The University of Southampton
University of Southampton Institutional Repository

Mandevillian intelligence: from individual vice to collective virtue

Mandevillian intelligence: from individual vice to collective virtue
Mandevillian intelligence: from individual vice to collective virtue
Mandevillian intelligence is a specific form of collective intelligence in which individual cognitive shortcomings, limitations and biases play a positive functional role in yielding various forms of collective cognitive success. When this idea is transposed to the epistemological domain, mandevillian intelligence emerges as the idea that individual forms of intellectual vice may, on occasion, support the epistemic performance of some form of multi-agent ensemble, such as a socio-epistemic system, a collective doxastic agent, or an epistemic group agent. As a specific form of collective intelligence, mandevillian intelligence is relevant to a number of debates in social epistemology, especially those that seek to understand how group (or collective) knowledge arises from the interactions between a collection of individual epistemic agents. Beyond this, however, mandevillian intelligence raises issues that are relevant to the research agendas of both virtue epistemology and applied epistemology. From a virtue epistemological perspective, mandevillian intelligence encourages us to adopt a relativistic conception of intellectual vice/virtue, enabling us to see how individual forms of intellectual vice may (sometimes) be relevant to collective forms of intellectual virtue. In addition, mandevillian intelligence is relevant to the nascent sub-discipline of applied epistemology. In particular, mandevillian intelligence forces us see the potential epistemic value of (e.g., technological) interventions that create, maintain or promote individual forms of intellectual vice.
epistemology, extended knowledge, active externalism, virtue reliabilism, extended cognition, social epistemology, virtue epistemology, distributed cognition, collective cognition
253–274
Oxford University Press
Smart, Paul R.
cd8a3dbf-d963-4009-80fb-76ecc93579df
Carter, Adam J
Clark, Andy
Kallestrup, Jesper
Palermos, Orestis Spyridon
Pritchard, Duncan
Smart, Paul R.
cd8a3dbf-d963-4009-80fb-76ecc93579df
Carter, Adam J
Clark, Andy
Kallestrup, Jesper
Palermos, Orestis Spyridon
Pritchard, Duncan

Smart, Paul R. (2018) Mandevillian intelligence: from individual vice to collective virtue. In, Carter, Adam J, Clark, Andy, Kallestrup, Jesper, Palermos, Orestis Spyridon and Pritchard, Duncan (eds.) Socially-Extended Epistemology. Oxford. Oxford University Press, 253–274. (doi:10.1093/oso/9780198801764.001.0001).

Record type: Book Section

Abstract

Mandevillian intelligence is a specific form of collective intelligence in which individual cognitive shortcomings, limitations and biases play a positive functional role in yielding various forms of collective cognitive success. When this idea is transposed to the epistemological domain, mandevillian intelligence emerges as the idea that individual forms of intellectual vice may, on occasion, support the epistemic performance of some form of multi-agent ensemble, such as a socio-epistemic system, a collective doxastic agent, or an epistemic group agent. As a specific form of collective intelligence, mandevillian intelligence is relevant to a number of debates in social epistemology, especially those that seek to understand how group (or collective) knowledge arises from the interactions between a collection of individual epistemic agents. Beyond this, however, mandevillian intelligence raises issues that are relevant to the research agendas of both virtue epistemology and applied epistemology. From a virtue epistemological perspective, mandevillian intelligence encourages us to adopt a relativistic conception of intellectual vice/virtue, enabling us to see how individual forms of intellectual vice may (sometimes) be relevant to collective forms of intellectual virtue. In addition, mandevillian intelligence is relevant to the nascent sub-discipline of applied epistemology. In particular, mandevillian intelligence forces us see the potential epistemic value of (e.g., technological) interventions that create, maintain or promote individual forms of intellectual vice.

Text
Vice and Virtue - Accepted Manuscript
Restricted to Repository staff only
Request a copy

More information

Accepted/In Press date: 15 May 2017
Published date: 14 August 2018
Keywords: epistemology, extended knowledge, active externalism, virtue reliabilism, extended cognition, social epistemology, virtue epistemology, distributed cognition, collective cognition
Organisations: Web & Internet Science

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 384323
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/384323
PURE UUID: 5f4d6be5-cf41-4df2-a05c-e5a88b9688a9
ORCID for Paul R. Smart: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0001-9989-5307

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 23 Nov 2015 15:15
Last modified: 15 Mar 2024 03:15

Export record

Altmetrics

Contributors

Author: Paul R. Smart ORCID iD
Editor: Adam J Carter
Editor: Andy Clark
Editor: Jesper Kallestrup
Editor: Orestis Spyridon Palermos
Editor: Duncan Pritchard

Download statistics

Downloads from ePrints over the past year. Other digital versions may also be available to download e.g. from the publisher's website.

View more statistics

Atom RSS 1.0 RSS 2.0

Contact ePrints Soton: eprints@soton.ac.uk

ePrints Soton supports OAI 2.0 with a base URL of http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/cgi/oai2

This repository has been built using EPrints software, developed at the University of Southampton, but available to everyone to use.

We use cookies to ensure that we give you the best experience on our website. If you continue without changing your settings, we will assume that you are happy to receive cookies on the University of Southampton website.

×