*English War Captains in the Hundred Years War*

Anne Curry

University of Southampton, UK

There seems to be no period in human history where opportunities for military employment were lacking. Even as early as the tenth century, theologians viewed society as divided into three distinct but inter-dependent groups based on function: those who worked (the *laboratores*, the vast majority), those who prayed (the *oratores*), and those who fought, the *bellatores*[[1]](#footnote-1). Although England and France had been at war in earlier centuries, the intensity of warfare between the opening of the Hundred Years War in 1337 and its end in 1453 was unparalleled. It produced what a modern recruitment agency would call ‘attractive career opportunities’ for those who wished to pursue a military career. By the time it began, all troops serving in English royal armies were paid for their services. It was intensive warfare against the Welsh, the Scottish and the French in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century which prompted this development[[2]](#footnote-2). If the crown had continued to rely solely on feudal obligation, English armies would not have been large enough. Furthermore, lengthy campaigns fought overseas needed longer-term commitments. The nobles who served in Edward I’s armies still did so by virtue of obligation and without pay. By the opening of the Hundred Years War in 1337, however, all troops from the highest earl to the lowliest foot archer served in return for pay, wage levels being fixed with reference to social as well as military status[[3]](#footnote-3). Payment of troops encouraged two important phenomena. First, the possibility for the crown of selecting men who were adequately qualified and equipped. And secondly, the possibility for the soldiers themselves to choose whether to have a military career or not. Both encouraged the development and definition of a professional warrior community.

Over the last few years, thanks to funding from the Arts and Humanities Research Council of the UK, we have been identifying and studying in detail English soldiers in the Hundred Years War. This has built on my own earlier work on the English army at the battle of Agincourt and in the subsequent conquest and occupation of northern France: in this I had collected and begun to analyse the names of the men-at-arms serving the English crown between 1415 and 1450[[4]](#footnote-4). The AHRC project was a joint initiative with Professor Adrian Bell of the University of Reading, one of my former research students. He carried out a prosopographical study of the expeditionary armies of 1387 and 1388 which including the archers as well as the men-at-arms[[5]](#footnote-5). We were assisted by Dr Andy King, a specialist in Anglo-Scottish warfare in the later middle ages, and by Dr David Simpkin, who had studied the nobility at war under Edward I and Edward II[[6]](#footnote-6). The AHRC research award also enabled the inclusion of a project student studying for a doctorate: this was Adam Chapman, who focused for his thesis on the Welsh soldier from Edward I’s conquest of Wales to the death of Henry V in 1422. The reason for choosing this topic was in order to examine the truth of the popular view that many of the soldiers serving the English were in fact Welsh. His researches have shown that this is a myth[[7]](#footnote-7). That said, Edward I could not have raised the large armies which he did (at their largest over 20,000) without the ability to raise mass infantry from the Welsh whom he had recently conquered. The participation of the Welsh declined over the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, and at the battle of Agincourt (1415) there were no more than 500 Welsh archers at most in the total of around 7,000 archers[[8]](#footnote-8). The rebellion in Wales which broke out in 1400 made the English crown wary of employing Welsh soldiers. Indeed, Dr Chapman has discovered that some of the 500 Welsh archers recruited for the army in 1415 never even crossed to France but were detailed instead to the defence of Wales since it was feared rebellion might break out again during Henry V’s absence in France[[9]](#footnote-9).

In our project we have concentrated on the period from the reopening of the War in 1369 and the expulsion of the English between 1449 and 1453 from all of their continental possessions save Calais. We chose this period because it is very well documented. It is possible to examine the membership of English armies in the first phase of the War between 1337 and 1360. Dr Andrew Ayton of the University of Hull has produced much valuable work on the soldiers of this period using letters of protection (which soldiers sought from the Chancery to avoid legal cases being conducted against them in their absence on campaign), horse valuations and the account rolls of the English crown[[10]](#footnote-10). However, it is only after 1369 that two important methods of recruitment became the norm, both producing much more information and in particular the names of soldiers. First the use of indentures by which captains providing troops, or agreeing to take up a garrison command, entered into a contract with the crown. This contract not only specified the duration of service and the numbers and types of troops but also conditions of service. Even where the actual indentures do not survive, we can draw on financial records which give their terms[[11]](#footnote-11). Secondly, the use of muster rolls whereby the troops captains brought were checked off at embarkation or in garrison to ensure that the terms of the indenture were met.

Our databases can be searched on-line at [www.medievalsoldier.org](http://www.medievalsoldier.org). This web site also includes studies which we have written, including profiles of individual soldiers based on materials from our database. For instance, there is a study of Owen Glendower, who was a loyal man-at-arms serving the English crown in campaigns against the French before1400, an experience which assisted him when it came to leading his Welsh supporters in a war against the English in the first decade of the fifteenth century. We have published further journal articles, including a study of language use of soldiers, and of the army which Henry IV led into Scotland in 1400 which was one of the largest raised during the Hundred Years War[[12]](#footnote-12). We have completed a book which will cover all the different ranks of soldiers serving the English crown between 1369 and 1453[[13]](#footnote-13).

You will find on our website three databases derived from three different kinds of archive. First, the records of expeditionary armies sent from England not only to France but also to Ireland, Wales, Spain, indeed any theatre in which the English were active and for which muster rolls survive. Secondly, the letters of protection and attorney which were given to soldiers going on campaign or serving in garrisons overseas. These are useful in filling gaps where muster rolls do not survive. Thirdly the muster rolls for the garrisons which the English maintained in Northern France in the period of the war between 1415 to 1450.

Together, these databases currently contain 250,000 service records. Exactly how many individual soldiers this represents is difficult to estimate since inconsistency in spellings make identification uncertain. However, there are considerable advantages in creating as large a sample as possible since it permits statistically valid conclusions on continuity of service and on the military career in general. This is particularly valuable for those whom chronicles of the period call ‘men of no name’ - the thousands of men-at-arms and archers who are no more than names on a list. We may never be able to find out anything more about them than that they chose a military career. But by analysis of their occurrences in the database we can show what this career might be like for the rank and file, or rather, just how varied it might be. Some men certainly served for long periods. Some moved between ranks. Some specialised in certain theatres, others ranged more widely. Some stayed with one leader, others served under many, choosing to stay put in a particular garrison despite changes in the holder of the captaincy.

Over the whole period of our study from 1369 to 1453 there were several thousand men who led retinues in expeditionary armies sent from England not only to France but also elsewhere, and even on occasion against civil disturbances within England itself, such as against the Peasants Revolt of 1381. Add to these the men who were appointed to regional commands, such as the lieutenants of the lordship of Ireland or the seneschals of Gascony, or to captaincies of places held by the English crown, such as the Tower of London, Calais and the other fortifications in its march, an area held by the English continuously from 1347 to 1558[[14]](#footnote-14). We have created a further database of such men but are currently seeking funding in order to carry out further analysis and to place it on our web site.

For the purpose of this paper, I have chosen to concentrate on a distinct sub-set: men who were appointed to captaincies and lieutenancies in the towns and castles captured and occupied by the English in Normandy and the area towards Paris known as the *pays de conquête* during the fifteenth-century phase of the war. I have included only those places which were garrisoned on a regular basis, discounting the smaller places which only occasionally held troops. I have also omitted garrison commands in Maine and also in the Paris region although this does not much affect my sample since the majority of those appointed to captaincies there had also held or were later to hold captaincies in Normandy.

This phase of the Hundred Years War undoubtedly offered the greatest opportunities for employment as a war captain since it was based upon a war of conquest. You will find on our web site already a case study of one such soldier, Sir John Cressy. I was prompted to study his career after reading the inscription on his tomb chest in the church of Dodford in Northamptonshire, that he was captain of Lisieux, Pont l’Eveque and Orbec, a councillor of the king in France, and that he died in Toul in 1444. All of this can be confirmed by reference to the surviving archives, and his career can be reconstructed, including his death whilst engaged in negotiations with Charles VII for the marriage of Henry VI to Margaret of Anjou.

The English garrisoned about 45 major towns and castles in Normandy, although there was fluctuation in this number as places were lost to the French or recovered by the English[[15]](#footnote-15). Harfleur provides a good example of this. It surrendered on 22 September 1415. It remained in English hands until recaptured by the French in January 1436 along with several other places in the pays de Caux such as Dieppe. Harfleur was retaken by the English in October 1440 and held by them until the final surrender of 1 January 1450. The rest of the duchy save for Mont-St-Michel was captured during Henry V’s second campaign (1417-19) and the majority of towns and castles remained under English control until the Reconquest of Charles VII in 1449-50. In military terms the significance of each of these towns and castles varied, a point which, as we shall see, affected who was appointed to which command. Some were backwaters throughout, such as Caen and Bayeux, never threatened by the French over the whole period. Others offered more stressful commands as the frontiers shifted. F or instance, once Paris fell to Charles VII in 1436 it became much more difficult to defend places such as Pontoise and Neufchâtel. Even though there was an official cessation of hostilities between the truce of Tours of May 1444 and the reopening of the war in July 1449 the English continued to maintain their garrisons, and therefore the need for captains to command them was sustained.

Fortunately we have very full archival records which provide the names of captains and lieutenants appointed by the English in Normandy. For the early years of the occupation they are known through the financial records of the English Exchequer, such as the account books of the treasurer of Harfleur, and the treasurer general of Normandy. After his landing in 1417 Henry V began series of enrolments parallel to the Patent and Close Rolls in England. These were called the Norman Rolls, and we find his appointments to captaincies detailed there. However, he also soon took over French systems of government, especially the financial administration of the *chambre des comptes*[[16]](#footnote-16). Henry’s first *chambre* was established at Caen, but after his death was merged with the *chambre* at Paris. After the loss of Paris in 1436 the English established a new *chambre* at Rouen. The records of these English chambers were later amalgamated with the main series of *chambre des comptes* archives in Paris. Although this archive has suffered many vicissitudes over the centuries and is now distributed over repositories in France, England, and North America, there is none the less a huge quantity of material to draw on. This includes indentures of appointment of captains, as well as quittances for pay. The identities of captains can also be gleaned from the many surviving muster rolls which have formed the basis of our project.

The names of 381 captains and lieutenants, serving in the Norman garrisons between 1417 and 1450, are known. Of the 381, 156 (41%) are only seen in the office of captain, 142 (37.3%) only as lieutenants, with 83 men (21.7%) holding both offices over time. The sample can be broken down further according to status (Table 1), where men are assigned the highest status they achieved during the period.

*Table 1. Captains and lieutenants by status*

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Bishops | 2 (0.5%) |
| Duke | 4 (1%) |
| Earl | 13 (3.4%) |
| Baron | 11 (2.9%) |
|  (nobility total | 30 (7.8%) |
| Knights (bachelor and banneret) | 115 (30.2%) |
| Esquire or unspecified | 236 (61.9%) |
| Total | 381 |
|  |  |

Appointments to captaincies lay with English commanders-in-chief: Henry V whilst he lived, his brother John duke of Bedford as regent to 1435, and thereafter by a succession of lieutenants-general appointed for a number of years. There is also evidence that local citizens might be consulted. In April 1442, for instance, the Estates forced the appointment of John Hesant as interim captain of St Lô when the earl of Oxford departed without notice. Hesant was confirmed in office at Michaelmas whilst awaiting the arrival from England of the new royal appointee, Sir Bernard Montferrant[[17]](#footnote-17). Appointments were generally made for a year at a time, usually from Michaelmas (29 September). Occasionally appointments were made for a number of years, sometimes linked to regional commands or to the office of *bailli*. For instance, at Evreux the offices were almost always combined. A new practice is noted in 1439 when Matthew Gough was appointed for life to the captaincy of Bayeux. A year later a similar appointment was made to Richard Curson at Honfleur. These appointments were made to confirm the long-term commitment of these professional soldiers: both men remained in Normandy until its loss. In 1440 the incoming lieutenant general, Richard duke of York, objected to the practice, complaining that there were not enough opportunities for the men he had brought with him in his new army[[18]](#footnote-18). Every incoming commander was keen to find positions for those who had served them in the past. York appointed the master of his household, Sir William Oldhall, and his treasurer, John Clay, to garrison captaincies. This reminds us of the importance of patronage in this period.

What is difficult to ascertain is the role of personal choice on the part of the captain or lieutenant. Did men express preferences to take up particular commands? Did they choose when to take up and when to resign a command, or were they always responding to orders? These questions have a relevance in prosopographical analysis. Was it, in effect, the government which created a cadre of military officers by selecting men to take up captaincies? Or did men create such a cadre through their own career and life choices? It is important to remember that holding a garrison captaincy or lieutenancy was only part of a military career. The same men served in expeditionary armies and in the field, and even in theatres outside Normandy.

There were between 2,000 and 6,000 soldiers in the garrisons each year, according to defensive needs. This shows that the officer class was relatively small. But there was also a high turnover. The average length of captaincy is 3.65 years, with the median at 2.7 years. The longest captaincy seems to be that of Lord Scales at Domfront, held for 20 years between 1428 and 1448. Overall, however, very few men held a captaincy for more than 10 years: there are only 14 examples. Several held office for one year or less. At Conches and St Lô, for instance, many captaincies were as short as three or six months. St Lô saw 24 changes in captain with no one serving for more than two years. This was the highest rate of turnover. Each garrison saw on average 8.5 changes in captain.

The least vulnerable garrisons saw the fewest changes. Montivilliers, for instance, had only two captains between 1422 and 1450, although admittedly it was in French hands between 1436 and 1441. The garrisons in the pays de Caux show the least turnover since this area was a military backwater until the losses of 1435-6. Bayeux and Caen, also relatively immune from conflict, also show low rates. We see much higher rates of turnover in more vulnerable areas such as the Vexin (Pontoise, Gisors, Gournay and Neufchâtel). A high turnover at Conches was particularly triggered by the loss of the neighbouring Louviers in 1440.

Figures for turnover can be misleading since some captains returned to a place for a second stint in office. Whilst St Lô had 24 changes in captain, it saw only 18 different men. We can also see that turnover rate varied across time, with higher rates in the reign of Henry V. This is not surprising. Henry tended to appoint peers or senior knights at the surrender of the town or castle, but as his conquest moved on, needed these men to command his army, not least for the siege of Rouen and then the advance to Paris.Eight of the peers who had held captaincies under Henry V did not do so under his son. A ninth, John Holland, earl of Huntingdon only returned to France in 1430 when Henry VI crossed in person with a large army: interestingly, however, after a twelve year gap he returned to the garrison command which he had held in 1419 (Gisors and Gournay with Gerberoy). Twenty five knights who had held garrison commands under Henry V did not hold such commands after 1422 and most did not return to France. For five other knights there was a lengthy gap as in the case of Huntingdon. Many of those who did not serve after 1422 were closely linked to the dead king. Others were needed within the minority government in England.

We can also see a tendency to operate in age cohorts. John, duke of Bedford was 31 years old when he became regent of France in 1422. Many of the peers active in Normandy during his term of office were born within five or six years of him.

The earls of Salisbury and Warwick, and Lords Talbot and Willoughby were all a few years his senior, the earls of Suffolk and Huntingdon were six or seven years his junior. The knights and esquires holding office in 1420s were generally in their late 20s or early 30s when they entered captaincies. Sir John Cressy first held a position of command when aged 25. Some leading captains, such as the earl of Warwick, Lord Talbot and Sir William Oldhall, continued into their 50s but others, such as Lord Willoughby and Sir John Fastolf retired from garrison command and active service in their early 40s. the average age of retirement seems to be in the mid 40s. A second generation born after 1400 was associated with Richard, duke of York (b. 1411) who was lieutenant general and governor in 1436-7 and between 1440 and 1445. These included the earls of Stafford, Oxford and Ormond, as well as Lords Beaumont, Bourgchier, and Fauconberg. When Normandy was lost they were approaching their mid to late 40s.

We can see that there was a range of types of people who held office as captain and lieutenant. At one end of the spectrum we have members of the royal family. At the other extreme, we have obscure esquires for whom the only information we have is that they were briefly lieutenant of a garrison. As in all military organisations, there was a strong sense of hierarchy. The perceived importance of the place affected the type of person appointed to their command. There was a distinct hierarchy, more obvious than during the previous French rule of Normandy where local links were more influential. Under English rule, the more significant the place, the higher-ranking the captain. This impressed the native population, thereby using their natural sense of deference to make them easier to control. In this context it is interesting to note the duke of York also expressed concerns about the large numbers of ‘pety captains’, that is captains of low rank, when he took up office as lieutenant-general in 1440.

Peers were appointed only to the most prestigious captaincies such as Pont-de-l’Arche, Avranches and Falaise. They were resident in garrison only sporadically since they often had commitments in the field or in government in both France and England. Sir Walter Hungerford was appointed as soon as the place surrendered in August 1418 and remained in post until 1430, but was scarcely ever present once he had been appointed royal treasurer of England in 1426. They were rarely included in the strength of the garrison and their indentures of appointment commonly allowed them to appoint lieutenants. Some appointments reveal the effect of patronage, not least in allowing peers to hold more than one captaincy even at times when multiple office holding was technically disallowed. The Norman capital, Rouen, was customarily commanded by the commander-in-chief (The Regent Bedford, and the later lieutenants-general), but effective control was delegated to a series of lieutenants, often themselves of high, and even noble, status. Bedford took command of a series of garrisons after the crises of 1429-30. In 1432 he nominated as lieutenant of his castle of Cherbourg Sir John Harpeley for three years because of the need for residence of a ‘chevalier notable’[[19]](#footnote-19). The role of Henry Beaufort, bishop of Winchester, in supporting the funding of war after the crises of 1429, his presence with the young king on the coronation expedition and his diplomatic activities, explain his appointment to the captaincies of Caen (1429-30), Honfleur (1430-1) and Cherbourg (1431-2, 1437-8), although he also had to rely on series of lieutenants for the safekeeping of all these places.

The middle-ranking garrisons in military and strategic terms, which constituted the majority of Norman towns and castles, were usually commanded by knights or prominent esquires. Indentures rarely accorded them the right to appoint lieutenants and they were usually included within the garrison effective. Muster evidence suggests that most were regularly resident although long absences, including periods in England, are evidenced, particularly after the truce of Tours. The smallest garrisons, often in subsidiary places, or in a rural rather than urban setting, were usually commanded by men who were esquires. These maintained near-constant residence and served in person, often as one of only a handful of mounted men-at-arms in the garrisons. This can be seen most clearly in Pont-d’Ouve, where there was only a *maison forte* guarding an passage across the bay, at St Catherine de Rouen, the abbey just outside Rouen, and Conches, a relatively small location.

We can see changes in response to military events, however. Conches assumed greater importance at its recovery in September 1442 after two years in French hands, this being reflected by the appointment of Lord Fauconberg as captain. Harfleur is also a good example. After its capture, it stood as an outpost of English control, its vulnerability revealed by its housing 1,200 men, the largest garrison ever maintained by the English in Normandy. Its captain was therefore the king’s uncle, although through an illegitimate line, Thomas, Beaufort, earl of Dorset (created duke of Exeter in November 1416 for his successful defence of Harfleur in the summer of that year). As Henry V’s conquest advanced and Harfleur was no longer vulnerable, its captaincy descended first to a knight and then to a succession of esquires, as the size of the garrison fell to 160 men[[20]](#footnote-20).

Most peers preferred to serve only now and again rather than committing themselves to long periods in France. Fourteen earls were appointed as garrison captains in Normandy - about 70% of all earls across the period - but only eight had extensive military careers. Only 11 barons, about 35% of the total number over the period, ever held captaincies in Normandy. In this context it is not surprising to see several younger sons seeking a military career. Lord Talbot began his career in this fashion[[21]](#footnote-21). Other examples are Richard Woodville snr and William Neville, Lord Fauconberg. Such younger sons were more likely to seek, or to be placed into, a military career, as too were the illegitimate offspring of peers, such as Sir John Montague, Bastard Salisbury who held a number of garrison commands. Even the Beauforts may have been directed into military activity because of their illegitimate descent from John of Gaunt, duke of Lancaster, which gave them less in the way of landed endowments in England. The long-term commitment required, and also the number of towns and castles which were garrisoned, also helps to explain the reliance which had to be placed on knights and esquires, men who were professional soldiers. Many of these display long careers.

It was men of lower status who tended to develop links with particular places and to be resident in Normandy for longer. A good example is Thomas Reddugh esquire. He became captain of Lisieux in September 1429, serving for seven years. On giving up office he was granted lands in the area. By 1440 we see him as an élu and a bourgeois of the town. But he then rejoined the military administration as lieutenant to the end of the occupation. He is one of many esquires on whom the occupation depended, and who were not only professional soldiers but became integrated into local society.

Lieutenants were rarely promoted to the captaincies of the places they served, although they might be promoted temporarily, as has happened after the death of the duke of Bedford in the garrisons in which he was captain. This was an essentially conservative world, as military worlds often are. We can see this more clearly when considering the social status of those who held office only as a captain of a garrison, those who held both lieutenancies and captaincies, and those who held lieutenancies only (Table 2).

*Table 2. Social status and the tenure of office*

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Holding captaincies only | Holding captaincies and lieutenancies | Holding lieutenancies only |
| bishops | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| dukes | 4 | 0 | 0 |
| earls | 12 | 1 | 0 |
| barons | 9 | 2 | 0 |
| knights | 66 | 42 | 7 |
| esquires | 63 | 38 | 135 |
| total | 156 | 83 | 142 |

It is not surprising to discover that a large proportion of our esquires only ever served as lieutenants. Captains were responsible for the nomination of their lieutenants, and indeed were often given explicit powers to do this. Names of lieutenants occasionally reveal pre-existing family and other connections. For instance, Hugh Stanlowe served as lieutenant to his brother John at Lisieux. However, he also served as lieutenant to Edmund Beaufort, earl of Dorset, at Alençon. Indeed the norm was for the relationship between captain and lieutenant to be based on professional contact rather than clientage. John, Lord Talbot, for instance, did not draw on his closest associates and personal retinue to provide his lieutenants but chose professional soldiers unconnected with him but who happened to be known to him and available at the time[[22]](#footnote-22). We can also detect a group of professional lieutenants who were prepared to serve under a number of captains and in a series of garrisons without any obvious bonds or connections. Their geographical mobility is particularly noticeable, and it can be seen that this was undertaken in search of promotion since it involved moving from smaller to larger and more important garrisons.

It was common in a muster for only the captain and sometimes the lieutenant, to be accorded the status of esquire. This is a contrast with the fourteenth century when every man-at-arms was called esquire. In this respect, therefore, holding a captaincy or lieutenancy contributed to social promotion, but elevation to knighthood was very limited and never accorded simply for garrison command. Despite the intensity of warfare, this period sees a decrease in the number of English knights as a whole. The crown was more scrupulous in its decision to dub knights. Men-at-arms of the status of esquires were just as useful and competent in the military sphere, as is witnessed by the fact that they were by far the most numerically dominant in our sample and provided the bulk of defensive command in Normandy.

Almost all of the men in our sample were English or, if of foreign origin such as the Robessarts who hailed from Hainault or the Dane Andry (later Sir Andrew) Ogard, had chosen to become English through denization. Only three Welshmen held captaincies, two of whom were knights (Sir Richard Guethin and Sir Griffith Don) and one an esquire (Matthew Gough): two further esquires served as lieutenants (Otis Amour and Griffth Ameredy). There was also a small number of Gascon captains, such as Sir Bernard de Montferrant (although he was discharged from his captaincy of St Lô in 1444 as he had been too long absent in Gascony)[[23]](#footnote-23), and the Lansac brothers. Interestingly Mondot de Lansac who was captain of Conches in 1444-5, accepted French allegiance in June 1451, and subsequently served in one of the companies of *grande ordonnance*[[24]](#footnote-24)*.* This again emphasises that these men were first and foremost professional soldiers, of which perhaps the prime example was the Aragonese soldier, Sir Francois de Surienne, who held captaincies at Verneuil, Longny and Montargis as well being involved infamously in the attack on Fougères in 1449 which reopened the war[[25]](#footnote-25). Only Dreux, technically outside Normandy but administered within the duchy’s military structure, regularly had French captains from 1431 to its loss in 1438. At that last point it was surrendered treasonably to the French, along with the neighbouring fortress of Chevreuse, by its captain, Sir Guillaume de Broullart, who continued in office under his new master. This defection also led to the dismissal from the garrison of Pontoise of Sir Guillaume de Bourneville who had served there as a mounted lance from at least 15 May 1430[[26]](#footnote-26). Yet he was never promoted to lieutenant despite his being the only knight in the garrison. English captains did not choose native lieutenants. There were scarcely any Normans who achieved this role. After the reverses of 1435-6 they were no longer trusted. Louis Oursel, who had been lieutenant at Vernon and in command of the Tour de Vernonnet, was booted out as a traitor in May 1436, even though he had served in the garrison for at least six years, having been controller in 1429-30[[27]](#footnote-27).

To large degree, therefore, social and military service remained distinct. However, the need to maintain an occupation over a large geographical area and for an extended period of time generated an increasing reliance on men of lower social status. This contributed to the declining involvement of the peerage, to the greater exclusivity of knighthood, and to the rise of the esquire as a military officer. The overall result was an increase in military professionalization, even though military hierarchies remained intact.

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