Mandevillian intelligence: from individual vice to collective virtue
Mandevillian intelligence: from individual vice to collective virtue
Mandevillian intelligence is a specific form of collective intelligence in which individual cognitive shortcomings, limitations and biases play a positive functional role in yielding various forms of collective cognitive success. When this idea is transposed to the epistemological domain, mandevillian intelligence emerges as the idea that individual forms of intellectual vice may, on occasion, support the epistemic performance of some form of multi-agent ensemble, such as a socio-epistemic system, a collective doxastic agent, or an epistemic group agent. As a specific form of collective intelligence, mandevillian intelligence is relevant to a number of debates in social epistemology, especially those that seek to understand how group (or collective) knowledge arises from the interactions between a collection of individual epistemic agents. Beyond this, however, mandevillian intelligence raises issues that are relevant to the research agendas of both virtue epistemology and applied epistemology. From a virtue epistemological perspective, mandevillian intelligence encourages us to adopt a relativistic conception of intellectual vice/virtue, enabling us to see how individual forms of intellectual vice may (sometimes) be relevant to collective forms of intellectual virtue. In addition, mandevillian intelligence is relevant to the nascent sub-discipline of applied epistemology. In particular, mandevillian intelligence forces us see the potential epistemic value of (e.g., technological) interventions that create, maintain or promote individual forms of intellectual vice.
epistemology, extended knowledge, active externalism, virtue reliabilism, extended cognition, social epistemology, virtue epistemology, distributed cognition, collective cognition
253–274
Smart, Paul R.
cd8a3dbf-d963-4009-80fb-76ecc93579df
Palermos, Orestis Spyridon
14 August 2018
Smart, Paul R.
cd8a3dbf-d963-4009-80fb-76ecc93579df
Palermos, Orestis Spyridon
Smart, Paul R.
(2018)
Mandevillian intelligence: from individual vice to collective virtue.
In,
Carter, Adam J, Clark, Andy, Kallestrup, Jesper, Palermos, Orestis Spyridon and Pritchard, Duncan
(eds.)
Socially-Extended Epistemology.
Oxford.
Oxford University Press, .
(doi:10.1093/oso/9780198801764.001.0001).
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Book Section
Abstract
Mandevillian intelligence is a specific form of collective intelligence in which individual cognitive shortcomings, limitations and biases play a positive functional role in yielding various forms of collective cognitive success. When this idea is transposed to the epistemological domain, mandevillian intelligence emerges as the idea that individual forms of intellectual vice may, on occasion, support the epistemic performance of some form of multi-agent ensemble, such as a socio-epistemic system, a collective doxastic agent, or an epistemic group agent. As a specific form of collective intelligence, mandevillian intelligence is relevant to a number of debates in social epistemology, especially those that seek to understand how group (or collective) knowledge arises from the interactions between a collection of individual epistemic agents. Beyond this, however, mandevillian intelligence raises issues that are relevant to the research agendas of both virtue epistemology and applied epistemology. From a virtue epistemological perspective, mandevillian intelligence encourages us to adopt a relativistic conception of intellectual vice/virtue, enabling us to see how individual forms of intellectual vice may (sometimes) be relevant to collective forms of intellectual virtue. In addition, mandevillian intelligence is relevant to the nascent sub-discipline of applied epistemology. In particular, mandevillian intelligence forces us see the potential epistemic value of (e.g., technological) interventions that create, maintain or promote individual forms of intellectual vice.
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Vice and Virtue
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Accepted/In Press date: 15 May 2017
Published date: 14 August 2018
Keywords:
epistemology, extended knowledge, active externalism, virtue reliabilism, extended cognition, social epistemology, virtue epistemology, distributed cognition, collective cognition
Organisations:
Web & Internet Science
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 384323
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/384323
PURE UUID: 5f4d6be5-cf41-4df2-a05c-e5a88b9688a9
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Date deposited: 23 Nov 2015 15:15
Last modified: 13 Sep 2024 01:39
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Contributors
Author:
Paul R. Smart
Editor:
Adam J Carter
Editor:
Andy Clark
Editor:
Jesper Kallestrup
Editor:
Orestis Spyridon Palermos
Editor:
Duncan Pritchard
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