	25.0	65.9
If a woman earns more money than her husband, it's almost certain to cause problems	12.1	47.1
On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do	14.3	68.0
On the whole, men make better business executives than women do	21.2	64.1

³¹ Source: <http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=16056>

In practice, as of February 2014, only 14.4% of MPs are women in the Grand National Assembly. For the same date, western average is about 34%³². Low female participation in local politics is also a fact in Turkey. After the March 2014 local authority elections, the percentage of elected women councillors is only 12%³³.

Similarly, the Family Values Study (2010) showed results in parallel with the World Values Survey that Turkish society is androcentric. Table 20 below is derived from FVS questions that measure relevant social perceptions.

Table 20: Perceptions towards woman

Statement	Totally agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Totally disagree	TOTAL
Fundamental duty of a women is to look after children and housework	17.0	33.7	18.0	22.5	8.8	100
Final decision over a matter is always man's	22.4	31.5	17.1	19.7	9.3	100
Head of the family is always the husband	32.4	34.0	14.2	13.2	6.2	100
Man is responsible for breadwinning	25.6	35.3	15.7	16.6	6.8	100
Having a boy child is more prestigious	10.7	17.8	15.4	34.2	21.9	100
Husband can beat wife if she disobeys	5.5	10.9	11.1	29.8	42.7	100

Even though most of the respondents disagree with the final statement above, it is still important to underline that more than 16% of people still believe husbands have the right to beat their wives. The World Values Survey (2010-2014) has also posed a similar question revealing 81% of the Turkish sample never justified the statement; however, it is still lower than the western average, which is 85%. On the other hand, TurkStat has revealed through surveys nearly 39% of

³² Source: Women in Parliament and Government Report Nr. SN1250, <http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/research/briefing-papers/SN01250/women-in-parliament-and-government> . Accessed in October 2014.

³³ Source: High Council of Elections

women in Turkey have been exposed to domestic violence from their husbands or partners, at least one time in their lives.

In summary, women are still far from emerging as equal members of Turkish society. Lower education levels, low labour force participation, mother and housewife roles tend to confine women in their homes. The results of the Family Structure Research (2011) has also indicated women are less active than men in social and cultural activities. Table 21 illustrates the habitual spare time activities of Turks.

Table 21: Spare time activities

Activity	Never %		Sometimes %		Frequently %	
	Men	Women	Man	Women	Man	Women
Going out: cafe houses	58.8	98.7	32.3	1.0	8.9	0.3
Going out: bars/night clubs	90.9	96.7	7.5	2.9	1.6	0.4
Going out: clubs/associations	83.7	94.9	13.6	4.2	2.7	0.8
Going out: Eating/drinking	46.3	61.4	45.9	33.1	7.8	5.5
Outdoor sports/gyms	61.2	75.7	31.3	21.1	7.5	3.2
Watching sports matches	64.6	93.0	26.6	6.0	8.8	0.9
Watching a movie/theatre	72.3	77.1	24.4	19.6	3.3	3.3
Handcrafting hobbies	57.2	38.0	35.5	44.1	7.3	17.9
Reading a newspaper	19.8	46.3	47.5	39.8	32.7	13.9
Reading a book	41.3	47.0	46.7	39.5	12.0	13.6
Using internet	56.9	73.7	20.0	13.9	23.1	12.4

It is obvious Turkish people are not fond of some western style socialisation especially like nightlife or club activities. On the other hand, men's and women's habits are different in some aspects. The only habitual action that women are more interested in is handcrafting. Newspaper and book reading follow as being prevalent free time activities for women. Given that handcrafting, newspaper and book reading are not necessarily social activities and can be realised at home alone, it is possible to argue that women tend to spend their spare time on their own.

In conclusion, women's position in Turkish society can be described as being socially disintegrated and isolated in the family establishment. Society tends to perceive women as the main performer of house works and child minding. Even though social situations of women have been changing for the better especially in terms of education over time, they are still disadvantaged in many aspects of social life, in comparison to men. Thus, it can be argued that socially isolated, less

educated, less trusting and confined in strong family and traditional relations, women would have less access to outer social networks to gain advantage resulting in women having less chance than men to invest individually in bridging social capital.

4.4.7 The civil context and its implications over social capital

In search of the predominant features of Turkish society, this section has shown through official data analysis that Turkey has some pros and cons in terms of the contextual background of social capital.

Firstly, the current circumstances of civil society organisations draw a dismal picture. The low level of organisational membership and relatively fewer numbers of CSOs characterise formal civil participation in Turkey. Most of the formal CSOs like sports clubs and mosque building associations are established for practical reasons stem from legal regulations.

Secondly, it is arguable the unwillingness of Turkish people to be involved in associations is mainly due to strong social values. Two prevalent phenomenon that moulded Turkish society as a whole are importance paid to religion and family connections. The Turks place religion in a prominent position in their lives. According to statistics, religion is a factor widely considered in vital decisions. Despite the secular educational policies of the Republic, it is clear religion still plays a significant role in people's relations. Strong family connections are well-preserved in Turkish society. Even though patriarchal family structures have been largely dissolved through modernisation, people place high importance on their immediate family and close relatives.

Religion and strong family ties underline relationship patterns of Turkish people to a large extent and leads to several consequences in production of social capital. In such a society, people's networks tend to remain limited covering immediate family and close relatives, some friends and religious affiliations. Undoubtedly, these strong bonds provide indispensable opportunities to take refuge in times of crisis. So, it is much easier to 'get by' for people who have bonding networks in society. However; confined in limited networks, people would certainly miss the chance of creating new and wider networks and information channels. Therefore creating new 'bridges' and 'getting ahead' would be more difficult in such a society.

As it is shown above, trust towards strangers is significantly low in Turkish society. It is not surprising that people tend to trust their family completely and their neighbours and relatives to a large extent. This creates an adverse effect which makes establishing new networks with formerly unknown people difficult. Thus, it can be argued bridging social capital is badly affected by low trust levels.

These social patterns would also have impacts on people's charitable actions and altruism. According to the World Giving Index, charitable actions and voluntary works of Turks are low. However, domestic researches showed the Turks are frequently involved in philanthropic movements. Because of the religious nature of giving, Turks tend not to prefer intermediary institutions for their charitable actions. Traditionally, charitable works are realised in people's close networks. Most people give aid to close relatives and neighbours as religious norms require doing so. Subsequently the charitable habits of Turkish people are likely to consolidate bonding social capital.

Finally, women's position in Turkish society has been argued above. Women's main responsibility in society is being a wife and mother. They are less educated than men and do not take place in the labour force and civil society organisations equally. Undoubtedly, women have less chance than men to extend their networks beyond family and neighbourhood settings.

All these social conditions and traditional values differentiate Turkish society from western societies, where trust and tolerance is much higher, civil society organisations are stronger and women are more equal with men. Although many modernisation reforms have been made throughout the history of the Republic, it seems that Turkish society still retains its distinctive values of family and religiousness. It can be deduced from the analysis of the sociological context that patterns of bottom-up production of social capital are traditionally and historically designed to foster its bonding types.

4.5 Conclusion: The Political and Civil Context in Turkey and the Need for a Top-down Approach towards Social Capital

As argued above, the political context in Turkey was generally designed as a reflection of state-centric elitist ideas and the product of top-down policies. Emphatically, the political, economic and social circumstances of Turkey in the 1920s was not conducive for the founders to pursue another course. Concerns surrounding the creation of a nation-state from the ashes of an old empire required a revolution from the top since there was almost no social consciousness and democratic demands among social strata to reform the nation as a whole. Suffering from segregationist movements since the 1821 Greek Revolt, the Turks literally became obsessed with unity of the land and nation and did not tolerate questioning of state authority in any way. Different ideas about the legitimacy of the state were regarded as threats against modernisation. Strong state-weak society relations did not give way to consolidation of civil society organisations since the 'father state' provided anything needed for the society in a best way from the top.

Following the 1946's transition to multi-party system, civil society organisations were able to raise their voices, however they were suppressed by the Democrat Party government. As the product of the 1960 military coup, the Constitution of 1961 have recognised many human rights and associational freedoms extensively; however, association activities were dominated by ideological splits, resulting in terror and anarchy in the streets, and the 1980 military coup. Within the prohibitive understanding of the 1982 Constitution, many obstacles against civil freedoms were imposed on Turkish society and the connection between politics and civil society were interrupted. Political participation was reduced to electoral voting and the masses became politically disaffected.

Theoretically, civil society associations have a crucial importance in the creation of social capital in a society. However, the political context that designs civil context through a legal framework was not enabling most of the time in the history of the Republic. The central state always favoured restrictions for civil society organisations on account of national security, and tended to prohibit them whenever the circumstances are deemed appropriate to do so. In such an environment, the democratic proliferation of civil society organisations remained a dream for decades. Thus, it is fair to argue civil associations aiming to consolidate democratic norms like pluralism, a culture of negotiation and tolerance could not take root in social spheres. Turkish people were not able to develop feeling of trust to others since they remained obliged to confine activities to their immediate networks where participation opportunities to outer networks were limited.

When such a disadvantageous legal context was established over already existing and inward looking sociological characteristics, a vicious circle was created and supported by traditional norms. With the effects of religion and strong family connections serving to foster bonding ties, people tended to remain in their close networks and felt reluctant to join in formal associations because they could already realise their philanthropic and social activities within their extended family and in the immediate neighbourhood. Without feeling a need to join in formal associations, people's demand for larger congregational freedoms remained weak. As a result, existing traditional values and political limitations over civil society organisations worked hand in hand to the detriment of the evolution of a modern civil society in Turkey. Thus, Turkish society remained as one of the least organised civil society in the world with very low level of trust as the main components of bridging social capital.

Even though reform process after 2000 and EU membership negotiations have helped to create a more suitable environment for civil society and indicated an enormous increase in associational figures, it is still possible to argue civil society organisations are subject to top-down policies initiated by governments or international bodies. Compared to developed western counterparts,

Turkey as a democratising country reserves an important and exemplary position among others due to its *sui generis* circumstances. If the state organisation is so decisive over the society, why does the state not deliberately work to alter the conditions of civil society positively? If social capital is the product of a historical past (Putnam 1993, 2000), why won't the state attempt to change the course of history? In Turkey's case, it is possible to observe the first fruits of such a change of understanding over the last decade; thus, it is worth Turkey considering studying top-down approaches towards creating social capital.

At point of the contextual discussion, it is possible to assert that two different types of social capital have to be distinguished for the rest of the study. As seen in Turkey's case, traditional norms generally correspond with the bonding type of social capital. However, bridging social capital is conceptually assumed to be more related with contemporary norms due to its nature requiring membership to formal and outer networks, participation in democratic decision making processes, and higher social trust; in general, modern ways of living. In other terms, bridging social capital can be a measure for the social modernisation level of the Turkish nation as well. It is also assumed for the rest of the thesis that neither modernisation progress, nor types of social capital are distributed equally or evenly among various regions of Turkey. Thus, the study will need to explore and measure the dispersion of the two social capital types throughout the regions. As being the product of, or affected by traditional norms, bonding social capital is assumed to be a function of religious and strong family connections, and higher trust within close networks. Thus, it could be measured through indicators of these norms. Similarly, bridging social capital can be measured through internationally accepted indicators of social modernity, like election turnout rates, associational membership rates, and newspaper readership, etc. Then; if the bridging social capital is related to modernity and the overall target of the state and governments is to realise social modernisation along with the economic development of the country as a whole, it is quite plausible for the state and government to invest in bridging social capital in a top-down manner, where it is empirically lower.

As the contextual background of social capital has a political aspect as well, it is also plausible to assume that political context for bridging social capital is not designed perfectly or at least adequately across localities. If an investment to the production of social capital is to be made through a top-down manner, instruments of the state and government would be the peripheral bureaucracy and local politicians. In this instance, the attitudes of the civil servants and local authorities towards civil society will have effects over the local context. Their success in realising the democratic governance in localities and their internalisation level of national civil society reforms needed to be explored. Therefore, the study will try to analyse social capital deeper in the field through the use of appropriate methods.

Chapter 5: METHODOLOGY

5.1 Introduction

As discussed in the previous chapter, Turkey is a challenging context in terms of bottom-up or top-down production of social capital. Accordingly, studying social capital in this context is also a challenging task.

Most importantly, the multifaceted nature of social capital and its sensitiveness to the context preconditions social capital research which will require comprehensive covering of all the possible factors effecting social capital's production. Witnessing the clash of tradition and modernisation approaches over the last two centuries, social capital in Turkish society has evolved where new political understandings and top-down reforms have attempted to dominate and shape society, and traditional norms and values struggled to defend and survive. Turkish society embodied the effects of both, accepting most of the modernisation reforms and preserving the traditional norms and values in daily life. Thus, a comprehensive conceptualisation of social capital including both modern aspects and the longstanding traditions of society, and a corresponding research strategy reflecting the contextual features of Turkey is essential in order to discuss how public authorities can create social capital.

The chapter will question first to what extent existing social capital studies in Turkey have been able to meet the criteria set above. The reader will see the scarcity of the number of social capital studies and their narrow approach in the conceptualisation are the main issues in social capital literature in Turkey. After addressing the weaknesses and gaps, the chapter will continue introducing the design and methodology preferred to realise the research aims. This will include underlining the research question, explore the need for a mixed methods approach to answer the sub-research questions, propose a comprehensive and unique conceptualisation of social capital for the Turkish context, also the measurement issues, challenges and limitations of the empirical phases will be discussed, broadly and systematically.

5.2 The Prior Social Capital Studies in Turkey and a Need for an Advanced Research Design

Social capital research in Turkey is still in its infancy academically and the subject is addressed only once and vaguely in ‘Development Plans for 2007-2013 and 2014-2018’, the main framework for the future development prospects of governments. It is possible to argue to some extent that due to lack of academic interest in the subject, the concept of social capital has not been brought into attention of politicians or state bureaucracy to a large extent. In particular, the production of social capital via state policies is totally unstudied in the Turkish context. Most of the Turkish social capital studies are aimed at showing the low level of social capital in Turkish society. In domestic studies, the low level of trust and low membership figures in civil society organisations are frequently addressed to explain the reason for the low level of social capital. In Turkish literature, the results of the World Values Surveys, European Values Surveys and Eurobarometer are mainly used to compare Turkey’s social capital with that of other countries (Fidrmuc and Gërkhani 2007, Aydemir and Ozsahin 2011, Aydemir and Tecim 2012). However, despite a thorough search on the available data repositories, the researcher was unable to find empirical studies linking the social capital subject with government policies, especially with local contextual designs, political opportunity structures, and participation patterns in decision making processes. Thus, reviewing a literature which is largely non-existent is quite a challenge and also an opportunity to fill what can be considered an academic oversight and close the existing gap in knowledge of this subject.

Nevertheless, the search for social capital literature in Turkey utilised several academic sources entailing national and international journals, web sites (mainly University libraries, Google Scholar and Web of Science), The Council of Higher Education in Turkey’s Thesis Centre, and the National Library in Ankara. Boolean operators were used for possible combinations of the keywords of ‘*social capital, Turkey, participation, governance, government, politics and democracy*’ in English and Turkish as the main themes. The search results revealed that in Turkey the concept of social capital was utilised mainly to explain economic and developmental matters (Erselcan 2009, Yildiz and Topuz 2011, Akin 2012). There are also few examples of research connecting the subject with business administration, and religion (Ozen and Aslan 2006, Ugur 2007, Yukleyen 2010). It is frequently shown in the concluding sections of the studies that authors recommend developing some policies to produce or foster social capital by governments and the state. An empirical study however investigating the ways of designing such policies are non-existent to the researcher’s knowledge at the time of the

study. Thus, this study that is aimed at answering the question *‘how public authorities can produce social capital in Turkey?’*, and will be the first empirical academic research in the field.

However, there is a growing interest in social capital in Turkish academia. The Council of Higher Education in Turkey, the main authority that regulates the academic sphere, publishes the permitted master’s and PhD theses. A search for the keyword ‘social capital’ (sosyal sermaye in Turkish) produces more than 60 results, nearly half of which are PhD theses submitted after 2006. Along with these early academic works, a few articles published in national and international journals exist. Hence the review of Turkish literature does not build an independent chapter, but serves as a standpoint to develop methodological preferences for this study.

The scarcity of saturating academic literature in the field impedes extracting distinct thematic features from the studies and hampers the feasibility of employing systematic review techniques. Even though academic studies in line with the overarching research question of this study are non-existent, there are some studies that partially answer the sub-research questions of this thesis. As mentioned briefly in the first chapter (page 3-5) the bidirectional nature of the sub-research questions involves measurement of social capital across Turkey’s regions. Thus, the studies of social capital’s measurement constitutes the main theme of the literature review in the Turkish context.

In Turkish literature, measurement of social capital is organised at national/regional and organisational level. However, organisational level studies are generally focused on business management and attempts to explain the importance of social capital in commercial firm relationships in organised industrial zones or trading branches. Therefore, these studies are excluded from the literature review since they are not related to political science in general.

National/regional level social capital studies in Turkey can be classified according to various data collection and analysis techniques. A reflection of profoundly dominant quantitative approaches, the first group of the studies reviewed here tends to employ ready-to-use official statistics. As previously mentioned in the international literature review chapter (page 54-55) indicator selection practices of existing studies resembles the authors’ conceptualisations and understandings of social capital in the Turkish context. As a result of different definitions and perceptions over the concept of social capital, indicators vary. Along with the conventional measures of social capital, e.g., association membership, election turnout rates, newspaper

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readership (Kara 2008); some unprecedented indicators like the number of doctors per 100.000 people, domestic electricity consumption (Filiztekin 2009), electricity theft-loss rates, tax collection rates, inland immigration (Tuysuz, 2011), number of mosques per 1000 population (Irmak, 2012), are also employed as social capital indicators. The creativity of the authors in adopting exceptional distal indicators reflects the scarcity of official statistics suitable for social capital's measurement in Turkey. One major weakness of the dependency on readily available official data is that, neither TurkStat, nor any other public institution had collected and published data about types of trust when those studies were conducted. This means, previous studies in Turkey inevitably lack an important indicator to measure social capital, and questions regarding their validity and accuracy arise.

One major finding in the Turkish literature partially answering the first sub question of the study is social capital is strongly correlated with the socio-economic development levels of regions. This is partly because most of the indicators used in those studies are also used as components of the socio-economic development index, as calculated by the Ministry of Development. As a consequence, a major weakness in Turkish literature, a question arise: Is it social capital, or socio-economic development measured?

The second group of studies in Turkish literature uses questionnaire techniques for data collection. (Ari Hareketi 2006, Uguz, et al. 2011, Cekic 2012). These studies are designed to measure social capital at national level. Sample size of these studies varies between 1216-2552 respondents. However, only Cekic's study (2012) reveals findings to making regional comparisons.

The 2006 study of Ari Hareketi (Bee movement) is one of the earliest examples of social capital studies in Turkey. In the reporting paper of the research, was found participation in civil society organisations (12%), generalised trust (13%), and non-electoral political participation (signing a petition, % 13) are low. Turkish people tend to trust in their family and close neighbours extensively. Homage without questioning the superiors is quite common (44%). Free time activities are dominated by home-based entertainment within the family. In general, the research argues that the social capital level of Turkish people is quite low and it should be increased in order to consolidate democracy in society.

Another example for questionnaire design, Uguz, et al. conducted research to measure social capital at national level in Turkey, using a survey design (Uguz et al, 2011). They used a sample of 1577 respondents covering 19 provinces across all statistical regions of Turkey. The main findings of the study are as follows: A large proportion of Turkish population believes most

people are generally self-seekers, institutional and non-institutional civic participation is low, political participation is confined to formal elections. Along with these findings, high trust in family members and low generalised trust against strangers reflects trust patterns in the sample. Network size among people is small but existing networks involve dense and strong relationships. Turkish people enjoy the advantages and opportunities of close networks especially in terms of financial and emotional crisis, however, bridging connections and benefits gathered via these networks are limited.

Another comprehensive study aimed at the measurement of social capital across the regions of Turkey is Cekic's (Cekic 2012) recent study. Some findings of that study were also used by the researcher to serve the aims of the current research. Cekic's study employs a mix of primary and secondary data collection methods on social capital. Primarily, Cekic conducted a telephone survey of a sample of 2552 respondents covering all regions of Turkey. The survey questions were aimed at revealing philanthropic tendencies, participation in civil society organisations and political participation. Secondarily, official statistics of newspaper readership, election turnout rates and membership figures of civil society organisations were included in the analysis. Following a principal component analysis, three factors were extracted: 'sense of community, philanthropy and active participation'. Cekic calculates the civil society index across regions and her findings show a similar lower east- higher west direction of social capital dispersion across Turkey's regions. This finding corresponds with the findings of previous studies (Tuysuz, Kara, Filiztekin) reviewed. However, trust as a social capital component is missing from Cekic's study, too.

5.3 The Weaknesses and Gaps in Turkish literature

As a new subject, social capital in Turkish literature offers a scarce area of academic research and there are many gaps needing further research.

Early examples of social capital studies in Turkey show different conceptualisations of the subject and their measurement techniques vary, reflecting the limitations of available, ready-to-use data. In general, the low level of social capital in Turkish society is represented by low civil participation and low trust figures, and researchers tend to use results of international surveys to defend their theses. A limited number of academic studies employ questionnaire techniques with limited samples, structuring main question sets drawn from social capital

literature in general. Studies aimed at the dispersion of social capital across Turkey's regions show similar results confirming western and more developed parts of Turkey are richer for social capital stocks. However, the sociological background of the regions and the main social values like tradition, family, trust and religion are generally absent and not utilised as indicators of different types of social capital. As discussed in the context chapter, measurement of social capital is a challenge in Turkey due to historical and cultural circumstances differentiating Turkey from the developed western countries where social capital was first conceptualised. However, conceptualisation of social capital under its bridging and bonding forms is widely omitted and a weak point of Turkish literature on the subject. On the other hand, low civic engagement measured through some conventional indicators like association membership and political participation might not be necessarily the case, as social capital can take different forms in different settings. For example, a study conducted across EU countries found Poland has relatively lower social capital than others, however it may also be reflected through unorganised civic involvement and informal participation practices (Maloney 2008, p.20). Therefore, a measurement activity which is limited in conventional social capital indicators, or employs indicators of socio-economic development as distal indicators of social capital, has to be limited as it is so in Turkish literature.

More importantly, academic research that connects the subject with social capital's production through top-down state policies and an institutional approach are non-existent in the Turkish literature. Even though most of the authors conclude and suggest governments and state institutions should play a role to produce or support social capital, a research studying how to do this, and revealing social capital's context dependant feature at local level is absent. The effect and implications of state-civil society relations, participation opportunities in decision making structures on social capital's formation is a totally unstudied area, a prime target of this study.

In summary, a need for an advanced research design incorporating measurement of different types of social capital, and then connecting it into production issues through state policies in Turkish context has emerged as an important gap in Turkish literature. The rest of the chapter will explain the methodological attempt to fill that gap.

5.4 The Research Design and Preferred Methodology

As mentioned in the review of Turkish literature, a more comprehensive approach is required to open a new avenue for Turkish academia. It would be unfair to underestimate the earliest

examples of social capital studies in Turkey since they established some conclusions to draw lessons from, however, the weak points have to be eliminated and the gaps remaining need to be filled conducting further studies that grasp the social capital issues better through adding different and alternative perspectives of the Turkish context.

Hence, this section will introduce and justify the methodological approaches followed by the researcher, and the adapted techniques in design, data collection and analysis activities.

Starting with the clarification of the research aims, questions and hypothesis, research philosophy surrounding the theoretical roots of the research topic will be described. Following this, the research strategy, which designed the empirical efforts to answer the research questions, is explained. The deployment of mixed methods of quantitative and qualitative approaches is discussed. The research applies a ‘two-phase design’, constituting two separate researches, former of which provides a standpoint for the latter; and quantitative and qualitative parts of the study are explored discretely.

For each phase of the research, preferred data sources and data collection techniques, process and methods of analysis, validity and reliability issues, challenges and limitations encountered during the empirical study are conveyed. Quality issues of validity, replicability and reliability are also discussed where required.

5.4.1 The research aims, research questions and hypothesis

Introduced in the first chapter (page 3) the researcher formulated the overarching research question as *‘what are the roles of governments for the production of social capital?’* This formulation reflects a clear institutional approach that argues deliberate state actions influence social capital in a ‘top-down’ manner.

The overarching research question involves a presupposition hypothetically, social capital can be created through top-down policies. However, this hypothesis generates further questions. *If social capital is to be produced by policies, how will social capital be measured? How will policy makers know where to ‘invest’ and where to focus?* As social capital is the product of both sociological infrastructure and political superstructures, it is assumed the social capital levels of the regions in Turkey are affected by those pre-determinants. Thus, the first sub-hypothesis emerges as *‘social capital is not distributed evenly or equally across regions’*. The first target of the research is to conceptualise and measure regional distribution of social capital in Turkey.

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Once the levels of social capital are measured, the study will need to focus on specific cases possibly reflecting discrepancies from the mainstream dispersion. These discrepancies are expected to allow the researcher to focus on specific cases to study in a greater depth.

As the overarching research question and overarching hypothesis discusses a political approach to the creation of social capital, it is also assumed social capital is a context dependent subject due to its sensitivity to political and legal framework. Consequently the second sub-question emerges as *'how the contextual features of localities are designed and, affect production of social capital?'* The answer to this question will serve the primary aim of the study since it involves an analysis of the state-civil society relationship at local levels. Following on, the second sub-hypothesis is formulated as *'differences of social capital levels across localities correspond with the quality of the state-civil society relations.'* As a result, the second target of the research is to analyse and interpret the local contexts and interpenetration of the state and civil society.

5.4.2 The research philosophy and strategy: Two-phase design

As already discussed the overarching research question and hypothesis trigger two further sub-questions and hypothesis, resulting in the research following a bidirectional philosophy and strategy.

Firstly, the research requires a measurement effort to reveal the different levels of social capital across Turkey's regions. As reviewed in Chapter 3, measurement of social capital is a complex issue. From the early applications of James Coleman (1988) and Robert Putnam (1993, 2000), measurement of social capital was instigated and operated by academics and development institutions using a vast range of numerical indicators. This is a dominant quantitative approach to the theory of social capital. Following this tradition, this research prefers quantitative methods for the measurement of social capital across Turkey's regions.

Secondly, the research requires a contextual analysis to answer the second sub-question and test the second hypothesis. In general, qualitative methods are preferred for contextual analysis. As the second target of the study is to shed light state-civil society relations, a qualitative position is preferred to see the world through the eyes of people of related parties.

Since the sub-research questions require different methodologies, neither quantitative, nor qualitative designs can answer them adequately on their own. For this reason a mixed


methods design is useful to provide the answer to the overarching research question in a holistic way.

To summarise, the empirical efforts in this study combine both quantitative and qualitative methods under 'Explanatory sequential two-phase design' (Creswell, 2014, p. 224-225, Read and Marsh, 2002, p.239). The two-phase design approach separates quantitative and qualitative research. In each phase, the researcher conducts the study within the appropriate data collection and analytical techniques. In this study, as the first sub-research question and hypothesis require, the researcher initially realised the quantitative phase, the measurement efforts of social capital; then second phase was conducted using qualitative methods. This design provided a suitable methodological framework to answer the research questions and test research hypothesis appropriately. The quantitative method has provided a baseline for the following qualitative research. Measurement results of social capital cannot produce data or evidence to answer the second sub-research question alone. However, qualitative research has explored the state-civil society relations in a contextual approach, where the selection logic of 'the contexts' relies on measured levels of social capital. This will be explained in a greater depth in the following sections.

As it is seen below in Figure 4, the data collection and analysis activities of each phase are different and were conducted separately. In the first phase, quantitative analysis techniques were employed. The quantitative results were used to design and plan the following qualitative study. Following this, qualitative data collection techniques and comparative content analysis were conducted on the case samples to answer the second sub-research question, and to confirm/negate the hypothesis.

Below, research activities for each phase will be explained in turn.

Figure 4: Explanatory sequential two-phase design



5.5 Phase 1: Measurement of Social Capital

5.5.1 The Conceptualisation of social capital in Turkish context

Any measurement attempt of social sciences requires conceptualisation. Concepts are the building blocks of theories. Categorisation of ideas in a theory is possible through conceptualisation. In quantitative studies, concepts have to be measured (Bryman 2001, p.66). So, an initial answer to the question of ‘how social capital is measured?’ is ‘measuring the concepts that form social capital’.

As reviewed in the measurement issues (Chapter 3), social capital research generally concentrates on three main concepts: Networks, norms and trust. If ‘relations matter’, ‘networks do matter’, since relationships shape people’s networks. Thus, measurement of social capital requires the measurement of networks initially. Networks can be considered the most visible and tangible concept of social capital theory and easier to measure using membership rates. They are norms that govern and shape networks. Norms in general, characterise the community. Shared values like tolerance, solidarity, altruism, voluntarism, democratic orientations, and obedience to rules are types of reciprocal norms and they are fostered by formal or informal sanctions. However, norms are generally intangible and require observation and survey to measure. Finally trust is an element of social capital that facilitates reciprocal and collective actions. Trust to familiars, strangers and institutions are main forms of trust and, in general, trust is measured through surveys questions.

At this point, the researcher focuses on Turkey in order to reflect the contextual features of Turkey in the measurement activity. It is important to keep in mind, low civil participation in social/political life, strong family connections, high religiousness and low generalised trust are the main characteristics defining Turkish society. There is evidence sociological background tends to produce bonding types of social capital traditionally. However, if the aim of Turkey as a nation is to ‘get ahead’, bridging social capital is more valuable to invest in. Thus, this study tries to break down social capital into bridging-bonding classification to distinguish their different implications.


Practically, bridging-bonding classification leads the research to further classify social capital’s concepts under structural-cognitive dimensions. In order to avoid from repetition, the reader is invited to turn back and reread pages 52-55 in Chapter 3 for the theoretical formation of the

structural-cognitive social capital classification (Uphoff 2000, p.218, Paxton 1999, p. 93, Krishna and Uphoff 1999, p.7).

As the structural dimension of social capital is more related to networks, it is more probable to measure. It consists of observable associations between individuals that link them through networks. On the other hand, cognitive social capital represents the subjective ties of individuals like norms of reciprocity and trust. Structures can be modified directly, but cognitive aspects are not easily changed and remain as subjective interpretations.

Therefore social capital concepts, which can be distinguished under bridging-bonding classification, can also be grouped under structural-cognitive dimensions in the context of Turkey. If the overall aim is to influence bridging social capital, mostly in the form of modern ways of participation in social and political life, bridging social capital will be measured through structural indicators. Similarly, as bonding social capital in Turkey's situation is closely related to traditional social values, which are difficult to change through policies, it will be measured using cognitive indicators. Figure 5 below summarises the discussion.

Figure 5: Conceptualisation of social capital in the Turkish context



To conclude, bridging social capital is conceptualised as the product of modernisation process and can be observed and measured through structures. On the other hand, bonding social capital is formulated by reflection of deep traditional social values, which can be interpreted cognitively. Although the participation decisions of people are also products of mental

processes being the outcomes of norms and values, they are more observable and open to outside influence by the state and politics. However, since the dogmatic features of religion is almost impossible to modify, and traditional values require generations to change, influencing bonding social capital through politics does not appear as a fruitful approach. Thus, creation of bridging social capital is the main focus of the research as it promises proliferation of modern ways of life, due to its nature requiring membership to formal and outer networks, participation in democratic decision making processes, and higher generalised trust.

5.5.2 Data Collection for Quantitative Research

5.5.2.1 The indicators for concepts and validity/reliability concerns

As already explained in the research aims and research questions, the quantitative part of the study aims to measure dispersion of social capital across Turkey's regions. In order to provide a measure of a concept, it is necessary to have an indicator or indicators that will mirror the concept. Indicators are indirect measures for concepts. As social capital conceptualisation in Turkey is multi-dimensional, measurement of social capital will require use of multiple-indicators.

Remembering the general measurement issues of social capital, indicators of social capital are quite diverse and there is no single set of indicators fitting into any context. In many cases, researchers tend to develop their own indicators to represent the conceptualisation they designed. Inevitably, this study will develop sets of indicators to reflect *sui generis* features of the Turkish context, as they are discussed in Chapter 4 above.

Selection of the indicators was profoundly affected by the availability of data. In general, social capital studies which focus on small samples in micro or organisation levels frequently employ questionnaire and structured interview techniques. Macro and national level studies can apply these techniques as well; however, they require time, organisation, and vast financial support to conduct. Research bodies or government agencies can afford such studies employing a range of experts. As a PhD student, the researcher had to carry out the study alone in a limited period of time. Consequently, questionnaire was not a feasible method of data collection for this study. For these practical reasons, indicators are selected from relevant sources, mostly official statistics of government agencies.

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Before moving to the indicator selection section, there are reliability and validity issues requiring mention. Reliability refers to consistency of the indicators of a concept (Pierce 2009, p.84). When considering the reliability of a measure, stability and internal reliability are sought. Stability refers to coherence of indicators over time. If a measure is administered to a group, and then re-administered, correlation between results should be high. Internal reliability is coherence between indicators when multi-indicator measures are used. If the answers of respondents on any indicator are consistent with other answers on other indicators, internal reliability is achieved (Bryman 2001, p. 70). Internal reliability is easily calculated through computer software, and *Cronbach's Alpha* is a commonly used test of internal reliability. A computed alpha coefficient will vary between '1' and '0'. '1' shows a perfect internal reliability, '0' stands for no reliability. Figures around 0.75 and 0.8 are widely regarded as acceptable internal reliability for the indicator sets.

Validity is another issue in quantitative research. Validity of a measurement activity lies behind the ability of indicators that devised to gauge a concept really measure the concept (Bryman 2001, p.30, Pierce 2009, p.74). In other words, indicators are supposed to be reflecting the main dimensions and ideas around the concept aimed to measure.

5.5.2.2 Official Statistics as the main data source

Bearing the reliability and validity issues in mind, the research continued for the collection of data to produce indicators that were supposed to measure bridging and bonding types of social capital. As mentioned the quantitative phase of the research aims to reveal regional dispersion of social capital types across Turkey's regions. To serve the purpose of second phase better, the data had to be collected at provincial level. Public administration in Turkey is based on 'prefectural system' and there are 81 provinces. Peripheral branches of central state services are managed under province and district governors' authority. There are also municipalities in every province, which are responsible for local services ranging from water, drainage, garbage collection to construction of infrastructures. The dual structure of public administration means the political context at local level is affected both by national and local politics. The official statistics preferred were derived from province level as policies that may be result from the measurement activity will require implementation at this level. However, bonding social capital indicators are only available at regional level.

Provinces are diverse in terms of population, geography, climate, socio-economic development level and culture. In accordance with the European Union's classification of statistical regions

(NUTS)³⁴, provinces were grouped under 12 regions and 26 sub-regions. The primary government agency for statistical data collection, the Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat), derives and publishes data in line with the NUTS classification. Along with the TurkStat, Ministries and their sub-departments reveal primary data relating to their area of operations. Thus the quantitative phase of the study is based on the data obtained from official statistics and archive materials as the primary sources. Below, the main features of official statistics and their pros/cons are given.

Official data is 'ready to use' as it is already collected by governments or organisations saving the researcher a considerable amount of time and financial resources. In general, public agencies and organisations collect data systematically and repeatedly to reflect changes in their service/operation areas across whole country. This enables researchers to make longitudinal and cross-sectional analysis. Replicability is possible when official statistics are used. Official statistics are unobtrusive, and are not produced as the result of specific case studies. Quantitative researches welcome official statistics as they are precise and standardised numerically. On the other hand, the reliability of official statistics is questionable. Some of the sensitive areas such as crime and unemployment rates are subject to manipulation by public agencies to meet for example, performance targets. Some of the official statistics may have limited access due to data protection or security reasons (Bryman 2001, p. 204-211, Yin 2014, p.106).

In Turkey, locating comprehensive statistics for social matters is quite challenging. TurkStat has only recently started to collect a range of social statistics through nationwide surveys. As a result, searching for completely satisfactory social capital indicators is inevitably limited. Most of the data used in this research was not available before 2011. The researcher had to push the limits of his imagination to produce indicators which would have at least face validity. On the other hand, as explained briefly above, indicator sets had to pass statistical reliability tests as well. Conceptual validity and statistical reliability issues have narrowed indicator selection choices already limited.

³⁴ NUTS: Nomenclature of Units for Territorial Statistics

At the end of exhaustive trial-error sessions, two most appropriate (conceptually valid and statistically reliable) sets of indicators were developed to construct the index calculation through factor analysis. They are shown in Table 22 below.

Table 22: Social capital indicators

INDICATORS FOR BRIDGING SOCIAL CAPITAL	INDICATORS FOR BONDING SOCIAL CAPITAL
Membership rates in civil associations	Average household size
Election turnout rates	Kin marriage
Newspaper readership	Patriarchal family structure
Informal Sociability	Bride price tradition
Formal employment	Degree of affinity of spouses
Blood donations	Arranged marriage
Active participation	Divorce rate
Education rates	Strength of religiousness
	Trust in family
	Trust in neighbours

In order to avoid repetition, descriptions of indicators are not given here, as they are explained in Chapter 6 in more detail. In short, however, the readers can establish the connection between indicators and social capital conceptualisation in the Turkish context (see figure 5 above). Bridging social capital indicators are selected to reflect the networks aspect of social capital, and all are related to modernity. Conversely, indicators for bonding social capital show the paternal and feudal background of the Turkish nation as it is explained in the context chapter (Chapter 4). They reflect strong family connections, religiousness and trust in close networks.

Indicators for bridging social capital were derived mainly from TurkStat's online data repository. Membership data for associations was collected from the Ministry of Interior's Department of Associations. This department keeps records of all associations operating in Turkey. Through a web portal, *DERBIS*, the Ministry of Interior is able to track legitimacy of associational works. Membership figures, meeting schedules and some other information required by law are uploaded to the system by the associations themselves. Blood donation

figures were derived from the Turkish Red Crescent. The only active participation data was derived from an academic study as a secondary source (Cekic, 2012).

Bonding social capital indicators were mostly derived from two important publications of Prime Ministry (2010) and the Ministry of Family and Social Policies (2011). Only the divorce rate data in this set was collected from TurkStat. It is worth noting, bonding indicators are collected by these agencies at regional level.

When this research had commenced in late 2012, the newest data available was from to 2011, meaning, most of the indicators reflects their value under 2011's conditions. Although Cekic's study mentioned above was dated on 2012, the author confirmed its data was collected in 2011. In other terms, measurement of social capital in Turkey provides a snapshot picture of 2011. Some of the figures in the bridging social capital indicators (i.e. membership figures) are subject to change overtime, due to the dynamics of social matters. However, it can be argued that bonding social capital indicators are more stable as they reflect values and norms, which require generations to evolve.

Official statistics as the main data source expands the strengths and quality of the research. Since most of the data was derived from TurkStat, it is plausible to accept they reflect their subjects accurately. Possessing government resources, public agencies employ experts to derive and publish statistics. Most of the experts have an academic background and process data in accordance with scientific and objective methods. It can be argued some data could be 'massaged' to show government and public institutions more favourably; however, this is more probable with the economic indicators. Most of the indicators here, for example, election turnout rates, newspaper readership, associational figures, and divorce rates, are not the focus of attention for many people to assess government performance, so manipulation is rather unlikely.

5.5.3 Quantitative Analysis: The Social Capital Index Calculation with Factor Analysis:

Factor analysis is a statistical technique for classifying a large number of interrelated variables into a limited number of dimensions or factors. It is a useful method in constructing multiple-item scales (Nachmias and Nachmias 2008, p.427). Factor analysis helps identifying prominent indicators of a concept; especially, abstract and vague concepts like social capital can be presented more clearly.

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As already explained there are a number of dimensions in the preferred conceptualisation of social capital. Consequently the social capital level of a province or a region is determined by the total effect of these dimensions. But, the question is, *which dimension affects which province/region and to what extent?* This becomes more complex as there are 81 provinces along with 8-10 variables. At this point, factor analysis explains the commonalities and correlations between indicators that can be decreased in number while still preserving most of the data. Factor analysis helps to explore strong relationships between the indicators and reduces their numbers into interpretable groups. These groups are known as ‘factors’. The correlation between an item and a factor is represented by a ‘factor loading’. Factor loading can be between 0 and 1, and similar to a correlation coefficient. The more the coefficient is close to 1, the more the variable effects that factor.

By means of factor analysis, a composite scale can be calculated. Standardised values of each item (provinces/regions in this study) are multiplied by factor score coefficients and then added. This can be formulated as follows.

$$f_i = \{c_1 \cdot z_{i1} + c_2 \cdot z_{i2} + c_3 \cdot z_{i3} + \dots + c_m \cdot z_{im}\}$$

f: factor score

i: items (provinces/regions in this study 1,2,3,...,81)

c: component coefficient for each variable (1,2,3,...,m)

z: standardised value of each item under corresponding variable (1,2,3,...,m)

Using the formula above, a factor score for each item can be calculated. If there is more than one factor, scores of other factors are also calculated for each item. In general, each factor has different variance explanation rates. The variance explanation rate shows the ability of factors to explain the total variance. As a rule in statistical studies, factors having eigenvalues greater than ‘1’ are taken into account. For each item (province), factor scores are weighted with their variance explanation rate and added. In this way, a composite index score for each item can be calculated. This is formulated as follows:

$$IS_i = V1 \cdot f_{i1} + V2 \cdot f_{i2} + \dots + Vm \cdot f_{im}$$

IS: Index Score

i: items (provinces/regions 1,2,...,81)

V: Variance explanation rate of the corresponding factor (1,2,...,m)

(For various applications of factor analysis see, Manly 2005, Nachmias and Nachmias 2008, Tatlidil, 2010, Ozaslan, et al. 2003)

Through factor analysis, provinces and regions are ranked by their factor scores to show the dispersion of social capital across Turkey.

Factor analysis is an advanced statistical technique; however, with the help of sophisticated statistical software, complex and time-consuming calculations are possible in minutes. In this research, SPSS v21 was employed to realise the factor analysis. Correlation, component, coefficient matrixes and factor scores were produced by the software. Statistical reliability tests like Cronbach's Alpha, Sampling Adequacy, and Split Half Correlation were also checked using software package. All these statistical tables can be found in Appendix 2.

5.6 The Findings of Phase 1 and Case Selection Process for Phase 2

Quantitative analysis has provided two separate indexes. By means of the indexes, bridging social capital rankings of provinces and bonding social capital rankings of regions are revealed. The findings showed social capital is not dispersed evenly across provinces and regions. In Putnam's initial study in Italy (Putnam, 1993), social capital showed a line of north-south direction, with a greater level of social capital in the north, and less for southern regions. In Turkey, this is valid for a west-east direction. In general, western provinces have higher bridging social capital; on the other hand, eastern regions have more bonding social capital. This finding is important for two reasons. Firstly, to the researcher's knowledge such a conceptualisation and calculation of bridging-bonding types of social capital was realised for the first time in the Turkish context. Secondly, this finding answered the first sub-question of the research, and the first hypothesis was confirmed.

Following this, social capital rankings were compared with the socio-economic development rankings of provinces and regions. The findings showed bridging social capital and socio-economic development has a very high positive correlation. Conversely bonding social capital corresponds with underdevelopment in Turkey's conditions.

One can argue the effects of socio-economic development on bridging social capital explains the high positive correlation. This is true, but to some extent. Income levels and education are

important determinants of people's decisions in joining civil and associational activities. In addition, voluntarism, altruism and philanthropy require time and financial resources. Simply, people have to feed themselves and meet basic needs like security and love initially, as Maslow's hierarchy of needs explained. However, socio-economic development level has failed to explain differences between bridging social capital levels in some provinces. Findings showed some provinces having similar socio-economic development levels have profoundly different bridging social capital scores. At first, it was thought this inconsistency might have resulted from variances of sociological background, as social capital is also a product of social norms and values from the bottom. However, discrepancies still exist even in some adjoining provinces, which share a similar social, economic and historical pasts. One other plausible reason emerged: Bridging social capital levels of these provinces are affected by the contextual circumstances of localities. To recall the second sub-hypothesis, social capital is a context dependant subject and the political context might as well affect it. Thus, the research needs to focus on the contextual features of localities. For example, what are the circumstances of local civil society-state relations, and what are the effects on local social capital? As discussed in the context chapter (Chapter 4), civil society and state relationships are generally dominated by the state-centric policies. Is this also valid at local level? Many reforms have been realised since the 2000s, but, have they been implemented by local public authorities? These questions have required further research, and initiated the second phase of the study. As already argued, the structural features of bridging social capital and its sensitiveness to political context makes it open to influence through top-down policies. It also emerged as an attractive topic due to its connection with modernity and development issues. This is why, the second phase of the study focused on bridging social capital so profoundly.

A multiple-case study design

In order to explore contextual differences causing variations of bridging social capital levels, a multiple-case study design was considered to be suitable for the purpose of the study.

The multiple-case study design is a sub-type of comparative design in general (Bryman 2008, p.58-61). Comparative design involves studying two contrasting cases using preferably the same method. The logic is the idea that comparison between two or more cases can serve better to understand social reality. Comparative designs can take form both of quantitative and qualitative researches. Cross-national and cross-cultural studies are very common examples of the comparative approach. Differences or similarities of the cases are considered to be useful for the explanation or building of theories. Essentially, comparative studies need

to be realised at more or less the same point in time, employing more or less the same research techniques to provide reliability and validity.

Comparative design is the principal method in studies of politics and international relations (Burnham, et al. 2008, p.66, Pierce 2009, p.56, Halperin and Heath 2012, p.202). Even though comparative methods are generally associated with cross-national studies, it is also possible to use a comparative approach in smaller contexts.

Through comparative design, political events and processes are often clarified and explained by comparison with similar events in other contexts. An important advantage of comparative design is its ability to provide rich and contextual descriptions allowing the researcher to identify clear similarities and differences (Pierce 2009, p.56). In reference to second sub-research question, *'how are the contextual features of localities designed and, what is their effect on the production of social capital?'* a contextual comparison is required to understand the possible effects of local governance practices on bridging social capital. If the sub-hypothesis *'differences of social capital levels across localities correspond with the quality of the state-civil society relations'* is to be tested, differences or similarities between cases in terms of assessment of relationships need to be explored. Thus, comparative design is the most suitable approach to answer the second sub-research question.

The major difficulty in comparative design is finding comparable cases. Cases need to be similar in a variety of aspects, however they need to be dissimilar for the variables under examination. This provides some causal inferences to evaluate social and political events. In the planning stage of the second phase, the researcher have spent a considerable amount of time on the selection of case provinces to compare. In order to ensure the comparability, the following steps have been taken.

To isolate the positive and negative outcomes of socio-economic development levels on social capital, it was decided to compare provinces in pairs, with low, middle and high socio-economic development levels. In the case selection phase, similarities of socio-economic development levels, cultural coherence and regional proximity were essential since they all have impacts on the political and civil context. In order to isolate these impacts, six case provinces were paired under three groups as having similar socio-economic development aspects and noticeably different social capital levels. Comparisons were made within the provinces in pair but not between the pairs having diverse socio-economic development levels.

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Socio-economic development (SED) levels of provinces in Turkey were calculated and published by The Ministry of Development in 2011 containing 61 indicators ranging from demographics to health, the economy, education, technology and communication. However, the SED index does not reflect cultural aspects. The case selection was based not only on SED rankings, but also the provinces were paired to mirror cultural similarities too. In Turkey, cultural similarities or differences are largely determined by geography. For example, eastern and south-eastern parts of Turkey are profoundly different in terms of family structures, traditions and community relationships. Similarly, northern and southern regions are also dissimilar in these respects. Consequently provinces were selected considering the geographical proximity. The researcher's previous professional experiences as a public administrator for 12 years in this field have also helped in case selections.

An additional important point affecting the decisions on case selection is Turkey's *sui generis* conditions in terms of regional terrorism. The Eastern and South-eastern parts of Turkey has experienced violent PKK terrorism since early 1980s and a state of emergency was in effect in the region mostly after the 1980 military coup. Extraordinary conditions and pressures on society from the state forces and terrorist groups largely affected the eastern and south-eastern communities and almost stopped economic and social developments for nearly two and a half decades. This is the reason for excluding case selections for the second phase totally excluded those terrorised regions. The selected provinces are paired to reflect 'ordinary and average' localities of Turkey and they do not step forward in any aspect of other province in pair. They are comparable in many other respects. In order to prevent repetition, further details of case provinces are given in the relevant chapter (Chapter 7).

There are more than six provinces that have been selected, however, for practical reasons, the fieldwork was limited. Along with accessibility, time required for travel and accommodation difficulties, the willingness of local figures to take part in the study also affected the researcher's decision on case selection. Readers need to remember the low trust figures regarding strangers in the context. The researcher's former position in public administration in Turkey provided a few disadvantages. Some local authorities from the opposition parties were unwilling to take part in the research as they considered the researcher as an agent of central government and the ruling party. The researcher knew that insisting on co-operation would not work, and the meetings with these people would not provide useful information as the tendency to give cliché answers in circular sentences would be likely. In addition, some political figures were too busy due to forthcoming local elections and could not spare time in the period planned for the fieldwork.

5.7 Phase 2: The Interpretation of Local Contexts:

As the first phase was unable to explain some discrepancies between development and social capital levels, the second phase of the research is required to answer the second sub-question; *'how are the contextual features of localities designed and, what is their effect on the production of social capital?'* Thus, second phase of the study was designed to reveal contextual differences of the comparable provinces in pairs. Mainly, the political and civil contexts of the provinces are difficult to explain using a quantitative study. State-civil society relationships are contingent on subjective interpretation. So, it is important to see the events through 'people's own eyes' who are the actors of state-society interaction. To reach this target, empirical material was collected primarily through qualitative methods. Qualitative methods are most appropriately employed where the goal of the research is to explore people's subjective experiences and the meanings they attached to those experiences. Primarily, qualitative data collection techniques include observation, participant observation, and individual or focus group interviews. Qualitative methods draw particular attention to contextual issues, placing real people's attitudes and behaviour in the context of their individual biography and the wider social setting. (Devine 2002, p.197-199). Observation and participant observation are not suitable for the designing conditions of this research. These methods are more appropriate where the scope and scale of the study is small, and time is abundant. In particular, participant observation requires spending time in the field and experiencing the living circumstances of the settings under scrutiny (Bernard and Ryan 2010, p.41). Therefore the qualitative phase of the study was conducted primarily using the interview technique. The nature of the main research themes also necessitated employing qualitative techniques, detailed below.

5.7.1 The Main Research Themes

Case provinces were deliberately selected to reflect contextual differences between similar localities. They were grouped under three pairs to represent the similarities in the socio-economic conditions and differences for the bridging social capital levels. It is expected the high social capital province in the pairs will have a better designed context, where participation is more encouraged and civil society organisations are better supported than those provinces with low social capital in the pair at each socio-economic development level.

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In order to make comparisons and reveal differences, the fieldwork was designed to analyse three main themes: The general characteristics of civil society in the province, assessment of design and effectiveness issues of the formal political opportunity structures, and assessment of state-civil society relationships through the participants' eyes.

Assessment of the general characteristics of CSOs is required in order to understand how civil actors define themselves and how political and managerial figures perceive them. The key interview question for this matter is '*Could you please tell me about general features of CSOs in the province?*' As is the nature of semi-structured interviews, steering questions were asked whilst the participants were responding. Questions under this theme have provided not only the comments on local civil society, but also provided clues around the strong and weak aspects of civil associations in the province. Picking up on the answers, the researcher diverted the conversation to assessment of relationships between local authorities and civil associations and the impact of public authorities on the underlined strengths/weaknesses.

During the fieldwork, special attention was paid to political opportunity structures being the non-electoral participation mechanisms. Deliberate questions were asked in order to reveal their design and effectiveness of these mechanisms. The mechanisms (*Town councils*) were purposefully examined since they serve as analytical tools allowing the exploration of the context in a greater depth. Although formal non-electoral participation mechanisms in Turkey are regulated by Municipality Law Nr. 5393, their design and effectiveness are largely dependent on local authorities' practises and approach to the subject of participation.

These mechanisms are regarded in the scope of this study as '*Political Opportunity Structures*' (POS) as they are defined in new social movement theory (Maloney, *et al.* 2000, p.809-810). According to the POS approach, it is possible to predict consequences of a structural transformation process of states and nations (Hooghe 2008, p.73), since civil society can react to or use the new opportunities provided by new institutions. In the Turkish context, it is possible to observe the outcomes of constitutional changes in 1961 and 1982 on civil society and social movements. Introducing countervailing mechanisms, the 1961 Constitution had designed a weaker state structure than the previous one, and social movements has exploited the new political opportunities in the form of labour unionism and politically themed associations. After the 1982 Constitution, most of the political opportunities were curtailed due to restrictive legislation and Turkish society entered in an era of political disaffection.

POS can be both formal and informal and shapes the context for individual or organised activists to operate and gives incentives for non-electoral political participation (Tarrow, 1994,

Kriesi 1995). Town councils in Turkey are examples of formal POS. Informal participation mechanisms were also explored in case provinces where they existed. Where voter turnout rate as electoral participation is considered as a primary and conventional social capital indicator in the literature of social capital's measurement, a similar logical approach is valid for non-electoral participation mechanisms. It is reasonable that non-electoral participation can also be regarded as a linking social capital facilitator since it involves face-to-face interaction among individuals, organisations and formal institutions, while voting is a more personal and isolated activity. However, it is only a decade since the introduction of formal political opportunity structures (*Town Councils*) in the Turkish local authority context. Thus, their evolution is still at its early stages. Nevertheless, they still provide a useful explanatory tool in search of relationship patterns between local authority and civil society organisations. In practice, some local authorities establish more open town councils and allow them operate while others withhold support and constrained them for a number of reasons. In fact, the design and effectiveness of town councils does not directly determine associational activity and social capital in a locality but provides a formal framework to interpret state-civil society relationships, allowing the researcher to make comparisons between selected provinces. POS (Town Councils) in the case provinces were explored since as they provided a useful formal framework to interpret state-civil society relationships.

The exact English translation of Town Council in Turkish legislation is 'City Council'. However, this might create confusion since a city council in the British context is the main decision making body in local authority settings. The function of a 'city council' in the Turkish context is fulfilled by the 'Municipal Council' formed through democratic elections constitutionally. Therefore the term 'Town Council' is preferred in order to address the formal, non-electoral participation mechanism.

Members of Town Councils in the Turkish context are not elected by citizens and they are regarded as umbrella organisations comprising various actors of the city in order to maintain participation in the decision making process and monitoring of public services. Translations of relevant articles of the Municipality Law Nr. 5393 (2005) below establishes town councils as follows:

ARTICLE 76-Town Council works for promoting a common vision for city and fellow-citizens, preservation of the rights of inhabitants and actualising the rules of sustainable development,

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environmental care, social solidarity, transparency, participation in governance and stable operation of control mechanism.

Municipalities shall provide necessary assistance and support to Town Council to enable performance of above listed activities effectively in cooperation with professional groups in the status of public institutions, trade unions, notaries, universities (if any), relevant non-governmental organizations, political parties, public institutions and corporations, and representatives of executive officers of parish [mukhtars] and other relevant individuals.

The opinions declared by the Town Council shall be put on the agenda and assessed during the first meeting of the Municipal Council. Working principles and procedures of the city council shall be defined with a bylaw to be prepared by the Ministry of Interior.

Article 76 imposes literally important tasks on town councils, however, in practice very few of them can fulfil these duties. The reasons behind the inactive town councils are examined widely in the empirical chapters.

The Ministry of Interior introduced the bylaw as required by the Law Nr. 5393, and it has been in effect since 2006. According to the bylaw, which sets rules for the formation of town councils and their operations in detail, three main instruments are responsible for conducting this participation mechanism: A chairman, an executive committee and a general assembly. As the bylaw requires, the general assembly of a town council is formed immediately after every local election, and members prescribed by law are summoned by the Mayor. This regulation gives Mayor an opportunity to select civil society associations as per the legal definition i.e. ‘relevant NGOs’. As discovered from the fieldwork, some Mayors use this authority to shape town councils to serve a specific purpose and for certain ends. The general assembly elects at least 7 members to form an executive committee, and elect a chairman for the town council.

A town council’s legal regulations are not examined widely at this point; however, it is clear the bylaw requires a democratic participation mechanism which operates freely as article 6 draws lists its duties starting with;

Article 6: The Town council enhances democratic participation and fellow-citizenship vision, common life awareness and internalisation of multi-actor governance settings in city management.

Town council regulations can be regarded as an example of ‘participatory engineering’ (Zittel 2008, p.120): *The concept of participatory engineering indicates the purposive attempt of*

political elites to positively affect the level of political participation by increasing institutional opportunities to participate. Although the concept of participatory engineering is offered to stop the problem of decreasing in political participation in western democracies, it can be regarded in the Turkish context as an effort to construct local democratic political participation previously blocked by the regime itself. Thus, the fieldwork assesses the outcomes of this 'engineering project'.

In an attempt to explore town councils' conditions in case provinces, interview questions were focused on two main aspects: design and effectiveness. In addition to interview questions, written material produced by town councils were also studied which are mainly activity reports and project publications where available.

Starting with the design of town councils, respondents were asked to talk about the formation of town councils in the early days. Their experience as town council members or observers revealed how the town council was formed, democratically or undemocratically. As the Municipality Law and the bylaw require municipal support for town councils, existence of support in the form of a budget, offices, and personnel was also investigated. These physical resources can be regarded as factors which affect a town council's effectiveness also. Questions concerning the council meetings, the general climate of the meetings, outcomes of town council decisions, responses from the municipal council, and examples of the town council's achievements or failures were also explored using steering questions. To recap, assessment of POS provides an insight on a local authority's ability and eagerness to achieve multi-actor governance as a top-down linking and bridging social capital facilitator.

The third main theme, state-civil society relationships were assessed through participants' own eyes. In order to explore behavioural patterns effecting the shape and quality of governance in a locality, assessment of relationships between CSOs and public authorities is essential. Besides formal political opportunity structures, attitudes and practices of local figures from both sides in day-to-day interactions are also a determinant in moulding the local context where CSOs form and operate. In assessing relationships, the reasons for civil society-state interactions and respondents' comments on these interactions are explored in accordance with their own views. Mainly, the reasons behind possible state-civil society contact, positive and negative views, perceptions and examples experienced through the interactions were examined to assess relations. It is indeed attitudinal and behavioural patterns that shape

these relationships. Thus, it is possible to explore attitudes and behaviours of public authorities affecting local context from people's perceptions within an inductive approach.

Three main research themes described above provides a useful framework to realise contextual analysis and making comparisons. The best method to extract these themes is considered to be 'interviews' with the parties' relationships.

5.7.2 The Data Collection Technique:

5.7.2.1 Interviews

It was decided interpretation of relationships and behavioural patterns shaping the civil context in selected provinces is best understood using the technique of face-to-face interviews with relevant respondents representatives of civil society organisations (CSO), political figures, and top officials of the case provinces. Multi-actor interviews enabled the researcher to triangulate findings to reach more accurate results.

The interview is one of the most preferred techniques of political science and it is applied as the major source of information (Pierce 2009, p.85). Interviews can range from being highly structured to unstructured. The highly structured interview is also known as the 'survey interview' (Bechhofer and Paterson 2000, p.63), and contains clearly listed, close-ended questions requiring short answers. This kind of interview is formal and its results can be analysed more easily, using statistical techniques. The structured interview is associated with quantitative research in general.

At the other extreme, unstructured interviews can appear to look and sound like casual conversations. The main focus of unstructured interviews is to focus people on a topic, listening to them, allowing them to provide the information. In this method, interviewees decide what is important to disclose or what is not. It is considered that speaking freely generally provides more comprehensive data. A researcher should be a good listener and patient with this method. Due to the absence of a researcher's intervention in using an unstructured approach risks vital information is missed (Bernard and Ryan 2010, p.28-29).

This research has adopted a *semi-structured* technique for the interviews. On commencing the interviews, the researcher had a clear focus regarding what questions would be used. Instead of asking general questions about the research subjects, he posed questions to address more specific issues. Another reason to follow a semi-structured technique was the multiple-case

study design requires comparisons between case provinces in three pairs. Interviewees in various provinces were asked more or less the same questions, making comparisons more accurate and meaningful.

In order to keep the interviewees focused on the topics, an interview guide was prepared and followed. Because the main aim of the fieldwork was to compare contextual differences that affecting civil society and bridging social capital, the interview questions were grouped under a few number of topics. Firstly, introductory questions were asked to explore the insights of respondents and their assessment of the *general circumstances of civil society in the province*. Then, questions on the *existing formal/ informal political opportunity structures (POS)* were posed. These mainly targeted design and operational issues of POS, which serve as the mechanism between civil society organisations and local public authorities in Turkish public administration. Finally, questions on subjective assessments have followed to examine *people's perceptions and interpretations for state-civil society relations*.

5.7.2.2 Sampling of the interviewees

Potential sources of data comprising documents or people are vast in social sciences. Consequently, a selective approach is essential particularly when the main data collection method is the semi-structured interview. The selection process is known as 'sampling', a sample requires representing features of the 'population'. In terms of this research, population covering all subjects in political, managerial and civil spheres in selected provinces, is not only vast, but also almost impossible to identify individually. Firstly, political actors ranging from local to national comprise, MPs, Mayors, leaders and board members of local branches of political parties, municipal councillors, etc. Secondly, public administrators are various, namely, province governors, deputy governors, directors of the central public services, police, etc. Lastly, and the most challenging, representatives of local civil society organisations numbers are more than hundreds in each province. So, a selection process was required that could cope with the limitations of time, financial resources and accessibility.

The sampling issue is normally discussed under two main headings in social science methodology: Probability and non-probability sampling. In methodology books, various techniques of sampling can be found; however, a useful collection of the techniques can be found in Wellington and Szczerbinski (2007).

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Probability sampling is more appropriate for large populations and used for quantitative researches. The main sub-techniques of probability sampling are random sampling, systematic sampling, stratified sampling, cluster sampling and stage sampling (Wellington and Szczerbinski 2007, p.65).

Non-probability sampling is also known as purposive sampling. In probability sampling, the chance of selection of each subject is nearly equal; in contrast, non-probability sampling relies on the researcher's judgement. Prominent types of non-probability sampling are convenience sampling, opportunistic sampling, typical sampling, maximum variation, atypical, criterion, snowball, critical and guided sampling (ibid, p.66).

In terms of this study, a mixture of a few non-probability sampling methods was preferred to select interview participants, namely, convenience, criterion, and guided sampling. Below, their values for the research and operation are discussed.

Convenience sampling simply entails selection of accessible, easy-to-contact and well-known people or settings. People who are available and agree are interviewed. On the other hand, interviews were not realised that randomly. A criterion sampling approach was also followed. The criterion approach required selecting particular people, in accordance with predetermined criteria. For example people with a reputation for good practice in a certain field. The criterion sampling approach was fortified with the guided sampling technique. In guided sampling, an informant, who has experience in the field, suggests particular people to interview, and in some cases, might assist the researcher gaining access to them.

As state and civil society relationships are bilateral, respondents from both sides were interviewed. These are representatives of leading civil society organisations, political figures and top officials. Following the ethics approval from the University's ethics committee, 63 semi-structured interviews across six provinces were conducted in December 2013 and January 2014. This timing was preferable due to practical reasons. Firstly, people in Turkey tend to arrange their holidays for the summer, and they are likely to be at work in the winter. The researcher arranged the field study mostly around Christmas time when the University is closed. Secondly, there was a local election scheduled for March 2014, and most of the political figures had already started their election campaigns. The research had to be conducted before the election since the politicians might have lost their chairs and would have been more difficult, maybe impossible to get in contact with them to conduct interviews.

In accordance with the local authority context in Turkey, mayors have taken part in the study being the most influential political actors of the provinces. Some deputy mayors, who are also municipal councillors, were interviewed serving as both managerial and political actors.

Province governors and their deputies-when governor was out of province-and some municipal officers in charge with the town council works and public relations took part in the fieldwork as managerial players. Local press columnists were also interviewed considered the 'third eyes' who can evaluate both sides (state-civil society) objectively. The fieldwork was specially designed to include a majority of all respondents from the civil players, the thinking being their comments would be more objective when compared to the political and managerial players who are expected to behave within some organisational and hierarchical rules. More detailed information about respondents and their break-down into provinces can be found in Chapter 7.

The CSOs were selected from the databases of the Provincial Office for Associations of governorships. There are hundreds of civil associations in each province. But their activity levels vary. CSOs which have relationships with public authorities in terms of project partnership and POS membership were preferred since they can interpret the local context more extensively depending on their own experiences. In order to satisfy the objectivity and reliability concerns, active CSOs were asked from the province governors and their deputies as key informants, who are colleagues of the researcher, and trustworthiness was taken for granted. Local press columnists were selected from local newspapers with higher circulations and through 'guided sampling' as well.

As mentioned already a purposive sampling strategy was preferred to distinguish interview participants. It is clear purposive sampling raises some questions of the representativeness of samples and generalisation of findings. In this study, an attempt to eliminate this was made by using a 'theoretical saturation' approach. 'Saturation' was first introduced in Glaser and Strauss's (1967) highly influential book, (quoted in Barbour 2009, p.54). It is described further in Strauss and Corbin (1998, p.212):

This means [point of saturation], until (a) no new or relevant data seem to be emerging regarding a category, (b) the category is well developed, in terms of its properties and dimensions demonstrating the variation, and (c) the relationships among categories are well established and validated.

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A pre-defined number for interviewees was not set in the beginning of the fieldwork. In particular representatives of civil society associations were not limited in number. However, it was seen that after interviewing 4 or 5 CSO leaders in each province, a saturation point achieved, where increasing the sample size, in other terms, interviews with further individuals, would not contribute to the study and add new evidence.

Technically, CSO representatives were interviewed first to see the results covering the three main subjects mentioned in the interview guide above. Then, along with the existing interview guide, questions arising from the CSO's responses were posed to politicians and the bureaucracy. During the first province's interviews (served as a pilot study as well), it revealed municipal councillors tended to repeat their party ideology, and abstained from giving details. Their contribution was regarded as limited by the researcher. In the succeeding provinces, only municipal councillors having administrative powers as deputy Mayors were interviewed where possible. As in some detail in the empirical chapter (see chapter...), managerial roles and political roles are intertwined and their distinction is blurred in Turkish local authority settings. As a consequence political actors in some provinces are also managerial actors or vice versa.

The length of interviews varied between 15 to 60 minutes, depending on the position and experience of the participant. Most of the interviews were conducted in participants' own offices, but a few of them required local cafés since their venues were inappropriate or too distant.

As the main data collection technique, the interviews with local figures of state-civil society relationships needed to be analysed to explore the similarities or dissimilarities of the contextual features of the localities. The analysis activity required a time-consuming phase of transcription and translation of the interviews.

5.7.2.3 The transcribing and translating

Captured through a digital audio recorder, the interview data was transcribed by the researcher. One major challenge of the study was all interviews were conducted in Turkish. Thus, a careful and reliable translation process was required. Translation is not an easy task and involves much more than simply transferring the words into another language. As the famous Latin saying 'traduttore-traditore', 'translator-traitor' expresses, it is sometimes impossible to reflect an exact meaning in one language into another.

Rossman and Rallis (2003, p. 260) identify three major issues relating to translation:

- a. *If you have translated from one language to another, which language constitutes the direct quotes?*
- b. *Can you use translated words as a direct quote?*
- c. *How do you signal a translation is accurate and captures the subtle meanings of the original language?*

These questions are most valid for any research using translated data. A universal solution to these controversies does not exist. Therefore translation of the interview texts required a flexible approach. Depending on the education and experience levels, the language ability of the interviewees varied. Some people tend to use exceptional local phrases not having an exact match in English. So, the researcher focused primarily on the meanings intended by the speaker. This can raise questions around subjectivity and/or misunderstandings; however, the researcher is quite confident he has captured the understanding of the 'real' meanings, due to his professional experiences as a public administrator. An average district governor in Turkey spends at least 3-4 hours a day listening to people's demands and complaints on a huge variety of subjects ranging from, i.e., security problems of schools to veterinary disease outbreaks, or coal needs of the poor. Dealing with many subjects from people from a variety of social strata has equipped him with a skill of being a 'good listener'. The researcher understands what people really say what they try to say. So, it is believed the translations reflect the real meanings of the interviewees' expressions as accurately as possible.

5.7.3 The Qualitative Content Analysis of the Interview Data

In political science, content analysis is a widely used approach. In essence, it is the study of recorded human communications. Human communications can be presented in many forms such as books, magazines, web pages, newspapers, paintings, poems, diaries and letters (Babbie 2013, p.295-296). Burnham et al. (2008, p. 259) claim that *"when somebody reads or listens to the content of a body of communication and then summarizes and interprets what is there, then content analysis can be said to have taken place"*. In this study, the human communication to be analysed are the translated interview texts.

Content analysis can take quantitative or qualitative forms. Quantitative content analysis is more related to the frequency of important words. On the other hand, qualitative content analysis is concerned with the meanings of the words.

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Qualitative content analysis has been defined as:

- *“a research method for the subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns” (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p.1278),*
- *“an approach of empirical, methodologically controlled analysis of texts within their context of communication, following content analytic rules and step by step models, without rash quantification” (Mayring, 2000, p.2), and*
- *“any qualitative data reduction and sense-making effort that takes a volume of qualitative material and attempts to identify core consistencies and meanings” (Patton, 2002, p.453).*

These three definitions illustrate that qualitative content analysis emphasizes an integrated view of speech/texts and their specific contexts. In this research, qualitative content analysis was preferred since the primary aims is to understand contextual issues regarding the meanings and practices of the state-society relationships.

5.7.3.1 The coding

Content analysis is essentially a coding operation. Coding activity can be defined as the process of transforming raw material into a standardised form (Babbie 2013, p.300). Coding involves the identification of sentences or sentence groups in the text and labelling them to reflect some thematic ideas (Halperin and Heath 2010, p.323).

Codes in content analysis need to mirror the logic behind conceptualisation and operation of the study. By creating a code, a part of the data is classified as an example or explanation of a given concept (Schreier 2012, p. 37). To understand the contextual features in sets of provinces, and to compare them, three main categories for coding was determined in line with the concepts asked through the questions in the interview guide. The questions on the general circumstances of civil society in the province, design and effectiveness of POS operations, and interpretation of state-society relations by the participants are the researched concepts of the qualitative study. These three main concepts served also as category headings for the codes.

A qualitative analysis software (Nvivo v.10) was utilised for the coding activity. Table 23 below produced by the software and reveals the main coding categories, referencing and frequency figures.

Table 23: Primary codes

Primary Codes	Number of Sub-codes	Number of Sources	Number of References
Assessment of General characteristics of CSOs	20	57	252
Assessment of Political Opportunity Structures	39	58	362
Assessment of Relationships	49	61	532

Under each primary code, appropriate sub-codes were created. As the content analysis requires rereading, after several readings of the text, common converged comments of interviewees have been collated under relevant sub-codes. Even though the software has illustrated important matters in the texts through high frequency and convergence in codes, it is not the software that realised the analysis. The software served as an index to facilitate fast browsing of numerous responses for different concepts. It helped with selecting ‘the golden quotes’ that describe and provide an example of the given concept and reflect the common ideas strongly and effectively.

5.7.3.2 Supplementary data: The primary and secondary documents

Along with the interviews, some primary and secondary data collected before and during the interviews was also used as an auxiliary to explore the local context in a greater depth.

The main forms of supplementary data source used for the qualitative phase, were legislation texts comprising laws, bylaws, and local authority service reports. These are important in understanding the formulation of local contexts by the state authority. Although laws and bylaws are introduced by central governments, local public authorities have some limited power to legitimately design their services. These sub-regulations (codes, guides, instructions) were also investigated during the fieldwork to understand the intentions and perceptions of local authorities specifically in respect of state-civil society relationships. Activity reports of the local authorities were also searched to find out the extent of their activities relating to civil society. Summaries of joint projects and meeting minutes were also checked.

As the main secondary data source, a thorough search of local media sources was conducted to explore local contextual settings of civil society-state relationships. Reviews and comments

of the newsreaders on the web pages were also useful to gain insights for the local contexts. In addition the reliability and exactness of some examples given or incidents narrated by participants were double-checked using the web-based local information sources.

Finally, the overall aim of the second phase was to explore circumstances and designs of the local context of state-civil society relationships in comparable provinces paired. Specifically, the second phase of the research has tried to explore a connection between the quality of contextual design with the level of bridging social capital claiming public authorities can facilitate or delay the production of bridging social capital through their executive powers shaping state-civil society relationships at local level. The best technique within many was to conduct semi-structured interviews and use qualitative content analysis enabling the researcher to examine the local contexts through certain people's eyes and perception of their reality.

5.8 The Conclusion

This chapter discussed and summarised the scientific methods applied and preferred throughout the research. Most importantly, the logical process behind the journey of the research was expressed step by step.

In this effort, prior social capital studies were reviewed to see the evolution of Turkish literature. It was found most of the social capital studies in Turkey involved measurement activities and making comments over their findings. Although some of the research could partially answer the first sub-question of this research, a more comprehensive approach to conceptualise social capital, reflecting the contextual necessities of Turkey emerged as a need for this study. In addition a research design, connecting the measurement activity with the daily practices of the local contexts through a comparative perspective was missing from the literature.

Having identified the prominent weaknesses and gaps in Turkish literature, the chapter continued with the clarification of the research aims, research questions and hypothesis. Then, coherent research methods serving the research aims were introduced with reference to discussions in the methodology literature. As the overarching research question instigated further sub questions, and due to their bilateral nature, utilisation of mixed research methods was imperative. Then the research was designed following the 'explanatory sequential two-phase design (Creswell, 2014), which entails a quantitative study at the outset. Following the

overwhelming tradition in the social capital literature, measurement of social capital in the Turkish context was implemented through a quantitative method in the first phase of the research. The researcher's conceptualisation of social capital in the Turkish context was expressed, and indicators reflecting the contextual features were introduced. Then, the second phase was designed based on the foundation provided by the first phase. The second phase prioritised the application of qualitative methods as the second sub-research question entails a contextual analysis of the framework of state-civil society relationships.

The two-phase design required various data collection methods and their analysis is based on different techniques. For the quantitative phase, official statistics were used extensively to shape the indicators of social capital in Turkey. Utilisation of an advanced statistical technique, index calculation with factor analysis, was explained briefly. The limitations and challenges affecting indicator selection tasks were discussed with reference to validity and statistical reliability issues.

Then, findings of the first phase, primarily the rankings of social capital levels of the provinces and regions, and logical reasons behind the selection of case provinces was expressed. The practicality of a 'multiple-case study design' was covered. As the main data collection method, semi-structured interviews with relevant participants, sample selection steps, and concepts searched throughout the fieldwork were explained. The challenges of the second phase, restrictions in conducting the fieldwork, sampling and language problems were underlined.

Finally, qualitative content analysis of the fieldwork data, transcriptions, translation issues, limited utilisation of qualitative analysis software, and coding activity were examined. In conclusion, this chapter has briefly answered the 'what, why, how, where, when and with whom' questions arising from the research.

Chapter 6: MEASUREMENT OF SOCIAL CAPITAL IN TURKEY

6.1 Introduction

As the overarching research question requires a measurement effort of social capital across Turkey's regions and provinces, the first phase of the research aims to answer the sub-question *'If social capital is to be produced by policies, how will social capital be measured? How will policy makers know where to 'invest' and where to focus?'* Depending on both the political context and sociological background, it is assumed in this study social capital is not distributed equally or evenly across regions, thus, social capital levels of the provinces/regions are required to be explored.

With the explanations of the methodology chapter and the established conceptualisation of social capital in the context, this chapter will set up the quantitative part of the explanatory sequential two-phase design. It involves three sub-sections. In the first section, bonding social capital indicators will be introduced and bonding social capital levels of regions will be calculated. The second section will similarly explain bridging social capital indicators and calculation. In the third section, findings will be discussed to show correlations between different types of social capital and socio-economic development, and coherence of the findings with the general social capital theory will be assessed.

Before starting the calculations, it is worth noting here most of the data used was gathered by government agencies in accordance with the 12 statistical regions that have been defined by The Ministry of Development and the Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat). The classification of statistical regions was designed in accordance with the EU's NUTS conditionals. Regions are divided into 26 sub-regions and 81 provinces. In terms of geography, economy, climate and social and cultural aspects, each region represents comparable common characteristics of its member provinces. Through TurkStat's regional offices, data is collected at provincial or higher levels, depending on the nature of demand for statistics. For example, family structure surveys are conducted at regional level because neighbouring provinces are similar and wouldn't differ extensively from the other and do not bear diverse social structures. Hence, it is possible findings on the regional statistics are applicable to each province of the region. While the

bridging social capital index is calculated at provincial level, bonding social capital indicators are only available at regional level. Bonding social capital indicators were derived mainly from The Family Structure Study/2011-2014 of the Ministry of Family and Social Policies (MFSP).

Below, the calculation of the bonding and bridging social capital levels of regions and provinces is explained.

6.2 The Bonding Social Capital Indicators and Index Calculation:

Bonding social capital indicators were selected carefully to reflect traditional characteristics underlining the evolution of cognitive norms and values of Turkish society. The main concern during the indicator selection phase was their face validity, in other words, their logical connection with the social capital concept. Unavailability of large data sets for social matters, and statistical reliability of the indicators were other challenges for bonding social capital calculation. A set comprising 10 different indicators was employed in the analysis to show the regional diversity of bonding social capital in Turkey. 8 out of the 10 indicators taken from the Family Structure Study-FSS (2011-2014). The remaining two indicators related to trust, take place in the Family Values Research-FVR (2010). Brief descriptions of the indicators and their logical connections with the concept of bonding social capital are given below.

6.2.1 The description of bonding social capital indicators

Average household size: This indicator shows the average number of members in households. Larger families in a household represent traditional and tribal connections. Large families indicate denser bonding connections. Turkey's average household size is 3.59 people per household. However it changes from 2.69 to 5.41, depending on regions.

Kin marriage: According to the records 23.3% of all marriages in Turkey are between relatives. This means almost one in every four people is married to a relative. The rate of kin marriages varies from 6.4% to 44.8% across the regions. A high percentage of kin marriage indicates denser family networks, and a higher level of bonding social capital.

Patriarchal family: The patriarchal family structure is also an indicator of bonding social capital since tribal relations are transferred down the generations of these families. Three generations of the family often live together in a household and family members are generally controlled by the older members, predominantly the grandfathers. According to the FSS results, 3.4% of families in Turkey are patriarchal. This varies from 1% to 7.5% regionally. At first glance,

representativeness of the data might seem inadequate. It is true patriarchal family structures have eroded over time and new generations live in nucleus families, it is possible to accept that today's parents have been children of yesterday's patriarchal families. The researcher has assumed traditional values and norms are still alive in the present generation. If a region has a higher patriarchal family rate today, it is more likely to have been higher in the recent past.

Bride price: A bride price is a sum of money or other economic assets like gold, land, livestock, etc. In economic terms, it is demanded by the bride's family from the groom as a compensation of the labour force lost and investment made throughout the bride's life. This is a very feudal method regarding woman as an economic asset or a type of capital. If the bride's family is rich, the bride price tends to be higher. Subsequently the bride price mechanism ensures only rich families could be connected through marriage, and social hierarchy is sustained by it. This shows the degree of traditional relationships and bonding social capital. Turkey's average rate of marriages with bride price is 18.1%, and ranges from 6.1% to 45.5% regionally.

Divorce rate: Where there are stronger family ties, divorce rates are expected to be lower. Despite the fact the divorce decision might result from many causes, higher social cohesion is assumed to be associated with lower divorce rates. Where the marriage decision is made by families, it is most likely the divorce decision will be made by the family also. To support this view, divorce rate numbers for the regions were compared with those of domestic violence towards woman. Rationally, it is expected regions having more domestic violence will have higher divorce rates. However it was discovered regions with higher domestic violence towards women experienced lower divorce rates ($r = -0,697$)³⁵. It implies intense family pressure and strict social bonds have a considerable negative impact on decisions concerning divorce. This might also be interpreted from aspect women living within the strict bonds of families have no other networks they can rely on when it comes to divorce. Remembering the explanations about position of the women in Turkish society (Chapter 4 page 85-88), women are subject to firm control by the society, but the level of this control varies across regions. Hence, the crude divorce rate, showing the number of divorces per 1000 people, is taken as an

³⁵ Source: TurkStat, www.turkstat.gov.tr

inverse indicator for bonding social capital. Where divorce rate is lower, bonding social capital is higher.

Degree of affinity: Degree of affinity in kin marriages also varies through the regions. In Turkey, 55% of all kin marriages are between uncles' and aunts' offspring. This score is minimum in the Western Marmara region at 38.5% and a maximum in the North Eastern Anatolia with 70.3%. At first glance, this indicator could be considered as the sub-data of the kin marriages indicator. However, the extended family structure in Turkey consists of layers of relatives. Marriages with the closest relatives indicate a higher social control by families over their offspring. Along with other reasons, close marriages aim to prevent physical capital of the patriarchal family from eroding through the inheritance in generations. In Bourdieu's terms, these families secure economic capital by drawing on their bonding social capital. Where the degree of affinity is closer, bonding social capital is expected to be higher.

Arranged marriage: Traditionally the mother of groom finds an appropriate girl for her son. In Turkey, by 2011, 53.6% of all marriages were resulted from this kind of 'arrangements'. 44.2% is approved by bride and groom, but 9.4% married without personal approval. The percentage of arranged marriages varies from 36.6% to 70.4% throughout the regions. An arranged marriage does not give any chance to spouses to prefer anybody beyond their parents' approval. Such a high social intervention in people's personal decisions undoubtedly represents how strong networks deeply effect people's lives. An arranged marriage also provides consolidation of narrow networks since parents generally find grooms and brides within close and familiar networks. Consequently, bonding social capital is fostered through arranged marriage.

Strongly religious: This is an indicator of religiousness of the regions. In Turkey, 50.1% of people describe themselves as 'a true believer and exerciser of the religion', in other words as strongly religious. The least religious region is the Aegean with 35.9%, and the most religious region is North Eastern Anatolia with 69.8%. Despite Islamic tradition has many rules encouraging people to come together for common purposes, the daily practice of religion in Turkey serve to establish and foster bonding networks, through neighbourhood mosques. Different denominations create diverse networks. As already discussed in the context chapter, religion plays an important role in people's philanthropic decisions. It is acceptable to assume religious people tend to have intense and inward-looking networks, which can be described as bonding social capital. As discussed in the context chapter (page 75-77), implications of

religion over people's philanthropic attitudes justifies religion being a source of bonding social capital in the Turkish context.

Trust in family: In social capital theory, bonding social capital is frequently associated with high in-group trust (e.g. The New York diamond market case of Coleman 1988, The U.S. Marine Corps in Putnam's 2000 study). Trust works as a glue for in-group solidarity and facilitates refuge in times of financial and emotional crisis. The Family Values Study (2010) shows trust in family is generally high in Turkey, however, it varies across regions (64%-89%). The percentage of people who consider their families trustworthy are used as an indicator to assess bonding social capital levels of the regions.

Trust in neighbours: Similar to the high trust in family, higher trust in neighbours also shows higher social cohesion. Coleman (1988) has showed how supervision of neighbours have positively affected school attainment of children, especially in Catholic communities. It was also addressed in the literature an aware neighbourhood has a positive affect over crime prevention. Therefore, higher trust in neighbourhood shows the existence of more robust relationships and closer acquaintances in the society, i.e. bonding social capital. It varies between 47% and 81% across regions.

It is believed the indicators above mirror the sociological background which tends to create and foster bonding social capital. These indicators in general reflect the norms and values (strong family ties, religiousness) and the trust (especially trust in close networks) aspects of social capital. In accordance with the contextual features of Turkey and conceptualisation of social capital in the Turkish context, bonding social capital fits in with the 'cognitive dimension' (see Figure 5, page 105).

In fact, it is possible to add several bonding social capital indicators, but, it is inappropriate for statistical reasons. Sampling adequacy is a reliability test in statistics and when the number of indicators are increased, the sampling size should be increased too. As the sampling in the analysis is limited to 12 regions, adding new indicators would decrease the sampling adequacy coefficient, creating a statistical reliability issue.

6.2.2 The software analysis

Using the indicators described above, factor analysis with the principal component method was employed using SPSS v21 software. The tables presented below were all created using the software and imported directly into the study.

Statistical reliability tests were conducted initially to ensure variables are appropriate for factor analysis.

Table 24 below shows the result of the Keiser-Mayer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy, a reliability test, result of which should be higher than 0.5. In this study, it is 0.637, which means the number of cases and variables are appropriate for principal component analysis. Another reliability test, Cronbach's Alpha is 0.836, which confirms inter-item reliability is high. The correlation matrix can be found in Table 49, Appendix 2.

Table 24: Sampling adequacy

KMO and Bartlett's Test		
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		,637
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	119,340
	df	45
	Sig.	,000

The execution of principal component analysis has extracted two components with eigenvalues over '1' as a statistical rule. As Table 25 shows below, the first component explains 52,2% of the total variance, and the second 28%. Together, the two components explain nearly 80.3% of total variance, which is a 'good' ratio in the principal component method. This means, the index will still hold more than 80% of all information of the original data set.

Table 25: Total variance explained in the analysis

Total Variance Explained									
Component	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings			Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	6,531	65,312	65,312	6,531	65,312	65,312	5,225	52,247	52,247
2	1,495	14,950	80,262	1,495	14,950	80,262	2,801	28,014	80,262

3	,956	9,565	89,826						
4	,532	5,319	95,145						
5	,178	1,784	96,929						
6	,166	1,663	98,592						
7	,090	,904	99,497						
8	,030	,299	99,796						
9	,016	,165	99,960						
10	,004	,040	100,000						

Finally, table 26 below shows the rotated component matrix, which presents weights of each variable over the components.

Table 26: Rotated component matrix

Rotated Component Matrix		
	Component	
	1	2
Average Household Size	.934	.113
Kin Marriage	.928	.021
Patriarchal Family	.884	.330
Bride Price	.863	.358
Divorce Rate	-.822	-.329
Degree of Affinity	.773	.530
Arranged Marriage	.651	.370
Trust in Neighbours	.078	.924
Trust in Family	.252	.912
Strongly Religious	.446	.583

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
 Rotation converged in 3 iterations.

As seen in Table 26, first component which explains 52.2% of total variance, has greater factor loadings in the first 7 variables. The highest loadings on Component 1 are on Average Household Size, (0.934), Kin Marriage (0.928) and Patriarchal Family (0.884). The most

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remarkable feature of Component 1 is divorce rate (-0.822) has a negative loading. This would prove the assumption the divorce rate and bonding social capital are associated inversely.

Other variables affecting the first component are Bride Price, Degree of Affinity and Arranged Marriage. It can be suggested the first component reflects the factor of traditional family structures and strong social control over family members. With fewer loadings, Component 2 has less effective on the index as it explains 28% of the total variance. The second component represents the factor of trust in close networks and strong religiousness.

By means of factor analysis, a composite scale is calculated. Standardised values of each item (regions in this chapter) are multiplied by the factor score coefficients and they are added. This can be formulated as follows.

$$f_i = \{c_1 \cdot z_{i1} + c_2 \cdot z_{i2} + c_3 \cdot z_{i3} + \dots + c_{10} \cdot z_{i10}\}$$

f: factor score

i: items (regions, 1,2...,12)

c: component coefficient for each variable (1,2,3,...,10)

z: standardised value of each item under corresponding variable (1,2,3,...,10)

Standardised variables (z-scores) and the component coefficient matrix can be found in appendix 2

Using the formula above, SPSS v21 has calculated factor scores for each region. Table 27 below shows the factor scores of statistical regions in Turkey.

Table 27: Factor scores

REGIONS	FACTOR-1 Traditional Family Structures	FACTOR-2 Trust in Close Networks and Religiousness
Istanbul	-0,64986	-0,46226
Western Marmara	-1,12695	-1,04677
Aegean	-1,08356	-0,37643
Eastern Marmara	-0,80502	0,10984

Western Anatolia	-0,30205	0,18402
Mediterranean	-0,07663	-0,96239
Middle Anatolia	0,37731	0,38463
Western Black Sea	-0,43062	0,76447
Eastern Black Sea	-0,10595	0,49166
North Eastern Anatolia	0,52784	2,50807
Middle Eastern Anatolia	1,74806	-0,93974
South Eastern Anatolia	1.92745	-0,6551

As each factor has different variance explanation rates (V), the weighted effect of each factor on the index is calculated using the formula below.

$$V1 = \frac{52,247}{80,262} = 0.65 \quad \text{and} \quad V2 = \frac{28,014}{80,262} = 0.35$$

For each item (region), factor scores are weighted with their variance explanation rate and added. In this way, a composite index score for each item is calculated. This is formulated as follows:

$$IS_i = V1 \cdot f_{i1} + V2 \cdot f_{i2}$$

IS: Index Score

i: items (regions,1,2,...,12)

V: Weight of corresponding factor over total variance explained.

$$IS_i = 0.65 \cdot f_{i1} + 0.35 \cdot f_{i2}$$

Following the calculation, bonding social capital index rankings of 12 statistical regions of Turkey are produced below:

Table 28: Bonding social capital rankings of regions

REGION	BONDING SOCIAL CAPITAL SCORES
North Eastern Anatolia	1.218997
South Eastern Anatolia	1.026034
Middle Eastern Anatolia	0.80991
Middle Anatolia	0.37986
Eastern Black Sea	0.102636
Western Black Sea	-0.01349
Western Anatolia	-0.13239
Mediterranean	-0.38579
Eastern Marmara	-0.48569
Istanbul	-0.58437
Aegean	-0.83674
Western Marmara	-1.09895

At first glance, scores of the regions reveal the eastern parts of Turkey have relatively more bonding social capital than western locations. This can also be compared with many other regional indicators, e.g. socio-economic development. However, comparisons will be made after measuring bridging social capital within the same method.

6.3 The Bridging Social Capital Indicators and Index Calculation:

In line with the conceptualisation of social capital in the Turkish context, bridging social capital represents the structural dimension of the concept. As discussed in the literature review and methodology chapters (page 52 and page 105), structural dimension reflects the networks aspect of social capital. Even though bonding social capital indicators above also reflect some narrow network structures shaped by traditional norms, bridging social capital indicators were selected to characterise wider and weaker networks within modern ways of living.

As the local public administration is established on the prefectural system, the bridging social capital index is calculated at provincial level. This also gives the opportunity to calculate it at regional level to make comparisons with bonding social capital.

8 main and 7 sub-indicators were used to calculate bridging social capital. They are mainly derived from official reports of TurkStat and relevant public authorities. Only one of them, the active participation indicator, had to be imported from a recent academic study (Cekic, 2012), due to non-existence of official data in that field.

6.3.1 The Description of Bridging Social Capital Indicators

Election Turnout Rates: This data is one of the most commonly used indicators of social capital in the literature. The data preferred in this study is the average percentage of turnout rates in the 2009 Local Authority Elections and the 2011 General Elections, being the most recent elections during the first phase of the study. It illustrates people's willingness to participate in politics. It also indicates the awareness level of people regarding the future of the country, and people's democratic orientations. Higher turnout rates indicate higher bridging social capital of a modern society.

Association membership: This is another widely used indicator of social capital. At first, association numbers of each province were simply proportioned to 15+ population of the province, so the number of associations per 10000 people was found. The main reason lies behind taking 15+ of the population is the Law of Associations in Turkey does not allow minors to enrol in an association. Otherwise, some provinces with relatively high younger population structure would have been disadvantaged compared to others. However, this method wasn't convincing since size and membership patterns of the associations are obviously different. Using this calculation, an association having 100 members and another having 1000 members will have equal weight in the analysis. But, it is more important to know the number of people who are enrolled in associations. In this way, the deteriorating effects of varying association sizes were isolated. The association figures used in the study show the percentage of people (15+) who are member of one or more associations in the province. Higher rates indicate higher civic engagement in the society. One caveat for this data emerges in Ankara's figures. According to the figures, more than 63% of Ankara's population are members of associations. In truth, they aren't. As the capital of the Turkish Republic, Ankara hosts many associations seeking the political and financial advantages of being closely in touch with central

government agencies. It means some members of associations in Ankara do not reside there. Because those associations are registered in Ankara province, their members are included in the statistics as though they live there. For example, the researcher is a member of the Public Administrator's Association registered in Ankara, but hasn't lived in Ankara for the last decade. However, Ankara's case shows the level of 'linking social capital', and its importance in the Turkish civil and political context. This situation is an exception for Ankara's case, yet, there is no evidence of such a phenomenon in any other province. Where association membership rate is higher, bridging social capital is higher. It is clear being involved in a formal association indicates the creation of wider networks beyond the immediate family and the neighbourhood.

Rate of educated people in population: This data shows the proportion of people with a university degree (graduate-master's-PhD) in the province's 20+ population. Educated people are expected to have larger horizontal networks in society as they may have many acquaintances from different social levels established while attending university. As discussed in the literature review chapter (page 30), education can be cause and outcome of social capital at the same time. A higher rate of educated people indicates a higher stock of bridging social capital of a province.

Newspaper readership: Newspaper readership is a conventional indicator of social capital and illustrates regular readers are regarded as more interested in community matters and their sense of belonging to society is much higher (Putnam, 1993 and, 2000, p.218). Consequently, if newspaper sales per population is higher in a province, it is assumed community engagement would be higher.

Formal Employment: The workplace is one of the primary sources for opportunity for most people to create new social relationships. Therefore, employment rates of provinces are used as an indicator showing if a province's employment rate is high, bridging social capital of that province will be high. Employment statistics might be deceptive on occasions because the calculation methods may serve to show supposedly higher government performance in the economy. There are several employment statistics derived and published by TurkStat and other public authorities but some will not suffice for the for study aim as they define employment and unemployment in different ways. For example, people not seeking job are not classified as 'unemployed' even though they are currently unemployed. After a brief assessment, it was decided taking formal employment rates published by 'The Social Security Institution' (SSI) would be more accurate in reflecting the bridging feature of workplace networks. According to legislation in Turkey, anyone working whether an employer or an employee must register himself and pay monthly premiums to the state pension scheme,

governed by the SSI. It is illegal and subject to fiscal penalties to work in anyway without being registered. One exemption of this regulation is 'unpaid family workers' in the agriculture sector. Consequently 'formal employment' is a better statistics to use as it includes the exact number of legal employers and employees. It is also assumed illegal/informal workers have much narrower networks because of the fear of being detected. They almost certainly use their bonding social capital to obtain employment. Formal employment as an indicator of bridging social capital is valuable as it creates more durable networks due to its non-temporal nature.

Blood Donors per 1000 people: This indicator represents the philanthropic tendencies of the society. As referred in the context chapter, traditional and religious norms in Turkey encourage people to carry out charitable actions limited to the extended family and neighbourhood level. However, blood donation represents a wider sense of altruism since the receiver of the aid is unknown to the blood donor. Blood donation may not create bridging networks directly, however, it shows at least the propensity to realise charitable activity beyond bonding networks. It is assumed higher number of blood donors represents higher bridging social capital. This data was derived from The Turkish Red Crescent.

Informal Sociability Index: This is a composite indicator involving a range of sub-indicators, so, it is different from the others in terms of calculation and representativeness. As already discussed in the methodology chapter (page 108), social statistics in Turkey are generally collected at regional level, due to the proximity of provinces in the regions represent cultural coherence. Sub-indicators of informal sociability index are derived from the Family Structure Study of the Ministry of Family and Social Policies. In the report, it is informed the data was collected using proportional sampling at provincial level and then aggregated at regional level (FSS 2014, p.17-18). Thus, it is assumed regional data represent the comprised provinces equally. 7 sub-indicators used here are as follows: Watching a movie/play in a cinema/theatre, eating out, sporting out, using social media on the web, attending formal association meetings, going out for night clubs/bars, and share of entertainment expenses in the family budget. The same method of the overall social capital index calculation, factor analysis with principal components, was also used to produce this sub indicator. For further information, statistical tables are in Appendix 2 (p.286).

Active Participation: This is the only secondary data source used in bridging social capital calculation. Due to non-existence of official statistics for non-electoral political participation

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and participation in civil campaigns, this research had to rely on a recent secondary data in academic spheres. Cekic's study (2012) describes active participation as 'participation in a civil campaign, participation in an electoral campaign, speaking with an MP or a local councillor, participation in a meeting of an environmental issue'. The active participation indicator shows bridging social capital's elements involving modern ways of participation in unfamiliar networks. It is also important some vertical relations between society and exercisers of power, in other terms, linking social capital exists to some extent in this data. Cekic calculates active participation over 26-sub regions covering 81 provinces, meaning regional data can equally be broken down to the provinces concerned.

6.3.2 The software analysis

Using the similar method calculating the bonding social capital index, the bridging social capital index scores of 81 provinces is calculated as follows.

Table 29 below shows the sampling is adequate (0.839) for principal component analysis. In addition, Cronbach's Alpha is 0.864, which shows high statistical reliability.

Table 29: Test of sampling adequacy

KMO and Bartlett's Test		
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		.839
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	386.749
	Df	28
	Sig.	.000

Table 30: Explained total variance

Total Variance Explained									
Component	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings			Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	4.353	54.409	54.409	4.353	54.409	54.409	3.852	48.153	48.153
2	1.261	15.767	70.176	1.261	15.767	70.176	1.762	22.023	70.176
3	.746	9.326	79.502						
4	.700	8.751	88.254						
5	.391	4.882	93.135						
6	.240	3.001	96.136						
7	.168	2.100	98.236						
8	.141	1.764	100.000						

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Table 30 above represents two components have been extracted, and more than 70% of all information is still preserved in the analysis of factors.

Table 31 below shows the rotated factor loadings of the components for each variable. The first five variables have more factor loadings in component-1, and the remaining three describes the second component. The first component explains 48% of the total variance and represents relationship between bridging social capital and modernity. On the other hand, the second component is more related to social and political awareness. In general, the two components reflect features of contemporary societies, where civil and political participation, education and awareness matter.

Table 31: Rotated component matrix

Rotated Component Matrix		
	Component	
	1	2
Rate of Educated People	.883	.131
Associational Membership Rate	.860	-.153
Newspaper Readership	.868	.260
Formal Employment	.849	.364
Informal Sociability	.777	.290
Blood Donations	.089	.761
Active Participation	.078	.748
Election Turnout Rate	.491	.548

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

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Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

Rotation converged in 3 iterations.

By means of factor analysis, a composite scale is calculated. Standardised values of each item (provinces in this chapter) are multiplied by factor score coefficients and they are added. This can be formulated as follows.

$$f_i = \{c_1 \cdot z_{i1} + c_2 \cdot z_{i2} + c_3 \cdot z_{i3} + \dots + c_8 \cdot z_{i8}\}$$

f: factor score

i: items (provinces, 1,2...,81)

c: component coefficient for each variable (1,2,3,...,8)

z: standardised value of each item under corresponding variable (1,2,3,...,8)

Standardised variables (z-scores) and matrixes can be found in Appendix 2 (p.282).

Using the formula above, SPSS v21 has calculated factor scores of each region. Table 32 below shows the factor scores of provinces in Turkey.

Table 32: Factor scores of provinces

Provinces	FACTOR-1 Modern Social Relations	FACTOR-2 Social and Political Awareness
İstanbul	3.23362	-1.63827
Tekirdağ	1.03105	0.14763
Edirne	0.66675	0.45687
Kırklareli	0.76112	0.30723
Balıkesir	0.31535	1.79649
Çanakkale	0.43431	2.21935
İzmir	1.60992	-0.36045
Aydın	0.23608	1.4003
Denizli	0.50066	1.73753

Muğla	0.66129	1.1892
Manisa	0.0575	0.87475
Afyonkarahisar	-0.0685	0.63114
Kütahya	0.24727	0.33012
Uşak	0.00538	1.88213
Bursa	1.18518	-0.3433
Eskişehir	1.45583	-0.17843
Bilecik	0.76844	0.56552
Kocaeli	1.30257	0.20572
Sakarya	0.60236	0.383
Düzce	0.76966	0.44652
Bolu	0.90327	0.38158
Yalova	0.85464	0.67363
Ankara	4.82723	-3.01457
Konya	0.30138	-0.21682
Karaman	0.3635	0.04198
Antalya	0.79006	0.28769
Isparta	0.20614	2.07335
Burdur	0.03216	2.00513
Adana	0.26628	0.17985
Mersin	0.43321	0.26477
Hatay	-0.34749	-0.02462
Kahramanmaraş	-0.42404	-0.10482
Osmaniye	-0.27689	0.07411

Kırıkkale	0.11841	0.06157
Aksaray	-0.77743	0.74788
Niğde	-0.46897	1.10693
Nevşehir	-0.30117	1.11183
Kırşehir	-0.24895	0.65262
Kayseri	0.23201	0.26166
Sivas	-0.17062	0.06117
Yozgat	-0.8709	0.03932
Zonguldak	0.75099	-0.44194
Karabük	1.22022	-0.6621
Bartın	0.10427	0.08264
Kastamonu	-0.05077	-0.28206
Çankırı	0.1915	-0.52456
Sinop	-0.07076	-0.20083
Samsun	0.13564	-0.25775
Tokat	-0.32932	0.07089
Çorum	-0.15712	-0.01259
Amasya	0.09345	0.24026
Trabzon	0.56321	-0.30702
Ordu	-0.42346	-0.02783
Giresun	-0.0737	-0.45992
Rize	0.25041	-0.01401
Artvin	0.15283	-0.11641
Gümüşhane	-0.47635	-0.17122
Erzurum	-0.91923	1.27253

Erzincan	-0.47911	1.35491
Bayburt	-0.75478	1.20387
Ağrı	-1.39443	-2.1449
Kars	-1.24711	-0.43417
Iğdır	-0.86202	-1.93918
Ardahan	-1.19061	-0.27087
Malatya	-0.56022	-0.28465
Elazığ	-0.05699	-1.22491
Bingöl	-0.84955	-1.27252
Tunceli	-0.44238	-0.20765
Van	-1.45558	-0.68437
Muş	-1.56856	-0.68399
Bitlis	-1.15876	-0.48571
Hakkari	-1.16401	-0.23366
Gaziantep	-0.57427	-0.50678
Adıyaman	-0.88174	-0.29172
Kilis	-0.7025	-0.17183
Şanlıurfa	-1.7005	-0.13914
Diyarbakır	-1.22026	-1.18516
Mardin	-1.13087	-2.13495
Batman	-0.81282	-1.84083
Şırnak	-1.0977	-1.47582
Siirt	-0.87471	-1.85129

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As each factor has different variance explanation rates (V), the weighted effect of each factor on the index is calculated using the formula below.

$$V1 = \frac{48.153}{70.176} = 0.69 \text{ and } V2 = \frac{22.023}{70.176} = 0.31$$

For each item (region), factor scores are weighted with their variance explanation rate and added. In this way, a composite index score for each item is calculated. This is formulated as follows:

$$IS_i = V1.f_{i1} + V2.f_{i2}$$

IS: Index Score

i: items (regions,1,2,...,12)

V: Weight of corresponding factor over total variance explained.

$$IS_i = 0.69.f_{i1} + 0.31.f_{i2}$$

Following the calculation, bridging social capital rankings of 81 provinces are produced below in descending order:

Table 33: Bridging social capital ranks of provinces

Provinces	Index Value
Ankara	2.366
İstanbul	1.704
Çanakkale	0.994
İzmir	0.991
Kocaeli	0.958
Eskişehir	0.942
Denizli	0.888
Muğla	0.826
Yalova	0.797
Isparta	0.792

Balıkesir	0.780
Tekirdağ	0.753
Bolu	0.739
Bursa	0.705
Bilecik	0.704
Düzce	0.668
Burdur	0.651
Antalya	0.632
Karabük	0.629
Kırklareli	0.618
Aydın	0.601
Edirne	0.600
Uşak	0.594
Sakarya	0.533
Mersin	0.380
Zonguldak	0.376
Manisa	0.313
Trabzon	0.290
Kütahya	0.273
Karaman	0.262
Kayseri	0.241
Adana	0.239
Rize	0.167
Afyonkarahisar	0.151

Nevşehir	0.142
Amasya	0.139
Konya	0.138
Kırıkkale	0.100
Bartın	0.097
Erzincan	0.096
Artvin	0.068
Kırşehir	0.033
Niğde	0.025
Samsun	0.012
Çankırı	-0.033
Sivas	-0.097
Sinop	-0.1115
Çorum	-0.1117
Kastamonu	-0.123
Bayburt	-0.140
Osmaniye	-0.166
Giresun	-0.194
Tokat	-0.203
Erzurum	-0.231
Hatay	-0.246
Aksaray	-0.298
Ordu	-0.299
Kahramanmaraş	-0.323
Tunceli	-0.368

Gümüşhane	-0.380
Elazığ	-0.423
Malatya	-0.473
Kilis	-0.535
Gaziantep	-0.553
Yozgat	-0.585
Adıyaman	-0.696
Hakkari	-0.872
Ardahan	-0.901
Bitlis	-0.947
Bingöl	-0.982
Kars	-0.991
Batman	-1.135
Siirt	-1.181
Iğdır	-1.200
Diyarbakır	-1.209
Şanlıurfa	-1.210
Van	-1.213
Şırnak	-1.216
Muş	-1.290
Mardin	-1.445
Ağrı	-1.629

In order to make more accurate comparisons of bonding social capital, which can only be calculated at regional level within the given conceptualisation, bridging social capital levels of

the regions are calculated using the same method. Bridging social capital indicators of regions are calculated as average scores of sub-provinces. Statistical tables of the regional bridging social capital calculation are in Appendix 2 (Tables 58-61), Table 34 below shows bridging social capital levels of the statistical regions.

Table 34: Bridging social capital scores of regions

REGIONS	BRIDGING SOCIAL CAPITAL SCORES
Western Anatolia	0.986
Istanbul	0.742
Western Marmara	0.722
Aegean	0.615
Eastern Marmara	0.566
Mediterranean	0.048
Middle Anatolia	-0.018
Western Black Sea	-0.109
Eastern Black Sea	-0.270
North Eastern Anatolia	-0.959
Middle Eastern Anatolia	-0.987
South Eastern Anatolia	-1.335

At this juncture, bonding social capital and bridging social capital levels of the regions/provinces were calculated under the preferred conceptualisation. Now, these findings and their implications for the study are discussed in the following sub-section.


6.4 Findings:

Firstly, the most remarkable finding of the quantitative phase is there is a strong negative correlation between bonding and bridging social capital levels in Turkey's regions/provinces. When two findings are compared in Table 35 and Graph 3, correlation coefficient is -0,886. This means regions/provinces having more bridging social capital tend to have less bonding social capital or vice versa.

Table 35: Bridging vs bonding social capital

REGIONS	BRIDGING SOCIAL CAPITAL SCORES	BONDING SOCIAL CAPITAL SCORES
Western Marmara	0.722	-1.099
Aegean	0.615	-0.837
Eastern Marmara	0.566	-0.486
Istanbul	0.742	-0.584
Mediterranean	0.048	-0.386
Western Anatolia	0.986	-0.132
Western Black Sea	-0.109	-0.013
Eastern Black Sea	-0.27	0.1026
Middle Anatolia	-0.018	0.3799
North Eastern Anatolia	-0.959	1.219
Middle Eastern Anatolia	-0.987	0.8099
South Eastern Anatolia	-1.335	1.026


Graph 3: Bridging vs bonding social capital




A negative correlation can be seen clearly when they are illustrated on regional maps of Turkey. Bridging social capital scores of provinces were grouped under desciles, each containing 8 provinces³⁶. Darker shaded regions/provinces show a higher index score of relevant social capital.

³⁶ 10th descile has 9 provinces as there are 81 provinces in total.

Map 1: Bonding social capital map of Turkey



Map 2: Bridging social capital map of Turkey



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Maps show types of social capital extend across Turkey following more or less an east-west trajectory. This finding recalls Putnam's study in Italy, indicating a north-south dichotomy (Putnam 1993). Even though bonding and bridging social capital are not substitutable but complementary, (the first is good for getting by, and the second is good for getting ahead); conceptualisation of bonding social capital in this study caused an interchangeable relationship between the two. Bonding social capital is formulated as the function of strong family connections, religiousness and higher trust in close networks and represents the traditional aspects of Turkish society. Conversely, bridging social capital represents modern life namely, membership to wider networks of civil and political participation. Thus, the maps also mirror the contradiction between modernity and tradition across Turkey's regions.

A second remarkable finding is bridging social capital and socio-economic development is positively correlated. The most important aspect of social capital for governmental attention is its implications on development issues (Chapter 3, section 3.2), bridging social capital levels of provinces are expected to be correlated with development indicators positively. To make the comparison, the socio-economic development index (SEDI) scores of provinces were included in the analysis. This data was taken from the Ministry of Development (2011) and rankings of the provinces can be found in Appendix 2, Table 62.

A simple correlation analysis showed there is a highly strong direct proportion between scores of bridging social capital and SEDI. The Correlations coefficient is 0.909.

Table 36: Correlations

Correlations			
		Bridging SCI	SEDI-2011
Bridging SCI	Pearson Correlation	1	.909**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000
	N	81	81
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).			

High correlation between bridging social capital index and SEDI can be the result of the similarity between their sub-indicators. However, this could partially explain the matter. SEDI-2011 was calculated using 61 indicators, and only two of the bridging social capital indicators are similar to those, rate of educated people and formal employment. Apart from them the

remaining indicators of the SEDI do not show any similarity with the remaining six bridging social capital indicators of this study.

A closer look at the findings reveal that bonding social capital is at its highest in eastern locations of Turkey, comprising mainly people of Kurdish origin. As the Kurdish population still preserve traditional relations and the effect of religious leaders (*sheiks*) and tribal landowners is still a reality, it is not surprising for the researcher the bonding social capital is higher in these regions. During the researcher's professional experience as a district and deputy governor in the region (2003-2008), it was observed long lasting extraordinary conditions have deteriorated the daily life of locals substantially. Needless to say, violent terrorist activities of the Kurdish separatist PKK, and military/state pressure on society has hindered the possibility of evolving a modern civil society and bridging social capital in these regions. State-civil society relationships had to be limited due to the fragmentation of local people mainly into two groups, supporters of the state and supporters of the PKK. Villagers believed to be supporters of the PKK were forced to evacuate their homes for inland immigration in 1990s. These immigrants have settled in suburban ghettos around the province centres or moved to metropolitan cities. Supporters of the state forces were allowed to stay in their homes and given military weaponry. They were recruited and paid as the 'village guards', and took part in military operations against the PKK terrorists, as the sub-divisions of the state forces. It is very difficult to talk about production of bridging social capital in such extraordinary circumstances. Instead, mostly security risks and long standing economic problems have forced people to foster their familiar networks, in terms of extended family and tribe.

It is worth noting here even though social capital conceptualisations of this study led to an opinion denigrating its bonding forms as an outcome, some components of bonding social capital are also necessary even in the most modern societies. How could one blame the high trust in the family and neighbourhood? Is the reality of weakening family structures not a concern for many governments? Neighbourhood watch practices are examples aimed at reviving the lost values of neighbourhood relationships for crime prevention. How can a person be told of for being more or less religious? Therefore, it is bonding social capital's traditional dimension (see Table 26 above) that would block an individual's development as a free and self-sufficient person. Traditions like patriarchal family, arranged marriage and kin marriage reflect parental pressure on the new generations and hinders them standing on their 'own two feet'.

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Another interesting result of the quantitative phase is it is very surprising in the Turkish context and contrary to the general assumptions of social capital theory, trust towards strangers (generalised trust) is also high among those trusting highly in their close networks. The correlation coefficient between bonding social capital and trust to strangers at regional level (0.452) is not very high, but still shows a positive direction. On the other hand, bridging social capital and trust to strangers are negatively correlated (-0.450)³⁷. This finding could be as important as to be a subject of another study alone, yet, the researcher believes the finding is the result of the contextual differences of Turkey not fitting in with general social capital theory. There could be many explanations for that, however, the researcher deduces high trust in close networks, strong family support for the individual and confidence in the tribal structures provide an expectancy that other individuals, who are also members of other tribal networks will reciprocate and obey the norms of the community. In practice, it is quite common in South-eastern parts of Turkey individual disputes can easily turn into a battle between two opposing tribes, because individuals seek support and help from their tribal connections. Since the individuals know other individuals will also have a strong establishment behind them, reciprocal actions and reconciliation are more likely and plausible for both sides. Thus, reciprocal action of the actors feeds into trust to strangers. Another question arises here, what is the meaning of the term 'stranger'? In small communities, strangers from the same community can be familiar in several ways, e.g. behaviour and clothing. Do they trust 'more strangers' from other regions or cultures? Supporting this idea, the urbanisation rate of bonding-high regions (%60.46) of Turkey is lower than west bonding-low regions (%82.14). In other words, bonding social capital emerges as a feature of smaller communities in the Turkish context, so the term 'stranger' must have a narrower meaning in smaller communities. In summary, the concept of trusting a stranger does not explain much in Turkish context, or it is another example showing the limitation of using trust as a 'rough and ready' measure in social capital studies.

Another result of the quantitative phase is about the crime prevention feature of social capital. Regional numbers of imprisoned convicts per 10.000 population were compared with regional social capital scores. Correlation analysis showed that crime rate and bonding social capital has a high negative correlation (-0.732). On the other hand, bridging social capital and crime are positively correlated (0.525). It shows effective supervision of patriarchal families and tribal

³⁷ That's why trust to strangers could not be included as an indicator for bridging social capital index.

norms on the individuals, neighbourhood relationships are effective for reducing crime. However, other factors like efficiency of security forces on controlling small city populations could also explain low crime rates.

Finally, the relationship between social capital and government performance was checked. In Turkey, the performance of government services is generally focused on economic and budget issues. TurkStat does not possess a definitive study or data collection system for performance indicators. There was an attempt by the Ministry of Interior to measure the performances of local authorities (BEPER 2007), but the project was abandoned due to misleading information flow from the local authorities. The only reasonable measure of government performance the researcher could employ is TurkStat's Life Satisfaction Survey 2013. In the survey, satisfaction from several central government services; the social security system, health, education, public safety, justice, and infrastructure for transportation, were measured. Table 37 below shows regional correlation of bridging social capital and satisfaction from several public services.

Table 37: Bridging social capital-public service satisfaction

REGIONS/SATISFACTIO N (%)	Social Security Sytem	Health Services	Educatio n	Justice	Public Safety	Infrastructure for Transportatio n	Bridging SCI
Istanbul	69.3	67.4	61.6	47.9	68.5	68.9	0.74
Western Marmara	78.2	79.0	77.8	64.3	86.6	83.1	0.72
Aegean	77.8	81.0	76.9	56.5	85.6	85.1	0.62
Eastern Marmara	69.4	78.3	70.0	55.1	81.5	78.5	0.57
Western Anatolia	75.5	78.3	73.0	63.9	83.0	82.0	0.99
Mediterranean	68.5	77.3	72.5	53.5	83.4	78.2	0.05
Middle Anatolia	75.5	83.2	78.4	55.2	88.4	83.5	-0.02
Western Black Sea	71.0	80.7	79.6	58.2	89.1	82.7	-0.11
Eastern Black Sea	80.3	83.4	80.8	72.0	89.4	81.5	-0.27

North Eastern Anatolia	65.8	73.2	73.1	53.4	84.5	75.5	-0.96
Middle Eastern Anatolia	58.0	67.3	64.8	46.5	79.1	65.9	-0.99
South Eastern Anatolia	58.7	73.3	70.6	41.5	78.6	70.3	-1.34
Correlations (p value)	0.699	0.316	0.080	0.481	-0.030	0.528	1.0

The correlation analysis show satisfaction levels of people from education and public safety services are not meaningfully correlated with bridging social capital. However, social security, infrastructure for transportation justice and health services are thought to be more satisfactorily provided in higher bridging social capital regions. As a result, it can be concluded regions having more bridging social capital tend to receive better public services in line with the assumptions of the general social capital theory.

6.5 The Conclusion

In light of these findings, the analysis has proved social capital is not distributed equally or evenly by type or by region, and the first sub-hypothesis is confirmed. Research has revealed there are a range of differences across Turkey's regions and provinces in terms of social capital. This finding of the research is consistent with previous researches published in Turkey. As a new finding, two different types of social capital contradict geographically. Eastern regions have more bonding social capital with higher deprivation levels, and western parts enjoy a much higher bridging social capital with robust socio-economic development. These findings can also be interpreted to some extent as the social transformation experience of the Turks over the last century. Since bridging social capital entails more active civil society and intersecting networks among society and public institutions, it might also represent a more pluralistic society with better governance practices. The bridging and bonding social capital maps reflect the outcome of the transition process of Turks from patriarchal and feudal characteristics towards a more democratic and developed society.

Positive correlation between bridging social capital and satisfaction levels with public services is another finding which is to some extent consistent with the theory. Such a comparison was

made for the first time in Turkey as the results of TurkStat's Life Satisfaction Survey were only published in 2013.

The unique conceptualisation of this study has also revealed some contradictory results for the social capital theory. As a significantly missing element in Turkish literature on social capital, trust in close networks and trust in strangers found they are both higher in bonding-high social capital regions. This concludes that higher participation in associations, electoral or non-electoral participation and community engagement do not create trust, or these activities are not resulted from a trusting community. The trust-bridging social capital link is empirically missing in Turkish context, conversely, any kind of trust tends to overlap with bonding social capital. Yet, some inferences over this matter along with the findings of the qualitative phase will be discussed in the conclusion chapter. Nevertheless, this is both a complex and an important finding to be a focus of another study.

Conceptualisation of social capital in this research favours bridging social capital since it is beneficial for 'getting ahead'. In the researcher's view, a developing country like Turkey needs to focus on bridging social capital. It is general characteristics of Turkish society which is moulded for centuries under strict traditional and religious cultural patterns that, strong attachment to family, neighbourhood and tribe provides bonding social capital. However, it is unfair to label bonding social capital solely as the main culprit for underdevelopment in the regions. Bonding social capital is quite helpful for people in 'getting by' especially in hard times of the country. Having experienced many devastating economic crises, high inflation eras and violent terrorist attacks in a specific region, Turkey owes its unity and sovereignty as a nation to bonding social capital emerging as social solidarity particularly at individual and community level. Turkey needs to find a way of preserving strong family structures and eliminating its negative effects on individual freedoms at the same time. Encouraging people to take part in modern social relationships, in other words, investing in bridging social capital can be a cure for the problem and, it is also required to realise a modern and pluralist society as it creates new networks where internalisation of democratic attitudes could consolidate.

Finally, a strong correlation between SEDI and bridging social capital justifies a basis for the implementation of state policies to produce social capital in the Turkish context. As the bridging social capital also stands for modernity, and the overall aim of the Turkish Republic from the start is a western style modernisation, democracy and development, it is reasonable, and a necessity to design state policies to produce or foster bridging social capital. But how?

Chapter 7: THE INTERPRETATION OF LOCAL CONTEXTS: HIGH SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PAIR

7.1 Introduction:

As mentioned in the literature review, social capital research is generally focused on development issues such as the economy, democratic efficacy and government performance, and it is regarded as a source inherited from historical and cultural characteristics of societies, and accumulated over the centuries. The historical and cultural past might diversify obligations, expectations, norms, sanctions and trustworthiness in societies, but the role of public authorities also needed to be taken into account by the social capital research because the civil context (the formal area where associations operate) is widely defined by written or unwritten rules of local and/or central governments. This is particularly important when social capital is defined as a function of vibrant associational activity, high civic engagement and public participation. Consequently, in addition to Putnam and his followers' favoured 'bottom-up' perspective, research on social capital production requires a 'top-down' approach involving exploration of contextual settings and opportunities provided by public authorities in a given locality. The top-down approach is also useful to analyse the creation of links between society and power structures regarded as a specific type of social capital: 'linking' social capital (Sabatini 2009, Halpern 2005, and Woolcock 2000). Linking social capital can be an indicator to demonstrate to what extent state and civil society are interlinked.

According to the top-down perspective's assumptions, the stock of social capital in a given locality is expected to coincide with conducive environment where civil society associations can flourish. It is expected provinces, where positive relationships between state and civil society organisations exist, and those providing civil associations with more opportunities, will have more bridging social capital. Although legal frameworks for associations are set up by central government regulations, local adjustments provided by local public authorities can also be supportive in offering additional opportunities like public grants, project budgets, and encouraging structures for participation and civic engagement. These factors will largely shape the context for associational activities. The overarching aim of the fieldwork is to discover the

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existence or non-existence of an enabling environment in selected provinces, and if civil society associations can operate easily or are blocked by state actions.

At this point of view, fieldworks comprising six localities in Turkey were designed to reveal and analyse local contexts mainly in terms of local governance patterns and the quality of civil society-state relationships.

Decision regarding the promotion of an enabling environment for civil society organisations is largely dependent on understandings, behaviours and attitudes of public figures in a given locality. Although many reforms have been implemented on civil freedoms over the last decade in Turkey, the implementation of reforms at local level needs questioning. Local politics is also a strong determinant for local authority-civil society relationships in the Turkish context. Some positive or negative approaches for civil society organisations from local authorities will affect the local context where associational activities are formed. Hence, the fieldwork also aimed to illustrate behavioural and attitudinal relationships and perceptions of public figures and civil society actors regarding each other.

Social capital is created in an environment of vibrant associational activity, and the research also aims to find out if prevailing stumbling blocks hinder civil society associations and local decision makers from establishing healthy relationships and creating 'good governance' in selected localities.

Therefore the fieldwork aims to reveal the existence of a consistency between high bridging social capital and wider formal and relational opportunities provided by the public sector for civil society organisations.

In this chapter, a brief explanation of the logic behind the case selection, and some information on the participants will be provided as an introduction, and will continue with the interpretation of local contexts in high socio-economic development pair. In the following chapters, readers will be able to turn to this section to refresh the background information provided.

Since the primary aim of the fieldwork is to discover the existence or non-existence of positive relationships between differences of social capital levels and the quality of civil society-state interactions, case provinces were carefully selected to reflect similar socio-economic conditions but different social capital levels. In case selection, similarities of socio-economic development levels, cultural coherence and regional proximity are essential as they all have impacts on the political and civic fabric. In order to isolate these impacts, six case provinces


were paired under three groups having similar socio-economic development aspects and noticeably different social capital levels.

The selected provinces are paired to reflect ‘ordinary and average’ localities in Turkey and they are not dominant in any aspect of the other province in the pair. They are comparable in many respects.

Table 38 and Map 3 below show case provinces where fieldworks have been conducted.

Table 38: Case provinces

	Case provinces	Socio-economic Development Index Rank	Bridging Social Capital Index Rank
Low Socio- Economic Development Level	Nigde (1)	56	43
	Yozgat (2)	65	65
Middle Socio- Economic Development Level	Kirikkale (3)	41	38
	Karabuk (4)	28	19
High Socio- Economic Development Level	Bolu (5)	11	13
	Canakkale (6)	14	3

Map 3: Selected provinces for fieldwork

The red shaded provinces are the examples of underdeveloped provinces in Turkey. Nigde (1) is 56th and Yozgat (2) is 65th in the SED rankings and Yozgat is the least developed province in this study. Remembering there are 81 provinces in Turkey, it is worth mentioning the remaining 16 provinces after Yozgat were largely affected by violent PKK terrorism. Yozgat is the least developed province among those not affected by terrorism. On the other hand, Nigde and Yozgat are distinctively different in bridging social capital levels.

Blue shaded provinces represent middle SED level. Kirikkale (3) is a central Anatolian city and its rank in SED is 41. Karabuk (4) is a slightly more developed province and 13 ranks above Kirikkale; however, its social capital level is higher by 19 rows. These two provinces have much in common as explained in the analysis below.

Provinces in green shaded pair are examples of developed cities and they are located in the western parts of Turkey. Bolu (5) is 11th in SED rankings and Canakkale (6) is 14th. Despite the fact Canakkale is slightly less developed province than Bolu, its social capital rank is higher. It is striking that Canakkale leaves many metropolitan cities behind in terms of bridging social capital levels, or in modern social relationships. There are 10 more developed provinces in SED rankings in front Bolu, however, 9 of them have metropolitan municipalities and they are densely populated (over millions) cities. Because of their economic prosperity and employment opportunities, those provinces have experienced enormous inland immigration in

the last three decades and their social structures have become increasingly heterogeneous. As a consequence, they are not comparable to other provinces in Turkey in the scope of this study. Wider information on the case provinces are given throughout the analysis.

In order to avoid repetition, readers can go back and read the methodology chapter for design and sampling issues of the fieldwork (Chapter 5, p.112).

During the fieldwork, 63 semi-structured interviews were conducted in selected provinces. Table 39 below shows the breakdown of respondents of the provinces and their positions.

Table 39: Figures of participants

Provinces	CSO reps.	Political figures	Top officials	Local media reps.	TOTAL
Nigde	7	2	3	2	14
Yozgat	6	2	2	1	11
Kirikkale	4	2	2	2	10
Karabuk	5	1	1	2	9
Bolu	3	1	2	2	8
Canakkale	6	1	2	2	11
TOTAL	31	9	12	11	63

7.2 The High Socio-Economic Development Pair: Canakkale and Bolu

Canakkale and Bolu are located in the western part of Turkey and they represent high socio-economic conditions. They are paired as case provinces since their socio-economic development levels are similar (see Table 38 above). Bolu is slightly more developed than Canakkale; however, Canakkale's bridging social capital level is higher. On the other hand, Canakkale is in the region where bonding social capital is the lowest. Bolu is in the Eastern Marmara region on the bonding social capital map and has relatively higher bonding social capital (see Map1 on page 156).

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The knowledge of the researcher on Bolu is not limited to the scope of this study as he has worked in Bolu province as Mengen district's governor from 2008 to 2011. Previous experience gained from observations and contacts with Bolu's many political, managerial and civil figures during this time was also used in interpreting the context ethnographically.

General information about the provinces are given below in Table 40.

Table 40: Information for the high development pair

PROVINCES	CANAKKALE	BOLU
Bridging social capital rank	3	13
Socio-economic development rank	14	11
Population of central municipal area/overall province population (2012)	110.000/493.000	131.000/281.000
Number of civil associations in the province	860	529
Share of main economic sectors in GDP ³⁸		
Agriculture and forestry	22%	38%
Industry and manufacture	18%	22%
Transportation	20%	17%
Political tendencies	Strong social-democrat tradition	Strong social-democrat tradition with recent shift to centre-right

³⁸ Source: www.turkstat.gov.tr

Culturally and ethnically both provinces display similar characteristics. They are not subject to intense inland immigration from eastern parts of Turkey and protect their social homogeneity. Political preferences are also similar. Both provinces are known as social democrat cities and local election results following the 1980 military coup reveals this similarity. Local election results with political party descriptions for the last three decades are shown in Appendix 3, Tables 69-70.

Economically, both provinces are not significantly different.

Despite all similarities in terms of culture, economy and politics, the local context is highly different in terms of local participation and relationship patterns. These are widely discussed under the primary-codes below.

7.3 The General Characteristics of CSOs in Canakkale and Bolu:

7.1.1. Canakkale:

Starting with Canakkale, which has a higher bridging social capital level of the pair, there is a robust and developing civil society structure in the city. At the time of the fieldwork, there were around 860 associations in the province. Many respondents describe CSOs as ‘active and varied’. When the reasons for dynamism are asked, respondents generally connected the subject to high level of education and pluralistic structure of the society. As Mr Burak GEZEN, a local journalist, stresses; *‘Canakkale is a province with high education levels and our people internalise pluralist culture in their daily lives. Thus, this redounds on CSOs. Voluntarism is high among the elderly, businessmen, youth and politicians’*. Similarly, Miss Digidem GURDOGAN³⁹ stated *‘We have many active CSOs here and people of Canakkale enjoy participation. In recent years we witnessed that many new CSOs have been opening in many branches, not for just disadvantaged groups but also for religious identities and sporting activities.... This variety is making our city richer in terms of social life’*.

Statistics confirms respondents’ views. According to reports of The Associations Desk for Canakkale Governorship, there were 716 CSOs in 2005 rising to 860 in 2013, a total increase rate nearly 20%, which is above Turkey’s average (15%) for the same period.

³⁹ Representative from Disabled’s Association and member of women’s sub-committee of town council.

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CSOs in Canakkale are also active in political participation. Mr Saim Yavuz, the Chairman of Town Council, informs *'CSOs in Canakkale are generally active with partnership works with public authorities, they play an effective role in decision making processes, as you can see in Town Council's successes'*.

High activity of CSOs is also confirmed by managerial figures. Deputy Governor, Mr Cemal YILDIZER, who is previously Deputy Governor of Bolu-the other province in the pair-is able to compare the two provinces from a managerial standpoint. He says, *'In terms of social life and vibrancy of CSOs, Canakkale is way beyond Bolu. In particular associations for the disabled are relatively more active. In 2012, we organised a seminar together with CSOs of Canakkale. We also invited academics. There were more than 100 participants and they discussed and designed a roadmap for public services relevant to the disabled. These decisions are now implemented by the Provincial Directorate of Family and Social Policies'*. Similarly, Deputy Mayor, Mr Ali SURUCU stressed that municipal management is quite satisfied with the activities of CSOs: *'we have many reactive associations for civil life; we sometimes have problems to keep up with their activities in terms of high demand for providing meeting halls and other venues'*.

On the other hand, there are also few negatives arising from respondents (Table 63 in Appendix 3). However, general comments about CSOs are positive and satisfactory for a small province like Canakkale.

7.3.1 Bolu:

Conversely, the general characteristics of CSOs draw a relatively different picture in Bolu. Despite the fact Bolu is a slightly more developed province, vibrancy of civic life is not as prominent as that of Canakkale.

As noted the researcher's former experience in Bolu province indicated Bolu has an enormous potential for CSOs to flourish. People tend to come together to overcome their problems. Bolu has one of the great examples of philanthropic activities in Turkey. Mr Izzet Baysal (1903-2000), who was a rich businessman, donated his wealth to the Izzet Baysal Foundation he established in 1986. This foundation has secured many investments for Bolu, especially for education, health and the social services. The total number of buildings constructed by this charitable foundation is 130, comprising many primary and secondary schools, a university,

hospitals and surgeries, and homes for the elderly. The cost of all these philanthropic works is over £100 million at 2013 prices⁴⁰. As goodwill spreads in waves, following Mr Baysal's example, many businessmen continued to support these voluntary services after Mr Baysal's death. Many schools, hospitals, academic scholarships are still being provided by the charitable people of Bolu. Not only personal donations, but also community commitment is strong in Bolu. Having experienced a devastating earthquake in 1999, the people of Bolu know the importance of social solidarity.

On the other hand, the robustness of charitable works is not reflected on CSOs. When respondents are asked to evaluate civil society, especially managerial and political actors tended to talk about professional chambers and charity foundations (ensemble of properties in Turkish context). Their descriptions about civic associations are rather negative and critical. This gives the impression philanthropic features of the society cannot be converted into formal associational movements. Even though the 1999 Earthquake was a milestone for changing perceptions of civil society organisations in Turkey, the CSOs of Bolu could not manage to sustain the ground covered during the successful operations for disaster relief.

Participants in Bolu generally refer to local politics when they are describing CSOs. Mr Alaaddin YILMAZ, the Mayor, describes the many common features of CSOs in one paragraph: *'CSOs in Bolu are as weak as they generally are in Turkey. Even worse, we do not have a chance to work to improve CSOs. Once, I tried to gather their offices together but I could achieve a little. I expect more demanding CSOs, but they are not. They are financially weak and can't afford their aims. In the end of the day, they remain like artificial and non-functional. Many of them are engaged in political parties and they appear as offshoots of politicians, thus they do not function as real CSOs'.*

Civil society representatives confirm the Mayor's views. Mr Suha ALPARSLAN, a local newspaper columnist, views the matter from a rather analytical perspective: *'I think the problem is rather related to Turkey's overall democratisation progress. If we are to have robust CSOs, we should internalise democracy in our daily lives. However, our people hesitate to get involved in civil activities just to avoid paying membership fees. I think development of CSOs is*

⁴⁰ Source:

http://izzetbaysalvakfi.org.tr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=411&Itemid=55

still at its infancy in Bolu. They are far from being non-governmental organisations. They adjust themselves in accordance with the current political climate. For example, we have four teachers' associations in Bolu. Each of them is reflecting various views in the political spectrum. Thus, they cannot succeed in class conflict. They cannot affect decision making mechanisms. They have to remain as backyards of political parties'. Another local media representative, Mr Mustafa COP, harshly criticised the general conditions saying *'CSOs in Bolu behave like nested structures of Governorship and Municipality. Whoever has the political power; CSOs follow him like bootlickers'.* He also draws attention to leadership struggles that affects CSOs negatively: *'Egoism divides civil society into many pieces. Association leaders are always same people, they cannot be changed within democratic ways, and they stick to their chairs and try to eliminate any opposition threatening their posts. Thus, the opposition leave the association and found a new one just for themselves. We experienced this in our Journalists' Association. We have now two associations on the same topic and our power is split'.* This leader centred feature of CSOs results in low activity and low commitment. Mr Turgut KALAYCIOGLU, Chairman of the Town Council, complains that, *'association leaders do not have a habit of discussing matters with their members. Another reason for this is association leaders are busy with their own business and they cannot spare required time for association works'.* Obviously, leader-centred organisations neglects information flows down to members, blocking channels that help create linking and bridging social capital. In other terms, the structure of CSO management mimics the hierarchical structures of the state and political institutions.

According to data provided by the Associations Desk for Bolu Governorship, overall figures of CSOs are on the rise since 2005. There were 460 associations in Bolu in 2005, this increased to 529 in 2013 at the rate of 15%, which is lower than increase rate of association figures in Canakkale for the same period.

In conclusion, Canakkale and Bolu have similar socio-economic development levels; however, civil society associations in Canakkale are more functioning and regarded as varied and active. Despite the fact there are a range of philanthropic foundations in Bolu, civil society is not effectively organised. According to the respondents' comments and the researcher's observations, Bolu experiences a political fragmentation, and structural inadequacies in terms of democratisation of CSOs. These differences are also reflected in their bridging social capital levels accordingly.

7.4 The Assessment of Political Opportunity Structures:

7.4.1 Canakkale:

Town Councils in the Turkish context are regarded as the formal political opportunity structures. They provide a useful framework to assess the local context shaped by the state and civil society actors. Despite the fact Town councils were regulated by law for the first time in 2006, there was already an established culture of participation in Canakkale. As one of the pilot provinces, where *'Local Agenda 21'* the project of the UNDP was implemented, several participatory assemblies had been operating in the city since late the 1990s. In Canakkale's case, the Town Council legislation just went ahead and gathered them altogether as a formally recognised body. That is why; transition processes of the Town council were swift and rather less problematic.

Canakkale Town Council is one of the few well-designed and actively working town councils in Turkey. It was observed and comprehended during the fieldwork the essence behind effective town councils stems from its democratic design.

When respondents were asked about their experiences during the Town Council's early days, they resolutely confirmed the initial procedures and elections of executive bodies were all democratic and no political or other interventions took place. According to journalist Burak GEZEN; *'Invitations for Town Council's first assembly were sent to every CSO in the city and we assembled with a large majority of the invited. If there were absentees, it was because of their busyness or negligence. The executive board and chairman were elected from the candidates freely. As a CSO representative and local media member, I regularly receive invitations for assemblies and other activities since.'* Not only the first establishment, but also the working principles of sub-committees are also designed democratically. As Mrs Ozge ULUSAL⁴¹ commented, *'Our sub-committee has nearly 53 representatives in many public and private institutions. We always accept decisions with the participation by the majority. Our elections are also good examples of participatory democracy at local level.'*

⁴¹ Chairman of the Women's Committee under Town Council

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Canakkale Town Council has designed sub-committees not only for disadvantaged groups; there are also many neighbourhood level participatory branches. Special attention is given to neighbourhood committees in order to draw ordinary people into the participation mechanisms. Their main target in doing so is to solve common problems through people's own efforts.

Canakkale Municipality's continuous support is an undeniable example of a well-designed and effective town council. Two offices were rented in a central location of the city and there are six employees for the council works and project implementations. The Municipality allocates a large amount of money, which was around 750.000 Turkish Lira⁴² in 2013⁴³. In addition, possibly the most important contribution of the municipality is they did not interfere with the town council's elections and gave town council a space where it could reside and operate freely. In one of his press releases, Mr Ulgur GOKHAN, the Mayor, stated *'Mayors have two options in shaping town councils: a mayor can interfere with the town council's business and ties the council strictly to his existence; or he can let them work to establish democratic participation. I preferred the second option and the town council can shoulder its important tasks in terms of consolidation of democracy in our city.'*⁴⁴ The Mayor bluntly states providing political opportunities for the civil society is generally up to politicians' choices. This also supports the view that a 'top-down' perspective is required to create linking and bridging social capital in local contexts. Conversely in the case of Bolu, the other province in the pair, the Mayor's attitude is generally decisive over the design and effectiveness of political opportunity structures, as reviewed below. In Canakkale, it can be said to a large extent the local authority is helpful in establishing a well-designed and effective town council.

Despite Canakkale Municipality supports the Town Council in many ways, the council is still regarded as an independent body. Chairman of Town Council Mr Saim YAVUZ explains this as the acquisition of the Local Agenda 21 process: *'During the early stages of Local Agenda 21 programme, we had to face with many obstacles and biases. There have been conflicts between civil society and municipal and political powers. But, this process taught all of us*

⁴² It is around £225.000 as of January 2014

⁴³ Total expenditure figure of municipal budget was 119.000.000 Turkish Lira in 2013. Town council's budget only takes less than 1/120 of it.

⁴⁴ Source: <http://www.canakkalekentkonseyi.org/index.php/component/content/article/25-the-project/268-canakkale-kent-konseyi-10-yanda> , accessed on 20.01.2014

where to stand in state-civil society relationships. Municipal staff and councillors were not aware of new concepts like participation, sustainable development, and a culture of consultation. They have learnt through discussions and began respecting and recognising us as an entity. It was a painful process; however, it created trustworthiness between actors. Consequently today, civil society and public authorities trust each other’.

Having been provided with a suitable environment and infrastructure, the town council emerged as an effective participation mechanism in Canakkale. According to respondents, the works of the Town Council is very well-known by the people of Canakkale. As Digidem GURDOGAN, a CSO representative states *‘the town council is becoming more and more popular. One of the main reasons for this is establishment of neighbourhood committees. We used to complain about people’s unawareness; however we now have offices in every neighbourhood, thus people now know what we are doing.’* Newspaper journalist Burak GEZER also stated *‘CSOs become more interested in Town Council’s works when they observe its success in decision making processes’.*

When respondents are asked about the most important success of the Town Council recognised across the city, they generally gave the example of their resistance against a proposed yacht marina. According to respondents, Town Council held many meetings with CSOs, public officials and academics in order to discuss the location of a new yacht marina planned by the municipality. After one and a half years, the municipal council had to withdraw its decision and the location of yacht marina has been moved to a more suitable and environmentally friendly area.

Another important project of the town council concerns *‘Romans’*⁴⁵. In Canakkale, there is a Roman neighbourhood which was settled nearly 500 years ago. Approximately 5000 Roman origin people still live in Canakkale suburbs freely observing their culture and traditions. In Turkey the general attitude among people against the gypsies is negative and they live in isolation. However, the town council focused on Romans in Canakkale and established a sub-committee in their neighbourhood. With the help of Canakkale University, a series of academic field studies were conducted to understand their way of life and living conditions. The study was published by the town council in a book titled *‘Bir Mahalleyi Anlamak’ (Understanding a*

⁴⁵ Gypsies call themselves as *Roman* in Turkish.

Neighbourhood). According to the chairman, Romans are now more involved in city matters than ever and they appreciate the opportunity to take part in the town council mechanisms.

One striking activity of the town council is *'The Declaration of Voters'*, accepted by the town council for the local elections to be held in March 2014. In this declaration, the town council reveals the expectations of the residents of Canakkale from the new municipal management. It contains 14 main subjects ranging from the environment, to the economy, culture and political participation.

After the field study was completed, it was posted on the Council's website stating the Town Council of Canakkale has introduced a new project to create awareness to encourage public participation. With the support of a local TV channel, the town council's activities and important discussions on the city are broadcasted in a programme on every Monday, called *'Kentim için, Kendim için' (For me, and for my city)*.

Despite all these success and institutionalisation, Canakkale Town Council is not immune from criticisms. Respondents frequently complain the town council is made up of people who are mainly social-democrat. This creates a bias in the activities and projects being implemented. The Chairman of the town council Mr YAVUZ explains *'the general political characteristics of Canakkale's people are also reflected on the town council. Our people are generally social-democrat and they define themselves as secular and Kemalist⁴⁶. The great majority of town council members share this ideology. Thus, we are not as inclusive as we would like to be. Whatever the effort we put in it did not help. Other groups in the city separate themselves, left-wing extremists, nationalists and Islamists would not attend our meetings'*. Mr Ibrahim BATTAL, who is the president of the Association of the Visually Handicapped, criticises the town council of operating like the municipality's backyard: *'budget allocations from municipality destroyed town council's credibility, authenticity and freedom. It was more democratic when Local Agenda 21 practices financed by the UNDP, were operated. Now, who pays the piper calls the tune!'*

In conclusion, the observation is, the formal political opportunity structure required by the Municipality Law exists in the case of Canakkale. There are several underlying reasons behind its success. First of all, the social fabric-sociological conditions for bottom up social capital

⁴⁶ Republicans name themselves as Kemalist ideologically, emphasising that they follow Kemal Ataturk's path.

formation- of people in Canakkale enables them to join in CSOs. Secondly, there was already an established participation mechanism first initiated by the UNDP's Local Agenda 21 Programme. Third, may be the most important factor in the scope of this study, there is a supportive local authority which provides channels of participation and enables CSOs to have their say over public matters. It can be argued the fate of the Town Council is largely determined by the municipal council and the Mayor. As shown in Bolu's example below, participatory mechanisms are quite fragile and their existence is predetermined by the municipal management in general. The existence of a well-designed and active participation mechanism corresponds with the higher bridging social capital level of Canakkale province. On the other hand, Canakkale town council is criticised for being a centre solely for a politically distinguished group: seculars and Kemalists. Nevertheless, its function as a local participation mechanism is still undeniable, and the successful practices of Canakkale Town Council are a few of good examples can be found in Turkish local context.

7.4.2 Bolu:

The assessment of the Town Council of Bolu reveals a contradictory picture when compared to that of Canakkale. As a highly developed city with a philanthropic past, the problems faced by CSOs are somehow reflected on design and effectiveness of town council as the formal public participation mechanism.

When Bolu town council was first established in 2009, there was no formal participation mechanism in the city. According to respondents, some undesirable events were witnessed during the establishment phase. Mr Mustafa NAMDAR, general secretary of the town council remembers *'there were a deputy mayor who were responsible for founding town council in the early days. According to legislation of that time, municipal councillors were also permitted to take part in the town councils' assembly. As a consequence, they invited politically 'convenient' CSOs and figures for town council meetings. The chairman of the town council was elected from the ruling party's municipal councillors. This led to a mistrust among the public. Consequently, the town council was stamped politically as an extension of the ruling party. Although the chairman had to resign due to a law amendment, there is still a strong belief the Town council is a politicised mechanism and this bias still exists.'*

It is obvious the initial steps are vitally important in shaping political opportunity structures successfully. In spite of these negative outcomes of ill-designed structures being generally

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understood by participants, there is little evidence of efforts to repair and improve broken reputations of the town council. According to local journalist Mr Mustafa COP, the law amendment prohibiting membership of municipal councillors in town council was a wasted opportunity: *'Political and organic connectedness between town council and municipal management was quite obvious until the law amendment. A new chairman and a new executive committee could have managed a fresh start; however, the mayor insisted one of his close companions should be elected as town council's chairman. Although the new town council management looks disconnected from the municipality politically and organically, the infrastructure of relationships is still the same, nothing changed in practice.'* The new executive committee was shaped by the presidents of professional chambers in the city, and emerged as a council of city elites. During the interview with Mr Alaaddin YILMAZ, the Mayor of Bolu, he stated explicitly he himself shaped the new town council as an elite committee: *'Our primary aim as a municipality is to achieve urban development. I specially designed town council's executive committee to serve municipal aims. The chairman of the town council is a construction engineer and architect; other members are from professional chambers who know the city's conditions very well. The main duty I expect from the town council is they should act to convince public opinion in accordance with our proposed urban development plans'.*

It is clear the Town Council in Bolu was not designed democratically and functionally. It is not regarded as a participation mechanism and does not provide CSOs with communication channels. The only CSO in the executive committee is the Journalist's Association.

Despite the fact the Mayor still has some expectations from the town council, whether they are appropriate or not for civil participation ends is arguable and the required infrastructure is not provided either. The Town council has not got a budget, an office or a staff at the time of the study. The interview with the chairman took place in his private engineering office. Similarly, the general secretary of the town council was interviewed in a local café.

Established on an undemocratic and-ill design, the town council is far from functioning effectively. The main reason for the ineffectiveness is the politicised structure of the town council and it is the main complaint of the participants. According to a top official of Bolu municipality, who wished to remain anonymous, she/he stated *'the town council could not follow an impartial path. They always appealed to a definite political element of society: the supporters of the ruling political party'*. Another respondent who is an anonymous CSO representative and town council member narrated that *'whenever we tried to implement a project in society, we were always asked by people if we are branches of the ruling political*

party. Despite all our efforts, we couldn't remove that label from ourselves'. Strong political influence of municipal management on the town council was present throughout the interviews. Respondents stated the town council could never emerge as a free body and remained as an extension of the municipality both politically and institutionally. As the journalist Mustafa COP described, 'It is not Bolu's Town Council; it is The Town Council of Bolu Municipality and always has been'.

As chairman of the town council Mr KALAYCIOGLU and general secretary Mr NAMDAR informed, the town council does not meet regularly. They say attendance of members is fairly low. However, respondents blame inadequacies of the current legislation in terms of ineffectiveness. They complain that under the municipal law and bylaw for town councils, it is impossible to form and operate an actively working participation mechanism. In their opinion, non-existence of an independent budget, organic and political interventions from the municipality and absence of any sanctioning power are the main stumbling blocks standing in the way of effective town councils.

In conclusion, the town council in Bolu was not formulated democratically and it does not function actively. The main reasons behind this are politicised interventions from the early stages of the formation, the elitist structure of the executive committee, technical expectations emphasised as urban development projects, absence of financial and physical support from municipality, and toothless legislation. Despite the fact that town councils are recognised as the formal political opportunity structures in this study, describing Bolu town council in this way is almost impossible as it does not provide any opportunity for CSOs to participate in the public decision making processes. It can be said to a large extent the local context is not designed adequately and does not allow CSOs to create links with the power structures democratically. Therefore it cannot be said creation of linking and bridging social capital is facilitated by the local authority in Bolu. This picture corresponds with the lower social capital level of Bolu when compared with Canakkale. Despite Bolu being a more developed province, the activity of civil society associations and design of the political opportunity structure is not superior to those of Canakkale. This implies actual practices of governance and contextual differences can make a difference in creating linking and bridging social capital through the performance of institutions in enabling an appropriate environment. That is why the most favoured 'bottom-up' perspective that explains the creation of social capital as an outcome of the historical and cultural past should be supplemented by a 'top-

down' perspective which draws attention to the impact of rules being implemented and the contextual diversities shaped by state activities.

7.5 The Assessment of Relationships:

In general, CSOs and state relationships are shaped by reasons stemming from the weakness of CSOs. In-kind aids and monetary support in definite forms like venue provisions and project funding are the main incentives for CSOs to be in contact with public authorities. In Canakkale's and Bolu's cases, this is also valid but less cited by the participants. Representing high socio-economic development provinces, Canakkale and Bolu have more self-sufficient CSOs compared to CSOs from more deprived provinces to be discussed later in the analysis.

When respondents were asked to interpret relationships between civil society and public authorities, their responses naturally revealed negative and positive comments. Not surprisingly, negative comments are more frequent in low social capital provinces and this situation is also accurate for the Canakkale-Bolu comparison (see Table 67-68 in Appendix 3). Below, findings from assessment of relationships in high development cities will be conveyed in detail for each province.

7.5.1 Canakkale:

Interviewees in Canakkale generally have a positive perception of civil society and state relationships. In the town council's case, direct support from the municipality is enjoyed by many CSOs. Especially disadvantaged groups like women, elderly and the disabled are able to gain access to municipal resources. Journalist Mr Burak GEZEN observed, *'there are many CSOs for disadvantaged groups in this city. I note municipal management supports these within a positive discrimination approach. For example, municipality designed sales offices for women who produce handicrafts in order to support their family budget. We also observe the both municipality and governorship are doing their best to support CSOs, and this is also true for lower level public departments'*. Similarly Mr Irfan GUZ, President of Association for the Physically Disabled of Canakkale, stated *'in the beginning of every financial year, we present project files to municipality and they allocate budget for us within the legal limitations'*. When the formal activity reports were examined, they showed Canakkale municipality is also supportive for amateur sports clubs, elderly homes and social activity centres in the neighbourhoods.

Mrs ULUSAL, a CSO representative stresses *'public authorities are supportive for us because they are governed by public administrators who have positive thoughts towards civil society and effective dialogues with CSOs. This is simply our luck'*. In confirmation, Deputy Governor Mr Cemal YILDIZER (previously deputy governor of Bolu) compares important members of the municipal managements of Canakkale and Bolu: *'Canakkale has a more active Mayor and management in terms of CSO-local authority relationships, this is definitely the result of the Mayor's personal intellect and his awareness of social matters'*.

Another consensus point among respondents is the supportive nature of project funding. Canakkale is located in Southern Marmara Development Region and CSOs in Canakkale receive grants from the development agency. There are also several EU's programmes at national level that local CSOs benefit from if their proposals are accepted. Mr YAVUZ, Chairman of the Town Council observed *'CSOs in Canakkale require support from public authorities, in addition to physical resources like offices or vehicles, project grants have emerged as a new financial opportunity for CSOs. There are many receiving these kinds of sources, amounts are tiny but associations are increasing their capacity through project writing and implementing. This accrues self-esteem and freedom. There are CSOs who became professional in terms of project writing in a competitive way.'* Project writing is an important obstacle for CSOs. Grant schemes are provided under strict regulations and applicants need to arrange their projects in compliance with the sponsors' rules. Educational needs for project writing is met by expert staff under an office established by Governorship of Canakkale. They regularly gather together CSO representatives and give seminars on the project cycle and implementation.

In summary, respondents agree there are good relationships between CSOs and state agencies in Canakkale. However, there are also criticisms emphasising the political fragmentation between CSOs. The domination of the social-democrat identity on the whole society automatically marginalises other political views. Journalist Mr Murat KIRAY claims *'representatives of right-wing religious CSOs have developed an attitude drawing themselves back from interacting with secularist-social democratic spheres. Even though there is no exclusion mechanism working against them, they prefer not to take part in the discussions.'* He also claims although support from the municipality to CSOs and town council is an important facilitator for local civil society, it damages voluntarism and the authenticity of civil society: *'when CSOs and participation mechanisms are closer to public bodies, they are distancing themselves from their primary target, which is to create a civic culture and democratic*

relationships within society. Unavoidably, interference with public authorities overshadows their works. Similarly, Mr BATTAL, the president of the Association of the Visually Handicapped, argued participatory democracy was more effective in the earlier days of the town council, starting in 2006, it diminished gradually during the transition process from Local Agenda 21 practices to a more formally regulated town council.

Consequently, although CSOs-state relationships are robust and the formal participation mechanism is active in Canakkale, there are complaints democratic settings are not developed to the desired level, due to the domination of a definite political ideology running through relationships of the formal mechanisms. Most of the respondents are concerned about exclusion of definite groups from the civil arena. This concern can also be regarded as an indicator of a mature civil society, which diagnoses problems itself and looks forward positively. One possible solution might be to design the context with more objective regulations in order the politicised effects be reduced to a minimum. Research has again revealed how political fragmentation and ideological alienation damage civil life and democratic participation in the Turkish context.

7.5.2 Bolu:

Assessment of CSOs-state relationships in Bolu draws a gloomy picture. Almost all respondents criticised current circumstances negatively. Only one positive comment was recorded during the interviews: Mr Ibrahim OZCIMENT, Governor of Bolu, mentioned the CSOs in Bolu are active in terms of receiving grants from Eastern Marmara Development Agency.

Other interpretations are significantly negative and they are generally directed towards the the municipal management. Governor Mr OZCIMENT summaries civil society-municipality relationships concisely: *'If you listen to people, people will produce new ideas and prefer participation. If you do not listen, they stop participating since they can't make any difference. That is exactly what happens in Bolu. Both political and managerial figures should listen to people persistently. Municipality does not rule this city with people's participation. Everybody waits for the Mayor's words. We have too much distance to cover in terms of achieving non-electoral democratic participation. The Law for Political Parties in effect should be changed in order to ensure a more democratic participation.* Mr Governor draws attention to a fundamental problem shaping local politics in Turkey: the powerful Mayor versus weak councillor dilemma, which stems from legal regulations.

Similarly, the chairman of Town Council, Mr KALAYCIOGLU stresses the Mayor's attitude to town council is not democratic: *'The Mayor assigns tasks to the town council, he tends to rule it in his way, and he will use appropriate results of council works for his own political ends. This is not a democratic standpoint. I know him very well; he is my friend for over 35 years'*.

A harsh interpretation for the approaches followed by Bolu Municipality comes from a journalist, Mr Suha ALPARSLAN: *'If I am to comment about municipality-civil society relationships, I need to take a closer look at the person and his team who have ruled this city for the last ten years. His beliefs in democracy are open to suspicion. He is extremely politicised. A democratic Mayor should free himself from his political engagements to some extent if he wants to serve all people of the city. But the municipal management separates people, labelling them 'supporters and oppositions'. Their democratic understanding is limited only with winning elections. We very well know democracy is not limited to elections, but what can we expect from a mentality whose only aim is to be elected again and again?'*⁴⁷

To his credit, Mayor Mr Alaaddin YILMAZ expressed himself sincerely he does not need any consultation from public: *'We are still challenging with development issues. We cannot work in a European way. We have to develop this city at full speed. Thus, I cannot wait for public opinion take shape; I do not have time for this. Sometimes I realise projects which are widely opposed by people, nevertheless, people are still satisfied with my way of doing things in the end of the day. They elect me again and again.'*⁴⁸

Despite the absence of a consultative approach, Bolu Municipality is quite active in providing social welfare state services. When the Mayor was asked about social projects aiming to create a robust civil society, he took the researcher on a tour of the municipal services for local community. It showed there are many good examples in terms of social aids are in effect. These services are naturally directed at deprived layers of the community. Food allowances and clothing, public soup kitchen, coal aid for winter, psychological support for families, study rooms and free preparatory classes for children of the poor are few of them. However, the

⁴⁷ It is worth to note here that Mr ALPARSLAN's 26-years-old newspaper, *Bolu Gundem*, has been closed down by Municipal Police one week earlier from 30 March 2014 local elections, due to some minor legal reasons.

⁴⁸ Mr YILMAZ, Mayor of Bolu has been elected for the third time in a row in 30 March 2014 local elections.

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common element of these services is they are for individuals and undeniably important for the people in need. But, they do not connect people with each other, conversely, poor people becomes more dependent on the public authority since the aid is provided in a patriarchal pattern, and showcases the goodwill of the municipality. It is obvious this kind of social policy will have some political returns in terms of consolidation of the voters' attachment to the ruling political party. Although there are a range of philanthropic activities in the civil life of Bolu, municipal management does not combine its social activities with the relevant CSOs. Only one good example was identified during the study. The municipality allocated a common park as a *'tea garden for the disabled'*. An association for the disabled runs it and disabled staff work there.

In such an environment, participants hold local authority responsible for that 'low brow' civil context. An anonymous civil society representative claimed the main reason for poor quality relationships is the municipal management always want to be at the centre of every activity: *'In the past, there was a deputy mayor, Mr Abdullah Ozturk; and he was extremely supportive for our associational activities. We had nearly 90 activities, and I counted 60 of them were realised thanks to the resources provided by Mr Ozturk. He left his position and the new deputy mayor for public relations does not accept our project proposals saying the municipality is already capable of doing the project, why we should do this instead of their staff?'*

Mr Mustafa NAMDAR, general secretary of the town council diagnoses the problem. He connects it to the political environment shaped during the last ten years: *'During the last two election terms, a definite political view is rooted in local politics. Confrontational culture is largely accepted among politicians. Whenever they take a microphone in public, they start with attacking their opponents insensibly. This leads to sharp political polarisations in society. Consensual politics is forgotten absolutely. Whoever cries louder, and whoever bangs his fist on the table mightier, is followed by the society. People follow politicians blindly'*.

It is discernible from the description of civil context and behavioural patterns relationships between CSOs and local authority are far from being healthy. Interactions are generally dominated by a politically powerful Mayor, whose ideas and approaches to public participation and consultation are limited. In spite of the fact municipal supports for poor people are represented as examples of good relationships with the community, they are generally welfare state services and attach only the poor people to the municipality individually. Therefore public relations as a term is understood as 'helping the poor' wrongly. Democratic culture and participation are simply reduced to local and general elections in a 4-5 year period. However,

according to the former professional experience of the researcher in Bolu province, there is great potential in Bolu if the local authority establishes democratic participation mechanisms and aims to realise better governance. In Bolu, it is difficult to see how the local context enables people to create linking social capital with public figures, due to their dismissive attitudes to civil society. Similarly, channels to create bridging social capital between CSOs and local people are damaged due to political polarisation demonstrated by the politicians' actions towards the populace.

7.6 Conclusions for the High Socio-Economic Pair

The assessment of the local context where CSOs and local authority interact reveals Canakkale and Bolu experience different practices in terms of public participation and the quality of state-civil society relationships.

As the 'good' example in the pair, Canakkale has an active civil society and a highly established formal participation mechanism. Almost 15 years of experience of the town council establishment provided the local civil society with some opportunities to mobilise public resources for effective participation. Support of local authorities for CSOs and formal participation mechanism is undeniable. According to interviewees, this is due to common beliefs internalised by the local public and civil figures. They are certainly aware the consolidation of democracy can be achieved by more open relationships between each other. However, dominance of social-democrat ideologies influencing the civil and political actors of the city has automatically created a marginalising effect for less prevalent political views. Unwillingness of other groups in the public decision making processes decreases the quality and comprehensiveness of formal participation mechanisms and CSO-local authority relationships. This is certainly a reflection of political polarisation of individuals and organisations. When people tend to identify themselves as supporters of or oppositions to the ruling political parties, existing schisms among different social spheres become deeper. Although the existing structure of political opportunities can provide an enabling environment individuals and associations could create links with power structures and establish bridges between each other, linking and bridging social capital created through state-civil society interpenetration in Canakkale will remain limited in a definite social/political sphere. Nevertheless, Canakkale draws a bright picture and constitutes a good example in establishing a rather healthy context for state-civil society relationships in Turkey.

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Despite its high socio-economic development level, Bolu experiences problems with democratic participation and CSO-local authority relationships. The town council as the formal political opportunity structure is almost dysfunctional. In people's minds, perception of the term civil society organisation is limited to professional and commercial chambers. Although there is a high level of philanthropic works and charitable foundations, associational activity is lower than expected. It seems Bolu cannot convert its civic potential into engagement in associational activities.

Civil society-state relationships are largely ruled by a powerful Mayor's actions. According to him, his major concern is with urban development in spite of Bolu being the 11th most developed city in Turkey. His strong refusal for consultation, and his views regarding participation mechanisms as a waste of time are completely unacceptable in modern governance settings. In addition to this, his patriarchal stance in the provision of basic social services is far from enhancing civil society as a whole, and it results in creation of more numbers of dependent people, wealth of whom is financially and politically dependant on the Mayor's existence. In such an environment, it is difficult to expect activities of the local authority can create linking and bridging social capital; conversely, it is more likely to be damaging.

In conclusion, the research findings support that regardless of socio-economic development, a better designed context for civil society activities and a more effective political opportunity structure is associated with higher bridging social capital level, whereas self-enclosed managerial structures and dysfunctional participation mechanisms relate to lower social capital. Thus, it should be recognised creation of bridging social capital can be context dependant; and the role of local public authorities as facilitators or inhibitors for civil society needs to be explored as an endogenous factor in social capital studies.

Chapter 8: THE INTERPRETATION OF LOCAL CONTEXTS: MIDDLE SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PAIR

8.1 Introduction

Karabuk and Kirikkale are provinces representing middle SED levels. Karabuk is slightly more developed than Kirikkale; however these two provinces have many common features. They are both industrial cities surrounded by small rural populations. Kirikkale and Karabuk were just small villages when the Republic of Turkey was founded in 1923. Both villages were selected as regions for early industrial investments by the new state. Kirikkale is a central Anatolian city located 78 km east of the capital Ankara. Karabuk is located in the western Black Sea region within commuting distance of the port of Zonguldak.

Karabuk was a small sub-village with 13 households in 1937. When the government decided to open a large iron-steel factory in the region, the destiny of Karabuk changed for good. The factory began production in 1939 and the first municipality was established in the same year. In 1953, it became a district under the Zonguldak province. After a constant development process, in 1995, a law was passed in the Grand National Assembly to establish a provincial public administration in Karabuk announcing it as the 78th province of Turkey.

Similarly, Kirikkale was a small village in 1925. The founders of the Turkish Republic required a secure place to establish the first strategic investments of the new State. According to national security strategies of that time, Kirikkale's location was found suitable as it is near to the capital city Ankara in central Anatolia. It was considered difficult to invade by foreign enemies. In 1925, a weapons factory, MKEK (Mechanical and Chemical Industry Corporation) was founded in Kirikkale and started production. In 1944, Kirikkale became a district of Ankara province. In 1986, a government enterprise TUPRAS (Turkish Petroleum Refineries Co.) has opened a large refinery near the city. With rapid industrialisation, the region of Kirikkale developed quickly and became the 71st province of Turkey in 1989.

General information about the provinces are presented in table 41 below.

Table 41: Information for the middle development pair

PROVINCES	Karabuk	Kirikkale
Bridging social capital rank	19	38
Socio-economic development rank	28	41
Population of central municipal area/overall province population (2012)	110.000/225.000	192.000/274.000
Rate of immigrants	39% ⁴⁹	28%
Number of civil associations	623	465
Share of main economic sectors in GDP ⁵⁰		
Agriculture and forestry	9.7%	5.4%
Industry and manufacture	61%	58.9%
Political tendencies	Right-wing/nationalist	Right-wing/Islamic-liberal

Politically, Karabuk and Kirikkale fall into the right-wing of the political spectrum. A left-wing party was never able to win a single local election in both provinces. Local election results of the last three decades can be found in Appendix 3 (Table 71-72) Kirikkale and Karabuk are also similar in having influential political figures of national politics. Kirikkale is represented in The Turkish Grand National Assembly by three MPs and all of them are from the AK Party. One of them is Professor Besir Atalay, currently Deputy Prime Minister and he was formerly the Minister of Interior and founding Rector of Kirikkale University. Karabuk is represented in the Grand National Assembly by two MPs, both from AK Party. One of them, Mr Mehmet Ali Sahin

⁴⁹ According to TurkStat database, nearly 39% of municipal population in Karabuk were born in other provinces. Given that four generations have passed since the city was founded and birthplaces of children of early immigrants' were all registered as Karabuk, real ratio of immigrants from other provinces would be much higher. This is also a similar fact in Kirikkale's case, at a lower rate.

⁵⁰ Source: www.turkstat.gov.tr

served as Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Justice and later Chairman of the Grand National Assembly in the last decade. It is worth noting in Turkish local politics, it is very crucial for a province to have influential actors in the ruling party of central government. This is because the central and unitary structure of the Turkish Republic, transfers to local budgets and investment plans were generally shaped by Ministry offices. Influential politicians are seen very important to transfer central government funds to the provinces they represent.

Although these similarities, the two provinces are different in terms of the local civil context and participation practices are reflected in bridging social capital levels. In Kirikkale, where political opportunity structures are almost paralysed, public authorities are harshly criticised and support for CSOs is limited. Kirikkale is behind Karabuk in terms of bridging social capital, and it takes place in a relatively higher bonding social capital region. However, Karabuk has a more open local authority, and enjoys various participation mechanisms. These contradictions are explored in a greater depth under the relevant primary-codes below.

8.2 The General Characteristics of CSOs in Karabuk and Kirikkale:

8.2.1 Karabuk:

Being the high social capital province in the pair, Karabuk has many CSOs in number. According to statistics derived from the Governorship of Karabuk, there were 623 active associations in the province at the time of the study and total membership was 54,595. When this figure is proportioned to +15 years age of province population, nearly 31% of people are association members, which is almost twice as higher than Turkey's average. The total number of associations in Karabuk was 541 in 2009, and it increased to 623 in 2013 at a rate of 15%. However, high numbers may not necessarily indicate an active association life. High membership rate is due to a couple of pensioners' associations that are mass membership organisations. According to respondents, civil society in Karabuk is characterised by dominance of immigrant groups from neighbouring and other provinces. This leads to some impeding practices against the development of robust civil society organisations. Mr İzzettin KUCUK, Governor of Karabuk, stressed *'we have a large variety of associations for 'fellow-countrymen' and it is almost impossible to observe such a variety in an average size province like Karabuk. I do not appreciate this situation since it hampers efforts to create a common identity in the city.'*

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Being an industrial city with a large amount of inland-immigrant workers, the people of Karabuk are rather focused on labour unions. It was assumed prior to the research the existence of trade unionism and labour movement in the city would create positive externalities for CSOs and the proliferation of associations. However, research revealed micro-nationalism in immigrant groups dominated trade unionism and local politics are shaped by the power struggles among these different identities having different political attachments. An experienced journalist and local newspaper owner Mr Ahmet GOLBEK shared his observations: *'In the past, trade unionism has triggered an unexpected fallacy. Immigrant workers having strict bonds of fellowship diverted their energy to win trade union elections. Their success in securing important labour leaderships led civil society to concentrate on consolidating fellowship bonds, and associational activism was reduced to and limited by trade unionism which is dominated by micro-nationalism. People did not give much credit to other kind of civic engagements'*. Inevitably, it has been noted that micro-nationalism has also affected local politics. Political parties regarded immigrant groups as 'reservoirs of voters' and approached them to take advantage of this. Mr Celal BULUT, who is a CSO representative and a former local politician, stressed *'political parties distribute important positions [e.g., municipal councillorships] prior to local elections among fellow-citizens groups. Through this, they ensure their votes as blocks. In turn, elected figures support immigrant associations in their important matters. Thus, they cannot criticise each other and this fragmentation in society goes on and on'*.

Even though respondents did not name it academically, the reality experienced in Karabuk is a type of 'bonding social capital'. Remember bonding social capital in this study is defined mainly as a function of strict and traditional family relations. Karabuk is in a region having relatively low bonding social capital; because family structures are more modern (nuclear families) and feudal relations hardly exist. However, the fellowship vision bonding the immigrant groups is strong; and bonding social capital is converted into linking social capital to gain political and economic advantages by local elections and labour unions.

Great emphasis on trade unionism negatively affected other CSOs and they generally share similar problems with other CSOs in Turkey's other regions. Low voluntarism, low activism, leader-oriented practices are also common subjects of complaint in Karabuk.

8.2.2 Kirikkale:

Kirikkale is the 38th province in the bridging social capital index rankings. According to statistics derived from The Associations Department of Kirikkale Governorship, there are 465 active associations in Kirikkale. The total number of association members is 36.310, and average association size is 78 people. Statistically, 16,9% of +15 age group of the population are members of an association, which is slightly over Turkey's average, 16,4%. However, this rate is roughly half of Karabuk's association figures. Nevertheless, the total number of CSOs has increased by 15% during the last five years, which was 404 in 2009, and 465 in 2013.

However, increasing associational figures do not imply an active associational life in Kirikkale. Most of the participants criticise CSOs as inactive and financially weak. Despite the fact Kirikkale is also a workers' city like Karabuk, the impact of labour unions on civil society is not as strong as in Karabuk. According to Mr Ramazan CETIN, a local newspaper owner and the President of Journalists' Association of Kirikkale, *'urban development and evolution of civil society do not overlap in Kirikkale's case. Despite all the intense economic investments of the government and private sector, we do not have robust and effective civil society organisations. Only a few co-operatives and professional chambers can raise their voices in the city, if they are to be considered as CSOs. Associations are financially weak and they cannot operate actively. Thus, we lack a pluralist civil society.'* More seriously, Deputy Mayor and a Municipal Councillor, Mr Halil DANACI criticised, *'if I am to describe CSOs in Kirikkale, their value is under zero in my consideration. Most of them are signboard associations which are fairly inactive and just make their compulsory meetings imposed by the law. Some others are aimed to cover some illegal or unsuitable activities. For example, we have a's Association. It is a legal entity in appearance, but I believe, its main activity is to provide gambling in their isolated offices⁵¹. Few associations are active for philanthropic works; however, their activities are also inadequate'*. Such a harsh description and understanding of civil society is quite exaggerated, nevertheless; it is worth noting how the municipal management approaches civil society at first.

⁵¹ Name of the association wasn't revealed here since the respondent's allegations depends on rumours in the city. The respondent is trying to emphasise according to Law of Associations and other relevant legislation in Turkey, police are not entitled to enter associational premises without an advance notice given at least 24 hours prior to any inspection. Some people abuse this regulation to cover up their illegal activities like gambling or prostitution in the association's premises.

Similar to Karabuk's case, the existence of large immigrant groups in Kirikkale is also alleged as a reason for an unhealthy civil society. Mr Ali KOLAT, Governor of Kirikkale, stressed *'we have many fellow-citizens' associations in Kirikkale. They preferred to act together to protect their cultural bonds and customs. This does not result in any conflict between immigrant groups, however, prevents a creation of common sense of belonging to the city and community. I know people who even born in this city still define themselves with their parents' former provinces'*. As experienced in Karabuk's case, Kirikkale has bonding social capital in terms of fellow-citizen groups. In addition, Kirikkale has more bonding social capital than Karabuk when related to strict family structures and traditions (see Map 1, page 156).

According to respondents, bonding social capital of immigrant groups is effective in shaping local politics. Journalist Mr Cetin argued bilateral relationships between local politicians and immigrant groups have strengthened immigrants' awareness of their particular identities and motivated them to recognise themselves as diverse and socially different. He stressed *'it was easy for politicians to get benefit from people's differences. They approached immigrants to take their votes easily. Local candidates arose from immigrant groups and used their own fellows to take advantage in local elections. This has sustained and reinforced existing diversities. Their low capacity and inability to produce interesting projects for election campaigns forced them to take the easy way, they abused these social groups and created political fragmentations'*.

In conclusion, Karabuk and Kirikkale have a similar past and social-economic conditions. Both were exposed to inland immigration; however, associational activity is stronger in Karabuk, at least numerically. Respondents in both provinces complain about the bonding social capital of immigrant groups as it hinders creation of common identity for the city's inhabitants. Local politicians in both provinces gained from social the social schisms making them deeper. However, these provinces do not share similar practices in terms of local participation mechanisms and the relationship patterns of local actors, as assessed below.

8.3 The Assessment of Political Opportunity Structures:

8.3.1 Karabuk:

Despite town councils being regulated in 2006, Karabuk town council remained inactive until the 2009 local elections. The chairman of the first town council was the former Mayor's wife and there is not a recorded activity of the town council until 2009. Following the 2009 local

elections, the new town council was shaped by the new municipal management. According to respondents, the town council was re-established democratically and has operated actively since then. Mr Rafet VERGILI, Mayor of Karabuk, stated *‘when I was elected in the 2009 March elections, there was not an institutional town council in the city. The former municipal management did not consider it important. We announced in the whole city the setting up of a new town council and invited CSOs and other relevant figures to the first general assembly. Members elected the executive committee and chairman themselves freely. It has become one of the few active town councils in Turkey.’* Other respondents from civil society, Mr Celal KARABULUT, Nimet SOYLU, and Ozcan BUYUKGENC confirmed that they have not observed any undemocratic intervention to the election and working processes of the Town Council.

The early practices of Karabuk town council illustrates it was designed to operate actively in many specific areas, and the sub-committees were designed for each topic as required by bylaw. In addition to these, Karabuk Town Council also designed unprecedented structures to monitor the public sector. For example, *‘The Audit Committee for MPs, Audit Committee for Public Officials, Audit Committee for Public Biddings’* were established.

Despite having a democratic and practical design, Karabuk town council has no office and budget. An employee was provided by the municipality for council works, however, this is not appreciated by the town council’s management. Mr Ozcan BUYUKGENC, Chairman of Town Council, stated *‘we have an employee for council works, who is also a municipal officer and busy with his primary job. The Municipal management did not provide an office for town council despite our insistence on having one. Their excuse is that they haven’t any spare offices for municipal works, and they are not able to give us an office under current circumstances. I personally requested the Mayor to build a new premise for the town council but he did not care. Luckily, I am a top official in Karabuk University and I can utilise University offices and staff for town council works’.* There is a contradiction between the statements of the Mayor and Chairman in this matter. The Mayor claimed they allocated an office in one of the municipality’s social buildings, but the management of the town council declined. It is understood the town council requires a separate building for their own use, but the municipality did not provide a separate building, instead offered offices in an existing building. There appears to be a problem of dialogue between the town council and municipal management. When it comes to the budget, there is no definite amount of money allocated

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for town council works; however, monetary needs are generally met by the municipality on submission by the town council for a project.

The municipality's impartial approach to the town council's formation and operation has created a positive public opinion, and the town council is known as a participation mechanism which is free from municipal management. The Province Governor Mr Izzettin KUCUK, stated *'Karabuk town council is a self-governing participation mechanism. Despite the fact some resources for town council are provided by municipal management, it has emerged as a free body'*. This is important for analysis since many town councils in Turkey are generally regarded as backyards of municipalities and their effectiveness and activities are damaged by biases excluding opposition groups from participating.

When it comes to effectiveness, the town council's activities are aimed mostly at social projects. It is seen the Chairman of Town Council's post in University of Karabuk has affected town council's sphere of interests. Being the University's Head of Department for Cultural and Social Affairs, Mr Ozcan BUYUKGENC has given prominence to projects such as *'Vision 2023 for Karabuk'⁵², Let's Remove Barriers⁵³, and A Smile by a Toy⁵⁴*. Not only Karabuk Municipality but also other public institutions and professional chambers in Karabuk contributed to these projects financially and emotionally.

Respondents have generally emphasised the effectiveness of town council is closely related to the resources provided by the municipality. On the other hand, they insisted the town council should operate freely as a body isolated from any political or managerial intervention from public institutions. Although the Mayor argued he *'purposefully drew [himself] back from council works so they would not feel any political pressure'*, he was also criticised by respondents that he did not provide the required supports in the form of a budget and an office. The views on town council-municipality relationships are paradoxical. People are complaining about the toothless legislation that locks the town council in its boundaries; conversely they require fiscal and physical resources from the very municipality that they want autonomy from. The Town Council's chairman Mr Buyukgenc stressed *'effectiveness of the town council is dependent on the Mayor's and municipal management's approach, if they want*

⁵² 2023 is the 100th anniversary of Turkish Republic's foundation. Project aims to set targets for Karabuk's managerial and political figures to realise until 2023.

⁵³ A project aiming an accessible city and public buildings for the disabled.

⁵⁴ A project aiming to encourage children to give their toys for the poor.

an active town council, they provide support. It is impossible to create a democratic and largely effective town council under these circumstances. We need fiscal and structural autonomy to operate desirably. It is clear the Karabuk Town Council could achieve some progress from the early stages but, it is constrained by the current situation and it requires more support from the municipal management. The infrastructure for an effective participation is almost ready with willing town councillors and civil society organisations, they only require a precipitating push from the local public authorities. This would greatly improve the relationships between local authorities and civil society, enabling them to build linking social capital jointly.

Therefore, even though Karabuk municipality has not extensively supported town council, the attitude of the Mayor and municipal management towards the town council can still be regarded positively. At least, municipal management hasn't interfered undemocratically in the town council's elections and operations. This is a support in a context where many Mayors constrained and paralysed town councils for political purposes, as demonstrated in Bolu's case, and in Kirikkale's case below.

8.3.2 Kirikkale:

As the formal participation mechanism, the Town Council of Kirikkale is fairly experiencing a bad fate. It was never regarded as a participation mechanism by the political, managerial and civil actors of the city. Since its foundation in 2009, the Mayor of Kirikkale, Mr Veli Korkmaz, has operated himself as Chairman of the town council. The General Secretary of town council was Mr. Halil Danaci, who is also Deputy Mayor and Municipal councillor for the ruling AK Party. It clear the town council was designed as a municipal unit under the strict control of the political and managerial figures of Kirikkale municipality. The executive committee of the town council was composed of the city elite, i.e. provincial directors of public services, leaders of commercial and professional chambers and representatives of a few CSOs which are local branches of some national level CSOs. Seemingly, a democratic approach wasn't followed during the first phases of town council's establishment. Not surprisingly, there are only a few activities were initiated by such a bureaucratic structure. Only a couple of seminars hosting famous journalists and a few theatre performances were organised by Kirikkale town council so far. These are artificial municipal organisations instituted in the town council's name in order to submit as activities in case inspectors from the Ministry of Interior enquire.

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When respondents were asked about the current circumstances and activities of the town council they reached a consensus it is absolutely inactive due to poor design. Mr Ali KOLAT, Governor of Kirikkale, stressed the main problem of Kirikkale town council is it is controlled by the mayor and municipal figures: *'If the chairman of the town council hadn't been the Mayor himself, it would have operated more actively. The Municipal approach to the town council has prevented it operating as a democratic mechanism. The Mayor regarded the town council as a municipal branch meaning it could not evolve as a channel primary function of which is to alert public authorities of the common problems of the city. In simple terms we are deprived of counselling with civil society through formally. The Town council should involve civil society leaders instead of bureaucrats if it is to perform desirably'*. The Governor is right mainly for two reasons: First, according to general acceptance in Turkish public administration and the researcher's former experience in the field, bureaucrats generally tend to approve their superiors' ideas and decisions providing they aren't illegal. Discussion is not a well-established type of interaction in Turkish state hierarchies. Thus, it would be naive and unrealistic to expect a positive contribution from bureaucrats concerning democratic participation. This demonstrates Kirikkale town council wasn't expected to be a democratic participation mechanism from the start. Secondly, bureaucrats are already occupied with their own posts and these kind of additional duties are generally regarded as 'drudgery'. The researcher discovered their attendance to such committees is quite low and they tend to pretext prior to meetings. A Representative of a CSOs, Mr Omer DEGIRMENCI, emphasised this saying *'I think our Mayor and town councillors are quite busy to spare enough time for town council works, they do not show any interest for convening the town council and its executive committee'*. As Mr Ahmet KOCAK, the general secretary of town council and a municipal officer, reported that Kirikkale town council meetings are no longer held; the last one took place in 2012.

Having 30 years of experience with the Kirikkale press, Mr Ramazan CETIN, who is also the president of Journalists' Association, criticised politicised approaches of municipality and argued the main reasons behind such a poorly designed and dysfunctional town council: *'The logic behind the town council regulations in general is its benefits for cities and governments. However in Kirikkale, they have not established the town council fit for its main purpose. Because, no one wants a pluralist civil society in this city. All they need is a single voice out of a chorus. They do not fancy polyphony, they do not self-criticise, and they are closed to public advice. They shaped town council undemocratically and invited only their own supporters. Thus, the town council focused on a single target: to remain silent. I am not optimistic for the*

future of the town council under such an understanding'. These reasons are to be explored in a greater depth below in the sub-section of the assessment of relationships.

When the Mayor and deputy mayor are asked about the structure and activities of the town council, they tended to produce excuses. The Deputy Mayor argued that in the early days resistance among municipal councillors surfaced. He gave some examples for the town council's early decisions that are not accepted by the municipal council. *'As far as I remember, the town council made a decision on a street illumination system. That was quite a specific subject and many municipal councillors argued the town council has no authority to make a decision concerning these matters. Some municipal councillors reacted asking 'who are those people, we are elected ones, and only we can decide!' That is why we needed to restrict the town council on important matters.'* It seems the power struggle between the town council and municipal council has resulted in apathy of the former. Similarly, the Mayor has stressed they could not obtain the required performance from town council and gave up convening it. Instead, they introduced another body to fulfil the town council's functions, which is the *'Union of Powers'*.

It is understood the Union of Powers was established in order to use the Deputy Prime Minister Besir ATALAY's influence in central government in Ankara. Its chairman is Mr ATALAY and members are the Province governor, the Mayor, MPs, the Rector of Kirikkale University, district governors and mayors, presidents of professional and commercial chambers, CEOs of heavy industry companies from the province and a few civil society organisations. The main focus of the Union of Powers is economic development. Establishment of new industrial zones around the city, environment projects, and new facilities for Kirikkale University are the most important projects which are still in the preparation phase. It is undeniable that such a committee will help to solve economic and developmental problems by diverting central government investments towards the province. However, it is quite questionable municipal respondents see the Union of Powers as a participation channel for civil society. Firstly, it is not a substitute for the town council in terms of shape and structure. Town councils are supposed to be structured to create channels of participation for the general public in city governance. However, the Union of Powers is composed of city elites who are already involved in governance of the city. Consequently, it is unreasonable to accept it as a public participation mechanism. Secondly, when respondents asked that what is going to happen if Mr Besir ATALAY loses his powerful position in central government, they did not give a clear answer.

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Therefore the Union of Powers is not an institutionalised structure. The researcher's similar experience in the Dursunbey district of Balıkesir province shows when a powerful figure disappears from the governance system, who was a significant MP in Durunbey's case, other systems established during his tenure collapses.

To summarise, there is not a formally established opportunity structure for public participation in Kirikkale. Elitist approaches and unwillingness of important figures on the town council has sealed its fate. Managerial and political figures of Kirikkale do not seem to adopt an enabling 'top-down perspective' for democratic participation of civil society, in the manner they adopted a 'top-down perspective' to divert central government resources towards the province.

When Karabuk's and Kirikkale's formal participation structures are compared, it is obvious Karabuk is ahead of Kirikkale. In Karabuk, there is a relatively institutionalised town council with democratic elections, and it shows itself to be a free body recognised by the public. Karabuk municipality is impartial regarding the town council's activities, however the town council will require more support, if it is to achieve better urban governance. Conversely, Kirikkale has systematically paralysed and then emasculated the town council, designing it as a municipal unit under control of the Mayor and deputy mayor from the beginning. The elitist approach sheltering behind the Deputy Prime Minister is unlikely to produce a desirable environment for 'less important' people to participate in city governance. As a result Karabuk's condition is more likely to provide opportunities to create linking and bridging social capital. In contrast, participation channels for civil society look completely closed in Kirikkale, and important figures need to change immediately their approach to multi-actor governance in the city. The difference between the two provinces seems to be a result of their approaches to civil society as they are assessed below.

8.4 The Assessment of Relationships:

In the middle socio-economic development pair, reasons for contact with public authorities are generally knotted around provision of venues and in-kind aids. As shown in Table 66 (Appendix 3), CSOs in Karabuk and Kirikkale generally develop relationships in order to receive supports from public authorities. In Kirikkale, another important reason for contact is a formal partnership, involving implementation of joint projects with the public authorities. For Karabuk, contact in order to receive better services is also worth focusing on, as it shows the openness of informal opportunity structures. When it comes to perceptions and the nature of

comments, it shows respondents in Kirikkale are more critical regarding relationships and this is reflected in their dissatisfaction over multi-actor governance. The remarkable findings are discussed below for each province of the pair.

8.4.1 Karabuk:

In Karabuk, assessment of relationships reveals that the actors involved in state-civil society relationships are generally satisfied with the current patterns of interaction, however, they have some concerns.

The main focus of complaints concerns the general characteristics of civil society organisations in the city. According to respondents, low voluntarism and financial weaknesses are regarded as primary drawbacks of CSOs. They criticise that civil society in Karabuk cannot reach a required awareness level to act as healthy and democratic entities. As Province Governor Mr Izzettin Kucuk stressed, CSOs are not comprehensive, they are small in size and struggle to survive due to shortage of their resources: *'People are not conscious or willing to solve their own problems with their own efforts. Thus, civil associations are started by a handful of members and they are generally unable to enlarge the association's membership figures. If association leaders do convince few friends, they join in as a favour. The time and money required to run the association becomes a heavier burden for founders over time, and then, they eventually give up and the association becomes inactive and dissolves. Only financially strong associations with relatively rich members survive for a long time. I dislike the view many CSOs tend to cut corners and ask for everything they need from public authorities. They even regard themselves branches of public institutions. They tend to take the easy route to obtain funds, asking for easy money and resources from the municipality and governorship. I find them unsuccessful in submitting projects for national or regional grant schemes'*.

Similarly, a local journalist Mrs Nimet SOYLU draws attention to society's underdeveloped conditions as a reason for weak CSOs: *'Civil society is insensitive to public matters. It should be society that forces public institutions and civil associations to react. Low sensitivity to common problems is reflected in the behaviour and attitudes of CSOs' leaders in Karabuk; they are as insensitive as the society they arise from.'* Similarly, another journalist Mr GOLBEK argued *'If we are to reach a level of collective action as observed in European communities, we need to increase our income per capita to the level of European economies. People are still afraid of raising their voices against public figures, because their economic independence is not ensured.'*

In many occasions people call our newspaper office to report some malfunctions and dissatisfactions of public services and request us to report them in the newspaper. But they tend to hide their identity as complainants. Our people are reluctant to emerge as individuals'. These ideas reflect common stumbling blocks for collective action and participation in Turkey. On the other hand, apart from these traditional and cultural hardships requiring generations to improve, the general assessment of civil society and local authority relationships in Karabuk reveals a promising picture in terms of open opportunities and more sympathetic public authorities for participation and better governance.

According to data derived from the municipality's website⁵⁵ and interview with the Mayor, Karabuk municipality efforts to improve social life in the city. One of the most remarkable social projects is '*social life centres*' which were constructed in large neighbourhoods. These buildings serve as community centres for the benefit of local people. Vocational and leisure time courses for women and children, associational meeting halls, internet access rooms, child playgrounds and similar services are provided in these premises. Respondents stressed recent policies of Karabuk Municipality are people-oriented. Unlike the former municipal management, the present management places more emphasis on social life instead of infrastructural development. According to the journalist Mr Golbek, '*previous municipal managements have achieved a massive amount of infrastructural investment for the development of the city. They had monetary support of central government as the Mayor was a member of the AK Party. The current Mayor [from an opposition party, MHP] was unable to access and transfer a large budget from Ankara; however he managed to achieve small but more solution-oriented projects. For example, one neighbourhood was geographically disadvantaged due to steep roads and steps; this Mayor had elevators constructed and thousands of people use them every day. These kinds of achievements are popular with the people.*'

Maybe the most important factor in the Mayor's achievement is he has introduced a new direct communication channel with people in the city: The Mayor's Mobile Office. This project allows the Mayor and leading municipal officials to conduct scheduled visits to the neighbourhoods. Residents of the neighbourhood meet with the mayor and his team in meeting halls of the social life centres mentioned above. In these meetings, people have an opportunity to express their complaints, concerns and recommendations directly to the

⁵⁵ Source: http://www.karabuk.bel.tr/projelerimiz_kgoster.asp?kid=78&shf=1

municipal managers. The Mayor and his team take notes of the demands and ensure problems will be solved by the next meeting. According to respondents, people directly participate in municipal management and have their say without limitation. This kind of open opportunity structure is rare in Turkey and it can be regarded as a practice of an open political opportunity structure. During the interview with the Mayor, he stressed Karabuk Municipality is planning a new project to encourage public participation. This project involves establishing a web portal that residents can login to vote on municipal decisions, to contribute in discussions and to share recommendations.

In addition to the mobile office application as an informal opportunity structure, the Mayor's personal attitudes are also appreciated by the people of Kirikkale. In the Turkish context, Mayors are generally regarded as unreachable and remote people. Arranging a visit to Mayor's office is difficult and requires connections with other municipal figures around the Mayor. Karabuk's Mayor shows unprecedented behaviour which is very unlikely to observe in any other province in Turkey. First of all, he does not use the big black luxury car provided by the municipality. He uses his own car with his private hire driver, sitting in the front seat. He does not employ bodyguards, quite common among Mayors especially when they are out of their offices. He behaves as an ordinary citizen, and the participants emphasised, local people tend to regard him as being one of them. These characteristics are important in analysing behaviours and attitudes since it reflects openness and approachability of the most important politician in the province. Moreover, the web pages of local newspapers are full of photos showing the Mayor's regular visits to shops, markets and bazaars, chatting with local people.

This demonstrates the Mayor and municipal managers accompanying him know the importance of keeping in touch with local people. Even though their support to town council is still inadequate, their mentality is matured enough to create a more open environment through which people can develop linking social capital. As an informal participation mechanism, the mayor's mobile office is a good example of convergence with the public and it enables interpenetration of people and local authority. Thus, it can be concluded Karabuk experiences developing participation practices that promise a better organised local context where civil society- and local authority interactions will flourish more desirably. Undoubtedly, this should result in stimulating the creation and proliferation of linking and bridging social capital.

8.4.2 Kirikkale:

Assessment of civil society-state relationships in Kirikkale reveals in general the circumstances are dissatisfactory of both the state side and civil society sides.

The Municipality's elitist approach, identified in the Town Council and Union of Powers' practices, is not appreciated by local CSOs. Most of the civil players blame local authorities and the figures representing public side do not comprehend the importance of civil society in urban governance. Conversely, managerial and political players allege CSOs in the province are too weak to fulfil their functions, therefore they have to focus on professional and commercial chambers to fill the space left by CSOs.

In the first instance, respondents tend to connect the weakness of civil society with the low socio-economic development level and the short history of Kirikkale as a province. However, many respondents having relationships in similarly developed surrounding provinces (e.g., Kirsehir and Nevsehir), expressed their observations that socio-economic development does not explain everything. They stressed the behaviour and attitude of local authority figures are also decisive for the operation of CSOs. For example; an anonymous leader of a charity association gave an example Nevsehir Municipality constructed a building for similar associations to gather their efforts⁵⁶. Similarly, another anonymous CSO leader of an association for the disabled, argued Kirsehir Municipality have greatly supported the town council with a building and budget.

These examples show attitude and approaches are quite important for shaping the infrastructure of the local context. On providing the examples, civil society representatives complained they do not perceive positive approach from Kirikkale's municipal management. An anonymous respondent has given some examples of their experiences of the relationship with local authority: *'We persistently demanded public toilets for the disabled especially in central locations. These are quite cheap investments, but municipality management is insensitive for such social matters'*. Similarly, Mr Askin OZBEK, president of a charitable association in Kirikkale, argued *'we cannot establish decent relations with local authorities. They always keep a distance and do not invite CSOs for consultation. They are too formal and*

⁵⁶ Information given by participants checked and confirmed at <http://www.haberler.com/gormeyenler-kultur-ve-birlesme-dernegi-hizmet-4627802-haberi/> and <http://www.haberler.com/kirsehir-kent-konseyi-yurutme-kurulu-toplandi-4298376-haberi/>

do not trust us. In fact, they could improve CSOs simply gathering them once a month or two months to discuss recent developments. If we feel we are considered, we would increase our motivation and intensify our works. It is up to local authorities as to whether they could trigger effective relationships with and between CSOs, or simply sit in their comfortable offices.' It seems local figures in Kirikkale have chosen the second option. A local journalist, Mr Mehmet ALTINDAG, connects unfavourable municipal approaches with the Mayor's personal attitudes: *'As I have always written in my column, our Mayor has realised immense infrastructural investments in the city; however, his personal relations with the public remained utterly incapable throughout his tenure. He did not walk in the streets and abstained from having a chat with local people, he preferred to stay in the municipality building. He was surrounded by smarmy figures who always draw pink sceneries, but he could not break this circle. A satisfaction survey conducted by his own political party revealed only %7-%10 of Kirikkale's residents are satisfied with him as a Mayor, that is why AK Party did not nominate him again as a candidate for the next local elections.'*

It is obvious the local context where relationship patterns of civil society and local public authorities are shaped is not well-designed in Kirikkale. Local authorities do not have any project specifically aimed at improving CSOs in the province. The elitist approach sheltered behind the Deputy Prime Minister does not take CSOs into account, and civil society is being left to its fate. Seemingly, such an environment is not promising for civil society in that they cannot create channels with the power structures and establish intersecting networks with other spheres of community. In other words, creating linking and bridging social capital in Kirikkale's present conditions seems unachievable without a 'top-down' perspective and they need to start with improving relationships.

8.5 Conclusions for the Middle Socio-Economic Development Pair:

Being moderately developed provinces, Karabuk and Kirikkale have similar history and socio-economic patterns. Being subject to intense state investments from the early years of the Republic, they both have experienced massive inland worker immigration mainly from adjoining provinces. Industrial production is the main economic activity and the local population is generally made up of worker classes. Fellowship bonds are still strong among the

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immigrants and they are acting together to preserve their cultural characteristics and to sustain connections with their hometowns. According to respondents, immigrant groups are taken advantage of by local politicians to guarantee blocks of votes. This has resulted in deepening social cleavages and it stunted the achievement of a sense of common identity in the provinces.

The experience of trade unionism in Karabuk has dominated the views regarding civil society and fostered the collective action under the bonding relationships of immigrant groups. Even though respondents in Karabuk claimed civil action is reduced to labour unionism and limited other kind of associations, its external effects over regular associations in terms of high membership figures is undeniable. Obtaining a collective action culture in trade unions, residents of Karabuk are more eager to come together in CSOs. However, Kirikkale did not experience a trade unionist movement in its history, and civic engagement is low as it is indicated by statistical figures.

Despite similar socio-economic development and historical backgrounds, Karabuk and Kirikkale draw distinctively contrasting pictures in terms of public participation practices and relationships aspects. Following the first election of the current Mayor, Karabuk Municipality has re-established the town council democratically. The main decision making bodies and sub-committees were established to operate actively. During the early years, the town council has achieved some social projects in the city and emerged as an independent body free from municipal interventions. In spite of more physical and monetary support from the municipality being required, Karabuk Town Council can achieve much in establishing a local participation mechanism which is relatively new in the Turkish local context. Undeniably, the Mayor's and municipal management's impartial attitudes are decisive in such a success. On the contrary, Kirikkale Municipality have started with a poorly-designed town council under the chairmanship of the Mayor and Deputy Mayor. Even though they made excuse CSOs in Kirikkale are weak, their elitist approach to social matters does not give a chance for CSOs to have a say in public matters. The elitist approach is best seen in Kirikkale's Union of Powers practices. In order to gain benefit from the Deputy Prime Minister's active position in central government, Union of Powers have profoundly focused on economic development primarily for infrastructural investments for the industry sector. Although municipal figures alleged that Union of Powers fulfils the functions of the town council, it is quite difficult to imagine that 'less privileged' layers of society can take place in such an organisation of elites.

Different practices are not limited to the town councils' experiences. Relationship patterns among civil society and local authorities are also significantly contradictory in two provinces. In Karabuk, the Mayor is sensitive to social matters and the municipality has invested large amount in budgets and effort in constructing social life centres. The Mayor also internalised democratic attitudes and is well aware of the importance of consultation with the public. His 'Mayor's mobile office' venture and prospected investments for the technological infrastructure of public participation are two of rare examples of local participation prospects in the Turkish local authority context. The Mayor's personal relationship with local residents are also admirable and are frequently cited in local press articles. Consequently, Karabuk Municipality is offering extensively open channels for local people and projects a promising picture for future practices. The March 2014 local elections revealed the Mayor and his managerial team satisfied expectations of voters and his party won the elections by a landslide as a result, increasing their votes by %20 since the last election in 2009 (see Table 71 in Appendix 3) In contrast, Kirikkale's Municipality was widely criticised by representatives of local CSOs and newspapers saying Kirikkale Municipality does not support civil society in terms of social projects and they are neglected. The Mayor's closed attitude towards local people were negatively reflected in public opinion polls conducted by his party showing less than %10 of residents appreciated him as their Mayor. Consequently, AK Party did not nominate him for the March 2014 local elections.

In conclusion, Karabuk and Kirikkale's contrasting social capital levels overlap with contrasting practices of civil participation and state-civil society interactions. Having statistically a higher bridging social capital level, Karabuk province offers more enabling local context where state-civil society inter-connection is deeper, while Kirikkale province follows an elitist approach neglecting local CSOs, and shuts off participation channels. Undoubtedly, more open structures and easily used participation channels are more likely to be supportive for the creation of linking and bridging social capital. This means, the role of local authorities in creation of social capital is mainly to provide supports for civil society accompanied by designing an enabling environment where CSOs can operate freely. Therefore, even though social capital is considered to be a product of long historical and cultural processes, the role of public authorities using well-designed or poorly-designed local contexts can facilitate or damage and hinder the social capital of local people. The context dependant nature of social capital therefore needs to be supported by local public institutions through a 'top-down' perspective.

Chapter 9: THE INTERPRETATION OF LOCAL CONTEXTS: THE LOW SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PAIR

9.1 Introduction

Nigde and Yozgat are located in Central Anatolia and represent two deprived provinces in Turkey. Yozgat is 65th in SED index and it is the least developed province of Turkey prior to the ones affected by PKK terrorism. Although Nigde is slightly a more developed city, the two provinces are similar in terms of history, culture and economic sectors.

General information about the provinces are presented in table 42 below.

Table 42: Information for the low development pair

PROVINCES	Nigde	Yozgat
Bridging social capital rank	43	65
Socio-economic development rank	56	65
Population of central municipal area/overall province population (2012)	118.000/340.000	78.000/453.000
Number of civil associations	381	438
Share of main economic sectors in GDP ⁵⁷		
Agriculture	41.5%	28.4%
Industry/commerce	24.8%	22.5%

⁵⁷ Source: www.turkstat.gov.tr

Political tendencies	Islamic liberal with a social-democrat past	Islamic liberal with a strong nationalist past
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Despite the fact that both provinces are finally merged with the AK Party politically, the local context in terms of civil society-state relationships and political opportunity structures still depicts dissimilar pictures. Research shows both provinces have weak civil society organisations; however, the public authorities look more supportive and open to the public in Nigde, where bridging social capital is relatively higher than Yozgat.

Both provinces are located in the same bonding social capital region, middle Anatolia. However Nigde has a higher position in bridging social capital levels, they also experience different patterns of state-civil society relationships. Their diversity in terms of bridging social capital, local governance and participation is explored below extensively.

9.2 The General Characteristics of CSOs in Nigde and Yozgat:

9.2.1 Nigde:

According to information gathered by Governorship of Nigde, there are 381 active associations and total of association members is 14.986. This equates to almost 40 members per association and 6.12% of +15 population is an association member. These figures are lower than Turkey's average, which is 16.44%. However, the number of civil society associations has been rising over the last decade and there were 313 associations in 2009. The increase rate of associational figures is 21.7%, which is above Turkey's average (15%) for the same period.

The economically deprived environment of Nigde inevitably effects CSOs in many ways. First of all, the low income levels of local people are reflected in the financial hardships experienced by CSOs in Nigde. Most of the respondents agreed one major barrier to association activities is the non-existence of adequate financial resources. Leaders of CSOs have difficulty collecting monthly membership fees imposed by the Law of Associations. They are impelled to keep them at a minimum; thus, their budgets remain limited making it challenging to achieve targets for the association. As a result, associations become passive and remain paralysed in a situation that respondents described as 'signboard associations'.

Along with the problems of economic deprivation, voluntarism and commitment to solve common problems are also low in Nigde. According to respondents, only a handful of people shoulder the burden of running an association. According to Mr Ugur MART, a local press columnist, *'CSOs are not at a desirable level of activity. They are not functionally organised and do not have massive membership rates. Some idealistic people run associations with sincere efforts. The rest of the members just join in general assemblies or chairman elections. People of central Anatolia are characterised as not liking supporting CSOs, and joining in their activities.'*

The weakness of CSOs was also emphasised as a matter of concern by the Mayor of Nigde, Mr Faruk AKDOGAN. He stressed *'the weakness of local CSOs results in low civic activity in our city. They are incapable of acting together in order to address the primary problems of the city. Thus; we [politicians from different views] do not compromise when such a pressure does not push us forward'*. The Mayor's point is an expression of the poor quality of local governance. A dysfunctional civil society does not contribute to the city's management and decision making processes. Conversely, the Province Governor Mr Necmettin KILIC is not pessimistic. According to him, the low level of formal association activities does not reflect people's commitment to social matters. He gives some examples from the social aid department of the governorship: *'Our people may not be interested in formal associations, but this does not necessarily mean they are antisocial. We have informal associations in every neighbourhood and every street. Our culture and religion encourage our people to come together to deal with common problems. For example, particularly in rural areas, the bonds of community are still strong enough to cope with poverty. We do know our people do not go to bed with full stomach when the neighbour is hungry. Generally immigrants and other people with no relatives and connections tend to apply for social aid'*. The Governor's views are generally acceptable in small-size provinces like Nigde. But his stance reflects bonding social capital, main function of which is to ensure 'getting by'. However, this study focuses on bridging and linking social capital which is useful for 'getting ahead'. In other words, it seems the existing philanthropic bonds have not been converted into formal platforms in the form of civil society associations.

CSOs in Nigde therefore are weak both in number and activity. This mainly results from low socio-economic conditionals. In this kind of an environment, relationships with local authorities are vital to sustain civil society organisations, examples are given below in relevant sub-section.

9.2.2 Yozgat:

The general characteristics of CSOs in Yozgat are as problematic as in Nigde. As a deprived province, Yozgat's civil society is very weak in numbers and activity. As the primary indicator of social capital, association figures of Yozgat are low. At the time of field study, there were 438 active associations in Yozgat and the total association membership was 15.283. When this figure is proportioned to 15+ years age group of the population, it is 4,38% of the population. This is one of the lowest in Turkey. During the period 2009-2013, the number of associations has increased by 18%, which is lower than the increase of the figure in Nigde.

When the willingness of residents to take part in associational activities is that low, it is impossible to see them as an effective association deserving to be treated as a CSO. Most respondents argued economic deprivation is the main stumbling block against a healthy civil society. Financial hardships and low income rates of people prevent them sparing money and time for civic activities.

In such conditions, there are only a few CSOs able to raise their voices independently. They are mainly educational associations for the poor and the disabled. According to statistics derived from the Governorship of Yozgat, almost 1/3 of all associations are for social aid services. 1/5 of associations are formed just to build mosques and classrooms for Quran courses. The third main category is amateur sport clubs. It is significant there is no civic association for advocacy purposes. In this environment, production of bridging social capital looks difficult as the availability of possible networks is limited and associations are formed rather for specific purposes due to legal regulations, as seen in the examples of sport clubs and religious services.

This results in active associations generally operating in social aid and education, as a consequence they have established close relationships with local authorities and receive funds from national or regional grant schemes. According to many respondents, many CSOs survive only with the support of local authorities. It seems local public authorities are required to show a more deliberate effort in such a weak association environment if they want to develop CSOs in Yozgat.

Consequently, assessment of the general characteristics of CSOs in Nigde and Yozgat revealed both provinces have weak civil society associations and this is mainly due to economic deprivation. The research however, showed relationships between the state-CSOs are relatively different between two provinces, as they are discussed in detail below.

9.3 The Assessment of Political Opportunity Structures:

9.3.1 Nigde:

The town council in Nigde was established in accordance with the Municipality Law in 2006. The Mayor himself runs the town council as the chairman. The executive committee, usually comprises neighbourhood representatives (mukhtars) and some civil association leaders. Instead of functioning as a local participation mechanism, the town council performs as a municipal office implementing social projects. Some of the projects are: a wheelchair campaign for the disabled, IT training and computer provision for mukhtars' offices, and budgeting trainings for secondary school children.

During the visit to Nigde province, it was discovered the municipality did not allocate a budget for town council works; however, aforementioned projects were achieved with a contribution from the municipal budget. An office was for the town council's secretariat and for a municipal officer who works as the General Secretary of Town Council.

The Mayor candidly expressed Nigde town council does not operate effectively. *'We are one of those provinces unable to run the town council actively. I think this is because of the low socio-economic development level of Nigde. People do not feel a need for participation in city management. When I was first elected in 2009, the town council had only its name, nothing more. We provided an office and commissioned staff for council works. During the early times, we invited at least 180 different figures comprising managerial, political, civil actors and local media. Very few of them accepted our invitation and attended meetings. People are not interested, so the town council remains inactive. We formed sub-committees for disadvantaged groups but I can't say they operate desirably'.* A CSO representative and chairman of the town council's sub-committee for the disabled, Mrs Songul CALISKAN, confirmed the Mayor's words the attendance at the town council's meetings are low. She stressed *'despite the efforts, activities remained limited with a few enthusiastic people's projects'*. Similarly, Mr Mustafa SAN, chairman of Young Industrialists and Businessmen's Association, argued low attendance is due to members' negligence: *'In the beginning, town council meetings were all right, but people lost interest in council works and attendance of members gradually dropped. People, including me, are generally busy with their own businesses and sometimes we cannot spare time for council meetings. This reality affected other members negatively and reduced the*

practicability of the town council. I think it would have been more effective if we had started with small and achievable projects in short run. It is clear the unwillingness of members and unrealistic targets set by the town council reduced its sustainability and resulted in loss of interest.

Despite all the negative course of events, municipal management did not give up convening the town council and sub-committees. The General Secretary of the Town Council Mr Bahadir CELIKBAS informed there are approximately 70 meetings of the town council's sub-committees each year. According to respondents, very few of the town council decisions are discussed by the municipal council. It shows the Nigde Town Council is far being a local participation mechanism, but rather a project office under the Municipal management's control.

9.3.2 Yozgat:

In Yozgat, the town council was established in 2007; however it is not functioning since 2012. There is not a budget allocated for the town council, or an office for council works.

During the early years, the town council was controlled by a municipal councillor from the ruling party, but there is no recorded activity of council works. After a new regulation in town council's legislation, the municipal councillor had to resign and a civilian Mr Unsal ALLIOGLU, a well-known personality in Yozgat, was elected as the chairman. However, he had after 6 months due to insufficient support from the municipality. During the interview he stressed that, *'I wanted to run the council effectively. We established decision making bodies and started producing projects and ideas for our city. The Municipality Law decrees the town council must be supported financially and physically by the municipal management. Despite all our efforts, I could not convince the Mayor and municipal councillors to provide even the minimum support. They did not allocate a budget or a building or staff'*. Despite all difficulties, the town did make some progress in emerging as an entity. They issued a list containing 40 topics identified as problems of the city. However, public institutions showed no interest. On social life, the town council has implemented some projects focusing on cleanness of streets, preventing use of obscene language in the streets, forming a classical music group with 60 residents and so on. Eventually, the chairman of the town council resigned after six months stating he did not want to be part of an organisation which is about to die due to municipal negligence.

According to respondents, the municipal management has manipulated the re-elections and urged council members to elect another person as chairman. This individual is still chairman of

the town council and he is also a businessman. According to respondents and a search on the local newspaper websites, town council did almost nothing under the rule of the new chairman. According to an anonymous respondent who closely monitor the town council works, the new chairman is not interested in town council works and is reluctant to convene the executive committee on schedule. The respondent defines the situation as *‘town council in Yozgat is performing only to fulfil the legal responsibility imposed by the Municipality Law’*.

On the back side of the curtain, the research discovered during the interviews the former chairman, who wanted to run the council as a participation mechanism for public decisions, was regarded as a political opponent of the Mayor and the leading party. According to the former chairman and some CSO leaders, the current municipality management deliberately cut all support to the town council to disable the mechanism. An anonymous CSO representative argued, *‘the former chairman Mr Allioglu had a nationalist ideology which is opposite of the Mayor’s political views. Allioglu’s actions were regarded as threats by municipal politicians. His decisions and discourse was abrupt and wasn’t appreciated by the ruling party. The Mayor and other politicians decided the title of Chairman encouraged Mr Allioglu and had to be denied of him. And then we heard Mr Rahmi NAZLIOGLU was appointed [not elected] as the town council’s new chairman. After his succession, he restructured the town council’s sub-committees dismissing Allioglu’s team, and replaced them with people having political affiliation to the ruling political party’*. There are also several articles on local newspapers criticising the municipal actors’ motives for this change of position⁵⁸.

It is clear political polarisation in Yozgat has had a detrimental impact on the town council’s establishment and activities. It has never been regarded as a participation mechanism by the municipality. Its chairmen, executive committee and sub-committees were never democratically elected, municipal intervention is always present. The attitude of political and

⁵⁸ For example, <http://www.yeniufukgazetesi.com.tr/yazarlar.php?yazarid=29&yaziid=2057&yaziid=2031> and <http://www.yozgatlilarfederasyonu.net/?Syf=22&Mkl=653031&pt=Osman%20Hakan%20%20K%C4%B0RACI&Yozgat-kent-konseji-nerede> and <http://www.yeniufukgazetesi.com.tr/yazarlar.php?yazarid=29&yaziid=2063&yaziid=432>

managerial figures to the town council clearly reflects their approach to civil society as a whole, which is discussed below.

In summing up this section demonstrates Nigde and Yozgat have been unable to achieve an effective town council operating as a local participation mechanism. There are different reasons for ineffective town councils. In Nigde, the weakness of civil society did not allow for an alternative to the municipal management and they established the town council as only as a project office and a municipal branch. In Yozgat, the town council remained inoperable due to weakness of civil society and political polarisation that is also observed in assessing relationships between civil society and local authorities.

9.4 The Assessment of Relationships:

9.4.1 Nigde:

Financial weaknesses of CSOs in Nigde are reflected in the reasons for their contact with the local authorities. In-kind aids and needs for buildings or meeting halls are main reasons CSOs need to get in contact with public figures. According to respondents in Nigde, many of the active CSOs are still alive thanks to a range of supports from local public authorities. It can be said Nigde municipality and other local public institutions are quite supportive for civil society organisations.

When relationships between Nigde municipality and CSOs are assessed, it revealed the Mayor's decision is vital for CSOs. In such an environment, it shows the Mayor's attitude determine the achievability of CSOs' targets. Powerful Mayor-weak municipal council reality in localities becomes apparent one more time in the study the Mayor's possible 'top-down' actions can help civil society in operating actively. It is observed and deducted through the interviews despite the low economic conditions of the municipality and narrow budget opportunities, municipal management could help some CSOs to operate actively.

One of the most remarkable achievements Nigde Municipality managed on social matters is a project to support a specific CSO. The Association for the Disabled of Nigde, a branch of a nationwide association for the disabled, received invigorating support from the municipality that has changed association's future. Mrs Songul CALISKAN, Chairwoman of the association emphasised the municipality and governorship have always been supportive of the association. She stated the Mayor has deliberately carried out a policy to positively

discriminate disadvantaged groups. Some social services for women and disabled people are delivered through their associations. The best example of this is a campaign to deliver battery-powered wheelchairs for disabled people. The Municipality management decided The Association for the Disabled of Nigde should take part in this service delivery and only disabled people who are member of the association were entitled to receive a wheelchair. At first glance, this might seem unfair in excluding other disabled people; nevertheless it resulted in very positive outcome. According to Mrs Caliskan, there were only 30 members before the campaign but when it was finished, the total number of members reached 400. Municipal efforts were complemented by Governorship's supports. A public building with a garden in a central location was allocated for the association and its rent and heating charges are paid by the Governorship. In this way, the association has put on many activity courses for the disabled members to participate in. Mrs Caliskan stated enthusiastically *'now, I registered almost all disabled people in the province and they are becoming more and more active every day. They had been imprisoned in their homes previously but now, most of them can attend many training courses like music, painting and handcrafts. Our dreams achieved with the help of local authorities'*. During the field study, the researcher has also visited an exhibition of arts created by the disabled people. This is a great example of how a simple decision can alter many people's lives positively. There is no doubt this is a concrete example of social capital creation through the collaboration of civil society and state institutions. This project can also be regarded as a good practice of public service delivery using a non-governmental organisation.

Mr Faruk AKDOGAN, Mayor of Nigde, has underlined in his interview local authorities' support is vital for active CSOs at local level. He stressed that *'activeness of local civil society organisations is up to public figures' dignifying them. If we give them value, they become more valued, if we leave them to their own fate, they would eventually erode and dissolve. I think we give them required value and attention in Nigde'*. The Mayor's views reflect the necessity of a 'top down' perspective in the Turkish local context especially in socio-economically deprived localities.

Municipal support is not limited to disadvantaged groups. Municipal management has also renovated and allocated a historical university building⁵⁹ for the use of some CSOs which are

⁵⁹ The name of this historical university building is *Akmedrese*, and it is dated back to 1400s AD.

especially focused on art and culture. According to respondents, at least seven new CSOs were opened in that building and municipal management does not charge rent.

Nigde Governorship is also active in terms of social projects and developed positive relationships with local CSOs. A new project introduced by The Ministry of Development in deprived provinces is successfully implemented by the Governorship and subsidiary public institutions. 'The Social Support Programme' (SODES in Turkish abbreviation) has provided at least 10 CSOs with public grants for their specific projects mainly focused on disadvantaged groups like children, women and the disabled. According to data derived from the Governorship, the total number of social projects in 2013 is 25 and the overall budget for the project is around 2.5 million Turkish Lira⁶⁰. Through these social projects, nearly 17.000 residents of Nigde are involved and received benefit from these projects. Respondents from civil society argued that SODES projects are extremely important for keeping CSOs alive and active. Mr Necmettin Kilic, Governor of Nigde, underlined the initialisation of SODES projects brought a new climate over civil society and synergised CSOs and the state institutions.

Alongside the central government projects like SODES, the Governorship of Nigde has been planning a comprehensive work aiming to develop a common vision for the provincial development. The Governor commented *'current regulations do not internalise civil society into decision making processes. It is thought that people are unwilling to participate. Honestly, do we open channels for them? Not much. But if we move one step towards them, I am sure they will come towards us at least three steps. Knowing this, we are working on a provincial development plan (NIGEP) that will involve all local actors in the province. Through workshops, we will give opportunity to CSOs to have their say for relevant topics, and they will have found a participation channel'*. Later on, it is learned from the project co-ordinator and Deputy Governor Mr Abdullah UCGUN the NIGEP has commenced in February 2014⁶¹.

Despite all the weaknesses of local CSOs, Nigde is fortunate in having public figures who approach civil society positively. Even though town council is not functioning fully, this is not due to municipal interventions. Conversely, the town council is dysfunctional due to the weakness and negligence of local CSOs. The implementation of the SODES projects appears to be giving civil society a new lease of life. The Municipality and Governorship's local projects

⁶⁰ Approximately £750.000 in 2013 prices.

⁶¹ A web page for NIGEP project has been designed as well: <http://www.nigep.com/>

and policies in Nigde show they have a high level of understanding comprehending the importance of civil society and consultation. In the end, it can be accepted to some extent all these indicators create an impression the local context in Nigde provides new opportunities for civil society for linking and bridging social capital to shape through.

9.4.2 Yozgat:

Similar to Nigde's case, civil society-state relationships are disabled by the financial and numerical weaknesses of the CSO. The main reason of contact with civil society is formal partnership. The SODES project of The Ministry of Development is also operating in Yozgat. There are 10 CSOs in Yozgat receiving public grants from the SODES budget. According to respondents, initialisation of the SODES project in the city is a life line support for local civil society. The Deputy Governor Mr Kemal SAHIN stressed *'If I imagine the absence of public supports by SODES, it is obvious that civil life in the city would be weaker and bloodless. More than 1.2 million Turkish Lira is allocated just in 2013 alone and rescued several CSOs. I know that some people are preparing to establish new associations and to apply for social project grants for future programmes'*. It is obvious project funds are highly appreciated by CSO representatives entitled to receive grants. However, CSO representatives are still complaining about the local support required to be provided by local public authorities.

The main focus of complaint is about the application procedures for SODES projects. Designing a project becomes too complicated for CSOs which are financially and personally weak. For example, an anonymous CSO leader argued they could not receive the required support from the Municipality or Governorship for SODES application processes: *'We were all alone in project writing phase, no one helped us or taught us how to prepare a project. Luckily, we have a member who is an academic at the university, so she could write the project'*. Similarly, a local press columnist Mr Bekir CAYLAK informed *'central or local government projects must be dedicated to improve local CSOs. Unfortunately, CSOs in Yozgat have many difficulties to find channels to reach grants. We hear local authorities in other provinces establish support offices with expert staff to help CSOs in preparing projects. There is one project office in governorship here but we did not observe any existence of it, it is just on paper'*.

Alongside formal project opportunities, CSO representatives also complain of negligence and the callousness of local public authorities. A Chairman/women of a disabled's association, an anonymous CSO leader criticised *'I am working for this association for more than 14 years. I*

have never witnessed a politician or a top official asking us what do we need or what they can do for us. We feel all alone in our work. They also tend to abuse our works. For example, we arranged an importation of second hand wheelchairs from Europe through our immigrant fellows in Germany. The Municipality has not helped us much through this but they arranged a ceremony when we were allocating the wheelchairs. The Mayor and local politicians showed up and used our efforts for their political ends and took credit for the project'. The participant hinted that some paternalistic relationships also effect the political climate of the province. This is confirmed by a municipal officer, who wanted to remain strictly anonymous: 'I observed local politicians and top officials follow a policy to abuse the economic deprivation of people. There are many poor people who apply to local authorities for food or money just to save the day. I think our politicians and managers ensure their positions and chairs as behaving like fathers. They do not care about solving people's employment or life quality problems. Poor people have no other option but to elect them to receive continuous public relief. The system is designed to transfer public and private resources to the poor to ensure the political consolidation of the ruling party and positions of local politicians. They saw the opportunity it is much easier to have votes if they create dependant masses'. This kind of approach of local figures certainly does not entail a need of consultation or open governance patterns. According to Mr Nazlioglu, representative of a businessman association, 'even a tiniest criticism is regarded as being a political opposition and enough to blame a person as opponent or enemy. Thus, no one is eager to raise their voice. We live in an economically deprived province, however, we are afraid of emphasizing this fact in our talks since our powerful politicians could hear and our economic relationships might get damaged. I have no hope for the future this bad system will change'.

The assessment of civil society-state relationships reveals the general circumstances of the local context does not seem supportive for civil society organisations in Yozgat. A social or political project aiming to internalise local civil society in the governance system was not discovered during the field study and the secondary data collection via the internet. The introduction of central government's SODES projects are highly appreciated by CSOs but they complain the lack of technical support from governorship that creates an inequality of opportunity among CSOs to receive grants. Weaknesses of civil society organisations merged with the paternalistic attitudes and closed opportunity structures, thus the design of the local context is not promising for CSOs to flourish.

9.5 The Conclusions for the Low Socio-Economic Development Pair:

Being examples of socio-economically deprived provinces, Nigde and Yozgat have a similar history, close geographical locations and alike economic circumstances. However, they are dissimilar in terms of bridging social capital levels.

Research revealed both provinces have weak civil society organisations mainly due to low economic conditions and insufficient income levels. People's unwillingness to come together in associations to solve their common problems indicates voluntarism and commitment to others is fairly low. Charitable activities are not beyond individual actions and only a few civil society organisations for disadvantaged groups could operate actively. It is seen in both provinces that associations for the disabled are a few good examples in terms of active associations.

As a central government project, the SODES was commenced and implemented in 2013 for both provinces and it was appreciated greatly by local CSOs since it provides budgetary opportunities. It is emphasised by many respondents implementation of the SODES projects brought a new vitality to several CSOs and motivated people to gather around new associations. Undoubtedly, the implementation of the SODES projects is novel and time will show its performance in fostering civil life in the case provinces. It can be considered as a good start in supporting CSOs and in developing new channels linking state and civil society.

Despite the similarities, assessments of the political opportunity structure and relationship patterns of state-civil society reveal different findings and practices. As the formal political opportunity structure, the town councils of Nigde and Yozgat are both dysfunctional, though; reasons behind ineffective town councils are different. In Nigde's case, municipal management had to establish the town council as a project office due to low attendance and negligence of local CSOs. However in Yozgat, the municipality deliberately cut support for the Town council and forced an active chairman to resign, as he was considered as a political opponent. The Town council elections were interfered with by the municipal powers and another chairman was elected to 'tame' the town council and redesigned it in line with ruling party's political views. Since then, Yozgat Town council is totally inactive and criticised repeatedly by many local press columnists in the city.

When assessing local government-civil society relationships, it shows the approach of Nigde's politicians and top officials to civil society are more open and warm. A concrete example of

generating social capital through public policies is observed in Nigde's Association for the Disabled. A municipal decision requiring provision of wheelchairs through the association has enormously increased membership figures and thus, association management can arrange new activities to engage disabled people in daily life. Apart from the municipality, the Governorship of Nigde is also supportive for CSOs and created new participation channels for civil society with the NIGEP project.

In contrast, a local social project to support CSOs or an informal political opportunity structure was not discovered through the field study and the secondary documentary search in Yozgat. Instead, political paternalism and abusive behaviour of local authorities were cited by respondents. It seems that local authorities do not consult with civil society and urban governance is profoundly lacking for open political opportunity structures. Even though local public figures stressed low socio-economic development level hinders establishing healthy relationships and good governance, the researcher did not discover any attempt aiming to support civil life and an association culture in the city of Yozgat.

Clearly the local context reflecting state-civil society relationships in Nigde and Yozgat is different in terms of public support and political opportunity structures. Research has revealed again better organised local settings and constructive approaches of public figures overlap with the higher levels of bridging social capital in the localities. As the high social capital province of the pair, Nigde's local context is more enabling and provides opportunities to create links between CSO-state institutions which is more likely to create linking and bridging social capital. On the contrary, having the least stock of bridging social capital in the scope of this study, Yozgat's local context is closed for CSOs and negligence by local players does not provide a required environment where state-civil society could interconnect.

Drawn from the findings a 'top-down' perspective is more necessary in deprived localities as the weakness of COSs is the main stumbling block to achieve healthy interactions between state and civil society. It was seen in Nigde deliberate local policies can help the creation of social capital in particular when they are focused on definite groups of people. In conclusion, a dedicated top-down perspective to create linking and bridging social capital can be supportive where economical, historical and cultural infrastructures are immature for sustaining a pluralist and modern civil society.

Chapter 10: THE CONCLUSIONS

10.1 Introduction

The study was initiated by the need to explore state-civil society relationships in Turkey using academic methodology. As a rarely studied area in Turkish academia, the production of social capital as a focus of a public policy was considered to be a fruitful framework to analyse the relationships.

In addition to the generally accepted view the accumulation of social capital is a historical process, and role of the state institutions in it is an exogenous factor, the research has taken a baseline this common belief needs to be supplemented from a view the state authority is also an indigenous factor for social capital production. Within a top-down perspective, public institutions, and agents operating them have an effect on the social capital in a context, as they have the power to shape the context through the use of legislative and/or executive state authority.

Turkey, as a field to research the argument above, was considered to be an appropriate context due to its sui generis conditions. A strong centralist state structure inherited from a long term empire, an elitist sovereignty of military/bureaucratic tradition, strict and swift reforms aiming to modernise and democratise the society as a whole reflect the state and the society in Turkey has generally evolved through top-down policies. Thus, civil society-state relationships have been dominated by the latter, causing and sometimes forcing the former to remain weak and disorganised. In addition to the changing context for civil society shares the common fate with the evolution of democracy in Turkey. The effect of military interventions on society and the politics, enabling and prohibiting regulations of succeeding Constitutions are all reflected in associational life of the Turkish people. The strong emphasis of the state establishment on Turkish politics and society inevitably raises the question: What can this all-sovereign/self-evident source of power do for social capital's production? Or, more literally, *what is the role of public institutions in creating social capital?*

The outcome of the long process of attempts to answer the question, the concluding chapter is designed mainly to reflect, interpret and generalise the findings. Systematically, the sub-sections will discuss the following topics in turn, what was researched and how it was

conducted, the limitations and problems, the findings and their implications for Turkish politics, the possible policy recommendations for social capital production, the contributions of the research to the existing social capital concept and new questions arising for future studies.

10.2 What was researched and how it was conducted?

Overall, the research carried out two main sub-researches in order to answer overarching research question. Using a sequential two phase design, the first aim of the research was to take a snapshot of Turkey with regard to social capital's distribution across the regions and provinces quantitatively. In contrast to previous social capital studies in Turkey, the research designed a unique conceptualisation to measure social capital under bridging and bonding types, reflecting the structural and cognitive aspects of the concept. Through the unprecedented conceptualisation of social capital, the research connects the issue with the broader concepts such as modernisation and socio-economic development.

In the second phase the role of public authorities, mainly of the local governments in creation of social capital were studied using qualitative techniques. Based on a deliberate case selection, the design of local contexts in terms of political and civil participation were investigated and compared. At this phase, the research aimed at finding correspondence between high level bridging social capital and existence of better designed political opportunity structures, enabling local authorities, and healthier relationships between civil-political and managerial actors.

Methodologically, the sequential two phase design governed the research throughout. In the first phase, ready-to-use measures of social capital drawn from the literature were adapted to the Turkish context to reveal the distribution of social capital across regions and provinces. As a national/regional level study, the measurement attempt was inevitably quantitative and dependant mainly on official statistics. An advanced statistical method, factor analysis was employed using a computing software to rank the provinces/regions on their index scores.

The second phase was qualitative and the main data source for contextual comparisons obtained from the interview transcripts of the participants. Along with those, newspaper articles, news records on the web were used to triangulate and confirm the claims and expressions raised by the interviewees. The qualitative analysis software, Nvivo v.10, was

employed to code the research themes and extract the 'golden quotes' that representing the common ideas and views of the participants comprehensively.

10.3 The limitations and problems

The study has suffered from the limitations which are common for many social capital studies: converting the abstract concepts into tangible numbers. Dependency on the official statistics and limited data repository for social studies of the Turkish context arises as the main impeding factor for accuracy of the measurement activity. Although bridging social capital was measured at provincial level, official data for bonding social capital was only available at regional level, thus some generalisations had to be made to explain the bonding social capital features of the sub-provinces of large statistical regions. Nevertheless, the study can claim the measurement activity was carried out as adequately as it could be, under these circumstances.

The qualitative phase also had limitations, these were mainly the case selection process and sampling of interviewees. Finding comparable cases in similar socio-development ranks was a challenge. Before deciding the 6 provinces in three pairs, a thorough search on internet-based media sources was initiated to obtain an insight on the provinces having contrasting contextual examples of state-civil society relationships. After the cases were decided on, the various willingness levels of potential interviewees in political, managerial and civil society spheres has affected the objectivity of the sampling process. As a reflection of a common belief in Turkish society, critical approaches to state organs are intrinsically discouraged in people's minds. Moreover, the researcher's credentials as a member of the state mechanism might have created a barrier for the participants to express their negative criticisms of the system and important figures. However, to the researcher's surprise, people were quite brave to criticise the traditionally unquestionable structures and powerful individuals, allowing the researcher to reach an acceptable saturation and depth in the findings. In other terms, they spoke when they were asked.

A major problem needing to be addressed is the problem of causal direction. Even though the qualitative research found to some extent coherence between high bridging social capital and a better designed context in terms of political opportunity structures, relationships and governance patterns, which one causes the other is not always crystal clear. Absence of a similar previous study has prevented the chance of making comparisons over a period of time.

Thus, some limited data to establish causal direction is used: the increase rates of civil associations, and specific examples given as the experience of respondents in the evolution of civil society-state relationships. More concretely, the researcher attempted to establish direction of causality with examples in each case. However in general, the weakness of civil society coupled with the dominance of political and managerial figures in the localities show together in most cases, different designs of the local context are outcomes of the decisions made, and behavioural patterns followed by the local influential figures. In other terms, the effect of 'top-down' applications are visible.

10.4 The Findings and Discussions

Due to the sequential two phase design, the research has two main sets of findings. As the overarching research question required, the researcher has structured the study in line with methodological necessities to answer sub-questions triggered. Each phase of the study produced a group of findings and some of the findings of the first phase were used to design the second phase.

10.4.1 The first phase

The first sub-question, *'If social capital is to be produced by policies, how will social capital be measured? How will policy makers know where to 'invest' and where to focus?'* was answered using quantitative analysis and it revealed types of social capital are dispersed across Turkey's regions and provinces at varying levels. Measuring structural and cognitive dimensions of social capital of the regions for the first time in Turkey, the first phase of the study revealed bridging social capital and bonding social capital are negatively correlated. Owing to the comprehensive conceptualisation, bridging social capital reflected the modern ways of living, mainly membership in civil associations, sociability and political awareness, in other terms, participation in objective structures. On the other hand, bonding social capital represented the cognitive aspects of society, such as traditional values, emotional relationships, strong emphasis on the family and religion, and higher trust in closer networks. The most important finding of the first phase is there is a solid positive correlation between socio-economic development and bridging social capital. On the contrary, bonding social capital is associated with underdevelopment. Whatever is the causal relationship, this finding alone justifies a strong basis for a public policy needing to aim at the production of bridging social capital. Since the socio-economic development index of Turkey consists of many aspects of development

issues, it is clear people from regions with higher bridging social capital are more likely to be better educated, wealthier, and healthier, in line with the general assumptions of social capital theory. At this point it is better to argue 'synergy' rather than 'causality'. A wholesale picture of a modern society where high development features and an active civil society are mutually complementary, is more likely to create much better ends in comparison to ex parte efforts for economic development. Thus, investment in bridging social capital needs to be considered as an indispensable component of development policies. Even though this idea was spelt once in the Development Plans for 2007-2018 in Turkey, there is no additional public policy to clearly guide the public administration.

Negative correlation between bridging and bonding social capital requires careful attention. At first glance, one could claim bonding social capital is bad for society and has to be broken up to resolve the problems that it causes. The conceptualisation of social capital in this research is in favour of bridging social capital since it is beneficial for 'getting ahead'. From the researcher's understanding, a developing country like Turkey needs to focus on bridging social capital. The general characteristics of Turkish society has been moulded over the centuries by strict traditional and religious cultural patterns, strong attachment to family, neighbourhood and tribe that provides bonding social capital. However, it is unfair to slander bonding social capital alone as the main culprit for the underdevelopment issues. Bonding social capital is helpful in enabling people to 'get by' especially in hard times of the country. Having experienced many devastating economic crises, high inflation eras and violent terrorist attacks in a specific region, Turkey owes its unity and sovereignty as a nation to bonding social capital which is emerged as social solidarity, especially at individual and community level. Turkey needs to find a way of preserving the strong family and neighbourhood structures and eliminating their demolishing effects on individual freedoms at the same time. Encouraging people to take part in modern social relationships, in other words, investing in bridging social capital could be a cure for the problem and, it is also required in order to achieve a modern and pluralist society as it brings new networks where internalisation of democratic attitudes would consolidate.

An important paradoxical finding, the negative correlation between bridging social capital and trust in strangers requires attention, too. Although the general social capital theory assumes that high trust in strangers is a feature of developed and civilised societies, the empirical link between trust-development and trust-bridging social capital is missing even in the most developed regions of Turkey. Trust of any kind-as measured by the Ministry of Family and

Social Policies-positively correlates with bonding social capital. It was expected to find positive correlation between trust in close networks and bonding social capital theoretically, however, due to the missing empirical link, the study can claim participation in civil associations is not caused by or lead to generalised trust in the Turkish context. It is plausible to assert trust in strangers is not a function of civil engagement in Turkey, and it is more likely to be affected by other variables like effective community norms and sanctions, rule of law, and an effective juridical system, each of which is a broad topic for a separate study.

The findings of the first phase have also revealed some discrepancies in the development-social capital connection. In some provinces, socio-economic development and bridging social capital do not match, in other words, some similarly developed provinces have distinctly varying bridging social capital stocks. The development level does not explain the civil and political participation perfectly alone, and this finding triggered the second phase of the study.

10.4.2 The second phase

The second phase focused on case provinces reflecting the inconsistency described above. The second sub-research question was formulated to investigate whether or not, there is a correspondence between high social capital level and design of state-civil society relationships. The context dependant nature of social capital assumes *'differences of social capital levels across localities correspond with the quality of the state-civil society relations'*. Subsequently, social capital levels not able to be explained by the socio-economic development level might be explained through differences in contextual designs of state-society interactions.

The second phase was designed to assess civil society-state relationships through the eyes of the actual actors. 63 semi-structured interviews have revealed many aspects of the relationships which cannot be observed or assessed through a quantitative approach. Content analysis using a coding software helped the researcher with deducing the thematic findings for each case provinces.

Despite the findings of the qualitative phase being case specific, together they could grasp the main issues and major problems of state-civil society relationships partially predating social capital production, and they can be generalised for a greater context.

The problems of civil associations and their implications on 'trust'

Firstly, the second phase revealed the general circumstances of civil society organisations in the case provinces illustrate more or less a dismal picture. Participants' views on CSOs are

generally negative (See Appendix 3, Table 63). These sub-codes obtained from the interviews might also be regarded as descriptions and expressions reflecting the main problems of civil society in the selected provinces. According to responses, the most emphasised feature of CSOs is the low members' low voluntarism and commitment. This finding can be regarded in parallel with The World Values Survey results (2011) indicating associational activity is fairly low in Turkey. People are not interested in formal associations partly because their voluntarism is low, and thus, they are not committed to social matters. This is the most criticised feature of Turkish civil society. This finding alone reflects producing social capital through public policies is a challenging task, as the clients of such policies are fairly limited in number, and less likely to produce extended outcomes for the rest of the society. Consequently the sociological background of the society does not provide broad opportunities that can be targeted politically.

The second remarkable finding emerging from the interviews is the bonding feature of associations is frequently underlined by respondents. This finding is especially valid for the provinces population of which is widely made up of immigrant groups. It was often stressed the strict bonds of immigrant groups have a strong influence on local politics.

The third common feature of associations respondents commented on is the weakness of associations in financial aspects. This is especially valid in lower SED provinces. This finding is not surprising where voluntarism and commitment are lower. As discussed in the Context chapter, people's habits regarding volunteering and philanthropic works are generally limited within familiar and close networks, and they do not tend to be involved in charitable activities through formal civil society organisations.

It was comprehended during the interviews most of the active associations are run by altruistic leaders and few members. In many cases, it is underscored an association's operations are limited to the activities of its leader. Respondents say many associations suddenly disappear immediately after their leaders' quit. This means, many associations at local level are still a long way from being institutionalised.

In some case provinces, associations are regarded as extensions of political parties. This is due for two main reasons: First, when they use political channels, it is easier to create links with power elites. Secondly, access to local or central project grants and funds are easier when the association is close to the ruling political party in the locality. This creates an automatic

exclusion mechanism in people's perspectives. Politicised associations are not favoured by people who have different political affiliations. As a result, comprehensiveness decreases for that association. This is valid not only for naturally politicised associations themed with human rights or ethnic diversity, but also valid for associations formed for mosque building or fine arts, where politics is irrelevant or much less predominant. For the production of social capital, the politicised structure of CSOs tend to produce linking social capital, creating and fostering patron-client relationships, for those having similar political attachment with the ruling political party in the province.

In general, negative descriptions of respondents cluster around low socio-economic development level and low bridging social capital provinces. As reflected in the code frequency table in (Appendix 3, Table 63) low activity, leaders' dominance and small membership rates influence the absence of a generalised trust-bridging social capital link. As mentioned clearly by a respondent in Karabuk province (Chapter 8, page 201), the founders of civil associations begin with a handful of people, and they struggle to convince their friend or acquaintances to enrol in the association. Members of the associations join the organisation just for their goodwill towards the association founders. They do not shoulder the financial or operational burden of the association and the future of the association is left to the endeavours of a few people, when they leave, the association dissolves. In such an association, it is hard to see how trusting attitudes to strangers can develop. Founders and members of the associations already know each other, having more or less trust towards other formerly known members. Because of the low activity, horizontal networks among various associations could not be established, and bridges between formerly unknown people are not constructed. If trust is gained and fostered through reciprocal actions of individuals, associations not able to provide a framework to create horizontal networks, will not create trust in the end. That is why bridging social capital-generalised trust link is missing in Turkey. Existing associations are less effective in gathering 'formerly unknown' people, instead, they foster the relationships among 'formerly known' people. This means, they tend to produce bonding social capital in its more general meaning, increasing in-group trust. This interpretation revisits a fundamental question and criticism of general social capital theory: Are all associations alike? In Turkey, they are not, and the potential of association membership numbers as a bridging social capital indicator is limited in the Turkish context due to associations' structural and practical inabilities in creating trust towards strangers.

The problems of formal political opportunity structures as a social capital facilitator

Town councils in the Turkish local administration context were examined in the case provinces, as they provide non-electoral political participation channels. As a social capital indicator, non-electoral political participation facilitates establishing links (linking social capital) between civil society and power elites.

Despite the fact Town Councils are regulated from a very democratic point of view by law, their effectiveness and operations in practice are generally affected by the attitudes of municipal management and the Mayor. In some case provinces, Mayors are very dominant over operations and practices of the town councils. For example, in Nigde and Kirikkale, the chairman of the town council is the mayor himself. In those town councils, council activities are relatively limited; they appear to fulfil their basic activities on paper only. However, in other town councils, it could be clearly seen that, their organs are elected more freely, civil society organisations are more involved in council works, and those councils are able to put their projects and decisions into effect. Not surprisingly, active town councils operate in provinces having relatively high bridging social capital levels (see Appendix 3, Table 64)

Participants in case provinces complain about the ‘toothless legislation’. The effective Municipal Law and Town Council’s Bylaw, have left the local town councils at the mercy of the municipal management. The dominance of the Mayor is fortified by the authority of summoning the town council following the local elections and inviting ‘relevant’ civil associations to construct the town council within his/her own preferences. Supporting the town council with a budget and equipping it with an office and staff are totally down to municipal decisions. In this way, municipal management can block or punish the town council by simply cutting of support.

Another focus point of responses on the ineffectiveness of the town councils is low attendance of civil society organisations. Many respondents argued the general assembly and executive committee of town councils could not convene due to insufficient numbers for a quorum for meetings. Where the municipality neglects the town council, their decisions remain worthless and willingness of people to take part in council works eventually diminishes. This creates a vicious circle so weak town councils become weaker, and a weak town council is powerless and remains completely paralysed as in the case of Kirikkale, whereas responsiveness is a key element in keeping participation mechanisms alive.

The dominance of the Mayors as the most influential actor in Turkish local politics, has inevitably led to partisan practices and politicisation of town councils. As a non-electoral political participation channel, town councils are naturally politics-related organisations. However, their experiences in the case provinces showed most of the town councils suffer from being seen as the backyards of the ruling political party in the province. This problem has been raised by the participants as the most important factor behind the ineffectiveness issue. As mentioned above, the way town councils are regulated by law is itself problematic in terms of political impartiality of the opportunity structure. Formation procedures of town councils and their dependency on municipal budgets and staff hinder operating as objective participation mechanisms where every political view can be voiced, and a democratic discussion culture can take root freely. Town councils are seen as extensions of the ruling political parties of municipalities. Even though some town councils persistently try to project their independence from municipal powers, for example in Karabuk and Canakkale, they are unable to convince public opinion and remove the bias affecting their freedom to act. CSOs who define themselves as definitely opposing the ruling political party draw back from taking part in town councils to convey to their members the message they oppose the municipality and ruling party politically. Others were unable to find a reasonable way to join in city governance as they abstain from being accused of being supporter of the ruling political party, in other words they had to stay out of the town council in order to protect the sense of impartiality among their members. Confrontational politics, a hereditary disease in Turkish politics, is reflected in the town councils' formation methods and operations. Even though more effective and impartially designed town councils exist in high bridging social capital provinces in pairs, the dominance of the municipality and its effects on the town council is evident in each case. The most effective town council in the study operates in Canakkale province, however, the precedence of laicism/Kemalism is obvious. As a political symbol, women having headscarves, or men with religious beards weren't observed in the published activity photographs. Canakkale town council can be regarded as a facilitator for creating bridging and linking social capital, but this will remain limited within a definite political/social strata.

Despite all negative criticisms for the design and effectiveness of town councils, the examples of Karabuk and Canakkale confirm municipal management and particularly the Mayor have the authority in designing and operating the town council democratically. The weak point is this is up to their goodwill. This finding confirms not only the institutions, but also the actors

operating them are very important in facilitating and leading civil and political participation to form social capital from top to down.

The assessment of civil society-state relationships and inferences on social capital's production

In general, the weakness of civil society organisations is the main disadvantage in making contact with public authorities. As described above, low voluntarism and commitment and leader-centred structures of CSOs are the main reasons for a weak civil society. This eventually leads them to stay close to public authorities to develop relationships. At this point, the reaction of public authorities-mainly of public figures representing them-is significantly decisive on the future of civil society organisations in many cases. Theoretically, constructive and supportive responses from the public side help in creating more effective CSOs, and they operate more effectively and reach more people, hence are more likely to create more social capital. On the other hand, unsupportive and hampering approaches tends to restrict CSOs to operate in their own vicious circle.

In civil society-state relationships, two main reasons for contact reflect financial weakness of CSOs (Appendix 3, Table 66). According to both sides, CSOs require much support especially in the form of equipment, vehicles, stationery, places of meeting, exhibitions, performance and central offices. Even in the high SED provinces, these are the primary reasons for contact.

A formal partnership is generally preferred by both sides in order to receive grants from national and international project programmes. These programmes, for example EU's 'Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance', or the Ministry of Development's and Regional Development Agencies' grant schemes, require civil society-public authority partnerships. As expressed by many respondents from both sides, these programmes foster establishment of strong ties between CSOs and local public figures, in other words 'linking social capital'.

In general, the reasons for contact draw a picture showing a majority of the active local CSOs are dependent on public authorities. However, their satisfaction of the quality of the relationships differ. It is obvious from the coding frequencies (Appendix 3, Table 67), high social capital provinces in each pair have significantly more positive comments, whereas low social capital ones criticise the relationships. In other terms, high social capital provinces are more successful in establishing constructive relationships between the different actors of governance therefore, the potential for linking and bridging social capital production is much

higher, and a higher interpenetration of state-civil society in local governance associates with higher levels of bridging social capital.

When sub-codes are examined individually, the first two sub-codes under positive perceptions reflect CSOs' expectations from public authorities. Respondents frequently express effective operations of CSOs, in some cases, the existence of CSOs are determined by the availability of public support and project funds. Most significantly, these two kinds of support are highly appreciated in Yozgat, the most deprived case in terms of socio-economic development. This echoes public authorities need to spread their efforts more exclusively and precisely toward CSOs where they are financially weaker and numerically fewer in terms of membership figures.

Amongst the negative comments (Appendix 3, Table 68) the most frequently coded one regards the strong influence of the Mayor on public decisions. This conclusion reflects a dominant feature of the Turkish local authority context: a powerful Mayor- weak municipal council. The party-list proportional representation system ensures dominance of Mayor as he/she is elected directly by the people, not the municipal council. In this system, councillors owe their positions to the Mayor and political party management, as they are enlisted generally by these actors. Municipal councillors are required to abide by the party discipline strictly in order to ensure a higher place on the candidate list for the next elections. In many cases, municipal decisions are "discussed" in party groups before they are discussed by the municipal council. In these meetings party members are "convinced" in line with the Mayor's opinion or party policy, and the whole party group votes on the matter as a block in the municipal council meeting. In addition, Municipality Law endows many executive authorities on the Mayor which are far beyond the representation task of the Municipality. These strong regulations elevate the Mayor to a position where he can intervene in almost any matters in the province. In practice, some Mayors use their authority through consultation mechanisms, some others behave like 'I know best'. According to respondents, the Mayor's dominance is higher in low social capital provinces. This structure justifies a very strong basis for 'top-down' perspective in search of social capital production. If legislative regulations are designed to extol some important figures, concentration of power gives them the opportunity to manipulate the local context through their decisions, attitudes and behavioural patterns. As this study is trying to explore, social capital varies in different contexts, and important figures have devices to shape the local context, they can either contribute to the production of social capital, or simply damage or destroy it by arranging the local context accordingly. The Mayor can control the municipality on his own, or consult with other actors and improve the quality

of governance, enabling CSOs to have their say, applying joint projects, or just supplying resources so they operate more effectively.

Over the last two decades, the Turkish public administration system has witnessed decentralisation reforms that set out to reduce the centre's influence on local authorities, and many prefectural powers of province and district governors were delegated to municipalities and special local authorities. The main discourse behind the discussions concerns the one-man-rule and the status-quo guarding practices of governors. It was thought delegation of central power to central authorities would improve the local democracies. However, the research revealed the dominance of the Mayor on the local settings has not changed much in civil society-state relationships. Due to election and political party regulations, decentralisation of power has created new power relationships knotted around the Mayor and the ruling political party at local level. The State-centric approach that characterised the republican era has left its place to political party-centric applications.

Concentration of political power in few hands at local level has led to a reality local politics are not shaped by open and equal participation, but shaped either by attachment to the ruling political ideology, which is embodied in the Mayor's presence, or opposition to it. The research revealed civil society-state relationships is badly damaged due to this political fragmentation. Inevitably, this kind of local political context will have some negative reflections on the social capital production issue. Groups in civil society tends to create links with power elites in order to gain benefit from the public resources, and take advantage of other groups. Thus, ruling political ideas lead to an automatic exclusion for the opposition or for the politically impartial. In particular the financial weakness of civil society organisations forced them to align with the ruling party's political views; as the consequence when the politically connected CSOs receive more benefits, the system reproduces itself. Therefore in this instance, CSOs are regarded as the extensions of political parties, although they were supposed to be the countervailing mechanisms against power structures. The implication of these findings on linking social capital in the Turkish local context is that civil society-state relationships tend to produce patron-client relationships and nepotism. The current structure of local relationships is more likely to reflect the 'dark side of social capital' as a result. Long before any social capital study in Turkey, quotation from Jonathan Fox's assumptions seems to describe Turkey's experience almost perfectly:

'...where societies are dominated by vertical power relations, authoritarian clientelism, and widespread mutual mistrust, one finds vicious circles that prevent the accumulation of social capital.' (Fox 1996, p.7)

In the exploration of formal political opportunity structures, effects of political fragmentation and the role of local authorities for creating this are more visible. As explained in the case of town councils, respondents complained largely about clashes of the rival political opinions. Although discussions between different views are essential in healthy democracies, they lead polarisation of society in Turkey's situation where a democratic environment is not consolidated and reconciliation culture is not common. Thus, in practice, clientelism and political discrimination greatly influence relationships between public authorities and civil society. This is abused by political figures as well as CSOs, since the former require vote, the latter funds. Consequently, people having opposite political opinions do not come together around associations for non-political ends, blocking the setting up of new networks bridging people from different spheres. Therefore the 'virtuous circles' are broken by the partisan actions (Herreros 2004, p.101-110).

Another striking finding of assessing the relationships is provinces having influential figures in central government are less likely to be concerned about civil society-state relations. This is particularly evident in Yozgat, Kirikkale, and Bolu, which all have powerful politicians in the central government. In these provinces, local politicians tend to solve the problems of the provinces using those important connections. They tend to behave like 'we know best'. The main concern of the local politicians is to channel central government investments into their provinces. Thus, it is not so important what civil society says, it is more important to listen to powerful representatives, as they have the keys for the 'treasure chest'. However, practices of the opposition municipalities, Canakkale and Karabuk, show they are both concerned with setting up political opportunity structures openly. In Karabuk, The Mayor's Mobile Office initiative, and in Canakkale, strong budgetary and warm relationship policies towards the Town council and the civil society, are good examples the opposition politicians pay importance in taking the pulse of the local communities. Since they are not as fortunate as the formers in transferring central government resources, opposition municipalities seek support of the voters by developing close relationships. In contrast, the ruling party politicians garner votes through mass investments by central government, whereas the opposition party politicians legitimise themselves by establishing linking social capital. To summarise, different political views, and local power relationships need to be considered as important variables in analysing local contexts, as they have influence on the state-civil society relationships.

10.5 The Possible Policy Recommendations

In the light of the findings, some policies for the central government and local administrations can be recommended.

An attempt to answer the question of how public authorities can create social capital firstly requires an accurate measurement effort. In the Turkish context, a fundamental problem is there is no specific effort of the state to measure social capital. Lack of awareness regarding social capital as a term and its favourable conclusions is the main issue for the absence of social capital policies of governments. This study has showed ready-to-use indicators have limited potential for social capital's measurement. In particular very limited data on trust is a problem. Thus, a first policy recommendation would be ***the top state institution for statistical purposes, TurkStat should develop a social capital index reflecting the sociological and political features of Turkish society.*** A provincial level study, based on large-sample questionnaires, will allow the relevant public or private bodies to make comparisons, and design policies specific to localities.

Diversity of sociological background, and varied socio-economic development levels across regions and provinces require context specific policies to produce social capital. Even though unequal social capital stocks of regions/provinces cannot be explained by socio-economic development alone, activity level of civil associations is strongly influenced by the wealth and understandings of the leaders and members. Thus, as seen in Canakkale, a high development level province, ***local authorities need to step back once the required legal framework and enabling environment is established, observe and support the actions of the local civil society exogenously. However, socio-economically underdeveloped provinces require substantially more efforts. A constant financial support through project partnerships will be necessary to sustain civil associations and help them evolve through time.***

Nevertheless, within the conceptualisation limits of the study, cognitive values and norms shaping bonding social capital are not likely to respond to public policies in short or midterm. Policies targeting bonding social capital do not seem to be a fruitful area in politics. In addition to that, bonding social capital is not totally harmful, conversely, strong attachment to family and faith-based social solidarity provide indispensable resources for individuals in hard times. Some tribal and feudal components of bonding social capital, consisting of strict control over individuals' freedoms, tend to erode overtime and are not much of a concern for future

prospects. Hence, policies to preserve and foster the family institution will support bonding social capital as a 'sociological superglue' in Putnam's terms. A recent development, establishment of the Ministry of Family and Social Policies in 2011, show policy makers in Turkey are already sensitive to issues relating to family as a policy target.

Structural features of bridging social capital, which are mainly engagement in civil networks and political participation, are more sensitive and open to influence through politics. Basically, possible policies to invest in bridging social capital are related to the support and enhancement of civil associations and formal/informal political opportunity structures.

Turkey has witnessed legislative reforms that broadening the framework for civil freedoms had a ground-breaking impact on the proliferation of civil associations. Over the last decade, a rapid increase in association numbers and membership figures has been experienced. Along with the freedoms, national/international grant schemes, allocated project budgets for civil associations are undoubtedly supportive. However, it would be premature to allege increasing association figures have contributed to the consolidation of 'generalised trust; and wider bridging networks. Existing structures of local associations still represent a weak civil society. Small membership rates, friend and fellow associations are unable to create generalised trust since they operate in already-known and familiar networks. Possible financial or other support for these kinds of associations is less likely to contribute to the accumulation of generalised trust. ***Public grant schemes and budget allowances require prioritising projects to encourage co-operative efforts and interaction of various associations, allowing them to create horizontal networks. Through such a policy, formerly alien networks, and reciprocal actions leading to generalised trust, would be established.***

When it comes to the political participation aspect of bridging social capital, formal political opportunity structures can be regarded as a facilitator for linking social capital creation. In the Turkish context, the town council as a formal POS, was designed by law to serve as a democratic non-electoral participation mechanism. However, in practice, there are many obstacles for functional town councils. National level regulations which burden broad tasks for the town councils do not always meet the diverse requirements of participation patterns of localities. ***A more flexible structure allowing the prioritisation of local issues would fit better to realise more achievable participation practices.*** In addition the politicised design and dominance of the Mayor and the municipality impede impartiality of the mechanism and limits its comprehensiveness. ***Financial and other support from the municipal management should be guaranteed by objective regulations, and fate of the town councils should not be left to***

the mercy of the Mayor and the municipality. As a main issue of non-electoral participation, responsiveness of the local authority to the town council's decisions should be ensured. Overall, local authorities, politicians and managers should not be afraid of criticisms, and they need to internalise the discussion culture if their aim is to achieve a better governance. In this way a healthier atmosphere to produce linking social capital among the actors of local politics would be accomplished.

The research has revealed the political fragmentation of the Turkish nation is a major problem in civil society-state relationships. Unfortunately, the reference point in these relationships is not the pluralist local democracy, but a strong attachment to party ideology. Recent local authority reforms aimed at delegation of central authorities on elected political mechanisms remained limited in terms of democratising the local governance. Powerful one-man rule of the prefectural system was required to be balanced by reinforced local authorities, however, this policy had limited effects on the state –civil society relationships. Legitimately powerful Mayors and a few important political figures have dominated the decision making processes, and it seems traditional managerial attitudes are still alive in the examples of local authorities. Civil society reforms or administrative reorganisations remain limited at local level since the agents who would exercise them are as important as the institutions. ***Instead of creating local political power elites and letting them follow patron-client relationships with society, it is better to built-up and strengthen the commissions of councillors in the local decision making processes. Such a delegation would balance the relationships in the local context and may prevent the accumulation of power in few hands.*** However, this will require a profound change in the local election and local administration system, thus it seems unlikely under current circumstances of Turkey today.

To summarise, it is not impossible to create social capital through state-civil society relationships, however, Turkey is a difficult arena to realise top-down policies due to historical and structural reasons. Sociologically, Turkish society has some disadvantages to establish modern and democratic civil society organisations. Fundamental and long-standing norms and values tend to create bonding types of social capital, in terms of family and religious networks. The weakness of modern civil society organisations hinders prospects for the effectiveness of financial and other supports of the state. On the other side of the coin, the legal framework extolling state-centric approaches towards society have begun to erode, however, political party/ideology centric applications replaced the former. Strong emphasis on the political

identities, inevitably lead to a political fragmentation of the society. Channels of participation are closed for those having opposing political views. Patron-client relationships between the state and society tend to discriminate people, and bluntly divide the nation into two camps. Supporters of the ruling party can obtain state resources, but opponents have to wait outside for their turn. It is plausible to predict that when the opposition gains power, they will follow a similar path. It is naive to suggest creating social capital is an easy task in such an environment. A high level of local democracy and a governance with better quality is essential for an environment to create social capital. ***The researcher can claim in conclusion if the state organisation-with its politicians and bureaucracy as a whole-targets production of social capital, they need to stop destroying it first immediately.*** That is the core policy recommendation.

10.6 The Academic Contributions and New Questions for Future Studies

The research investigated the civil society-state relationships in Turkey through a framework of social capital's production. As an evolving theory, social capital provides a fruitful approach to assess the various aspects of civil and political participation in the Turkish context.

As a major contribution, the study supports the growing view in international academia the production of social capital is sensitive to contextual designs shaped by political power. As a developing and democratising country, Turkey is proved to be a potential example to analyse and observe the effects of top-down reforms on civil society and prospects for social capital's creation.

Secondly, the research has introduced a new dimension to discussions of social capital issues in Turkey's literature. As a rarely studied area, social capital research is still in its infancy in Turkey, and this study is an opening point of a new academic avenue focusing on the production issues of social capital in Turkey. Now, narrow measurement efforts of social capital and making few comments concerning its low level in Turkey is not an attractive or fertile proposition for the academia anymore. A new era of research dedicated to social capital's production issues should start following this study. Replicable and improvable measurement efforts, and the possibility of future interviews with the actors in case provinces of the study have made longitudinal studies possible.

Thirdly, the research has proved the overwhelming quantitative approaches in social capital theory are insufficient alone to reach acceptable conclusions. Use of official statistics may lead to deceptive findings, as the missing link of bridging social capital-generalised trust finding exemplified. The reason behind the missing link was revealed through the qualitative phase of this study. The cognitive aspects of social capital, mainly the norms and values, cultural features like tradition and religion are important determinants of people's participation preferences and they are naturally subject to interpretation. Therefore the quantitative approach needs to be supplemented with qualitative methods for a better grasp of social reality.

Fourthly, the research introduced a unique conceptualisation of social capital types for the Turkish context. A conceptualisation ignoring the various sources of social capital in a definite context lead to barren findings and lacks comprehensiveness. In the Turkish context, research has showed bonding social capital needs to be measured and interpreted as the favoured bottom-up approach of social capital's formation is actually based on the norms and values that moulded society over centuries. Different types of social capital can work together or operate to the detriment of other. Thus they need to be analysed separately, then findings of the analysis should be interpreted together.

Finally, the research has raised some new questions that could give way to a range of academic researches.

The missing link of bridging social capital-generalised trust in Turkey is itself an important area for future queries. Why does bridging social capital fail to create generalised trust? What kinds of civil associations tends to create generalised trust, so, hence which ones are more deserving of public funds?

Empirical studies to measure linking social capital will also be beneficial to develop understandings of social capital issues. Does non-electoral participation really create social capital? To what extent do formal political opportunity structures in practice help its production?

As the main instrument of supporting civil society, the effect of public funds and grant schemes on the effectiveness of associational activities, and their potential to contribute the members' social capital are also interesting subjects for further experimental studies.

THE EPILOGUE

It was the summer of 2009. I was sitting comfortably in my office in the Mengen district of Bolu province. The janitor knocked on the door and informed me that a couple of local people arrived for a visit. I greeted them and ordered tea as usual. After a couple of polite introductory words, they explained the reason behind their visit. They were close friends and concerned about the future of the district's culinary college. Mengen was a historically important district with a reputation for the quality of its chefs. Since the Ottoman times, the most famous chefs in the palace were from Mengen and even today, most high quality restaurants and luxury hotels have been employing chefs from Mengen. I already knew that some chefs working for the President of the Republic, and even the chefs of some Middle Eastern kings were from Mengen. There is a culinary college in the district preserving the dominance of Mengen chefs in the sector. But, the condition of the school in terms of the building and kitchens were quite poor, and there was no dormitory. The school was operating in a building previously serving as the district library. My visitors were quite concerned about the condition of the school and wanted to start a campaign to construct a new school building to elevate the quality and attract more students. However, they did not know how to begin, and were visiting me for a consultation.

I advised them to convene a formal association first. A new building was quite a big project to achieve through tiny donations of the local people. Thus, I suggested start by paying visits to MPs in Ankara, asking for their support. In addition I emphasised the importance of getting in contact with the famous chefs working for powerful figures.

Shortly after, they formed the association in Ankara and started lobbying activities. In this period, I and the Mayor of the district together paid visits to important political and University managers to explain the need for a new building and departments. Mengen was lucky to have an important factory of forestry products. Together with the association leaders, we informed Mr Ahmet Kahraman, the owner of the factory, about the project. He showed interest in helping the construction of the new building in exchange for some tax returns. By the way, the association was applying pressure over the MPs and other local politicians for their support.

A couple of months later, the Rector of Bolu Izzet Baysal University and Mr Kahraman signed a protocol for the new building and some new university departments for the culinary school.

The Epilogue

Eventually, the construction started in summer 2011, then I left Mengen for a bigger district, and the new building was completed in 2012.

Approaching the end of this study, I received an invitation for the graduation ceremony of the first students of the new culinary school. I understand now our efforts with the association, politicians, bureaucracy and businessmen theoretically mean we have mobilised our various types of social capital, in order to reach an identified target. Cooking as the traditional profession of the district provided us with required bonds to get together. It had always been there, but dormant. Representing the bureaucracy, my acquaintanceships with the politicians and businessmen were the connections that served as linking social capital. Finally, it was the good relationships and trust between us which bridged our efforts and created the synergy to achieve a development project. We all utilised our connections not for self-interests, but for a communal end. The association does not dissolve after reaching its aim, and is still working on community projects and lobbying for new public services for Mengen district⁶².

So, it is better together.

⁶² <http://www.mengenfakulteyaptirmadernegi.com/>

Appendix 1: THE EVOLUTION of POLITICAL CLIMATE and LEGAL FRAMEWORK for CIVIL CONTEXT

The studies of political sciences categorises the Republican era of Turkey into major political milestones having enormous impacts on the whole nation. Deploying this methodology, this section will elaborate the evolution of the legal framework effecting civil society in four brief eras. Chronologically, they are 1923-1946: single-party rule, 1946-1960: transition to democracy, 1960-1980: effects of 1960 military coup, 1980-2000: effects of 1980 military coup, and 2000-present: period of reforms.

1923-1946: Single-Party rule:

Even though the first constitution dates back to 1876, freedom of association of Ottoman era was only accepted by the Sultan after 1909 with the introduction of the first Law of Associations. This regulation is important since it remained as the foundation stone for the following laws and other regulations regarding the subject. This law accepted '*Ottomans have the right to assemble*'. On the other hand, it banned associations fostering segregationist ideas. Regarding the political circumstances of the time, this was necessary for an empire experiencing nationalist rebellions of its sub-nations. This new freedom was welcomed by the intelligentsia from the different groups of the empire. Although they gathered together for social and cultural reasons, they acted as political organisations in practice, aiming to gain independence from the Ottoman rule (Ministry of Interior, 2013). Not only non-Muslim and Arab factions, but also Turks, who desired a more democratic country gathered around these kinds of associations (Kaya and Ayan 2011, p.60). Thus, the perceived negativity of civil organisations as threats to the state and unity took root in the state mechanism. Later, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk used the support of these associations of Turkish nationalism to challenge the foreign invaders during the War of Independence (1919-1922).

Inheriting a weak association culture dominated by military-bureaucratic-intelligentsia figures, the first era of the Turkish Republic is identified with single-party rule. All of the reforms of the Turkish Revolution were implemented and the sovereignty of central state was strengthened during this period. The CHP (Republican People's Party) was the only permitted political organisation and it was fully integrated with the state mechanism through bureaucratic elites. For example, along with their bureaucratic roles, province and district governors were also

representatives and heads of the local branches of CHP. This era can be considered as 'totalitarian republic' as the major emphasis was to consolidate foundations of the new state instead of increasing the level of democracy. Some internal and external factors like 1925 Kurdish rebellion in the eastern provinces, radical Islamic uprisings, the 1929 global economic crisis and the threat of war in the 1930s motivated the government to take firm action to sustain unity of the nation and sovereignty of the state. On reflection, these circumstances meant restrictions on civil society inevitably. Despite associational freedoms were bestowed in 1924 Constitution and 1926 Civil Code, practice of these rights was limited by extraordinary laws introduced against riots and uprisings. In particular regulations against class-based organisations have destroyed worker's unions. Forming associations became subject to permission of state authorities in 1938. Already weak, civil society was unable to react against the limitation of rights when a Court of Constitution did not exist and the Grand National Assembly was the sole and uncontrolled law making authority. As a result of these precautions to protect the new republic, many nation-wide associations were forced to disband and merge with the CHP's organisation. The '*Public Houses*', which were CHP's peripheral branches, became the main organisations where civil society operated (Uyar 2004).

Economically, the state also took over the control of the economic sectors. Insufficient capital accumulation and failure of the private sector in the 1929 global economic crisis led extensive state regulation of the economy. Despite the fact Turkey did not enter the World War II, the economy was deeply affected and consumption of certain goods was limited by rationing. The state became the main investor, entrepreneur and employer in industrial sectors and main buyer of private sector production. These circumstances also affected civil society negatively since one of its prerequisites is a free market economy. Prevalence of state-centric modernisation policies were strengthened when the society became more dependent on the state economically.

Therefore the first era of the Republic does not have a good track record regarding freedoms for associations. The main priority of the new state was to maintain stability of the newly reformed foundations and to react against any threat. Thus, state elites did not welcome any protests to emerge from society. Early practices of the Turkish elites laid the foundation stones of a paternalist state structure. The main argument for the paternalist policies drawn from the era are:

- *The State was built itself on the understanding people are not able to satisfy their own needs alone, thus they should be cared for and protected like children by a father-state.*
- *The State had the right to intervene in any matter in the name of the public. Expecting full obedience, the preferences of the state elites and privileged politicians were imposed upon citizens to regulate society.*

- *The rule of law was not the first concern. Despite the 1924 Constitution and Civil Code, associational freedoms were severely violated through other laws and applications of bureaucracy. In other terms, the state did not act in accordance with law; instead laws were stretched to adjust the de facto outcomes of the rulers' preferences (Caniklioglu 2007, p.138-139).*

1946-1960: Transition to democracy

Following the unsuccessful attempts of 1925 and 1930, transition to a multi-party democracy had to wait until 1946. The examples of *The Progressive Republican Party* in 1925 and *The Free Republican Party* in 1930 were ended due to allegations they were taken over by those wanting a theocratic state. However, internal and external occurrences required Turkey to accept multi-party political system constitutionally.

In general, the internal factors were economically driven. (Gunal 2012, p.165). The economic recession of 1930s and famine caused by World War II have damaged income distribution in favour of the newly-formed commercial and bourgeois class. To free themselves from the interventionist single-party rule combined with a statist bureaucracy, the new and privileged social classes required a more flexible era of economics and politics. In addition feudal landlords of vast agricultural estates required a political climate change since they had been threatened by CHP's expropriation policies aiming to give their lands to landless villagers (Kaya and Ayan 2011, p. 74).

Externally, the democratic powers being the victors of WW II, developed negative attitudes to nations still having totalitarian regimes. Additionally, Turkey required strong relationships with western democracies to counter the raising threat of communist Russia. Russia's territorial demands in Turkey's north-eastern borders, and their claims of Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits cornered Turkey in a considerably disadvantageous position at the time. In order to protect itself from a possible Russian invasion, the worst nightmare of the Turks since 1877 Russian war, Turkey had to turn towards the western powers. Thus, the first step to take was the transition to democracy, in those times' understanding, transition to a multi-party system. In January 1946, *The Democrat Party* was founded by a group of MPs who left CHP.

Along with this transition, many positive reforms were made in civil rights. In 1947, The Law of Association re-introduced the right to form associations without permission of the state authorities. Bans on class-based associations, trade unions and political parties were lifted.

The Democrat Party (DP) has won the 1950 general elections by a landslide. Behind this success, there was Party's propaganda offering a more liberal economy policy and abandoning CHP's antidemocratic regulations. In the first half of the 1950s, the DP has introduced new reforms that have won people's heart. Most remarkable was the ban against Arabic *athan*, the religious invitation call to prayer by Mosques was lifted. This policy could be considered as a starting point of viewing political Islam as a fruitful tool to obtain votes in the multi-party democracy of Turkey.

The DP's pledges were aiming to relieve the authoritarian applications of Republicans over the citizens and a policy shift towards more liberal and democratic regulations. Despite their slogan was *'Enough! The Word is nation's'*, after the 1956 elections, the DP begun to impose authoritarian practices, a direct contradiction of its own party programme. For example, the limitations on labour unions were tightened, a new Law of Meetings and Demonstrations was introduced crippling these rights extensively. Some provinces not voting for DP were downgraded to district administrations and connected to neighbouring provinces. Their *'motherland's frontier'* application, an informal entity with membership of DP supporters, divided nation politically into two dissentient camps. Names of new members joining the *'frontier'* were announced by national radio channels for hours every day. DP's applications can be considered as the first examples of confrontational politics in the Turkish democracy creating rival group to consolidate supporters, dividing nation into opposing political camps.

Along with the oppressive, majoritarian and stolid attitudes; failure in the economy, raising inflation and international debt, the bloating religious demands of radicals created politically discontented social groups particularly among the educated people of bureaucracy, press, university and the military (Gokhan 2011, p.171). Major stance of these groups was the idea the unbalanced power of a majority party rule should be limited by countervailing mechanisms like court of constitution and a bicameral National Assembly. These demands required a constitutional change which was impossible as the DP had the vast majority of chairs in the Grand National Assembly. As a result, the armed forces took power via a military coup to get rid of the DP and its leaders.

1960-1980: The Effects of 1960 military coup and the Constitution of 1961

Following the 27th May 1960 coup, the Constitution of 1924 was suspended, a new *'Assembly of Representatives'* was established to draw up a new constitution. The leaders of the DP were put on trial and Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, the Minister of Finance Hasan Polatkan and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatin Rustu Zorlu were executed. Many DP members were sentenced to prison terms.

Even though the 1960 military coup passed into history as a bloody era and disgrace for Turkish democracy, the new Constitution of 1961 was designed to give extensive freedoms to citizens against the oppressive state. The new constitution was accepted by 61.5% of voters in referendum. Regarding civil rights and freedoms, it stressed in the *'preamble'* passage the main aim of the new constitution was to establish a democratic rule of law:

*...desire to establish a democratic rule of law based on juridical and social foundations, which will ensure and guarantee human rights and liberties, national solidarity, social justice and the welfare and the prosperity of individual and society...*⁶³

The fundamental features of the 1961 Constitution are 'the rule of law' and 'social state' have been spelt out for the first time in the constitution. While national sovereignty was monopolised by the Grand National Assembly in the 1924 constitution, the new constitution distributed the sovereignty across various power structures. The nation was to *...exercise sovereignty through authorised agencies prescribed by the principles laid down in the constitution* (Article 4). Reflecting on the demands of privileged social groups prior to the coup, the new constitution has accepted bicameral Grand National Assembly as *The Senate of Republic* and *National Assembly*. Doing so, unlawful behaviour of any majority government would be blocked by the senate. In addition a *'Court of Constitution'* was formed to supervise laws and cancel unconstitutional regulations.

The importance of the 1961 Constitution in the evolution of rights and freedoms of Turkish citizens is undeniable. Basic rights and liberties were strongly secured against oppressive governments through mechanisms not existing in the 1924 constitution. Article 10 and 11 regulated them in general, assigning the state with the duty of removing all political, economic and social barriers blocking basic rights and liberties. Limitation of basic rights and freedoms could only be realised by law which is *in conformity with the letter and spirit of the constitution*. These laws could not infringe upon essence of any right or liberty even when the purpose is to *'uphold public interest, morals and order, social justice and national security'*. In other words, the new constitution were aimed to create a climate where liberties are essential, limitations are exceptional.

In terms of freedoms specially relating to civil society were also extensively regulated in the 1961 Constitution. The right and freedom to congregate and demonstrate (article 28), the right to form

⁶³ For an original English translation text of 1961 Constitution:
<http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/1961constitution-text.pdf>

associations (article 29), the right to form trade unions (article 46) and the right to collective bargaining and strike (article 47) were constitutionally accepted.

As shown in the Context chapter (p,,,) the 1960s and 1970s witnessed an enormous increase in association numbers. It undoubtedly resulted from the liberal regulations of the 1961 constitution. Similarly, membership of worker unions had increased more than five times during the period of 1960-1971 (Kaya and Ayan 2011, p.97). Equipped with the right to strike and collective bargaining, large working class movements, strikes and meetings were also experienced disturbing the ruling liberal '*Adalet Party*' (Justice Party) and bourgeoisie. In the 1970s, the government attempted to curtail workers' movements and social awakening through legislation but it was cancelled by the Court of Constitution. Consequently, a change in the 1961 Constitution became a mission for those factions uneasy with social movements. Their main reasoning was anarchy in the streets between dissident groups and police, damaging the peace and order. According to them the Constitution of 1961 was 'too large for freedoms' and led to fracturing of public order and peace. This generous constitution had to be changed. Despite all the efforts of governments and the 1971 indirect military intervention, anarchy movements were not deterred, and Turkey could not overcome unstable security situation. Undoubtedly, there were many other national and international burdens on Turkey's shoulders extensively destabilising the economy and social order, which are left-right wing ideological clashes, the new social movements of 1968, the cold war and 1973 oil crisis, the problem of Cypriot Turks and embargo following Turkey's military intervention in Cyprus; but they are outside the scope of this study.

In conclusion, the libertarian characteristics of the 1961 Constitution provided a legally suitable context for civil society to flourish. Second generations of the Turkish Republic enjoyed an era of freedoms their parents never experienced. Unfortunately, 'excessive' freedoms were not internalised by the different social groups and politicians. Association freedoms served to deepen social and ideological differences into nationalist and socialist camps explicitly. 'Organisation member' as a term became synonymous with the terms 'terrorist or anarchist'. So, despite the numerical increase in association numbers showing the existence of an enabling environment for civil society; intermediary features of civil society organisations, namely tolerance and trust were not be consolidated. Therefore, the period of 1960-1980 can be regarded as the period where the negative perspectives against association freedoms were rooted deeply in some social and political spheres.

1980-2000s: The effects of the 1980 military coup and the 1982

Constitution

The widespread idea among politicians and the civil-military bureaucracy constitutional freedoms had to be constricted had one main motivation: the authority of the state had to be re-established. As the result of political and ideological tensions had destroyed stability, the Turkish armed forces took over the government authority on 12th September 1980 and dissolved the National Grand Assembly and outlawed all existing political parties. Interestingly, all anarchy movements suddenly stopped overnight. The 1961 Constitution was suspended and a '*National Security Council*' was formed by commanders-in-chief of the Turkish military. Existing party leaders were in custody by a decision of NSC. To prepare a new constitution, an *Advisory Council* was formed with members appointed by generals and province governors.

A referendum for the new constitution was held on 07 November 1982, and was accepted by the vast majority of voters (91.4%). Chief Marshal and President of the State Kenan Evren had held meetings in almost every province to convince citizens to accept the new constitution and it was forbidden to organise counter-propaganda.

As the main argument against the 1961 Constitution was its 'excessive' libertarian characteristics, the new constitution had to be designed to limit freedoms causing 'terror and anarchy'. One of the most remarkable differences between the constitutions was that the former had defined the state apparatus as being 'based on human rights', while the latter defined it as being 'respecting human rights'. In this way, human rights was no longer the main reference point for the Turkish State, instead, indivisibility of state and nation was the central point of concern. The 1982 Constitution set out its preferences in favour of the state and nation rather than individual rights and freedoms⁶⁴. Liberties were exceptional but, limitations were essential. In this way, the state authority was re-established at the expense of civil rights.

In general, the 1982 Constitution reinforced executive power and abandoned the bicameral system. The law making process in the Grand National Assembly was simplified and quorum requirements reduced. Power was shared between the Prime Ministry and the Presidency of Republic. Constitutional amendments became subject to rigid supervision and regulation.

One of the most important features of the 1982 Constitution was its regulations restricting civil and political participation. Since the generals and their supporters thought the ideological differences were reinforced by associational activities and labour unions, these establishments

⁶⁴ For an original English text of 1982 Constitution: <http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/1982Constitution-1995-1.pdf>

were targeted and their organic or financial relationships with political parties banned. A new Law of Associations Nr.2908 was introduced and association freedoms were restricted. Nearly 27.000 associations closed down due to their illegal actions. More than 650.000 people, mostly association members, were taken into custody and interrogated for their political views and activities. Allegations of torture and violation of human rights were quite common in this period. Similarly, trade unions experienced heavy pressure. While there were nearly 6 million members of trade unions in 1980, numbers decreased to 1.7 million in 1985 (Aslan and Kaya 2004, p. 220). Workers' right to strike were limited and strikes aiming at political ends became illegal. According to Erdost and Boratav, civil society had to be silenced through the 1982 constitution to create a peaceful atmosphere so global neo-liberal economy policies and globalisation could be established in Turkey (Erdost 1989, p.178, Boratav 2000, 23-32).

As the result of the oppressive 1982 Constitution, the military-bureaucracy and central state gained power against civil society. Almost all existing organisational channels of civil society for decision making processes were blocked. Political participation was reduced to the level of voting activity in general and local elections. People were unable to find non-electoral ways of influencing politics formally, as a result they saw voting as the sole political participation activity. Since then, election turnout rates sustain high levels. According to the OECD Better Life Index, voter turnout rate of Turkey is 88% and well above the OECD average of 72%⁶⁵. When election turnout rates of Turkish citizens are compared through the 1960s and 1970s, when the libertarian 1961 Constitution was in effect, people were less concerned about general elections. After the 1980 military coup, turnout rate increased significantly. It is possible to argue political participation and voice raising channels were more accessible during the 1960s and 1970s by associational freedoms. After the 1982 Constitution's prohibitive approach to non-electoral political participation, people were only able to be involved in politics via elections. Table 43 below shows the course of turnout rates in Turkey from 1950 to 1999 in general elections. The shaded area refers to the period of the 1961 Constitution. Although election turnout rate is regarded as a conventional social capital indicator, it reflects blocked non-electoral participation channels.

Table 43: Trends in election turnout rates⁶⁶

General Election	Turnout Rate %
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⁶⁵ Source: <http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/countries/turkey/>, accessed on 20 October 2014.

⁶⁶ Source : www.turkstat.gov.tr

1950	89.3
1954	88.6
1957	76.6
1961	81.4
1965	71.3
1969	64.3
1973	66.8
1977	72.4
1983	92.3
1987	93.3
1991	83.9
1995	85.2
1999	87.1

It is worth noting, during the 1980s and 1990s, Turkey experienced two important problems in the state-civil society relationship: Ethnic PKK terrorism and the rise of Islamist groups. According to Fuat Keyman, the 1990s in particular characterised Turkish politics with the struggle between the state-centric tradition and identity/diversity politics. This resulted in the major concern of the Republic emerged as protecting the unity of Turkey in response to Kurdish separatism and ensuring the secular structure of the state against Islamist movements. Inevitably, identity problems superseded civil society, national security overrode democracy, and republican citizenship surpassed right-seeking individualism (Keyman 2006, p.29). So, the 1980s and 1990s cannot be regarded as a healthy atmosphere for civil society organisations and accumulation of bridging social capital.

Only after the 1982 Constitution's anti-democratic articles were altered in the late 1990s and 2000s, could civil context start to normalise.

2000-present: The period of reforms:

Appendices

Commencing in the mid-1990s, 2000s a gradual recovery of civil and association rights is evident. Undoubtedly, these were the consequences of both internal and external developments.

Internally, restrictive and oppressive regulations of the 1982 Constitution created a reaction in civil society spheres. Along with booming inflation, deteriorating income equality; violent PKK terrorism and assassinations of secular figures of the intelligentsia (e.g. Ugur Mumcu and Bahriye Uçok) deeply shocked ordinary middle-classes. Harsh measures of the central state to deter terrorism and unsuccessful reforms to reinvigorate the economy did not help to establish a healthy atmosphere for civil society in Turkey during 1990s. The incident ending the high regard for a 'father-state' originated from a natural disaster in the 1999 Marmara Earthquake. Claiming more than 17.000 lives, the earthquake hit Turkey's most developed provinces Kocaeli, Bolu and Sakarya. The incapability of central government agencies in rescue and disaster relief, their uncoordinated actions and chaos created an enormous reaction against government. (Kubieck 2002, Jalali 2002). In particular the inadequate performance of the government-led Red Crescent Agency and disclosed corruption in the construction administrations of central and local governments caused a downward shift in people's perspective of the legitimacy of the state authority. Conversely, countless civil society organisations and charities displayed tremendous efforts voluntarily and lifted most of the burden from victims' shoulders. That was a turning point of negative views against civil society and their positive contribution to social and civil life was started to be recognised and receive praise.

The shifting perceptions towards the patrimonial state and its ineffective performance to cope with terrorism, economic crisis and disasters, raised the expectations for a more democratic, functional, responsible, transparent and efficient state organisation. Civil society started to emerge as an indispensable actor to transform the state for the better. Therefore, constructing and designing better context for civil society organisations became a requisite.

Externally, Turkey's efforts for EU membership progress have had an undeniable impact on civil society reforms. Starting with Copenhagen Political Criteria (June 1993), requiring the consolidation of democracy in terms of human rights, rule of law and respect for minorities, Turkey committed to implement democratic reforms. Following the reforms, full membership negotiations between Turkey and EU started formally in 03/10/2005. Namely, 'civil society dialogue' between Turkey and EU places CSOs in a central place in EU policy documents (EU 2003, 2004, 2005, 2007, 2008). The European Union has financially supported civil society organisations in Turkey with funds and grant schemes. Specifically, the Instrument of Pre-

accession Assistance (IPA) has granted nearly €4.8 billion between 2007-2013 for Turkey and almost 1/3 of the amount was allocated to civil society organisations⁶⁷.

The first comprehensive reforms for civil society had already started with the amendments of the 1982 Constitution in 1995. The main acquisitions of the 1995 reforms are as follows: Prohibitions for public workers to form unions lifted, minimum age requirements for political party membership reduced to 18 from 21 years, and political parties able to engage in international relations and form women and youth branches. University academics and students entitled to join political parties. Political activities of associations, trade unions, and professional organisations emancipated. Especially associations re-gained the right to establish formal relationships with political parties, to act together with trade unions, professional associations and charitable foundations for political ends. Administrative authorities of bureaucracy and police forces on associations were straitened and some limiting authorities became subject to decision of court of justice.

A second wave of reforms were introduced in the 2001 Constitutional amendment. Restrictive provisions of basic rights and liberties mostly lifted in general. Specifically, limitations of civil society organisations' outdoor meetings and street demonstrations annulled to legitimise their political activities. Civil servants were made free to form and join in their own unions.

A major upturn for the legal framework of associations was implemented in 2003 through a law amendment. Until this change, the relations of the state and associations were supervised from through police headquarters. Audit and supervision of civil associations were the police's business. The new law established a civil administration as a department in the Ministry of Interior. The Department of Associations and its peripheral branches under province and district governorships became formal contact points in the state-association relationships. This development shows associational matters were no longer regarded as security problems; in other terms, the state's perception towards associations has been 'civilised'.

A complementing step was the new Law of Associations in 2004. Through this law, the bureaucratic requirements for associations were simplified, the audit and tutelage authority of central government softened. Formation of federations and confederations for associations were legitimised. Limitations on permitted areas of operations, international relations, income sources,

⁶⁷ Source: Ministry of EU Affairs, <http://www.ab.gov.tr/index.php?p=5>

fund raising activities, and property rights were substantially lifted. Bans against joint projects between public authorities and associations were annulled (Gokalp 2005, p.209-214; Celik, 2013).

In addition to legislative reforms, Ministries, local governments, regional development agencies and universities have started to allocate numerous financial supports and grant schemes for projects of civil society organisations.

The impact of civil society reforms creating a more desirable environment can easily be observed via the numerical records of associations. In the period of 2004-2014, the overall number of associations has skyrocketed from 69.971 to 102.547, at the rate of 46%. However, despite continuous contextual reforms for civil society organisations have enabled people to form associations, Turkey still has average scores when compared internationally. According to the CIVICUS Enabling Environment Index (2013), Turkey ranks in 34th place among the 50 groups of countries⁶⁸.

Conclusion

A brief review of the evolution of civil rights and freedoms in the republican era of Turkey reveals the fate of the civil society is closely related to the steps and milestones taken in the process of the democratic transition process of Turkish society.

The legal framework for civil freedoms evolved reflecting the internal and external developments and actual circumstances of the periods. In an attempt to create a modernised and westernised nation, Atatürk and his companions implemented many reforms in a revolutionary way. The 'top-down approach' they followed placed the state mechanism at the centre of politics and society. Inherited from the Ottomans, a strong state establishment was fortified with the nationalism and loyalty of citizens in the single-party period.

Evolution of civil society accelerated after the transition to multi-party system, but interrupted by the 1960 military coup. As the result of an undemocratic intervention, the Constitution of 1961 paradoxically strengthened the civil freedoms and transformed the state structure to a more democratic level. In particular labour unions enjoyed larger freedoms. A significant rise in the figures of associations were recorded in the period of the 1962 Constitution. Unfortunately, the larger freedoms did not bring about a more democratic environment, instead, political and

⁶⁸ CIVICUS EEI consists of three main dimensions: Socio-economic, socio-cultural and governance. There were overall 109 countries in the index and ranked through their index scores. Statistically, some countries hit same scores and they can be grouped under 50 groups of scores.

ideological differences deepened and turned into street clashes destabilising the peace and order of the whole nation.

Produced by the 1980 military coup, the Constitution of 1982 annulled and restricted many of the civil freedoms as a response to anarchy movements. Public order was reinstated quickly, but at the expense of some democratic rights. Political participation channels were blocked and reduced only to voting in elections, a politically disaffected mass was created as the result.

Only after the 1999 Marmara Earthquake and EU membership processes, did perceptions towards civil society organisations change for the better. Many reforms for the freedom of associations and facilitating regulations were introduced in the following 2000s. The effects of reforms are clearly visible from the enormous increase in the association figures.

In conclusion, Turkey has witnessed a fluctuating course in the evolution of civil freedoms. Restrictive regulations are generally the outcome of crisis periods, and after every crisis period, new reforms were introduced for civil society. Now, Turkish civil society is enjoying a period of the most comprehensive civic freedoms in its history in the last two decades, and the indications of new framework for the civil context is generally positive.

Appendix 2: STATISTICAL TABLES

Standardised Variables (z-scores) for Bridging Social Capital Calculation

Table 44: Standardised Variables (z-scores) for Bridging Social Capital Calculation

Provinces	Turnout Rate	Association Membership	Educated rate	Employment	Active Participation	Newspaper Readers	Blood Donors	Informal Sociability
İstanbul	-0.50727	1.66173	2.06329	2.18259	-1.12821	3.74768	-1.13571	3.43966
Tekirdağ	0.66759	-0.1602	0.2792	2.26011	0.15684	0.98585	-0.72948	1.263
Edirne	0.730	0.15908	0.6009	0.21073	0.15684	0.98585	0.3864	1.263

	25		9				5	
Kırklareli	1.356 85	0.17935	0.3117 8	0.42954	0.15684	0.98585	- 0.3209 3	1.263
Balıkesir	0.730 25	0.17935	0.5276 7	0.22201	2.88155	0.99139	0.2947 9	1.263
Çanakkale	1.153 2	0.31112	0.8128	0.58575	2.88155	0.99139	0.9511 3	1.263
İzmir	0.213 31	0.61266	2.2303	1.07346	-0.9711	1.95678	0.6385 1	0.77202
Aydın	0.714 59	-0.10572	0.5276 7	0.11766	1.28165	1.02341	1.0107 8	0.77202
Denizli	1.294 19	-0.03604	0.5113 7	1.36273	1.28165	1.02341	1.1914 5	0.77202
Muğla	0.542 27	-0.07532	1.2079 1	1.16111	1.28165	1.02341	0.6715 7	0.77202
Manisa	1.450 84	-0.09812	- 0.4173 4	0.46251	-0.50916	-0.11108	1.1431 4	0.77202
Afyonkarahisar	1.137 54	-0.24763	- 0.5436 1	0.06408	-0.50916	-0.11108	0.7982 1	0.77202
Kütahya	1.294 19	0.51637	- 0.4214 1	0.12595	-0.50916	-0.11108	0.5639 8	0.77202
Uşak	1.309 85	-0.0069	- 0.0140 8	0.92992	-0.50916	-0.11108	3.2254	0.77202
Bursa	0.479 62	0.85972	0.7720 6	1.52446	-0.43592	0.61775	- 0.2011 6	0.95205

Eskişehir	0.683 26	1.04851	2.2954 7	1.01134	-0.43592	0.61775	0.4602 3	0.95205
Bilecik	1.685 81	0.26424	0.3565 9	1.10969	-0.43592	0.61775	0.5620 2	0.95205
Kocaeli	0.683 26	0.84199	1.1101 5	1.95823	0.34149	0.90594	- 0.0324 4	0.95205
Sakarya	0.667 59	0.30858	0.0307 3	0.68379	0.34149	0.90594	0.0301 8	0.95205
Düzce	1.074 88	0.72542	- 0.2666 2	1.17914	0.34149	0.90594	0.0326 2	0.95205
Bolu	0.808 58	0.33519	0.7150 4	1.23024	0.34149	0.90594	0.0015 3	0.95205
Yalova	- 0.272 3	0.7571	1.1793 9	0.95846	0.34149	0.90594	1.5187	0.95205
Ankara	0.416 96	6.67141	4.5276 3	2.20838	-1.14449	2.74854	- 0.9209 8	1.45939
Konya	0.369 96	-0.33885	0.2669 8	0.19731	-0.1724	-0.49976	- 0.7416 3	1.45939
Karaman	1.043 55	-0.2679	- 0.1973 8	0.84851	-0.1724	-0.49976	- 0.7515 4	1.45939
Antalya	0.025 33	-0.24889	1.3830 6	1.59868	0.45604	0.91857	- 0.0673 3	0.21559
Isparta	0.510	0.17428	1.3138	0.32864	0.45604	0.91857	3.5508	0.21559

Appendices

	94		1				1	
Burdur	1.638 81	-0.47062	0.2710 5	0.67278	0.45604	0.91857	2.2052 9	0.21559
Adana	- 0.538 6	-0.19315	0.6498 6	-0.18633	0.44352	1.17954	0.2203 4	0.21559
Mersin	0.056 66	0.09066	0.6620 8	0.04417	0.44352	1.17954	0.1830 2	0.21559
Hatay	0.119 32	-0.39713	- 0.3603 1	-0.56055	-0.69256	-0.50084	0.3572	0.21559
Kahramanmaraş	0.260 31	-0.71134	- 0.7024 7	-0.37115	-0.69256	-0.50084	- 0.1396 9	0.21559
Osmaniye	0.448 29	-0.49216	- 0.0955 5	-0.47651	-0.69256	-0.50084	0.3496 5	0.21559
Kırıkkale	0.087 99	0.81031	0.3158 6	-0.22943	1.4807	-0.13113	- 0.8245 4	-0.29176
Aksaray	- 1.024 21	-0.7937	- 0.8409 6	0.01328	1.4807	-0.13113	- 0.0146 4	-0.29176
Niğde	0.620 6	-0.55804	- 0.2014 5	0.03487	1.4807	-0.13113	0.0213	-0.29176
Nevşehir	0.714 59	-0.46048	- 0.3236 5	0.78993	1.4807	-0.13113	- 0.1046 2	-0.29176
Kırşehir	- 0.475	-0.09432	0.3647 4	-0.00851	1.4807	-0.13113	0.1043 6	-0.29176

	94							
Kayseri	0.698 92	0.135	0.8209 4	0.57216	0.37967	-0.31448	- 0.0929 1	-0.29176
Sivas	- 0.225 3	0.02731	0.1366 3	-0.1735	0.37967	-0.31448	- 0.0412 1	-0.29176
Yozgat	- 1.525 49	-0.7785	- 1.1749 7	-0.45116	0.37967	-0.31448	- 0.0070 5	-0.29176
Zonguldak	0.228 98	1.65159	- 0.1933 1	0.32066	-0.10856	0.47572	- 0.0831 6	0.46107
Karabük	0.510 94	2.55876	0.5806 2	0.26052	-0.10856	0.47572	- 0.0157 4	0.46107
Bartın	0.479 62	0.19582	- 0.6495 1	-0.11265	-0.10856	0.47572	- 0.0237 1	0.46107
Kastamonu	0.573 6	-0.07785	- 0.7065 4	0.17278	-0.30761	-0.59768	- 0.7879 7	0.46107
Çankırı	0.432 62	0.61139	- 0.5558 3	0.17195	-0.30761	-0.59768	- 0.7722 7	0.46107
Sinop	0.009 67	-0.02464	- 0.3032 8	-0.01804	-0.30761	-0.59768	- 0.1911	0.46107
Samsun	- 0.052	0.12107	0.1732 9	-0.06167	-0.12796	-0.31504	- 0.2739	0.46107

	99						5	
Tokat	0.385 63	-0.48709	- 0.3847 5	-0.79621	-0.12796	-0.31504	- 0.1991 2	0.46107
Çorum	0.949 56	-0.39333	- 0.6658 1	-0.19738	-0.12796	-0.31504	- 0.7601 7	0.46107
Amasya	1.262 86	-0.24763	0.1284 8	0.07185	-0.12796	-0.31504	- 0.2614 5	0.46107
Trabzon	- 0.381 95	0.92181	1.2201 2	0.35841	0.37341	0.37567	- 0.0304 9	-0.66817
Ordu	- 0.538 6	-0.20835	-0.6821	-0.50981	0.37341	0.37567	- 0.2318 7	-0.66817
Giresun	- 0.507 27	-0.04111	- 0.1322 1	-0.18695	0.37341	0.37567	- 0.9475 6	-0.66817
Rize	- 0.663 92	0.80017	0.2018	0.63222	0.37341	0.37567	0.4031 4	-0.66817
Artvin	0.119 32	0.33899	0.0999 7	0.25975	0.37341	0.37567	- 0.4412	-0.66817
Gümüşhane	- 2.684 68	-0.27423	-0.2544	-0.1699	0.37341	0.37567	0.6524 3	-0.66817
Erzurum	- 0.648 25	-0.5251	0.3728 8	-0.68585	1.36177	-0.42177	1.4622 8	-1.20825
Erzincan	0.479	-0.04871	0.3728	0.32285	1.36177	-0.42177	1.1128	-1.20825

	62		8				3	
Bayburt	- 0.193 97	0.20089	- 0.4091 9	-0.19669	1.36177	-0.42177	1.2692 3	-1.20825
Ağrı	- 3.170 29	-0.81651	- 1.7411 5	-2.16218	-1.68279	-1.1689	- 1.0889 7	-1.20825
Kars	- 1.697 8	-0.76202	- 0.7106 1	-1.45123	-1.68279	-1.1689	1.5271 5	-1.20825
Iğdır	- 1.979 77	-0.70121	- 0.7717 1	-1.26805	-1.68279	-1.1689	- 1.2447 5	-1.20825
Ardahan	- 0.945 89	-0.73288	-1.0935	-1.02017	-1.68279	-1.1689	1.3141 1	-1.20825
Malatya	- 0.256 63	-0.40727	- 1.0486 9	0.02065	-0.4716	-0.59292	- 0.3038 6	-0.66817
Elazığ	- 0.381 95	-0.33251	0.5113 7	-0.4398	-0.4716	-0.59292	- 1.6720 7	-0.66817
Bingöl	- 1.259 18	-0.75569	- 1.0446 2	-1.55086	-0.4716	-0.59292	- 1.6220 6	-0.66817
Tunceli	- 1.306 18	-0.63152	0.5561 8	-0.27242	-0.4716	-0.59292	0.6250 2	-0.66817
Van	- 1.556	-0.72908	- 1.3704	-2.00714	0.37529	-1.71808	- 1.1205	-0.66817

	81		8				4	
Muş	- 1.854 45	-0.88999	- 1.5863 7	-1.96258	0.37529	-1.71808	- 1.0909 9	-0.66817
Bitlis	- 0.804 9	-0.72148	- 0.8531 8	-1.37165	0.37529	-1.71808	- 1.1494 1	-0.66817
Hakkari	0.416 96	-0.6784	- 0.9183 5	-1.72892	0.37529	-1.71808	- 1.2622 7	-0.66817
Gaziantep	- 0.789 24	-0.35152	- 0.7554 2	-0.05452	-0.70195	-0.12494	- 0.0501 4	-1.5683
Adıyaman	- 0.052 99	-0.69741	-0.8654	-1.11949	-0.70195	-0.12494	- 0.0832 3	-1.5683
Kilis	0.322 97	-0.60365	- 0.7513 5	-0.57806	-0.70195	-0.12494	- 0.0678 8	-1.5683
Şanlıurfa	- 1.462 83	-0.90773	- 1.6433 9	-1.42542	-0.26504	-1.54471	0.3536 1	-1.5683
Diyarbakır	- 1.447 16	-0.89379	- 0.7594 9	-1.3955	-0.26504	-1.54471	- 1.5259 4	-1.5683
Mardin	- 1.760 46	-0.89126	-1.3379	-1.52115	-2.09654	-1.34867	- 1.4729 6	-1.5683
Batman	- 0.428 95	-0.70501	- 0.7146 9	-1.29304	-2.09654	-1.34867	- 1.4535 1	-1.5683

Şırnak	0.21331	-1.15859	-1.21163	-1.49681	-2.09654	-1.34867	-1.40499	-1.5683
Siirt	-0.67958	-0.83931	-0.788	-1.2326	-2.09654	-1.34867	-1.43325	-1.5683

Standardised Variables (z-scores) for Bonding Social Capital Calculation

Table 45: Standardised Variables (z-scores) for Bonding Social Capital Calculation

REGION	Average Household Size	Patriarchal Family	Arranged Marriage	Degree Of Affinity	Bride Price	Kin Marriage	Strongly Religious	Divorce Rate	Trust-Family	Trust-Neighbour
Istanbul	-0.22953	-0.92992	-1.55954	-0.34124	-0.49118	-0.60125	-0.89149	0.78598	-0.10298	-0.62669
Western Marmara	-1.2993	-1.17975	-1.82286	-1.65468	-0.7787	-1.71124	-0.51539	0.65874	-1.33871	-1.38718
Aegean	-0.67219	-0.84664	-0.65673	-1.36771	-1.06622	-0.70035	-1.87353	1.35856	-0.53474	0.32391
Eastern Marmara	-0.63531	-0.63845	-0.94826	-0.88207	-0.67807	-1.01749	0.76961	0.40426	0.26923	-0.72175
Western Anatolia	-0.27871	-0.18043	0.64106	-0.0653	-0.60619	0.33035	-0.43182	0.94503	0.13524	0.41897
Mediterran	-0.24183	-	0.2742	0.188	-	0.1519	-	0.690	-	-

ean		0.97156	9	55	0.735	6	0.7974	55	1.130	0.79569
					57		7		27	
Middle Anatolia	-0.18034	1.23527	1.3557 8	0.861 83	0.220 43	0.2510 7	0.0801	0.245 2	0.269 23	0.29222
Western Black Sea	-0.53694	- 0.22207	0.4999 9	- 0.186 72	0.047 92	- 0.4228 5	0.1532 3	- 0.104 71	0.328 78	0.87315
Eastern Black Sea	-0.57382	- 0.13879	0.4811 9	0.067 14	- 0.563 06	0.2213 4	1.0098 9	- 0.788 63	- 0.147 64	0.56684
North Eastern Anatolia	1.14765	1.11035	0.4905 9	1.855 19	1.765 85	0.2609 8	1.6680 7	- 1.393 02	2.606 7	2.2568
Middle Eastern Anatolia	1.45505	1.40182	0.4059 5	0.574 86	1.449 58	1.1430 3	1.0621 3	- 1.472 55	- 0.668 73	- 0.96469
South Eastern Anatolia	2.04527	1.36018	0.8385 5	0.950 13	1.435 2	2.0944 5	- 0.2333 2	- 1.329 4	0.313 9	- 0.23589

Statistical Tables for Bonding Social Capital Index

Table 46: Reliability statistics

Reliability Statistics			
Cronbach's Alpha	Part 1	Value	.455
		N of Items	5 ^a
	Part 2	Value	.838
		N of Items	5 ^b
	Total N of Items		10
	Correlation Between Forms		.792

Spearman-Brown Coefficient	Equal Length	.884
	Unequal Length	.884
Guttman Split-Half Coefficient		.858

a. The items are: Average Household Size, Patriarchal Family, Arranged Marriage, Divorce Rate, Bride Price

b. The items are: Degree Of Affinity, KinMarriage, Strongly Religious, TRUST_Family, TRUST_Neighbour.

Table 47: Rotated component matrix

Rotated Component Matrix ^a		
	Component	
	1	2
Average Household Size	.934	.113
Kin Marriage	.928	.021
Patriarchal Family)	.884	.330
Bride Price	.863	.358
Divorce Rate	-.822	-.329
Degree Of Affinity	.773	.530
Arranged Marriage	.651	.370
TRUST_Neighbour	.078	.924
TRUST_Family	.252	.912
Strongly Religious	.446	.583

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.^a

a. Rotation converged in 3 iterations.

Table 48: Component score coefficient matrix

Component Score Coefficient Matrix

Appendices

	Component	
	1	2
Average Household Size	.242	-.151
Kin Marriage	.262	-.199
Patriarchal Family	.179	-.023
Bride Price	.167	-.004
Divorce Rate	-.161	.010
Degree Of Affinity	.102	.109
Arranged Marriage	.103	.051
TRUST_Neighbour	-.186	.477
TRUST_Family	-.134	.431
StronglyReligious	-.004	.211

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

Table 49: Correlation matrix

Correlation Matrix										
	Average Househ old Size	Patriarchal Family	Arranged Marriage	Divorce Rate	Bride Price	Degree Of Affinity	Kin Marriage	Strongly Religious	TRUST_Fa mily	TRUST_Neig hbour
Average Household Size	1.000	.825	.510	-.785	.904	.772	.877	.388	.428	.193
Patriarchal Family	.825	1.000	.739	-.795	.893	.825	.793	.576	.518	.366
Arranged Marriage	.510	.739	1.000	-.491	.513	.758	.756	.369	.382	.514
Divorce Rate	-.785	-.795	-.491	1.000	-.883	-.729	-.677	-.782	-.468	-.299
Bride Price	.904	.893	.513	-.883	1.000	.821	.708	.615	.588	.354

Degree Of Affinity	.772	.825	.758	-.729	.821	1.000	.758	.592	.676	.551
Kin Marriage	.877	.793	.756	-.677	.708	.758	1.000	.275	.254	.191
Strongly Religious	.388	.576	.369	-.782	.615	.592	.275	1.000	.575	.372
TRUST_Family	.428	.518	.382	-.468	.588	.676	.254	.575	1.000	.841
TRUST_Neighbour	.193	.366	.514	-.299	.354	.551	.191	.372	.841	1.000

Statistical Tables for Bridging Social Capital Index

Table 50: Reliability statistics

Reliability Statistics			
Cronbach's Alpha	Part 1	Value	.821
		N of Items	4 ^a
	Part 2	Value	.691
		N of Items	4 ^b
	Total N of Items		8
Correlation Between Forms			.754
Spearman-Brown Coefficient	Equal Length		.860
	Unequal Length		.860
Guttman Split-Half Coefficient			.857

a. The items are: Turnout Rate, Association Membership Newspaper Readership, Informal Sociability.

b. The items are: Formal employment, Blood Donors, Active Participation, Educated Rate.

Table 51: Rotated component matrix

Rotated Component Matrix^a

Appendices

	Component	
	1	2
Educated Rate	.883	.131
Association Membership	.860	-.153
Newspaper Readership	.868	.260
Formal employment	.849	.364
Informal Sociability	.777	.290
Blood Donors	.089	.761
Active Participation	.078	.748
Turnout Rate	.491	.548

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.^a

a. Rotation converged in 3 iterations.

Table 52: Component score coefficient matrix

Component Score Coefficient Matrix		
	Component	
	1	2
Educated Rate	.256	-.091
Association Membership	.308	-.286
Newspaper Readership	.225	.002
Formal employment	.197	.079
Informal Sociability	.189	.042
Blood Donors	-.129	.515
Active Participation	-.130	.508
Turnout Rate	.044	.282

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

Component Scores.

Table 53: Correlation matrix

Correlation Matrix								
	Educated Rate	Association Membership	Newspaper Readership	Formal employment	Informal Sociability	Blood Donors	Active Participation	Turnout Rate
Educated Rate	1.000	.752	.793	.756	.590	.255	.213	.393
Association Membership	.752	1.000	.646	.602	.501	.046	.047	.295
Newspaper Readership	.793	.646	1.000	.822	.719	.299	.281	.433
Formal employment	.756	.602	.822	1.000	.748	.322	.298	.619
Informal Sociability	.590	.501	.719	.748	1.000	.178	.235	.609
Blood Donors	.255	.046	.299	.322	.178	1.000	.308	.324
Active Participation	.213	.047	.281	.298	.235	.308	1.000	.281
Turnout Rate	.393	.295	.433	.619	.609	.324	.281	1.000

Statistical Tables for Informal Sociability Index

Table 54: Standardised variables (z-scores) of informal sociability

REGION	Movie/theatre	Eating Out	Sporting Out	SocialMediaU ser	AttendsMeeti ngs	EntertainmentBu dget	Bar/NightClu bs
Istanbul	2.12381	1.5469	0.88659	1.07136	1.82015	1.58937	2.33863
Western Marmara	0.34949	0.2430	0.30435	0.12325	1.02383	0.92064	0.67806
Aegean	-0.18819	-0.03145	0.09263	0.08533	0.45504	0.37474	0.84412
Eastern Marmara	1.04846	0.86068	0.83366	-1.24201	0.91007	0.7091	0.17989
Western Anatolia	1.10223	1.78712	1.99813	-0.97655	0.5688	0.85923	0.17989
Mediterrane an	0.13442	-0.20302	0.67487	-1.31786	0.34128	0.32697	0.51201
Middle Anatolia	-0.61833	-0.78633	-0.33082	1.52645	-1.13759	-0.86719	-1.14856
Western Black Sea	-0.34949	0.17442	-0.22496	1.60229	-0.5688	-0.47823	-0.65039
Eastern Black Sea	-0.56456	-0.47752	-0.70133	-0.14222	-0.79632	-1.00366	-0.48433
North Eastern Anatolia	-0.94093	-1.06083	-1.38943	0.1991	-1.25135	-1.41309	-0.81644
Middle Eastern Anatolia	-0.83339	-0.54614	-0.86012	-0.78693	-0.22752	0.39521	-0.65039
South Eastern Anatolia	-1.26353	-1.5069	-1.28357	-0.14222	-1.13759	-1.41309	-0.9825

Table 55: Total Variance Explained for Informal Sociability indicators

Component	Initial Eigenvalues			Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	5.254	75.061	75.061	5.167	73.817	73.817
2	1.010	14.427	89.487	1.097	15.670	89.487
3	.469	6.694	96.182			
4	.137	1.963	98.145			
5	.081	1.156	99.301			
6	.037	.527	99.827			
7	.012	.173	100.000			

Table 56: Rotated Component Matrix for Informal sociability

Rotated Component Matrix^a

	Component	
	1	2
Zscore(Movie/Theatre)	.969	-.010
Zscore(EatingOut)	.934	-.060
Zscore(SportingOut)	.869	-.246
Zscore(SocialMediaUser)	-.081	.991
Zscore(AttendsMeetings)	.957	-.135
Zscore(EntertainmentBudget)	.935	-.172
Zscore(Bar/NightClubs goers)	.897	.053

Appendices

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser
Normalization.

a. Rotation converged in 3 iterations.

Table 57: Factor Scores and Index Values for Informal Sociability

REGION	FACTOR-1	FACTOR-2	V=0.83	V=0.17	Index Value
Istanbul	2.00436	1.40535	1.653378	0.24609	1.899468
Western Marmara	0.64956	0.14594	0.535816	0.025555	0.561371
Aegean	0.28859	0.14426	0.238055	0.025261	0.263316
Eastern Marmara	0.70078	-1.19539	0.578067	-0.20932	0.368743
Western Anatolia	1.04997	-1.05819	0.866111	-0.1853	0.680812
Mediterranean	0.1825	-1.30066	0.150543	-0.22776	-0.07722
Middle Anatolia	-0.75205	1.30927	-0.62036	0.229265	-0.39109
Western Black Sea	-0.22948	1.47924	-0.1893	0.259029	0.069733
Eastern Black Sea	-0.73398	-0.11104	-0.60545	-0.01944	-0.6249
North Eastern Anatolia	-1.2072	0.23142	-0.99581	0.040524	-0.95528
Middle Eastern Anatolia	-0.57093	-0.85882	-0.47095	-0.15039	-0.62134
South Eastern Anatolia	-1.38213	-0.19138	-1.14011	-0.03351	-1.17362

Statistical Tables for Bridging Social Capital Index at Regional Level

Table 58: Reliability tests

KMO and Bartlett's Test

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.	.654
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Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	84.949
	df	28
	Sig.	.000

Table 59: Total variance explained

Total Variance Explained									
Component	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings			Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	4.682	58.525	58.525	4.682	58.525	58.525	4.676	58.454	58.454
2	1.861	23.265	81.790	1.861	23.265	81.790	1.867	23.336	81.790
3	.609	7.616	89.406						
4	.495	6.188	95.593						
5	.266	3.331	98.924						
6	.048	.604	99.528						
7	.019	.236	99.765						
8	.019	.235	100.000						
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.									

Table 60: Rotated component matrix

Rotated Component Matrix^a

	Component	
	1	2
EducatedRate	.945	-.089
AssocMembership	.835	-.242
Newspaper	.925	-.094
FormalEmployment	.971	.101
InformalSociability	.930	-.017
BloodDonors	-.250	.753
ActiveParticipation	-.066	.860
TurnoutRate	.595	.690

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.^a

a. Rotation converged in 3 iterations.

Table 61: Component Score coefficient matrix

Component Score Coefficient Matrix

	Component	
	1	2
EducatedRate	.201	-.034
AssocMembership	.175	-.118

Newspaper	.197	-.037
FormalEmployment	.210	.068
InformalSociability	.199	.004
BloodDonors	-.043	.400
ActiveParticipation	-.002	.460
TurnoutRate	.137	.379

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

Component Scores.

Socio-Economic Development Index Rankings and Scores of Provinces (2011)

Table 62: SEDI rankings of the provinces

	PROVINCES	INDEX SCORE		PROVINCES	INDEX SCORE
1	İstanbul	4.5154	42	Malatya	-0.0785
2	Ankara	2.8384	43	Afyonkarahisar	-0.0797
3	İzmir	1.9715	44	Artvin	-0.1046
4	Kocaeli	1.6592	45	Erzincan	-0.1056
5	Antalya	1.5026	46	Hatay	-0.1302
6	Bursa	1.374	47	Kastamonu	-0.1471
7	Eskişehir	1.1671	48	Bartın	-0.1976
8	Muğla	1.0493	49	Sivas	-0.2208

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9	Tekirdağ	0.9154	50	Çorum	-0.2405
10	Denizli	0.9122	51	Sinop	-0.2479
11	Bolu	0.6394	52	Giresun	-0.2564
12	Edirne	0.6383	53	Osmaniye	-0.2892
13	Yalova	0.6263	54	Çankırı	-0.3312
14	Çanakkale	0.5999	55	Aksaray	-0.3671
15	Kırklareli	0.5923	56	Niğde	-0.3761
16	Adana	0.5666	57	Tokat	-0.3821
17	Kayseri	0.565	58	Tunceli	-0.3892
18	Sakarya	0.5641	59	Erzurum	-0.4327
19	Aydın	0.5597	60	Kahramanmaraş	-0.4677
20	Konya	0.5308	61	Ordu	-0.481
21	Isparta	0.5272	62	Gümüşhane	-0.4814
22	Balıkesir	0.4764	63	Kilis	-0.5733
23	Manisa	0.4711	64	Bayburt	-0.5946
24	Mersin	0.4636	65	Yozgat	-0.6079
25	Uşak	0.3737	66	Adıyaman	-0.9602
26	Burdur	0.3684	67	Diyarbakır	-1.0014
27	Bilecik	0.3634	68	Kars	-1.0923
28	Karabük	0.2916	69	Iğdır	-1.1184
29	Zonguldak	0.2758	70	Batman	-1.1203
30	Gaziantep	0.2678	71	Ardahan	-1.1384
31	Trabzon	0.2218	72	Bingöl	-1.192
32	Karaman	0.1864	73	Şanlıurfa	-1.2801
33	Samsun	0.1579	74	Mardin	-1.3591
34	Rize	0.155	75	Van	-1.3783

35	Düzce	0.1056	76	Bitlis	-1.4003
36	Nevşehir	0.1029	77	Siirt	-1.4166
37	Amasya	0.051	78	Şırnak	-1.4605
38	Kütahya	0.0198	79	Ağrı	-1.6366
39	Elazığ	-0.0103	80	Hakkari	-1.6961
40	Kırşehir	-0.0211	81	Muş	-1.7329
41	Kırıkkale	-0.0687			

Appendix 3: TABLES OF QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

Table 63: The Assessment of General Characteristics of CSOs (overall references in descending order)

Sub-codes	Coding Frequency	Low SED		Middle SED		High SED	
		Nigde ⁶⁹	Yozgat	Karabuk	Kirikkale	Canakkale	Bolu
Low voluntarism and commitment	28	8	8	1	8	-	3
Bonding associations	21	3	2	8	8	-	-
Financially weak	20	7	6	-	4	1	2
Activities are reduced to leader's endeavour	20	7	5	2	3	-	3
Politicised	18	5	2	3	1	1	6
Low activity	18	3	6	4	4	-	1
Signboard associations	17	6	5	2	3	-	1

⁶⁹ Dark shaded provinces are the ones having high social capital in the pair

Serves for leader only-business card leadership	16	3	4	4	4	1	-
Inexperienced	14	3	4	2	5	-	-
Low collective behaviour	13	6	3	-	2	1	1
Developing	11	6	1	1	-	1	2
Irresponsible	10	6	-	1	1	-	2
Leadership struggles hinder CSOs	10	1	3	1	2	-	3
Varied and active	10	-	-	-	-	10	-
Aims to link with power elites	8	3	2	1	1	-	1
Low communication between CSOs	6	1	1	1	3	-	-
Aims to cover-up illegal actions	6	-	-	1	4	1	-
TOTAL	246	68	52	32	53	16	25

Table 64: Coding Frequency for Effective Town Council

Sub-codes	Coding Frequency	Low SED		Middle SED		High SED	
		Nigde ⁷⁰	Yozgat	Karabuk	Kirikkale	Canakkale	Bolu
LA(Local Authority) respects Town Council	8	-	-	-	-	8	-
Covers all relevant interest groups as an overarching mechanism	8	-	-	3	-	5	-
Town Council is known by the public	7	-	-	4	-	3	-
Town Council regularly meets	6	1	-	4	-	2	-

⁷⁰ Dark shaded provinces are the ones having higher social capital in pairs.

LA encourages Town Council	3	-	-	-	-	3	-
TOTAL	33	1	-	11	-	21	-

Table 65: Coding Frequency for Ineffective Town Council

Sub-codes	Number of References	Low SED		Middle SED		High SED	
		Nigde	Yozgat	Karabuk	Kirikkale	Canakkale	Bolu
Politicised mechanism	23	-	5	3	-	7	8
Attendance of CSOs are low	21	7	4	-	5	2	3
Paperwork organisation	20	3	9	-	3	-	5
Unknown by public	17	5	3	-	4	-	5
LA disabled Town Council on purpose	16	-	7	1	5	-	3
LA neglects Town Council	15	-	5	-	8	-	2
Toothless legislation	15	-	-	7	-	3	5
Town Council doesn't cover all relevant CSOs	10	2	2	-	1	2	3
Mayor neglects town council	10	-	3	-	6	-	1
Biases against Town Council	10	-	-	-	-	9	1
Town Council doesn't meet regularly	9	-	6	-	2	-	1
Waste of time	5	1	1	-	2	-	1

TOTAL	171	18	45	11	36	23	38
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Table 66: The reasons for contact between CSOs and public authorities

Sub-codes	Coding Frequency	Low SED		Middle SED		High SED	
		Nigde ⁷¹	Yozgat	Karabuk	Kirikkale	Canakkale	Bolu
In-kind aids	31	12	5	2	7	4	1
Provision of venues	28	11	5	1	4	4	3
Formal partnership	27	10	7	1	5	3	1
Moral support	14	9	-	2	2	1	-
Informal partnership	12	3	3	2	2	1	1
Create links with power elites	10	4	3	1	1	1	-
Legal responsibilities	8	3	3	-	2	-	-
Receive better services	6	3	-	3	-	-	-
Personal advantages	4	1	2	1	-	-	-
TOTAL	140	56	28	13	23	14	6

Table 67: Positive Perceptions about relations

Sub-codes	Coding Frequency	Low SED		Middle SED		High SED	
		Nigde ⁷²	Yozgat	Karabuk	Kirikkale	Canakkale	Bolu
Project funding is very supportive for CSOs	22	5	10	1	2	3	1
Public support is essential for CSOs to	22	1	13	1	3	4	-

⁷¹ Dark shaded provinces are the ones having higher social capital in pairs.

⁷² Dark shaded provinces are the ones having high social capital in pairs

operate							
Public Authority Managements are open to CSOs	20	10	2	6	-	2	-
Public Authorities supports CSOs greatly	19	12	1	-	-	6	-
Mayor has democratic values	17	5	-	10	-	2	-
Local Authority efforts to improve social life	13	9	1	2	-	1	-
Local Authority supports participation mechanisms	8	-	-	5	-	3	-
TOTAL	121	42	27	25	5	21	1

Table 68: Negative Perceptions about Relations

Sub-codes	Coding frequency	Low SED		Middle SED		High SED	
		Nigde	Yozgat	Karabuk	Kirikkale	Canakkale	Bolu
Mayor's decision is first and foremost	37	10	12	2	9	-	4
Participant blames public authorities when assessing relations	28	2	13	1	10	-	2
Low SED level is an excuse for poor relations	21	4	8	2	5	1	1
Political fragmentation hinders civil	19	4	4	-	2	5	4

society							
Local Authority neglects CSOs	18	3	2	2	10	-	1
Participant blames CSOs when assessing relations	15	-	2	5	5	1	2
Mayor knows best	10	-	-	-	4	-	6
Local Authority abuses CSOs for political ends	7	-	3	-	-	-	4
Lack of effective communication habit	6	2	2	-	2	-	-
Project funding is not supportive	6	1	-	1	2	-	2
TOTAL	167	26	46	13	49	7	26

Table 69: Local elections and winning political parties in Bolu

Year	Political Party	%
1984	ANAP (<i>Motherland Party</i>) ⁷³	49,08
1989	SHP (<i>Social-democrat People's Party</i>) ⁷⁴	43,75
1994	SHP (<i>Social-democrat People's Party</i>)	24,97
1999	DSP (<i>Democratic Left Party</i>)	25,80
2004	AK Party (<i>Justice and Development Party</i>) ⁷⁵	47,27
2009	AK Party (<i>Justice and Development Party</i>)	43,35
2014	AK Party (<i>Justice and Development Party</i>)	49,60

⁷³ ANAP was a liberal-democrat party which led Turkish politics after 1980 military government had banned all existing political parties.

⁷⁴ SHP was established as being a continuation of CHP (Republican People's Party) which was banned after 1980 military coup. CHP was founded by Ataturk in 1923 and it was the only permitted political party until 1946. Party defines itself as representing secular and democratic preferences of many Turkish people. SHP turned to its original name, CHP, in 1992.

⁷⁵ AK Party is the leading political party in Turkey since 2002 general elections and it is still in power.

Table 70: Local elections and winning political parties in Canakkale:

Year	Political Party	%
1984	ANAP (<i>Motherland Party</i>)	28,33
1989	SHP (<i>Social-democrat People's Party</i>)	55,44
1994	CHP (<i>People's Republican Party</i>)	30,20
1999	CHP (<i>People's Republican Party</i>)	24,49 ⁷⁶
2004	CHP (<i>People's Republican Party</i>)	44,81
2009	CHP (<i>People's Republican Party</i>)	39,40
2014	CHP (<i>People's Republican Party</i>)	54,40

Table 71: Local elections and winning political parties in Karabuk

Year	Political Party	%
1989	DYP (<i>True Path Party</i>) ^{77, 78}	37,47
1994	RP (<i>Wealth Party</i>) ⁷⁹	33,71
1999	DYP (<i>True Path Party</i>)	24,93
2004	AKP (<i>Justice and Development Party</i>)	58,08
2009	MHP (<i>Nationalist Movement Party</i>) ⁸⁰	31,62
2014	MHP (<i>Nationalist Movement Party</i>)	51,80

⁷⁶ Another social democrat party, DSP, took 19% of all votes increasing overall left-wing votes up to 45%.

⁷⁷ When DP (Democrat Party) was banned after 1980 military coup, followers of that party has founded DYP, in late 1990s it regained its original name. This party follows liberal-democrat policies.

⁷⁸ Elections in 1989 and 1994 were for district municipality.

⁷⁹ RP (Wealth Party) was founded after 1980 military coup as an Islamist party and banned in 1999 by a Constitutional Court verdict because of being a centre of illegal anti-secular movements.

⁸⁰ In 2009 elections MHP could win only with 250 votes, second party was AKP.

Table 72: Local elections and winning political parties in Kirikkale

Year	Political Party	%
1989	MCP (<i>Nationalist Works Party</i>) ⁸¹	30,51
1994	ANAP (<i>Motherland Party</i>)	20,77 ⁸²
1999	MHP (<i>Nationalist Movement Party</i>)	27,90
2004	AK Party (<i>Justice and Development Party</i>)	38,79
2009	AK Party (<i>Justice and Development Party</i>)	31,46
2014	AK Party (<i>Justice and Development Party</i>)	44,30

Table 73: Local elections and winning political parties in Nigde

Year	Political Party	%
1984	MDP (<i>Nationalist Democratic Party</i>) ⁸³	26,41
1989	SHP (<i>Social-democrat People's Party</i>)	40,95
1994	SHP (<i>Social-democrat People's Party</i>)	33,19
1999	MHP (<i>Nationalist Movement Party</i>)	31,97
2004	MHP (<i>Nationalist Movement Party</i>)	38,05
2009	AK Parti (<i>Justice and Development Party</i>)	39,95
2014	AK Parti (<i>Justice and Development Party</i>)	41,10

Table 74: Local elections and winning political parties in Yozgat

Year	Political Party	%
1984	ANAP (<i>Motherland Party</i>)	64,2
1989	MCP (<i>Nationalist Works Party</i>) ⁸⁴	49,1

⁸¹ 1989 election was for district municipality

⁸² In 1994 local elections, ANAP could hardly win the elections by only 180 votes. Second party was Islamist RP (Wealth Party).

⁸³ This party was shaped by generals shortly after 1980 military coup, however its life was short, dissolved in 1985. It could win local election in Nigde by a nose only with 150 more votes. The second party was neo-liberal Motherland Party.

1994	MHP (<i>Nationalist Movement Party</i>)	43,8
1999	MHP (<i>Nationalist Movement Party</i>)	41,2
2004	AK Party (<i>Justice and Development Party</i>)	60,0
2009	AK Party (<i>Justice and Development Party</i>)	54,7
2014	AK Party (<i>Justice and Development Party</i>)	56,2

⁸⁴ MCP was a nationalist party which converted to MHP later.

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List of Participants by Province

Participants in Nigde Province	Position/title
1-Necmeddin KILIC	Province Governor
2-Faruk AKDOGAN	Mayor of Nigde
3-Cengiz ECEMIS	Municipal Councillor
4-Bahadir CELIKBAS	General Secretary/Town Council
5-Songul CALISKAN	CSO leader/ Association for the Disabled of Nigde
6-Ayse SAN	CSO leader/ Cemre Association
7-Bahtiyar YAMANER	Mukhtar/ Elected Neighbourhood representative. Leader of Mukhtars' Association
8-Omer DEMIR	CSO leader/ Association for Martyrs' Families
9-Duran KARA	Chief officer/ Associations desk of Nigde Governorship
10- Fatma BUYUKAKKAS	Municipal Councillor/CSO leader/

	Association for the Children and Youth
11-Mustafa SAN	CSO leader. Association for the Young Industrialists and Tradesman
12-Ugur MART	Local newspaper rep./ Nigde Detay Haber Newspaper
13-Mehmet ERGUN	Local newspaper rep./ Nigde Gundem Newspaper
14-Anonymous	Top Official at Nigde Municipality

Participants in Yozgat Province	Position/Title
1-Kemal SAHIN	Deputy Governor of Yozgat
2-Yusuf BASER	Mayor of Yozgat
3-Rahmi NAZLIOGLU	CSO leader/Chairman of Yozgat Town Council
4-Bekir CAYLAK	Local newspaper rep./ Yozgat Yenisehir Newspaper
5-Turgut HATIOGLU	CSO leader/Association for Yozgat's Educators
6-Unsal ALLIOGLU	Ex-chairman of town council
7-Anonymous	Municipal Councillor
8-Anonymous	CSO leader
9-Anonymous	CSO leader
10-Anonymous	CSO leader

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11-Anonymous	Municipal top official
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Participants in Kirikkale Province	Position/Title
1-Ali KOLAT	Province Governor
2-Veli KORKMAZ	Mayor of Kirikkale
3-Halil DANACI	Municipal Councillor/Deputy Mayor
4-Ramazan CETIN	Local newspaper rep./ Il Gazetesi Sahibi Newspaper
5-Omer DEGIRMENCI	CSO leader/Member of Union of Powers
6-Mehmet ALTUNDAG	Local newspaper rep./ Pusula Newspaper
7-Asir OZBEK	CSO leader/ Besinci Mevsim Yardim Dernegi
8-Ahmet KOCAK	Municipal officer/Former town council secretary
9-Anonymous	CSO leader
10-Anonymous	CSO leader

Participants in Karabuk Province	Position/Title
1-Izzettin KUCUK	Province Governor
2-Rafet VERGILI	Mayor
3-Ahmet GOLBEK	Local newspaper rep./ Bolgenin Sesi Newspaper
4-Ozcan BUYUKGENC	Chairman of Karabuk Town Council
5-Nimet SOYLU	Local newspaper rep./ Karabuk

	Haber Gazetesi
6-Serpil GULEN	CSO leader/ Assoc. for Animal rights
7-Davut CAYIR	Mukhtar/ Elected Neighbourhood representative. Leader of Mukhtars' Association
8-Celal BULUT	CSO leader/ Pensioners' Association
9-Yunus CIGDEM	CSO leader/ Association for the Visually Handicapped
10-Mevlut YURT	CSO leader Association for the Physically Disabled

Participants in Bolu Province	Position/Title
1-Ibrahim OZCIMEN	Province Governor
2-Alaaddin YILMAZ	Mayor
3-Turgut KALAYCIOGLU	Chairman of Town Council
4-Mustafa COP	Local newspaper columnist
5-Mustafa NAMDAR	General Secretary of Town Council
6-M. Suha ALPARSLAN	Local newspaper columnist
7-Anonymous	CSO leader/member of town council
8-Anonymous	Top official-Bolu municipality

Participants in Canakkale Province	Position/Title
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1-Cemal YILDIZER	Deputy Province Governor
2-Ali SURUCU	Deputy Mayor
3-Saim YAVUZ	Chairman of Town Council
4-Ibrahim BATTAL	CSO leader/ Association for the visually handicapped
5-Burak GEZEN	Local newspaper columnist/ Chairman of Journalists' Association
6-Murat KIRAY	Local newspaper columnist
7-Didem GURDOGAN	Officer at Governorship/ Member of Town council
8-Sevgi ULUSAL	Ex-municipal councillor/CSO leader/ Town Council member/Chairman of sub-committee for the women
9-Irfan GUZ	CSO leader/ Town council member/Chairman of sub-committee for the disabled
10-Neriman URGANCI	CSO leader/ Women's Association

