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Cooperation and the division of labour

Cooperation and the division of labour
Cooperation and the division of labour
Cooperation is vital for maintaining the integrity of complex life forms. In many cases in nature cooperation manifests it-self through constituent parts performing different, but complementary, functions. The vast majority of studies on the evolution of cooperation, however, look only at the special case in which cooperation manifests itself via the constituent parts performing identical tasks. In this paper we investigate a class of games in which the socially optimal behaviour has the property of being heterogeneous. We show that this class of games is equivalent to a region of ST space (the space of normalised two-player games characterised by the ‘sucker’ and ‘temptation’ payoffs) which has previously been dismissed. We analyse, through a simple group selection model, properties that evolving agents would need to have in order to “solve” this dilemma. Specifically we find that positive assortment on pure strategies may lower mean individual pay-off, and that assortment on mixed strategies will increase pay-off, but not maximise it.
Tudge, Simon
302f675d-7164-47e0-96b0-c85c1f48fddc
Brede, Markus
bbd03865-8e0b-4372-b9d7-cd549631f3f7
Watson, Richard
ce199dfc-d5d4-4edf-bd7b-f9e224c96c75
Tudge, Simon
302f675d-7164-47e0-96b0-c85c1f48fddc
Brede, Markus
bbd03865-8e0b-4372-b9d7-cd549631f3f7
Watson, Richard
ce199dfc-d5d4-4edf-bd7b-f9e224c96c75

Tudge, Simon, Brede, Markus and Watson, Richard (2013) Cooperation and the division of labour At Proceedings of the twelfth European Conference on the Synthesis and Simulation of Living Systems, Italy. 02 - 06 Sep 2013. 8 pp.

Record type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)

Abstract

Cooperation is vital for maintaining the integrity of complex life forms. In many cases in nature cooperation manifests it-self through constituent parts performing different, but complementary, functions. The vast majority of studies on the evolution of cooperation, however, look only at the special case in which cooperation manifests itself via the constituent parts performing identical tasks. In this paper we investigate a class of games in which the socially optimal behaviour has the property of being heterogeneous. We show that this class of games is equivalent to a region of ST space (the space of normalised two-player games characterised by the ‘sucker’ and ‘temptation’ payoffs) which has previously been dismissed. We analyse, through a simple group selection model, properties that evolving agents would need to have in order to “solve” this dilemma. Specifically we find that positive assortment on pure strategies may lower mean individual pay-off, and that assortment on mixed strategies will increase pay-off, but not maximise it.

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Published date: September 2013
Venue - Dates: Proceedings of the twelfth European Conference on the Synthesis and Simulation of Living Systems, Italy, 2013-09-02 - 2013-09-06
Organisations: Agents, Interactions & Complexity

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 384979
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/384979
PURE UUID: 3ab97668-c38b-4dff-b1f2-c923fe0a2adf

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Date deposited: 14 Jan 2016 15:07
Last modified: 11 Nov 2017 13:00

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Contributors

Author: Simon Tudge
Author: Markus Brede
Author: Richard Watson

University divisions

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