The University of Southampton
University of Southampton Institutional Repository

Epistemic reasons II: Basing

Epistemic reasons II: Basing
Epistemic reasons II: Basing
The paper is an opinionated tour of the literature on the reasons for which we hold beliefs and other doxastic attitudes, which I call ‘operative epistemic reasons’. After drawing some distinctions in §1, I begin in §2 by discussing the ontology of operative epistemic reasons, assessing arguments for and against the view that they are mental states. I recommend a pluralist non‐mentalist view that takes seriously the variety of operative epistemic reasons ascriptions and allows these reasons to be both propositions and truth‐making facts. In §3, I turn to consider what it takes for a consideration to be an operative epistemic reason, examining three conditions – the representational, treating, and explanatory conditions – that have been proposed. I offer a novel view about the explanatory condition. In §4, I discuss the special case of inferential operative reasons and examine attempts to understand them in terms of rule‐following, sketching a competence‐based spinoff of dispositionalism. Finally, in §5, I consider whether there are non‐inferential operative reasons, observing that one needn't countenance them to be a foundationalist but then developing a view about what they are and how they do and don't differ from inferential reasons.
1747-9991
377-389
Sylvan, Kurt
507b57c8-e6ec-4a02-8b35-6d640b08b61c
Sylvan, Kurt
507b57c8-e6ec-4a02-8b35-6d640b08b61c

Sylvan, Kurt (2016) Epistemic reasons II: Basing. Philosophy Compass, 11 (7), 377-389. (doi:10.1111/phc3.12329).

Record type: Article

Abstract

The paper is an opinionated tour of the literature on the reasons for which we hold beliefs and other doxastic attitudes, which I call ‘operative epistemic reasons’. After drawing some distinctions in §1, I begin in §2 by discussing the ontology of operative epistemic reasons, assessing arguments for and against the view that they are mental states. I recommend a pluralist non‐mentalist view that takes seriously the variety of operative epistemic reasons ascriptions and allows these reasons to be both propositions and truth‐making facts. In §3, I turn to consider what it takes for a consideration to be an operative epistemic reason, examining three conditions – the representational, treating, and explanatory conditions – that have been proposed. I offer a novel view about the explanatory condition. In §4, I discuss the special case of inferential operative reasons and examine attempts to understand them in terms of rule‐following, sketching a competence‐based spinoff of dispositionalism. Finally, in §5, I consider whether there are non‐inferential operative reasons, observing that one needn't countenance them to be a foundationalist but then developing a view about what they are and how they do and don't differ from inferential reasons.

Text
EpistemicReasonsII[finaldraft].pdf - Accepted Manuscript
Download (253kB)

More information

Accepted/In Press date: 11 February 2016
e-pub ahead of print date: 4 July 2016
Published date: July 2016
Organisations: Philosophy

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 387264
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/387264
ISSN: 1747-9991
PURE UUID: f32f4862-5b1c-45de-988e-e56fe4291458

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 17 Feb 2016 09:20
Last modified: 27 Apr 2022 05:07

Export record

Altmetrics

Download statistics

Downloads from ePrints over the past year. Other digital versions may also be available to download e.g. from the publisher's website.

View more statistics

Atom RSS 1.0 RSS 2.0

Contact ePrints Soton: eprints@soton.ac.uk

ePrints Soton supports OAI 2.0 with a base URL of http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/cgi/oai2

This repository has been built using EPrints software, developed at the University of Southampton, but available to everyone to use.

We use cookies to ensure that we give you the best experience on our website. If you continue without changing your settings, we will assume that you are happy to receive cookies on the University of Southampton website.

×