Skorupski on spontaneity, apriority, and normative truth
Skorupski on spontaneity, apriority, and normative truth
This paper raises a dilemma for Skorupski's meta-normative outlook in The Domain of Reasons and explores some escape routes, recommending a more thoroughgoing Kantianism as the best option. §1 argues that we cannot plausibly combine Skorupski's spontaneity-based epistemology of normativity with his cognition-independent view of normative truth. §§2-4 consider whether we should keep the epistemology and revise the metaphysics, opting for constructivism. While Skorupski’s negative case for his spontaneity-based epistemology is found wanting, it is suggested that a better argument for keeping the epistemology and switching to Kantian constructivism can be given from a thesis he finds appealing—viz., ‘cognitive internalism’. While this premise is not, it is argued, obviously true, the view it supports does provide a good way to undergird Skorupski’s most interesting rationale for his reasons-first approach.
normativity, reasons, rationality, constructivism, apriority
1-11
Sylvan, Kurt
507b57c8-e6ec-4a02-8b35-6d640b08b61c
Sylvan, Kurt
507b57c8-e6ec-4a02-8b35-6d640b08b61c
Sylvan, Kurt
(2015)
Skorupski on spontaneity, apriority, and normative truth.
The Philosophical Quarterly, .
(doi:10.1093/pq/pqw013).
(In Press)
Abstract
This paper raises a dilemma for Skorupski's meta-normative outlook in The Domain of Reasons and explores some escape routes, recommending a more thoroughgoing Kantianism as the best option. §1 argues that we cannot plausibly combine Skorupski's spontaneity-based epistemology of normativity with his cognition-independent view of normative truth. §§2-4 consider whether we should keep the epistemology and revise the metaphysics, opting for constructivism. While Skorupski’s negative case for his spontaneity-based epistemology is found wanting, it is suggested that a better argument for keeping the epistemology and switching to Kantian constructivism can be given from a thesis he finds appealing—viz., ‘cognitive internalism’. While this premise is not, it is argued, obviously true, the view it supports does provide a good way to undergird Skorupski’s most interesting rationale for his reasons-first approach.
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FinalVersionSpontaneityApriorityNormativeTruthSylvan.pdf
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Accepted/In Press date: 14 December 2015
Keywords:
normativity, reasons, rationality, constructivism, apriority
Organisations:
Philosophy
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 386680
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/386680
ISSN: 0031-8094
PURE UUID: 23725573-8d4f-43fa-9e9d-18bf8e656277
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Date deposited: 03 Feb 2016 12:30
Last modified: 15 Mar 2024 05:23
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