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Fault tolerant mechanism design for general task allocation

Fault tolerant mechanism design for general task allocation
Fault tolerant mechanism design for general task allocation
We study a general task allocation problem, involving multiple agents that collaboratively accomplish tasks and where agents may fail to successfully complete the tasks assigned to them (known as execution uncertainty). The goal is to choose an allocation that maximises social welfare while taking their execution uncertainty into account (i.e., fault tolerant). To achieve this, we show that the post-execution verification (PEV)-based mechanism presented by Porter et al. (2008) is applicable if and only if agents' valuations are risk-neutral (i.e., the solution is almost universal). We then consider a more advanced setting where an agent's execution uncertainty is not completely predictable by the agent alone but aggregated from all agents' private opinions (known as trust). We show that PEV-based mechanism with trust is still applicable if and only if the trust aggregation is multilinear. Given this characterisation, we further demonstrate how this mechanism can be successfully applied in a real-world setting. Finally, we draw the parallels between our results and the literature of efficient mechanism design with general interdependent valuations.
execution uncertainty, interdependent valuations, type verification, trust aggregation
323-331
ACM
Zhao, Dengji
731b17f8-df94-49cb-b45d-8edf05c59edf
Ramchurn, Sarvapali
1d62ae2a-a498-444e-912d-a6082d3aaea3
Jennings, Nicholas
ab3d94cc-247c-4545-9d1e-65873d6cdb30
Zhao, Dengji
731b17f8-df94-49cb-b45d-8edf05c59edf
Ramchurn, Sarvapali
1d62ae2a-a498-444e-912d-a6082d3aaea3
Jennings, Nicholas
ab3d94cc-247c-4545-9d1e-65873d6cdb30

Zhao, Dengji, Ramchurn, Sarvapali and Jennings, Nicholas (2016) Fault tolerant mechanism design for general task allocation. In Proceedings of the 15th International Conference. ACM. 9 pp, pp. 323-331.

Record type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)

Abstract

We study a general task allocation problem, involving multiple agents that collaboratively accomplish tasks and where agents may fail to successfully complete the tasks assigned to them (known as execution uncertainty). The goal is to choose an allocation that maximises social welfare while taking their execution uncertainty into account (i.e., fault tolerant). To achieve this, we show that the post-execution verification (PEV)-based mechanism presented by Porter et al. (2008) is applicable if and only if agents' valuations are risk-neutral (i.e., the solution is almost universal). We then consider a more advanced setting where an agent's execution uncertainty is not completely predictable by the agent alone but aggregated from all agents' private opinions (known as trust). We show that PEV-based mechanism with trust is still applicable if and only if the trust aggregation is multilinear. Given this characterisation, we further demonstrate how this mechanism can be successfully applied in a real-world setting. Finally, we draw the parallels between our results and the literature of efficient mechanism design with general interdependent valuations.

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Accepted/In Press date: 31 March 2016
e-pub ahead of print date: 13 May 2016
Published date: 2016
Venue - Dates: The 15th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2016), Singapore, 2016-05-09 - 2016-05-13
Keywords: execution uncertainty, interdependent valuations, type verification, trust aggregation
Organisations: Agents, Interactions & Complexity

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 388365
URI: https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/388365
PURE UUID: 21d84901-39a9-44f8-a79c-93b09ecd57fd
ORCID for Sarvapali Ramchurn: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0001-9686-4302

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 26 Feb 2016 15:02
Last modified: 06 Jun 2018 12:42

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Contributors

Author: Dengji Zhao
Author: Sarvapali Ramchurn ORCID iD
Author: Nicholas Jennings

University divisions

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