Reasons as good bases

Gregory, Alex (2015) Reasons as good bases Philosophical Studies, pp. 1-20. (doi:10.1007/s11098-015-0609-8).


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In this paper, I defend a new theory of normative reasons called reasons as good bases (RGB), according to which a normative reason to ? is something that is a good basis for ?ing. The idea is that the grounds on which we do things—bases—can be better or worse as things of their kind, and a normative reason—a good reason—is something that is just a good instance of such a ground. After introducing RGB, I clarify what it is to be a good basis, and argue that RGB has various attractive features: it has intuitive implications, makes good sense of the weights of reasons, and attractively explains the relationship between normative reasons and motivating reasons. I then briefly defend the view from objections and compare it to rivals. Finally, I sketch two possible implications of RGB: some kind of constitutivism, according to which the norms that govern us are explained by the nature of agency, and second, the claim that agents who do things for reasons generally do them for good reasons.

Item Type: Article
Digital Object Identifier (DOI): doi:10.1007/s11098-015-0609-8
ISSNs: 0031-8116 (print)
Keywords: reasons, normative reasons, motivating reasons, basing, constitutivism, normativity, value, attributive goodness
Organisations: Philosophy
ePrint ID: 386627
Date :
Date Event
November 2015Accepted/In Press
10 December 2015Published
Date Deposited: 02 Feb 2016 16:33
Last Modified: 17 Apr 2017 04:21
Further Information:Google Scholar

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