Two arguments for Evidentialism
Two arguments for Evidentialism
Evidentialism is the thesis that all reasons to believe p are evidence for p. Pragmatists hold that pragmatic considerations –incentives for believing –can also be reasons to believe. Nishi Shah, Thomas Kelly and others have argued for evidentialism on the grounds that incentives for belief fail a ‘reasoning constraint’ on reasons: roughly, reasons must be considerations we can reason from, but we cannot reason from incentives to belief. In the first half of the paper, I show that this argument fails: the claim that we cannot reason from incentives is either false or does not combine with the reasoning constraint to support evidentialism. However, the failure of this argument suggests an alternative route to evidentialism. Roughly, reasons must be premises of good reasoning, but it is not good reasoning to reason from incentives to belief. The second half of the paper develops and defends this argument for evidentialism.
evidentialism, pragmatic reasons for belief, reasoning, reasons
805-818
Way, Jonathan
2c3f95c6-ba9f-4640-b2f6-d23363a96c48
October 2016
Way, Jonathan
2c3f95c6-ba9f-4640-b2f6-d23363a96c48
Way, Jonathan
(2016)
Two arguments for Evidentialism.
The Philosophical Quarterly, 66 (265), .
(doi:10.1093/pq/pqw026).
Abstract
Evidentialism is the thesis that all reasons to believe p are evidence for p. Pragmatists hold that pragmatic considerations –incentives for believing –can also be reasons to believe. Nishi Shah, Thomas Kelly and others have argued for evidentialism on the grounds that incentives for belief fail a ‘reasoning constraint’ on reasons: roughly, reasons must be considerations we can reason from, but we cannot reason from incentives to belief. In the first half of the paper, I show that this argument fails: the claim that we cannot reason from incentives is either false or does not combine with the reasoning constraint to support evidentialism. However, the failure of this argument suggests an alternative route to evidentialism. Roughly, reasons must be premises of good reasoning, but it is not good reasoning to reason from incentives to belief. The second half of the paper develops and defends this argument for evidentialism.
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Two Arguments PQ final web.pdf
- Accepted Manuscript
More information
Accepted/In Press date: 19 February 2016
e-pub ahead of print date: 26 April 2016
Published date: October 2016
Keywords:
evidentialism, pragmatic reasons for belief, reasoning, reasons
Organisations:
Philosophy
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 388222
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/388222
ISSN: 0031-8094
PURE UUID: 6792cea1-e88f-489d-9c03-8da3879d6b9f
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Date deposited: 22 Feb 2016 11:54
Last modified: 15 Mar 2024 05:24
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