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Epistemic reasons I: Normativity

Epistemic reasons I: Normativity
Epistemic reasons I: Normativity
This paper is an opinionated guide to the literature on normative (i.e., good) epistemic reasons. After making some distinctions in §1, I begin in §2 by discussing the ontology of normative epistemic reasons, assessing arguments for and against the view that they are mental states, and concluding that they are not mental states. In §3, I examine the distinction between normative epistemic reasons there are and normative epistemic reasons we possess. I offer a novel account of this distinction and argue that we in fact ought to acknowledge a threefold distinction between objective, possessed, and apparent normative epistemic reasons. In §4, I discuss the question of which normative reasons for doxastic attitudes are the epistemic ones, evaluating reasons against a simple evidentialist answer. Finally, in §5, I look at the role of reasons in epistemology, considering challenges to viewing reasons as the building blocks of epistemic normativity and maintaining that the challenges recommend a novel bi‐level epistemology rather than a marginalization of reasons in epistemology.
1747-9991
364-376
Sylvan, Kurt
507b57c8-e6ec-4a02-8b35-6d640b08b61c
Sylvan, Kurt
507b57c8-e6ec-4a02-8b35-6d640b08b61c

Sylvan, Kurt (2016) Epistemic reasons I: Normativity. Philosophy Compass, 11 (7), 364-376. (doi:10.1111/phc3.12327).

Record type: Article

Abstract

This paper is an opinionated guide to the literature on normative (i.e., good) epistemic reasons. After making some distinctions in §1, I begin in §2 by discussing the ontology of normative epistemic reasons, assessing arguments for and against the view that they are mental states, and concluding that they are not mental states. In §3, I examine the distinction between normative epistemic reasons there are and normative epistemic reasons we possess. I offer a novel account of this distinction and argue that we in fact ought to acknowledge a threefold distinction between objective, possessed, and apparent normative epistemic reasons. In §4, I discuss the question of which normative reasons for doxastic attitudes are the epistemic ones, evaluating reasons against a simple evidentialist answer. Finally, in §5, I look at the role of reasons in epistemology, considering challenges to viewing reasons as the building blocks of epistemic normativity and maintaining that the challenges recommend a novel bi‐level epistemology rather than a marginalization of reasons in epistemology.

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Accepted/In Press date: 11 February 2016
e-pub ahead of print date: 4 July 2016
Published date: July 2016
Organisations: Philosophy

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 387263
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/387263
ISSN: 1747-9991
PURE UUID: 001ee4d2-e422-4dcb-afe3-ea1530600c0f

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Date deposited: 17 Feb 2016 09:14
Last modified: 09 Jan 2022 07:34

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