Strategic voting with incomplete information
Strategic voting with incomplete information
Classical results in social choice theory on the susceptibility of voting rules to strategic manipulation make the assumption that the manipulator has complete information regarding the preferences of the other voters. In reality, however, voters only have incomplete information, which limits their ability to manipulate. We explore how these limitations affect both the manipulability of voting rules and the dynamics of systems in which voters may repeatedly update their own vote in reaction to the moves made by others. We focus on the Plurality, Veto, κ-approval, Borda, Copeland, and Maximin voting rules, and consider several types of information that are natural in the context of these rules, namely information on the current front-runner, on the scores obtained by each alternative, and on the majority graph induced by the individual preferences.
International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence
Endriss, Ulle
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Obraztsova, Svetlana
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Polukarov, Maria
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Rosenschein, Jeffrey S.
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Endriss, Ulle
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Obraztsova, Svetlana
5a201770-908c-44a8-8e22-62cb16d92bf6
Polukarov, Maria
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Rosenschein, Jeffrey S.
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Endriss, Ulle, Obraztsova, Svetlana, Polukarov, Maria and Rosenschein, Jeffrey S.
(2016)
Strategic voting with incomplete information.
Kambhampati, Subbarao
(ed.)
In Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence.
International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence.
7 pp
.
Record type:
Conference or Workshop Item
(Paper)
Abstract
Classical results in social choice theory on the susceptibility of voting rules to strategic manipulation make the assumption that the manipulator has complete information regarding the preferences of the other voters. In reality, however, voters only have incomplete information, which limits their ability to manipulate. We explore how these limitations affect both the manipulability of voting rules and the dynamics of systems in which voters may repeatedly update their own vote in reaction to the moves made by others. We focus on the Plurality, Veto, κ-approval, Borda, Copeland, and Maximin voting rules, and consider several types of information that are natural in the context of these rules, namely information on the current front-runner, on the scores obtained by each alternative, and on the majority graph induced by the individual preferences.
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EndrissEtAlIJCAI2016.pdf
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Accepted/In Press date: 5 April 2016
e-pub ahead of print date: July 2016
Venue - Dates:
25th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI 2016), New York City, United States, 2016-07-09 - 2016-07-15
Organisations:
Electronics & Computer Science
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 391559
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/391559
PURE UUID: ffe8eabd-9fc8-4d64-b4bc-bef3cde095e5
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Date deposited: 15 Jun 2016 14:50
Last modified: 15 Mar 2024 18:28
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Contributors
Author:
Ulle Endriss
Author:
Svetlana Obraztsova
Author:
Maria Polukarov
Author:
Jeffrey S. Rosenschein
Editor:
Subbarao Kambhampati
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