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Reasons as good bases

Reasons as good bases
Reasons as good bases
In this paper, I defend a new theory of normative reasons called reasons as good bases (RGB), according to which a normative reason to ? is something that is a good basis for ?ing. The idea is that the grounds on which we do things—bases—can be better or worse as things of their kind, and a normative reason—a good reason—is something that is just a good instance of such a ground. After introducing RGB, I clarify what it is to be a good basis, and argue that RGB has various attractive features: it has intuitive implications, makes good sense of the weights of reasons, and attractively explains the relationship between normative reasons and motivating reasons. I then briefly defend the view from objections and compare it to rivals. Finally, I sketch two possible implications of RGB: some kind of constitutivism, according to which the norms that govern us are explained by the nature of agency, and second, the claim that agents who do things for reasons generally do them for good reasons.
reasons, normative reasons, motivating reasons, basing, constitutivism, normativity, value, attributive goodness
0031-8116
1-20
Gregory, Alex
4f392d61-1825-4ee5-bc21-18922c89d80f
Gregory, Alex
4f392d61-1825-4ee5-bc21-18922c89d80f

Gregory, Alex (2015) Reasons as good bases Philosophical Studies, pp. 1-20. (doi:10.1007/s11098-015-0609-8).

Record type: Article

Abstract

In this paper, I defend a new theory of normative reasons called reasons as good bases (RGB), according to which a normative reason to ? is something that is a good basis for ?ing. The idea is that the grounds on which we do things—bases—can be better or worse as things of their kind, and a normative reason—a good reason—is something that is just a good instance of such a ground. After introducing RGB, I clarify what it is to be a good basis, and argue that RGB has various attractive features: it has intuitive implications, makes good sense of the weights of reasons, and attractively explains the relationship between normative reasons and motivating reasons. I then briefly defend the view from objections and compare it to rivals. Finally, I sketch two possible implications of RGB: some kind of constitutivism, according to which the norms that govern us are explained by the nature of agency, and second, the claim that agents who do things for reasons generally do them for good reasons.

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More information

Accepted/In Press date: November 2015
Published date: 10 December 2015
Keywords: reasons, normative reasons, motivating reasons, basing, constitutivism, normativity, value, attributive goodness
Organisations: Philosophy

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 386627
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/386627
ISSN: 0031-8116
PURE UUID: 7a5ab382-8893-49ca-8e60-dddf5033e43d

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Date deposited: 02 Feb 2016 16:33
Last modified: 17 Jul 2017 19:48

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Author: Alex Gregory

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